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THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SYSTEM. FRACTIONARISM AND ANARCHISM, FROM CHESS TO GO

Iulian CHIFU, PhD.*

The international community of experts is thoroughly looking at what the world and international relations will look like after the post Cold War transition. There are already a number of theories that have not come true: the end of history with the globalization of democratic liberalism and an international order dominated by the US, the absolute hegemony of the US, fight through asymmetrical wars between states and terrorist networks, multiplication of global actors with ambitions, capabilities and global access but without responsibilities of statehood, the new regionalism and integration in continental blocs around a regional power in order to face economic competition.

The economic crisis generated by toxic financial derivates such as subprime in the USA and the sovereign debt crisis that erupted in Europe changed the agenda. The retreat of the US from Afghanistan and Iraq and the reduction, or even abandonment of interventionism, or even the use of military force in conflicts (and its replacement with the hypothetical soft power) showed that we are far from the end of this transformation. Some speak of a new medievalism[1], others about the new anarchism[2] or about the normalcy of the statelessness (not necessary the week state case, but the lack of the state as such) or even a G Zero[3] world with every nation for itself. But perhaps transition is over and what we are now living is the international system that we shall have for the next 40-50 years: unstable, chaotic, with multiple and competing areas of interest for the big player, but also with area of little interest to actors (in the pragmatic terms of objectives to be achieved).

In this context, great actors too are reorienting their external policy. The west is pragmatically adjusting its level of ambition and pragmatic action towards strict objectives justified by interests and which in turn justify the allocation of resources. An ultra pragmatic game of chess[4], of maximizing results with available resources, with an approach of external market policy. In the mean time, China has advanced towards a game of positioning, of filling the space and long term strategy. On the other hand, Russia has adapted its old policy based on the geopolitics of a super power to a strategy that we can call "because I can" and "because you can't stop me", an approach much closer to the game of Go which seems to be the great game of the next stage in international affairs.

Keywords*: geopolitics, strategy, economic crisis, policies.*

1. Fundamental changes in immutable spheres. The three Geo's

The degree of tectonicity of the world of the future and of international relations is amplified also by the transformation of elements until recently seen

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[1] John RAPLEY, *The New Middle Ages*, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2006.

[2] Robert D. KAPLAN, *The Coming Anarchy*, The Atlantic, February 1994.

[3] Ian BREMMER, *Every Nation for Itself. Winners and Loosers in a G-Zero World*, Portfolio/Penguin, New York, 2012.

[4] Referință la Zbigniew BRZEZINSKI, *The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives*, Basic books, New York, 1997.

as immutable to a different state. Global warming and climate changes are causing for the North Arctic Corridor to become a viable transportation and circulation route, with all its security related consequences, while the rise in ocean waters are changing mandatory crossing points and straights into free traffic routes, are creating new ways of maritime transportation or are even leading to the disappearance of entire states off the world map, thus imposing the movement of populations on firmer ground and causing unseen issues to arise in international public law – if a state still exists or if it can still be a member of the UN or how can you lawfully exclude a state from the General Assembly and other institutions as long as it has lost its territory.

Therefore, if until recently we spoke of 2 Geo's – geopolitics and geo-economics – and disputing who is influencing who, today we have a new element – variable geography (on a seasonal basis, or with stable and long term changes). We have reached three fundamental variables instead of two, to the three Geo's[5], and this complicates both calculations and strategies and the global game, and previous reasoning no longer applies to this new scenario.

In terms of economy, the global economic crisis was doubled by a raising phenomenon, a real game changer – the shale gas revolution. The development in the US of the capacity of production of oil and shale gas has already turned the American state into the second oil producer in the world, and 2014 will cause it to overtake the Russian Federation's production of oil. The US is also becoming a net gas exporter at a price that is defying the competition, 70 dollars per 1000 square meters, with effects in the delocalization of gas consuming industries – three BASF chemical factories moved on the other side of the ocean thanks to access to cheap resources but also regarding the rules of market economy and rule of law, inexistent in the case of other world producers.

Once the paradigm shifted, the US feels independent from the Middle East, from other energy resources, especially hydrocarbons, resources that they have thus set free for other global consumers with whom they will compete on the LNG market (natural liquefied gas) that they are creating. Of course, the elimination of such dependencies changes also the appetite, the policies and interest, especially because American policy remains pragmatic, defined by limits in regard to resources, but also to the appetite of the population to support military action regardless of reason, context or meridian.

2. ESB – Eurasian Suppliers Belt

The Great Global Game is now shifting towards an entirely new paradigm through new or ongoing transformations, the main topic, that of energy resources is threatening to reconfigure the global arena: the main consumers remain Europe and overpopulated states in South and Southeast Asia – India,

[5] Cleo PASKAL, *The "Three Geo's" (Geopolitical, Geo-economic and Geophysical Changes) in the Indo-Pacific,* presentation and the Global Future Forum Conference, "Natural Resources, Economics and Geopolitics: Eurasian Interdependencies with Global Security Implications", 17-18 September, 2013, Stockholm.

China, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Philippines – while suppliers of hydrocarbons are situated, from a physical point of view, in between the two blocs of consumers, in a belt that begins in the Middle East via Central Asia towards Russia[6].

The two blocs end up being natural competitors in regard to resources, trying to attract as much as possible from resources outside the region, but connected through pipelines and territory. If for now resources seem sufficient on medium term, the competition curb threatens to grow very soon. And the dispute will take place mostly on this Euro-Asian continental continuum (nothing to do with theories of Eurasianism by Dughin or Karaganov, the Valdai group or Messenberg[7] proposals for collective security by Medvedev).

Moreover, this ESB is characterized by high instability due to the end of development dictatorships and the start of the Arab Spring. Evermore, the region most exposed after the retreat of NATO troupes from Afghanistan in 2014 is Central Asia which, should it enter in the vortex of violent instability seasoned with Islamic radicalism, risks dangerously unbalancing global resources. And the fall of Central Asia into chaos can also fundamentally affect the stability of Russia, itself troubled by economic problems and hyper-dependency on resources on top of its demographic problem east of the Ural Mountains, the space containing most of its resources. That is why we believe that the security of Central Asia is important for the security of the entire Eurasian continuum.

3. Anarchism, chaos and instability of the periphery[8]

The Syrian episode can be read in multiple keys, according to interests or the appreciation for the involvement of one or the other actors: from the obstruction of aid for the population of an Arab state by Russia and China, to the absence of appetite for intervention in the Syrian war by the West until the chemical attack on September 21, to "the error of Obama" and the fall of US exceptionalism and to the "exceptional diplomatic action" of Russia, which has been declared on several meridians the "winner" of the Syrian episode.

What we can say is that in places where interests collide, the international community manages to harmonize its positions. It has done so in Libya, it is now doing it in Syria, but with less ambitions and egos and more flexibility, with the risk of remarkable internal political costs. But what is happening in areas where no relevant power has significant interest?

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[6] Iulian CHIFU, *Why Central Asia is Central to Eurasian Security*, presentation and the Global Future Forum Conference, "Natural Resources, Economics and Geopolitics: Eurasian Interdependencies with Global Security Implications", 17-18 September, 2013, Stockholm.

[7] An agreement between German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev that settled that the EU Russia can advance security discussions in a bilateral format if Russia manages to help solve the separatist movement issue in Transdniester region, seen as the frozen conflict that is most easy to solve.

[8] David DANELO, *Anarchy is the New Normal: Unconventional Governance in the 21-st Century*, FPRI, October 2013, la http://www.fpri.org/articles/2013/10/anarchy-new-normal-unconventional-governance-and-21st-century-statecraft.

Syria is considered a precedent here as well. Not because there had been no interest, but because they were not important enough to push for intervention or because those who had interests did not also have the necessary capabilities to determine a major change. Up to the chemical attack, the US could not be broken into directly managing the conflict with military means or at least a credible threat of use of force that we have seen. So Syria was a periphery of American interests at that time.

But there are several other periphery areas[9] in spaces such as Africa, South America, South East Asia, the Pacific, where stakes are considered small and there is not enough interest defined by relevant actors. In these places perhaps there are already ongoing conflicts, people are dying, resources are being used, but without having all these elements come to the forefront in the media in order to stir any type of interest from relevant actors[10]. There we are indeed talking about chaos and the new anarchy of the system.

But there is also anarchy in the manner of international action of perfectly legitimate and well built states, their absence from the structures of globalization and lack of integration within international structures (other than the UN), the running away from any form of regional institutional cooperation and acceptance of globalization as perspective in which, in order to play, in order to be a subject, not an object, you need to find your own formula of regional integration in order to matter. New anarchism is translated also into the multiplication of actors and the entrance to the stage in more and more visible roles of sub-state actors, separatist entities, tribal trans-frontier groups, radical terrorist structures that propose administration formulas in certain regions, thus replacing for the state.

We are, therefore, reaching the "normalcy of the statelessness"[11], from the existence of week states – see the sub-Saharan region from Western Sahara to Bab el Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden, through Yemen and Syria – or tribal non-state formations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan and in Afghanistan, the Houthi dominated area in Yemen or important parts of India, the Azawad region in Mali and the north of Nigeria that exited the control of legitimate authorities.

Medievalism too has several representations today, from the pre-eminence of some perfectly organized regions that are, in turn, manifesting as actors as such, on the side of and sometimes on top of the states that they are part of – see the situation in decentralized or confederational areas stronger than the state itself or very well administered separatist regions, but autonomous in decision making on most issues and with global relevance. Finally, the G0 version is another formula of international anarchism through the exaggeration of nationalism and autocracies in a world of interdependencies, of eluding

[9] Iulian CHIFU – *Third generation Conflicts* in 'Millenium III', nr.8-9, summer 2002, pp.169-189.
[10] Hedley BULL, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, Columbia University Press, 1977, p. 312.
[11] Jakub GRYGIEL, *The Power of Statelessness*, in 'Policy Review', Hoover Institution, April 1, 2009.

coagulation of interests, of flexibilization of relations or of respect for the interests of neighbors or the region.

All these become at the same time realities of the contemporary world, especially in distant spaces without major interests of relevant actors. But the international chaos is doubled also by another type of chaos, that of the end of democracy as we knew it or the launch of a new generation of post-computer democracy – democracy 2.0[12]. Here the Internet, after having generated the major technological leap as basis for globalization, is threatening to fundamentally change democracy.

Social networks today are not only place of mobilization, but also instruments for building new democratic options, beyond known rules. We have had two contexts that lead to the use of the technical instrument and of social networks beyond the Arab Spring: the reaction of the middle class and the intelligentsia, the main losers of the crisis, towards the financial leadership, responsible for the crisis but bailed out by the political leadership because it is "too big to fail", as well as the end of the welfare state and the cession of the state to the participative society of a set of its attributes – in the field of social affairs. In this context, the specific situations in some states have lead to the overall criticism of the political class as well as the request by the middle class for privileged access to decision making, proportional to the responsibilities undertaken.

A new relation between state and society is on the making and this situation fundamentally changes the political generation and the democratic one overall. If current democratic rules are unable to manage fundamental values of equality of access to opportunities and justice in the case of those responsible for the crisis, then they must be improved and that is why the Internet has created social constructs not meant to reflect and find solutions or group therapy but that surpass the contemplative phase and lead directly to action in the streets. This is the big leap of democracy 2.0, especially since the public part which is acting has no leaders, can not structure itself in a classical manner because it is not allowed to do so by the social construct of the social network and that has its own life and evolution, it rejects agendas and negotiations and forces the respect of imposed opinions. Governance must also keep in mind these impersonal constructs that live in the virtual space but produce visible consequences and effects on the streets.

This change amplifies chaos and internal anarchy, multiplies the actors and interests that influence policies and that must be taken into account. The complexity derived from this multiplication of authors differs in accordance with their nature and degree of implication so that it ends up influencing global processes and, in any case, policies, including external policy of a state, investment policy of a company or the fate of a political actor.

[12] Iulian CHIFU, *Democracy. The next generation. Participative society, active society and the new forms of social constructs*, article to appear in Intelligence Magazine.

4. Type of policy. From chess to Go

But perhaps the most interesting change is that of the type of action of relevant actors. The US and European states have opted, with various degree of action, for pragmatic objectives, strict planning, actions strictly driven in order to achieve major and imperative results and with visible effects, proportional to limited resources. An approach we have defined as deriving from economic market policy with maximum efficiency but which excludes or substantially limits the appetite for strategy, for long term investment that gives no result during the mandate of the decision maker approving the funds, but in that of his successors.

The appeal to intervention is different as well. If France and Britain were spearheads in Libya and the US ended up "leading from behind" by supplying capabilities that Europe doesn't have and in which it no longer invests, in the case of Syria, the step forward was not taken until the chemical attack and the crossing of the "red line" drawn by the American president. And investment in military capabilities go from minimal, insignificant ones at a European level to the ambitions of Poland (or Russia) to become militarily endowed with top technology and capabilities for a future global military competition.

If the West is going mostly on this minimalist, ultra pragmatic and economical approach which has allowed the abandonment of many spaces where there were friends, where hopes and expectations had been raised and that could have very easily been maintained, China has already moved on to the game of Go. This is a strategy game where you position white and black tokens and you build areas of control where you take the tokens of the adversary. Therefore spatial control and filling the space matter – the capitalization of any opportunity and the sanction of vulnerability in order to position your own tokens, take control and create subtle and lasting influence.

In this context, we can subsume the case of Tonga, an island-state in the middle of the Pacific, a British governorate that pulled away and passed responsibility to Australia and New Zeeland. These two states, less interested and lacking capabilities of managing such themes have created a blunder in regard to the King of Tonga from where control changed dramatically and China invested massively in the state of 100.000 inhabitants. Cheap and without problems. The same happened – with other reasons – in Fiji, Kiribati or the Maldives. In the case of these state islands the dimension of economic exclusive zones reaches up to that of India, thus the interest in resources and votes in the UN General Assembly that China wanted. But perhaps most important was the positioning in the ocean, the capitalization of opportunity and control of space, the filling of space, even if such a policy does not immediately correspond to a strategy requiring this investment.

Russia too has a formula of external policy that exceeds the tendency to recreate, under different forms, of the post-soviet space or the grandeur of super power. Here politics is managed by direct interests, classical geopolitical reasons

but also by the "because I can" policy. A clear case in Transdniester where investment exists and until recently had no reason. The communists were leading the state from Chişinău, re-integration was probable – why maintain the unsustainable enclave that costs 70% of the budget and that didn't fit into any strategy?

Well, "because I can" and "because you can not stop me from doing it" would be the answer of Russia. "Yes, it is costing me money, but I can afford it. I have no plan to use it anywhere, I don't know what I will use it for, but I have it and I will stay there because I can. Maybe I will exchange it strategically, maybe I will use it in the future for some objectives that will come up, I don't know, but I am keeping it". This is the formula of approaching this theme and others by Moscow in regard to Europe, the West, the US. And this approach is much closer to the game of Go proposed by China as future rule for global strategic games of external policy and international relations of the future.

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GLOBALIZATION AND ITS INFLUENCE ON POWER CENTERS BECOMING

Bogdan MALANCIUC*

The dominant trend, widely recognized of the time is globalization, particularly through the integration, on a global scale, of the main forces of the economies, less national and more dependent on globalization centers. Globalization of flows of goods and services, capital, people and technology mainly influence the distribution of power (especially economic) in the international system. Unfortunately the massive deregulation of these flows has led to the economic crisis that began in 2007. The bailout measures taken by the national states to support large multinational companies (mainly banks, insurance companies, etc.) led to a strengthening of the position of states as centers of power.

Keywords**:** *globalization, power, economic power, capital flows, national state.*

Introduction

Globalization is the term used to describe changes in an economy and globally resulting from the international trade resulting from unprecedented amplitude and cultural exchanges. In the economic context, when analyzing this phenomenon it is common to refer almost exclusively to the effects of trade, particularly in terms of its liberalization and free trade.

In other words "Globalization is a very complex process carried out on several dimensions: political, economic, technical and technological, cultural and societal." [1] All these processes occur simultaneously and influence each other.

It can be said that globalization is the opposite of economic nationalism and protectionism, being akin to neoliberalism and free market economy, with common characteristics with internationalization.

It is important to note that there is a close correlation between globalization and diffusion of economic power, these phenomena cannot be analyzed separately.

1. Globalization - the prevailing trend of the contemporary world

International Monetary Fund defines globalization as "the increasing in economic interdependence of countries worldwide through increasing volume and variety of transactions of goods and services across borders, international capital flows more freely and faster, but also a wider diffusion of technology". (IMF, World Economic Outlook, 1997 May). The World Bank defines

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[1] Ana BAL, Sterian DUMITRESCU, *Economie mondială*, Ed. Economică, Bucureşti, 2002, p. 396.

globalization as "the freedom and ability of individuals and firms to initiate voluntary economic transactions with residents of other countries."

Thomas Friedman identified three phases of globalization[2]:

- 1492 - 1800: national states have the primary role;
- 1800 - 2000: imposition of multinationals;
- After 2000: the power of individuals to collaborate and compete globally.

A very interesting definition that emphasizes the issues of power that we are interested in is that of the International Forum on Globalization which defines this phenomenon as "the way to a global economic system dominated by banks and international trade that are not part of national governments" [3]. Here we also mention the only result of globalization as "the massive transfer, worldwide, of the economic and political power of national states from the hands of national states to those of the global corporations".

Economic globalization is driven by a number of four types of cross-border flows, namely:

- Flows of goods and services (trade and free trade);
- Capital flows;
- Flows of people (migration);
- Flows of technology.

The exchange of goods is the backbone of the entire international trading system. The debut in global economic integration was done on the movement of goods. Agreements between countries, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and then the World Trade Organization (WTO) gave them a multilateral negotiation framework, largely avoiding the onset of bilateral economic wars.

GATT aimed and largely succeeded to favor the development of international trade through the application and enforcement of rules:

a) Promoting the development of international economic trade by removing barriers, insuring equality between its members in terms of using fair trade practices;

b) Equal treatment of all signatory states, meaning non-discrimination applied in the relations between the parties, those states being obliged to offer each other automatically, immediately, unconditionally and without equivalent concessions, any advantage granted in customs or trade of a product originating or for any other country, specifying specific exemption cases, and also to ensure free trade and avoid protectionism;

c) Contracting parties have committed not to establish nor maintain among themselves any quantitative restrictions on imports, the only tool of their trade policy being basically the customs tariff;

d) Contracting parties have committed not to use dumping.

[2] Thomas FRIEDMAN, *Pământul este plat, Scurtă istorie a secolului XXI,* Editura Polirom, Iași, 2007, chapter 1
[3] http://www.ifg.org/pdf/Invis%20Govt.pdf accessed 09.10.2012.

The fact that GATT did not have the status of a UN specialized organization was constituted in one of the main reasons for the establishment of WTO.

The beginning of WTO operations and the implementation of applying the results of the Uruguay Round have multiple meanings, among which we can mention:

a) the development of an institutional framework characterized by stability within which the participating states provide one another predictable conditions of trading and work towards its continuous liberalization;

b) the new organization is characterized by universality, the number of states that can participate being unlimited;

c) the principles and rules framework was extended from trade of goods to the trade of services and of intellectual property rights protection.

The internationalization of production and that of service are closely intertwined, and we could speak of a tertiary-industrial complex as global[4]. New technologies (microelectronics, computers, telecommunications, satellites, fibber optics) tend to industrialize the production of services and tertialize the production of goods.

Two categories of services have contributed significantly to the globalization of business relationships: the consulting and the financial ones.

Financial flows provide the necessary liquidity to the international markets but they also can be extremely dangerous - as the Asians found out during the financial crisis of 1997-1998.

An analysis of the global mobility of capital[5] during 1870-2000 divides this period into four sub-periods:

- The gold standard period 1870-1914. During this period the global capital market took the London market as a reference point, the capital city of the British Empire. This fixed exchange rate system was, for most countries, stable and reliable system.

- Between1914-1945 the world economy faced two world wars and the Great Depression. The gold standard was cancelled during WWI, monetary policy being subordinated to the goals set by national policies. The period was characterized by a pronounced control of capital movements (protection against monetary crisis), which led to capital flows and minimum international investments.

- The 1945-1971 period after the Bretton Woods agreement is characterized by an expansion of trade which helped to rebuild the global economy.
- After 1971, with the U.S. abandonment of the dollar's convertibility into gold and the abandonment of fixed exchange rates, governments have given up gradually to capital control.

[4] Wladimir ANDREFF, *Les Multinationales globales*, Editions La Decouverte, Paris, 1996, p. 67.
[5] Maurice OBSTFELD, Alan,TAYLOR, *Globalization and capital markets*, 2002, cf. http://www.nber.org/papers/w8846.pdf, accessed on 02.10.2013.

Obstfeld and Taylor drew a very interesting schematic representation of the four periods as it follows:

Figure 1: Conjecture? A Stylized View of Capital Mobility in Modern History



Source: Introspection.

One can notice the steep increase of financial flows that occurred after 1980. If we continued the scheme after the year 2000, probably their growth rate would be higher (Glass Steagall Act was repealed in 1999) till the beginning of the economic crisis in 2007-2008.

Besides the forms that globalization takes and are mentioned above, we can display two others, also very important: the labour movement to find better employment opportunities and dissemination of knowledge related especially to different economic policies, management techniques and production methods.

Globalization creates both opportunities and risks. Joseph Stiglitz in his book Globalization notices that the accelerated development of the world, the growth of both the economy and living standards constitute the true promise of this phenomenon. But on the other hand, Stiglitz also observed, the western hypocrisy (their desire to "free trade" limited only to their products ...) leads to greater poverty, vulnerability and instability of some countries". Too often the strong preach what they do not practice. And if we add strategic considerations, the equation of the world trade becomes super complicated[6]. Tariq Ramadan notes that "from the offices in Washington, London or Paris, or from New York or Tokyo exchanges, domination is exercised by force in this new form of international division which establishes new-look colonialism"[7].

All these have a profound impact on power relations between different centres of power whether states, international organizations or multinational

[6] Robert COOPER, *Destrămarea națiunilor-geopolitica lumilor secolului XXI*, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, Bucureşti, 2007, p. 9.
[7] Ali LAIDI, *Efectul de bumerang. Cum a determinat globalizarea apariția terorismului*, Editura House of Guides, Bucureşti, 2007, p. 101.

companies. The integration of national economies as a result of the expansion of cross-border flows leads to diminishing the importance of national boundaries for economic activities. Basically the State has lost a great deal of control that it used to have on the economic agents who had been operating on their territory.

A more and more striking correlation appears between the trade between different centres of power and the state's desire to ensure the national security. The increasing international crime and illegal trade of various goods and services are facilitated by globalization and national states face important dilemmas.

2. The becoming of the economic power centres

Throughout history the economic power was most often associated with assets like land, natural resources and the ability to spend more than the opponents on weapons. In the contemporary world characterized by globalization, these elements, although still important, contribute less to the economic power than the society's and the government's capacity that leads it to create robust macroeconomic and financial policies, fair and predictable legislation – the framework of a genuine market competition.

Supporting the creation of a local workforce, educated and easily adaptable, of a developed infrastructure (transport, communications, energy), a stable and friendly investment climate should be the characteristics of a good governance that will mainly contribute to economic power status of a state. These real assets, created by Governments and society as a whole for themselves, guarantee a successful integration into the global economy. This successful integration provides more than the size of certain economies, the real economic power. Successful examples are Japan and the four Asian tigers (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore) in `70s -` 80s, China after Deng Xiaoping's reforms.

Thanks especially to China (whose economy is now about 5% of the world economy, compared to only 3% in 1980), Asia is going through a period of robust economic growth. This permanent increase in economy is more important in showing the economic power than the size of an economy in itself. Asia's success should not be exaggerated, though; the region still suffers from a number of economic, political and demographic weaknesses. It is too dependent on the global economy and thus vulnerable to external shocks.

The first decade of the 21st century has seen a major change in financial power from the West to other parts of the world, especially Asia. Countries in this region hold two thirds of the world's financial reserves, more than half of the amount being preserved in USD. Consequently, world countries have a strong interest in ensuring the health of the U.S. economy. The states' decisions to keep reserves in USD are related to the firm belief that the U.S. are the main security provider, if not the only one. The drop in dollar affected the deposits of

states that kept their reserves in USD, prompting them to diversify by keeping amounts in Euros or Yen, too.

What can governments do to exercise their financial power is very little compared to what private entities can do. In the past financial flows used to follow commercial transactions, but now they occupy a real universe, separated and always in expansion.

Governments with good ratings prefer to borrow the necessary funds from the private market, thus avoiding the imposed conditions to the granting of loans by the World Bank or International Monetary Fund. These conditions set by the Washington Consensus namely fiscal austerity, rapid privatization and market liberalization did not prove very often that would really help economies of countries in need.

As globalization has altered the content of the economic power, it has also limited the ability to use it independently. A country can use only partially the economic power. China depends heavily on the markets of U.S., EU and Japan. This means that the use of economic power by China unilaterally will decrease the foreign investors' confidence, thus slowing the necessary economic growth to the Chinese leadership to maintain legitimacy.

Conclusions

The liberalization of capital movements due to eliminating restrictions for foreign firms' participation on national capital markets and eliminating state control over inputs / outputs of capital decreased drastically the national authorities' control of their own economies, especially on financial flows therefrom. Thus the likelihood of a major crisis increased, which has happened since 2007.The uncontrolled growth of mortgage lending in the U.S. market mainly due to lower U.S. interest required by Fed to the American banks together with the extreme deregulation of financial markets have been the causes that started the current financial crisis.

All states have proved unprepared for the proliferation of derivative financial instruments, meaning titles whose price is based on market value of other goods, such as stock indices, currencies ... entities that have caused many nervous breakdowns.

Maybe those who called these titles "disguised bets", closer to casino business than financial activities exaggerated. All countries, when the financial crisis exploded in all its severity and were forced to intervene, they had no database to provide concrete information on the increasing risk associated with derivative titles held by the national bank.

To understand the importance of the financial part in the general context of the crisis, we must remember that they were made available to the TARP program - to protect banks from toxic assets - 700 billion dollars (more than Romania's GDP totalled over the last five years).

Obviously these bail out programs have left traces in the distribution of power, too. Many reputed companies and firms were saved from sure collapse of public money. Thus the states' position as power centres has improved considerably. The state's role as regulator of the economy gained new meaning again.

Theories on the "retreat of the state" (Susan Strange), "end of the state", "decline of the state", "state dissolution",statements made in the early 90's based on the idea that the territorial state has reached historic timeout period with the arrival of globalization must be reconsidered.

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16. LAIDI Ali, *Efectul de bumerang. Cum a determinat globalizarea apariția terorismului*, Bucureşti: Editura House of Guides, 2007;
17. OBSTFELD, Maurice; TAYLOR, Alan, *Globalization and capital markets*, 2002, cf. http://www.nber.org/papers/w8846.pdf;
18. STIGLITZ, Joseph, *Globalizarea, speranțe şi deziluzii*, Bucureşti: Editura Economică, 2005;
19. http://www.ifg.org/pdf/Invis%20Govt.pdf.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS. SECURITY PROSPECTS

Mirela ATANASIU, PhD.*

In our paper we intend to fulfil an analysis of the evolution of the security prospects of the East-West international relations as result of their cultural dichotomy. In first we will identify and describe the main East-West axes and main former, present and future security prospects concerning these axes. We also intend to identify and describe some consequences of the political, cultural, military, economic and social East-West relations over the global geopolitical framework. An important issue in our focused research we consider to be the forms of cooperation created between East and West parties (bilateral relations among states, security organizations, economic organization, etc.) and the security prospects foreseen under the created circumstances.

Keywords*: geopolitics, security, East-West dichotomy, cooperation, relations.*

Geopolitics approaches the relations settled among power and geographical spaces. Yves Lacoste insisted that: "The peculiarity of multiple geopolitical phenomena comes from the representations opposing in a more or less antagonist manner and connected to the issues concerning the power-territory relation"[1]. World is shared in at least four pieces when comes about comparison in regard to the fourth geographical coordinates: North, South, West and East.

Also, in matters of geopolitical perception, individually, these four regional "shares" were seen as opposite on the already named directions: North to South and East to West. Concomitantly, history has shown the main relational trends inclusively the security issues shifted, forth and back, North-South or East-West directions.

As regards the North-South conflict relations is well known the American war, but this is not the subject of our study. Therefore we will focus our analysis on East-West relations, which can not be identified and analyzed without identifying their differences and similarities.

1. Why is East different from West?

Although the question can gather many answers, we consider the main distinction can be done by comparing the Asian and European histories. Here we can see debates taking place since the Middle Ages about the main Oriental and Occidental regions were strongly asserted by religion. The religious authority strongly impacted in the époque's politics in the same areas. Still, there were differences in how humans created their relation with the Absolute power – God. As is shown in a book written by Hajime Nakamura, under the advices of a

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[1] Yves LACOSTE, *Dictionnaire de géopolitique*, Flammarion, p. 27 (*apud*: Paul CLAVAL, *Geopolitică şi geostrategie. Gândirea politică, spaţiul şi teritoriul in secolul al XX-lea*, Editura Corint, Bucureşti, 2001, p. 6).

group of Occidental and Oriental specialists: "the Occidental thinkers always regarded God as a master, but the Japanese believers didn't considered theirselves to be 'mastered' by the Holly power but 'guided', 'advised'"[2]. Consequently, the analyses highlighted the differences in the manner of evolution of the Occident and Orient. This idea, of evolution, became dominant in the Occident since the end of the modern époque while in the Orient the modern approaches came and go quicker in this period. Later the things changed, the evolution started also in the Orient but always was modified by the existent traditions, even today.

Also, we can come to the idea Asia is different because, in the traditional European sociology, scholars as Montesquieu, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, and Max Weber "sought to establish 'despotism' as a general form of Oriental civilization whose historic mobility contrasted with the restless innovation of Europe"[3].

Referring to the East-West antagonism, Samuel Huntington clearly seen in his "Clash of civilizations" that: "The philosophical assumptions, basic values, social relations, habits and perspectives on living are significantly different in the respective regions"[4]. We might say all the natural environment impacts over a civilization formation and development. The same author stated "in the post-Cold War, culture is a force which equally divides or unifies"[5].

We also consider the universalistic assumptions of Occidental civilization concerning its supremacy over the over civilization types arises conflicts particularly with Islam and the great emerging powers as China, Japan or India, as well as with countries as Turkey which sees itself as the same Eastern and Western pivot country.

The true differences stand in the living conditions for the citizens, their educational background and conditions, in the level of economic development, in their military capabilities and the built infrastructure. These entire elements are important in the grid conceived to find out the level of security in the Occident and Orient. Therefore, in terms of human development items (as are seen in the below figure no. 1), "about 1.7 billion people in the 109 countries covered by the MPI—a third of their population — live in multidimensional poverty — that is, with at least 33 percent of the indicators reflecting acute deprivation in health, education and standard of living. This exceeds the estimated 1.3 billion people in those countries who live on $1.25 a day or less (though it is below the share who live on $2 or less)"[6]. From them, for example, by 2050, the East Asian and South Asian economies will have increased by over

[2] Hajime NAKAMURA, *Orient şi Occident: O istorie comparată a ideilor*, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1997, p.453.
[3] Victor LIEBERMAN, *Transcending East-West Dichotomies: State and Culture Formation in Six Ostensibly Disparate Areas*, in „Modern Asian Studies", Vol. 31, No. 3, JSTOR, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 1997, p. 463.
[4] Samuel P. HUNTINGTON, *Ciocnirea civilizațiilor şi refacerea ordinii mondiale,* Editura Antet, 1997, p. 37.
[5] *Idem.*
[6] Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), See: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/mpi/, accessed on November 12, 2013.

