"CAROL I" NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY
Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies

PROCEEDINGS

INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE
STRATEGIES XXI

THE COMPLEX AND DYNAMIC NATURE OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

ProQuest

Editor
Stan ANTON

November 24-25, 2016
Bucharest – Romania

C O N T E N T S

WHAT KIND OF FUTURE ARE WE PREPARING FOR: *JOINT OPERATING ENVIRONMENT (JOE) 2035*

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Abstract: The paper briefly analyzes an official document made public, in mid-July 2016, by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The document is called Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World and is aimed at offering some recommendations dealing with what the U.S. – and the rest of the Western world, including countries on the Eastern rim on NATO – must do in order to be better prepared for the complex threats, risks and challenges in the foreseeable future. Several major interconnected geo-strategic threats, risks and challenges in the foreseeable future are taken into account and some potentially important windows of opportunity as well. The main aim of this paper is that of depicting some politically and strategically significant consequences of the conceptual-intellectual framework JOE 2035 is so vividly and convincingly presenting.

Keywords: threats, risks, challenges, windows of opportunity, freedom, deterrence, exploring the future, Russia, the Western world.

Introduction

In a brief *Foreword* to the main text we are speaking here about, Vice Admiral Kevin D. Scott, U.S. Navy, the Director for Joint Force Development at the Joint Chiefs of Staff is openly stating *the strategic future of the U.S. – and of the rest of the Western world (and let us seriously take into account Romania is belonging to the West as well, together with other countries on the Eastern rim of NATO) – is both intensely grim and intensely challenging*. He is almost openly predicting[1], for the next few decades, that „looking ahead, competitive behavior between the U.S. and potential – and actual – adversaries will be overt and violent". More than this, Vice Admiral Scott is also openly stating the „interaction" of the United States „with competitors will include attempts to deter and deny us our strategic objectives or be marked by ambiguous, but still coercive pursuit of political goals backed by the threat or potential of applied military power", also adding „over the next two decades, both overt and ambiguous competitive interactions between dissimilar military forces will be a normal and recurrent condition for the Joint Force"[2]. Up to a certain point, *nothing is dramatically and completely new in such an evaluation*. More than 55 years ago, Henry Kissinger was writing to Nixon that the more and more fragmented power distribution on the world arena, plus the intensity of various political activities, and the more and more complex nature of international conflicts and alignments have seriously eroded the ability of both superpowers to significantly

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[1] We are using here this concept in a very cautious way, simply because the text is openly stating it "does not predict the future or attempt to forecast specific scenarios or events", also adding: "Instead, it develops a range of possibilities about future conflict by re-imagining the set of factors and circumstances shaping the future security environment". For these lines see *Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World*, July 14, 2016, at the internet address http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joe/joe_2035_july16.pdf (for the rest of the footnotes, the text will be designated by means of an acronym – *JOE 2035*), p. 1.

[2] Vice Admiral Kevin D. Scott, U.S. Navy, "Foreword", in *JOE 2035*, p. ii.

influence ongoing trends and actions of other governments[3]. In such a context, future looked very grim at that very moment as well.

1. Some basic features of the future: main risks, threats and challenges

The future *Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2035* is speaking about has several major features. The text we are analyzing and commenting here is clearly stating "a range of competitors will" more or less directly "confront the United States and its global partners and interests"[4], within a general context shaped by "twin overarching challenges". The first of them is "contested norms", meaning on the global arena will be present and will act, sometimes using more or less overt and massive military means, "adversaries that credibly challenge the rules and agreements that define the international order". The second of the "twin overarching challenges" the U.S. and America's allies will most probably confronted with is designated in the text by means of using another concept – "persistent disorder", which means "certain adversaries exploiting the inability of societies to provide functioning, stable, and legitimate governance"[5]. The text is also a *warning signal*, stating the answer to the two major challenges already listed above is to be a *balanced* and *very* flexible one. The risks potentially associated to paying too much attention to only one of the "twin overarching challenges" immense: *JOE 2035* is saying "placing too much emphasis on *contested norms* – particularly those high-tech and expensive capabilities to contain or disrupt an expansionist state power – may discount potentially disruptive low-end threats, which have demonstrated a troubling tendency to fester and emerge as surprise or strategic shock for the United States". And dealing with the other major challenge, the text is clearly stating: "conversely, tilting the balance of force development activities towards capabilities designed to counter persistent disorder may risk a world in which other great powers or alliances of great powers decisively shift the international order in highly unfavorable ways"[6].

In such a general context, *a major risk* emerges: "a combination of more capable competitors, more dangerous threats, and greater fiscal uncertainty is likely to make unilateral action by the United States more difficult and potentially less effective in 2035"[7].

2. Basic features of the future: three windows of opportunity to be taken into account

At least some of the threats, risks and challenges already presented in the pages above are, up to a certain point (or do have within their own complex structures), some potentially significant windows of opportunity. And after briefly analyzing the most important ideas in the JOE 2035, it is – we think – very useful to list (and explain, with some details) some of these windows of opportunity directly associated with the risks, threats and challenges , and also to deliver later on, in the final lines of the text, some *policy recommendations*.

The first significant window of opportunity is, up to a certain point, a set of features strongly connected to the very existence of competitors (or foes) of both the U.S. and, in more general terms, of the Western world (and let us remember *Romania clearly is a part of this Western world*, by means of several strong ties: a significant part of the political, cultural and military traditions; a significant part of the modern and contemporary fundamental political values; significant elements of the national interest; NATO membership; EU membership

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[3] Robert Kagan, *Lumea clădită de America*, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2015, p. 135.
[4] *JOE 2035*, p. ii.
[5] *Ibidem*, p. ii.
[6] For this direct warning, see *JOE 2035*, p. iii.
[7] *JOE 2035*, p. 5.

and the strategic partnership with the United States). To offer a very simple explanation, the existence of competitors and / or foes is a threat (or at least a risk): but if these competitors have a lot of vulnerabilities they are neither able nor willing to properly solve, this might be a significant window of opportunity. *And several of the political actors on the world arena openly challenging both the power status of the U.S. and the allies and alliances Washington, DC is relying on do have massive, strategically significant – and sometimes perennial – structural vulnerabilities. JOE 2035* is openly speaking about the very identity of some of these possible / probable competitors the West might be forced to confront. They are, according to some lines in the text we are quoting here from, *Russia*, a country which "will continue to use the threat of military power to secure regional interests and promote perceptions that it is still a great power", *Iran*, which "will continue to develop and leverage regional proxies and partners", and *China*, an immense country which "might develop a more dynamic and adaptive maritime stratagem in an attempt to impose irreversible outcomes for island disputes in the East and South China Seas"[8]. Or, in other list, the "rising powers including for example, China, Russia, India, Iran, or Brazil", which "have increasingly expressed dissatisfaction with their roles, access, and authorities within the current international system"[9] (China, Russia and Iran are a common denominator of both lists). *Russia* clearly has some major strategic vulnerabilities (or at least weaknesses): without Ukraine, it is not any more an *European* power[10] (what the U.S. and NATO *might* do if Brzezinski is right – and he is! – it is not very difficult to understand); and its economy (vital for maintaining the pace of neo-imperial ambitions) is based mainly on exporting oil and gas; and the size of its population is simply collapsing (some recent work are indicating until 2050, Russia's population is going to grown significantly smaller – from 141 million people to only 111 million[11]). *China*, a country too large to be ignored and too ambitious to be trusted[12], has a lot of more or less intensely dysfunctional domestic contradictions[13], is forced to massively rely on imports (according to the CIA's *World Factbook*, the country is buying a lot of oil from abroad: "6.167 million bbl/day (2014 est.)", and a lot of natural gas: "59.7 billion cu m (2014 est.)"[14], and its exaggerate claims and overt expansionist policies in the South China Sea are so strongly alienating most of the other regional powers, that even Vietnam, for some decades in open collision with the U.S., is almost officially stating now the power of the U.S. is both useful and necessary for the global security[15]; China is also less modern, technologically, than the U.S. and in more general terms than the West (along the past few decades, rulers in Beijing did a lot to put and end to the gap separating China and the technologically advanced West, but the gap, even if much smaller, is still present[16])

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[8] *JOE 2035*, p. 7.

[9] *JOE 2035*, p. 8.

[10] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Marea tablă de şah: Supremaţia americană şi imperativele sale geostrategice*, Univers Enciclopedic, Bucureşti, 2000, pp. 54, 59.

[11] Robert D. Kaplan, *Răzbunarea geografiei: ce ne spune harta despre confflictele viitoare şi lupta împotriva destinului*, Ed. Litera, Bucureşti, 2014, p. 244.

[12] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Triada geostrategică: Convieţuirea cu China, Europa, Rusia*, Ed. Historia, Bucureşti, 2006, p. 19.

[13] *Ibidem*, pp. 21-24.

[14] ***, "Energy", in "China", in *The World Factbook*, at the internet address https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html.

[15] Robert D. Kaplan, *Butoiul de pulbere al Asiei: Marea Chinei de Sud şi sfârşitul stabilităţii în Pacific*, Ed. Litera, Bucureşti, 2016, pp. 79-81.

[16] For the magnitude of this technological and scientific gap 40 years ago see Deng Xiaoping, „Să manifestăm respect faţă de însuşirea cunoştinţelor şi faţă de oamenii instruiţi. Extrase dintr-o convorbire cu doi membri ai Comitetului Central al partidului, 24 mai 1977", in Deng Xiaoping, *Opere alese 1975-1984*, Editura Politică, Bucureşti, 1987, p. 34.

Migration might also be, up to a certain point, not only a major challenge and security threat, but an immense window of opportunity as well. JOE 2035 is openly stating, speaking about mass migration, "the mixing of new people, ideas, culture, and ideologies can result in unrest and conflict between those moving in and native citizens", also adding "many receiving nations will be incapable of integrating new immigrants, which might lead to disenfranchised, insular immigrant communities"[17]. Cultural identity clashes, and problems in integrating migrants are real and major risks, we have to admit. But let us not forget *in some significant occasions, along the world history, immigration was, in the end, a major source – and engine – of political power[18] and development*. At least two examples are to be seriously taken into account: that of the United States, mainly in the 19th century and in the opening stages of the 20th; and the revival of West Germany in the 1970s. The 13 British colonies which were to become the United States had, at about 1750, broadly 2 million inhabitants (a total population of almost the same size as the demographic resources of Holland and Sweden. At 1800, after two generations, the population in the U.S. was two times larger – 4 million people[19]. And almost one century later, the same country had a total population of 62.6 million people in 1890, and 75.9 million in 1900[20] (when the average pace of demographic growth at global level was a 100% increase per century, the population of the U.S. had increased 19 times in 100 years – the domestic growth was impressive, but between 20 and 40 million immigrants came in the 19th century to the U.S.). And in the case of West Germany, the situation is also clearly proving *well-managed immigration is a major source of power*. An online text dealing with changing patterns of immigration to Germany between 1945 and 1997 was reporting, some years ago, "in the past fifty years… West Germany has been one of the countries receiving the highest number of immigrants in the world. In 1950 some 8 million of the 50 million inhabitants of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) were postwar refugees and expellees (Vertriebene). Since then, West Germany's population has increased by 16 million (to 66 million in 1994)", also adding "some 80 percent of this increase can be explained by net migration gains (12.9 million between 1950 and 1994)". It's true, many of these immigrants coming to Germany were Germans from different European countries. But, the same text is stating, "the total number of foreigners in Germany" was also large, along several decades: "around 1.2 million in 1964 (2 percent of the total population). By 1970 the number of foreigners had reached 3 million (5 percent of the total population). And in 1973 employment of so-called guest workers reached its peak: 2.6 million, or 12 percent of all gainfully employed people in West Germany. Labor migrants from Turkey (605,000), Yugoslavia (535,000), and Italy (450,000) constituted the largest groups, and a total of almost 4 million foreigners lived in West Germany (7 percent of total population)"; the text is also adding "from 1968 to 1973, more foreigners than ever came to West Germany. Every day some five hundred to a thousand new guest workers were recruited, bringing the surplus of foreign immigrants to 387,000 a year. Sometimes trains and planes had to be chartered in order to bring enough additional workers into the country. The foreign population grew from 1.9 to 4.0 million, and the number of foreign workers and employees increased from 1.1 million to its historical peak of 2.6 million"[21].

Quite clearly, in our *professional* opinion, one of the most important windows of opportunity along the next few decades is a basic feature of human societies anytime, anywhere: that of *reacting to stimuli, within of a logic which is very easy to understand: the stronger the stimuli are, the more powerful the reaction usually is*. This very logic is, as far as

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[17] *JOE 2035*, pp. 10-11.

[18] For us, the meaning of power is that clearly stated by several major Realist authors – see, for example, the definition of power in Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politica între naţiuni: Lupta pentru putere şi lupta pentru pace*, Editura Polirom, Iaşi, Bucureşti, 2007, p. 68.

[19] Paul Kennedy, *Ascensiunea şi decăderea marilor puteri:transformări economice şi conflicte militare din 1500 până în 2000*, Polirom, Iaşi, 2011, p. 109 (tabel 3).

[20] *Ibidem,* p. 191 (table 12).

[21] Rainer Münz and Ralf E. Ulrich, "Changing Patterns of Immigration to Germany, 1945-1997", *Research & Seminars*, at the internet address https://migration.ucdavis.edu/rs/more.php?id=69.

can understand, fully operational when we are speaking about threats and conflicts of any nature and magnitude[22]. At least a part – or share – of this window of opportunity political leaders in the Western (and democratic) world might, sooner or later, take much (or, better said, *more*) care of is *the very nature of the liberal mind (in the broadest sense of this concept; we are not speaking here about the strictly political liberalism, but about the clearly larger political culture developed around it, and about the intellectual liberalism and some of its public consequences*[23]*)*.

On several undeniable occasions, along the past few centuries, liberal values – and the desire to protect freedom / liberty[24]*, both at domestic (or intra-state) level or on the international arena – have pushed both individuals and groups (some of them small, but others clearly large) to freely involve themselves in voluntary efforts against political actors threatening or harming the very idea of freedom and justice*. See, for example, the notorious example offered by Lord Byron. The Greek War of Independence started in early 1821, and a few months later, in May, Byron "was elected to the London Greek Committee, recently formed to aid the struggling insurgents". In July, Byron "made good on his offer of personal assistance to the patriots by sailing from Genoa on 16 July, bound for Leghorn and Greece". According to what we know, he carried with him "a considerable sum of money and medical supplies for the Greek cause". After landing in a British de facto possession in the Ionian Sea, "in November [1823] Byron agreed to loan four thousand pounds to the Greek fleet for its activation" and a few months later, "in January 1824 he joined the moderate leader Prince Alexander Mavrokordátos on the mainland in swampy Missolonghi". Here, "wearing his red military uniform, Byron was enthusiastically welcomed by shouts, salutes, and salvos, and hailed as a 'Messiah'. On the eve of his birthday, he turned once more to poetry to express his inner feelings on his life and the principles of freedom; the ten stanzas of 'On This Day I Complete My Thirty-Sixth Year' constitute one of his last poems". We know, with many details, that "over the next three and one-half months, all occasions – military, political, physical, climatic… – seemed to conspire against him: his leadership of a planned attack on the Turkish stronghold at Lepanto was postponed for lack of soldiers; factions still prevented a unified war effort; his constitution, weakened by years of dieting to combat congenital portliness, deteriorated under the constant strain and the cold winter rains in Missolonghi", but he did not abandon the cause of the Greek freedom. On the contrary, "despite uncertainty and reverses, he continued to commit money and energy to Mavrokordátos and the Greek cause". Some months later, "on April 9, having been soaked by a heavy rain while out riding, Byron suffered fever and rheumatic pains", and "by the twelfth he was seriously ill. Repeated bleedings, which he initially resisted, further debilitated him. On Easter Sunday, he entered a comatose state. At six o'clock on the evening of Easter Monday, 19 April 1824, during a violent electrical storm, Byron died". It is important to remember how significant the consequences of his personal involvement in the Greek War for Independence have been after

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[22] A notorious, very robust and very influential work dealing with conflict is openly stating "the continued existence of a… group may be threatened by other groups, and these threats are often met by aggressive or defensive action" – see Anatol Rapoport, *Conflict in Man-Made Environment*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Baltimore, Victoria, 1974, p. 224.

[23] Dealing with the nature, place and role of freedom (or liberty) within the liberal system of values, a recent political thought encyclopedia is stating "no one can deny freedom is something good", but a lot of contradictory opinions exist, when we are speaking about the "nature of freedom" – see David Miller (coordinator), *Enciclopedia Blackwell a gândirii politice*, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2000, pp. 438-439. The same work is also openly stating there is no analysis of the nature and real value of freedom „to be universally accepted" – p. 438.

[24] For the Romanian reader, one of the most condensed – but very serious – surveys of the meaning of freedom / liberty is to be found in Cristian Preda, *Mic dicţionar de gândire politică liberală*, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 68. This brief presentation is listing two main questions, each of them really vital for shaping intellectual liberalism: Which are the obstacles I am confronted with?, and Who is the master, who is in control?

his death: "His death proved effective in uniting Greece against the enemy and in eliciting support for its struggle from all parts of the civilized world. In October 1827 British, French, and Russian forces destroyed the Turkish and Egyptian fleets at Navarino, assuring Greek independence, which was acknowledged by the sultan in 1829". We also know, from an online biography, that "his spirit animated liberal revolutionary movements: most of the officers executed following the unsuccessful 1825 Decembrist uprising in Russia were Byronists; the Italian patriot Giuseppe Mazzini associated Byron with the eternal struggle of the oppressed to be free. Shelley, Heine, and others adopted Byron's open-necked shirt, which he wears in Thomas Phillips's striking 1814 painting"[25].

Another one is that offered, in the 1930s, by the International Brigades which have valiantly fought, in Spain, against the well armed and professionally led forces of General Franco and his Italian and German allies. And I am not speaking here about that part of the International Brigades made up of Communists, clearly more or less directly mobilized by the Soviet Union, or as a consequence of Soviet initiatives (Antony Beevor is openly stating some 50 % of the British volunteers were Communists, but the rest *were not* – they were either "middle-class intellectuals and ideological Beau Gestes" or "manual workers", or individuals "who went to Spain partly in search of excitement", and even some "White Russians, hoping that service with the Brigades would allow them to return home[26]. When the Kremlin finally decided to organize a massive 'campaign of support in the struggle of the Spanish people' (on September 18, 1936, almost one month and a half after the first resolution dealing with the same issue, adopted by the Komintern on August 3), "in Spain there were already several hundred foreign volunteers". In the end, "during the course of the whole civil war between 32,000 and 35,000 men from 53 different countries served in the ranks of the International Brigades", and some other "5,000 foreigners served outside" them, "mostly attached to the CNT[27] or the POUM[28]"[29].

We strongly underline here that on some occasions, the average individual offered help to the Spanish Republic even if he was not directly involved in military operations. Antony Beevor is reporting, in his so well documented and quite recent volume on the Spanish Civil War, early fights "on the Puntza ridge to the south of Irun" have involved not only "untrained workers", plus "Asturians, Basque nationalists and French Communist volunteers", but also "French peasants from just across the border signaling the positions" of the Nationalist artillery[30].

A more recent example, also in the 1930s, is offered by the quite large number of volunteers who wished to fight (and some of them have bravely did this) along the Finns, against the obviously morally and politically completely unacceptable Soviet invasion in late 1939 and early 1940. Carl Gustaf Emil Manerheim is openly stating his country gladly received a lot of foreign *voluntary* help. In February 1940, for example, a Swedish corps of volunteers with 8,000 soldiers was already present in Finland. From Norway came 725 volunteers, and a Danish battalion, with 800 soldiers was also present in Finland. In the final stages of the so difficult Winter War, a Foreign Legion called Sisu, was organized, grouping contingents coming from 26 foreign nations. Mannerheim is also writing about a Finnish-American legion with 300 volunteers which been actively involved in some combat

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[25] For all these elements see ***, "Lord Byron (George Gordon) 1788-1824", on the webpage of the *Poetry Foundation*, at the internet address https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems-and-poets/poets/detail/lord-byron.

[26] Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War 1936-1939*, Phoenix (Orion Books), London, 2007, pp. 177-179.

[27] Confederación Nacional de Trabajo, a major trade union in Spain.

[28] Partit Obrer d'Unificació Marxista, a political party grouping Communists who had followed Trotsky, established in Catalunya / Catalonia in 1935.

[29] Antony Beevor, *op. cit.*, pp. 176-177.

[30] *Ibidem*, pp. 129-130.

operations, and is reporting the total number of foreign volunteers who came by their free will to fight for the freedom of Finland has been roughly 11,500 people[31].

Even more recently, on the occasion of the hybrid war Russia has suddenly unleashed against Ukraine, in 2014, *large 100 % volunteer forces have played a very significant role in defending the very existence of the Ukrainian state*. In 2014, in June, a few moths after the very heavy fighting in Eastern Ukraine, the Interior Minister in Kiev was publicly stating some 30 volunteer battalions have already been formed, with 5,600 combatants, and 3,000 of them were already serving in directly threatened regions. Almost one year later, in late March and April 2015, according to several open sources and some data offered by the Ukrainian government, almost 50,000 troops were deployed in the conflict areas in the Eastern part of the country, and about 11,000 (or 22%, which is not at all a percentage we can ignore) were soldier belonging to volunteer battalions[32].

3. Very brief conclusions and some policy recommendations

European states, both large and small (including the basically *minor powers*[33] on the Eastern border of NATO, now enjoying a *special* relationship with the United States), will have to adapt themselves to the changes, challenges, threats and risks *JOE 2035* is speaking about. *Some reactions to very probable (or maybe imminent) future realities listed and analyzed by JOE 2035 are both possible and, according to our professional opinion, desirable; above all, a resolute and skillful use of various windows of opportunity (including, possibly, the three already listed and commented above) might be almost compulsory in order to maintain the global balance of power, and in order to deter (and maybe contain) the main probable aggressors*:

1. *Maintaining, consolidating and possibly seriously expanding NATO*, in order to avoid *any* situation in which the Alliance is not strong enough to cope with threats, risks and challenges ahead. As far as we are concerned, NATO is very important for *both* the U.S. (which, beyond the legitimate frustration generated by the notorious 'capability gap', can rely a lot on its European partners, as wars in the Gulf and in Afghanistan have clearly proved along the past decades), and the European states (which joined NATO in order to balance the very significant power of the Kremlin and now, in the post-Crimea context, feel themselves threatened again, exactly like in the late 1940s, by Russia)

2. Using both already existent structures and institutions, and – in case of need – newly designed *innovative* ones *to consolidate public awareness in the area of national, regional / continental and hemispheric vital interests, security and defense issues*.

3. Using the same structures and institutions in order *to forge – and start using – a new individual and collective ethos in the Western world: the idea that freedom is not to be abandoned, and that – in case of need – fighting for it is a must might naturally be the backbone of this reinforced ethos with serious roots in the past few centuries, both in Europe, and in the United States*.

4. *Strongly enhancing relatively cheap and effective instruments for strategic deterrence* – confronted with the massive resurgence of Russian neo-imperial ambitions and strategically aggressive actions, at least the minor actors on the Eastern border of NATO

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[31] Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, Mareşalul Finlandei *Memorii*, Ed. Militară, Bucureşti, 2003, pp. 214-215

[32] For these data see Florin Diaconu, "Three Lessons to Massively and Openly Learn From: on Political and Analytical Errors, Deterrence, and Popular reactions", in Niculae Iancu, Andrei Fortuna, Cristian Barna, and Mihaela Teodor (editors), *Countering Hybrid Threats: Lessons Learned from Ukraine*, IOS Press, Amsterdam, Berlin, Washington, DC (in cooperation with NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division), pp. 110.

[33] This category is grouping *both* what we usually call medium-sized powers and the small powers – see Martin Wight, *Politica de putere*, Ed. Arc, Chişinău, 1998, pp. 69-75.

might feel the need to establish, expand, train and rely on structures resembling, up to a certain point, what we are usually calling *National Guard* (which obviously has to be a 100 % volunteer force, mainly able to actively defend the village or township, or county / district where the members of a unit are residing and working).

5. *Dealing with some challenges and risks the West is confronted with in a way maximizing the associated windows of opportunity*. See, for example, the problem of mass migration. *As long as most of the Western societies are severely confronted with negative demographic growth, enhancing national and regional power by means of deliberately boosting, orienting and controlling migration might be a significant source of extra power (at least in terms of industrial output)*.

6. In the long run, vulnerabilities of the main competitors / foes the West (including the U.S., with its global role and global interests) is confronted with are to be properly used, mainly in order to deter aggressive behavior of those actors (for example, please do imagine, for a moment, the sudden collapse of the Russian neo-imperial assertiveness *if* countries in Central and Eastern Europe could manage to massively reorient themselves to other sources of energy than Russian oil and gas; in such a situation, relying too much, economically and strategically, on exports and their value as a political lever might become a frightening nightmare for the expansionist Russian leaders and their plans).

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HOW TO TURN AMERICAN MISSILES INTO RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA BULLETS? THE AMERICAN ANTI-MISSILE SHIELD FROM DEVESELU

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Abstract: While in Romania held the commissioning of one of the elements of the NATO's antiballistic defensive shield, the propaganda machine of the Kremlin was trying to impose the idea that the capabilities installed at Deveselu by US and NATO have an offensive end, threatening the Russian Federation security. The present study is aimed at identifying the design of the informational campaign for the inauguration of the Aegis Ashore system in Roma that Russian Federation used to push its own political and military agenda in order to provide a geopolitical alternative to Atlanticism and the US domination. Media analysis show that the techniques and instruments used in the Russian propaganda campaign are dosed in such a manner that they may deem Deveselu as one of the greatest American military threat at the border of the Russian Federation. In this context, the Deveselu argument, once included in a negative psychological, emotional and aspirational horizon, can be frequently used by the Kremlin for the mobilisation of foreign and domestic publics against US and NATO.

Keywords: propaganda, informational war, anti-missiles shield, Deveselu, Putin, NATO, USA.

Introduction

The commissioning of the antiballistic defense system in Deveselu stimulated the Kremlin's anti-American ideological effervescence to the extent that Vladimir Putin himself, from the height of his geopolitical targets, tried to turn US missiles into „Russian propaganda bullets". Even though, in 2016 there were a number of military movements on the border between NATO and Russia that were significant to both parties, the Russian propaganda machine has braught up the issue of the antiballistic shield from Romania whenever it came to „hard power" threats that are hanging over Russia.

Relations between NATO and Russia have deteriorated significantly in recent years. The reasons are being attributed to the Russian Federation's actions that contradict the interests of the EU and the US: the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation in 2014; maintaining the war in the breakaway regions of Eastern Ukraine; helping the Assad regime in Syria; the systematic violation of NATO's airspace; supporting far-right movements in EU states, and the attempts at destabiling the consensus in the EU; the Russian propaganda machine creates chaos and mistrust in many states, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. Damage to these relations has manifested dramaticaly at a diplomatic level, with the EU imposing economic sanctions on Russia, Russia leaving the G8 and the decreased level of importance of the discussions of the NATO – Rusia Council.

For the first time at a NATO summit - in Warsaw (July 2016), when discussing security chalanges and threats to NATO, Russia was the first nominee, even before ISIS. Paragraph 5 of the Joint Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the North Atlantic Council meeting in Warsaw, from 8 to 9 July 2016, stated: "Russia's aggressive actions, including provocative military activities in the periphery of

NATO territory and its demonstrated willingness to attain political goals by the threat and use of force, are a source of regional instability, fundamentally challenge the Alliance, have damaged Euro-Atlantic security, and threaten our long-standing goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace." Paragraph 10 from the same document details the threats: "Russia's destabilizing actions and policies include: the ongoing illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea, which we do not and will not recognize and which we call on Russia to reverse; the violation of sovereign borders by force; the deliberate destabilization of eastern Ukraine; large-scale snap exercises contrary to the spirit of the Vienna Document, and provocative military activities near NATO borders, including in the Baltic and Black Sea regions and the Eastern Mediterranean; its irresponsible and aggressive nuclear rhetoric, military concept and underlying posture; and its repeated violations of NATO Allied airspace. In addition, Russia's military intervention, significant military presence and support for the regime in Syria, and its use of its military presence in the Black Sea to project power into the Eastern Mediterranean have posed further risks and challenges for the security of Allies and others."[1]

The joint Declaration in Warsaw may be a sign that NATO officials have understood the point that countries in Eastern Europe, especially the Baltic countries, have been trying to make when it came to Russian threats. In this context, NATO has strengthened its presence on the Russian border by stationing troops and weapons.

NATO's actions in response to Russian threats may be comprehensive enough to make them forget about Deveselu. Despite this, the Kremlin Propaganda machine, has increased its efforts in painting the Deveselu antiballistic shield, inaugurated in May 2016, as being the largest military threat at the gate of the Russian border.

The General Secretary of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, when he attended the inauguration of the shield at Deveselu on May 12, 2016 stated that "The threat to NATO allies, represented by ballistic missiles coming from outside the Euro-Atlantic area is real. Many countries, including some neighboring NATO seek to develop ballistic missiles or to obtain them. Our program is a long term investment against a long-term threat. We must be prepared and make steady progress. As the name suggests, the system is purely defensive. This site in Romania, like the one in Poland, is not directed against Russia. There are too few interceptors, locate too south or too close to Russia to intercept their intercontinental ballistic missiles[2]." In reply, the very next day, the President of the Russian Federation deemed the antiballistic shield located in Romania as a threat to his country, and announced that Russia will take defensive actions: "The geopolitical situation is not changing for the better. Unfortunately, it is getting worse, considering the installation of American antiballistic elements in Romania ... The installation of antiballistic systems in Europe represents an additional threat to Russia[3]". Two weeks later, Vladimir Putin reminded Romania and Poland that they are in range of Russian missiles: "If yesterday, in these regions in Romania, people simply did not know what it means to be in range (of ballistic missiles), today we are forced to take certain steps to ensure our security," he said in Athens. "The same can be said for Poland [4]", the Russian leader added.

Romania's participation in the development of the European component of the American antiballistic defense system has been decided by the National Defense Supreme Council on February 4th 2010 and the construction of the capability started at Base 99

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[1] https://www.mae.ro/node/36635
[2] http://www.gandul.info/stiri/scutul-antiracheta-de-la-deveselu-a-fost-inaugurat-cum-functioneaza-15311151, accesat la 01.09.2016
[3] http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/vladimir-putin-sistemul-antiracheta-din-romania-o-amenintare-rusia-va-lua-masuri-de-aparare-15319691, accesat la 01.09.2016
[4] http://www.agerpres.ro/externe/2016/05/28/putin-avertizeaza-romania-si-polonia-ca-se-afla-in-raza-de-actiune-a-rachetelor-ruse-07-27-44, accesat la 01.09.2016

Deveselu in 2013. Its components have been operational since 2015 and the integration with NATO's antiballistic centralized defense system has been attested since May 2016. The Deveselu Base hosts three batteries, containing 24 SM-3 interceptor missiles, and a radar system meant to guide them.

The American missile defense system is comprised of both terrestrial (fixed and mobile) and maritime interceptors that can fire projectiles meant to intercept short, medium and long ranged missiles before they can reach the US. The west coast of the USA hosts at least 13 land-based interceptor systems, at Fort Greely (Alaska) and Vandenberg (California). There will be a total of 44 interceptor missile ramps in the western US before 2017.

The Aegis system that is installed on Navy ships and platforms, has the role of intercepting short to medium range missiles. Currently, there are at least 24 Aegis systems installed on American Navy ships, most of them patrolling the Pacific Ocean. The Aegis systems will be used in a plan to create a NATO anti-missile shield in Europe meant to counteract the threats posed by countries like Iran. Deveselu (Romania) hosts a ground based Aegis system (Aegis Ashore), and a similar installation will be placed in Poland. Another component of the anti-ballistic defense system, is a mobile terrestrial high-altitude system called THAAD that is installed on military trucks[5], according to Reuters quoted by Hotnews.

1. Informational warfare and the geopolitical stakes of the Russian Federation

In recent years, the Russian Federation has had several victories waging hybrid wars that used information warfare components – as a first phase, and afterwards, traditional forces as support. It is said that the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation is the result of an asymmetric hybrid war, waged in close proximity to Romania, in which information campaigns were conducted in perfect sync with cyber warfare and the assault of special operations forces that were trained particularly for this type confrontations[6]. But the Russian Federation's first real success in applying this postmodern conflict model was won in 2008, in the war in Georgia.

The contemporary Russian state views information from a geopolitical standpoint and treats it as a dangerous weapon that does not cost much, that can be easily transmitted and received and has the ability to overcome any barriers. In contemporary Russian geopolitical theories, information and network battles, just like their more extreme forms, such as psychological and cyber warfare, are means used by states to achieve their international, regional and internal goals, and to obtain geopolitical advantages[7].

Theories on information warfare have a long tradition in Russia. For example, the theory of special propaganda ("spetspropaganda"), was taught at the Military Institute of Foreign Languages in Moscow in 1942, was removed from the curriculum of the institution in 1990 and was later reintroduced in 2000. In 2000, once the Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation was approved, information warfare was deemed a field of academic study. Information warfare is regarded by the Russian academic world as a multidisciplinary applied sciences (politics, economics, social sciences, military, intelligence, diplomacy, propaganda, psychology, communication, technology, etc.[8]).

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[5]http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-20518493-armata-sua-8-state-aliate-efectuat-marti-test-sistemului-antiracheta-europa.htm, accesat la 01.09.2016
[6] Luminiţa Kohalmi, *Comunicare publică în domeniul securităţii*, Editura Pro Universitaria, Bucureşti, 2014, p. 117.
[7] *Ibidem*, p. 118.
[8] *Ibidem*, p. 120.

Russian Vladimir Lefebvre is a legend in the field of information warfare. He is the inventor of the reflexive control concept, used to serve a partner or an enemy information that will influence him to make a decision or follow a predetermined course of action. It is rumored that the character and personality of the Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, have made him a target of a reflexive control operation, during the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. Other information warfare actions that the Russians have made in the region were a cyber-attack on Estonia in 2007, and a proactive campaign made to discredit the idea that Lithuanians or Latvians have their own national identities[9].

The Russian theory on geopolitical information warfare was somewhat built in opposition with the technological information warfare theory, developed by the US and Western Europe. This is why, expressions like "information war", "network war" or "cyber war" have completely different meanings in Russia in comparison to the West. Few Russian theorists distinguish between cyber war and network war, as manifestations of technological and social dimensions of the fourth generation war.

Information warfare is defined as "creating alternative realities by perverting the objective truth - based on concrete data, facts and arguments - twisting it by using a pre-selected combination of elements, facts and pieces of truth, that are interpreted and combined with altered reasoning based on syllogisms, sophistry, propaganda, forced interpretation, all stuffed with a variety of lies.[10]".

In Russia, information warfare is defined as "influencing the consciousness of the masses as part of the rivalry between different civilizations systems, adopted by different countries in the information space by using specific methods aimed at using information resources as weapons[11]". It is clear that there is a mixture of civilian and military, technological and social dimensions, in a context that makes direct references to the Cold War and the psychological warfare between East and West.

The phrase "information warfare" seems to be used in Russian theory and practice in two situations: a series of obligations resulting from the Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation and as a geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the West (US, NATO, EU etc.), with ideological and cultural coordinates. As can be noted, the technological dimension of the information warfare is minimized and excluded from the public sphere.

2. The anti missile shield from Deveselu – A theme in Russia's antiamerican propaganda arsenal

The Russian informational campaign with regards to Deveselu, was focused on a narrative meant for an international audience, focused on Central and Eastern Europe, supported by the Russian government. It was aimed mainly at the following directions: nuclear threats – the placement of the antiballistic shield in Romania is portrayed as a "flagrant violation" of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty by the US; the division of the West – Romanians may become potentially innocent targets of Russian missiles, if Russia had to defend itself from NATO and US threats; Russia's victimization – the antiballistic system developed by NATO and the US in Romania and Poland is a direct threat to Russia's security.

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[9] *Ibidem*, p. 121.
[10] Iulian Chifu, Oazu Nantoi, *Război informaţional. Tipizarea modelului agresiunii,* Editura Institutului de Ştiinţe Politice şi Relaţii Internaţionale Ion I.C. Brătianu al Academiei Române, Bucureşti, 2016, pag. 6
[11]http://understandingwar.org/sitweaponses/default/files/Russian%20Report%201%20Putin's%20Information%20Warfare%20in%20Ukraine-%20Soviet%20Origins%20of%20Russias%20Hybrid%20Warfare.pdf, accesat la 01.09.2016

The theme has become increasingly hotter when the term for commissioning of the antiballistic system at Deveselu was close, the campaign reaching its peak immediately after the base became operational. Despite NATO deploying troops and weaponry in Eastern Europe, on its's boarders with Russia, Vladimir Putin has managed to portray the antiballistic shield from Deveselu as being the main "hard power" threat to Russia's borders, in the context of the struggle between two civilizations: the neoconservative post liberal Eurasian and the US-led neoliberal Atlantic civilization.

There have been several Russian spokespersons with regards to Deveselu, most of them raking Russian officials. Mihail Ulianov, the head of the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, said in 2014 that the placement of the anti-missile shield in Europe is a "serious violation[12]" of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). Mihail Vanin, in an interview for Jyllands-Posten in March 2015, said that "If Denmark will join the missile defense system, which is controlled by the United States, Danish military ships will be targets of Russian nuclear missiles. It is important that they know this[13]".

The Russian Security Council (the equivalent of CSAT), quoted by Interfax decreed in June 2015 that Romania and Poland "automatically become potential targets" for Russia, because they host elements of the American antiballistic shield. The Security Council claims that the antiballistic shield is aimed against strategic Russian arsenal, although, the US, NATO and the countries hosting the American antiballistic shield (Romania and Poland) have given assurances that the facility is not aimed against Russian military capabilities. Evgheni Lukianov, the secretary of the Russian Security Council said for Interfax, with regards to Romania and Poland "If they want to be our targets, that's their choice[14]".

In 2015 Deputy Minister Serghei Ryabkov for the Russian Foreign Ministry, quoted by Reuters[15] said that Russia sees no reason why the United States continues to implement the construction of antiballistic capabilities in Europe, after signing the nuclear agreement with Iran in July. In 2015 Serghei Karakaiev, the commander of the Russian Strategic Missiles Forces, quoted by Reuters, said that Russian missiles have the ability to penetrate the antiballistic system built by the United States. Karakaiev also said for RIA Novosti[16] that "Experts estimate that based on its abilities to analyze data, and its fire power the American antiballistic defense system, as is now, is unable to withstand a massive Russian attack"

The Russian Foreign Ministry announced in April 2016 that Moscow is "extremely concerned" by the installation of antiballistic NATO capabilities in Romania and Poland, which are prohibited by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), and warned that Russia will take defensive actions, according to Sputnik agency, quoted by Mediafax. Just before the Deveselu anti-missile shield was operational, Russian foreign Minister, said "We are extremely concerned with the American antiballistic system that is currently installed in Romania, and will be installed in Poland, since they are prohibited by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF)".

The president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin is the main spokesperson in matters regarding Deveselu since he has access to all Russian and international news

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[12] http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-18272091-rusia-instalarea-sistemelor-antiracheta-europa-incalca-tratatul-fortelor-nucleare-intermediare.htm, accesat la 01.09.2016

[13] http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-19703430-ambasador-rus-toate-tarile-care-vor-inscrie-sistemul-antiracheta-nato-vor-tinte-ale-rusiei.htm, accesat la 01.09.2016

[14] http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-20253526-rusia-romania-polonia-devin-automat-tinte-potentiale-prin-gazduirea-scutului-anti-racheta.htm, accesat la 01.09.2016

[15] http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-russia_report-20356380-rusia-dupa-incheierea-acordului-nuclear-iranul-sua-nu-mai-niciun-motiv-construiasca-scutul-antiracheta-europa.htm, accesat la 01.09.2016

[16] http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-russia_report-20671222-rusia-sustine-poate-trece-scutul-antiracheta-american.htm, accesat la 01.09.2016

channels, thus confirming the importance of the topic when it comes to Russian information warfare. According to the Russian press agency TASS, quoted by Agerpress[17], in June 2016, the Russian president believed that the antiballistic capability in Europe can be turned into an offensive system that can be used against Russia and that the construction of the capability is based on an Iranian nuclear threat that "does not exist". The Russian President, at a meeting with international press agencies in Sankt Petersburg said "The threats (nuclear threats from Iran) do not exist and that means that I was right when I said that they are lying to us when they base the construction of the antiballistic missile system in Europe as a response to an Iran nuclear threat. Indeed once again tried to deceive us". Putin also said "We know how long it will take the Americans to have a new missile, that will have more than 500 km range, and in that moment, they will threaten our nuclear capabilities. We have known this for years. And they know that we know." The Russian leader also noted that the US "despite all our objections and proposals for real cooperation, they do now wish to work with us, and they reject all our proposals and act according to their plan". Putin also said "You can choose to believe me or not, but we have offered concrete forms of cooperation, and they have all been rejected". The Russian president also noted that antiballistic NATO systems have been built in Romania. "They have always spoken about why. We have to defend ourselves against Iranian nuclear threats. Where is the Iranian nuclear threat? It does not exist", Putin said.

A few days after the Deveselu system became operational, the main Russian public television network "Rossia 1" aired a documentary called "The European trap", in a show called "Special correspondent", 10 minutes of which have been dedicated to our country. Starting from the western orientation of Ukraine, the documentary shows the "miserable situation" in which, countries that have chosen the same path have gotten in: Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, and Bulgaria. The author, Alexandr Rogatkin, one of the more active reporters of the Kremlin's propaganda apparatus[18], filmed the movie at Deveselu, and focused on the townsman's poverty. He found two people that said that "it was better before", and that entering the EU has brought no benefits to the town from Olt County. Others images were filmed in a poor neighborhood, on the outskirts of Bucharest, "two minutes away from the city center", where people complained about being "marginalized". Russian journalists show exhaust fumes from heating plants and garbage thrown on the streets, as proof that orientation towards the West has not helped Romania. They took statements of a man with a Bluetooth ear-piece, that complained that he has no money to pay the electricity bill, and another who claims to have fought in the Revolution in December 1989 and was injured, and now lives in a miserable studio in that ghetto – this person is presented as evidence of the way Romania treats its heroes. Other characters in the documentary complain that it was better when Ceausescu was president, an affirmation that is generalized by Rogatkin, and presented as proof that Romania fell into "the European trap", by abandoning the communism and the "soviet power" prosperity. A resident of the area complains that "factories have all been sold for scraps and we are starving" whilst he is playing cards with his neighbors. Traian Basescu had been interviewed with regards to Romania's progress since joining NATO and the EU, and his saying were shown in parallel with the dirt on the outskirts of Bucharest.

The movie was shown during a live debate that was attended by Moscow experts that see NATO as a threat, and American, Polish and German analysts that tried to convince the Russians that their fears were unfounded[19].

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[17] http://stirileprotv.ro/stiri/international/putin-scutul-de-la-deveselu-ar-putea-fi-folosit-impotriva-rusiei-americanii-ne-mint-incearca-sa-ne-insele.html, accesat la 01.09.2016

[18] http://stirileprotv.ro/special/documentar-rossia-1-despre-romania-pe-vremea-lui-ceausescu-era-mai-bine-ce-au-filmat-jurnalistii-kremlinului-la-deveselu.html, accesat la 01.09.2016

[19] http://stiri.tvr.ro/postul-public-de-televiziune-din-rusia-a-difuzat-un-documentar-care-ironizeaza-scutul-antiracheta-de-la-deveselu-si-denigreaza-romania_74831.html, accesat la 01.09.2016

Igor Korotcenko editor of the "National Defense", declared "The problem is, and this is the key…. That neither the Romanian nor the Poland government will know which type of missiles or anti-missiles will be loaded into the launch silos by the Pentagon". Ariel Cohen, an American political analyst said that "Russia does not have to fear the global antiballistic system. It is a purely defensive system. On the contrary, Russia should come and negotiate with the US, in order to establish the type of missiles that should be used, where they should be used and why." The "European trap" documentary also showed aspects of everyday lives of people in Bulgaria, Montenegro and Serbia. In the fragment dedicated to the former Yugoslav area, the focus is set on the fact that people died as a result of the 1999 NATO bombings, and that life standards fell after the dismantling of the Yugoslavian Federation.

Another theme that emerged after the Aegis Ashore system in Romania became operational belongs to the Russian propaganda arsenal, although the information source cannot be directly associated to Russia. Russiatoday.ro stated on the 19th of August 2016 that "According to sources quoted by EurActiv.com, the Pentagon has begun the transfer of 20 B61 nuclear warhead aviation bombs to the Turkish Incirlik air base, and to the Romanian Deveselu base which hosts the American antiballistic shield. Even though the Romanian Foreign Ministry has denied the allegations, and the Ministry of defense said it was just speculation, the event cannot be overlooked since neither ministries have any authority on the Deveselu base, this being an American site[20]". This information, has travelled on all media sites and baffled the Romanian public, even though it was instantly denied by authorities.

Conclusions

Given the volume, the number of media channels that have been used, the frequency and the extent of the communication, The Russian Federation has chosen an imagological approach to the antiballistic shield from Deveselu, and portray it as the largest american military threats at its borders. Even though NATO has begun deploying troupes and weaponry to the border of NATO and Russia, Kremlin ideologists still use american aggression discourses, and views the instalment of the Aegis Ashore system in Romania as a manifestation of this type of aggresion.

Given the fact that internatonal, russian, and local media air the position of russian officials, including Vladimir Putin with regards to Deveselu, the american aniballistic shield that is installed in Romania may be included in a negative psychological, emotional and aspirational horizon. This horizon seems to have attack potential, including nuclear, directed at the Russian Federation.

The Kremlin will frequently use the installation of the antiballistic shield in Romania as a method in which to further its own military and political games and impose a geopolitical alternative to Atlanticism and the US domination.

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THE EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP RELOCATION
AFTER AFGHANISTAN

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Abstract: The world is constantly changing, facing a complex range of risks that diversifies and increases continuously. In this context, we present the relocation of the Euro-Atlantic post Afghanistan as a response to the problems of an unstable Ukraine caused by an unpredictable Russia; the war in Syria which generates refugees' flows to the EU; emergence of new terrorist threats created by ISIS in Syria and Iraq; and failure of Libya reconstruction.

Keywords: Euro-Atlantic partnership, security of Europe, NATO, the EU, the evolution of Euro-Atlantic strategies, June 2016 NATO summit, the 2016 EU summit.

Events in recent years have resulted in over twenty European countries to show an increased interest in crisis management and security threats valuing the values of the EU and NATO. However, the two organizations are unable to develop formal framework, with negative effects on Euro-Atlantic security.

The major problem that generated this block is the poor cooperation between the EU and NATO had supported the Berlin Plus agreements and cooperation framework adopted in 2002 and 2003[1].

In 2004 it launched Operation Althea, the European single mission conducted under the Berlin Plus framework for cooperation in Bosnia and Herzegovina[2].

Relatively small operation, because reconfiguration in 2012. This was reduced to nearly 600 people[3].

In other missions, which were not under guardianship Berlin Plus agreements, the EU and NATO went in parallel with: EULEX and KFOR missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Resolute Support EUPOL missions in the Gulf of Aden mission Atalanta and Ocean Shield: These cases represent a proof of good cooperation between the two organizations EU and NATO[4].

The relationship between the EU and NATO is supported by the Member States that belong to both organizations. However, we can not overlook the interests of Member States that are only in one organization, thus generating a number of problems that may block cooperation. We can mention here the case of Cyprus, attention always in NATO-EU relations, which caused friction between state organizations.

Following the so called coup in 1974 and the Turkish invasion, Cyprus was divided between Greeks and Turks in the South Island North Island. Thus, in 2004 the Greek part of Cyprus joined the EU and NATO member Turkey refused to recognize Southern Cyprus,

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[1] See : www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm?selectedlocale=en.

[2] The only operation in which the EU has used NATO means Concordia, the first EU military operation carried out in FYROM, between March and December 2003.

[3] www.euforbih.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15&Itemid=134.

[4] N. Græger, *Security. EU–NATO Relations: Informal Cooperation as a Common Lifestyle*, in: A. Orsini (ed.), The long-term political action of the EU with(in) international organizations, GREEN Book Series n°4, Ashgate, London, 2014.

which led to a strained relationship between Ankara and Brussels and blocking of NATO-EU cooperation.

Over the years the EU has "subcontracted" defense policy of Western European Union (UEO). Apart from its members, the UEO given associate membership of the European states that were part of NATO and the status of observer states, although part of the EU, did not want to be part of a military structure.

"The commitment UEO was very flexible. Member participation in UEO operations is optional, depending on foreign policy. Associate Membership has allowed a structured exchange of information with European countries outside the EU, such as Turkey and Norway. At the same time enabling them to participate in UEO missions, including operations planning. Absorption UEO within the EU in the first decade of the XXI century complicated status neutral because they have acquired in this way the same rights as any other Member State. In addition, reduced absorption channels of communication with countries outside the EU, and thus were further.

Apart from Turkey, there are five other NATO countries that are not EU members. Three of them, Albania, Iceland and Norway, are European countries that have close relations with the EU, ranging from the participation of Norway in the Nordic Battle Group Albania's EU candidate status. The main difference between membership of the EU and NATO is made of two non-European countries: Canada and USA. The dominant role the US plays within NATO is one of the defining elements of the Alliance and the core of ideological division that characterized the military integration of Europe.

Other countries that are members of the EU but not members of NATO, and we can mention here, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta adopted a strictly neutral position regarding the armed conflict. But they have a good participation in the peacekeeping operations led by the ONU. Their participation in EU and PSAC missions, that allows the urn, to mobilize resources and experiences in a way that is politically acceptable. One example is the Nordic Battle Group, which brings together bands from Estonia, Ireland, Finland, Sweden and Norway and is available to the EU.

NATO-EU relations are some very complex. And a country like Norway, which is not a member of NATO and the EU, under EU cooperates developing a great relationship working with the EU Military Staff.

Although France and the UK were privileged position, even if France has re-joined the NATO in 2009 after leaving the structure in 1967, while the UK was considered one of the forces required in the development of European military capabilities common. This happened until this summer (2016) when the UK decided to leave the EU after 43 years through a historic referendum:

The current stage of NATO-EU relations is balanced and delicate at the same time; taking into account the atlantists positions and the pressure from Turkey and various political events in Europe.

1996 NATO Summit in Berlin laid the basis of agreements between NATO and the EU. Concept known as Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), was based on the idea of "divisible, but not divided". This created a two-tier system, in which NATO has the first option to respond to a crisis. If NATO chooses not to act, could lay CJTF pre-selected forces so that they can be used by the EU. Such an arrangement has allowed the EU to have military capabilities and infrastructure necessary for planning separted missions, without having to duplicate what already exists within NATO. The disadvantage is that the two organizations are not on equal footing, the EU will act only if NATO decides not to act first.

Berlin accord represint only a preliminary agrement, and the debate on the way how to implement those ones and the CJTF concept continued for several years. The US position was explained by Madeleine Albright clear in an article that appeared in the Financial Times

on December 7, 1998, just days after the UK and France have published the statement from Saint-Malo regarding the integrated European military force. In this interview with Madeleine Albright, then US secretary of state, said the United States is in favor of a deeper European integration in defense, but such integration had to follow the principle of "3D":
- No duplication of structures that already existed within NATO;
- No discrimination against NATO members that were not EU members;
- No decoupling of the transatlantic link[5].

However, due to Turkey opposition, the agreement, known as the "Berlin Plus", entered into vigor in March 2003 and is still the Framework plan that rules EU-NATO relationship today. Since its adoption in 2003, it was used twice: during the course of Operation Concordia in FYROM (Macedonia), and in 2004 in Bosnia and Herzegovina EUFOR-for Althea operation.

It can be said that in 2003, EU-NATO relationship was governed mainly by the Berlin Plus agrements. These agreements were faced criticism from becoming larger over the past decade. Subordination EU structure to NATO, critics say these agreements was the right choice when PSAC was in its begging, but now they believe them, it is time for Europe to fully develop the capabilities of its own, without the need to resort to "crutch" NATO. Creating an EU military headquarters, proposed the "group of five" in 2011, an idea strongly rejected by Britain, is an example of the current debate. On the other hand, the EU and NATO have launched in parallel and almost competitively, naval patrols to combat piracy in the Horn of Africa (EUNAVFOR Atalanta and Ocean Shield, respectively) can be seen as another example. Despite the EU's assertion, it seems that not all NATO and PSAC, provides security for Europe final military defense in case of a foreign attack. To further complicate matters, the main supporter of NATO, the United States, announced "pivot to Asia", which can be seen as a reduction of US military forces deployed in Europe and the Middle East. This provoked calls both the US and some European countries for Europe to begin to pay more attention to its defense needs. The issue of "burden sharing responsabilităţilor- division" within NATO is as old as the alliance itself, but today`s situation the newest element is that US assets, which until now has supported European defense will be potential reduced. If the Europeans fail to cover this gap, Europe will be in the a situation, already confirmed by the crisis in Syria, to reduce considerably the ability to influence the world around them.

The security of Europe nowadays is facing new challenges in dealing with the east and south crises caused by Russia in Ucraine; the war in Syria and the ISIS terrorist attacks.

In according to this, Nato will organise a Summit in Varsovia between 8th-9th of June 2016 ,where it will be put into place ,, the implementing of the new security way of the Alliance ,therefore NATO will be prepared to protect all members of the Alliance against all the threats'', even if there will be a misunderstanding of the russian agresion or dealing with the current situation in Middle East.

At the 28th-29th of June Summit ,UE is expected to adapt a   new   global   strategy prioritising the protection of the extern politics of UE by drawing the general direction .

In order to avoid possible fragmentation and to sustain the coordination of national politics ,the european security and defense cooperation needs to be supported by UE and NATO .

The Europeans are facing diverse security challenges , where the military cooperation is the most important factor. The european countries major problem is the low budgets created by the economic crisis in 2008 and the insufficient military resources to meet the contemporan challenges. European Defence Agency (EDA) is stating that national defense

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[5] Crăciun Ioan, *The Comprehensive Approach,* Course NATO.

budgets have fallen by 15% between 2006 and 2013[6] and at beggining of 2016, the NATO General Secretary had announced „the decline of european spendings has been stopped''[7].

Although this difficult period of combating cross-border threats should boost cooperation, statistics show that only 2% of defense spending goes to EU member's cooperation. European governments are sending fewer troops to peacekeeping missions increasingly and are selective of the missions in which they participate. We have the example of operations in Afghanistan where all EU Members and NATO also participated, another example being the NATO military intervention in Libya, where less than half members have attended.

We can say that the US military presence in Europe and in the Middle East has increased, however, it is the subject of an intense debate on crisis management and the US role in the EU neighborhood. US is not willing to manage these crises.

There is a record and progress on European cooperation in security and defense which context, the EU and NATO are trying to encourage the collaboration between members. We can recall the initiative of European Command Air Transport in Netherlands, or Heavy Airlift Wing in Hungary, formats of Regional Cooperation (format cooperation of Baltic, Nordic and Visegrad), bilateral cooperation, (Franco-British, Belgian-Dutch, and German-Dutch), etc.

The 2011 military intervention in Libya is an operational cooperation during missions, which began as a set of national operations of France, Britain and the US subsequently transferred under NATO command. Another example of anti-ISIS coalition will be in Syria and in Iraq, to which Britain and Germany joined following the terrorist attacks in Paris. Another coalition to intervene in Libya against the ISIS militants is the UK, France, Italy and the US.

Depending on the objectives and goals proposed, European governments choose their form of military cooperation, acting through NATO and / or the EU, as well as regional coalitions or bilateral. National interests representing their orientation towards a close and flexible collaboration presented by the contemporary security crises and managing their limited resources.

NATO's future in an uncertain world

The end of Cold War has represented for NATO a key point in its existence. This modification increases its composition and command structures managed to adapt new conditions and to create Euro-Atlantic area, drawing lines into leading the diplomatic and military bureaucracy, Primus inter pares. "Thus, the United States, has succeeded in transforming the old institution in one stabilizing after the Cold War.

The challenges have not ended, NATO is currently facing a new set of vulnerabilities, growing risks and threats are coming from Southern and Eastern Europe. Thus, after years of chaos, Alliance leaders focus on a strategy for NATO's southern neighborhood and on concerns over Russia.

In reality, the East-South balance management will be high on the agenda of the NATO Summit in Warsaw (June 2016) as it is to maintain the unity of the Alliance. We

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[6] http://www.timpul.md/articol/viitorul-summit-nato-va-avea-loc-pe-8-i-9-iunie-2016-la-varovia-74771.html, accessed today 05.05.2016

[6] Handbook for Defence Related SMEs, available on Internet la: https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/publications/publication-details/pub/handbook-for-defence-related-smes, accessed on 27.10.2016

[7] Secretary General's Annual Report 2015, available on Internet : http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_01/20160128_SG_AnnualReport_2015_en.pdf, accessed on 27.10.2016

believe that the Alliance's agenda will consist of Mediterranean and the Russian Federation security challenges.

The recent study RAND concluded that ,, Russian forces could reach the outskirts of Estonia and Latvia, Tallinn, Riga respectively in 60 hours "and that ,, NATO will need a force of about seven brigades, including three heavy armored brigades - adequately supported by air and land ,, to prevent the Baltic States to be invaded by Russian forces quickly. "

Another problem which NATO is facing ,is the so-called "Suwalki Gap" – the strip linking Poland to Lithuania, the only land connection between Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and the rest of Europe, which has become an important objective of the strategy promoted by Russia, through which it seeks denial of access. Another measure taken by Russia to change the regional balance of power is the strengthening of Moscow's military forces and the deployment of the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. All these clues lead to the observation of a possible military conflict in the southern flank of NATO.

Nuclear policy is another sensitive branch of NATO to be revised because it is based on the document, Deterrence and Defense Posture Review "2012 presenting Russia as a partner of NATO. Events of recent years clearly demonstrates that the situation has changed, Russia using exactly this nuclear posture in response to NATO. There are random planned missions TU-95 bombers, which have the capability to carry nuclear warheads. In conclusion, NATO must pay higher interest issues with nuclear policy and nuclear deterrence needs reassessment in accordance with art. 5.

The collective security must not be neglected. New forms of war (asymmetric hybrid, counterterrorism, etc.) that combines criminal actions with aggressive propaganda campaign, speculating vulnerabilities media or social networks, cyber-attacks, terrorism, etc. NATO, must therefore face a wide range of threats that require unusual solutions.

At the 2014 Summit in Wales, NATO has tilted its mind to the defense, but no solutions have been found to respond to the threats of the XXI century security, who need an approach based on intelligence, cyber support, Special Forces and the interventions network.

Therefore, NATO must broaden its horizons to take necessary measures in response to contemporary crises and to create a united front consolidating its political dimension. NATO is not only a major military actor, but also a political actor and must think beyond the collective defense.

NATO should engage in security matters, soft " type and to open a dialogue with external partners reassessing open-door policy and partnerships.

NATO partnerships must be created and supported no matter what. Partners are required their individual attention and a real commitment of their problems. At NATO summit in 2014, NATO was the starting point of the creative thinking about the needs and ways to address the problems of its partners by identifying mutually beneficial interests.

Another problem is the open door policy, a political project with a symbolic message, which needs to be placed and continued in the core policy of the Alliance showing the political will of NATO, regardless of its boundaries or fear of antagonizing Russia.

Conclusions

In an effort to conclude the foregoing, we hope that the 2016 summit in Warsaw includes substantial transformation characterized by ambition and political unity, as they are core elements of NATO power. We have to find innovative answers to contemporary challenges, regardless of geographic location north, south, east or types of conventional war or not. In the southern neighborhood, we believe that NATO must find better solutions to solve the challenges of non-linear in a short time, , in a political context, economic, cultural and religious ambiguity of which tools and strategies are far from be obvious. In the Eastern

neighborhood, the possibilities for counteracting threats is obvious, less obvious seems to be the reaction and the Alliance will tackle these problems.

One possible future scenario would be that of a "global NATO", whose expansion is across the Atlantic to include all those countries who share the views of Western in terms of democracy and market economy. In such scenario, PSAC could become the European pillar of an alliance spanning several continents, something similar to what French President Chirac had in mind when he suggested that his country will re-join NATO in 1995. such a scenario does not resolve the question of the relationship with Turkey, unless the unlikely Turkey's EU accession

Another scenario is the model of "concentric circles", in which case a nucleus relatively small of European countries decided to move ahead and to reach a high level of military integration, perhaps through a permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), as the Lisbon Treaty provides. In such a scenario, the EU would be able to conduct independent operations without having to duplicate NATO structures using common structures put in place by PESCO countries. This scenario does not relieve states with dual affiliation EU / NATO from the obligations they have under NATO Aliance. That`s why, regardless of which future the EU and NATO countries will continue, they will be forced to work and collaborate for many years from now on.

In order to resolve these conflicts, it is extremely interesting to see where France and Turkey will position, taking account of the French interests they have in the security of the French Mediterranean, the Sahel and the sub-Saharan Africa. In our view, Turkey is a key ally of the NATO security on its borders in the Middle East. Ankara is also very interested in fighting Russia in the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Syria.

The final decisions will be taken by the,, pillar members "of NATO: USA, UK, Germany and France – according to crisis management and conflict management as well as current and future strike of balance, taking into account the Russian factor representing a source of risk, both in the southern and eastern part, on the other hand can become a unifying element for the entire,, geography "of NATO.

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IS IT POSSIBLE TO PREVENT IMMINENT TERROR ATTACKS?
THE U.S. INTERVENTION CASE AGAINST
KHORASAN TERROR GROUP

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Abstract: *The present paper aims to analyze the context that led to the start of the American intervention in Syria, in September 2014. As a result of Iraqi forces being unable to face the armed offensive of the Islamic State (ISIL) organization coming from the civil war devastated Syria and taking into account the potential risk of a collapse of the Iraqi state, the United States and its partner nations in the region (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Qatar) launched airstrikes against ISIL positions on 22 September 2014. In the weeks prior to the intervention, sources in the American government revealed that an even more dangerous terrorist actor was present in Syria, namely the Khorasan Group, which was allegedly plotting a series of imminent attacks against the territory of the United States. This article applies critical discourse analysis to a series of official and media positions in order to highlight that the imminence requirements posed by terror threats are met, even when the available data is inaccurate or outright missing.*

Keywords: *terrorism, imminence, terror group Khorasan, critical discourse analysis, foreign military intervention, internationalized civil war, ISIL, Syria.*

Introduction

Initially, the United States-led military intervention in Syria which began on 22 September 2014 was two-pronged: it targeted the terrorist organization the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as a continuation of the intervention in Iraq – which dated from June 15, 2014 – against ISIL, as well as against the Khorasan Group, regarded as an extension of the al-Nusra Front – the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. Afterwards, the terror group disappears from the media coverage, with officials noting that irrespective of "whether it was valid to hit them or not, or whether it was too soon or too late"[1] (Rear Admiral John Kirby, Pentagon Spokesperson), the intelligence indicated that the group was in the stages of an attack. F.B.I. Director Jack Comey argued: "[...] what I could see concerned me very much that they were working toward an attack"[2].

The study analyzes the narrative behind the intervention against the Khorasan Group, which was regarded as posing an imminent threat against the United States, even though the group was generally unheard of, prior to September 2014. The study is divided in three parts: after providing a brief overview of the Syrian conflict prior to September 2014, the study will address the issues surrounding the concept of imminence and how in this case, it applies in both the narrow and broader sense of the concept, based on the available literature in the field. In the last part, the study researches the official and media sources before and after the

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[1] ***, *Department of Defense Press Briefing by Rear Adm. Kirby in the Pentagon Briefing Room*, Press Operations, 25 September 2014, U.S. Department of Defense, available at: https://goo.gl/u39dBM, accessed on: 01.08.2016.
[2] Peter Sullivan, "FBI, Pentagon Unsure How Close Khorasan Group Was to US Strike", *The Hill*, 25 September 2014, available at https://goo.gl/S8dvgA, accessed on: 01.08.2016.

beginning of the intervention in Syria, and hypothesizes that if initially the press accounts regarding the Khorasan Group cited an imminent threat understood in its former sense, afterwards, the official framing of the threat covers the latter sense of the concept. Consequently, it refers to the legitimacy of the intervention, of how the United States legitimated its decision to intervene in Syria without seeking prior Congressional approval or a mandate from the U.N. Security Council, on the basis of the imminence rationale, and by relying on the existing two Authorizations for Use of Military Force (AUMF), from 2001 and 2002.The study will not cover the hypothesis according to which the intervention against the terror group was used in effect as a cover attack against the ISIL rival and enemy in the region, the al-Nusra Front.

1. Overview of the Syrian conflict

The conflict in Syria began in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, after the protests against the authoritarian leadership of President Bashar al-Assad were violently repressed by the Syrian Armed Forces. The tactics of the regime opponents morphed into armed rebellion and insurgency, with the opposition forces coalescing as of July 2011, into the Free Syrian Army. In the initial stages of the Syrian civil war, the sides were divided between the Assad regime (supported by the Alawites and Christians, the Shiite allies – Hezbollah, Iran – and Russia) and the "Sunni uprising", backed by Turkey, the Sunni Gulf Monarchies[3] and by extension the Arab League. Other rebel forces involved were the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front, Southern Front, the Army of Islam, and more importantly the Kurdish forces (the YPG militias).

In the last five years and a half, what started as a conflict between government forces and rebels, turned into an internationalized civil war with proxy stakes, attracting on both sides great powers and their allies. As Karen Rasler notes, history has shown that external interference in civil conflicts always influences the outcome in these situations, as seen for example during the 1970s, in places such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Cambodia, El Salvador, Lebanon, Nigeria, Yemen or Pakistan[4]. The conflict in Syria meets to various degrees the criteria identified by Gregory A. Raymond and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., that reflect the interventionary behavior of "intervenor" states in civil wars. Accordingly, the four sets of variables identified by the authors are:

1. "economic and strategic motives;
2. conditions in the target state, such as the extent of its socio-cultural cleavages and political stability;
3. geographic proximity, power differentials, and other properties of the dyadic relationship between intervenor and target;
4. structural variables like alliance polarization and capability distribution"[5].

The initial radicalization of the rebel elements and the growing confessionalization trend has been attributed to a combination of factors varying from the escalation of the armed conflict, the constant flow of foreign fighters of jihadist inspiration from other Middle Eastern countries and from Europe, as well as to the initial strategy of providing assistance and

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[3] Muriel Asseburg, Heiko Wimmen, "Civil War in Syria. External Actors and Interests as Drivers of Conflict", *Stifung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) Comments* 43, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, December 2012, p. 2, available at: https://goo.gl/4n8RD2, accessed on: 02.08.2016.
[4] Karen Rasler, "Internationalized Civil War. A Dynamic Analysis of the Syrian Intervention in Lebanon", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 27, No. 3, September 1993, pp. 421-422.
[5] Gregory A. Raymond, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., "Long Cycles and Internationalized Civil War", *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 49, No. 2, May 1987, p. 482.

training to the rebels, in some cases indiscriminately[6]. Similar to the post-2003 Iraq, the security breakdown and instability in the rebel dominated areas, opened the gateways for the apparition, growth and expansion of terrorist organizations beginning from January 2012, with Jabhat al-Nusra, also known as al-Qaeda in Syria, and continuing with its rival, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) terrorist organization, in April 2013. In November 2013, Brian Michael Jenkins stated before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, that: "the growing role of jihadist elements, with their numbers increasing through the recruitment of foreign fighters and defections from other rebel groups, have divided the rebel movement and discouraged anti-Assad governments in the West from providing significant military support"[7].

Until September 2014, the United States' involvement in Syria consisted in providing lethal and non-lethal aid as well as training to the opposition rebels, with the exception of the Islamic extremist groups. Though President Barack Obama set the use of chemicals weapons as a red line for direct intervention, in 2013, the President did not opt for a military strike and instead favored a diplomatic solution whose outcome guaranteed the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons. This happened after Secretary of State John Kerry proposed that an attack on Syria could be averted if President Assad would "turn over every single bit of his chemical weapons to the international community in the next week"[8], proposal to which both Syria and Russia favorably acquiesced.

By 2014, the rise of the Islamic State and its territorial gains in Syria and Iraq began posing a threat to the viability of the Iraqi state, especially after the Islamic State's Northern Iraq offensive in June 2014, which saw the capture of major strategic cities such as Mosul and Tikrit and a retreat of the Iraqi military. A counter-offensive in late June of the government forces also proved to be a failure. In August 2014, ISIL continued its expansion in Northern Iraq, capturing in particular, Sinjar and more importantly the Mosul Dam. Meanwhile, ISIL was committing a series of atrocities, persecuting the Christian and Yazidi minorities, in a series of expulsions and massacres. The humanitarian crisis and the inability of the Iraqi government to subdue and contain the ISIL threat, lead in turn to the U.S.-led intervention and a successful counter-attack on the part of the Kurdish and Iraqi forces.

The legal arguments cited by the Obama Administration were based on the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) and the 2002 AUMF against Iraq[9]. The Administration argued that ISIL falls under the incidence of the 2001 AUMF for the following reasons: 1. the original group from which ISIL grew out of, namely al-Qaeda in Iraq which conspired with the al Qaeda leadership; 2. ISIL continued to have ties with al-Qaeda operatives; 3. ISIL utilizes similar tactics and acts of violence to al-Qaeda; 4. similar to

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[6] See for example the statement regarding the rebels, given by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs for Qatar, Khalid bin Mohammad al-Attiyah, from December 2012: "I am very much against excluding anyone at this stage or bracketing them as terrorists, or bracketing them as al-Qaeda. What we are doing is only creating a sleeping monster, and this is wrong. We should bring them all together , we should treat them all equally, and we should work on them to change their ideology" (quoted in Christopher Phillips, *The Battle for Syria. International Rivalry in the New Middle East*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2016, p. 125).

[7] Brian Michael Jenkins, *The Role of Terrorism and Terror in Syria's Civil War (Testimony presented before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcomittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade)*, RAND Corporation, 20 November 2013, p. 2, available at: https://goo.gl/y141w2, accessed on: 01.08.2016.

[8] ***, *Press Conference by Kerry, British Foreign Secretary Hague*, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, 9 September 2013, available at: http https://goo.gl/vkZqvG, accessed on: 01.08.2016. See also: Yochi Dreazen, "Did Kerry Just Ad-Lib His Way Out of a War?", *Foreign Policy*, 09.09. 2013, available at: goo.gl/1JF4to.

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al-Qaeda, ISIL also has the intention to establish an Islamic caliphate[10]. As regards the 2002 AUMF, the broad language permits the interpretation of a "continuing threat posed by Iraq" against the national security of the United States, as "provid[ing] authority to defend against threats *to* Iraq as well as threats posed *by* Iraq"[11]. Moreover, as a senior official of the Administration noted, the 2002 AUMF also grants the President "the statutory authority to conduct air strikes against ISIS in Syria"[12].

The following section provides an analysis of the concept of imminence and how it applies in the context of self-defense and preemptive military interventions.

2. Strategic considerations regarding the conditions of self-defense, imminence and preemption

International law acknowledges that states might use force in self-defense. The United Nations Charter states in Article 51 that: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations"[13]. In December 2004, a U.N. report issued by the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, distinguished between imminent threats that fall under the incidence of Article 51 and latent threats which require that the Security Council authorize the use of force[14]. The criteria for using force in self-defense take into account whether a state was attacked or a state regards an attack to be imminent[15]. In order for the second criterion to apply, two conditions have to be meet first: use of military force as a last resort; and proportional and limited use of force against the perceived threat[16]. The imminence requirement would allow a potential victim party to use force in order to preempt the actions of a potential aggressor, based on a temporal clause and where possible, an action component – "a physical manifestation of aggression"[17].

In the customary international law, the *Caroline* doctrine – which was reaffirmed during the Nuremberg Trials – states that the right to self-defense is legitimated when the action is deemed to be *necessary* and the measures taken,, *proportionate*[18]. In the first half of the XIX century, after the Caroline incident[19], the U.S. Secretary of State, Daniel Webster argued that:

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[17] Russell Christopher, "Imminence in Justified Targeted Killing", in Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin, and Andrew Altman (eds.), *Targeted Killings. Law and Morality in an Asymmetrical World*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 271-272.

[18] John O'Brien, *International Law*, Cavendish Publishing Limited, The Glass House, London, 2001, p. 682.

[19] The Caroline doctrine was the result of British actions surrounding the American steamboat "The Caroline" (1837), which had been used by American supporters of the Canadian insurrection (1837-1838), to assist the Canadian side and provide military aid, even though the U.S. remained a neutral party in the conflict. As a result, the British decided to destroy "The Caroline" by setting it on fire and overtuning it in the Niagara Falls, arguing that their action was undertaken in self defense (see more in: Olaoluwa Olusanya, *Identifying the Aggressor*

"For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat – most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack. We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today adversaries"[20].

After the terrorist attacks from September 11, 2001, the U.S. argued in favor of preemptive measures in order to avoid other future potential catastrophes[21]. The U.S. National Security Strategy from September 2002 reframed the nature of imminence when assessing a threat and also provided the Bush administration's justification for the "broadened notion of legitimate preemptive war"[22]: "Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction – weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning"[23].

Preemption under the *Bush Doctrine* moves beyond the framework of the *Caroline Doctrine* and is grounded on the basis that the dangers posed by terrorism require "a more expansive interpretation of the concept of imminence"[24]. Aiden Warren and Ingvild Bode explain the rationale behind the Bush administration's strategic preemptive option and note that the strategy required the Administration to connect preemptive actions with the expanded notion of imminence, which represented "a key element in the condition of necessity as it relates to preemption"[25]. Elizabeth Wilmshurst's "Chatham House Principles on Self-defence" invokes a similar justification, stating that due to the nature of the current threats, "imminence cannot be construed by reference to a temporal criterion only, but must reflect the wider circumstances of the threat"[26].

The *Obama Doctrine* follows in the steps of the Bush Doctrine especially in so far as preemption is concerned, while amending the language of the "Global War on Terror" by promoting a less overtly militaristic and Manichean discourse, and instead opting for one rooted in a more realist understanding of international relations. The Administration has applied anticipatory self-defense – which has after all motivated in part, the intervention in Syria, against both ISIL ("individual self-defense") and the Khorasan Group ("imminent

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under International Law. A Principles Approach, Peter Lang AG, Bern, 2006, pp. 105-106). Bellamy notes that: "The US protested against the attack, claiming that its sovereignty had been violated, but the British insisted that they were exercising their right to self-defence. The British defended their action by blaming the US for failing to prevent the use of its territory by the Canadian rebels, and justified the attack as 'a necessity of self-defence and self-preservation'. [...] the US rejected this argument, insisting that the level of threat that could justify 'hot pursuit' must be 'imminent, and extreme, and involving impending destruction'" (Alex J. Bellamy, "The Ethics and Laws of War", in Richard Devetak, Anthony Burke, and Jim George (eds.), *An Introduction to International Relations (Second Edition)*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012, p. 226).

[20] Daniel Webster quoted in Michael Byers, *War Law Understanding. International Law and Armed Conflict*, Atlantic Books, London, 2005, p. 77.

[21] See also: Abraham D. Sofaer, "On the Necessity of Pre-emption", *European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2003, pp. 209-226.

[22] Gerard Huiskamp, "*Minority Report* on the Bush Doctrine", in. Joseph G. Peschek (ed.), *The Politics of Empire. War, Terror and Hegemony*, Routledge, Oxon and New York, 2006, p. 130.

[23] *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* quoted in *Ibidem*.

[24] Geoffrey S. Corn, "Legal Basis for the Use of Armed Forces", in Geoffrey S. Corn et al. (eds.), *The War on Terror and the Laws of War. A Military Perspective (Second Edition)*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2015, p. 14.

[25] Aiden Warren, Ingvild Bode, *Governing the Use-of-Force in International Relations. The Post 9/11 US Challenge on International Law*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014, p. 137.

[26] Elizabeth Wilmshurst quoted in Michael Wood, "Terrorism and the International Law on the Use of Force", in Ben Saul (ed.), *Research Handbook on International Law and Terrorism*, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, 2014, p. 205.

threat")[27]. This is further analyzed in the subsequent section. Additionally, a *2011 White Paper* from the Department of Justice (DOJ), regarding targeted killing, frames "imminence" as: "The condition that an operational leader present an 'imminent' threat of violent attack against the United States does not require the United States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate future"[28]. In addition, the White Paper refers to how:

1. "certain members of al-Qaeda are continually plotting attacks;
2. that al-Qa'ida would engage in such attacks regularly to the extent it were able to do so;
3. that the U.S. government may not be aware of all al-Qaeda plots as they are developing and thus cannot be confident that none is about to occur;
4. and that, in light of these predicates, the nation may have a limited window of opportunity within which to strike in a manner that both has a high likelihood of success and reduces the probability of American casualties"[29].

This justification is in line with the post-9/11 security framework in which the requirement of imminence is subtracted from the fact that while the terrorist threat is present, active, and disruptive – either in the form of terror groups or lone wolves – states are operating with information that is fallible and at times, even inaccurate, which in turn has led to a series of erroneous targets and civilian deaths[30].

3. The case for the intervention against the Khorasan terror group

The press articles from September 2014 regarding the Khorasan terror group, advance a scenario in which the group poses an immediate, imminent threat. The members of the group are thought to be seasoned al-Qaeda operatives from Afghanistan and Pakistan. The first in-depth analysis of the group is found in an article from *Associated Press*, entitled "AP Enterprise: al-Qaida's Syrian Cell Alarms US", from 13 September 2014. The article begins by stating that according to U.S. government sources, the group "poses a more direct and imminent threat to the United States, working with Yemeni bomb-makers to target U.S. aviation"[31]. Former C.I.A. Deputy Director Mike Morell posited that the group allegedly "evolved into the external operations arm" of Jabhat al Nusra – the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, fighting on the side of the rebels against both ISIL as well as against the government forces. In Morell's view, the group's main objective consists in attacking aviation targets in the belief that they could harm the American economy, by creating a situation similar to 9/11[32]. In February 2015, Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, in a hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, described the Khorasan Group as

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[27] Jack Goldsmith, "The Contributions of the Obama Administration to the Practice and Theory of International Law", *Harvard International Law Journal*, Vol. 57, No. 2, Spring 2016, pp. 7-8.
[28] ***, *Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa'ida or an Associate Force*, Department of Justice White Paper (Draft), 8 November 2011, p. 7, available at: https://goo.gl/fgfUlS, accessed on: 03.08.2016.
[29] *Ibidem*, p. 8.
[30] See: ***, "Counting Drones Strike Deaths", Columbia Law School, Human Rights Clinic, October 2012, available at: https://goo.gl/JXBUII; Scott Shane, "Drone Strikes Reveal Uncomfortable Truth: U.S. Is Often Unsure About Who Will Die*", The New York Times*, 23 April 2015, available at: https://goo.gl/nMolpc; Spencer Ackerman, "41 Men Targeted but 1147 People Killed: US Drones Strikes – the Facts on the Ground", *The Guardian*, 24 November 2014, available at: https://goo.gl/43vNmO.
[31] Ken Dilanian, Eileen Sullivan, "AP Enterprise: al-Qaida's Syrian Cell Alarms US", *Associated Press*, 13 September 2014, available at: https://goo.gl/pWFgmM, accessed on: 06.08.2016.
[32] Mike Morell quoted in ***, "What is Khorasan?", *CBS News*, 18 September 2014, available at: https://goo.gl/pnJ1nJ, accessed on: 06.08.2016.

being composed of "al-Nusrah Front and al-Qaeda core extremists"[33]. The intelligence determined that members of this group had been "nearing the execution phase for an attack in Europe or the Homeland"[34].

According to the *AP* report, the leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri sent the operatives to Syria in order to recruit jihadi fighters with European and American passports that would enable them to board U.S.-bound airlines without attracting attention from airport security. Furthermore, the Khorasan members had also collaborated with the bomb-makers from the Yemeni offshoot of al-Qaeda – al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), an in particular with the expert bomb-maker, Ibrahim al-Asiri, who had been attributed with building the cargo bombs hidden in printer cartridges[35]. The goal was to test new methods that would bypass airport security in order to smuggle explosive devices aboard[36]. Moreover, the group's leader, Muhsin al-Fadhli had reportedly been close to Osama Bin Laden and was one of the few who had been informed about the 9/11 terrorist attacks prior to their launch[37]. As of February 2005, the U.S. had classified al-Fadhli as Specially Designated Global Terrorist[38]. Subsequent articles present the Khorasan Group as posing a greater threat than ISIL, especially since unlike its other terrorist counterparts, the group remains hidden and maintains a social media blackout. The Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper Jr. compared it to ISIL, noting that both pose a similar type of danger to the homeland[39].

The first time President Obama refers to the Khorasan Group is in the Letter from the President addressed to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, regarding the war powers resolution on Syria from 23 September 2014. The President recounts how the U.S. Armed Forces engaged al-Qaeda and associated forces in various counter-terror operations and how on 22 September 2014, the U.S. military initiated an operation against "elements of al-Qaeda known as the Khorasan Group", located in Syria[40]. Initially, the airstrikes targeted the Syrian areas surrounding the city of Aleppo where the Khorasan Group was allegedly located, followed by the headquarters of ISIL, situated in Raqqa.

If in the reports prior to the military intervention, the unofficial sources gave the unwitting impression of an impending, imminent attack, under the auspices of the ticking clock metaphor[41], afterwards, the official position of the Obama Administration fits under the broad concept of imminences described in the previous section. As Jack Goldsmith points out, the Administration based its decision to intervene in self-defense in order to target terrorists located in a nation with which the U.S. is not at war, on the grounds that "the government in

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[33] Nicholas J. Rasmussen, "Current Terrorist Threat to the United States", Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 12 February 2015, p. 8, available at: https://goo.gl/tRpvvM, accessed on: 07.08.2016.
[34] *Ibidem*.
[35] ***, "Al Qaeda's Quiet Plan to Outdo ISIS and Hit U.S.", *CBS News*, 18 September 2014, available at: https://goo.gl/54JQP1, accessed on: 07.08.2016.
[36] K. Dilanian, E. Sullivan, *op. cit*.
[37] Mark Mazzetti, Michael S. Schmidt, and Ben Hubbard, "U.S. Suspects More Direct Threats Beyond ISIS", *The New York Times*, 20 September 2014, available at: https://goo.gl/9JiqqC, accessed on: 07.08.2016.
[38] ***, *Treasury Takes Action to Stem Funding to the Iraqi Insurgency*, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Center, 15 February 2005, available at: https://goo.gl/AR4Ssc, accessed on: 07.08.2016.
[39] M. Mazzetti, M.S. Schmidt, and B. Hubbard, *op. cit.*
[40] Barack Obama, "Letter from the President – War Powers Resolution Regarding Syria", White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 23 September 2014, available at: https://goo.gl/RtesDp, accessed on: 07.08.2016.
[41] According to Stahl, the metaphor of the ticking clock signifies that one is "running out of time". It "infuses public life with a nearness (in both time and space) that has come to characterize the sensibility inscribed by the War on Terror". See Roger Stahl, "A Clockwork War: Rhetorics of Time in a Time of Terror", *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, Vol. 94, No. 1, February 2008, p. 87.

that nation was unwilling or unable to suppress the threat"[42]. On 23 September 2014, Pentagon Press Secretary, Rear Adm. John Kirby stated that:

"In terms of the Khorasan group, which is a network of seasoned Al Qaida veterans, these strikes were undertaken to disrupt *imminent attack plotting* against the United States and western targets. These targets have established a safe haven in Syria to plan external attacks, construct and test improvised explosive devices, and recruit westerners to conduct operations. The United States took action to protect our interests and to remove their capability to act", and Director of Operations, Lt. Gen. William Mayville also stated: "U.S. military forces also executed unilateral precision strikes against the Khorasan Group, an A.Q.-affiliated terrorist organization located in northwest Syria. The intelligence reports indicated that the Khorasan Group was in the *final stages of plans* to execute major attacks against Western targets and potentially the U.S. homeland"[43].

In support of the broad concept of imminence thesis, F.B.I. Director Jack Comey also refers to the Khorasan Group, as "looking to do it [working on an effort to attack] very, very soon. [...] tomorrow or three weeks or three months from now. [...] And so we have to act as if it's coming tomorrow"[44]. After the intervention, another official described the group's activity as "aspirational", noting how "there did not yet seem to be a concrete plan in the works"[45]. The public available information presented in the official statements is not indicative of a *concrete* threat regarding an imminent attack against the U.S. territory. Even the U.S. report to the Security Council remains vague as far as consolidating the claim for invoking Article 51, stating only that the U.S. targeted "al-Qaeda elements in Syria known as the Khorasan Group to address terrorist threats that they pose to the United States and our partners and allies"[46].

The vague formulations present in the self-defense standards allow for the concept of imminence to be used in both the literal sense and in the broad understanding, with the former used in the media to legitimate the necessity of the current course of action, and the latter applied in motivating the lawfulness of the intervention. Louise Arimatsu and Michael N. Schmitt argue that a state benefits from less precise norms, when opting for how to face a threat[47], while Monica Hakimi notes that a position on the current state of the law "will be legally relevant so long as it continues to resonate with enough states or other global actors – such that it might reasonably be invoked or applied in specific incidents"[48]. As seen in the case of the intervention against Khorasan, the operational practice does not reflect the position "widely accepted and treated as law"[49]. Even though these actions would not be treated as unlawful in the present case, it is highly unlikely that this practice would be as widely and tacitly accepted if other states would undertake similar actions in the guise of self-defense against parties that are considered to pose a threat in the broad sense of imminence and are located in states deemed unable or unwilling to take action against them.

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[42] J. Goldsmith, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
[43] Rear Adm. John Kirby, Lt. Gen. William Mayville, *Department of Defense Press Briefing on Operations in Syria by Lt. Gen. Mayville in the Pentagon Briefing Room*, U.S. Department of Defense, 23 September 2014, available at: https://goo.gl/Soq9Zi, accessed on: 08.08.2016.
[44] Scott Pelley, "FBI Director on Threat of ISIS, Cybercrime", *CBS News*, 5 October 2014, available at: http://goo.gl/WNtzTb, accessed on: 08.08.2016.
[45] Mark Mazzeti, "A Terror Cell That Avoided the Spotlight", *The New York Times*, 24 September 2014, available at: https://goo.gl/d4VfiZ, accessed on: 08.08.2016.
[46] U.S. Permanent Representative Letter, 23 September 2014, cited in Monica Hakimi, "Defensive Force against Non-State Actors: The State of Play", *International Law* Studies, U.S. Naval War College, Vol. 91, 2015, p. 28.
[47] Louise Arimatsu, Michael N. Schmitt, "Attacking "Islamic State" and the Khorasan Group. Surveying the International Law Landscape", 53 *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law Bulletin* 1 (2014), 18 November 2014, p. 29, available at: https://goo.gl/AcXPAa, accessed on: 09.08.2016.
[48] M. Hakimi, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
[49] *Ibidem.*

Conclusions

The multiple actors involved in the Syrian crisis, with their conflicting interests pursued in the conflict, allowed for Syria to become a testing ground for interventions with no apparent feasible, long term resolution in sight. The intervention against the Khorasan Group was motivated on the basis that its members were al-Qaeda operatives plotting imminent attacks against U.S. and its allies, located in a country unable or unwilling to effectively act against them. In a letter addressed to the U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Samantha Power argues that because ISIL and other terrorist groups pose a threat to many countries – including the U.S. – the "States must be able to defend themselves, in accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, as reflected in Article 51 of the UN Charter, when, as is the case here, the government of the State where the threat is located is unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its territory for such attacks"[50]. The Khorasan example shows the contradictions between the existent law and the operational practice especially since the basis for the intervention in a state that has not asked for international assistance, nor is presently at war with the state acting in self-defense, resides on the notion that the state harboring the terrorist group, is unwilling or unable to eliminate the threat. In turn, this justifies the expansion of the intervention against ISIL from Iraq to Syria. This raises the following question: In the present case, does the imminent threat posed by the Khorasan Group justify bypassing both the Congress and especially the Security Council, in acting unilaterally without seeking prior authorization?

Moreover, strictly where the Khorasan Group is concerned, how does one determine that the state is unable or unwilling to effectively confront the terrorist element[51]? As Christophe Paulussen and Kinga Tibori Szabó note, according to this rationale, the imminence clause becomes secondary. In this case, the argument given in support of the Article 51 claim – "that a state is unwilling or unable to prevent its territory from being used by terrorists – is not enough to trigger the right of self-defence"[52], in absence of an imminent threat. Yet since the U.S. is operating on what C.I.A. Director John Brennan describes as the "more flexible understanding of imminence"[53], one can argue that the condition for imminence or the "threat of imminent attack" is satisfied, especially as it pertains to the anticipatory self-defense rationale advanced in the national security positions and documents cited in the second section.

The study has shown how in the weeks leading to the intervention from 22 September 2014, the Khorasan Group was presented as posing an imminent threat and rivaling ISIL as far as the risk it posed to the U.S. interests and of its allies. The cited official statements illustrate how the imminent argument was used to frame the operation that had also targeted ISIL locations and represented an expansion of the U.S.'s war efforts from Iraq to Syria, without seeking the approval of the U.S. Congress, nor requiring the Security Council authorization. The case is notable for how the U.S. interprets and engages in self-defense in the context of asymmetric warfare.

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[50] Cited in Christophe Paulussen, Kinga Tibori Szabó, "Testing the Validity of US Self-Defence Arguments against the Khorasan Group in Syria", 4 November 2014, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague Publications, available at: https://goo.gl/ESZwAc, on 09.08.2016.

[51] U.S. Ambassador Samantha Powers to the U.N. in *Ibidem*.

[52] *Ibidem*. See also: Kinga Tibori-Szabó, "The 'Unwilling or Unable' Test and the Law of Self-defence", in Christophe Paulussen, Tamara Takács, Vesna Lazić, Ben Van Rompuy (eds.), *Fundamental Rights in International and European Law. Public and Private Law Perspectives*, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, 2016, pp. 73-97.

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BRITISH SECURITY STRATEGY POST-BREXIT

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Abstract: The surprising vote on Brexit brought forward somber perspectives on the evolution of European security policies. As the United Kingdom has long been a great contributor to security policies, both within NATO and with the feeble European Union policy in the field, its future absence from the European security framework has led many to believe that the Union shall be deprived of a significant actor, one that would have helped it advance significantly. This is highly important as European Union security was in the making, aiming towards a consolidation of its stance among global actors in the field. Thus, the deprival of British military and security expertise and resources shall be strongly experienced. In a weak European Union, affected by the previous Grexit situation, with many contesting its federalist vision, and even more its utility, Brexit raised even more doubts on the future of the European construction.

Keywords: Brexit, withdrawal, security, defense, EU security.

Introduction

Although the United Kingdom has been having a troublesome history within the European Union ever since its accession, and even before (given the two rejections faced before the accession in the 1970s), along with a separate position taken towards several EU policies and strategies, the advent of Brexit brought forth the severity of its disappointment with the EU system, the faith in its own strength and the lack of preparedness of the EU conglomerate to such a case. Even though another "-EXIT" has been under discussion recently – that of Greece – Grexit – the respective crisis being averted in due time, in the present situation, the United Kingdom Exit could not be.

From a security-related perspective, the British withdrawal from the European Union shall affect not only its European counterparts, but also its own security policies. This shall be reflected in the need to publish a new Strategic Defence and Security Review (as the last one dates from 2015), announcing its strategic and spending priorities in the new framework – outside the European Union. However, this depends very much on the country's stance towards the latter. Should the United Kingdom decide to participate in European Union security and defense related mission, as a third party, then this shall be regulated through the SDSR.

Taking everything into consideration, the aim of this paper is dual – to assess the evolution of British security policies in relation with the European Union, post Brexit, as well as the possible evolution of internal security policies and spending, in the aftermath of the same event. Given the uncertainty of whether the United Kingdom shall remain a third party actor in the European security or not, and the in-land and out-land implications of such a decision, it is highly important to draw an assessment of both possibilities, due to the strong position that the United Kingdom has been retaining, both on the global security scene, as well as on the European one.

The implications of Brexit are multiple – for the country firstly, for the European Union secondly, and for the whole international community, lastly.

There are many concerns regarding the British exit from the EU: the possible undermining of the image and actual capabilities of NATO defense, the weakening of the already feeble European defense in which the United Kingdom has already fought for a strong bargaining chip, the remote possibility of Scotland looking for independence, which would weaken also British defense arrangements, the possibility of achieving a more global-oriented position[1], etc. However, the latter is massively dependent on the need to accommodate defense requests closer to home. Thus, its future military involvement in areas such the Middle East, Africa and the Balkans is to be questioned, depending on the impact of such troubled areas on homeland security.

In November 2015, the Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) was published by the United Kingdom government. The aim of the document is to specify the national security strategy to be followed, as well as key spending priorities. As can be easily noticed, given the time of the publication of the document, the SDSR did not assess the possible implications of the exit. Ergo, the speculative dimension of all studies on the matter. Additionally, there is a strong debate on the need to have a new SDSR drafted, which would comprise this new state of facts and should be ready by the end of 2016/beginning of 2017[2].

1. Implications for British defense

According to the 2015 SDSR, the UK is dealing with a plethora of threats to its security – in the European Neighborhood, the challenges posed by the Russian Federation in its attempts to alter borders by force, the emergence of ISIS and its impact on the whole Middle East geopolitics, the state collapse of Libya and its spiralling of the migrant crisis, and the on-going impact of the financial crisis. Also, the immediate threats that need to be faced by the United Kingdom are listed as follows: terrorism, state-based threats, cyber-threats, and the erosion of rules governing the international order.

In such a situation, having a strong international presence and a powerful coooperation with other countries is highly important. Consequently, as shall be seen throughout this article, the United Kingdom has been placing more emphasis on its relationship with the United States, rather than with the European Union. Moreover, its justification of Brexit has been the need to (re)gain a more global profile.

According to the National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defense and Security Review 2015 (further referred as NSS 2015), National Security Objective 2 is "project our global influence", which could be done through careful consideration of existing partnerships as well as the development of others – "invest more in our alliances, build new, stronger partnerships and persuade potential adversaries of the benefits of cooperation, to multiply what we can achieve alone"[3].

NSS 2015 highlights, in the words of Prime-minister David Cameron that British security and defense can be achieved through cooperation with allies – "[…] Britain's safety and security depends not just on our own efforts, but on working hand in glove with our allies to deal with the common threats that face us all, from terrorism to climate change.[…] We

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[1] Malcolm Chalmers, *Would a New SDSR Be Needed After a Brexit Vote?*, Briefing Paper, Royal United Services Institute, June 2016, p. 3, available at https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/chalmers_brexit_sdsr.final_.pdf, accessed 20.09.2016.

[2] Although, in normal conditions, the next SDSR would have to be drafted after the following general elections of May 2020.

[3] ***, *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defense and Security Review 2015, A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom* (NSS 2015), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, November 2015, p. 11, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478933/52309_Cm_9161_NSS_SD_Review_web_only.pdf, accessed 21.09.2016.

will work with our allies in Europe and around the world – as well as seizing opportunities to reach out to emerging powers"[4].

According to the document, "our renewed economic security means we can afford to invest further in our national security"[5]. And this could be done given the fact while in 2015, the British defense cuts have been of 3.5%, in 2016, the country met the target of spending 2% of its GDP on defense.

In this view there are worth mentioning several intended developments in British defense:

- The capabilities to mount a major combat operation involving 50.000 militaries.
- Urgently acquire a fleet of 9 P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft (2020).
- The entry into service of the second aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales (testing in 2019).
- Upgraded (since 2015) its 227 Challenger 2 battle tanks.
- A French –UK Combined Joint Expeditionary Force of approx. 10.000 militaries[6].

However, it appears in both the NSS and the SDSR that the European Union is not necessary to British security, having a more likely constraining effect on the unfolding of the latter, especially from the point of view of resource allocation. Instead, its defense and engagement strategy has been re-organized around three main elements: the "special relationship" with the United States, its bi-lateral relations with European states – "promiscuous bilateralism"[7] and its connections with emerging powers.

2. Implications for the European Union

The United Kingdom has always shown a resistance towards further integration and the possible constitution of the "United States of Europe", preferring instead the road to intergovernmentalism[8].

For the EU, Brexit could not come at a worse time, as youth unemployment is high again, Greece is going through difficulties, and the position of several key political leaders, such as Angela Merkel (and the United Kingdom is seeking to develop a particular relationship with Germany in the aftermath of Brexit) is shaking. In such circumstances, Brexit is likely to be interpreted as a hostile act for the European structure. There is also the specter of elections looming all throughout Europe; to have an exit in such conditions signals the lack of strength of the European construction and its inability to cope with inner problems and tensions.