20 times[7]. With that comes a rise in Human Development Index, the index used to measure the standards of living. India's HDI will approach .8. East Asia's would approach .94 or fairly close to the living standards of the western nations such as the EU and the US This would mean that it would be rather difficult to determine the difference in wealth of the two. Because of East Asian and Indian populations, their economy would be very large, and if current trends continue, India's long-term population could approach double that of China. East Asia could surpass all western nations' combined economies as early as 2030. South Asia could soon follow if the hundreds of millions in poverty continue to be lifted into middle class.



Figure no. 1 – Human Development Indicators
Source: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/mpi/

The trend for greater Asian economic dominance based on the extrapolations of recent historic economic trends highlighted the trend towards mainland China becoming the largest and India the second largest economies by the year 2050 in terms of GDP[8]. Still, the region is not powerful enough to lead the world let alone to dictate its rules, it will have to play along.

2. East-West dichotomy

The "East-West dichotomy" is a philosophical concept of ancient origin which claims that the two cultural hemispheres, East and West, developed diametrically opposed, one from the particular to the universal and the other from the universal to the particular; the East is more inductive while the West is

[7] Ronnie C. CHAN, *Asia's future in a globalized world*, See: http://www.cap-lmu.de/publikationen/1999/asias_future_globalization.php.
[8] Idem.

more deductive[9]. Briefly, East-West dichotomy mainly refers to the conceptual contrast between Eastern and Western cultures. Thus, this dichotomy mainly refers to "used language, religion, values, traditions and habits"[10].

This dichotomy was a political and ideological creation of the Cold War which expressed and aimed the European continent dividing; an ideology intending to divide a single entity united as physical-geographical space, history, culture and many other plans. Unfortunately, some residual forms of this political dividing continue to live in our mental and conceptual frameworks.

Following the apparition of the world bipolar relation between the US from West and the USSR from East, it is considered by Western specialists "the East-West confrontation is permanent and direct in Europe, the Middle East and the Far East"[11]. The balance of power concept appeared in result. The regard from East scholars is not very different, a Chinese professor to the Political Science Department in Peking University even declared: "The two political systems [in East and West] are very different. I don't see a reason why we should not have some form of benign competition"[12]. So, the East-West confrontation is undergone by the great hegemonic states because the third world countries can not directly compete with the strong Western powers and appeal to indirect means of war as terrorism, or insurgency.

Earth's population is included in a religious mosaic represented by different cults. The biggest percentage comes to Christians (48.5%)[13], frequently more in the Western part of the world, Europe, Northern America, Latin America and Australia, the second percentage (14,8%) comes to Islamism, and Hinduism (14.8%), Buddhism (8,7%), Animism (6.0%), Confucianism (5.0%), Taoism (1.7%) and Sikh religion (0.5%)[14]. So, it is obvious the greatest part of the Christian religions relies on Euro-Atlantic territories and the other religions are predominated in the Asian continent. This results in differences in maters of perception, ideologies, law, habits, etc.

Our opinion is that polarity does not necessarily mean opposition or contrast but involves complementarily elements combining in consonance and articulated in proper non-violent actions. Still, as Mircea Malita quoted: "Among cultures and civilizations can appear moment of tensions and crisis but also consonance phases wherein they mutually potentate"[15]. In the post-Cold War period, it became obvious that cultural identity and culture as a whole

[9] China Book International, See: http://www.cbi.gov.cn:8080/wisework/content/121796.html, accessed on 10.11.2013.

[10] Samuel P. HUNTINGTON, *The West Unique, Not Universal*, in „Foreign Affairs", November-December 1996, pp. 28-45.

[11] Paul CLAVAL, *Geopolitică şi geostrategie. Gândirea politică, spaţiul şi teritoriul in secolul al XX-lea*, Editura Corint, Bucureşti, 2001, p. 140

[12] Jisi Wang, professor, dean of the School of International Studies, Peking University, and director of the Center for International and Strategic Studies, Peking University, See: Wang Jisi: I don't see why we should not have some benign competition, September 25, 2013, http://www.east-west-dichotomy.com/, accessed on November 12, 2013.

[13] Nicolae ILINCA, *Geografia umană. Populaţia şi aşezările omeneşti,* Editura Corint, Bucureşti, 1999, p. 83.

[14] Idem.

[15] Mircea MALIŢA, *Zece mii de culturi, o singură civilizaţie*, Editura Nemira, Bucureşti, 2001.p. 18.

shapes the cohesion, disintegration or conflict trends in the world. Traditionally, the divide has been one of an Islamic "East" versus an American and European "West". In recent years, this dichotomy has become more complicated by one factor in particular, the global dissemination of Islamic fundamentalism. Within some Middle Eastern and Central Asian nations (e.g., Afghanistan and Pakistan), some critics would say that with cultural diversity within Islamic nations the situation has moved "beyond that of an East-West dichotomy and into a tripartite situation"[16].

We consider globalization will lead to the diminution of extremist and fundamentalist trends whether they are religious, cultural or different nature. The globalization phenomenon creates widely in the collective conscience and action of both West and East, as indirect effects, the communion of at least two goals: to achieve the common goals and to solve the common problems, the both intended to be fulfilled on global plan[17].

3. Main axes of East-West opposite relations and consequences over the European Union

The main axis is traced between the Eastern and Western hemispheres of the world. The Western region of the world is considered by the geopoliticians to be the whole Western Europe extended to the Atlantic Ocean, and in East, from the border with Ukraine, Bulgaria and Turkey to the Ural Mountains. In the Occidental scholar perspective, the Eastern part of the world also comprises the Middle East situated in the South and East of the Mediterranean Sea to the Persian Gulf (See Figure no. 2).

Figure no. 2 – Eastern and Western Countries Delimitation
Source: http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_SgphszP_auk/TN59rYaxjDI/AAAAAAAAABA/KhJT6mfv 5RQ/s1600/ world_map.jpg

[16] Lina KHATIB, *Filming the Modern Middle East. Politics in the Cinemas of Hollywood and the Arab World*, I.B.Tauris Publisher, Nov 28, 2006.
[17] Mirela ATANASIU, *Effects of Economic Globalization over Individual Security*, in „Romanian Scientists Annals" no. 3/2013, National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2013.

The European continent comprises a well-known East-West axis. There are many ways this relation it can be seen. The regions had different patterns of thinking and different perspectives. Usually history is not the first explanatory argument for the Western nationalism but it is for the Eastern one[18].

Consequently, the Western people ask themselves if the labour force migration from the East will amplify the unemployment rate of the western citizens and will request supplementary efforts from their systems of social protection. Lately, there were exacerbated in many countries the problems generated by the free movement and difficulties of Romm minority integration, the gipsies cane from the eastern countries confronting to this serious social issue since a long time in more serious forms. The reunification of the continent, even partial, transformed it in an European problem and must be solved with democratic means, in solidarity spirit, on the continental level and despite the beliefs of some populist politicians, the European citizenship is a reality.

The diminution of development gaps in the European space between nations, states and regions, between communities, as well as for the prestige of Europe as pattern of solving the problems, in the economic globalization situation and the contemporary society it became source of anxieties, in East as well as in West.

The under-development of countries in the European area is direct consequence of the old empires dominance; some not more developed then the quasi-colonies they administrate it, as well as the delay in forming the national states, reported to the similarly process from the Western Europe. This delay reflected in the delay of institutional modernization process and in the process of economic and social development. To these are added the times of totalitarian regimes, collapsed in 1989, which, also contributed to the diminution of some development gaps, they generated, at their turn, in many fields, other gaps, particularly on political and institutional but also technological plan.

The European countries common interests, today, request for the aggregation of all states efforts in order to diminish the existent gaps, inclusively by the support of the European Union institutional consolidation process and the enlargement process towards East.

Conclusions

In the actual globalization context, we consider the East-West dichotomy it is not real anymore but it remained real in human perception. Nowadays, East-West economic, diplomatic, political, etc. relations, no matter we speak about the European or world relational level are hybridized. The multitude of multinational economic organizations is just one of the proofs showing we are right when we state this.

Still, we can not say they are no differences among the Eastern and Western civilizations but they must not necessarily be a source of conflict or

[18] http://www.iwm.at/publ-jvc/jc-08-03.pdf.

misunderstanding. Tolerance in the exerted relations is always an important issue for the good East-West vicinity. This situation is common for the Eastern and Western parts of Europe, which try to deal their issues mainly in the European Union framework, for the Middle East and the Far East countries approach to Western countries and vice versa.

We consider equally important for the success of the effort to diminish the gaps of development are the promotion and enlargement of bi and multilateral cooperation on Balkan countries, countries tided by long traditions and multiple common interests, the cooperation in order to transform the Balkan, Danube and Black Sea adjacent area which is not a marginal area anymore for Europe, in an attracting, harmonious, irreconcilable conflicts, a dynamic space, of economic and social development in active connection with the European communities' countries and with the countries situated in the adjacent areas of this space.

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15. http://www.iwm.at/publ-jvc/jc-08-03.pdf.

DEMOCRACY AND WAR: THE PREDICTIVE VALUE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY

Teodora FUIOR*

The theory of democratic peace is one of the most influential ideas in international relations. In contrast to the realist theory, which considers internal political order of states irrelevant to international security, the theory of democratic peace associates international stability with the presence of liberal democratic norms and institutions. The theory argues that democracies do not enter in war against other democracies. It inspires a foreign policy that supports and encourages the expansion of democracy in the world, justifying most military interventions after the Cold War and promoting institutional arrangements aimed at regional and global peace. This article examines the main explanations of democratic peace theory (institutional, normative and relational) and their criticism. Despite its influence on current security strategies, the democratic peace theory has little predictive value on state behaviour. The causal relationship between attributes of liberal democratic political systems and their external behaviour remains unclear.

Keywords: *democratic peace, liberal democracy, democratization, political liberalism.*

Introduction: the origins of democratic peace theory

Democratic peace theory argues that democracies seldom if ever make war upon one another, therefore, a world in which as many countries as possible have a democratic political system is a peaceful world. Democratic peace theory is one of the most famous and influential ideas in the international relations theory, inspiring for decades a foreign policy that encourages and supports democratization in the world, policy pursued by both Western powers and international organizations.

In contrast to the realist theory which states that internal political order of states is irrelevant for international security, the democratic peace theory associates international stability and security not to geostrategic agreements, but with the presence of liberal democratic norms and institutions[1] . Democratic peace is part of the liberal stream in the theory of international relations, which argues that states' foreign policy preferences and actions are the result of domestic and transnational social pressures[2].

At the origin of the democratic peace theory is the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. In his philosophical essay "*Perpetual Peace*" ("*Zum Ewigen Friedental*"), published in 1795, Kant conceives the path to long-lasting peace as

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[1] Alexandra GHECIU, *International relations between history, theory and public policies. The American lesson,* in *National Security Policy. Concepts, institutions, processes*. POLIROM, 2007, p. 67.

[2] Andrew MORAVCSIK, *The New Liberalism,* in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Science,* edited by Robert E. GOODIN, Oxford University Press, 2011 , p. 710.

a universal federation of free republics, whose citizens enjoy fundamental rights[3]. For Kant peace is not the natural state of the human society. Even without open hostility, there is always a constant threat of violent outbursts. Therefore, the state of peace must be created and built by conscious effort, and as a moral duty. Perpetual peace is understood as an ideal; not a utopian speculation, but an ethical imperative that must, and can be achieved.

Kant defines three prerequisites to perpetual peace and presents them in the form of a treaty. Only as more states fulfil these requirements, perpetual peace will become possible:

1. "*The civil constitution of each state shall be republican*"[4]. Kant defines republicanism as the political principle of severing the executive power from the legislative one; for him, republicanism is the only constitutional design originated from the social contract. A republican regime is led by a representative government, and is founded upon the principles of freedom, equality, respect for law and private property. The consent of subjects is needed to start up a war, but given the human and financial costs that they would have to bear in the case of a conflict, this consent is improbable. Therefore, a world made up of republics would be more peaceful than a world of monarchies, whose rulers may engage in wars without great risk to themselves.
2. "*The law of nations shall be funded on a federation of free states*"[5]; Kant argues that the attempt to build peace in a world of independent states is doomed to fail, because independence entails defining and pursuing selfish national interests that inevitably lead to conflict; only the creation of a federation of free republican states will eliminate the conflicts of interests that lead to war;
3. "*The rights of men, as citizens of the world, will be limited to the conditions of universal hospitality*"[6] ; every citizen has the right to visit a foreign territory and the right to be treated without hostility; Kant thus anticipates a right to universal citizenship.

Kant's theory has inspired many of the scientific efforts dedicated to understand the relationship between democracy and war, to explain differences of behaviour between democratic and non-democratic systems and to identify the circumstances and the ways democracies use force[7].

1. The theory of democratic peace in social sciences research

The literature on democratic peace has proliferated starting in the 1960s, along with the diversification of research methods, which virtually cover the

[3] Immanuel KANT, *Perpetul Peace*, pp. 106-136, http://www.archive.org/stream/perpetualpeacea00 kantgoog#page/n124/mode/2up, accessed on line at 25.10.2013.
[4] *Ibidem*, p. 120.
[5] *Ibidem*, p. 128.
[6] *Ibidem*, p.137.
[7] See Wolfgang MERKEL, *Democracy through War?*, Democratization, Vol. 15, Nr. 3, June 2008, p.488.

entire research methodology in political sciences[8]. Until late 1980s, the study of democratic peace was dominated by statistical methods, which sought to identify correlations between states' internal political regime and their appetite for war in foreign policy. The empirical studies from this first generation of research have reached a relative consensus in concluding that democracies do not engage in mutual conflict, but they enter into war with non-democratic states with the same frequency as other political regimes. Gradually, the research has shifted focus from the question *whether* democracies enter into war, to the question *why*. Thus, a second generation of research on democratic peace, based on sophisticated statistical methods, case studies and formal models, has tested the correlations between different characteristics of democratic systems and their foreign policy, trying to explaine the causal mechanisms through which democratic institutions influence foreign policy, but also the perceptions other states develop about the probable behaviour of political leaders in a democracy.

The first political scientists that tried to compare democracies' belligerence with the one of autocratic states were Dean V. Babst (1972) and Rudolph Joseph Rummel (1979). Using a simple and operational definition of democracy, Babst concluded that between 1789 and 1941, no war was fought between independent nations led by governments that emerged from elections[9].

In the 1970s, taking advantage of the development of statistical methods, Rudolph Rummel investigated over six years the causes and conditions for conflict, identifying 33 sentences that explain conflict. One of these theses is that "*libertarian systems exclude mutual violence*"[10]. Democracy is, in his view, a method of non-violent resolution of conflicts of interest and the form of government associated with the lowest degrees of external violence, involvement in war, and internal violence[11]. Rummel has correlated global peace with the spread of democracy, concluding that democracies are less prone to war, both among themselves and in relation to non-democratic states. This version of the democratic peace is called "*monadic*". The thesis, however, is disputed by political scientists who advocate for the "*dyadic*" or relational version of democratic peace[12], which claims the existence of a separate area of peace, shared only between consolidated liberal democracies; in relationship to non-democracies, democracies are as prone to conflict as dictatorships. The

[8] For an inclusive examination of the development of research methods on democratic peace see Alexander L. GEORGE şi Andrew BENNET, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2005, pp. 37-64.

[9] Dean V. BABST, *Elective Governments: A Force for Peace*, in "Wisconsin Sociologist" Vol. 3, No. 1, 1964, pp. 9-14

[10] RJ RUMMEL, *Understanding Conflict and War*, vol. 4, 1979, p. 279.

[11] Rummel is also well known for branding the term "democide", defined as the intentional killing of a person or of a population by the government. He estimated that during 20th century 262 million people have become victims of democide, six times more than those killed in war. Rummel argues that there is a direct relationship between political power and democide; the more concentrated political power, the higher its tendency to democide. When political power is diffuse, balanced and subjected to inter-institutional control, political violence becomes rare.

[12] Daniel BIRO, *The thesis of democratic peace*, in *Manual of International Relations*, edited by Andrei Miroiu and Radu-Sebastian Ungureanu, Polirom, 2006, pp. 260-261.

attack of Egypt in 1956 by Britain, France and Israel, the invasion of Iraq by the United States in 2003, are considered eloquent arguments in support of this second type of the democratic peace.

Michael W. Doyle has developed the modern theory of democratic peace in its dyadic version. Doyle used the systematic analysis of existing data on interstate conflict[13], classifying all countries involved in wars depending on their political regime. This approach allowed him to reconfirm the conclusions of Babst and Rummel, and to shed new light on Kant's theory, drawing world's attention on the fact that liberal peace exists, and the expansion of liberal democracy is the way to reduce the threat of war. Doyle argues that democratic peace is essentially based on trust: democracies enjoy mutual trust, whereas dictators do not enjoy the trust of democratic leaders. For this reason war does not burst between democracies, but it often occurs between democracies and dictatorships[14].

The research of the last two decades use increasingly elaborate definitions of democracy, and attempt to identify the effects of a significant number of variables on states' behaviour in foreign policy: separation of powers, rule of law, free market economy, wealth, economic growth rates, membership in military alliances, military capabilities, geographical proximity to other democracies, the existence of a regional hegemon[15]. Three main causal explanations of democratic peace theory were identified: (1) institutional, (2) normative and (3) relational[16].

The institutional explanation

Democratic institutions constrain political leaders and impose limitations that discourage them in choosing war as political alternative.

The first constraint on political leaders is the constitutional and legal framework that must be respected by the executive power. The decision making process in a democracy requires time and a strict following of legal procedures, which includes parliamentary and public debates, allowing grievances and differences to be expressed and defused, diminishing in the same time leaders' ability to initiate a surprise attack on another state[17].

A second constraint is the institution of elections, which allows for the manifestation of social preferences relevant to the external behaviour of states.

[13] The project *Correlates of War* of Michigan University was initiated in 1963 by Professor J. David Singer. The objective of the project is to systematically summon scientific knowledge about war. The historian Melvin Small, joins the project and contributes to archive specific data on the occurrence and magnitude of intra and inter-state wars after 1815. For the scientific integrity of their work Singer and Small had to respond difficult questions, like defining the notions of "state" or "war". In 1972 they published *The Wages of War*, publication that provides the standard definition of war, referential for further research in the field. Project data is continuously updated, being available on line at: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/Datasets.htm.

[14] Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace*, Norton New York, 1997

[15] Alexander L. GEORGE and Andrew BENNET, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2005, p. 41.

[16]RAND Reports, *The Democratic Peace Idea*, p. 149/152, page accessed on line at 03.01.2012, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1346/MR1346.appc.pdf.

[17] John M. OWEN, *How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace*, in *International Security*, 19:2, 1994, pp. 87–125.

The institutional structures of political representation in a liberal democracy are an essential determinant of how national interests are defined by political leaders, and therefore of their foreign policy preferences[18]. The mechanism of political representation requires political elites who want to be re-elected more precaution to avoid the failure of implemented policies, including the failure of a war. Consequently, elites will favour war only when victory is anticipated; once a war is started, political leaders will make greater efforts to win it, investing more resources and increasing costs and duration of the conflict. Anticipating these high costs of belligerence, democratic leaders will be more likely to negotiate than to go to war[19].

The normative explanation

The political culture of a liberal democracy values the respect of law, negotiation and compromise, freedom of expression and communication, in the detriment of conflict and violence. Norms and values shared by democratic states lead them to define themselves as being peaceful and non-threatening[20]. Liberalism involves a series of rules of *correct behaviour* based on political independence, mutual respect and non-interference in the internal affairs of other liberal states. Democracies perceive other democracies as being rational, predictable and trustworthy; the pacifist culture dominating domestic policy is projected in external relations, thus creating an inter-democratic space of mutual trust, peace and stability.

The relational explanation

Democracies tend to develop among themselves a space of economic interdependence that reduces the probability of war. Democratic states have free market economies and provide financial and commercial guarantees that are more reliable than those provided by authoritarian states. Consequently, democracies favour mutual trade, knowledge, understanding and negotiation. Trade discourages war because of expected commercial losses, and also because it diminishes the benefits of a conquest[21]. In a space of liberal peace, states resolve economic conflicts through alternative means, which prevent the outbreak of war. These systemic effects of democracy are called *pluralistic security community* by Karl Deutch, *complex interdependence* by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, or *self-limiting system* by John Ikenberry[22].

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[18] Andrew MORAVCSIK, *The New Liberalism*, in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Science*, edited by Robert E. GOODIN, Oxford University Press, 2011 , pp. 712-713

[19] Bruce Bueno de MESQUITA, James D. MORROW, Randolph M. SIVERSON, and Alastair SMITH, *An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace*, in American Political Science Review, 93:4 (December 1999), pp. 791–807.

[20] Zeev MAOZ și Bruce M. RUSSETT, *Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace*, 1946–1986, in American Political Science Review, 87:3 (September 1993), pp. 624–638.

[21] John R. ONEAL and Bruce M. RUSSETT, *The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950–1985*, in International Studies Quarterly, 41:2, (June 1997), pp. 267–294.

[22] Andrew MORAVCSIK, *op. cit.*, p.722.

2. **The Theory of Democratic Peace in Practice**

Some political scientists argue that empirical evidence collected in the last two decades proves that modern democracies do not enter fewer wars than autocracies, even when it comes to wars of aggression. However, because the wars democracies enter are not waged on national territory and are based on high technology, the costs borne by their citizens are reduced. Moreover, statistics show that democracies are generally victorious when fighting a war. During 1816-1992, 81% of them have won wars[23]. Democracies create defensive alliances, enter into collective security arrangements and tend to fight on the same side in a major war. They choose the wars they enter with more responsibility, tend to win them, suffer fewer losses, are less likely to initiate international crises, and rarely enter in preventive wars.

The liberal vision of democratic peace was validated by political leaders like Margaret Thatcher or Boutros Boutros- Ghali and played a central role in the U.S. government efforts to create a "community of democracies" in the world. Inspired by Kant philosophy and Enlightenment tradition, enriched by the American missionary ethos, President Woodrow Wilson was the first statesman who tried to introduce moral and ethical criteria in the foundation of international politics, justifying U.S. foreign and security policy through the need to spread democracy in the world[24]. Wilson believed the American power will atrophy if the U.S. does not succeed to spread freedom around the globe; his arguments are at the core of the Idealist school of thought in the theory of international relations[25]. Michael Doyle argues that the "zone of peace" based on moral values shared among liberal states, has supported the American alliance with NATO and Japan. Successive U.S. administrations have justified their foreign policies through the presumptive benefits of broadening the scope of democracy. A variety of means have been used to promote democracy in the world, from economic assistance, political support and technical advice offered to emerging democracies, to actions designed to cause the fall of authoritarian regimes, by political pressure, economic sanctions or military intervention. Inter-democratic peace theory inspires the neoconservative tradition[26] as well and justifies most of the recent military interventions.

In his first official State of the Union speech, in January 1994, President Clinton stated that democracies have never gone to war against each other and promoting democracy in the world will be a central pillar of its foreign policy: "*the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to*

[23] Wolfgang MERKEL, *op. cit.*, p.489.
[24] George Cristian MAIOR, *Incertainty. Strategic thinking and international relations in 21st century,* RAO 2009, pp. 136-137.
[25] See Robert McELROY, *Morality in American Foreign Policy,* Paideia, Bucharest, 1998.
[26] The neoconservatory school of thought sustains the interdemocratic peace theory and the universality of liberal values, but gives little credentials to international law and institutions.

support the advance of democracy elsewhere"[27]. President Bush proclaimed in the inaugural speech for his second term that *"the survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world"*[28]. President Obama's speech in acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize is considered to be an eloquent articulation of the democratic peace theory: "*peace is unstable where citizens are denied the right to speak freely or worship as they please; choose their own leaders or assemble without fear. Pent up grievances fester, and the suppression of tribal and religious identity can lead to violence. We also know that the opposite is true. Only when Europe became free did it finally find peace. America has never fought a war against a democracy, and our closest friends are governments that protect the rights of their citizens. No matter how callously defined, neither America's interests – nor the world's –are served by the denial of human aspirations"*[29].

Democratic peace theory remains popular today, being used to justify foreign policy not only by Western governments, but also by major international organizations like the UN, NATO, OSCE and EU, which promote democratic norms and institutions as a way to ensure political stability and international security. Democratic peace theory is especially present in NATO discourse in the 1990s, as causal explanation of NATO strategy to address post-Cold War security environment[30]. One of the most important NATO initiatives launched with the aim to create international democratic peace was the Partnership for Peace.

3. Limits of the democratic peace theory

The democratic peace theory generates predictions about peace and war, about the impact of democratic institutions on global stability. It announces long-term historical changes in the nature of international politics and it identifies direct causal relationships between internal economic, social and political developments and states' external behaviour.

Despite its popularity and influence, the predictive value of this theory on states behaviour is questioned, for reasons relating both with the methodological limitations of the research in the field, and with the practical validity of the generalizations implied.

Most analysts explain the democratic peace theory through a reductive and causal logic. With other words, they try to explain an observed phenomenon

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[27] William J. CLINTON, *Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union January 25, 1994*, accessed online on 31.12.2011, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=50409#axzz1i7tvHngO.

[28] http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/01/magazine/01wwln_essay.html.

[29] http://www.demdigest.net/blog/2009/12/obama-makes-case-for-democratic-peace-and-for-engaging-autocrats/, site accessed on 26.01.2012.

[30] Alexandra GHECIU, *International Relations between History, Theory and Public Policy. The American Lesson*, in *National Security Policy*, edited by Luciana Alexandra Ghica and Marian Zulean, POLIROM, 2007, pp.69-70.

- liberal democracies generally do not engage in conflict with one another - by identifying attributes of the research subject, such as institutional arrangements, decision-making style, a cultural predisposition toward compromise, and assigning a causal relationship between them and the initially observed behaviour[31].

The main problem of the theory is the difficulty to quantify and compare variables like democratic norms and behaviours. There is no database - global, generally accepted and considered to be objective, to be used in the assessment of these variables[32]. Statistical methods, which are prevalent in the investigation of democratic peace, do not allow testing for causal mechanisms in specific contexts. The exceptions to inter-democratic peace are few in number, but they are not explained by the theory, thus challenging the generalizations suggested by statistical methods. Case studies attempt to overcome the limitations of statistical methods; they explore in detail the causal mechanisms, in order to identify new variables and formulate new hypotheses. The theories resulting from these qualitative research methods focus on interactions between combinations of variables, and not on variables considered in isolation[33]. Therefore, case studies on democratic peace examine different types and subtypes of *democracy* and *war*. Distinction is made, for example, between centralized and decentralized democracies, emergent and consolidated democracy, normative preferences of political leaders and those of the masses, or between precarious, conditional and stable peace. The use of these subcategories resulted in a significant number of studies that conclude that post-conflict states, or states in early stages of transition from dictatorship to a democratic system, are vulnerable and unstable, representing a fertile ground for internal and international conflict.

In the last two decades, scepticism about democratization in post-conflict countries has become very popular in the academic world, despite contrary developments in international politics, which justify most military interventions after the cold-war through the logic of democratic peace. Robert B. Kaplan argued more than a decade ago that liberal democracy failed and will fail in poor countries, while international efforts to promote democracy do nothing else but supporting governments in those countries to grow into a new type of authoritarian regimes[34]. More recent research[35] show that horizontal inequalities - between groups that differ in political, economic, ethnic or cultural terms -, are

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[31] Raymond DUVALL and Jutta WELDES, *The International Relations of Democracy, Liberalism and War: Directions for Future Reasearch*, in "Democracy, Liberalism and War, Rethinking the Democratic Peace Debate", edited by Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, Boulder London, 2001, p. 200.
[32] Alexander L. GEORGE and Andrew BENNET, *Op. Cit*., p. 43.
[33] *Ibidem*, p. 46.
[34] Robert M. KAPLAN, *Was Democracy Just a Moment?, 1997*, p. 6.
[35] Gudrun ØSTBY, *Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Civil Conflict*, in „Journal of Peace Research" vol. 45, no. 2, 2008, pp. 143–162; Stewart, FRANCES (ed.), 2008, *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies*, Palgrave Macmillan; Stewart, Francis, 2002, *Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development*, Working Paper 1, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE), at http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs/workingpaper1.pdf.

a common cause of violent outbreaks, which can be enhanced by the existence of fragile democratic institutions. Multiparty systems in post-conflict or fragile states often lead to the formation of parties based on tribal, religious or ethnic identities, encouraging the institutionalization of these divisions. Elections are won by cultivating the awareness of group alterity and spurring the exclusion of *others*[36].

Another author who is unconvinced by the conventional beliefs of the 1990s regarding the opportunity to foster democratization processes in post-conflict states is Fareed Zakaria[37]. He writes that it is difficult to find evidence proving that democracy strengthens peace. The factors that contribute to the stability of democracy and its peaceful behaviour are not the same with those that trigger the democratization process. Consolidated democracies are less likely to generate a war with neighbours; however, young democracies have high chances to engage in regional violence, the evolution of the democratization process depending upon the quality of political leaders and the economic development.

In a series of articles and studies that culminated with the publication of the book "*Electing to Fight. Why Emerging Democracies go to War*" political scientists Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder[38] assert that new democracies are often unstable and belligerent[39]. Mansfield and Snyder have collected an impressive amount of statistical information about countries that have gone through a process of democratization in the last 200 years and showed how emerging democracies, where state institutions are not fully formed and stable, are more aggressive and prone to war; their examples range from the disastrous French attack on Prussia in 1870, the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974, the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 1992 or the conflict between the former Yugoslav states. Data collected by them shows that former authoritarian regimes making progress in democratic participation are more likely to go to war than authoritarian or democratic regimes. States that make significant and swift changes from a pure autocracy to a democracy with broad popular participation are, in the first decade following the democratic change, twice more likely to enter into war than states that remain autocratic.

The explanation given by the two scientists is that countries in the process of democratization cannot ensure the rule of law and lack well organized political parties or a professional media. The authority of state institutions is

[36] Robert M. KAPLAN, *The Ends of the Earth*, Random House, 1997, p. 61.

[37] Fareed ZAKARIA, *The Future of Freedom. Neoliberal Democracy in Unites States of America and in the World*, Polirom 2009.

[38] Edward D. MANSFIELD and Jack SNYDER, *Democratization and the Danger of War*, International Security, 20:1, 1995, pp. 5–38; Edward D. MANSFIELD and Jack SNYDER, *Democratization and War*, Foreign Affairs, 74:2, 1995, pp. 79–97;http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/50974/edward-mansfield-and-jack-snyder/democratization-and-war. Jack L. Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*, W. W. Norton, New York, 2000; Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, *Electing to Fight. Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*, MIT Press Cambridge, 2005

[39] See also Zeev MAOZ and Nasrin ABDOLALI, *Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816–1976*, in "Journal of Conflict Resolution", 33:1, 1989, pp. 3–35; and Michael D. Ward and Kristian S. Gleditsch, *Democratizing for Peace*, American Political Science Review, 92:1, 1998, pp. 51–61.

generally weak and unstable. The disappearance of authoritarian power, usually highly concentrated, leads to the emergence of social groups with different, often conflicting, interests among which a balance of power cannot be established quickly. Concerned with the seizure of power, or with avoiding losing it, elites are tempted to mobilize the masses around nationalist or populist agendas, situation that proves very dangerous in a young democracy. Without strong and stable institutions which could prevent and sanction excesses of speech and behaviour, empowering people equals with feeding bellicose nationalist tendencies. The most illustrative example is given by the events in former Yugoslavia after the fall of communism, when Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia and Franjo Tudjman in Croatia, were both using populist nationalism to maintain political power at the cost of starting a violent conflict. Democratization is an extremely difficult and long process - sometimes lasting several decades, and with no guarantee that it will inevitably end with a solid liberal democracy. Incomplete transitions (blocked before democratic consolidation) in countries with weak government institutions increase the likelihood of involvement in international conflict from four to 15 times. The risk of having transition countries engaged in a violent conflict remains high until democracy is fully consolidated. Unfortunately, the reforms implemented in most contemporary democratization processes are limited to the introduction of a minimal democracy (characterized essentially by the organisation of free elections), and don't produce fully democratic states.

Conclusions

The interest for the democratic peace exploded after 1990, the theory becoming a central theme in political science. Despite a contesting minority, there is now a general consensus on the idea that democratic states are peaceful among each other. The spread of democracy has implications for international relations: a divided world is prone to violent conflict, whereas a world where democracy spreads has the potential of being more peaceful. The wide and passionate attention dedicated to the democratic peace theory is a proof that democracy is central to the new security paradigm. The lack of representative and functional political institutions is a major source of insecurity, injustice and abuse. On the other hand, the lack of security, for the state and for its citizens is the major obstacle to political, economic and social development. The obvious conclusion is that democracy and security are inseparable.

Academic research increasingly focuses on democratic transformation and the challenges of this process in different regions of the globe. However, we don't have yet democratization theories of universal applicability. Moreover, insufficient analysis was dedicated to the specific role played in democratization by different national institutions - such as the army, police, judiciary, private sector, political parties -, or, by different governmental policies – such as the

economic policy, strategies for ethnic integration, foreign policy, security sector reform.

Democratization is always a slow and complex process, subtly combining popular policies with selfish interests of authoritarian elites. The internal anarchy that emerges after conflict should be replaced with reconciliation processes, with negotiation and mutual acceptance between different ethnic and social groups. But the empirical analysis of post-conflict stabilization processes reveals a major discrepancy between the intentions based on this requirement and their practical consequences. Conflicts recently concluded are often reopened and exacerbated by the pluralistic nature of free societies and by the competitive manifestation of various political identities. As much as elections may contribute to the democratic transformation, they are often a trigger for renewed conflict in fragile states. Early efforts of democratization can even become a source of insecurity when the electoral competition between the signatories of a peace agreement is the ground for resorting to violence. Frequently, internal conflicts are fuelled by mistakes made in the post-conflict design of democratic institutions and processes.

Only countries with strong institutions, such as functional bureaucracies and judiciary systems, have successfully gone through democratization processes and managed to remain peaceful. Therefore, democratization efforts should follow a determined temporal sequence, where institution building precedes competitive elections. Failure to follow this sequence is likely to produce violent conflict on short term, but also to allow the articulation of illiberal political forces, able to block the consolidation of democracy on long term.

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MILITARY CONFLICTS – PRESENT AND PERSPECTIVES

Ilie MELINTE*

The challenge is becoming greater in some cases, particularly in terms of terrorism, case where the enemy is invisible, with an unlimited capacity of transformation, disguise and manifestation depending on several variables. Not only from this point of view, the complexity of the factors which stand at the base of releasing of the current crises, develop the areas of manifestations of these, so that the non-military fields become relevant, with consequences that can be at least as harmful even if we are not speaking strictly about the loss of human lives and the destruction caused by the armed violence.

Keywords*: military conflict, terrorism, threats against security, Weapons of Mass Destruction.*

1. Conflicts in the Twentieth Century

The twentieth century is considered the bloodiest century in history and this, in the first place, due to the two world wars that made tens of millions of victims. After the end of these, followed the "Cold War" which lasted four decades, this demonstrates the dominant conflict condition of this century. "The arms race" has remained a characteristic collocation of this century, whereas in this period appeared the CBRN weapons of mass destruction (chemical, bacteriological, radiological and nuclear), the military technologies had been improved and at the same time have been taken place confrontations of ideologies, the geopolitics was updated under the form of a strategic doctrine of control of some areas, resources and support bases. Fortunately "the forecasts related to the third world war have not come true, instead took its place a long cold war"[1].

The reputed diplomat Mircea Malita, in his work "Games on the world's stage. Conflicts, negotiations, diplomacy" makes a comprehensive scan of the twentieth century. He states that "the end of the Cold War has removed the perspective of a new world conflagration and ignited the hope of the entry in a peaceful era. But the place of an overall war was taken by a series of wars"[2].

The end of the last century has revealed a new image of conflicts and new trends were identified by analysts:

1. The new conflicts were intrastate (there were no longer fought between states);
2. The conflicts of the end of the century followed the affirmation of identity and therefore were called identity wars or cultural wars. The main components of the culture had an important role in the need for affirmation of this identity:

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[1] http://www.scribd.com/doc/51211649/Conflictul-Internațional/21.05.2013.

[2] Mircea MALIȚA, *Jocuri pe scena lumii. Conflicte, negocieri, diplomație,/ Games on the world's stage. Conflicts, negotiations, diplomacy.* CH Beck Publishing House, Bucharest, 2007, p.24.

language, ethnicity, nationality, religion, own history, customs and territorial expansion area;

3. The use of force to resolve conflicts is no longer effective, have been proved to be outdated, as the ultra-technicist armies. The Guerillas has made irrelevant the field, and the anonymity and the small groups prevented the identification and location of the enemy. They were made for other kind of conflicts. Therefore from Sri Lanka and in Northern Ireland, or from Caucasus to the Balkans, from Central Africa to the Middle East, these new identity conflicts appeal to a wide array of military means, they were radicalized and have recourse to new forms of practice of violence;

4. The classical diplomacy attempts also failed. The methods of peaceful resolution of conflicts mentioned in the UN Charter, drawn up for the benefit of an international system composed of states, have proved to be powerless in front of the new phenomenon. The least formal of these methods, the negotiation, opposite to the legal formalism of the institutionalized Arbitration Court from Hague, has shown the need to adapt to reality through the transition from the old distributive school to an innovative one. Unfortunately, this signal of the researchers was not enough to be mastered at the diplomatic level. The misunderstanding of the phenomenon was present in the Balkans, where the mediators trained in the distributive school have only deepened through their formulas the separation and the segregation tendencies[3];

5. The United Nations, for which the local wars elaborated the doctrine and applied the method of the peacekeeping forces, generally did not go further of the separation of the parties on an armistice line, ineffective in the internal conflicts or of the achievement of peace in terms of an agreement between the parties, difficult to define in the clash of cultures, and stopped in front of the hardships of peace-building. Several factors contributed to the low efficiency of the UN in front of the conflicts of this period: lack of funds, the limited nature of the mandate that was unresponsive to the situation from the field and the orientation of the great powers toward their own solutions and the interventions carried out or just with the notification of the Security Council;

6. In the panorama of conflicts of the past decade is appearing the war initiated by Iraq by attacking Kuwait. By its format, falls within the classical model of inter-state conflicts in which aggression can be identified[4];

7. In the 90s has been produced the multiplication of acts of the international terrorism. The terrorism has become the favorite weapon of certain organizations or groups that invoked the inherited legitimacy from the wars of liberation and independence from the 60s of the decolonization and the formation of new states from the world's map. This is the extreme form of the identity syndrome with roots in the tribal structure of the society, taking as a pretext the cultural themes of the religion, language, ethnicity and tradition.

[3] http://www.scribd.eom/doc/51211649/Conflictul-Internațional/21.05.2013.

[4] Francis FUKUYAMA, *America la răscruce - Democrația, puterea şi moştenirea noeconservatoare, /America at crossroad – Democracy, power and the non-conservatory legacy*, Antet Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, p. 61.

"The demassification" of weapons of mass destruction has allowed to these, to target the access to these weapons.

The largest school for terrorism was the sustentation and the acceptance of the deep conflicts considered as locals, untreated, left to ferment in their own juice. The blindness of the strategies that worked in the situations of the classical logic guides them to analyze a confrontational situation in terms of visible enemy. Wishing to contribute to its defeat, they armed and trained a new invisible enemy of tomorrow, far more powerful and intractable.

8. The conclusion of the previous points reveals a global crisis situation, totally different from the economical or political crises. It is about a total inadequacy between the challenge of a new kind of conflict and the answers which the institutions, means and ideas that the international system dispose in order to extinguish or prevent them. It has been said that the societies learn as well as the individuals, by shock or anticipation. The learning costs through shock are much higher than those that would be required for the formation of a forward-looking attitude in the spheres of politics, economy, technologies and education. It was a shock for the USA, but also for the rest of the world, the terrorist attacks of September 11 in New York and Washington.

They have constituted a turning point, a turning of the page of history, a true end of the twentieth century and a possible beginning of the next one. The novelty lies in the dimension of the challenge, the ability of execution and the explicit disclosure of the strategies that were maturating and developing underground, elaborated of a movement with human resources and underappreciated destructions, materializing in a type of conflict that threatens the security of the whole world.

2. Present aspects in conflicts management

The features of the current processes, the concerns that are caused by them and the risks that accompany them are burning topics of analysis or interpretation. The usage of the modern military technology, especially of the weapons of mass destruction, their continuous proliferation, the threat to the expansion from the national armed forces level to the individual or group's action, constitutes the first source of danger. She includes the CBRN weapons, which until now were state monopoly, but also the war through the means of communication or the electronic ones which were made possible by disseminating the communication technologies. The battlefield and the enemy are not strictly delimited or clearly identified; they have become diffuse and ever-present[5]. In this new setting, the military engagement is replaced by punctual actions and countermeasures.

[5] AdrianTONEA, colonel dr., *Dezinformarea - componentă de bază a războiului modern, / Disinformation – a basic component of the modern war*, Editura Academiei Forţelor Terestre "Nicolae Bălcescu" /"Nicolae Bălcescu" Land Forces Academy Publishing House, 2009, p.28.

Along with the economic, political, legal or historian factors "the identity becomes a central argument among the explicit or implicit set of considerations which follow the justification of the legitimacy of resorting to violent methods. It has been said that the economical motivation (confrontation between rich and poor) is a major source of tension. And yet, in the case of terrorism we see an active participation of individuals with high education and a good financial situation. The identity element includes both those with low education and those of the highly trained, who can claim frustration, the inability to achieve esteem or recognition – these being considered fundamental psychological needs"[6].

In this case, the recourse to violence comes from categories that are put away by the implacable walk of the technical and intellectual development. In the current confrontations are invoked the so called legitimacy of conflicts.

The extremist circles in their action are invoking fundamental values or inalienable rights (independence, struggle against foreign domination or against of an abusive or unjust power, social inequality, suppression of their culture, etc.)[7].

The international agreements do not respond to these situations, since originally were formulated for other international relations, but they still contain ambiguities that allow different interpretations.

The new conflict strategies that are closely linked also with the used tactics and weapons, rarely seek the defeat of an enemy or forcing him to capitulate or to seek a peace agreement. The purpose of the authors is to demoralize the society that they consider an enemy, to break the social and national solidarity, to paralyze the mechanisms that ensure its operation (transport, communication, information, health, etc.) and to destabilize and destroy its fundamental institutions. For this purpose, they make use of murderous attacks, planning explosions, fires, the spread of diseases, kidnappings and other acts of sabotage or criminal activity. Each conflict has its distinctive parameters that require specific solutions, according to those conditions of time and place, and are involving "the cutting of a Gordian knot" of well-rooted considerations, scientific techniques and the art of diplomacy[8].

The current way of managing military conflicts is revealed as a vast field of debate and analysis, a first important point of departure is that "in the current developments in the case of confrontation is registered the armed violence, have to be pursued two main objectives: firstly, to establish a political and military agreement, simultaneously with the analysis of the causes of the crisis and, secondly, the reduction of the effects of the crisis and supporting the victims. The crisis management is not only humanitarian aid. This must be accompanied

[6] Mircea MALIȚA, *Jocuri pe scena lumii. Conflicte, negocieri, diplomație,/ Games on the world's stage. Conflicts, negotiations, diplomacy.* CH Beck Publishing House, Bucharest, 2007, p.24.
[7] http://www.scribd.eom/doc/51211649/Conflictul-Internațional/21.05.2013.
[8] Mircea MALIȚA, *Diplomația,/ Diplomacy,* Editura Didactică şi Pedagogică./ Didactic and Pedagogical Publishing House, Bucharest, 1970, p.34.

by political action; otherwise it will tend to be no more than a mean to control in a superficial way the unstable situations or the conflict"[9].

The absence of a war does not imply the existence of peace. A lasting peace requires the restoration of justice and the respect of the fundamental rights of individuals, that's why the crisis management should be directed towards the discovery and use of sustainable solutions, having a holistic view upon the involved factors.

At international level, a major role in crisis management is the responsibility of the international security institutions. The basis of all actions of this type is the United Nations Charter, which aims primarily to maintain the international peace and security. However, at present, although the UN has institutionalized a number of preventive procedures and of assistance of the involved states in the different conflicts (crisis prevention, peacekeeping operations and peace-building operations), NATO is the organization that provides the most coherent crisis management strategy.

The organization considers the concept of crisis management as representing those coordinated actions initiated in order to avoid a crisis, to prevent his escalation into an armed conflict and to halt hostilities, if they do occur[10].

NATO also set the following objectives of crisis management: contribution to reducing tensions and preventing their transformation into crises; crisis management that occurs to prevent its escalation into a conflict; ensuring timely preparation of civil and military crises of varying degrees; in the case of an outbreak of hostilities, the control of the response, prevent escalation and determination of any aggressor to stop the attack and withdraw from the territory of the Alliance (this is not applicable to technological, humanitarian and natural crisis); de-escalation in order to restore normality after the escalation or hostilities were stopped or are under control; the application of the "learned lessons" from other similar experiences.

An element of relative novelty is represented by defending against the threat of a ballistic missile attack[11].

This aspect may lead to the assumption of an essential mission from NATO's part, given that, due to American initiative to deploy a missile shield will provide a better coverage, faster and stronger than in the case of the previous proposals[12].

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[9] Teodor FRUNZETI, Lieutenant-General univ. prof., *Conflict şi negociere in relaţiile internaţionale* - curs,/ *Conflict and negotiation in international relations –course*, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare „Carol I", / "Carol I" National Defense University's Publishing House, 2011, p. 19.

[10] Teodor FRUNZETI, Lieutenant-General univ. prof., *Conflict şi negociere in relaţiile internaţionale* - curs,/ *Conflict and negotiation in international relations –course*, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare „Carol I", / "Carol I" National Defense University's Publishing House, 2011, p. 20.

[11] http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf, pp. 3, 5, 10.

[12] Viorel BUŢA, General Brigadier (r) univ. prof. dr., *EVOLUŢIA CONCEPTULUI STRATEGIC AL NATO - continuitatea si flexibilitatea unei alianţe in mediul internaţional de securitate,* Revista de Ştiinţe Militare, Editată de Secţia de Ştiinţe Militare a Academiei Oamenilor de Ştiinţă din România, Nr. 1 (22), Year XI, 2011, p.53. / THE EVOLUTION OF NATO'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT- *continuity and flexibility of an Alliance in the*

In relation to the EU, is attempted the delimitation of the two strategies which compose the answer to crisis, meaning the crisis management and conflict resolution.

Regarding the crisis management, the European Union defines this concept as follows: initiated actions needed to prevent vertical escalation (intensification of violence) and on horizontal (territorial spread) of the conflicts. The resolving of these takes in consideration the operation undertaken in the short term for the cessation of violent actions.

Another approach to the issue of the crisis management and especially of conflict prevention is that of the OSCE.

When confronted with a conflict or a potential conflict situation, the organization uses a number of ways and actions aimed to solve the problem:

- missions to collect data, short-term visits of experts and personalities from OSCE countries;
- missions and other field activities – are main tools that are needed to prevent conflicts, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation of the region;
- OSCE presidency personal representatives, with a clear mandate regarding the tasks that are assigned especially in the domain of conflict prevention and crisis management;
- ad-hoc committees, which are formed of a small number of OSCE members as their main mission is the counseling of the organization's presidency in the domain of conflict prevention, crisis management and dispute resolution;
- mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution – procedures that facilitate the prompt and direct contract between the conflicting parties. The advantage of these lies in the fact that it does not require consensus, and thus can be activated by a small number of members of the OSCE and allows a fast reaction;
- peacekeeping operations – important operational element of OSCE's capability for conflict prevention and also crisis management. It is important to note the fact that this tool is used also in case when the conflicting parties are members of the OSCE, but has never been applied in such a situation.

3. The perspectives of conflicts in the XXIth century

In reconfiguring the global report of power, the military power therefore, is manifested further as an indispensable ingredient, to which appeal all the protagonists – primary or secondary ones.

The re-lease of the "military methodology" action in the event of local conflicts, puts in a new light also the national, regional and global security issue.

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international security environment, The journal of the Military Sciences, Edited by the Department of Military Science Academy scientists from Romania.

Analysts on international security issues are trying to determine which elements of the international environment that may cause concern to the safety and welfare of the citizens of the world and what can be done to mitigate or even eliminate the sources of turbulence. Similar questions were asked 200 or 150 years ago, but each time the answers were different.

It is estimated that the national and international security revaluation which was revised by the end of the Cold War was again modified by inserting in this global equation the element of the international terrorism, a force with an ampleness with whom the world has never faced ever before, although the terrorism and the international collaboration between the former terrorists were existing over a hundred years. The post Cold War era – despite the trend of rapid economic development and democracy offensive – did not impose the elimination of the military solutions in the various disputes of the local market; notable efforts in this direction, however, were recorded.

However, in some areas, the geopolitical reshaping have opened true "Pandora's Boxes", which until then had been restricted and kept under control by the two superpowers in the context of the bipolar world order. Most of the "new conflicts", which have been and continue to be interstate conflicts, broke out in regions where the government's weakness became more pronounced in the new security framework.

The world has become, to some extent, more uncertain, and the people, ethnic groups and governments pursue more complex goals and objectives than before. The parting lines and borders between the actions of governments, military and civilian forces, public and private sector have become much more blurred and unclear.

We are witnessing, on the other hand, today at the apparition of a new generation of fighters, the sub-state entities, the non-national and transnational groups, whose identity is based on a common basis, such as the ideology, tribal affiliation, the culture, ethnicity, religion, geography, illegal economic activities or on a combination of some or all of these factors.

These entities have become more violent and seek to modify the internal balance of the forces in order to promote their own interests. Exacerbated to the extremes, such a conflict would tend towards the fragmentation of the state and society structures and push many areas and regions in a state of instability inducing an increase of the violence within the international system.

On the other hand, the tendencies to generalize the civilization models – through other means than the dialogue of the cultures – can result tensions and armed conflicts. The reality proves that in such areas of the "export of advanced models" appear training grounds and sanctuaries for the fundamentalist, terrorist and criminal networks, which exploit in their own interests the instruments, malfunctions and easements of the globalization. The main instruments of these networks are the internet and the modern technology of the information that allow them to communicate, to act and to move almost anywhere in the world without being detected.

The transparency and permeability of borders somehow will complicate even more the management of the national and international security, allowing to tensions and conflicts to spread easily from one country to another.

We must expect that the moment of the commencement of future conflicts and the completion thereof not to be very clear, as it is expected, and that not all conflicts are followed by a state of peace.

The security dilemma remains a *"paradox of power"* and it is *"akin to prisoner's dilemma. As someone's power grows, the others security decreases, pushing them to violence in order to defend themselves"*[13].

On the contrary, the security context might slip into a twilight zone between peace and war. Even in such perspective, the military power that expresses "the ability of states at achieving higher goals through the threat of war or by war"[14], alone would not have the ability to resolve conflicting issues of the current and prospective era.

The processes of the economical globalization and the interaction between cultures, those of the affirmation of human rights, democratic governance, reducing the gaps between North and South are too complicated to be solved through the traditional appeal to arms. Such problems require dialogue and negotiation, international cooperation, the elaboration of a set of democratic values which have to be respected by the international actors, the well-functioning of the international organizations etc.

The non-military arsenals of the crisis management and of the extinguishing conflicts remain political and diplomatic instruments of paramount importance for the preservation of peace, being the most appropriate in term of the relationship between the invested resources and the achieved results[15].

However, the complementarities of the use of the military instruments and non-military means in resolving crises and conflicts it is actually clear and perhaps more efficient than at any time in the world's history.

The use of the military power on the basis of a specific international legislation, in situation and formulas that are according to the will of the international community – therefore can contribute to ensure stability and peace.

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[13] Mircea MALIȚA, *Intre război şi pace ,/Between war and peace,* C.H.Beck. Publishing House, Bucharest. 2007, p.142.

[14] Teodor FRUNZETI, Lieutenant-General univ. prof., dr., *Putere națională şi putere militară,* in "LUMEA 2011 - / *National power and military power* in "THE WORLD 2011- Enciclopedie politică şi militară (studii strategice şi de securitate)". Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei. / Political and military encyclopedia (strategic and security studies)". / The Publishing House of the Technical Centre of the Army Editorial, Bucharest, 2011, p.21.

[15] Rodica DINULESCU. *Argumentul nuclear in politica externă a statelor, / The nuclear argument in the state's foreign policy,* Editura Institutul European, / Publishing House Of The European Institute, Iaşi, 2011, p.162.

Conclusions

The XXIth century made his debut equally violent and tragic with the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2011, action which confirmed the new threat to peace and security of States – the terrorism.

The studies in the security domain, structure the wars which went 'til present in four generations, the fourth generation being the last and includes the contemporary confrontations but already can be seen the trends towards the fifth generation.

The current phase of the wars with origins in the 70s, are characterized by a radical change in the typology of the enemy, at the base being the way in which this type of unconventional enemy can attract and use in his favor the detailed intervening changes in the political, economical, social, security, etc. environments.

In this context, *"the opponent's unconventionality gives to the conflict an asymmetric character both in terms of the objectives pursued by it and also by the means used to achieve them"*[16].

The contemporary conflicts are dissymmetric and asymmetric, respectively confrontations in which the opposing parties are trying by any means and ways to avoid the war in a space in which the opponent holds the net superiority. In this respect, as an example of a fourth generation war can be considered the campaign launched by the USA in Afghanistan and in general against the international terrorism as a result of the attacks of 11 September 2001[17].

It is no doubt that we cross a period that is as interesting as it is complex in terms of security field, otherwise a very sensitive one on three basic levels: national, regional and international, a period that brings in front of the actual national and international actors, a number of challenges that are difficult to avoid and manage.

Concerning the military conflicts, we have in consideration the competition in the technological field in the branch with an unprecedented rise and which has brought in the present a developing level that leaves the possibility of guessing the way in which these will be conducted in the near future.

The four known "classical" spatial dimensions (land, sea, air, space) in which the modern man has developed military actions seems to have become

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[16] Teodor FRUNZETI, *Soluționarea crizelor internationale. Mijloace militare și nemilitare,* Editura Institutul European, / *Resolving international crises. Military and non-military means,* the European Institute Publishing House. Iași, 2006, p. 96.

[17] Adriana SAULIUC, *Crizele și conflictele inceputului de mileniu III,* Conferința științifică internațională – Strategii XXI, Complexitatea și dinamismul mediului de securitate, vol. 2, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare "Carol I" / *The crises and conflicts of the beginning of Millennium III,* International Scientific Conference-session - Strategies XXI, The complexity and dynamism of the security environment, vol.2, "Carol I", National Defence University's publishing House, Bucharest, 2012, p.72.

already insufficient, for the need of enforceability this has open Pandora's box for the fifth dimension – the informational field.

In the same time, the actions in the economical, energetic, psychological fields are preferred by the current international actors, many cases demonstrate that these are more efficient than the military interventions, due to the enclosure of this latter by the rules of the international law which does not allow easily a trigger action of an armed aggression.

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14. http://www.scribd.eom/doc/51211649/Conflictul-Internațional/21.05.2013;
15. http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf.

THEORETICAL INSIGHTS ON STATE AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Alexandra SARCINSCHI, PhD.*

The paper focuses on state's role in managing security and defense. The theoretical framework on state, superpower, great power and failed state is a starting point that is completed with the analysis on national defense concept. The conclusion is that a state that properly provides essential political goods, such as defense, is a provider of security both at national and international level, but at the opposite pole, the failed states are to be considered providers of insecurity both for their citizens and for the entire international community.

Keywords: *state, national defence, superpower, great power, emerging power, failed state.*

State and national defence are two basic concepts in security studies. In the globalized world, the internal performance of one country has, in most cases, repercussions on its international status and, obviously, on its role in the international arena. In this context, national defence depends not only on internal factors, but also on external factors, such as the ones specific to the international security environment configuration and the international status and role of that state. This paper is a foray into the theoretical framework on state and national defense, analyzing various theories influencing formulation of national defense policy and strategies.

1. On State

State is more than a concept that was gradually crystallized by scientific analysis and philosophical reflections; it involves a complex historical phenomenon. In addition, state is the most common object and unit of analysis both in International Relations and in the field of security and implicitly defense. From the Antiquity approach to the present one, state has always had a very important role in shaping the security at various levels: from the individual to groups of states.

Historians argue that the state designates a recent, modern phenomenon that was initiated by the Renaissance and Reformation. Since the 14th Century until the 17th Century, the general political body represented state, the "general states" whose essential attributes were sovereignty, self-determination, territorial unity and representativeness[1]. Starting with the modern liberal state, rule of law, social state and the totalitarian state, these attributes were propagated over time

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[1] Nicolae LOTREANU, *Stat*, in "Dicţionar de sociologie", Cătălin ZAMFIR and Lazăr VLĂSCEANU (eds.), Ed. Babel, Bucureşti, 1998, pp. 591-592.

and were developed, but they were also seriously violated (totalitarianism), becoming principles of existence and evolution of the modern state : national sovereignty, the principle of representative government, the separation and balance of powers, the rule of law and the principle of consecration constitutional or fundamental rights and freedoms of humans.

In the last five decades, the debate included an element that brings a new dimension of existence of state, particularly the national one, namely globalization.

The end of bipolarity has produced important changes in the security environment, such as: the wave of inter-and intra-state conflicts in the vicinity of the European Union; international terrorism; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; organized crime; illegal immigration; failed states; economic and social underdevelopment; violation of human rights; dysfunctional multilateral institutions; environmental problems, etc. These factors are more difficult to identify and deter than the politico-military threat specific to the Cold War. For this reason, states and international security organizations have reevaluated and reformulated their policies and security strategies to counter new types of security risks, dangers and threats.

Related to the issue of international security are the status and role of a state on the international arena. In this context, the International Relations theory operates with concepts that define the status of the most important state actors on the international arena such as superpowers, great powers developed countries, advanced countries, industrialized countries, etc. At the opposite pole are States defined as fragile states, failed states, dangerous states, collapsed states, etc. Some of these concepts are ambiguous and others are synonymous, but all attempts to illustrate the degree of importance and the role that those states have in the International System (IS).

Regarding the terms of superpower and great power, there are many views on the current IS that is defined as either multipolar or as polycentric[2], nonpolar[3] or even uni-multipolar[4].

Currently there is debate on whether or not to use the term superpower. Samuel P. Huntington said in 1999 that the IS is likely uni-multipolar, with a superpower and several great powers, calling into question the importance of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa[5] seven years before the first BRIC Summit (BRICS, by joining South Africa in 2010). Jeffrey D. Sachs continues to argue in 2012 that the IS is changing from an unipolar one, clearly dominated by the US, in a truly multipolar one where US, EU, BRICS and smaller powers (such as Nigeria and Turkey) have regional importance, but do not want to assume global leadership because the economic burden that is associated to this

[2] Daniel MÖCKLI (ed.), *Strategic Trends 2012. Key Development in Global Affairs*, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, 2012, p. 12, URL: www.sta.ethz.ch.
[3] Richard N. HAASS, „The Age of Nonpolarity", in *Foreign Affairs*, May-June 2008, Vol. 87, No. 3, pp. 44-56, EBSCO, International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center.
[4] Samuel P. HUNTINGTON, „The Lonely Superpower", in *Foreign Affairs*, March-April 1999, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 35-49, EBSCO, International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center.
[5] Ibidem.

status[6]. Moreover, according to a report by the US National Council for information, it is expected that the US will lose its superpower status by 2030, but no country, neither China nor India (about the same report predicts it will overtake China in economic terms) will become a hegemonic power[7]. The power will be distributed in networks and coalitions of a multipolar world and its very nature will change.

In this framework, one can argue about the "rise" of the debate on failed states[8]. Failure is recorded when the state can only provide a very limited amount of essential political goods such as defense. These countries lose their role as the main providers of political goods in favor of non-state actors or even of "lords of war". Thus, a failed state is a form of political organization devoid of content that is unable or unwilling to meet its fundamental obligations as a nation-state in the contemporary world. In such a state, institutions are flawed; democratic debate is absent; the judiciary is derived from the executive and is not independent; citizens know that they cannot rely on the judiciary system; bureaucracy has lost its sense of professional responsibility and is a factor in the oppression of the citizens.[9]

In what follows, we will focus on national defense as one of the most important tasks of the state in maintaining a proper degree of security.

2. On national defense

Analysis of national defense should start, of course, from its definition. This definition is approached differently from one state to another, but the essence is the same: national defense includes all measures and activities adopted and carried out by state in order to ensure its national sovereignty, independence and unity, territorial integrity and constitutional democracy[10]. Issues related to national defense are subject to regular reviews in order to adapt to the evolving security environment.

In addition to the strict political and military approach, national defense was dealt over time from different perspectives: from Law to Managerial

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[6] Jeffrey D. SACHS, „The Challenges of a Multipolar World", in *Social Europe*, 24.04.2012, URL: http://www.social-europe.eu/2012/04/the-challenges-of-a-multipolar-world.

[7] National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds*, December 2012, p. iv, URL: www.dni.gov/nic/globaltrends.

[8] One of the most accurate analyses of failed states is the one published by the *Fund for Peace* entitled The Failed States Index - an annual ranking of 178 nations based on their levels of stability and the pressure they face (The Fund for Peace, *The Failed States Index 2012*, Washington, 2012, URL: http://ffp.statesindex.org/.). The top 10 countries with the highest score meaning the "most failed" are Somalia, DR Congo, Sudan (and South Sudan), Chad, Zimbabwe, Afghanistan, Haiti, Yemen, Iraq and Central African Republic. The difference between the country with the very high alert score, Somalia (114.9), and the country with very sustainable score, Finland (20) is about 95 points that indicates huge differences between them in terms of social, economic, political and military indicators.

[9] Robert I. ROTBERG, *Nation-State Failure: A Recurring Phenomenon?*, NIC 2020 Project, 2003, p. 3-4.

[10] *Legea nr. 45 din 1 iulie 1994. Legea apărării naționale a României (Law No. 45 from 1st of July 1994. The Law of National Defense of Romania)*, Cap. 1, Art. 1, URL: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.frame.

Economics. Thus can be raised the following: the right to national defense; national defense as a public good; the monopoly on national defense, etc.