To go into more particular aspects, in the aftermath of Brexit, the United Kingdom would no longer be a member of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. This could be translated as a departure from European defense concerns towards more global-oriented ones. However, its retreat from European defense is not complete, as it will remain a strong element within the NATO collective defense policy in Europe. There is also the possibility of the UK

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[4] *Ibidem*, p. 6.

[5] *Ibidem*, p. 5.

[6] Andre Dumoulin, *Brexit and European Defense, An In-depth Analysis, e-Note 20*, Center for Security and Defense Studies, Belgium, 8th June 2016, p.3, available at www.irsd.be/website/images/livres/enotes/20.pdf, accessed 20.09.2016.

[7] Mădălina Dobrescu, *Brexit is likely to hinder Britain's National Security Strategy*, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 21June 2016, available at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2016/06/21/brexit-is-likely-to-hinder-britains-national-security-strategy/, accessed 28.09.2016. The term is used to describe the forging of coalitions depending on the issue under negotiation, opposing thus the stronger and more stable French-German alliance: Italy, Spain, Poland, Sweden, Finland, etc.

[8] Richard G. Whitman, *Brexit or Bremain: what future for the UK's European Diplomatic strategy?*, *International Affairs*, No.92, Vol.3, 2016, p. 511.

signing a framework agreement with the EU in order to be able to participate in CSDP operations as well as cooperation agreement for the European Defense Agency. So far, the UK has been reluctant to commit troops for military operations (focusing more on the NATO dimension in this regard), and sent personnel to "civilian" operations (border observation, capacity building, etc.).

The United Kingdom provides on a EU level strategic airlift and intelligence, surveillance and reconaissance capabilities, which are scarce among other member states. In the absence of the United Kingdom from the CSDP, such capabilities shall no longer be available, meaning that many EU operations in the running will be deprived of such assets. A good example is the fact that within EUNAVFOR anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia, the headqarters are provided by the United Kingdom. In the absence of the United Kingdom as a European Union member within CSDP, this facility will no longer be available.

Brexit would make Europe even more vulnerable to political shocks from within and from outside, leading thus to further instability, and adding to several already manifest crises: the economic crisis of 2008, the migration phenomenon, terrorism within its borders and the Eurozone instability. Brexit is likely to affect the stance of anglophile countries within the EU: Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark, and stir reactions towards possible similar referendums in Italy, France and the Netherlands.

According to scholars[9], despite its choice of exit, the United Kingdom shall remain very much intertwined with EU defense policy. However, the manner in which UK-EU relations shall be performed is subject to a re-negotiation, in the aftermath of Brexit.

Additionally, the exit of the United Kingdom will definitely change the European geopolitical landscape. By its placing outside the EU, the United Kingdom, along with Turkey and the Russian Federation will lead to the creation of a multi-polar Europe, which is likely to be disputed between the United States and Asian powers. The absence of the United Kingdom from the European Union means that France is likely to occupy the position of EU Representative within the UN Security Council, having thus the incentive to ask for a permanent occupation.

There are also opinions stating that a British withdrawal should not be seen as a tragedy, both for the European Union, as well as the country itself. Predictions on how Brexit will affect the United Kingdom and its position relatively to the European Union are not entirely somber – "The United Kingdom could become to Europe what Australia is to Asia, albeit without the sunshine or the kangaroos: a close ally of the US, enjoying a high measure of security while living in semi-detachment from the continent next door"[10].

According to Heisbourg, "unlike the single market or other areas in which sovereignty is shared with the European institutions, defence and security are not caught in a complex web of intertwined national and supranational competences. There is no European omelette here to unscramble in case of a Brexit" [11].

Thus, in the absence of the United Kingdom, France and Germany are free to engage in the creation of a new European Union, on federal grounds.

By consequence, British membership of the European Union needs to be seen in terms of "costs and benefits", and not as an emotional attachment – "as a latecomer, Britain has always found the EU's organizations and policies uncongenial"[12].

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[9] *Ibidem*, p. 523.

[10] Francois Heisbourg, *Brexit and European Security*, *Survival*, Vol. 58, No.3, June-July 2016, p. 14.

[11] *Ibidem*, p. 13.

[12]***, *"The Roots of Euroscepticism"*, March 12th 2016, p. 4, in The Economist, *The Brexit Briefs. Our Guide to Britain's EU Referendum* (Collection of articles on the topic), June 2016, available at https://www.economist.com/.../EconomistBrexitBriefs16.pdf, accessed 23.09.2016.

3. Defense implications on a strategic level

As could be easily deduced, strategic implications on defense will be noticed in the relationship with the United States of America, with member countries of the European Union and with third parties which considered the United Kingdom as a point of access to the European Union. Furthermore, implications for intelligence sharing and future forms of structured cooperation with the European Union shall be referred to here.

Problems are likely to occur even in the framework of the Anglo-American "special relationship", as President Obama and other American officials expressed their preference of the United Kingdom to remain within the European Union. The American interest in this regard is justified by the support manifested throughout time by both Democrats and Republicans for EU and NATO enlargement as "tenet for transatlantic relations"[13]. This is an ambivalent approach, as the American perspective over United Kingdom membership of the EU is that of a country which would control the latter's development in order not to replicate NATO.

What the United States have been expecting and received in the past years from the European Union was a shared burden of responsibility on a global level. The United Kingdom contributed to a great extent by helping shape a European Union foreign policy that is compatible and complementary to American objectives.

Additionally, the American officials view the European Union as a supplier of forces around the world that would supplement NATO –directed American assets (such as maintaining a permanent carrier in the Persian Gulf)[14]. However, since the European countries have been recently reducing defense budgets, this hope of supplementing aid has been turned into a harassing issue –according to James Arbuthnot "there is a risk that NATO will become an irritant for the Americans, rather than a partner of choice"[15].

There has long been a strong cooperation between the US and the UK in military fields: nuclear weapons, intelligence-sharing and special forces. This cooperation has been extensively seen throughout the Afghanistan and Iraq interventions. The Libyan war was an example of the American intentions to have the European Union powers deal extensively with such a crisis and their inability to do so.

As far as working with other member states of the EU is concerned, the United Kingdom already has a thorough working relationship with France through the framework of the Lancaster House treaties of 2010. Given the fact that the United Kingdom and France had already secured these treaties, as far as security and defense are concerned, it appears that Brexit might not be such a difficult thing to digest for the British side. The impact is more severe on the CSDP/ESDP side, which would be thus deprived of the British military and logistic resources. Additionally, in the NSS 2015 there are references to the need to extend the defense relationship with other European partners, among which France (already secured through the Lancaster Treaties) and Germany are highly featured.

Believing that Brexit would advance the United Kingdom in its quest for a global position could also decouple it from global powers such as China and India, to name but a few. The latter two are known to have used the relations with the United Kingdom as a means of access to the European Union.

It could be also discussed that for the European Union, the implications of the British exit, on a foreign and defense policy level are not considered tremendously severe, due to the safety net provided by the PESCO project. This project consists of a permanent structured

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[13] Whitman, *op.cit.*, p. 528.
[14] Tim Oliver and Michael John Williams, *Special relationships in flux: Brexit and the future of the US-EU and US-UK relationships*, *International Affairs*, No.92, Vol.3, 2016, p. 562.
[15] *Ibidem.*

cooperation between Germany and France (having the support of Netherlands and Belgium), a mechanism based on bilateral security and cooperation in matters of defense. Such an endeavor aims towards the goal of creating the European Defense Union. Efforts in this regard have already been made by the passing of the "Policy Framework for Systematic and Long-Term Defense Cooperation" in the November 2014 European Council, an instrument which would help ensure convergence between European defense systems. PESCO's legal grounds lie in articles 42, 43 and 44 of the TEU and despite its incipient status, it offers "[EU member states] whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another's a framework to make security and defense deals"[16].

There is a possibility that in the absence of the UK, the EU will use the opportunity to combine the existing political union with the project of the European Defense Union. In order to do this, considerable steps have been taken, ever since the Solana Report of February 2015 – a permanent EU military headquarter had been created in Brussels, levels of funding for common operations have been increased, and there are ongoing plans to make CSDP more efficient and highly effective in order for it to become complementary to NATO.

It is a fact that all throughout time, the United Kingdom has been ambivalent towards the matter of European defense, seeking to delay its advancement, at the same time as contributing to the latter (in the form of military and logistics used in CSDP operations). Thus, the Saint-Malo Summit of 1998 can be considered a compromise in this regard, between the French enthusiasm of creating a defense union and the British support for NATO primacy in defense matters.

In the absence of British opposition, the EU can make (and has already made) considerable steps towards the institutionalizing of European defense, through the creation of a European defense policy – the British have been against creating a European army, a Defense General Headquarter, a common financing mechanism for defense, etc.).

A significant fact is that Brexit also impacts arms and munition industry, as the United Kingdom strongly supported the liberalization of the specific market, while France is showing a rather protectionist view[17].

As far as cooperation on foreign affairs and intelligence is concerned, many British officials have stated the importance of remaining within the European Union – Home Secretary Theresa May re-affirmed that in the context of the existence of the European Arrest Warrant and the regulations on access to intelligence databases, the British presence within the European Union would make the country safer in the face of terrorism and crime. Such a statement is supported by the claims of former national security advisor, Pauline Neville-Jones, who argued that Brexit would have a weakening effect on border control and police cooperation. On the other hand, Sir Richard Dearlove (former head of MI6) argued that such an exit would have little effect on Britain[18]. To further extend the debate on the impact of Brexit, Eliza Manningham-Butler, former head of MI5 warned that "if we isolate ourselves we would lose influence… and put ourselves in great peril"[19]. Paradoxically, when Prime-minister Cameron called for a referendum, his main point was that Britain was safer in the EU rather than outside it.

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[16] Peter van Ham, *Brexit: Strategic Consequences for Europe. A Scenario Study*, Clingendael Report, Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations, February 2016, p. 14, available at https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Brexit%20Report%20February%202016.pdf, accessed 24.09.2016.
[17] Ian Bond, Sophia Besch, Agata Gostynska- Jakubowska, Rem Korteweg, Camino Mortera-Martinez and Simon Tilford, *Europe after Brexit: Unleashed or Undone?*, Center for European Reform, April 2016, pp. 9-11, available at https://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/pb_euafterBrexit_15april16.pdf, accessed 24.09.2016.
[18] ***, "*Security Concerns*",The Economist, 14th May 2016, p. 13, in The Economist, *The Brexit Briefs. Our Guide to Britain's EU Referendum* (Collection of articles on the topic), June 2016, available at https://www.economist.com/.../EconomistBrexitBriefs16.pdf, accessed 23.09.2016.
[19] *Ibidem.*

Brexit supporters reject such concerns, replicating that NATO represents the centerfold of attention to Britain, despite the fact that there are EU civilian missions and tools that have been previously useful to the North-Atlantic Alliance. Additionally, the key element in the tackling of intelligence is the "Five Eyes" group (reuniting former colonies of the British Empire and thus excluding any European influence). Finally, the EU is considered a negative influence, and consequently, relinquished from any security-related concern by Brexiteers due to the fact that the European Court of Justice can rule in security cases (the latter is highly debatable).

Finally, an important effect will also be the strain put on the NATO-EU relationship. Since the focus of defense policy shall be moved towards NATO, institutional tensions are likely to occur (especially due to the low interest manifested by the EU in the accession of Turkey – already a NATO member). This is highly important as there are growing pressures from Washington to have European states assume more responsibility on European defense and security.

Conclusions

Currently, the UK is undergoing a recalibration of its manner of relating to both the EU and the world. This exit needs to be seen as a reassertion of sovereignty, and of its global rather than European position.

The manner of influencing EU decision is no longer through the firm presence in the debates and law-making, but rather through diplomatic means, within the CSDP and EDSP and through the European External Action Service. Consequently, it is probable that in the event of effective withdrawal, a form of cooperation shall be achieved, one that would benefit both the United Kingdom, as well as the European Union, as it would allow the latter to engage actively in military and civilian operations, having the British assets and logistics at hand

BREXIT could engender a redefinition of CSDP in order to make it more efficient, covering all its aspects (operational, political-military, budgetary and diplomatic). Thus, it could lead to further integration within the federalist project.

Apart from generating possible referendum waves all throughout Europe, Brexit can also produce tensions within the United Kingdom, especially in Ireland and Scotland, two areas significant to the British defense. The Northern Ireland issue and the terrorist threat stemming from the respective area could pose problems to national security. On the other hand, Scotland has been strongly opposed to the exit, and it might seek its own referendum in this regard. Additionally, Scotland raises another question concerning national security, as Britain's strategic nuclear force is based in Faslane, Scotland. Should Scotland seek a separation from the United Kingdom, the latter would have to relocate its forces rapidly.

Taking everything into consideration, scholars agree that Brexit has been generating a massive impact on matters of national security and the debate is far from ended since the effective exit mechanism shall only be put into practice in March 2017.

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THE GEOPOLITICAL CONUNDRUM IN THE MIDDLE-EAST

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Abstract: Interrelation among actors, interests and goals in the Middle-East seem to overwhelm socio-political sensitivities arising from a clash between the fundamental ideas, values and principles of the West and Islam. Perhaps islamist terrorism obtains its impetus from the complex web of intermingling factors arising from economic interdependence between the West, Islam and Russia as prompted by Globalization.
This paper is to reveal the study made on geopolitical factors that dictate to interrelation in the Middle East, thereby exposing the supremacy of economic (oil) interdependence over all socio-political sensitivities arising within the region.

Keywords: globalization, interdependence, sensitivities, geopolitical factors, oil.

Introduction

Globalization has been defined as the extension of markets across national frontiers. It is "the continual increase in transnational and worldwide socio-political and economic interactions aided by advances in technology". It is reflective of both intensive and extensive relations involving large and continuous flows of goods and services over long distances around the globe.[1] In their book "Understanding global conflict and cooperation", Nye Jr. and Welch defined globalization as the culmination of worldwide networks of interdependence. They explained that in the span of one generation, global economic interdependence has grown extraordinary as a consequence of enormous technological progress and the entrenchment of policies aimed at opening national economies internally and externally to global competition.[2]

Oil brings together a complex set of intermingling factors. The numerous actors and interests soaring around oil have made international politics more complex as actors pursue a wider range of goals especially human security. The survival, growth and vibrancy of contemporary economic development in fact depends on oil.[3] Energy expert Edward L. Morse argues that oil is situated at the core of modern industrial economy – a major source of energy and key driver of economic growth. It forms 40% of the world's total energy supply.[4] Robert E. Ebel of the US Center for Strategic and International Studies concluded in 2002 that oil is the determinant of wellbeing, national security and international power – it fuels military power, national treasuries and international politics.[5] Economic interdependence generates moral concerns which in turn create social sensitivity – they have an effect on practices, attitudes and wellbeing e.g. Mullahs reaction to pornography and nudity in Afghanistan – or the Saudi - human rights violation in the eyes of American public.[6] The diffusion of ideas, values and principles foments all kinds of social sensitivities.

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[1] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Power and Interdependence,* Pearson, 2012, p. 229.
[2] Josef S. Nye and David A. Welch, *Understanding Global conflict and cooperation,* Pearson, 2014, p. 267.
[3] Michael T Clare, *Blood and Oil,* Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2004. p. 10.
[4] *Ibidem*, p. 7.
[5] *Ibidem,* p. 9.
[6] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence,* Longman Classics, 2012, p. 233.

Still, the west composed of America and its allied nations, and Russia among other great powers come to the Middle East primarily to obtain oil. Having in mind, the existing hostility against Western values, they therefore opt first and foremost, to protect the oil wells and installations located in their respective friendly countries against internal-destabilizing elements. Secondly, they remain covertly positioned to prevent any encroachment or expansion into each other's friendly territories. Accordingly, it seems that Islamist terrorism is a predictable risk pursuant to the maintenance of strategic dominance over any resource-rich country or region and a post-cold war instrument through which the superpowers pursue their resource seeking endeavors without having to confront each other directly.

1. The Primacy of Economic Interdependence

Interdependence is derived from the word dependence, which according to Nye Jr. and Welch, means to be affected to a significant extent by an external force. In the global environment, it refers to situations in which actors from different parts of the international system depend on one another for one thing or the other to the extent that they affect one another positively or negatively. Interdependence among countries and other actors in the global market is characterized by international transactions – flow of money, goods, people and messages across national frontiers.[7] Interdependence with reference to International politics means mutual dependence – a situation of significant reciprocal effects (gains and/or losses) accruing from transactions between transnational actors, countries or actors within different countries. [8]

Jean Jacques Rousseau pointed out that with interdependence comes conflict and friction. He observed that in most cases of economic interdependence there is a tendency for political conflict. He explained that the costs or gains associated with interdependence generate concern on issues or things that local inhabitants care about and invariably affects politics. Accordingly, International transactions i.e. flow of money, goods, services, people and messages across national frontiers, generates effects reflected in gains, costs and constraints on the parties involved in such transactions. It also brings about significant effects on other non-economic aspects that people care about such as religious ideas, values and principles, which invariably affect domestic politics.[9]

The involvement of domestic, transnational and governmental interests in the politics of interdependence has brought about constraints and limitations in the autonomous decision making capacity of all actors. Actors including statesmen (as explained by classical realism) become compelled to consider the implication of adopting a posture that may trigger unintended consequences arising from the posture of other actors. The increasing influence of transnational actors and their ability to influence effects of transactions thus creates the link between domestic and foreign policy. It also provides the rationale behind the increasing incapacity of states to control outcomes as mentioned earlier and makes the notion of national interest increasingly difficult to use effectively in determining or predicting the foreign policy posture of a state. Accordingly, the role of strong state actors like the United States, Britain, France and Japan and the multinational oil companies had been and remain very complex in the politics and security of the Persian Gulf region. For example, the attempt by nationalists in Iran to depose the Shah in 1953 was thwarted by the successful covert intervention of US and Britain to restore his crown.[10] During the Arab oil embargo of 1973, 25% cut in US oil from the Arabs nearly resulted in military intervention in the region as gathered from classified

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[7] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *op. cit.,* p. 273.

[8] *Ibidem*, p. 7.

[9] *Ibidem,* p. 232.

[10] Josef S. Nye and David A. Welch, *Understanding Global conflict and cooperation*,Pearson, 2014, p. 288.

documents released in 2004 revealing that the USA contemplated the use of force in seizing Persian gulf oil fields if they face strangulation. The impending strangulation was (surprisingly) not prevented by the Shah of Iran who was presumed to be a stooge of western interest. Instead, The Shah led other OPEC members to quadruple oil prices.[11] The day was saved by strong multinational oil companies who cushioned the effect of the embargo by providing oil from alternative sources like Venezuela and Indonesia to meet US demand. The multinationals supported US with oil from other suppliers because they are long-term profit maximizers. They recognized the needed for stability and access to the market in order to continue in the course of business. They also feared the nationalization of their companies within troubled areas.[12]

The supremacy and overwhelming constraints imposed by interdependence are found explicit in the trade sanctions on Libya and freezing of their assets in the 1980s, and Iran since the 1979 revolution. These actions though a clear violation of capitalist principles and economic freedom; the US government resorted to their use anyway; bending democratic principles to facilitate the flow of oil.[13] Similarly, the oil for Security arrangement of February 1945 between the great Satan (in the words of the Islamist) and Saudi monarchy is sustained in spite of rejection from Islamists and the risk of arousing violent hostility from those who resent American presence in their midst.

2. Clashing Civilizations or Clashing Interests?

Countries in the Middle East region possess about 60% of the total oil reserves on earth. It is also home to 25 mostly Muslim countries. Arguably therefore, the domain of the Islamic civilization holds the vast energy resource that today forms the backbone of the economies of the Western Civilization.[14] On the other hand, the economies of the Islamic civilization are mostly rentier economies. Revenue generated from the sales of oil forms about 90% of the regions GDP. They therefore depend on the petro-dollars through the sales of oil to meet expenditures on infrastructure and charities. The effect of the plunge from 90 dollars per barrel to 35 dollars per barrel within a period of three months in 2015, sent shock waves to all oil exporting countries. Majority could not accommodate their budgets in the 2015 due to this plunge.

The Middle East countries also depend on western security to maintain their territorial integrity and secure the oil fields and channels. They often obtain more than money in return for oil. They demand support during UN sessions, advanced weapons and military protection.[15] They are thus in the same vain, affected significantly by events in the domain of the western civilization. It is therefore arguable that with regard to socio-political factors, oil politics commands the conduct of interrelation among actors and not ideas, values or principles. Global economic dependence on oil and the vulnerability associated with interruption in oil supply invariably generates commensurate impetus with geopolitical control over the region. Accordingly, the efficacy of clashing ideas, values and principles becomes in doubt when it comes to the impetus driving Islamist terrorism.

Examining the nature of interdependence between the United States of America and the Saudi ruling family and its role in the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan explains the conundrum.

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[11] *Ibidem*, p. 290.
[12] *Ibidem* , p. 291.
[13] Michael T Clare*, Blood and Oil,* Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2004, p. 10.
[14] Josef S. Nye and David A. Welch, *op. cit.,* p. 287.
[15] Michael T. Clare*, op. cit.*, p.10.

2.1. *Saudi Arabia and USA*

America found Saudi Arabia to be the greatest material price and a stupendous strategic power in human history. Thanks to the 60-year concession over an area called *al-Hasa* obtained from Saudi Arabia in 1933. This concession allowed America to establish an offshore drilling company called SOCAL (Standard Oil of California).[16] In return, the Saudi Monarchy received apart from money, a promise to build and develop infrastructure for the country. From this period, the romance commenced in full in February 1943 when President Roosevelt declared the defense of Saudi Arabia vital to the defense of the United States and invoked the Lend –Lease act of 1941 which gave the president an exclusive right to transfer military equipment to any country deemed vulnerable to soviet expansion. By 1945, United States of America represented by President Roosevelt entered into a bourgeoning relationship with the Saudi ruling family represented by King Abdul Aziz,[17] putting in place, a Public Private Partnership to ensure that American Companies could operate within Saudi territory with assurances of profit and security. A permanent American military base was also permitted in *Dhahran*.[18] America and the Saudi Government provided security while the private firms continued with business as usual.

In this relationship, the Saudis for one were protected from stronger neighboring countries like Iraq and Iran and also from internal revolt. By 1951, a Mutual Defense Assistance had been established between the two, giving way for the supply of modern combat planes and other weaponry, intelligence support and military protection in times of aggression. Since then, for the United States, Saudi oil helped it with enough energy to attain a spectacular economic growth and the ability to sustain great armies and air forces,[19] while America continues (till date) to provide security around the Saudi borders near Yemen and Kuwait and other areas considered vulnerable.

A strong relation supervenes between these two civilizations. However, owing to a clash between their respective ideas values and principles, each one confronts moral questions and at times internal revolt from its legitimate citizens. The Saudi nationals are concerned with the presence of infidels on holy lands[20], they saw this relation as a plunder on Saudi riches, corruption and dictation on its rulers and using it to terrorize its Muslim neighbors. On the other hand, sensitivities arise from the American public who sees Saudi Arabia as an oil-rich authoritarian monarchy, resistant to democracy and notorious in the abuse of human rights.[21]

The situation persisted in spite of these sensitivities, thereby affirming the supremacy of economic interdependence over any religious or moral sentiments. Consequently, the Islamists began to agitate against the endless mismanagement and waste of national assets and unholy association with "American infidels" (encouraged by a successful revolution in Iran). This was exacerbated in 1979 with a religious uprising in Mecca, challenging the religious legitimacy of the Saudi royal family and accusing it of transgressing the bounds permitted by Islam. The USA thus intensified their effort in defending the regime by assisting with military training and equipment for the Saudi National Guard, materializing their pledge to protect the Saud Family against all threats including internal revolt from own-legitimate citizens. This marked the beginning of American involvement in domestic issues of Saudi Arabia and the aggravation of its disdain by the Islamist ideologists.

Similarly, irrespective of ideas, values and principles, the United States of America seem to support any friendly government that allows their access to oil. They have supported

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[16] *Ibidem,* p. 30.
[17] *Ibidem*, p. 35.
[18] *Ibidem,* pp. 33-36.
[19] *Ibidem* , pp. 37-38.
[20] *Ibidem*, p. 43.
[21] *Ibidem*, pp. 51-53.

the government of Iran from soviet continued presence in its machinated autonomous – Azerbaijan in 1946. USA stood by the Shah of Iran following his deposition by the Iranian Parliament in 1941. His removal gave way for the nationalization of USA oil companies, due to which, the USA intervened and restored their position in a coup supported by the west in 1953.[22] But in 1981, the same United States stood against Iran for agitating to replicate its 1979 revolution in Saudi Arabia. The rationale, Reagan told reporters was to make sure that Saudi Arabia was not taken over by a regime that would server the relationship and shut the oil wells.[23] After the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the eventual hostage crisis, all military and economic exchanges were prohibited between the West and Iran. Diplomatic relations were also severed in 1980.[24] This goes to prove that the relationship was purely based on Iran's role in protecting USA oil interest in the region – without recourse to any dispute in their respective ideas, values and principles. If Khomeini could serve that interest perhaps his regime wouldn't have been listed as a sponsor of terrorism.

Similarly, United States also supported Iraq against Iran in 1988 but was later to wage an all-out war against it in 1991 after its army invaded Kuwait, automatically making it a threat to US interest and a considerable concern over global oil supply. The USA committed up to 500,000 troops and billions worth of military equipment including a permanent military base in Kuwait to contain Saddam Hussein's forces and roll them back between 1990 and 2000.[25] USA has continued to protect and support any regime (Kuwait tanker ships in 1987 etc.) agent to American strategy in the Middle East – disapproving soviet expansion and safeguarding continued flow of oil, while maintaining stability in the region and avoiding confrontation with Moscow.[26] The quagmire however, goes on and on but the fact suggests that both the USA and Russia seek to guarantee the uninterrupted supply of oil from their respective allies. They both seek to ensure the security or ascension of a regime that would not deny the flow of oil from the region to the west – whether it is Islamic, democratic, and repressive or not.

2.2.   Al-Qaida to the rescue

Having lost claim to the Quran or Hadith by virtue of their ties with the USA, the Saudi ruling family adopted a strategy of giving charity to rebellious groups and involving their scholars in the management of religious institutions.[27] It cultivated them to pursue a more compelling call –to deter and repel soviet expansion into Afghanistan in 1979. Islamic zealots were trained and equipped including Osama's al-Qaida, to support Afghan rebels (Taliban) against a soviet backed government in Afghanistan. The success in this operation saw a continued use of these elements against soviet expansion and heralded an unfortunate pattern of giving or rather "paying" aid to militant groups, thereby giving impetus to al-Qaida and the Taliban.[28] The trend saw an increase in their sophistication and logistic capability. In 1988 al-Qaida was reported to bomb American Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. By 1990, the armed militias (offshoot from the Afghan war in 1979) were confident to confront Iraqi forces in defense of Saudi Arabia. The refusal of the Saudi ruling family to accept their offer humiliated al-Qaida, which in turn avowed to humiliate the baleful relationship between the US and the Saud family, thereby making it their (Saudi Ruling family and USA) implacable foe. Since then, Al-Qaida has claimed responsibility for a series of terrorist acts including the bombing of the SANG headquarters in 1995 - the Khobar towers, quarters to the Operation

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[22] Yetiv Steve A., *op.cit.*, p. 28.
[23] Michael T. Clare, *op. cit*., p. 48.
[24] Yetiv, Steve A., *op. cit.*, p. 31.
[25] Michael T. Clare, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
[26] Yetiv, Steve A., *op. cit.*, p. 30.
[27] Michael T. Clare, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
[28] Michael T. Clare, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-48.

Southern watch military personnel, the US Cole in 2000 and ultimately, the WTC in 2001 to mention a few.[29]

Conclusion

Global economic prosperity depends on the availability of oil – the most viable and versatile energy source in the world. Vulnerability associated with interruption in oil supply invariably generates commensurate impetus with strategic dominance over the Middle East - the custodian of 60% of the world's known reserves of oil. Socio-political sensitivities arising from interdependence with this region thus remain risks to be managed because oil must flow at all cost, and by all means necessary.

Strong military alliance between America and Saudi Arabia and the use of the Taliban and Al-Qaida against soviet expansion seems to indirectly arm and fund elements that have remained a colossal challenge to global peace and security. It proves that western resource seekers team up with "radical, non-democratic and repressive elements" to secure the flow of oil from their respective clients in the region. The use of unconventional elements in strategic dominance over the region-including violation of global norms and Islamist terrorism therefore reflect new methods of great power struggle and new global tools for pursuing socio-political and economic opportunities.

Islamist terrorism is thus not in the interest of the Islamic civilization, but in the interest of a phantom exploiting the sensitive issues between the western and Islamic civilizations - using them as instruments in the pursuance of credible intentions for continued presence of allied and other forces to safeguard access to cheap fossil fuel and its continuous flow to powerful industrial economies.

The impetus driving Islamist Terrorism is therefore from a clash between the bourgeoning interests that seek dominance over the region. A lasting solution to global peace and security will be viable only with due regard to socio-political sensitivities arising from economic interdependence.

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11. SYED Qutb Syed, *Milestones*, Kazi Publications, 1964.

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[29] *Ibidem*, pp. 53-55.

CURRENT GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT, POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS ON ROMANIA'S REGIONAL INTERESTS

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Abstract: *The actual security environment, characterized by significant military and geopolitical tensions, affects, at least at a regional level, politico-military and economic interests of Romania. Of the general politico-military context, geographic location, the Black Sea region which had become an important confluence area among interests of the Russian Federation, regional countries and other regional and Euro-Atlantic bodies, makes Romania the eastern border of the EU and NATO. Moreover, the Russia's unpredictable actions, Turkey's potential instability, with complex implications in the region, Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East security challenges, will lead countries of the region, as well as EU, NATO and of course US, to reconsider their positions and future action approaches. As a result, the regional context requires Romania to assume its role as pivotal country and the responsibility to protect its interests, primarily by itself, as forms of affirmation and strengthening its role as a regional pole of stability, not only in relation with the EU and NATO, but also in strategic partnership with the US.*

Keywords: *tensions, confluence, regional context, regional interests, regional pole of stability.*

Introduction

Based on the theory of Sir Halford John Mackinder, in reference to "the pivot area", called by him, the Heartland[1], and extrapolating the geographical position of Romania in correspondence with him, I think we can say that our country is one of the most favorable locations, such as to transform it, for several reasons, in a regional center of gravity. For example, the central disposition of Romania in Europe[2], positioning in the vicinity of delineating borders the Russian Federation and in particular the immediate vicinity of Crimea makes Romania lie in a real confluence zone between East and West, the more advanced Euro-Atlantic position from which it can monitor and exercise control over regional political-military developments and more. Thus, we can say that its positioning in the region in such a key location, its potential, natural resources, vulnerabilities and not least, threats which will have to face as a result of its visions and Euro-Atlantic approaches, are likely to highlight the quality of Romania's pivotal country in the regional context and, consequently, the necessity of assuming by it, the responsibilities deriving from this quality.

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[1] Sir Halford John MACKINDER, *„Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction"*, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, 1942, p. xviii.
[2] Ana-Maria ENE, *Romania's Central European Position*, at http://www.e-scoala.ro/geografie/pozitia_central_europeana_romania.html, retrieved on: 12.09.2016

1. The Black Sea region in the current geopolitical context

Black Sea by geographical location and membership of Romania in this area is the largest of the regional boundaries of the area of responsibility of our country, mainly as a state on the eastern border of the EU and NATO. However, the Black Sea area is a zone of confluence of a complex and fluctuating amalgam of interests. In it, the Russian Federation is one of the actors who managed the expansion of major ramifications both in the European and in the West and East. Its actions in the past two years in the Black Sea region constituted and continue to constitute major threats to regional security environment. Relevant in this respect are the annexation of Crimea and accelerated militarization of it, the involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine[3] which likely to be permanent and, eventually, turning into a frozen conflict, breaches of international law, discussing the international order, preservation frozen conflicts with the possibility of "warming" them at any time, involvement in the conflict in Syria, the location of air bases in Syria and Iran, the temporary freezing of economic and military relations with Turkey as a result of felling in November 2015 by Turkish air force a Russian aircraft, and reconfiguring their after failed military putsch in Turkey.

The perspective of nuclear weapons and of operative-tactical missile systems (type ISKANDER)[4] deployment in Crimea (action so far unconfirmed) jeopardizes the negotiating process directed to restore a climate of mutual trust between NATO and the Russian Federation.

Turkey, at its turn, is another important regional player, the events of this summer (coup attempt of July 15 to 16, followed by adoption of politico-military and social measures, valued by some analysts of Turkey foreign policy, as being centered more on the personal interest of the country head, how on the country[5]), raises questions marks on the secular country status, respect for fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, membership to NATO and is joining the European Union.

On the other hand, Turkey's involvement in the conflict in Syria, an action that culminated in the launch over the Syrian territory, in the common border zone, the "Euphrates Shield"[6] Operation, shows the determination of Ankara to impose its interests in the region. The Operation stated purpose was achieving a buffer zone on Syrian territory that would limit and even stop the Daesh/Islamic State terrorist actions against Turkish territory. It seems that the Turkish authorities were on the agenda also other added targets that would be targeted attempt to prevent getting the community Kurdish southeastern Turkey and northern Syria an extensive autonomy[7], historical problem of Turkey. These actions are intended, most likely, preventing the creation of a Kurdish state, which could include not only territories in

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[3] Iulian CHIFU, *Putin recognized for the first time Russian aggression in East Europe,* at http://www.evz.ro/putin-a-recunoscut-in-premiera-agresiunea-militara-a-trupelor-rus.html, retrieved on: 17.09.2016

[4] ***, *Ukraine military say Russia deploys Iskander air defense missiles in Crimea*, at https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-military-say-russia-deploys-iskander-air-defense-missiles-in-crimea-374075.html, retrieved on: 10.05.2016

[5] Laurentiu SÎRBU, *The faults of Erdogan's foreign policy,* at http://www.euro-stiri.ro/esecurile-politicii-externe-a-turciei-lui-erdogan,* retrieved on: 20.06.2016.

[6] Adrian PĂTRUȘCĂ, *Operation „Euphrates Shield": does America cede in the front of Turkey's defiance?,* at http://www.evz.ro/operatiunea-scutul-eufratului-cedeaza-america-in-fata-sfidarii-turciei.html, retrieved on: 25.08.2016

[7] ***, STRATFOR, *Turkey More Preoccupied by Kurds Than Syrian Government*, at https://sputniknews.com/politics/201604191038278550-stratfor-turkey-syria-kurds/, retrieved on: 25.08.2016

southeastern Turkey, but also in northern Syria, Iraq and western Iran[8]. The regional security environment developments may indicate that a potential hegemonic tendencies arising from Turkey[9], such as to ensure that its imposition power pole of the Muslim world[10]. The current economic and military power of Turkey, the political determination of the ruling party, the dynamic changes of the situation in Europe and Middle East, evolutions in the relationship among NATO / US and the Russian Federation, on the one hand, and flirtation between Turkey and Russian Federation, Turkey and the EU respectively, on the other hand are sufficient grounds, accumulated while ensuring both the framework and the trigger for the revival desire to take over the leadership of the Muslim world and the shift towards a new form organization caliphate. Also evolving in this regard will certainly generate both indications of potential changes in the geostrategy of Turkey on the Black Sea, and possible effects on related eastern Mediterranean Sea areas, and thus the Middle East.

Future actions of the Russian Federation and Turkey, characterized by a relatively high degree of unpredictability require that states in the region, including NATO and the US, as a strategic partner of Romania, to reconsider how to act in specific situations of possible asymmetric or hybrid actions deployment. Today, mainly in the Black Sea region, we are witnessing a new form of cooling and even straining relations between NATO and the Russian Federation. This inevitably makes Romania to be on the line this "cold front" that begins to materialize increasingly more in the relationship between the two main generating entities.

A characteristic of the security environment in the Black Sea, at least in the last two years, is given by the continued trend of degradation of geopolitical balance and of military and non-military actions which, having developments and significant effects, visibly affect the interests of economic development and Romania's national security. On the one hand, this fact requires for Romania the necessity to find ways and means for developing the ability to anticipate potential threats (generated by each specific global security environment, and in particular, the threats created by the Russian Federation in the Black Sea region, through its strategy and policy and also its military actions, specific mostly hybrid war) and, on the other hand, taking a proactive approach to prevent and counteract them. To achieve the current geopolitical context, objectives conducive to promoting regional security and enforcement of security policies is necessary and important for Romania to confirm its status of a reliable partner and pole of stability for the Black Sea region within the EU, NATO and in conjunction with strategic partners.

2. The main risks and threats in the Black Sea Region

Although in principle the completion of the Cold War opened the way to a more relaxed approach for relationship between NATO and Russia, invading Georgia in August 2008 raised the first serious doubts about Russia's readiness to cooperate with the nearby countries and to renounce fight to get a status of global power pole. Russia's action against Georgia in 2008 led to a state of political and decisional unprecedented paralysis at the level of Euro-Atlantic policy makers, mainly due to desire for not returns at previous strained relation. This aspect was however very effectively exploited by Russia, by imposing control

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[8] The Washinton Post, by Ishaan Tharoor, *Turkey's messy war in the Middle East, explained*, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/07/27/the-messy-war-turkey-is-now-fighting-in-the-middle-east/, retrieved on: 25.08.2016

[9] Marcel Răduţ SELIŞTE, *The New Ottoman Empire – The Sultan Erdogan, the riot of janissary and stupid crusaders*, at http://www.activenews.ro/stiri-politic/Noul-Imperiu-Otoman-%E2%80%93-Sultanul-Erdogan-revolta-ienicerilor-si-cruciatii-cei-stupizi-135089, retrieved on: 25.08.2016.

[10] Călin RADU, *Turkey, the new geopolitical pivot for the Middle East,* at http://geopolitics.ro/turcia-noul-pivot-geopolitic-din-orientul-mijlociu/, retrieved on: 14.04.2016.

over the two enclaves South Ossetia and Abkhazia, then reaching a very favorable compromise for it and a quite unfavorable situation for Georgia[11], which accepted a frozen conflict on its territory, by force. That action of Russian Federation surprised in the same way as earlier, when, in March 1992, war between Russia and Republic of Moldova[12], generated Transnistria, a buffer zone in another frozen conflict, which impeded an indeterminate time a possible attempt of unification between Republic Moldova and Romania. Existence of an autonomous region named Transnistria inside of Republic of Moldova, which although is not recognized by the no EU states, had its opportunity to announce independence a year before of R. Moldova, offers primarily for Russian Federation, to the extent it will need, an important lever for thwarting NATO enlargement to the East[13]. Moreover, through the voting power of this "turntables", can influence political decisions in Chisinau, which will have as a result a retaining in a "gray area" of R. Moldova. I believe that this will have a possible effect not only the deferment of Euro-Atlantic integration process of the Republic of Moldova, but also will be directed to thwarting Romania efforts, for provide the best favorable framework for union with these. On the other hand, the view expressed by Maxim Shevchenko, an adviser to President Putin, brings into question the idea of achieving a possible union on grounds ethnic between Moldova and Romania, but this should be an "exchange currency" which would justify an acceptance as Transnistria will become part integrated of the Russian Federation[14]. Once, such a solution would be accepted, will help the Russian Federation to obtain, without major costs, at least two important advantages. One of them would be to gaining control over Ukraine and Moldova simultaneously. A second one, obtained by reciprocity, due to of union between Romania and R. Moldova on ethnically considerations, it can be used in order to obtain the favorable justifications for its intervention in Crimea, and to assure a validation of its actions by international bodies. A success in this regard could result in the recognition of this territory as belonging to the Russian Federation and, why not, then under the auspices of the Minsk Agreement 2 may be generated either premises favorable for a federalization of Ukraine or in the light of developments of situations into region, will materialize an extended autonomy for Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Because acceptance of such statements from NATO and the EU[15], are unlikely to happen, at least in the medium term, a fulfillment of the objectives to achieve unification between Romania and Moldova, into a near future, seems that remains uncertain. However we can say that the Black Sea region enjoyed by the opportunity of a relative relaxations of political and military tensions after Cold War era was ended, a situation which was assumed to be a revival of East-West cooperation, able to, honest, ensure long-term development of economy, enlargement of commune markets, and free trade to at regional.

Although it seemed that the situation at regional level was oriented to a positively development, especially after the way in which the Russian Federation involved itself in

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[11] Nicolae FILIPESCU, *The Georgia's war consequences,* at http://www.revista22.ro/consecintele-razboiului-din-georgia-5142.html, retrieved on: 14.10.2010
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[14] *** moldova.org, *(Incredible Statemens) Putin's Councelor: Rusia could support Moldova's unification with Romania but EU is opposing,* at http://www.timpul.md/articol/(declaraii-incredibile)-consilier-al-lui-putin-rusia-ar-putea-susine-unirea-moldovei-cu-romania-dar-ue-este-impotriva-79293.html, retrieved on: 18.09.2016
[15] Lilia TRACI, AGERPRES, *Pro-Kremlin German expert Alexander Rahr about an eventual unification of Moldova and Romania: EU will not allow,* at *https://www.agerpres.ro/externe/2016/06/07/expert-german-pro-kremlin-despre-eventuala-unire-a-republicii-moldova-cu-romania-ue-nu-va-permite-11-54-27,* retrieved on: 18.09.2016

preparing and ensuring the best conditions of security and cooperation during the Olympics in Sochi, all hopes were dashed by the abusive actions of Russia Federation, executed for conquering Crimea peninsula and by the subsequent outbreak of the conflict in eastern of Ukraine[16], Donbas region. After this, a series of threats regionally represented and by a possible "warming" of one of the so-called frozen conflicts, targeting self-proclaimed republics such as Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, would should impose a necessity for theirs reconsideration, since each of them, even taken separately, could lead to a further destabilization of the region. Such regional destabilization could have even much more diverse effects on the evolution and interests of all Black Sea countries. It is obvious that it would not be desirable a occurrence of such situations, especially now, when Europe is experiencing unprecedented exacerbations as those related the scourge of terrorism, new variety of threats asymmetric, with the effects of hybrid war's actions, and not finally, the pressure of the successive waves of migrants, the immigrants and the refugees. These vulnerabilities EU, by extension, the war in Syria and the global expansion of the areas controlled by the many phalange of the Islamic State, were conducive to trends revisionist[17] and Russia's attempts to return into the race for reassertion as regional power and who will looks like having a capacity and potential for action at global level. Such reaction surprise us much more because, beginning from 1991, were initiated a series of steps with high hopes of success, for revival and strengthen of the NATO-Russia dialogue. That was followed by a consolidation, achieved through the creation of the Permanent Joint Council, and completion in Paris in May 1997 the Founding Act, based on who have been established these aspects regarding relations, cooperation and mutual security. Through its provisions, both Parties undertake, inter alia, to assume the responsibility to respect sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states[18]. As a continuation of all efforts directed towards establish a continuous political dialogue and for positioning Russia on a par with countries within NATO, especially as expression of the Rome Declaration, the NATO-Russia Council it was created in May 2002. Subsequently a number of joint constructive actions were taken, actions which have developed favorably until 2008, then when, due to the Russian intervention in Georgia, the dialogue was suspended. Despite subsequent efforts to relaunch the dialog, and even though some of these successfully materialized in this regard, so soon at the end of the same year and also in the coming years, Russia has continued to show its hegemonic tendencies and revisionist[19], evidenced in the 2014 by forced annexation of Crimean peninsula. This mode of action of Russia, in conjunction with tensions arising from the conflict in eastern Ukraine, the phenomena of refugees' migration, situation developments in Turkey makes the Black Sea basin an increasing instability zone, which had generated a number of new security risks. The problem is that if they are not managed effectively, these can degenerate into notable threats not only against Black Sea littoral states, including Romania, but also to the security and interests of other Western and European countries. I support this assessment exemplifying the fact that Crimean Peninsula was annexed by Russian Federation using techniques and tactics specific to a hybrid conflict, but also as a result of thorough preparation and planning process, which started long before started action[20]. Also, the geopolitical environment and the level of

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[16] Valentin NAUMESCU, *The war of East enter the critical decisions faze*, at http://www.contributors.ro/global-europa/razboiul-estului-intra-in-faza-deciziilor-critice/, retrieved on: 05.09.2016

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[18] Romania's Permanent Delegation to NATO, *NATO Partnership; NATO-Rusia Council*, at https://nato.mae.ro/node/271, retrieved on: 29.09.2016

[19] Liliana BARBĂROŞIE, interview with Iulian CHIFU, *NATO military bases, Eastern flank and Russia*, at http://www.europalibera.org/a/27220831.html, retrieved on: 29.09.2016

[20] Anne-Marie BLAJAN, *Crimea at one year after annexation: A territory definitely lost by Ukraine. The President Putin confirms that he planned the annexation three weeks before referendum*, at

regional security, favorable for development, for cooperation, trade and free exchange existing at the beginning of 2014, were deeply affected, at least in the medium term as a result of the accelerated militarization effort of Crimean[21], reorganizing military and structural of that peninsula, characterized by military point of view by concentrating new types of means and combat equipment deployed in different locations situated in the peninsula. This arsenal includes five naval platforms carrying the KALIBR[22] missile system, respectively frigate class ADMIRAL GRIGOROVICH, two fast patrol boats BUYAN class and three KILO II class submarines, which are deployed already in the Black Sea. Also, Russia has re-dislocated in Crimea new types of radar, aircraft and coastal defense systems. All these measures are part of a plan to strengthen southwestern border, including the creation of new military bases near the border with Ukraine[23], elaborated by Moscow. The conflict in eastern Ukraine, whose development may divert, ultimately, to a new frozen conflict, despite sustained efforts for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the vicinity of the contact line, continues the series of main risks and threats over the Black Sea region. It is somewhat obvious that Russia continues to use this conflict, in particular to stop any possibility the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine. Knowing that as long as a state has disputes with its neighbors, will be difficult if not impossible to join Euro-Atlantic organisms it will may cause Ukraine's transformation into a buffer zone between East and West, which it would be quite advantageous for Russia, which do not wants to have a neighbor prosperous, safe and stable in Ukraine. Therefore, I considered that we can estimate the possible transformation of the ongoing conflict from eastern Ukraine, after a period of time, in a frozen conflict, ready to be reactivated based on Moscow's strategic needs. However, this issue raises another set of questions, including: How long will could Russia to support its economy[24], society, military deployments, the infrastructure reconstruction in main separatist regions of Donetsk and Lugansk from eastern Ukraine? Considering the fall in oil prices - a phenomenon with important negative impact on Russia's economy and budget revenues - it is possible that, at some point, the conflict in eastern Ukraine to return against Russia[25]. Moreover if Moscow authorities and separatists pro- Russians in Donetsk and Lugansk will not has the economic capacity to support the two regions, may face a situation that could generate discontent among the local population and thus a reorientation towards the Kiev administration. Another aspect regarding evolution the geopolitical and military situation from the basin Black Sea, and force projection in areas outside the region is the Russian military operation in Syria. Another aspect which is refers at evolutions the geopolitical and military situation from the basin Black Sea, and force projection in areas outside this region, is the Russian military operation

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http://cursdeguvernare.ro/crimeea-la-un-an-de-la-anexare-un-teritoriu-pierdut-definitiv-de-ucraina-presedintele-putin-confirma-ca-planifica-anexarea-cu-trei-saptamani-inainte-de-referendum.html, retrieved on: 19.08.2016

[21] Armand;GOSU, Octavian MANEA, *Crimea's annexation change the power balance in the Black Sea,* at http://www.revista22.ro/anexarea-crimeei-schimba-balanta-de-putere-in-marea-neagra-51651.html, retrieved on: 11.09.2016

[22] Andrei AKULOV *Kalibr: Russia's Naval System Upping Cruise Missile Game*, at http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2016/05/24/kalibr-russia-naval-system-upping-cruise-missile-game.html, retrieved on: 30.05.2016

[23] Oleg COJOCARU, *Russia's Page: Shoigu link the consolidation of south-western flank with the instability in Ukraine,* at http://www.paginaderusia.ro/nici-usturoi-n-a-mancat-soigu-explica-consolidarea-flancului-sud-vestic-de-instabilitatea-din-ucraina/, retrieved on: 01.09.2016

[24] Mihai DRĂGHICI, Mediafax, *Russia not recognize pro-Russian areas in Ukraine in order to not give West pretexts, but support them,* at *http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/rusia-nu-recunoaste-zonele-proruse-din-ucraina-pentru-a-nu-da-pretexte-occidentului-dar-le-sustine-15402712*, retrieved on: 11.09.2016

[25] Gabriela ANGHEL, *The Russian roulette*, at http://m.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/international/%E2%80%9Eruleta-ruseasca%E2%80%9C-din-panoplia-kremlinului-355759, retrieved on: 22.09.2016

in Syria. The initial declared goal for launching of this operation was to help sustain to power of Bashar al-Assad and to support his regime and to support it in the fighting against the rebels opponents.

Another goal of the presence of Russian Armed Forces in the Mediterranean Sea and implicitly Russia's efforts to consolidate its air and naval bases in Syria, even though this was later announced[26], is addressing to create the conditions for protecting Russia's medium-to long-term interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Middle East, as well as making their military presence permanent in these areas. At the same time, Russians wanted to show to the international community that they are a super power, capable to manage a conflict outside their borders effectively due to modern precision combat capabilities. A quite explicit threat in the region is posed not necessarily by the precision of the weapons, possibly a 50-100 m error off the target, but the big number of operational platforms already existing in the Black Sea and the Caspian, capable to launch long range missiles from concealed spots even over other countries' territories. This threat could become even more evident considering that still more similar platforms are in course of getting operational and ready to add in the near future to the already existing arsenal in the Black Sea.

Coming back in the Black Sea region, a new aspect meant to impair the regional stability and security even more was the edgy moment of the relations between the Russia and Turkey following the shooting down of a Russian Su-24M on 24 November 2015[27] by a Turkish aircraft at the Turkish-Syrian border. Consequently, after exchanging harsh declarations with the Turkish party, Russia decided to limit, even cease the mutual economical, military and political relations that also included the Black Sea area. Later on, following the failed coup in Turkey, a gradual rapprochement in the Russian-Turkish cooperation can be witnessed, including economic and military, mainly due to the apologies addressed by the Turkish president to Russia.

Russia's interferences in other Black Sea states' domestic affairs (Moldova, Georgia) and its impact upon these countries represent a destabilizing potential, capable of developing further regional tensions. For example, Moldova has to face the Transnistrian issue and the permanent presence in that separatist region of a Russian Operational Task Group. Moldova is still uncertain as to its foreign political course and while swinging between West and East, and keeping in an unfortunate "grey zone" it may be assimilated into a virtual "battlefield" of different interests and state entities. [28] This struggle of Moldova in making a decision whether to step resolutely towards EU integration or hang on Russia's wake can be exemplified by simply approaching certain issues that touch or even interfere in some of Romania's regional interests. Although Moldova has declared its intention of joining EU back in 2009, it was incapable to materialize this goal mainly because of the deadlock created by the political struggle in the country. Neither the pro-EU parties nor those sticking to the socialist and communist doctrines could impose their decisions upon the foreign policy of Moldova. This aspect, added to the endemic corruption at the highest levels and the overthrow of the government halted the financing programs initiated in common with foreign financial authorities and gave way to attempts both from the West and from Russia to integrate and

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[26] Emily BENAMMAR *Syria conflict: Why is Russia's president Vladimir Putin supporting Bashar al-Assad's regime?,* at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-09-06/why-is-russia-supporting-assad3f/4937028#russia, retrieved on: 11.09.2016

[27] The National Journal, *Vladimir Putin: The Su-24 shooting down is a knife in the back,* at http://jurnalul.ro/stiri/externe/vladimir-putin-doborarea-avionului-su-24-este-un-cutit-infipt-in-spate-701810.html, retrieved on: 22.09.2016

[28] STRATFOR, *Europe and Russia Compete in Moldova,* at https://www.stratfor.com/video/europe-and-russia-compete-moldova,* retrieved on: 22.09.2016

keep Moldova under their spheres of influence. [29]

In this context, Romania, in its willingness to support Moldova's efforts to join the EU, has been the most constant and wholehearted supporter of it. Support came on several fronts, whether it was about easing the visa regime, facilitating formalities for access of youth to education, freedom to trade and to practice in Romania, financial and economic assistance, political support for the decision makers in Chisinau, as they seek to integrate, at least at the administrative level, some European models and, not least, through guarantees and support for the policy makers of the importance of Euro-Atlantic integration of Moldova into the EU and NATO. Despite the fact that both the European Union and Romania have pledged to financially support Moldova being actively involved between 2011-2013, Russia continues to exercise control over both the politics and finances of this country while the presence of armed self-proclaimed Transnistrian republic has also its effect on decisions taken in Chisinau.[30]

Russia has increased its military presence in Georgia in the two separatist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Additionally, depending on its interests, Russia can easily revive frozen conflicts in the Black Sea region (Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transdnistria) even only as a constraint decision.

Additionally to the above risks, which have the Russian Federation as their primary source, we can add institutional corruption, poverty, illegal immigration, organized crime and terrorism. Internal political instability of the Black Sea states may impact social security (by lowering the living standards of the population and increasing crime), economic security (producing incoherent economic policies), military security (insufficient funds to achieve modernization programs and to equip the armed forces, weakening the countries defense capacity through its own means and forces) and environment security. The type and efficiency of economic and energetic activities can reduce energy dependence of the Black Sea states and EU on energy imports from Russia[31].

The Black Sea is situated at the junction of important potential energy corridors, which once concluded could connect traditional EU consumers with other resources suppliers than Russia. Also the Black Sea is a junction between the Caspian and Mediterranean regions through which an important transport corridor appears that can ensure energetic independence of many Eastern European countries from the current monopoly of Russian gas. This generated an economic competition involving the riparian states, the world great powers and international organizations for access to the exploitation and transportation of Eurasia energy resources to the EU.

Taking into consideration the current context characterized by political instability and uncertainty regarding compliance with international law, with agreements and treaties already ratified by actors with economic or interests of other nature in the region could affect investments and thus the development of regional energetic architecture by states that are involved in the competition[32].

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[29] STRATFOR, *Moldova's Instability Could Be Romania's Opportunity*, at https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/moldovas-instability-could-be-romanias-opportunity, retrieved on: 20.09.2016
[30] STRATFOR, *The Next Stage of Russia's Resurgence: Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova,* at https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/next-stage-russias-resurgence-ukraine-belarus-and-moldova, retrieved on: 22.092016
[31] Mariana PAPATULICA *Black Sea Area at the Crossroad of the Biggest Global Energy Players' Interests. The Impact on Romania*, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212567115002403, webpage viewed on: 22.09.2016
[32] STRATFOR, *The Problems Foreign Powers Find in the Balkans,* https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/problems-foreign-powers-find-balkans, webpage viewed on: 21.09.2016

3. References regarding the character and object of Romania's regional interests

Talking about "interest" as a notion with a general meaning, reaching the interest or the passing from a level of aspiration to something real, concrete will be realized making several steps. Simplifying everything to only a description of a process, the succession of the steps will involve an interdependence between the result and responses to the following questions: what are we expecting to gain doing the next action – *identification of the interest;* what should we make to gain what we have planned – *establishing the objectives;* how can we gain what we have planned - *identification of ways/courses of actions;* what could we use to do the planned action – *choosing the tools and means which help us to be effective and to gain the wished effect.*

Extrapolating to the specificity of the Romanian *National Defense Strategy for 2015-2019 – A Strong Romania in Europe and the World,* we can see there are similarities in the sequence of steps that lead to defining the national interest and objectives and formulating main directions of action to ensure the national security[33], depending on the threats, risks and vulnerabilities identified during the analysis of the security environment evolution. The conceptual approach of the notion "national interest", as it is defined by the National Defense Strategy for 2015-2019, provides the theoretical framework necessary for the elaboration of a comparative analysis of vulnerabilities, threats and potential risks, and those courses of action considered optimal for achieving national security objectives internal or external. In addition, the start of actions devoted to define the state's identity and defining characteristics as a complementary form of ensuring its survival[34], as well as assuming the obligation for the state to provide equally not only the safety of citizens in its territory, but also for the safety of Romanians everywhere they are living[35], highlights both Romania's intention to establish a certain level of ambition and its determination to assert its position and materialize its role in the EU. As previously mentioned, if the risks, threats and vulnerabilities that may impede the achievement of a specific national objective are known, by assessing the implications and connections between them, based on a process of analysis, we can determine the optimal courses of action. To the extent that we want to address the risks, threats and vulnerabilities, not in terms of their nature, but from the point of view of existing or potential generating factors at the regional level, it is necessary to identify those political, diplomatic, military and / or conjectural actions put into practice by riparian States, with or without intent to harm national interests of another state in the region, can still greatly affect the achieving of its national objectives. In this context, it is clear that means for ensuring the national security will be subsequent to the chosen courses of action.

So, for determining in what extent the current geopolitical context can affect Romania's regional interests firstly we will have to identify which of them interfere with the interests of other regional actors, and subsequently, to what extent the effects of these interactions may affect Romania's stability and national security interests. To address this requirement, we have to identify an appropriate way of analysis, or a proper instrument which can be used to perform analysis. For this purpose, we will use the concept of *regional interest* as a tool of analysis for emphasizing in what extent Romania's position in the most advanced area of confluence of major interests between East and West may affect the achievement of

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[33] Romanian Presidential Administration, *The National Defense Strategy for 2015-2019 – A Powerful Romania in Europe and the World*, point 13, page 6, Bucharest, 2015.

[34] Cătălina MIHAI, EurActiv.ro, *Klaus Iohannis announces a country's project which will establish the level of ambition of Romania inside EU*, at http://www.euractiv.ro/politic-intern/klaus-iohannis-anunta-un-proiect-de-tara-care-va-stabili-nivelul-de-ambitie-al-romaniei-in-ue-4833, retrieved on: 29 august 2016

[35] Romanian Presidential Administration, *The Guide of National Defense Strategy for 2015-2019,* CSAT decision No. 128 on 10 decembrie 2015, The Glossary of the main concepts and terms used by *the National Defense Strategy,* page 9, Bucharest, 2015.

some goals derived from national interest.

Since the National Defense Strategy are established security objectives, mainly for 2015-2019, which are aimed mainly to ensure and strengthen the country's capability to defense its territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty and also to ensure the safety and security of its people[36], the measures to fulfill this goals will be the basis for determining the level of ambition and key elements that will support the promotion of the national interest. We can therefore assess that Romania's *regional interests* represent at a conceptual level the outcome of the analysis of some specific aspects of the national interest. Common object of regional interests is to identify, validate and apply the principles and methods capable of ensuring, in their application, the accomplishing of those objectives that contribute to supporting, promoting and ensuring the achievement of national interest.

4. **Development of the security environment and the potential impacts on Romania's regional interests**

The importance of maintaining a good neighbor relations and enhancing cooperation with regional states, not only in the current dynamic security environment described by inherent tensions, vulnerabilities and risks, imposed for Romania the need to initiate steps for establishing its level of ambition, place and role in NATO and EU.

Identifying, defining and taking these elements is essential for completing the state project[37] which Romania wants to be destined for emphasizing stability and predictability of the state as part of EU and NATO. The effects generated by the Russia's abusive annexation and intense militarization of Crimea, the eastern Ukraine conflict, the initiation of Turkey's ample process of political, administrative and military reorganization in bent for ideological reorientation of it, after the events of July 15 2016[38], the phenomenon of endemic corruption and political instability characteristic for the Black Sea riparian states[39], generated a high mistrust between riparians, raising significant degree of uncertainty and insecurity in the area. Currently, Romania is an attractive country for foreign investors whereas offers of significant advantages for them. The most important of these are related to the fact that Romania is crossed by three important Pan-European corridors, the country has skilled labor force, is favored due to its geographical conditions for tourism development, natural resources, diversified business environment that complies with European standards. Also, in addition to Romania's membership of EU and NATO, and its strategic partnership with US, it has bilateral diplomatic relations with 177 of the 191 UN member states, plus the Holy See, the Sovereign Military Order of Malta and the Palestinian National Authority[40].

A pronounced imbalance of the current regional stability and security could be generated by escalating of eastern Ukraine conflict, intensifying of revisionist actions of Russia, escalation of internal tensions in Turkey, and also triggered by the emergence of actions for denigration, inter-ethnic tensions, the effects of the migration phenomenon and / or

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[36] Romanian Presidential Administration, *The National Defense Strategy for 2015-2019 – A Powerful Romania in Europe and the World*, Chapter I – The defining of national security objectives and interests, subchapter 1.2, National security interests, point 20, page. 8, Bucharest, 2015

[37] idem 36

[38] Jeffrey MANKOFF, Center for Strategic & International Studies, *A Friend in Need? Russia and Turkey after the Coup,* at *https://www.csis.org/analysis/friend-need-russia-and-turkey-after-coup,* retrieved on: 05.08. 2016

[39] Luke COFFEY, The National Interest, *A Tangled Web of Corruption Is Strangling Moldova*, at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/tangled-web-corruption-strangling-moldova-17518?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter, retrieved on: 07.09.2016

[40] Ambasada României în Australia, (Romania Embassy in Australia) *Promovare economică, Atragerea investiţiilor străine în România*, disponibilă la pagina web, https://canberra.mae.ro/node/589, pagină consultată la data de: 15.09.2016

nationalist-extremist manifestations, internal or regional. For Romania, any such situation could considerably diminish its attractiveness for foreign investors, which if added accumulated technological gaps and ineffectiveness in spending European funds[41], will make harder to valorize resources and geostrategic position of the country.

The securing of resources found within the land and maritime borders of Romania, mainly those discovered during Black Sea prospection[42] may be one of the regional interests. This is subsequent to the one of the defense of the country's territorial integrity and inalienability because, to some extent, have a common regional objective, namely to ensure regional security in the Black Sea area. Through both conceptually and operationally efforts and contributions[43], Romania continues to consolidate his profile as a pivotal country in its relation with NATO and the European Union and reflects (via participation with units from different Romanian Armed Forces services at joint/combined NATO and EU operations, exercises and missions) as a credible partner.

Some foreign publications express different points of view regarding Romania's relations with strategic partners, considering that "Romania has become a pivotal strategic influence at the geographical confluence of several regions: Central Europe, the Balkans, post-Soviet states and western part of the Black Sea."[44] In this context, Romania addresses with expediency these types of statements and military, diplomatic and economic actions of Russia. This kind of reaction is part of Romania's efforts and orientation towards materializing its regional stability pole role and to ensure the needed transparency to foster dialogue and to diminish potential regional conflicts. Romania's interest to support Moldova's European path and ensuring a real support in this regard is fully justified, given not only the linguistic and cultural common identities but also a common history which links the two countries. Romania was the first state which, on 27 August 1991, recognized Moldova's independence and initiated diplomatic relations at embassy level followed by a series of bilateral treaties and agreements that strengthened relationship between the two countries. During the past 25 years, Romania was the most sincere and fervent supporter of Moldova's European integration, wishing at the same time that its integration process to be irreversible and to generate regional stability. This regional interest was emphasized by Romania especially by assuming the role of security guarantor of the EU and NATO's eastern border.

However, this goal seems to be extremely difficult, as the Moldovan society is divided between those who support the Euro-Atlantic integration, those who would choose the Eurasian Union and a relative mass of undecided persons. The phenomenon is completed by the effects generated by corruption identified even at the highest forums of the society and interference / pressure in the breakaway region of Transnistria. Depending on the result of the elections in Chisinau, a new road map will evolve for Moldova. However, a pro-Russian orientation will create favorable opportunities for Russia. In our opinion, Russia will use these advantages as a strong enough leverage to destabilize not only Moldova but also Ukraine and

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[41] Elena CALISTRU, *Two systemic problems in European funds management*, at, http://www.contributors.ro/global-europa/doua-probleme-de-sistem-in-managementul-fondurilor-europene/, retrieved on: 10.09.2016
[42] Ovidiu MARINCEA Adevărul.ro, *What gas and oil resources is the Black Sea hiding and what companies are fighting for them, http://adevarul.ro/economie/afaceri/ce-resurse-petrol-gaze-ascunde-marea-neagra-companii-bat-ele-1_50e41d1d596d72009161cc94/index.html,* retrieved on: 14.09. 2016
[43] Romanian Presidential Administration, *The National Defense Strategy for 2015-2019 – A Powerful Romania in Europe and the World,* Chapter I - Defining national security interests and objectives, Subchapter 1.3. - National security objectives point 24, page 10, Bucharest, 2015.
[44] Anne-Marie BLAJAN *Ria Novosti / How Russia sees Romania-US relation: "Bucharest, the American Cerberus in the Balkans",* available at http://cursdeguvernare.ro/ria-novosti-cum-vede-rusia-relatia-romania-sua-bucurestiul-cerberul-american-din-balcani.html, retrieved on: 23.08.2016

maybe, using the same strategies, the European Union[45]. It is obvious that Romania's regional interest represented by Moldova's EU integration becomes more difficult especially if Tiraspol decisions will differ from those at Chisinau and all this will conduct to "Maidan"-like protests.

Conclusions

We notice the fact that at regional level, exist a divergence between the geopolitical vectors which define the Black Sea region bylaw and character. These differences and revisionist ways of one of the former empires, of being recognized either as former powers, or out of their wish to reorient the social and religious organizational way, they managed to transform the Black Sea region from a favorable area for economical and free-trade development in an area full of tensions, frustrations and coerces on the territorial integrity and independence of some of the riparian states. This restlessness of the political, diplomatic and military environments is characterized by the emerge of risks and warn offs which developed first of all because of the power vacuum and cohesion at the European community level, but also because of the existing profound vulnerabilities at the EU member states and of those who wanted the integration in the euro-Atlantic organizations.

In order to address the risks and threats specific in the Black Sea, especially those resulting from Russia, Romania needs to take an active role in managing the challenges of the security environment in the Black Sea area and to increase cooperation (in the political, military, economic and energy domains), both with riparian states and with those that are not necessarily bordering, but they intend to develop bilateral relations based on mutual respect and advantageous free trade. An important lever which Romania can use for this purpose is the intensification of cooperation with NATO, the EU and the US, in order to increase mutual trust and create a predictable and stable security environment in the region. In this respect, Romania should highlight the relations with partners in NATO and the EU, the importance of effectively counter and decisive of Russia's revisionist and expansionist trends, by emphasizing the supplementation risks and vulnerabilities which could cause a pro-Western foreign policy vector shift in the Black Sea bordering countries. Special emphasis should be placed on supporting the European cause of Moldova, Romania being able to use its role as "advocate" in the European echelons, in order to achieve a closer relationship and greater support from the EU for Moldova. In this way, it is expected that a larger share of Moldova's population to support the country's integration into European structures once the benefits of this integration would be more visible in the country's development and the living standards of the population.

In the same time, it is also required a significant involvement of NATO in support of Georgia's pro-Western orientation in order to prevent shifting of this country to Russia. In this case, Romania can assume an important role, given the good relations between the two countries and the support that Romania can provide in terms of reforms and efforts necessary to meet NATO standards.

The recent rapprochement between Russia and Turkey, and possible shortfalls of the Ankara authorities from democratic norms constitute additional challenges for NATO. Romania may act in favor of developing cooperation with Turkey both in NATO and in the EU, as a result of membership. Lastly, it can play an important role in the region as a result of the existing partnership and good relations of friendship and cooperation that Romania has developed over time with Turkey.

In conclusion, Romania's good relations with Black Sea neighboring countries justifies

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[45] Cristian PÎRVULESCU, interview-Digi24, *Russia is trying to destabilize Romania and Ukraine through Moldova,* http://www.digi24.ro/stiri/externe/ue/rusia-incearca-sa-destabilizeze-romania-si-ucraina-prin-republica-moldova-spune-cristian-pirvulescu-473349, retrieved on: 21.09.2016.

the view that the country can assume a greater role in its membership in NATO and the EU, for turning the Black Sea into a safer area.

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8. ***, *The Next Stage of Russia's Resurgence: Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova,* STRATFOR, disponibil la https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/next-stage-russias-resurgence-ukraine-belarus-and-moldova.
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10. ****, Turkey More Preoccupied by Kurds Than Syrian Government,* STRATFOR, disponibil la https://sputniknews.com/politics/201604191038278550-stratfor-turkey-syria-kurds/.
11. ***, *Ukraine military say Russia deploys Iskander air defense missiles in Crimea,* disponibil la https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-military-say-russia-deploys-iskander-air-defense-missiles-in-crimea-374075.html.
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THE CONTRIBUTION OF NATO AND EU EXPEDITIONARY MISSIONS TO STRENGTHENING SECURITY

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Abstract: Starting from the current security threats – that are multiple, diverse, of hybrid nature – and the need to counter them through multiple means – from soft ones (diplomacy) to hard ones (military means) and smart ones (combined soft and hard means), the paper analyses, from the perspective of Romanian participation, the contribution of NATO and EU expeditionary missions to strengthening security. Moreover, the work analyses in parallel from the point of view of typology and geographical coverage, ongoing NATO and EU missions and operations, taking into account the defence diplomacy component.

Keywords: Romania, NATO, EU, security threats, expeditionary operations/missions, stability and support operations, defence diplomacy, smart means for ensuring security and defence.

1. Introductory considerations concerning smart means of countering security threats

Unlike the period preceding the end of the Cold War, when threats were mainly aimed at the territory of a State, we notice that currently the nature of risks and threats is extremely diversified, without being limited to military ones. We refer, for instance, to regional instability and crises which can escalate at any time and affect a State in several ways – even if that State is remote from the risk centre, given the high degree of interdependence between States, generated by globalisation – to the scourge of terrorism – extremely unpredictable in terms of location and course of action, whose propagation was facilitated by the proliferation of weapons –, but also to serious economic, social and identity problems that bear a risk of escalation, on the one hand, and a risk of propagation, on the other hand. These new types of threats, which are often combined, giving rise to hybrid threats, have led to the transformation of both armed forces and the ways and means of countering these threats.

Currently, armed forces of NATO and EU Member States are much more flexible and better trained to face the new types of threats, interoperability being a priority, given the wide scope of multinational expeditionary missions. In turn, the means of countering threats are no longer purely military, based on *hard* (mainly military) power, *soft* (diplomatic) means also being often used, leading to the combination called *smart*[1] (smart means of countering threats).

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[1] A.N. The expression *smart means of countering threats* is an extrapolation of the expression *smart power*, used by Joseph Nye. See *Nye, Joseph.* "Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power". *Foreign Affairs*; *Nye, Joseph.* "Wielding Smart Power in World Affairs". *Boston Globe*; Nye, Joseph. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004); *Nye, Joseph S. (2011).* The Future of Power. *New York: Public Affairs,* 2011, pp. 207–208, but also Nossel, Suzanne, "Smart Power", *Foreign Affairs*.

2.   Romania's participation in NATO expeditionary operations[2]

As indicated by NATO Strategic Concept, 2010, still in force, the Alliance focuses on three main missions: collective defence through actions meant to deter and to defend, crisis management and cooperative security.

NATO conducts Article 5 joint operations, which are intended to ensure collective defence, but also non-Article 5 operations, such as crisis response military operations, including in very remote geographical areas. In addition, there are actions intended to accomplish the basic mission of ensuring a community that enjoys freedom, peace, security and common values[3]. The goal is to strengthen the security of each Member State, but also the security of the Alliance as a whole.

Analysing the military operations conducted by NATO over the last decade and a half, we were able to find that they have much more diverse objectives than they used to have in the past, when they focused primarily on the defence of territories. The new operations include: deterrence and defence against threats, crisis prevention, conflict management, stabilisation of post-conflict situations, fighting security challenges such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and piracy.

As a NATO Member State for over a decade, apart from the undisputed security advantages and the possibility to participate in decision-making processes, Romania has also had a significant contribution to the operational processes of the North Atlantic Alliance. In addition to the fulfilment of the obligations undertaken as a Member State, this contribution to NATO operations is the main way of optimising the level of interoperability of national forces, which must take action, increasingly often, in a multinational format, together with the forces of ally and partner States. In this regard, we would like to highlight the fact that Romania has participated with forces and capabilities ever since the beginning of NATO operations and missions in Afghanistan and in the Balkans[4].

For the purpose of emphasising the contribution made by our country, we will provide a review of the ongoing NATO military operations.

Although Romania is among the countries that does not recognize the statehood of Kosovo Province, it contributed and currently contributes with several contingents to ***KFOR Mission*** (***NATO-led Kosovo Force***). This mission was launched on 12 June 1999 under Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council, having as objectives ensuring security in the region and the security of civilians, supporting the development of Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) and supporting the development of a democratic, peaceful and stable multi-ethnic Kosovo[5]. From the perspective of multilateral defence diplomacy, NATO cooperates with the UN, the EU and other international actors in order to *achieve the objectives of the mission undertaken.*

ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) – perhaps the most important and also the largest operation in NATO's history – was continued from 1 January 2015 with ***Resolute Support Mission (RSM)***. The current mission aims to support Afghan National Security and Defence Forces (ANSDF) by assisting them in the planning, programming and budgeting process, in the process of generating force, recruitment, training, management and human

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[2] A.N. In this study, we use the expression "expeditionary mission" with referrence to both civil and military missions, as conducted by the EU, but also the expression "expeditionary operations" with reference to the military operations conducted by NATO.

[3] Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, 19 November 2010 (NATO Strategic Concept), p. 5, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_68580.htm, accessed on 12.10.2016.

[4] See http://www.mapn.ro/diepa/politicadeaparare/politici_nato.htm, accessed on 12.10.2016.

[5] For more details, see the official website of the mission, http://jfcnaples.nato.int/kfor, retrieved on 12.10.2016.

resources development, as well as advising the Afghan authorities to respect the rule of law and good governance within ANSDF. RSM is based on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), signed on 30 September 2014 and ratified by the Afghan Parliament on 27 November the same year, stating conditions in which there NATO troops can be deployed in Afghanistan, and the type of activities that can be deployed on Afghan territory.

At the meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in May, it was decided to continue RSM after 2016, emphasizing the need for a flexible approach in deploying troops across Afghanistan, an approach that was confirmed by the Heads of State and Government during Warsaw NATO Summit in July. Regarding Romania's participation in RSM, the Supreme Council of National Defence has approved sending up to 650 troops in 2016.

A good example that the Alliance does not act strictly in conflict zones is ***Operation Active Endeavour (OAE)*** of maritime surveillance to combat terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea, an operation launched in October 2001 – as a prompt response to the attacks on US – recently concluded, in October 2016. We note that September 11, 2001 was the first time in the history when the Alliance invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

OAE ships of participating States have conducted patrol activities, vessel traffic monitoring and control, while providing escort for civilian ships through the Straits of Gibraltar to protect them from piracy. In addition, since 2003, there have been added operations of inspecting vessels, in order to deter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorist activities.

As a component of defence diplomacy, we note that, since 2004, this operation was joined by partner states in the region – we refer, in particular, to the seven countries that are part of the Mediterranean Dialogue: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Thus, we can conclude that OAE is a framework for strengthening relations with NATO partner states.

Under this operation, Romania has participated annually in the period 2005-2011 and in 2013, with a frigate manned by 205 soldiers. In the years 2014 and 2015, national contributions were deployed as part of NATO's Standing Naval Force. Participation in OAE has shown, on the one hand, the ongoing commitment of our country to the international community's efforts to combat terrorism and, on the other hand, the Romanian Navy's ability to successfully execute maritime surveillance actions.

Given the success of the operation, but also the complexity of the terrorist phenomenon, at the NATO Summit from Warsaw in July 2016, there was decided to transform OAE in a maritime operation more flexible and broad – Sea Guardian – able to meet a broader spectrum of activities, consisting of seven operational tasks: maritime situational awareness, freedom of navigation, maritime interdiction, countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, protecting critical infrastructure, combating terrorism at sea and maritime security capacity building[6].

Another NATO operation in progress to which Romania is contributing is Ocean Shield (OOS), aimed at combating piracy in the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean. As a consequence of the requested of the states in this region for support in order to develop their capacities to combat piracy activities, the operation was approved on 17 August 2009. NATO conducted previously such missions to combat piracy, two examples being Allied Provider and Allied Protector. To carry out the objective within OOS there are underway activities to deter acts of piracy, to neutralize piracy capacity and to protect ships transiting the area, all these actions being meant to help increase security in the region.

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[6] According to OAE official website, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136233.htm

Even if OOS is due to end on 15 December 2016, the Alliance will remain committed to such operations by maintaining maritime situational awareness and combat maritime piracy through actions of cooperation with international actors.

So, also in terms of defence diplomacy, NATO cooperates closely with the EU also in this area – the EU conducting *Operation Atalanta*, as well as other state and supra-state actors. We note, in this regard, the Combined Maritime Forces[7] (CMF) initiative composed of 31 states, performing Combined Task Force 151 led by the US.

Another direction of NATO involvement with Romanian contribution is the support for the African Union (AU), on request, in peacekeeping missions on the African continent. NATO has assisted the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) since June 2007, the mandate being extended on several occasions. Contribution of NATO assumes operational support, logistics and construction capabilities. Specifically, NATO has provided air transport in the rotation of contingents in theatre and also training for staff UA contributing to operationalize African Standby Force (ASF), which is meant to be correspondent on the African continent of NATO Response Force. And in this respect, NATO-EU cooperation was and is a close one.

Not least, we need to recall the ***NATO air police mission*** undertaken following the actions in 2014 in Ukraine, by which the Russian Federation illegally annexed Crimea. These collective missions undertaken in peacetime aim to detect, track and identify violations of airspace and, at the same time, taking necessary and appropriate measures. Thus, the Airspace of the Member States that do not have fighter jets – Albania, Slovenia and the Baltic Countries – are being flown by F-16s Allies, so as to insure their security.

Police actions airline is one of the three permanent NATO forces contributing to the ongoing efforts for collective defence of the Alliance. These include also standing maritime forces and integrated air defence system, which includes missile defence system of the Alliance.

In view of the above, we can say that our country has contributed to the NATO actions intended to ensure security in the framework of the Alliance and beyond it. Its activities focus on several aspects, such as: detailed knowledge of the nature of threats, establishing or even creating appropriate methods of response, improving the response capacity, as well as enhancing cooperation and improving the efforts made to involve partner States, but also other international actors.

We consider that these efforts and courses of action of Romania within NATO are useful and relevant, given that the Alliance continues the transformation process and, at the same time, continues to be engaged in operational efforts beyond its direct area of responsibility.

3. Romania's participation in the EU expeditionary missions

According to the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, ever since 1992, the EU has had the following objectives, through CFSP: "to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union; to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter; to promote international cooperation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms"[8].

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[7] See https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/about/, retrieved on 13.10.2016.
[8] The Treaty of Maastricht, 1992, J1, available at http://cursdeguvernare.ro/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/maastricht-1992.pdf

According to the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), the EU conducts Petersberg operations consisting of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, missions of crisis management and peace-making[9].

Later on, through the Treaty of Lisbon, in force since 1 December 2009, the EU extended its scope of action to the field of security and defence, so that "the Union may use civilian and military means", its missions including "joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories"[10]. The Treaty also provides that the Union may conduct this type of missions outside the territories of the Member States in order to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The European Council decides on the need to launch a mission and establishes the specificities of each mission, and it is the High Representative for the CFSP that coordinates the missions.

An important aspect from the point of view of defence diplomacy is represented by the "Berlin Plus" Agreements between the EU and NATO, which provide that the European Union can benefit, in the missions conducted by it, from the capabilities and resources of the North Atlantic Alliance.

As regards the participation in the missions and operations conducted under the aegis of CSDP, Romania is among the top contributing countries. In order for this to be possible, the Supreme Council for National Defence adopted, on 27 June 2011, the National Strategy on civilian capabilities, which provides a structured framework to enable the participation of civilian experts in international crisis management missions. On the basis of this legal framework, Romanian experts were sent, either by means of secondment or on a contractual basis, in missions and operations with objectives such as: training armed forces, security sector reform in certain States, fighting piracy, monitoring the implementation of peace agreements and border assistance[11].

Over the last years, our country has been contributing to numerous civilian missions and military operations conducted under the aegis of CSDP, carried out not only on the European continent, but also in more remote areas, such as Africa and the Middle East[12]. In this case, we are talking about 14 of the 17 ongoing CSDP missions, whose essential elements will be emphasised in this paper in order to see the manner in which they contribute to the strengthening of security at global level. Figure no. 1 illustrates the current missions conducted under the aegis of CSDP.

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[9] According to the Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, Article J7 point 2.
[10] The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community Article 43(1), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/RO/TXT/PDF /?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL&from=RO
[11] According to the information published by MAE, available at http://www.mae.ro/node/1879, accesat la 14.10.2016.
[12] For details, see the official page of the European External Action Service http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index_en.htm

Figure no. 1 CSDP ongoing Missions

Source: European External Action Service, https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en, retrieved on 20.10.2016.

EUFOR Althea[13] (EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina), launched at the end of 2004, continued the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) mission, with the participation of 20 States. The mission has as main objectives contributing to security in the region, fulfilling the implementation plan of the Mission belonging to the Office of the High Representative (OHR) on the Peace Agreement and the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAP) towards EU accession and supporting the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina to align with NATO standards.

Among the missions undertaken on the European territory, there is also EULEX Kosovo - a police and judicial mission in the rule of law, initiated in 2009, with a mandate extended until 14 June 2018. The mission has two main parts, the first being to monitor, to provide guidance and counselling and the second – of executive nature –, intended to ensure the transfer of executive functions to local authorities, as they progress on the rule of law. All

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[13] In Greek, Althea is the goddess of healing.

Member States participate in the mission, joined by five other contributing states (Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the US).

EUNAVFOR Atalanta (Somalia) is a military operation, meant to combat piracy in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean, initiated in 2008, with notable effects, whose mandate was extended until December 2016. EUNAVFOR is an example of EU's *comprehensive approach*, as it takes into account both current symptoms and causes of the problem. In order to accomplish both objectives, the Union is pursuing two complementary missions in the region, EUCAP Nestor and EUTM Somalia[14].

EUCAP Nestor (Regional Maritime Security Capacity Building Mission in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean) is a civilian mission, launched in 2012, complemented by military expertise, aimed at strengthening maritime capacity in five countries in the Horn of Africa and Western Indian Ocean: Djibouti, Somalia, Seychelles, Kenya and Tanzania. From the diplomatic point of view, we consider noteworthy that, in September 2016, the leadership of the mission was taken by a Romanian representative.

EUAM Ukraine (*European Union Advisory Mission*) is a civilian assistance mission in the civil security sector reform, including police and rule of law, initiated in late 2014 at the request of the Ukrainian Government.

EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine (*EU Border Assistance Mission*), launched in 2005 under the aegis of the European Commission, is working on the border between the two countries and its mandate has been extended four times, valid until the end of November 2017. Its purpose is to support customs authorities to prevent and detect the smuggling and trafficking of goods and people, promoting border control, customs practices and trade rules according to EU standards.

EUMM Georgia is a civilian monitoring mission, initiated in September 2008, with the mandate extended repeatedly. The main objectives of the mission is to contribute to stability both in the short and long term in Georgia and surrounding areas, to increase trust between opposing parties (Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and promote European values. To be noted that the EU has conducted in the past (2004-2005) another mission in this country - EUJUST Themis, aimed at implementing the rule of law.

EUNAVFOR MED Sofia is another example of the EU's comprehensive approach, just like EUNAVFOR Somalia, whose objective is to identify and capture the ships operated by smugglers of migrants, in order to counter trafficking in the southern Central Mediterranean, but also to prevent loss of life at sea. Launched in 2015, the mission has extended the mandate until 27 July 2017 to the initial objectives, being added another two: training Libyan coastguard and navy and contributing to the implementation of the arms embargo imposed by the UN on the high seas of the Libyan coast[15].

EUPOL Afghanistan (*EU Police Mission in Afghanistan*) is a mission launched in 2007, designed to support the reform efforts of the Afghan Government to build a civilian police service operating within a framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights.

EUPOL COPPS (*EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories*) is an EU police mission undertaken in the Palestinian Territories, initiated in 2006 in order to support justice, rule of law and public order. Its mandate has been extended several times, ending in June 2017. In the mission participate international experts from 21 Member States as well as partner countries (Canada, Norway, Turkey).

EUBAM Rafah (EU Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories) is an assistance mission on the border between Israel and the Gaza Strip, aimed, on the one hand, to maintain open and supervise the crossing of the border, and

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[14] For details, see official webpage of the mission, http://eunavfor.eu/mission/, retrieved on 14.10.2016.
[15] Pentru mai multe detalii, a se vedea http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eunavfor-med/pdf/factsheet_eunavfor_med_en.pdf, retrieved on 14.10.2016.

increase confidence between the Israeli government and Palestinian authorities. This mission, launched in 2005, grants technical support to EUPOL COPPS mission and its mandate, extended repeatedly, is to end on 30 June 2017.

In addition, Romania is contributing expertise in three missions of military training of the armed forces - EU Training Mission – **EUTM RCA** in the Central African Republic, **EUTM Mali** and, respectively, **EUTM Somalia**. As regards the duration of these three missions, EUTM RCA was initiated this summer (July 2016), with mandate until 20 September 2018, EUTM Mali, launched three years ago, it has a mandate until May 2018 and the oldest of the three training missions, deployed in Somalia, was launched in April 2010, with the mandate extended until the end of this year, in the mission contributing 11 Member States plus Serbia.

Considering Romania's participation in these missions undertaken under the auspices of the EU, we can state that regarding the civilian component, our country is one of the major contributors, both in terms of human resources and equipment. In terms of human resources, at the level of November 2012, Romania had a substantial participation of 284 civilian and military experts. In the period 2014-2015, Romanian contract staff working in CSDP missions was about 50 experts and at the level of October 2016 Romania was represented by 40 experts and seconded by over 70 national contract experts (employees with individual contracts), ranking among the largest contributors to such missions[16].

In conclusion, we believe that national commitment is justified and relevant, given the size and importance gained by this type of actions within the European Union's efforts aimed at promoting global democratic values and the rule of law, human rights and good governance. These efforts have, undoubtedly, a visible impact in terms of enhancing international stability and security and it is expected that extending external security to be reflected in the security of the citizens of the Member States.

4. Comparative analysis of NATO and EU expeditionary missions

Next, we take a brief comparative analysis of military and non-military operations undertaken by NATO and the EU, both in terms of numbers, typology and geographic area.

According to *the numeric criterion*, we see that NATO has six ongoing operations, while the EU is implementing 17 missions.

According *to typology*, NATO conducts military operations, while the EU is undertaking both military operations (6) and civilian ones, among them being police and legal missions.

From the geographical point of view – the areas of the world where NATO and the EU carry out missions – there are certain regions where, given the complexity of security problems, it was decided that it is best that NATO and the EU to act complementary, each addressing either sequentially or simultaneously, another dimension.

In *Europe*, specifically, in the Western Balkans, NATO, through KFOR mission, envisages achieving and maintaining security in Kosovo, while the EU has led a mission that took into account the rule of law (EULEX Kosovo). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO conducted military operation EUFOR Althea, while the EU has acted with a police mission (EUPM), this being the first mission conducted under the ESDP, restoring order and the rule of law in the region helping in the formation of professional police force.

In the Middle East, NATO conducted a reconstruction mission in Afghanistan - International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) - the most important and also the largest operation in NATO's history. Currently, this mission is completed and turned into a mission

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[16] A.N. The numbers are based on the study made during doctoral period, from official open sources – Romania's Ministry of National Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

of advising, training and supporting Afghan National Security Forces, called "Resolute Support". On the other hand, the EU is deploying in Afghanistan a civilian mission, of police, designed to support the reform efforts of the Afghan Government to build a police service that operates within a framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights (EUPOL Afghanistan). In Iraq, the Alliance has deployed NATO mission Training - Iraq (NTM-I), helping with training, equipment and technical assistance in preparing Iraqi security forces, while Europe held EUJUST LEX mission for crisis management and also an integrated mission in the rule of law.

In North Africa, specifically in Libya, NATO Deployed in 2011, Operation Unified Protector (OUP) surveillance in the Mediterranean, given the embargo on arms sales to Libya. The mission aimed to maintain the zone prohibited to air flights and the protection of civilian areas from attacks and threats of attack. The EU also initiated in 2013 an operation for supporting post-conflict reconstruction, namely the civilian assistance mission on the border of Libya (EU Border Assistance Mission - EUBAM). Also in North Africa, more specifically in the Mediterranean, NATO Launched in 2001, Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) to combat terrorism, an Article 5 operation. In the Horn of Africa, NATO's Operation Ocean Shield (OOS) is intended to combat maritime piracy. On the other hand, the EU has undertaken in this region a naval mission, EUNAVFOR Atalanta/Somalia to combat piracy.

As it can be seen, in areas where NATO and the EU have conducted missions in a complementary manner, each of the two organizations addressed the security issues from another perspective, NATO militarily and the EU, mainly from the point of view police, legal or of insuring borders and, exceptionally, deploying military missions, for example to combat piracy. We can say that NATO and the EU address current security challenges of a concerted manner, acting, in some cases, in the same geographical area, but with different aims, so as to avoid duplication and achieve maximum efficiency.

On the other hand, NATO has acted in areas where an intervention from the EU was not necessary, in punctual missions such as that in Turkey, "Active Fence", which aimed at strengthening the air defence capability of the country.

The EU, in turn, also carries out independent missions: in Eurasia, the Union is pursuing a civilian monitoring mission in Georgia - EUMM and in the Palestinian Territories a police mission intended to support justice, the rule of law and public order (EUPOL COPPS); on the border between Israel and Gaza, EU is conducting EUBAM Rafah mission of assistance providing technical support to the previous one and another mission on the border between Moldova and Ukraine's (of EUBAM type) in order to assist customs authorities to prevent and detect smuggling and trafficking of goods and people.

Conclusion

As reflected in the comparative analysis, while NATO carries out mainly military operations, the EU acts rather by civilian or police missions, which aim to train armed forces, reform the security sector, combat piracy, monitor the implementation of peace agreements and offer border assistance. Such non-military missions conducted under the CSDP umbrella is new in terms of typology.

On the whole, these operations are complex and aim at different targets, from humanitarian assistance to combat operations. While in some joint military operations all three components of the categories of forces (land, sea, air) are involved, sometimes prevails a particular component. In addition, the joint participation may include organisations, institutions or non-military agencies.

The common element of all these missions is the multinational character. Thus, each Member State or, where appropriate, Partner State has contributed according to its possibility,

taking into account the economic and human resources. We can say that Romania, despite the financial austerity period, made a substantial contribution to expeditionary missions, enjoying the recognition of the allies.

Given these arguments, we can say that the missions we inventoried are part of the new generation of missions of NATO and EU, which are individualized in purely military, traditional, operations and non-military and non-conventional missions, defence diplomacy having a key role, on the one hand, through cooperation between participating states and, on the other hand, through the cooperation between the two supra-state actors, NATO and the EU.

Romania's commitment to the EU civilian missions is justified by the importance and scope that they got in the context of EU demarches to promote the functional rule of law, the reform of the civil security sector, enhancing institutional capacities of regional and local authorities, the respect for rights human rights and good governance, with a direct impact on international stability and security. Strengthening security externally greatly contributes to the prosperity and security of EU Member States and their citizens.

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12. Official website of NATO, http://www.aco.nato.int /kfor.aspx.
13. Official website of EU External Action Service, http://www.eeas.europa.eu
14. Treaty of Amsterdam, EU, 1997.
15. Treaty of Lisbon, EU, 2009.
16. Treaty of Maastricht, EU, 1992.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A2/AD SYSTEM IN THE BLACK SEA: RISKS AND THREATS TO ROMANIA

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Abstract: The annexation of Crimean Peninsula has allowed Moscow to consolidate and strengthen its presence in the Black Sea, affecting the security perceptions of NATO states from the south-eastern flank. However, the NATO Summit in Warsaw showed that the Alliance grants a greater importance to north-eastern flank by disparities proposals to strengthen the Alliance's presence. Meanwhile, Russian Federation continued the militarization of the Crimean Peninsula, by implementing a local system of anti-access and anti-denial zone (A2 / AD). This article aims to analyze the consequences of implementing the A2 / AD system in Crimea and Romania's dynamic risk profile. The working hypothesis of the article is the changing balance of power in the Black Sea to the detriment of Romania's security. Major topics approached are the geopolitical importance of Crimea, implementation of A2 / AD in the peninsula, risks and threats to Romania, a topical subject treated from a new perspective, less debated in Romania.

Keywords: Russian Federation, Crimean Peninsula, Black Sea, A2/AD, Romania

1. The importance of Crimea for the Russian Federation

The Crimean Peninsula was under Tatar control until the end of the eighteenth century when Catherine II announced the annexation of the region in 1783 to the Russian Empire.[1] She established the main naval base of the Russian Empire on the Black Sea in the city of Sevastopol in 1785.[2] It retained its importance until 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed and the peninsula became part of independent Ukraine since it had been offered to the Ukrainian SSR as a gift in 1954 by Nikita Khrushchev, the leader of the Soviet Union at that time, celebrating 300 years of Russian-Ukrainian friendship.[3] The breakup of the Soviet Union meant that its successor state, the Russian Federation, lost the strategic positioning and the freedom of maneuver which Crimea offered to it in the Black Sea region. However, Moscow would regain its position on May 28th 1997 when Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma signed the Treaty of Friendship Cooperation and Partnership in Kiev. Among other things, it provided the division of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet between the two parts and the use by the Russian Federation of the Ukrainian port of Sevastopol and its territorial waters until 2017, for 98 million dollars per year.[4]

The agreement was, for a short time, endangered by the tensions between Moscow and Kiev once in 2005 when the Orange Revolution brought a new president to Kiev, Viktor Yushchenko, with a pro-Western vision. It refocused Ukraine's foreign policy towards the

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[1] Paul KUBICEK, *The History of Ukraine*, Greenwood Press, London, 2008, p. 52.
[2] David WARMES, *Cronica țarilor ruși*, (trad.) de Ligia Șendrea, M.A.S.T, 2001. București, p. 140.
[3] Paul KUBICEK, *op cit*, p. 8.
[4] Michael SPECTER „Setting Past Aside, Russia and Ukraine Sign Friendship Treaty", *The New York Times*, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/01/world/setting-past-aside-russia-and-ukraine-sign-friendship-treaty.html, accessed on 14.08.2016.

West to the significant discomfort of the Kremlin, which leveraged its various ties to Kiev, especially energy, to put pressure on Yushchenko during his entire term, leading Westerners analysts to liken Russia's energy extraction and transit capabilities to a 'weapon'. Between 2005 and 2010, Gazprom continued to increase gas prices for Ukraine and to put pressure on it to pay its outstanding debts.[5]

Therefore, in 2007 the Ukrainian President said that if Russia will stop gas supplies, Ukraine will review the contract on the stationing of the Russian fleet in Crimea.[6] Eventually, the crisis was over and the two sides reached a settlement. However, Russian worries were renewed when, in 2009, Viktor Yushchenko removed the Russian intelligence service, the Federal Security Service, from Crimea. Its agents were embedded with the fleet in Sevastopol, but Ukraine insisted their presence undermined their state institutions by recruiting informants among Ukrainian officials and undertaking clandestine operations trying to smuggle secret documents.[7] Russian-Ukrainian relations improved significantly in 2010 when Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian politician, was elected president of Ukraine. Shortly after taking office, the Federal Security Service returned to Crimea and the agreement on the stationing of the Russian fleet in Sevastopol was extended until 2042, by the signing of the Kharkiv Agreement on 21 April 2010, between Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych.[8] The Ukrainian revolutionary upheaval in early 2014 put the Russian Federation in a difficult situation given that one of the consequences of the Euromaidan was to replace the pro-Russian leadership in Kiev with a pro-Western one.

Thus, Moscow was forced to act because there were well founded fears that the new leadership would suspend the Kharkiv Agreement. If this would have been happened, Russia would have lost a vital strategic point in the Black Sea. The Crimean Peninsula offers Moscow great freedom of maneuver in the Black Sea area and the ability to project its naval power to the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Furthermore, the link with the Eastern Mediterranean must be maintained by the Russian Federation to facilitate access to the port of Tartus in Syria where it has operated a naval base since 1971.[9] In turn, the Syrian port represents an important strategic position in the region especially in the current regional context. At the same time, the peninsula facilitates Russia's access to warm waters, which was far limited by the winter ice after the Soviet Union collapsed and lost the ports of Riga and Tallinn.[10] Therefore, the Russian Federation could not afford to lose Sevastopol and so decided to act when the pro-Russian political regime from Kiev was replaced by a pro-Western one after Ukrainian revolution from February. On 28 February 2014, armed personnel without military insignia began the illegal takeover of the peninsula without encountering any opposition from the Ukrainian army.[11]

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[5] Valeri PANIUȘKIN, Mihail ZÎGAR, *Gazprom: noua armă a Rusiei*, (trad.) de Marina Vraciu, Leonte Ivanov, Daria Bighiu, Curtea Veche, București, 2008, p. 202.

[6] Stanislav SECRIERU, "Accente geo-economice în politica externă rusă", *Revista Monitor Strategic* nr. 1-2, 2007, p. 82.

[7] Philip SHISHKIN, "How Russian Spy Games Are Sabotaging Ukraine's Intelligence Agency", *Wall Street Journal*, 11.03.2015, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-spy-games-are-sabotaging-ukraines-intelligence-agency-1426127401, accessed on 04.05.2015.

[8] Luke HARDING, "Ukraine extends lease for Russia's Black Sea Fleet", *The Guardian*, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/21/ukraine-black-sea-fleet-russia, accessed on 14.08.2016.

[9] Frank GARDNER, "How vital is Syria's Tartus port to Russia?", *BBC*, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18616191, accessed on 14.08.2016.

[10] Zbigniew BRZEZINSKI, *Marea tablă de șah*, (trad.) de Aurelia Ionescu, Univers Enciclopedic, București, 2000, p.106.

[11] Andrew WILSON, *Ukraine Crisis: What It Means for the West*, Yale University Press, London, 2014, pp.110-113.

Shortly, a referendum was held which resulted in 95% of the population voting for annexation to the Russian Federation which happened on 18 March 2014.[12] With this decision, Moscow has arguably found itself in willful violation of International law and, in response, the West has imposed economic and political sanctions that attempted to isolate Russia on the international stage. However, the annexation of Crimea has significantly changed the balance of power in the Black Sea, which is a critical matter for the riparian states, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and Georgia, as well as for NATO and for European Union.

One should also be taken into account the importance of the Black Sea in the economic and energy security fields for the European Union and NATO. For both organizations, energy security is a strategic priority and the route for delivery of the energy resources from Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus passes through the Black Sea to reach Europe.[13] Therefore, after the annexation of Crimea a tense atmosphere settled on the Black Sea because in a place where Western interests collide like tectonic plates with those of the Russian Federation, the balance of power had suddenly shifted in favor of Moscow.

2. The implementation of the A2 / AD system in Crimea

With the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula, the Russian Federation has obtained a territory of approximately $27,000 \text{ km}^2$ and an exclusive economic zone based on the continental shelf around it where there are large reserves of oil and natural gas that Moscow can now exploit.[14] Moreover, Russia obtained 7 military and civilian airports[15] and seven ports in Chornomorske, Novoozerne, Yevpatoria, Sevastopol, Balaklava, Mikolaivka, and Feodosia.[16] In addition, Russia took possession of significant Ukrainian military equipment and military and industrial infrastructure from the peninsula. However, on 29 April 2014, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said that all 23 facilities of the defense industry and the ports will be used to modernize the Russian Black Sea fleet.[17]

Also, 79 vessels, including 22 Ukrainian war ships, were captured with the occupation of Crimea, of which only 33 were returned, reducing Ukraine's Black Sea fleet by more than half.[18]

Thus, after the annexation of the peninsula, Russian Federation began its militarization to secure it with an A2 / AD - Anti-Area/ Acces Denial system which signified a fundamental transformation of the security environment in the Black Sea region. The development of A2 / AD[19] by a state actor involves creating anti-access and interdiction capabilities in order to block access by land, sea and air of other countries in certain regions. Its effectiveness acts as

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[12] Mike COLLETT-WHITE, "Crimeans vote over 90 percent to quit Ukraine for Russia", *Reuters*, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-idUSBREA1Q1E820140316, accessed on 15.08.2016.

[13] Octavian SERGENTU, "Arhitectura Mării Negre în gramatica proiecției geostrategice", *Revista GeoPolitica*, Anul XIII, nr. 57, 2014, p.109.

[14] Frank UMBACH, "The energy dimensions of Russia's annexation of Crimea", *NATO Review*, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/nato-energy-security-running-on-empty/Ukraine-energy-independence-gas-dependence-on-Russia/EN/index.htm, accessed on 14.08.2016.

[15] State Aviation Aministration of Ukraine, available at http://avia.gov.ua/documents/airports/certif ication/Aerodrome_ZPM_MTR/24145.html, accessed on 14.08.2016.

[16] Sergei GRINEVETSKY *et all.*, *The Black Sea Encyclopedia*, Springer, Berlin, 2015, p.780.

[17] John C.K. DALY, "After Crimea: The Future of the Black Sea Fleet", *The James Town Fundation*, 22.05.2014, available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42411&chash=ba c019ee21bc092c444e87f58808a694#.V7baD_l96Uk, accessed on 19.08.2016.

[18] *Ibidem.*

[19] Nathan FREIER, "The Emerging Anti-Access/Area-Denial Challenge", *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, available at https://www.csis.org/analysis/emerging-anti-accessarea-denial-challenge, accessed on 11.08.2016.

an impediment for others states and requires significant political will, economic, information and military capacity to implement successfully.[20] Moreover, the system must incorporate military capabilities in the field of land, sea, air, space and cyberspace.[21] Military interdiction capabilities include weapons of mass destruction, ballistic and cruise missiles, artillery, naval mines, electronic warfare, radar systems, short-range / man-portable air defense and anti-armor systems, all of significant technological sophistication.[22]

Also, the state that develops such a system must have the capacity to wage cyber warfare and irregular and hybrid warfare that could include terrorist attacks, strikes against critical infrastructures and proxy war.[23] The aim is to distract the attention of a state from a certain area making by turning its focus on another. The Russian Federation had all the elements necessary for the development of such a system and its construction began around the Crimean Peninsula immediately after annexation. The main purpose is to keep the territory under Russian occupation and to discourage any attempt of Ukraine to regain the peninsula. At the same time, Moscow wants to block the unauthorized access of other actors in the area, especially NATO members, which is already limited by the Montreux Convention. Also Russia desires the capability to restrict freedom of movement of enemy ships and aircraft in the region.

2.1. Land Area

In January 2014, before the annexation of Crimea Moscow had approximately 12.500 soldiers, 116 armored vehicles, 24 artillery pieces, 22 fighter jets, 37 helicopters, 26 warships and two submarines in the peninsula.[24] On 28 February 2014 the Russian Federation began sending more troops to Crimea. On the same day, thirteen Russian aircraft landed at a military airport near Sevastopol, leaving on the ground 2.000 Russian soldiers.[25] This comes after the revolution succeeded in removing Ukrainian pro-Russian central leadership from Kiev and after forming a new pro-Western national government on February 27. Since then, the annexation of the peninsula progressed alongside the gradual accumulation of soldiers and military equipment through which Moscow has strengthened its presence. Therefore, on March 10, there were at least 100 Russian vehicles including trucks, armored personnel carriers and artillery pieces sighted on a road near the port of Sevastopol. Shortly thereafter, on March 14 in the Kazachaya Bay near Sevastopol, there were reported sightings of trucks, troops and at least one amphibious armored carrier, which were disgorged from the Russian warship Yamal 156.[26] In the absence of a road linking the peninsula to Russian territory, Moscow had to bring military equipment and troops by air and sea. So, to ease access and transport combat equipment and troops in the peninsula, the Russian Federation announced in March 2014 that it would build a bridge across the Kerch Strait which will connect the peninsula to the Krasnodar region from southwestern Russia.

This infrastructure will not only serve a military role, but also a civilian one as a vital substitution to Ukrainian critical infrastructure connections necessary to the peninsula (water,

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[20] *Ibidem.*

[21] *Ibidem.*

[22] *Ibidem.*

[23] *Ibidem.*

[24] Defence Intelligence of Ukraine, "Peculiarities of the activity of the Russian troops grouping in the temporarily occupied Crimea", available at http://gur.mil.gov.ua/en/content/osoblyvosti-diialnosti-uhrupovannia-rosiiskykh-viisk-v-tymchasovo-okupovanomu-krymu.html, accessed on 31.06.2016.

[25] "Ukraine accuses Russia of deploying troops in Crimea", *BBC*, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26392958, accessed on 5.12.2014.

[26] Andrew OSBORN, Alastair MACDONALD, "Russia brings trucks, armor into Ukraine's", *Reuters,* available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/14/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-military-idUSBREA2D0G520140314, accessed on 09.12.2014.

energy, transport etc.). In the peninsula Ukraine uses these resources in a hybrid war against the Russian Federation. The bridge will have a four-lane highway and two rail lines and is expected to become operational in December 2018, the total costs declared by the Kremlin reaching 6 billion dollars.[27] In July 2016, the Russian government decided to allocate 1.5 billion dollars to build a motorway which would be ready by 2020, whose role is to continue the bridge in order to link the main cities of the peninsula, Simferopol (the Crimean capital) and Sevastopol.[28] Russia has considered several plans for the rehabilitation and upgrading of the road infrastructure in order to have quick access routes that will allow Moscow to supply the population and its troops, to ensure better control over the peninsula and to boost the economy in the area. Russia also invested in the construction and modernization of the energy and military infrastructure from the region.

In April 2014 the Russian Ministry of Economic Development announced that it will invest 19.5 billion dollars for the development of Crimea between 2014 and 2017.[29] The Russian Federation continued to bring troops and military equipment to the peninsula and in November 2014 brought more mobile systems-air missiles, S-300PMU type with a range of 150 km.[30]

Thus, the airspace around Crimea became fully secure since the radar system has a range of 300 km.[31] In April 2015, Crimea was incorporated into the South Military District of the Russian Federation and concomitantly Sergey Shoigu, the Russian defense minister, stated that about 100 army units had been set up in peninsula.[32] The consolidation of its military presence continued and, by the end of 2015, the Russian Federation had in Crimea two infantry brigades near Sevastopol and one near Simferopol, with a total of about 7.000 soldiers, with BTR-82 armored personnel carriers and T-73 tanks.[33] Rounding out the force was one regiment for electronic warfare near Yalta, as well as one artillery regiment and one air defense division near Simferopol. Russia also has in Crimea a mobile surface-to-ground and ground-to-air missile system type 3K60 BAL, with a range of 260 km and another mobile system of anti-ship missiles, type K-300 Bastion, with a range of 300 km, both positioned in southern Crimea.[34]

In order to further strengthen its position, in early August 2016, the Russian Federation brought to the Feodosia port in Crimea the most advanced mobile surface to air missile system of its Army, the S-400 type, with a range of 400 km.[35] Therefore, the deployment of such mobile rocket systems in Crimea created a bubble around the peninsula which does not allow foreign aircraft, ships or infantry to approach without being hit. According to Russian Air Force Chief of Staff Vladimir Shamanov, Moscow intends to create

[27] "Cost of Kerch Strait bridge to Crimea valued at more than $6 billion", *TASS*, available at http://tass.com/russia/747587, accessed on 22.08.2016.
[28] "Russian Government to Allocate $1.5 Bln to Highway in Crimea", *The Moscow Times*, 25.07.2016, available at https://themoscowtimes.com/news/russian-government-to-allocate-15-bln-to-highway-in-crimea-54724, accessed on 21.08.2016.
[29] "Feasibility study for construction of Kerch bridge due by October 1", *TASS*, 23.04.2014, available at http://tass.ru/en/russia/729299, accessed on 19.08.2016.
[30] "Russian Military in Crimea Receives S-300PMU Surface-to-Air Missile Systems", *Sputnik*, available at http://sputniknews.com/military/20141203/1015431828.html, accessed on 24.08.2016.
[31] "Profile: Russia's S-300 missile system", *BBC*, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-22652131, accessed on 24.08.2016.
[32] "Almost 100 military units and organizations created in Crimea", *TASS*, available at http://tass.ru/en/russia/785884, accessed on 22.08.2016.
[33] The International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, Routledge, London, 2016, p.175.
[34] *Ibidem.*
[35] "Russia deploys advanced air defence system to Crimea", *Al Jazeera*, available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/russia-deploys-advanced-air-defence-system-crimea-160813073345332.html, accessed on 22.08.2016.

at the beginning of 2017 an Airborne Assault Regiment in the Dzhankoy region of Crimea.[36]
Also in 2017, Russia could bring to the Peninsula Podsolnukh radars with a range of 450 km
which, according to the Russian military, can also detect stealth aircraft.[37]

2.2. Maritime space

On June 21, 2014, Moscow announced the modernization and enlargement of the
Black Sea fleet. The former commander of the Naval Forces of the Russian Federation, Viktor
Chirkov, said that the Russian Black Sea Fleet will receive about 30 new combat ships by
2020, an investment worth 2.3 billion dollars.[38] These include six Admiral Grigorovich class
frigates, six Varshavyanka class submarines, six patrol ships for territorial waters and the
exclusive economic zone of Crimea, three ships for detecting and destroying mines of the
Aleksandrit class, four fast patrolling ships of Raptor type and other vessels, all from the latest
technological generation.[39] This will facilitate a better control over the region and will make it
more difficult for Ukraine to attempt to restore control in the area.

From August 2014 to June 2016, the Russian Black Sea fleet has received all of the
ordered submarines from the Varshavyanka class, equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles with a
range of 1,500 km.[40] The submarines are based in the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, which
is in an upgrading process to ensure their safe residence. By June 2016 only three berths were
built out of six planned by 2020.[41] Regarding the frigates, only two of the six planned were
assigned during 2016, with another one slated to join them by the end of this year. Three more
frigates would have to enter into use by 2018 but the Russian Federation has sold them to
India in early August because the Ukrainian factory which was producing gas turbines for
such ships decided to stop deliveries after the annexation of Crimea.[42] Also added to the
composition of the fleet in November 2015 were two Buyam class corvettes equipped with
Kalibr cruise missiles, and until the end of this year another one will have arrived.[43]

According to Russian news agencies by May 2016, the Russian Black Sea fleet's
included 277 ships, of which 49 were warships, and about 2,500 soldiers.[44] Therefore, Russia
has strengthened its position as the most powerful actor in the Black Sea region, changing the

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[36] "Russia to start forming air assault regiment in Crimea in 2017", *Russia Beyond the Headlines*, available at
http://rbth.com/news/2016/08/03/russia-to-start-forming-air-assault-regiment-in-crimea-in-2017_617759,
accessed on 25.08.2016.
[37] "Russia Plans to Deploy Extra Sunflower Radars Capable of Detecting F-35 Jets", *Sputnik,* available at
http://sputniknews.com/military/20160810/1044129781/russia-podsolnukh-radar.html?utm_source=https
%3A%2F%2, accessed on 22.08.2016.
[38] Zachary KECK, "Russia Expands Naval Presence in Crimea", *The Diplomat*, available at
http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/russia-expands-naval-presence-in-crimea/, accessed on 15.08.2016.
[39] "Russia's Black Sea Fleet to get 30 new warships in next 6 years", *TASS*, available at
http://tass.com/russia/737231, accessed on 15.08.2016.
[40] Nicholas de LARRINAGA, "Russia launches sixth and final improved Kilo-class submarine", *Janes*, available
at http://www.janes.com/article/60917/russia-launches-sixth-and-final-improved-kilo-class-submarine , accessed
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[41] Nikolai LITOVKIN "Russia to open new naval base in Black Sea to counter NATO", *Russia Beyond The
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counter-nato_607229, 29.05.2016, accessed on 22.08.2016.
[42] Franz-Stefan GADY "India to Acquire 3 Guided Missile Frigates From Russia", *The Diplomat*, 05.08.2016,
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v-oblasti-oborony-i-bezopasnosti-v-zerkale-smi-monitoring-smi-za-nedelyu-s-09-po-15-maya-2016-goda-6775,
accessed on 26.08.2016.

balance of power in the Pontic basin and marginalizing Ukrainian power. Besides taking several Ukrainian ships during the occupation of Crimea, the Russian Federation also entered into possession of the military dolphin facilities from the peninsula which Ukraine inherited after the Soviet Union collapsed. During the Cold War, these dolphins were trained to attack divers with harpoons which were tied to their back, as well as detect mines and carry out kamikaze missions.[45] However, they were sold to Iran in 2000, but, from 2014 onward, the Russian Federation has started to train dolphins again but, when the information appeared in the press, Moscow issued a denial. However, in March 2016, the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation announced on its official website that it plans to buy five dolphins.[46] In the world, there are only two such training bases for dolphins, one in the United States at San Diego and one in Sevastopol.[47]

2.3 Airspace

By March 2016, the Russian Federation had brought to Crimea a squadron of Su-24 bombers, one of Su-25, both stationed near Simferopol and two squadrons of multi-role Su-27 and Su-30 type fighter jets, at Belbek air base[48], totalling around 40 fighters.[49] In addition, in the north of the peninsula, at the Dzhankoy airbase, three squadrons of Ka-52, Mi-35, Mi-28, Mi-26 and Mi-8 helicopters and several drones were stationed.[50] Moscow has also invested in the aerial transportation infrastructure of Crimea, starting with the modernization of several military and civilian airports from those 7 which are in the peninsula. Moreover, the Federal Agency of Transport of the Russian Federation approved in April 2016 the building of a new airport near Simferopol that will be ready by 2018.[51] So, by implementing the A2 / AD system, the Russian Federation has built a real stronghold in Crimea. The military capabilities positioned there are a threat to the freedom of movement in the Black Sea but also for the security of riparian states.

According to the Ukrainian Army Intelligence Service (GUR), by May 2016 the Russian Federation had in Crimea 23.900 soldiers, 613 tanks and armored vehicles, 162 artillery pieces of which 56 are multiple rocket launchers. Also accounted for in the peninsula are 101 fighter jets, 56 helicopters, 34 warships, four submarines and 16 missile systems to defend the coast including 3K60 BAL, K-300 Bastion mobile missile launchers[52] and eight S-400 launchers arrived in August this year.[53] In addition, by the end of August about 24 SU-34, SU-29 and MIG-35C fighters arrived at the Belbek and Kirovsk airports.[54]

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[45] "Iran buys kamikaze dolphins", *BBC*, 03.08.2000, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/middle_east /670551.stm, accessed on 28.08.2016.

[46] Karin BRULLIARD, "Russia's military is recruiting dolphins, and their mission is a mystery", *The Washington Post*, 11.03.2016, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/animalia/wp/2016/03/11/russias-military-is-recruiting-dolphins-and-their-mission-is-a-mystery/, accessed on 22.08.2016.

[47] "Iran buys kamikaze dolphins", *BBC*, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/middle_east /670551.stm, accessed on 28.08.2016.

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[50] *Ibidem.*

[51] "At the airport of Simferopol began to build a new terminal", *Ukrop News 24*, available at http://ukropnews24.com/at-the-airport-of-simferopol-began-to-build-a-new-terminal/, accessed on 29.08.2016.

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[53] *Ibidem.*

[54] *Ibidem.*

January 2014 (before the annexation)	Soldiers	12.500
	Armored vehicles	116
	Artillery pieces	24
	Fighter Jets	22
	Helicopters	37
	Warships	26
	Submarines	2
May 2016 (about two years after the annexation)	Soldiers	23.900
	Armored vehicles and tanks	613
	Artillery pieces	162
	Fighter jets	101
	Helicopters	56
	Warships	34 from Ukrainian sources, 49 from Russian sources
	Submarines	4
	Missile launchers	16 missile systems 3K60 BAL, K-300 Bastion
		8 missile systems S-400 Triumph

Figure no. 1 Russian military presence in the Crimean Peninsula and the Black Sea

3. Risks and threats to the security of Romania

Romania announced in March 2014 through an official press release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that it does not recognize the illegal annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea by the Russian Federation. According to the release, this action "is likely to boost the existing prolonged conflicts in Romania's neighboring areas, implicitly in those of EU and

North Atlantic Alliance, threatening to affect stability and security in the European space"[55]. Also on 16 May 2014, the President of Romania at that time, Traian Băsescu told a press conference in the presence of Anders Rasmussen, Secretary General of NATO, that the occupation of Crimea "creates imbalances in the balance of power in the Black Sea, which will be compensated for"[56]. Băsescu added that "in our opinion the Black Sea has become the most sensitive part in the region, it's the biggest vulnerability we have"[57]. However, Rasmussen assured Romania of the Alliance's support in a possible conflict. In the current context, both Romania and NATO must pay greater importance to the Black Sea region because of the actions of the Russian Federation which continues to militarize Crimea.

Thus, the placement of 3K60 BAL, K-300 and S-400 Bastion mobile missile launchers in the peninsula represents a threat because their range penetrates deep into the airspace and Exclusive Economic Zone of Romania from the Black Sea. Moreover, the S-400 is capable of hitting air targets that are above the port of Constanța. At the same time, the consolidation of the Russian Black Sea Fleet's capacity tilted the balance of power further towards the Russian Federation to the detriment of NATO forces, which have limited access in the region on account of the Montreux Convention from 1936.[58] Turkish President Recep Erdogan, in the context of the tenth Conference of Chiefs of Defence of the Balkan States, which took place in May 2016, that following discussions with the NATO Secretary General, conveyed Turkey's dissatisfaction with the Alliance lack of presence and visibility in the Black Sea. Erdogan claims that he told Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg: "You are not visible in the Black Sea. And your invisibility in the Black Sea turns it into a Russian lake. As riparian countries, we should live up to our responsibilities. As NATO members, we should take all required steps in all spheres, including the sea, air and ground"[59].

This statement comes shortly after the beginning of 2016, when the Romanian Defence Minister, Mihnea Motoc, announced that Romania will begin negotiations with allies to create a permanent NATO fleet in the Black Sea.[60] Even if Bucharest and Ankara wanted to strengthen NATO's presence in the area, the Romanian initiative was unsuccessful because of Bulgaria's opposition to avoid upsetting Russia in a difficult electoral and economic internal context. The Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov, shortly after the official visit of President of Romania in Bulgaria on June 2016, stated that "our country will not become part of the Black Sea fleet being prepared against Russia"[61] adding that "I always say that I want the Black Sea to see sailboats, yachts, large boats with tourists and not become an arena of

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[55] "Romania nu va recunoaste actul anexarii Republicii Autonome Crimeea, parte integranta a statului Ucraina – MAE", *Hot News*, available at http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-16850169-romania-nu-recunoaste-actul-anexarii-republicii-autonome-crimeea-parte-integranta-statului-ucraina-mae.htm, accessed on 27.08.2016.

[56] "Rasmussen, secretarul general NATO: România nu e singură. Nimeni nu mai poate avea încredere în garanțiile de securitate oferite de Rusia / Băsescu: Anexarea Crimeei creează dezechilibre în Marea Neagră, care vor trebui compensate", *Hot News*, available at http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-17274730-live-text-seful-nato-fost-primit-traian-basescu-palatul-cotroceni.htm, accessed on 29.08.2016.

[57] *Ibidem.*

[58] Stephen STARR, "How The 1936 Montreux Convention Would Help Russia In A Ukraine War", *International Business Times*, available at http://www.ibtimes.com/how-1936-montreux-convention-would-help-russia-ukraine-war-1582507, accessed on 29.08.2016.

[59] Serkan DEMİRTAŞ, "NATO, Turkey challenge Russia on Black Sea", *Hurriyet*, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/nato-turkey-challenge-russia-on-black-sea-.aspx?pageID=449&nID=99 297&NewsCatID=429, accessed on 27.08.2016.

[60] Marian CHIRIAC, "Romania Calls for Permanent NATO Black Sea Force", *Balkan Insight*, available at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/romania-calls-for-permanent-nato-black-sea-force-02-01-2016-1, accessed on 28.08.2016.

[61] Georgi GOTEVI, "Bulgaria refuses to join NATO Black Sea fleet against Russia" *EurActiv*, available at https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/bulgaria-refuses-to-join-nato-black-sea-fleet-against-russia/, accessed on 30.08.2016.

military action (…) I do not need a war in the Black Sea"[62]. Thus, the special visit of Romanian President to Sofia, who traveled there in order to gain Bulgaria's support in achieving the creation of the fleet, was unsuccessful. However, the presence of a NATO fleet in the Black Sea it's needed to deter and counter a possible threat a threat from the Russian Federation. NATO sought to consolidate its presence in the Black Sea by bringing warships by rotation but in limited number and for short periods of time.

The number of vessels and their total tonnage during their stationing are regulated by the Montreux Convention, but the creation of a permanent Alliance fleet in the Black Sea would ameliorate this problem. The risk of a military confrontation between NATO and the Russian Federation in the Black Sea basin is low. However, the existence of the Alliance fleet would discourage Moscow from taking certain actions such as violating the sea and air space of NATO allies, something that Russia has done several times from 2014 to the present day.

Another threat to Romania's security is generated by the Kalibr cruise missiles that are equipped on the new Russian frigates and corvettes from the Black Sea. The range of such missiles reaches 1,500 km, which was confirmed in October 2015 when Russia launched 26 Kalibr rockets, from warships located in Caspian Sea, which hit multiple targets in Syria.[63] Therefore, from Sevastopol such a missile could easily hit Bucharest, Budapest, Ankara, Sofia, and even NATO's Aegis anti-missile defense system from Deveselu. Russian Army military sources claim that the Aegis system is not capable of intercepting Kalibr missiles.[64] Moscow also began organizing more complex military exercises in the region after the annexation of Crimea and developed an aggressive behavior towards the Ukraine and NATO in the Black Sea. From 2014 to the time of writing this paper, the Russian Federation has undertaken dozens of military exercises in Crimea and in the maritime area around the peninsula. The largest exercise, called "Caucasus 2016" took place between 5-10 September and involved 100.000 troops, 2.500 combat vehicles, 60 ships and 400 aircraft.[65] Also, in the last two years, several Russian fighter planes, bombers and reconnaissance planes flew very close to Turkish, Bulgarian and Romanian air space, being intercepted by the fighter planes of those countries.[66] According to Laurian Anastasof, Chief of the Romanian Air Force, from the beginning of 2016 to June, Romanian fighter jets rose 4 times from the ground to intercept Russian combat aircraft that were coming too close to Romania's airspace.[67] At the same time, Russian fighters, starting from March 2014, made several provocative gestures against NATO warships, which were in International waters in the Black Sea.

[62] Andrew HEAVENS, "Bulgaria says will not join any NATO Black Sea fleet after Russian warning", *Reuters*, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-nato-bulgaria-blacksea-idUKKCN0Z21NU, accessed on 28.08.2016.
[63] Sylvia WESTALL, Dominic EVANS, "Russia backs Syrian forces in major assault on insurgents", *Reuters*, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-strikes-idUKKCN0S10BI20151008, accessed on 28.08.2016.
[64] "US Missile Defense in Eastern Europe: How Russia Will Respond", *Sputnik*, available at https://sputniknews.com/military/20160516/1039683754/us-missile-defense-europe-russian-response.html , accessed on 08.09.2016.
[65] "MFA Ukraine: Russia's Caucasus 2016 drills constitute increasing military threat", *Unian*, available at http://www.unian.info/politics/1509354-mfa-ukraine-russias-caucasus-2016-drills-constitute-increasing-military-threat.html, accessed on 08.09.2016
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[67] Dora VULCAN, "Aeronave militare rusesti riscant de aproape de spatiul romanesc de patru ori in acest an", *Revista 22*, available at http://revista22.ro/70253452/aeronave-militare-rusesti-riscant-de-aproape-de-spatiul-romanesc-de-patru-ori-in-acest-an.html, accessed on 08.09.2016.

All these actions, corroborated with the occupation of two offshore energy platforms of Ukraine in December 2015, prove Moscow's aggressive behavior which has manifested in the Black Sea region since the annexation of Crimea.[68]

So, although Romania does not acknowledge and accept the new boundaries set by the Russian Federation in the Black Sea, Bucharest must be aware that it has regained a common maritime border with Russia, after 25 years, which could generate disputes. Moreover, in the absence of a NATO permanent fleet in the Black Sea, Romania must strengthen its full spectrum military capabilities by purchasing current generation hardware able to counter the A2 / AD system of the Russian Federation, like the Polish model on the Baltic Sea. Thus, Romania should strengthen its coastal zone, from Constanța to Tulcea, by purchasing TRS-15 three dimensional radars, with a range of about 240 km[69], which would give it a better capacity of monitoring the airspace in its Black Sea vicinity. It is also necessary to endow the army with NSM anti-ship cruise missiles, which can hit ground targets at distances of 185 km.[70] Also required are Patriot anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems with a range of 160 km.[71]

Conclusion

Russian territory and the Crimean peninsula are not within the range of these systems, therefore Moscow could not accuse Romania that it is gearing up for offensive action. Finally, to successfully counteract the A2 / AD system, in addition to those listed above, Romania needs political will and a good quality of governance to pursue the long term strategies required for ensuring National defense and security.

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[68] Maksym BUGRIY, "Russia's moves to gain dominance in the Black Sea", *The Ukrainian Weekly*, available at http://www.ukrweekly.com/uwwp/russias-moves-to-gain-dominance-in-the-black-sea/, accessed on 8.09.2016.
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OFFICIAL LANGUAGE, SYMBOL OF MODERN STATE

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Abstract: According to international standards, the official language of a nation state represents a part of national security. Speaking about the official language in the Republic of Moldova and its degree of functionality, unfortunately it is obvious that historical language does not correspond to the official language present in a national, sovereign and independent state. In our opinion, this situation represents not only a linguistic danger at the level of correctness of Romanian language in the Republic of Moldova, but also a danger at the level of national security, in the case when propagandistic intentions of the Russian Federation are obvious, by using a wide range of mass-media sources, aiming at the impairment of values and aspirations of state politics.

According to sociolinguistic theses, two literary languages cannot coexist in a nation state, because it conducts to an impairment. Therefore, the state faces a difficult situation, determined by the fact that it is supposed to promote two different cultures, and also two different national politics – actually, it represents an enormous paradox and absurdity.

This situation does not correspond to the international standards, and it is obvious the fact that we live in a state, impaired in various domains: linguistics, culture, politics and mass-media. Nowadays, the most widely used language is not the language that involves great number of speakers, but the language that is spread in the field of mass-media (for example: Russian language functionality in the majority Former Soviet Countries). It represents that kind of language that has a bigger material support for being promoted, and it also monopolizes press and audiovisual. Thereby, it is necessary to adopt a new Legislation in the Republic of Moldova in the field of linguistics, and new laws in accordance to the international standards of an official language in an independent and sovereign state.

Keywords: literary language, national language, culture language, national state, linguistic legislation, informational space, hybrid war.

Introduction

A literary language constitutes the proper form of a national language. The literary language forms a super version of the national language, characterized by a system of written standards, which assures a certain stability. The literary language has a large domain of functionality, it has all cultural features of the nation. The literary language is the language of science, philosophy and arts, it is also the language of the media and the politics, just like it is the language of different institutions: administration, school, theater and church[1]. A literary language is the cultural language which constitutes the historic and religious character of the nation. A literary language is the language that went through all evolution stages, which one of the most important is the grammar formation[2].

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[1] R. A. Budagov, *Literaturnâe iazâki i iazâkovâe stili*, Vâsşaia Şkola, Moscova, 1967, pp. 5-6.
[2] Ş. Munteanu, Ţâra V., Istoria limbii române liteare, Editura Didactică şi Pedagogică, Bucureşti, 1978, p. 11.

1. Aspects of functioning official language in Moldova

According to international standards, the official language represents a part of national security, just like all state symbols: the flag, the anthem and others.

Therefore, speaking about the official language, which is Romanian language, in the Republic of Moldova and its degree of functionality, unfortunately it is obvious that historical language does not correspond to the official language present in a national "sovereign and independent state" [3].

The situation of the official language contradicts the century aspirations of the nation with historic rights, just like the "persuasion of the Moldovan state nation in the historic context of its becoming a nation"[4]. The Republic of Moldova along with an energetic and territory insecurity it displays with a linguistic insecurity as well. The respective social linguistic situation is determined by more factors. One of these would be the delay of adopting a new linguistic legislation suitable for the notion of a national state. At the same time it lacks a linguistic policy directed towards the strategic objectives of consolidation of the state, something which creates the inexistence of a sequence and a political will in this sense.

At the moment the Republic of Moldova displays with a linguistic legislation which dates from the Soviet Union. The official language of the country is thus "protected" by the laws which were adopted for another state formation – the Moldovan R.S.S., which was a part of Soviet Union[5]. For the 1989 year the respective legislation constitutes a big achievement, while for the current context it does not correspond with the status of the Republic of Moldova as a sovereign and independent state[6]. This legislation is completely anachronistic and it has plenty of unjustified voids and superficial formulations which give double interpretation of the articles, that tolerates and encourages the feeble knowledge of the official language. The rules of the functioning language are completely ignored. The media is mainly in Russian language, the TV channels casted are mainly in Russian, ply woods and posters are in Russian, commercial units, businesses, cinemas are functioning in another language than the official language, institutions that write their correspondence and documents only in Russian language and there are many other situations where the official language is underestimated[7].

In our opinion this situation represents not only a linguistic danger at the level of righteousness of Romanian language in the republic of Moldova, but also a danger at the level of national security[8], because into a sovereign and independent state there cannot function simultaneously *two cultural languages*, two literary languages.

The Romanian and the Russian languages are two cultural languages which display of the same lexical and grammatical potential, but according to international norms, two literary languages cannot coexist in a nation state, because it conducts to an impairment. Therefore, the state faces a difficult situation, determined by the fact that is supposed to promote two different cultures and two different national politics – actually it represents an enormous paradox.

Two cultures and two national politics which are promoted in one single state constitutes a phenomena which underestimates the social political stability of the state and its

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[3] CONSTITUŢIA REPUBLICII MOLDOVA (adoptată la 29. 07. 94), p. 7.

[4] *Ibidem*, p. 6.

[5] A.Bantoş, *Situaţia limbii de stat în Republica Moldova: de jure şi de facto*// Limba Română, nr. 9-10, Anul XVIII, Chişinău, 2008, p. 43.

[6] Bantoş A., *Idem*, p. 44.

[7] M. Purice, *Legislaţia lingvistică şi problemele limbii de stat* // Limba Română, nr. 9-12, Anul XI, Chişinău, 2001, p. 28.

[8] A. Ciobanu, *Reflecţii lingvistice*, Academia de Ştiinţe a Moldovei, Chişinău, 2009, pp. 75-77.

democratic aspirations. Thus from the perspective of the theories regarding the national state, we consider that the functionality of the Russian language (the owner of 70% of local media) simultaneously with the official language of the Republic of Moldova which is Romanian language constitutes a vulnerability. Nowadays the Russian language functions wider than the official language, although it isn't *the official language*.

The range of information in Russian language reflects a huge flow of it not just from the Republic of Moldova but from another country as well. The information is an essential element of the state system[9]. Thus the transmitter of the information pretend that their sources are entirely objective, actually these are completely subjective[10], a fact determined through social information of the state system from which it comes, but also from promotion of economic interests of external politics, geopolitics, regional etc. of the respective country[11], in this case we are talking about Russian Federation. The social information of a state is spread according to those that promote it, for more levels of it, like: economic information, social political information, technical information, information belonging to all cultural formulas and not in last instance the ideology[12].

The social information of a state constitutes all peculiarities of that nation, psycho-social and all interests and needs of this. In the context of this social information a special feature has the social political information, ideological which is elaborated and chosen from some special positions like politics and ideology[13].

The human being is a social phenomena, because he is a consumer of the state information, social group and the nation that comes from. The citizen that is formed into a social national context, that has to face two cultural and national languages is put into the situation of living the feeling of belonging to two national cultures and respectively to two national policies, which is as we previously mentioned a huge paradox into a national state.

There comes the problem of the volume of the received information from another language than the official one, which is undermined in this sense. Such a factor is essential, because the volume and the frequency with which the information is displayed to the consumer it depends the psycho-social status of the person that belongs to the nation, mentality, interests, ideology. The promotion of a state different than the promoting state, might ruin the national interests of the state along with the economical, political and regional interests, can divide the society.

In the context of some asymmetric threats (a hybrid war) over the state, this becomes vulnerable front of these dangers. Moreover the means of information have the determining role of damaging the evolution of the country, because the promoters of the specific information of another state have the goal of controlling and subverting the target state by the means of propaganda and intimidation campaigns. By the means of such a war there is the attempt to subdue the state. Therefore the Republic of Moldova is completely vulnerable front of such dangers[14].

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[9] Used with legal significance: "Overstructural institution, main instrument of political and administrative organization through means whereby is exercised functionality of social system and are reglementated the relations between people; the territory and population over which is exercited this organization authority" (*Apud* Dicționarul explicativ al limbii române (ediția a II-a revăzută și adăugită), București: Editura Univers Enciclopedic Gold, 2009).

[10] V. G. Afanasiev, *Sistemnosti i obşestvo*, Izdatelstvo Politicescoi Literaturî, Moscova, 1980, p. 237.

[11] *Ibidem*, p. 238.

[12] *Ibidem*, p. 238.

[13] *Ibidem*, pp. 238-239.

[14] See the opinion of german political scientist, professor of University "Georg August" from Goettingen, Peter W. Schultze to *http://www.report.md/politic/Peter-W.-Schultze-Impotriva-Moldovei-se-duce-un-razboi-informational-parte-a-razboiului-hibrid-137*.

Conclusions

Thus the subversion of the official language represents an injustice, because the official language of the Republic of Moldova represents the historic language of the nation. The supremacy of another language represents a big threat for the informational security, political and ethnic security. This situation does not correspond to the international standards and it is obvious the fact that we live in a state impaired in various domains: linguistics, culture, politics and mass-media. Nowadays the most widely used language is not the language that involves great number of speakers, but the language that is spread in the field of mass-media (for example: Russian language functionality in the majority Former Soviet Countries). It represents that kind of language that has bigger material support for being promoted and it also monopolizes the media and audiovisual.

In the situation of the Republic of Moldova where such phenomena are tolerated it does not win the official language (the Romanian language) but the subverting language (in this case the Russian language). Thereby, it is necessary to adopt a new Legislation in the Republic of Moldova in the field of linguistics and new laws in accordance to the international standards of an official language in an independent and sovereign state, where the official language represents a supreme condition of the modern state.

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NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL THREATS IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALISATION

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Abstract: The corruption in Romania versus the international corruption is described by the means of terrorism, organized crime and money laundering. In the workshop „The complexity and dynamics of the security environment" I will present the three main national and international threats: terrorism, organized crime and money laundering, threats that are part of the shadow economy, present both in Romania and worldwide, but also the impact of these harmful phenomenon in society. At the same time, the purpose of the writing is to identify these threats in Romania and to bring forward the necessity of combating this harmful phenomenon, phenomenon that have social and economic reasons. Within the presentation, I insist upon the need to combat the money laundering and the terrorism, threats that are part of a complex economic cycle which is centered on corruption.

Keywords: corruption, shadow economy, terrorism, money laundering, organized crime.

Introduction

In this paper the author intends are to respond concretely to a series of questions facing increasingly often all states. What does the underground economy suppose and how has started? Which is the main business behind these forms of economy? Are there any measures to stop and combat this harmful phenomenon to Romanian society?

I will try to detail all the answers in this thesis and I will also try to propose a series of legislative measures that would lead to a solution, at least short term, as regards the threats in the business environment and the entire economy market.

Why Romania is considered a market economy?

The market economy represents a social system of work division each person pursuing his own interest and at the same time, it does not "enjoy" the intervention of the state in economy. The concept of market is closely linked to consumption because the last is the main pillar in the proper functioning of the whole society.

There is a period in Romanian society, when about mafia, human trafficking, drug trafficking, organized crime is discussed as in a legend, as if no one heard these phrases than in other unknown spheres until now. "After the transition period and including the moment, it is increasingly often spoken about white Gule. The existence of underground economy should not be ignored because the denying declaratory of the phenomenon does not mean its eradication and it does not mean that it is not there."[1]

Smuggling of cigarettes and alcohol, the barter with black currency represents the perfect environment where tax evasion is found, which is closely linked to the underground economy. Romanian authorities are waging a battle against corruption and underground

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[1] Drăgoi PĂTROI, *Evaziunea fiscală între latura permisivă, aspectul contravenţional şi caracterul infracţional*, Editura „Economică", Bucureşti, 2006, p.156.

economy but in the center of these flagella there are often people of other nationalities such as Chinese, Turks, Arabs, Tunisians, Israelis and catching them is deficient because some of them proceed as true experts and they know their vulnerabilities.

1. The underground economy and its effects

The underground economy consists of all illicit areas of the economy such as: tax evasion, tax fraud, illegal work, organza crime, terrorism, begging, money laundering. Underground economy definition is limited to not declaring full activity, failure to register in accounting, his ultimate goal being to avoid fees related to the state budget. Unlike tax evasion, which involves a criminal offense and is limited to the omission of certain operations by good science in accounting documents, within the underground economy no activity is registered in filter records.

A market is considered as a result of supply and demand. The one who chooses the supply from the underground economy sphere is "attracted", at first glance, by the attractive price. I believe that if there were no underground economy there would not be markets, butchers or merchandise. Trade, as is defined in the dictionary of the Romanian language and literature, represents, "an exchange of products by mart, branch of the economy within the traffic of merchandise moves deploys ♦ goods trade, barter or production"[2].

So, in default of underground economy, the only pillars that would "loose ", would be those who have a weaker financial situation. Usually those with a precarious situation are those who apply at the underground economy, when they want to buy or sell certain categories of goods. It appears that both the visible and the underground economy cover the needs of the population, but the latter has the main feature lower price. The informal economy is created from counterfeit merchandise or second hand merchandise, even false merchandise, their quality being one questionable.

For example, when purchasing a mobile phone on the market, there are a number of people who want to purchase the good "under sale" regime as they will find this mobile at a price considerable lower than the price from the store. Those who have a grandiloquent attitude will choose to purchase the mobile from the store because they have warranty for a period of two years, and also when the product stops functioning within normal parameters, the company is obliged to remedy the situation.

So, those who purchase a good, in other regime than normal will not have some advantages, but they will pay a lower price for that product. From this point of view, I find it appropriate the underground economy as it brings a number of benefits to people with a statute average or below average to purchase a product that they could not afford them normally only in light of the fact the price is significantly lower.

"Over time it was concluded that the underground economy can be beneficial as long as it serves the proper conduct of the economic environment by satisfying the demand for urban and small craftsmen."[3]

In trade's case is particularly difficult to demonstrate and quantify the presence of underground economy in this sector, as goods are bought and resold quickly and the institutions empowered to pursue and investigate these illegal acts are almost impossible to prove in court the real culprits. The only market segment where the underground economy may be proved easier is in production as are pursued certain tracks and competent authorities find it easier to prove them later. Also in the underground economy a "key" area represents the construction sector.

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[2] Dicţionarul explicativ al limbii române.
[3] Cristina COVACI VOICU, *Îndreptar de economie subterană. Abordarea multidimensională a eşecului raţionalităţii economice*, Editura „ASE", Bucureşti, 2015, p. 9.

"The underground economy is an equivocal concept that is not in the measurability domain and control or eradication. The arguments brought in favor of the idea of incommensurability are just the limitations of obsessive attempts to measure the underground economy."[4]

In the opinion of Austrian Professor Friedrich Schneider, the underground economy in 2013 is estimated at 30% of GDP. This indicator is a relative one, my opinion being that the underground economy is 10% above the level calculated by the Austrian, as there are a number of elements that have not been added and taken into account in the analysis. Some authors consider that the underground economy "help" the underdeveloped sectors and small businesses, because they do not declare anything just to avoid the tax burden. Once with globalization, national and international governments lead a strong fight against the underground economy, having as austerity measure control taxes.

Table no.1 Level shadow economy in Romania versus other EU countries

Shadow economy

Source: Created by the author based on Friedrich Schneider data (2008-2010)

Since the appearance of Romanian currency, it has been created the black market, which represents the underground economy, part of the population, who did not wanted and still wants to not pay taxes. From the sociological point of view, either it is rejected deliberately by certain groups non-payment of these taxes, being considered exceedingly entrepreneurs to pay them or entrepreneurs who use these methods are of the opinion that in the past they have been honest but the state did not respond as they have expected and they obey to some behavior of internal type toward the state, which they consider a "supreme damage".

There is another category which is part of the underground economy, that receive "protection" from certain groups of people and are favored and encouraged to practice this type of economy, since they will later "serve" to some obscure interests. This "protection" is closely related to corruption.

In Romania, the underground economy knows multiple causes. The underground economy causes into Mircea Cosea's vision from the perspective of Romania represent:
"▪Communist legacy and the peculiarities of economic and social behavior;

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[4] Cristina COVACI VOICU, *Îndreptar de economie subterană. Abordarea multidimensională a eșecului raționalității economice*, Editura „ASE", București, 2015 , p.10.

▪State interference in the economy by the replacement of the motion market with administrative measures;

▪Lack of competence and efficiency of public administration;

▪Lack of transparency in the privatization process and the use of resulted founds from privatization;

▪ Insufficient attention paid to respecting and guaranteeing private property;

▪ Daunting tax for the business environment and a complicated tax system;

▪ Fragility of the National Bank supervision mechanism;

▪ Instability of the legislative framework;

▪ Political customer."[5]

In the category of underground economy are part: work under the table, criminal activities, tax fraud, tax evasion, arms trafficking, drug trafficking, human trafficking and prostitution as these categories of crimes are carriers of income, but their income is not declared.

1.1 The work under the table

The term of "work under the table" passes often in the cryptic sphere, statistics offered from the World Bank and EUROSTATE ranks Romania, along Bulgaria at one of the lowest rates applicable to labor, as can be seen in the table below. The lowest indicator is found including in countries such as Italy, Cyprus, FYROM, but the lowest percentage in the European Union is allocated to Greece. Although these statistics indicate a percentage of Romania amounts to 61.0%, there is another category of persons occupying a job but do not have an employment contract for inclusion in this analysis.

Table no. 2 Rates of employment, the category of age contacted between 15 and 64 years, from 2004 to 2014
(%)

Source: Created by the author based on EUROSTAT data (2012-2014)

The work under the table is used to elude the state budget through non-payment of contributions owed the state, as a result of employment. Contributions owed by the employer for each employee in Romania, consist of (CASS-5.2% Unemployment 0.5%, 15.8% CAS-normal conditions, FNUASS- 0.85% Risk Fund and accidents 0.4% and 0.25% Fund of salary claims). Contributions are significant for a firm or a company that figures with over 1000

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[5] Mircea COŞEA, *România Subterană* , Editura „Tribuna Economică", Bucureşti, 2003, p.145.

employees. They prefer to hire a contract of employment for a minimum wage and some of the money to be handed out cash, so they avoid the payment of taxes and fees.

Groups of people using this practice deviate from the rules, breaking the labor laws and tax. "Some economists believe that it can be discussed , as in the case of unemployment, even about a natural rate of the underground economy (under can be appreciated that it does not exert any negative influence on macroeconomic indicators), although its methodology of assessment quantitative is highly uncertain and does not have at the base scientific rules and principles"[6].

The labor market in Romania has acquired new dimensions as a result of economic transition. The fact that the population started to diminish and the privatization and restructuring of several institutions after 1989 led to loss of jobs.

The vulnerability in this case is represented by migration because most of the population after the transition, finding themselves unable to find a job preferred to migrate to new financial centers across Europe to find a better paid job. So I believe that the main vulnerabilities of undeclared work are: aging population, education and migration.

"The solution of "undeclared work" represents the option to survive, and its usefulness is in relieving the state budget of a considerable financial effort that would require social protection for those working without legal forms"[7]. I believe that the labor market in Romania would balance with a demand and an equal offer, application consisting of constant preparation, long-lasting, with a high education level and an offer related to the preparation.

The main inconvenient at the moment is the unequal offer payment offered by the employer, salaries that are not as expected and that is the main reason for persons with higher education and more, choose to migrate to centers more developed that offer an acceptable salary , as expected. New legislation regarding labor market could absorb existing inequities in this segment.

1.2 Criminal activities

"Non-recorded economy is a scourge of the modern world associated with economic crime, organized crime, drug market, counterfeits."[8]

"Transnational crime has an international dimension which means that a criminal group act in several countries, a transnational dimension which refers at the cooperation that criminal groups of various nationalities realizes together to control certain markets. The fundamental purpose of organized crime structures represent the continuing capitalization or accumulation of resources by illegal means, being targeted especially the traditional areas (drug trafficking, smuggling, tax evasion, black mail etc.) and new areas (terrorism, arms trafficking, people, privatizations, securities estate companies, etc.)."[9] The ultimate goal of transnational crime is the accumulation of power at international level as mafia groups and illegal funds.

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[6] Drăgoi PĂTROI, *Evaziunea fiscală între latura permisivă, aspectul contravenţional şi caracterul infracţional*, Editura ,,Economică", Bucureşti, 2006 , p.150.

[7] Drăgoi PĂTROI, *Evaziunea fiscală între latura permisivă, aspectul contravenţional şi caracterul infracţional* , Editura ,,Economică", Bucureşti, 2006 , p.153.

[8] Cristina COVACI VOICU, *Îndreptar de economie subterană. Abordarea multidimensională a eşecului raţionalităţii economice*, Editura ,,ASE", Bucureşti, 201, p.18.

[9] Adrian IACOB, *Conceptul de criminalitate organizată în dreptul European*, Site: http: //fs.procuror.ro.

2. Money laundering

"There is evidence that even in ancient times some traders were hiding their fortunes obtained more or less honest, investing them in other provinces or states, where they were not asked how they obtained." [10]

"In the early twentieth century, when the US declared the prohibition of alcohol and the ban gambling, there have been created conditions to obtain by those who violated this law of large amounts of cash which would have produced difficulty in justifying origin. Therefore, these entrepreneurs turned to the opening of some business that were involving the use of large amounts of cash." [11]

"Money laundering strategies include transactions that by volume are very profitable and attractive to legal financial institutions." [12] "Since banks are good and facilitate business of the honest people, demonstrate that they are both important for criminals and money launderers, for the same reasons." [13]

So we can conclude that credit institutions "play" an important role equally for people who run a business properly, respecting the laws of the country in which it operates as well as for money launderers, seeking any way to launder illicit funds from illicit ways.

"Money laundering is an act that targets the incomings obtained by crime, and it can be defined as any act of hiding, camouflage, acquisition, possession, use, investment, movement, storage or transfer of property to which the law expressly confers status offense". [14]

Later, this phenomenon has expanded including Romania. In Romania, money laundering phenomenon follows Law no.656 of 07.12.2002, Republished for prevention and sanctioning of money laundering and for training of some measures to prevent and combat terrorism financing.

Although money laundering as a criminal offense, according the law 656/2002 is punished with imprisonment from 3 years to 12 years, depending on the seriousness of the unlawful act committed, money launderers seem not to care about these sanctioning procedures, these threading this crime as it is a current activity.

In this world shrouded of the mafia, the two groups the launder and the owner of the real funds explain for the beginning which are the requirement and the action takes place as a contract well established. The beneficiary of the funds is not always the one who handles "the laundering" itself, most often, it incurs an experienced person to take charge of the whole operation.

3. International terrorism

Author's purpose regarding international terrorism is understanding of this toxic scourge for the global economy in terms of ideological, religious, social and cultural and the reasons for certain groups of people choose to join this harmful phenomenon.

Terrorism is one of the main threats of the European Union in recent years and I believe it is important to understand elementary notions of this and impulsion that "pushes" toward terrorism, and the ultimate goal of these devastating actions at international level.

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[10] Ştefan POPA şi Gheorghe DRĂGAN, *Spălarea banilor şi finanţarea terorismului-ameninţări planetare pe rute financiare*, Editura „Expert", Bucureşti, 2005, p. 9.
[11] *Ibidem.*
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[13] John MADINGERM, *Money Laundering A Guide for Criminal Investigators*, Ediţia a III-a, CRC Press, New Work, 2012, p.139.
[14] *Ibidem.*

From a historical perspective, terrorism appears mainly after the Cold War (1947-1991) as a result of tensions and political ideological confrontations and politics at worldwide level. The reasons for this phenomenon are poverty, unemployment, lack of education, general injustice, therefore a shared vision of the above, globalization.

Globalization has helped terrorism primarily to develop from the technological point of view, and secondly to finance in economic terms, at a later stage expand. After the global economic crisis which started in 2008, which affected the whole West, the states started a war for world supremacy.

Globalization "serves" self-interest of certain groups of people with a certain political influence. This "whole" implies the power of the strong to benefit from the weak. This decline social and political decline is formed around the private interests.

After the attacks of 11 September 2001 against the United States of America is the first time when it has been spoken about terrorism and also since then the phenomenon has gain enormous magnitude at global level, the experts in the field, researching the causes that led to this form of violence and also what is the solution to stop it.

Since then, the population has begun to realize the danger of terrorism and also to document on this phenomenon. From that date until now the phenomenon has become increasingly more connotations and the fight against it is increasingly engaged. Following the terrorist attacks of that time, catching terrorists has become a job in itself, from the FBI and CIA, to the competent authorities within Romania, as DIIICOT, SRI, SIE. They recruit people with extensive experience, having a specific profile and then integrate them into environments that pose a threat to the security of that country.

US State Department use the following definition regarding "the term" terrorism. "Terrorism means premeditated violence, politically motivated committed against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, to influence the public."[15]

I consider that terrorism is closely linked to the economic environment, since it is financed from various places. The phenomenon of money laundry and arms trafficking are two important flagella that lead toward terrorism. First, terrorism is seen as an activity that falls within the economic sphere, being considered an unlawful activity that violates especially a fundamental human right, namely the right to life. Moreover it is considered that this scourge of terrorism is devoid of moral and philosophical concepts and at the same time lacks political objectives. According to the dictionary of the Romanian Language "terrorism constitutes all intentional acts of violence committed by a group or organization to provoke a generalized fear and to achieve political goals."[16]

From the sociological point of view, most likely, there are some categories of people that uses the terrorism, because it considers that is the only plausible option because their families have died as a result of some injustices committed by various states or the second category of people who have the desire to kill in their personality, to create riots. Both categories are as dangerous as they together form a whole. The third hypothesis is religious reasons.

Attacks are becoming more accentuated during the last period to France due to the fact that, in the past, the French colonies have tried mastering all territories. Speaking increasingly often about the true reasons for which France is threatened constantly by this scourge called terrorism. If the first generation have adapted to conditions as a result of colonization, it seems that future generations do not support the idea that others lead them. To take revenge, terrorists fix certain strategic points within a country, especially crowded places and want to devastate that area. Usually the targets are chosen and according to inspection made by security authorities in order to "succeed" operation.

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[15] Definiție dată de Departamentul de stat al SUA, 2002.
[16] Dicționarul explicativ al limbii române.

3.1 The low level of education

The low levels of education and poverty "push" to terrorism. Due to the fact that terrorist activity may obtain a series of fast earning by kidnapping, begging, amount of money paid to the families of people seized, human character of certain groups of people, in their desire to get rich quick, choose this form of terror. So often, the primary purpose is adopted as a result of purely economic needs.

We examine the level of education, whereas the education gives you aware of this phenomenon, implications and later repercussions. Lack of stable income can attract individuals to these violent organizations. Moreover, we accentuate the fact that once an individual chooses to be part of a terrorist group, the choice is a permanent with clear and defined rules. The possible exit from this violent environment can cause even its death.

With globalization, the world's states want a common religious culture, namely west. In these circumstances is diminished trust in the other cultures and each religion declares war to the others for power and the final supremacy. In these circumstances, we can speak about power as a mainstay for the phenomenon of terrorism, power economic point of view, militarily and politically.

This case is because that after the Second World War, some states have begun to grow and develop faster than others. At this level is also Romania, some statistics accepting the fact that we are among the last places in terms of development in the European Union along Bulgaria.

Conclusions

The underground economy together with the phenomenon of money laundry and international terrorism represent actual problems of the population, both in Romania and at international level. All these phenomena harmful to society, along with corruption phenomenon should be analyzed with caution and appropriate authorities in Romania,, with catching the criminals who commit these illegal acts, should be supported and encouraged to continue combating them and diminishing them.

The author's proposal is to establish a new organization covering all these actual issues - underground economy, corruption, money laundry and terrorism, institution organized both by professionals in ministries empowered and from the Romanian Information Service and including specialists from National Agency for Fiscal Administration so a newly formed institution covering all segments presented above and try as much as possible remedy them. A country's economy will operate in a normal manner as possible if the state with its institutions want the surrender of the nuisances phenomenon in society.

Moreover, I think it is opportune to review the level of Romanian government fiscal policies to reduce the underground economy presented in Romania, currently present and those who "practice" underground economy to focus on the normal one, official. A final proposal from the author, targets a new legislation regarding labor market that could absorb existing inequities in this segment.

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FACETS OF COMMUNICATION – FROM CRYSTALLIZING PERSONAL IDENTITY TO NATIONAL SECURITY

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Abstract: *This paper documents the potential correlations between individual identity and the risks and vulnerabilities of national security placing the phenomenon of communication as the common denominator. Different aspects of individual identity are explored in order to accommodate various dimensions and definitions of national security. A special emphasis is placed on the unconscious features of different forms of communication. We insist on the social influencing facet of communication from the earliest moments of individual education to the persuasiveness of mass communication and their possible impact on national security.*

Keywords: *Individual identity, national security, communication, unconscious, influence, asymmetry*

Introduction

As indicated by National Defense Strategy for 2015 – 2019, "in the current context, in addition to knowing the risks and threats in all aspects - sources, manifestations, means, techniques – the development of the capacity of anticipation, based on knowledge and education is fundamental"[1]. And this role of knowledge and education primarily rests on the academic field as a privileged space for reflection, favorable to reception, analysis and integration of all the particular aspects of different areas and approaches to security, a process completed with the dissemination of results. I consider that by the proposed conclusions, this article could mark a contribution on understanding the variety of the asymmetrical treats for the *national* security.

In the XXI century the definition of security has marked a shift from issues mostly referring to states to individual issues, from a definition centered on force and military action to ways of soft influence, of economic, ideological or identity nature, using tools of informational, communicational nature. These latter types of means stress precisely the *identity* of the community as a reference object of security, security that can be compromised on the specific feature of preserving the consistency and continuity of identity. Even if in most theoretical approaches the security concept is defined by the size of its military, political, economic, environmental and energy resources, we aim to emphasize the paramount importance of the societal identity dimension for the national security. In this regard we will analyze the different layers of the individual identity of the community members, their way of constitution and the significance of the relations between these layers with the nation, nationality and the state organization. It will be discussed what the national state signifies and the link between its security and the individual identity of the citizens; there will also be discussed the usage of various forms of mass communication as tools to influence and alter the relations between the various layers of individual identity. By arguments we hope to re-

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[1] *Strategia națională de apărare a țării pentru perioada 2015 – 2019*, p.18.

assess the necessity of a psychological approach meant to explain the creation, continuity and the functionality of the national state as an optimal facilitating frame for the expression of various aspects of individual identity.

1. The collective identity-national state nexus

The need for connection with others and the need to belong to a group or community are recognized as fundamental psychological necessities that create the premises for the social cooperation. By a continuous reference to social environment we individualize and we crystallize an identity that has initially a predominantly biological nucleus (temperament, gender, race) which defines transmitted personality features. Throughout one's development and education route these features will enrich and refine as the values-character feature of personality. As such, highly individualized options on various aspects of life will emerge, from attitudes towards other people, to moral convictions and stable subjective guidelines manifested in the content of ideals, aspirations and daily activities, especially the social and professional ones.

The biological functioning and the interactional determinism leads to the appearance of several dimensions, aspects of identity, making it both vague and highly disputed. With reference to the criterion of perceptibility we can say that identity is defined on the one hand by the physical appearance, language and actions, daily habits (practical - behavioral identity). On the other hand, identity has an invisible dimension shaped by preferences and the identification with various aspects of social reality. A useful tool in analyzing various aspects of identity is Geert Hofstede's[2] theory on nation-specific cultural dimensions. The six dimensions contain explicit or indirect references to fundamental aspects that determine how a community is structured, even at a national level. Thus, the degree of individualism, the attitude to hierarchy and power, competitiveness, tolerance, long-term orientation are cultural variables that originate in the practical dimension of identity but they determine key issues related to the acquisition and transmission of values, the willingness to build social relations-oriented to purposes, common institutions and ideals.

What makes, however, that beyond language and membership in a particular geographical area, most of individuals to use, more or less in their defining, elements related to the nation and national? Trying to answer this question we will treat directly the issue of identity related to the formation of nations and of the nation state.

Due of its predictive qualities, one of the most useful approaches to the process of developing nations is the ethno-symbolic theory. The father of this approach, Anthony D. Smith, argues that the origin of nations must be sought with ethnic groups[3]. In ethno-symbolic perspective, the nation is a social group with historical character whose central element that gives it continuity and persistence is culture (myths, habits, memories, rituals, traditions, symbols) associated with a common history and territory. The author emphasizes the fundamental importance of cultural affinities in building the national and ethnic identity to the detriment of the physical links or kinship. These affinities guide the crystallization of the social structures, the interaction of members and their orientation towards collective goals and activities. The leading element in maintaining a certain national identity is the continuous identification of individuals with a distinct and common cultural heritage. Smith goes on to identify three factors that have paved the transformation of ethnic communities into nations[4]. Thus, the division of labor, the political and administrative control and the cultural

[2] Hofstede, Geert. Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values (2nd ed.), Beverly Hills CA: SAGE Publications, 1984, p. 34.
[3] Smith, Anthony. *Nationalism and Modernism,* Routledge, 1998, p. 192.
[4] *Idem, Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity*, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 24.

coordination are considered to be revolutions that led progressively to legislative standardization, territorialisation, the centralization and *cultural uniformity* in the form of a public culture, sovereignty, freedom of expression and participation in the social and political life. Significantly for our approach, amid the thinking specificity as an individual psychic process favoring operations with classes and categorization, division of labor as a social feature has contributed to the emergence of social classes and strata.

The constitution of nations and the elements which determine the continuity of such communities bring us closer to the answer of our questions and may explain the passions and concerns they evoke. What seems to contribute to the historical persistence of nations, beyond a certain inertia of nationally representative institutions, are the very elements of civilization, symbols and beliefs[5] that evoke a common past and, moreover, seem to predict a *common destiny* of those who they share. We may say that individuals project their individual existence, a temporary limited one in a common being, the nation, a timeless one, whose past is lost in the mists of time, with a future that only the global crises (or globalization) seem to threaten. From a psychoanalytic perspective we can say that as children project omnipotence ideals on parents, similarly, individuals project psychological needs on a superordinate community, in order to reduce the anguish of perishability.

Addressing the issue in terms of limits, we can assert that according to the individuals' capacity to symbolize, the limits that individuals need in shaping the personal identity range from internal limits, mental, permeable and fluid boundary, to visible, objective limits under the form of physical borders between nations. Due to anxieties, imagination and unconscious operations we will always be driven to internal psychical movements of regressive-identifier nature. So we identify ourselves with individuals, classes or structures, be they idols, heroes, national teams or institutions. They serve both to a sense of belonging and inclusion simultaneously with the competition needs and even conflict ones; in this ambivalence resides precisely the durability of such processes and structures.

We can say that in the above mentioned context of the three types of revolutions, the nation has become, after the tribe, clan, city-states or empires, the useful and necessary "object" meant to moderate some of the individual projected psychological needs. Thus, returning to identity, the nation offers the individual the possibility of belonging and social identification with the characteristics, features and qualities of a class and wider community, with an almost unquestionable identity, enforceable only against other nations. We believe that these mostly unconscious mechanisms of internalization or displacing experiences from individual to classes and broader categories, in this case the nation, an imagined[6] community, have the explanatory potential needed to understand the abandonment of the private-individual interests and the manifestation of devotion acts, loyalty, solidarity, heroism, sacrifice and resistance to any act perceived as being directed against the existence of a common nation. The nature of these psychological mechanisms make them "more basic" resistant to introspection, critical investigation, and especially long-lasting.

It is necessary to mention that the identification with a particular class, category most often leads to over simplify the complexity of social identity and leads to labeling. While it is obvious that what contributes to defining practical identity, activities and daily routines are virtually universal, the significance attributed by categorization (e.g. does not eat pork so he is Muslim) led not only to a favorable perception of diversity but also to interpretations of enforceability, antagonism and conflict.

A nation is a living organism which continuously develops and interprets its elements of culture. On the other hand, the national state is defined by real structures and institutions

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[5] A special emphasis is placed on religious beliefs that transcend individual limits.
[6] Imagined is not equated with unreal but stresses the faith in an invisible connection with other members of a larger community without being in direct, physical contact with them.

that function both as symbols and as tools to harmonize the functioning of various social classes and categories on a material and economic base to support a joint project aimed at the needs and interests of each citizen. In this context it becomes important to interrogate whether the current transformations specific to this stage of globalization (freedom of movement, immigration, hyper-industrialization, relocation of production capacity) can be integrated in the line of a continuous and unavoidable transformation of the identity of a nation or they pose moments of discontinuity with the potential to erode or even dissolve the national states character.

2. The role of communication in the socialization of the individuals

Communication aims to bring closer the individuals in order to share their experiences through words. This closeness between the community members serves in different weights, depending on age and time, to different individual psychological needs. At one end of the continuum we have purely mental, symbolic representational needs and at the other end we find associated individuals ready to improve their chances of success in the face of difficulties, uncertainties or even hazards meant to endanger their safety.

While at the beginning of human society oral communication was the unique practice, the further development of societies and technology has turned communication into a nonperishable reference and an interface between the subjects in various fields and concerns. Following the theoretical developments of Marcia Cavell[7], we can say that the language in all its forms contain elements in varying proportions about the external physical reality and the subjective internal experience. That is why the psychological determinism must be placed at the forefront of approaches due to the triangular communication phenomenon in signifying information, the dialogical aspect of human existence but also because of the interpretative posture performed by the human mind. Conversely, communication is essential in understanding the crystallization of the individual self, the sense of community and togetherness, but also the individual-society opposition or symbolic interaction and influence.

By complexity, depth and potentially explanatory features, the most suitable theories on understanding the psychological transition from an individual psychologically undifferentiated existence with a predominantly biological identity, to a social, interactional-symbolic one, are the psychodynamic theories of attachment[8]. These theories are useful in understanding the emergence of meaning in human language, communication phenomena with his interactional-adaptive feature and interpersonal *influence*. Because the primary function of the caregiver is to modulate the child's affects through an emotional fine-tuning[9], the theory of attachment has the capacity to serve a *synchronized* understanding of relations between the affective dimension and the rational one, between the individual and society, between communication and influence, between identity and knowledge. In support of these theories there come the statements of the anthropologist Chet Sherwood, indicating that all studies confirm the hypothesis that the emergence, development and evolution of human cognition was due to a major change in brain development, a change that cannot be explained but only through a more intense and prolonged care to newborns of mothers and their helpers[10]. In the same vein, not only the anthropologists but also the ethologists indicated that the possibility of any type of mammal, human or nonhuman to be involved in the social life of

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[7] Marcia, Cavell, *Becoming a subject: reflections in philosophy and psychoanalysis*, Clarendon Press, 2006.
[8] Bowlby, J., *Attachment and loss.* Vol. 1: Attachment, Basic Books, New York, 1969.
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the community is conditioned by the ability to precisely assess the emotional disposal of the other[11]. We believe that this clarification of language as inter-relational is essential in understanding the communication persuasive character, language as a means of suggestion, as a vehicle for changing attitudes and behavior. Because of the fact that the investment, projection of affects into various aspects of life is made from an early age in an inter-relational context, of attachment (in a transitional space), the meanings given have an unconscious dimension. The designation of objects, phenomena and internal states made by caregivers using certain words, arranged in a certain shape according to an (invisible) grammar creates future dispositions of perception, at least in syntax, which the receiver will actively and unconsciously project while interpreting messages.

In the context of the early child-caregiver communication relationship the mode of signification of the former depends on what kind of identity the future adult will acquire with mental expressions in different variables - locus of control, dominant-ascending vs. submissive-obedient, degree of impressionability to stimulus, readiness for communication, the degree of responsiveness etc.). Each of the listed variables will leave their mark on both the types of interaction with others, family, colleagues, local community and on how the individual receives and interprets the messages he receives. Consequently, while a favorable development of the child (via safe attachment) will lead to a representation of *exchange* to communication phenomena (symmetry, reciprocity, recognition of their individuality, the development of a healthy sense of self, emergence of intentionality, gaining the freedom to say " no "). In case of some hesitant –anxious attachment relationships, communication will acquire what Alex Mucchielli designate as essentially for the phenomenon, namely *influence* (asymmetry, hidden intentions, disproportionality). Furthermore, I will stress the link that these purely psychological issues have with communication and especially with that of national security:

1. It shows clearly how the negative interactional experiences in early life are reflected in the individual identity and especially in the types of relationships with the environment and on how it is felt the connotation phenomenon of communication (exchange vs. influence). The arrangements for early education are relevant for how to intercept communication messages, regardless of their content.

2. How healthy the relationships and significance of the individual (the attachment supportive relationship where communication is felt as being stimulating as an the exchange) creates the potential for:
- the openness to explore the world and its characteristics (curiosity and
   communication availability);
- the emergence of capacity of triangulation[12] and symbolic thinking;
- the crystallization of I-non-I borders, gaining confidence and self-esteem;
- the acquisition of the ability to form and maintain connections;
- the liaising with the party and the voluntary control of attention;
- the appearance and introspective capacity of mentalizing and those metacognitive.

These features, in turn, lead to:
- an appropriate reception (an understanding of both the manifest content and an availability of exploring the latent intentions in the minds of those who built posts);
- a critical exploration of the personal position and of the transmitter;
- the ability to follow messages;

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[11] One of the fundamental acquisition gained by an individual that has undergone a satisfactory attachment relationship is the emergence of mentalization, ability to "read" the minds of others.

[12] It involves detachment from the subjectivity of our own vision and ability to see things from the other's perspective.

- a low need to use the other individuals in the interpretation of reality;
- the development of a system of realistic expectations in the interaction with the social environment;
- the availability to have stable social, coherent and realistic representations.

A negative signification (made through an insecure-hesitant-anxious attachment in which the communication was felt as an intrusive influence) will keep the future adult trapped in a dual relationship of functional dependence, predominantly affective, opaque to introspection. This kind of relationship leads to the absence or underdevelopment of a critical mental apparatus of exploration and investigation of the content of messages[13] correlated with great emotional sensitivity to their content and therefore, to a greater *susceptibility to the influence*. From an interactional point of view, individuals educated in such a relationship will be characterized by uncertainty, suspicion, distrust or they will reach withdrawal, social isolation. Moreover, these negative attachment types, create predispositions to mental disorders which would distort the understanding of all forms of communication and will create major difficulties in networking.

3. Public communication as social influence and national security

The public communication campaigns have different effects in terms of knowledge acquired, changing attitudes or behavior. Starting from one of the characteristics that define the public communication as a form of communication used by organizations or groups in pursuing certain goals by using the mass-media, the analysis of public communication extends beyond the public communication work carried out by the state institutions. Thus, this paper extends the interest also to non-state entities, non-governmental, political, financial, economic or even religious entities that carry on such activity.

The public communication is part of a larger flow of communication in which the individual is immersed in daily life with family, coworkers, neighbors or friends. Interpreted as a mean of *social influence*, the public communication is studied by the social psychology and communication specialists; it is estimated that a third of the work of social psychology has as a central concern issues of influence. The influencing at a social level is possible both because of a certain level of technology and of some psychosocial conditions. As such, the explosion of digitally communication has created the technical conditions of quasi instantaneous and simultaneous interaction of a large number of individuals on a global scale and of messaging with a wide range of audiences spread.

The fundamental psychological substrate of persuasion is twofold. Firstly, it is determined by the existence of a secondary, unconscious mental level, incongruent with the visible, conscious aspects, both in the transmitter and the receiver. Secondly, the subjects often manifest aversion to ambiguity and a lack of interest in the search for new, complementary information.

In order to understand the psychological mechanisms that underlies influencing process, it is necessary to clarify the characteristics of persuasion and manipulation. A brief review of the literature addressing the phenomena of influence, persuasion or manipulation brings us to a variety of techniques, methods, tools. Whether we look at the techniques presented by Robert Cialdini[14] or those of Alex Mucchielli[15], what it is clear to the reader is the centrality of the affective-emotional dimension in making sense of persuasive communication leaving the logical-rational operation on the second place. It is brought to the

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[13] http://www.gandul.info/stiri/patru-din-zece-elevi-romani-pot-citi-acest-text-dar-nu-l-inteleg-liceenii-romani-printre-cei-mai-slabi-din-lume-la-testele-pisa-11741051, 05.10.2016.
[14] Robert, Cialdini. *Influence: Science and Practice*, 4th ed., MA: Allyn & Bacon, Boston, 2001.
[15] Alex, Mucchielli, *Arta de a influenta. Analiza tehnicilor de manipulare*, Polirom, Bucureşti, 2015.

forefront the explanations of concepts and phrases such as *identification*, similarity, to like, mutuality, inertia. The essential difference between the different techniques and models of persuasion is centered precisely on the ratio between the affective-emotional dimension and the rational, logical one.

Philippe Breton considered that "the cognitive or psychological violence involved by manipulation earns its effectiveness due to its dissimulation"[16]. Unlike argumentation which is "transparent", manipulation contains an invisible discursive operation. If at this author one can notice an approach that takes into account both affective and cognitive dimensions, yet they are interpreted separately. A more specific theoretical and integrated model in terms of the two dimensions is that of Richard E. Petty and John Cacioppo[17] called "Elaboration likelihood model" (ELM) describing how stimuli are processed, their place in the psychological functioning and their impact on training and attitudinal orientation. Accordingly, the authors postulate the existence of two routes which carry two ways of persuasion, a central and a peripheral route. The central way involves mostly a rational, cognitive way of processing, that leads to a stable and lasting attitude, while the peripheral route involves the processing of information which disregards the logic of message, a central emphasis being ascribed to the credibility and to attractiveness of the source.

Manipulation is most often defined by the effect of restricting the freedom of audience after exposure to the delivered message and it is felt mostly unconsciously in a way to adopt desired opinion or behavior, expected by the message issuer. This restriction uses two major categories of resorts; one of cognitive nature mainly by framing or contextualization, the other one is based on the evocative character of emotions; the two combined can be used in different proportions. Noteworthy is the fact that most often the cognitive manipulation is based mainly not necessarily on content but on the receptor's impossibility to access other sources of information. This limitation is often linked to the credibility given to the source and due to the lack of interest of the subject for alternatives. The likelihood and the drafting of the message using variable weights of the two routes depend, according to the authors, on the motivation of the receptors to process the received information and the ability of critical thinking; all these are based on the personal interests of subjects and on the personal information background. But this explanation indicates eloquently that being driven by interests, even the central route, which involves a rational approach, it may be "contaminated" with sub-conscious elements.

The implicit assumption in the act of manipulation is that the receiver's resistance has to be overcome to the intention of the transmitter by the inability to decrypt, to understand the full spectrum of the effects of the message *without* altering the receptor's illusion that is still free to make a choice, to join or not to the content of the message. Thus, in his work, Antony Pratkins[18] indicates as the central concern of the persuasion model of "approach-avoidance" the identification of the receiver's resistance as a central element that has to be overcome. Persuasion is only required when subjects say "I do not like it!" "I do not believe it!" or "I will not do that!".

What it is considered as an obstacle are precisely the forces, defined by the author to be of motivational nature which inhibit the change and call for the required persuasion. It can thus be said, under this model, that all the effort of persuasion is geared towards overcoming the resistance. That is why the next step needs to be done on identifying various forms of resistance that the persuasion effort must overcome.

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[16] Philippe, Breton, La *parole manipulée*, La Decouverte, Paris, 2000, p. 56.
[17] Richard Petty, John Cacioppo, *The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion*. Advances in experimental social psychology: 125, 1986.
[18] Anthony, Pratkanis (Ed.) *The science of social influence Advances and future progress*. Taylor & Francis Group, New York, 2007.

The national security can only be meaningful in the context of addressing it in a circular relationship with the individual security and the existence of a national identity of that state. An identity that must be fundamentally defined by its origins, history, space and its values discernible both in the institutional functioning and on the subjective individual behavior. The national security policy seeks to preserve this identity in the context of national and democratic form of organization of society, with the ultimate aim of ensuring protection, expression and citizens' welfare state.

Through its direct or related effects, the current transformation processes associated with globalization[19] lead to a decline in the significance of nation and national member organization type, which is considered an anachronistic ideological fiction[20] and the sovereignty of states is considered to be of the past period. Following a more comprehensive definition of the national security it is natural to outline the possible impact that the campaigns on public communication, associated to various non-state actors and processes mentioned above, can have on the functional possibilities of the state structures, from the representation and legitimacy ones to administrative and economic ones, through action on the ordinary citizens but also on the public individuals, holding important positions (MPs, ministers, heads of political parties, directors etc.).

Analyzing the role of the media, as a technological vector of public communication in a democracy, biases or erroneous assumptions can be identified at the individual perception of mass-media. These flaws alter the objectivity of the way in which the audience targeted by the influencing communication processes, analyzes and signifies the information transmitted via these channels. At the social level, one aspect of the media identity is that of the "fourth power" in a democratic society, an ally of the citizens and the government in the accurate and objective description of the society, which through its journalists detects violation of rights, jams, abuse, errors. Once with the development of market mechanisms and the increased globalization process, things have taken a significant turn. The near disappearance of the diversity of opinions obtained due to the purchasing of whole trusts press and news agencies by a single economic entity or media, both at national level and internationally or by the indirect "blackmail" of purchasing of advertising space, the interest towards an honest information passed into the background, his place being taken by influence, persuasion and manipulation in order to promote the private interests, often of financial-economic nature. This aspect was noted even by the association of the "phenomenon of the media campaigns"[21] with one of Romania's security vulnerabilities as they are meant in the National Defense Strategy of 2010. In this document, when talking about vulnerabilities, the public communication actions were targeted; they sought to "denigrate the state institutions by disseminating false information about their work" and "the pressures of media trusts on the political decision in order to obtain economic benefits or in the relation to state institutions"[22]. Thus, through a predominantly cognitive manipulation, which relied on the existence of a certain reputation and credibility of sources, the actions of certain individuals or public institutions were re-signified in order to create the public perception of adverse intentions to the citizens' interests.

Through the persuasive mechanisms that promote products, services, habits or different candidates, the public communication seems to contribute to one of the most

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[19] *Future State 2030: The global megatrends shaping governments* - Mowat Centre, School of Public Policy & Governance, University of Toronto.

[20] Sylvia, Walby, *The Myth of the Nation-State: Theorizing Society and Polities in a Global Era*, In *Sociology*, Volume 37(3), pp. 529–546

[21] Strategiei Națională de Apărare, Pentru o Românie care garantează securitatea și prosperitatea generațiilor viitoare, București, 2010, pg. 14, http://ccpic.mai.gov.ro/docs/Strategia_nationala_de_aparare.pdf

[22] *Ibidem*, p. 14.

significant trends which is that of the individual's empowerment[23]. The emphasis on personal benefits may backfire at the level of social climate or diluting the collective-national solidarity aspects of individual identity. On a more impersonal level, the centralized leadership ability is diminished or it is even undermined the legitimacy and authority of the state institutions. The harmful effects that the public communication campaigns can induce at the individual mental functioning may be manifested by the occurrence of feelings of alienation and insecurity. These alterations of wellness have a direct impact on the basic level of families, professional performance and at social level they produce anomie, the decreased cohesion and consensus, an attitude of reluctance to the common values promoted by the state institutions. These two combined levels lead on the one hand to the impossibility of defending the values of dignity, civic cohesion and on the other hand to the impossibility of the affirmation of national identity or promotion of national interests on the international political arena.

Conclusion

In this paper I presented different aspects of individual identity which are related to social environment and the phenomenon of communication in society. Conditioned by the early relational types of attachment, individual identity will further be nuanced by cultural and moral values and pragmatic aspects of daily activities which have a community and national print. Individual empowerment, relocation of the production means underlying profit and productivity, environmental degradation, freedom of movement, global communicational technologies, corruption, virtual communities based on interests are some key features of the contemporary global society which shapes individual identities from early ages, with massive impact on families, institutional educational process and the dynamics of national states. In the new era of globalization, the ability of the national state to provide optimal conditions for citizen's welfare is challenged by the asymmetry of the policies of the non-state entities which are driven mainly by profit policies in the context of persuasive mass-media communication and market economy mechanisms. In the above mentioned context further psychological vulnerabilities driven by the educational process flaws (which impede on critical thinking ability and induces identity issues), persuasive and even manipulative features of public communication made by non-state entities has the potential that on the long run to disturb those facets of social identity linked with traditions, community practices, civic responsibility. Social equilibrium and human solidarity are tested by self-centered, individualistic interests and consumerism as a central feature of contemporary individual identity. In a such environment, national security education and culture, how the crisis are handled or the ways we respond to the misinformation are just few dimensions of a new sort of *collective* defense. This kind of approach distributes responsibilities not only to state's institutions but also to ordinary citizens and civil society. Through his decentralized approach is conceived to raise the level of individual commitment, set the individuals in contact with national identity and interests, and gave citizens more access to informational resources. On the other hand, public communication made by state's institutions will target the sorts of individual *identifications* that have positive impact on the homogeneity of national identity. Moreover, this approach will raise social cohesion and consolidates the legitimacy of state's institutions.

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[23] As indicated by Vodafone' slogan ("Power to you"), "individual empowerment" is the first feature to be found in the major trends of the future.

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CONSOLIDATING DEFENSE AND SECURITY POLICIES IN THE CURRENT SOCIETY BETWEEN DOCTRINE, IDELOGY AND SCIENTIFIC EXPERTISE

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Abstract: By means of problem researched and exposed briefly I aim to draw attention to the role of expertise when elaborating security policies and strategies, in such a way that they can become genuine tools when managing situations that can breach security. In the knowledge-based society, the role of scientific reseach and of expertise has grown exponentially in comparison with the previous centuries.

No decision when elaborating security and defense policies is based exclusively on national and geostrategic interest, especially when it comes to understanding contexts and consitions that are connected to efficiency and managing resources to reach the political targets.

At the level of several governments there is a diveristy of structures and institutions founded and specialised in offering expertise in various fields of interets and each of these reflec the larger implications that cultural and traditional aspects have when presenting and perceiving the problem, especially when it comes to decision making.

Keywords: strategy, scientific advice, geostrategy, research, security policies.

Introduction

Elaborating security and defense strategies constitute, for a state, a complex process, done at the highest level, which uses considerable resources within a nation, whose final aim ist o draw some guidelines of action on the medium and long run.

If until the early 1990s, the military structures within a country was responsible for the elaboration of defense and security policy, after this period, the implications the research and the academic environment have in these strategic documents can be observed.[1]

In security policy, a key role should be played by scientific expertise offered by specialists in various fields of interest. Major issues such as climate change, cyber security, poverty, pandemics, facing society today and which must be managed effectively determines both the policy makers, the media representatives, and the citizens of a community to require specialist support from experts, engineers, scientists in order to identify the optimal solutions.[2]

Worldwide, more precisely between several governments, there are a variety of structures and institutions founded and specialized in providing specialized expertise in various fields of interest, and each reflects the enormous implications that the cultural and traditional aspects have when presenting and perceiving the problem, but especially in decision making.

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[1] Marian, Zulean, *Strategiile de securitate naţională în spaţiul Euroatlantic,* Editura TRITONIC, Bucureşti, 2015.

[2] James, Wilsdon; Kristiann, Allen; Katsia Paulavets, *Science advice to Governments: Diverse systems, common challenges*, 2014, p. 6.

However, in this diversity existing globally, several categories of structures[3] stand out as the most commonly used, often in combination, between particular systems:

   a. Advisory Councils: entities that have as their primary objective policy advice in terms of research fields (which is different from specialized counseling for public order) and are made up of senior scientists, along with representatives from industry, education higher and civil society.
   b. Advisory Committees: consisting of specialized experts who can address technical and regulatory matters detailed in areas such as health, environment and food safety.
   c. National Academies and other educational systems and networks of academies: they have a growing role in issuing decisions and security policies.
   d. *Main scientific advisors.*
   e. Non-governmental organizations, in which people with expertise in areas related to development strategies work.

However, it should be noted that none of these five structures listed above is entirely perfect, and the governments of the states usually rely on the expertise derived from two or more of these, the results being combined to build a wide ecosystem of expertise around the issue that is analysed.

It is elementary that the language used is appropriate and clear. On the one hand, a consultant specialized needs a sophisticated understanding of how the policy works, as well as the pressures and constraints under which ministers, civil servants and decision makers work, and on the other, the beneficiary must meet the minimum knowledge to enable them to understand and interpret what is offered as viable solutions.

For example, some structures such as national academies are better suited to provide formal counseling, in the long run, because they gather expert groups regularly and they elaborate detailed reports. Others, such as main scientific advisors, provide rapid, informal advice, in an emergency and the expertise they provide comes either from a number of sources, either through the data resulted from ad-hoc working groups.

Interestingly, and I will try to detail in the next chapter, if the states that requested specialized expertise from academia in developing security strategies have proven to be more effective than those that have not taken these steps.

The society's perception of the dangers "that threaten" differs depending on the period to which we refer. Thus, after the Cold War, naming the enemy[4] is increasingly difficult in comparison with the previous period, when the enemy was perceived as any individual or entity infringing upon territorial integrity. Today's threats are more complex than the previous Cold War, from climate change to poverty proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism or regional crises. "As the Cold War and the bipolar structure of the postwar international system began to unravel at the end of the 80s, there were grounds for believing that the security concept became the preferred high-level talks in the emerging postwar international system*"[5]*.

Therefore, the next chapter will present and analyze the necessary steps in this regard taken by the two countries emergent States BRICs (China and India), two great powers of NATO (USA and UK) and 2 other uncommitted States (South Korea and Switzerland).

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[3] Kelly, Henry; Oelrich, Ivan , *Flying Blind: The Rise, Fall, and Possible Resurrection of Science Policy Advice in the United States*, Federation of America scientists, Washington, 2004.
[4] http://www.lapunkt.ro/2015/12/15/interviu-marian-zulean-ce-este-strategia-de-securitate-nationala.
[5] Buzan, Barry, *Popoarele, Statele şi Frica*, Editura CARTIER, Chişinău, 2014, p. 25.

1. Aspects of security policies in contemporary society

1.1. Emerging States: China, India

The current model of relationship between policy makers and academia has been established in *China* since 1949 once the establishment of Chinese Academy of Sciences[6] was founded. Currently, the expertise provided is supplemented by specialists from the Academy of Social Sciences, Chinese Academy of Engineering and the views of various stakeholders.

Decision makers ask for consultancy at various stages of public policies - from formulation to implementation - for a variety of areas: natural sciences, environmental, social, risk management, emergency management, etc. The size of the consultation and the selection of experts depend on the needs resulting from the process of generating and implementing of relevant public policy.

Despite a tradition of consultations with the academic environment, the State Council and various ministries do not have yet a formalized structure for consultation, a person responsible for coordinating the consultations among experts and politicians or a senior advisor in government[7].

Moreover, in our opinion, the creation of such a function would not bring significant added value - given the variety of areas and issues facing policymakers and the wide horizon of elements in the social environment, out of which topics on the political agenda are selected and prioritized; one person could not hold the necessary knowledge to meet such a variety of advisory duties.

The main strength of the relationship between the level of decision-making processes and the academic one in China remain independent research institutions. To this we may add, in our opinion, the flexibility of the consultation processes.

The **Indian** relationship between the political and the expert levels is plural, featuring a number of governmental support mechanisms for obtaining support both from the academic community, and other areas, including the internal experts of those institutions in particular.

Obtaining and providing support for decision is a dynamic, continuous process, in which consultants, decision makers and stakeholders (civil society, companies) are engaged simultaneously.

In terms of expertise from the academia, the Indian model relies on a network of three universities: National Academy Indian Science in New Delhi[8], Academia Indian Science in Bangalore and the National Academy of Sciences in Allahabad, all three founded in the 1930s, before the state became independent. The three universities generate knowledge for decision makers both at their request, on their own initiative, through works / individual or group efforts.

Regarding internal consultation structures of the executive, one of the most important is the Principal Scientific Consultant Office (PSA) [9] with the Government of India. PSA chairs the Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC-C) of the cabinet in office and is traditionally a famous scientist or an academic celebrity life.

The Scientific Advisory Committee, chaired by the Principal Scientific Advisor, is composed of scientists, engineers, representatives of universities and academies of science, as well as leaders in the industry. Forms committee recommendations are drawn up after consultations with various stakeholders on the policies to be developed under the consultation materials, as submitted to the executive of the position papers or reports with recommendations.

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[6] http://english.cas.cn/about_us/introduction/201501/t20150114_135284.shtml, 31.10.2016
[7] Wilsdon, James, Allen Kristiann, Paulavets, Katsia *Science advice to Governments:Diverse Systems, common Challenges,* 2014.
[8] http://www.insaindia.org/youngmedal.php, 20.09.2016.
[9] http://psa.gov.in/about-us/about-us, 18 .07.2016.

In addition to PSA, there is also the premier Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC - PM). Its president is subject to the same rigorous criteria and professional recognition as the Principal Scientific Advisory, being a well-known scientist or professor.

SAC - PM activity restarted in 2005 (after its abolition in 1990), the body being oriented towards a variety of topics of public policy, ranging from critical infrastructure developments to science and technology. Among the concerns of the Committee there are also potential gaps in competitiveness internally, promoting technological cooperation between developing countries, changes in international competitiveness and its evolution trends.[10]

Thus, natural disasters in India in 2001 (earthquake) and 2004 (tsunami) led to the establishment of the National Disaster Management Authority, attached to the Government, whose activity is based, among other things, on a centre of early warning system and a technical system dedicated, created and kept in operation by academics (natural science departments of various universities) and specialists.

1.2. Uncommitted countries: South Korea, Switzerland

In **South Korea**, one of the main bodies providing advice and expertise is the the Presidential Advisory Council for Science and Technology (PACST)[11]. The organisation provides the President with advice on development strategies and key policies in science and technology, elements of institutional reform to improve this area, information and human resources to encourage innovation.

PACST has been functioning since 1991, between 2008-2012 having, besides the areas of science and technology, consulting tasks concerning education. Since September 2013 it has been composed of a total of 30 experts, divided into three committees.

On topics related to emergencies, PACST offers the president consultative meetings or written reports. Before the views are submitted to the decider, prior dialogues with ministers take place; they will implement the policies discussed and they are the ones consulted, especially the ones whose areas will be affected. To reduce the risk of transmission to the president, the information that does not suit the actual situation or inapplicable solutions, PACST accepts changes and suggestions to improve the materials, following the discussions with the representatives of the executive.

The advisory body builds and strengthens their expertise from both the previous members' careers, and through their participation in workshops, public hearings, lectures and symposia, conferences.

The South Korean model presents other gaps: it is a sectorial body of advice (only science and technology), which, despite the promotion of best practice, does not reflect the entire diversity and the public policy issues covered.

On the chain of the policy formulation and its implementation, PACST is reflected in a point marginally, through the powers of the institution; the head of state does not actively participate in policy making, nor does he implement them (this power is given to the government), but promulgates laws related to these[12].

In the **Swiss** system, the main responsibility for the provision of expertise for decision-makers lies in the hands of the Academy of Sciences, which provides advice for all the levels of the policy chain of public policies, from formulation to implementation, feedback capturing and revision / adjustment. Moreover, the institution has developed a set of organizations and fora, facilitating the interaction between policy makers, the public, academia and possibly

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[10] Wilsdon, James, Allen Kristiann, Paulavets, Katsia *Science advice to Governments:Diverse Systems, common Challenges,* 2014.

[11] http://english.pacst.go.kr/intro/en_estaBgRoles.do, 01.08.2016.

[12] Wilsdon, James, Allen Kristiann, Paulavets, Katsia *Science advice to Governments:Diverse Systems, common Challenges,* 2014.

international actors, placing it in the centre of the debate on topics of interdisciplinary, current affairs as well as those of significant impact on climate change, for example.

The oldest such organization connected to the Swiss Academy of Sciences, ProClim[13], already has more than two decades of operation, becoming emblematic of the way in which the Swiss type of relationship between the academic and polical spheres works. ProClim develop a variety of products, such as sheets, reports and national assessments, organize meetings, debates and joint workshops which are attended by politicians, representatives of the economic environment and various stakeholders; in addition, to improve their performance, they delegate members to international associations of research or research-development programs, cooperating with media institutions, which provides background information on which they create materials and draw up various reports and briefings[14].

In some areas, such as energy, the Swiss government has also established committees of experts who advise the executive members. The success of the forum and similar structures in Switzerland is related to a number of factors such as coherence and consistency, transparency of the process of consultation and the involvement of as many actors; the messages are simplified to be understood by the target audience but they do not lack scientific content, the uncertain or controversial elements being included in the materials and exposed as such, etc. In a world dominated by a high informational influx and in which the lay people distinguish hard between the correct and relevant data, the experts guide both decision makers to know scientifically verified and filtered information, and the press and the general public to understand relevant issues on various current topics.

At the same time, the consultation process is designed unlike the models from other states, to have an intermediate zone between the research environment and the decision makers so that they can mediate dialogue (forums such ProClim). The network of researchers involved in the process is permanently maintained by providinging it with information and the continued development of those who compose it (for example, their participation in international conferences, workshops, debates).

1.3. NATO member states: Great Britain and the USA

In this chapter, I will try to show how scientific advice id provided by experts for the **UK** Government. The scientific expertise for the Prime Minister of Great Britain is provided by GCSA (Goverment Chief Scientific Adviser) – the Head of the Government in Sciencific Advice. Since April 2013 this structure has been coordinated by Sir Mark Walport[15].

The role of the GCSA is to provide both the Prime Minister and his Cabinet members expertise in policies in science, engineering and technology. For this, GCSA cooperate with experts from other fields and CSA - Chief Scientific Advisors. The main purpose of the CSA is to ensure that decisions are certified by valid scientific expertise.

In emergencies, the state formations of the British government can appeal to SAGE (Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies) – the Group of scientific expertise in case of emergencies[16]. SAGE is composed of experts in various fields, this body being coordinated by GCSA.

The British organization SAGE was activated in 2014 when massive floods occurred in the UK and Europe, in 2011 with the Fukushima nuclear incident, and in 2009 when AH5N1 virus was known as the "bird flu."

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[13] http://www.naturalsciences.ch/organisations/proclim.

[14] Wilsdon, James, Allen Kristiann, Paulavets, Katsia *Science advice to Governments:Diverse Systems, common Challenges,* 2014.

[15] https://www.gov.uk/government/people/mark-walport.

[16] Wilsdon, James, Allen Kristiann, Paulavets, Katsia *Science advice to Governments:Diverse Systems, common Challenges,* 2014.

The UK government departments achieve their policies based on expert reports from several sources such as:
- informal networks of academics, analysts and policy makers in the UK government;
- official networks - such as the OECD;
- various research centres that are funded to deliver the deciding factors a range of independent analysis on the policies that are to be made by them;
- researchers from the public sector.

Complex decisions are improved if decision makers are informed by scientific and technical analyses, a process that can often be difficult because of the different perspectives that lead to the assessment of risks, different costs and benefits. Resolving these differences is part of a political debate in a free society.

The officials in the **USA** benefit do not lack advice provision, but rather they are inundated by studies and opinions on any topic. The studies are available from various groups, some sponsored by corporations or advocacy groups, others by NGOs. The diversity of the sources is essential, but it is sometimes insufficient. The problem arises in addressing problems that require a long and complex analysis to support decision-makers - especially when persistent uncertainties make it impossible to draw firm technical conclusions[17]. Complex decisions are improved if decision makers are informed by solid scientific and technical analyses, a process that can often be difficult because of the different perspectives leading to the assessment of risks, different costs and benefits. Resolving these differences is part of a political debate in a free society.

Lately, concern about the fact that the institutional infrastructure for providing this advice has been seriously affected has intensified. The disappearance of the Congress Technology Assessment Office (Office of Technology Assessment - OTA[18]) has created major concerns about the available scientific and technical advice to the Congress, the executive branch and the quality of advice offered having been questioned by various groups. There was particular concern about the apparent decline in the influence of the office of the Presidential Advisor for Science and Technology and the absence of a clear replacement for the Office of Technology Assessment of the Congress.

In this regard, two types of problems were indicated: political decisions are made without the benefit of a thorough, impartial analysis, given timely and even if high quality analysis is available, it is ignored, manipulated, distorted or suppressed.

Conclusions

The society's perception of the dangers existing in it, inducing the feeling of insecurity varies depending on the historical moment to which we refer. Before the Cold War, the society perceived as danger as anything that is represented by any entity which threatens the territorial integrity of the state. Still under these perceptions of the danger which threatens the security of a state, strategic documents were developed before and after the Cold War. In both cases, the strategic documents show types of threats.

In today's context of security challenges, among threats and risks, one can identify: terrorism, proliferation of mass destruction weapons, transnational organized crime, global instability and regional crises, fragile states and failed, situations of civil emergency, climate change, competition for energy, poverty, inequality, poor governance.

In other words, if before the Cold War strategic documents were drafted by representatives of the military field, since the security of a State was perceived as defending territorial integrity and its borders, currently, the part of security combines military elements

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[17] Kelly, Henry; Oelrich, Ivan , *Flying Blind: The Rise, Fall, and Possible Resurrection of Science Policy Advice in the United States*, Federation of America scientists, Washington, 2004, pp. 5-8.
[18] http://www.princeton.edu/~ota/ns20/proces_f.html.

with aspects of a variety of fields. Therefore, the effective management of all matters that may constitute risks and threats to the national security means seeking specialized expertise of the approved people or institutions.