In the literature, the right to national defense is the right to use necessary and proportionate force against an armed attack or an imminent threat of an attack against the political independence or territorial integrity of a state[11]. In this context, are often invoked two points of view: on the one hand, the right to national defense should be regarded as the collective exercise of the right to self-defense; on the other hand, national defense is reduced to other values that individuals may share and they want to protect. These approaches are also subject to criticism, in that the action and reaction under the umbrella of national defense involves loss of lives, which denies the idea of individual self-defense. Also, there are identified two approaches to justify the right to national defense: the first approach refers to the fact that some states have the right to defend the territorial integrity and political independence when they are means necessary to protect legitimate domestic political institutions, and the second approach postulates that all states have the moral and legal right to defend the territorial integrity and political independence as a provision of international law[12]. David R. Mapel, associate professor at the University of Colorado, analyzes all these points of view and outlines a more comprehensive framework based on domestic political institutions which he consider to be legitimate when they are protecting certain basic human rights through the rule of law. In addition, the analysis is also based on the premise that "minimal democracy" is also a requirement for internal legitimacy when democracy can be established without compromising basic human rights. In this context, Mapel argues that states that have developed their own historical forms of legitimate government have the moral right to self-defense. Along with this internal legitimacy, international law is the basis of national defense and thus all States have the moral right to national defense only if it represents the defending of international law too. Moreover, the justification of the right to national defense must include motivation regarding the need, imminence and proportionality. Mapel concludes his analysis in that, although these elements are essential, however, in some cases, they make national defense not morally permissible; in this cases, the political independence, the territorial control and the legitimate political institutions do not always excuse the destruction caused by war. [13]

Another perspective on national defense is outlined in the Managerial Economy. The national defense is considered a public good, a product or a service that when consumed by one individual does not reduce the amount available to other individuals[14]. Moreover, national defense is not exclusive in the sense that both the citizens who pay national taxes and those who do not pay

[11] David R. MAPEL, *The Right of National Defense*, in "International Studies Perspectives", No. 8/2007, pp. 1-15.
[12] Idem, p. 2.
[13] Idem, pp. 13-14.
[14] Mark HIRSCHEY, *Fundamentals of Managerial Economics*, Cengage Learning, 2009, Ohio, p. 632.

benefit from it. National defense may be one of the most expensive public goods. For example, USA allocated in 2012 646 billion dollars (USD) to defense, i.e. about 4.7% of its GDP, and for year 2013 announced 623.4 billion USD[15], meaning over 1,900 USD per capita[16]. There are pros and cons regarding the level of defense spending, but there is no doubt that defense budgeting is very important.

The issue of national defense can be seen from the perspective of the monopoly on defense. In 2003, The Ludwig von Mises Institute edited *The Myth of National Defense: Essays on the Theory and History of Security Production*, work that proposes a new perspective on defense: the idea that the state is the only actor that can provide adequate national defense is considered a dangerous myth[17]. The authors assume that the debate about national defense can raise two widely accepted, but contradictory assumptions. On one hand, it is stated that any form of monopoly is harmful from the point of view of consumers, in that it represents an exclusive privilege that is guaranteed by a unique producer of goods or services that alone sets the level of quality and prices. On the other hand, security has to be done by the government and it is its main function (the protection of life, liberty and property and reduce/eliminate internal and external violence). In this context, national defense is under the monopoly of state that, according to the first assumption, is not desirable; still, according to the second assumption, it is a necessity and, based on this contradiction, the authors of this study support the idea of privatization of national defense and security.[18]

Obviously, theoretical framework is not the only factor that shapes one state's approach on national defence. Capacity of state actors to provide security is now closely linked to the extent to which they manage to streamline the internal process of providing public goods, which depends largely on its history, social and economic indicators and specific national interests of that state. A starting point could be the establishment of a typology of interests of a modern democratic state, based on the areas in which they occur: economic and ecological interests (long-term economic/ecological welfare of population) or political/security interests (the maximization of state's the ability to respond quickly and effectively to any future challenge or threat)[19]. The failure to meet these interests invariably leads to the decrease of internal and external performance. States with such problems are weak states, failing states and countries that collapse.

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[15] *United States of America*, in "Military Technology" No. 1, 2012, p. 34. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost.

[16] According to US Census Bureau, on 28 March 2013 US population was 315.568.964 inhabitants. URL: http://www.census.gov/main/www/popclock.html .

[17] Hans-Hermann HOPPE (ed.), *The Myth of National Defense: Essays on the Theory and History of Security Production*, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Alabama, 2003.

[18] Ibidem.

[19] David SANDERS, *Relațiile internaționale: neorealism și neoliberalim*, in „Manual de știință politică", Robert E. GOODIN and Hans-Dieter KLINGEMANN (eds.), Ed. Polirom, Iași, 2005, pp. 375-389.

Conclusions

In the globalized world, the internal performance of one state has in most cases repercussions on its international status. From this point of view, the logical conclusion is that a state may hold one of the two main roles: provider of security or provider of insecurity. It is obvious that there can be a middle position, but it is insignificant in relation to the configuration of the security environment. A state that properly provides essential political goods, such as defense, has more chances to be considered as a provider of security both at national and international level. At the opposite pole, the failed states are to be considered providers of insecurity both for their citizens and for the entire international community.

The important international status of superpower or great power of one state is correlated with indicators of internal performance (such as government, economy, legitimacy, elites, etc.), but also with an active role of generator of security at international level. In the case of failed states, the values of such indicators are below the average and they have a lower status on the international arena, even seen as a danger or threat to security. These states have the role of provider of insecurity. Therefore, even if the end state is the same, namely national defense, these categories of states are using different means to achieve it. The superpower and the great powers invest complex resources in their economic, politic, social and military security while the failed states are caught in a circle of poverty and war that is aimed to achieve their national interests in a complete different manner that the most of the world states do.

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CHARACTERISTICS OF INSURGENCY

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Historical casuistry regarding insurgency appears to be rich and capacious, drawing considerate attention. Concerning its role and expression in time, it is generally accepted that the patterns and actional models were in accordance with the action/reaction cycle inside well-defined spaces. The present dimension of military and security-related thinking takes into consideration the positioning of the terrorist phenomena in an insurgency, increasing the degree of damage to the geo-political target frame. The Counter insurgency operations contains both fighting terrorism and insurgency, the two reealing an obvious operational symbiosis. When analysing the insurgency certain specific characteristics need to be taken into consideration- continuity, social dimension, ideological support, the asymmetrical aspect of the confrontation, its organised and systemic character. In order to provide extra results, tehnological, geographical and religious aspects might be specifically analysed, together with elements that fall under the regional character of the confrontation.

Keywords*: insurgency; counter insurgency; terrorism; assymetrical actions; target groups.*

1. General considerations

The specific turmoil of the present security situation requests that governmental and non-governmental institutions cooperate in developing a far-reaching strategy in order to efficiently fight the asymmetrical threats posed to various countries and the whole world. This demand comes into existance at the end of the Cold War, when the western countries were engaged in an attempt to counterpose the communist threat. The 9/11 terrorist attack resulted in a true change of paradigm regarding national security, as well as engaging in asymmetrical conflicts. This attack abruptly promoted an element of global agression, threatening in particular the United States- terrorism. This challenge, along with the more diffcult one-insurgency, needs major counterposing efforts, in the „soft" and „hard power" range, maintained by various institutions, on a long-time plan.

Aspects regarding insurgency have only recently been borught up, even though this subject is an old one. American publications admit that: „*The United States must be prepared to fight and win both conventional and asymmetric or "small" wars. The strategic interaction thesis shows why the two missions demand two kinds of armed forces: one to defend U.S. interests in conventional wars, and one to defend them in asymmetric wars. If the United States, in other words, is to win future "boxing matches" against light-weight opponents who use their own version of the rope-a-dope, it will need togheters with more*

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initiative than discipline, and more endurance than punching power."(Ivan Arreguin-Toft, 2005)

The above mentioned text represents the quintessence of aspects to be subsequently detailed, being directly connected to the "obsessive challenge" of the beginning of the century and also to the essence of the asymmetrical conflict, which we are trying to define here, a conflict between the strong and the weak, operational wise. A confrontation where the side presenting a weaker operational potential, usually, comes out a winner. Why does it involve the USA? Because the USA represents the invariable laboratory that sanctions, consecrates and deconsecrates doctrines, principles, tactics, techniques and methods of waging war and managing conflicts.

We need to keep in mind that the involvement of a top military power in an asymmetrical conflict implies two factors: preparing the target audience for a long-term confrontation, despite having the technological and equipment upper hand, as well as using Special Operations Forces, specifically trained and equipped for handling decisive confrontations related to counter-insurgency (Hoffman, 1981). At the same time, we must consider the multiple vulnerabilities affecting a top power taking part in an asymmetrical conflict, when the national consensus needed to set off the confrontation is absent. When Spec Ops Forces are not available, conventional forces will be constrained to be able to plan and develop a counter-insurgency strategy. Involving conventional forces might lead to a conflict escalation and the long-term involvement of the target groups, ultimately involving the whole population (Waltzer 1977).

Analyzing requests dictated by the training, doctrine, and active response of the US Armed Forces, we can firmly state that the said requests have been ignored or only partially fulfilled. As a consequence, a seemingly unbalanced confrontation like the one in Afghanistan, the hottest operations theatre these days, the so called operational "weak" is on the verge of accomplishing its military and political objectives. They manifest themselves different, not necessarily on a tactical level, as things are obviously debatable here, but definitely on a strategic level. Of course, we certainly cannot give verdicts on the "vietnamisation" of Afghanistan, but at the same time, we need to consider the fact that the "afghanisation" or the "talibanisation" could represent certitudes that need to be analyzed when looking at the conflict's big picture.

Requested or not, a clear answer is needed to the question: "Is Afghanistan on the way of becoming a failed intervention?" No certain answer can be given. We need to take into consideration the aspects concerning internal security in its wholeness, the "in nuce" democratization on western values and principles and prosperity, better yet the decent living indicators, above the critical poverty line. Considering perspectives, we can notice a certain failure, or the partial achievement of initial objectives. Legitimate questions need to be raised, lessons need to be learned, from a military history and military art point of view, as well as a geostrategic and geo-political point of view.

If we consider Afghanistan our case study, we should note that this conflict is in its entirety part of the so called "war on terror", the main objective being controlling or eliminating the number one threat to the free world- terrorism. However, the war on terror was a component of the insurgency manifested in this conflict space. So,the priority was not the war on terrorism, but rather the taking apart of the insurgency's action mechanism.

Planting the terrorist phenomena on extended areas contains specific aspects of coexistence. One of them exists as the result of the combined efforts of various factions interested in generating a shift in power, replacing governments in their own countries with relatively fragile democracies. From a practical point of view, the insurgency phenomena manifests itself profoundly, terrorism having its own combat philosophy. The final attitude of both elements is predictable- governing the targeted state, after a period of time.

This association of terrorism and insurgency not only created an axiological confusion, but also preventing the distinct evaluation of these elements, one of which is dominant (insurgency) while the other subordinated.

History teaches hard lessons when we choose to ignore them, without the needed realistic approach and the respect demanded when generating a viable grand strategy. Concretely, forty years after the dishonorable ending of the Vietnam War, aspects of the conflict are being reiterated, putting the military power in a relatively disreputable position, ending a war that's been won in its classic dimension and trying to end a conflict about to be lost, pacifying the social target groups on a tactical level. Another vision and approach appear to be needed.

2. Threat Substantiation Modes

The security objectives of western countries are heavily disputed, under the influence of the so called "economic colonialism", a consequence of globalization. The undeveloped countries, having unstable democracies point fingers at the multitude of economic, diplomatic and financial levers maneuvered by western democracies controlling the strategic situation in areas characterized by geopolitical risk. As an example, the development of nuclear weapons by countries like Iran and North Korea add to the proliferation of regional instability, creating opportunities for non-statal local actors to establish regional hegemonies (Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia). The geopolitical stage in underdeveloped countries is being expanded by 20 new cities, having populations of over one million, unstable and generating discontent. The causes for the discontent reach strategic levels, fueling global social unrest. States harboring terrorists and insurgency nucleus' have major issues concerning quality of life, environmental problems and endemic poverty. The major deficiencies in providing basic resources- water, food and energy, are exploited by local leaders in their own interest, by indoctrinating the masses. This tactic is

used especially in Islamic societies where the educational factor is greatly neglected.

One can relate to the national socialism and ethnical and religious movements, from the past century, however, in the present, the cultural and religious dimension is the one that plays a decisive part in the existence and development of phenomena related to expressing violence in various circumstances, further deepening the gaps in the world we live in.

Huntington fuels controversies but at the same time makes us more responsible for a world that can move towards stability or chaos, underlining the importance of the way we conceive and situate our democratic values. Afghanistan is an expression of this great social discontent, of the failure to build together a democratic society for the future, for the common well- being. Afghanistan tells us we still have two very different worlds, expressing themselves in their own way and looking to defend their own interests and values. This is the motive, this is where we need to find and understand the roots of insurgency, the XXIst century guerilla war.

3. Fighting asymmetrical threats

In order to increase the efficiency of the counter-measures we need to properly understand the means of objective promotion specific to every group. On one hand, we are witnessing an attempt to promote global stability, trough just governing, the market economy and strengthening security related modes. On the other hand, we see acute manifestations of insurgency, influenced by internal factors, like the weak or absent government control, inability to protect citizens, a command economy and endemic poverty. Obviously, these are the elements that need to be eradicated. In order for this to be accomplished, a new Strategy is needed, one that can efficiently combat asymmetrical threats in mentioned societies. There is an overlap between the “soft” and “hard” factors on threat factors level, so the reaction level needs to have similar solutions. This symbiosis must generate integrating solutions for fighting the respective factors in a geopolitical perspective. Because the above mentioned threat factors are being internally generated, the Counter Strategy needs to have the same internal involvement. This strategy should be based on understating the insurgency, accepting and revealing its characteristics, as only by knowing and acknowledging the value and significance of the insurgency, can we be prepared for and efficient in counter-insurgency operations.

4. Characteristics of Insurgency

The social basis of insurgency measures the way that historical continuity creates determinism, necessary in order for us to have an all-embracing perspective. On a social level, we find various objectives, all of them subsidiary

to politics, centered, in most of the cases, on gaining power, in all its aspects, or certain rights or privileges.

The social component can be found in the political agendas that the insurgents promote, which rely heavily on a "mass basis". This is a factor that sets apart the insurgency from other forms of violent reaction, even terrorism, the mass basis representing not necessarily a massive involvement in insurgent actions, but the sympathy and support needed from the population, a population that becomes a massive target group, a "sine qua non" condition for the existence of the movement. In the same way, one of the most difficult challenges for the counter-insurgency forces is distinguishing between the militant fighter and the supporting, or at least tolerating- regular citizen.

Also, this characteristic influences a perpetual dynamic of the movement, in various geographical regions, related to human communities and administrative areas. This mass character is able not only to protect the movement, but also to give it an apparent legitimacy, so that every action, even a terrorist one, could be considered justified. This approach also creates a continuous selection and recruitment basis, making it possible to replace losses.

This mass character has its roots in the specific ideology the movement embraces. This is why present day Afghanistan represents not the terrorist haven but the area of essential division between the religious fundamentalism of the insurgent factions and the western values promoted by the Coalition. The Ideology represents a mechanism that indoctrinates fighters to the point where the sacrifice goes as far as martyrdom. This affects a great deal the success of the campaigns to "conquer the hearts and souls" of local population, ideology usually being a reflex of traditionalism or of social problems they are dealing with.

Insurgency is characteristic to long-term conflicts, the war of attrition becoming a consequence in time of previous factors, but also an objective of the movement, looking to be successful even through a remise. The latest statistics indicate an average of over 25 years of conflict, throughout which the insurgency movement manifested strong nationalist purposes.

This raises the question: is the western world prepared to accept a war of attrition or will we feel the need to establish the beginning and the end of a military operation, without knowing what the long-term effects will be, and having a fluctuant and not flexible strategy ("urge operations")? It seems that the present tendency is to shorten the period of time for the "outing" and those 25 years are actually halved, see Afghanistan 2002-2014.

Another element is the "organized and systemic" characteristic, imposed by a certain hierarchy, beyond obvious decentralization traits. Starting from a common ideological basis, the organizational structures of insurgency forces rely heavily on decentralization. This translates into an element of surprise for counter-insurgency forces, making it very difficult to concentrate the effort of the same forces, while giving the insurgents a greater liberty of action. Still, we cannot say that we are dealing with a diffusion of the insurgency forces acting

individually, because there always is a hierarchy, a chain of command, that are difficult to take apart. Any successful outcome is of great importance, affecting the moral of the insurgents and the initiative and the planning of future hits from a systemic point of view and accomplishing political goals, essential for the movement's consistency and credibility.

We can also notice a remarkable systemic self-control mechanism, network action of insurgency formations having the intrinsic value of a system that is being further structured and restructured, this mechanism assuring its survival under the most difficult circumstances.

Success in fighting and eradicating terrorism and its roots and insurgency needs joint actions from these two perspectives. The complex social environment generates resistance and denial of change.

Insurgency is first of all characterized by *continuity*, being associated with the whole military history, when it is perceived as a social resistance fight, related or unrelated to the armed conflict looking to protect assumed rights and the cultural and religious identity. Of course, throughout the ages, it had various shapes and sizes- from the great peasant movements of the Middle Ages, to the XIX-th century independence movements, to the Second World War partisan movements, to the 1960's anti-colonial movement, the ethnic-nationalist secessionist movement, or the insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The strategy of defense and security needs to address multiple present threats, such as internal factors generating insurgency, fundamentalism and terrorism, extremism, bioterrorism, and other. This approach needs to polarize the efforts of the Coalition for it to grant success. Political leaders, as well as specialists, have to use a common resort strategy, tactics, concepts and operational methods.

The economic dimension will take into consideration the economic realities and objectives for the next century, serving to the long-term stability of unbalanced and unsafe areas. Economic security needs to admit the protection and promotion of commercial interests in unstable markets.

The diplomatic dimension needs to take into consideration the distinct efforts to promote interests in various areas. States leading coalitions need to persuade their partners regarding priorities and joint actions.

The communication dimension relates to information sharing inside the coalitions and unstable regions. Understanding and accepting the actions meant to bring stability to security areas is of great importance.

The combat dimension- as a mode of training internal structures of target states regarding domestic security and government functionality. Direct involvement in reducing the threat factors is not advised, instead counseling and mentoring need to be used.

The religious dimension is reputable in Islamic societies, defined by low education levels. The religious aspects prevail over the democratic ones, replacing the administrative power with the religious leaders' authority.

Obviously, when analyzing insurgency we need to take a look at other aspects as well- space continuity, the psychological dimension, cultural aspects, partisan involvement of various states, and so forth.

Conclusions

Asymmetrical threats are a reality of our world. They will continue to fuel and contain the symbiosis of insurgency and terrorism in unstable democracies. They are interbedded and affect democratic development and instability. As ways of countering them, political willingness, able to polarize synchronized efforts on multiple efforts is an absolute must. The counter-insurgency aspects need to address insurgency and terrorism through complex and intense efforts.

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PERSPECTIVES FOR CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE TOWARDS 2030 – INTEGRATION OR RE-PERIPHERALIZATION?

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The paper highlights that along currently identifiable human / societal, economic, political drivers and processes of European integration the gloomiest scenario the Central and Eastern European region might face (that is both possible and probable) is the re-peripheralization of the region and a relative drift away from developed Western countries. Such an unfavorable scenario would yield direct economic and social consequences (thus posing challenges to societal security) and indirect consequences regarding defense capabilities and the scarcity of resources available for defense. The analytical paper offers a set of specific regional drivers that are identified for initiating further discussion on the evolution of our regional security environment, our understanding and perceptions of security, as well as for framing future scenarios of regional development within the wider processes of European integration

***Keywords**: security, Central and Eastern Europe, centrum – periphery, regional cooperation, NATO*

Introduction

In 2012, NATO Allied Command Transformation launched its strategic foresight analysis process under the title '*The Shared Perspective of the World in 2030 and Beyond*'. The kick-off Foresight Analysis Workshop in Brussels, Belgium on 24-25 October 2012 identified the common themes for analysis and some drivers, which will likely contribute to transforming the future of the Alliance. The original version of this paper served as a contribution to the second Foresight Analysis Workshop that took place in Budapest, Hungary 13-14 November 2012 as a food for thought piece regarding the perspectives of Central and Eastern Europe along the drivers previously identified.

Being aware of the terminological controversies regarding the boundaries of Central Europe,[1] for the purposes of this paper we define Central and Eastern Europe as the geographical sphere that includes post-Yugoslav countries on the Southern perimeter, former Soviet Bloc countries in the East, and those former Soviet Bloc countries that have accessed the European Union since the 1989/91 period when regime changes swept through the region, as the core.[2] Thus we are examining a heterogeneous and diverse (or fragmented) region in which there are generally identifiable drivers and always there are exceptions for 'special cases'. We set our analysis on the ground of evaluating historical trends as such

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[1] For an overview see: Romsics, Ignác: *Közép- és/vagy Kelet-Európa? Egy terminológiai vita nyomában.* In: Rubicon, 1997/5-6.
http://www.rubicon.hu/magyar/oldalak/kozep_es_vagy_kelet_europa_egy_terminologiai_vita_nyomaban/

[2] Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, Albania, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

trends might provide the only more or less firm starting point in a dynamically transforming world that has become even more vulnerable to shocks since the 2008 economic crisis had begun.

Our analysis will highlight that along the currently identifiable drivers the gloomiest scenario the region might face that is both possible and probable is the re-peripheralization of the region and a relative drift away from developed Western countries. Such an unfavorable scenario would yield direct economic and social consequences (thus posing challenges to societal security) and indirect consequences regarding defense capabilities and the scarcity of resources available for defense. We offer the set of specific regional drivers that we identify here for the participants of the second Foresight Analysis Workshop for further discussion and framing future scenarios together.

1. Historical trends and resultant drivers

The determining characteristics of the region in the 20th century have been its *semi-peripheral* location relative to the more developed (thus 'central') Western European countries, its geographical position *in-between great powers* (Germany and Russia) while made up of *small states*, its *fragmented structure* being diffused with *thriving inter-ethnic conflicts*, and characterized by *democratic deficit.*

- Following the fundamental transformation of the region, when the bipolar world order fell apart, its semi-peripheral characteristic triggered a strong desire for *modernization* among the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. This desire will certainly not change in the coming decades.
- Central and Eastern Europe has become a formally defined single region due to its geographical *position in-between major European powers, Germany and Russia*. However, neither previous decades, nor the past twenty years have brought about an immanent integrative understanding and self-identification of the peoples living here as belonging to a 'single, autonomous Central and Eastern European region'. On the contrary: *fragmentation has prevailed is several ways.* First, there is a continued differentiation of sub-regions, such as the Baltic countries, the Visegrad countries or the Western Balkans. Second, even though ethnic tensions have eased, this process is yet unfinished and appeasement had to be empowered by international pressure. Third, regional cooperation – in the sense of joint advocacy of shared interests – has remained weak, even among the Visegrad countries where institutionalized mechanisms shall support this process. As the current crisis of the European Union is likely to exert long-lasting effects on the cohesion of the Union, fragmentation within the Central and Eastern European region is expected to prevail, or

even to strengthen in the coming years. [3] In the latter case, if accompanied by the multiplicator effect of other drivers, re-peripheralization will be a possible outcome.

- Due to the regional fragmentation in Central and Eastern Europe and the *limited opportunities that small states have*,[4] Euro-Atlantic institutions and especially the European Union will remain the primary channels of more efficient advocacy for their political and economic interests in a globalized world. Also, even though NATO will remain a key forum for representing security interests, we should keep in mind that the no country possesses outstanding hard or soft power capabilities in the region,[5] thus advocacy of their interests will also suffer shortcomings for not being able to fully support them with means of power. Due to prevailing fragmentation and the *danger of re-peripheralization* we cannot count on the strengthening will for cooperation of these countries. Even though the success of pursuing a better future in the region would largely depend on how long-term, predictable and sustainable strategic planning strengthens converging interests, current experience shows that pursuing diverse short-term national interests along regional lines of fragmentation prevents this.
- When taking a look at to what extent could societies in the region overcome their democratic deficit in the past two decades, we can see controversial results.[6] There has been significant progress regarding the adoption of democratic institutions and formal ways of political conduct, but still *there is a long way to go regarding how these institutional frameworks function and how political culture and civic participation fill these with substance*. As democratic practice largely depend not just on historical traditions but also on current experience and processes of learning and acculturation, the successful overcome of the democratic deficit the region shows also depends on the success or failure and the ways and means of modernization in the region.
- It is also important to note that *the threat perception of these societies has predominantly been focusing on issues of economic and social security, not on military issues*, thus expectations towards political elites highlighted the need for modernization and economic development. As long as the current trend of low level of military threat perception in the

[3] Samary, Cathrine: Eastern Europe Faced with the Crises of the System. The International Institute for Research and Education (IIRE) http://www.iire.org/es/component/content/article/202-leurope-de-lest-a-lepreuve-des-crises-de-systeme.html.

[4] István BIBÓ, A *kelet-európai kisállamok nyomorúsága*, In: Bibó, István: *Válogatott tanulmányok*, Vol. II. Magvető, 1986. pp. 185-265.; Péter TÁLAS: *Integrációk szorításában. A kelet-közép-európai térség biztonságáról 1990-2010*. In: Háda, Béla et al (Eds.) *Nemzetek és birodalmak. Diószegi István 80 éves*. Budapest, 2010. pp. 617-630.

[5] Poland was the only country in the region that made significant effort to show her hard power capabilities (in Iraq and Afghanistan), but despite highlighting strong solidarity these commitments also pushed Polish capabilities to their limits.

[6] For more details see Freedom House's Nations in Transit Database. http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit

region continues, resources dedicated for defense also continue to remain under pressure and underfinanced militaries, shrinking or stagnating defense expenditures and the scarce resources for capability development will be phenomena for the long term. In an optimistic scenario though, this should press nations for tighter and more efficient cooperation both within the European Union and NATO.

2. Integration as a driver

As a special driver, Central and Eastern Europe has experienced three simultaneous processes of integration during the past twenty years that fundamentally determine the results achieved and also future perspectives.[7]

- The process of Euro-Atlantic accession brought about *Europeanization*, which meant that after organic integration processes in the region were broken in 1945, these were to continue in the 1990s when countries of the region attempted to join much more developed Western European countries. The significance of this inorganic development has been much underestimated both by Brussels and national political elites.
- Like regional integration, national integration (nation building) has also been diverted in 1945, and only the changes of regime in 1989 brought back the opportunity to continue these. Thus old and newborn countries in the region have been striving to develop national integration policies and expand their national sovereignty in the process that we identify as *re-nationalization*.[8]
- Overarching these, an even more powerful process, *globalization* (defined for our purposes as a universal integration) has transformed the region through the free flow of ideas, information, people, goods and wealth. It was especially the economic aspect of globalization that triggered deep changes in the region through foreign investment – but in an uneven distribution and different manner throughout the region.[9]

After the Cold War most countries of Central and Eastern Europe identified *Euro-Atlantic integration as the key to their long-term prosperity (within the European Union) and security (within NATO)*, as a tool that is suitable to handle those challenges that characterize the region and which can minimize the negative consequences of historical trends. The peaceful settlement of territorial disputes, the adoption of democratic institutions and market economy as accession criteria set the path for most countries of the region.

[7] Péter TÁLAS, *Integrációk szorításában,* pp. 623-624.

[8] It is worth to note that European and national integration have inherently different understandings of sovereignty (limiting and sharing vs. maximizing and retaining sovereignty) and security (protecting interests vs. protecting territories).

[9] *Foreign Direct Investment in Central and Eastern Europe. A case of boom and bust?* Price Waterhouse Cooper, March 2010, p. 2.

However, regained independence from the Soviet sphere of influence also revived nationalist ideologies and policies in the region, thus *political nationalism* became, and to a certain extent has remained a special driver among these countries.[10] This also includes the articulation, reframing and pursuit of national interests, the strengthening of national economies and national identities, and in several cases the 1990s triggered the foundation and consolidation of new nation states. (Nationalist endeavors have also been diverse: the primary goal of Europeanization moderated nationalism among the Visegrad countries, while initiating wide-scale ethnic violence in Yugoslavia.)

Macroeconomic data from the past two decades show that *Eastern and Central Europe has been a relative winner of economic globalization* due to accelerated modernization (through foreign direct investment, technology import, the creation of workplaces, and the spread of economic and technological know-how). This is underpinned by the fact that the lack of these economic enablers has always been identified by national political elites as a risk of lag and peripheralization. At the same time the distribution of foreign direct investment was highly uneven throughout the region and also pulled back local entrepreneurs and the national accumulation of capital.

The *simultaneous and overlapping effects of these three processes of integration* create the need of active political harmonization in order to keep disparities and resulting tension under control. The fulfillment of accession criteria on behalf of the European Union and NATO brought positive yield in many aspects by restricting nationalist intentions, like through the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes and minority issues, or granting equal political and cultural rights for minorities within a democratically built institutional system. Such requirements at the same time could not solve inherent structural problems like the lack of a well-developed civic society, or a wide and stable economic middle class, and shortcomings of a democratic political culture that are just as essential conditions for a well-functioning democratic society as democratic institutions.

Another essential condition of integration was how national economies could be transformed into market economies in order to achieve compatibility with more developed European economies. However, even though the creation of national bourgeoisie through privatization was one of the national priorities throughout the region, the lack of local economic means and capital, high ratios of national debt and the lack of financial know-how confined these aims, thus resulting only in limited success. That is why foreign capital gained a determining role in privatization and modernization causing *high level of*

[10] Nationalism is mentioned here as ethnic nationalism as differentiated from civic nationalisms of Western Europe.

dependence from external economic factors and higher degree of economic vulnerability.[11]

The key question of the coming years will be how these simultaneous processes of integration will interact and improve or exacerbate ongoing processes, and how societies will perceive their relative situation as changing for the better or worse?

3. Political drivers

EU-accession was widely celebrated in all countries of the region in 2004, and little has been commented upon the fact that integration was a necessity in many aspects, lacking in other credible options outside the Union. Also, accession only meant that new channels of advocacy opened up for new member states – new, but not automatically permeable channels. Countries of the region gradually had to realize that interdependence and open borders (the four freedoms of the EU) also limit their sovereignty and restrain national authorities at the same time. What is more important: *in case new member states cannot balance external economic pressures and cannot identify key areas through which the advocacy of their particular national interests can be channeled, their further economic, societal and political development will come to a halt.* The 2008 economic crisis made these countries realize this and generated much frustration, exaggerated and used by some in the political elites.[12]

As ethnic nationalist endeavors were abused in the 1990s by some political actors, different (national, social) traits of political populism have been used in the past decade.[13] *Thriving populism will pose a significant risk in the coming years, especially in those countries that are less successful in modernization*. Populist tendencies in the region can build on the historical traditions of autocratic centralized state policies and paternalism, taking advantage of the democratic deficit in the region mentioned before, articulating necessary (but hard) structural reforms as if these were forced upon countries of the region by requirements of the EU or other external actors. As populists can also rely on a number of common 'survival techniques' that people have been

[11] As mentioned before, people in the region perceive primarily economic and related societal threats to their security, therefore a slow, prolonged modernization and economic development through a more prudent privatization process was not a real option for political elites competing for votes. Where privatization was a more gradual process, like in Poland, moderateness was not a consequence of deliberate policies driven by local elites, but the lack of foreign investor interest or the reluctance of trade unions.

[12] Regional political elites will also transform until 2030: the generation of 'regime changers' will be replaced by members the younger generation who had been socialized after 1990 in a (more) democratic political environment. Personal changes will also bring about the repositioning of these elites, largely depending on the success or failure of integration of these countries.

[13] Andrej SKOLKAY, *Populism in Central Eastern Europe*. IWM Working Paper No. 1/2000 Vienna. http://www.nlp.at/hl/medien/wppopulism.pdf; Mesežnikov, Grigorij – Gyárfášová, Oľga – Smilov, Daniel (Eds.): *Populists Politics and Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe*. Institute for Public Affairs, Bratislava, 2008. http://www.isp.org.pl/files/78321244907384660012186295 76.pdf; Langenbacher, Nora – Schellenberg, Britta (Eds.): *Is Europe on the "right" path? Right-wing extremism and right-wing populism in Europe.* Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2011. p. 348. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/do/08338.pdf.

using in the region for decades (pragmatism, changing sides, blaming others instead of being self-reflective), thus populist argumentation often appears to be intuitive and natural, *populism should be identified as a more serious risk than political extremism*.

Atlanticism will also remain a determining political driver in the coming years as the primary tool of guaranteeing stability and security in the region against both internal and external threats and challenges.[14] Even though Atlanticism might have lost some of its attraction compared to the more troubled and unpredictable 1990s, but it is beyond doubt that it will play a continued role in local elites' security perceptions regarding factors like Russia, the stability of the post-Soviet region or the Balkans. At the same time, as Atlanticism is *not just a security guarantee but also a means to mediate democratic values and open up traditional perceptions to a global perspective*, the presence of the United States has direct influence upon regional issues. (The US pivot to the Pacific region, however, might also result in decreasing openness to American political goals.) Weakening Atlanticism in the long run would also likely to push the region more towards peripheralization.

The major dilemma regarding political drivers will be whether local elites would push for closer integration in Europe, sacrificing what needs to be sacrificed on the home front in order to keep in line with Brussels politics, or differentiation in the EU will distance these countries from the core? Also it is unclear to what extent could Atlanticism moderate such a possible shift and maintain strong commitment and solidarity within NATO?

4. Human and economic drivers

Historical patterns have long-lasting effects on societies in the region, further complicating the management of structural problems, like the lack of a developed and strong middle class. These underdeveloped but overburdened strata are expected to make a living, provide tax revenues for overly broad social welfare systems, be competitive with foreign investors and entrepreneurs, accumulate capital and invest at home, financially support an aging society burdened with non-integrated marginalized groups (such as the Roma)[15] and flexibly overcome economic crises that have repeatedly hit the region. Furthermore, the narrow middle class is expected to strengthen and develop civic society and integrate marginalized groups. In order to be able to manage

[14] Ronald D. ASMUS, Alexandr VONDRA, *The Origins of Atlanticism in Central and Eastern Europe*. In: Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18. No. 2, July 2005 pp. 203-216, http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct_publication_attachments/foreignpolicyAsmusVondraCCAM.pdf.

[15] *The situation of Roma EU citizens moving to and settling in other EU Member States*. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2008. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/629-ROMA-Movement-Comparative-report_en.pdf; *The situation of Roma in 11 EU Member States - Survey Results at a Glance*. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, UNDP, 2012. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/2099-FRA-2012-Roma-at-a-glance_EN.pdf.

these ‘tasks’, *the extension and development of the civic middle class will be the key of successful modernization*.

However, it is not only the middle class that faces difficulties in the coming decades. As long-term demographic trends that normally should empower growing economies point towards negative scenarios in the region after 2020 (due to ageing societies),[16] the *fundamental restructuring of social welfare systems will be inevitable* even before 2030. As such structural reforms cut deep and their potential target groups (pensioners) play a central role at national elections, these reforms will generate significant societal tension and will also influence how political elites position themselves.

Long-term economic prospects of the region depend on the broader European economic situation more than ever before. As these are small, open, export-oriented economies exposed to general economic trends (such as developments regarding foreign direct investment, the quality and quantity of human resources, research and development etc.), negative European prospects will put a pressure on Central and Eastern Europe as well.[17] Further *dependence will prevail regarding energy*: if countries of the region cannot articulate and advocate a unified regional (if not European) energy policy, Russia will be able to maintain her indirect economic influence keeping the upper hand on Energy transit. As the exposure of national economies varies throughout the region, *differentiation and further fragmentation is likely to take place, also negatively influencing convergence within the European Union.*

As Central and Eastern European countries generally *underperform in technological innovation*,[18] it is only a limited perspective that the region can use some extra enablers to improve its relative position until 2030. The greatest potential enabler the region can use lies in its well-trained and educated human resources, if the added value produced by Central and Eastern European workers will increase and there will be some areas in which regional expertise can create comparative advantages.

[16] *Regions 2020 – Demographic Challenges for European Regions*. Brussels, November 2008. http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/working/regions2020/pdf/regions2020_demographic.pdf; Kenichi Hirose (Ed.): *Pension Reform in Central and Eastern Europe in Times of Crisis, Austerity and Beyond*. International Labor Organization (ILO), 2011. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-geneva/---sro-budapest/documents/publication/wcms_171551.pdf.

[17] *The 2012 Ageing Report: Underlying Assumptions and Projection Methodologies*. European Commission, Economic and Financial Affaires, 2011.
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2011/pdf/ee-2011-4_en.pdf.

[18] Even the best performing Visegrad countries are only classified as ’moderate innovators’ in the EU Innovation Union Scoreboard, in the third group of countries out of four groups altogether. *Innovation Union Scoreboard 2010*. The Innovation Union’s performance scoreboard for Research and Innovation. February 1, 2011. http://www.proinno-europe.eu/sites/default/files/docs_EIS2010/IUS_2010_final.pdf.

5. Public perceptions and underlying reality: further integration or re-peripheralization?

In historical perspective the European integration of Central and Eastern European countries – perceived in socio-economic terms as *moving from the center of periphery to the periphery of the center – is a great success.* This is true even if we take a Euro-skeptic point of view and recall that these countries are situated in a less developed region of the European Union – of a Union that is already losing relative position to emerging centers of global power. However, the people of the region do not judge success or failure in historical perspective, but based on their experience and economic realities since their accession to Euro-Atlantic institutions. It is of great importance in this subjective judgment that *the point of reference also shifted from the periphery to the center* for these countries. This shift may cause further dissatisfaction in those countries where the societal, economic and political transformation brought about by the change of regime resulted in economic downturn, societal tension and in the loss of real perspective; in those countries, where integration was not a means of development but the aim itself.

Conclusion

The coming years until 2030 are likely to present a Central and Eastern European region that is further fragmented, differentiated, and is striving to avoid re-peripheralization both in economic and political senses. Such trends would also determine the relation of Central and Eastern European nations to NATO and the capabilities these countries are able and willing to provide. A possible re-peripheralization of the region would pose the risk of weakening political and military cohesion. Therefore it is of utmost importance to further strengthen core values of the Alliance and initiate multinational cooperation maintaining the current momentum of transformation.

Measuring the results and future perspectives of integration (versus re-peripheralization) in terms of economic benefit might prove to be a useful indicator as these achievements will determine the degree of coherence and solidarity both within Eastern and Central Europe, and towards Brussels[19]. Thus, we identify *coherence and solidarity empowered by economic success (or their lack) as the key factors that determine the future of these countries.*

[19] Reflecting on the consequences of the current economic crisis (to which these countries reacted diversely – See: Jacques RUPNIK, *The Euro Crisis: Central European Lessons.* Eurozine, March 30, 2012. http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2012-03-30-rupnik-en.html), euroscepticism strengthened along patterns of economic performance. In Poland, where economic crisis management proved to be the most successful, public support for the EU has remained high (69% in favor), while in Hungary (42%) and the Czech Republic (34%) support weakened. (See: PEW Research Center: *European Unity on the Rocks*. May 29, 2012 http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/05/29/european-unity-on-the-rocks/).

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PERSPECTIVES OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN MULTINATIONAL DEFENCE COOPERATION

Tamás CSIKI*

The financial crisis triggered the impression among European states that the negative effects of the further decreasing defence budgets could be tackled by tighter defence cooperation, especially on capability development. New initiatives have emerged both within NATO and the European Union in this regard, but interestingly, new parallel defence co-operations have also been created and old ones have been revitalized on the sub-regional level. In Central Europe, two frameworks have recently evolved in this field: on the one hand, the Visegrad Countries (V4) – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – have been cooperating on various issues since the 1990s, though the first element of their defence cooperation was born only in 2011 by initiating a V4 EU Battlegroup. On the other hand, Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia have begun collaborating within the framework of the Central European Defence Initiative (CEDI) in the fields of training, operations and capability development since 2011. The article raises the question whether such regional forms could serve for incubating and nurturing new projects and giving timely answers to current capability shortfalls in Central Europe?[1]

Keywords*: Central Europe, defense, military capabilities, multinational cooperation, Visegrad Countries, CEDI, NATO, EU Battlegroup.*

Introduction

International experts – as well as Hungarians – have been paying ever growing attention to multinational forms of defense cooperation[2] and capabilities development since the financial crisis hit the defense sector in Central Europe with an austerity not seen since the end of the Cold War. The need for innovative ideas that tailor needs to deeds and provide deliverable options is great. However, most expert papers are limited to comparing strategic cultures, security identities or national security documents and focus less on the *modus vivendi*, on how multinational defense cooperation could be fostered and practical, delivering processes and methods of cooperation could be developed.

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[1] I would like to express my thanks and appreciation to Bence NÉMETH from the Defense Planning Department of the Ministry of Defense of Hungary, with whom I have closely been working together on this topic during the past two years and who has always been ready and willing to raise new ideas, offer comments and push the research forward. Also, I am glad for further input and comments from István BALOGH (HIIA, Hungary), Péter TÁLAS (CSDS, Hungary), Fruzsina TÓFALVI (MoD, Hungary), Gergely VARGA (CSDS, Hungary) and speakers of the "Expert Workshop on Capability Development among the V4 Countries – 'How to tailor needs to deeds?' –" organized on 27 08 2013 in Budapest, Dominik P. JANKOWSKI, Jan JIRES, Marian MAJER, Milan SUPLATA and Marcin TERLIKOWSKI.

[2] The multinational development of capabilities, or in other words, Multinational Defense Co-operation (MDC) 'is any arrangement where two or more nations work together to enhance military capability. This can include exchanges and liaison, training and exercising, common doctrine, collaborative equipment procurement, or multinational formations.' See: Ministry of Defence, *Multinational Defence Co-operation*, Policy Paper, Paper No. 2, (London: Directorate of Corporate Communications), 2001. p. 2.

After the defense dimension of the Visegrad Cooperation was relatively fruitless for two decades, 2011-2012 brought V4 countries to a new level: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia decided to establish a joint EU Battlegroup. Still there is a long way to go to make the V4 BG a reality, but there seems to be considerable space left for other capability development initiatives as well. Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia have begun collaborating within the framework of the Central European Defence Initiative (in the fields of training, operations and capability development since 2011. The article raises the question whether such regional frameworks could serve for incubating and nurturing new projects and giving timely answers to current capability shortfalls in Central Europe?[3]

1. Central European mutlinational frameworks of cooperation in the field of defence

As mentioned above, we can differentiate between two multinational frameworks of defence cooperation in Central Europe, that of the Visegrad Countries (V4) and the Central European Defence Initiative (CEDI, previously also known as the Central European Roundtable on Defence Cooperation). International experts have been paying ever growing attention to these multinational forms of defence cooperation and military capability development since the financial crisis hit the defence sector in Central Europe with an austerity not seen since the end of the Cold War. (On the V4 see: Kiss, 2011; Weiss, 2012, Valasek and Suplata, 2012. On CEDI see: Csiki and Németh, 2012, Kurowska and Németh, 2013) Recently comparative expert papers have also been prepared, aiming at pointing out the lessons learnt from existing defence cooperation frameworks and identifying the best suitable practices that might be able to further enhance and bring forward these collaborations. (Valasek and Suplata, 2012; Budai, 2013) The obvious reason for this renewed interest is the momentum that the Visegrad Cooperation and CEDI have been gathering since 2011.

After the defence dimension of the Visegrad Cooperation was relatively fruitless for two decades, 2011-2012 brought V4 countries to a new level: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia decided to establish a joint EU Battlegroup. Still there is a long way to go to make the V4 Battlegroup a reality, but it is a first step of pooling capabilities beyond doubt. CEDI, born as the Central European Roundtable on Defence Cooperation in 2011, has received less attention as this new framework for defence collaboration among Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia has been

[3] Even though the current trends and future prospects of defense expenditures, the present situation of the armed forces of Central European countries and their capability requirements (shortfalls) are fundamentally related to this topic, the current article will not elaborate upon these but focuses on capability development initiatives and viable models and methods of cooperation, wishing to give a comparative evaluation and formulate some recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of these frameworks.

functioning rather as an ‘incubator’ for new, practical initiatives that can be realized on the ground in the short term. The potential in CEDI, however, seems to be substantial, as several actual projects have successfully been carried on by participating states.

It is obvious that these two frameworks differ significantly in terms of structure, institutionalization, membership and the way they function, and have triggered successful initiatives to a different degree. As we attribute the different dynamics behind the functioning of these defence collaborations to the different setup that characterize them, the following subchapters will briefly assess and compare them, highlighting those characteristics that are more capable to bring forward cooperation based on the experience gained and lessons learnt so far.

1.1. V4 Defence Cooperation

Cooperation among the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland in the framework of the Visegrad Group – or Visegrad Four (V4) – dates back to 1991 when regional cooperation on Central Europe was pursued in order to mutually enhance the chances of Euro-Atlantic integration of these four (then three with Czechoslovakia being one federative state) countries. It was determining however, that the cooperation of the Visegrad Countries was based on a wide functional spectrum, including various fields of political, economic and cultural issues that all participants wished to cooperate upon by bringing their joint efforts closer along shared interests. Regional patterns of cooperation among these countries in defence-related matters have been shown only on a limited scale even after NATO and EU accessions (for example by harmonizing point of views and adopting joint declarations on defence and foreign policy), and despite their respective contributions to NATO collective defence and operations, as well as to EU CSDP, a characteristic ‘V4 defence project’ has not appeared on the horizon until 2011.

Following two decades of fruitlessness in this field, the four countries agreed to establish a European Union Battlegroup in May 2011 – expected to become operational and be on standby in the first half of 2016. The role of the leading nation of the Visegrad Battlegroup is undertaken by Poland, also providing the majority of the troops (900), while the Czech Republic provides 750, Hungary 510 and Slovakia 450 troops. Negotiations on force generation are under way as the V4 Ministers of Defence signed their Letter of Intent (LoI) at their meeting on March 6, 2013 on creating the Battlegroup and the Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) and Technical Agreements (TA) are under preparation to make practical cooperation possible. Having a modular structure, the leading roles for 7 out of 8 functional modules have already been divided among the participants. However, critical capability shortfalls are still on the table, combat and transport helicopters and strategic airlift among others that will need to be provided. (Tófalvi, 2013) Other issues, including the permanence of the Battlegroup as a sustained capability package among the V4 countries and the

possible application of the BG have also remained as topics for further negotiation.

Moreover, the V4 Battlegroup gives an old answer to an old question dating back to 2004 by pooling such capabilities that might never be applied in practice as the European Union has proven to be unable to generate the necessary political commitment so far to use the much-appreciated Battlegroups even in times of need. Even if allow for the possible use of the V4 Battlegroup in a future EU crisis management operation, we must admit that the creation of lacking military capabilities should be the primary target of newly emerging initiatives of defence cooperation, going beyond putting together existing units into new force structures. The latter also bears significant value for providing capable, deployable multinational units that could not be provided on a national basis, but is less likely to fill capability shortfalls that could be covered only through deeper cooperation in the form of sharing capabilities (joint procurement and development).

It is beyond doubt that the V4 Battlegroup has become the flagship project of the Visegrad Countries – and practically the only such project that has been born and nurtured as a V4 defence project. The reasons why cooperation in the field of defence among them has been limited as compared to other fields (energy policy being a successful example) in our opinion are the setup and characteristic of the cooperation, particularly meaning that:

- V4 is a structured, institutionalized framework for cooperation, thus it is more rigid;
- V4 constitutes of uneven partners regarding size, resources and capabilities (three small and a middle-size country, the latter exceeding the sum of the first three), thus it is likely to create dependencies and inequalities;
- V4 projects are initiated based on the consensual participation of all four Visegrad countries, serving as a shared platform of initiatives, thus limiting the opportunity of spontaneously built collaborations by two or three partners.

These characteristics limit the opportunities of cooperation to a certain extent, especially in the early period of incubating and nurturing newborn ideas when it would be especially important to ensure flexibility for finding suitable solutions. Since both policy makers and experts (see for example: Rasmussen, 2012, Valasek and Suplata, 2012) agree that flexibility and adaptability are key enablers to successful co-operation, less rigid and regulated, and more tailored-to-needs forms of cooperation should be given preference, as explained in the following.

1.2. Central European Defence Initiative

A brand new framework for defence cooperation among Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia begun in 2011, primarily called the Central European Roundtable on Defence Co-operation, more recently

named as Central European Defence Initiative. This framework includes the fields of training, operations and capability development and has achieved the following results by 2013: (Tófalvi, 2013)

- Following upon the Czech initiative a multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defence battalion has been created involving the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia among the CEDI countries and extended to include Poland, also becoming the lead nation of the battalion, and becoming a successful Smart Defence program. Other countries have also expressed their interest in the formation.
- Based on the 'food for thought' paper produced by Austria and Croatia, bilateral cooperation in the field of training Special Operations Forces (SOF) has become a practice by now and might be further extended to further CEDI countries offering joint training of SOF.
- As the Multinational Logistic Co-ordination Centre (MLCC) was established in the Czech Republic in 2010, a regionally focused initiative on creating a multinational Joint Logistics Support Group (JLSG) is now on the table. MLCC has become a Smart Defence Tier 1 project since.
- Hungary produced a 'food for thought' paper on Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) cooperation and in this framework 'Train the Trainers' and 'Weapons Intelligence Team' (WIT) activities have been successful in sharing lessons learnt.
- The joint training of Czech, Croatian and Hungarian Air Mentor Teams for Afghanistan begun thanks to the negotiations going on within CEDI and has been successfully going on since, while also negotiations on deeper regional cooperation in aviation training are going on.

Based on these projects, we can genuinely state that initiatives nurtured in the CEDI framework have proven to be successful, evolving both in terms of participants, attracting further countries to join, and in terms of integration into NATO Smart Defence programs. Thus, even though literature on CEDI is limited (Csiki and Németh, 2012), based on the experience gathered so far we can already outline the fundamental characteristics of this framework, such as:

- CEDI is not structured and has remained un-institutionalized, thus providing more flexible options for negotiation (building on expert-level meetings and the formal meetings of Defence Policy Directors as well as the informal meetings of Ministers of Defence);
- CEDI constitutes of relatively even partners regarding size, resources and capabilities (six small countries, none possessing disproportionately greater capabilities);
- CEDI projects are initiated based on voluntary participation of any partner countries, being able to choose *à la carte* among defence cooperation initiatives without formal obligations.

This means that the participants of CEDI build practical and more flexible forms of cooperation, starting with the spontaneous cooperation of 2-3 countries,

with CEDI playing the role of an open forum and clearing house for them. As experience has shown, there are cases when the 'incubation' period was so successful, that more countries also joined the initiative, developing them into broader regional as well as viable Smart Defence programs. Significantly, CEDI seems to be more fruitful and effective than Visegrad's formalised cooperation.

2. How Central European defence collaborations fit to the main European trends?

We can draw further conclusions by comparing the two main frameworks of military cooperation in Central Europe – V4 and CEDI – to the current European trends. The creation of the Visegrad Battlegroup is a great achievement for the Central European region, if we compare what Central European regional initiatives have and have not achieved since the end of Cold War. Basically, the Central European countries could not establish a single viable, significant regional defence initiative. Probably, it is the reason why many analysts and practitioners raised their head for the particular news of the creation of the Visegrad Battlegroup, and not for other Battlegroups.

At the same time, we have to recognize that the Visegrad Battlegroup tries to answer a demand which emerged ten years ago when the EU Battlegroup concept had been framed in 2004. That time many believed that these force packages will provide the answer for responding to smaller crises, but the usefulness and applicability of EU Battlegroups have been questioned, as they have never been used despite the fact that there was demand for it from the international community. (Major and Mölling, 2011, Hatzigeorgopoulos 2012) In addition, Tomáš Weiss highlights that the Visegrad Battlegroup 'is not and cannot be the answer to the region's difficulty in sustaining a reasonable level of military power'. Thus, 'development of further common capabilities should follow, starting with training, schooling, and maintenance' (Weiss, 2011). Accordingly, we can perceive the creation of the Visegrad Battlegroup as a late adaptation for a decade old demand of generating rapid reaction forces and capability development packages rather than fitting into the current trend of European defence collaborations, when everyone focuses on cost effectiveness and Pooling & Sharing of capabilities.

Contrarily, CEDI provides a forum for six Central European countries, where they can raise potential areas of practical cooperation and each and every country is free to join and contribute to it. Thus, cooperation is forged on the ground of flexible and practical mechanisms while there is no 'institutional' pressure – as would have been the case in the Visegrad format, where the support of all participating countries are necessary to begin to cooperate on any issue. Last but not least, all participating countries in CEDI have about the same level of resources and military manpower, providing equal weight and influence, unlike the Visegrad Group, which includes Poland, which is often considered the 'lead nation'. (Budai, 2013)

It is also important to note that CEDI has not just provided the ground for new raising initiatives, but in the cases of the Joint Logistics Support Group and the CBRN Battalion these initiatives had been extended to include all Visegrad countries (and even beyond), thus becoming a successful 'incubator of ideas' for the V4 cooperation as well, later on further channelled into NATO's Smart Defence framework in which such 'grass-root initiatives' can complement large-scale multinational capability development (e.g. procurement) programs.

We can summarize the lessons learnt of the comparison and also highlight best practices if we also compare V4 and CEDI to NORDEFCO along those characteristics that have been discussed throughout the paper (the summary of the characteristics of NORDEFCO is provided partly based upon Bátora and Matlary, 2011):

Characteristics	**V4**	**CEDI**	**NORDEFCO**
Structured, institutionalized framework	YES	NO	YES
Partners and their capabilities	UNEVEN	EVEN	UNEVEN
Participation mechanisms	CONSENSUAL MORE RIGID	FREE-TO-JOIN MORE FLEXIBLE	FREE-TO-JOIN MORE FLEXIBLE
Function	PLATFORM	FORUM AND CLEARING HOUSE	FORUM AND CLEARING HOUSE
Provides answers to:	EARLIER NEEDS	CURRENT NEEDS	CURRENT NEEDS

Table 1. A functional comparison of the Visegrad, CEDI and NORDEFCO frameworks

However, CEDI and V4 cooperation should not be seen as competitive frameworks but collaborations which can complement each other. As capability shortfalls in the region are numerous, the division of labour between CEDI (taking the lead in relatively small-scale bi- or trilateral 'start-up' programs) and V4 (taking the lead in more ambitious, thus costly multinational programs) can provide a healthy environment for fulfilling different needs regarding military cooperation in Central Europe. As Kurowska and Németh (2012) have spectacularly depicted, if each nation can identify, choose and push forward a specific role (such as initiator, lead nation, facilitator, etc.) for itself within these frameworks and they are willing to underpin efforts with real political, professional (that of the military elite) and societal support, the current regionally focused frameworks could deliver capabilities both to the micro (nation state) and to the macro (NATO, EU) levels. However, the question still remains: how could we foster cooperation when simutaneously facing the challenges of financial austerity, strategic fatigue from current demanding military operations, a non-military security perception of Central European societies, sometimes limited societal trust towards each other, a returning interest in strengthening the nation state and the challenges of harmonizing procurement, development as well as pooling and sharing initiatives among

militaries of the region? In the following – instead of concluding an open-ended process – I will raise some recommendations for this purpose.

3. Instead of conclusion: Recommendations

Beyond the comparative analysis of existing cooperative frameworks in the field of defense provided above, a number of recommendations can be formulated – as assessed briefly upon the comments raised at the "*Expert Workshop on Capability Development among the V4 Countries – 'How to tailor needs to deeds?' –*" organized on August 27, 2013 in Budapest:

1) As the pillars of credibility required for enhanced multinational cooperation such as joint procurement are enduring political commitment and the stability in financial resources, these two shall be improved to the greatest extent possible within countries in the region.
2) In order to improve political commitment that is firmly based on societal support, there is a need for a better communicated and channeled discourse – both political and societal discourse. Of course this cannot be complete without getting members of the military involved. A broader political and professional discussion, also more open to the public shall be initiated.
3) Cooperation should be based on the widest possible pool of institutional partners in various levels. The idea of the Polish National Security Council should be replicated in other V4 countries, bringing together government representatives from all relevant fields. Cooperation among administrations should be extended and reinforced, including joint sessions of V4 parliamentarians, the regular and formal meetings of defense planners, etc.
4) Direct cooperation among Ministries of Defense should especially be strengthened through the exchange of liaison personnel, military planners, procurement officers, etc. Such cooperation could follow the practices of the Franco-British defense cooperation by mutually establishing double-hatted positions within respective Ministries of Defense.

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THE U.S. AND SOME ISSUES OF THE REALISTIC SCHOOL REGARDING THE SECURITY DYNAMICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Eugen LUNGU*

As the only global power, the U.S. continues to be the best placed extra-regional actor in the Middle East's geopolitics, more than two decades after the end of the Cold War. Having a strategic importance for the global economy, the Middle East continues to be a priority in the U.S. foreign policy, given that in this region energy-related interests intersect with the interests of other extra-regional state actors. The U.S. security policy in the region continues to be dominated by realist approaches and the maintaining of the balance power will represent, in the coming years too, a key objective of Washington's policy in the Middle East.

Keywords: *extra-regional actor, global power, U.S. security, Middle East, Arab countries.*

Introduction

Since the first Gulf War (1991) and until today, the inter-state conflict in Syria, we can say that in more than two decades the Middle East has seen an increased dynamics of regional security. In addition to the Arab and non-Arab states which are part of this geopolitical area, a realistic perspective of power games in the Middle East recommends the U.S. as the main extra-regional actor which has played and continues to play a crucial role in setting up the power balance in this region. Thus, along with a number of strong state actors of the Western world (Great Britain, France, Germany, etc.), but in contrast to other major extra-regional actors (Russian Federation, China, etc.) that are promoting their interests in the Middle East, the U.S. continues to keep its dominant position in the system of international relations and to exert a significant influence in the geopolitics of the Arab world.

We shall further try to briefly present, from the perspective of political realism, the role that the U.S., as the sole global power, currently plays in the context of the dynamics of security of the Middle East.

1. The Realism of Extra-regional State Actors - a Constant of the Geopolitical Relations in the Middle East Region

The analysis of the security dynamics in the Middle East, in terms of the assumptions of the realistic school, besides the primary exam of power games that involve the states of this geopolitical space, emphasizes the role of extra-regional state actors which exert a significant political and military influence. The important resources of oil and natural gas possessed by a series of Arab

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countries as well as the Middle East strategic positioning close to Europe are two of the factors that led the Western world powers to exert a geopolitical influence in this area, since the nineteenth century. Thus, there are many views that point out that external factors played a major role in the Arab world, especially after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Subsequently during the Cold War, the two superpowers, the U.S. and USSR, have consistently promoted the economic, political and military interests in the Arab world, managing to define certain "ideological space" by attracting various Arab countries in their sphere of influence. Thus the last decades of Middle East history recorded the fact that the wars between Israel and Arab countries in 1967 and 1973, like many other confrontations of the Cold War, were actually armed confrontation between the U.S. and USSR, starting from the backstage issues of these wars, on the one hand, and from the origin of the armaments used by the two camps, on the other hand.

At the beginning of the 21rst century, we can appreciate that the of the most important powers of the planet for the Arab world has developed, due to the increased need of energy on the global market, considering that oil remained the main source of global energy. As in the previous epochs, presently in the geopolitical space of the Arab world the interests on political, economic and military aspects of extra-regional great powers intersect and true "fault lines" are being drawn that, on the one hand, express the ratio of the existing forces on the international stage, and on the other hand, preserve "something" of the influence exerted by certain external powers of the Cold War period. Although, theoretically speaking, one can consider that it is difficult to explain how each state defines its national interest, the practice of international life shows that states build their foreign policies and act according to their own national interest. Even if we do not know details about the concrete ways by which the states "sketch" their national interest, we agree that "defining national interests depends largely on the type of internal society and the culture specific to each State"[1]. From the perspective of classical realism, as Morgenthau understood that politics is a struggle for the seizure of power and used the concept of national interest for the analysis of this struggle, we can say that the understanding and accurate definition of national interest would allow observers to explain the past actions of states and to anticipate the future ones[2]. From the perspective of political realism, it is considered that extra-regional state actors exercising their influence in the Middle East region define their political and security interests according to the local balance of power, but at the same time taking into account the global balance of power. The dynamics of security and the arrangements of power in this geopolitical space in which are attracted both "local" states, as well as powerful states from the extra-regional sphere justify

[1] Joseph S. NYE, Jr. *Descifrarea conflictelor internaţionale. Teorie şi istorie*, Editura Antet, Filipeştii de Târg Prahova, 2005, p.53.
[2]John A. VASQUEZ, *The power of power politics. From classical realism to neotradiţionalism*, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, Cambridge, 2004, p.371.

the statements of various representatives of the realistic trends regarding the timeliness of the principles and theories of this school of thought. Thus in relation to the whole geopolitical space of the Middle East the representatives of various realistic currents consider that this region has the most points in common with the realistic theoretical principles of international relations. The armed conflicts which took place in the Middle East after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the two Gulf wars, the clashes between Palestinians and Israelis, and so on, as well as many other security issues grafted onto the state actors' aspirations in the Arab world to better position themselves in the context of the local balance of power are existing relevant events which demonstrate the viability of the theoretical principles of classical and contemporary realism.

An overview on the significant extra-regional actors that are currently exerting their influence in the Arab world reveals two categories of relevant actors from the viewpoint of the topics of this study. A first group is represented by powerful entities acting individually, according to their own strategies: USA, the Russian Federation, China, UK, India, Germany, France etc., and the second category of actors is represented by unions (groups of) countries, such as the EU, BRICS. We shall present below some relevant issues concerning the United States, as a global leader and main extra-regional actor in the geopolitics security dynamics of the Middle East region. We shall try to emphasize Washington's strategy as to the Middle East and to show how it operates in the context of regional power games, as well as how it is positioned in relation to the other extra-regional actors in terms of both local power balance and at the global level. We believe that the strong influence of the U.S. on regional relations of political, economic and security nature is one of the most important features of the system of Arab states in the two regions.

2. The USA – the Extra-regional Actor that Influences Decisively the Security Dynamics in the Middle East

The U.S., unique global superpower, is the most important extra-regional actor which exerts a strong influence in the Middle East, putting a decisive mark on the configuration of the balance of local power. If we relate to the Cold War period, given the fierce competition between the two superpowers, in the forefront of U.S. foreign policy goals was placed the promotion of the U.S. interests in the Middle East, by using American economic and military power for political purposes, in line with the national interest of this superpower. Thus, by the early 70s, the Middle East was not a main direction of U.S. policy of economic aid, but it is estimated that since the Nixon administration onward began a new era in addressing U.S. relations with Middle Eastern countries. In the new geopolitical conditions shaped by Washington, Israel and Egypt became the main recipients of American foreign aid intended for the Middle East space. The strategic goal of the U.S. in the light of those aids was made clear by the

State Department in those years, "in order to support the economic, political and security interests of the U.S. and to promote U.S. foreign policy objectives in the region"[3]. Also after the peace agreement of Camp David in 1979, the U.S. began to provide long-term military aid to Egypt, which, together with the one given to Israel, totaled about $ 5 billion. This strategy of promoting foreign aid for Egypt, as in other situations in which the same means were used, was taking into account to influence the behavior of a potentially unfriendly state, facilitating the fulfillment of the strategic objectives of U.S. policy in the Middle East. According to certain studies[4] touching the U.S. financial aid in the Middle East, it is currently estimated that Israel, Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority and Lebanon are the main beneficiaries of U.S. aid in this region. However, even if the Arab world was constantly for the U.S. an area of strategic interest, America's interest for the democratization of this geopolitical space was reduced until September 11, 2001. Why did Washington behave in this way? Because it was considered that with the democratization of the Arab countries, the geo-strategic interests of the U.S. in relation to the Arab world would have been endangered if the government of certain Arab states had been exerted by Islamist political forces, and the consequences on the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians, would have unquestionably been negative.[5]

According to the opinions expressed by a number of experts on energy security, it is argued that the U.S. and part of their Western allies still remain dependent, to a significant extent, on the oil extracted from the Arab countries of the Middle East.[6] In fact, the way the oil reserves are exploited and managed in the two regions influences oil prices worldwide, with a strong influence on the global economy.