The states that have requested support from the entities with specialized skills in providing specialized expertise in various fields, have proven to be more effective than those that have developed strategies established by means of the traditional method.

However, we have to consider that there are neither cooperation models that claim to be universally valid and applicable to all situations, nor formed work and procedures provided, each interaction experts - makers being made depending on the needs and the specificity of each policy.

On the other hand, we have to take into account the emergence of possible risks or deficiencies in supplying the specialized expertise to policy makers in the process of developing security policies, such as the absence of mechanisms to monitor the way in which the consultation process has led to effects, a relative lack of efficiency in terms of time (drafting written material submitted to the political level, consulting academics before being transmitted is likely to be time consuming and to lead to missing the moments when such materials would have enjoyed the maximum of utility and convenience), relatively limited human and financial resources, a high capacity to foresee the long-term risks and to suggest ways to improve them, but reduced management capacities in the short and medium term.

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13. http://english.pacst.go.kr/intro/en_estaBgRoles.do.
14. http://www.naturalsciences.ch/organisations/proclim.
15. http://english.cas.cn/about_us/introduction/201501/t20150114_135284.shtml.
16. http://www.insaindia.org/youngmedal.php.
17. http://english.pacst.go.kr/intro/en_estaBgRoles.do

DEFENSE DIPLOMACY, RULES AND ORDER
IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

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Abstract: *One of the instruments to implement the foreign and security policy of a state is defense diplomacy.*

The component of defense diplomacy is aimed at indirectly using armed forces to address national security issues.

The role of military commanders in theaters of operations extends to the diplomatic sphere, to serving as negotiators for the parties, which are under conflict for the conflict reconstruction stages of the post – conflict phase.

The defense diplomacy concept shows a multilayered coherent development, with a visible impact on the following elements: strengthening institutions, reinforcing a strategic dialogue and exchanges in the field of information, promoting stability through cooperation and measures to boost confidence and security, improving the democratic civil control, military reform, military training[1].

Defense Diplomacy can have impact upon the development of the safety and security sector, as well as upon the sense of the strategic defense community, both regionally and internationally.

Keywords: *defense diplomacy, foreign policy, strategic community.*

Introduction

Defense diplomacy can affect the development of the security and safety sector, as well as the sense of the defense strategic community, both at regional and international level.

The credibility and mutual trust, built in the long term and through informal activities with other nations' forces is also an essential component, besides coordinating defense diplomacy and the national and allied foreign policy objectives. The diplomatic aspects of the military domain regard the circumstances in which the military turns, in a direct or indirect way, into an explicit tool for a wide foreign policy. It is a complementary role to that of national defense.

The balance of emphasis terms makes the difference between defense diplomacy and international regulatory defense. Thus, the international norm is the result of formal commitments to a particular vision of international security. The component of defense diplomacy is mainly aimed at indirectly using armed forces in response to issues related to providing national security. The military commanders in operation theatres play a crucial role in this architecture. Their role is not limited to the operational dimension alone, but also to the diplomatic sphere, as in the elementary case of fulfilling the basic function of negotiating with warring parties or local officers in charge of the post - conflict reconstruction stages.

Defense has been and will remain a fundamental area for a state. It includes all decisions, measures the institutions of a state adopt and apply, both nationally and

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[1] George Maior, *Diplomati si soldati: o aliantă postmoderna (II)*, în Revista Cultura nr.: 59, Secțiunea: Cultură politică: carnet diplomatic, București, 2007.

internationally, to ensure the constitutional rights, protect the values and promote the national interests, according to the national and international law, as well as to all international agreements the state is a signatory of. Therefore, the national nature of defense will also include the obligations of a state to international organizations, either financial or human.

Defense diplomacy

The *defense diplomacy* concept is rather new in the security domain and the analytic theory of foreign policies. However, using military representatives and attaches has a long tradition and the political-military negotiations, treaties or assistance forms have been generated by the internal nature of modern military systems.

This concept shows a multilayered development, both as regards military cooperation and interstate security, with a visible impact upon the following components: strengthening institutions, reinforcing strategic dialogue and exchanges in the intelligence field, promoting stability through cooperation and measures to boost confidence and security, improving the democratic civil control, the military reform, the military training[2].

From the military perspective, we can identify some roles of diplomacy[3] such as: finding the ways and the means for crisis and conflict prevention, their monitoring and, where appropriate, their management; taking part in diplomatic negotiations to prevent crisis and other negotiations till the full completion of the pre and post conflict situation; promoting measures for arms control; promoting and enforcing measures to control the export of arms and technologies; promoting and enforcing confidence-building measures between states, as well as between states and international organizations or bodies; developing cooperation programs as regards educating and training civilians and the military; effectively using the concept of deterrence; developing any other ways, including military, to relief and reinforce a climate of peace and trust between states; providing arms control activities; preventing the proliferation of conventional weapons, mass destruction weapons, nuclear technology and dual technologies; preventing diplomatic, economic, technological and military surprises; preventing and reducing the conflict outbreak risk; peacekeeping and peace-building measures; enforcement of international and humanitarian law principles in all political, economic and military actions.

The difference between classical diplomacy and defense diplomacy resides in the set of additional tools used within a different type of organization (conceptual architecture, strategy etc) the latter benefits of. In this case, defense diplomacy includes, among other elements, the military cooperation and partnership, military training, participation in multinational units, assistance programs, exchange of information, the activities of military attaches, issues related to arms control, exchange of staff etc.

Defense diplomacy is more like a process with impact upon two interconnected trends: the first, democratization and security and safety sector reform; the second, building a sense of the defense strategic community at regional and international level, by developing a common language, sharing the same objectives and values and by directly contributing to an increased trust and security in the areas of interest.

In other words, defense diplomacy also uses the military contacts at interstate level to influence decisions by different parties as regards security and defense.

The states' ability to influence each other by using military capabilities has been increasingly replaced by their ability to use information as a means to take control in conflict situations (in this context, some even talk about *intelligence diplomacy*). Likewise, there is a

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[2] George Maior, *Diplomats and soldiers: a postmodern alliance (II)*, the Culture Magazine no: 59, Section: Political culture: diplomatic card, Bucharest, 2007.
[3] Sergiu T. Medar, *Defense diplomacy*, CTEA Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, p. 13.

need to speed up cooperation between political decision-making structures and intelligence structures, both military and general, to connect the necessary of information to the need of analysis and political-strategic action in the external sector. Thus, we consider defense diplomacy both a fundamental mission of the military system and an instrument to widely promote complex security interests and values at national and international level[4].

It is also reasonable to assume that security and defense diplomacy, beyond the military, becomes a powerful tool in managing non-military aspects of the national and international security, in rewiring the economic, social, energy, environmental protection issues. Defense diplomacy could play an important role, that of actively engaging the civil society, especially in post-conflict areas.

International conflicts have two pillars, international law and international order. These two pillars are based on the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Humanitarian international intervention means violating a state's sovereignty to protect fundamental human rights. These interventions are often the coercive and dictatorial interface within the interior jurisdiction of the State. Humanitarian interventions are legitimized by the just war theory, as they provide an answer for the moment when forces should be used.

Humanitarian intervention has become one of the pillars of the new international architecture created by restricting the state sovereignty concept.

Serious violations of human rights, mass murders, tortures, oppression organized by states towards their own citizens, are perceived as violations of standards of conduct or as humanitarian crises which dismantle the safety of communities, having as a result the intervention of other states.

The interventions of other states take place according to regulatory frameworks that prescribe the actions aimed at protecting and rebuilding the security of humanitarian crisis-hit communities. If humanitarian intervention is assumed and taken by a significant number of international players, possible allegations of bias would be unfounded.

A player, who declares his actions as humanitarian, tries in an explicit manner "to legitimize them as fair and moral and therefore justified, not selfish"[5].

To explain "humanitarian interventions" and let not make place the military aspect to the detriment of humanitarian intervention, the balance of the speech was tilted on human rights.

An action taken in a state becomes of humanitarian nature only if the objective is to stop people's suffering, one that affects the human nature and dignity. By considering that the humanitarian act is driven by the above-mentioned objective, we can conclude that the debate is focused on means. Thus, we can assume that the means can take two distinct forms: military and civilian.

Argumentation of the humanitarian intervention is by all means peaceful, completely exclude military force as humanitarian action, whereas those who claim that military means too can be used for humanitarian purposes consider the military force as a resource of humanitarian actions.

The theory of intervention on humanitarian grounds acknowledges the right of a state to exercise international control over another state's actions, when its sovereignty is opposed to the laws of humanity[6].

The use of force is clearly placed outside the international law. On the other hand, Article 51 of the UN Charter[7] allows the use of force when it comes to the right of self-

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[4] George Maior, *op. cit*.
[5]Aidan Hehir, *Humanitarian Intervention, an Introduction*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 12.
[6]Ellery Stowel, *Intervention in international Law* (Washington DC: John Byrne & Co, 1991, p. 53.
[7]http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html

defense. Chapter VII also allows the use of force, but the actions taken under this chapter must receive the approval of the Security Council.

„The norm of justified intervention"[8] seems to become more and more an institution in international law. At the UN Summit in 2005, all states have said yes to the "responsibility to protect" principle, which states that coercive intervention, including the use of military force, can be guaranteed in cases of serious human rights violations[9]. Furthermore, there was an important change as regards the practice of the Security Council that expanded the definition of what is "the threat to international peace and security", according to Article 39 of the UN Charter. This category includes civil wars, humanitarian crises and strikes against democratically elected regimes[10]. Also, the establishment of international criminal tribunals and of the International Criminal Court is considered a positive sign in the evolution for turning this norm legal.

The concept "jus in bello" is opposed to the "jus ad bellum" concept. The first include all the international law rules governing the admissibility to use force between states, and the latter governs the right to engage (or not) in a war.

The first Additional Protocol to the 1977 Geneva Conventions[11] takes into account the particularity of these national liberation wars, calling them international armed conflict situations. Their assimilation as simple domestic insurrections should not be accepted; the result is the fact that foreign armed support for these national liberation movements cannot be forbidden due to the fact it would mean interference in the internal affairs of a state.

Consequently, the category of humanitarian intervention deepens the complexity of the right to use armed force or not. Humanitarian interventions are aimed at protecting from the military point of view the population of a foreign state against the abuses committed by their own government.

Thus, the responsibility of the international community to protect populations from genocide and crimes against humanity under certain circumstances precisely defined.

In case of "any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" (Article 39 of the Charter), the Security Council is entitled to impose certain measures upon states, such as economic sanctions or to authorize states to conduct military action.

For example, this argument was used to legally justify the military intervention of NATO in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999, when the government was accused of seriously violating the international humanitarian law in Kosovo.

The Kosovo case has given Russia a series of extra arguments for turning into a reality the associated belonging model and, at the same time, for presenting itself as the defender of international law, apparently violated by the U.S. and by some EU member states when recognizing Kosovo's independence.

As a result of the above-mentioned action, the fundamental conditions for the start of reconstruction have been created. The military intervention of NATO in Kosovo began after more than a year of increasing violence and due to the fact Belgrade has repeatedly violated the UN Security Council resolutions urging Belgrade to end the repression against the Albanian population in Kosovo.

In March 1999, the Alliance decided to launch an air campaign against the military and paramilitary structures of the Yugoslav government responsible for the repression. This

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[8]Laura Reed, Carl Kaysen (eds), *From Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention* (New York: American Academy of Arts and Science, 1993, p. 12.
[9]„The Responsability to Protect", *Report of the International Commission on Intervention on State Sovereignty* (Otawa: International Development Research Center, 2001), p. 69.
[10]Simon Chestermen, *Just war or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 124.
[11] http://www.monitoruljuridic.ro/act/protocol-aditional-nr-1-din-10-iunie-1977-la-conventiile-de-la-geneva-din-12-august-1949-privind-protectia-victimelor-conflictelor-armate-internationale-emitent-50334.html

decision was made after having exhausted all other options and after the repeated failure of peace talks to defeat Belgrade's intransigence.

Faced with the UN Security Council's inability to take action in order for its resolutions on conflict to be respected, the Allied concluded that the only option to stop the humanitarian catastrophe and restore stability in the region was to use military means.

Thus, the mandate of the Kosovo Force - KFOR[12] includes deterring new hostilities, establishing a secure environment and demilitarizing Kosovo's Liberation Army. In addition, it supports the international humanitarian effort and cooperates with the international civil structure, the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), in order to establish a stable environment to ensure further development in Kosovo.

The results of the UN Council, in terms of member states' security, but not only, are: reducing the likelihood of a major military conflict and developing a climate of cooperation and partnership, to achieve a new security model for the 21st century, in a world united by the values of democracy, freedom of human rights and the rule of law; the North-Atlantic structures representing the symbol and reality of those values and their extension being the only appropriate way to address the necessities of the new international security environment, as the new relations of international life require immediate measures to identify threats, tensions and crises that might affect the international security environment, the unconventional risk factors, with a great potential of danger for the local and global security, with the political-military crises likely to become a threat like ethnic conflicts, and that is why the „*solidarity in pursuit of peace*" concept is tackled in the new 2010-2020 NATO security strategy, namely the possibility of invoking Article 5 for third countries (non-NATO)[13].

According to the new strategic concept of NATO, there is no doubt about invoking Article 5, but it also refers to the dangers beyond the Euro-Atlantic region. This fact is consistent with the United States national defense strategy[14], aimed at defending the US territory, the US citizens and political system, prosperity, economic stability and high living standards, international stability and security, promoting democracy and human rights worldwide.

The new concept is about providing international security through a dynamic coalition able to deal with an unpredictable world in the second decade of the 21st century, aiming to achieve "unity, security and freedom" and redefining the emerging vulnerabilities to international security, besides terrorism, such as: weapons of mass destruction proliferation, nuclear proliferation, cyberspace attacks, piracy in international maritime space, organized crime, assault on energy resources, climate change caused by negligence, financial and economic crises, ethnic disputes, unsolved conflicts.

Conclusion

The security environment has shown us that given the diversity of international relations, due to the states' desire to gain state power, meaning stronger economy and army, there are higher chances for security to deteriorate, turning into violence, military conflicts or even worse, into war. This is why we believe that defense diplomacy is a highly placed concept within the architecture of a system made up of people, reasons of state, experts in diplomacy and defense.

Assuming new military missions and commitments contribute in a positive way to the transformation of the military system. The multilateral cooperation processes have a double

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[12]The mandate of KFOR is based on both a technical military agreement between NATO and the Yugoslav commanders, and the UN 1244 Security Council Resolution, of 1999.
[13]http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120203_strategic-concept-2010-fr.pdf
[14]http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2008NationalDefenseStrategy.pdf

meaning. On the one hand, cooperation means exporting stability. Moreover, cooperation also contributes to internal transformation and development. For this reason, defense diplomacy should be seen both as a fundamental mission of the modern military system and an instrument to broadly and strongly promote security interests and values at national and international level.

The consequences of this type of diplomacy show us its strengths, but also the areas where there is room for improvement, depending on the particularities of each and every single case.

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STREAMLINING OF DEFENCE EXPENDITURE

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Abstract: *Nowadays, it is difficult to imagine safe functioning of the state without properly equipped armed forces, and the need for implementation of the latest scientific and technological achievements to arms and military equipment calls for the necessity to expend large sums of money. This necessity arising from the need to ensure the security of the state and its citizens in a way justifies defense spending. By and large, savings in defense spending should be seen not as a direct reduction of the size of public spending on security, but as a set of methods to streamline the expenditure. The chief objective of this paper is to present the methods of streamlining of defense spending used in the Ministry of National Defense. This paper discusses the essence of planning and programming of defense spending, the need for technical modernisation of the armed forces and the idea of the reform of military economic structures.*

Keywords: *economic security, economics of defence, streamlining of public spending, military expenditure, defence spending, long-term financial planning.*

Introduction

In the conditions of limited resources and the emergence of an increasing number of public needs including those in the field of defence and security, the issues related to the increasing of the efficiency of the state and the public sector are growing in importance.

Following on from that, essential appears to be a matter of choosing the level of public service provision because it has a profound impact on the tasks, responsibilities and costs of the functioning of public institutions. Execution of permanently increasing offer of public services requires the development of appropriate techniques and methods, adapting instruments and taking into account a number of external factors. More often than not it is necessary to make compromises consisting in the selection of some of the activities at the expense of others. Often there is also the necessity of deferring certain public decisions, which is mainly due to the limited financial resources. Another factor are also restrictions relating to certain political conditions.

Therefore, a special role in this area is attributed to the issues of streamlining in the public finance sector, understood in the context of the streamlining of financial economy that is the streamlining of public revenue and expenditure. In the area of defence, from the point of view of the streamlining activity, long-term financial planning linked to the need for achieving certain goals becomes a priority.

The purpose of this article is an attempt to determine the grounds for long-term planning as regards defence tasks of the state.

1. Streamlining of tasks and defense expenditure – theoretical perspective

Streamlining means activities aimed at achieving the objective in a better way than before. In theoretical perspective, the rational issues fit mainly in the area of economic sciences (economics, finance, management science), social sciences (psychology, the science of defense, the science of safety, the science of public policy)[1]. In theory, rational activity in relation to economic decisions also fits in the field of praxeology.

Dictionary of foreign words[2] defines streamlining (Lat. *rationalis* rational, reasonable) as an application of new measures aimed at improving the previously used ones.

From a point of view of economics, the streamlining of the public economy is closely related to the effectiveness and mainly relates to the expenditure side of the public finance sector, which in principle should be considered in two aspects[3]:

1. As a search for savings in expenditure, that is applying the savings formula which provides for obtaining certain effects while aiming to minimise costs.

2. As a search for solutions which bring maximum results when using the efficiency formula which provides for achieving maximum results at constant specific expenditure.

Analysis of rational decision theories leads to the conclusion that the security (defence) phenomena are of qualitative character and are characterised by continuous variability. Safety is in fact a dynamic system dependable on the number of external and internal factors, which makes the area of phenomena, which a decision-maker having an impact on the security situation is interested in, very extensive. Following on from that it is difficult to apply the same measures and evaluate various phenomena defining the same problem. It makes streamlining decisions in this area difficult to catalogue. The situation is even more complicated by the fact that the decisions in the field of security and its financing are frequently made by a collective decision-maker. This raises the new problem of how to determine the preferences of this collective decision-maker. Moreover, in this case, demand for maximisation is debatable since from the point of view of the decision maker there is not much information. It is only an indication that in certain situations the decision maker has to choose the action that maximises the effect. However, in theory, there is no ready-made solutions of how to make this choice. It should also be remembered that when aiming at the maximisation of the strategic objective of security (defence) and the means of its financing, frequently the decision maker has to make concessions and therefore does not necessarily seek to maximise operational or tactical objectives. He may equally well be interested in a satisfactory solution because in a given strategy in a given situation it can be just as beneficial as the optimum solution[4].

Rationality of decisions in the field of defence (safety) and ways of its financing, in the context of the rationality theory will therefore be conditioned by[5]:

1. The rationality of action of the decision maker.
2. The rationality of the objective.
3. The rationality of means and methods:
   a) leading to the choice of action;
   b) related to the implementation of the decision made.

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[1] In Poland since 2011 not functioning military science. The science of defense and the science of safety in Poland is one of the disciplines included in the area of social sciences.

[2] *Słownika Wyrazów Obcych*, red. nauk. I. Kamińskiej-Szmaj, Wydawnictwa Europa, Warszawa 2001.

[3] Por. R. Matwiejczuk, *Zarządzanie marketingowo logistyczne – wartość i efektywność*, C. H. Beck, Warszawa 2006, s. 77.

[4] Por. K. Stańczyk, *Racjonalizacja gospodarki finansowej wojska*, Ementon, Warszawa 2015, s. 190.

[5] Por. H. Borgosz, *Decyzje racjonalne*, „Studia nauk politycznych" 1987, nr 4 (88), s. 72.

Funds for the defence began to be described as defence expenditure. They are allocated for one of the areas of state activities related to counteracting all kinds of threats[6] and serve to ensure state security. They concern all civil and military undertakings aimed at preventing and counteracting any potential threats to national security, which could lead to a political and military crisis[7].

More precisely, defence expenditure can be defined in relation to the defence understood in a narrower sense, where the defence should be equated with national defence understood as activities aimed at the adequate preparation and use of forces and means being at the disposal of the state to counteract any kind of external and internal threats detrimental to the national interest[8]. Under this assumption, defence expenditure is equivalent to spending public funds for national defence. They will be connected with the necessity of fulfilling by the state the assigned functions. They can be spent on the defence preparation in peacetime, warding off threats and waging war[9]. Thus, in practice, more often than not the defence expenditure is treated as the total amount of expenditure of the ministry of defense of a given country, supplemented by defence expenditure financed by other ministries or other public sources (programs, funds, etc.)[10].

Today, because of its importance for the functioning of the state and its citizens, defence expenditure has its undisputed place in the state budget and fit within the scope of public expenditure. Therefore, they are subject to the general rules on public spending, taking into account the specificity of the allocation of this expenditure for defence purposes. Streamlining of defence expenditure must therefore be the outcome of general solutions addressed to the whole public sector, taking into consideration the specificity of objectives and tasks performed by the Ministry of National Defence. Such an approach to the problem of streamlining of defense expenditure (as well as the streamlining of the whole public expenditure), leads to the need to examine it in two main areas: macroeconomic and microeconomic.

At the macroeconomic level, it is all about determining the rational – for society and economy – level and structure of defence expenditure. The scope of this problem includes not only the absolute level of expenditure or the relative level of defence expenditure, usually presented in relation to GDP, but also its internal structure. For the rational use of the defence budget, it is important not only how much of public money is spent and on what, it is also vital how these funds are spent[11]. Streamlining of the structure of defence expenditure must therefore be made in various cross-sections, e.g. in relation to: current and investment expenditure, property related and personal expenditure, achieving and developing specific operational capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces, sources of financing of this expenditure, level of its use, or forms of incurring of this expenditure.

The micro-economic dimension of defence expenditure applies to the entities that directly use funds from the defence budget. It is primarily about organisational units of the Ministry of National Defence, formed in a three-stage division of budget funds administrators, functioning within the organisational and legal forms provided for the public finance sector.

It is worth remembering that the macroeconomic and microeconomic planes are closely related and only their joint consideration ensures streamlined defence budget expenditure. Methods for streamlining of defence expenditure will therefore refer in the

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[6] Por. *Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, AON, Warszawa 2008, s. 79.
[7] Por. *Strategia Rozwoju Systemu Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2022*, Rada Ministrów 2013, s. 18.
[8] *Ibidem*, s, 80.
[9] Por. *Słownik terminów…*, *op. cit.*, s. 171.
[10] Szerzej o wydatkach obronnych K. Stańczyk, *Wydatki obronne*, w: *Ekonomika bezpieczeństwa państwa w zarysie*, red. nauk. J. Płaczek, Difin, Warszawa 2014, s. 100 i n.
[11] Por. S. Owsiak, *Finanse publiczne. Teoria i praktyka*, PWN, Warszawa 2005, s. 244.

macroscale to the whole Ministry of National Defence, and in the microscale to its organisational entities. These methods will be characterised by some kind of universality consisting in the opportunity to use solutions for public expenditure in relation to defence expenditure. In practice, among the universal solutions for the streamlining of defence expenditure one can distinguish: programming and long-term planning, task-based classification of the budget, public procurement system, management control, internal audit, public finance discipline, or solutions for the reforms of organisational structures.

2. Long-term planning of defence expenditure

The transformation at the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first century, which strengthened the political and economic stability of Poland, at that time gave possibilities of real planning of the country's long-term and medium-term[12] development also in terms of state security including defence expenditure aimed at achieving this objective. This entailed, among others, the development of strategic documents which became the grounds for the development management system of Poland.

Poland introduced a development management system which allows for efficient management of the development policy of the state. This policy allows to specify the development objectives of the country and plan how they are going to be executed. Such planning is of paramount importance because thanks to that we know where we are going and can manage the available funds in a rational way.

The core of the new system are two strategies on the basis of which the Council of Ministers make decisions concerning the development of the country:

1. Long-term development strategy of the country. Poland 2030. The third wave of modernity[13], which includes a vision for the development of Poland until 2030.

2. Medium-term National Development Strategy 2020 which defines the development objectives of the country until 2020[14].

In the new development management system, the major strategic documents also include nine integrated strategies which detail the National Development Strategy 2020:

1. Strategy for Innovation and Efficiency of the Economy (coordinator - Ministry of Economy).
2. Human Capital Development Strategy (coordinator - Ministry of Labour and Social Policy).
2. Transport Development Strategy (coordinator - Ministry of Infrastructure and Development).
3. Strategy for Energy Security and the Environment (coordinator - Ministry of Economy).
4. Efficient State Strategy (coordinator - Ministry of Administration and Digitization)
5. Social Capital Development Strategy (PDF file) (coordinator - Ministry of Culture and National Heritage).
6. National Strategy of Regional Development – Regions, Cities, Rural Areas (coordinator - Ministry of Infrastructure and Development).
7. Strategy for Sustainable Development of Rural Areas, Agriculture and Fisheries (coordinator - Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development).

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[12] Szerzej: *Nowe zarządzanie publiczne – skuteczność i efektywność*, red. T. Lubińska, Difin, Warszawa 2009, s. 63-69.
[13] Przyjęta przez Radę Ministrów uchwałą nr 16 w dniu 5 lutego 2013 r. (M. P. poz. 121).
[14] Przyjęta przez Radę Ministrów uchwałą nr 157 w dniu 25 września 2012 r. (M. P. poz. 882).

8. Strategy for Development of the National Security System (coordinator - Ministry of National Defence).

These are integrated strategies because they combine social, economic and spatial planning. They also take into account the relations between different fields and thus allowing for better coordination and greater efficiency. All government development programs should be consistent with the provisions of integrated strategies.

Strategy for Development of the National Security System is a new generation document which take into consideration the requirements of modern management system of state development. For the first time the strategy in the area of national security was developed in connection with socio-economic policies of the country and was based on the methodology for the implementation of objectives contained therein. A system of indicators that will aid analytical and evaluative activities, enabling the observation of changes in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, will be the base to monitor the implementation of the objectives of the Strategy for Development of the National Security System.

Assuming that the implementation of specific plans for the country's development involves the provision of adequate financial resources for this purpose, or that without adequate financial resources it is not possible to implement development projects, long-term and medium-term planning had to be based on budgeting. Pragmatically, this demand is met by Multiannual Financial Plan of the State.

3. Issues of security and defence in the Multiannual Financial Plan of the State

Multiannual Financial Plan of the State[15] is an instrument for medium-term financial planning of the state budget which is prepared for a given financial year and the next three years.

The forecast of the state budget expenses is presented in the Multiannual Financial Plan of the State taking into account the functions of the state along with the objectives and measures of the degree of execution of the given function – referring analogically to the task-based state budget. In addition, there are specific relationships between the Multiannual Financial Plan of the State (the resolution) and the state budget (act) as when drafting the budget act it is necessary to refer to the provisions contained in the MFPS – on the one hand, but at the same time when the existing financial, economic and social processes deviate from the planned, MFPS must be updated – on the other. Thus, the Multiannual Financial Plan of the State is the basis for the preparation of the draft budget act for the next financial year.

Multiannual Financial Plan of the State is an attempt to connect objectives and current tasks with the objectives and medium-term and long-term tasks, and binding socio-economic policy of Poland with the main policies in the European Union.

Within the Multiannual Financial Plan of the State, planning of expenditures for individual functions and determining the priority tasks within the task-based state budget allows for the translation of these funds or limits into specific objectives, areas or programs resulting from development strategies. According to the proposed allocation of budget tasks to the targeted development strategies, *Strategy for Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022* is financed under the two constant functions of the state: the 11th function – External security and inviolability of borders, and the 15th function – Foreign policy.

11th function - External security and inviolability of borders, covers the activities of the administrators responsible for the state defence issues, Polish Armed Forces and the participation in military undertakings under international agreements. Ensuring the

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[15] Por. *Ustawa o finansach publicznych z dnia 27 sierpnia 2009 r.* (Dz.U. Nr 157, poz. 1240 ze zm.), art. 103 i 105.

independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Poland is the overriding objective of the state. Its adequate funding is an indisputable priority of the state budget.

The main task of the state in this area is the development of operational capabilities of the armed forces to ensure effective defence and protection of Polish borders as part of the activities carried out independently or as part of collective defence - also abroad. As far as fulfilling the allied obligations is concerned, Polish Armed Forces maintain their readiness to participate in activities organized by NATO, the EU or as part of ad hoc coalitions of states. Moreover, as part of the function, administrators conduct activities involving, among others, identifying and countering external threats detrimental to the security, defence, independence and integrity of the territory of the Republic of Poland.

The 11th function fits in the priority direction of interventions: Consolidation of national security (under the objective: Strengthening the conditions conducive to meeting the individual needs of citizens), in a strategic area Efficient and effective state, which was defined in the National Development Strategy 2020.

The objective of the 11th function is to ensure the independence and territorial integrity. The level of fulfillment of this objective was measured by five indicators:

1. National and allied level of readiness of the Polish Armed Forces.
2. Manning of the Polish Armed Forces with professional soldiers in "P" time.
3. The relation of an indicator of combat potential to its level from the previous year.
4. The average annual number of soldiers sent to the Polish Military Contingent (PKW) in relation to the level of national ambitions.
5. Staffing of the Polish Armed Forces.

Assessment of the use of the indicators used in the Multiannual Financial Plan of the State as part of the 11th function - External security and inviolability of borders is not clear. It must be borne in mind that the administration is an organisation consisting of people and therefore it needs time and a chance to acquire certain habits and skills. It is also significant that part of the tasks performed by the Ministry of National Defence is by nature classified. It is therefore difficult to assess e.g. the state of the Armed Forces having in mind the need for state secrecy.

Demand to build an integrated system of state security linking security with state development and covering all the structures of the state, takes on particular relevance in the current reality – in the face of rapidly occurring changes and events as well as risks present in the geopolitical and international sphere. One of the essential conditions for the smooth, stable and sustainable social and economic development of the country is in fact a guarantee of permanent external security and inviolability of borders. The overriding objective namely ensuring independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Poland, meaning the protection of the sovereignty, independence and stability inside the country, will be implemented (as part of the 11th function − External security and inviolability of borders) through a range of activities consolidating, integrating, developing and modernizing the system of external state security.

Conducive to that phenomenon will be the stable funding of defence expenditure (at least 2% of GDP of the previous year) associated with the nominal increase of GDP allowing, according to the assumptions and actions foreseen in the *Strategy for development of the national security system of the Republic of Poland 2022,* for technical modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces. The effect of the use of these funds will be visible in the form of value (monitored on an annual basis) describing the relationship between the combat potential – i.e. military equipment – and its level in the previous year, calculated using the *Unit Qualitative Indicators for different equipment groups of weapons and military equipment of the Polish Armed Forces*. In the years 2016-19, this potential will increase and its largest growth is to be achieved in 2018.

Along with the modernisation of the army, the innovative technological potential of the Polish defence industry will be supported and built. Positive qualitative change in the field of technical modernisation will be accompanied by the gradual increase in the level of staffing of the Polish Armed Forces, including the creation of territorial defence structures while limiting the level of its fluctuation. The amended provisions[16] allowing for the extension of the period of military service for contract soldiers will be conducive to that phenomenon. Staffing of the Polish Armed Forces (the number of professional soldiers and soldiers of the National Reserve Forces) is forecast to increase. It is assumed that the Polish Armed Forces will be able to carry out their tasks in the forecast perspective if the indicator of manning of the Polish Armed Forces with professional soldiers in "p" time (the ratio of the state registration of professional soldiers to the number of "p" positions in %) will be at least 80%[17].

These changes will take place under the assumption of simultaneous raising of the level of training and improvement of organisational structures, including management and command systems.

An important contribution to the strengthening of national security is also the implementation of defence cooperation and the fulfillment of allied commitments of our country, resulting from the Polish membership in the EU and NATO – including the participation in international military missions in which the average number of soldiers sent to Polish Military Contingents in relation to the level of national ambitions[18] is planned to be in the range of 0.15-0.17.

The development of sectorial multiannual strategies and the Multiannual Financial Plan of the State implemented within the framework of performance-based budgeting, with a possibility of implementation of issues of national security ensures adequate, planned, consistent with the need for ensuring security use of resources for national defence which are charged parametrically.

As far as defence expenditure planning is concerned, it is also important to recognise that the longer the horizon of financial planning, the greater the risk of error resulting mainly from the inability to accurately predict the environmental conditions and the possibility of unforeseen events that may occur in the course of planning.

Conclusions

The contents of the study allow to generate several relevant conclusions:

First: Well-grounded need for ensuring state security requires a permanent and stable supply of funds. The amount of these funds is basically a compromise depending on a number of economic, political and social factors, the existing situation in the country and abroad, as well as emerging or potentially possible hazards. Analysis of the current situation of public finance indicates that the implementation of long-term planning exerts a positive influence on the level of security.

Second: The main advantage of the Polish model of financing of the Polish Armed Forces is, guaranteed by law, amount of budgetary funds allocated for defence expenditure of not less than 2% of GDP from the previous year. Development of sectorial multiannual

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[16] *Ustawa z dnia 30 stycznia 2016 r. o zmianie ustawy o służbie wojskowej żołnierzy zawodowych* (Dz. U. poz. 308).

[17] *Wieloletni Plan Finansowy Państwa na lata 2016–2019*, Rada Ministrów, Warszawa 2016.

[18] Poziom ambicji narodowych oznacza poziom zaangażowania Sił Zbrojnych RP (wielkość sił przebywających jednocześnie w operacjach poza granicami kraju) określony w *uchwale Rady Ministrów nr 170/2012 z dnia 25 września 2012 r. w sprawie określenia szczegółowych kierunków przebudowy i modernizacji SZ RP na lata 2013-2018.*

strategies and the Multiannual Financial Plan of the State implemented within the framework of performance-based budgeting, with a possibility of implementation of issues of national security ensures adequate, planned, consistent with the need for ensuring security use of resources for national defence which are charged parametrically.

Third: The Ministry of National Defence plans disbursement of funds from the state budget on the basis of the objectives defined by the Polish government in the long-term and medium-term state development strategies and the nine integrated strategies including the "Strategy for Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022". As part of this strategies, the Polish Armed Forces implement the transformation process of combat potential, which is aimed at streamlining the composition and organisational structures of military units according to their new tasks stemming from the national needs and allied commitments. All the plans concerning the restructuring of the organisational structures, technical modernisation and investment in military infrastructure are subject to a comprehensive analyses of costs and benefits.

Fourth: The process of technical modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces is implemented in a systematic manner, based on the needs defined during the review of the operational needs including the budget possibilities of the Ministry of National Defence. Successive withdrawal of military technology which no longer meets the requirements of the modern battlefield is accompanied by the acquisition of new generation military equipment. Financial resources planned for subsequent years are allocated primarily for the development of essential capabilities of the Armed Forces.

Fifth: Within the space of recent years, the Ministry of National Defence continued a series of austerity measures including a reform of the control and command system of the Polish Armed Forces, the process of transferring of redundant real estate and movable property outside the Ministry of National Defence, streamlining of the deployment of military units and institutions according to the operating conditions. These undertakings bespeak correct, conscious and substantive approach of the management of the Ministry of National Defence towards the issues of public finance.

Sixth: Any attempt to "save up" on defence may lead to weakening of the potential of the Polish Armed Forces. This may result in the necessity to limit the tasks of security, deterioration in the quality of defence services, or abandoning the implementation of some projects. Such actions may deteriorate the position of Poland in the international arena, and the potential consequences of such actions could be disastrous for the state and the nation.

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DEMOGRAPHY AND SECURITY.
GLOBAL RESHAPINGS IN THE 21st CENTURY

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Abstract: The 21st century is marked by historically unprecedented demographic transformations, which have the potential to reshape the world as it is known to us today. Within this context and in accordance with the concept of security spreading on other non-military areas, the present research started from the question "Do connections of the demographic transformations with security or insecurity exist?" and aimed to identify the nature of this connection and the typologies of demographic evolutions which can offer legitimacy to such connection. As a result, the paper proceeds from analyzing the professional literature to classifying some of the most important aspects of demographic changes with possible impact on security, in its endeavor to offer a structure to the relation between demography and security. There are no certainties regarding how the future world would look like, but the analysis of demographic trends represents a research field of great actuality and importance, which may come to practitioners' aid by means of understanding the potential security implications.

Keywords: relation between demography and security, challenges, opportunities, state of conflict, frailty, stability.

> *"Demographic shifts are a cause, an effect, and a forerunner of geopolitical shocks and transformations. Their study should be one of the first steps in any form of strategic estimate."*[1]

Introduction

As a result of the changes generated by the magnitude of new global demographic evolutions without historical precedent, the relation between demography and security has begun to come increasingly to the attention of the academic environment and international practitioners over the past years. Thus, new concepts such as security demography and demographic security have emerged (some of them still in the prototype phase and scarcely used due to their novelty, such as the concept of demographic security; the security demography has a broader area of usage, especially among American specialists), as well as developments in the field analyses proper to researchers and practitioners. Moreover, the approaches appear to focus on some prevalent topics, such as economic implications, state stability/instability, state of conflict, transformations of the power balance.

The present research has as foundation the analysis of specific demographic indicators, the observation of the international security environment's evolution and the analysis of professional literature. Thus, the research aims to identify the possible nature of the relation between demography and security and of the global challenges, regional ones and challenges specific to certain states, considering a field of research with an important potential for future development at international as well as national level.

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[1] Laurent Murawiec, David Adamson (Eds.), *Demography and Security-Proceedings of a Workshop,* RAND's Population Matters, Paris, 2000, p. 1, available at https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings /2005/RAND_CF169 . pdf, accessed on 07.10.2016.

1.   Legitimacy of the relation between demography and security

Due to the necessity imposed by the increase of the international security environment's dynamism and complexity and by the diversifying of threat types, the approach of looking upon the concept of security exclusively in military terms has ceased to exist. Barry Buzan, one of the most prominent names in terms of security studies, states that "Security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile"[2]. He thus identified three security levels (state security, individual security and the international security system) and five security dimensions (military, political, economic, social/societal and environmental), none of them operating isolated, but in interconnection.[3] We may assert that these dimensions are in accordance with the new evolutions which generated the necessity of taking into account the diversification of threat typologies which transcend the classical politico-military specter. Because the aspects referring to population are among the societal sectors with impressive evolutions during the 20th and 21st centuries, they are discussed by B. Buzan within the social dimension, where the main threats are those from the sphere of identity and of balance/lack of balance within a state. The weaker states are often poorly prepared to cope with identity and cultural differences, thus being considered that the majority of the conflicts prevalent nowadays are those which have a societal element.[4] One of the important demographic components is the structural one, especially of ethnic and religious nature. As a result, one of the most widespread conceptual perspectives on contemporary security includes elements with potential demographic substratum.

On the other hand, the magnitude of potential demographic evolutions generated the development of a specific research field towards the relation between demography and security, which is approached with high interest by both the academic environment and the practitioners. From the research conducted until now in this extremely new area, we have identified Jack Goldstone as a pioneer; other resonant names include: Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba, Richard P. Cincotta, Christian Leuprecht, Henrik Urdal, Elizabeth Leahy Madsen and also Richard Jackson and Neil Howe, although the latter two are rather engaged in the area of the relation between demography and geopolitics. On the other hand, the practitioners' environment is especially well developed in the United States, who pay high attention to this relation both at the level of the United States Department of Defense (DOD) and the CIA. As far as DOD is concerned, Kathleen Hicks has more than once spread the importance of demography and the DOD's point of view regarding the matter, whereas if we report to the CIA, the Agency has been publishing a report called "Long-Term Global Demographic Trends: Reshaping the Geopolitical Landscape"[5] since as far back as 2001. The report shapes a picture of the global demographic challenges to the world's geopolitics and highlights the most important threats regarding this matter.

But, at world level, the importance and relevance of this new area is given not only by identifying punctual demographic transformations and relating them to potential security implications, thus generating an innovating research field, but also by the magnitude of these

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[2] Barry Buzan, „New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century", *International Affairs*, (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), vol. 67, no. 3/ 1991, Ed. Blackwell Publishing, pp. 432-433, available online   at http://home.sogang.ac.kr/sites/jaechun/courses/Lists/b7/Attachments/10/New%20Patterns%20of%20Global%20 Security%20in%20the%20TwentyFirst%20Century_Buzan.pdf, accessed on 22.09.2016.

[3] Marianne Stone, „Security According to Buzan: A Comprehensive Security Analysis", Security Discussion Papers Series 1, Grouped' Etudesetd' Expertise" Sécuritéet Technologies" GEEST, 2009, p. 1, available online at http://www.geest.msh-paris.fr/IMG/pdf/Security_for_Buzan.mp3.pdf, accessed on 11.10.2016.

[4] *Idem*, p. 5.

[5] CIA, *Long term global demographic trends reshaping the geopolitical landscape*, CIA Report July, 2001, available online at https://www.cia.gov /library/reports/general-reports-1/Demo_Trends_For_Web.pdf, accessed on 15.08.2016.

transformations itself, which seems to dictate the necessity of shaping and further deepening this research branch. Specialists warn that the future world will be radically transformed because of these unprecedented demographic evolutions. Regarding this matter, we will refer to a few statements of some important personalities from the security-demography research area:

- Richard Jackson and Neil Howe: „The world is entering a demographic transformation of historic and unprecedented dimensions"[6].

- Jack Goldstone claimed at a conference dedicated to this topic: „My job here is to trying to persuade you that we are going to be living in a different world … it is going to be a very challenging world … the world is moving into areas demographic, economic, political that we did not anticipate and that create very complicated new challenges."[7]

- Elizabeth Leahy Madsen: „Today we are in an era of unprecedented demographic divergences, with population trends moving simultaneous in different directions."[8]

- David E. Bloom: „Humankind is being buffeted by the forces of demographic change."[9]

- Christian Leuprecht: „I should say why first of all should we be interested in demography. The world in undergoing demographic changes in an unprecedented scale. This is the first year when more people are living in urban centers than in rural centers, that countries are becoming ever more diverse culturally, linguistically, religiously and I think demographics are going to be for the 21st century what class cleavages were to the 19th century. It is the single biggest challenge for how we live together in peaceful and harmoniously means in the 21st century."[10]

Within this context, David E. Bloom states that the humanity will face challenges such as population growth, demographic aging, migration and urbanization, claiming that („the most prominent changes are rapid population growth in some developing economies and shifting shares of adolescents and young adults in others, increasing longevity and population aging throughout the world, and urbanization and international migration)"[11]

Broadly, international specialists point out the relation between security and demography from the perspective of some major demographic transformations and most of the time their opinions converge towards following types of population evolutions: 1. Population growth; 2. Aging; 3. Migration; 4. Urbanization. Thus, even if each of them offers different structures for the relevant categories of demographic transformations, they mainly stick to the four categories mentioned above. The different structures offer multiple angles for the analysis of the relation between demography and security, but at the same time they help forming a foundation for new structures.

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[6]Richard Jackson, Neil Howe, *The Graying of the Great Powers*, Ed. CSIS, Washington DC, 2008, p. 1.

[7]Jack A. Goldstone, *The Impact of Global Demographic Changes on the International Security Environment*, lecture held within The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Institute for Emerging Market Studies (IEMS), 2014, minute 1:21- 2:05, available online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CyRXj3NWP5Y, accessed on 03.10.2016.

[8]Elizabeth Leahy Madsen, *Demographic Security: Population, Conflict, and Development*, lecture held within Environmental Change & Security Program (ECSP), minute 0:51- 0:59, available online at https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=4JThOTyORLs, accessed on 04.10.2016.

[9]David E. Bloom, „Demographic Upheaval", *Finance & Development*, vol. 53, no. 1, March 2016, International Monetary Fund, available online at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2016/03/bloom.htm, accessed on 03.10.2016.

[6]Richard Jackson, Neil Howe, *The Graying of the Great Powers*, Ed. CSIS, Washington DC, 2008, p. 1.

[7]Jack A. Goldstone, video 2014, minute 1:21- 2:05.

[8]Elizabeth Leahy Madsen, *Demographic Security: Population, Conflict, and Development*, lecture held within Environmental Change & Security Program (ECSP), minute 0:51- 0:59, available online at https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=4JThOTyORLs, accessed on 04.10.2016.

[9]David E. Bloom, 2016, *op. cit*.

[10]Christian Leuprecht, *Christian Leuprecht on Demography, Conflict and National Security*, lecture held within Environmental Change & Security Program (ECSP), Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars, January 2009, minute 0:40-1:17, available online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KgSg3-zcNXg, accessed on 04.10.2016.

[11]David E. Bloom, 2016, *op. cit.*

We will enumerate below a couple of examples of highlighting the demographic transformations with the greatest importance to security and also structures of this relation:

▪ Jack Goldstone, as a forwarder in this new research field, appreciates as some of the most important transformations with potential impact on security: 1. The disproportional growth of population at global level, especially that specific of the Muslim states; 2. The decline of the E.U. and former European U.S.S.R population; 3. Notable differences between the developed states with aging population and the states still in process of development with young population; 4. Increasing migration from the states in process of development to the developed states.[12] This brings an innovative approach by structuring the demographic transformations most important to security according to five groups whose populations grow way faster than the global population. In his vision, this is the new population bomb. Jack Goldstone identifies the following five groups: 1. Sub-Saharan Africa (the dimension of demographic growth may activate this zone as global economic actor; potential political radicalization due to the low capacity of economically absorbing youth with superior studies; important migration source); 2. Global middle class (China, India, Latin America, Middle Orient and last, Africa; potential negative effects: radicalism, extremism, ethnic and religious segregation, contribution to migration growth, organized crime increase, increase of energy and animal products consumption); 3. Urban population (especially in states in process of development and low income states; mass concentration of population in urban areas in states with lower income than the Occidental states; cities and new technological frontiers: energy, food, waste, transportation for cities with low income, suburbs); 4. Muslim population (possible jihadist approach of Islam; the relation between the West and the Muslim population and identifying forms of cooperation; the war of civilizations: potential of youth joining radical movements); 5. Aged population (Japan, China, Europe, Russia; how the future societies will look like in the context of demographic aging; social infrastructure; adapting to the new social, economic, biological, fiscal and military realities; generations conflict regarding top priorities; international security and public policy).[13]

▪ Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba, author to numerous studies on the topic, also holding an academic lecture on demography and security for both civil and military audiences, approaches this area from the perspective of those transformations which generate opportunities on one hand and challenges on the other hand. She begins with aspects regarding birthrate, death rate and migration and foresees two major challenges and two big opportunities for security from demographic perspective in the 21st century: a) Opportunities: 1. Transitional age structure; 2. Urbanization; b) Challenges: 1. The youth bulge; 2. Demographic aging.[14] Regarding structure, Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba considers that demography can have three functions in the relation between demography and security: 1. Indicator (for opportunities and challenges; f. eg: the high conflict rate risk); 2. Resource (for conflict or progress; f. eg: positive contribution to economy, to democratic governing); 3. Multiplier (for power and prosperity, f. eg. for social, economic and

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[12] Jack A. Goldstone, „Flash Points and Tipping Points: Security Implications of global Population Changes", *New directions in Demographic Security*, Report of *Program: Environmental Change and Security* (ECSP REPORT), no. 13, 2008–2009, available online at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ECSPReport13_ Goldstone.pdf , accessed on 02.10.2016
[13] Jack Goldstone, 2014, video *op. Cit.*, minute 4:17-4:18; 4:55-46:00.
Jack A. Goldstone, „Population and Security: How Demographic Change can Lead to Violent Conflict," *Columbia Journal of International Affairs* vol. 56, no. 1, 2002, pp. 245-63, available online at http://www.mafhoum.com/ press6/179S21.pdf, accessed on 03.10.2016.
[14] Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba, *The Future Faces of War- Population and National Security*, Ed. Praeger Security International, ABC CILO LCD, Santa Barbara, Denver, Oxford, 2011, pp. 1-153.
Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba, *Teaching Demography and Security Linkages*, interview for Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars, within Environmental Change and Security Program (ECSP), 2009, interview available online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gV4FZH69Lbs, accessed on 04.10.2016.
Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba, conference upon release of: *The Future Faces of War: Population and National Security*, within Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars, 14 March 2011, available at https://www.youtube.com /watch?v=drH26iUVGHo, accessed on 05.10.2016.

political trends).[15] Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba integrates demographic opportunities and challenges with their specific functions of indicators, resources and multipliers within the concept developed by Nazli Choucri, who considers security as a function of three types of security: military security, regimen security and human security.[16] We must nevertheless mention that the latter is modified by J.D. Sciubba to structural security (due to the fact that human security places the individual as central figure, whereas structural security places the state as such).[17] J.D. Sciubba considers: 1. Military security as the external defense of a state, which regards protecting the state from external threats and projecting external power; demography is relevant in this context especially by the numbers of military personnel and by the impact of demographic trends on a state's army and on its allies and opponents; 2. Regimen security as internal stability, designated by internal threats and by the ability of a state to remain in power or even to exist (the case of North Africa and of many states of the Sub-Saharan Africa); from demographic perspective, it is of high interest to observe how these trends affect the state's own power, the regimen's internal instability and the chances for a rebellion/riot/revolution to take place; 3. Structural security as a relation between human security and the state, having the state as central figure; here it is of high relevance how population and environment trends impact, for example, the poverty level; demography is extremely relevant in what the relation between poverty and the state is concerned – until the stage where the state may become a failed one, as well as in what some direct relations are concerned, such as how the number of soldiers can help a state grow and in return financially support its army and defense system.[18]

▪ Christian Leuprecht starts from three types of demographic dynamics (fertility, mortality and migration dynamics) in order to bring to attention some evolutions of maximal relevance, especially as far as the national security at its structural level is concerned: the age structure, the ethnic/religious structure[19], but also the distribution structure (urban-rural, intrastate-groups of population outside their countries of origin).[20] He states that it is quite seldom within the field of social sciences for generally unprecedented phenomena to be observed, but from demographic perspective we are currently facing a "non-exploited territory". In Christian Leuprecht's vision, this is happening mainly due to contrasts and discrepancies: between the demographic decline of Europe and the relative decline of America and the rise of Asia and Africa; between the states undergoing population aging (the most influential states at world level) and those with a young population (the less developed states); the openness and increasing availability towards mobility.[21]

▪ Richard P. Cincotta focuses especially on following population dynamics: growth rates, age structure and distribution within the context of a state's stability, of civil conflict and even of standing a chance at democracy.[22]

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[15] Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba, 2011, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-155; pp 153-166.
   Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba, video 2011, *op. Cit.*, minute: 12:58-18:44; 0:01-42:07
[16] Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba, 2011, *op. Cit.*, pp. 9-10.
[17] *Idem,* p. 3.
   Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba, video 2011, *op. Cit.*, minute: 1:16: 3:10.
   Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba, video2009.
[18] *Ibidem.*
[19] Christian Leuprecht, *From Report 13 - Christian Leuprecht on Migration as the Demographic Wild Card in Civil Conflict*, interview for Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars, within Environmental Change and Security Programme (ECSP), March 2009, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N1O6IRji7fE, accessed on 04.10.2016.
   Christian Leuprecht, „Migration as the demographic Wild Card in Civil Conflict", în *Report 13- New directions in Demographic security,* Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars, 2009, available at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/ECSPReport13, accessed on 04.10.2016.
   Christian Leuprecht, 29 ianuarie 2009, *op. Cit.*
[20] Christian Leuprecht, Jack A. Goldstone, „Political Demography", *E-International Relations*, 2013, available at http://www.e-ir.info/2013/02/23/political-demography/, accessed on 04.10.2016.
[21] *Idem*, p. 1.
[22] Richard P. Cincotta, „How democracies grow up", *Foreign Policy*, 2008, available at http://foreignpolicy.com /2009/10/09/how-democracies-grow-up/, accessed on 05.10.2016.

▪ Kathleen Hicks, as a representative of the United States Department of Defense (DOD), focuses on demographic analyses from the perspective of trends for the USA and for the areas of strategic interest for the USA. She thus enlists the most relevant areas of interest: 1. understanding the implications of demographic transformations for the USA; 2. the implications of changes for the areas of strategic interest for the USA such as South Asia (the young population of Pakistan, the effects of urbanization in Afghanistan, etc.), the Middle East (Saudi Arabia and its positive role in the education of women, etc.), the Western hemisphere (the growth of Chinese population in America and China's involvement perspective for the area), Europe (the perspective of demographic aging and the challenges of restructuring and dimensioning the army), Russia (depopulation of large areas, change of the ethnic structure in some of the important cities, etc.)[23]

Nevertheless, even if it can be clearly observed that there is, at international level, a legitimacy of the relation between demography and security, given by the magnitude of demographic transformations which might bring along security implications, the perspective is that of the possible rather than deterministic. In this respect we bring to attention dome of the statements which reject demography as destiny in what both its evolutions and the impact on security are concerned. We hereby mention that the assertion "demography is not destiny" (and its translated equivalent) is found nearly as an axiom in the works of a great part of the specialists in this field. Thus, Kathleen Hicks, as the USA Department of Defense representative, does not regard demography as destiny, but rather as one of the key trends by stating: "Within the DOD we do not treat demography as destiny, but instead perceive it as one of the key trends"[24] ; Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba states that "demography is not a destiny; it is what the state does with it what matters"[25]; Elizabeth Leahy Madsen discusses the fact that demographic trends might undergo changes and states within this context that demography is not destiny[26]; Richard P. Cincotta points out this assertion right within a subchapter of a research work, which he names "Demography is not destiny" and claims that the factors of political decision need to refer to demographic transformations in as constructive a manner as possible, this being to see the changes at population level as challenges and vulnerabilities for the state and its institutions and in certain cases as options and opportunities. The author considers that "the demographic future is far from being a secure one. The demographic trends are not immutable. … some of the aspects of population dynamics are definitely more predisposed to interventions"[27]. In accordance to the international opinion, we do not consider demography as a predestination. We appreciate that demography is neither destiny regarding the certainty of its trends' evolution, nor regarding security implications. We must consider that demography is the result of complex politic, economic, cultural and civilization societal evolutions (in M. Maliţa's vision on culture and civilization) and even military ones – which, if experimenting major changes, may cast an influence or even determine ample societal transformations within the other above mentioned

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Richard P. Cincotta, Robert Engelman, Daniele Anastasion, *The Security Demographic: Population and Civil Conflict After the Cold War*, Population Action International, Washington, DC, 2003, available at http://pai.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/The_Security_Demographic_Population_and_Civil_Conflict_After_th e_Cold_War-1.pdf, accessed on 05.10.2016.

Richard P. Cincotta, „Demographic Security Comes of Age", *The Next Steps for Environment, Population, and Security, Environmental Change and Security Program Report* (ECSP REPORT), nr. 10, 2004, available at https://www.wilsoncenter .org/ sites/default/files/ecspr10_C-cincotta.pdf, accessed on 05.10.2016.

[23] Kathleen Hicks, lecture held within the book release: *The Future Faces of War: Population and National Security*, Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars, March 2011, minute: 43:57-44:18, available online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=drH26iUVGHo, accessed at 05.10.2016.

[24] *Idem,* minute: 43:57-44:18.

[25] Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba, video 2011, *op. cit.,* minute: 27:24-27:28.

[26] Elizabeth Leahy Madsen, *Demographic Security: Population, Conflict, and Development*, interview within *Environmental Change and Security Program* (ECSP), Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars, June 2011, minut: 14:35-14:55, available online at https://www.newsecuritybeat.org /2011/06/watch-demographic-security-101-with-elizabeth-leahy-madsen/, accessed at 06.10.2016.

[27] Richard P. Cincotta, 2004, *op. cit.,* p. 27.

areas. We can instead relate to these as to a potential, and not a certitude; a potential which may support a state in its effort to identify trends which the state wishes to capitalize or to counteract. This is why identifying major demographic trends is extremely important, in order to develop plans and actions of mid and long term regarding improving/counteracting vulnerabilities, risks and threats and maximizing opportunities and options. Regarding this aspect, we will point out some types of demographic transformations which may lead to major global reconfigurations with impact inclusively on security.

2. Major global reconfigurations. Potential impact on security

We consent to the international community regarding the most important demographic evolutions which can potentially reshape the surface of the world, as we know it today, in a significant way and which, besides, may have complex implications on security. We consider that, at global level, the historically unprecedented changes regarding population, which have the potential of reconfiguring the world, can be classified in three large dimensions, dimensions which are also specific to the phenomenon of demographic transition. This structure has as foundation three theories of demographic transition (even if professional literature highlights different approaches of demographic transition according to different influential factors): 1. classical transition (with Warren Thompson – 1929 and Frank Notestein – 1954 as initiators), centered on the numeric component of population (through changes of the fertility and mortality level), which result in growth, stagnation or decline of the population; 2. demographic transition regarded from the perspective of changes within the age structure of population (Malmberg Bo and Lena Sommestad), with a high interest here on the process towards population aging; 3. transition named David Coleman's Third transition, which focuses on migration and the changes it brings within the ethnic/racial structure.[28] As a result, the three dimensions are: 1. the numeric dimension; 2. the age structure dimension; 3. dimension of migration dynamics. Other two relevant dimensions may also be integrated to the above mentioned structure, as follows: the distribution dimension can be a component in each of the three dimensions, and the cultural structure one can be integrated to the numeric dimension, as well as to the age structure and migration dynamics ones. According to this structure of three dimensions, we will shape a picture of the world in the 21st century, in accordance to demographic transformations with potential impact on security; we hereby mention that the factors of demographic nature are interconnected to and interdependent on societal dynamics (cultural, political, economic ones, etc.) and that these dimensions are to be analyzed as potential indicators, resources and multiplier[29] for the security, and not from the perspective of a predestination, as previously mentioned. On the other hand, while at this, we will try to highlight the fact that the global condition is a jigsaw puzzle, a commutation of differentiated and often contrasting regional conditions.

2.1 The numeric dimension regards global transformations as a commutation of regional, national and intrastate specifics: population growth, stagnation or decline are its main topics. At global level, the theme of overpopulation, even though it was a topic of major interest especially in the second half of the 20th century, is currently arousing less and less interest as compared to

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[28] John F. May, *World Population Policies - Their Origin, Evolution and Impact*, Ed. Springer Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, London, 2012, p. 21.
Malmberg Bo, Lena Sommestad, *Four Phases in the Demographic Transition. Implications for Economic and Social Development in Sweden 1820-2000*, Institute for Futures Studies,2000, pp.1-26, p.3, available online at http://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6253422.pdf, accessed at 20.03.2013
Dirk J. van de Kaa, „The Idea of a Second Demographic Transition in Industrialized Countries", *Welfare Policy Seminar of the National Institute of Population and Social Security*, Tokyo, Japan, Januar 2002, pp. 1-34, pp. 1-2, available online at http://websv.ipss.go.jp/webj-ad/WebJournal.files/population/2003_4/Kaa.pdf, accessed at 14.07.2014.
David Coleman, „Immigration and Ethnic Change in Low Fertility Countries: A Third Demographic Transition", *Population and Developmenr Review*, vol. 32, nr. 3, The Population Council, Inc., 2006, pp.401-446, p. 402.
[29] Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba, 2011, *op. cit.*

some regional challenges. Jack Goldstone asserted in 2014 that "I do not think that the Planet is being threatened by overpopulation in the manner some are tempted to do" [30]; we adhere to this position based on the analysis of foreseen global trends, but also on interventions by means of population programs which led to significant decreases in birth rate, with differentiated regional specifics. Thus, even though we observed an acceleration of the population growth rhythm at global level in the 20th century, especially after the 2000s , this rhythm has been undergoing a gradual slowdown, (to see the evolution of how the population has been increasing by each billion since the end of the 19th century until the available forecasts for 2100).[31] Moreover, the specialists support the possibility for the global population to settle down to 10 – 11 billions (according to the sources of the data) around 2100 and even to face a slight decline.[32] As a result, this numeric dimension is centered on major regional demographic differences: the fact that we have regions with states which still undergo massive population growth (especially those of Sub-Saharan Africa), and others with states marked by population decline (Europe, Russia and Japan). By 2100, the only area which will still undergo growth will be Africa, thus doubling its share of the global population (from 16,13% to 39,12%) and North America will have a slight decrease (below 1%); meanwhile, the great loser will be Europe (4%) but by 2025 Asia too (16%).[33] Also, J.F. May points out that the share of global population corresponding to the most developed states will suffer, while the share of the states within the process of development and of those less developed will increase. [34] This can be observed if we analyze the top 20 most populated states by 2050. [35] From this perspective, we are facing an increasingly "non-Western" world.[36]The specialists claim that implications such as the decreasing activity of models promoted by the Western society may emerge. The developed democracies might be seen as sophisticated, privileged elites outdated institutions rely upon. [37] Instead, "neo-authoritarian non-liberal regimens" could become a model much more attractive to the young population who will reach maturity in the developing countries. [38] We are yet to see what possible impact these influential transformations will have on the power factor within involvement and international vision on security. On the other hand, returning to those states which undergo massive population growth, this may turn to a destabilizing factor with potential of conflict on the long term. Here we can refer to the State Frailty Index (SFI), which contains an indicator of demographic pressure. From the data of the Fund for Peace, we can observe that if the demographic pressure increases gradually, so will the SFI, thus the state frailty. Of course, there are other factors which contribute to state frailty, but its correlation to the demographic pressure is clear; moreover, the same pattern of correlation can be made between

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[30]Jack Goldstone, video 2014, *op. cit.,*minut 4:55- 5:00.

[31] U.S. Census Bureau, *International Data Base, World Population: 1950-2050*, People and Households, Washington, available online at http://www.census.gov/population/ international/data/ idb/worldpopgraph.php, accessed at 10.03.2012.

 Pardee Center for International Futures, IfS, Denver University, table data 2010-2100, available online at http://www.ifs.du.edu/ ifs/frm _TableDisplay.aspx, accessed at 09.03.2015.

[32] 10 billions inhabitants by 2100 according to Pardee Center for International Futures, IfS Platform, Denver University, table data 2010-2100, available online at http://www.ifs.du.edu/ifs/frm_TableDisplay.aspx, accessed at 05.09.2016.

 11 billions inhabitants by 2100, according to ONU, World Population Prospects The 2015 Revision - Key Findings and Advance Tables, New York, United Nations, 2015, pp. 3- 4, available online at https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/publications/files/key_findings_wpp _2015.pdf, accessed at 10.08.2016.

[33]ONU, *World Population Prospects The 2015 Revision- Volume I: Comprehensive Tables*, available online at https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/publications/files/key_findings_wpp_2015.pdf, accessed at 22.09.2016.

[34]John F. May, 2012, *op. cit.,* p. 15.

[35]ONU, 2015, *op. cit.*

[36]Nayef Al-Rodhan, *Neo-statecraft and Meta-Geopolitics: Reconciliation of Power, Interests and Justice in the 21st Century" , Ed. LIT Verlag. Berlin,* 2009, p. 187 ApudC.Bell, "The End of the Vasco da Gama Era: The Next Landscape of the World Politics,"Lowy Institute Paper 21, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Australia, 2007, p. 11.

[37]Nayef Al-Rodhan, 2009, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

[38]Richard Jackson, Neil Howe, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

SFI and the Total Fertility Rate.[39] On the other hand, if substantial population growth can impact the level of stability, we are yet to see what the impact of population decline on security will be, especially the impact of the transformations of the ethnic distribution. We could here offer two major examples: 1. The decline of the Russian population and possible loss of demographic covering of the Eastern territory and Siberia and the potential growth of Chinese population which establish themselves in Eastern China and Siberia (according to some of the specialists, this may intensify the tensions between these historical archrivals)[40]; 2. The decline of the European population and significant transformations of the ethnic structure as a result of both differentiated growth rates of local population as compared to the immigrants and of continuous immigration (this matter will be again approached within the third dimension). From the perspective of this dimension, the most important indicators might be: the total fertility rate (and the states that either exceed by far, or do no longer reach the threshold of generation replacement of 2,1) and the population growth rate. The most important transformations might be those regarding regional and interstate differences, and those of intrastate ethnic groups.

2.2 The Age-Structural dimension. By 2100, at the global level the population is expected to tend towards aging. But until greater harmonization in this regard, regional differences are those that may have an impact on security. From this point of view the regional situation of states constitutes a global mosaic. Due to various demographic evolution and therefore different stages of the transition specific to each country, worldwide there are several types of states by age structure. For greater clarity, we will use the typology developed by the UN Population Action International (PAI): a) states with very young age structures (where over 2/3 of the population is under the age of 30); b) countries with a youthful age structure (over 60% of the population continue to be younger than 30 years old); c) transitional countries (45% - 60% of the population is under 30 years old); d) mature countries (where the overall rate of fertility is below the generation replacement level of 2.1; <45% of the population is below the age of 30 and older adults–age og 60 and over- constitute ¼ of the total population).[41] From this perspective, the West (Europe and North America) along with Russia, Japan, Australia have mature population, a part of Asia and South America have transitional age structures (China, Mexico, Indonesia, Brazil, etc.) and also Turkey can be mentioned in this group, while the Middle East, some of Asia´ states (Mongolia, etc.) and some countries in south America (Bolivia, Paraguay) have young population. Very young population is concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Central America. Elizabeth Leahy Madsen states, observing the results of a research project funded by the US government ("State Failure Task Force"), that the age structure was the only biggest predictor of failed states by the end of the twentieth century; in her opinion the role of population to the instability of a state has supported the very development of demography - security research field.[42] Thus, in terms of security three age structures are relevant: 1. transitional age and two opposing phenomena, at the extremes of the age structure axis: 2. The youth bulge (meaning "the high proportion of young people with ages between 15 and 29 years old in the total population aged over 15 years"[43]) and 3. The population aging. Transitional age is a feature

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[39]The Found for Peace, Fragility State Index: available online at http://fsi.fundforpe.aceorg/, accessed at 30.09. 2016.

Total Fertility Rate: date ONU, World Population Prospects The 2015 Revision Volume I: Comprehensive Tables, New York, United Nations, 2015 p. 124, available online at https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2015 _Volume-I_Comprehensive-Tables.pdf, accessed at 10.08.2016.

[40]Nayef Al-Rodhan, 2009, p. 59, Apud Naumann et al, *op. cit.,* note 96, p. 33.

[41]Elizabeth Leahy Madsen, Beatrice Daumerie, Karen Hardee, *The effects of age structure on development - Policy and issue brief* , PAI, Washington, Dc, 2010, available online at http://pai.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/ SOTC_PIB.pdf, accessed at 29.04.2013.

[42]Elizabeth Leahy Madsen, *Demographic Security: Population, Conflict, and Development*, interview for Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars, within Environmental Change and Security Program (ECSP), 2011, available online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4JThOTyORLs, accessed at 02.10.2016.

[43]John F. May (2012), *op. cit.*, p. 7

especially of Argentina, Brazil, China, Indonesia, India, Mexico, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela. From a security perspective, that can be seen as an opportunity for development, growth and security, but also as a challenge for integrating the active population in social infrastructure in order to contribute to this emergence. Otherwise, this could lead to organized crime, social tensions, etc. Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba considers transitional age as one of the two main demographic opportunities of the XXI century, a period that could serve as a provision for further aging. The economic miracles of East Asia, the Asian Tigers and Brazil are given as examples where demography has served to fuel the economic boom, with high proportions of the population of working age, this acting as a multiplier. She argues that economic resources have become the new standard of power and that states with transitional ages are best positioned for increasing their power through their own economy and national security, and also the chances of democratic government. This way these states could become stable partners (eg. IBSA Dialogue Forum). D. J. Sciubba assert that if they are positioned in tense areas, these particular states can play the role of a stable actor in the region and thus have positive influence in the zone. This transitional structure, as seen by J. D. Sciubba, indicates potential for global security partnerships. [44] Regarding the second category is interest, namely the phenomenon of youth bulge, a phenomenon very present especially in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, Justin Yifu Lin believes that this can act in two ways: a) as demographic dividend, when the youth bulge can be integrated into the labor market; b) as a "demographic bomb" when this mass of young population is not integrated into the workforce, and as a result of discontent may become a potential source of instability. [45] For the possible implications in a state's security or insecurity, we could extend the area of integrating young people from the labor market to social infrastructure, experts considering that among the most important are: the education system, the health care system, labor market and family. Most often this phenomenon of youth bulge is linked in many studies to state instability and conflict. Elizabeth Leahy Madsen brings into attention a research of Peace Research Institute Oslo, conducted by Henrik Urdal, which show that between 1950 and 2000 the states with significant youth bulges were about 1.5 times more prone to conflict. [46] Making references to 2010 PAI data and R. P Cincotta research results, EL Madsen also asserts that states with very young age structure and younger one are in an overwhelming proportion (90% of them) more likely to have autocratic regimes or only partially democratic ones (PAI 2010), and as the youth bulge decreases, countries are more likely to sustain a democracy (Cincotta 2008). [47] Richard P. Cincotta affirm that the age structure may provide a clue in the direction of political violence manifested mainly by internal conflicts (civil war, ethnic conflict, domestic terrorism, violent political demonstrations, etc.). In this context, he gives the example of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Palestine, most of the central part of Sub-Saharan Africa - from Nigeria, Congo, to Kenya and Ethiopia. [48] Also the specialist considers that in states with youth bulges is much less likely to be achieved a liberal democracy than in those countries with mature population. Once this mass of young people experience a decrease of 0.40, 50% chance of

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[44]Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba, 2011, *op. cit.*

Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba, video 2011, *op. cit.*, minute: 30:19 -30:22.

[45]Justin Yifu Lin, „Youth bulge: a demographic dividend or a demographic bomb in developing countries?", 2012, World Bank, available online at http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/youth-bulge-a-demographic-dividend-or-a-demographic-bomb-in-developing-countries, accessed at 22.04.2015

[46]Elizabeth Leahy Madsen, 2011, *op. cit.*

Henrik Urdal, „A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 50, no. 3, 2006, pp. 607–629, available online at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00416.x/abstract, accessed at 10.10.2016.

[47] Elizabeth Leahy Madsen, video 2011, *op. cit.*

[48]Richard Cincotta, *Political Demography and Unrest in the Middle East*, interview for Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars, within Environmental Change and Security Program (ECSP), 2011, available online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=saVLR0921_s, accessed at 10.10.2016.

democratization is considered to exist. [49] Calling to the results of a study, which analyzed the civil conflicts between 1970 to 2000 within 180 countries, he points out the importance of demographic factors in the risk of a civil conflict (the recent progress in the demographic transition -from high to low birth and death rates - is associated with the continued decline of national states vulnerability to civil conflict). That is why their analysis is of great relevance for policy makers involved in the national security area. [50] One of the demographic factors closely associated with the likelihood of a civil conflict outbreak during the 1990s was youth bulge, where states with a high proportion of it, usually over 40% from the total adult population, were more than double prone to the outbreak of civil strife than the countries with smaller proportions. [51] Of course, RP Cincotta argues that demographic factors do not act on their own, but key demographic features interact one with another, but also with non-demographic factors (such as historical ethnic tensions, placid governance and ineffective institutions), and from this perspective states that, the higher demographic risks for civil conflicts are concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and South Asia.[52] Given that, at least up to 2025, these regions will continue to have significant proportions of youth bulges, we can expect a perpetuation of instability / insecurity for some states, especially where also persist vulnerabilities in their social infrastructure, water and food resources and where there exist a governance without a long-term strategic vision. Advancing to the last category of interest from the age structure and security perspective, namely the population aging, this is an unprecedented phenomenon in human history that begins to manifest itself already among the most developed countries. In 2015, globally there were 901 million persons aged 60 and over, representing 12% of the world total population. If in 2015, Europe had the most significant proportion of the elderly population (24%) by 2050 all major regions of the world except Africa will record elderly population of over ¼ of their total population. The number of older people worldwide is projected to rise to 1.4 billion by 2030, 2.1 billion by 2050 and 3.2 billion by 2100. [53] The most affected countries are expected to be the EU ones, China (where the effects of Only Child Policy will activate and accelerate aging) and Japan. The challenges brought by aging are especially budgetary ones for states and for their ability to maintain an adequate level of expenditure in the area of international security and the national defense system. [54] From security perspective one can consider several potential implications of interest: the contribution to shifts in poles of power and implications for some powers with a traditional role in maintaining security in 20st century; geriatric peace (Mark L. Hass); generations potential conflict of priorities (J. Goldstone A); implications for social infrastructure; implications for the military system. US Intelligence Agency warned since 2001 about a possible decrease in desire for involvement of the European allies confronted with population aging in supporting US to manage global hot spots. Also, aging of European population along with its decline are seen as potential causes for the inability to successfully substitute manpower in the armed forces, most likely those requiring defense restructured armies.[55] In this context, Mark L. Hass brings into question the concept of geriatric peace. [56] Richard Jackson and Neil Howe argue that developing countries will face a chronic shortage of young people as a result of aging, which

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[49] Richard Cincotta, „Half a Chance: Youth Bulges and Transitions to Liberal Democracy", in *New directions in Demographic Security*, Raport al *Programului Environmental Change and Security* (ECSP REPORT), no. 13, 2008–2009, available online at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ECSPReport13_Cincotta.pdf, accessed at 22.09.2016.
[50] Richard P. Cincotta, Robert Engelman, Daniele Anastasion, *op. cit.*
[51] *Idem*, p. 13.
[52] *Idem*, pp. 12 - 13.
[53] ONU, *World Population Prospects The 2015 Revision- Volume I: Comprehensive Tables*, p. XXV, available online at https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/publications/files/key_findings_wpp_2015.pdf, accessed at 29.09.2016.
[54]Nayef Al-Rodhan, 2009, *op. cit.*, p. 185.
[55] CIA, 2001, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
[56] Mark L. Haas, „A Geriatric Peace? The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations" , *International Security*, vol. 32, no. 1/ 2007, Harvard College and Massachusetts Institute for Tehnologz, pp. 112–147, p. 114, available online at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/is3201_pp112-147.pdf, accessed at 12.12.2012.

is a challenge for economic stability and stability of the forces that act on security.[57] Nayef Al-Rodhan brings an overview of the possible implications of demographic aging, which may be correlated with security dimensions: economic (social security, economic decline due to a possible role for innovation and initiative of young population and that population decline); political (possible emergence of protectionism and conservative political orientation); military (defence budget cuts due to challenges arising from budgetary pressure resulting from demographic aging phenomenon; a potential aversion to war of the aging states); geopolitical (potential contribution to the decline of geopolitical power and the need to extend the alliance to emerging countries).[58] In terms of security and population aging, JA Goldstone argues that financial system, health care, pensions, transport, the education, almost all social infrastructures created in advanced countries were destined for societies with a majority of the population under the age of 45, where the youth population was larger than that of the elderly. Therefore aging can bring besides the implication for the social infrastructure, political issue with potential of generating social tensions: generation conflict over priorities, with effects in international security and public policy[59]. J.D. Sciubba sees aging as one of the two major demographic challenges of the XXI century, with the following potential effects on security (resulting from lower active population and financial effects of the phenomenon): implications for the national defence as a possible shrinking number of military (eg Germany, Japan) and the fact that army will have to compete with other sectors of the economy for the financial means. However, J.D. Sciubba do not consider that we are going to face the end of the army for at least the following reasons: 1. Even though the population will experience a decrease, will you experience a part of the military system and most powerful countries in the world are those that they will face at the earliest aging population; 2. Technological advance will most likely cause the army to rely increasingly more on techniques and perhaps less on the number of military; 3. The European Union already takes measures to increase military efficiently of the member states based on the comparative advantages of different sectors of the armies; 4. The perception of the states regarding the areas in which they are as a danger zone can motivate them, despite demographic aging , to maintain the existence of the Army; 5. Alliances are potential sources of power, but also to ones that can increase the number of military.[60] However, it considers that the aging population will affect to some extent the capabilities of states. From here, the specialist brings into attention some questions, such as: will this phenomenon bring more peace and representativeness of peace worldwide, since aging will manifest itself especially among the most powerful and democratic countries of the world (the theory of democratic peace: democracies do not fall at war with each other and they are usually much less prone to enter in war).[61] Therefore, how will the West be reconfigured especially by the aging population is a topic of great interest to regional and even international security. As a conclusion to the relationship between security and age structure of the population, from the study of literature, especially these three types of structures can create premises for both opportunities as well as challenges, which are regionally differentiated according to the demographic trends. If for states with young and very young age structures, the phenomenon of youth bulge brings into focus especially the challenges to stability / fragility for the state, for those countries with transitional age structure it is be seen whether they will be able to exploit the demographic dividend in order to increase their economic power and their security. And never the less, for those countries that will face population aging the challenges budgetary and financial system will undergo with implications of economic, social, political and even military it captures the interest. Thus, among the most important indicators in this respect are: the structure of the age groups, the proportion of young population / youth bulge, the median age and the dependency ratio (child dependency and old-age dependency).

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[57] Richard Jackson, Neil Howe, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 2.
[58] Nayef Al-Rodhan (2009), *op. cit.*, pp. 59, 185-187.
[59] Jack A. Goldstone, video 2014, *op. cit.*, minute 36:05.
[60] Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba, video 2011, *op. cit.*, minute: 21:10 – 29:30.
[61] *Idem.*

2.3 The dimension of the migration dynamics. In terms of magnitude, Peter Schatzer asserts that "The 21st century will be the era of migration"[62], as a result either of economic reasons (migration for jobs), either of non-economic ones (war, persecution, natural causes). [63] From a demographic perspective, UN and OECD data shows that in 2015, globally there are approximately 244 million international migrants. From 1990 to 2013 there was an increase in the number of international migrants by 65% in the Nordic region and 34% in the south area, [64] and from 2000 to 2015 the migration increased overall by 41%.[65] It is estimated that by 2050 the number of international migrants may double (reaching approx. 405 million migrants), if the phenomenon will continue in the same manner. [66] This can bring at least three types of demographic changes: 1. Equilibrating the "demographic balance" through its own regulator characteristic, as a natural response to differences between countries of origin and destination[67] (on the one hand between the development of numerical population: decline in developed countries of the world and growth in the less developed and less developed ones; on the other hand between the age structure evolution: aging population and the masses of young / youth bulge); US Intelligence Agency, considers migration as possible "partial solution to the demographic imbalances" [68] ; 2. changes in the ethnic composition; 3. Accelerating the urbanization. From the perspective of the main routes of international migration, Ionel Stoica, states that "at the beginning of the 21st century international people movements have evolved into five systems of international migration[69]: 1. North American system, 2. the western European system 3. The system of oil rich countries, 4. migration from Eastern Europe to the West and 5. Asia - Pacific system ". To these can be added the one that generated the European migration crisis. Main destinations for immigration are USA, Canada, UK, France, Spain, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Russia and Australia. [70] Because of these flows the ethnic structure can be affected, which combined with other complex factors (cultural, social, political, etc.) can cause instability.[71] The most affected countries in terms of the consequences on ethnic structure and security of international migration phenomenon are those in which the percentage of migrants exceed 10% in which are found urban ethnic polarizations, this especially if cultural background of migrants is very different from the one of the host state. We can bring into attention especially the prospective

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[62]Peter Schatzer, *Global Migration Trends-An Era of International Migration*, IOM, Penha Longa, Portugalia, October 2001, available online at www.iom.int/index2.htm, accessed at 04.03.2011.

[63]Philip Martin, Jonas Widgren, „International Migration: Facing the Challenge", *Population Bulletin,* vol. 57, no.1/2002, pp. 3-40, p. 8, available online at http://www.prb.org/Source/57.1IntlMigration_Eng.pdf, accessed at 06.02.2015.

[64]ONU, OCDE, *World Migration in Figures*, A joint contribution by UN-DESA and the OECD to the United Nations High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, October 2013, p. 1, available online at http://www.oecd. org/els/mig/World-Migration-in-Figures.pdf, accessed at 10.01.2015.

[65]ONU, *Trends in international migration*, 2015, available online at http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/ population/migration/publications/populationfacts/docs/MigrationPopFacts20154.pdf, accessed at 29.09.2015.

[66]IOM, *The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change*, World Migration Report 2010, International Organization for Migration (IOM) https://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/Newsrelease/docs/WM2010_FINAL _23_11_2010.pdf

[67]Paul Minderhoud, „New patterns of migration and challenges for the future, 50 years of Social Security Coordination Past – Present – Future", *Report of the conference celebrating the 50th Anniversary of the European Coordination of Social Security*, European Commission: Unity E.3, Praga, May 2009, p. 4, available online at http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=5338&langId=en, accessed at 20.02.2015.

[68]CIA (2001), *op. cit.*, p. 42.

[69]Ionel Stoica, *Implicaţii Geopolitice şi de securitate ale Migraţiei Internaţionale în Contextul Globalizarii. Studiu de Caz: România*, Doctoral Thesis in Manuscript, Bucharest, Universitatea din Bucharest, 2010, pp. 37-38 Apud George Erdeli, Liliana Dumitrache (2001), *op. cit.*, p. 146-149; Douglas S. Massey, *Patterns and Processes of International Migration in the 21st Century*, http://time.dufe.edu.cn/wencong/africanmigration/1Massey.pdf.

[70]ONU, OCDE, 2013, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

 Neli Esipova, Julie Ray, „700 Million worldwide desire to migrate permanently", GALLUP, November 2009, available online at http://www.gallup.com/poll/124028/700-million-worldwide-desiremigratepermanently.aspx, accessed at 06.03.2012.

[71] CIA, 2001, *op. cit.,* p. 45.

cases of Europe and Russia. The issues the West European area is facing consist in integrating the Muslim origin immigrants[72], which are foresee to reach 20% of the European population by 2050[73], therefore doubling their number (increasing from 4% in 1990, to 6% in 2010 and continuing the upward trend, PEW estimating up to 8% in 2030[74]). Here, in addition to the demographic percentage indicators an essential aspect is the existence of urban ethnic polarization. In this context the European cities with significant proportion of the Muslim population can be mention, such as: Berlin, Paris, Madrid, Turin, which Jocelyn Cesary, characterize as "Muslim cities"[75], and other cities such as Amsterdam, Bradford, Birmingham, Brussels, London, Marseille, Rotterdam, Vienna.[76] On the other hand, the European migrants crisis is adding further demographic pressure, considering the number of migrants and the preponderance of young men and their concentration in European urban centers.[77] Only in the last 12 months in European countries have arrived around 1.5 million refugees.[78] This crisis has the potential to enhance the security issues and the fact that the flow of immigrants has brought identification issues for some of them, may become an opportunity for extremist movements, as assessed Frontex.[79] Regarding Russia (which has a proportion of immigrant of 8.483% of the total population) they come mostly from Central Asia and China.[80] Even if immigrants are vital for the future of Russia's demographic decline, filling the vacuum of Russia's population with Chinese population is subject to international analyzes on geopolitical implications.[81] Some voices considers that the geographical proximity of one of the biggest world powers to an emergent one with growing population can lead to conflict, especially if the emergent power will try to exploit the vulnerability of the international actor with declining demographic.[82] Returning to the demographic balancing function of the migration worldwide, the 21st Century is likely to make Africa a major source of immigrants, young people who seek to move from the overcrowded cities of Africa in the industrial countries, with populations growing slow or declining and aging.[83] This phenomenon could exacerbate the problems of immigrants integration and the spectrum of intrastate ethnical tensions, especially in urban areas. The tensions and the conflict of this kind is likely to be a reality very present throughout the 21st century. In this context we call on studies

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[76] The Economist (2008), „When town halls turn to Mecca", available online at http://www.economist.com/node/1 2724966?story_id=12724966, accessed at 22.02.2012.

[77]EUROSTAT, *Asylum statistics*, 2016, available online at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/ index. php/Asylum_statistics, accessed at 20.09.2016.

[78] *Idem.*

[79]Frontex , *Annual Risk Analysis 2015*, The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), 2015, p. 5, available online at http://frontex.europa.eu /assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2015.pdf, accessed at 02.10.2015

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[81]Alexandr Dughin, *Bazele geopoliticii*, Bucharest, Ed. Eurasiatica, 2010, p. 239.
 Francis P. Sempa (2012), „Population in the study of geopolitics", in Susan Yoshihara, Douglas A. Sylva (eds), *Population Decline and the Remaking of Great Power Politics*, Washintong D.C, Ed. Potomac Books, Inc., 2012, p. 74.

[82]Francis P. Sempa, 2012, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

[83]Paul Minderhoud, 2009, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

conducted by Christian Leuprecht who appreciate that high annual rates of population growth in urban centers are associated with high probability of civil conflict occurrence: rates below 1% are associated with probabilities of 19%, while a rate of 4% is associated with a probability of 40%.[84] The Central Intelligence Agency of US warn in 2001 that migration could be an encouraging factor for urbanization and also assessing a possible increase in conflicts in urban areas due to a rapid increase in urban population especially in developing countries (Asia being quite exposed from this point of view). [85] Richard P. Cincotta argues in a study conducted under the aegis of Population Action International, that states with urban population growth rates of over 4 percent were about twice as predisposed to outbreak of civil conflict, to countries with lower rates.(referring to the period 1970-2000).[86] On the other hand, if we refer to urbanization as an opportunity, this is one of the two greatest demographic opportunities of the 21st century highlighted by D. J. Sciubba. The specialist argues that if the main population trend for the 20rd century was the increase, from 1.6 billion to 6.1 billion the 21st century characteristic trend is the shift to an urban majority population. 2008 was the first year in history when the global population reached 50% urbanization, [87] migration bringing its contribution in this regard. Related to urbanization as an opportunity for security, D. J. Sciubba considers that urban areas can bring opportunities for access to education, sanitation and health, and innovation may arise from population that is joining together. [88] Also she believes that cities are very important for a state and can increase its security, asserting that cities can produce a large proportion of GDP in a states (in the developed ones: 85% and 55% in those with low incomes). D. J. Sciubba argues that the emergence of urban Cordial in Africa can create growth engines for West Africa.[89] On the other hand, J.D. Sciubba does not exclude any challenges arising from urbanization, the fact that concentrations of population may be exposed to major hazards, such as natural disasters (for cities situated in coastline areas), terrorist attacks. Also the emergence of slums creates propitious conditions to the spread of diseases for example (insecurity individual level). Therefore, urbanization can be seen as an indicator of global hot spots. In this context, J. D. Sciubba even raises the question of how can these transformations affect government, if we can witness the emergence of cities-states (the divergence of interests between the city and the state to which it belongs). [90] Therefore, regarding the dimension of migration dynamics the most important issues are those concerning increasing ethnic polarization especially for states with a traditional homogeneous ethnic structure, but also its contribution to urbanization. Thus, the most important indicators are: the percentage of immigrants as a share of the total population of a state / an urban center; the ethnic composition of immigration, urbanization rate, age and gender structure of immigrants, their distribution.

Following the results of the indicators and literature analysis, structured on three dimensions of demographic transformation as a structure for the nexus demography-security, we can assert that the world is going through global reconfigurations in the 21st century. Their magnitude is impossible to remain without implications on security. Of course, the realities of this century will be shaped by how states and the international community will act to maximize the opportunities and counteract the challenges.

Demography is not destiny, and the numbers without the social, economic, political, military, geopolitical context have no relevance to security, but that is why it is essential to study future demographic developments in relation to the changes in the society, security and geopolitics. This area of research is full ascension and will be extremely important throughout the 21st century.

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[85]CIA, 2001, *op. cit.*, pp. 56, 60.
[86] Richard P. Cincotta, Robert Engelman, Daniele Anastasion, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
[87] Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba, video 2011, *op. cit.*, minute: 34:20 – 34:37; 34:46-34:50.
[88] *Idem,* minute: 35:11-35:42; 35:44-35:49; 35:52-36:16.
[89] Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba, video 2011, *op. cit.*, minute: 35:52-36:16.
[90] *Idem*, minute: 36:17 –36:25; 37:35- 37:46; 37:47-38:11

Conclusions

The 21ˢᵗ century is marked by unprecedented demographic transformation, which also influenced the start of academia and practitioners environment researches in the area of the potential security implications of these changes in the population.

Through the present study, after analyzing the literature, we can assert that international demographic changes are perceived as a major and having the role of reshaping the face of the world as we know it today, even if the experts do not relate to demography as destiny as a determination. The most important demographic developments highlighted by the specialists from security perspective are: unequal numerical evolution of the world population, the youth bulges phenomenon, population aging, migration and urbanization. All these changes could have implications at the individual security level, at the level of state security, up to the international one, as could be seen from the structures identified in the literature for demography-security relationship.

During the three dimensions of the most important demographic transformations (numerical dimension, age structure one and the dynamics of migration dimension - that includes elements of the ethnic structural dimension, but also of the distribution - component urbanization), after the structure of the most relevant theories of demographic transition research, has sought to outline the main changes in the population and their possible implications for security. Thus, it is clear that during the 21ˢᵗ century, the world demographic situation will continue to be a mosaic of regional and state differentiated cases and even antagonistic from some perspectives. Growth, stagnation and population decline coexist, just as very different age structures do (structures from very young to mature, which will record the first aging population). On the other hand migration dynamics divide the world between countries of destination and countries of origin. In this study we list some of the most important points of the demography-security relationship: A) potential increasingly non-Western world, as a result of numerical evolution and the tendencies of aging, can lead the emergence of new actors in maintaining the international security, but also this could imply changes in the attractiveness of democracies and the possible emergence of neo-authoritarian regimes attractiveness; numerical evolution of the population in areas with significant population growth can lead to a demographic pressure that may contribute to state fragility / insecurity state; on the opposite side are the countries that will face population vacuums; who will these vacuums be filled? Will this situation lead to the emergence of tensions between states?; B) the age structure may bring both opportunities and challenges (1. States with transitional age can support economic growth and security if they are able to optimally absorb the active population, otherwise organized crime for example can increase, as well and civil tensions; 2. States that have youth bulge can experience a demographic dividend or increase the possibility of conflict occurrence especially civil intrastate one, according to the state social infrastructures which may or may not have the ability to integrate successfully these young populations; 3. The states that will face population aging are likely to experience budgetary challenges that can lead to restructuration of the army, topics such as geriatric peace coexist with those of possible generational conflicts of interest); C) migration as a way of balancing the demographic imbalances can generate other challenges, especially in the ethnic structure and polarization of urban ethnic communities; on the other hand migration as an urbanization accelerator brings into actuality both opportunities and challenges (urbanization can contribute to economic development and security, but on the other hand can also increase the risk of civil conflict in urban areas). These are just a few elements that could shape the international reality and the one specific for each country in the 21ˢᵗ century.

Therefore for states and international community this new field of research is essential in identifying opportunities and challenges and to contribute to shaping a safer world.

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APPROACH TO MIGRATION IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC: SHOULD WE BE WORRIED?

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Abstract: The paper deals with one of the hottest contemporary issues - the international mass migration, which is intensively perceived as one of the most important challenges of our times for the present and the future of the European Union. Migration is largely negatively perceived as a security threat, which threatens the stability and security of European countries. However, a closer examination of migration and its consequences shows that this simplified and almost exclusively negative stereotype of migration does not exactly reflect reality and available "hard data". The Czech Republic's example demonstrates how the problem of migration is perceived in general, what attitude to immigration the Czech society occupies along with its reasons. The purpose of the conference paper is to contribute to the search for answers to the question whether migration is a genuine security threat or rather the opportunity or even the necessity, which we should exploit.

Keywords: migration, demographics, public surveys, securitization, ageing.

Introduction

Migration is undoubtedly a topical and important social, political and security issue of today. In my paper I would like to discuss how we approach the problem of migration in our country, what position the Czech society has toward immigration, the reasons for this position, and whether it is justified or counterproductive. The purpose of my paper is to contribute to answering the questions how much does the arrival of migrants represent a real security threat for us and to what extent is it an opportunity that we should exploit.

In the beginning, it must be noted that the current migration crisis is not likely to be a short-term issue. It can be expected to continue in the coming years, including much more significant impact on the Czech country and society. The causes of migration from the Near and Middle East, as well as from North Africa and the Sahel are of a more permanent nature. The ongoing armed conflicts, desperate security and economic situation as well as the demographic development and negative impacts of deteriorating environment will continue to be a source of massive immigration to Europe. Therefore, the question is not when will this exodus end and everything will return to normal, but when will we accept it as the fact, how will we approach it and how will we learn to live together with the newly coming people.

For an illustration of the current situation in the Czech Republic, we can see that in the long term there are around 470,000 foreigners residing in this country today, out of which more than 206,000 temporarily and roughly 262,000 permanently. The largest numbers are those of Ukrainians (106,000), Slovaks (102,000), Vietnamese (57,000), Russians (35,000), Germans (21,000) and Poles (20,000).[1] The population of the Czech Republic is 10,554,000 million (as of 31. 12. 2015).[2]

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[1] *Cizinci podle typu pobytu, pohlaví a státního občanství - k 31. 12. 2015*. Český statistický úřad [online]. [cit. 2016-09-28]. Available from: https://goo.gl/BQaCfV
[2] *Obyvatelstvo*. Český statistický úřad [online]. [cit. 2016-09-28]. Available from: https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/obyvatelstvo_lide

In terms of international migration the Czech Republic is obviously a transit country, however, neighbouring with the main migration target, the Federal Republic of Germany. In 2015 Germany recorded about 890,000 incomers.[3] The total number of migrants to Europe reached in 2015 more than one million people.[4] Since January 2016 the number of immigrants has raised up to next 280,000 incomers (as of 31.8.2016).[5] The largest numbers of migrants to Europe come from Syria, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq, and Albania.

Over the past year 8563[6] immigrants were retained in the Czech Republic and 1100 of them applied for asylum. Since the beginning of the year 2016 more than 4146 immigrants were retained and more than 900 applied for asylum (as of October 2016).[7] Roughly half of them are applicants from Ukraine, followed by incomers from Cuba, China, Vietnam and post-soviet republics.[8] From Syria and Iraq, where hundreds of thousands of migrants to Europe come from, less than 80 and 130 refugees applied for asylum in the Czech Republic.

These figures clearly illustrate the fact that our country is neither a target nor a country of interest for the migrants from the current large migration wave. At the same time, they illustrate the fact that owing to these numbers and also the strict Czech asylum procedure, our citizens do not have a practical possibility of contact with the refugees personally.

1. Public concerns

Despite the low numbers stated above, migration currently arouses a lot of emotion and public interest in our country. In our case, we can observe in this field, for example, the fears of the deterioration of the security situation, emphasizing linking the topic of immigration with Islamic radicalism and terrorism especially.[9] Also fears of abusing the social system by the newcomers, increasing competition in the labour market, increase in crime, or introduction of exotic diseases; these are just some of the concerns that are openly spelt out in public in connection with the migrants.

The concerns of the public and the rejection of migrants are very clear. Public opinion polls record only a low percentage of respondents with unclear or no opinion on immigration - this indicates the fact that the public is strongly interested in the issue and develops its clear (ideological) position toward it. At the same time, it may be surprising to see a very strict refusal of all immigrants regardless of the cause of their departure from their country. This very negative position of the Czech public concerns also refugees fleeing from war.[10]

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It can be assumed that immigration is securitized, i.e. interpreted as a security threat, by media[11], certain political elements, president or other persons with sufficient authority and possibilities to influence the public opinion.[12] Based on empirical data from public opinion polls, it seems that a large part of the Czech society accepts this interpretation, feels threatened by immigration and requires strong, fast, simple and forceful or restrictive measures by the state or anybody who addresses these concerns with their political offer. In particular the unsubstantiated linking of the recent terrorist attacks in Brussels, Paris and Nice with the migration crisis leads to the forming of a simplistic and a false image of a migrant. A new negative stereotype is being created: refugee = Muslim = terrorist.

2. Possible reasons for increased sensitivity

The answer why the Czech society reacts to the migration crisis so sensitively, emotionally and even hysterically, and why there is such a very low level of empathy and solidarity in comparison with other countries (including the target countries of migration) probably lies not only in the present day interest of media and politicians, but especially in the demographic or historical and social development of our country.

Today's Czech state is unique in demographic terms. In the aftermath of the World War II, massive ethnic cleansing and movements of the population took place on our territory. The result is a monolithic ethnic structure of the Czech Republic, which is a true nation state not only in the political sense, but also in the ethnic sense. The border of the Czech Republic defines the geographical scope of the Czech nation. There are no significant compact ethnic minorities on our territory, neither is there any significant and compact Czech minority in the neighbouring or other countries. At present, the Czech, Moravian or Silesian ethnicity is reported by almost 95% of the population of the Czech Republic.[13]

In addition, for almost the whole of the second half of the twentieth century the Czech society was deprived of a normal contact and communication even with its nearest neighbours as a consequence of the nature of the reigning communist regime, and in particular the creation of the Iron Curtain. Also the failure or practical absence of policies for integration of the Roma population helped create prejudice against other ethnicities. It can be said that a few generations in this country grew up without the possibility of a direct contact and unmediated experience with foreigners or other nationalities. At the same time, the level of personal experience is an essential factor for creating and intergenerational transfer of stereotypes. Such constructed and maintained stereotype of a foreigner - "non-local" as an agent of danger or potential economic competitor is difficult and takes long time to change. The completely different approach to migrants from the point of view of different generations is also evidence of this.

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3. Immigration: a threat or an opportunity?

The current sensitivity and the concerns of the Czech public are not due to personal experience with immigrants, but rather the lack thereof. It would certainly be an interesting topic for a sociological research to find out what and who forms the currently negatively formulated ideological position of a large part of the public toward migrants. What are the origins of the information raising public concerns bordering with xenophobia? How many Muslims, Arabs, Africans, Kurds, Afghans, Ukrainians or other migrants do the people who protest against immigration and Islam at Czech squares know and what personal experience do they have with them? If we take into account the numbers and locations of foreigners in the Czech Republic, public information produced by the Security Information Service[14] or the academic research, it can be concluded that there is a higher degree of influence of some media and populist activities of some political leaders and movements than elsewhere in terms of creating a stereotype of an immigrant and securitization of migration.

It is a paradox that although the majority of citizens have a negative stance toward migration, migrants are inevitably necessary for the long-term sustainability of economic stability and social cohesion of the Czech society. The facts are merciless. Similarly to the vast majority of European countries the population of our country grows old, only the dynamics of aging of the Czech population is extremely high. The average age of the Czech population is 41 and in 2030 it will be as high as 50. Fertility in the Czech Republic is about 1.26, while at least 2.14 children per woman is needed to ensure simple reproduction. Similarly, crude birth rate is 9‰ while minimum of 15‰ is necessary for reproduction. In other words, the Czech society is aging and starts to become extinct, and this happens extremely quickly.[15]

If we do not have more children or do not accept and incorporate significantly more migrants, not only will this result in the decline in population, but there will also be an increase in the proportion of people in the retirement age and the decline in the number of economically active people. To illustrate this: in 1950 the share of people older than 65 was 8% of the population, today it is 18%, and in 2060 it will be 34%.[16] This will result in the unsustainability of the social system in its current form, impoverishment of the country and society, shortage of staff for the operation of the state, including personnel for the armed forces and security corps, etc.

Conclusion

The growing migration to Europe is a fact, as well as the numbers of our own demographic decline. Nowadays, the Czech Republic has a unique opportunity to set long-term parameters for a comprehensive immigration policy and to set clear rules and conditions for the reception and mainly the integration of foreigners into the Czech society. A promising attempt can be seen in the recently adopted Strategy on Migration Policy of the Czech Republic[17], the implementation of which will undoubtedly be time consuming and resource demanding.

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The Czech Republic is now one of sovereign, stable, secure, and prosperous countries. It belongs among one fifth of the richest countries in the world. Currently, it occupies the 28th rank of the Human Development Index, which the United Nations use for a global comparison of key aspects of human development, such as a long and healthy life, access to education, standard of living, etc.[18] But will this status remain sustainable? What is the source of these high security and living standards? What is actually the source of the prosperity and the influence of the Czech Republic? Is it the production and control of strategic raw materials? Is it the powerful military? Is it the economic influence? Technological dominance? None of these. The source of prosperity and strength of our country and our society is in the people. Their hard work and their intelligent brains. And their number continuously declines. Therefore, it should be in the interest of our country and society to accept immigration as a fact, move away from the simplistic view and irrational fear, and make maximum use of the opportunities that migration can bring to ourselves and our descendants.

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RADICALIZATION IN EUROPE
IN THE CONTEXT OF MUSLIM IMMIGRATION

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Abstract: Actual historical time witnesses acute humanitarian crises taking place in the Middle East and North Africa region particularly inhabited by Muslim Arab population. These crises have led to the exodus of the Muslim population not only in countries in the immediate neighbourhood, but also in Europe. Thus, now, European states have reached to face a real immigration crisis triggered by various reasons subsequent to demographic phenomena. One of the major consequences of Muslim immigration, in addition to the rise of Islamist terrorism in the European territory, we consider to be the radicalization trend, both of indigenous peoples and of Muslim immigrants, leading to impaired rule of European law.

In the present paper, we want to present some coordinates, prerequisites and present and future consequences of radicalization perpetuating at the cost of European democratic values, such as unity in diversity.

Keywords: threat, security, demography, islamophobia, Islamization, Europe, extremism.

Introduction

Radicalization is a dynamic process by which individuals or groups of individuals commit themselves to adopt a system of beliefs, but also to disseminate it in the rest of overall society.

At the level of scientific research undergone in the field we have identified two forms of radicalization related to the use/non-use of violence[1]. The first form refers to the expressed disagreement to a particular status-quo, but without using violent methods in transmitting the respective message. The second is an advanced stage where ideas turn into action on others, who "must be" compelled to adopt the same belief system whatever means of coercion are used on them, including violence. However, non-violent radicals can provide ideological support and can serve as an important recruitment basis for violent radicals[2] because it is much easier to convince individuals to action if they already share your beliefs.

So the initial core of radicalization is promoted by discourse. In democratic states, like European ones, the problem to stop the radicalization early in the discourse phase, is more sensitive because freedom of expression is a fundamental right which can only be restricted for reasons of national security. Moreover, the United Nations, in May 2016, issued a statement relate to the freedom of expression "Everyone has the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, especially on matters of public interest, including issues related to violence and terrorism, and to comment on and criticize the way states and politicians respond to these phenomena"[3]. Although freedom of expression is restricted in the EU[4] and European states law in situations that

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[1] See: *Are violent and non-violent radicalization the same thing?*, Center for Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence, available online at: https://info-radical.org/en/radicalization/definition/, accessed on 10.10.2016.

[2] Manzar Zaidi, *Studying Non-violent Radicalization*, Centre for Pakistan and Gulf Studies, January 30, 2014, available online at: http://cpakgulf.org/2014/ 01/30/studying-non-violent-radicalization/, accessed on 12.10.2016.

[3] *Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and countering violent extremism*, 1. General Principles, United Nations Human Rights, Helsinki, May 4, 2016, available online at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Display News.aspx?NewsID=19915&LangID=E#sthash.iNJbEp3M.dpuf, accessed on 14.10.2016.

[4] At European level, limitations on freedom of expression in the context of the threat to security are laid down in the Convention of the Council of Europe for the Prevention of Terrorism in 2005 and the EU Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JAI on combating terrorism.

threaten national security, it is difficult to prove this kind of threat in a speech unaccompanied itself of violent physical action.

Moreover, if we eliminate violence from the current equation of Islamism, the movement could be seen as proactive and constructive, and Islamists could be seen as promoters of modernization, and change. The commitment of the Islamists in social and economic life of Muslim countries could be seen as one specifically directed at making positive change in the society by revitalizing the relevance of secular values of religion in the modern society affected by interaction with other systems of values considered adulterated under the religion of Islam.

Experts of Centre for Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence believe that radicalization liable to lead to violence may take various forms, depending on the time and the historical process it passes, which may be related to various causes or ideologies as: right-wing extremism; political-religious extremism; left-wing extremism and thematic extremism[5].

Right-wing extremism is a form of radicalization associated with fascism, racism, supremacy and ultra-nationalism. This radicalization form is characterized by violent defending of racial, ethnic or pseudo-national identities accompanied by radical hostility towards the state authorities, minorities, immigrants and/or leftist political parties.

Political-religious extremism is seen as a form of radicalization associated with political interpretation of religion and defence by violent means of a religious identity perceived as being under attack (by international conflicts, foreign policy, social debates etc.). Any religion can give rise to this kind of violent radicalization.

Left-wing extremism focuses primarily on anti-capitalist demands and requests the conversion of political systems considered responsible for producing social inequalities and that can last resort to violent means to support their cause.

Thematic extremism is motivated essentially by an unique problem. This category includes groups that advocate against abortion, homosexuality or feminism. In this category can also enter mass murderers whose motivations are partly or completely ideological.

The premises, process and forms of European radicalization

Muslim immigration in Europe, regardless of historical time in which it occurred, facilitated the meeting of secular Europeanism with the traditional Islam[6], context where both systems with different polarities, went through a process of adaptation. As a result of their interaction Europeans suffer a resettlement of their Christian roots and Muslims need to adapt to European social and cultural environment marked by a different system of values. Therefore, with the massive wave of Muslim immigrants in recent years, the issue of Islam in Europe has returned in the front of European political agenda.

The overall negative consequences of immigration on states are of different natures and affect societies differently depending on the degree of experience, preparedness and response of government institutions, but also by cultural, ethnic and religious differences existent between hosted and host population which makes their initial accommodating and assimilation more difficult.

Among the risks, vulnerabilities and threats against European countries' security brought by Muslim immigration there are[7]:

- Formal-institutional gaps, related to the presence/absence of the legal framework governing the status of refugees on a state' territory (i.e. rights to: employment, education, health care, etc. and obligations to: respect the laws and customs of the host country, for example);

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[5] *Types of radicalization*, Centre for Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence, available online at: https://info-radical.org/en/radicalization/types-of-radicalization/, accessed on 10.09.2016.

[6] Timothy A. Byrnes, Peter J. Katzenstein (editors), *Religion in an Expanding Europe*, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 204.

[7] Adam Szymański, *Turkey at a geopolitical crossroads – Part I,* 13 mai 2016, available online at: http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/interviews/1992-turkey-at-a-geopolitical-crossroads-part-i, accessed on 06.09.2016.

- Social-economic vulnerabilities caused by overuse of government institutions of the respective countries. Immigrants are supported by European host countries ensuring their basic needs (food, water, housing, education, medicine, etc.). the costs to cover their needs come from the national budgets or financial and material aid received from other states or organizations of humanitarian aid. Also, there exist the surplus of labour force (made up of refugees of working age who are willing to work illegally with prolonged program and a lot less money at the expense of citizens working legally);

- Risks and threats to public security are multiple originated. Some refer to the potential risk to the physical health of the local population constituted by the presence among the refugees of transmissible diseases. Other are related to individuals organized into criminal groups dealing with smuggling goods and people or even to some extremist and terrorist elements infiltrated in the bulk of immigrant groups. Also, another problem that was aggravated in the context that in 2015 more than one million immigrants have arrived in the EU was the growth of criminal networks involvement in trafficking of migrants. Thus, EUROPOL show that more than 90% of immigrants traveling to the EU have used enabling services and, in most cases, these services were provided by criminal groups[8] that generated substantial profits for groups smuggling immigrants;

- Cultural and ethnic issues (linguistic, religious and cultural differences between immigrants and the host population creates tensions and adjustment problems that require careful management by the authorities).

In the same context, the experiences of some countries, such as the Nordic, with important historical background in hosting Muslims refugees and holding solid immigration policies began to be presented as failed attempts[9] to assimilate Muslim immigrants. Thus, in the Western mass-media began to be circulated idea of "Muslims' Europeanization impossibility"[10] in the sense of their appropriation of European democratic values and culture. This negative image was reinforced by some unfortunate events in which the promoters of anti-Western violence were Muslims. These images inputed in the European public mind the idea that Muslim migration movements have the potential to threaten European security. Representative for the miss-issues of Muslim populations adaptation to the Western customs are abusive situations and disorder resulted from numerous attacks, such as sexual assaults organized by refugees just arrived from the MENA region on New Year's Eve in Germany, involving about 10,000 Muslims who have aggressed about 1,000 women[11]. Furthermore, two terrorist attacks that occurred in Germany in 2016 were also initiated by immigrants[12]. As a result, migration of large groups of Muslims to the West sparks concern among specialists in security and international relations, given that the phenomenon catalyses the trend of terrorism internationalization, with predilection the Islamist terrorism. European community made up of politicians and ordinary citizens were quick to react to both the level of discourse against the "Islamization of Europe" and against all Muslims, radicals or not, amid a general feeling of Islamophobia that increases in intensity with each act threatening the European community and has

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[8] *Migrant smuggling in the EU*, EUROPOL, February 2016, p. 2.

[9] In Sweden two laws affecting asylum seekers were given since the summer of 2016. The first refers to the fact that those who have applied for asylum and received a deportation order will not be entitled to housing or a daily allowance. The latter involves legislative decision to limit the possibility of asylum seekers to obtain a residence permit and reunite with their families. See details at: *Legislative changes that will affect asylum seekers*, April 19, 2016, available online at: http://www.migrationsverket.se/English/Private-individuals/Protection-and-asylum-in-Sweden/ Nyheter/2016-04-19-Legislative-changes-that-will-affect-asylum-seekers.html, accessed on 02.11.2016.

[10] For example, foreign and Romanian authors warn on this topic: Timothy A. Byrnes, Peter J. Katzenstein (editors), *op. cit.*, Claire L. Adida, David D. Laitin, and Marie-Anne Valfort, *Don't Fear Muslim Immigrants. They Aren't the Real Problem*, Foreign Affairs, April 26, 2016, available online at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-26/dont-fear-muslim-immigrants, Florin Iftode, „Is Europe Being Islamized - A Consequence of the Islamic Religion?", in EIRP Proceedings, Vol. 11, 2016.

[11] David French, *Mass Muslim Immigration will bring Islams Problem Here*, January 8, 2016, available online at: http://www.nationalreview.com/article/429480/muslim-immigrations-sexual-assault-terrorism-problem, accessed on 21.09.2016.

[12] On 27.04.2016, in Ansbach, a Syrian asylum seeker detonates a bomb in a bar, and in Wuerzburg a refugee mutilates 5 persons with an ax in train shouting "Allah Akbar". See details in: *List of Islamic Terror: 2016*, available online at: http://www.thereligionofpeace.com/attacks/attacks.aspx?Yr=2016, accessed on 23.09.2016.

as small connection with the Muslim world (vandalism exercised by immigrant groups, violence in the ghettos of the suburbs of big European cities, Islamist terrorism etc.).

All these aspects derived from the threats and uncertainties generated by the phenomenon of Muslim immigration were a number of factors for the radicalization of Europe in at least three forms of extremism. The first two forms of radicalization, the right-wing extremism and the thematic anti-Muslim extremism affect at the same time European citizens and domestic political parties. The third type, of Islamic radicalization, covers several categories of individuals: Europeans without apparent connections with Islam; Europeans former immigrants of second or third generation who have failed to adapt to the European way of life; groups of Muslims refugees newly arrived in Europe who are still confused and under the impact of violence experienced in their countries where are carried out civil war and massive violations of human rights.

On the European territory currently an increase in the intensity of right-wing extremism is shown which is characterized by exacerbating nationalism in some European countries expressed by European indigenous population groups who have come to use violence under the pretext to defend the ethnic and national identity. Most acute form that can be reached is that of denial and rejection of all other ethnic groups in the national territory.

In Europe, especially in countries where immigrants have created social disorder, revived a number of right-wing extremist parties that support the nationalist cause and fight to ban the access of refugees in those countries. A map of this trend is shown in Figure 1. There is for example in France - led by the National Front Marie Le Pen[13], Golden Dawn - in Greece, the Democratic Party - in Sweden etc.

Figure no. 1 – The turn to right of the European parties in the context of Muslim immigration[14]

Moreover, the topic of immigration was one exploited in many states also in the context of presidential elections in 2015 and, as we have seen recently in the US election results, Mr. Trump has benefited from its circulated anti-immigration policy[15].

The radicalization of extreme right is accompanied by a second represented by radical hostility toward minority and Muslim immigrants. This type of thematic extremism is produced as a

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[13] „Europe's Anti-Immigrant Parties Stand to Gain Ground in Wake of Paris Attacks", in *the Wall Street Journal*, January 16, 2015, available online at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/europes-anti-immigrant-parties-stand-to-gain-ground-in-wake-of-paris-attacks-1421371307, accessed on 10.11.2016.

[14] Idem.

[15] Claire L. Adida, David D. Laitin, and Marie-Anne Valfort, *Don't Fear Muslim Immigrants. They Aren't the Real Problem,* April 26, 2016, available online at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-26/dont-fear-muslim-immigrants, accessed on 10.11.2016.

response to the phenomenon of Islamic radicalization of European territory. It included some European societies which have suffered from the failure to adapt Muslim refugees and immigrants, which culminated in violent individual or organized assaults to some Muslim ethnics.

A special form of radicalization that poses problems to the European security is imported from Islamist terrorist organizations struggling at present to create an Islamic caliphate in the Middle East and North Africa region. Under the impetus of this ideology "that catches" especially to the misfit people to the democratic societies and Western way of life, a number of individuals dissatisfied with the mode of action of the state authorities in managing certain punctual or general issues who tend to empathize with extremist Islamist ideology. Amid numerous social problems encountered both by Muslims and non-Muslims, some Europeans from France, Germany or the United Kingdom went to fight as foreign fighters for the cause of the terrorist organization Islamic state. Moreover, in the last 4-5 years, individuals who seemed to be integrated into their societies planned terrorist attacks on Western targets such as trains, planes, buses and airports. Also, terrorist acts were directed to the institutions of states and national symbols.

We present below a general outline of the process of radicalization of Islamist type, adapted from a model presented by Faiza Patel as developed by the American FBI.

| PRE-RADICALIZATION	SELF-IDENTIFICATION	INDOCTRINATION	ACTION (JIHADIZATION)
Motivation/ Conversion - Sympathy - Identification of an ideal - Conversion as protest - Reinterpretation of self -belief **Stimulus** - Auto-stimulus - External stimulus **Opportunity** - Internet - Mosque - School - Prison	**The individual accepts the cause** **Characteristics:** - Isolation from the former life environments - The acceptation of a new social identity starts **Key-components** - the persons looks to experiment Islamic religious practises and to train in basic techniques of paramilitary fight.	**Immersion into similar groups** - Social - Terrorist **Characteristics:** - strengthening own social identity - looking for opportunities to participate in group activities: training camps, surveillance activity, financing. The individual is convinced he/she must support the cause by all the means.	**The individual is knowingly involved in extremist activities** **Characteristics:** - achieves operational activities of facilitation, recruitment, financing; - participates or initiates training, planning and execution actions for some violent scenarios.
Conversion/ reinterpretation	**Acceptance**	**Conversion/ reinterpretation**	**Terrorism**
Inaction	**Temptation to act**	**Ready to act**	**Action implementation**

Figure no. 2 –Islamic radicalization process[16]

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[16] Faiza Patel, *Rethinking Radicalization*, Brennan Center for Justice, New York University School of Law, 2011, p. 23, available online at: https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/RethinkingRadicalization.pdf, accessed on 02.10.2016.

Some individuals who become radicals were victims of self-radicalization process. Thus, Europeans were radicalized only by consuming extremist literature without having formal links with any terrorist organization. Highly publicized cases generated by this type of self-radicalization in Europe were of Anders Behring Breivik (who carried out armed attacks in Oslo and Utoya in July 2011) and Mohamed Merah who acted in Toulouse in March 2012.

Compulsion of individuals by using violence to impose beliefs among masses of population, or punishment of others who do not share the same beliefs is the final step of the process of radicalization. Thus, extremism in its most violent - terrorism - is the most serious consequence of the process of radicalization.

One concern in addition is the Muslim-dominated neighbourhoods considered prohibited to non-Muslims; Australian media identified about750 of these urban areas in France only[17]. The extent of ghettoization specific for French urban periphery prompted Western media to use names like "Islamic mini-state" or "France – an Islamic state"[18] when referring to those ghettos or to France as a whole. This phenomenon is not peculiar only in France but also in Great Britain or Germany, European countries with large Muslim populations. Muslim enclaves in European cities are, in our view, a significant threat to the security of Western facilitating the reproduction of Islamic radicalism.

Another situation with the potential to become a threat to European security is the conversion of European Muslim communities to a fundamentalist version of Islamic faith, transformation catalyzed by elements of Islamist propaganda. This phenomenon must be pursued by the relevant European organizations of the security sector (intelligence services, police, etc.), predominantly by strengthening supervision by governmental actions carried out in mosques, Islamic schools and charity organizations.

The immediate result of the radicalization of European due to the perception of threat to European security has brought a number of restrictions contesting European and democratic values of both their citizens and immigrants. Thus, besides limiting freedom of expression in situations considered to affect national security and freedom of movement is also contested as a result of restriction of borders between EU countries in order to stop external migration. Also, by tightening national immigration policies of European states are violated some rights to work, education and family gathering of groups of refugees.

Conclusions

Muslim immigration has brought uncertainty and anxiety characteristic of the tumultuous Middle East region and North Africa region. Fears are related to the immediate phenomenon to damage European culture and way of life under the pressure of Islamic population avalanche with a civilization, if not antagonistic towards the European one, but with very different manner to approach values and rights of individuals.

Europe has been the subject of radicalization at least twice in its history: Nazism defeated in Europe at the end of the World War II in 1945, and communism self-consumed in 1989, after the collapse of the USSR. Moreover, there are voices claiming that after the two already mentioned, today "Islamic ideology must be defeated"[19].

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[17] Martin Lehmann, *Multiculturalism fails in France - civil war predicted*, 2016, available online at: http://australian-news.net/articles/view.php?id=272, accessed on 23.09.2016.

[18] See: *Center Field: European no-go zones become conversational no-go zones,* The Counter Jihad Report, January 27, 2015, available online at: https://counterjihadreport.com/tag/sensitive-urban-zones-zus/; How Many More 'Molenbeeks' Are There In France?, May 3, 2016, available online at: http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-05-03/how-many-more-molenbeeks-are-there-france; *Muslims segregated from French society in growing Islamist mini-states,* available online at: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jan/7/french-islamist-mini-states-grow-into-problem-out-/, accessed on 23.09.2016.

[19] *Responsibility to prevent and respond to incitement to terrorism*, available online at: http://www.uio.no/studier/emner/jus/humanrights/JUS5503/h15/teaching-materials/limitation-of-freedom-of-speech.pdf, accessed on 10.11.2016.

As we have shown in this paper, we consider that Europe is recently the subject of at least three forms of extremism (rightist, political-religious and thematically) to which the phenomenon of immigration Islamic contributed enough to be considered significant cause of radicalization trend in the territory of European states.

We believe that both phenomena emphasizing Islamist terrorism and radicalization of Europe, are potentially serious threat to Western civilization as a whole and the EU political order. In this context, one of the urgent measures to be taken by EU states is changing the laws on immigration in order to improve internal security. In this regard, at one hand, expulsion procedures should be simplified, applications for asylum should be analyzed quickly and decisively, and visas should be denied to members of groups who use or support terrorism and terrorists and, on the other part, the criminal penalties related to false documents (visa, passport, etc.) should be tightened.

Social, economic and financial policies directed towards the integration of the Muslim population and their adaptation to the European way of life should lead to the socialization of individuals in a multicultural environment and to assuming roles in society by them, facilitating accession to the stage specific for the integration of individuals in a democratic society where social norms have to be learned, nonviolent behaviour internalized in the psychic structure of them, not only by the fact that violent actions are sanctioned, but as a result of cultural understanding of values as nonviolence interethnic tolerance and ethnic, religious or otherwise diversity.

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TERRORISM – THE MAIN THREAT AGAINST EUROPEAN DEFENSE AND SECURITY

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Abstract: The terrorist phenomenon, in its different manifestations, has always been a part of world history. The degree of alertness though, has varied greatly.

Following the events of September 11, 2001, but also after the attacks in Istanbul, London, Madrid, Brussels and Paris, for the first time a non state actor has been declared a direct adversary in a military confrontation. A military campaign was launched against the al-Qaeda and its supporters from Afghanistan. A broad range of measure was introduced, regionally and globally, aiming to support state defense, and also to monitor the activity of terrorist leaders. The efficiency of such effort has seen its fruition with the death of Osama Bin Laden. Still, this victory has offered nothing more but a false sense of security, creating in the democratic world the illusion of an end to the war.

The progressive development of the terrorist organization of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), also known under the name of Daesh, has put once more the terrorist threat at the top of the global security agenda.

Keywords: ISIS, EU, al-Qaeda, Europe, Security, Defense.

The recent evolution of the military and political situation in the Middle East, doubled by the sudden appearance of a powerful immigrant wave, has direct effects on Europe. The impact can be directly felt at all levels of the European society.

Now, more than ever, there could felt the lack of a coherent strategy for emergency situations, built and adopted in collaboration. The institutional reaction have been rather formal and hesitant in the given context. Inappropriate reactions, adopted under pressure by a few of the European states, have had an effect contrary to the one being pursued. Instead of assuring citizen security against potential aggressors, they did nothing more than to limit the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, by restricting free circulation, instituting a state of emergency and limiting the right to a private life.

The measures being adopted in the European space are merely reactions and not solutions. These solutions ought to come from an understanding of the problem, an analysis of the risks and an identification of vulnerabilities. An integrated approach, starting from the possible boundary changes in the Middle East generated by continual instability, and moving on to the emergence of "virtual state actors" whose institutional foundations are based on radical or extremist groups, can allow for a possible identification of the risks and vulnerabilities for the European space, as well for possible solutions to inevitable challenges ahead.

The need for a thorough documentation of the phenomenon is given by the fact that starting with the end of WWII and up to November 13, 2015, the European territory has never been confronted with a planned attack that was well organized, had multiple targets in different countries.

The reference to November 13, 2015, is very important because it marks the beginning of the siege. It is the day when the President of France, Francois Holland has declared a state of emergency all over France and closed down the borders of the country. This was a reaction to the six terrorist attacks that took place on the 13th and the 14th of November 2015. The immediate effects of this measure have led to the giving extraordinary powers to the authority of the state. These were similar, from a juridical point of view, to the ones taken during wartimes: the banishment of circulation according to the decisions of the local Prefects, the establishment of protection and security zones, the banishment of cultural and artistic manifestations, the possibility of imposing controls at any given time, a control over the press, the radio and television.

Referring to the situation described, there are widely accepted the definition of "war" as an armed conflict, between two or more states, nations or human groups, with the purpose of accomplishing economic and political ends[1]. The word "defense" is defined as being one of the main forms of combat, which aims at stopping the offensive of the enemy and represents the totality of measure taken for this given purpose.[2]

At the moment both definitions reflect reality and the terrorist attacks in Paris and the terrorist alerts, have raised a series of questions both in and outside of Europe. These are questions related to the purpose of the terrorist organizations and the efficiency of the governments that face this kind of threat.

The European security environment, marked as it is by these attacks but also by the inconsistency of the political decision makers in adopting suitable defense measures, demands for an immediate answer for this emergency situation. According the director of Europol, Rob Wainwright, the threat of Islamist terrorism is at its highest point since September 11[3]. There are at least three reasons for this.

First of all, groups as the Islamic State (ISIS) and al-Qaeda, aim at provoking mass victims, by comparison with other groups which favor killings and actions with a symbolic meaning. The purpose of these groups is to bring about a general sense of terror among the population, and at the same time to attract new sympathizers and challenging their opponents to remain in a state of permanent defense.

Secondly, ISIS and al-Qaeda have clearly designated Europe as a target. Al-Qaeda has already made several attacks on European territory in the past, for example Madrid (2004) and London (2005). Recently, among the attackers of Charlie Hebdo, at least one person has benefited from trainings from the al-Qaeda. ISIS has replaced al-Qaeda as a main terrorist threat in Europe. The attacks in Paris and Nice, and also the attacks in Brussels, represent proof of the intentions of ISIS to prepare and execute operation on Europe at the same time with the effort to extend its territorial influence in Iraq and Syria.

Thirdly, while some al-Qaeda cells are still considered active in Europe, a great number of Europeans have joined ISIS, according to the director of Europol. Approximately five thousand European citizens have left for Iraq and Syria. Among these, 40% are considered dead or disappeared, while 60% are still in the Middle East, some having returned to Europe[4]. Not all those who have returned are bound by hostile attitudes, having been

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[1] *DEXONLINE*, available online at: https://dexonline.ro/definitie/razboi, accessed at 24.08.2016.

[2] *DEXONLINE*, available online at: https://dexonline.ro/definitie/aparare, accessed at 24.08.2016.

[3] *Dailymail, Terror threat highest since 9/11 with up to 5,000 fanatics at large after returning from Syria, warns Europe's police chief,* available online at:: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2908147/Major-security-alert-triggered-jihadists-boasted-killed-British-soldier-amid-growing-fears-ISIS-style-attacks-UK.html, accessed at 01.10.2016.

[4]*ISIS IN THE WEST, The Western Militant Flow to Syria and Iraq,* p. 6, available online at: https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/12898-isis-in-the-west-march-2016/ISIS-in-the-West-II.8a0c30a894ec4b96a8
340d5b26779456.pdf, accessed at 17.09.2016.

traumatized by the experiences they lived through and choosing to not to be involved. Still, there are some who return in order for further recruitment or to plan violent actions of the European territory. This percentage represents a very serious threat, as being illustrated by the attacks in the Western Europe. These native European fighters represent the target of the law enforcement agencies in Europe. In 2015, a total number of 1077 people have been arrested for terrorist crimes and in direct connection to such actions. This number is far greater than the one in 2014 (774) and represents a continuation of a rising trend. The biggest number of arrests in the European Union was connected to jihadist terrorism (687). Almost two thirds, 63% of those arrested, were European citizens, the majority being born in the European Union (58%)[5].

It is very important to mention that terrorism is far from being a new phenomenon in Europe. Most European countries have been faced with internal terrorism (in the form of separatist groups) or international terrorism (like the communist and anarchist groups or the Islamic groups from Algeria and Morocco) throughout the 20th century.

Hence, there is a history of terrorism and of combating terrorism in Europe, many of these groups posing, in certain historical contexts, a equal real threat, to the point of their total or progressive elimination. Some of these groups are still active, but generally the new forms of terrorism have become more benign today. This past experience represents, from the point of view of combating terrorism, an advantage, as many questions have found their answers in the past victories or failures of the fights against terrorism and radicalism.

In the light of the past events, a hypotheses appears, namely that the jihadist terrorist groups have built a more "advanced settlement"[6] in Europe, more precisely, in Belgium. Such an approach would suggest that Belgium works as a centre for ISIS recruitment and as a platform for launching operations in Europe. Still, it can be noticed that ISIS fighters operate in a more decentralized manner, a series of Jihadist networks being active in Europe, including Belgium, but not exclusively. At the same time, it is true that the terrorist cell which has carried on the terrorist attacks in Paris was in close connection with Belgium. Some of the attackers have live in Belgium, travelled through the country or had connection with it, and one of them travelled back to Belgium after the attack. The person who planned the attack, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, was a Belgian citizen whose name has appeared at different points in time in many investigations related to failed attacks in Europe during the year 2014. The investigation has to clarify the way in which the cell was formed (it is possible for it to have been partially formed based on the close relations with Syria, where the fighters are grouped according to their language and on informal networks, aspects in which Abaaoud would have played a central role), and also when and how the attacks were planned.

Even thought this hypotheses has not been confirmed, Belgium has still proven to be a fertile ground for the ISIS recruiters. It is being estimated that at least four hundred Belgian citizens (probably more than five hundred), have joined the group in Syria and Iraq. The Belgian intelligence is closely monitoring approximately eight hundred people suspected for connections with ISIS. According to the Belgian Interior Minister, Jan Jambon, at the end of October 2015, 272 Belgian citizens have joined ISIS in Syria and Iraq, among which eighty

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[5] *TE-SAT 2016, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2016,* EUROPOL, pp. 10-11, available online at:https://www.europol.europa.eu/category/publication-category/strategic-analysis/eu-terrorism-situation-trend-report-te-sat, accessed at 19.10.2016.
[6]*The New York Times, Terrorism Response Puts Belgium in a Harsh Light,* available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/world/europe/its-capital-frozen-belgium-surveys-past-failures-and-squabbles.html?_r=2, accessed at 19.10.2016.

lost their lives and thirteen were heading towards Syria. 134 returned, 65 tried to leave Syria and 352 have submitted requests for joining ISIS[7].

These numbers situate Belgium at the top of the list of the countries that contribute with human resources to ISIS[8]. There are many elements which could support an explanation for this. For many years, a significant number of radical groups have been actively preaching in Belgium, the recruitment and training of the youngsters for joining the Jihad. One example is the organization "Sharia4Belgium", whose members were sentences to prison in February 2015. Such a phenomenon is not typically Belgian. "Sharia4Belgium" is in fact a franchise of a British Groups called "Sharia4UK". This organization has been very efficient and influent. Moreover, a snowball effect[9] existed as well, the radicalization and the recruitment taking place among the family and the group of friends.

Looking individually at the situation, by relating only to one state of the European Union, but one which could be considered a continental model, it can be said that the policies of integration from Belgium have failed. Whole neighborhoods, with Muslim immigrants have been completely neglected by the authorities. Still, most of the studies which focus on radicalization suggest that better integration policies will not solve the whole problem, because radicalization is more connected to an "isolation" phenomenon, than to socio-economical conditions[10].

In what concerns the lack of control on behalf of the state, the neighborhoods which have been left without surveillance by state authorities are not peculiar to Belgium, similar situation being found in the suburbs of Paris and London.

In considering the hypotheses of Belgium being an "advanced settlement" it must be also said that Belgium occupies a central position in Western Europe, being a small country with very good communication routes which may well function as easy evacuation routes for terrorists. This context makes the existence of an operational platform very plausible.

Immediately after the attacks in Paris, the general opinion was that Belgium represents the weak link in the fight against terrorism. According to the President of France, Francois Hollande, the attacks were "prepared in Belgium", while the Belgium intelligence was not "sufficiently prepared"[11], according to a former director of French intelligence[12].

The Belgian government responded by saying that most of the attackers were French citizens and that the attacker of the Jewish museum in Brussels, in 2014, was also a French citizen, who had been trained in France, and who returned to France immediately after the attack. The mutual accusations are worth nothing in this context. Both Belgium and France, and implicitly the whole of Europe, must rethink their policies in relation to the phenomenon of radicalization and terrorism after the limits have been obviously tested.

What Europe is missing is a coordinated and inclusive approach in the battle against terrorism. There is no global strategy against terrorism that encompasses all dimensions, from

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[7] *HLN.BE, Dynamische databank Syriëstrijders in januari operationeel,* available online at: http: //www.hln.be/hln/nl/ 32616/Terreurdreiging-in-Belgie/article/detail/2544234/2015/12/02/Dynamische-databank-Syriestrijders-in-januari-operationeel.dhtml., accessed at 01.09.2016.

[8] *STATISTA, Belgium Is the EU 'Capital' For Foreign Fighters,* available online at: https://www.statista.Com/chart/ 4024/belgium-is-the-eu-capital-for-foreign-fighters/, accessed at 01.09.2016.

[9] *"A situation in which something increases in size or importance at a faster and faster rate"* – Cambridge Dictionary, available online at: http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/a-snowball-effect#translations, accessed at 23.10.2016. Most likely, in case of terrorist attacks with religious background, it is a spiritual task overcompensation on those involved.

[10] *Journal of Strategic Security, Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories,* available online at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1139&context=jss, accessed at 07.09.2016.

[11] *Financial Times, Belgium security agency faced cut,* available online at: https://www.ft.com/content/83d749dc-9200-11e5-94e6-c5413829caa5, accessed at 15.08.2016.

[12] Alain Chouet, former head of DGSE.

prevention to repression, including here foreign policy as well. Moreover, such a strategy could be realized only in coordination with all relevant institutional actors and this is a challenging task given the complex institutional European framework. Still, the present political will should be lead in this direction.

The attackers from Paris have managed to escape the monitoring of the Belgian and French intelligence, and also they left and returned to Syria, by using different routes through Europe, travelling unnoticed by all European security agencies. Their names appeared in the files of Belgian intelligence, they went through checkups at the borders of the European Union, even in the Schengen area. It is still unclear whether the attacks in Paris, Nice or Brussels could have been prevented, but we can formulate the hypotheses, which will be further developed, regarding ways in which European security can respond to the terrorist threat.

It is of great importance for the European leaders not to abolish the European political project which offers an opened space for freedom, rights and prosperity, in the name of the fight against terrorism. Still, this does not mean that Europeans should be naïve or passive regarding the terrorist phenomenon. The European countries have lived for a great number of years with the illusion that security is cheap and optional because there has never existed a direct threat and as a consequence the budgets for security structures (defense, intelligence, police) has constantly dropped. In the last few years, the economic austerity has put great pressure on European finances, having as a result supplementary cuts in the security budgets. It is true that in liberal democracies the cutbacks in security budgets does not cost politicians very much from an electoral point of view. Not as much as diminishing the budgets for education or social benefits. The recent attacks have not made it clear if the European governments are willing to make durable investments in structures of security and defense. Secondly, there is need for more cooperation among European countries, regarding all dimensions of the counter-terrorist spectrum. Recent events have made clear a series of failures in the cooperation between intelligence and security agencies. Certain mechanisms and platforms already exist at the European level (like Europol and the Schengen Information System), but these are underfunded, poorly manned and remain unused in their most part.

Terrorism is without borders, just as counter-terrorism should be. The terrorist who attacked Paris had different nationalities. They were trained in Syria and returned to Europe by travelling through different states.

A significant part of the response regarding the terrorist threat lies within the national borders, at the level of intelligence, security and judicial services. The challenge in combating terrorism can be found in the coordination of the activity of these agencies, with the purpose of managing the threat. A series of measure have been taken, at the European level, in order to coordinate the efforts and to facilitate the information exchange. The negative aspect is that European cooperation among national intelligence agencies will always be restricted by national filters and institutional barriers.

The terrorist threat asks for a long term global response. At the national level, this means that the responses of governments must go beyond limited security measures. At the moment, emergency measures were taken in France and Belgium, in order to manage and reduce the threat. Some of these measures remain debatable, like the plan of Belgium to send all repatriate persons in detention units, considering the fact that some of the terrorist were radicalized inside detention units.

The direct or indirect threats to which the European territory is being subjected evolve and change according to the new realities of international life. The main enemy in the war against terrorism was, after September 11, al-Qaeda. This disappearance must not be regarded as an elimination of the threat, but a re-evaluation of the terrorist organization must be considered. Al – Qaeda has never been a stable structure from an organizational point of view,

with a strong identity from the point of view of long term objectives. On the other hand, its main accomplishment is to have borrowed its name to multiple local and regional extremist organizations. Hence, the name of al-Qaeda is at the moment being used by groups or factions that can be found in the geographical area between Afghanistan and Pakistan and all the way to Western Africa. The agenda of these organizations is in most cases focused on local interests, lacking the motivation and resources to carry on major attacks against the European territory.

Still, some groups present in the Middle East, especially ISIS and al-Qaeda, represent a major risk for European security. This is due to the operations which take place at the European borders. In this context there is the possibility of creating bridges among vulnerable countries from an institutional point of view, by projecting qualified military forces in the European territory.

Moreover, the high radicalization of the Muslim communities which live in Europe has lead to the initiation of individual attacks that do not have a specific target. These are carried on only with the purpose of inducing a state of fear and insecurity among the civilian population. The extremism manifested by part of the European citizens' represents a real threat, but the situations must be analyzed individually, the adherents to Islamist fanaticism representing only a minority. Moreover, the terrorist actions are incompatible with the values of Islam and are condemned by the majority of Muslim religious leaders.[13]

The complexity of the terrorist phenomenon, doubled by the new tendencies, requires a new reaction on behalf of the euroatlantic space, a reaction based on a re-evaluation of the mechanisms and strategies. This represents a challenge not only from the point of view of practical efficiency, but it is also stems from the necessity to combine restrictive measures with respect for fundamental civil rights and freedoms. Hence, a right balance must be sought after between security objectives, financial resources and individual freedoms.

In the given political context from the Arab states the emergence of a very powerful anti-Western sentiment is likely to rise. This can be argued based on two given realities. First of all, the disaffection of the Syrian population with the Western democracies, as they see themselves left in the hands of Bashar al-Assad, inconsistent with the tacit support of the West when Egyptian generals took power. Secondly, the terrorist organizations in the Middles East, by taking advantage of the political instability in the region and of the weakness of government, have managed to occupy significant territories and create safe zones for the members of these organizations.

One peculiar example is that of ISIS, an organization with a progressive territorial evolution in the areas from Eastern Syria and Northern Iraq, which installed a regime of terror in these areas. In January 2014, ISIS has managed to gain the control of the Ambar province in Iraq, including the city of Fallujah, and in June 2014 it went further into Iraqi territory, occupying the cities of Mosul, Tikrit and Tal Afar. In the occupied territories ISIS proclaimed an Islamic Caliphate, having as a leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. According to certain estimations[14], the Caliphate has a surface of approximately 90.000 km² (similar to the territory of Austria or Portugal). The leaders of ISIS have declared several times that these territories have a temporary status, the aim being that of a further occupation of territories towards the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Moreover, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi instigates to revolt by

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[13] In September 2014 the leaders of the Muslim communities in France have condemned the acts of violence in Syria and Iraq, making clear that "they are against the terrorist attacks which represents in fact crimes against humanity and that the Muslim community does not support such groups and their leaders. These acts belong to a past era and the call for Jihad and the religious indoctrination of the young are not specific to the teachings of Islam".

[14] The Independent, *ISIS loses territory the size of Ireland within 18 months,* available online at: http://www. independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-territory-syria-iraq-latest-news-islamic-state-daesh-a7129421.html, accessed at 15.10.2016.

means of all media channels, calling for obedience in front of the new State authority and envisioning world domination by Islam.

The ISIS governance in all occupied territories is marked by the instauration of a regime of terror whose politics are assassinations, mutilations, torture and human abuses.

The influence of the terrorist organization has extended beyond the borders of Iraq and Syria. A group from Northern Africa called Jund al-Khilafah (the soldiers of the Caliphate) being extremely active in the region, a fact that comes to prove the formation of independent entities beyond the present borders of the Caliphate and under its subordination.

The purpose of the ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, is to rise to the fame of Osama Bin Laden, but this represents a menace for the Western world. Since the al-Qaeda leader needed September 11 to rise to his fame, so does Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi need a similar event to place himself at the head of the fight against the Western world.

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ELIMINATION OF TERRORISM SOURCES OF FINANCING
- A POSSIBLE "TROJAN HORSE" IN DESTRUCTURATION
OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS?

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Abstract: The twentieth century brought the world's most horrific facts of history through two world wars[1]. The consequences of two world wars have turned the onset of the XXI century in an enemy of modern society, democracy and progress, a recrudescent danger or even an "invisible" enemy.

States faced with asymmetric threats since ancient times but in the present century they became a global risk factor. After the events on September 11 2001, the world woke up to reality, experiencing new forms and action processes specific to terrorism, being forced to re-evaluate this risk and to change their vision of global safety.

Terrorism is an asymmetrical, unconventional conflict, which by its anarchic, adaptable and diffuse nature is extremely difficult to identify, manage and countered. But a weak point could be found and must be exploited to the maximum in order to destroy this plague of the modern world. This vulnerability is represented by the sources of financing the terrorism.

In this paper we intend to present some coordinates of the funding sources most frequently used by terrorist organizations around the globe.

Keywords: terrorism, asymmetric threats, terrorist financing, financing sources, terrorism vulnerability .

Any financial support, any form of action, act of encouragement, planning or participating in an act of terror is considered to be a terrorism **source of financing.** We can observe that the financing of terrorism has not only financial items but also items related to action, direct involvement in any form. However, this study's focus is financial sources of terrorist networks.

Usually terrorist attacks require relatively small amounts of money and this was noted in the following cases: World Trade Centre in 1993 - approx. $ 19,000, the World Trade Centre in 2001 - approx. $ 500,000, Madrid, 2004 - approx. $ 10,000 London 2005 - approx. $ 15,000, Jakarta, 2003 - approx. $ 30,000, a suicide attack - approx. $ 1,500, Istanbul 2003 - approx. $ 50,000, Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 approx. $ 50,000, Bali 2002 - 20,000 $. The data above were included in a report of the Monitoring Team of the United Nations - *Report on Al-Qaeda and Taliban* issued in August 2004[2].

According to recent studies conducted by experts and political analysts, some of the terrorists involved in the attacks in Paris (07.01.2015 and 11.13.2015) and Brussels (03.22.2016), have "*invested*" amounts of money received as social aid in achieving their purposes. Thus, if in over 2 years, five of the attackers have received social benefits that taken

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[1] Ina Raluca Tomescu, TERORISMUL INTERNAŢIONAL – *istoric, actualitate, provocări*, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2014, p. 16.

[2] Laura-Susana Lica-Banu, *Apariţia şi proliferarea finanţării terorismului,* SC Universul juridic SRL Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010, pp. 15 - 109.

together are more than 50,000 euros, authorities estimated that 33,000 euros were used in carrying out the attacks:

1. 30,000 euros "costed" Paris attacks;
2. 3,000 euros the Brussels assault.[3]

It can thus be seen that the most expensive act of terrorism was the most extensive, serious and terrifying of all, which wast he attack on the US on September 11 2001. Most of funds is towards maintaining the entire mechanism: the financial support of members of organizations: training, planning, recruitment, procurement, communication, transport, targets recognition, maintaining safe houses and international networks, techniques of persuasion, propaganda, etc.

Terrorist groups profited from globalization[4] in order to expand and have adapted easily to the new technical and financial resources, despite the efforts of states and international organizations to combat them. Methods and financial sources of terrorists are complex and vary depending on the size and guidelines of the terrorist cell, region, country and the opportunities they can speculate, the ultimate goal being to raise funds.

Overall, financial sources can be divided into two: legal sources and illegal sources.[5]

Legal sources are considered to be legitimate businesses, charities, NGOs, *zakat* and donations of any kind used to generate income and / or as business front to launder money from other illegal businesses. These sources are less profitable, but offer a more secure operation as it is very difficult for authorities to trace the route of revenue and the final beneficiary. Legal sources can range from small and medium businesses (farms, fisheries), to big business (corporations, companies) and can work in various fields (industry, transport, real estate, agriculture, economic market). Supportive environment in which terrorist groups can develop their businesses are the areas where taxation is low and fraud can be made with ease. South-East Asia is one such area, also being an Islamic banking center.

Middle East is also a favorable environment for business development supporting terrorist activities. Al Qaeda has more businesses in this area; in Khartoum it owns construction companies, investment companies, business transport and in other sectors. *Al Hijra Construction* (road builders), *International-Ikhals* (sweets producer), *Blessed Fruits* (exporter of fruits and vegetables) are just a few examples.

Charities and NGOs can generate funds from several areas of the world and have subsidiaries in different countries.[6] Terrorist organizations send their people in these areas to control or to embezzle funds. Moreover, these legal financial sources enjoy public confidence and rare controls and less attention from authorities. It is extremely difficult for authorities to trace which are charities or NGOs with dubious intentions, especially since there are only some people who are trying malicious misuse of funds. Some examples are: *Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Global Relief Foundation, International Islamic Relief Organization*, associated with Al Qaeda, *Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, Quranic Literacy Institute, Viva Palestina*, associated with Hamas.

 Qur'an talks about *Zakat* as a law of particular importance for the Muslim community and supposedly the wealthiest should donate to the poorest. The fee is binding, and does not have a fixed percentage varies depending on the possibilities for everyone. Those who are not Muslims but live in the Muslim community are obliged to offer a similar tax called *Jizyah*. The amounts collected from these taxes are very high, only in Saudi Arabia are collected

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[3] Florin Rusu, Agerpress, 08/05/2016.

[4] Laura-Susana Lica-Banu, *Apariţia şi proliferarea finanţării terorismului,* SC Universul juridic SRL Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010, p. 14.

[5] *Ibidem,* pp. 24 - 28.

[6] Laura-Susana Lica-Banu, *op. cit.,* pp. 78 - 82.

about $ 10 million $/year.[7] Accounting for these amounts is precarious and make it possible to transform these duties in money washing machines. Besides Zakat terrorist groups receive sponsorship from wealthy sympathizers or even from Islamic banks, *Bank al-Taqwa*[8] being associated with Hamas and Al Qaeda or *Al-Shamal Islamic Bank* was established by Osama bin Laden.

Illegal sources are those that producing the highest income in a relatively short time, but have a high risk for terrorist organizations because they are easier to detect than the legal ones. These illegal sources are from: drug trafficking, human trafficking, arms trafficking, fraud with credit cards and checks, cyber crime, piracy, kidnapping, theft, robbery, smuggling, or any kind of criminal activity smaller or larger to produce a big profit quickly.

Drug trafficking is one of the most important sources of income with minimal investment because it produces a huge profit. Sales market can be almost anywhere and is in continuous expansion. Poppy fields in Afghanistan represents between 70% and 90% of the world's opium, which is controlled by Al Qaeda and the Taliban. South America is also an area rich in coca plantations, an area where groups of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and National Liberation Army of Colombia are in control. According to the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs the production cost of one kilogram of cocaine is $ 3,000 and the sale price is $ 20,000. The production cost of one kilogram of heroin is 4,000-5,000 dollars and the sale price is $ 250,000 - $ 300,000. Payment is made in advance and terrorist groups do not suffer any eventual loss occurring during transport. The risk is high, but earnings are accordingly.[9]

Terrorist networks, in addition to producing revenue in order to secure their existence and proper functioning of cells in various places, must be able to move their funds. The main methods of moving funds may be: hawala, couriers or through the international banking system.

Hawala is a money transfer system that originated in Islamic law, which was mentioned for the first time in the eighth century. This system is used in almost all Middle East and is based on trust and assurance of anonymity because transactions are not done on paper. Users of this system transmit money abroad or in various regions without physical transfer. The money that need to be transferred are given to a *hawaladar* (regional agent), which provides a password in exchange, the beneficiary can withdraw the money from a hawaladar in the area where he wants to be moved. This system is considered very effective. Operations are difficult to track because of the lack of authority records, and where they exist they are encoded.

Another method used is by courier, which is achieved by physical transfer of money by delegated persons. This method can be problematic given the limited amount that can be transferred physically. To maximize the effectiveness of the operation, often couriers are transferring the money in valuables (gold, precious stones) which at the destination are changed back into money, allowing transfer of large amounts of funds.

The international bank is also used for transferring funds, but this method is riskier for terrorist organizations because it leaves traces in the banking system. In order to be hiding the true beneficiary and to make tracking as sinuous as possible for authorities, terrorist groups use umbrella companies, offshore companies, tax havens, charities, NGOs. To bring money into Western banks are used Islamic banks, which have a different system from the West. Transfer by lectronic systems are used by people with false identity and amounts are kept below $ 10,000 in order to avoid attracting attention to themselves.

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[7] Wikipedia, August 2009.
[8] Wikipedia, 12/28/2015.
[9] *Epoch Times* Romania,08.06.2010.

During the Cold War[10], terrorism was used for political destabilization in war zones, the destruction of social infrastructure and economic development of these countries and the weakening of their military capacity. Cold War terrorist activities were financed by sponsor-states, but with the end of the war and the sanctions imposed by the United Nations, sponsor-states have entered in a strong decline and terrorist organizations had to find other sources of funding. According to the State Department of the United States sponsor-states currently known are: North Korea, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Syria.

Internationally, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF-GAFI)[11] is the most important organization concerned with combating money laundering and terrorist financing. FATF is an international independent body, inter-governmental, which has the mandate to set standards and promote direct implementation of legal measures. It was created in 1989 by the G7 countries and currently comprises 34 member countries and two international organizations: the European Commission and Gulf Cooperation Council. The main purpose is to support and contribute to international efforts against money laundering, terrorist financing and other threats to the integrity of the international financial system by issuing international standards, recommendations, effective implementation of legal measures. There is a very close collaboration between FATF and similar bodies around the world, such as EU, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Organization of American States, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the African Union, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.

After the September 11 attacks in the United States, FATF agreed on a set of nine *Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing*. They require partner states to take measures concerning:

1. ratification and implementation of the instruments issued by the United Nations;
2. incrimination of terrorist financing;
3. blocking and confiscation of terrorist assets;
4. providing extensive assistance to law enforcement authorities and the regulators in other countries to investigate terrorist financing;
5. reporting of suspicious transactions related to terrorist financing;
6. the imposition of requirements to combat terrorist financing systems in rapid transmission of money;
7. strengthen customer identification measures at domestic and international SWIFT transfers;
8. monitoring the transport of cash across the border by couriers;
9. ensure that entities, in particular non-profit organizations, can not be used to finance terrorism.

For the period 2012 - 2020, the FATF was empowered to establish guidelines / rules of good practice that partner countries can assimilate in domestic policies, they aimed at:

1. policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing and coordination;
2. money laundering and confiscation;
3. terrorist financing and proliferation of financing;
4. transparency and the real beneficiary of and legal persons and arrangements;
5. preventive measures;
6. duties and responsibilities of competent authorities and other institutional measures;
7. International cooperation.

FATF recommendations were revised a second time in 2003, and this, together with the Special Recommendations, were endorsed by 180 countries and are universally

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[10] Laura-Susana Lica-Banu, *Apariţia şi proliferarea finanţării terorismului,* SC Universul juridic SRL Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010, pp. 31, 107.

[11] *Ibidem,* pp. 18 - 19.

recognized as *international standards for combating money laundering and financing terrorism* (AML/CFT).[12]

Conclusions

Terrorists are using ancestral instincts by distorting the true message of Islam religion and by indoctrination of younger generations in order to achieve their goals. This phenomenon is stirring controversy in Western society.

The secret services, in order to manage the collection of vital information to maintain security in the state and to divert any criminal plans must employ monitoring both cyber and the real space, in a more focused manner, which can lead to controversy nationally and internationally. But for a society to be able to call itself as such, it must operate in a natural order of things, and this order can be obtained in peace and integrity of the state where it operates. This phenomenon of terrorist acts exactly in the heart of society, sowing chaos and fear among the population.

In the late sixth century B.C. Chinese General Sun Tzu said that „*to win the war must know your enemy*" and this law of war is current and functional today. But what do you do when the enemy is not in front of you and do not know against whom you fight, and yet the enemy manages to strike the safety and integrity of a state, its economy, its innocent citizens, the very freedom of people? The only thing that remains is to adapt to new asymmetric threats, looking for weak spot and act without hesitation. As we saw above, funding sources are the vascular system of the phenomenon of terrorism and strangling it can make terrorist groups no longer able to organize themselves so well, this action can repress the phenomenon, reduce it to the level of isolated fanaticism, or in the best case, fade it completely.

This atypical global war can be won by minimizing organized crime that is closely connected to terrorist groups through a rigorous control of the financial system at all levels, through effective cooperation of intelligence services internationally and, not least, through education and empowerment of people.

Surely in a perfect world these factors would be able to combat terrorism, but the reality brings forward new global issues favoring this phenomenon (economic crisis, energy crisis, racism, chauvinism, etc.), and we owe it to posterity to find the solution each time and fight for a better future.

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4. *International Convention - the suppression of financing of terrorism* - text document published in the Official Monitor no. 852 / 26.11.2002.

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[12] Daniela Sanda Mateș, *Finanțarea organizațiilor teroriste, în condițiile globalizării și ale modificărilor balanței mondiale de putere*, Thesis, Bucharest, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, 2013, pp. 152-155.

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13. Wikipedia, 28/12/2015.

OFFSHORE CENTERS - THE LIMIT BETWEEN
LEGALITY AND ILLEGALITY

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Abstract*: As a result of the globalization, the tax heavens attracted the interest of normal citizens, and also of the theoreticians and of the practitioners. The theoreticians believe the fact that tax havens have as the main core the transcendence, while the practitioners completely discharge and refuse the idea. In the workshop ,,The complex and dynamic nature of the security environment" I will present the reasons why the world's biggest businessmen prefer to place their money in an offshore center, which is at the edge of legality and illegality. Author's purpose is to draw the limit between tax avoidance and the concealment of illicit money. Also, the author tries to present the threats that hide behind the tax havens, threats that affect the global and national economy. The fight against this phenomenon is part of a cycle of financial economical violation which is corruption.*

Keywords*: tax haven, offshore, organized crime, money laundering, and terrorism.*

Introduction

The tax havens or the offshore financial centers as they are defined in the specialty literature, have as a final purpose, either avoiding the taxation, either hiding the illicit money, because of the fact that part of these funds, come from activities such as: organized crime, money laundry, gun trafficking, trafficking of human beings, prostitution, tax evasion and terrorism. These financial centers present cryptic advantages in the sphere of economic crime and cross – border crime. Some voices believe the fact that the tax havens are predominant in countries which have low contributions and these jurisdictions are preferred because of the fact that they fulfill the final objective of an entrepreneur, and that is: maximizing the profit. Therefore, placing the money in a certain jurisdiction has as a primordial objective avoiding the taxation.

Following the globalization, the tax havens and the offshore financial centers represent a more and more controversial subject. The author's purpose is that of deciphering this phenomenon and at the same time of understanding it in its complexity. This work will try to decipher the mysteries behind this subject and, at the same time, to explain a series of aspects. The term offshore "sends", most of the times, to the sphere of illegality and of the criminality. I consider the fact that, a series of businesses from the tax havens have at their basis illicit businesses, but the choice of the entrepreneurs is the one of placing the funds in the offshore centers, in order to avoid the tax burden. The percentage of illicit businesses is a hard one to be quantified, even by the specialists in the field, because of the bank secret "enjoyed" by these offshore centers.

In order to "enter" and to decipher the phenomenon of tax havens and of the offshore centers is necessary, initially, to clarify the two notions. The tax haven is defined in the specialty literature as being the jurisdiction which offers a preferential legislation, formed from diminished taxes and contributions, certain jurisdictions being situated even with zero

for contributions and taxes. On the other hand, the offshore financial center actually represents the tax payers, who chose this path in order to optimize their profits, placing the funds obtained in a more favorable area for the future profits. The advantages of an offshore financial center differ from a natural personal to a legal person, existing certain jurisdictions which "attract" the natural persons or on the other segment, there are jurisdictions which are captivating for the legal persons, or another category, which offers a wide range of alternative for the natural persons, as well as for the legal persons.

In the tax havens, a business can be totally exempted from the payment of the contributions, on the condition that, the entrepreneur pays certain government taxes. The purpose of the tax havens is to attract the international businesses. There is, at the same time, the alternative that a tax haven will not include a zero contribution, but to offer other significant advantages, such as, for example, keeping the information secret from the foreign governments.

Certain groups of people prefer the tax havens in order to avoid the overwhelming taxation from the jurisdiction which they belong to. Following the globalization, Romania is known as being a country with a raised bureaucracy and with contribution difficult to pay.

In the context of the aspects discussed, part of the prosper businesses from Romania and the rich people of the country choose to place their fund in other jurisdictions. At the same time, there is the second category, who wants to hide the money which comes from illicit activities, because of the fact that they have as a principal tribute the flagrantly breaking of the law. Some voices consider the fact that 80% of the tax heavens are represented by the tax evasion. The tax evasion represents the central nucleus of the states because of the fact that all the states from the world are confronted with this phenomenon. The tax dodger, from the social point of view, permanently follows the legislation and wishes to "trick" the law because he doesn't want to pay the contributions and wishes to avoid them by any means. The author's purpose is the one of discovering the limiting line between legality and illegality.

"The lacking of some firm actions of the public authorities for executing and discouraging the evasion practices will lead, implicitly, at the discrediting of the state's institutions and to the lost of the population's confidence in the efficiency and determining the fight against this flagella."[1]

The technology "plays" an extremely important role, because of the fact that the information is stored at the electronic level in all the economic environments. Therefore, many times, the edification of the authorities with regards to the real tax dodgers can be a matter of time and of deciphering the technology. In the current context, it is discussed more and more often about the technologic know-how.

1. Defining the tax havens

"In the understanding of the common English language, the word offshore means a territory situated outside the shore. The same word used in the specialty economic language, designates the economic activities and the companies which develop their activity in the national borders of the state in which those firms are residents."[2]

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[1] Dragoş PĂTROIU, *Evaziunea fiscală între latura permisivă, aspectul contravenţional şi caracterul infracţional*, Editura „Economică", Ediţia a II-a, Bucureşti 2007, p. 341.
[2] Cristian George BUZAN, *Paradisurile fiscale şi centrele financiare offshore*, Editura „C.H.Beck", Bucureşti, 2011, p. 1.

The distinct governmental activities, as well as the low contributions, represent primary reasons of the natural persons, as well as of the legal persons for placing their funds in these jurisdictions.

"Among the factors which contributed to the occurrence and the development of the tax havens it is also listed the stability of the trust in the local financial institutions, the distrust in the government agencies and the need of privacy regarding the financial and banking transactions."[3]

Therefore, the businesses which are developed in a tax haven are made outside the jurisdiction to which the society belongs. Throughout the time, institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the Organization for Cooperation and Economic Development were concerned about offering a definition as simple as possible, concluding the fact that an offshore financial center "is any kind of financial center where there are activities involving offshore entities."[4]

Another definition offered for the tax havens says the fact that "it is called a tax haven a territory in which the natural persons or the societies are under the impression that they are less imposed then elsewhere"[5]. In the conditions in which, the natural persons or the legal persons who "resort" to these kinds of jurisdictions pay lower contributions, to the extent that they don't develop their activity on the territory of the tax haven where they were registered. This is the first essential condition for the companies and for the natural persons to benefit from lower contributions and taxes. Therefore, anywhere there can be constituted an offshore financial center, but only among a tax haven the entities can benefit from these tax facilities.

The specialists demonstrate the fact that the tax havens are in an ascending trend in the last period, notably after the terrorist attacks from the 11th of September 2011. The events of that date "favored" and continue to protect and to finance terrorism, by the means of the offshore center. The plausibility of these territories and the level of trust of the population in these jurisdictions resides in the fact that "here there are the subsidiaries of the vast majority of the powerful European and American banks, the biggest law firms are up to date with every dollar that passes through the clients' accounts, and of the big companies and audit firms control the development of these operations, which they consider to be perfectly legal, but which refuse to comment on the spectacular collapses reminded and nor about the suspicious businesses of the great global corporations."[6]

1.1 The characteristics of the tax havens

The funds placed in tax heavens come from corruption, organized crime, gun trafficking, human trafficking, money which can be easily "laundered" and, in this way, the money find a temporary channels, as it is necessary, for their transformation into legality. The transparency in the offshore centers lacks altogether and I consider that this will lack for a very long time, because of the fact that the government and the interests of certain categories of people "intervene" in this game, having in their centre the factor of destructions, which is, the corruption.

The principal characteristics of the tax havens, which "attract" the investors, are: the bank secret, reduced contributions, reduced commissions and administration taxes of the bank accounts, qualified staff, the lack of the control on the currency, modern means of

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[3] L.KISS, L.VARADI, D. COOPER, *Planificare fiscală 2000*, Editura „Napoca Star", Cluj-Napoca, 2000, p. 63.
[4] Cristian George BUZAN, *Paradisurile fiscale şi centrele financiare offshore*, Editura „C.H.Beck", Bucureşti, 2011, p.1.
[5] Radu BUZIRNESCU, *Evaziunea fiscală internă şi internaţională,* Editura „Universitaria", Craiova, 2007, p.110.
[6] Ziarul Financiar din 02.02.2004, pp.14-15.

transportation, qualified staff. All these facilities help the business operator to develop their activity in a place in which they benefit from a series of advantages.

The primordial purpose of the tax havens is represented by the wish of an entrepreneur of maximizing their profits. "The Americans explain the fact that the use of the tax havens by the American companies, doesn't have as a purpose a possible tax evasion, but the expansion abroad by the legal means made available by the legislators of their country. Because of the fact that we assimilate indeed the tax havens, the tax evasions, even it is about the tax evasion, perfectly legal."[7]

1.2 The advantages of an offshore

Each jurisdiction follows its own interest, namely the one of captivating the attention of the direct investments. The offshore financial centers want that the great businesses of the world to be part of their jurisdictions, because of the fact that the more placements they will have, the more the global situation of that respective jurisdiction will grow. The principal advantage in the case of placing the money in a jurisdiction is represented by the confidentiality of the date and at the same time an economic, political and stable financial climate. The law firms, which in general, function as intermediates between the client and the bank, recommends by choice Delaware for the natural and legal persons, a company of this type doesn't have the compulsoriness of keeping the accounting records, and the applicable accounting commission of the account in Delaware is in the total amount of 385 euros.

According to an international ONG, Tax Justice Network, Delaware is considered to be the biggest tax haven in the world. I have realized an analysis of the most cost – effective offshore centers, for the legal persons, as well as for the legal persons and I have chosen Delaware for the advantages offered, equally for both the categories, natural persons and legal persons.

Because of the fact that Delaware is part of the United States of America, he disposes of a series of airports, highways, ports. In this jurisdiction there can be registered companies of the type IBC (International Business Company), as well as LLC (Limited Liability Company). The company of the form LLC is excerpted from the payment of the taxes if the shareholders aren't residents and if they don't own a "Greed Card". A company of the type LLC offers the entire confidentiality of the real beneficiary. In the same time, in Delaware any person, of any kind of nationality, can open a current account. Another significant advantage, is represented by the Treaty regarding avoiding the double taxation, signed between Romania and the United States of America.[8] Therefore, the principal advantages in the Delaware jurisdiction are: zero taxes and contributions, the data confidentiality, minimum costs at the maintenance of the current account and at its opening, reduces bureaucracy, protecting the personal fortune and the lack of the added value tax.

Choosing the offshore financial center, for placing the money, represents an important decision which must be carefully analyzed. The principal objective, which must be taken into consideration, in the case of choosing a jurisdiction are: the existence of a secure banking system, modern means of communication, financial discretion, the existence of treaties for avoiding the double taxation, as well as the economical, political and financial stability of the respective jurisdiction.

Below it is presented a list with the principal offshore financial centers, as it follows:

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[7] Claude DAUPHIN, *Ghidul cu adevărat practic al paradisurilor fiscale*, Editura „Tribuna", Bucureşti, 1999, p. 24.
[8] Decretul cu Nr. 238 din 23 decembrie 1974 pentru ratificarea Convenţiei dintre guvernul Republicii Socialiste România şi guvernul Statelor Unite ale Americii privind evitarea dublei impuneri şi prevenirea evaziunii fiscale asupra veniturilor, semnată la Washington la 4 decembrie 1973.

Table no. 1 The list with the principal offshore financial centers

Andorra	Guam	Niue
Anguilla	Guernsey	Panama
Antigua	Hong Kong	Philippines
Aruba	Isle of Man	Puerto Rico
Bahamas	Israel	Seychelles
Bahrain	Japan	Singapore
Barbados	Jersey	St Kitts and Nevis
Belize	Labuan, Malaysia	St Lucia
Bermuda	Lebanon	St Vincent and the Grenadines
British Virgin Islands	Liechtenstein	Switzerland
Cayman Islands	Luxembourg	Tahiti
Cook Islands	Macau	Tangier
Costa Rica	Malta	Thailand
Cyprus	Marianas	Turks and Caicos
Djibouti	Marshall Islands	United States (particularly, Delaware, but some other states have offshore characteristics)
Dominica	Mauritius	Uruguay
Dublin	Micronesia	Vanuatu
Gibraltar	Montserrat	Western Samoa
Grenada	Nauru	Netherlands Antilles

Source: International Monetary Fund, 2000

1.3 The rapid exchange of an offshore

In an offshore there activate a series of natural or legal persons, who have solid knowledge with regards to the legislation of the states from where they come from and from the other states. The free will is the one that dictates in such cases, in order to choose a certain jurisdiction. At the same time, these groups of people want a raised protection of their incomes. If they don't enjoy the "proper" protection, they will not hesitate to move their businesses in other jurisdictions which fulfill the conditions stipulated by the beneficiaries of the funds.

1.4 The taxation as a subject of public interest

The taxation started to be studied more and more frequently in the last period because of the interest from the natural persons, as well as from the legal persons. The legal persons are the most "affected" by the burden of the taxation, but, the interest is also channeled to the natural persons, who have the compulsoriness of the salary contributions, on the buildings and including on the money they owe, as it is the case for a banking deposit. It is known the fact that if a natural person constitutes a deposit in a credit institution, in Romania, regardless of the term of the placement (3, 6, 9, 12 months) he, will have to by the liquidation of the deposit to pay the consideration for the income contribution owed to the state budget for the amount placed in the bank, the contribution being of 16%.

The entire population is interested in the excessive taxation from Romania because of the fact that this subject has global implications. The decision of a relaxed tax politics can have benefits if we report ourselves to the legal persons, as well as at the natural persons. It is very important to establish and to educate the natural persons from the tax point of view, including, to consult a tax specialist for diverse test cases met. The new regulations in terms of the taxation, regarding the contribution for the buildings, for the land, have an important role and are addressed to the natural persons. The state, in his attributions of collecting the contributions and the taxes from the population finds itself, frequently, in the position of explaining to the entire nation the reasons which "led" to the respective decision.

"The impact at the level of the taxation from a country on the investments isn't symmetrical. It has been shown, from the point of view of the elasticity of the investment in regards to the level of the taxation is that not the low level of the contributions will decisively attract the investment, instead, a raised level of the taxes and of the contributions tends, in general, to discourage the new investments. Therefore, the countries with an elevated taxation will be much more stimulated to reduce the contributions, then the ones with an already reduced fiscality."[9]

"The countries which have a reduced quality of the governance also have a reduced political – institutional capacity of collecting the taxes and the contributions. This deficiency can lead to the impulsion of raising the assessment rates in order to recover the incomes lost. It hasn't been found a direct correlation between the countries with a raised taxation and the level of corruption, with other words; the countries with an elevated corruption don't necessarily have an excessive taxation."[10]

Table no. 2 The level of taxation in the EU

Country	Type of contribution	Percentage					Observations
Austria	Progressive tax	36,5 %	43,21%	50%			for the annual incomes which exceed 60.000 euros
Belgium	Progressive tax	25%	30%	40%	45%	50%	for the annual incomes of over 37.870 euros
Bulgaria	Prorated tax	10%					-
Czech	Prorated tax	15% with a joint liability of the surcharge of 7% for the incomes bigger than 4 average salaries					
Cyprus	Progressive tax	20%	25%	30%	35%		for the annual incomes which exceed 60.000 euros
Croatia	Progressive tax	12%	25%	40%			for the annual incomes of over 158.400 Croatian kunes
Denmark	Progressive tax	It cannot be quantified because the tax on the income is paid at a national level, as well as at a local level.					-
Estonia	Prorated tax	20%					-
Finlandia	Progressive tax	Starting with 6,5% until 31,75%					for the annual incomes which exceed 90.000 euros
France	Progressive tax	14%	30%	41%	45%		for the annual incomes which exceed 151.956 euros
Germany	Progressive tax	14%	42%	45%			for the annual incomes which exceed 250.731 euros

[9] Cristian George BUZAN, *Paradisurile fiscale şi centrele financiare offshore*, Editura „C.H.Beck", Bucureşti, 2011, p. 22.
[10] *Ibidem.*

Greece	Progressive tax	22%	32%	42%			for the annual incomes which exceed 45.000 euros
Irland	Progressive tax	20%		40%			for the annual incomes which exceed 33.800 euros
Italy	Progressive tax	23%	27%	38%	41%	43%	for the annual incomes which exceed 75.000 euros
Latvia	Prorated tax	23%					-
Lithuania	Prorated tax	15%					-
Luxemburg	Progressive tax	40%					for the annual incomes which exceed 100.000 euros
Malta	Progressive tax	15%	25%	35%			for the annual incomes which exceed 60.000 euros
Holland	Progressive tax	36,5%	42%	52%			for the annual incomes which exceed 57.585 euros
Polland	Progressive tax	18%		32%			for the annual incomes which exceed 85.528 zlots
Portugal	Progressive tax	14,5%	28,5%	37%	45%	48%	for the annual incomes which exceed 80.000 euros
Romania	Prorated tax	16%					-
Slovakia	Progressive tax	16%	27%	41%	50%		for the annual incomes which exceed 70.907,2 euros
Spain	Progressive tax	19,5%		46%			for the annual incomes which exceed 60.000 euros
Sweden	Progressive tax	It cannot be quantified because the tax on the income is paid at a national level, as well as at a local level.					-
Hungary	Prorated tax	16%					-
UK	Progressive tax	20%	40%	45%			for the annual incomes which exceed 150.000 pounds

Source: Date furnizate de Comisia Europeană, Taxation and Customs Union (https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/economic-analysis-taxation/taxation-trends-eu-union/country-chapters_en)

2. The offshore centers at the limit between legality and illegality

The offshore centers are most of the times situated in a cryptic plan because they are associated to the sphere of the illegality, of the mafia, of the corruption. At the same time, the secret services are infiltrated in the places predestined to be offshore centers, especially for finding the offenders.

I consider the fact that parts of the businesses developed in the offshore centers are based upon legal activities, although a hypothesis in this context is ambiguous. It is indicated a separation between legality and illegality. Maximizing the profit and the payment of lower contributions, find a series of people thinking to place their money in these offshore financial centers, their activities being correct and following completely the rules from the Romanian legislation.

"Therefore, the offshore companies do no represent illicit hiding places from the tax authorities, and founded and administered correctly, they can ensure enormous tax economies and the protection of the fortune in a perfectly legal manner."[11] At the same time, nobody can

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[11] Nicolae GHINEA, „*Consideraţii privind legalitatea operaţiunilor offshore",* Revista de investigare a criminalităţii, Bucureşti, 2009, p.102, Site: http://www.iparomania.ro/ content/fkc/ric_nr_4.pdf, accesed on: 05.09.2016.

deny the fact that a category of legal persons is using these jurisdictions only for maximizing the profit and for avoiding the existent tax burden in the natal country.

Therefore, the myths according to whom the money that come from prohibited activities are placed in the offshore centers represent an image destined to the tax havens for a couple of years now. The organized groups which are using the phenomenon of tax evasion, crime, gun trafficking, drug trafficking have evolved much in the last decade, because of the fact that they behave as real entrepreneurs. They, in order to protect their identity, as well as they fortunes, "resort to" the best professionals in the tax and accounting domain in order to offer them consultancy and use all the advantages offered by the tax havens. The criminal groups behave as they are real professionals following "maximum profits with minimum expenses, the vertical control of the sectors, reducing the competition, enhancing the loyalty of the permanent employees and of their clients. They identify and exploit rapidly and efficiently the weaknesses of the legal and justice systems, but also of the opportunities offered by the tax heavens."[12]

I will analyze two cases which assume the placing of the money in offshore financial centers, which are situated at the limit between legality and illegality.

For example, the commercial societies use the offshore financial centers in order to reduce the profit realized by the parent company, society which is under a jurisdiction with an elevated taxation. Therefore, the parent company will sell to the offshore company, goods at a minimum price and then, the offshore company will sign the contracts and will sell the goods at a higher price. The parent company, because of the fact that will sell these goods at a lower price, will have a smaller profit and the corporate tax will be of a much smaller value.

Because of this transaction, the offshore company will realize a profit of a higher value, but it will not pay the corporate tax because it is situated under a jurisdiction, where, the corporate tax is zero and insignificant. Therefore, such a scheme is legal and it is used by the large companies for avoiding the tax burden.

Another example, aims for the illegal side. Therefore, I will analyze an example of tax evasion between two commercial societies having the purpose of eluding the state's budget, by not paying the taxes attributed to the employer and to the employee. Therefore, a society A with the head office in Romania and which appears to have 20 employees, who are paid with the minimum salary on the economy in the amount of 1.050 RON. The society B, is an offshore-type of company, which has the head office in Cyprus. Every month, from the accounts of the society B there are transferred to all the 20 employees the amount of 3.000 RON, following a contract signed between the company B and the company A. The amount of 3.000 RON, transferred every month to the 20 employees represents an untaxed amount, especially for eluding the state budget. The tort for not paying the taxes associated with the employee and with the employer, on a period of 6 months, is in the total amount of 9.515 Euros, calculated at a minimum salary of 1.050 RON.

The two examples illustrate the limit between legality and illegality, the first example representing the entrepreneur who wants to place his funds in tax heavens because of the elevated taxation from the natal country, and the second example, represents the entrepreneur who wants to avoid the contributions and uses a complex scheme with the help of an offshore financial center.

The states with a normal taxation entered in disagreements with the offshore financial centers, each one of them trying to defend its own interests. The onshore financial centers blame the offshore financial centers of an unfair taxation competition and of operations which support the criminal groups and, at the same time, they are accused of the fact that they don't

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[12] Herve BOLLANGER, *Criminalitatea Economică în Europa*, Editura „P.U.F ", 2002, p. 25.

follow the rightful international norms. Another serious accusation is that the tax heavens encourage these criminal groups and the criminal investigations in this field are hard to be proved, and the tax agents find hard this impossible request of demonstrating the origin of the money and the source of the funds obtained illegally. The non-cooperation of the offshore financial centers leads in the end to the aggravation of the investigations and, at the same time, at closing these cases, not having enough evidence against the defendants of facts of corruption, money laundry, gun trafficking, drug trafficking. The lack of transparency is in fact the principal "attraction" of the criminal groups and the principal disadvantage for the authorities which look after "catching" the offenders. The cross-border criminality represents a threat for the national security. "The ONU reports reveal the fact that the countries with developed economies spend almost 2% of the gross domestic product for fighting against trans-national crime, meanwhile the countries in the course of development spend approximately seven times more. Also, it is estimated the fact that between 50 and 75% of the currency under circulations is controlled by the underground economy."[13]

Conclusions

The legislation regarding the offshore centers develops a series of debates concerning the doctrine, as well as the specialty practice. The primordial lacking in the specialty literature is constituted by the imperfect legislations in this field, not being a clear law, for every citizen to understand and, at the same time, and unitary form. The frequent changes which are attributed to the legislation only have the role of burdening the tax duties which pass onto the citizens and of creating, most of the times, confusion and uncertainty.

A first proposal from the author for a higher control of placing the money in the offshore financial centers is presented, firstly, by the reduction of the corruption in the tax administration, as well as in the justice system.

At the same time, it is indicated to be controlled the law firms which intermediate the opening of the accounts in the tax havens. The proposal of the author, in this case, is that these firms to make available for the certified bodies a list which contains the commercial societies and the natural persons who have opened accounts in the offshore financial centers. These lists should be known among NAFA, so as for the inspectors to execute the necessary verifications in order to determine the origin of the money and, at the same time, an analysis if these funds are licit or illicit.

But, because of the fact that the natural and legal persons who place their money in offshore financial centers are "enjoying" the transparency and the confidentiality of the data, this measure isn't momentarily possible in Romania because of the legislation into force, as well as of the protection which these categories of people are enjoying, who chose to place their money in other jurisdictions.

Another proposal from the author is the foundation of a specialized institution in the control and a permanent verification of the foreign capital which enter into the current accounts from Romania, funds which come from offshore financial centers.

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[13] Nicolae GHINEA, „*Consideraţii privind legalitatea operaţiunilor offshore*", Revista de investigare a criminalităţii, Bucureşti, 2009, pp.102, Site: http://www.iparomania.ro/ content/fkc/ric_nr_4.pdf, accesed on 11.09.2016.

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11. Site Evedex, Site: http://evedex.net/, accesed on: 01.09.2016
12. Site-ul Comisiei Europene, Site: https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/economic-analysis-taxation/taxation-trends-eu-union/country-chapters_en, accesed on:11.09.2016.
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COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE AND MANAGEMENT EFFICACY

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***Abstract**: In this paper, we aim to briefly analyze the relationship between competitive intelligence and management's efficacy, taking into account the implications of the economic factor to national security in the context of the reconfiguration of the global economy, whereof we believe that will lead to a gradual transition to a new management paradigm, adapted to the new realities that will have as central element the proper decision making substantiation, in addition to some substantial changes of the business architecture. By the creation, development and use of a competitive intelligence system, a company's decision making process is significantly improved, thereby placing the foundation of a higher effectiveness of that company. In a free market economy, in which the privat capital has a majority, in order to grow economically and to positively influence the national security, the continuous improvement of the private companies competitiveness will have to be seriously taken into account.*

***Keywords**: competitive intelligence, management, efficacy, competitive advantage, security*

Global economy reconfiguration in the 21st century

The debates on the future of the world economy highlight different perceptions and points of view, from the stagnation of the advanced economies and the prospect that robust economic growth is history, amid less spectacular innovations than in the past, to those that highlight the tremendous potential of innovation, thoughtful policies, economies and emerging markets to generate growth, in the next decades.[1]

Currently, the global economy tends to turn in a *New Economic Order* quite fast, a process that is still in an incipient stage, which will require rethinking business, economy and international political system, if becomes a reality. The American economist Dale Jorgenson believes that the transition to this new economic order will be held until 2020, due to the massive global economic reconfigurations.[2]

According with the *International Monetary Fund*, the current global economic system is strongly influenced by several transforming factors, of which we can mention:[3]

– *globalization* – the progress of information technologies and communications, of the transport, lead to an accelerating globalization, world countries becoming increasingly interdependent through a rapid growth of trade in goods, services, capital and labor. In the past 50 years, significant changes have taken place in terms of volume, direction and nature of international trade, which have benefited from the liberalization of trade policies, across the globe. No less significant was the increase of the financial flows, the global financial assets being modified from *$250 billion in 1970 to $70 trillion in 2010.*

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[1] http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2014/09/kose.htm accesat la 16.10.16.
[2] The Emergence of the New Economic Order: Growth în the G7 and the G20 - http://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php, accesed on 16.10.16.
[3] The source for the following enumeration is: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2014/09/kose.htm accesed on 16.10.16.

– *input of new technologies* – the extraordinary technological advances of the last half century have radically changed the way of work, facilitated international trade, financial linkages and innovation – the most spectacular innovations being those among computers and mobile phones (Henry Kissinger highlights that the number of devices connected to the internet would grow to fifty billion by the year 2020 on the horizon making its appearance a so-called *internet of things*, in other words, an "*internet that includes everything*"[4]);
– *the emergence of new global players* – with reference to emerging economies, BRIC countries generating half of the global growth, in the last decade;
– *economic crises* – the most recent global recession was the worst since the 1930s, approx. 83 million unemployed young individuals being recorded in 2009, the global economy and labor markets still facing its effects;
– *population growth* – world population has grown from 3 billion in 1965 to around 7 billion in 2013, but the economic growth was faster, presently the standard average life expectancy of citizens being higher than in the past (there have been advances in medicine which led to higher life expectancy);
– *climate change* – the alarming increase of the carbon dioxide emissions generated a multitude of issues, such as ice melting and planetary ocean levels rising, the natural disasters that have been caused by extreme weather events increased by three times, from 1960 to the present days.

Economic security can be understood as one of the vital factors of national security, ensuring resources and dynamic balance of its other components[5].

Cristian Băhnăreanu noted that the debates on economic security evolve from national economies to the regional and international economic complex area[6], highlighting the dependence relationship between the adequate economic security and the national and international security, in the context of the realities of the beginning of the third millennium[7].

The global economic reconfigurations have influenced, are influencing and will continue to directly influence the daily activity of the private companies, which can not exist independent of the macro-environment conditions. In these circumstances, in order to satisfy the customers' needs any further and survive in the market, the companies are looking for solutions to face the new economic realities and the competition dynamics. One of these solutions is being represented by the use of competitive intelligence.

According to statistics, in Romania "*more than 72% of the turnover of large and very large enterprises in the industry is carried out by subsidiaries of multinational companies resident in Romania. In the Top 100 is a notable presence of 30 companies with foreign capital majority, covering 76.55% of the turnover of the companies in the industry, and only three private owned Romanian companies, covering 3.87% of the total business of the top companies in the industry. Regarding the presence on the foreign markets, out of the 100 largest exporters, which provides over 52% of the total exports, 96 are companies with foreign capital and from the total of 34 sub-branches of industry (NACE), 25 have leading companies with foreign capital*"[8].

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[4]Kissinger, Henry, *Ordinea mondială*, pag. 276, Editura Rao, București, 2015.
[5]Pigui, Traian, *Securitate Economică și Securitate Umană Globală*, Colocviu Strategic nr. 10 (XXII), 2004 -
http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_publicatii/cs10-04.pdf accesat la 21.10.16.
[6]Băhnăreanu, Cristian, *Impactul factorilor economici asupra securității* -
http://conference.dresmara.ro/conferences/2006/03_Bahnareanu_Cristian.pdf accesat la 21.10.16
[7]*Idem.*
[8]Data is taken from Dan Popa, "*Statistică: Exporturile din luna iulie au urcat la 4,5 miliarde euro. Din primii 100 de exportatori, 96 au capital majoritar străin*", available at http://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-finante_banci-15542033-statistica-exporturile-din-luna-iulie- urcat-4-5-miliarde-euro-din-primii-100-exportatori-96-capital-majoritar-strain.
htm apud Decision no. 775/2015 on the approval of *The National Competitivity Strategy 2015-2020* -

The presence of foreign capital in our country is a very good thing, which enshrines once again that Romania is an economically and politically stable country, attractive in terms of making investments. Nevertheless, regarding the majority of the domestic capital, it should be considered an increasing of its share in the total turnover realized in the national territory (regardless of the industry).

One of the national security dimensions is the economic one, so we can say that while the national economy is strong and competitive the national security wins. Competitiveness of an economy is directly influenced by its economic actors' competitiveness. Consequently, in the conditions of a free market economy, in which the private capital has a majority, in order to grow economically and to positively influence the national security, the improvement of the competitiveness of the private companies will have to be considered a priority.

In the long term, the quality of life standards can be maintained and even improved, through competitiveness. Therefore, in the short term, we need to understand what are the conditions that allow corporations or individual states to be / become more competitive than others[9] in order to increase the economic competitiveness of the Romanian companies and of our country, as well, in the medium and long term (according to the *World Economic Forum*, in terms of competitiveness, Romania occupies the 62nd place only, out of 138 countries[10]).

Although there are many differences between the competition at the national level and the international level, such as *the differences in the cost of inputs, the different circumstances existing on the foreign markets, the different role of governments from one country to another, the differences in monitoring foreign competitors, of the objectives and allocated resources,* we must bear in mind that structural factors and the basic competitive forces of the market remain the same[11]. These basic competitive forces were described by Michael E. Porter as: the industry competitors and rivalry between them; the new potential competitors (potential entrants); the buyers (the bargaining power that they have); the existing similar products or services (substitutes); the suppliers (the bargaining power that they have)[12].

Competitive intelligence and management efficacy

The reconfiguring of the global economy will determine a reconfiguration of the business architecture, as well as the gradual transition towards a new management paradigm, adapted to the new realities, which will have to focus on the correct substantiation of the decision making.

Peter Drucker considered that "business effectiveness is determined by the essential things that can and must be learned by a good manager, such as time management, focus on contributing to the organization's work, identifying the way and the momentum for the capitalization of the strenghts, in order to obtain the maximum benefits, appropriate prioritizing and the combination of all these elements with an effective decision making process"[13].

In order to increase managerial effectiveness, there should be considered a series of elements.

– *The use of competitive intelligence in the decision making substantiation* – by creating,

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http://lege5.ro/Gratuit/haydambyga/hotararea-nr-775-2015-privind-aprobarea-strategiei-nationale-pentru-competitivitate-2015-2020 accesata la 03.08.16.

[9] Competitiveness & Economic Development - Institute For Strategy And Competitiveness - Harvard Business School - http://www.isc.hbs.edu/competitiveness-economic-development/Pages/default.aspx accesat la 09.08.16

[10] World Economic Forum, *The Global Competitiveness Report* 2016-2017.

[11] Porter, Michael E., *Competitive Strategy. Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors*, p. 276, Free Press, New York, 2004.

[12] *Ibidem,* p. 4.

[13] Drucker, Peter, *Despre decizie și eficacitate,* Meteor Press, București, 2007.

deploying, managing and controlling a competitive intelligence system, the decision-making process becomes more effective by: anticipating changes in the target market, to avoid strategic surprise; anticipating the actions of competitors and the discovery of new competitors or potential competitors; learning from the successes or failures of others; increasing the diversity and the quality of the acquisitions; acquiring in-depth knowledge about technologies, products and processes that affect the company; addressing new business, identifying new markets, niches and more efficient ways of production and sales of the company's products and services; improving the perception about the company; facilitating the implementation of the latest management techniques[14]. Trying a comparison, we can say that *if the manager is the brain of an organization, the competitive intelligence is its eyes and ears.*

- *The implementation of an Early Warning System* – the use of an Early Warning System is becoming more and more necessary, if not mandatory, in any company that wants to progress, the managers being helped to quickly identify all the opportunities, vulnerabilities, threats and risks to their business, as well as to take the best decisions.

- *The "value chain" analysis* - very important for any company that wants to perform and to reduce the existing gaps between the company's internal capabilities and the external competitive environment.

- *Encouraging staff's creativity and innovation* – Abraham Maslow believed that "*human beings are capable of extraordinary achievements; creativity and innovation are natural elements of our composition ....* "[15]. It is very interesting that the most successful companies are those that are the most creative and innovative ones, about them being observed that they rather distance themselves from competitors than compete with them[16].

- *Efficient communication,* both within the organization and between the organization and the external environment, as well as identifying and using the *best communication channels* – for a company to be efficient, competitive and to continue to exist in time, it must communicate effectively or learn how to do it. At a first glance, when we talk about communication, we think to an efficient communication with the customers, which is really vital, but not sufficient. First, the communication must start within the company, first among employees, between departments and between the different hierarchical levels (basically, in any company, communication is made between groups). Subsequently, in relation to its macro-environment, the organization must learn to communicate as a whole, which will create prerequisites to obtain added value.

- *Ergonomics* should be included among the top priorities of any management system, being classified into: *ergonomics of design* (to achieve, by people, maximum of results with minimum of effort), *ergonomics of correction* (rehabilitating and correcting the performances of the existing working means to the new realities, by targeting the improvement of the workplace microclimate), *ergonomics of production* (from procurement of the raw materials to the end-consumer), *ergonomics of the products* (which directly determines the company's competitiveness, the products being more popular on the market, as they are more efficient and more responsive to the consumer demands and needs), *ergonomics of information* (decision making process, perception, organizational management), *ergonomics of environment* (especially environment protection), *workplace ergonomics* (emphasizing the sizing of labor instruments, control stations and environmental factors) and *ergonomics of the human body* (that studies human behavior in relation to the peculiarities of work)[17].

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[14]Kahaner, Larry, *Competitive intelligence: how to gather, analyze, and use informaţion to move your business to the top*, pp. 23-27, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1997.
[15]Maslow, Abraham H., *Motivaţie şi Afaceri*, pag. 14, Editura Trei, Bucureşti, 2013.
[16]http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-burrus/creativity-and-innovation_b_4149993.html accesat la 19.10.16
[17]Toma, G., Teodoru, S., Tudose, M., Lungu, Severin Florian, *Schimbarea Managerială. Managementul schimbării*, pp.

- *Management, settlement and the transformation of the organizational conflicts in development opportunities and business efficiency* – solving organizational conflicts, by managers, regardless of their nature, must be done through communication (constructive dialogue with the parties and between the parties), through a diplomatic approach of each situation, through proper understanding of the causes that have led to a conflict – not necessary to consider the effect but the cause that gave rise to the conflict), and the adoption of proper solutions, in order to defuse the occured situations. Conflicts of various intensities and causalities, make their appearance at any organization, the success of its business, translated in terms of its competitiveness, depending on how managers will know how to identify the real causes, to address and solve them successfully.

- *Harmonious use of all managerial functions* (prediction, planning, organizing, motivating, coordination, control and regulation).

- *Compliance with the principles of management* – mere knowledge of management principles is not sufficient, in the past, Henry Fayol well noting the fact that not the principles are lacking, in business, but rather their application in practice[18].

- *Permanent orientation towards the expected results* – a company's daily operations should not lose sight of the successful achievement of objectives set.

- *Social responsibility* – being competitive means more than to focus on achieving business goals, more than being better than your competitors, more than differentiate yourself from them or win the hearts of your customers. Being competitive means to prove social responsibility. The link between CSR and competitiveness there can be demonstrated. To differentiate yourself from the competition and get ahead of it, the company must show sincerity and responsibility, both to itself and in relation to its external environment. Responsibility translates itself through the quality of the products and services, through their real usefulness, through the protection of the environment and human communities in areas where the company operates, respecting life in general by not harming the health of consumers, responsiveness to suggestions and complaints thereof. At the same time, companies can choose to engage in various projects, useful to the community, such as charities, investment in education and health, sponsorship of sports activities etc.

By creating, deploying, managing and controlling a competitive intelligence system, company-wide, the leadership has following advantages: it receives information novelty about the competitors; it can anticipate the actions of the competitors, as well as to discover new competitors or potential competitors; it can anticipate the changes in the target market(s) in order to prevent the strategic surprise; it can learn from the successes or failures of others; it may increase the diversity and the quality of acquisitions; it can learn new things about technologies, products and processes that affect the company; it can address new business, identifying new markets, niches and more efficient ways of production and sales; it may be more open to the perception of their company; it may facilitate implementation of the latest management techniques[19]; it enables a better understanding of the company and the opportunity to make improvements to its internal working processes; the company can constantly adapt their policies to the evolving market in which it operates; it enables more effective recruitment of human resources; it creates the premises to ensure the development of products and services perfectly adapted to meet the customer needs and expectations (at all levels of Maslow's pyramid), by processing signals received from market; it gives decision support to managers, based on intelligence products grounded in reality and novelty; it provides support in creating and implementing business strategies; it provides support in

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231-234, Editura A.N.I., Bucureşti, 2009.
[18]M. Moldoveanu, , Dobrescu, E. M., Ioan-Franc, V., *Iniţiere în managementul afacerilor mici şi mijlocii*, p. 18, Editura Expert, Bucureşti, 1998.
[19]Larry, Kahaner, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-27.

structuring the management activity within the company; it provides support for communication with the macro-environment; it supports all the company's departments; it has a decisive contribution to a functional *early warning system*; it helps top management identifying and flag certain development opportunities or potential vulnerabilities, threats and risks to the company; ensures increased efficiency of using material and financial resources of the company; allows labor productivity growth; provide a high level of protection of corporate data and information (including R & D); it help to prevent and counteract any disinformation addressing the business; it help to prevent and counteract potential industrial espionage carried out by competitors; not least, it helps uncovering the plans and strategies of competitors.

In regard with the strategy, for the senior management level, the *Strategic Intelligence Analysis* should be one of the most important analytical areas, a vital one, that helps to identify market trends and models, as well as to predict future developments of potential opportunities and threats to the business[20] (of the *Strategic Intelligence Analysis* examples we shall further include predicting developments on the opportunities, threats and risks; profiles of industries and competitors, trend analysis, anomaly detection and impact analysis[21]).

The determination of the effectiveness level of the competitive intelligence work can be done by examining five key indicators (the vast majority of these indicators are qualitative).

• *The quality of intelligence provided to the management* – is aimed the accuracy of information, the detailing of the information which facilitates the decision making process, the relevance to the business, the time response to certain punctual requests coming from the company's management, the speed of the requested information supply, to the managers, the frequency of situations when the management is taken aback etc.

• *The practical applicability of information provided by competitive intelligence* – focuses on how the information from the activities of competitive intelligence is used.

• *Developing of an intelligence culture within the company* – refers to the fact that an organizational intelligence culture is one in which a large proportion of the employees is contributing to the provision of data and information on competitors, the information is required before taking certain decisions, employees access to some information is subject to certain procedures and clear arguments, and one in which victories against competitors are celebrated intensely.

• *The analysis of the events* – the effectiveness of competitive intelligence can be tested after the completion of an analysis that aims to highlight the link between losses and a poor competitive intelligence.

• *Market share* – the clearest expression of the success or failure of competitive intelligence activities is the market share.[22]

Conclusions

Any company wants to overcome its competitors and become more profitable, to increase its market share, to develop and diversify its panel of products and services, investing time and money in change, restructuring, people. All these hopes and efforts are futile in the absence of a healthy management vision, an appropiate management system and a smart management style.

Competitive intelligence provides information novelty to the management system,

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[20]Fleisher, Craig S., Bensoussan, Babette E., *Business and Competitive Analysis*, Second Edition, p. 32, Pearson Education, New Jersey, 2015.
[21]*Idem.*
[22]West, Chris, *Competitive Intelligence*, pag. 180-183, Palgrave, Hampshire, 2001.

about competitors, products, services, objectives, policies and strategies, information that should be used in time, in order to generate a competitive advantage, such as an increased market share, a bigger turnover or higher profit rate. However, solely the quickly dissemination and use of information is not a sufficient condition to achieve performance, as it depends on how is it used. From this point of view we consider that: the information should be integrated into a business intelligence system, where it can be processed, correlated with other data and information and properly analyzed; the information must be disseminated in due time, to all the relevant departments of the company; the information must be appropriately protected in order to reduce the risk of getting known by the competition.

In order to support the managers in creating effective and efficient management systems, as preconditions of achieving competitiveness in the markets where they operate, we wish to make the following recommendations:

- the managers should clearly establish which is their vision on the future of their company, which is its mission and its core values;
- the managers should set S.M.A.R.T. objectives and develop appropriate strategies to achieve them, in line with the vision, the mission and the company's values;
- the managers must ensure themselves that the organization has all the necessary resources to achieve the objectives set (human, material, financial, informational, etc.);
- the managers need to adapt to the specific conditions of the market on which the company operates;
- the managers must ensure themselves that the company is able to adapt to the specific market conditions in which it operates, and to the dynamics of the business environment, in general;
- the managers must ensure that the company is well organized, that the work is done in a structured manner, aiming the effectiveness of all the activities;
- the managers should pay particular attention to the compliance with the management functions and principles;
- the managers must analyze the entire value chain of the company, on an ongoing basis;
- the managers need to communicate effectively and efficiently, adapting to each context, with their employees, with their customers and with their competitors;
- the managers should actively use business intelligence and competitive intelligence, in their daily activity, as well as an *Early Warning System.*

In the current management of their business, managers must encourage strategic thinking, to properly analyze the perceptions of the company in the market, to anticipate its evolution and the competitors movements, as well as to pay attention on the management styles they promote in their relationship with the employees. In the same time, we consider that: every manager must substantialize its decisions on rigorous analysis, in order to be able to flexibly adapt the policies and himself to the working environment; every manager must send confidence to the subordinates and to encourage their creativity; every manager must encourage the compliance with all the ergonomic standards within the company; every manager must encourage the social responsibility.