Washington is well aware that any problem that might affect the production and transportation of oil from the Middle East as is the case of blocking the Straits of Hormuz through which 20% of the RDA of oil on the planet pass, would have disastrous consequences, both at the level of the global economy as well as on the international security environment. These issues, which concern the production, but especially the transportation and security resources of oil transportation infrastructure in Arab countries, taking into account the consequences for the global economy, are issues that fall under the security of the U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East geopolitical space.

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[3]United States Agency for International Development, *Congressional Presentation for Fiscal Year 1987*, Vol. 99, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1987, p. 21.

[4]Jeremy M. SHARP, *US Foreign Asistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2010 Request*, Congresional Research Service, June 15, 2010, p.2.

[5]It is known that the democratic game can and produces unexpected surprises (the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front in the 1991 elections in Algeria; the Hamas victory in the 2005 elections in the territories belonging to the Palestinian National Authority, etc), which made the U.S., by applying the principles of realism in foreign policy to manifest reserves regarding the democratization of the Arab world prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

[6]It is estimated that 17% of the annual U.S. oil imports come from the Persian Gulf region, and in the next years the U.S. dependence on oil from the Middle East will increase, website http://www.globalresearch.ca/america-s -dependency-on-middle-east-oil.

After the terrorist attacks on the USA, of September 11, 2001, the U.S. strategy towards the Arab-Muslim world has undergone significant changes as compared to the ten years that had passed after the end of the Cold War. If until the terrorist attacks of Al-Qaeda, the U.S. had no interest to generate political changes in the Arab world, subsequently the concept of promoting democracy in the Arab countries has become a priority on the agenda of U.S. foreign policy in the Arab countries of the Middle East. Many authors have criticized the U.S. external behavior, and the performance of the Republican power in the White House during both terms of President George W. Bush, saying that American neo-conservatism had a crucial influence on the fields of foreign and security policy of the most powerful state in the world. Thus, the neo-conservative thinking substantiated the major decisions of the U.S. action as the sole power of international relations, and especially of those of the U.S. administration regarding the maintenance of global security[7]. In the spirit of the neoconservative orientation, "Bush's administration placed the change of regimes at the head and in the center of their foreign policy and acted externally by force of arms, overthrowing the existing regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq".[8] The major actions that have been undertaken externally during the period in which George W. Bush was the president of USA did not deviate from this rule imposed by neoconservatives, by dint of whom the regimes of different states were seen, analyzed and interpreted in a different vision from the previous administrations. Thus, it was thought that undemocratic regimes were more likely to adopt positions hostile to U.S. interests and therefore the security of the United States would depend on the spread of democracy and human rights in the world. As Zoé Nautré appreciates, "after September 11, 2001, to promote democracy in the Arab world has become a national of the highest level security priority for the United States"[9]. In this respect, neoconservatives were convinced that the U.S. should exploit its global leadership quality and promote democracy abroad in order to overthrow undemocratic regimes[10]. Also, by spreading freedom and democracy in Arab countries, a geopolitical space where the terrorists who attacked the U.S. in September 2001 were born, was an objective aiming to neutralize that potential paradise of international terrorism.[11] Thus, the beginning of the war in Iraq in 2003 and the change of the dictatorial regime led by Saddam Hussein was followed by an intensification of U.S. participation in the political, economic and military "affairs" of the Arab world, an opportunity for the United States to strengthen its position of pivotal actor in the Arab world.

The current U.S. President Barack Obama tried since the beginning of his first term a different approach to his policy with the Arab states, and a new

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[7] Eugen LUNGU, *Zece ani de turbulenţe in securitatea lumii. 2001-2011*, Editura Institutului de Ştiinţe Politice şi Relaţii Internaţionale, Bucureşti, 2013, p.12.
[8] Francis FUKUYAMA, *America la răscruce. Democraţia, puterea şi moştenirea neoconservatoare*, Editura Antet, Filipeştii de Târg, 2006, p.30.
[9] Zoé NAUTRÉ, *US Interests in the Arab World: Democracy Promotion by American NGOs*, Fokus Amerika, Nr.4/2008, p.1.
[10] Paul ROBINSON, *Dicţionar de securitate internaţională*, Editura CA Publishing, Cluj-Napoca, 2010, p.134.
[11] Zoé NAUTRÉ, *op. cit.*

openness towards the Muslim world as compared to George W. Bush's era. Thus, the first foreign trip of President Obama was in Turkey, a Muslim country situated in the broader Middle East, sending a very clear signal regarding a change in the strategy concerning the relations with the Arab-Muslim world. Even if the current policy of the democrats in the White House contains a number of items specific to political diplomacy, which differs from that of the former Republican president, a series of analysts of the problems of the Arab world believe that in the "Obama era" political realism was the dominant line of the United States policy in the Arab world: "In the foreign policy regarding Middle East countries, Obama has demonstrated continuity as compared to the past, and not a real change. He fully accepted the basic premises of political realism, advising U.S. Foreign Policy."[12] It is estimated that starting from the major events known by the Middle East during the mandates of President George W. Bush, Barak Obama's America had to deal with extremely complex situations in the Middle East, ever since the years of his first term at the White House: threat of Iran's nuclear program, civil war in Syria and the effects that have propagated in the international environment with the use of chemical weapons in this conflict, as well as the Jihadist phenomenon, as part and parcel of the "Syrian problem"; continuation of sectarian fights in Iraq and the difficulties of finding a political solution to a number of issues that concern the territorial integrity of the Arab state (Ex. "Kurdish problem" - the autonomous region of Kurdistan in Iraq); the vigorous development in political Islam in some Arab countries of the protesting spirit against political, cultural and moral values of the Western world; the danger of radical Islam and terrorism; the deadlock of the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians in the context of the irreversible slippage of the Palestinians to radical Islam. It is estimated that despite his political beliefs Barak Obama could not make a radical change in U.S. foreign policy mechanisms: "He allowed cynical realism to dictate politics, a model which often dominated U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East at the end of the Second World War"[13].

Political and military experts appreciate the major strategic role that U.S. military bases play in Arab countries from the perspective of ensuring the military security of the U.S. Arab allies, as well as in maintaining a stability of local power balance. Concomitantly with the measures by which the United States has increased its military presence around the South China Sea and in the Pacific, according to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), were launched and implemented operational plans[14] through which a considerable part of U.S. troops which left Iraq at the end of 2011 was deployed to Kuwait. Given the scope of the military operations conducted in the war against terrorism, it is

[12]Fawaz A. GERGES, *The Obama approach to the Middle East: the end of America's moment?*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, International Affairs 89: 2 (2013), p.299.
[13] Fawaz A. GERGES, *op. cit.*, p.323.
[14]Fred H. LAWSON, *US Strategy in the Middle East: Will the South China Sea Eclipse the Gulf?*, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 29 february 2012, p.3.

known that both in the case of Afghanistan (2001) and of the operations in Iraq (2003) for the management of the various categories of armed forces U.S. bases in Qatar, Kuwait and other countries in the Middle East region have been used[15]. In the current geopolitical context in which the Syrian civil war by its sectarian dimension creates uncertainty in other sub-regions of the Arab world, but especially given that the Iranian nuclear dossier is still an unsolved issue, military strategists believe that the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf region still remains in relation to Tehran's military power a balancing factor meant to preserve the balance of local power. Thus, as Sun DeGang was assessing in 2010, "Since the end of the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. military bases in the Gulf Cooperation Council states have evolved in terms of functionality from isolating Iran and Iraq to strengthening the importance of the U.S. in the region"[16]. After the end of the war in Iraq, based on the contacts of American officials with Arab leaders of the Gulf region, U.S. military capabilities were displaced in Bahrain, Qatar, UAE and Oman. Additionally, CENTCOM confirmed in early 2012 the maintenance of two U.S. aircraft carriers and military support in the waters of the Gulf, and on the whole it is estimated that the U.S. military presence in the Gulf region is now similar to that of the late 90s: military bases in Kuwait, Bahrain naval bases and upgraded air bases in Qatar and Oman. Although at present, Washington has deployed military forces in the Middle East and means of combat forces for all categories of armed forces, with the largest military presence in the Middle East, there are a series of studies on the safety of this geopolitical space anticipating a possible disengagement of the U.S.A. in the Middle East region. The respective studies, attempting to argue historically such a possibility, noted the withdrawals of other major powers of the last century in the Middle East: the Ottoman Empire (through its disintegration at the end of the First World War), Great Britain and France (at the end of the Second World War), and USSR (with the end the Cold War). The scenarios on a possible partial withdrawal of the U.S. from the Middle East are fed also by the fact that the U.S. could gradually no longer be energetically dependent on the oil of the Arab world. It is estimated that a withdrawal of the U.S.A. from the Middle East region in the coming decades would create the possibility of other powers, such as Iran or China, to take the lead at regional level and reconfigure the local power balance. In this regard, Kieran Morris has a point of view worth highlighting: "Realism argues that when all or several states seek to maximize the power, stability is maintained by changing or reforming alliances in order to restore the balance of power"[17]. Although we do not share this point of view called into question by the strong relations between the U.S. and Israel aimed at maintaining the U.S. presence in the Middle East for a long time, it is assumed that the evolution / involution "of the device" of the U.S. military forces in the Middle East over the next decade

[15] Călin HENTEA, *Noile haine ale propagandei*, Editura Paralela 45, Pitești, 2008, p.310.
[16]Sun DEGANG, *The US military bases in the Gulf Cooperation Council States: dynamic of readjustment*, Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia), Vol.4, No4, 2010, p.44.
[17] Kieran MORRIS, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

can lead to a number of conclusions pertinent for anyone who investigates the security phenomenon in the Arab world and the extra-regional actors involved in this geopolitical space.

Conclusions

It is estimated by various observers of the Middle East security issues that the Arab Spring, once the autocratic regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya were eliminated, but also with the other changes in different Arab countries, could also be the sunset of realpolitik between the USA relations and the Arab countries. The acceptance by Washington of authoritarian Arab leaders for several decades to the benefit of maintaining regional stability is presented by certain studies on the geopolitics of the Middle East as a stage of "foreign policy" that current U.S. authorities would not like to reproduce. Although after 2010 certain elements of U.S. foreign policy support this idea, we believe, however, that it is far too early to talk of a substantial change in the U.S. policy in the Middle East.

As long as the U.S. will be interested in this region for its own energy security, but also for the security of a very close ally, Israel, we believe that the principles of the realistic school will prevail in substantiating the foreign and security policy of Washington in relation to the Arab world.

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SOME KEY ELEMENTS OF THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA IN 2013

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The study systematically explores some of the most important evolutions of the regional balance of power in the Persian Gulf area along the first nine months of 2013. The text explores with a lot of details three main distinct issues: first of all, the way in which Iranian military power evolved (and also some elements of the Iranian foreign policy agenda, in a political context shaped by the fact that Hassan Rohani has won the presidential elections); and, secondly, the study evaluates the geo-strategic and military significance of some major multinational military exercises (with general staff activities, but also with troops involved in massive combat training activities) which have taken place along the first months of 2013, directly involving some important regional actors, but also a quite massive American presence (military units of all sorts, directly subordinated to CENTCOM / U.S. Central Command); and, finally, a brief presentation of some major features of the national power and major strategic priorities of Saudi Arabia, the largest and most potent Sunni state in the Gulf area.

Keywords: *Iran; CENTCOM (U.S. Central Command); Saudi Arabia; balance of power; military exercises; proxy war; sea power.*

From the very beginning, I would like to make two remarks, of *methodological* nature. I believe these allow for a better and more nuanced understanding of the rest of the text. First of all, because of the reduced volume of this paper, I have abandoned the idea of completeness from the start. Thus, for example, I analyze only three of the segments whose vector sum composes the dynamic and complex *geo-strategic* reality of the Gulf region. Second of all, I wish to mention that I constantly operate within the *classical realism paradigm of understanding and interpreting international relations*, a paradigm whose central author is Hans J. Morgenthau[1]. I think that, as long as the main topics of research are military capabilities and war, concepts used by realism – mainly *national power* (with its constitutive elements) and *interest* – are effective instruments.

Within the very complex and dynamic system of realities, with relevance in regard to *strategy* and *grand strategy*[2] in the Persian Gulf region, there are three distinct elements which are of notable interest to me. These are: a. elements in relation to the dynamic of Iran's foreign policy and security agenda. Iran is a country that – not at all by accident – erodes the present configuration of the balance of power in the Gulf region, thus gravely and directly affecting major interests and vital components of the West's security concerns (Romania,

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[1] Hans J. MORGENTHAU.

[2] For *(grand) strategy* see B. H. LIDDELL HART, *Strategia. Acţiunile indirecte*, Ed. Militară, Bucureşti, 1973, pp. 334-335.

through its membership in the EU and NATO, as well as through the strategic partnership with the U.S., is part of the Western world); b. the manner in which the U.S., now under budgetary constraints, and under the pressure of security responsibilities and commitments in different regions of the globe (situation which is constantly near the point of overextension[3]), as well as under the pressure of the decision to progressively shift its foreign and security policy center of gravity, as well as important parts of its military power to the Pacific, can (even with diminished power) act for maintaining strategic stability in the Gulf region; and c. central elements of the dynamic of Saudi Arabia's behavior (which I regard as being nothing else than a *quickly emerging major regional power*[4]) on the international arena.

1. Elements of Iranian strategic agenda: evolution and actions of the Iranian Navy

It is not my intention to cope, here, with *all* elements of the foreign policy agenda and of the strategic agenda of Iran. The topic I have deliberately chosen is a very narrow (but highly significant) one: the dynamics (evolution) and some major actions of the Iranian navy. Choosing this very topic for a more detailed presentation is based on a serious reason: in many occasions along the entire world history, accelerated development and more and more ambitious large scale activities of naval forces clearly indicate that the state we are speaking about actively seeks for gaining more influence on the international arena[5]. Gaining extra influence is a goal naval forces can reach in different ways: by means of directly threatening different competitors, or by means of 'hegemonic war'[6], or simply by means of skillfully 'flexing muscle' of the Navy in more or less distant regions which are significant for the major interests of the state.

Some *very* brief elements of political science and strategic theory might be useful to better understand the topic we are speaking about. "The waterways of the world provided a new mobility – to man himself, later to products of his toil and skill, and at all times to his ideas"[7], clearly states a serious and quite recent work on sea power. Mainly the final words of the fragment quoted here seem to be *very* useful for our debate – they suggest that naval actions and activities of all sorts are, up to a certain point, vectors able to effectively disseminate ideas of all sorts. Here we are speaking, of course, about *political*

[3] For *overextension* / *overreach* see, for example, Andrei MIROIU, Radu-Sebastian UNGUREANU (coordonatori), *Manual de relații internaționale*, Polirom, Iași, 2006, p. 39 (the author deals with the Soviet overextension in the Cold War era).

[4] For different types of *actors* (*powers*) on the international arena see Martin WIGHT, *Politica de putere*, Editura Arc, Chișinău, 1998.

[5] For the very solid correlation of increased naval might and increasing national power see the notorious and very influential volume A. T. MAHAN, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History: 1660-1783*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1890.

[6] For the concept of 'hegemonic war' (or war of hegemony) see, for example, Robet GILPIN, *Război și schimbare in politica mondială*, Ed. Scrisul Românesc, Craiova, 2000, pp. 240-257.

[7] E. B. POTTER (editor), *Sea Power. A Naval History*, second edition, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1981, p. 1.

and strategic ideas belonging to the decision-makers in Tehran. We also feel the need to underline that, along the entire world history, "the seas and oceans have for long been a specific area of rivalry and armed conflict". The same author (who also is the founding father of the Soviet blue water navy) directly stated that naval activities can generate prestige on the international arena, and "prestige in international world is important" not only for trade, but also for "the international relations" which, in the end, are "resting on… sea power" [8].

Along the last few months, Iranian Navy has been actively involved in several ambitious missions, some of them on seas far away from home. On March 4, 2013, after sailing for more than 13.000 kilometers in almost 40 days, a small *tactical* task force (designated by Iranian authorities, because of obvious propagandistic reasons, as being "the 24th Fleet") made up by two Iranian warships (*Kharg*, an improvised helicopter carrier and the destroyer *Saban*) reached Zhangjiagang, a port in China, *Press TV*, an English-language channel of the state-controlled Iranian TV reported. A high-ranking Iranian naval official declared that, along the several weeks of continuous sailing on the Indian Ocean, through the Strait of Malacca and on the seas of South-Eastern Asia, *the two Iranian combat ships successfully "intercepted" 1,180 trade ships and oil tankers, and also monitored more than 120 military units (ships and aircraft) belonging to other countries*[9]. On March 21, the two ships, on their way to Iranian homeports reached Colombo, in Sri Lanka (Ceylon). An official declaration dealing with this event strongly underlined that the Iranian Navy made a lot of progress (at tactical and technological level) along the past few years and also that Iran is to be regarded, now, because of the increased might and capabilities of its Navy, as a trans-regional power[10].

In mid-March 2013, the Commander in Chief of the Iranian naval forces, Admiral Sayyari, proudly announced that Iranian combat ships will operate, quite soon, even "beyond" the Pacific Ocean, sailing to the Atlantic. Such a decision, Sayyari said, is a natural consequence of one of the *strategic* missions of the Navy – that of being more and more present in "international water", in as many as possible regions of the World Ocean[11]. It might be important to remember that, as early as September, 2012, the same Sayyaari officially declared that his country in going to send, quite soon, in the next few years, combat ships in international waters *near the coastline of the United States*[12].

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[8] S. G. GORSHKOV, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, *The Sea Power of the State*, Robert E. Krieger, Malabar, Florida, 1983, p. IX, and 5.

[9] „Iranian Navy's 24th fleet docks at Chinese port: Iranian commander", *Press TV*, March 4, 2013, at the Internet address www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/03/04/291911/iran-navys-24th-fleet-docks-in-china/.

[10] „Iran Navy to boost presence in international waters: Iran MP", *Press TV*, March 24, 2013, at the Internet address www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/03/24/295019/iran-to-boost-presence-in-intl-waters/ .

[11] „Iran Navy to expand its presence to the Atlantic ocean in 2013", *World Tribune.com*, March 18, 2013, at the Internet address http://www.worldtribune.com/2013/03/18/iran-navy-to-extend-its-presence-to-the-atlantic-ocean-in-2013/.

[12] „Iran's navy aims to sail off US shores soon", *Associated Press / Fox News*, September 24, 2012, at the Internet address http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/09/04/iran-navy-aims-to-sail-off-us-shores-soon/

Another element important for properly evaluating the Iranian Navy is the fact that quite large amounts of strategic resources (manpower, cash, advanced elements of technological skills)are used to build and to operate new combat ships of different types. In the second half of March, 2013, for example, Iran officially launched, in Anzali, a port on the shores of the Caspian Sea, a new combat ship, described by different open sources as being a guided missile destroyer. The *political* and *strategic* significance of the event was made even clearer by the fact that President Ahmadinejad himself (his second term came to an end several months later) was present in Anzali on that very occasion[13]. Some other new ships of the Iranian Navy were built and became operational in the Gulf and in the Indian Ocean.

At the beginning of 2012, Iranian Navy had almost 40,000 sailors and officers: 18,000 belonging to regular armed forces, and 20,000 in the naval branch of the Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). *These 40,000 men could use several hundred combat ships*: three *Kilo* class submarines, five smaller submarines, three frigates, two corvettes, at least 10 fast missile boats, three minelayers, and other almost 200 smaller ships of all sorts, armed with missiles, rockets, recoilless guns, heavy machine guns. These ships can simply close (or block) all shipping lanes in the Gulf, using more than 2,000 heavy floating and submerged mines[14].

The pace of development, and the various types of actions of the Iranian Navy put a lot of pressure on the security environment in the Persian Gulf area, generating different types of reactions. One of the most significant recent reactions is that of Admiral J. W. Greenert, who was, in March 2012, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy. Greenert declared – says a piece of news published by the U.S. Department of Defense – that *U.S. naval forces are going to strengthen their presence in the Gulf, in order to keep open, in any circumstances, the shipping lanes in the Hormuz Straits.* Greenert also declared that, at least in one occasion, the march through Hormuy Straits of one of the U.S. aircraft carriers (*USS John C. Stennis*) has been intensely monitored by a large part of the Iranian Navy. The same American admiral also said that the America needs a serious increase of number of ships and assets of other types in the Gulf[15], and this evaluation indirectly indicates how potent the Iranian Navy becomes.

Some of the episodes listed here (see, for example, pretending that a tiny tactical task force is a fleet) are, obviously, Iranian *propaganda* actions. *But not*

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[13] Craig GIAMMONA (*NBC News*), „Iran launches destroyer in Caspian Sea, *NBC News*, March 17, 2013, at the Internet address http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/17/17347648-iran-launches-destroyer-in-caspian-sea?lite

[14] See „Order of battle: American and Iranian Naval and Air Forces in and around the Persian Gulf", on the site of the *Concerned Citizens News Network (CCNN)*, at the Internet address www.ccnn.us/Order_of_Battle_Iran10.html

[15] Jim GARAMONE, American Forces Press Service, „Navy looks to bolster capabilities in Persian Gulf", piece of news published on March 16, 2012, at the Internet address www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=67586

all efforts done by Iran in order to develop and use the Navy are pure propaganda tools. The increasing number of combat ships of all sorts of the Iranian Navy, operating both in the Gulf and outside the Gulf can severely harm the regional balance of power, both in the Persian Gulf and in some parts of the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean.

2. U.S. interests and presence in the Persian Gulf

There are many *major* (and from a certain perspective, even *vital*) U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region: two of them especially preoccupy me. First of all, Washington is interested in assuring an unbroken link between the oil extraction areas in the Gulf (roughly 48% of the worldwide oil reserves) and the different types of consumers form the rest of the world[16]. Nothing exceptional here – for the U.S., the freedom of world trade, respectively configuring a large global market, terrain on which the American economy (the world's strongest), with respect to promoting its national interests, can operate in optimal conditions, constitutes a perennial priority, explicitly formulated since president W. Wilson's time[17], in 1918. *Strictly* strategic interests are also present, in a massive and obvious way. I hereby especially refer to the *containment* [18] policy targeted against Iran, a state whose' strategic and foreign policy agenda contains several extremely worrisome aspects. The *massiveness* and the *importance* of the U.S. interests in the Gulf have led, in the recent past, to the fact that, on certain occasions, Washington has sent almost 500.000 soldiers[19] in the Persian Gulf. But such *resource allocation is unlikely today*, given the fact that the U.S. instruments of power on the global stage are reoriented towards the Pacific. In addition, the Defense budget is strongly affected by a huge compression, under the impact of the economic and financial crisis. In these conditions, *the U.S. is getting ready – however it can – to hereinafter protect its interests and allies form the Persian Gulf region, as well as to continue the containment policy against Iran, even in the context of the massive American military presence reduction in the Gulf region.* From such a perspective, it is clear that the U.S. is now prospecting the possibility of using what we could call "*composite surrogates"* (*defense and security formulas, in which the majority of forces and means are provided by regional allies, while a reduced American military force can, if needed, act as a catalyst and binder*), instead of using *huge and very expensive* quantities of American weapons and human force.

The command structure known as *CENTCOM* (*U.S. Central Command*) is getting ready for the moment in which the U.S. military presence in the Middle

[16] Richard D. SOKOLSKI (editor), *The United States and the Persan Gulf: Reshaping security strategy for the post-containment era, National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C.,* 2003, p. 9.
[17] John TOLAND, *No man's land: 1918, the final year of the Great War,* Doubleday & Co., New York, 1980, pp. 121-130.
[18] For the use of the *ideea* of containing Iran, see Richard D. SOKOLSKI, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
[19] In 1991, the U.S. sent to the Gulf 420.000 soldiers, while UK - 35.000, and France - 17.000. For the figures see Institutul de Istorie şi Teorie Militară, *Războiul din Golf: Studiu politico-militar*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1991, pp. 91-95.

East will become less consistent (especially after the withdrawal of the majority of American forces from Afghanistan, until the end of 2014) than it is now[20]. It is important to remember that the Area of Responsibility (*AOR*) of CENTCOM covers no less than 20 states, *nine* of which are situated *in*, or *nearby* the Gulf region. Regarding *CENTCOM's AOR's* present situation, as well as the evolution perspectives in this vast geographic area, general James N. Mattis, *CENTCOM* commander at that time (he was subsequently replaced, by general Lloyd J. Austin III, towards the end of March 2013), stated, on March 5, current year, in front of the *Senate Armed Services Committee*, that "with volatility [being] a defining feature of the region", *CENTCOM* must be prepared to "respond to military crises while at the same time work in tandem with regional partners". Mattis highlighted that *CENTCOM*'s major priority is to "protect U.S. interests" by "using fewer military resources in an era of fiscal restraint and political change". Mattis's conclusion can be easily to understood, if we keep in mind *the major geostrategic importance* of the Middle East: "America must remain deeply engaged in the rgion and fully utilize all tools of national power as a force for stability…"[21].

Among the political and military forms of *regional cooperation*, organized with U.S. involvement and with the participation of American military forces, and aiming to protect both regional stability and American interests in *CENTCOM's* area of responsibility, we briefly present here two *large international military exercises*, which recently took place. We emphasize the fact that these exercises have an important common denominator: the participation of a *large* number of states from the region, as wel as the participation of U.S. *elite* (and *rapid reaction*) *forces.*

The first one is *Eagle Resolve* – an *annual multi-lateral military exercise*, conducted by U.S. forces and Gulf Cooperation Council regional partners at various locations throughout Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, from April 21-May 6, 2013. According to a press source, *Eagle Resolve* is a multi-national event designed to support cooperative defense. *Eagle Resolve* demonstrates U.S. Central Command's dedication to GCC [the Gulf Cooperation Council] regional partners and the combined efforts to sustain regional security and stability[22]. On April 20, 2013, just a day before the official beginning of this international military exercise, Major-General Robert Catalanotti, *CENTCOM*'s Director of Exercises and Training Directorate, stated that "our goal is to build relationships and capabilities that will bring us [the U.S. and the nations in the region] closer together and enhance the region's stability". The press source we quote here also stated that "this year's scenarios will focus on: integrated air and missile

[20] Donna MILES, „Centcom plans for broader regional engagement post-2014", material de presă al *American Forces Press Service*, July 10, 2013, at the Internet address www.defense.gov/news/nesarticle.aspx?id=120434

[21] See *2013 Posture Statement: Statement Of U.S. Marine Corps General James N. Mattis, Commander, U.S. Central Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 5, 2013 about the posture of U.S. Central Command*, at the Internet address http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom/posture-statement/

[22] Fragments from „Exercise Eagle Resolve 2013", on *DVIDS – Defense Video & Imagery Distribution System*, at the Internet address http://www.dvidshub.net/feature/EagleResolve#.UekLLtJSjkp.

defense; consequence management; critical infrastructure protection; counter-terrorism, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear-passive defense; and interdiction and border security"[23]. Among other things, we mention that there aren't many regional actors which are able, technically speaking, to resort to a possible attack by making use of ballistic means or weapons of mass destruction. To be more specific, *the Arab countries in the Gulf, as well as the U.S. are worried by the high dynamic of Iran's strategic weapons programs, and by important elements of its foreign policy agenda, because Tehran has regional hegemonic potential, as well as an aggressive-expansionist imperial tradition*. We stress the fact that significant elements (soldiers and hardware) from *the 26th MEU – Marine Expeditionary Unit*[24] have participated at the *Eagle Resolve 2013*, operating from the *USS San Antonio* (*LPD 17*)[25], a large, modern and very potent amphibious transport (and assault) ship.

Between June 9 and 20, 2013 (only five weeks after *Eagle Resolve 2013*), Jordan hosted the third edition of the multi-national military exercises known as *Eager Lion*. According to a text posted on the site of the American Department of Defense[26], "service members from 19 countries" have participated at this grand military drill. The same source estimates "more than 8,000 Eager Lion participants", of which "about 5000" are American service members, "from all services". It is worth mentioning that, according to the open sources, the effective *command* structure of the exercise was *not* provided by the Americans (although they represented the *majority* of the involved service members), but by Jordan; Major-General Robert Catalanotti, *CENTCOM'*s director of Exercises and Training Directorate (whom we have previously mentioned) stated that "all of this combined training, led by the Jordanian armed forces, will come together […], strengthening the partnership between 19 countries and increasing the ability of participating nations to operate together during any contingency"[27]. We also mention the fact that "7000 civilian workers from humanitarian NGOs like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)"[28] have participated at the grand military exercises in Jordan. The same article also mentions that elements from the structure called *Expeditionary Strike*

[23] Mae-li ALLISON (Major), „US, GCC nations begin cooperative defense exercise in Qatar", *U.S. Central Command Public Affairs*, April 20, 2013, at the Internet address http://www.dvidshub.net/news/105535/us-gcc-nations-begin-cooperative-defense-exercise-qatar#.UekpZNJSjko

[24] *MEU (Marine Expeditionary Unit)* designates a combat unit of the U.S. Marine Corps, with some 2,200 military personnel. A *MEU* has resources of all sorts, enabling it to operate for 15 days without being reinforced. For the structure and capabilities of the MEU see, for example, *26th Marine Expeditionary Unit: a certain force in an uncertain world*, at the Internet address www.26meu.marines.mil/About/MEU.aspx

[25] For its characteristics see www.san-antonio.navy.mil ("the most high-tech, advanced amphibious ship ever built")

[26] „U.S. forces, regional partners kick off 'Eager Lion' in Jordan", *U.S. Central Command News Releases*, June 11, 2013 at the Internet address http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120255

[27] *Ibidem*

[28] *Ibidem*, second part of the text

Group 5[29], which includes the *Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group*, comprised of 3 *heavy landing and assault ships – USS Kearsarge, USS Carter Hall and USS San Antonio* have participated at *Eager Lion*, having a "major role". Subunits from the *MEU 26* (which we have previously talked about)[30] have also participated at *Eager Lion*. In the present *geostrategic* state of affairs, the effort to catalyze, consolidate and use certain large regional coalitions, which are capable of sustaining grand common military exercises like *Eager Resolve* or *Eager Lion*, is *mandatory* for the U.S. policy and its' *vital interests* in the Persian Gulf region (and in a broader sense, the entire Middle East). However, we do not know if this is *sufficient*. In other words: *we do not know how effective such coalitions will prove to be in the case of real and major crises.*

3. Saudi Arabia: consolidated power status and *proxy war* against Iran

Saudi Arabia is, undoubtedly, the most important of the six regional powers which, together, shape the structure called the Gulf Cooperation Council (in alphabetical order: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates-UAE). Its GDP, total area and total population makes Saudi Arabia the most powerful Sunni Arab state in the Gulf Area. More than this, Saudi Arabia has another tremendous asset, easily transferred into political power: it controls some of the holy places of the Muslim faith. This very fact offers Riyadh a significant window of opportunity, but also places on the shoulders of the Saudi decision-makers an immense responsibility. Along many years, the basic feature of Saudi-Iranian relations is that of increased tensions. *Sunni Saudis are, clearly, deeply interested to limit (or to contain) the actions of Shiite Iranians who are aiming to make Tehran the de facto hegemonic power in the Persian Gulf area and, in broader terms, across the entire Middle East.*

Saudi military forces are not at all small or weak. *According to open sources, the Saudi defense industry budget might be the fourth largest in the world* (only the U.S., China and Russia spent more to produce weapons necessary for maintaining very strong armed forces). The amount of money used by Saudi Arabia for national (and regional) defense is really huge: some 52.9 billion USD in 2013, and some forecasts indicate that *defense spending is going to grow in the near future, reaching, with a pace of annual growth of 7.92 %, almost 77.3 billion USD in 2018*[31].

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[29] *Expeditionary Strike Group 5* operates within *the 5th U.S. Fleet*, based at Manama, in Bahrain. It coordinates a rapid reaction force, able to land, for different types of missions (combat, peace-keeping, humanitarian), practically anywhere practic in the Middle East, the Gulf, the Indian subcontinent or on the shores of Africa, more than 3.500 soldiers – see „Strike force on standby for conflict zones across Gulf", *The National*, November 12, 2009, at the Internet address http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/strike-force-on-standby-for-conflict-zones-across-gulf

[30] Michael S. LOCKETT (Cpl., Marine Corps), „Marine platoon works with Jordanian Armed Forces", *American Forces Press Service*, June 14, 2013, at http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=120294.

[31] http://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/saudi-arabian-defence-industry-placed-000000421.html.

In the era of the Gulf War in 1991, by means of which Saddam Hussein was severely defeated and forced to abandon Kuwait (which he had invaded in 1990), Saudi Arabia mobilized and deployed quite large and well armed military forces: according to a Romanian military evaluation published almost 22 years ago, the Saudis had, in 1991, two armored (tank) brigades, four mechanized brigades, one infantry brigade, one air assault / air mobile brigade, a guards brigade and 14 complete air squadrons. These forces had at that moment some 67.500 soldiers, 800 medium tanks, 200 armored fighting vehicles, 1,044 artillery tubes (including mortars), 30 large missile-launching systems, 120 combat planes (60 of them were U.S. built *F-15*s; 24 *Tornado* were also available), 62 helicopters, and more than 50 combat ships of different types[32].

For some years after the astonishing and complete *military* success of *Operation Desert Storm*, Saudi Arabia simply ceased to think that defense spending is the highest possible priority. And this because of a very simple reason: badly defeated, with crippled armed forces, Saddam Hussein was not regarded to be a major and imminent threat; but, on the other hand, Hussein's Iraq was still powerful enough to absorb, to slow, and maybe to stop a potential Iranian major offensive / aggressive operation. In such a situation, Saudi armed forces grew larger (in 2002, for example, Saudi Arabia had 160 *F-15*s, a four times increase in 10 years, and also had several U.S.-made *M1A1 Abrams*), but its general level of combat training and combat worthiness clearly has been severely declining for several years after 1990-1991[33]. According to what open sources say, roughly between *Desert Storm* (1991) and the second massive American military intervention against Saddam Hussein, in 2003, the Saudi defense budget was a very stable one, with no significant increase (20 to 25 billion USD per year[34]).

Later on, when Iraqi forces ceased, after 2003, to be a really effective barrier (or deterrent) against the more and more aggressive and expansionist Iran, Saudi Arabia started developing, massively and quickly, its armed forces. The development pace of the Saudi military forces was directly correlated, starting with 2005, to larger and larger defense budgets[35], quite easily available as a result of really huge revenues generated by oil exports. The Saudis got involved, more or less directly, because of obvious geo-strategic reasons, in *several* conflicts with a clear common denominator: the *Shiite* Iran was trying to enlarge its sphere of influence, while *Sunni* Saudi Arabia attempted to stop (or at least to limit or to slow) Iranian expansionism. *For example, Saudi Arabia was (and still is) deeply interested to put and end to the Houthi rebellion in Yemen*,

[32] For the Saudi military power in 1991, see Institutul de Istorie şi Teorie Militară, *op. cit.*, p. 85

[33] Richard D. SOKOLSKI (editor), *The United States and the Persan Gulf: Reshaping security strategy for the post-containment era, National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C.*, 2003, pp. 78-79.

[34] Anthony H. CORDESMAN, Alexander WILNER, *The Gulf Military Balance 2012 (Working Draft: May 16, 2012)*, CSIS, Washington, D.C., 2012, p. 54 (the Saudi defense budget was 20-25 billion USD per year, at least from 1997 to 2004)

[35] *Ibidem*, p. 54: 2005: more than 28 billion USD; 2006: more than 32 billion USD; 2007: more than 37,6 billion, etc.

which has been fomented and supported (by several massive arms transports[36]) by Iran.

Even more recently, *the Sunni Saudi Arabia proved itself to be deeply preoccupied by the increasing conflict in Syria*, and this mainly because the regime of Bashar al Assad is continuously and massively supported by the *Shiite* Iran, while the opposition fighting against Assad is dominated by *Sunni* political and military organizations. I strongly feel the need to underline that Iranian support in favor of Assad, an *Alawite*, is not at all limited to speeches and diplomacy; on the contrary, open sources and many Western analysts and leaders say, *Tehran already has in Syria a significant military presence, and it sends weapons, using various routes, to Syrian governmental forces.* Intensity of the conflict involving Saudi Arabia and Iran in Syria has already reached the level of significance we usually call *proxy war.*

In the final stages of August, 2013, international media presented, with a lot of details, an almost *astonishing* strategic offer made by the Saudi prince Bandar bin Sultan, former ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the U.S. and, at the present moment, acting chief of the Saudi intelligence services, to the Russian president Vladimir Putin. The high Saudi official told Putin that Saudi Arabia is ready to fully cooperate with Moscow (and to make, if necessary, significant and costly concessions) in the field of oil extraction and trade, and is also ready to buy Russian weapons (some sources speak about potential contracts with a total value of almost 15 billion U.S. dollars). Bandar bin Sultan asked Putin, in exchange for all these, *not* to support any more the regime in Damascus. Bin Sultan also told the Russian president – international media clearly states – that Saudi Arabia controls the *Sunni* Chechens fighting now in Syria, directly against Assad (and *also* against the *Shiite* Iran, a major ally and protector of Assad), and promised the Russians that these Chechens will not be permitted to launch terrorist attacks, in 2014, against the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi. This promise was accompanied by the same request: Russia is to abandon Bashar al Assad[37] (who is now the *most important regional ally* of Tehran, the *geo-strategic arch-foe* of Saudi Arabia).

Even more recently, *Washington Post* has published an article saying that Saudi Arabia was both *strongly disappointed* and *strongly irritated* because Washington, D.C. seemed to be, in mid-September, on the verge of accepting a Russian plan to place the Syrian chemical weapons under international control. Such a plan might preserve the regime led by Assad. The article openly underlines that the Saudis are those who are "spearheading military support for the Syrian rebels" and "had publicly backed the idea of U.S. strikes" against valuable targets vital for the Assad regime, and also that "for Gulf states

[36] For the military help offered by Iran to the Houthi rebels in Yemen see Eric SCHMITT and Robert F. WORTH „With Arms for Yemen Rebels, Iran Seeks Wider Mideast Role", *New York Times*, March 15, 2012, at the Internet address http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/world/middleeast/aiding-yemen-rebels-iran-seeks-wider-mideast-role.html

[37] See, for example, A. EVANS-PRITCHARD, „Saudis offer Russia secret oil deal if it drops Syria", Telegraph, August 27, 2013, at www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/10266957/Saudis-offer-Russia...

including Saudi Arabia… the fight to oust Assad plays into a wider regional struggle against the influence of the Shiite Iran"[38]. *All these elements, put together, generate the vivid image of a more and more potent and assertive regional power, ready to make huge efforts to 'contain' Iran and the regional allies of Tehran*.

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[38] Loveday MORRIS, „U.S. ties in Persan Gulf at risk as Obama allows space for Russian-Syrian plan", *Washington Post*, September 11, 2013, at www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-gulf-relations-at-risk-as-obama-allows-space-for....

NATO-EU PARTNERSHIP. TRADITION AND CHANGES

Cristina BOGZEANU*

The economic and financial crisis begun in 2007 has brought significant challenges for all the actors of the international arena. New centers of power have asserted increasingly strongly their status as significant centers of power on the world stage, US announced that its strategic interests pivoted towards Asia-Pacific region, new security challenges have begun to impact on the characteristics of the international system; one could also speak about new areas with a high potential to generate conflicts such as Northern Africa or about new manners of interaction between international actors.

Thus, international system as well as the international security environment can be characterized by its fluid, complex and dynamic character. Thus, under these conditions, which are the evolutions that can be found at the level of NATO-EU relation? To what extent have these current international trends affected this partnership? These are the question to which the present paper sets itself to find a justified answer, departing from the history of these relations as well as from US central role in this context.

Keywords*: multipolarity; strategic partnership; European security; responsibilities; defence planning.*

A year before the world economic and financial crisis reached its apogee, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO's Secretary General at that time, was speaking about NATO-EU relation as a "frozen conflict"[1], emphasizing in this way the problematic and difficult character of the cooperation between the main European security organizations. Actually, as necessary as a coherent, clear and strong NATO-EU partnership might be, as much difficult its functioning turns out to be.

International system's dynamic triggers repercussions on the terms in which this relation is defined. Thus, if NATO-EU relation developed in the context of unipolarity, in which US played the role of world's sole super-power, the increasingly clear possibility for other states to become comparable centers of power certainly have had consequences on NATO-EU partnership. The definition of national interests and of the strategic priorities of the actor described by Madeleine Albright as "the indispensable nation" influence both the actors, respectively NATO, where Washington represents the ally with the most consistent resources of power, and EU, through the partnership relations. Actually, when approaching NATO-EU relation, US play a central role.

The change of international system's polarity is also accompanied by the emergence of new characteristics of the international security environment, new challenges and even new security risks and threats, requiring a new approach, as transformations at polarity's level equals, first of all, with changes of the relations between international actors.

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[1] *NATO and the EU: Time for a New Chapter. Keynote speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer,* 29 Jan. 2007, Berlin, Germany, URL: http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2007/s070129b.html.

Additionally, neither the perceptions of the relations between the two organizations could be seen as keeping a constant character during time. If, at the moment when Brussels was making its firsts steps towards the development of a security and defence dimension, there was a fear that EU could eventually turn into a competitor for NATO regarding the provision of security for the European space, the rhetoric has constantly evolved into the imperative of an equality-based and complementary partnership. Even more, official documents and the discourses of the two organizations' representatives abound in emphasizes of the necessity of cooperation or of improving cooperation between NATO and EU in various areas related to security. However, actually, at the level of the action undertaken in common, of consultations and of creating legal and institutional frameworks for cooperation, this relation evidently needs improvement.

1. NATO-EU relation coordinates and inherent difficulties

The key role of the Euro-Atlantic partnership has constantly been emphasized in the programmatic documents issued both at NATO and at EU level. Thus, NATO Strategic Concept (2010) mentioned that "the transatlantic link remains as strong, and as important to the preservation of Euro-Atlantic peace and security, as ever. The security of NATO members on both sides of the Atlantic is indivisible"[2]. This idea was reiterated at Chicago Summit (2012): "NATO and the EU share common values and strategic interests. The EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. Fully strengthening this strategic partnership, as agreed by our two organizations and enshrined in the Strategic Concept, is particularly important in the current environment of austerity"[3].

Reiterating the necessity to consolidate cooperation relations between NATO and EU can be interpreted not only as a token of the awareness and acceptance of the need to enhance this partnership, but also as indications of certain issues remained unresolved, related to the parameters within which this relation in defined. Thus, reading between the lines of the declarations regarding the need for a functional NATO-EU partnership, there can be found proofs of the fact that this cooperation is still facing significant difficulties.

A similar approach can be identified at EU's level. European Security Strategy (2003) stipulated that "The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO"[4] and that "the EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance

[2] *Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon*, 19-20 November 2010, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Brussels, 2010, p. 6.

[3] *Chicago Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012*, URL: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm?mo de=pressrelease.

[4] *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December 2003, URL: http://www.con silium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, p. 1.

the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organizations in crisis management. This reflects our common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century"[5].

However, although these organizations' main security tasks remain unchanged, although the positive impact of the cooperation between them is still widely accepted and so it is the need for deepening this partnership, the fact that NATO-EU relation evolved towards a new stage, under the influence of the general dynamic of the international security environment, is of high appearance[6].

When trying to see NATO and EU visions on their relation according to the official presentations published on-line, there can be observed a discrepancy. Thus, European External Action Service official web page refers to NATO only from the perspective of "Berlin Plus" Agreements significance and contents[7]. NATO site[8], instead, offers more space to the Alliance relation to the EU, underlining repeatedly its importance, the role plaid by EU in maintaining Euro-Atlantic space security, the need for further development of EU security and defence dimension as well as for the two organizations to play complementary roles and to support each other in promoting international security. The means for achieving these objectives are the following: a) mutual openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for the full institutional autonomy and integrity; b) the enhancement of cooperation in the operations afferent to the management of the full range of crises, from coordinated planning to mutual support on the field; c) the extension of political consultations so as to include all aspects of common interest which shall lead to a common assessment and perspective; d) full cooperation in the capabilities' development so as to avoid duplication and maximize the efficiency of expenditures[9].

Another relevant aspect is represented by the fact that, beyond the awareness on the importance of their cooperation, NATO-EU relation is missing a strong legal fundament. Thus, besides the texts of EU treaties and strategic documents and NATO strategic concept and summit declarations, there can be identified only two such documents. Firstly, it is about NATO-EU Declaration on the European Security and Defence Policy (2002) which reiterates a series of political principles laying at the basis of this relation. Extremely relevant is, in our opinion, the fact that this document illustrates that EU is attributed a secondary role in security issues. "European Union and NATO (…) welcome the continued important role of NATO in crisis management and conflict prevention, and reaffirm that NATO remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members (…) reaffirm that a stronger European role will help

[5] Ibidem, p. 12.
[6] For an extensive approach, see Cristina BOGZEANU, *Evoluția relației NATO-UE față de determinarea polilor de putere*, "Carol I" National University Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2013.
[7] *CSDP Partnership*, URL: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/partners/index _en.htm.
[8] *NATO-EU: a strategic partnership*, URL: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/nato live/topics_49217.htm.
[9] Ibidem.

contribute to the vitality of the Alliance, specifically in the field of crisis management"[10].

In 2003, "Berlin Plus" Agreements established a basis for NATO-EU cooperation in crisis management. "Berlin Plus" represents one of the few areas of NATO-EU cooperation having acquired a solid institutional fundament. Nevertheless, until presently, EU carried out only two missions within this agreements' framework (Concordia and Althea), both of them in Western Balkans and both of them undertaking NATO's previous missions' responsibilities. These agreements can be considered an effort to offer a legal and institutional frame to NATO-EU relations, but there can be easily noted that, at that time, there was a clear tendency to give the Union a secondary status in relation to NATO in terms of security responsibilities, to give the EU the function of supporting NATO's action and the course of Concordia and Althea operations are eloquent in this respect.

Nevertheless, since the coming into force of "Berlin Plus" Agreements, the world has passed through a range of substantial changes. NATO-EU relation is nowadays under the imperative of an equitable share of European and Euro-Atlantic security tasks. In other words, as opposed to the attitude adopted in "Berlin Plus" case, NATO's current position (and, in this respect, one shall have in view the central US position which is central in the Alliance organization and functioning) is not to keep EU in a subsidiary position, but to support its development until it reaches an equality status, being capable of assuming equal responsibilities in the area of security and defence.

2. European security – towards an equitable burden sharing

As mentioned before, NATO-EU relation is becoming increasingly complex, as EU has to assume more responsibilities in terms of security. This comes as a result of US strategic priorities "pivoting" towards Asia-Pacific concomitantly with Washington decision to balance NATO member states' financial contribution to the functioning of the Alliance. In other words, either we consider NATO or the EU, the core issue consists in determining the Europeans to invest more in their security.

Washington's current foreign policy trends don't hide a decision to "abandon" the Europeans, but the need to share in an equitable manner the responsibilities for regional and international security. The significance of the article 5 of the Treaty of Washington maintains its validity. Actually, for NATO this could be translated into a return to the Alliance fundamental mission – collective defence. The end of the military operations in Middle East, the mission in Libya carried out under the lead of European states clearly indicate the tendency to give up non-article 5 missions for the article 5 ones. At the same

[10] *EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP*, 16 Dec. 2002, URL: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_19544.htm.

time, it is noteworthy that the project of the ballistic anti-missile shield is still in effect. All these, together with smart defence and pooling and sharing initiatives reveal the fact that the main security guarantor for European security is expected to be the EU and its member states, the US assuming the role of insurer of insurers, an insurer of last instance[11].

In our opinion, this is the main change of NATO-EU relation in the context of multipolarity – the greater implication of the European states in ensuring their own security, but this necessity come together with a series of serious challenges.

The gravest challenge refers to the Europeans institutional and financial capacity to succeed in playing this role on the European and international arena. Not only has the EU been strongly affected by the economic and financial crisis, whose effects are still present inclusively in the area of military budgets, but it has also passed relatively recently through a reform of the institutions afferent to the Common Security and Defence Policy. Moreover, EU also goes through a real political crisis which raises questions on its viability and the chances of enduring beyond this period of ample changes at the level of the international strategic system.

Plus, the events happened during the last three years represented both demonstrations of this new role on the international arena for the European states and of EU insufficient capacity to approach them in an efficient manner, using EU institutional framework and instruments. One of the most eloquent examples in this respect is the case of Libya (2011), where the European states led the military operation Unified Protector, but under NATO aegis, EU's intervention turning out to be, at best, marginal.

Another such demonstration was made by the course of events in Mali (2012), when the authorities lost control on the north of the state and solicited a French military support. Although French troops ended the insurgency, the problem consisted in the fact that as necessary and justified a EU military intervention had been, as obvious was its lack of capacity to intervene in a decisive manner to solve a crisis in a state characterized as "an important EU partner in Western Africa"[12]. Nevertheless, in February 2013, EU launched a training mission (EUTM) for contributing to Malian military forces training and organization. Although EUTM is a military mission, its mandate does not include combat actions.

The fact that EU and its member states haven't crystallized yet the necessary instruments and capacity to intervene in the crisis management in the close proximity was also revealed by the evolution of the crisis in Syria. As far as the EU is concerned, Syria is included in the European Neighborhood Policy, an initiative meant to ensure a stable security environment in the vicinity of EU borders. A major EU involvement would have been, therefore, justifiable. And

[11] Jim THOMAS, „Asigurătorul Asigurătorilor", in *Foreign Policy România*, no. 25, Nov./Dec. 2011, p. 46.
[12] *EU Relations with Mali*, URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/mali/.

this the more as instability in Syria seriously impacted on a state with which Brussels set itself to improve relations – Turkey. Thus, in July 2013, in the context of a violent reaction of Turkish authorities against the protesters, leaders in Brussels proposed a consolidated partnership with Ankara and a new momentum to the accession negotiations[13]. To all these, there shall be also added Turkey's strategic value for EU from the perspective of energy security, of the relations with the Russian Federation and of the balance of power in the Wider Black Sea Area[14]. As a consequence, EU would have been expected to intervene at least diplomatically and humanitarianly in the management of this crisis, making use of the instruments which represent the added value brought by Europeans in crisis management. The actual EU reaction in this respect consisted in an embargo on arms and equipments which could be used for internal repression and punctual sanctions for the individuals taking part in repression actors, a reaction which, in the context of the "chemical weapons crisis" of August 2013, turned out to be insufficient in order to appreciate that the Union has had a real contribution to the management of this crisis.

Nor at NATO's level has a common action in this respect crystallized, as the Secretary General of the Alliance announced that the manner in which the intervention in Syria would develop is still its member states' option and that NATO hasn't yet established a role in this context.

3. Traditional and new areas of cooperation

Both NATO and EU have paid a lot of attention to their cooperation in practice, on the theaters of operations. In 2003, EU and NATO agreed on a concerted approach for the Western Balkans, which expressed their common vision on the crises in this area and set themselves to cooperate in stabilizing the region. Afghanistan, Darfur and piracy activities in Somalia seas are other examples of NATO-EU cooperation in the theaters of operations.

As far as these organizations' visions on crisis management is concerned, noteworthy is the central role given to the concept of "comprehensive approach", an idea meant to create the necessary framework for complementary actions. Comprehensive approach supposes the use of civilian, military and political instruments in crisis management. This concept is central for NATO-EU relation as EU had the tendency to develop its civilian crisis management capacity, being centered in Brussels' vision on principles such as "local capacity building in failed states, the importance of policy to ensure peace settlement, legitimacy in crisis intervention, unity of effort, security, crisis transformation and regional engagement"[15]. At the same time, NATO maintained the trend of

[13] Stefan FÜLE, Speech – *EU-Turkey bound together*, June, 7th, 2013, URL: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-517_en.htm.

[14] For details, see Cristina BOGZEANU, *Evoluţia mediului de securitate din Zona Extinsă a Mării Negre şi influenţa acesteia asupra configurării Forţelor Navale ale României pe termen mediu şi lung*, "Carol I" National University Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2012, pp. 33-39

[15] Teodor FRUNZETI, "Comprehensive approach in crisis management", in *Strategic Impact*, no. 3[44]/2012, p. 11.

developing its military crisis management capability, thus ensuring complementary and the avoidance of the situation in which NATO-EU relation would gain a competitive character.

Presently, one could not speak about the possibility for the EU to become a competitor for NATO in security and defence terms, but about the necessity for Brussels to become an equal partner for NATO. "Pooling and sharing" initiative, meant to contribute to the development of EU military capabilities and, implicitly, of its capacity to take action unilaterally in crisis management confirms this idea. Even more, it is also notable the mention of NATO Strategic Concept (2010) regarding the development of NATO's civilian capabilities: "form an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability to interface more effectively with civilian partners, building on the lessons learned from NATO-led operations"[16].

There is a considerable difference between this trend and the attitude seen before the economic and financial crisis. In his speech at Berlin (2007), Jaap de Hoop Scheffer emphasized the complementary character of the two organizations: "[our success] depends on whether we succeed in creating a secure environment for political and economic development. NATO can create that environment, but cannot do more. NATO does not have the civil means to drive reconstruction forward, and we also have no interest at all in acquiring such means. It is the EU that has such means. For that reason it can, together with other civil players, give decisive impetus to reconstruction. In other words, the two institutions are dependent upon one another"[17]. It is significant, in our opinion, that, since then, although the speeches promoting and reiterating the stringency of consolidating cooperation have become more and more ample and frequent, both NATO and EU make efforts to consolidate those capabilities that weren't developed sufficiently or at all. Thus, at NATO's level, there can be found the wish to develop civilian capabilities, while the EU is striving to develop the military ones.

In our opinion, comprehensive approach constituted a framework and an opportunity to take advantage of the two organizations' common experience and to develop it, being based on the one of the most important principles governing the report between the two organizations – complementarity. But, the efforts to enhance burden sharing within this partnership by a assuming various crisis management instruments (comprehensive approach) may have been shaded by the recent initiatives in defence planning – smart defence (NATO) and pooling and sharing (EU)[18]. Nonetheless, beyond these apparently paradoxically trends, there is a basic European issue – European states' small financial contribution to

[16] *Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon,* 19-20 November 2010, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Brussels, 2010, p. 21.

[17] *NATO and the EU: Time for a New Chapter. Keynote speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer,* 29 Jan. 2007, Berlin, Germany, URL: http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2007/s070129b.html.

[18] The significances and implications of these initiatives, see Cristina BOGZEANU, "NATO-EU relation from the perspective of the implications of 'smart defence' and 'pooling and sharing' concepts", in *Strategic Impact,* no. 3 [44]/2012, pp. 33-40.

their own defence, an issue which expanded in the context of the economic and financial crisis and the re-definition of US strategic priorities in the favor of Asia-Pacific region.

Additionally, comprehensive approach is not the sole manner found to share the security burden between NATO and EU. There are also opinions according to which NATO-EU relation shall be founded on burden sharing on geographical lines. In this respect, NATO is supposed to deal with crises in South-East Asia, while the EU with the ones happening in the Balkans and Africa[19].

But, such a manner to share responsibilities would be, in our opinion, very little feasible in the current international context. First of all, at a closer look at EU development in terms of security and defence or at Brussels reactions to the crises in Georgia (2008), Libya (2011), Mali (2013), it is easy to see that the Unions hasn't yet developed the necessary resources to cover unilaterally all the crises in a certain region. The main reason for this is represented by the fact that, within a changing international context requiring flexibility, adaptability, assuming responsibilities, European security and defence are still tributary to the post-Cold War statu quo – US security guarantees.

As a consequence, in a "best case" scenario, the security of the European space and of its vicinity would be guaranteed through an equitable, thoroughly complementary NATO-EU partnership, based on unequivocal normative acts, defined within adequate institutional frameworks.

Plus, as we have mentioned before, the issues of NATO-EU relations becomes increasingly complex as the necessity of its optimal functioning is directly proportional with the difficulties that have to be overcome.

In this respect, one shall also note that there are two major security challenges having acquired a higher priority on NATO and EU security agendas, namely cyber and energy threats.

Regarding cyber security, both NATO and EU developed wide variety of programmatic documents, strategies and action plans. Noteworthy is the fact that the role assumed by NATO in this context is smaller than the EU's one as the Alliance's Cyber Defence Policy focuses mainly on the protection of NATO networks and on national networks cyber defence requirements on which the Alliance relies in order to achieve its fundamental tasks: collective defence and crisis management.

NATO-EU cooperation in this domain is even more complicated as it supposes the consistent support of both national authorities and private actors. Also, in order to make the most of this partnership in this sphere, it would be necessary to include capabilities development (security defence issues have already been included in "smart defence" projects), an efficient exchange of information between the actors involved, as well as the agreement on a common

[19] Daniel HAMILTON (coord.), *Alliance Reborn: An Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century. The Washington NATO Project*, February 2009, URL: http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/sebin/i/y/nato_report_final.pdf, p. xi.

way of research, risk assessment and response to events which may represent a cyber risk. Inter-institutional communication is crucial for an efficient common countering of cyber risks.

Similarly can be analyzed NATO and EU preoccupations related to energy security. NATO Strategic Concept (2010) refers to the risk represented by the high level of NATO member states' energy dependency as well as to the vulnerabilities of the afferent critical infrastructures. Energy security is also included in the Report on the implementation of European Security Strategy (2008), the accent being laid, this time, on European states' energy dependency, on the necessity of an EU energy policy and on the diversification of power resources.

Broadly speaking, NATO's preoccupations in this area are centered on three major aspects: the protection of energy critical infrastructures (which may easily become targets for terrorist or cyber attacks), the energy efficiency of the deployed forces[20] and the mitigation of their impact on the environment, the possibility for the insufficient character of the resources to lead to conflicts. As far as energy critical infrastructures protection is concerned, NATO can list at least two operations implying such activities. Firstly, it is about Operation Active Endeavour (Mediterranean Sea) supposing, among others, the escort of civilian ships and, secondly, about the operation against piracy in the Somalia's seas, implying the protection of the ships transporting oil.

For the EU, the issue of energy security takes a relatively different form. Thus, there can be found, at European Defence Agency's level, initiatives similar to NATO's ones, such as "Military Green" or "Go Green", focused on the development of military equipments with no negative impact on the environment. For instance, "Go Green" supposes the development of military equipments using renewable sources of energy. Nevertheless, for Brussels, much more stringent seems to be finding a solution to create an EU energy policy and a common market in this respect, as well as the reduction of the dependency on Russian hydrocarbons.

The need for NATO-EU cooperation in this area is accepted and acknowledged by both of them, but finding solutions for enhancing cooperation is still difficult.

Conclusions

Official documents and declarations emitted by NATO and EU reveal the necessity and importance of their partnership. But, the way in which these texts are formulated, the abundance of references to need of "improving", "consolidating", "enhancing", "developing" cooperation, as well as the manner in which this cooperation materializes indicate the existence of significant

[20] In 2013, NATO organized a camp meant to contribute to the identification of the best practices for cutting back energy resources during operations. For details, see: URL: http://www.nato.int/cps/ar/SID-6F95EE29-67535D83/nato live/news_101896.htm?selectedLocale=en.

difficulties hindering this process. The causes of this fact are multiple and, sometimes, apparently paradoxical. Nevertheless, the distinct nature of the two organizations, the different ways of organization and functioning, even the differences regarding their evolution in time, as well as US NATO membership have been enough to determine their existence.

This state of facts describes the present-day situation, but this doesn't mean it is of recent date too. But, in the process of time, the data of this issue become more and more complicated. NATO-EU partnership is useful, but even more difficult to be put into practice against the scarcity of resources and the changes occurred in their member states' strategic priorities.

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PERSPECTIVES OF COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY FOLLOWING THE 2010 LISBON TREATY

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The Lisbon Treaty prepared the development and affirmation of the European Union on the international scene. This treaty's provisions are directed to the increase of importance and role of the European Union in the world. On the new world scene, the European Union increases its position by adopting an integrationist treaty with functionalist approach.

The European construction success will consist in the irreversible acceptation of changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty and the reshaping of the common foreign and security policy as an active, efficient and dynamic instrument. Another feature of success will be given by the ratio of trust of people as regards this construction and the will to continue the European dream of Europe' parents.

Keywords: CFSP, ESDP, CSDP, EU, pillar, defence, security, European states, sovereignty

The European Union is an union of states founded on democratic and immutable principles. The international security environment is insecure, the international scene is non-governable but the European Union must stand as the space of democracy, peace and security. Therefore, it must adapt its security to the new global changes. This intention was also shaped by the successive transformation of its common security policy, the most important, we consider, are those accomplished by 2010 Lisbon Treaty.

1. The apparition of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

Following the end of the second world conflagration, Europe was in ruin and economic-social disaster. The help given by the Americans in the reconstruction of the European states was as a breath of oxygen. In 1948, five states (France, the Great Britain, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg) sign the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, briefly the Brussels Treaty. This treaty was afterwards included in NATO after the assignation of General Dwight Eisenhower in the job as Supreme Allied Commander for Europe. The need to defence against the Soviet Threat is more visibly expressed in the French Foreign Minister Réne Pléven proposal. Pleven Plan, proposed in 1952, regarded the constitution of an European Community of Defence but also of an European Political Community. The plan was not voted by the French Assembly in 1954. The failure of this initiative was because of the lack of vision of the European leaders. Other

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contradictory issue in the adoption of this plan was the fear of a possible federalization of Europe.

The Brussels Treaty became in 1954 the Western Europe Union (WEU). The main goals of WEU were to create a solid economic basis, to institute a mutual assistance in situation of aggression and the resettlement of trust among the western European states by controlling the armaments production. WEU also served as linkage between the European Union and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

In the first years of the European Union, the protection of this space was provided by the United States of America. Once with the detachment and the political relaxation between the both great powers, the European Union understood it cannot permanently ground on American or NATO capabilities.

In the Western Europe Union framework appeared the concept of European Security and Defence Identity. The concept born in December 1973 in Copenhagen, and allowed the European states to develop capacities of their own separated from NATO and USA. Europe cannot ground anymore exclusively on foreign support thus it must develop its own capacity of defence.

To the initiative of France and Belgium, in October 1984, to the WEU Summit in Rome, the WEU foreign and defence ministers define the European identity of security and defence as gradual harmonization of defence policies of the Member States. In October 1987, in Hague, The Platform for European security interests is launched. The Hague Platform stipulated NATO indivisibility.