Analyzing the beneficial effects that the implementation of a competitive intelligence system has on the decision-making process of a company, which becomes more efficient and effective, we can easily notice that it thereby creates the foundation for an effectiveness increasing of that company (as distinguished Peter Drucker, effective decision making is one of the determining factors in *achieving business effectiveness*) and obtain competitive advantage.

In any state, a better competitiveness of the companies regardless of industry is positively influencing the state of its own economy. Given that the economic dimension of the security is perceived as generating balance for all other dimensions of it, the economic

security represents a vital factor for the national security, that should be treated as such.

In conclusion, taking into account the economic factor implications to the national security and the reconfiguration of the global economy, the relationship between competitive intelligence, management effectiveness and security is a direct and a demonstrable one.

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FROM ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE TO AGROINTELLIGENCE

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Abstract*: The article analyses the relation between intelligence economic and agrointelligence, seen as strategical instruments for monitoring, evaluation, analyzing and disseminating information from agro-food sector. Through this multidisciplinary and multidimensional approach, the usefulness and relevance of the information integrated in producing agro-strategical knowledge (agrointelligence knowledge) is being demonstrated. The new informational architecture of food security will substantiate itself on multifunctional aspects at socio-agro-geo-economical level, because partial and fragmented information are replaced, in the new globalization paradigm, with complex and useful information of agrointelligence type.*

The paper suggests alternative, integrated and innovative solutions to ensuring food safety by an Information System on Food Security (SISA), the latter having the role of monitoring and managing the main challenges of agro-food sector and prevent/control food insecurity at European and global level.

Keywords*: intelligence economic, agrointelligence, knowledge agrointelligence, politics agrointelligence, Information System on Food Security (SISA)*

1. The concept of *knowledge agrointelligence* and agro-strategic information

Starting from the supposition: "Food security can be insured if there is agro-strategic information of agrointelligence type, managed in an Information System on Food Security (SISA)", the main objective of the present article is to define new agro-strategic concepts and approaches of agrointelligence type. These solutions will be the base of a methodological framework on monitoring, evaluation, analysis and dissemination of information in the agro-food sector, an integrated and innovative information system.

In order to reach the main objective, the present paper includes a set of secondary objectives which substantiated on a series of interdependent agro-strategic axes, serving to propose interdisciplinary approaches. In a first stage, the analysis between intelligence economic and agrointelligence seen as integrated and innovative solutions for the maintenance of food security and sustainable development at national level has been proposed. Through this multidisciplinary approach it has been attempted to demonstrate the role of information and agro-strategic knowledge (knowledge agrointelligence) in obtaining early warnings to prevent and combat food insecurity.

The analysis techniques and methodology proposed in this research are not an invention, but an integrated product, born from a multidisciplinary approach, forasmuch as food security in the 21st century is defined by the fusion between intelligence economic and social security in the new geo-bio-eco-agro-food paradigm in which the agro-strategic information becomes a reference element in combating prolonged agro-economical crisis.

2. Business intelligence, intelligence economic and agrointelligence

Intelligence economic (IE) can have different terminologies, depending on its application on sub-sector level: agrointelligence, financial, juridical, cultural, sport, emotional, geo-economical intelligence etc. This term can be interpreted as a strategic-information management of companies and private actors or as a proactive approach of external environment, but also as a decisional support[1].

However, a distinction between business intelligence and intelligence economic or competitive intelligence must be made, the former focusing on the automatic exploitation of information. Business intelligence is developing data-mining techniques which are structured and processed by numerous personalized programs (*software*) with the aim at big data analytics or primary data-mining. Instead, intelligence economic includes knowledge management principles and methods and generates strategic information. This uses early warning and risk management notions[2].

If the concept of intelligence economic (IE) becomes a new way of strategic-information management, which directly or indirectly imposes on the actual competitive security environment through his transversal nature, then the notion of agrointelligence becomes connected to the different science from agro-food sector. For example, bioterrorism demands the national defense system to interfere with biochemistry. The interconnection of sectors and multidimensional approach of intelligence are also connected to agriculture which presents a series of vulnerabilities: natural disasters, critical infrastructure, climate changes, bioterrorism, expansion of intensive agriculture, biotechnology accidents, urban expansion etc.

If we look upon the right to life and food, then the interdependent relation between national security and agro-food sector should not be overlooked. In this equation, agrointelligence relates directly to national security and safety, directly influencing itself under the form of cause-effect formula. This integrated approach becomes necessary in the actual security environment in continuous transformation and in which the food system is more and more interconnected and agriculture becomes more and more vulnerable to present climate changes and socio-economical crisis.

In this context, the notion of agrointelligence, as an integrated part of intelligence economic notion, becomes a new dimension of food security in the new paradigm of globalization, substantiating on an interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approach. It was born as an answer to the present challenges and threats, where by definition, it proposes integrated and intelligent solutions for the agro-food sector in the actual hybrid and asymmetric context, where the phenomenon of globalization involves and imposes a competitive and strategic approach including in the agro-socio-economical domain[3].

3. Agrointelligence and System on Food Security (SISA)

The need for agrointelligence becomes imperative in the present context for two reasons: the globalization risk in the informational era by the rise of an interdependency at the level of tendencies from agro-food sector, the complexities, uniformity and interconnection of the sectors that need an integrated approach. Agrointelligence is a new concept which

[1] Christian Harbulot, *Manual de Intelligence Economic,* ediția a II-a, Editura PUF. (accesat la 15 martie 2016)

[2] Delbecque Eric, *Intelligence Economic*, Presses Universitaires de France, 2006.

[3] Henri Martre (coord.), *Rapport du Commissariat au Plan consacré à «l'intelligence économique et la compétitivité des entreprises»,* La documentation française, 1994, pp. 16-17.

influences multiple sectors from the agro-food system, found in relation of interdependency and over which agriculture has a major impact[4].

Also, the new dimension – agrointelligence – will cancel the errors and uncertainties at agro-commercial level and will support the competitiveness growth at local, regional and national level through constant access to agro-strategic knowledge and information. This new interdependent approach will consider multifunctional aspects at geo-economical and geo-strategic level with the aim of preventing and combating agro-food insecurity during crisis or emergency situations. Moreover, the concept of agriculture must be multidisciplinary analyzed considering the evolution of technology, agro-genetics and nanotechnology. Thus, the agro sector must be connected to the economical security environment due to its connections with the domains related to it: food security and safety, ecological, economical security, social and societal security. Hence, the risk and threats associated with the agro-food sector can generate alternative crisis, which involves an integrated, innovative and informational approach to it (agrointelligence)[5].

However, this policy can create sector sub-policies, like politics agrointelligence due to its multidimensional structure and ramification. More, it can be looked as an economical, technological, information management, juridical/political, psychosocial science research integrated domain by the integrated use of technological resources in order to define a new discipline. What is innovative in this domain is the approach of integrated techniques of socio-politico-economical analysis, which substantiates on strategic methods of data gathering and planning in risk management.

To manage the agro-food sector's risks and seize the opportunities, each network entity needs to build itself a strict monitoring and early warning system. The monitoring underlies the agrointelligence process and becomes useful in developing security strategies by influence. The purpose of monitoring is to produce agro-strategic knowledge through the confrontation with the external and international environment (benchmark) in relation with the competitive environment, to improve the best practices of other actors (constant monitoring and update of indicators) and to reduce uncertainty (anticipation/prediction).

Data that generates agrointelligence products come from multiple governmental or nongovernmental organizations or groups of organizations. These actors are structured as integrated networks, which in their turn, each and every one of them generates agro-strategic information regarding their sphere of activity. They are mostly from the medical sector, agriculture, veterinary medicine, environmental and plant protection, food industry, security and intelligence, juridical, national defense, border security or (non)governmental agencies. In this network, each actor/organization provides data according to their object of activity. Needless to say, the fact that each information supplier includes many departments which can become agro-strategic analysis suppliers needs to be considered. These departments can be oriented towards the following domains: medicine, biology, physics, sociology, intelligence, counter-information, monitoring, risk analysis, juridical, emergency situations planning[6].

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[4] Neacşu Mădălina Steluţa, fondator Agrointelligence SISA, *Nevoia de cultură de securitate agroalimentară prin cunoaştere şi informaţie în contextul conflictelor regionale*, http://adevarul.ro/international/foreign-policy/nevoia-cultura-securitate-agroalimentara-cunoastere-siinformatie-contextul-conflictelor-regionale-1_553df46acfbe376e3598a83d/index.html

[5] Neacşu,Steluţa Mădălina, *Agrointelligence. Securitatea agroalimentară – o nouă paradigmă a globalizării*, Bucureşti, Editura Institutul European Iaşi, noiembrie 2015

[6] Neacşu Mădălina Steluţa, fondator Agrointelligence SISA , *« Agrointelligence – o analiza integrata si strategica a sectorului agroalimentar »*, articol publicat pe http://www.sisa.ro/component/content/article/18-noutati/63-agrointelligence-o-analiz%C4%83-integrat%C4%83-%C8%99i-strategic%C4%83-a-sectorului-agroalimentar.html

The actors from the innovative and integrated platform of agrointelligence take the form of intersystem networks, which interacts to generate knowledge agrointelligence. The transfer and use of agrointelligence knowledge cause:

➢ A better governance in the agro-food sector forasmuch as agrointelligence can be seen as an analytic instrument for diagnostic and orientation, but also as an agro-strategic information supplier for decision-makers.

➢ A communication network for farmers, a sort of integrated, innovative and strategic consulting which offers transparency and facilitates public-private partnerships (PPP).

It is required that the data supplying network is decentralized, diversified and with a multidisciplinary approach, where different science and intelligence based sectors can interdependently coalesce. Thus, the science and intelligence will be able to use a mutual language, which will generate in effect knowledge agrointelligence. The effect of this synergy will be the obtaining of integrated and extended analysis acquired by the interpretation of all the supplied data from different actors involved in the analysis process.

Starting from this informational matrix, the agrointelligence products are based on knowledge agrointelligence and can take different forms: agro-strategic reports, evolution scenarios, early warning, oral displays or conferences, but also online communication platforms connected to mass-media sources and social media networks.

Conclusions

Why is there a need of an Information System on Food Security (SISA) to transfer agro-strategic knowledge of agrointelligence type? It is known that information becomes a vital resource in operating and management of organizations. The availability of relevant information, obtained in a timely manner, becomes essential for the proper functioning of an integrated system from a management view: planning, organizing, monitoring and control. Hence, the utility of a SISA will depend on the following factors: its capacity of analysis and communication, its proper support and integration at institutional level, but also on the use of adequate methods and, nevertheless, on the technology at the base of informational management.

SISA and the decisional process imply the involvement of many actors interconnected in a strategic informational architecture, forasmuch as food security insurance involves the direct connection of decision-makers with those groups that are vulnerable to food insecurity and also, the constant knowledge and monitoring of the nature and causes of food insecurity. The national and international policies indicate that the global objective of governments is to unite their forces to reduce to half the food insecurity cases in crisis situation during the next 50 years. Thus, in such a context, a well-analyzed information regarding food security and safety becomes essential for a series of actors: planners, financiers and other decision-makers which deal with the building and application of food security policies and programs.

In conclusion, an Information System on Food Security must meet the next objectives: the gathering and management of data which can be facts or numbers, data that can be gathered directly or taken from secondary/adjacent sources to the agro-food sector; the analysis and interpretation of data to generate agro-strategic information – of agrointelligence type – an useful information for the agro-strategic decision-making; the dissemination and communication of agro-strategic information to the beneficiaries that can be found in different private organizations or institutional networks; the transformation of agro-strategic information in knowledge agrointelligence once the deciders have assimilated and transformed the agrointelligence information into public programs and policies.

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MULTIPLE CONTEXTS OF DEFINING NATIONAL DEFENCE STRATEGIES. NORTHERN EUROPE'S SITUATION. IDENTIFYING REGIONAL EQUATION

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Abstract: This scientific paper intends to present the equation of Northern Europe, approach that requires the analysis of the multiple contexts in which the documents concerning the defence of Nordic countries were definEditura The research also takes into account the multiple interferences occurring in the relation between defence and security.

As a result of scientific research, we have identified three contexts: historical, geopolitical and geostrategic. Analysis of these contexts has shown that the countries of Northern Europe are acting in the logic of a complex security, concept under consideration theorists of the Copenhagen School. In order to complete this complex of security with regional valence, the Nordic countries have chosen to be part in the security community which includes EU States and NATO Allies.

The analysis of the defence and security policies of the North European states demonstrates that they were designed with the doctrinal and technological interoperability as central axis. It is the common principle of ensuring defence and security of neighbors to strengthen its own state defence and security.

Keywords: Northern Europe, security, defence, strategy, regional, context, historical, geopolitical, geostrategic, security complex.

1. Multiple contexts of documents defining the scope of Nordic defence[1]

A national strategy which ensures the security and defence of a country, regardless of his title, is a reflection of the era in which politics was conductEditura Such a document should meet the needs of ensuring defence and security of a state and its citizens and must provide solutions to the threats, vulnerabilities and risks which might affect the state. To articulate a complete picture which contributes to shaping the equation of the Northern Europe, we have identified three contexts in which the Nordic countries have defined the documents in the sphere of defence and security: a historical context, a geostrategic and a geopolitical one.

The five Nordic countries - Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden - have a common history marked by the presence of Vikings in Northern Europe, beginning with the 800. This history continued for over three hundred years, and three kingdoms - Denmark, Norway and Sweden were form While Christianity spread through the region, urban settlements first appeared and navigation was developed along with technological advances and the erection of bridges and fortresses.[2]

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[1] Elements of this scientific communication are included into the Scientific Report research with title: *Northern Europe - Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden. The content and the dynamic of the strategies for ensuring national defence*, PhD. HRIB, Teodora Irina, National University of Defence "Carol I", 2016.
[2] Dragomir E., Miloiu, S., *Istoria Finlandei*, Cetatea de Scaun, Târgovişte, 2010-2011, p. 39.

Contacts between the population in the Nordic countries are set before the year 800, most being commercial. Trade had no impact just near North European states, but also in developing links with more distant regions, including the Black Sea region. One of the trade routes that linked the Gotland Area from Sweden to Finland and came to Constantinople via the Black Sea is what is now known as *the road from the Varangians to the Greeks*.[3]

A noteworthy period is between the years 1397-1523 when, through the Union of Kalmar, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Finland and Sweden were found under a single crown. Subsequently, a series of wars between Denmark and Sweden marked the period between 1563-1721. From 1700 to 1721, in an attempt to defeat Sweden, Denmark join forces with Poland and Russia, stage known as the *Great Northern War*. Sweden manages to defeat in a first step, both Denmark and Russia, that after a period of the recovery of the army, Russian troops led by Tsar Peter the Great to defeat King Charles XII of Sweden in the battle of Poltava, in 1709.[4] Thus, after a period of territorial expansion, which marked the seventeenth century, Swedish Empire begins to lose territories, including Finland, which was conquered in the Middle Ages. Finland was several times battlefield between Swedish and Russian empires. From 1809, Finland became a Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire, being after 1890 part of its defence system. At that time, *the city of Helsinki was an important base of the Baltic Fleet, whose mission is to block an attack on Petrograd*.[5] In the context of the decline of the Russian imperial authorities and the formation of a strong Finnish political class, which fought for national self-determination, Finland proclaims its independence in 1917. Following the Napoleonic Wars, Norway under the Danish crown, is given to Sweden after the Peace of Kiel in 1814. The military campaign against Norway is the last war in which Sweden was engagEditura On 7 June 1905 Norway is proclaimed an independent state.

For Iceland, the period is noteworthy since 930, when was established the oldest parliamentary system of Europe (*Althingi*). Eric the Red, banished from Iceland for murder of Althingi, started at sea and discovered Greenland and founded a colony here in 982. Traveling missionaries, backed by the Christian king of Norway, imposed Christianity as a new religion in 1000. In 1262, weakened by infighting, Iceland came under Norwegian possession, keeping, however, a wide autonomy. Between the XV-XVIII centuries, plagues, natural disasters and commercial exploitation had a profound impact on the population of Iceland, reducing numerically, about 30,000 people. Icelandic nation is reinvigorated during the XIXth century and culminating with the adoption of its own Constitution in 1874. On 17 June 1944 Iceland proclaimed as an independent state.

On the geopolitical context, it is necessary to recall that among the many definitions, the concept of geopolitics is the theory that a state policy would be determined by its geographical situation.[6] We are talking, therefore, about the study of how geography influences international politics.[7] From primary interpretation, which is proposed by classical geopolitics,
which is based on a geographical determinism and located in a realistic paradigm of international relations theory, the concept of geopolitics evolved, being at the crossroads of several disciplines, including history, political science, sociology or psychology.

The Northern Europe countries remain in the logic of geographical determinism and articulate their foreign policy and the defence and security taking into account the geopolitical

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[3] Cristea, George, *Regi şi diplomaţi suedezi în spaţiul românesc – Secolele XVII-XX*, Ed. Academia Română, Centrul de Studii Transilvane, Cluj-Napoca, 2007, p. 5.

[4] Englund, Peter, *The Battle That Shook Europe: Poltava and the Birth of the Russian Empire*, Ed. I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, Londra, 2013, ISBN: 9781780764764.

[5] Dragomir, E., Miloiu, S., *Istoria Finlandei*, 2010-2011, Târgovişte, Ed. Cetatea de Scaun , p. 173.

[6] Comşulea, E., Şerban, V., Teiuş, S., *Dicţionar explicativ al limbii române de azi*, Ed. Litera, Bucureşti, 2007.

[7] *http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/geopolitics*, found at 17.11.2015.

context of each of them, but also the region. The general characteristic, the main one, is determined by the proximity to water. All five countries from the Northern Europe are countries bordering with cold water, tumultuous, who forced the development of a type of population able to survive in difficult conditions and to develop their navigation skills, especially coastal shipping, so-called *peoples of the sea*[8].

Some of the most important geostrategic specialists, including Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, George Friedman, Colin S. Gray, Julian Corbelt or Aleksandr Dugin, approach geostrategy from the perspective of a subdomain of the geopolitics. For them, it is important how the geographical factor acts on the military and political planning of a state. Bearing in mind that that research in this field deals with issues including allocation of resources to achieve national goals, we deem that geostrategy involves comprehensive planning. Through this comprehensive planning is tracked the efficiency of the mode in which measures merge to achieve the objectives determined by the political factor.

At international level, the actors - state[9] and non-state[10] - is facing a complex geostrategic context, problematic, volatile, constantly evolving. International actors are forced to make quick decisions and propose solutions both negotiated under time pressure and situations in the field and limitations of international law. Given the magnitude of this situation in terms of security and defence, and their impact on companies, state actors, especially European states, are facing processes of managing multiple crises simultaneously under different stages. An example is the refugee crisis. In a first step, state actors have had to cope with massive wave of people stormed the borders of European countries. Later, after scale, supranational actors intervened, crisis situations evolving in different levels and turning migration into a crisis that put into question including freedom of movement.

How will manage the EU to crisis situations will have a long-term impact because it will lead to changes in what was considered on completed European edifice, but it turns out perfectible, both in terms of its structure and in relations with other actors such as NATO and the UN.

We are at a historical stage where what we believe was enshrined at the end of the Cold War[11] is shaken by various actions, including military, political, misinformation, which threaten democratic values, including freedom, equality before the law, equal rights, rule of law.[12]

2. The multiple interferences occurring in the relation between defence and security

National defence is a collective asset[13], which is part of those goods, *which if they are assigned to an individual from a group means that all individuals are assigned to the same group[14]*. In the same logic, security is a collective asset. The definition of the security concept has exceeded initial definition, according to which security is *the condition or state in which an entity is certain to its survival*[15]. This concept is derived from medieval *raison d'Etat* (state policy), which has the meaning of "*state of necessity*". At this point, the concept of security is subject to many complex academic debates, highlighting its flexibility.

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[8] Paine, Lincoln, *Marea şi civilizaţia. O istorie maritimă a lumii,* Ed. Polirom, Iaşi, 2015.
[9] Governments.
[10] Entities that constrain state actors to take certain decisions based on interests.
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The states from Northern Europe are in the logic of a complex security. The multiples contexts already presented, especially the historical one, current and future developments demonstrate that cases related to national security of each Nordic country can not be addressed separately from other situations, but in a permanent connection. The security complex concept is the focus of the Copenhagen School theoreticians, being widely discussed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. Buzan is one that articulates this concept by choosing an approach to the theory of connection between states in security issues beyond geographic proximity, military or political to the economic interdependence or at social level.

Also, in addition of this complex security concept with a regional valence, the Nordic countries have chosen to become a part of the community of security in which are found EU states and NATO allies. In international relations, a community of security is an area where widespread use of violence, such as war, has become unlikely or even unthinkable[16]. The expression community of security it was introduced into international relations theory by Professor Karl W. Deutsch, in 1957. According to him, a community of security is made up of countries that have, due to a common development (geographic, cultural, linguistic proximity), a common perception of security problems and how they can be solved thanks to a level of mutual trust which was developed by various mechanisms[17].

Regardless of the new approaches and conceptual formulations, the state remained the backbone of security studies.

The position of a state, NATO ally and EU membership, does not automatically generate guarantee protection of all national interests. There are numerous interferences arising in relation between defence and security, including climate change, the global economic situation, limited resources, demographic or migration processes, increasing the number of refugees, which causes exacerbating nationalism, terrorism. These phenomena may become overlapping, depending on how to address their vulnerabilities, risks or threats. For example, there is a substantial risk of making a real connection between illegal immigration and terrorism.

3. Articulation of the Northern Europe equation

When we talk about the articulation of the Northern Europe equation we consider three elements: a) **Known**: the five Nordic countries; b) *Variables*: politico-military alliances of these countries and how they evolve and develop. Denmark, Iceland and Norway are allies in NATO; Sweden and Finland are not NATO members, but partner states. Denmark, Sweden and Finland are EU members, while Iceland and Norway – no; c) *Unknowns*: global challenges.

The key of the Northern Europe equation is, in our opinion, the concept of "social welfare", the "welfare state". The Nordics have an integrated approach to protect the social system, acting in this regard both at regional and European level and globally.

The equation of the Northern Europe may be affected by a number of current challenges, which are both at regional or European level and globally. Among the challenges are global migration and terrorism, including the existence of religious extremism, which generate violence and lead to terrorism; issue of foreign fighters; exacerbating extreme right; Russia's role in the Syrian context; transnational organized crime; trafficking in persons; climate change, including the impact on the dynamics of Arctic and geopolitics in this space. Also, the countries of Northern Europe are meet the challenges of military and security at

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[16] Jora, Lucian (coautor), *Enciclopedia Relaţiilor Internaţionale*, Ed. Institutului de Ştiinţe Politice şi Relaţii Internaţionale „I.C.Brătianu", Bucureşti. 2015, p. 67.

[17] Jora, Lucian (coautor), *Enciclopedia Relaţiilor Internaţionale*, Ed. Institutului de Ştiinţe Politice şi Relaţii Internaţionale „I.C.Brătianu", Bucureşti. 2015, p. 67.

regional and European background marked by a series of elements such as continuing austerity in recent years, which prompted simultaneously reducing costs, including those for defence, and increasing attention on crisis management, the action of Russia in Crimea and the profoundly negative developments in Ukraine intensified military actions of Russia in the Arctic, migration and refugee crisis, the terrorist phenomenon and scale movements to the extreme right and getting the first places in electorates preferences in these states of the Eurosceptic and anti-immigration parties such as Sweden Democrats and the Danish People's Party.

The five Nordic countries must reconsider security and defence policies and find solid to medium and long term solutions, sustainable, that provide assurance of territorial defence and security. The solutions are complex, from the deepening and development of the mechanisms of the Nordic cooperation to clarification of the relationship with NATO by Finland and Sweden, or closer cooperation in the field of defence between Nordic countries and the take point solutions, such as the reintroduction of border controls. Such a measure was instituted by Sweden, from 1 January 2016, at the Danish border, to control migration flows. Deepening the cooperation between the Nordic States on the one hand, to the point of full interoperability, and cooperation between the Nordic countries and the United States, on the other hand, are considered essential measures for ensuring the national defence of these countries. This is one of the conclusions of researchers Stefan Forss and Pekka Holopainen, *„Breaking the Nordic defence deadlock”[18]*.

Regarding NATO cooperation of Finland and Sweden, even NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, has sent public messages of encouragement to deepen cooperation with the Alliance, especially in the context of increasing military actions of Russia in Northern Europe[19]

Conclusions

The presented analysis has been developed starting from an evidence of the current security context: security without defence or vice versa is not possible. Dilemma on military-military in national security is no longer valid. The actual context determines the action at national and international level in order to obtain a space defence and security.

Far from being exhaustive, this communication brings to the attention of the scientific community a range of basic elements for articulation and development of defence and security policies by states from Northern Europe. These elements are decisive, particular for understanding the subsequent developments in the region, the impact on European and global level.

The countries from Northern Europe have defined in the defence and security field given three contexts: historical, geopolitical and geostrategic. The backbone of the defence and security policies of the Nordic countries is doctrinal and technological interoperability.

The common principle is the principle of ensuring common security and defence neighbors to strengthen its own state defence and security.

The countries of Northern Europe are acting in the logic of a complex security. The situations related to each Nordic country's national security can not be addressed separately, but in a permanent connection, beyond to the close cultural, linguistic, geographical, military, political or economic approach. In order to complete this complex of security with regional

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[18] This study was published in February 2015 by Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press.
[19] http://www.agerpres.ro/externe/2015/11/10/stoltenberg-finlanda-si-suedia-ar-trebui-incurajate-sa-coopereze-mai-mult-cu-alianta-nord-atlantica-19-15-57, found at 10.11 2015 and
http://www.janes.com/article/55246/finnish-and-swedish-nato-membership-unlikely-before-2020-despite-growing-support-russia-to-retaliate-economically, found at 10.11 2015.

valence, the Nordic countries have chosen to be part in the security community which includes EU States and NATO Allies.

The position of a state, NATO ally and EU membership, does not automatically generate guarantee protection of all national interests.

The interferences arising in relation between defence and security, from limited resources to exacerbating nationalism may become overlapping, depending on how to address their vulnerabilities, risks or threats.

The concept of social welfare is the key of North equation and it can be affected by a number of current challenges, which are both at regional or European level and globally, also. How it proceeds these challenges could cause changes in the equation of Nordic countries, with implications for defence and security. To address these challenges, the Nordic countries are in a complex security logic which relies, first of all, on deepening Nordic cooperation, as well as on the cooperation between these countries and the US and on the cooperation in international organizations. Analysis on defence and security policies of Sweden and Finland revealed that the two countries are working effectively within the current international security system without joining NATO. Reexamination of the security and defence policies may result new options, in the future.

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34. www.janes.com –„Jane´s Defence".

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37. www.osce.org –Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

38. www.regjeringen.no – The Government of the Kingdom of Norway.

39. http://valtioneuvosto.fi – The Government of Finland.

MODERN WARFARE, PRODUCT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE DOCTRINE

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Abstract: The liberal peace is the most comprehensive and compelling challenge to the realist theories on hegemonic order and balance of power. Although the modern warfare is certainly a product of the democratic peace, conceptually scholars appreciate differently the contribution, as causality, of the differences between the Western and non-western cultures, positioning themselves in two camps pro and against in terms of assimilation of the concept of the state modernization with the liberal democratization. In the present scientific papers, we focus on qualitative thematic and comparative analysis of two of the most representative theories on the possible evolution of the international system, namely the liberal theory of Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington's realist theory. The divergence of these two theories is determined by questioning the universality of Western culture values and the impact of the other non-western cultures may have on the evolution of mankind.

Keywords: international relations, liberalism, realism, modern warfare, democratic peace, NATO

„First, what did we see when we looked at Operation Iraqi Freedom through the lens of transformation?[…] we certainly saw the power of transformation itself […]"
vice adm (ret.) A. K. Cebrowski

Introduction

In the period immediately following the US (United States of America) intervention in Iraq (2003), military commanders around the world have viewed the concept of waging military operations, based on information superiority generated by using the latest technology, as the result of the emerging process of transformation of army according to the concept of the *network centric warfare* (NCW), whici was announced for the first time in 1998 by vice admiral A.K. Cebrowski. Military leaders assessed that the ability to collect, process, distribute information and to act on faster than the enemy is the key to victory. Vice Admiral Cebrowski called this situation as a „*new American way of war*"[1].

But the understanding of the modern warfare and how armies should be transformed in order to meet its challenges can be made not only on the considerations of the technological „*upgrade*". The study of war from the perspective of military science and theories of international relations remains essential in terms of theory, being able to provide ideological and doctrinal basis necessary for transformation.

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[1] Sean T. Lawson, „*Nonlinear Science and Warfare –chaos, complexity and the US military in the information age*", Routlege Taylor &Francis Group, New York, 2014, pp. 3,4.

1. Liberalism as spring of the democratic peace doctrine

If, in the case of *realism,* we can identify in other cultures, oriental or Asian, elements of *power* and forms of *balance of power* theories, *liberalism* is a stream whose roots belong solely to Western civilization from the seventeenth century. In this regard, thinkers such as Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham, representative figures of the Enlightenment, reacted vigorously through their works to the extreme violence that manifested in the relations between states. Both were concerned, which is not coincidentally within liberalism, by the condition of human being into the internal plan of *social contract* between individual and State as well as by the *nature of international relations* between states.

The idea that the war, as a tool in politics among nations, may be prohibited by the creation of a confederation of states, in Kant's view can be put into practice through a set of treaties of peace and the establishment of a worldwide federal government, which had to ensure compliance with those treaties[2]. But the most important premise for Kant is that states have to adopt *republican constitution* because, in his view, *republican states* show a greater desire for peace and rational behavior in relations with other republican states. Later, Kant's belief of creating „*a pacific federation*"[3] of republics was taken up and developed by liberal idealists in the concept of the „*democratic peace*", at the beginning of twentieth century.

One of the main advocate of cooperation between states on the basis of liberal principles was Woodrow Wilson (28th US President, 1913-1921), whose remarkable political activity was marked by his academic background in the field of political science and international relations. He was the one who brought America from traditional isolationism, directing it towards a policy of active involvement in the construction of the world order in which USA should assume the responsibilities of the main power. W. Wilson disavowed totally realist vision of Theodore Roosevelt (26th US President, 1901- 1909), appreciating the role of *balance of power politics* in international relations as „*inefficient and immoral ... and we can miss the use of it in the future*"[4]. The immorality of the balance lies in the nature of secret treaties between states and its inefficiency is proved by its failure to prevent the outbreak of the Great War. In this context, the solution for Wilson and other contemporary idealists was represented by the development of international organizations that should perform similar functions to the national institutions in the areas of executive, legislative and even judicial.

Currently, we note that the objectives of the political leaders of major powers from Euro-Atlantic area *have been, are or become* related to ensuring global peace, therefore the concrete directions for action are aiming to democratize the states from the international system as a prerequisite for securing global peace. This approach appears to reflect the conviction that democracies are more prone to the peaceful resolution of disputes among them and to the international cooperation, which is able to justify the international community's efforts to support the establishment of democratic regimes in countries that traditionally, culturally and religiously do not share the Western values. Thus we witness the implementation of liberal *democratic peace* theory, whose main assumption is that „*democracies rarely if ever go to war with each other*"[5].

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[2] Immanuel Kant, „*Toward perpetual peace and other writings on politics, peace and history*", Yale University Press, London, 2006, pp. 78, 80, 81.

[3] *Ibidem*, pp. 80, 91.

[4] Joseph S. Nye Jr., „*Descifrarea conflictelor internaţionale –teorie şi istorie*", Editura Antet XX Press, Filipeştii de Târg (Prahova), 2005, p. 84.

[5] Jack S. Levy, William Thompson , „*Causes of war*", Published by Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2010, p. 105.

The starting point for conceptualizing the role of democracy in international relations was the article „Elective *Govenments– a force for peace*" published in 1972 by the American sociologist Dean V. Babst, in which he proposed to reach „*a better understanding of how the basic structure of a lasting peace may be established*"[6]. Babst's empirical approach was followed by Michael W. Doyle in 1983 who published the article „*Kant, Liberal, Legacies, and Foreign Affairs*" the results of his study regarding the wars fought by democracies between 1800-1980. The work of Doyle is currently the most cited source by scholars, this being due to the fact that, unlike Babst, Doyle is not only content just to argue empirically absence of war between democracies but also he analyzes the democracies' relations with the other states which have other forms of government or share different values. From this perspective, Doyle shows that democracies are sometimes driven more by passion than prudence, tending to justify their foreign policy in terms of ideology of liberal democracy and to initiate ideological wars which can sometimes turn into real „*crusades to rid the world of evil*"[7].

As Jack Levy also considers, *democratic peace* is „*the closest thing we have to an empirical law in international relations*"[8], theory stating that democracies, by their very nature do not start wars against each other, which historically guarantees peace between democratic states and this, arguably it happens without exception. This particular concept is noted by Michael Doyle in his study when he says that „*the apparent absence of war among the more clearly liberal states, whether adjacent or not, for almost two hundred year, thus has some significance*"[9], he appreciating that the key feature into the dispute regarding liberal peace is the way how liberal democracies are defined. In addition, empirical evidence being difficult to deny, theory critics' skepticism is more related to the validity and consistency of interpretation of causal relations determined on a limited sample data and not by the absence or presence of war between democracies.

2. The doctrine of democratic peace in the Cold War bipolar order

The success of liberalism is reflected by the increasing number of the liberal regimes, from three in Kant's era (Switzerland, France and the US), to more than 123 democracies from the 192 countries which there are currently[10]. Of course, classifying accurately a state as truly democratic is difficult, which has led experts to say that although more than half of the world's states are formally democratic, the number of genuine democracies is much lower, about 20[11].

From the perspective of scholars, like David Singer and Melvin Small (,,*The war proneness of democratic regimes, 1816-1965*". Jerusalem Journal of International Relations. 1, (4), 1976, pp. 50-69), that the lack of wars between democracies does not induce necessarily the conclusion the democracies would be more peaceful than other states, they are considering that the inclusion of the liberal ideology's principles in foreign policy could trigger a predilection of democratic states to initiate war with *autocracies*. This critique against the liberals has historical roots in their dispute with the Marxist-Leninists and the

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[6] Dean V. Babst, articol „*Elective governments – a force for peace*" , 1972, p. 1, disponibil la https://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/BABST.ELECTIVE.GOVERNMENT.PDF, accessed on 22.08.2016,

[7] Jack S. Levy, William Thompson, „*Causes of war*", Published by Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2010, p. 104.

[8] Ibidem, p. 208.

[9] Michael Doyle, „*Kant, Liberal, Legacies, and Foreign Affairs*", Part I, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 12, no. 3, Summer 1983, p. 217.

[10] BORGEN Magazine, „*How Many Democratic Nations Are There?*", 29 sept. 2013, ed. on-line, disponibil la http://www.borgenmagazine.com/many-democratic-nations/ , accessed on 22.08.2016.

[11] The Economist, „*Democracy Index 2015: Democracy in an age of anxiety*" , ed. on-line, disponibil la http://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2015 , accessed on 22.08.2016.

realists, now it is taken over by those contesting the *universality* of the liberal democratic values. The destructive potential of the wars waged by democracies caused Winston Churchill to say that „*democracy is more vindictive than Cabinets... the wars of peoples will be more terrible than those of kings*"[12].

The development and implementation of the *democratic peace* concept are closely linked to the characteristics of *world order* which has been in place after the Second World War. From the political point of view, we can distinguish between the order based on the U.S.-Soviet Union *bipolarity* of the Cold War, and the one that is based on the U.S. hegemony after the USSR collapse. Although, in what concerns the first, realists such as Waltz, claim that it has ensured peace through the mechanism of the *nuclear balance* between the two powers, we cannot fail to see that the including of the principles of liberalism within US foreign policy focused, from the beginning of the Cold War, on the global promotion of American values of democracy through concrete actions to support globally the establishment of democratic regimes. In this sense, the US rhetoric regarding the involvement in Korea (1950-1953) and Vietnam (1955-1975) was not based on the *national interest* arguments but on a *moral mission* to promote specific values of liberal American society (democracy, individual freedom, human rights) [13]. Even if ideologically the confrontation between the US and USSR was synonymous to that between liberalism and Marxism-Leninism, the prospect of the American leaders, at least until the end of the 70s was realistic, based on maintaining the existing *status quo* and preserving the balance of power, this situation was explicitly stated by President Nixon who believed that the premises of a better and safer world lies in „*if we have a strong, healty United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan, each balancing the other, not playing one against the other, an even balance* " and „*all nations, adversaries and friends alike, must have a stake in preserving the international system*"[14].

3. The End of history: the liberal peace or the clush of civilizations?

In the post-Cold War era, with the establishment of world order based on the US hegemony, American leaders' position has been clearly liberal, based on the conviction of the universality of the values of liberal democracy and the US role to ensure world order. This approach is found in President Clinton's State of the Union speech in 1994, saying it „*the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don't attack each other, they make better trading partners and partners in diplomacy*"[15].

This note of liberal discourse is also found to President George W. Bush justifying the onset of military operations in Afghanistan (2001- *Operation Enduring Freedom*) and Iraq (*2003 - Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2010 - Operation New Dawn*) through a joint of realistic and liberalist strong influences on American liberties and values by overthrowing dictatorial regimes and by the establishment of democracy.

We should note the consistency of US vision on global order, relevant being the fact that *two of the four enduring national interests* in the National Security Strategy of President Obama refers to „*the respect for universal values at home and around the world*" and „*a*

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[12] Wilson Churchill, „*Army Reform*", may 13, 1901. House of Commons, disponibil la http://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1901-1914-rising-star/108-army-reform accessed on 27.08.2016
[13] Henry Kissinger, „*World Order - Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History*", Published by Penguin Group, London, 2014, pp. 288,195.
[14] *Ibidem*, pp. 303, 306.
[15] Bill Clinton, „*State of the Union Address*", January 25, 1994, disponibil la http://millercenter.org/president/clinton/speeches/speech-3437 , accessed on 27.08.2016

rules-based international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security..."[16].

But this trend to promote or even to impose the liberal democratic values at the international level, generates the counter-reaction of states or social groups belonging to non-Western cultures, such as Islam, Confucian, Orthodox-Slavic (Russian) or Hindu. Of course this is not necessarily and compulsory a violent one, taking the form of war, but it can become the source of inspiration and motivation for states with revisionist actions on the *world order* and *territorial sovereignty*, or for the actions of the *Violent Extremist Organizations* (VEO) [17].

Although *modern warfare* is certainly a product of democratic peace, conceptually, the scholars appreciate differently the contribution, as causal, of the differences between the *western* and *non-western cultures*, positioning themselves in two camps: *for* and *against* in terms of assimilation of the concept of *modernization* of the state with *the liberal democratization*.

Illustrative for the two schools of thought are Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington, who managed to polarize the scientific community in the effort to make predictions on the future of humanity and possible war which it will fight. Their prospects in political and international relations reflects their experience in academia, especially for Huntington whose career is closely linked to the prestigious university Harvard (Cambridge, Massachusetts USA) and their work as experts and advisors in different American presidential administrations or diplomacy. The two manage to combine the practitioner's pragmatism with the theorist's expertise, their works standing out by lucidity and objectivity in formulating the problems.

The distinctive approach of Francis Fukuyama is related to the article „*The end of history?*" published in the summer of 1989 in the international relations magazine „*The National Interest*", the subject being treated extensively three years later in the book „*The end of history and the last man*" (The Free Press, New York, 1992).

The central premise of the article, and subsequently Fukuyama's book, is that the Cold War's end is the final stage of the mankind's *ideological evolution* and the *universalization* of the Western liberal democracy as the ultimate form of government[18]. He states that the metaphor of „*end of history*" does not belong him, being introduced by Friedrich Hegel, German philosopher (1770-1831) in his famous work „*the Phenomenology of Spirit*" (1807), in which he declared that the end of history should considered to be 1806, with the defeat of the Prussian monarchy by Napoleon at the battle of Jena, thus symbolizing the victory of the French Revolution's ideals and the *impending* of their universalization. It is interesting to note that the term is preferred by the German socialist Karl Marx (1818-1883) who believed that dialectical process of historical development will end with the communism, which will resolve all the contradictions from society.

Fukuyama argues coherently that the two alternatives, Nazism and Communism, no longer challenges the Western *ideological liberalism*, the great challenge of humanity is constituted by the assimilation of Western values in regions with large discrepancies in economic development, especially in the areas of civilizations that share different cultural values. He believes that values such as *individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, freedom, rule of law, democracy, the market economy, the separation of*

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[16] ***, „*National Security Strategy*", February 2015, p. 2, disponibil la https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf, accessed on 27.08.2016

[17] ***, „*The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*", 2015, p.1, disponibil la http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf, accessed on 27.08.2016

[18] Francis Fukuyama, articol „*The end of history?*", The National Interest, Summer 1989, p. 1, disponibil la http://kropfpolisci.com/exceptionalism.fukuyama.pdf, accessed on 27.08.2016.

church and state are the supreme expression of the evolution of human consciousness, from antiquity to the present, therefore, ideologically, it can be hardly imagined anything more[19].

Although these assertions seem to recommend Fukuyama as an idealistic optimist, he expresses his pessimism regarding the future of mankind, stating explicitly that *the end of history "does not by any means imply the end of international conflict"*[20]. For him, the radical nationalism and other forms of racial or ethnic discrimination will be the major causes of war, as was confirmed by subsequent developments in the Balkans space. Outstanding for 1989 and even 1992 are the predictions of the ideological evolution of Russia and China, which *will not become liberal societies* in a *foreseeable future*[21], but still, even delaying in own ideologies, as well as their returning to tsarist or Manchurian imperialism, they finally will adhere to the values of Western culture.

Characteristic for Fukuyama is his perspective on Islam, which he regards as a local and limited phenomenon, not acknowledging its *universality* as rival ideology of democracy. Because, in his view, the state *modernization* involves necessarily its *secularization,* the current Islamic radicalism is able just to slow down the progress towards democratization of the Islamic countries[22].

In fact, as we mentioned before, for Fukuyama the differences between Western and other civilizations (Chinese, Muslim, Russian, and Hindi) represent the sources of conflicts, even violent, but in an *unspecified* future these cultures, preserving their own identities, will assimilate Western culture and its values.

Unlike Fukuyama, who provides a bigger causal impact to *nationalism* than to religion, Samuel Huntington believes that *religion* is crucial in defining the nature of a civilization, so he identifying it as the most likely source of conflict in the future[23]. Similarly Fukuyama began his academic approach with an article entitled *"The Clash of Civilizations?"* published in 1993 in Foreign Affairs, developing it later in 1996 with the book *"The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order"*.

Even if for both theorists, Fukuyama and Huntington, *sovereign state* continues to be the basic unit of the international system, there is a profound disagreement regarding the *universality* of Western culture values and *immediacy*, even delayed, of their acceptance by other cultures. For Fukuyama, the direction of system's evolution is clear, without alternatives, the only uncertainty is related to how fast and with how many disturbances the final condition will be reached. In exchange, for Huntington solutions are multiple because, in his view, the Asian culture – especially the Chinese but also Islam, have the strength to be alternatives to Western culture and they are not willing to assimilate its ideological values. It is essential that Huntington distinguishes between the *state modernization* and the *liberal democratization* of the state, showing that some cultures can only choose *technological upgrading*, as China and other Arab states, without being interested in adopting Western democracy or human rights and freedoms. Thus, Huntington feels entitled to say that *"the conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world"*[24].

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[19] *Ibidem*, p. 6.
[20] *Ibidem*, p 16.
[21] *Ibidem*, p. 13.
[22] Costa André Georghiou, articol *"Unexpected convergence the huntington /fukuyama debate"*, the 8th Pan-European Conference on International Relations, September 2013, pp. 6, 7, disponibil la http://www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/warsaw2013/GEORGHIOU%20Huntington-Fukuyama%20Sept%202013.pdf, accessed on 30.08.2016.
[23] Samuel P. Huntington. articol *"The clash of civilizations?"*, Foreign Affairs, (Summer 1993), p. 25, disponibil la http://online.sfsu.edu/mroozbeh/CLASS/h-607-pdfs/S.Huntington-Clash.pdf, accessed on 30.08.2016.
[24] Ibidem, pp. 22, 39.

As we said, for Huntington also, nation state remains *the main actor*, but he considers that it doesn't pursue an irreversible path towards *secularism*, on the contrary is already visible the tendency of some states, nowadays still secular, to return to religious values. These trends are alarming identified in the Turkey's orientation towards a religious rhetoric with Ottoman-imperialist elements, also in the China's discourse with obvious traditionalist-Confucian accents and renunciation of communist ideology, but also for secular India addressing internal problems into a pronounced Hindu perspective.

Conclusions

As we have shown liberalism influenced, and we are convinced that it continues to have a fundamentally influence on the internal organization of states and international relations system. In our view, values such as *individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, freedom, rule of law, democracy, the market economy, the separation of church and state* represent objective and universal achievements of the evolution of the human consciousness and knowledge.

Analyzing how the powers from the system, especially US, argue their foreign policy by considering the liberal democracy promotion, even resorting to military intervention, we conclude that the *doctrine of liberal democratic peace* has an significant causal impact in terms of their behavior, constituting a formal motivation enough for their involvement in conflicts with autocracies or other states that do not meet democratic standards.

Regarding the post Cold War period, from *the comparative study* of Francis Fukuyama's liberal theory and Samuel Huntington's realistic theory we deduce that *their divergence* is determined by *questioning the universality* of the values of Western culture and the *impact* of the other non-Western cultures may have on human evolution.

An important conclusion which we deduce is the preserving of the role as *the main unit* of the international system by the *sovereign state*. We need this conclusion in order to argue that *war between states*, whether it has an *ideological* motivation or *cultural-religious* one, remains *the main threat* to the security of a state, hence the direct obligation of the state to develop, qualitatively and quantitatively, its military forces.

We note Fukuyama and Huntington's convergence of views regarding the *importance* of the Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, which has, for both, a *minimal role* in the equation of the new world order. This is because the goals of terrorist groups like *al Qaida* or *Islamic State (ISIL)* aim to the destruction of Arab states formed after the westphalian model, their ultimate goal being the establishment of a universal caliphate - *Islam's house* (*dar al Islam*). The possibility of such a project, whereby a civilization becomes a unified and coherent political entity, is explicitly excluded by Huntington[25], thus he is reaffirming the primary role of the westphalian sovereign state.

As we have shown already, and without minimizing the psychological and emotional impact of terrorist actions carried out by *Violent Extremist Organizations* on the global security environment, their actions do not have the amplitude to endanger the current world order. Of course, they can contribute as *mass of maneuver into the hybrid warfare's economy*, but just playing the role mapped by a possible *revisionist state*. That is, in our view, the proponents of the danger of terrorist attacks prevalence are arguing their theories on the basis of the reduced probability of the imminency of an interstate war, neglecting the fact that all wars have been likely only shortly before their outbreak and the one that was largely probable, between the the US and the USSR, hadn't luckily occured. In addition, we are convinced that no country will nominate in its security strategy, document covering a 5-year

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[25] Samuel P. Huntington. articol „*The clash of civilizations?*", Foreign Affairs, (Summer 1993), p. 48, disponibil la http://online.sfsu.edu/mroozbeh/CLASS/h-607-pdfs/S.Huntington-Clash.pdf, accessed on 30.08.2016.

horizon, an certain enemy state or an imminent war with it, thus eliminating any role of the diplomacy but also of the surprise.

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THEORETICAL APPROACHES
ON CONTEMPORARY MILITARY OPERATIONS

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Abstract: Based on the experience of military conflicts at the end of 20th century and the beginning of 21st century and on the point of view of military experts, the study aims to analyze military conflicts from the perspective of conducting military operations. In this context, there are envisaged the processes of switching from one form of warfare to another, the methods of using troops in modern military operations. Thus, there are analyzed the factors, conditions that contributed to the apparition of the term „operation", as well as the stages of evolution of operational art.

Keywords: war, operation, process, aero terrestrial battle, military conflict, phase.

If you know the enemy and know yourself,
you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.
Sun Tzu

Introduction

The experience of the military conflicts from the end of 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century showed us that the current conditions slowly melted the difference between peace and war. In our days it is discussed an eventual reform in the way of starting a war. The war isn't announced and if it starts it isn't taking place in a classic way. To have a clear vision of this complexity of controversial ideas and to be able to follow current trends, it is necessary to look upon the historical apparition of the term "Operations" and the phases of evolution of the military art.

The end of 18th century and the beginning of 19th century brought essential changes in the social and military behavior. The French Revolution (1789-1799) had an important role that led to deep changes in the military field and the armed hostility. Studying the wars from the 19th century it is revealed a new vision upon the military art. So the theorist Carl von Clausewitz said: "When the armies started becoming larger, they were assigned larger areas, the strategy was winning through the interoperability of different parts and so the battle order had to interact with strategy, this interaction was created through the junction point of the strategy with tactics, in other words the moment when the armed forces were divided in battle formation." [1]

In the past, when due to the conditions, it was impossible to create massive armed forces, battles were held on the territory of the state, the victory was limited to one or two battles. In the typology of military action, the objectives, the conflicts scale and the concepts are analyzed in a hierarchy. The relation operation- battle-fight is the essential structure of military action.

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[1] Carl von Clausewitz, *Despre Război*, Editura Militară, București, 1982, p. 281.

The operation is a „product" that appeared recently under the evolution of military art after the French Revolution. The first elements of operation appeared after the confrontation between French and Russian troops in the „Berezina Battle" (1812)[2]. The Operation is a branch of military art and it evolved depending on the scale of war.

The analysis of modern military conflicts from the Persian Gulf, The Near East, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, North Africa and Eastern Ukraine, proved that a functional state, in a short period of time (1-2 months), or even days, may become a bloody fighting arena that can become, in turn, a starting point of a civil war that can escalade to a humanitarian disaster and chaos. If we were to compare the destruction made to the social, economic and politic sphere of a state, we can associate them with those of a classic war.

We could remark that the „War Rules" are considerable revised. For the solution of political and strategic purpose, there are frequently used non-military processes because of their efficiency. The focus is based on a diversity of informational, human and political sources or other limitless methods, with the implication of society for the realization of proposed purposes. At the same time, with the action mentioned before, on a large scale are held military actions that have a secret character that differs from those of the operation with the purpose of surprising the enemy.

A way to mislead the enemy consists from introducing own forces under the peacekeeping aegis and their use in military actions for the successful realization of the conflict. At the beginning of the 3rd millennium, some worldwide events haven't contributed to the stability and the prevention of a new military conflict, so maintaining the armed forces operational is required to defend the integrity and territorial sovereignty of a state. From those above mentioned, the main objective of the Armed Force and military personnel is to learn new methods, processes and concepts upon the starting and conducting a military conflict in the vision of modern military specialists. According to analysts' opinion, in dependence of the level of the society's violence, the risks, vulnerabilities and threats for national security are increasing. The evolution and transformation of modern states' Armed Force are made due to these aspects and are characterized through the following:

➢ The main characteristics of "informational era" have their impact over the evolution of new fighting types, methods and processes.

➢ The technological progress in microelectronics and IT have created new informational systems in military warfare that enhanced the executional and leading system

➢ The use of airborne forces and diversion groups, enemy potential and the irregular troops in military actions.

➢ Invention of new WMD that generates new nonconventional and informational crisis.

➢ A radical revision on the place, role and processes of modern warfare.

The military experience has shown us that the success or defeat in a war is determined by the anticipated action or lack of information. After a thorough analysis of studies and literature on the military action in modern condition, based on the task of multinational forces in Iraq 1991, there can be distinguished three phases.

First phase starts with the beginning of the aggression on a large scale with a global flux of psychological and technological information, summed in a form of informational operation by all categories of special operations. This phase also involves the preparation and use of research-diversion groups of military infrastructure, government and other targets. Also, there are deployed joint task forces on the directions of action and there is done a research of the objectives intended to be destroyed by the air component.

In the *second phase,* possible actions will start through air strikes meant to destroy the economic and moral potential of the enemy through the destruction of main economic and

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[2] В.А.Семенов, Краткий очерк развития советского оперативного искусства, Москва, 1960, стр. 12-13.

industrial centers, and the population's moral state. In this concept the use of aviation for the help of ground forces gains a second role and is limited for only when it's necessary. This concept was used in the Gulf War. The possible concept of the aviation use isn't different from that which was used in the past. The hostilities will start through a powerful air operation carried out by multiple strikes meant to gain air supremacy. The contribution of Air Force for the victory was mention by high ranking commanders. The ex-Commander of Allied Forces in Europe during the WWII, general Eisenhower stated that even if aviation can't bring victory on its own, victory isn't possible without air supremacy[3].

In the third phase, after aviation actions, there will follow ground actions that may start immediately after those of aviation or after a period of time. During the Gulf War, the ground operation started after 28 days from those of aviation[4]. It's seen that ground troops are used for the conquer of industrial and administrative centers.

We should be aware of the fact that before the start of hostility, the enemy will use all kinds of intelligence: ground, cosmic, air, radio electronic, acoustic on an operative level that will allow the enemy to discover the force group and its probable actions. When the action starts, the enemy is able to use all of their force in the context of state's doctrine. The above mentioned information is confirmed during the conflicts in the Gulf War (1991-2003). But the cooperation brought on Yugoslavia has shown us that depending on the aim of the operation, the structure, the forces aren't always used in the ground phase.[5] The argument for this is the fact that the conquer of a territory isn't the main goal of military actions. The analysis of the 3rd millennium's military conflicts has shown us the flexibility in the commanding of modern states' army and the innovation of the new methods of starting and conducting of offensive actions in dependence of the created conditions. The military actions held in the Gulf War Yugoslavia[6] and the antiterrorist operation has shown us that in modern conflicts before the use of "air component" (5-7 days or more), we should be aware of the enemy special force activity. The purpose of those is the destabilization of law forces, blockade of economic, social and military objects and energetic system of an operative and strategic level, also the use of combined aggressive actions that involves external military forces and internal paramilitary structures. In the first 2 days of the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan (2001), the "air component" was used for the strike over aerodromes, command points, antiaircraft objectives, troop concentration area, military vehicles and terrorist camp base and on the 3rd day F18 Hornet were introduced in the fight. The Iraq conflict (2003) has shown us that the air operations weren't used in a classic way as in previous conflicts. A modern war can't be held without a major and effective contribution of Air Force. The side that doesn't have that kind of force or isn't using them properly is doomed to lose the war. After the WWI all the conflicts didn't use all air resources, even in the Gulf War in which through the effort of allied forces was concentrated a considerable large number of aircrafts for the conflicts' dimensions and the enemy's real possibilities. From these, it results that aviation must be used rationally and efficient in the battle's decisive moments.

For outlining the essential problems for preparing and conducting defensive operation on an operative group level that is used with the air component it is necessary to study the possible offensive actions of the enemy. The Gulf War became a model of a joint modern operation in which the multinational force's actions were characterized through increased activity in a combination with vertical maneuver. A specific feature of the action was the fact

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[3] Dwight Eisenhower, *Cruciadă în Europa*, Editura Politică, 1975, p.70.
[4] Eseu despre strategia şi tactica militară, Bucureşti, 1995, p. 143; Thierry Camous, Orienturi Occidenturi, Chişinău, 209, p. 438.
[5] М.А. Гареев, Полководцы победы, Москва, 2004, стр. 412-413; В.И.Шатько, История военного искусства, Минск, 2011, стр. 247; 249.
[6] *Ibidem*, p. 249.

that division had a difference of 1-2 hours between their offensive actions. The key element is the use of enemy's weak points for the choice of the main offensive direction.[7] In the AO of the multinational forces were used raid groups formed from attack helicopters and tactic groups at the level of company - battalion with the following missions:

➢ Prohibiting the movement of troops from 2nd echelon.
➢ Surprise strike of mechanized and tank columns.
➢ Road block that prevent enemy troops withdrawal.
➢ Leadership and logistics disorganization.
➢ Misleading the enemy forces from the main objectives.
➢ The use of psychological and informational warfare.

For intervention in the "Operation Desert Storm" were build 3 operative groups
1. South (3rd Mechanized Division, 101st Airborne Division, 82nd Airborne Division and marine units).
2. Nord (173rd Airborne Division).
3. Vest (special forces).[8]

From USA and Europe in the Persian Gulf, the "half of million army" was brought by air bridge of C-130 and C-3

In the depth of enemy lines diversion groups were used over the military and governmental infrastructure[9], for the support of main forces and majoring the offensive phase through the establishment of threats from different directions. In the depth were used airmobile, airborne and marine operative-tactic groups. The forces that were used in the Operation Desert Storm were formed from 82nd Airborne Division, 101st Airborne Division (USA), 4th French Airborne Division, Egyptian Airborne Brigade. In total were involved 23 Airborne and Airmobile Battalions, only 10 were used as airborne forces and the remaining formed Airmobile and helicopter raid troops.[10] The experience gained in the operation has shown us the viability of military experts' missions on the use of land forces in the actual conditions. The main characteristics of the operation were:

➢ The Iraq main force have organized circular defense in big cities but in the "cracks" formed between them the defense was organized instable, so the big cities were avoided, blocked only with necessary forces, the offensive rate was 20-55 km/day in the state's depth that ensured the fulfilment of the main mission.[11]

So the use of troops in modern conflicts has shown us essential changes in the method of use of those based on the politic, diplomatic and economic or other non-military aspect in cooperation with military action that include:

➢ Decrease of military and economic potential of state's military and civil infrastructure.
➢ The conducting of military actions in all environments (air, land, marine and cosmic) in concordance with asymmetric and symmetric actions with the use of a wide range of direct and indirect fire systems.
➢ Simultaneous action held against forces and objectives in the depth of state.
➢ Unified command of forces.
➢ The use of civil-military component.

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[7] Герасимов В.В., Основные тенденции развития форм и способов применения Вооружённых Сил, 2013, стр. 24-29.
[8] М.А. Гареев, Полководцы победы, Москва, 2004, стр. 439.
[9] В.И. Шатько, История военного искусства, Минск, 2011, стр. 247.
[10] В.И. Шатько, История военного искусства, Минск, 2011, стр. 247.
[11] Герасимов В.В. Основные тенденции развития форм и способов применения Вооружённых Сил, 2013, стр. 24-29.

From the analysis of modern military conflicts there can be revealed the fact that the use of troops has changed essentially the aspect of military actions.

The analysts and military specialist show us new forms of land forces use, rather than the classic ones in which the units were attributed small AO in which the troops were concentrated, and the operative groups were echeloned in depth for the offensive actions and the conquer of named objectives, when our troops were advancing, the enemy was retreating from the conquered area. In their opinion the offense remains the main form of warfare and represent the successive or simultaneous attack of enemy troops and the liberation of main objectives and territories.

The offensive action must be held in cooperation with air component. The belligerent forces will avoid direct confrontation and will use intervals between big units to block defensive points and achieve goals with minimal loses, in the same time will be held informational operation by special forces. A major role is attributed to the physic-geographical condition of the state and the IPB. Also we must consider the fact that there are other treats and risks for the state's national security and integrity. It results that how the modern forces will be used depends from the political and military situation, the mission's specific, force structure and its character.

Conclusion

From the study of recent military conflicts results that in the vision of military specialists and analysts, the character of an operation and the proper use of troops is based on the solving the objectives that involves military science that determine some theoretical part of operative art and tactics. At first, having a clear vision about defense and the use of land forces of an operative level will help improve the steadiness and defense activity not only of battle potential but also the physical and geographic condition of the action's direction.

In the end it is necessary to make a study based on the military action held not only by multinational force in Iraq, Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, but also the action of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and Russian troops in Chechnya and South Ossetia. It is necessary to build and prove the viability of the big units' leadership staff that is capable to hold independent actions, independent on an isolated direction.

The state or group of states(allied) that controls the sea, land, air and space, the 4 essential dimensions of modern strategy, and also the media space: info sphere – a crucial dimension in politic strategy, will easily defeat an enemy that pretended only for a limited power.

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INCREASING THE EFFICIENCY OF MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES USING LEAN SIX SIGMA METHODOLOGY

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Abstract: Transformations of the industrial processes and services from recent decades have involved major changes in the concepts of maintenance equipments management. Lean and Six Sigma methodologies developed in the recent period have distinguished themselves by getting an increased economic efficiency of the industrial processes under significant budgetary restrictions. Implementing Lean Six Sigma concept has allowed the identification of some effective and sustainable solutions to reduce the costs by involving the operators in the production process in the field of the repairs and maintenance.

Keywords: maintenance, military equipments, metodology, concepts.

Introduction

The many transformations of actual military systems were imposed by the change in the latest decades of the risk types and threats to NATO member states. These changes were aimed at both the organization modality of military management, and the structures and equipping of combat forces, of combat support and logistics support.

The technological evolution of the military technical systems of NATO army imposed the change of their use and maintenance modalities. New rules of engagement in battle were established, new procedures of use, in terms of operators, were implemented and execution procedures of specific maintenance activities were upgraded.

To obtain a high level of availability of equipment used in military actions and during training, the management and execution structures in maintenance area implemented modern procedures and concepts of equipment management during their life cycle. These concepts have been introduced out of need of framing within the limited budgetary resources, and out of the need of achieving a greater availability of some latest equipment. The new equipment, equipped with modern monitoring and control systems, requested significant changes in the organization and execution of specific maintenance activities.

Conceptual changes have occurred by implementing modern concepts of maintenance, reliability centered - MCF, maintenance based on equipment status - MBS, analyze and control of costs associated to the maintenance activity during its lifetime - LCC, but also by implementing modern management business management methodologies of the activity of management and execution structures of maintenance. Although each of these concepts has specific advantages and disadvantages, improving structures activity management is a common component (specifically addressed) of each of these concepts.

1. Methodologies used in the performant management of maintenance structures

In the maintenance activity of military or civilian equipment, a particularly important aspect is the choice of maintenance strategy. This target returns to management structures that are meant to decide the choice of implementing of those concepts, by which one can achieve high coefficient of technical condition and minimize resource consumption.

In the practice, for achieving improved performance of management activity, one uses multiple management methodologies. In improving services and processes specific to equipment maintenance in recent decades there have been observed the methodologies Kaizen, Lean, Six Sigma, Lean Six Sigma. They are specific for the growth and diversification of production, which resulted in cost reductions of approximately 20% and increases of the involvement and motivation degree among employers.

Statistics show that in an organization, as an average, only 10% of the management team involves in improving the organization's activities. Implementing methodologies presented lead to increased staff involvement in the management team in the improvement activities of the organization by 60% in the case of Kaizen[1] management and almost entirely in the case of Lean Six Sigma management.

Kaizen is a management process developed as a set of good practices of gradual improvement of the organization management by involving all employers.

Lean Six Sigma is a methodology that can be applied to improve the manufacturing of production processes and the elimination of waste by increasing the speed of the process and the identification and elimination of errors. This methodology has been obtained by selecting the advantages of both methods that have led to its occurence, Lean and Six Sigma methodology.

Lean methodology has occurred for the first time in Ford car plant in 1913 and it was taken up and developed after the Second World War by Eiji Toyoda and Taiichi Ohno within the Japanese car company Toyota Motor Company.

„The concept of fluent production – Lean Management focuses on eliminating all waste along the whole length of the logistics chain and in all the processes within an enterprise and on the position of human resources in the centre of the exploitation of all their intellectual capacities, within the entire structure of the company and at all its echelons"[2].

The introduction of Lean methodology seeks to maximize employees' work results by eliminating production losses and aims to correlate the production results with customer requirements on time, quality and quantity specified. Lean Management seeks to identify and eliminate the seven categories of losses specific to any productive process: *"overproduction, waiting time, unnecessary travel, unnecessary operations, excessive inventories, unnecessary movement and defects"[3]*.

Lean production wants products/services to have a perfect quality from the very first time (eliminating failures and non-value), products/services to contain a surplus value (transformations), the customer to have the willingness to pay products/services. The five Lean principles are based on the "Just in time" method and can be defined as it follows: identifying value - the customer lays down the product/service requirements, which helps identify areas that generate losses/waste; value stream - activities identified in the phase of receiving the order, design, production planning, execution, delivery that can bring added value; flow - activities to identify and eliminate waste/waste in every stage of the process; extracting – process functioning only on the grounds of a firm customer order; continuous improvement - the identification and elimination of new losses/waste on the productive chain.

The introduction of Lean management in the activity of maintenance structures has allowed management structures to find solutions to eliminate losses by analyzing each of the

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[1] http://www.zf.ro/profesii/kaizen-si-lean-six-sigma-doua-filosofii-de-business-pentru-afaceri-in-vremuri-tulburi-4447121, accessed 25.09.2016.
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[3] Gabriela-Veronica STOIANOVICI, *Waste elimination using lean manufacturing techniques*, A XI-th multidisciplinary National Conference – with international participation, "Professor Dorin Pavel – Romanian hydropower founder", Sebeş, 2011.

sectors that characterizes the production flow. Thus, one can avoid the cost of downtime or loss due to waiting times for some spare-parts or materials due the non-buying or to the existence of some tough procedures of release from deposits, one may identify causes leading to the creation of waste or carrying out repairs of poor quality, one can identify activities with a low economic efficiency, that can be replaced or removed, one can be identify improvement needs for specialized staff etc.

Another modern methodology to improve processes that characterize productive flows or services is Six Sigma methodology.

Six Sigma methodology seeks to improve processes in order to enable their results the delivery of products or services according to customers' requirements. A trial is expected to fulfill Six Sigma conditions if the failure rate is below 3,4 failures per one million units (the probability of avoiding failure is 99.99966%). Because in the current economic conditions only those companies that are able to adapt their terms to customer requirements can survive, implementing Six Sigma methodology focuses on identifying those changes that can achieve this goal.

Six Sigma concept (6 σ) can be understood more easily using "normal distribution", which is statistically represented by a curve shaped a bell. In real life, the production processes that result in products and services (including those of maintenance) is conducted by a normal distribution of events occurring. As it is not a mathematical process, natural variations of events occurring fall in a deviation that can be modeled as a bell type curve.


Figure no. 1   Normal distribution of events process[4]

Adapting the production process to market requirements, in Six Sigma conception, means identifying the best solutions to maintain maximum efficiency and availability of productive flow elements. Availability is achieved by loss preventing measures in the maintenance process, a process constantly improved based on the principles of this methodology, and by involving operator staff in the maintenance activities. The concept enables the possibility of achieving a maximum efficiency for the organization by a full system analysis of human-organization-environment, so that the products/services offered to clients can become more competitive than those of the competition.

Maintenance approach in terms of Six Sigma methodology provides total productive maintenance concept and is based on the precise definition of the mission, vision, objectives, expected results and strategy. As a total productive maintenance, Six Sigma seeks to obtain the highest yield for each of the process stages, the competent involvement in the maintenance activities of all staff (including managers) of each business sector of the process (from design to execution and delivery), increasing actionable autonomy of employers. The concept is to reduce dissipation of resources by using inefficient maintenance concepts and transfer maintenance responsibility on operators that become thus more interested in the use and operation modality.

2. Lean Six Sigma methodology

The management of manufacturing processes uses, in the current period, a combination of the advantages of both methodologies Lean and Six Sigma. Combining the advantages of the two methodologies has led to the issuing of Lean Six Sigma methodology that focuses simultaneously on loss elimination while reducing process errors in order to meet customer requirements. This methodology is regarded as the fastest way of lowering investment and costs together with significant quality increase and process speed.

Lean Six Sigma is based on the fact that, although the process has achieved an outstanding performance, one can still identify solutions for continuous improvement by using a cycle type like DMAIC - Definir, Mesurer, Analyser, Innover, Controler.

Figure no. 1 DMAIC method[5]

Definition: this stage focuses on goal setting and the goal of improving by collecting real data of the process and customer's requirements.

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[5] http://www.firstpolymer.com/3791-2/, accessed 25.09.2016

Measurement: definition of the process steps, establishing the optimal level of desired performance and the focus on improving the existing process.

Analysis: identifying and locating the causes of errors / losses.

Improvement: identifying some ways to streamline, definition and validation of procedures, correction and re-evaluation of interventions.

Control: determining the performance level of the improved process, definition of some statistical control methods and of new standards and procedures, verifying the level of costs and profits of the new process.

The DMAIC method that characterizes Lean Six Sigma methodology is used to improve products / services / already existing processes. The method is used as a system combining different tools for continuous improvement and focuses on the process by analyzing and comparing the results. By measuring errors for each defined phase, one can run an effect analysis, there are identified the ways to improve and there are controlled the changes results.

Another way to process improvement used by Lean Six Sigma methodology is still a cyclical method DMADV - Definir, Mesurer, Analyser, Design, Verify.

Figure no. 2 DMADV method[6]

Using Lean Six Sigma methodology of DMADV method assumes the control of the processes for the design of new products / services / processes.

Being a methodology aimed at improving knowledge and managerial performance, having a certain level of knowledge in this methodology area is being made by graduating some specialty courses. The results of the examinations allow for the granting of some certificates called belts. Owning belts of different colors does not specify only the level of knowledge, but also certifies the role of each member within the framework of the organization's management.

Professional knowledge held in the organization management field in terms of Lean Six Sigma methodology is certified by granting belts of different colors corresponding to the level of expertise:

- white belt - allows working in some local teams of improving problems concerning general projects. The holder has knowledge of the basic concepts of methodology;

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[6] http://www.firstpolymer.com/3791-2/, accessed 26.09.2016

- yellow belt - allows the participation, as a member, in the project team. It may endorse project improvements;
- green belt - contributes to the collection and interpretation of data for major projects;
- black belt - works on implementing projects of improvements. It can train lower level teams;
- black belt master - can train black or green belt leveled teams. It works in order to develop some strategic ways of improving the process as internal consultant and specialist in the methodology implementation technology.


Figure no. 3 The classification levels of competence

In terms of Lean Six Sigma methodology, the assessment of managerial performance in perfecting a process consisted of:
1. aligning improvement projects themes and objectives at the company strategy;
2. correctly establishing the data of the improvement project;
3. noting the importance of planning phenomenon of change and precise determining of project constraints and phases;
4. awareness of the role of risk analysis for implementing the changes as an earlier stage of the planning process of change;
5. developing teamwork and setting up multidisciplinary teams;
6. precise definition and assuming of responsibilities within the changes implement team;
7. involvement of senior managers in activities by providing objective analysis of changes (based on data collected);
8. monitoring benefits while implementing changes;
9. focusing on determining the exact causes of errors and their elimination;
10. selection and use of tools specific to productivity, capacity and quality;
11. sustainability level of projects;
12. use of project management skills;
13. validating results and their registration.

These criteria for assessing the performance of Lean Six Sigma management are only a part of the evaluation modalities. Given the many types of processes and ways to streamline them, the development of new criteria remains at the discretion of the management team.

Because the Lean Six Sigma methodology is an effective way to increase the management performance in the perfecting of the maintenance processes, it can be considered that using the methodology in specific activities of the repair and maintenance military system may lead to significant increases in operational availability of the new technological generation of military equipment. Given the current budgetary constraints of the military system that generates reduction requirements of the logistics footprint of military actions, we can consider that the use of Lean Six Sigma methodology in the management and execution maintenance structures for military equipments can help to reduce resource waste and errors. Meanwhile, this methodology allows to increase the efficiency of equipment and military technical systems management through continuous improvement measures identified through definition, measurement, analyzation, improvement and control specific Lean Six Sigma activities.

Conclusions

In today's industrial-type development processes, the performance of an organization (flexibility, quality, duration, costs) is related to the way of continuous improvement of activities in a world where the competition between companies is getting stronger and stronger. Lean Six Sigma methodology objectives of systematic errors elimination and continuous improving productivity are general goals, available in any company that wants to increase profits.

The advantage of approaching this type of methodology - Lean Six Sigma - in terms of professional development is that it can be applied to any process, not being specific for certain types of processes. Given the possibility of applying stages, the results can be observed after each stage.

Choosing to implement Lean Six Sigma determines the increase of the effectiveness of maintenance by maximizing the use of equipment and staff (productive and indirectly productive), the elimination of waiting times, of wastage and spoilage.

Lean Six Sigma methodology focuses on determining the source that produces the appearance of the defect / error during the development of the process and identifying the best way to eliminate the cause that will produce the same non-compliance, in the future.

Wide implementation of Lean Six Sigma methodology in the repair and maintenance military system required by the new generation technological complexity of technical systems and weapon systems will lead to improvement in the lifecycle equipment management and significant decrease in associated costs.

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USING MODERN CONCEPTS OF MAINTENANCE TO IMPROVE PERFORMANCE IN MILITARY MAINTENANCE STRUCTURES

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Abstract: Advanced technical systems held by modern armies currently involve the implementation of adequate solutions for repair and maintenance. Improving the performance of the military maintenance structures under limited budget requires adaptation of some solutions developed by the civil service industry in the process of maintenance of the military equipment such as Lean Six Sigma methodology, reliability centred maintenance (RCM), Condition Based Maintenance (CBM), Life Cycle Costs (LCC), System Lifecycle Management (SLCM).

Keywords: maintenance, repairs, military equipments, availability.

Introduction

The current military context, in which the geopolitical circumstances depend on new types of risks and threats, require the providing of a continuous run of the means of fighting, especially during the mission, as fundamental requirement for creating a strong response force. To achieve this objective, the streamlining and remodeling of the maintenance system present a particularly important role. This process was imposed both by the reality of the modern battlefield and by the requirements of bordering in the restricted and limited budgets in all NATO countries. Thus, it was created the framework of the maintenance systems modernization, process that has led to the increase of the equipment reliability and to the reduction of the repairs and maintenance costs.

At the NATO in recent decades, the maintenance modernization at NATO and member countries level included the activity improvement of the management and execution structures, the modernization of structures organizational system, the increase of the professional performances of the maintenance specialists and operators, the improvement of the equipment monitoring, the increase of the informational flow speed between structures and implementation of new maintenance concepts developed and tested by the civilian industry.

Also, the requirements of modernizing of the maintenance structures and implementation of new procedures, methodologies and concepts were determined by the technological evolution that led to the improvement and diversification of the existing weapon systems from the security forces of NATO countries. The current weapon systems are specific for reduced intervention forces, with a response power significantly increased, sustainable and coordinated by modern procedures and operational concepts. They have sophisticated equipment for data transmission, for ballistic protection, increased firepower and movement speed. All these facilities request the development of modern maintenance concepts, designed to achieve an equipment availability as high as possible.

1. Maintenance activities typology

The decreasing of operating costs together with the increasing of availability equipment that can be found in the endowment of modern armies involves tracking multiple activity fields characterizing equipment maintenance. The most important lines of action, which can influence the decreasing of maintenance costs and the increasing of the availability level of military technical systems, are the following ones: the management of the maintenance activity, the equipment management during a lifecycle, the management costs associated to the operating and maintenance systems, the information maintenance management, the equipment monitoring, professional training, materials and spare parts management etc.

These issues are dealt with in a diverse way by the specialty literature, which mentions several categories of maintenance activity in terms of equipment reliability:

- Reactive or corrective maintenance - *"The maintenance carried out after fault finding in order to reboot the equipment so as to operate in the nominal parameters"*[1].

Advantages:	Disadvantages:
- low initial cost for new equipments; - it needs a small number of personnel– the maintenance of complex equipment is usually outsourced; - it does not need activities or personal for planning.	It is imprevisible which leads to a series of shortcomings: - hard budgetary estimation; - decrease in the life cicle of equipments; - rise in the danger of security incidents; - increase in the time needed for reinstallation; - increase in the cost of materials and spare parts.

- Preventive maintenance - is the systematic intervention program, conducted at regular intervals in accordance with a well established graphic, aiming at ensuring the proper functioning of equipment.

Advantages:	Disadvantages:
- the strategy of monitorng does not need to be planned and the results do not need to be interpretated; - it requires a reduced number of personnel for the activity of planification and interpretation of the results; - it doesn't need complex equipments of diagnosing.	- it requires the planning of the maintenance program; - the frequency of preventive maintenance activities is big; - the cost of materials and spare parts is bigger; - increase in the reliability of equipments.

- Proactive maintenance - *"the maintenance undertaken before a failure, in order to prevent any dangerous condition or emergency (repair program revision, ensuring the stock of spare parts by monitoring operating parameters)"*[2].

Advantages:	Disadvantages:
- increase in the lifetime of equipments; - decrease in the number of interventions needed to bring back the equipment in	- it needs specialized personnel and instruments used for planning the activity of maintanance; - it requires efficient equipment for monitoring

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[1] Marinel CÎMPAN, Mariana ARGHIR, *Studies and research to equipment maintenance*, A XIII-th multidisciplinary National Conference – with international participation, "Professor Dorin Pavel – Romanian hydropower founder", Sebeş, 2013

[2] Constantin BÎRLEANU, *Maintenance integrated in manufacturing systems*, student scientific session, Bucharest Polytechnic University, May 2015

working condition; - the cost of materials and spare parts is little; - lower risk of malfunction; - easy budgetary estimation.	and diagnosing; - it increase the work amount needed for monitoring; - it includes invasive activities which can cause accidental damage to the equipments.

- Predictive maintenance - includes fault detection activities at an early stage, based on the monitoring of the phenomena characteristic to the faults occurrence.

Advantages: - it providing a high life expectancy and a high disponibility for the equipments; - it allows corrective activities; - it reduces the cost of workmanship and spare parts; - it increases the energy saving.	Disadvantages: - increase in the number of diagnosing equipments and costs; - it requires highly proffestional training; - it requires a bigger number of monitoring activities.

The maintenance of technical systems aims to increase equipment reliability, profitable industrial process and reducing associated costs and can be classified as it follows:


Figure no. 1 Types of maintenance

Choosing a maintenance strategy is the priority objective of maintenance management structures. This choice is based on criteria of economic performance based on associated costs, on the analyzes of the geostrategic situation, on studies and research in the management of production activities, on criteria for providing materials and spare parts, on the technological level of equipment, on the risk level and on the security degree specific to repair

and maintenance activities etc. Also, one must take into account that the maintenance management doesn't aim at increasing productivity by minimizing the time to perform maintenance and repair operations, but it is a means of faults occurrence prevention, that may cause loss due to the equipment operating inability. Therefore, the maintenance work quality becomes more important than the quantity of work.

2. Modern methodologies and concepts used in equipment maintenance

Military and civilian structures equipment operation under optimal conditions and with maximum efficiency is the essential objective of management and execution maintenance fields. The technological development of the next-generation equipment, the change in the way of operation and monitoring their operation behavior has enabled the development of new techniques for monitoring and diagnostics based on a variety of sensor types and analysis of data recorded by them. With these developments, it was noted a diversification of the procedures, methodologies and concepts of execution of maintenance activities, both in terms of management and the proper execution of these activities.

Among the procedures that have been implemented in recent decades to improve the maintenance activity, there were noted Lean and Six Sigma methodologies.

Lean methodology appeared for the first time in 1913, on the assembly line of T model, one of the most famous models of the car manufacturer Ford. The methodology has been taken over by Eiji Toyoda and Taiichi Ohno and implemented by the Japanese car manufacturer Toyota Motor Company, after World War II, when Japanese industry was faced with an acute shortage of raw materials, human and financial resources. The idea, later taken to the United States industry, is based on increasing competitiveness by eliminating waste and, under the name of Lean Manufacturing, aims to achieve production in strict correlation with customer needs, at the time and date and in the quantity ordered by him /her. According to Lean ideology, one aims to eliminate the seven categories of losses identified in production processes: *"overproduction, waiting time, unnecessary travel, unnecessary operations, excessive inventories, unnecessary movement and defects"[3]*.

Six Sigma methodology is a methodology that relates to improving processes in order to produce results in line with clients' expectations and aims at delivering the best products and services in terms of client's requirements. The processes that meet the six sigma level are those that fall, in terms of defects, below a level of 3,4 defects per million units (the probability of avoiding failure is 99,99966%). Six Sigma is based on two methods for improving activities and processes in an organization: DMAIC method - Definir, Mesurer, Analyser, Innover, Controler, used to improve the existing products/services/processes, and DMADV method - Definir, Mesurer, Analyser, Design, Verify, used to project used to design new products/services/processes.

Lean Six Sigma is a methodology which combines Lean and Six Sigma methodologies performance to eliminate losses, at the same time focusing on reducing process defects for customer satisfaction. *This methodology creates, in repair and maintenance systems, the fastest option to improve the quality and speed of the process while decreasing costs and investments[4].*

Another method to increase the performance of equipment maintenance activity is the implementation of the Reliability Centred Maintenance - RCM. This concept was introduced

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[3] Gabriela-Veronica STOIANOVICI, Eliminating losses using Lean manufacturing techniques, A XI-th multidisciplinary National Conference – with international participation, "Professor Dorin Pavel – Romanian hydropower founder", Sebeş, 2011.

[4] Michael L. GEORGE, Lean Six Sigma for Service, *How to Use Lean Speed and Six Sigma Quality to Improve Services and Transactions,* New York, 2003.

in the activity of state management and execution structures in the maintenance equipment field due to the need to make them more reliable, i.e. to maintain its operation technical parameters within the limits designed for as long as possible. The dictionary of neologisms, edition 1986, presents reliability as a *"Size characterizing the functional safety of a technical system in accordance with rules prescribed"*[5].

The RCM concept characterizes a systematic process used in the practice for determining the specific tasks to maintenance structures so as to achieve the operation of the equipment as designed, without failure, as intended and under the specified environmental conditions. This concept was first used to determine the maintenance requirements of the United Airlines, Boeing 747 aircraft and subsequently adopted by the USA Department of Defense (DoD) with very good results.

Using RCM allows determining defects production modality by using criticality analysis - "*a Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis"* (FMECA), taking into account equipment operation. The RCM concept demonstrates that each piece of equipment has a limited life and it is not enough some type of repair to eliminate some considerable risks. Starting from the design phase, it is required to establish a maintenance program providing the replacement of some critical components. It is thus allowed the prolonging of the life of equipment together with a drastic decrease in the risk of unwanted events (faults).

RCM principles are: preservation of equipment operation; identifying ways of producing malfunctions; prioritizing repair faults depending on the level of risk; selecting the most effective maintenance activities. The RCM implementation methodology is based on: overhauls for the disposal of wear or aging of components due to the fulfillment of their normative time duration or standard operating time; predictive inspections with the aim to determine failure conditions by using non-intrusive technologies of control and testing; the RCM Plan development, which includes the types of maintenance operations during the equipment life. The work quality (plans, revisions, inspections) depends on the level of training and experience of engineering and technical staff in management structures and in those of the execution of maintenance activities.

Maintenance systems that use RCM concept are characterized by cyclical activities of continuous improvement of business:
- Planning
- Execution
- Checking
- Action

Figure no. 2 Specific activities RCM[6]

RCM is characterized by the following specific activities: repairs, maintenance, operational classifications, predictive inspections, monitoring, technical controls, rebounds and outlets that are included in the contracts of achieving integrated logistics support. This concept has been implemented with good results in the armies of NATO member countries and has proven effective especially in theaters of operations where achieving increased reliability involves considerable decrease risk in using the equipment. Thus, the concept seems to have the disadvantage of a long service implementation and professional knowledge of high level for the staff specialized in the field of repairs and maintenance.

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[5] Florin MARCU, Constant MANECA, *Dictionary of neologisms*, RSR Academy Publishing House, Bucharest, 1986.
[6] http://alterevoingenieros.blogspot.ro/2014/04/rcm-taxonomy-and-core-principles.html, accessed 25.09.2016.

Another used maintenance concept, with outstanding results, is the Condition Based Maintenance - CBM. This concept, known as part of the predictive maintenance field, uses operating parameters obtained in real-time for the prioritization and optimizing maintenance resources (durations of interventions, costs associated to materials and spare parts, equipment no operating periods of time etc.), the concept has the advantage of decreasing the risk of damage by monitoring the operation of the equipment. So, the specialized staff or operator in the maintenance field can intervene in a timely manner to restore operating parameters.

By implementing CBM, one reduces the number of planned interventions, increases the availability level and the safety of operation, decreases the risk of damage and life-cycle cost, while maintaining operational performance. Introducing MBS in the existing maintenance systems requires major changes in the organization of structures, procedures, staff, resource, leading to changing maintenance principles.

Another drawback of the implementation of this concept is the initial cost of equipping with specialized monitoring tools and testing operation tools. These costs significantly increase maintenance costs for aging equipment with a significant service life. This requires both the introduction and adaptation of sensors in composing equipment, and, also, enabling new control tools, increasing costs for such equipment.

The warning and monitoring systems, used by the CBM concept, uses next-generation techniques of vibration monitoring (forced, linear, free, non / amortized), of analysis frictions (analysis of lubricants and wear particles contained), sensors and level, humidity, temperature and pressure transducers, ultrasonic analysis, electronic surveillance devices, dedicated software and other non-destructive monitoring devices.

The research into maintenance led to the development of this maintenance model by developing the concept of CBM+ (Condition Based Maintenance Plus - CBM+) that is based on a combination of RCMand CBM by adding the required structure for the maintenance information management (information extraction and processing, monitoring, analysis of historical data etc.). Due to costs, this new concept is mainly used in critical systems in sensitive areas (aeronautics, astronomy etc.), but also in the military field for equipment maintenance in the operations stages, emergency interventions, battle permanent services (Air Police, C4ISR specific equipment etc.).

Another concept used especially in management of the maintenance work is the management of Life Cycle Costs – LCC. This concept was developed due to the soaring value of the equipment due to their increasing complexity and performance. The need to frame in reduced budget allocations, determined by economic and financial environmental difficulties, at an international level, imposed multiple conditioning in technological flows design in the maintenance field, as well.

Life cycle cost management involves optimization activities for each of the stages that the equipment goes through during its life - design, approval, manufacturing, operation, repair and maintenance, maintenance, decommissioning, safe disposal. Cost analysis offers effective tools to management and execution structures of maintenance in planning future activities in terms of production plans and allocated budgets. The cost analysis of maintenance work involves analysis of each cost that constitutes the overall cost: direct costs, indirect costs and semi-direct costs.

GLOBAL COST

DIRECT COST - Subcontracting - Spare parts and materials - Workmanship	COLLATERAL COST - Unplanned investments - Failure to comply with contractual deadlines - Safety stocks - Complaints of beneficiaries	SEMIDIRECT COST - Stocks of spare parts - Activities of the productive staff - Scrap value

Figure no. 3 Components of the overall costs

Statistical estimation of costs in maintenance activities uses the concept *of average maintenance total cost per time unit* including the cost of preventive intervention, the intervention cost after defect production, the average operating time and the normal use. The average maintenance cost per time unit is a decisive criterion in the choice of maintenance strategy to be implemented.

Another criterion used in the selection of strategy maintenance is "hidden" costs, represented by the consequences posed by contract failure (time, quantity, quality etc.), non-security costs, loss of brand image, non-quality, lack of productivity of aging equipment etc. Together with "visible" costs (wages, spare parts and materials etc.), these costs represent the main elements in the analysis of any maintenance implementation strategy costs.

The equipments/technical systems management during life cycle (System Life Cycle Management - SLCM) is another concept that aims to improve the maintenance structures activity. This modern management system is based on modern principles of using diagnostic and inspection technologies that contribute to the integration and simplification of solutions of ensuring integrated logistic support (ILS). SLCM requires continuous management during equipment lifecycle with selective recovery of the operating resource for essential equipment. The focus is on ensuring the functioning in order to fulfill the mission through the use of advanced diagnostic testing equipment and technical engineering staff specialization according to the new requirements. This concept is an interconnection of three modern concepts of the management of maintenance work: life-cycle cost analysis; reliability centered on maintenance and integrated logistics support.

SLCM is a concept implemented in the military maintenance structures aiming at the harmonious combination of the advantages of each of the concepts mentioned to obtain a high level of availability of equipment for the least cost.

Inasmuch as the military and civilian repair and maintenance systems are characterized by the same factors of influence, it can be said that maintenance methodologies and concepts are similar in both cases. The difference consist in the need to ensure the higher availability coefficients in the military system especially for equipments used in military conflicts. For them, the risk of faults can generate major consequences for both the equipment and especially for the operating personnel.

Using the modern maintenance concepts in civil field contribute to the improvement and streamlining of technical and production systems management based on continuous monitoring, optimal use of resources and the elimination of waste, significant reduction of errors, control of costs and increase in the equipment availability. These concepts taken and implemented in the military helps to identify new technical and economic efficiency solutions

that create a competitive system with beneficial effects for the conceptual development of the maintenance and repair system.

Conclusions

The implementation in the activity of state maintenance management and execution structures of the new methodologies and concepts aims at continuously ensuring of a higher technical status coefficient in the same time with the risks associated to fortuitous defects / faults.

One, also, follows reducing the logistical footprint in equipment use, increased professional performance of specialized staff and involving operator staff, obtaining a higher level of reliability of equipment, the use with increased efficiency of the technical resource at their disposal, combat of wear and strict control costs associated to the maintenance activity.

By achieving these objectives, the maintenance activity becomes more profitable, the work quality improves and the implementation methodology of concepts directly influences the increasing of the availability of equipment and the lowering of maintenance costs.

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EARLY WARNING SYSTEM AS A PART OF MODERN INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS

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Abstract: The first and main security level of every country, political system are intelligence service. The main role of that system is to predict, analysis and preventing all threats that can appear and have destructive influence on political system.

Last events on Middle East and Eastern Europe showed that modern intelligence systems can't give full and effective image of threats. And as a result, it is quite hard, to make prognoses for the future and adjust decisions making process.

So as a result modern intelligence system should be transformed and include Early Warning System of conflict, which should work as a strong annalistic center. The main task of that system is to track social climate and detect potential situations that can transform in to conflict.

Keywords: early warning system, political system, intelligence system, security, conflict, threat.

History of human civilization is full of different crisis, conflicts and terrors. During our school and university education we are learning about that. The main idea is to prevent possibility to repeat such way of things by showing, from the childhood, bad thing as an example. Also our behavior is always controlled by adults (teachers, parents and other) they are trying to teach as how to become good person and do good things. And there is a lot of other methods and possibilities how to educate our future generation, and prevent them from repeating our errors.

But modern life and world hasn't become less cruel and militaristic. Just observing our daily news we can see that there are hundreds of injured, dead people a big movement of migrants and refugees. And all people waiting the end of conflicts and problems but no, more and more countries are involved into this conflicts, because of that conflicts lass longer and make more damage for our society.

World powerful countries and international organizations spent billions of money to resolve conflicts in our world. Specialists create new programs and plans for resolving international and local conflicts, but they appear again and again. The main problem of that is that most of conflicts have a long history and sometimes for short period of time they just stop, and become frozen, but not resolved. There are the greatest numbers of old unresolved conflicts then new one. Also modern possibilities work as a fuel for old conflicts and help them to become more powerful than they were before. And all this conflicts and crisis are a big thereat for different political systems, countries, international organizations.

The firs and the main level of security is intelligence system. This security system should observe and analyze prevailing situation. Intelligence system shouldn't just prevent the threats but prevent possibility of threats appearance.

Intelligence prevent threats by showing full image of situations that can transform in crisis or conflict. Intelligence is a right hand of decision making process and from intelligence work depends what and when decisions would be accepted.

Modern international situation shows that intelligence can't work effectively with modern threats. It is becoming harder to analyze mass of information that grows up every day. Also, the big problem for intelligence systems is that technologies empowers enemies so they are able to coordinate their troops and followers all over the world.

Take into consideration all facts and modern international security situation we should change our view about conflicts and methods that been used. That's why modern intelligence systems should include Early Warning System that should resolve analytics and prediction process and make decision making process easier and faster. It should combine all possible institutions and government and nongovernment organizations to expand information area for processing bigger mass of information and be able to make effective predictions in time.

1. Modern intelligence problems and threats

Main security level of every country, political system is intelligence service. The main roll of that system is to predict, analysis and preventing all threats that can appear and have destructive influence on political system.

To be able to work with all possible threats and prevent appearance of conflicts, intelligence system should consist of different departments that can study all sides of threats. One of the most important is annalistic department, which collects all information about conflicts and threats and create image that helps to understand potential of threats and risk their transformation.

Last events on Middle East and Eastern Europe showed that modern intelligence systems can't give full and effective image of threats. And as a result it is quit hard to make prognoses for the future and adjust decisions making process.

Islamic State is a bright example of that problem. US intelligence system (CSI) couldn't predict that ISIS can become a strong military power in Middle East which can destabilize situation in region. In 2014 Barack Obama announced that US intelligence system underestimate possibilities of IS.

Before the civil war in Syria, government forces actively fight with Islamic State forces, which committed terrorist attacks in Syria. After the tense of political situation in Syria and beginning of armed confrontation between supporters of different political sides, government troops were forced to fight on two fronts, against ISIS and opposition. As a result Syrian army were limited in actions against ISIS terrorists and military troops.

US is the main opponent of Bashar al-Assad, and it is clear that US intelligence should have been expected challenges that appeared after the destabilization of the political system in Syria. Situation on Middle East shows that US intelligence system worked situationally.

US military action against Bashar al-Assad triggered activation of Kurdish groups in northern Syria, who rebelled against the Syrian political system, supporting anti-government forces.

In turn, the activity of Syrian Kurds made a great influence on the Kurdish minority in Turkey. Military confrontation between the Turkey government and The Kurdistan Workers Party was renewed.

Activation Kurds groups on the Middle East makes as return to Eastern Europe to the Ukrainian conflict in Donbas and annexation of Crimea. There is a small thing that unites all this conflicts, Russian influence.

Last few years showed that Russia is a big threat for international peace and not just by herself military powers but mostly by influence on different radical organizations all over

the world. Russian military help to Syrian government destroyed all plans and hopes for peace on Middle East.

Crash of Russian jet Su-24 that was hit by Turkish F-16, spoil relations between two countries. Also situation with Russian jet provoked political support from Russia to Turkish Kurds and international conviction of military operations against Turkish Kurds. After failed military coup, were Russian president warn Erdogan about coup, Turkey began to change political courses by changing international friends and partners. Besides, coup provoked aggressive internal policy and strengthened military operations against Turkish Kurds, which has crossed the Syrian border.

Roman Istrati, Romanian journalist, identified that main threats for European security are different pro-Russian conclaves. And Ukrainian war showed possibilities of such conclaves. There are a lot of similar conclaves all around the Europe. In Romania we have RMDSZ which speaking about territorial autonomy and special rights for the Romanian Magyars.
In Ukraine we have the same organization, party "Jobbik" that creates the same threat for Ukrainian national security.

There is big Russian ethnic group in Lithuania, also, there is facts that Catalan in Spain also funded by Russia. And starting from USSR there is some relations between Kurds and Russian intelligence.

All this conclaves and organizations were created not yesterday or year earlier. This relations were developed during years behind world back and none drew attention that this "international" relations can be a real threat for world peace, but this relations should have been observed and identify by different intelligence systems.

Analyzing all events that were proposed and modern international situation we can highlight few main problems of intelligence systems.

First of all military and civil intelligence are divided and work separately. The cooperation between this to departments of organizations is too small or is completely absent. And we aren't talking about cooperation closely to the battlefield, we are talking about cooperation between civil intelligence here in countries, far away from battlefield. We should understand that today terrorism really become international. Modern technologies helped terrorism with that and if soldier win the war, it is quite hard to say if conflict over, because terrorist can hide anywhere and appear any time. Intelligence should establish deeper cooperation with other organizations and departments to be able to collect as much information as they could.

Second big problem are communication technologies as internet and different social networks that become a perfect and very comfortable place for coordination and organization different terroristic attacks. The last attacks in Western Europe are good example, when attacks was organized by online chatting. Also we can find any information about tools that we need for bomb and other weapons and explosives.

Modern intelligence should understand that internet space is a new battlefield and a new area for crimes. We can see that this terroristic fully connected to the Middle East terroristic organizations, so there is a big terroristic network all over the world and it is a big threat for world security and intelligence systems should develop their analyzing departments and skills.

It follows that intelligence have a big problems with collecting and analyzing process. Our modern life is full of information and every day number of information increases. Intelligence should be able to filter all information and find truth but as a result we can see that modern intelligence can't comprehend everything. So it should develop and implement modern technologies, methods using Big Data ideas.

The last problem that arise from the previous problems is insolvency in scenario planning. The main idea of intelligence systems are to collect information and create an image of situation which will be helpful in decision making process. But if intelligence can't give information support to the government of head of organization, the decisions wouldn't be able to give necessary effects and results.

Modern intelligence system should be transformed and include new methods of analyze and prediction to be able to work with big mass of information and create predictions and scenarios. Early Warning System (EWS) is structure that includes new analytic technologies, structure of cooperation with other departments and organizations. EWS should resolve the nowadays intelligence problems.

2. Early Warning System as a part of intelligence

The idea is to create a structure, system that includes all possible departments and organizations that can give information about different areas of social life, starting from individual and his interests, finishing with political climates and political attitudes.

The task of Early Warning System is to track social climate and detect potential situations that can transform in to conflict. That means that Early Warning system should find "latent conflicts" that in future can become a conflict or crisis that will have destructive influence on political system.

All famous scientists of conflictology (A. F. Bentley, R. Dahrendorf; L. A. Coser) talking about individual origin of the conflict based on the needs that arise in the individual. Then comes the formation of a group that will defend its interests. Further there is a clash of opposing the wishes of other groups, which fully develops the conflict. There is a struggle between groups, leading to different consequences: consensus between groups, or total victory of one group over another.

It means, to be able to predict threats and warn the conflict it is necessary to find the problems from the beginning, on individual level or when individual interest transforms into group interest but conflict still on latent level.

That's why a good underground for EWS will be modern develop society. It means that there should be develop a great number of groups, social organization that know how and should always connect with each other discussing different problems and important questions for them. For discussing and expression their positions and ideas society should have a number of tools. For example: social network, membership in different government and nongovernment organization. Also there should be organized possibility to contact with government on different levels, like e-Government, different informational and social departments.

Main task to create and teach people to speak about things that concern them. This will help to collect as much information as possible.

All information collected from society, other intelligence departments (military, foreign), government departments, should pass across analytic filter which will process all information and choose the main facts, events and ideas.

The Neural Network will play the role of this analytic filter. Exactly neural network should transform and develop intelligence work. This system is main tool of information processing. It can process a huge number of information and separate it on different categories and find the main informational line. This function will reduce time for finding and analyzing information. Also neural network have possibility to self-education, system should be taught only on basic stages of system implementation. During the work process, neural network will develop function will be able to process more information and find connections between facts and events.

After analyze neural network will give the main thesis and problems about different arias. System will point at the most problem arias of social, political and international life.

All information received from neural network will be replaced into big Data Bases. This will help to keep the most important and precious information for further processing and developing neural network work.

Next element of EWS is modeling and scenario making process. When neural network highlight problem points experts trying to model situations, using information given by neural network, and create all possible scenarios that can occur under different conditions.

Using results of modeling and scenario making process, experts form a list of necessary decisions that can help to resolve existing problems or prevent threats and possibility their transformation.

List of decisions transmitted to government, department, organization or institution which is responsible for decision making process.

Early Warning System also can work with conflicts which are now going. System works in the same way creating list of decisions.

Implementation Early Warning System is a new step in intelligence work and methods. This system can resolve present problems with intelligence that exist. Also it can give new opportunities for intelligence systems.

International organization as NATO at the 27-th summit in Warsaw, announced about new program that should develop and provide intelligence for Alliance and cold it JISR (Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance). This program includes idea of Early Warning System. JIRS is a first step in creating EWS.

Conclusions

XXI shows that we are quite far from the world peace, and all modern intelligence systems can't fight all conflicts and prevent their appearance. And that's why we should develop intelligence system, and they could give necessary answer for all present and future threats.

Critical situation on Middle East, War on Donbas and annexation of Crimea, absence results in Minsk negotiation, unpredictable behavior of Turkish government, regular terroristic attacks in Western Europe, migrant crisis and other conflicts and crisis all this events and process are a result of intelligence work and inability to react in time on main threats.

Also there is a big threat from different nongovernment organizations, conclaves that are supported by different organizations and countries. This organizations and conclaves can be activated in any time and make big damage to world, national security.

To resolve present conflicts, crisis and prevent the appearance of new threats and conflicts it is necessary to develop intelligence systems, which can work in modern conditions.

According to present world situation distinguishes several basic problems with intelligence systems. First of all it is a bad cooperation with other organizations and departments. This provokes long time for coordination and cooperation. As a result a lot of time spends on different bureaucratic procedures. Also it limits informational exchange between departments and organizations, so it is become harder to make prognoses for future.

Next problem is limited informational space that is processed by intelligence. Present and future enemies us technological achievements to organize and coordinate different attacks. We can see that intelligence can't predict some of them. So it is important to increase observation space.

Increasing of observation space entails big informational loads. Present society consist and depends on information and increases in space scales. That's why intelligence should find possibility to control informational content and be able to find threats inside informational mass.

Also it seems that intelligence often works situationally. That's why it can't make long term predictions and help in the decision making process.

There are a lot other problems which follow one another. To solve this problems and make modernization of intelligence systems it is important to find a new approach to the intelligence process. Early Warning System is a one of possible variants of problem solving.

This is not just a system but it is a new method of organization and optimization work process. EWS makes a new way of cooperation between different organizations. Implements new method of analyze as Neural Network. Increasing scenario and modeling making process. As a result EWS gives intelligence new possibility to make full image of different critical situations, possible threats and predict results of decision making process. Also it can help to resolve present conflicts by making scenario of their end.

Early Warning System as a part of intelligence system is a new step in cooperation, informational analyze and decision making process.

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THE ROLE OF OSINT IN REINVENTING INTELLIGENCE

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Abstract: In the twentieth century, the "secret" set itself up as the main working tool for the intelligence agencies. The "information" was considered a valuable resource because of the difficulties involved in getting it. Currently the "open source" component of the "information" has achieved a growing role in intelligence amid accelerated growth that we experienced in technology and communications. Today, some valuable information can be identified at distance by combining all the possibilities offered by the online communication environment. Tomorrow, however, it becomes increasingly difficult to achieve this outcome given that the online environment is transformed into a place of confrontation between adversaries open to mass distortion and associated to various forms of cyber aggression.
The present study aims to highlight the trends generated by the OSINT "revolution" in the security field with emphasis mainly on the features that are identified within the intelligence cycle.

Keywords: OSINT, public intelligence, intelligence analysis, knowledge, SOCMINT.

Introduction

Our age is increasingly more influenced by the abundance of information facilitated by the development of technology products and online media. After the Cold War the accelerated technological development has increased the potential of information provided by OSINT. The open sources' "revolution" has opened new opportunities for intelligence services but also challenges that should be addressed through the most appropriate response mechanisms. Thus, the size of analytical intelligence has grown in importance. The now data available in the media and social networks support the analytical process and the analysts who are able to contribute to the overall informational framework by collating both the secret and open data.

At the same time, the proliferation of data and the spread of the means of access to them has resulted in a more acute "need to know" sense on the decision makers' side that really challenges the limits of intelligence providers. The ability of the intelligence communities to absorb the relevant information is not unlimited. In other words, the impressive level of information provided by scientific and technological developments in recent years could be overwhelming if we do not keep the pace in our efforts to develop both the proper processing analytical tools necessary to turn and exploit the large volumes of data provided through OSINT, "some of them subject to manipulation, intentional or unintentional alteration by the multitude of actors involved in their submission"[1].

The intelligence communities are facing today a reality dominated by the increasingly high rate of open data accessibility. Gregory Treverton, a representative figure in the intelligence research field, stated, more than a decade ago, that the new intelligence environment will be influenced by a "diminishing value of secrets and spreading the

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[1] G.C. Maior, I. Nițu, (2013), *Ars Analytica – provocări și tendințe în analiza de intelligence*, Editura RAO, București.

information available, if not entirely open source in any case, not all secret"[2]. He signaled, in other words, an intelligence paradigm shift from secrecy to information, from the period in which the intelligence agencies were more focused on collection to nowadays intelligence centered on collection and analysis.

1. OSINT and the changing trends in intelligence

The open source relevance in intelligence derives, more than ever, on the reflection of the following trends that regard the domain of OSINT:

- **OSINT transcend traditional media sources and expands beyond the other traditional INT domains**

Nowadays, information can be collected both by directing operators' actions of elicitation, consulting commercial satellite images or use specialized software to monitor online traffic or conduct traffic analysis[3].

The relationship between OSINT and the other INT domains deserves to be detailed in the light of the latest developments.

- *OSINT vs. IMINT*

Gregory F. Treverton stated (2001) that IMINT became so widespread in the private commercial businesses that its very existence as a distinct component of the intelligence asset is in danger[4]. It is important to mention, nevertheless, that no matter how important became the commercial imagery and even if private companies (like, for example, Digital Globe, Space Imaging) are offering plenty of satellite images they will never substitute the public IMINT capabilities because, simply, in an hypothetical case of it would the very notion of secrecy inside the specific intelligence activities would be lost. However, their emergence amplifies the competition between the public and private intelligence. The private IMINT would be non-existent outside the broader spectrum described OSINT, which triggers a sort of mutual conditionality type of relationship between OSINT and IMINT. The image processed by specialized companies is worthless if it is not published or popularized in open sources; it is information that does not sell and therefore does not meet the interests of the private company which is essentially financial and profit driven. Basically, this is the major difference between the public and private intelligence. An intelligence service does not need to make known its intentions and the types of information it operates only in particular situations which require such a course of action like, for example, a special operation designed to deter an opponent (when the leak in the media may be voluntary and is meant to neutralize a potential hostile action of a specific opponent).

- *OSINT vs. HUMINT*

OSINT does not confine to traditional media sources (online publications, TV and radio stations, blogs, etc.), official public information (institutional statistical reports, messages and public statements), data and information of academic debate (conferences, think tank debates,

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[2] G.F. Treverton, (2001), *Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information*, Cambridge University press, Cambridge.
[3] S.C. Mercado, *Sailing the Sea of OSINT in the Information Age*, [online], https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no3/article05.html#fn16
[4] G.F. Treverton, (2001), *Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information*, Cambridge University press, Cambridge.

etc.) and gray literature[5]. With the development of social networks, OSINT involved new digital media products with user-created content (which may take the form of news, messages, and various other materials in text, video and / or audio) for distribution on the Internet.

Social media platforms like Facebook, Google+, Twitter and V. Kontakte have become spaces of social interaction. They enable each individual to become "a producer and a vehicle for transmitting information"[6] . The opinions expressed by individuals get value regardless of the type of information (true or false) the message content expresses. In the relation between OSINT and HUMINT, the ideas and messages expressed on social platforms by various individuals are relevant because they validates the content of information transmitted and can support the work of profiling the individual personality and behavior, relational circle and areas of interest for the individuals expressing them. All these possibilities offered by OSINT and can be used by default by cyberspace aggressors.

Exploitation of human resources in various areas of crisis represents a challenge for any intelligence agency in terms of financial and time costs. Therefore, OSINT is an alternative to HUMINT in specific crisis situations. In others, it could provide a basis to initiate specific operations like recruitment of a new source. Open sources exemplify situations where data from Twitter can be used for approaching and recruiting a new source[7]. Social media provides data on persons indicating their area of expertise (what do they know?) and their relational diagram (who do they know?) which are extremely useful for solving a specific task.

- *OSINT vs. SIGINT*

During the Cold War, SIGINT capabilities were indispensable for an intelligence service amid widespread use of telephone lines and radio communications. Currently, mobile communications are enabling the transmission of messages through various social platforms provided by online service providers (Google, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, etc.). More and more people find indispensable the mobile devices in their possession and the applications they offer, some of them (e.g. Skype and WhatsApp)[8] equipped with encryption of the message from the transmitter to the receiver and vice versa. On the background of higher threat of terrorist attack, this latter aspect manifests concern at the level of some Western countries which intend to regulate the access of competent authorities to encrypted communications provided by Facebook (via WhatsUp).

From this perspective, nowadays, the theory that highlights monitoring social media networks is "the new SIGINT" is becoming increasingly likely. A new dimension, SOCMINT (Social Media Intelligence) self-generates in a spectrum that interferes with two major areas in intelligence, OSINT and SIGINT. SOCMINT becomes an indispensable an intelligence capability in terms of operability. Internet hosts platforms indicating in real time by the use of social media, the latest developments in a given area crisis. At the same time social media can provide data in a security matter that would otherwise be very difficult or even impossible to achieve without losing momentum.

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[5] what is published without taking responsibility by a publisher and is circulated outside commercial channels.
[6] G.C. Maior, Nițu, I., (2013), Ars Analytica – provocări și tendințe în analiza de intelligence, Editura RAO, București.
[7] M.D. Trujillo, (2012), *Are Intelligence Failures Inevitable?*, [online], http://www.e-ir.info/2012/11/08/are-intelligence-failures-inevitable/ Wheaton, Kristan J., (2012) *The new Humint*, [online], http://sourcesandmethods.blogspot.ro/2012/10/the-new-humint.html .
[8] Amir Rapaport, „*Israel revolution in the intelligence agencies*",

- **OSINT favors information operations and becomes a "weapon" used for to achieving operational or strategic objectives**

OSINT is a weapon for the abuser as much as it is for the defender. In an informational conflict situation the competitive advantage is obtained by the one who knows how to discern *truth* from *falsehood* and, more recently, *possible* from *likely*.

The exploitation of open sources for their own benefit has become, increasingly, a rule in practice state and non-state actors. It is the case of recently consumed latest events in Ukraine and Middle East crises.

Ukraine can be an example where open source has been used by Russia not only in order to collect information but mainly as a means of disinformation and propaganda as part of wider actions which subsequently were associated with hybrid aggression, which ultimately was perceived within the literature as the most innovative way of driving the modern warfare. Within its informational actions, Russia has used the so-called technique of "reflexive control" which essentially meant to influence Western actors' decisions in the sense of not engaging within the Ukrainian conflict[9]. The efficient use of public space and strategic communication process (STRATCOM) were key-elements that supported Russia's assertive policy in relation to the Western states on the issue of Ukraine. Basically, the Western reaction was neutralized by the actions of Russian media that promoted intensively public messages that, on the one hand, have consistently denied the involvement of Russian military in Ukraine (*including the presence of "little green men" in Crimea*) (Ash, 2015) and, on the other hand, supported the inclusion of the Ukrainian issue on the international agenda (*objective that ultimately contributed to raising the profile of Russia's global power*).

The utility of online space for subversive actions of Russian propaganda and disinformation has been substantiated and early June A.C. when The New York Times revealed (Chen, 2015), on June 2015 the Internet Research Agency in Saint Petersburg. It is assessed that this new entity run clandestine operations mainly consisting in the invasion of virtual social networks with directed information which were designed to put Moscow in a positive light on controversial issues such as the crisis in Ukraine, the collapse of the ruble in the context of the European economic sanctions extension and the global declining of the oil price. Also, it is assessed the operators, so-called "trolls", had the mission to post messages denigrating political leadership in Kiev and optimistic comments on Russia's economic recovery.

Terrorist groups are using social media tools to promote their cause by sharing images, maps and audio-video messages. The social networks are also a productive device in support of recruitment of new members and an exchange of ideas beliefs' and intentions' environment. Currently, no other terrorist group does better the exploitation of social media than Daesh. Recent studies on this issue indicates that the Twitter platform forms the core Daesh propaganda and dissemination of messages as it offers a high degree of connectivity, provides the possibility to conceal the user (*especially in areas where government control over the Internet is low*) and liaise with other media propaganda and radicalization posted on dedicated platforms like *Youtube*, *Facebook*, *archive.org* and *justpaste.it*[10] .

- **OSINT essentially requires the increasing role of intelligence analysis within the intelligence cycle**

Distribution of knowledge, information and expertise in an interconnected and technologically advanced world as that in which we live makes the intelligence analysis

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[9] M. Snegovaia, (2015), *Putin Information Warfare in Ukraine,* [online],
http://understandingwar.org/report/putins-information-warfare-ukraine-soviet-origins-russias-hybrid-warfare
[10] J. Shaheen, (2016), *Network of terror: How Daesh uses adaptive social networks to spread its message*, [online], www.stratcomcoe.org/download/file/fid/3312.

(defined as a cognitive effort whose aim is to generate actionable knowledge) an extremely useful, even essential for any consumer of information, no matter it is a public or private entity.

The intelligence analysis will face changes in the near future. We live in times in which *the intelligence analyst becomes a collector of information* at all levels - tactical, operational and strategic. At the tactical and operational this new approach will probably be based on *target analysis* to support intelligence collection. The analyst will be so specialized and will have enough knowledge to be able to properly interpret the OSINT exploited data, a process in which social media has a special place.

At the strategic level, foresight models will likely be encouraged that enables so that the decisions to easily be transformed in actions (actionable intelligence). The analyst uses OSINT to identify the context elements (complementary data collected through other INT secret sources) which is much needed to understand the topics covered in the work it develops. For him it is essential to know where to find the relevant parts of its research field (*know who know what*) to shorten an elaborate process of search and be operative and satisfy the needs of strategic decision makers.

- **OSINT "revolution" encourages "outsourcing" of knowledge outside the intelligence communities**

The advance of the Internet has made available more information in open media sources and virtual libraries which are freely used by the academic scholars, non-governmental organizations specialized in analysis, consulting companies and business intelligence. Many of these experts offer high quality assessments that compete analyzes performed by intelligence services and may be useful in validating their own *knowledge* (or the information collected and evaluated at a time on a given problematic).

Conclusions - OSINT "revolution" and intelligence new standards

Excellence in private and public intelligence resides in the organizations' capacity to reinvent itself, to adapt its operational potential of the new opportunities offered by, among others, the latest developments in open sources, and to self-adjust to the challenges and external stimuli transmitted by the OSINT "revolution".

Open sources, by definition, may generate much more information than the secret sources, even though this is clearly visible *"more in terms of quantity than quality"*[11]. Intelligence agencies can not generate *knowledge* and *understanding* if there are reluctant to new methods and special means and techniques that are revolutionizing collection (e.g. SOCMINT) and *analysis* (e.g. of structured analysis techniques - analysis of competing hypotheses, the technique of alternative scenarios, brainstorming etc.). And especially these two components of the intelligence cycle, *collection* and *analysis*, are the most affordable to the agencies in recurrent regeneration processes and internal reorganization. If the means of optimizing the processes for *collection* and *analysis* are not in line with the new trends in OSINT then it is very possible that the intelligence agencies do not keep up with new manifestations of threats and risks (*like the terrorist threat and the hybrid threat*).

Collecting information from open sources is generally less expensive. OSINT should become therefore an indispensable tactical and operational collecting tool useful also in strategic analysis. OSINT supports multisource intelligence analysis by directing the collection process. SOCMINT induction into the operational environment will provide any intelligence organization the ability to appropriately react in a preliminary phase of a crisis

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[11] F. Schaurer, Störger, J., (2010), *The Evolution of Open Source Intelligence*, [online], http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/OSINT-Report-3.pdf.

and during it. Because in common situations supports the *knowledge* almost in real time, SOCMINT becomes relevant in two of the intelligence community functions - early warning and active reporting.

Since most relevant information to national security is often available in open sources in Russian, Arabic, Chinese, it is necessary the import of human resource to have specific language skills, a sound knowledge of culture and history in certain areas of interest and disclose potential special skills to permanently train and develop collecting and information analysis techniques and procedures[12] .

In OSINT intelligence is no longer resuming on information but, more, on analysis and evaluation. Today, the challenge lies in intelligence "selection (know what is what) between good and bad sources, the valid and expired, the relevant and irrelevant" and validate information from open sources. This takes time but can be implemented in two ways: *validation of source* from a continuous process of analyzing the relationship between the source and information and *validation of information* obtained from open sources through its fusion, within the organization, with other information obtained from classified or technical sources or inter-agency cooperation on various issues of common interest.

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PERFORMANCE-BASED BUDGETING
IN THE AREA OF STATE DEFENCE

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Abstract: *The transition of the socio-economic system, the processes of globalization and Poland's integration with the EU structures have had a direct impact on the Polish society transformations and changes to the management of public organizations.*

The purpose of this paper is to present few key factors influencing an effective implementation of the New Public Management, mainly the procedures and tools used in the department in the Ministry of National Defence in Poland.

In the article a development of works and Polish experience associated with long-term financial plan for the state and task-budget have been discussed.

Keywords: *economic security, economics of defence, military expenditure, defence spending, long-term financial planning.*

Introduction

New Public Management (NPM) is a model of public administration based on management. This model can be also described by many other names, which include but are not limited to:

1. Managerialism or public managerialism;
2. Market-based public administration;
3. Entrepreneurial government;
4. Business-like management.

NPM is a market model which recognizes the existence of independent and equal entities. Enterprises, independent government departments and natural persons operate their own businesses and relations between them are regulated by a contract. Effective rules of behaviour that have stood the test of competition and have been widely recognized as applicable, are conducive to the intensification and expansion of exchange. As a result of the flattening and fragmentation of organisational structures and decentralisation of powers, the concept of NPM ensures flexibility of the public sector and increases its effectiveness while not limiting its tasks and programmes[1].

As the doctrine of management in the public sector, NPM is definitely of managerial nature and focuses on:

1. Transformation into market oriented economy;
2. Public partnership;
3. Flattening of organizational structures;
4. Efficiency and measurable achievements;
5. External audit, competent supervision and evaluation.

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[1] *Zarządzanie sektorem publicznym. Poszukiwanie rozwiązań*, materiał internetowy autora henrykspol, http://blogi.newsweek.pl/Tekst/spoleczenstwo/623859

NPM's mission is mainly to increase the effectiveness and thus the efficiency of the public sector. This mission is fulfilled with changes in the style of management in the public sector, which is graphically illustrated in Table no. 1.

NPM focuses on[2]:

1. Proper goal setting and result monitoring;
2. Financial management (efficiency);
3. Determination of service standards;
4. Using the benchmarking solutions (the possibility of making comparisons on a sample of proven best practices);
5. Modern human resources management.

	Distinguishing feature	**Traditional management in the public sector**	**New Public Management**
1.	Organisational structure	Centralisation	Divided between units organised around individual services
2.	Relations between administrative units and within them	Undefined, indefinite	Based on contracts
3.	Manner of operation	Emphasis on the ethics of governance, without organisational changes	Adaptation of management methods from the private sector
4.	Method of financing	Fixed or growing budget	Cuts in the use of resources
5.	Management style	Essential role of political skills and knowledge of regulations	Transparent management
6.	Result orientation	Use of implied and secret standards	Need for clearly defined aims
7.	Control measures	Control only over the procedures and rules related to the money spending	Inspection results and outcomes

Table no. 1 *NMP in relation to traditional forms of management in the public sector*[3]

NPM has contributed to the strengthening of public administration by deepening ties between the political and administrative sphere and creating citizen-friendly administration.

NPM is focused on:

1. Service recipients – their needs and expectations,
2. Promotion of competition among service providers ,
3. Transfer of control to the local community,
4. Decentralisation of competition,
5. Introduction of participatory governance.

The objective of the administration in the spirit of the NPM is to obtain results as well as control and responsibility for results. Effective activities entail a combination of efforts of public, private and non-governmental sectors in order to solve problems[4]. Result oriented

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[2] H. Krynicka, *Koncepcja nowego zarządzania w sektorze publicznym (New Public Management)*, Prace Instytutu Prawa i Administracji PWSZ w Sulechowie, praca publikowana w Internecie, http://www.bibliotekacyfrowa.pl/Content/34636/014.pdf z 14.03.2013 r., s. 196.

[3] K. Opolski, P. Modzelewski, *Quality management in public services*, CeDeWu Publishing, Warsaw 2004, p. 35.

[4] *Ibidem*, p. 197.

management stimulates public organisations to implement innovation and improve effectiveness and efficiency, and also contributes to improving the quality of policy and decision-making[5].

2. The reform of public finances and its impact on the Ministry of National Defence

New management involving the replacement of the traditional bureaucratic model of administration management by a managerial model that is using in the public sector rules and management models known and used in the private sector. Modern tools began to be implemented into the public sector, namely: quality management system based on the requirements of ISO 9000, strategic planning, long-term financial planning, risk management, internal audit, management control, achievement measurement system (balanced scorecard), account of costs and performance-based budgeting which is a key element of modern public management[6].

Instruments of NPM enable the implementation of tasks in cooperation with other entities, as well as allow to increase citizens' trust in public administration through greater transparency of public finance and accountability in spending public funds. Thus, the *Act on public finance*, amended in 2009, improves state finances and adapts them to the standards of the European Union, using the key instruments which increase the efficiency of implementation of public tasks, i.e.:

1. Performance-based budget as a tool for effective management of public finances and redistribution of public resources in order to achieve better results,

2. Long-term state financial plan which is to indicate the directions of the state financial policy (adopted for four years and subject to annual update),

3. Management control as an integral process of strengthening control over public spending (activities undertaken to ensure that the objectives and tasks are executed in accordance with the law, in an effective, efficient and timely manner[7]),

4. Auditing as a process involving examination and evaluation of the adequacy and effectiveness of the internal control system, risk identification and management, and the quality of performed tasks,

5. Prudential thresholds[8] and mechanisms designed to limit the public debt by using the methods and tools supporting:

– Public-Private Partnership (meaning cooperation between the units of public and local administration and private entities in the area of public services), which is one of the competitive ways of financing of public investment,

– Economics of services based on outsourcing in order to improve the efficiency of the organization and ensure its growth and success in the market[9],

– The quality management system as a process that requires constant modifications and improvements,

– Benchmarking as a tool and an element of a long-term strategy,

– Budgeting as a tool of management and control,

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[5] H. de Bruijn, *Managing Performance in the Public Sector,* Routledge, London-New York 2002, p. 9.
[6] E. Skrzypek, *Nowe zarządzanie publiczne – budżet zadaniowy*, w: Budżet zadaniowy jako nowoczesne narzędzie zarządzania gospodarką narodową, pod red. A. Siedleckiej, Wyd. Państwowej Szkoły Wyższej im Papieża Jana Pawła II, Biała Podlaska 2011, p. 18.
[7] K. Puchacz, *Nowe standardy kontroli zarządczej w jednostkach sektora finansów publicznych – omówienie i propozycje wzorcowych rozwiązań*, ODDK, Gdańsk 2010, p. 9.
[8] Por. art. 86 *Ustawy o finansach publicznych* z dnia 27 sierpnia 2009 r., Dz.U.nr 157, poz.1240.
[9] T. Kopczyński, *Outsourcing w zarządzaniu przedsiębiorstwem*, PWE, Warszawa 2010, p. 41.

− Controlling which embraces functions that help in the execution of management functions, that is strategic and operational planning, organising and managing people.

3. Performance-based budget in the area of state defence

Performance-based budget is a modern method of public finance management, which when properly used can provide answers to the questions about the tasks connected with making expenditures in a given financial year, objectives of the tasks, methods of their measurement, effects which should be achieved through the implementation of the objectives and also indications whether the objectives have been achieved.

In Poland, works on the implementation of performance-based budget are in progress since 2006 and they are already very advanced.

Task division is a tool to support the process of public management aimed at improving the effectiveness and efficiency of achieving the planned results. It meets both an informative function as well as a function supporting activities regarding the planning and implementation processes for the effective and efficient achievement of planned results by the people performing the functions of public authorities and managers of units in the department.

The concept of performance-based system can be divided into the following aspects:

1. Performance-based, understood as a set of methods and techniques used to build − in accordance with the substantive law − the structure of public tasks in the system of state functions, budgetary tasks, budget subtasks and activities, and to identify − at every level of the task − the objectives and measures identifying the degree of achievement or implementation of the objectives, appropriate to the level of the structure,

2. Financial, which are a set of methods and techniques used to build the state expenditure plan or the costs of public sector unit, necessary to achieve the intended results by determining the costs necessary for the performance of task-oriented activities,

3. Managerial, showing the application of the concept of a task-oriented system for public management, both in the administrative systems and individual units of public finance sector, oriented for executing the planned public tasks defined at various levels of the task-oriented structure,

4. Functional, finding their application in organisational solutions, through which the ministers in charge of different government departments and heads of the departments' units implement the processes of programming, monitoring and reporting as part of the performance-based system of the state budget.

Nowadays, the model of performance-based budgeting allows for translating the objectives specified in the strategic documents (including in particular the objectives of pro-development nature) in a transparent and unambiguous way into the net of aims included in the Long-Term State Financial Plan, and then – through a coherent task-based structure of that plan – their identification in the task-based structure of the task-based spending plan.

The use of currently used catalogue of functions, tasks, subtasks and activities, allows to increase the level of transparency of the budget planning process thanks to, among others, substantive ordering and simplification and internal unification of substantive ranges of particular classification items in a manner consistent with the operation of public authorities in creating public policies in the particular expenditure areas and managing public funds.

As far as the activity of national defence units and institutions is concerned, the 11th function of the state i.e. External security and inviolability of borders, becomes a priority[10]. This function is designed to ensure the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Poland. It involves issues related to defence and the functioning and development of the

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[10] The consolidated amount of expenditure on the 11th function in 2017 − 29, 32 billion PLN.

Polish Armed Forces, including the participation in the military undertakings under international agreements. The main task of the state in this area is the development of operational capabilities of the armed forces to ensure effective defence and protection of the borders of Poland.

As part of this function, public authorities also conduct, among others, activities allowing for the recognition and prevention of external threats detrimental to the security, defence, independence and integrity of the territory of the Republic of Poland. When it comes to fulfilling the allied obligations, Polish Armed Forces maintain their readiness to participate in NATO or EU operations, or those within the framework of ad hoc coalitions of states.

This function will be implemented within the framework of the following tasks[11]:
1. Maintenance and development of operational capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces.
2. Support for intelligence and counterintelligence.
3. Implementation of alliance and international commitments and the participation in the activities contributing to peace and international stability.
4. Readiness of the state administrative and economic structures for the defence of the state.
5. Support for defence management.

Task 11.1. Maintenance and development of operational capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces

Implementation of the task is oriented towards achieving adequate development of strategic capabilities for preventing surprise military presence, increasing operational capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces to conduct independent and allied defence activities, as well as strengthening the military potential (including its modernity). Public funds are also allocated for the training of Polish Armed Forces and maintenance of their combat readiness. As part of the function in question, there are carried out activities aimed at securing the operational capabilities to command the Polish Armed Forces, maintaining the ability of military recognition of external military threats, as well as activities allowing for effective striking of the enemy's forces in an emergency state. Logistical and medical protection of operational capabilities, as well as accommodation for the Polish Armed Forces are provided. The task embraces the most important program for the state defence i.e. a multiannual programme "The priority tasks of technical modernization of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland within operational programs".

This task is performed by the Ministry of National Defence, Modernisation Fund of the Armed Forces, and the Military Property Agency.

The objective set for the task is to achieve the required level of development of strategic capabilities to prevent surprise military presence and strengthening the military potential and operational capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces to conduct independent and allied defence activities.

The projected consolidated amount of expenditure for the implementation of the task in the years 2017-2019 amounts to 87.18 billion PLN including the planned consolidated amount of expenditure for 2017 which amounts to 26.63 billion PLN.

Task 11.2. Support for intelligence and counterintelligence

The task is to provide support for intelligence and counterintelligence, which is aimed at the identification of risks affecting the security of the state and military capabilities of the Armed Forces. There are conducted activities related to the detection and prevention of threats detrimental to the security of the state; defence and military capabilities of the Armed Forces; independence and integrity of the territory of Poland, including those connected with the recognition of international terrorism, extremism and international organised crime

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[11] Planowanie w układzie zadaniowym na 2017 rok , *Skonsolidowany plan wydatków w układzie zadaniowym na 2017 rok i dwa kolejne lata,* Rada Ministrów, Warszawa 2016.

groups. Furthermore, the activities to ensure the safety of military units, organisational units of the Ministry of Defence and soldiers performing official orders outside of the country, are being carried out too. Implementation of the task takes place also through the interaction with the bodies authorised to prosecute criminal offenses as well as the cooperation in organising the Polish military missions abroad. The leading entities subordinate to the Ministry of Defence in this regard are the Military Intelligence Service and the Military Counterintelligence Service.

This task is performed by the Ministry of National Defence and the Intelligence Agency.

The objective set for the task is to identify the risks affecting the security of the state and the military capability of the Polish Armed Forces.

The projected consolidated amount of expenditure for the implementation of the task in the years 2017-2019 amounts to 2 billion PLN including the planned consolidated amount of expenditure for 2017 which amounts to 0.6 billion PLN.

Task 11.3. Implementation of alliance and international commitments and the participation in the activities contributing to peace and international stability

Initiatives and projects implemented within the framework of the task are aimed at deepening international cooperation to strengthen the defence of Poland. Active involvement in the missions and operations of NATO, the EU and the coalition are conducive to the achievement of the objective. The task also considers international bilateral and multilateral cooperation and the functioning of diplomatic missions and multinational structures within NATO and the EU, and covers the creation and operation of allied and international military structures on the territory of Poland.

This task is performed by the Ministry of National Defence and NATO Defense Investment Division.

The objective set for the task is to strengthen the security and the position of the Republic of Poland in the international arena.

The projected consolidated amount of expenditure for the implementation of the task in the years 2017-2019 amounts to 3.12 billion PLN including the planned consolidated amount of expenditure for 2017 which amounts to 1.01 billion PLN.

Task 11.4. Readiness of the state administrative and economic structures for the defence of the state

As part of the task, within their jurisdiction, public authorities conduct a variety of projects related to the maintenance and improvement of non-military structures of the state defence system, and to the imposition of the obligation concerning the production and repair capacity on the entrepreneurs of special economic and defence significance. In addition, public administration also ensures the functioning of the national security management system, organises the defence training, organizes and conducts military registration and qualification, and also deals with the development and maintenance of state reserves of medicinal and medical products.

This task is performed by …

The objective set for the task is to maintain the ability to perform defence tasks by the public authorities and entrepreneurs.

The projected consolidated amount of expenditure for the implementation of the task in the years 2017-2019 amounts to 0.62 billion PLN including the planned consolidated amount of expenditure for 2017 which amounts to 0.2 billion PLN.

Task 11.5. Support for defence management

Implementation of the task involves ensuring the functioning, continuity and organisation of work of the Ministry of Defence which supports the process of defence

management throughout the department, enabling the fulfilment of objectives of the Minister of National Defence as regards defence policy.

This task is performed by the Ministry of Defence.

The objective set for the task is to ensure effective and efficient operation of the government authority to achieve the objectives of the defence policy.

The projected consolidated amount of expenditure for the implementation of the task in the years 2017-2019 amounts to 1.59 billion PLN including the planned consolidated amount of expenditure for 2017 which amounts to 0.88 billion PLN.

Conclusion

The source literature emphasises the lack of conclusive results of the New Public Management used in Western European countries.

In fact, these days in Poland one may meet both supporters and people who critically address the concept of the use of NPM in the public sector. The supporters point out that the new regulations in the field of public finance, functioning in the market economy (through the use of appropriate instruments) have an impact on the increase of the effectiveness and efficiency of the public administration (in cooperation with other entities) and contribute to:

1. Stabilisation of public finance.
2. Smooth and efficient functioning of public administration.
3. Enhancing of the quality of services – customer / taxpayer service.
4. Improvement of the organisation and efficiency of the public funds management.

The opponents argue that the use of a managerial model in the public sector management is limited because:

1. There is no equality between citizens as regards the access to public services.
2. NPM uses different market solutions to meet various society needs, in which the market as a resource allocation mechanism fails.
3. The concept does not recognize the difference between a customer – consumer who finances the provision of goods and services and a customer – recipient who needs goods and services.
4. Markets created in the public sector are not free competition markets but the competition markets organised by various public authorities.
5. Ensuring the efficiency and reduction of costs for the provision of public services may be threatened, among others, by artificially inflating costs, corruption, or the high cost of private entities operation (e.g. as part of outsourcing).
6. NPM does not recognise the fact that market forces are not sufficient to achieve full consumer satisfaction (for instance social and environmental effects of production, which the market does not need to take into account).

Some authors also point to the fact that the autonomy of organisational units of public administration formed in the manner advocated by New Public Management and directed by professional managers may pose a threat to the democratic processes of political responsibility for the actions of the state and its government in the public sphere.

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PREREQUISITS
FOR CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT AND SHARING

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Abstract: *The article discuses the necessary preconditions to be achieved in order to develop capabilities suitable for sharing. It brings recent outputs of current Defence university's research programs focused on capabilities development and tools to support it. It portrays possibilities of applying best practices in capabilities development into national environment and looks at the best ways how to combine processes and tools to produce capabilities reflecting the nature of current and future security environment. Proposed national approach to capabilities development, as one of the outputs of current research program STRATAL, briefly described in the article, offers incentives for discussions on the capabilities development topic.*

Keywords*: capabilities, development, process, scenarios, modularity, risk, assessment.*

Introduction

Center of Security and Military-Strategic Studies, University of Defence in Brno works since the beginning of 2016 on the research program „Strategic Alternatives of building and development of the Armed forces of the Czech republic - STRATAL". The research program has been focused on developing and improving tools that will support capabilities development in the Czech Republic.

Capabilities development can be implemented in many ways, it can focus on improving and modernizing the existing platforms, it can focus on outnumbering potential adversaries, or it can deal with uncertainties and focus on flexibility. Flexibility means the ability to react quickly to emerging challenges and tailor task forces to the character of the missions that occur. That requires reviewing the way military units are supported in order to allow more flexibility and relative independence of smaller echelons.

This article discusses some of the outputs of the research program STRATAL related to the capabilities development as incentives for defence planning improvement and food for thought for research communities.

1. Capabilities planning

Security environment is a complex environment and as developments in recent years suggest, its dynamics vary and it may quickly generate highly unpredictable chain of events. Recent developments in Ukraine, threats posed by the Islamic State terrorist organization or crisis in Syria serve as wakeup calls to countries in Europe and help redirect the countries' defence budgets from steady decline to incremental increase. Increase in defence budget is a reasonable incentive for achieving improvements in capabilities planning.

One of the objectives of the research program STRATAL – "Elaboration of methodical Framework of Capabilities planning", focuses on describing a defence planning process suitable for single NATO member country and on elaborating supporting methodologies to guide the process' implementation. The description of the defence planning process is one of the desired outputs of the program in 2016. The defence planning process is

based on elementary requirements: it has to enable defence planners to generate capabilities requirements reflecting challenges caused by future security threats, it needs to be compatible with the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), and it should be based on Process Management theory.

Security threats in context of defence planning represent a driving factor of it. Security threats have to be addressed in order to ensure a country is able to defend itself, when security threats may materialize. Small countries such as the Czech Republic don't have sufficient resources to support development of full scale capabilities. Although the required resources will always be insufficient for identified requirements, knowing the estimated impact of security threats and knowing required capabilities is critical for building country's defence, regardless of availability of resources.

To build the right set of capabilities, that are fit for purpose and that enable the country to confront the challenges of current and future security environment, it is necessary to use suitable tools, that enable security analysts and defence planners to identify relevant threats, related risks and required capabilities.


Figure no. 1 Defence planning process
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One of the elementary tools is a defence planning process that is process-wise and based on NDPP and can be synchronized with it. This creates one of the preconditions for harmonizing defence planning of NATO member countries with that of NATO as a whole. This also subsequently contributes to the effective building of collective defence.

The proposed raw model of the defence planning process consists of four phases: Establishing political guidance, Determining requirements, Planning Capabilities development, and Implementing and assessing. The figure bellow indicates how this model corresponds to NDPP and what are the single country specific phases reflecting the difference between defence planning of the Alliance and defence planning of the individual country.

Figure no. 2 NDPP and proposed national Defence planning process model

The key phase within the defence planning process is „Determining requirements". The objective of this phase is updating the existing capabilities requirements and reviewing their completeness and relevance. The resulting set of capabilities requirements is subsequently tested by scenarios in a wargaming. The wargaming results in capabilities requirements consisting of capabilities to be maintained, capability shortfalls and capability surpluses. Before finalizing capabilities requirements, risk assessment has to be implemented. Capabilities to be maintained can be directly included into final capabilities requirements, capability surpluses can also be directly included into final capabilities requirements as capabilities required to be discharged from service. Capability shortfalls have to be further assessed, risks related to capabilities shortfalls have to be assessed.

The required capabilities should reflect threats that will remain relevant in the future, considering the outlook with 25-30 years' timeframe that reflects the usual life-cycle of major weapon platforms. Mike Strain and Kevin Hassett for example work in their study[1] with time horizon 25 years, describing scenarios of possible future. However, defence planning related scenarios may work with different time-frames that are considered by the government and by the defence planners relevant for ensuring defence of the country in the long term. Scenarios that describe a reasonably distant future related to the security threats play a vital role in determining capabilities requirements.

Procházka and collaborators[2] for example suggests on scenarios: *"We can define scenario as a coherent, internally consistent and credible description of possible future state of the tracked phenomenon. Important fact is, that it is not a forecast, but one of the alternative pictures of possible future development"*.

TRADOC Regulation 71-20 describes scenarios as follows: *"A scenario is a graphic, data, and narrative tool that describes the global conditions before, during, and sometimes after a conflict"*.[3]

In simple terms, scenario describes *"a single way to a future (developmental scenario) or simply a description of a single future situation (situational scenario)"[4]*.As the same reference suggests, developing scenarios is reasonable in two levels of detail: generic and specific. Generic scenarios is there defined as *"having generalised characteristics that are*

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[1] M., Strain, K., Hasset, *4 possible futures for US workers in 2040*, dostupné na: https://www.aei.org/publication/4-possible-futures-for-us-workers-in-2040/
[2] J., Procházka, F. Mičánek, J. Šmondrk, J., Melichar, *Scénáře v procesu plánování schopností,* Vojenské rozhledy č. 1/2016, Ministerstvo obrany ČR, Praha, 2015, strana 48, ISSN 1210-3292 (print), ISSN 2336 (on-line), dostupné na: http://www.vojenskerozhledy.cz/images/archiv_voj_rozhl/cele_cisla/Rozhledy2016-1.pdf
[3] *TRADOC Regulation 71-20,* 28 June 2013, USA, Department of the Army Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command Fort Eustis, Virginia 23604-5700, s. 54, 6-6. Scenarios dostupné na: http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs
[4] *Handbook on Longterm Defence Planning,* RTO-TR-069 AC/323(SAS-025)TP/41, NATO RTO, Ottawa 2003, ISBN 92-837-1098-3

representative of a class of adversaries or a geographical region", specific scenarios is defined as "having a fixed relationship to particular nation and geography". Furthermore, as reference 5 also suggests, scenarios have to meet two criteria to serve their purpose: credibility and relevance. Credibility means, that events in scenario must make sense – be credible. Relevance related to a scenario means that it should deal issues that may lead to a conflict, the conflict itself or other situation where military forces might be used.

Set of scenarios dealing with plausible futures and elaborating relevant security threats represent an effective tool for determining capabilities requirements that are needed for providing security to the country. Such a set of scenarios is one of primary prerequisites that has to be created in order to identify required capabilities that are fit for purpose.

As a result of wargaming there is a set of capabilities identified, that are needed to deal with the security challenges elaborated in scenarios. The set of capabilities has to have a set of requirements that should cover all considered security challenges. In reality such a complete set of requirements is usually related to unrealistically high budget that is not likely to be approved. To deal with it, there capability set options have to be drafted, accompanied by risk assessment.

Given the likely disproportions between requirements and available budget for each proposed capability set option, it is inevitable and necessary to go through balancing capabilities requirements options with related budget requirements. Budget that is eventually approved however, should never fall below the acceptable risk level. The figure bellow portrays illustrative example of three capability set options tested against six scenarios and a result of risk assessment related to every identified capability shortfall in each scenario. Each capability set option has the overall risk assessment expressing the overall level of success across all scenarios. Risk assessment should also consider the possibility that some of the scenarios might occur simultaneously or in a sequence.


Figure no. 3 Balancing Capabilities requirements with available budget
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Each capability set option on the figure has an illustrative budget requirement in the far right column. The level of risk and the likelihood of budget approval for each option are

color-coded. From the color-coding we can assume the preferred option regarding defence related risks and the likely option regarding budget approval. Conflict between capability requirements and related budget requirements will always be there and the budget will always be the winner. However to go through this conflict and to balance capabilities requirements against available budget is a necessary and inevitable step of the defence planning process. For illustrative purposes we consider moderate risk presented on the figure to be an acceptable risk.

2. Capabilities development

Developing capabilities means implementing capabilities development plan. Key to implementation of any plan is the ability to measure it's progress and the ability to adapt the plan, when the results of the assessment indicate so. Last phase „Implementing and Assessing" of the proposed defence planning process model covers implementing the Capability development plan and assessing the progress. Assessment involves monitoring and evaluating the outcomes of the actions executed in order to achieve capabilities' development objectives. The ability to conduct assessment depends on incorporating measurability into the plan. That means drafting measures of progress to each objective - each concerned capability, so that the progress of capabilities' development is measurable. A generic model of measure of progress portrayed on figure bellow can be applied.

Measure of progress		Code
Objective achieved	Description	5
Achieving the objective likely	Description	4
The objective achieved partially	Description	3
Achieving the objective is not likely/has been in an initial stage	Description	2
The objective will not be achieved/has not started yet	Description	1

Figure no. 4 Generic model of measure of progress
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Functional areas described as DOTMLPFI[5] offer a reasonable structure for drafting a measure of progress. Functional areas serve as capabilities' pillars or building blocks that need to be built for each capability in order to have the capability ready for operational use. That describes the elementary relationship between capabilities and functional areas. The example above uses five levels of progress that are named (left column), described (middle column) and coded with number and with colour (right column). Colour coding and coding with numbers serve for quick orientation, description of the status of progress with appropriate level of detail is necessary for producing a comprehensive and understandable assessment.

Measure of progress - Objective X / Functional Area „DOCTRINES"		Code
Objective achieved	Description of the status of progress	5
Achieving the objective likely	Description of the status of progress	4
The objective achieved partially	Description of the status of progress	3
Achieving the objective is not likely/has been in an initial stage	Description of the status of progress	2
The objective will not be achieved/has not started yet	Description of the status of progress	1

Figure no. 5 Measure of progress for the Functional Area "DOCTRINES" - Illustrative example
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[5] DOTMPLFI - Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Personnel, Leadership, Facilities, Interoperability

This model serves as a suitable foundation for drafting measures of progress for each respective capability. That implies the use of full spectrum of functional areas to each capability. Illustrative example of an assessment of progress for capability „Tank Battalion" is on the figure bellow.

	Measure of progress (using all Functional Areas) - Capability: „Tank Battalion"	Code
D	Objective achieved	5
O	The objective achieved partially	3
T	The objective will not be achieved/has not started yet	1
M	Achieving the objective likely	4
L	The objective will not be achieved/has not started yet	1
P	The objective achieved partially	3
F	Achieving the objective is not likely/has been in an initial stage	2
I	Achieving the objective likely	4

Figure no. 6 Measure of progress of capability "Tank Battalion" - Illustrative example
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The measure of progress on the figure represents a summary of a capability assessment structured by functional areas. As the example suggests, progress may differ in each functional area so that it is not reasonable to produce a single statement coded by one single number for expressing the progress of capability development. Assessment of progress has to be reasonably detailed to provide a realistic picture of progress.

Developing capabilities is like building a house, in order to have the house complete, we need to have all the bricks, fittings, roof and other building blocks, functioning and sitting in a desired position. Once we have all the building blocks in place, fitted together and connected to the infrastructure, we can use the house. It is equally valid for developing capabilities. The „building blocks" relation between functional areas and capabilities indicates a suitability of functional areas for measuring progress of capabilities development. Using functional areas for drafting measures of progress of capabilities sets measurability to the Capabilities development plan. When capabilities development is regularly assessed, it provides a reliable tool for managing the Capabilities development plan implementation.

Building blocks idea, described as modularity concept by Paul K. Davis[6], is a concept well suited for building capabilities under uncertainty. Application of modularity concept to capabilities building and development means building specific capabilities suited for a range of specific tasks that can be assembled in order to build a task force tailored to a specific mission as it occurs. Modularity concept means to step away from standard force structures in which units have standard organizational structure that lack flexibility, when a need to tailor a task organization to a specific mission occurs. When the mission requires a task force size of a company for example, the brigade that provides major elements for that task force has to provide also a support structures from the brigade's logistics. That may disable the remaining part of that brigade as a trade-off for relative independence of the task force that was built for the mission. That implies a requirement for different approach to building support structures that would allow exploiting modularity concept to its full potential. That means more investments into supporting structures and changes in organizational structure of forces. Units of lower echelons, companies or even platoons in the army and their equivalents in other services need to have support elements embedded in their organizational structure to allow

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[6] Paul, K. Davis, *Analytic Architectire for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and Transformation,* RAND National Defence Research Institute, 2002, dostupné na internetu: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1513.html

relative independence and more flexibility. When applying modularity concept, it will be necessary to leave support structures designed for larger echelons that work best when the entire echelons operate as expected.

If we want to consider sharing capabilities as a viable option for capabilities development, the interoperability, as one of the functional areas and one of the building blocks of capabilities, represents one of the preconditions for sharing capabilities. Imagine you have electric device that requires 110 voltage and specific type of electric socket, which is installed in your house. Than imagine your neighbour living in a house nearby, connected to 220 voltage and using different type of electric sockets in his house, having the same electric device that can be used only in his house with his electric infrastructure. If you want to share your electric device with your neighbour and vice versa, it won't be possible due to a different voltage and different types of electric sockets in your houses. There is no interoperability between the electric infrastructure in your house and the neighbour's house and between the two electric devices, thus there are no preconditions for sharing.

Modularity and interoperability offer flexibility in tailoring capabilities sets required for dealing with specific threats in multinational environment and both represent vital prerequisites for capabilities sharing. Using functional areas by countries that consider capabilities sharing to be an option, enables these countries to describe and develop capabilities by one set of standards and communicate capabilities developments.

3. Possible national approach to capabilities development

For drafting a model of defence planning process as one of the 2016 outputs of the research program STRATAL, NDPP has been taken as a foundation and as a process that integrates and harmonizes national defence planning activities. The research activities resulted in a draft of a national defence planning process as a four-phase process as indicated earlier. The defence planning process consists of Capabilities planning (planning phase) and Capabilities development (implementation phase) as two distinct parts of the process. This fact gives the defence planning process a character of a management process rather than a character of a planning process. One of the options of drafting the defence planning process is to keep planning and implementation phases in one comprehensive process and introduce it as a Defence planning process. This way the Defence planning process can be implemented comprehensively and serve as a complex tool for capabilities planning and development. Figure bellow describes one of the proposed alternatives of defence process in generic terms.


Figure no. 7 Capabilities planning and development in Defence planning process
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These four phases are the backbone of the defence planning process; figure bellow shows major inputs and outputs required for each phase of the process.


Figure no. 8 Defence planning process model
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The process model on the figure indicates an option that means taking a comprehensive approach to defence planning process, integrating planning and execution phases into one integrated process. The option that would separate planning and execution phases and that would introduce defence planning process as a planning process with „Implementing and assessing" as a subsequent and separate process will not be discussed in the article.

Regardless of what approach will be taken towards defence planning process structure, the approach to capabilities development remains as discussed in the article. The proposed application of identifying and assessing capabilities requirements, of assessing risks related to capability shortfalls and of assessing the progress of capabilities development will be further elaborated in STRATAL research project.

Conclusions

The article discusses some of the outputs of the research program STRATAL, presenting the results of the work towards achieving the objective „Elaborating methodological Framework for capabilities planning", as one of the five objectives of the program.

The article brought possible approach to building defence planning process of a NATO member country. The author suggested a defence planning process and a set of plausible scenarios dealing with future threats to be the primary prerequisites for developing capabilities.

Risk assessment related to capability shortfalls was briefly mentioned as a suitable tool to support balancing capabilities requirements with budget restrictions.

Proposed measures of progress as supporting tool to help manage the implementation of Capabilities development plan were introduced. Relation between functional areas (DOTMLPFI) and capabilities was briefly discussed, indicating the functional areas to be the building blocks of capabilities. Building blocks concept and interoperability were indicated as some of the prerequisites for capabilities sharing and for tailoring capabilities sets to emerging missions.

Possible approach to drafting the defence planning process as an incentive for discussions was briefly introduced in the last chapter of the article.

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ENHANCEMENT OF DEFENCE PLANNING PROCESS
– CASE STUDY CZECH REPUBLIC

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Abstract*: The paper deals with the development of defence planning process in the Czech Republic while seeking and implementing best practice in this area during more than two decades of transformation towards modern defence management. Sound business processes within the defence sector of each country or international organisation are prerequisite for effective strategic management. Defence planning process belongs between the most critical business processes, which integrates planning effort in several planning domains such as – capability development, acquisition, resources, research and development, multinational cooperation, legislation, etc. In practice it means that defence planning requires continues adaptation to the ever evolving both internal and external environment of any given organisation to ensure it remains fit for purpose. Since 1989 the Czech Republic Defence Organisation has been in process of permanent transformation, reorganisation and institutional adaptation. One can observe several remarkable phases which provided impetus also for defence planning process further improvement. The main purpose of the conference paper is to assess these efforts in pattern of institutional change. Additionally, it offers critical lessons learned and contributes to the identification of best practice in the area of defence planning among NATO allies and partners.*

Keywords*: defence planning, defence planning process, defence planning enhancement, defence policy, best practice.*

Introduction

Policymakers and analysts in the Czech Republic had subscribed, after 1989, to a security narrative that saw Europe as a zone of stability, built on cooperation and civilian conflict-resolution. Challenges to that order in the past seemed limited to transnational risk and the indirect effects of state failure and fragility of the world. The Czech Republic Defence Policy (CZDP) and the Czech Republic Defence Organisation (CZDO) were remodelled to support operational deployments in framework of international crisis response effort. Such challenges continue to exist, but decision makers are forced to recognise that to the east of NATO and EU a powerful actor is willing to employ military force in a way associated with the great-power conflicts of the past.[1] Territorial defence and collective defence under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty[2] has once again become the primary focus of CZDP. The most important task for CZDO lies in strengthening the readiness of the Czech Republic Armed Forces (CZAF) and enhancement of all supporting processes.[3]

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[1] The Military Balance, The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics 2015. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. London.
[2] The North Atlantic Treaty, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.
[3] Wales Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, 4-5 September 2014,http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm

Several measures have been already taken by respective authorities in this effort. First of all, the changing strategic landscape has shifted budgetary priorities of the Czech Republic Government. After several years of its reductions, the Czech Republic announced in September 2014 it was planning to raise defence spending to 1,4% of GDP by 2020 (up from the 1% of GDP it currently allocates).[4] Secondly, strategic and policy documents dealing with defence issues have been amended or elaborated and adopted by the Czech Republic Government e.g. Security Strategy 2015,[5] Concept Development of The Czech Republic Armed Forces[6] and The Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030.[7] Thirdly, the Minister of Defence announced several initiatives to reinforce its internal business process. The overall objective of all of these undertakings is to ensure that the CZDO is functioning properly in fulfilment of its mission and all available resources are spent in the most effective and efficient way within transparent and accountable institutional framework.

Against this background, one of the most promising areas for strengthening the CZDO internal business processes is indisputably defence planning. Within the planning community is it generally believed that there is always potential for defence planning process further improvement in order to make it even more responsive to political and military leadership tasking.

Currently, the Czech Republic national defence planning process is being challenged by two critical requirements: (1) improvement of force posture and readiness of today forces and (2) better capability delivery for uncertain security and operational environment for forces of tomorrow. These requirements reflect the political and military desire to enhance CZAF capability in three phases: milestone 2020, milestone 2025 and future force beyond 2025. Milestone 2020 aims at mitigating negative impact of shrinking budgets on CZAF capability and readiness. Milestone 2025 focus on developing balanced force posture for complex operations including high-end conventional fighting. While both milestones have been already contemplated in necessary level of details and are being implemented accordingly, the vision of capability delivery for future force beyond 2025 time horizon is still rather vague. It means that planning beyond 2025 requires not only significant conceptual effort but also sound process, mechanisms and tools which will assist defence planners in identifying the right set of capability necessary for future operations and will ensure operational relevance and affordability of future forces. In practice it means that there is a critical need for enhancement of long-term defence planning within CZDO.

Defence Planning Assessment

Defence planning is in many ways a dependent variable, dependent for example upon the particular country's civil-military relations architecture, their (civilian or military) administrative planning and decision-making traditions, the national security culture including traditions for parliamentary involvement, and on the country's strategic environment and its perception of how it is changing. This multifaceted and complex subject is the central mechanism for organising decisive societal – strategic – decisions concerning both tax payer

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[4] Czech Coalition Agreement, 2014, available at http://www.army.cz/en/ministry-of-defence/newsroom/news/czech-governmental-coalition-sign-agreement-on-the-progressive-increase-of-the-defence-budget-101455.
[5] Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, 2015, available at http://www.mzv.cz/file/1483514/Security_Strategy_CZ_2015.pdf.
[6] Concept Development of the Czech Republic Armed Forces, MoD, Prague, 2015, available at http://www.mocr.army.cz/images/id_40001_50000/46088/KVA__R_ve__ejn___verze.pdf.
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acquisitions of expensive defence equipment and the ability to deter, and ultimately fight, wars.[8]

Assessment on defence planning process including initiatives and lesson learned will focus on 5 following periods in the Czech Republic defence policy adaptation: (1) Democratisation; (2) Integration; (3) Reforms; (4) Transformation; and (5) Enhanced Readiness.[9]

Democratisation

Democratisation period is aligned with the social change after 1989 in the Czech Republic (at that time in Czechoslovakia). Main objective of the new political elite was to subordinate military leadership and armed forces to the western principles of civil control and democratic oversight.

Nevertheless, during this period there was some sort of scepticism about the usefulness of a systematic and complex planning after the abolishment of the central planning system put in place by the communist regime. It was believed, that CZDO and CZAF will be manage as a business company. In practice, it meant that sound budgeting process was seen as the most suitable instrument to manage development of CZAF capabilities. Introduced was so called management by money and planning was limited exclusively to the short-term timespan. One can observe some sort of decadence of defence planning function at this time.

This situation had a negative impact on the development and daily operations of CZDO because its nature - e.g. the level of complexity, a long-life cycle of military equipment and preparation of suitable personnel - requires a credible planning function spanning short-, mid- and long-term horizons. Most importantly there was disconnect between rather short-term political cycle in the Czech Republic[10] and decision making process embracing a long-term investment in equipment, infrastructure and people.

Integration

This period is associated with the successful fulfilment of interoperability criteria as one of many preconditions for NATO membership (12 March, 1999). Defence planning has yield once again more importance of political and military leadership as it was properly addressed in the amended defence legislation package passed by Parliament.[11] The most important achievement at this time was the establishment of interagency-coordination instrument for defence issues. The National Security Council was set up under Article 9 of Constitutional Act No 110/1998 on the security of the Czech Republic.[12] Additionally, defence planning at national level was conducted under new law and its main outcome was *Defence Plan* incorporating planning effort of all state institutions critical for defence

[8] BREITENBAUCH, Henrich Defence Planning, *Academics Foresights*, No 13, 2015, available at: http://www.academic-foresights.com/Defence_Planning.html.

[9] PROCHÁZKA, Josef; STOJAR, Richard; JANOŠEC, Josef; TŮMA, Miroslav; MAREK, Jindřich; PERNICA, Bohuslav, *Armed Forces of the Czech Republic - A Symbol of Democracy and State Sovereignty*, Praha: Vojenský historický ústav Ministerstvo obrany Praha, 2014.

[10] Since 1989 there were 16 ministers of defence appointed and more than 20 strategic and conceptual documents adopted by the Czech´s Government. These facts underscore the political instability related to the defence policy formulation and its implementation. Available at: http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=89972.

[11] Defence legislation package from 1999 consisted of several laws: (1) Constitutional Act No 110/1998 on the security of the Czech Republic; (2) Act No 221/1999 on conduct of military service, (3) Act No 222/1999 on defence provision

[12] Composition and activities of the National Security Council are laid down under Resolution of the Government of the Czech Republic No 391 of 10 June 1998 on the National Security Council and on the planning of measures to safeguard the security of the Czech Republic.

provision of the country. In cooperation with other allies especially with the United States attempts have been made to adopt Planning, Programing and Budgeting System (PPBS). That initiative finally failed mostly due to the different strategic culture in the Czech Republic and level of organizational maturity of CZDO.

Reforms

Reforms period main objective was to establish *modern, mobile, young, motivated* and *all-volunteered* armed forces for international crisis response operations (CRO) at the beginning of XXI Century. Priority for CZDO was to reinforce defence planning at the ministry of defence level and develop sound defence planning function fully harmonised with NATO Defence Planning Process, budget development and execution process and acquisition process. Main challenge consisted of proper alignment of all available resources with strategic level objectives and highest priorities.

Transformation

Transformation period is typical for its effort to create a modern military force with expeditionary capability. Nevertheless, for strategic management most pressing issue was shrinking budget and growing misbalance among Ends, Ways and Means. Still, during this period CZDO has significantly enhanced its planning ability. Defence planning was designed as a capability driven process ensuring a complex development of the CZAF and its relevance for the future military confrontations. It focuses on a holistic approach to capability development applying functional areas according to NATO DOTMLPFI[13] methodology. Defence planning was harmonized with defence resource management through the common set of objectives. In addition, short- and mid-term planning horizon was institutionalized and strategic level decision and coordination body providing political-military advice on defence planning related issues to Minister of Defence was established.[14]

In recent years more emphasis in public non-profit organizations has been put on the output rather than input, as a result of growing pressure due to the ever shrinking public budgets. It means that defence planners priority number one is the definition of desired end-state and identification of effects which military organization should achieve. In order to address this requirement and seek higher level of effectiveness and efficiency CZDO implemented objective-based planning and budgeting. However, some deficiencies still persist e.g. the formulation and description of objectives lies far away from SMART approach.

Enhanced Readiness

Shifting security environment after 2014 put defence organisations and armed forces in different situational context. Defence policy and capability development should address both crisis response operations and high-end conventional fighting. Back-to-the-roots concept means that territorial defence and collective defence matters and defence planning must reflect on these developments.[15] Against this background, the Czech Republic defence planning is still missing comprehensive political guidance as a tool for providing a necessary

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[13] Assessment and detailed evaluation of required operational capabilities can be performed in following functional areas: Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Interoperability. *In: Czech´s Ministry of Defence Planning Directives 66/2012.*

[14] Minister's of Defence Planning Council.

[15] Warsaw Summit Communiqué. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm.

political direction for the long-term development of national defence system in its entirety. In forefront of defence planning enhancement at this period is capability delivery for balanced armed forces, development of necessary reserves in terms of personal and material for worse-case scenario of armed forces potential employments, whole society resilience against hybrid sort of threats including development of strategic communication instruments and provision of security of supply to cover armed forces need both in peace time and in time of crisis.

Defence Planning Enhancement

Based on the above mentioned assessment there is a need for the Czech Republic defence planning process further enhancement. It should be conducted along following lines.

Defence planning should address the growing level of uncertainty. While it might be seen impossible from the sceptics' point of view to predict the future, thinking about the future is essential for military organisations to formulate concepts, strategies, plans and initiatives that will be effective across the widest range of contingencies, and executable within projected resource limitations.[16] To manage this challenge for defence planning under uncertainty the Czech Republic should implement the capability based planning (CBP) methodology.[17]

Successful defence planning requires involvement of top-level political and military leadership and begins with issuing comprehensive political guidance.[18] Defence planning must be administratively light and its inputs must be user friendly and useful for day-to-day strategic level management.

Furthermore, defence planning must be able to address constrained resource environment. There must be flexible mechanisms in place to balance objectives and resources while assessing operational risks to mission success for requirements prioritisation.

In addition, it should provide real time situational awareness on fulfilment of strategic objectives and performance criteria of CZDO. It must by objective and transparent for all stakeholders including the taxpayers. It should allow for clear accountability in case that a deviation from originally approved plans is identified. Furthermore, corrective actions might be sought and implemented.

Periods/Synopsis	Main characteristics of defence policy adaptation	Main characteristics of defence planning development	Critical Lessons Learned	Initiatives
Democratisation (1989-1993)	Implementation of western principles of civil control and democratic oversight over military. Overall reduction of country´s defence potential after the end of Cold War in ´90	No need for comprehensive and credible planning. Erosion of existing central planning system. Short-term planning and growing importance of financial management	Planning is essential function. Short-term defence planning is inadequate for successful development of military capability	Management by Money

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[16] PROCHÁZKA, Josef. Challenges for defence planning - Business process optimisation and performance management. In: *The complex and dynamic nature of the security environment*. Bucharest, Romania: Carol I National Defence University, 2015, pp. 102-111.

[17] PROCHÁZKA, Josef; MIČÁNEK, František; MELICHAR, Josef; ŠMONDRK, Jozef. Scenáře v procesu plánování schopností. *Vojenské rozhledy (Czech Military Review)*, 2016, sv. 25 (57), č. 1, s. 44-60.

[18] Handbook on Long Term Defence Planning. RTO Technical Report 069, Research and Technology Organisation – Studies, Analysis and Simulation Panel, 2003.

Integration (1994-1999)	Fulfilment of interoperability criteria as one of many preconditions for successful achievement of NATO membership	Attempts to introduce planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS)	Effective defence planning must reflect specific national conditions - strategic and organizational culture, existing management model and norms	Interagency coordination; Defence law package; PPBS;
Reforms (1999-2006)	Establishment of *modern, mobile, young, motivated* and *all-volunteered* armed forces for international crisis response operations	Comprehensive defence planning and coordination at national and multinational level	Even robust legislative framework does not necessary mean that organization is able to ensure effective planning. You have to have in place organizational framework, skilled people and supportive managers	Institutional adaptation including optimization of defence planning process – internal directives. Harmonization with NATO Defence Planning Process
Transformation (2007-2013)	Creation of a modern military force with expeditionary capability under deteriorating financial constrains. Afghanisation of armed forces capability	Complex approach to capability planning (functional areas DOTMLPFI), output oriented on one set of objectives for planning and budgeting	Establishment of performance management framework in public sector is possible. Critical component in defence planning is uncertainty and ability to address resource constrains. Urgent operational requirements must be secondary driver after proper conceptual top-down planning	Objective based planning and budgeting; Complex capability development (DOTMLPFI), Controlling, performance and transparency
Enhanced Readiness (2014 - till now)	Emphasis on territorial defence and collective defence after the rapid shift of security landscape in 2014	Credible planning for high-end-military conventional confrontation, long-term timespan	We need to plan and do right think to ensure long-term relevance and affordability of our entire defence sector	Defence planning under uncertainty – capability based (CBP methodology); Emphasis on long-term planning and capability delivery; IT support optimisation

Figure no. 1 Summary of main characteristics of Czech Republic defence policy adaptation and defence planning development since 1989.

The most advanced defence planning process should fulfill the following general attributes:

- *Simplicity*. Defence planning process must be administratively light. Inputs from this process must meet specific purpose and usefulness while covering short-, mid- and long-term timespan.

- *Broad executive commitment*. Senior political and military leadership should be involved in process at critical milestones, e.g. formulation of comprehensive political

guidance providing clear strategic direction and priorities, decision taking on investment portfolio, decision on performance evaluations, etc.

- *Comprehensiveness*. It must ensure harmonization of effort of all ministries and agencies involved in the safeguarding of country's security and defence including linkage to NATO and EU Defence Planning.

- *Complexity*. Planners must address all functional areas inherited with capability development (DOTMLPFI methodology).

- *Capability based*. Planning is about managing uncertainty. Planners should be able to think about potential future developments and design alternative strategies for wide spectrum of contingencies. In order to do so, capability based planning methodology should be applied including analytical techniques like scenario, foresight analysis and others.

- *Output oriented*. It should follow at the political level defined objectives and enable to allocate resources against the most pressing priorities. Performance measurement should be based on comprehensive set of Key Performance Indicators. Realistic feedback must allow for our plan corrections if required.

- *Flexibility*. Planning must be responsive to the urgent operational requirements in order to ensure mission success of ongoing operations.

- *Transparency and Accountability*. Political leadership is accountable to the taxpayer and should provide evidence on effectiveness and efficiency any time in the process unless security is not compromised.

Conclusion

The article offers an assessment on the Czech Republic defence planning evolution since 1989. Defence planning is one of the most significant business processes within any given defence organization. Defence planning of the Czech Republic still struggles with the legacy of political and social transition after the collapse of communist's regimes. It has been continuously adapted to the ever changing external and internal environment in order to be fit for purpose. This adaptation embraces 5 periods since 1989.

Currently, the Czech Republic defence planning is based on modern principles and best practice of NATO Allies. It is also partially harmonized on multinational, national and ministry of defence levels and its outputs serves for resource allocation and capability delivery.

Besides achieved significant progress, there are still several components which the Czech Republic defence planning is still missing and which would ensure that the process is matured and fit for purpose and enable informed and balanced decision-making both for armed forces of today and tomorrow. This also means that planning under uncertainty - reflecting in some form CBP methodology - is likely to remain a basic framework for defence planning in the future.

In this regard, the Czech Republic defence planning requires further enhancement along following lines: (1) comprehensive political guidance elaboration; (2) complete application of CBP methodology; (3) strengthening of already existing but still rather vague conceptual long-term planning; (4) introduction of credible performance management framework; and (5) improved relevance of defence planning outputs for senior political and military leadership day-to-day management and decision-making.

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LOGISTICS SUPPORT'S PARTICULARITIES
OF MILITARY UNITS DURING PEACETIME

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Abstract: The logistics support of military units during peace is based on a functional logistic system where the authorities of management and logistical execution are involved in producing an efficient logistics support by using an informatic logistic system which will streamline the supply of material goods by using modern means and techniques and covering all the functional areas of military logistics during peacetime. From the point of view of ensuring an efficient and logistic support, the role of the logistic system must bound with the ordering system and at the same time, must take in account the requests of the final beneficiary (the serviceman).The person in question must wait to obtain ammunition, food, water, medical support and fuel for the battle technique in question (for the aircrafts,warships and so on). The mentioned goods are required for maintaining the conditions for life, both in peacetime and especially in times of crisis and war.

Keywords: logistics; logistic support; planning; distribution; consumption.

The ongoing reform of the Romanian Army requires the creation and modernization of integrated, flexible and functional military logistic, which has to fit the needs of providing combat forces with all the necessary categories of technical equipment and materials (in the right place at the right time, as simple as possible, and with minimum expenses), as well as the requirements for achieving interoperability with the modern army's logistic system of NATO's member states or partners.

Measures taken in the reform of the military in general and the achievement of the objectives mentioned above are, according to my view, components of managerial reformist vision which expects its fleshing into practice to generate better performance. All these terms can be concentrated into a theoretical and practical emphasis of crucial importance, the logistical support of military units in peacetime and the management of logistic support are the main sources for achieving an efficient and appropriate logistical support for any military entity, no matter its level.

Calling into question the major objectives achieved and taking into account the conceptual boundaries of logistics, the thing that stands out is the accent that needs to be put on the issue of restructuration and modernization of the military system in general and the logistics in particular. In accordance with NATO, the logistics are defined as „..*the science of planning, executing the movement and assuring the military forces; in its most comprehensive sense, it contains those aspects of military operations which relate to: projection and development, acquisition, storage, transportation, distribution, maintenance, evacuation of the materials and their removal from service; the personnel transport; the acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation and decommission of buildings; the acquisition or provision of services; medical support* "[1]. As shown in this definition, the logistics represent the acquisition, supply of materials, military transport, staffing and the mobilization of

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[1] *NATO Logistics Handbook*, SNLC Secretariat Internaţional Staff, Defence Policy and Planning Division, Logistics, NATO HQ, 1110 Brussels, 2012, p. 20.

economic resources. Based on this definition of logistics, I appreciate that logistics are a collection of activities related to the acquisition, movement, storage and delivery of parts and goods in a supply chain, while at the same time it ensures the functions of transmission, distribution and storage of material goods. I also believe that the logistician's mission begins just here and consists of bringing goods and services to the right place at the right time, under the required conditions, as well as providing the largest contribution to fulfilling the basic missions of each military unit during peacetime and as well as in times of crisis, mobilization or war.

During the tests for determining the boundaries of logistics with the distribution channels, some specialists had to appeal to a new concept, the logistic channel. They believe that the main purpose of a logistics channel is to deliver the goods in time and to properly manage the goods. I consider that such a channel is a chain of events that adds value, while this actual value is not realized until the product assortment is positioned physically and temporally to its appropriate configuration while, at the same time, having no ownership changes. Only if the transactions carried out in the channel meet appreciation, acceptance and user satisfaction, a substantial value is added through the process of logistical support.

On behalf of the things said earlier, I can say that logistical support of the units during peacetime starts from the needs or requirements of combat forces that train and go on this logistics channel, beyond the manufacturer, until it reaches the suppliers of raw materials. By following these considerations, the phrase "logistics chain" (supply chain) was born.

This phrase symbolizes the bringing together of participants from the circuit of a product, from conception to consumption. By this way, the fundamental principle of any supply chain is that, the further we depart from the final consumer, the variability of orders increases.

According to the logistics specialists, the supply chain-delivery "... has to be a coordinated organization, which acts as a system, to improve and optimize processes in order to obtain an overall benefit. The competitiveness and performance of an organization depends on the membership of a supply-delivery chain that operates efficiently and effectively, in which there is a synergy due to the imposition and implementation of common goals and strategies of the partners"[2].

Based on this view, I believe the highlighting of the supply chain-delivery must keep in mind that this is a process of planning, implementing and controlling the supply operations carried out in order to meet the beneficiary with maximum efficiency. The logistical support management of military units during peace encompasses all stocks and movements of material goods, their processing (if applicable), as well as finished materials and goods from point of origin to consumer (in this case the military). I also appreciate that combat forces can train in peacetime and are able to operate in wartime only under an existing, agile and flexible logistic system, in which *"... the distribution flow does not suffer the limitations when crossing the level borders"[3]*. The newly made logistical structures are based on the principle of relieving combat forces of logistical tasks. These structures consist of modular elements, categories of large units, units (subunits) with whom it can intervene (if necessary) for providing logistical support to army units that are preparing during peacetime, for crisis and war situations.

In the process of planning logistics management, it is necessary to have regard of all the actions carried out by the chief of logistic structure in order to establish and achieve the logistics system established by the leader (manager). Note, however, that the analysis made,

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[2] Gheorghe Minculete, A. Minculete, M.A. Răducea, *Some approaches to supply chain management, delivery*, p. 112.
[3] FM 4-0, *Combat Service Support*, cap. 1.

bear in mind the contents of all logistics management functions. The reduction of any managerial function leads to inefficiency in terms of leadership.

A hierarchy of logistics troops also creates the possibility of establishing concrete and clear responsibilities in this area during peacetime and also in times of crisis or war. Modern war, with its features, characteristic forms and techniques of preparation, release and deployment involves the application of methods, instruments and means of management different from those previously known and used. Of course, military confrontation does not affect the methodology and technology of the logistics support management in any substantial way. Their existence is a continuum, with different nuances, that are not very different compared to the methods used in peacetime.

In terms of holding some varied and complex fighting techniques, as making use of certain categories of military equipment, with distinguished possibilities, that increase the volume of information, the crucial issue of managerial and logistical work in peacetime is to ensure the efficiency in situations of crisis and war.

Based on the conclusions drawn from military conflicts, including the most recent ones, and the practice gained in military exercises, I believe that the main activities carried by governing bodies in charge of planning the strategic, operational and tactical levels are: obtaining and transmitting of general information about the international and internal political-military situation, as well as transmitting the information in a logistical way in order to ensure the techno material and medical operations; organizing the human resources required to ensure large military units through mobilization activities and coordination of herds; adopting measures to protect the secrecy of logistic information and communication.

I believe that the supply chain-delivery of the military area lacks flexibility, mobility, efficiency and interoperability. At the same time, maintaining a force that needs to be prepared in order to face a possible threat (which can occur anywhere and at any time) is not the best way to use resources, as long as the just-in-time type of logistics can be a more fitting and less costly alternative. In this context, the supply-delivery chain lacks capabilities to fully acknowledge the situation and is not capable of communicating and delivering the information. In conclusion, the chain reduces the capability of taking logistical prints from the field, because it lacks the means of deducting a war.

I believe that the Romanian army's logistics system as a whole encounters difficulties due to the continuous decline of the Romanian defense industry in recent years. This system is reactive, but it must be transformed into a proactive one, based on flexibility, vision and foresight. All activities of the logistical support process highlights not only difficulties of the logistics management but also its role and importance, which are determined by their military training in peacetime and in military actions in crisis and war. Depending on the situation the logistics system is at peacetime or at war, some logistical support process activities are more or less nuanced related on others.

I appreciate that the problems in military units' logistics in peacetime are not clearly defined by laws and logistics staff is in the situation of not knowing the whole process of logistic support and how to act when a crisis, a state of emergency or an armed conflict arises. Characteristic for this period is the work done for passing military logistics system, with all its components, from the peace status to war. Lately, even though the idea that now and in the near future Romania is not threatened by any real or potential external jeopardy has been floating, the leading politic-military staff has to take into account anything may affect the integrity, unity, independence and sovereignty of the Romanian state. In this context, the political and military leadership must ensure the enforcement activities quickly and safely. To achieve this, military logistics system and logistics information system have to be viable, coherent and must operate both vertically and horizontally, during any event in which the military transition from peace to war would occur.

Logistics management's role and importance in peacetime is determined by the dynamics of human resources and technical equipment that, through the personnel policies and procurement, prepares human, technical and material support of any future conflict. In other words, peace prepares war. Of course, the existence of the legal conditions of manifestation for logistics management and creation of the necessary logistic structures at different hierarchical levels indicating the areas of responsibility, can't figure out any complex issue.

As far as I am concerned, some issues remain to be figured out in the logistics system, such as its internal cohesion and functionality. Thus, in addition with a well-founded relationship system, a matter of great importance is the selection and appointment to leadership positions on the logistics line of candidates that have undergone one complex cycle of training, including postgraduate operational and strategic level courses, use of equipment and computers for learning and training in foreign languages. A particular attention will be given to those who have undergone various forms of training or participated in abroad activities.

By checking the correlation between the logistical support of military units in peacetime and as well as in wartime, it is evident that the first one determines the second, meaning that the efficiency of the measures and activities aimed at defending the national defense, marks in a positive or negative way, the logistic actions done during the transition of the Romanian army, from peace to war. In this regard, I strongly appreciate that, in peacetime, logistical support aims to ensure the supply with armament, technique, equipment, food and training in all aspects of the country's armed forces, and keeping them at a high fighting potential, to be able, based on the decision of the constitutional bodies, to complete any of the missions established in situations of crisis and war.

Conclusions

The basic direction of this theme is the features of the logistical support at military units' level in peacetime, and also the ways and means by which the integrated logistics system will be able to provide the flexibility and sustainability of military establishments to fulfill the full spectrum of missions that are employed in, by using an appropriate logistical support. In this sense, my main goal was and is to highlight solutions for improving activities related to the subject at hand. The focus of my analysis is how to tackle the main issues identified in real logistics of the military units during peace, and gradually move towards applying the theoretical concepts mentioned above, by exemplifying them in the realities of the nowadays logistic systems.

I consider that the fundamental requirement of an efficient logistic support in peacetime is to create integrated logistics with great mobility, ensuring the necessary logistics in the place and in the volume required at the right time. The transformation and mobility will focus in providing logistical support to military units by creating an echelon to coordinate activities from a strategic level, through the operative one and translating it into a whole conception, at the tactical level.

Achieving the fundamental requirement for an efficient logistics support will be based on the modernization of the informational technology and the control of logistic management by creating flexible microstructures for managing and executing with an optimal speed capability, which are able to act in any circumstances, according to the tasks entrusted.

To achieve the objectives set by each military unit in peacetime, the logistical support must meet the following requirements: the creation of an integrated logistics system or modifying the existing one; an efficient management of information and focus on initial and final requirements of the supply chain.

Also, in a secondary direction, we analyzed the competitiveness and performance of logistics support in military units during peace, by having in view their membership in an efficient and effective supply chain-delivery, in which there is a desire to make things work better based on common objectives and strategies.

Thus, I pointed out the role of logistic support's management in peacetime, having the goal of ensuring the final quality logistical support that is sufficient for all functional areas of logistic military units in peacetime. The analysis was based generally on my experience as a logistic officer and particularly on legislative and regulatory study of theoretical material, as well as documentaries and specialty materials. Therefore, I emphasized the importance of leading bodies of the logistic system in military units during peacetime and the harmonization of duties on the logistics line in peacetime to those in wartime to successfully meet the fundamental objectives of national defense and the basic mission given to each entity's military side.

Finally, through my study I have tried to highlight the importance of logistical support of military units during peacetime, the advance to military and civilian decision-making structures, the idea that logistics and logistical support should be reconsidered for the initial situation of peace, but closely linked with emergency, crisis, and war mobilization in the legislative, structural and procedural point of view. All these legislative changes, in line with the logistics support of the Romanian Army have to be executed in close connection with the trends of modernization manifested in the national and international economic system, at the same level as the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and of those of European Union (EU).

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THE OPERATIONAL DETERMINING FACTORS OF AIR DEFENCE

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Abstract: In this paper we present an overview on the operational environment of the air defence. Basing on the fundamentals of futurology we try to sum up the trends that air defence will have to face with. We consider the asymmetric spectrum of air threats and we present a wide picture about the offensive air assets as one of the main determinants of the future operational environment of air defence.

Keywords: future; operational environment; air defence; air threats; asymmetric threats

Introduction

"It is very hard to predict, especially when we speak about future", said once Nils Bohr the famous scientist. This truth is experienced also by experts who intend to predict the future of our security environment and the character and interior contents of the wars (armed conflicts) of the future. Despite the difficulties, the cognition of the future to be expected and the creation of valid future images have emphasised importance in the field of military affairs for the decision-makers.

Today there are scientifically based research papers using so many techniques of future research written; however, we have to recognise that future research can be very "multi-layered", and it can be only sustained in the present with certain plausibility, deriving from the present. The problem is made much more complex by the fact that since the 1980s the relative stability of the past decades has been replaced by a very complex and difficult situation. The prognoses, the circumstances and conditions of the processing of forecasts have changed. Future research of scientific quality has had to face a new situation: in the society, in several fields of political and economic life, as well as in the field of military affairs, stability and balance that had existed earlier in a wide circle have been becoming less and less characteristic.

The events and conditions characteristic for changeability and instability can be experienced in more and more fields. According to certain sociologists[1] "*we have to calculate on the prolongation of the duration of instable periods and the fact that unexpected changes will more and more frequently take place. We can follow it more and more difficultly how and while the system changes. Instable conditions seem to become permanent.*"

The situation is, however, not so simple, instability is present in parallel with stable processes and the culmination points inducing epoch-making changes. It means that also in the environment of security "*beside of old, fading processes new ones are spreading.*" It is a spectacular example that nowadays in Iraq the traditional phenomena (weapons, military

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[1] Among others Erzsébet Nováky (Corvinus University, Centre for Future Studies).

techniques) belonging to a much earlier generation of warfare are present in parallel with the American culture of warfare of the most modern military technology: guerrilla war and warfare based on terrorist attacks, together with network-centric warfare and effect-based operations.

This complex situation induced that we will be forced to apply newer and newer methods[2] beside the traditional methods of future research in the description of the security environment in the future. In future research in security policy and in the forecast of the form and internal contents of prospective wars the governmental and non-profit research centres, ("think-tanks"[3]) of the United States are in the first place. Although there have happened some positive changes in order to balance American professional dominance that can be experienced also in this field, since within the frameworks of the Allied Command Transformation established not long ago so-called "centres of excellence"[4] have also been founded. The main mission of these centres is to provide future-image and vision for the NATO, for the purpose of making grounded medium-term and long-term plans.

Military thinking and the decision-making processes of the commanders have always included the requirement of future research and forecasts. It is enough to have a glance at a simple process of operation planning, the order of commander's decision-making, and we can establish that the prediction of the courses of action of the enemy is also based on prognosis-making processes integrating general evolution theory and scenario-making methods. This claim can be observed much more in the elaboration of medium- and long-term plans of military development, or thinking further the above analogy, in the case of planning of a longer campaign or even a complete war, since the necessary decisions can be prepared only based on a future image elaborated with scientific circumspection.

The analysis of the environment of security, the time-horizon of the examination of potential threats and trends of threat usually produce studies of medium-term (5-10, perhaps 15 years) and much more long-term, even 20-40 (50) years forecasts.

We can see the results of the analyses of shorter terms in the first chapters of security strategies, strategic conceptions and allied and national doctrines of integrating character, where the main messages to be explained further are grounded. Analyses of such terms, usually, if they are executed with strictly scientific methods, are usually made with the use of the results of classical prognostics ("forecasting"). Prognostics prolongs future based on the tendencies of the near past and the future, and based on the experiences and phenomena of reality available up to now gives a prognosis of the (near) future.

In the present research paper, we are to present the most important elements of future images (strategies, official studies that summarise the trends, etc.) created with the above summarised methods of future research.

1. The Fundamental Change Of The Strategic Environment: Asymmetric Threats Arriving From Airspace

The air component of the security challenges of the succinctly summarised trends of threats of security strategies is basically constituted by the threats arriving from the airspace.

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[2] For example, the THEORY OF GENERAL EVOLUTION, DELPHI-METHOD and the CHAOS THEORY, and beside them, many new methods and the combination of methods appeared, for example, "STORY TELLING", "FUTURE WORKSHOP or the "SCENARIO METHOD", etc.

[3] Fortunately, in the near past there has been progress in Hungary in this issue, since very exigent studies and articles were published. For example: János DEÁK: The war of nowadays and of the future, Hadtudomány [Military Studies], 2005/2.

[4] The Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC) founded in Kalkar, Germany is the first such research centre the main assignment of which is long-term forecasting, the exploration of the trends of air and space warfare, and contribution to the elaboration of the strategic conceptions of the NATO.

The development of air assault equipment and the process their (harmful) proliferation to be explained further in detail means a potential threat. It is the increase of freedom of the transfer of the technology that makes it possible for more and more states and even groups to produce such devices, not speaking about the dangers caused by weapon trade.[5]

Terror threat coming from airspace after the attack against the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon cannot be ignored, since our country is already also part of the West, and in the war on terror we are allied to the United States.

The increase of the terror threat coming from the airspace can be observed even today, since there are well-organised terrorist groups that after thorough planning considering every factor may acquire destruction weapons and carriers that are suitable for considerable destruction and damages (poisoning, infection, psychical pressure, etc.). They can use the legally availed aircrafts or civilian aircrafts purloined on the ground or hijacked in the air whose application as devices of destruction mean a serious threat today also to our homeland.

The situation is made more complex by the fact that these criminal groups may be able to install warheads (poisons, explosives) in "small aircrafts" and execute terror attacks with them against the appointed target. Apart from the small aircraft platform, it is imaginable that they will acquire more serious warfare technologies and use helicopters, drones or, according to the darkest version, ballistic missiles. The complexity of such a terror attack and the difficulty of the defence against it are shown by the fact that that attack can be initiated from beyond the borders but also from within the borders of the country, and it is very disturbing as for the calculation of the reaction time.

Airspace challenges deriving from regional instability basically stem from the economic and social backwardness, democratic deficit and complex religious and ethnic conflicts unresolved for centuries of the regions.

Military challenges and threats in the classical sense have relevantly decreased; however, instability in itself is a possibility for the appearance of the form of airspace threats, and we cannot exclude the chance of attacks with the use of the airspace. The platform, the targets and the destruction (poisoning) material can be similar as mentioned above: the most likely is the use of small (sport) aircrafts.

Certainly we do not only have to calculate on terror attacks from the regions, since organised crime (drug, weapon, fissile material and refugee smuggling, etc.) and the violation of the international rule of aviation (e. g., its "Balkanian"-type application) can also endanger the security of the airspace of the western world.

The very quick spread of *mass destruction vehicles and their carriers* and the technological transfer of their production mean a potential danger to our homeland. It is a well-known fact that the most important terrorist organisations have already made attempts to acquire fissile material, and such materials may be and might have been smuggled out of some successor states of the Soviet Union.

As for our homeland, air threat endangering the Hungarian contingent *during the military operations outside the area of the country* is a very important element, and certainly it cannot be separated from the threat endangering the coalition forces, it is an organic part of this threat. Furthermore, the participation of our homeland in such operations can also induce attacks against Hungarian targets from the state our sub-state parts of the conflict, which can be very dangerous if the given state (group, organisation) owns nuclear weapons or is even able to produce "dirty bombs".

Nowadays we speak very little about the risk of security that evolves with *the appearance of man-portable air defence missiles in illegal hand,* and its application against

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[5] Last year the news told about the incident when the Spanish Navy "caught" a ship transporting main elements of ballistic missiles at the Spanish coasts. The addressee was probably one of the Middle-Eastern states or terrorist organisations.

civilian or even military air vehicles or the threatening with it can cause very serious damages.

2. The Range of Offensive Air Assets As One of the Main Determinants of The Future Operational Environment of the Air Defence

Apart from the visioning of security future images, the technological and proliferation trends and the making of prognoses can more and more come to the front in military future research, since it may be the basis, for example, of the elaboration of potential air threat alternatives in the preparation of the development decisions of the air force. Although the main assignment of air defence has not changed in the last decades, the spectrum of its threats from the side of flying warfare vehicles has considerably been restructured, changes of emphasis have evolved. The earlier evolved air defence well-known from the past can be characterised as the classical air defence and its version that developed further in an evolutional way, "extended air defence".[6]

We can understand why this fairly new concept appeared in the theoretical system of air defence, what is there behind it and what qualities it contains through the review of the main categories of air raid vehicles and their tendencies of development. The spectrum of air threat is constituted by air warfare vehicles on which we can calculate as potentially dangerous to the objects to be defended. It is practical to analyse, beside the dangers deriving from the application of fixed-wing aircrafts and rotary-wing aircrafts meaning traditional threat, the risks deriving from the application of ballistic missiles, manoeuvring robotic aircrafts, pilotless aircrafts and surface-to-air missiles.

The quick development of technology, the harmful proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their carriers, and the air threat that can be realised with fairly cheap technology induced considerable changes in the quality of air defence. While in the past both the centre of gravity and the focus of air defence aimed at the armed air vehicles, aircrafts and helicopters controlled by a pilot, nowadays more and more the fights against pilotless air vehicles, ballistic missiles and air vehicles operating based on aerodynamic principles have come to the front. The attached diagrams make it very spectacular that certain air warfare vehicles that mean serious threats, comparing to the prizes of the development and maintenance of fixed-wing aircrafts demanding high technology, can be produced and deployed en-masse at a fairly cheap prize, making a serious challenge to air defence.

2.1. Fixed-wing aircrafts

It is aircrafts that mean the most classical threat for air defence and for the objects to be defended, and they will probably stay a very important element of the air threat spectrum also in the future.

We classify the following categories as fixed-wing aircrafts: *bombers, fighter-bombers, fighters* and *reconnaissance, cargo and battle aircrafts.* According to the newest trends of technological developments, and due to the military savings becoming more and more general air forces do their best to deploy multifunctional, universally applicable aircrafts.

Due to the wide range of the applicability of aircrafts, they are applied in each segments of air warfare, and they can execute *strategic air raids, attacking and defensive air warfare operations, air interception, direct air support, electronic fight* and *air reconnaissance.*

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[6] *Extended Air Defence, EAD.*

The designers of air defence can calculate on that enemy fix-winged aircrafts will attack the targets of large value, like sea harbours, airports, platoon groups, air defence artillery units, command and control centres and logistical bases.

The weaponry and ordnances of fixed-wing aircraft provide a very wide spectrum of application, and they can carry machine-gun, automatic cannon, guided and non-guided surface-to-surface missiles, air-to-air missiles, reconnaissance and electronic fight containers. Some of these types of aircraft are also able to launch robotic aircrafts, and the air defence must also count on it.

2.2.   Helicopters

Since the War of Korea helicopters have been playing an increasing role in warfare. In the beginning they were applied for reconnaissance and artillery fire control, then later for the transporting of troops and material-technical equipment, but by today they have become usable in the full spectrum of air warfare, as a result of technical and warfare specialisation.

This fact was made spectacular by the first air attack of the Gulf War in which the most important radar stations of the Iraqi air defence forces were liquidated with AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, paralysing the command and control system of the air defence, with which they decisively contributed to the success of the operations of the neutralisation of the air defence forces.

One of the most dangerous weapon systems of our age the attack helicopter was applied by the French for the first time, in the Algerian Crisis, 1959. After that the theory of application, the warfare with attack helicopter started to evolve, and this process was justified by the "attack, transport and armed helicopters" applied en-masse in the Vietnam War. Due to its multi-sidedness and great surviving and anti-tank ability, helicopters are ideal air vehicles to support the warfare and operations of ground forces. In most countries we can consider attack helicopters, namely one of their cheaper, but very effective alternative, the so-called armed (armed, multirole) helicopters as the main resource of the direct air support of the troops.

Another indispensable element of the fight of mobile air troops and air descent operations is the transport (multi-functional) helicopter with which it is possible to transport the forces to the appointed area, and like this the (special) forces penetrating in the depths of the enemy can disrupt the command and control system of the enemy, occupy object of key importance and destroy warfare elements of decisive importance.

Search and rescue operations of war time and peace time and air health care evacuation (transporting the casualties home) nowadays cannot be imagined without modern helicopters, and with the help of the aircrafts with special equipment, the air force is able to save the crew of the aircraft (helicopter) in trouble and to transport the casualties of the battle field.

The development of air defence helicopters is also a present-day development trend, with which the execution of the annihilation of air vehicles of low velocity (helicopters, aircrafts, balloons) is planned.

Military experts recognised early that helicopters can be prominent warfare vehicles; therefore, they were equipped with a wide scale of board weapons and ordnances. It can bear the following weapons (or interior or exterior ordnances): machine gun, automatic cannon, guided and non-guided missiles, grenade launchers, air-to-air missiles, reconnaissance and electronic fight containers.

For ground-based air defence systems the application of helicopters can mean a serious threat, since usually the vehicles attacking in pairs, exploiting the natural opportunities of camouflage given by the surface, are able to approach the target area flying close to the ground. The annihilation of warfare vehicles executing operations in drifting mean a very

great difficulty to air defence systems operating based on the principle of radial velocity measurement (applying Doppler-frequency). The combat against helicopters is aided by the fact that their application depends on the weather and the given period of the day, and its relative loudness makes it easier to locate it with traditional devices.

2.3. *Ballistic missiles*

The Desert Storm operation of the Gulf War made the designers of air defence weapon systems and air defence operations draw very important conclusions. The Iraqi soldiers, despite the relatively small effectivity of warfare aircrafts, applied ballistic missiles and robotic aircrafts attacking ground targets with relative success. The experiences of the war revealed what challenges the Republic of Hungary and its allies must face in the future in the field of air threats.

The high expenditures of the development, maintenance and application of fixed-wing aircrafts and the prospective great losses of the air forces of the NATO member states makes it very attractive for several countries to acquire ballistic missiles. The press often calls the missiles meaning a real threat in potential contemporary crisis areas only "the long stick of the poor countries", and their danger is in their relatively low costs (O,5-1 million USD) and the simplicity of the their manufacturing technology. The weapon system that can be considered the successor of the V-2 rockets of the Second World War was developed by the Soviets in the 1950s (under their NATO-codename: SCUD), and several of its modifications became widespread.

The ballistic missiles can cause destruction of unacceptable degree by aiming at the cities of large population or by the application of non-traditional explosive heads. Furthermore, it cannot be ignored that the deployment of the missiles or threatening with their application can have severe psychological effects that was also evidently proved by the Gulf War, when the Iraqi government was threatening Israel with SCUD-rockets.

The ballistic missiles can be applied as the vehicles of the "first strike" or of the so-called "revenge attack", and their velocity and the variability of their launching make them suitable weapons for carrying unexpected attacks. The ballistic missiles make it possible that the applying countries should project their military forces into long distances, far beyond their borders, with which they can also restructure the battlefields, since the field commanders must use serious resources to neutralise the rocket threats. It also means a further problem that the majority of possible aggressor nations in potential crisis areas own mass destruction weapons together with ballistic missiles.

The vertical launching systems have a surviving ability of great degree, especially when they are applied in a dark time of the day or at low visibility. The launching vehicles of great mobility are able to occupy the hidden launch facilities, making it very difficult for forces and vehicles to locate and annihilate them. The surviving ability of the launching vehicles means that in the case of a possible crisis management or of an operation outside NATO area the rocket threat can stay permanent during the whole action.

The warfare ability of these missile systems, due to their low accuracy and precision, is not very relevant; however, we cannot forget about their low range, considerable surviving ability, ability of carrying mass destruction weapons, and the psychical pressure on the population that the potential application or the threatening with its application may mean.

The defence against ballistic missiles can be really effective only if active air defence fight is completed with the activity of traditional (special) forces assigned to locate and annihilate the launching vehicles. If the Republic of Hungary would like to meet the challenges represented by ballistic missiles, then it should think over acquiring a missile defence system and the adaptation of the theory of application.

2.4. *Manoeuvring cruise missiles*

The roots of present-day manoeuvring robotic aircrafts, similarly to ballistic missiles, can be found in the German military industry of the Second World War. The V-1 rocket of the Wehrmacht and the Okha-type robotic aircraft of the Japanese army served as the basis for the post-war American developments. The vehicle that was in the beginning used as air defence shooting practice target was deployed at the Air Force and the Navy in the 1950s. The development of robotic aircraft then continued, and the vehicles launched from ground-, air- or sea-based systems were developed for strategic (nuclear) attacks in the time of the bipolar world.

We call the vehicles robotic aircrafts that are *equipped with wings of different types and categories, stabilizers and engines utilising the oxygen of the atmosphere, flying along a programmed orbit or flying with remote control.* Usually, robotic aircrafts approach the target to be annihilated with flying along the surface (e. g., with TERCOM navigation) in the entire period of the operation, or in the beginning they fly along a ballistic orbit then return to the airspace flying along the surface.

Robotic airplanes – within the category of tactical rockets, together with pilotless airplanes and air-to-surface rockets – are classified as so-called "tactical aerodynamic rockets". As for the development of robotic aircrafts, beside the application of more and more modern technology, the trend according to which it is not vehicles applying high technology that are being developed can also be observed, but similarly to the "weapon of poor people", the ballistic missile, first and foremost with the transformation of anti-ship vehicles and with the use of products and GPS-devices available at the free market cheap weapon systems of limited warfare abilities are created.

The limited ability of accuracy and precision concerns the probability of reaching the target. However, the importance of the weapon system is given by the fact that in possession of this type of relatively cheap vehicle the power relations of the region can be changed, not speaking about the fact that robotic aircrafts are even able to carry mass destruction weapons and have a surviving ability of great degree.

As for the size, the form, the mode of control or the types of weapons carried by them, there is a very wide variety of manoeuvring robotic aircrafts in use, and their range is from 30 km even up to 1000-3000 km. After the short-range anti-ship versions several countries are developing manoeuvring robotic aircraft attacking ground targets, and in their control the GPS satellite navigation technology can also be applied. The aim of the development of future technologies of manoeuvring robotic aircrafts is to increase the range and to improve the accuracy of these vehicles.

Usually, the manoeuvring robotic aircrafts are designed to be applied in the destruction of non-mobile targets that do not have real strategic importance, and similarly to ballistic missiles, they play a serious psychological role and can maintain permanent threats in crisis areas.

2.5. *Remotely piloted aircrafts*

We classify the pilotless air vehicles of remote control and the programmed unpiloted vehicles, the so-called drones as pilotless aircrafts. These vehicles are characterised by the fact that they are easy and cheap to acquire and produce, and they can be used in several different ways. They can be applied for reconnaissance missions, electronic warfare, for strikes against ground (or water) targets; furthermore, they can also participate in the neutralisation of air defence systems and can be involved in artillery fire control and deception.

It is a great advantage of pilotless aircrafts that its crew demands much less training than aircraft pilots, and its application increases the morality of warfare by the fact that the missions do not risk the life of the pilots.

Due to its small size, effective radar wave reverberating cross section and its low flying profile, it is a very difficult assignment for air defence systems to annihilate pilotless aircrafts.

2.6. Air-to-surface missile systems

Also tactical air-to-surface missiles – similarly to robotic aircrafts and pilotless aircrafts – belong to the category tactical aerodynamic missiles. According to their control systems, they can be radio-guided, self-guided against radars, half-active laser-guided, electro-optical and TV-guided. Due to their large velocity and small effective radar cross section these targets are also very difficult to locate, follow and annihilate.

We have to especially deal with the anti-radar missiles to be applied against radiating radio-technological devices (radars) that are the most important equipment for the oppression of air defence systems, because it means a very serious threat, since with its application the enemy can raid upon our reconnaissance and fire control radars from a relatively great distance, from outside the fire zone. Anti-radar missiles can have a very destructive effect if they are applied together with deceiving pilotless aircrafts used for the activation of radars.

Conclusion

As we have written it in the beginning of the research paper, it is very difficult to "predict", but it was said by Lajos Kossuth: "The past is the mirror for future." We cannot ignore and neglect the elaboration of longer-term prognoses. We evidently, considering our possibilities and abilities, must deal with the prospective tendencies and the problems indicated by them. We have to find the adequate answers to three questions in order that prospective development should not cause drawbacks to air defence experts and troops realising it. These are proliferation, the quick development of air warfare vehicles and the widening airspace threats represented by civilian vehicles.

As for the proliferation of mass destruction vehicles, the problem first and foremost requires a non-military solution. It is political, diplomatic and economic efforts that are able to obstacle and slow down this very dangerous and harmful process, even if they are not able to stop it. The attention of state and economic decision-makers must be turned to this circle of problems, and we should participate in the hindering of the proliferation at most with proposals.

The search for the "airspace answer" to the quick development of air warfare vehicles is nowadays on the beam. The construction of the early reconnaissance and forecasting systems provides a suitable basis for the maintenance of active and effective ground- and air-based air defence systems. At the moment it has rather limits of expenditures than technological limits. The extension of the local air defence systems into regional systems in time and space and via the increase of level of security can be effective. The alarm services and situations of suitable quantity and quality can provide sufficient defence, even against surprise-like aggression. Air defence that is not applied element by element, but strictly as an integrated system – together with all necessary components – can give suitable answers to current military challenges and threats.

Nowadays the applicability of civilian aircrafts as air raid vehicles means the most complex problem. There is no perfect, effective solution for terrorism operating in every situation at the moment. The possibility of acquiring small civilian aircrafts, as mentioned above in the article, and their transfiguration into weapons is unfortunately too simple and is

not expensive at all. The restriction or ad absurdum the complete prohibition of private aviation is not the best solution in the same way as the building of the continuous and direct air defence of the endangered targets and objects. The first solution would generate nearly unsolvable legal problems, while the second would mean unendurable expenditures. In these fields, the air defence seems to be the "loser". The available military vehicles and possibilities do not and cannot grant a satisfactory solution, mainly due to the problems caused by the very narrow reaction time. In the same way as at the dangers caused by proliferation, in this field there is also state interference and regulation necessary, completing it with strictly regulated military contribution, and as a final step, with the annihilation of suspicious or evidently enemy air targets as soon as possible. Undoubtedly, 11th September of 2001 redefined many things as for the possible activity against "civilian" air vehicles.

In summary, air defence as defence activity is always in drawback against the threats that arrive from the air, but we must do our best in order to decrease this drawback.

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BEHAVIORAL ISSUES SPECIFIC FOR PEOPLE PRONE TO LEAKING OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

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Abstract: Starting from the idea that technological development of the last decade has allowed both, an easier way of sending of the information, much easier by IT systems and increase the level of socialization and training of new relationships that do not require direct contact between individuals, but only one virtual contact, for intelligence structures appear as a challenge to new social realities identifying specific threats in the area of terrorism and espionage.

Thus human relationships established online or subsequently mediated by appealing to modern technology, whose purpose is criminal can sometimes be successfully identified and researched by studying human behavior. More specifically, interest developments behavioral analysis of state institutions employee who has access to classified information and who is prone to compromise them.

Behavioral clues, conduct specific simulated suspicion will outline and contribute to its analysis in conjunction with other specific instruments which will ultimately confirm or rule out criminal matters.

Keywords: classified information, security, simulated behavior, compromising information;

1. Simulated behavior

At the behavioral level, social scientists believe conduct as an attitudes transducer, which is the result of total configuration attitudes. They are not equal in intensity and value, personal attitudes within the system there is a selection, after which it is designated and promoted the attitude with the deepest form of implication in human behavior.

In social activities of the human subject, often appear contradictory statements who requests his personality. Thus, part of socio-professional expediency may be in conflict with subject own state at a certain time or even with his personal beliefs. Moreover, changing their system of values, accepting certain situations circumstantial or even opposite values, according to organizational behavior, generates dilemmas. Avoiding them or mitigating possible negative effects requires elasticity in thinking process and a tactful behavior.

According to R. Baboianu, a feature of organizational behavior is the learned and acquired character[1]. Any purchase that will make the human subject and which will influence professional behavior is a phase of personal development, in the direction of a required profile of functional attributions. On behavioral aspects, I. Ciofu identifies two ways of attitudinal response, folded or not in the regulated bureaucratic functional responsibilities[2]:

- apparent behavior, consisting of externalized reactions of the human subject, such as verbal and the nonverbal language, facial expressions, limb movement, body position;

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[1] Radu Băboianu, *Comportamentul simulat prin tehnica poligraf*, Revista Intelligence, nr.16,2009, pp. 42-45.
[2] Ioan Ciofu I., *Comportamentul simulat*, Editura Academiei, Bucureşti, 1974, p. 51.

- unapparent behavior includes internal changes indirectly detectable, accompanying processes of thought, emotion, language etc.

Between the two ways of behavior was established a relationship, in the sense that human apparent behavior necessarily represent unapparent forms of behavior, but not every manifestation unapparent corresponding manifestations of the behavior. Thus, some attitudinal aspects can be controlled and simulated.

In the context of developing a culture of security on classified information, I appreciate that people intending to provide classified information to unauthorized person done a despicable professional act and in most cases will display a simulated behavior in an attempt to conceal or to falsify the sense of reality. Cloaking attempt is determined by awareness of the human subject intention of infringement of the legal framework, simulation is not simply a mistake. It becomes a calculated intent, sustained and pragmatic interests against relevant organizational rules, an expression of psychological splitting or duplication.

I appreciate as a condition for success of a simulation, its internal consistency, the ability to maintain a coherent approach to the fictitious subject, in other words to maintain the lie. That approach is always motivated by subject's desires, interests and it appears in the different situations of interpersonal relationships in the workplace or in society:

- to hide failure in daily operational procedures;
- to camouflage the intentions of criminal acts that have violated operating procedures;
- to exonerate, in need of protection, desire of revenge;
- to withstand pressures and coercive rules of the institution, sometimes under the Criminal Code, in the case of exposing relationships with people outside of the legal framework, people from foreign institution who fraudulently obtained, without authorization access, classified information.

With direct reference to coercive measures, behavioral psychology emphasizes the important role for learning of some behaviors, determined by rewards and sanctions. They contribute either axiomatic acceptance of new acquisitions or eliminate the unfit ones.

Simulated behavior is achieved by resorting to various strategies, characterized by varying levels of spontaneity, depending on the individual abilities of improvisation and dissimulation and also on the personal relationship between the subject and his professional group[3]:

- appeal to the imagination;
- exaggerating or diminishing issues;
- the addition or omission of data;
- substitution some issues with incriminating note on his person;
- transforming data, according to his own reality projection;
- the silence

2. The investigation of simulated behavior

The simulating one is operating by an elastic logic to achieve, as quickly as possible his goal, using language and knowing very well the reality that propose to hide. Simulation clothes outdoors intention to mislead by three masked processes:

a) a rationalized attitude in which the subject tries to offer plausible reasons to justify an error or an illegal act committed intentionally, realizing incident created normative and its effects;

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[3] Mihai Aniței, Viorel Pașca, *Aplicații ale noilor tehnologii de imagistică corticală în detecția comportamentului simulat* http://www.ipsihologie.ro/images/stories/revista2010-12/art04Pasca.pdf, accessed on 18.04.2016

b)   subject seeks to project their personal attitudes to the account of others;

c)   the inverse variance simulation under b), the identification, thereby assigning the subject and wanted attitudes of others.

At the cognitive level, the interaction of the individual who adopts a simulated behavior (to hide facts or intentions) with others, from their professional sphere, is marked by the reactivity to aspects of committing some illegal acts. This is translated in a feeling of psychological tension. According to practitioners, clinicians, advocates of applied psychology, psycho-somatic unity of the simulation gives us a definite chance of investigating and detecting any simulated behavior.

In the case of normal people (psycho-physiological point of view), simulated behavior is often associated with intense emotional experience of states. In the context of the research, not apparent conduct of individuals prone to leaking classified information starts to be emphasized in the moment of their professional interaction or during unannounced checks (in the case of thematic controls to the protection of classified information).

Considering the fact that, like other crimes, treason by leaking classified information leads to the incriminated some states common to all offenders (due to the risk of loss of employment, imprisonment, fines etc.) allow us to state psychophysiological reactions of the accused that are similar regardless of the crime, differing only by their intensity. For this, we use the data obtained in social investigations analyzed by A. Papari. Thus, the most common psychophysiological reactions as a evidential result of committing criminal acts are[4]:

- increased heart rate;
- increase of blood pressure;
- phenomena of vasoconstrictors and vasodilation (flushing and pallor);
- accelerated and decreased respiration;
- disturbance of phonation and sound broadcasts;
- dry mouth phenomenon;
- sudden contraction of skeletal muscles.

For a psycho-physiological reactions identification, A. Papari analyzed cases of subjects who were motivated to develop a simulated behavior. Reactions listed are less under a volunteer control, they are determined by the perception of the risk of being detected subject's deed or intent, in response to a situational own assessment. This analysis includes inevitably some emotional issues related to the wrath of condemnation, if it is established a legal guilt.

In a dependence on the neurophysiological changes, the behavioral changes can be observed more easily in:
• changes in the face mimic;
• inadvertent seizure of motor functions;
• tremor in the voice;
• changing the perception of time between question and answer;

A number of theoretical and experimental researches tries to quantify human behavior, to conceptualize and generalize the fundamental principles, to determine the relationships between causes and actions. According to D. Gabor, researchers orientation is divided into at least four major objectives:
a) developping strategies able to analyze some categories of simulated behavior;
b) develop a psychological pattern abstract for each type of simulation;
c) identifying specific neurophysiological substrate for each type of simulation;

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[4] Adrian.Papari, *Metode de detectare a comportamentului simulat*, https://www.scribd.com/doc/8283869/ Metode –de-Detectare-a-Comportamentului-Simulat-ADRIAN PAPARI, accessed on 16.04.2016

d) to establish correlations between neurophysiological substrate of simulation and psycho-physiological indicators, used for the detection of simulated behavior.

According to R. Baboianu, the most popular means and techniques of investigation of simulated behavior, which we appreciate it can be used successfully to identify human subject generator of a deliberate act of disclosing state secrets are: the polygraph technique, detection method of stress in voice, emotional stress detection method in writing. In addition, D. Gabor considered as investigative techniques: free association method, the method of driving experience, technique and conscious suppression of censorship costly technical method, evaluation of evoked potentials manifested in the human brain. Regardless of investigative technique adopted, environmental conditions, subjective assessment errors and inaccuracies equipment are factors that can interfere in a wrong way.

The simplest decryption capabilities of simulated behavior are largely researched and developed by calling on applied psychology, by studying the information came as a result of studying the language forms. Along with the study of gestures, body language, language with all its forms and applied psychology give an increased interest to some indicators with level of detail or behavioral codification differentiation, resulted from the analysis of indicators of overall value.

Because the approach of consciousness plan is an indirect subject, polygraph technique is one of the most advanced techniques for detecting concealment. The technique's focus is to highlight the truth, if the individual renders faithfully and sincerely content elements of subjective reality, that playing mental acquisition of facts. But the difficulty is given by the dependence of specialized equipment for such activities and by the existence of the trained staff.

Starting from the assertion of the expert polygraph technique, R. Baboianu, that „the polygraph technique can easily be adapted to any situation where the simulated behavior is targeted", in the context of the theme we believe that this method will allow:

- to identify the authors of security incidents on classified information;
- the veracity of relations between the employee of an institution that holds valuable information for national security and interests of representatives adverse to national values;
- to establish sincerity of the employees, in the research of a security incident, in order to document the facts and drawing up plans to counteract the negative effects;
- to establish the circumstances that qualify certain facts against national security;
- the detection of libelous statements made to concentrate the fault on another person.

As a proof of its efficiency, at the departmental level, in the U.S., over 14 departments (U.S. Army, Air Force, FBI, NSA, CIA, Secret Service, etc.) use the polygraph technique successfully, for cases that involve espionage.
In the crime investigation process, polygraph technique covers an area unapproachable by other methods in the judicial process, identifies, captures, interprets psychophysiological changes occurred in conditions of disguising the truth by the contradiction between the two poles create "matrix morality" and "matrix criminal" .

The complexity of investigation of simulated behavior lies in the increased difficulty for identifying the reality, regardless of the procedure and the technique used.

Conclusion

By knowing misuses of reality and truth, externalized through a simulated behavior, we go through a first step in filtering real intentions of the human subject. Additional, conclusive elements will be obtained in the context of direct contact (interview or

counseling), depending on experience, skills building dialogue from the assessor. More information about the real intentions of a person suspected of committing an offense will be obtained through analysis of existing data, in conjunction with contextual issues.

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THE ROLE OF ISTAR IN IMPROVING COMMANDER'S SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

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Abstract: ISTAR is a grouping of information collection, processing, dissemination and communication assets designed, structured, linked and disciplined to provide situational awareness (SA), support to targeting and support to commanders in decision making. Advanced technology and capabilities enable and create opportunities to create ISTAR system as a critical role in all military operations. The biggest challenge remains the ability to synchronize both effectiveness and capabilities of the Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) systems for the intended mission. The task of information sharing and integration of ISTAR systems based on its architecture framework, interoperability policies as well as some form of evaluation tools help to determine, if not ensure the overall effectiveness of such integration efforts. The paper studying the impact of situation awareness on commander's decisions.

Keywords: ISTAR system, situational awareness, commander decisions, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance.

Introduction

The new development of information and communication technologies, more intelligent weapon systems implementation and a changing operational environment increase the need for gathering accuracy information in real time. Information obtained in this manner is processed and transformed into intelligence information which is very important for decision making of commanders[1].

New changes in command and conduct of NATO operations, requires finding new ways to provide integrated information's for decision making. When the collection and exploitation of information is coordinated within the targeting process, the combined activity is known as ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance). ISTAR is an integrated system who provides a key role in achieving of information superiority for commanders.

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[1] Martin Psík, Petr Čech, *ISTAR system building in the Army of the Czech Republic*, Economics and Management, University of Defence in Brno, pp. 71-78, 31 July 2012.

One of the first Alliance military operations with employment of coalition ISTAR assets was a sustained NATO air campaign in Bosnia and Herzegovina (code-named by NATO Operation Deliberate Force) in 1995[2].

The relationship between Command and the Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) function is critically important in conducted operations. An helpful ISTAR efficiency will enable the Command to detect adversary weaknesses and grant him to make the resolution that can exploit those weaknesses[3].

The various processes used to collect and analyze the information are the result of numerous individual systems some of which have only been recently introduced in the field while many others are still in development as a result of advances in the information age[4]. "ISTAR is a system of systems. It consists of separate systems, units, headquarters and formations that become more effective and efficient by means of interfaces and central coordination of their information and activities, without adversely affecting the responsibility of the various levels"[5].

Whilst the purpose of ISTAR is to support decision-making, the key type of activity undertaken between the Command and ISTAR is problem-solving, which includes problem framing and the formulation and testing of hypotheses[6].

1. ISTAR – general analysis

In addition to the fusion of data, the fusion of commanders and staffs may be the critical organizational requirement to ensure that ISTAR resources are correctly employed. In multinational operations, the sharing of intelligence, information and data may require a flexibility of approach by both commanders and staffs to prevent barriers from being created. If ISTAR assets are not properly exploited and data is not fused in a timely manner, the knowledge edge for friendly forces may well be eroded[7].

ISTAR requirement give advisable, precise, relevant and secure information and intelligence to every stage of command, withhold that its initial function is to help the commander and his judgment making process.

To understanding correctly the term ISTAR it is necessary to present its every term definition:

Intelligence - is defined as "The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations"[8]. Data can be gathered by many ways including cameras, radars or electronic systems and assessed or processed to create commander decision useful information.

Surveillance - is defined as "The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other

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[2]   Giuseppe   Marani,   R.S.T.A.   Cycle   Lessons   Learned,   [electronic   resource
http://ftp.rta.nato.int/public//PubFullText/RTO/MP/RTOMP-001///$MP-001-01.pdf.
[3] *** *Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition And Reconnaissance (ISTAR) Part 3*, Army Field Manual Volume 1 Combined Arms Operations, Ukraine, 2002.
[4] Réal Dubé, Gaétan Thibault, *The Canadian Istar Information-Centric Collaborative Workspace Concept*, Defence R&D Canada, 2004.
[5] *** *The Dutch Approach of ISTAR Concept during NRF-4.* [electronic resource] – Access mode: http://www.cdef.-terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/doctrine/doctrine09/version_us/foreign_studies /art04.pdf
[6] Paddy Turner, *The role of sensemaking in the Command-ISTAR relationship*, 12TH ICCRTS "Adapting C2 to the 21st Century", UK, 2007.
[7] *** http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/374C76EE_1143_EC82_2E238839A97A527B.pdf
[8] *** Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition And Reconnaissance (ISTAR) Part 3, Army Field Manual Volume 1 Combined Arms Operations, Ukraina, 2002.

means"[9]. Surveillance systems are used to search into specific operation or to acquire more itemized information on an express observation.

Target Acquisition - is defined as "The detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of weapons"[10]. Targets could be states, districts, equipment's, agencies or individuals and will deliver satisfactory precision in location adversary forces.

Reconnaissance - is defined as "a mission undertaken to obtain by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic or geographic characteristics of a particular area"[11].

NATO countries agreed to distinguish three principal elements of ISTAR[12] :

1. Information.

The information or intelligence collected by the ISTAR systems will be converted into the selected common data format. The standardized (raw) data once transferred over the network will be stored into a main local data server. The same network is also connected to a suite of exploitation systems, where they are used to process and analyze the raw data, before the processed and filtered information is again transferred and stored in the same database server figure 1.

Situation awareness systems will retrieve and generate the selected intelligence picture to support decision makers[13].

Figure no. 1 Information sharing within a local architecture[14]

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[9] *** http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/374C76EE_1143_EC82_2E238839A97A527B.pdf.

[10] *** Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition And Reconnaissance (ISTAR) Part 3, Army Field Manual Volume 1 Combined Arms Operations, Ukraina, 2002.

[11] *Ibidem*.

[12] *** AJP-2, *The ISTAR Concept (Chapter 1-4-1), December 2003*.

[13] Soh, Sze Shiang, *Determining Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) system effectiveness, and integration as part of force protection and system survivability*, thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2013.

[14] Barbara Essendorfer, Eduardo Monari, Heiko Wanning, *An Integrated System for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)*, International Journal on Advances in Security, vol 2 no 2&3, 2009, pp. 256-266.

2. Processes

The ISTAR process originates from both the intelligence cycle, undertaken by intelligence staffs, and the operational scheme of manoeuvre, which is managed by the operations staff and the targeting process. ISTAR supplements, but does not replace, the Intelligence Cycle (figure 2). The information derived from ISTAR operations is provided concurrently to the intelligence cycle, the targeting process and other appropriate staff[15].


Figure no. 2 The Intelligence Cycle[16]

3. The ISTAR Architecture

This encompasses the collection assets and their controlling organisations, analysis elements, the requesters of the product and the Communications and Information System infrastructure that links them all together at all levels of command[17].

The term ISTAR is used to refer both to the operational process and to the personnel, assets and architecture involved in the process.Modern intelligence collection systems can accumulate vast amounts of information. To be useful, the information must be relevant, accurate, analyzed, properly formatted, and disseminated in a timely manner to the commander.

Information capabilities which must be considered, include[18]:

ISTAR Units are those specialized units that have surveillance and/or reconnaissance as their primary mission. These units include but are not limited to (figure 3):

1. Infantry and armor scout platoons.
2. Battlefield Surveillance Brigade units.

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[15] *** *Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR)*, Canadian Land Force, B-GL-352-001/FP-001, 2001.

[16] *Ibidem*.

[17] Y. Pashchuk, Y. Salnyk, *Implementation Of Istar In Ukrainian Armed Forces*, Army Academy named after Hetman Petro Sahaydachnyi, Lviv, http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/vtzb_2013_1_15, 2013.

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3. Elements to include all HUMINT, geospatial intelligence, SIGINT, imagery intelligence
(IMINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), technical intelligence (TECHINT), medical intelligence (MEDINT) and counterintelligence (CI) assets.

4. Fires target acquisition sections.

5. Long-range surveillance units.

6. Chemical defense units.

7. Reconnaissance squadrons.

8. Attack and/or reconnaissance aircraft.

Figure no. 3 ISTAR Units

ISTAR-capable units are units that do not have surveillance and/or reconnaissance as their primary mission, but may be directed to perform these missions to complement or expand the ISTAR capability. Examples of these units include:

1. Combat engineers

2. Infantry battalions

3. Military police

4. Logistical convoys (during the course of their normal movements).

Additional Capabilities. Those units that are not tasked with a surveillance and/or reconnaissance mission but can observe and report information incidental to their normal missions. Their reports provide valuable information about the threat and environment that assists the intelligence staff an accurate picture of the threat and alerting the command to unpredicted, potentially dangerous threat activity. Examples of these units and operations include:

1. Unit leaders meeting with host nation leaders (information engagements).

2. CA teams reporting the location and condition of refugee concentrations visited while assisting non-governmental agencies. They report statistics and data on populations, essential services, and governmental functions that can be useful in answering the commanders critical information requirements.

3. Transportation or sustainment units reporting route conditions while moving supplies throughout the area of operation.

4. Any element moving from point to point in the area of operation. All Soldiers are potential sources of relevant information regarding the threat and the operational environment.

4. The role of ISTAR in commander's decision

The Intelligence Cycle, presented in figure 2, is the essential course for evolve intelligence, is foremost to the STAR system. The indispensable items of the Intelligence Cycle (Direction, Collection, Processing and Dissemination) is an activity in its own right, which enclose a multitude of sub-processes. These sub-processes go far to the production of intelligence results and are adequate at all levels of command. The impulsion to the ISTAR course is the commander, while thorough requirements are insured through both the IPB (Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace) and Intelligence Estimate, figure 4.

IPB is an logical methodology that is leaded at all levels of command to make graphical intelligence evaluation, assess and other intelligence results in assistance of the commander' s decision making actions. The principal role of IPB is to backing the commander's decision making actions, give him with a means to concentrate ISTAR collection assets on significant operations and establish targeting requirements.

IPB comprises of three indispensable steps:
- battlespace area evaluation;
- threat evaluation;
- threat integration.

From an ISTAR view IPB is altogether used to immediate ISTAR activity in support of present and aftertime missions.

The Intelligence Estimate is a judicious process of argument used to determine enemy courses of action, highlight intelligence breach and prioritise gathering activities. Its primary function is to aid a commander's decision making actions. The Intelligence Estimate is especially useful in concentrate on those links of intelligence that cannot be straightforwardly bound to the battlespace or a geographic representation[19].

The main terms from intelligence estimate are:
- a revision of the case;
- the adversary's likely purpose;
- elements, such as field, force disposal, period and area;
- the main conclusions out of the factors;
- the adversary's presumptive course of action;
- a brief of enemy vulnerabilities;
- information requirements including priorities.

CCIR (Commanders Critical Information Requirements) are the answers to questions of the commander during the pass from one stage to another of an operation that will let him to lead actions successfully[20].

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[19] Y. Pashchuk, Y. Salnyk, *Implementation Of Istar In Ukrainian Armed Forces*, Army Academy named after Hetman Petro Sahaydachnyi, Lviv, http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/vtzb_2013_1_15, 2013.

[20] *** *Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition And Reconnaissance (ISTAR) Part 3*, Army Field Manual Volume 1 Combined Arms Operations, Ukraine, 2002.

These necessity consequently be split into a set of Information Requirements that are then mixed with *Information Requirements* from other items. Some of these Information Requirements will be crucial to the make of the intelligence required for the planning and course of actions.


Figure no. 4 ISTAR and the Intelligence Cycle[21]

A lot of the CCIR and Information Requirements will be non-ISTAR connected or will merely requested datas that are already stored. There will, though, be some questions about the enemy or the terrain, which are crucial to the planning and valuable fulfilment of the course of action. There is an constructive instancy to PIR (Priority Intelligence Requirements) and they may also need a more profound review of the information that are retain, or the use of ISTAR is a matter of priority.

The terms *Intelligence Requirements Management and Collection Co-ordination* are normally submitted in a various order and more ordinarily well-known as CCIRM (figure 4). However the viability of the Intelligence Cycle proved that managing the requirements need forego the collection of information. Where the expression CCIRM is used or not there are two principal functions that must be accomplish to collect the information necessary efficiently and these are acquainted as managing the intelligence requirements and co-ordinating the gathering exertion.

Information will be acquired in many different ways. Some of informations will have already been turned into intelligence, such as reports from existing databases, others will just be products of information that necessitate further remaking. The information collected can be distinguished into two types. Information is the first that is time critical and which must be cross through the system as rapidly as possible in order to be operate on – this is called Combat Information. This kind of information is supposed to be that essential for time critical targeting. The second is universal information that concur to the total intelligence image. Informations, including the time critical information, will be cross behind into the Intelligence Cycle for Processing and forwards exploitation.

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[21] Y. Pashchuk, Y. Salnyk, *Implementation Of Istar In Ukrainian Armed Forces*, Army Academy named after Hetman Petro Sahaydachnyi, Lviv, http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/vtzb_2013_1_15 , 2013.

Processing is the part of the Intelligence Cycle where the information collect is transformed into intelligence; its location within the ISTAR System. It is defined as "The production of intelligence through collation, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of information and/or other intelligence"[22].

The principal activities within Processing are:
- collation;
- evaluation;
- analysis;
- integration;
- interpretation.

Time Critical Information must be permitted to pass over the courses to the requester as rapidly as possible. This information is usually for targeting aims where the need for rapidity is highest.

Dissemination is defined as "the timely conveyance of intelligence, in an appropriate form and by any suitable means, to those who need it"[23] and its location into the ISTAR system.

Dissemination is ruled by a suite of principles:

1. An evident separation should be made between dataset and the interpretation of them.

2. With the pressure of time and limitations on the amount of information and intelligence that can be crossed, the necessity for relating to be brief and to the spot is extreme.

3. Intelligence can be understood more rapidly and lightly if it is headed with a judicious succession that track a standard format.

4. When is feasible information should be changed into intelligence and distributed because the interpretation of the data is more important than the data themselves.

5. ISTAR staffs are responsible for ensuring that all information and intelligence is passed to those who need it.

6. Immediate information and intelligence collected to encounter intelligence requirements will be distributed whenever it get disposable.

7. As a universal principle, information about the enemy need not be exceedingly classified if the enemy would not have enough time to operate it should he intercept it.

Conclusions

Situational awareness for commanders and staff is vital. Any situation or contingency can be managed in optimal way if current information and intelligence is available.

The commander is central to starting the ISTAR system, ensuring the overall courses and providing arbitration over discordant preferences. The commander should be conscious that he "owns" this action, that it is working to his leadership and that it is sensible to his requests.

The STAR system is described as being a cyclical process and will constantly track the same trend. Supposition and inferences will be made continually and information will be confront with that already keep, motivating farther Information Requirements from into the system. Information Requirements and inlets will also be fed up constantly from outside roots.

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[22] Y. Pashchuk, Y. Salnyk, *Implementation Of Istar In Ukrainian Armed Forces*, Army Academy named after Hetman Petro Sahaydachnyi, Lviv, http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/vtzb_2013_1_15 , 2013.
[23] *Ibidem.*

Creating best application of the available ISTAR gathering assets spot an rising heaviness on coordination. The STAR system cannot effectively assist the commander's needs of his collection means are not well coordinated and controlled.

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CYBERSECURITY – A NEW DIMENSION OF NATIONAL SECURITY?

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Abstract: In the last years, cybersecurity becomes a strategic concept which is included in national security strategies. Globalization and the Internet have given new incredible powers based on continuous development of network technologies for individuals, organizations and nations. For anyone - students, soldiers, spies, propagandists, hackers and terrorists - gathering information, communications, fundraising and public relations have been digitized and revolutionized.

The increase dependence of critical infrastructure on IT&C components lets cyber-attacks become lethal to existing infrastructures; and many attacks are from both state and non-state actors.

In the international context in which the resurgence of terrorism is closely linked to actions of Islamist extremist hostile groups in cyberspace, the cyber security issue, as a component of national security, becomes the theme and rationale for developing specific instruments of fundamental and highly applied research.

Keywords: cybersecurity, cyber-attacks, national security, critical infrastructure, protection cyber infrastructure.

Introduction

Recent developments of cyber-attacks in our country ranks among the most dynamic cyber threat actual threat to national security. Romania addressing cyber security as an important dimension of national security, with the commitment to provide the legal framework in the field to meet international requirements and to facilitate voluntary, bilateral cooperation and exchange prompt and efficient exchange of information between authorities responsible for combating the use of Information and Communication Technology / ICT terrorist or criminal, "as stated in a press release, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[1]

On the other hand, the Romanian Intelligence Service, the national authority in cyber security, say that "internationally attacks against information systems are a growing phenomenon in recent years, their development is often associated with certain events that impact nations, communities or groups in society, sometimes becoming the mirror in cyberspace ongoing conflicts in various places in the world. ... In this general context, early 2015 marked the resurgence of terrorism in Europe, has generated international growth in the number of attacks carried out in cyberspace, motivated by extremist ideology through which manifest their adherence to Islam aggressors. " [2]

In this context extremely complex, the resurgence of terrorism is closely linked to actions of increasingly hostile groups extremist Islamist cyberspace, the issue of cyber security as a component of national security becomes the theme and rationale for developing specific tools research depth and applied equally highly. In these circumstances, developing

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[1] www.mae.ro/comunicat 10.02.2016 (https://www.mae.ro/node/28364)
[2] www.sri.ro/comunicat 16.01.2015

cyber-attack scenarios, the implications are numerous and complicated in the national security field, makes it possible to blend theoretical with the practical component, providing a realistic solution, reasonable and robust, offering guaranteed success while providing the feedback the necessary actors.

Cyber-attack scenario involves identifying elements that will influence future decisions and actions, and their establishment in a document that represents an overview for solving a problem of cybersecurity. The script creates a unified vision under a conceptual and organizational support being develop action plans in the field of cyber security and critical infrastructure resiliency response cyber-attack.

A possible scenario of cyber attack

Globalization and technology of high-level availability window to the individual, entailed the opening of modern societies and their connection to the planet.

We live in a world that is increasingly interdependent, and this is largely due to developments in the field of information technology and communications. There are many benefits of this interdependence, but there are also disadvantages, turned into vulnerabilities of entities social interconnected (from organizations / unions / international alliances to state / institutions / individuals) that have become almost entirely dependent on computer systems to perform important activities. Therefore, users from around the world must prepare to face a new set of challenges, mainly related to cyberspace, because increasingly more lives daily to every citizen, national economies and national and international security depends now on a cyberspace safety and stable.

These challenges included the concept of "cybersecurity"[3] that refers to threats, vulnerabilities and the need for governments and supra-state structures to develop a security comprehensive security strategy for their digital network. Cyberspace vulnerabilities[4], resulting from an incorrect design or management of ICT infrastructure at national type can cause the intrusive actions of state actors or non-state actors interested in attacking this area.

Field script

Cyber threats[5] are multiple and can generate, depending on the level for which they are designed, extreme damage national cyber infrastructures[6] and thus affect national security. From this perspective, it is circulated increasingly more idea of a new national security components namely cyber security.

Cybersecurity must to be addressed cooperation between different actors nationally, such as institutions, private companies and organizations non-profit and at level international between national states, regional organizations and organizations worldwide because this became a problem In this global, world states and international organizations have become

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[3]cybersecurity - normality resulting from the application of a set of proactive and reactive measures that ensure the confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity and non-repudiation in electronic information, resources and services, public or private, in cyberspace. The measures may include proactive and reactive policies, concepts, standards and guidelines for security, risk management, training and awareness raising activities, implementation of technical solutions to protect cyber infrastructure, identity management, consequence management (H. 271/2013 about Cyber Security Strategy of Romania, 2013, p. 7).

[4]vulnerability in cyberspace - weakness in the design and implementation of cyber infrastructure and associated security measures that can be exploited by a threat (H. 271/2013 about Cyber Security Strategy of Romania, 2013, p. 7).

[5]cyber threat - circumstance or event which constitutes a potential threat to cyber security (H. 271/2013 about Cyber Security Strategy of Romania, 2013, p. 7).

[6]cyber infrastructure - information technology and communications infrastructure, consisting of systems, applications related to electronic communications networks and services (H. 271/2013 about Cyber Security Strategy of Romania, 2013, p. 7).

increasingly concerned with maintaining the security of **cyberspace**[7]. If real space could be protected by physical borders associated with a complex of political, economic, diplomatic, military and otherwise, cyberspace is a global space, like international maritime space or outer space, except that now there it is controlled by international regulations clear.

In the context of large-scale terrorist phenomena, some of them **recent,** and increasing occurrence of cyber assaults associated with terrorism scenario aimed at complex issues of a terrorist attack managed through virtual space. Due to interconnection of critical infrastructure, such an attack could generate consequences and even cross-border, where regional interdependencies.

The goal of the scenario

Cybersecurity must have a proactive nature mainly involving information protection through intrusion prevention, detection and response to attack.

Today's digital networks are even nervous system of communications infrastructure, energy and economic. In this context, cyber security gains special value in national and international security. Thus, the consequences of a cyber-attack very well planned and very well executed digital infrastructure can be disastrous for the state or organization target, with direct effects on their security as a whole. In this regard, one laptop connected to a network can be viewed as a powerful weapon that can produce similar effects to a cruise missile. Thus, it is more than obvious finding the best solutions cyber defense, cyber „ so called concept of defense "[8], which will become soon a new emphasis on national defense strategy.

Because cyberattacks on critical infrastructure occur at the strategic level, the response must be equally: public awareness, investment in education, scientific research, development of cyber law and international cooperation. Since security cyber evolved from a technical discipline to a strategic concept, and attacks cyber affect national and international security at strategic level, leaders must look beyond arena.

In this context extremely aggressive, taking decisions at international, regional and national level are required expeditiously, representing the normative and strategic decision-making. In the context of cyber security scenarios, their purpose is to adopt a national policy decisions aimed at actions and measures for managing cyber bullying and its consequences, possibly with Community assistance request by activating the solidarity clause of the EU Treaty.

Objectives of the scenario

Cyber security must involve structures with responsibilities in the area of several public and private organizations, using different components and different approaches to security. As such, it is beneficial to address cyber security in two ways: on the one hand as a collection of policies and actions used to protect the connected network (including computers, hardware, information stored and in transit) from unauthorized access, modification, theft, interruption or other threat, and secondly as a process of permanent monitoring and evaluation of these policies and actions in order to ensure improvement of the quality of security to the changing nature of threats.

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[7]cyberspace - virtual environment generated by cyber infrastructures including content information processed, stored or transmitted, as well as actions taken by users in this (H. 271/2013 about Cyber Security Strategy of Romania, 2013, p. 7).
[8]cyber defense - actions taken in cyberspace to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, counter aggression and ensuring appropriate response against specific threats to cyber infrastructures national defense (H. 271/2013 about Cyber Security Strategy of Romania, 2013, p. 7).

It is foreseen that in the near future will increase the number of actors, including terrorist organizations, that can acquire and develop capabilities to attack physically or logically the global information infrastructure, including communications infrastructure, the Internet or computer networks which provide command-control critical processes . The main advantage of the attacker in cyberspace is that it is not detectable with certainty, so the decision to respond with a counter becomes difficult to take and justified.

Ability to respond to such types of attacks (cyber defense capabilities) must include technology and highly qualified human resource to enable an effective defense and dispel surprise.

In these circumstances, terrorist attacks using cyberspace will become extremely aggressive, prevent and combat them, achieved by cooperation mechanisms at national, regional and even international development through a strong culture of cybersecurity.

Thus, the objectives of a strategy on security culture aimed at:

• Awareness about the potential impact of a cyberbully, knowing that at present, they constitute powerful offensive weapons, and the company is not yet ready for understanding, acceptance and conduct of a war in the virtual environment that can quickly determine unprecedented attacks that can destroy the human species;

• Understanding / practice inter-institutional cooperation mechanisms in the event of a cyber-attack on national cyber infrastructure. Cyberspace is considered essentially a space devoid of any legislative and institutional constraints, which is why the only way of ensuring cyber security is determined by applying mechanisms for inter-institutional cooperation, regional and international. Moreover, the use of ICT in command and control structures of a state's vital infrastructure, information technology interdependence creates vulnerabilities which can be exploited by cyber-attacks. Warning schemes and inter-institutional cooperation is the best solution for responding to cyber-attack.

• Develop a set of recommended best practices. Cyber security is a field very new, which creates prerequisites for a situation which is carried out with aggression indescribable in a time hard to say in a space indefinitely, which is why adopting a set of recommendations and best industry practices adopted voluntarily by all actors involved, provides restrains the chances of a possible cyber-attacks, which can be extremely dangerous consequences that generates the nations, states, mankind in general.

Setting the target group

In cyber-attack scenarios, the actions are concentrated, although apparently not related. Thus, the targets are comprised of entities owning items that, once attacked, can harm national security call different forms: be it elements of critical infrastructure, whose shutdown causes damage proportional, be it activities in space virtual intended to create opinion trends in social media;

Critical infrastructures are direct effects of cyber-attacks. State or non-state actors aimed at damage to a state, focused cyberattacks on the critical infrastructure of a state. From this point of view, the target audience of cyber-attacks aimed at owners / managers / operators of national critical infrastructure. The most popular cyber-attacks, - attacks in Estonia, Red October, Epic Turla or Stuxnet were targeted critical infrastructure, causing damage to the owners / operators of national critical infrastructure.

On the other hand, the interdependence of critical infrastructure (energy, transport etc.) to cyber infrastructure can create many other problems to owners / administrators / operators of IC. The cyber-attacks focused on infrastructure such as SCADA / GRID will cause damage to energy infrastructure, etc. (eg. Stuxnet). In the vast majority of states, cyber infrastructures are owned by private owners, which is why public-private partnership is essential in the protection of national critical infrastructures.

Steps to carry out a cyber attack

Steps carrying out a cyber operations consist of a series of objectives, lines of action and decisions intended to meet the goals previously set by the network of cyber criminals.

The first stage begins before starting operation and cyber operations is to establish unique need of this type - financial benefits, political objectives / strategic, harassment or psychological damage to the person. After the decision was adopted, the cyber-attack targets were setting, which can be: theft of data / information confidential data destruction, manipulation of data or take control of target systems

Attackers computer selects paths penetration target computer system or network using (virtual platform or web) or through an insider (insider co-opted to collaborate) or supply chain Server victim.

In the next stage, cyber bullies target the achievement of malicious software through manufacturing such a program, or use an existing malware surcharge by hiring one offered by another group of computer crime.

The process continues by selecting a method to break into the victim system. In this regard, there are several viable options such as: use of internal resources, compromising the supply chain, using SQL injections or using the spear phishing (sending confidential data by web users unwittingly).

In this stage reaches its climax as the attackers computer starts running itself a cyber-attack respecting the following steps: establish the present inside the information target system, spread the software malicious network attacked, seepage data and information of interest / destruction or file manipulation.

Upon completion of the cyber-attack, the authors will try by means, methods and techniques to delete all traces and evidence that may incriminate them. At the same time, they make an objective assessment of all the stages to be set effects and consequences of bullying on target to identify completeness attack and to determine the level of fulfillment of preset objectives. Depending on the results, the group of cybercrime resume attacks on other targets or methods of attack is improving.

Identifying the problem to be solved and the particular situation

Due to the lack of foresight on cyber-attacks and the specific characteristics of their (lack of borders, knowing your opponent, how to achieve the attack, lack of predictability, lack patterns etc.) cyber-attack generates every time a crisis, which can be identified very difficult and, in general, post factum, which gives perpetrators an unquestionable advantage. In these conditions, simulations and permanent monitoring of possible assailants and a cyber intelligence well done, the only possible solution.

The issue proposed to be debated provides attacks cybernetic on some national critical infrastructure, in our case, water infrastructure, whose infection causes damage to the population, health thereof and the economy di affected area, on the one hand and infrastructure energy, which affect, cause harm to the economy. The problem is that, because of the dependence of critical infrastructure systems IT & C, on the one hand and the interdependence of their damage critical infrastructure produces unfavorable consequences and other infrastructure, leading ultimately to create a destabilization of social, economic and even nature affecting national security to the affected area.

In this context, cyber-attacks, whose purpose is to answer initial offensive on the decisions taken at the political level, can cause exceptionally grave damage to local or even national level. In this context, the problem identified is likely to keep national security through strong response to terrorist attacks or terrorism national and international particular situation is given by remedying the consequences on critical infrastructure cyber-attacks.

Instead of argument

Today, Cyberspace is a new field for actions of war. Modern war goes against terrorist attacks or attacks against critical infrastructure of a state. Attackers increasingly less visible, use cyberspace as an extremely safe and easy for goals. Actors, state or not, behind the computer, can trigger attacks prejudicial true immeasurable states.

Actions in cyberspace are focused actions, hidden, focused on getting the benefits of a state by getting control over energy resources and economic implications of that state.

High dependence of the critical infrastructure of any state infrastructure cyber indispensable virtual society we live in, and the global dimension of cyberspace we use makes cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure of a state to be the main form of destabilization of security national of that State. In these circumstances, the need to introduce cybersecurity both the component and the proactive than reactive, as a new dimension of national security becomes somewhat normal and common national strategic principles

Conclusions

In conclusion we face a society characterized by knowledge and changing, defined by a complex and dynamic world caused by mutations that took place against the background of globalization of information addiction. Exponential evolution of cyber environment and strategic valences acquired strong states entails risks and vulnerabilities that are frequently exploited by malicious entities aim of committing crimes, espionage, which endanger both individuals and society.

In this context, cyber security challenges are increasingly complex and varied, each state has an obligation to identify and measure the development of effective mechanisms of resilience and response to threats in the virtual environment.[9]

I also believe that the "boom" similar cybercrime activities is facilitated by the presence in the online environment of a growing number of malicious programmers type and setting up groups that offer online consultancy, which feeds the desire of individuals a- and test your knowledge in the field of cybercrimes, followed by the instinctive desire to earn easy money or to have access to confidential information of other public institutions.

Despite reports in the media, according to which new types of criminals carrying out criminal activities in cyber - space, necessarily consist of individuals intellectually gifted, normal cyber attackers represent, in fact, an adaptation of the name, the method, in which traditional tackling crime in a modern form, and these aspects indicate the urgent need to address properly the issue of crime and cybercrime in this century.[10]

Current tends shows that the struggle for supremacy menus in cyberspace, where traditional control strategies do not work, the actors are invisible, the targets are information resources, and initiate measures are always one step behind cyber-attacks developments.

So make one flaw in the operation of these systems can destabilize global security and the balance of civil society, which means that dependence company computer systems acquired a dimension deeper than the predicted initial and Romania should align the standards developments cyber imposed.

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[9]https://cybersecuritytrends.ro/cooperare-pentru-securitate-cibernetica/
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ASPECTS ON THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
IN THE CYBER DEFENCE FIELD

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Abstract: On the national and transnational level, legal aspects of cyber security are mainly presented in relation to the criminal law; its main aspects are emphasized by the fragmentation of basic and procedural national criminal law, as well by the efforts for their harmonizing.

The diversity of national laws is one of main reasons for vulnerabilities generated by informatics criminality phenomenon worldwide, mainly because such diversity does not allow the development of an unique legislative response to the global phenomenon.

The main goal of our scientific study is to emphasize some aspects on the legal framework in the cyber defence field.

Keywords: public good, cyberspace, cyber defence, security, international cooperation.

Introduction

Although the term of non-exclusive resource or global good is not interpreted constantly by the same descriptive elements, it comes from the interaction of two disciplines, international law and political economy.

In order to settle how the virtual space could efficiently be considered as a common good worldwide, first it must be defined in the framework of international treaties regulating so-called common goods, as, the free sea, space, or Antarctica[1], as well as by the perspective of logical criteria should exist to justify the existence of some specialized institutions (as the collective agreements and cultural norms) to provide the access to peculiar common resources.

Regarding the classical approach on the international regulation of common goods, we must foresee humankind reached to those pre-existent regions by discovery and people have not any role in their creation or development, therefore the patrimonial interests' legality was not discussed. The use of this approach conflicts with the nature of the cyber space, manmade creation, where the patrimonial rights prevail and the defining of some common goods is more related to the international consensus rather than to a pre-existent status-quo. In the study of the recommended bibliography, we identified two critical considerations when cyber space is defined by the point of view of principles of international regulation of common goods. First, the media itself, although is the object of natural laws of physics, essentially was generated by the humankind. Secondly, even the recognized public goods are not treated as

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[1] *Convenţia Naţiunilor Unite cu privire la Legea Marii,* pct. VII, December 10, 1982, available online at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201833/volume-1833-A-31363-English.pdf, accessed on 18.05.2016. *Acordul care guvernează activitatea statelor pe Lună şi pe celelalte corpuri cereşti, adoptat în 5 decembrie 1979,* 1363 U.N.T.S., available online at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201363/volume-1363-I-23002-English.pdf, accessed on 18.05.2016; *Tratatul asupra Antarcticii,* 1 decembrie 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S, available online at: https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/peace/docs/antarcticnuc.html, accessed on 18.05.2016.

such as a whole, thus, in order to judge the concurrent receivables of any scientific discovery that becomes component of the cyber space, any legal arbiter, appointed to the international level, has the need to overcome the already established rights, respectively sovereignty and property rights recognized by many internal jurisdictions of the states on which territory or jurisdiction manifest or can manifest this discovery or its effects.

When the sovereignty or the property rights must be recognized for certain parts or applications of the virtual space, by effect, also the international customs and behavioural norms will be convened for the transit and the operation in the framework of these infrastructure elements which are *de facto* property of other states or organizations. Still even before to try to elaborate cooperation norms for each new common value manifesting in the cyber space should be first identified if the logical circumstances justify the efforts for such assignment, the basic principle for political economists is to prevent thee excessive exploitation of resources when none individual actor has the stimulant structure necessary to pay the cost of providing a collective good or the necessary means to constraint its actions in order to preserve for the future the availability of a common resource; this principle is plastically enunciated by Garrett Hardin by his affirmation that "*ruin is the destination to which each people hurry, each of them aiming his/her own interest in a society believing in the liberty of common goods*"[2].

Keeping in mind the already stated facts, by political-economic perspective, cyber space in its actual form of existence does not achieve the both logical criteria in order to be considered common good because, firstly, the physical resources standing on its basis to remain submitted to the private property rights and, secondly, positive identification of the legitimate users as well as the exclusion of illegitimate users is not yet possible, therefore preventing the imposition of initially settled collective regulations or solutions. Also, taking into consideration or unilateral declaration by some states or non-state actors with international coverage of the cyber space as a common good worldwide would need the partial subordination of sovereignty and property rights settled in many jurisdictions and therefore any structure of collective governance for the cyber space would need a consensual legal distinction between the actives of possession and common goods, these factors have serious impact on the construction of some strategic and legal paradigms in the field of cyber security.

1. Cyber security vs. cyber defence of the states

Cyber security has become a matter of concern and global importance once with globalization of communications networks, infrastructure components of information technology, and economic, political and military systems that use increasingly more automate decision making cyber systems.

States in an attempt to define their long-term security objectives and to determine their main ways of achieving them, and to obtain a competitive advantage over other players, realize cyber defence strategies. In *Cyber Security Framework Manual*[3] published in 2012 by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence stated that until the publication of this manual "*... More than 50 nations have published some form of cyber strategy that defines what security means for future national security and economic initiatives*"[4].

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[2] Garrett Hardin, *The Tragedy of the Commons, Revista Science*, Serie Nouă, Vol. 162, No. 3859, 13 decembrie 1968, Asociatia Americana pentru Stiinte Avansate, pp. 1243-1248.
[3] Alexander Klimburg, *National Cyber Security Framework Manual*, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2012, disponibil online pe: https://ccdcoe.org/publications/books/NationalCyberSecurity FrameworkManual.pdf, accesat la 22.09.2016.
[4] National *Cyber Security Framework Manual*, NATO CCD COE Publications, decembrie 2012, p. 12.

Usually the terms "defense" or "security" are associated with that of "cybernetics" in a military context. Since the field was started to be settled by law, because of its grown relevance in criminal matters, along with terms somewhat specific for military area as "cyber defense" and "cyber security", other notions are also circulated such as "cyber war", "cyber espionage", leading to "cyber crime" or a radicalized form of it called "cyber terrorism".

Definition of cyber security as a science is a challenge deriving from specific aspects of this field, because cyber space security is built artificially, very little tied to the physical world; there are fewer "a priori" constraints from the perspective of a potential attacker, and from the perspective of the attacked. In the virtual environment, dynamic threats related to cyber security are arising in particular from the fact that the nature and agenda of adversaries is constantly changing, having as a catalyst for both the development of methods and technical means and behavior opponents in building a response to defensive actions.

To define coherently cyber security, the most important attributes would be building a common language and defining some basic concepts of which security community can develop a generally accepted concept. Because cyber security can be defined as a science only in the present of opponents, these objects will change over time but a common language and an agreement on experimental protocols will facilitate hypothesis testing and validation of laboratory experiments, which however will have to be confirmed by analogies on the size and complexity in the practical reality of the field. This approach can build basic philosophical science of cyber security; one can identify elements of scientific theory, experimental models or practical research community in the cyber security field can adopt to make significant progress in the field.

United States Department of Defense has two concepts on which "cyber security" is defined. The first, used primarily by major staffs of the various types of forces refers to actions taken to detect, analyze, monitor, protect and respond to any unauthorized activities on information systems and computer networks belonging to the US Department of Defense (DOD). A second form of "cyber security" definition is found in strategic documents underlying the establishment of US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), which defines "defensive cyber operations" as *"routing and synchronization of actions to detect, analyze mitigate and combat informatics threats and vulnerabilities in order to impede the opponent's offensive action in cyberspace, to protect critical US missions and to allow freedom of action in their vital space"*[5]. Therefore, in the American state, in 2003, the document US National Cyber Security Initiative[6] was developed as part of the National Strategy for Homeland Security in 2002[7], and revised in 2007. It wants to be a guide that organizes and unifies the efforts of Homeland Security for the American nation and is defined as a national effort focused on preventing and combating terrorist attacks, protection against hazards and natural or manmade disasters and in building and maintaining the response capabilities and reconstruction incidents occurring. It is completed by the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets[8] document developed throughout 2003.

The cyber strategy is built on the axiom of collective defence and responsibility of the entire American nation for the defence and security of the state, and provides a common basis for four objectives: prevention and neutralization of terrorist attacks; protecting people, critical infrastructure and key resources; capability development and reconstruction response

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[5] GAO, *Defense Department Cyber Efforts. More Detailed Guidance Needed to Ensure Military Services Develop Appropriate Cyberspace Capabilities*, Washington, DC, GAO, mai 2011, p. 5.
[6] *The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace*, February 2003, disponibil online pe: https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cyberspace_strategy.pdf accesat la 16.09.2016.
[7] *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, iulie 2002, disponibil online pe: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nat-strat-hls-2002.pdf, accesat la 20.09.2016.
[8] *The Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets* Februarie 2003, disponibil online la: https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Physical_Strategy.pdf, accesat la 26.09.2016.

to cyber incidents; continuous strengthening of the operating base to ensure long-term success.

Being thought of as a component of this strategy, the US National Initiative for Cyber Security is a guide that defines the commitment and empowerment framework of all segments of American society to secure both portions of cyberspace they operate or control, and the segments they interact with. The basic principle on which it is built this document is that cyberspace is a difficult challenge that will require a coordinated and concentrated effort of the entire American society, on all levels, from the federal government, state or local, private sector to the citizens.

Thus, cyber defence emphasizes the need of organizations and nations to protect key information systems in accordance with their responsibilities for countering cyber attacks. Moreover, as we have shown in the American model, cyber defense is not only an attribute of the defence sector or public order, but of the entire nation from the military, the government, the economic segment, research, the academia or the citizen. Also, these elements must be addressed integrated, thus creating the need not only for a coherent strategy of the nation, but also the establishment of structures to act effectively and synchronized with all these segments on both dimensions of a cyber threats, control and prevention.

2. Conceptual limitations of international cooperation for cyber space security

Because cyber attacks and illegal exploitation of information and communications technologies (ICT) capacities around the world are increasing in numbers, refinement and complexity, government and particular those adhering to the respect of fundamental values of humankind enhance their cooperation efforts in order to confront these types of threats.

Organizations with role in defending target infrastructures have as mission not only to neutralize attacks, to eliminate effects and to re-establish nominal parameters of attacked infrastructures, but many times have the obligation to provide to the proprietary or state entities owing target infrastructures some elements to help to the identification of the sponsor or the source of the attack. Thus, in order to protect their vital interests, countries and international organizations dependent of ICT focus not only on the organization of their cyber security policies but also on the defining and harmonization those principles in agreement with the principles of the other allied or potential partner states compatible by technological perspective or sharing the same fundamental values.

Although many countries included in their cyber defence strategies national legal and military measures, without an international cooperation these measures are inadequate against modern threats generated by enemies without internationally identifiable and recognized legal structure with network type organization and using cyber terrorism as battle strategy. Regional partnerships, also, does not offer adequate cyber security because along the fact in the association to a such agreement primes the geographical criterion, technological or defence doctrines differences can generate divergent interests and the cyber attacks can be initiated from a region or a country that is not covered by such of partnership. Collecting information is the starting point and key-element to build an international partnership which not only to allow to identify some potential aggressors by using "early warning" mechanisms but also to provide evidentiary elements to apply some response measures internationally non-redoubtable or to use international justice system to impose sanctions over the aggressor. If in the situation of cyber criminality international organizations as INTERPOL[9] quickly constituted capacities to identify evidentiary elements of a cyber aggression, even when the role of technology is not immediately obvious and afterwards cooperation mechanisms were

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[9] *Connecting Police for a Safer World,* INTERPOL, available online at: http://www.interpol.int/, accessed on 18.05.2016.

created and agreed by the international community in order to distribute these proofs without altering their judiciary values, in the situations of cyber conflicts, states greatly dependent on ICT continue to approach cyber conflicts involving state and non-state actors by the prism of exclusive right of sovereign powers to approach these conflicts in conformity with their own legal systems or by the prism of bilateral or multilateral agreements with other states. Because the infrastructure and the content of cyber space remain in conformity with the actual legislation and in the conception of majority of law-makers submitted to national jurisdiction, we can affirm the efficiency of these regulations is rather a matter of legal and technical implementation than one to attribute truth and justice. Thus, also in other transnational legal aspects, in order to defend property rights and citizens' interests, some states can be tempted to invoke initially extraterritorial competencies followed by the extension of sovereign authority over the non-exclusive resources in the cyber space.

As long as majority of actions and developments with impact over the virtual space tend to ignore the physical frontiers, the unilateral efforts of some state actors tend to be costly or ineffective. One of the initial approaches of cyber defence at the beginning of internet expansion was to isolate diverse infrastructure or to control its interconnections. Nowadays, because of globalization of economic, social and political processes using internet as support, the technological evolution allowed the expansion of ICT systems in each component of daily life and their interconnection by "wireless" networks, this approach obviously stopped to be a viable option, and in this situation cooperation is essential to provide cyber security.

Experts of SANS Institute stated[10] that an important part of this challenge is to guide the revealing actors in the international cyber space to accomplish at least the following roles: to regulate and to limit actions a state can direct against other state in the cyber field, indifferently of the type of action; to impose to the signatory states duties to assure that the private actors inside their frontiers does not engage, collaborate or passively assist to certain informatics acts with offending or destructive character; to settle interstate cooperation mechanisms to monitor and combat malicious cyber operations; to define and to clarify concepts characterizing cyber space in order to prevent erroneous interpretations which can lead to an escalation of violence in the cyber space or to amplify response measures by using non-cyber means.

An international treaty on cyber security could cover any number of background topics varying from cyber weapons control to informatics criminality and mutual assistance. In the vision of General Michael Hayden, who in 2008 acted as director of Central Intelligence Agency, a cyber treaty should forbid cyber attacks over civil targets, but not over some military targets, neither over cyber espionage operations. Such treaty *"will protect vulnerable networks in the private property in the US and will allow to the country to maintain its leader position in the cyber war against military targets"*[11]. The extension of this concept is done by Richard A. Clarke, former national coordinator for security, infrastructure protection and antiterrorism in the mandate of president Bush, who argues that espionage activities should not be forbidden because US *"greatly depend on electronic means related to espionage in their mechanisms of analysis and identification of threats and aggressions against them (…) and however, verification and attribution of cyber espionage actions are much too difficult to*

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[10] Dan Robel, *International Cybercrime Treaty: Looking Beyond Ratification*, SANS Institute InfoSec Reading Room, available online at: https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/incident/international-cybercrime-treaty-ratification-1756, accessed on 18.05.2016.

[11] Michael V. Hayden, *Playing to the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of Terror*, Kindle Edition, Penguin Press, 23 februarie, 2016.

achieve"[12]. Still, both quoted authors recognize cyber espionage can easily be perceived as a military attack and therefore can be confusing and difficult to isolate.

Generally, state entities particularly states strongly dependent of ICT although agree international cooperation to promote cyber security, are opposing to an agreement to limit and control the means and mechanisms used in cyber espionage and they prefer to act unilaterally, as is US where Obama administration by its strategy tried to determine an international change of attitude on commercial secret theft, particularly the one achieved by ICT, by exercising increasing economic and media pressures over China[13].

Conclusions

Owed to the fact law can be first seen as a form of cooperation, the necessary conditions to exist an international framework to regulate cyber space can exist when cooperation mechanisms exist and function, when a consent of majority of important actors is settled on the fundamental values, and the non-cooperation cost is major.

We can state we have the alignment of individual and collective interests because social norms have the capacity to generate legal norms. These are a part of necessary conditions to promote the apparition and development of some legal norms to generate the apparition of some legal constraint to be sufficiently presented to continue to support international norms that finally regulate cyber conflict. Once with the growth of cyber component share in the military and non-military conflicts it can be observed the apparition of initial conditions leading to the generation of some legal norms, but also the will of revealing actors in the international environment to integrate these norms in a coherent framework to regulate cyber space.

The evolution of some usual international norms, which by their consensual adaptation to be able to regulate efficiently cyber conflicts is less probable particularly because customary international law mainly depends on the interconnection of historical precedents whose common interpretation was established consensually by the main involved actors, these precedents forming practise patterns, and these actors avoiding to speak publicly of informatics hazards wherein they were involved.

Owed to the fact the involvement of cyber component in conflicts will significantly increase in the future, states confront a greater stimulus to come with a system of rules mutually advantageous as the interpretation on the cyber space of UN Charter interdiction to non-defensive use of force[14] , still, also in this case, the regulation is limited because the sponsor of a cyber attack is hardly identifiable when the sponsorship of the attack, or even the attack itself is very good protected and therefore neither of the parts could not be identified as being the subject for penalties or compensations, thus regulations could not practically enforce any punitive measure.

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[12] Richard A. Clarke, Robert Knake, *Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It*, Paperback – April, 2012, p. 27.
[13] Greg Austin, *China's Cyberespionage: The National Security Distinction and U.S. Diplomacy,* available online at: http://thediplomat.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/thediplomat_2015-05-21_22-14-05.pdf, accessed on 18.05.2016.
[14] *Carta Națiunilor Unite*, Cap. 1 Articolul 2, Paragraful 4, available online at: http://www.anr.gov.ro/docs/legislatie/internationala/Carta_Organizatiei_Natiunilor_Unite_ONU.pdf, accessed on September 14, 2016.

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4. https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201833/volume-1833-A-31363-English.pdf
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10. http://www.anr.gov.ro/docs/legislatie/internationala/Carta_Organizatiei_Natiunilor_Unite_ONU.pdf.

CYBER DEFENCE IN THE NORTH-ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION: STRUCTURES AND TRENDS

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Abstract: Cyber security became a matter of interest and global importance once with the globalization of communications networks, infrastructures component of information technologies, as well as economic, political and military systems increasingly using cyber systems in the decisional-making processes. Cyberspace is the new field of war that lately joined the traditional arenas of battle, meaning land, maritime, air and space. In the framework of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Wales (September 4, 2014), the Enhanced NATO Policy on Cyber Defence was adopted; it rises cyber defence to the level of strategic component of NATO concept of collective defence.

Starting from these aspects, our scientific initiative has as goal to present structures and main trends on cyber defence within NATO.

Keywords: North-Atlantic Treaty Organization, cyber defence, structures, trends, capabilities

Introduction

Globalization phenomenon, with Internet as one of main mechanisms of manifestation, has given to the individuals, organizations and nations new spaces to exert their power game to reach the own levels of ambitions. Thus, cyberspace became a fertile field to solve some institutional, social, economic, educational problems but it is also an environment increasingly integrating in the others environments where the war is dwelt, respectively land, air, maritime, space.

Moreover, the manifestation of globalization effects is the main factor for the fast demarcation of cyber security by its rapid transition from a mostly technical discipline to a strategic concept with coagulation trends worldwide. In this context, NATO proved is aware about the greatest share of vulnerabilities generated by the cyber environment and the greater sophistication of the cyber attacks over its member states, as well over the Alliance infrastructure. Nowadays, given the importance given to this virtual environment, cyber defence was declared one of main directions of action of collective defence[1].

In order to approach this new dimension of conflict, but also to get an advantage to the potential attackers, NATO created its own specific structures to exploit this opportunity and to prevent vulnerabilities involved by the use of communication and informatics technologies in a volatile security environment.

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[1] *Cyber defence,* 27 iulie 2016, available online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm accesed on 05.09.2016.

1.   NATO structures involved in cyber defence

The evolution of cyber defence concepts in the NATO framework are strongly influenced by the nations disposing of technological advantages of own defence industries as the United States of America, the United Kingdom or France.

Thus the diverse approaches, from the one centred on the origin and characteristic of the attacker or oriented on the concept of critical infrastructure specific for the US, the one oriented on combating hybrid threats and the concept of cyber defence organizing based on flexible command structures „Cyber Future Force"[2] type focused on the achievement of immediate tactical objectives subordinated to the tactical component responsible of the objective – characteristic of cyber defence of British Armed Forces -, or France's approach constructing a core authority – National Agency for the Security of Informational Systems (*Agence Nationale pour la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information*)[3], subordinated to the General Secretary for Security and Defence, all of those determined the concomitant apparition in NATO of some structures for cyber defence which although in theory can seem contradictory, practise proved their efficiency. For example, we mention the implementation to the level of NATO Computer Incident Response Capability – NCIRC[4] of "Cyber Red Team"[5] concept, deriving from the British cyber defence strategy and defined by the British Ministry of Defence as "…*a team formed with the objective to submit to an organization plans, programs, ideas and hypothesis for thorough analysis and to challenge ... will offer to the end-users (commandant, leader or manager) with an initial value more robust for decision making*"[6] and migrating to "Cyber Rangers"[7], characteristic to US Department of Defence.

If the operations of a "Red Team" are characterized by penetration actions against some ICT infrastructures and associates together the same field of production and operation on each ICT system, by contrast the operations of a "Cyber Rangers" team defined by DOD as "…*testing, evaluation of concepts, policies and technologies in the cyberspace…*"[8], is based on building some simulated environments where actions of the adversaries are mimed and attacks are virtually executed.

Although both teams are multidisciplinary and have similar structures, the first have only mobile capabilities and the latter are fixed and often organized around some laboratories. Still the practice have shown that by cooperation in the framework of a tactical operation of the both types of teams, the added intelligence value is extremely valuable, the concept of

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[2] *House of Commons - Defence Committee - Sixth Report of Session 2012–13*, Published on 9 January 2013 by Authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited, available online at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmdfence/106/106.pdf, accessed on 05.06.2016.

[3] Patrice Tromparent, French Cyberdefence Policy, Delegation for Strategic Affairs Ministry of Defense Paris, France presentation for 2012 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, available online at: https://ccdcoe.org/cycon/2012/proceedings/d2r3s2_tromparent.pdf, accessed on 05.06.2016.

[4] *NATO Wales Summit Guide,* available online at: http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20141008_140108SummitGuideWales2014-eng.pdf accessed on la 05.06.2016..

[5] UK Ministry of Defence, *Red Teaming Guide, dated January 2013 - The Development, Concepts and Doctrine*, Centre Shrivenham SWINDON, Wiltshire, SN6 8RF, available online at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/142533/20130301_red_teaming_ed2.pdf, accessed on 05.06.2016.

[6] *Ibidem*, p. 9.

[7] Todd Arnlod, Rob Harrison, Gregory Conti, *Professionalizing the Army's Cyber Officer Force*, United States Military Academy, West Point NY 10996, available online at: http://www.westpoint.edu/acc/SiteAssets/SitePages/Reports/PACOF.pdf, accessed on 05.06.2016.

[8] Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, *US DoD*, 2011, available online at: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab/documents/DOD-Strategy-for-Operating-in-Cyberspace.pdf, accessed on 05.06.2016.

these mixed teams, called "NATO Rapid Reaction Team"[9] is more used in the late decade of years.

Diversity of cyber capabilities uses represents one of the great challenges NATO has in defining its role in cyber defence. Thus, NATO strategists identified two categories of cyber attacks where the organization can have determinant role[10]:

1. Cyber espionage indifferently is executed on the operational or strategic levels, can compromise ICT systems confidentiality, and also the confidentiality of systems for information collecting, thus revealing military secrets and sensitive information to the adversaries.

2. Sabotage done by cyber means or with dominant cyber component can have important physical effects, particularly when systems of weapons, military decision-making systems, logistical systems or telecommunications systems are aimed and such are damaged including decisional command and control, but also civil systems as the critical infrastructures.

Along with the protection of own ICT infrastructures, NATO is the organization granting particular concern to the personnel cyber protection, to all the levels and in all fields. In the late years, following the analysis of the attacks over the NATO critical infrastructures, the social engineering component of the "Advanced Persistent Threat - APT[11] particularly regarded NATO personnel, by trials to involve it in extortion of money or different frauds for financial gains, as preliminary phase in undergoing above mentioned types of attacks.

The analysis of cyber incidents on diverse NATO structures lead to two conclusions:

1. Until now, the most dangerous adversaries of NATO in the cyber field are the nation states; although in the last year there were identified a series of attacks presumed to come from the hackers groups sympathisers of ISIS[12], they have not the intended success. Such, although intelligence systems reported in the late years that despite the increase of offensive capacity in the organized crime networks which could be used in the future by non-state actors as terrorists, private organizations specialized in extremely sophisticated espionage acts and sabotage in the cyber field, they need capacities, a level of knowledge and understanding of NATO technical systems and a determination generated by a report cost – benefit to the level of a nation-state.

2. Until now, although over NATO infrastructures there were not produced kinetic or physical damages determined by terrorist actions with major cyber component, cyber attacks technology evolves continuously, component elements of cost – benefit analysis become increasingly complicated and reactive to the change of international security environment, thus terrorist attacks with determinant cyber component remain serious threat against information security or even against NATO communications infrastructure.

These conclusions, along with the analysis of attacks against public and private infrastructure of Estonia in May 2007, determined the defence ministers of the allied countries that in the meeting in June 2007 from Brussels to adopt a series of measures in order to grow the cyber resilience of NATO structures as a whole on three main directions of activity.

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[9] *NATO Rapid Reaction Team to fight cyber attack,* 13 martie 2012, available online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_85161.htm, accessed on 05.06.2016.
[10] Cezar Vasilescu, *Cyber Attacks: Emerging Threats to the 21st Century Critical Information Infrastructures*, aprilie 2012, available online at: http://www.defenceandstrategy.eu/filemanager/files/file.php?file=73464 accessed on 05.06.2016.
[11] *Defence Against Terrorism Review*, Vol. 3, No. 2, Fall 2010, COE-DAT, pp. 23-36, available online at: http://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/datr/volume6/03How_Cyberterrorists_Could_Be_Living_Inside_Your_Systems.pdf, accessed on 05.06.2016.
[12] Benjamin Runkle, *Is the Islamic State a Cyber Threat?,* 9 septembrie 2015, available online at: http://warontherocks.com/2015/09/is-the-islamic-state-a-cyber-threat/, accessed on 05.06.2016.

The first direction of research: coordination and assistance for cyber defence is in this moment implemented by military, political and technical authorities of NATO concomitantly with the ones implemented by component nations and based on experience and expertise of component nations with technological advantages. An important aspect of this direction was the settlement of Cyber Defence Management Authority – CDMA[13], with exclusive missions to coordinate cyber defence in the whole Alliance, this body being coordinated by the Council of Management Authority for Cyber Defence that comprises political, military, operational and technical NATO leaders with responsibilities in the cyber defence field.

The second direction of research: CDMA represents the most important organization of NATO offering advice to the North Atlantic Council and to the member states in strategic issues related to the cyber defence.

The third direction of research: before the attacks in Estonia in 2007, NATO cyber defence efforts greatly focused on the protection of communication systems owned and operated by the Alliance. Following the attacks in Estonia, there was shown that a massive attack over the critical infrastructure of a member state nor only can imply an Article 5 type reaction but can also disturb the logistical and operational flows of the Alliance and these concluding in the extension of NATO defence focus to the national level, on the combating and also prevention components. Although until now in all the strategic documents of the Alliance is underlined that the allies themselves have main responsibility for the security of their own ICT systems and their information, on the core level of NATO, there were developed assistance mechanisms for the allies requesting support to protect their ICT systems, including when cyber attacks occur, by the intervention of Rapid Reaction Team – RRT[14] composed by maximum 6 national or NATO experts, as the type or characteristics of the missions require.

As concerns the research/development and training direction of specialized personnel in the cyber defence field in Tallinn a centre of research was established in 2003 and in 2008 gained NATO accreditation as excellence centre and was named NATO Excellence Centre for Cooperation in Cyber Defence – CCDCOE, which nowadays has research/development attributions but also training attributions for NATO or sponsor nations personnel (Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Holland, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and United States of America).

In the middle of 2002 year, the implementation of Cyber Defence Program was approved by the North-Atlantic Council and afterwards was implemented in three phases: 2003-2006 - NCIRC request and operating and settlement of its provisory operation capabilities; 2006-2012 – bringing to optimum operational level to NCIRC at the end of 2012; 2012-present – identification of requirements and resources necessary to attenuate and eliminate vulnerabilities in the cyber field, regarding to include CDMA in the development by the specialized industrial sectors of the component countries of some technologies to be available on all the security space of NATO.

Besides CCDCOE and CDMA, NATO Communications and Information Systems Services Agency – NCSA[15] is responsible to protect communication systems with four main tasks: ICT support for NATO operations: ICT support for NATO exercises; ICT support for NATO Major Staffs; to provide support for the implementation of new ICT systems and

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[13] *173 DSCFC 09 E BIS - NATO and Cyber Defence,* available online at: http://www.nato pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=1782, accessed on 05.06.2016.
[14] *Men in black – NATO's cybermen,* 24 aprilie 2015, available online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ news_118855.htm, accessed on 05.06.2016.
[15] *Connecting Forces,* NATO Communications and Information Agency, available online at: https://www.ncia.nato.int/About/Pages/About-the-NCI-Agency.aspx, accessed on 05.06.2016.

projects at the Alliance level. The functional structure of NATO cyber defence capabilities is illustrated in Figure no. 1.

Supplementary, NCIRC has the responsibility to evaluate NATO security networks, to detect and to response by countermeasures to any cyber attack over a NATO infrastructure or associated to it; „*NCIRC experts have the missions to support system administrators to block the informatics attacks, to limit their deterioration and to fix software errors classified as vulnerabilities and making possible such kind of attacks*"[16].

In this structure, CDMA is the single authority on the defence against cyber attacks, being responsible of the initiation and coordination of each effort, but the NATO cyber defence actions between the members and external organizations take place in CDCSC. On the other hand, NCIRC is the department with technical and operational capabilities of intervention and is responsible for the development, implementation and maintenance of cyber defence services of the Alliance.

Figure no. 1 Functional structure for NATO cyber defence[17]

Although following 2008 cyber defence capabilities have remarkably improved, security analysts warns over the fact that the organization will not be able to rapidly and efficiently answer to advanced cyber threats[18] firstly because there is no common definition of critical infrastructures given by the member states and their commonly protection is hard to

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[16] Transatlantic Policy Briefs, *Coming to Terms with a New Treat: NATO and Cyber Security*, p. 3, January 2013, available online at: http://www.cepolicy.org/sites/cepolicy.org/files/attachments/08_-_tpb_cyber_ terlikowski_vyskoc11.pdf, accessed on 05.06.2016.

[17] *Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive COPD Interim V1.0,* available online at: https://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-COPD.pdf, accessed on 05.06.2016.

[18] Jarno Limnel, *NATO's September Summit Must Confront Cyber Threats,* 11 august 2014, available online at: http://breakingdefense.com/2014/08/natos-september-summit-must-confront-cyber-threats/, accessed on 05.06.2016.

accomplish not only because of political aspects but also because of technological or social aspects existing conceptual and technological discrepancies in the ICT infrastructure building among the member states of the Alliance, as is, for example, the difference in approach of USA, Germany and France. Another aspect with negative impact over the implementation of common defence principle in the ICT infrastructures area is that despite some political or diplomatic declaration inside the Alliance, the component states use for their cyber protection information, technologies and capabilities that creates them a strategic advantage and many times they prefer to keep these capabilities classified from any other else and, secondly, the decision making factors are afraid of revealing these capabilities to a potential enemy can become vulnerable in front of a potential attack. On the other hand, the NATO partnership policy with the defence industry and the integration in the defence flow of the academic environment of the member states, promoted in the late decade, brought significant enhancements not only to the used technologies but also as regards the training of specialists in cyber security, which in the end lead to the creation of a level of trust between the defence industry and the structures of the Alliance with responsibilities in the cyber defence field.

2. Evolution trends of NATO cyber defence capabilities

Transformation is defined by NATO as "*a continuous and pro-active process on the development and integration of some innovator, doctrine and capabilities concepts in order to improve the efficiency and interoperability of military forces*"[19] and includes requirements on the capacities defining for the multinational operations of the future, as well as education and formation program in order to allow the allies to implement their future concepts and capacities.

In order to renew the relevance of the Alliance in the post-ISAF environment, transformation was, probably, the more disputed subject for NATO and its allies in the late years. The Allied Commandment for Transformation of NATO (ACT) is localized in Virginia, United States of America and is responsible for the NATO transformation processes, including for those in the cyber defence area. Although the late years reports have shown that NATO allies are more technologically advanced than their potential adversaries, the same analyses show this advantage will not persist in the future, because more and more nations can be potential enemies of the Alliance tend to increasingly focus on the development of their defensive and offensive cyber capacities.

One of the priorities the Alliance focused and will continue to focus is the increase of CCDCOE capacities and capabilities in Tallinn, which although from technical perspective is not an institution, it provides based on the NATO doctrine and strategy for cyber defence and aspire "...*to become main source of expertise in the cooperative cyber defence field*"[20].

A major challenge for NATO is the fact that its own internal systems are connected to a series of national systems, and these are increasingly interdependent in development and interconnection. In order to protect NATO systems, there exist the need to make a detailed cartography not only of these systems, many of them component of national critical infrastructures of the respective countries. Although such action is requested insistently on the CDMA level, for its operating a political decision to the Alliance's level is needed.

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[19] *What is Transformation? - An Introduction to Allied Command Transformation*, NATO UNCLASSIFIED – PUBLICLY DISCLOSED, January 2015, available online at: http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/Otras Publicaciones/Internacional/2015/NATO_Introduction_AlliedCommand_Transformation_Jan2015.pdf, accessed on 05.06.2016.

[20] Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Cyber-Allies, *Strengths and weaknesses of NATO's cyberdefense posture*, ETH Zurich - Center for Security Studies, February 2012, available online at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1997153_code1782288.pdf?abstractid=1997153&mirid=1, accessed on 05.06.2016.

Another major challenge that will influence in the future how NATO capabilities develops is the issue of the gap existing between the smaller and greater nations, the latest aiming to enlarge NATO role in certain specific problems. In the cyberspace this phenomenon manifests by the will of smaller countries with limited resources to benefit from NATO defensive cyber capacities and even to extend them, but countries as US, UK, France and Germany owed to the fact they invest great deal of money in own systems of cyber defence field, and therefore are reluctant to redirect money in NATO missions and projects doubling the already existing capacities.

The debate on the balance of tasks in NATO, although overcome the cyber defence framework will be in the future the most influential element owed to the dynamics of stability the Alliance has to confront as well because of growth of cyber component in the global threats of security, and thus owed to this unbalance, the Alliance risks to become *"a multilevel organization wherein only part of the members have cyber capabilities of battle and want to use them"*[21].

Conclusions

Although cyber attacks were considered to be asymmetric threats since the Riga Summit in 2006, hardly following the attacks over Estonia in 2007 NATO achieved the fact that *"cyber war, as is often called, refers inclusively to a campaign supported by cyber operations concerted against IT infrastructures of target-state, and this leads to the mass-destruction of websites by using spam and malware infections"*[22].

In the late decade, NATO became an organization actively contributing in all the spaces to the global security, standing mainly as an alliance with Euro-Atlantic vocation and maintaining unchanged the collective defence principle, stipulated in the Article 5 provisions of North-Atlantic Treaty. As a political-military organization, it bases its activity on a strategic concept made up by a structure of doctrinaire ideas and a mechanism defining the goals and means of their achievement for defined periods of time.

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[21] *Transcript of Defense Secretary Gates's Speech on NATO's Future*, Brussels, June 2011, available online at: http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/06/10/transcript-of-defense-secretary-gatess-speech-on-natos-future/, accessed on 05.06.2016.

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ROMANIA'S DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY REGARDING CYBERWAR

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Abstract: The rapid evolution of the Internet in particular, and the virtual environment – generally – in the recent years, has propelled the issue of ensuring an accesible and functional cyber environment both to the forefront of national security of states and international organizations. The task reachable for each country or organization is to protect their own online networks against cyber attacks, cyber espionage, cyber crime and other forms of aggression in cyberspace. For the democracies that guarantee fundamental rights and freedoms, the goal is to do this while guaranteeing a free internet and protection of private live. Although Romania does not have a highly developed cyber infrastructure, the strategies adopted in the recent years, the entities created and the inclusion of cybersecurity in the cathegory of basic measures to improve the safety of the citizens, our state sends a firm response to the challenges in the virtual environment.

Keywords: cyberwar, cybersecurity, cyberattack, defense, strategies, legislation.

Introduction

Throughout history, the armed forces were frequently involved in national political actions of the states. The generals have become indispensable assistants of political leaders. They had access to influential members of society, while enjoying the loyalty of military structures. This turned them both authors and the targets of plots, putting them in the position of being suspected as rival political leaders. History has recorded countless rivalries among military and civilian leadership, often leading to extended periods of direct military rule. Currently, the risk that these rivalries take birth again is minimal due to the balance between the civilian government and military leadership, materialized by the professionalization of military. Also, maintaining a corps of retired military and recruitment from external source (for example, the possibility of becoming a military personnel, for certain positions, without being mandatory the graduation of a military school) from different sectors of society provides a convergence of military and civilian cultural trends, thereby helping to reduce possible causes of conflict between the leaderships of the two sectors.

1 Military policy – national defense strategy

In Romania, civil democratic control of defense domain shall be made under provisions of Law no. 203/2015 regarding defense planning, by clearly specifying the role of the constitutional institutions in the formulation of defense policy. In the context of this policy, our country seeks to enhance the contribution to European Security and Defence Policy, as European Union member, and strengthening profile within NATO.

Thus, in accordance with the Government Programme for 2013-2016, approved by Romanian Parliament Decision no. 45 of December 21, 2012, Romanian Government's

defense policy for the period 2013-2016[1] was focused on three main lines: implementation of a human resources management system allowing the development of professional motivation and career development of staff in the defense system; generating the necessary conditions for increasing the operational capacity of the military force; providing strategic continuity elements on NATO, EU and strategic partnerships, particularly the US Strategic Partnership for the 21st century.

In order to achieve these objectives, to the Ministry of National Defence have been established a series of lines of action materialized in the defense planning process optimization based on capability development and carrying out the obligations arising from membership of the EU and NATO. Among such main courses of action we can highlight: further participation in international operations; active involvement in "Smart Defence – NATO" projects[2] and "*Pooling and Sharing* – EU"[3]; fulfillment of obligations under the Strategic Partnership with US; active involvement in ensuring and maintaining regional security and stability; reviewing legislation incident to the military; Romanian armed forces welfare; stimulating domestic production of the defense industry.

The current National Defense Strategy of the country for the period 2015-2019, approved by Romanian Parliament Decision no. 33 of June 23, 2015, pays special attention to the cyber domain, in contrast to its forerunner[4]. Thus, from the perspective of internal national security objectives, it aims to strengthen security and critical infrastructure protection in the following sectors: cyber, energy and transportation. As regards developments in the global security environment on long and average term, it's estimated to be dominated by complex trends so it is imperative to adapt infrastructures according to the occurrence of possible cyber attacks, energy crises, pandemics, disasters, etc.

In the chapter treating threats, risks and vulnerabilities to the defense and security of our state, the National Defense Strategy considers, inter alia, cyber attacks launched by hackers groups, those developed by groups of cyber crime and cyber threats launched by hostile entities state or non-state actors, which target strategic cyber infrastructures of public institutions and private companies, as issues directly affecting national security.

On intelligence, counterintelligence and security domain, it is considered that promoting the interests of national cybersecurity corroborated by providing mechanisms to prevent and counter cyber attacks against strategic information infrastructures, as the main action in the cyber field.

The importance given to the whole spectrum of cyber also emerges from the defense planning document drawn up at departmental level, which aims to fulfill the provisions of the National Defense Strategy and implementing the defense objectives the government program established –White Charter of Defense, approved by Romanian Parliament Decision no. 12 of April 11, 2016. In the text of this document, prepared by the Ministry of National Defence, are reiterated the national defense objectives set in the strategy, among them being found reissued the one that refers on strengthening the security and protection of critical cyber infrastructure, transport and energy.

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[1] This government program has been valid until the investiture of governance outside a political practice enshrined. Following the tragedy "Collective", where more than 50 lives were lost, was granted confidence to the government led by Dacian Julien Cioloş, whose actual work began in November, 2015.
[2] It's a cooperative approach to generate modern necessary defense capabilities for the Alliance's future. Allies are encouraged to work together to develop, acquire, operate and maintain the military capabilities needed to fulfill the commitments under NATO's Strategic Concept.
[3] It's a concept developed by the European Defence Agency together with EU members and refers to pooling and sharing initiatives and projects of Union members, in order to develop their capabilities in the military field.
[4] National Defense Strategy of the country, approved by Romanian Parliament Decision no. 30 of November 4, 2008.

When assessing the security environment, the Charter allocates a special attention to cyber attacks, considering that they represent a substantial threat of a global nature, difficult to identify and counteract which is currently experiencing an unprecedented expansion. Potential serious harm to computer systems due to the increasing frequency and complexity of such attacks can have a significant impact on critical infrastructures, including defense. To amplify the results of cyber attacks it is considered that in the near future they will be combined with specific actions, especially espionage, sabotage or subversive campaigns.

Referring to the capabilities identified as necessary for the fulfillment of the entire spectrum of tasks undertaken nationally and internationally, the Charter believes that should be ensured the development of cyber capabilities while developing a system of C4ISR[5] to implement the Concept of management of Romanian Army forces structure.

2 Policy response to challenges

If in the previous chapter we analyzed national defense strategy in the context of military policies, in this chapter we will broaden the scope of policies analysis and these policies responses to challenges, especially those that originate in cyberspace.

Taking into consideration the progressive development of the virtual environment into a space increasingly contributing more to the intensification and spread of conventional threats to national security and cyber attacks against IT systems and communications, due to the incredible development of information technologies and information society, it has become a priority at national level to adopt a strategy on cybersecurity.

2.1. Strategies

Thus, on 23 May 2013, the Romanian Government adopted Decision no. 271 approving the *Cybersecurity strategy of Romania* and the *National action plan on implementation of the national cybersecurity strategy*.

Romania's cybersecurity strategy addresses the issue of cybersecurity from the perspective of four key objectives: establishing the conceptual, organizational and action framework necessary to ensure cyber protection; national capacity development of risk management regarding cybersecurity and cyber incident response; promoting and strengthening the culture of cybersecurity; development of cooperation at national and international level in the field of cyber.

By adopting a strategy in the field of cyber, our country aims to develop an information environment governed by the principles of interoperability and specific services of the information society, ensuring – at the same time and on the same level in terms of importance – strict compliance with fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens, while promoting the national security interests. Also, by developing the cybersecurity strategy, Romania has sent a strong signal of connection to international realities, at the same time being aware of the need to coordinate with similar efforts of countries in Europe in order to treat effectively the challenges and opportunities generated in the virtual environment.

A prompt response to any cyber threat cannot be given, in my opinion, unless an intense institutional cooperation. By setting up the National Cyber Security System, coordinated by the Cyber Security Operative Council, the interinstitutional cooperation it's ensured throughout the status of permanent members representatives of the following institutions: Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Communications and Information Society, Special Telecommunications Service, Foreign Intelligence Service, Protection and Guard Service, National Registry Office for

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[5] Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

Classified Information, Secretary of the Supreme Council of National Defence and Romanian Intelligence Service as the technical coordinator of the Board.

Also, the adoption of such a strategy authorizes: outlining a harmonized framework for knowledge, preventing and countering aggressions in cyberspace; creating specific consistent and coherent cooperation procedures between institutions and authorities that have prerogatives in the field; development of public-private partnership; promotion and implementation of national programs of risk awareness as a result of browsing the virtual environment; stimulation of research and development regarding information security; initiating, modifying and completing the legislative framework for cyber in line with international organizations regulatory initiatives to which Romania is a party.

Regarding the impact of national cybersecurity strategy, it will be analyzed on several levels. In terms of social, the opportunities offered by a secure virtual environment in conjunction with the awareness of the consequences of its misuse browsing, the strategy contributes to public awareness of the multivalent nature of cyberspace. From the business perspective, due to the transfer of a significant part of the banking transactions into the online space, the cybersecurity strategy contributes on developing and strengthening public-private partnership, while setting up a series of indicators needed to build a secure business environment. At macro-economic level by establishing clear lines of action to prevent and counter cyber crime, generally, and attacks against critical infrastructure, specially, such a strategy prevents damaging the state's budget.

Nuclear safety and security are requirements that cannot be met in the 21st century without taking into account the challenges of the virtual environment. Among the measures to be taken to improve nuclear safety and security, protection of installations, organizations, activities, data and information in the nuclear field against cyber threats is fundamental. This measure is not just a concept in theory as it is found in the National Nuclear Security and Safety Strategy, approved by Government Decision no. 600 of July 30, 2014. Moreover, the Rules on the protection of nuclear facilities against cyber threats, approved by Order of the National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control no. 181 of November 4, 2014, sets out in detail the regulatory and control framework which is essential in ensuring cyber security in the nuclear field.

In terms of national strategies, as a response to the challenges residents of cyberspace, must be disclosed the National strategy regarding the Digital Agenda for Romania in 2020, approved by Government Decision no. 245 of May 19, 2015. it appeared to treat several national ICT deficiencies such as: Romanians skepticism in the use of electronic services, the lack of standardization in terms of interoperability of information systems of the authorities and public establishments, deficiencies in providing uniform access to electronic communications networks, etc. As expected, security of networks and information systems play an important role in this strategy.

All these steps are welcome but, in order to adapt to the challenges and opportunities arising from a security environment which is in a permanent change, as well as evolutions in the global development of information technologies, I think we should periodically review the entire strategies incident to cyber domain, given the alarming rate of progress in this issue.

2.2. Research plans

Challenges in cyber aroused great interest into research-development community. Thus, according to the National Plan for Research, Development and Innovation 2, for the period 2007-30 June 2014, approved by Government Decision no. 475, 2007, information and communications technology field was considered one of the areas of basic research in our country, security and availability of information systems being a direction of research of great

interest. Within this direction, detecting / preventing / investigating cyber attacks was one of nine research topics.

The National Plan for Research, Development and Innovation for the period 2015-2020, approved by Government Decision no. 583 of August 6, 2015, ITC, space and security represents a priority area of specialization, underlining the importance given to this sector.

2.3. Governmental programs

Governmental program of the current government, approved by Parliament Decision no. 45 of 17 November, 2015, has not proposed to reform all sectors of Romanian society, the main cause being the limited period of the mandate given – one year. Instead, it proposed a concrete set of firm measures, limited in terms of numbers, but to transform into the foundations of a sustainable development.

Although defense is not inserted as a separate domain, the current government program reiterates priorities of the previous document such as: strengthening and development of strategic partnership with the US, fulfillment of obligations arising from membership of NATO and EU, allocating the necessary resources to achieve purchasing and procurement programs needed to increase the operational capacity of the Romanian Army.

Cyber domain is indirectly among priorities when it comes to measures to be taken to increase the safety of citizens. Two such measures are closely related to cybersecurity: critical infrastructure protection and protection of citizens against cyber crime.

Another extremely important measure, with strong effects in the virtual environment, it's offering digital services to citizens in order to streamline public activities. As a result, the adoption of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 41 of June 30, 2016, regarding the establishment of measures to simplify the central government level and amending and supplementing certain acts, was aimed, and in my point of view, was largely successful, to implement a significant simplification to reduce bureaucracy at central government level. By implementing measures such as the acceptance by public institutions and specialized bodies of the central government of electronic copies of identity cards and send them by e-mail, it was significantly reduced the effort of the citizens to procure documents in order to obtain public services. Such a measure also shows a realistic interconnection of databases between public institutions.

2.4. Statements

The importance attached to ensuring cybersecurity at the national level results from our political leaders and military statements who, not infrequently, respond to the challenges arising on this domain in a firm and sometimes even discouraging way. Such an example was given by the President of Romania, who reaffirmed, while participating in the inauguration ceremony of the missile facility at Deveselu, the nation-leading role of our country in the context of Cyber Defense Fund[6] and the need to increase the Alliance's role in countering emerging risks in areas such as cyber defense, countering terrorism and energy security.

2.5. The optimum balance of policies and interests between ensuring cyber security and respecting the human rights

According to Art. 1 para. (4) of the Romanian Constitution, our state is organized according to the principle of separation and balance of powers – legislative, executive and

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6 Under Government Decision no. 1130 of December 23, 2014, regarding the approval of the Financial Management Agreement between Romania, through Romanian Intelligence Service, and NATO Financial Control Office, of NATO's Fund support for Ukraine in cyber defense domain, our country has contributed in 2015 to 500,000 Euros.

judiciary - within the constitutional democracy. The legislative power is represented by Parliament, executive power is the Government and other specialized institutions of the central government, while the judiciary is the High Court of Cassation and Justice and other courts.

Based on these elements and reiterating the principle of balance of powers, I'll emphasize the importance of this balance by briefly detailing the "disagreement" between the legislative and the judiciary on cyber security.

In Romania, It's well known the Constitutional Court's Decision no. 17 of January 21, 2015, on the objections of unconstitutionality of the provisions of the Romanian Law on cyber security. The court concluded Romanian Law on cyber security unconstitutional as a whole.

Taking into consideration the development of the cyber attacks, legislature considered a national priority to adopt a cyber security law whose main aims are: ensuring the general framework for cooperation in the cybersecurity field, setting the framework for cybersecurity activities, as well as defining the obligations of public or private entities in protecting cyber infrastructures.

Outside form critics of the draft law, the Romanian Constitutional Court revealed a major substance flaw, the one that named Romanian Intelligence Service as the national authority in the field of cybersecurity, which would cause – say the opponents of the law and Romanian Constitutional Court – granting unrestricted and unsupervised access to all computer data to an institution that does not meet the condition of a civil body subject to democratic control. Because of this reason, in conjunction with others, court considered – rightly in the view of the opponents – that regulations of Romanian Law on cyber security are inconsistent with the fundamental human rights and freedoms: right to intimate, family and private life, inviolability of correspondence, the right to protection of personal data.

I consider that this "confrontation" between the legislative, on one hand and the judiciary on the other side, it's the best example of the long and arduous road to be traveled to ensure the right balance of policies and interests between ensuring cybersecurity and respect for human rights.

2.6. Entities

National Computer Emergency Response Team – CERT-RO is a positive example of the development of our state regarding cyber domain. CERT-RO was established under Government Decision no. 494 of June 2, 2011 and it has the main role to develop and distribute public preventing, countering and mitigation policies of incidents occurring in the national cyber infrastructure. However, CERT-RO is the national contact point for the similar structures of the partner states and organizations to which Romania is a party.

The National Center CYBERINT is the specialized body of the Romanian Intelligence Service - national authority in CyberIntelligence - responsible for linking the technical systems for defense and intelligence capabilities in order to identify the information necessary to prevent stop and / or limit the consequences of aggression against ICT systems of the critical infrastructure.

Conclusions

We see now that, although cyber operations in the past few years have not produced significant material damage nor dramatic consequences in humanitarian terms, the risk of an outbreak of cyberwar, minimum at operational level, could not be more realistic. The strategies adopted at national level, governmental programs, action and research plans, statements of our political leaders, but also by entities created, Romania is on an ascending corridor in terms of response to possible challenges in cyberspace.

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