Europe integrity is dependent by the security and defence and by the initiation of an European pillar in the NATO framework. A successful pattern of this initiative is represented by the settlement in 1987 of the French-German Brigade which historically originates in the Friendship Treaty signed by France and the Federal German Republic in 1963 at Elysé.

Following the Maastricht Treaty, WEU becomes integrant part of EU development and the main instrument to apply the decisions and actions with implications in the defence field. CFSP will become the second pillar of the organization and, thus, the security and defence will become main part of the European construction.

In 1992, Petersberg Declaration defines the range of missions lead by the Western Europe Union: humanitarian, for search and rescue, peacekeeping, crisis management operations. The growth of WEU importance owed to the French impulse. Afterwards, the growth of organization importance leads to the intensification of the European presence in NATO.

After the Maastricht Treaty, the security and defence component of Europe will evolve and transform in a veritable instrument to assert the European values all over the world.

2. CFSP metamorphoses from Amsterdam to Lisbon

The Amsterdam Treaty substantially modifies the Common Foreign Security Policy of Europe. There are traced five major goals for this policy by the Treaty. The main goal is to defend the common values, fundamental interests, integrity and independence of the Union in conformity with the UN Charter principles. The second goal is to strengthen the Union's security by all means. The third goal is represented by the peacekeeping and the consolidation of international security. The fourth goal is constituted by the promotion of international cooperation and the last goal is to develop and strengthen the democracy and state of law, as well as the respect of human rights.

The Köln European Council increased the European Union role despite the Western Europe Union in the field of security and defence. Saint-Malo Summit in 1998 installed the French-English military cooperation on the European level. The Köln European Council grounds the European Security and Defence Policy. ESDP is an intergovernmental process allowing the development of military operations under the authority of the European Union with NATO capabilities. ESDP is integrant part of CFSP. The same in Köln was decided the settlement of a global goal, called *Helsinki Headline Goal 2003*. It consisted in the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force by about 50-60,000 humans, with self-sustenance capacity in the operation field for sixty days and 12 months outside the operation field. This reaction force must execute Petersberg-type missions. Also, in the *Helsinki Headline Goal 2003* framework it was provisioned the settlement of some political-military institutions as the European Major Staff, the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee.

The Political and Security Committee created by Nice Treaty assesses the international security environment, defines European Union's policies, supports the development of military capabilities and traces political-strategic guidelines. Since 2005, in the Political and Security Committee, each state will have a single representative. The European Union Military Staff is lead by a four-star general, proposed by the reunited major staff with a 3 years mandate. The main attributions of the European Major Staff are in the following fields: planning policies, information, operations and exercises, logistics and resources, communication and information systems, civil-military cooperation cell.

The European Union missions are operationally leaded by the deputy of Supreme Allied Commander in Europe who is European general. EU cell to the Supreme Allied Commandment in Europe has as role the interoperability with NATO and the improvement of operations. EU operations using NATO resources and capacities are called Berlin Plus. Previously this name, Berlin operation assigned the WEU command and NATO capabilities.

In the European Council framework, in conformity to Amsterdam Treaty, there are also present the General Directorate of Foreign Relation and the General Directorate of Defence. The High Representative of CFSP also

conducts the SitCen monitoring the international environment, collects information, analyzes geostrategic problems, and prevents critical situations by the early warning mechanism.

In December 2002, at Copenhagen was signed the NATO-EU agreement regarding the EU access to the NATO means and capabilities, thus the Berlin Plus Agreement enters into force. EU operations will be done with Alliance's resources not with national resources.

Washington Summit in 1999 decided the European Union should lead the crisis management operations with NATO capacities, and to the European Council in Brussels in 2002 was signed the NATO-EU agreement on CSDP. These decisions strengthened the role on the European Union inside NATO, resulting in a stronger and clearer resonance of the EU Member States inside the North-Atlantic Alliance.

In 2003, the Security Strategy or Solana Document appears. In Salonic, Javier Solana, the High Representative of CFSP will read the document „A safer Europe in a better world". This strategy has three main goals[1]: stability inside the European Union borders and good governance in the near vicinity, an international order based on efficient multilateralism and adequate answer against old and new threats.

Other key-moment in the CFSP transformation is the apparition of European Defence Agency. The main goal of this agency is a coherent European policy in the field of defence capacities development, researches and armaments.

Nice Treaty will bring as main transformation CFSP functioning by the means of Common Security and Defence Policy. The European Security and Defence Policy started from CSDP and lead to the materialization of EU operations. WEU became integrant part of European Union development. The European Council is the supreme forum for decision making concerning the security and defence matters. The main goals of the European Union are settled in this forum, the Council's presidency can emergently convoke the Council. Other important decision is the settlement of Political and Security Committee directly subordinated to the Council.

The first ESDP – CSDP was ARTEMIS in the Democratic Republic of Congo, a stabilization mission of Bunya region in this country. Other missions lead by the European states on the African continent is missions from Congo in 2005, Guinea-Bissau in 2008, and Chad in 2009. The CSDP missions respect the human rights, the principles of women and children non-discrimination, the respect for moral and physical integrity of collaterals to the conflict.

In 2004, the specific "Athens" cooperation mechanism developed and provisioned the Member States must bear the CFSP missions expenditures. For example, ESDP budget gradually grew from year to year. In 2006, the budget was about 102 million Euros, in 2010, about 280 million Euros and in 2012,

[1] *European Security Strategy "A Secure Europe in a Better World"*, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 11, Vezi: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.

about 9.4 billion Euros. The growth of budget represents the wish for more active representations of the European Union on global plan.

3. The Lisbon Treaty and the disappearance of pillar II of the European Union

The Lisbon Treaty is the generic name for two treaties entered in force on December 1st, 2009, the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. This treaty is considered to be federalist and integrationist. Its critics sustain the European Union looks to legitimate its federalist vocation by this treaty.

The European Union adopted a functionalist vision, step-by-step, gradual integration of the European states without damaging the sovereignty. Sovereignty is central element in the existence of a state. Truncation, sharing or infringement of this main state attribute is direct attack over this state existence. The states fought for centuries to acquire this attribute. Nowadays, great part of the European states have gradually and willingly renounced to their sovereignty in the favour of the European Union. In conformity with the juridical norms, the EU member states do not have anymore the exclusivity, supremacy and independency as regards the decisions they must take on their territory and population. The internal and external sovereignty of states is not absolute anymore. This vision is shared by the critics of the Lisbon Treaty.

The defenders of this treaty express their belief the member states of the European Union willingly give in a part of their sovereignty and their goal is full convergence of internal and external policies. The member states willingly give in the sovereignty in order to confirm the federalist will of their leaders and peoples.

The Common Foreign Security Policy is the most tensioned field as regards the state sovereignty theory. There are researchers sustaining the logical-juridical fractions from the treaty stimulate the union to become political entity with supranational and federal competencies. Other affirms either European state did not give in willingly a part of their sovereignty.

The European Union states are international law sovereign subjects and in conformity with the Westphalia principle they can shape themselves and independently their foreign policy. The Lisbon Treaty emphasizes the Common Foreign Security Policy has intergovernmental character. All the member states collaborates to fulfil Union' and their interest.

In the Treaty on European Union are stipulated[2]: the Union competence in matters of common foreign security policy includes all the foreign policy fields. The European Union has special competence in all the foreign policy fields. By all means, the Union is a juridical umbrella over the European states. The same

[2] Art. 24, *Tratatul privind Uniunea Europeană* (versiune consolidată), Bruxelles, 2009, p. 19, Vezi: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:0013:0046:RO:PDF.

Article of law states the Union wishes for a step-by-step defining of a common defence policy able to lead to a common defence. We notice the integrationist thesis on Europe wins the cause. From the same article we can notice the Union has special competencies in Union's security field, thus, it is conformed the Union has juridical entity, which is also stipulated in Article 46 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The Union has independency as regards security matters it considers; states give in the prerogative of security maintenance preservation to the European Union. Union's security automatically means the security of each member state.

The Common Foreign Security Policy means a transformation of internal and external sovereignty of all member-states in the favour of the Union as distinctive juridical entity. The member-states, by signing the Lisbon Treaty, wish the convergence of the foreign policies in order to promote the Union's interests and values on the international scene.

The promotion of Union's interests on the international scene can damage the promotion of national interests on the same area. The ambiguity of CFSP role results from the fact the European Union competence it is not settled and either states' competences as regards CFSP. Although the states do not have shared competences with the Union in the field, because Article 4, line 2 stipulates the national security is the exclusive responsibility of the states.

Line 2, Article 10 of the Treaty on the European Union relatives the principle of states sovereignty – European Union member-states can not elaborate and apply alone their foreign policies. The treaty recognizes these states sovereignty. The dilemma appears when CFSP has role that prevails to the state because Article 24, line 2, shows us the Union applies CFSP by state solidarity principle and creates convergence of the member-states actions. The member-states give in willingly their sovereignty. The state convergence leads to the elimination of sovereign state will and the fulfilment of the union will.

A state sovereignty cannot be reduced to the level of a competence; it is unique, indivisible and plenary. The European Union is considered by many jurists an anomaly by the fact a body with supra-state attributes produces a deterioration of compounding states sovereignty. The Common Foreign Security Policy is the most disputed field of the new treaty. It is a field wherein the convergence and the synergy must be harmonized. An increasing harmonization of states interests are the key of success from political perspective of the European Union. Europe' states united to be stronger and to avoid conflicts. Smaller affectation of the sovereignty is produced while we are not alone on world scene.

The theory competence sustains the sovereignty term must be replaced with the competence one which is defined as a power atributed to a subject of superior law constituting as delegate of sovereignty; the Union's states assign it a paart of their sovereignty. Competence is willingly delegation of sovereignty; a Member State accept for the Union to sign in an international agreement instead of it. ESDP ambiguity is willingly because the states cannot suddenly

give up to their sovereingty. Despite all the citics, the European states maintain their functionalist thesis refering to a gradual integration, step-by-step federalization, mutually agreed harmonization of all policies, an independent not asserted convergence.

In the XXI century, the European Union will confront great challenges. Europe is a post-modern world wherein the major conflicts dissapered. A full integration of the states will be good for the promotion of this democratic corner of heaven.

4. The Common Foreign and Security Policy and the new global architecture

The global architecture is still forming after the bipolar era. The United States of America continuously remain the first great power, the unique-multipolar world of Huntington, is the present we live today.

The newly appeared power centers do not take from USA power but increase their power in an interdependence relation. Giovanni Grevi said we live in a multipolar and interdependent world; we live in an interpolar era.

Nowadays, in the world we have a single superpower, the United States of America and four competing states: India, China, Russia and Brasilia to which is added an union of states – the European Union. It is a multipolar, balanced world controlling the international world. From the fourth competing powers, India and Brasilia are not part of the UN Security Council and this can raise frustrations on long term and accentuations of competition. The competition for power is a competition for recognition.

Nowadays, at a first sight, the world evolution is full of uncertainty. To a deeper analysis, we notice the world economy centre is moving from Atlantic to Pacific. Pacific will be the future of economy. Here meet three great powers and two candidate states to the great power statute. The three states are USA, China and Russia. The other two are Mexico and Indonesia. Zbigniew Brzezinski imagined this world as a chessboard disputed by three great powers – USA, China and Russia. To these states is added the European Union recognized as soft power by excellence, an economic-cultural power, but not military power. The future of Europe will be in concern to the path it will choose. The European Union has for the future three main directions, an alliance of states, a cooperation forum or a federation. The world's future uncertainty is also Europe's uncertainty.

The present global security problems are extremely complex and different. A strong connection was created between the asymmetrical threats. The present world environment is characterized by few trends and evolutions. The first trend is toward a complex and dynamic global environment. A complex environment, full of uncertainties and gaps thus the strategic thinking cannot efficiently approach. This helplessness leads us to the second trend of the global environment as the lack of consensus on the international security

approach. An international security which is hard to define and conceived owed to the inflation of concepts. A third trend that became characteristics of the present security environment is the CNN effect; all the events happen directly and this can lead to the incapacity to take profound and substantiated decisions. A fourth trend is the fragmentation in the analytical thinking of institutions to the international and national levels. A last trend is the absence of a security pattern, an ad-hoc pattern being unable to install.

In the future global architecture, a great challenge will be the transparency of borders. This will effect on the increase of threats against the national security. The borders will be inflicted by any threat and will not be a control to prevent an imminent danger over the national security.

The European Union will have to choose its own approach over the future of the international scene. In a global world, wherein the competition for power will be serious, the Union will have to find solutions and resources to maintain its position. Although it confront with difficulties, the European Union is a successful pattern of world history and values it grounded on will help it to resist to all the challenges of the new world. The European Union role will be adhesive political entity among the great powers representing an economic power which will serve as economic and civilization pattern for all the emerging powers.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy will have to be veritable vector of the European power. The state power projection is fulfilled by the means of foreign policy. ESDP will adapt to all the global metamorphoses and all the global trends. This process will have to happen. If it would not happen, ESDP will fail in becoming main vector of projecting the Union's interests and thus EU will loose from its prestige and will transform into a meaningless forum of democratic states.

5. The development of security and defence component in the context of the new security paradigm

The new security environment was defined by Robert Cooper as a complex environment wherein are crossing over many historical eras. The pre-modern era is of conflicts and insecurity, the modern era is of classical conflict and relative security of the individual and the post-modern world is represented by the absence of military threats and a great ratio of human security. In such world, threats do not differ but are complex and diverse. The asymmetrical threats are a danger at each corner; therefore the states must develop a solid component of security and defence.

The *hard power* term assigns a military-economic power by excellence and the term of *soft power* – a cultural power able to influence by persuasion. The new powers of XXI century will be *smart power*; they will be states mixing these powers in order to reach to wanted results. The European Union must become *smart power*, an entity that has precious mix of power resources.

In the XXI century, there will be developed new security paradigm. The political-military or traditional security will evolve toward an informational and economic security. The threats would not be classical anymore, they will come mostly from the virtual field. Although the sources of classical threat are still met in the developing countries, the developed states will confront new threats. Therefore, it must be taken into account the change of security paradigm.

The new security paradigm is oriented toward the informatics security, economic security and urban-societal security. There will be post-modern security which will adapt to the post-modern world wherein will appear. The classical security will be transformed by this new security paradigm.

Conclusions

The international security environment will be still complex, dynamic and evolving. The transformation will suffer will be in substance, but also in form. Replacing the classical nuclear threat, the informatics viruses' threat will appear. Replacing the nuclear winter, informatics night will appear. The systematic and irreplaceable destruction produced by nuclear weapons will be replaced by the global paralysis of the informational systems.

The new security paradigm must be accepted by all the world's powers. The European Union has to adapt by the development of a security and defence component conforming to this new complex, dynamic and revolutionary paradigm.

In the newly created framework, it is needed the improvement of European institutions as for the European Union to became visible and strong partner on the international scene. In this regard, the main change brought by the Lisbon Treaty in 2010 is the disappearance of the European pillars: European Communities, the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the police and judiciary cooperation in penal maters. The suppression of pillars firstly impacted in granting the juridical entity statute for the European Union and the capacity to represent the states on international level. Now on, the Union will be able to sign international agreements and treaties.

For a better foreign representation and for shaping a coherent and united foreign policy, the European institutions enhanced their powers in the foreign policy field. The European Parliament gain permanent co-decisional power along with the European Council and the Ministers Council, co-decision in matters of intern justice, agricultural law and foreign representation of the Union.

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NATO'S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Adriana SAULIUC*

At the end of the Cold War, NATO faced a major crisis: along with the disappearance of its main enemy, USSR, the reason to exist of the Alliance became an extremely disputed issue. But the '90s opened a new era, an era in which peace and stability were difficult to achieve. The significant number of crisis and conflicts occurred in the post-Cold War period, gave NATO the chance to reorganize, to implement major changes in the organization and functioning of the Alliance. This context less peacefully offered NATO the opportunity to prove that it can be a security provider with relevance in ensuring regional and international security.

Today, crisis management represents one of the Alliance's fundamental security tasks. With experience, capabilities and facilities to involve both military and non-military, NATO has the capacity to respond to a threat that jeopardizes regional and international stability.

***Keywords**: NATO, international crisis, international conflicts, international security.*

Introduction

The end of the Second World War and the sudden shift into a different kind of conflict, this time "cold", led to the need for joint efforts of the states to protect themselves against dangers to which their security was exposed, so, new non-state international actors were created. Among them, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a political-military organization, which was established to safeguard the security of the Western Europe countries.

Despite the period of confrontation crossed by Europe during the Cold War, NATO has been kept in an inactive phase, and immediately after its end, the Alliance existence was considered undue, in the sense that the disappearance of the enemy against whom it was created to act, the Soviet Union, remove its raison d'être.

But the post-Cold War security environment has evolved rapidly and has revealed new challenges and threats for member states, giving the Alliance multiple opportunities to get involved and to demonstrate its efficiency, as it did not have in the first part of its existence.

Moreover, the changes that have occurred, stipulated by the Strategic Concepts adopted after 1991, and NATO's willingness to engage in crisis management and conflict resolution, led to the transformation of the Alliance into a security international organization, able to engage in action aimed to restore peace in conflict areas. Currently, NATO is an actively involved actor in peace support missions, as well as crisis management in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond.

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1. NATO in search of an identity

NATO has its origins in the initiative that led to the signing in 1948 of the Treaty of Brussels, in which five European countries: Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and Britain set up a common defense system meant to protect them from political, ideological or military aggressions that could jeopardize their security. Then followed negotiations with two states allied during the Second World War – Canada and United States of America "in order to create a unique North Atlantic Alliance, based on security guarantees and mutual commitments between Europe and North America". [1]

Thus, on April 4, 1949, in Washington, was signed the treaty which sets up a common security system based on a partnership between the signatory states, which constitutes NATO's act of birth, created in order to supervise the peace of the old continent strongly affected by the two world wars. In other words, "The Marshall Plan was designed to restore Europe economically" while NATO was created "to take care of its security". [2]

The Alliance has a pure defensive vocation, its security is indivisible and any attack against one of its members is considered an attack on all members, as states by the famous Article 5, while the presence of U.S. forces in Europe remains essential for its security, security inherently connected to that of North America.

Admitting that it is a political-military organization, NATO is concerned about both dimensions. Thus, politically, the organization promotes democratic values and encourage cooperation in issues related to defense and security, the goal being to build trust, while on the long term, it is aimed an increase of its capacity to prevent conflicts. On the other hand, from a military perspective, we talk about NATO as a supporter of peaceful settlement of disputes, but prepared where diplomacy fails (and it does in many cases), to provide military capability necessary to carry out missions that can restore stability in the affected state / region[3].

At the time of the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949), Western-European countries and their main supporter, United States have insisted that NATO is not directed against a particular state – Soviet Union. In reality, the Alliance was a "defensive gesture" of the member states against the communist danger which threatened to swallow the whole Europe and then to extend its influence outside the old continent.

Therefore, NATO was born in one of the most turbulent periods of human history, the Cold War increasing the risk of a nuclear confrontation between the two superpowers that were battling global supremacy, a situation that would have catastrophic consequences for the world's population. The same period has been a favorable environment for the deployment and consumption of some

[1] Andrei POPESCU, Ioan JINGA, *Organizații europene și euroatlantice,* Lumina Lex, Bucharest, 2001, p. 40.
[2] Henry KISSINGER, *Diplomația*, Editura Bic All, Bucharest, 2007, p. 401.
[3] *Discover NATO. Basics. A political and military Alliance,* http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/what_is_nato.htm.

international crises and conflicts, among them, the Korean War (1950 - 1953) not ended until today.

Based on this situation, the fact that NATO, a political-military organization created to maintain security in its coverage area was not involved even in one single military engagement during the entire period of the Cold War, seems more then unusual. At a first glance, it could mean that in the Euro-Atlantic area there was no major danger threatening the security of any Member State, which was not true. But from the beginning of the Cold War, Western Europe was rapidly transformed into a different theater of war: in strategically important European cities, such as Berlin and Vienna, was launched "a war between British and American spies on the one hand and Russian to each other"[4].

Given this reality, it was inevitable for NATO not to find a place in an equation in which the games were made by the two superpowers behind the front line, in a secret world, governed by unwritten rules. At the same time, another factor that contributed to the inefficiency of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance during this period derives from the fact that the "Big Two", whose main objective was to endure the security and domination, used in achieving their goals action of intimidation, propaganda, subversion, local and peripheral wars, waged by interposed actors, deliberately avoiding direct contact Thus, both the United States and its close allies (Western Europe countries) were found in most of the cases behind the first line, not interested to get involved directly in actions that could determine NATO to (re) act.

The end of the Cold War with the fall of the Iron Curtain and the Soviet Union dissolution opened a new era in which humanity hoped that peace and international stability is not far. But the developments of the time pulled out threats and security challenges for the 90s, more problematic for regional and international security. Also, the end of the confrontation between the two military giants, the unquestionable leaders of both geographical and ideological hemispheres, caused major challenges for NATO, in the sense that the loss of its principal adversary, the Soviet Union, raised questions regarding the raison d'être of the Alliance. With the disappearance of the main threat, the debate regarding the maintenance or the dissolution of NATO became a favorite topic for the representatives in the field, extensive discussions based on the same subject took place in the member states. But the end of the Cold War was immediately followed by the shaping of the new types of threats regarding national, regional and international security, whose variety and intensity have increased the danger of destabilization of some countries and regions:

Ethnic tensions;

- organized cross-border crime;
- redistribution of spheres of influence;
- trafficking in drugs, human beings and radioactive substances;

[4] John RANELAGH, *Agenția CIA. Ascensiunea şi declinul,* Editura B.I.C. ALL, Bucharest, 1997, p. 102.

- political instability manifested in certain areas;
- increasing the number of "failed states". [5]

Given this situation, the Member States have realized that giving up the existence of NATO could have significant negative effects on their stability and security, so they preferred to transform the political-military organization and adapt it to environmental conditions of those times, instead of the termination of its existence. The search or recreation of a new identity has become one of the major tasks of NATO in the early '90s, which have materialized in the signing in November 1991, in Rome, of the Alliance's Strategic Concept. It was the moment when it began the prefiguration of the current form of the regional security organization. With little resemblance to earlier strategic concepts (the Strategic Concept for the defense of the North Atlantic area developed during 1949-1959, the Strategic Concept called "flexible response" – 1967), was emphasized the cooperation with former adversaries instead the confrontation, while adding the need for geographical expansion of the Alliance, with the aim of strengthen security across Europe. With the adoption of this new concept, it also began NATO's process of transformation, which has exceeded its military limits becoming relevant in two crucial areas: defense and security. [6]

In the period that followed, the Alliance was compelled to reposition itself to the new risks and threats, which despite the fact that they hadn't the capability to produce significant damage to the planet, as would have happened in the case of a nuclear war between the two superpowers, they were generating a state of major instability both regionally and internationally. The fact that NATO survived in this tortuous context in which events have succeeded and complicated at breakneck speed, is due primarily to its capacity to reform, to adapt within an international environment which imposed significant challenges for state and non-state international actors of the time.

More specifically, the Alliance survival after the Cold War was a direct result of the changes imposed on it by the adoption, on several occasions during 1991 – 1999, of the Strategic Concepts which however does not changed and original treaty - NATO Charter. The decision to extend the Alliance to the east was an inspired one given that the measure has led to the expansion of the organization's room for maneuver, which enabled the reduction of the surface areas that could cause problems. Also, moving towards the east part of the European continent lead to the materialization of the intention to turn enemies into partners. Being near the Russian Federation (*de jure* and *de facto* heir to the Soviet Union), offered the two international actors to put their guns down, metaphorically speaking, and sit at the same table, the outcome being impossible to predict before 1989: the establishment in 1997 of the Permanent Council NATO – Russia. A new chapter was opened in the relations evolution between

[5]Gabriel GABOR, *Mediul internațional de securitate din perspectivă europeană,* in „Spațiul sud-est european in contextul globalizării", The scientific communication session, Section: Security and defense, National Defense University Press „Carol I", Bucharest, 2007, pp. 19 – 20.
[6] Constantin MOȘTOFLEI, *Evoluția Conceptului Strategic al Alianței,* http://www.presamil.ro/SMM/2004/03-04/pag%206-8.htm.

the two actors despite the fact that Moscow still believes that NATO represents one of the greatest threats to the security of the Russian Federation.

Another important moment in Alliance's evolution is the Lisbon Summit in November 2010 and the adoption of the last Strategic Concept called "active engagement, modern defense". The document sets out the basic tasks and principles that will guide NATO in the aftermath of its adoption, including acclimatized elements for XXI century:

1. the fundamental purpose of NATO remains the protection of the freedom and security of all its members, both by political and military means, the Alliance remains an essential source of stability in this unpredictable world;
2. NATO member states form a unique community of values, united by the fundamental values of liberty, democracy, human rights and rule of law;
3. political and military obligations between Europe and North America have been set at NATO level, following the establishment of the Alliance in 1949, while transatlantic ties remain as powerful and important for preserving peace and Euro-Atlantic security, as always. The security of NATO members on both sides of the Atlantic is indivisible;
4. the modern security environment includes a broad and evolving set of challenges for the security of NATO's territory and for its population. With the purpose to ensure the security, the Alliance must to effectively fulfill three essential core tasks, all helping to protect the members of the Alliance, and always in accordance with international law:
    a. *collective defense* – NATO members will always assist each other against attacks, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty;
    b. *crisis management* – NATO has a unique and robust system of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after the conflict. NATO will actively use an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage ongoing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts;
    c. *security cooperation* – the Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security through a partnership with relevant countries and other international organizations;
5. NATO remains the unique and essential transatlantic forum for consultation on all matters affecting the territorial integrity, political independence and security of its members, in accordance with Article 4 of the Washington Treaty;
6. in order to meet the full range of NATO missions as efficiently as possible, the allies will engage in a continuous process of reform, modernization and transformation. [7]

[7] *Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,* NATO Public Diplomacy, 1110 Brussels, Belgium, pp. 6 – 9.

2. Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention in NATO's vision

Since 1991, NATO has sought to define itself and to find answers to the main problems it faced in an attempt to adapt to the security environment of that period, but also from the desire to respond efficiently to the situations / elements that raised issues for the regional and international security and stability. In this regard, since the Rome Summit and the adoption of the Strategic Concept in 1991, document that clearly specifies the interest of Member States regarding the international crisis management actions, with a growing concern of the Alliance regarding this sensitive area. Document talks about the fact that "the success of the Alliance policy will require a coherent conception of the political authorities to coordinate the appropriate measures of crisis management based on a range of policy instruments or other kind, including military one".[8] Other important documents adopted within the framework of high-level summits, such NATO's Strategic Concept in Washington (1999), or the Declaration of the Prague Summit in 2002, talk about the importance of the Alliance involvement in crisis management missions, as an important step in conflict prevention.

In Washington, in 1999, the document signed by the heads of state and Government, defines, in separate chapters, the objectives and tasks of the North-Atlantic Alliance, based on security, consultation, deterrence and defense, crisis management and partnerships.[9] Crisis management actions are delimited by the chapter named Fundamental Security Missions which stipulate new measures in order to "improve security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic zone", and explains crisis management as the ability "to be ready, from case to case, by consensus, in accordance with Article 7 of Washington Treaty, to contribute effectively to conflict prevention and active engagement in crisis management, including in crisis response operations".[10] With the experience of the missions already deployed, and forecasting how the international security environment will evolve, the document recognizes the importance of the military dimension by reaffirming the need of "complex military capabilities, as the basic means of the Alliance ability to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management through crisis response non-Article 5 operations". [11]

The last Alliance's Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit (November, 2010) amends the terms of NATO crisis management missions. Security section Security through crisis management section highlights the fact that outbreaks of tension from outside the Alliance are as harmful to regional and international peace and security, turning them into a "direct threat to the security of Alliance territory and its population" so that "NATO will engage,

[8] *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept,* Roma, 7\-8 Nov. 1991, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm.
[9] Constantin MOȘTOFLEI, *op. cit.*
[10] *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, 24 Apr. 1999, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm.
[11] *Ibidem*.

therefore, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction". [12]

The major challenges faced by international actors (state and non-state) security led to the awareness that cooperation between international organizations specialized in managing problematic situations is welcome. Thus, cooperation between NATO and the UN began in 1949 naturally, and continued as a result of events that led the Alliance and United Nations in resolving the crises and conflicts faced by international security in the years that followed. An example is the case of Bosnia, the war ended only after the involvement of two international actors – the UN and NATO. The first one engaged in the diplomatic part, with United States playing an important role, while the Alliance took over the peacekeeping operation. It was the first major operation in response to a crisis for the regional security organization, with the use of the Implementation Force – IFOR starting December 1995, under UN Resolution 1031, designed to implement the military side of the Dayton Peace Agreement. It was replaced one year later by the Stabilisation Force – SFOR, led by NATO. [13]

Unlike NATO-UN relations, ties with the European Union can be considered more profound if we take into consideration the European identity of the two organizations. The interoperability level on which are based the relations between the two actors, gives content to collective European capacity for crisis management. In this way, the realization of the European Security and Defence Identity – IESA, is considered to be an irreversible process, through its framework formed by the development of the existing NATO – EU relationship, as the process of establishing a common security and defense policy will develop more.

Another international actor with whom NATO cooperates in security area, namely in crisis management and conflict prevention is OSCE. At the political level, NATO and OSCE consult each other on regional security issues, thing that didn't stop the two organizations to separately develop initiatives with the Mediterranean states. Regarding the operational level, the OSCE ability to engage in activities related to conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation was tested in missions carried out, along with NATO, in the Western Balkans (Bosnia – Herzegovina 1996; Kosovo – between '98 and '99, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). [14]

Instead of conclusions

Immediately after its establishment, NATO entered into a state of "hibernation", due to lack of its activity, so the Alliance faced the changes of the

[12] Strategic Concept for Security and Defence *"Active engagement, modern defense"*, http://militar.infomondo.ro/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Conceptul-Startegic-NATO-Lisabona-2010.pdf.
[13] *Peace support operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52122.htm.
[14] *NATO's relations with the OSCE*, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49911.htm.

early ’90s both unprepared and indecisive regarding its relevance in a world in which the main enemy of the West had disappeared, eliminating the need for its existence. But the dissolution of the USSR represented for the Alliance the moment when NATO has acquired the relevance of an notorious security organization, and the decisions that the Alliance has subsequently taken and the adjustments in according with the evolution security environment, deservedly secured its place in the selected club of relevant international organizations.

The numerous bodies and mechanisms set up by NATO in crisis management and conflict prevention ensure the organization necessary leverage for its involvement in situations that are problematic and not only for regional security, making it a reliable international actor both for its partners but also for the countries in whose territory are carried out missions.

The way NATO has evolved gradually from regional to international is a consequence of changes on international stage, generating the need for the Alliance involvement in theaters outside its area of coverage. Missions carried "away from home" turned NATO into a regional organization with global ambitions, a coherent partner for the UN due to international security challenges currently facing, needs a reliable support. And the ongoing NATO missions in areas beyond the territorial boundaries of the Alliance with thousands of miles, demonstrate that it has won a well-deserved top place among the most important international security organizations.

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5. ****Strategic Concept for Security and Defence "*Active engagement, modern defense*", http://militar.infomondo.ro/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Conceptul-Startegic-NATO-Lisabona-2010.pdf;
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7. ****The Alliance’s Strategic Concept*, 24 Apr. 1999, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm.
8. GABOR, Gabriel, *Mediul internațional de securitate din perspectivă europeană*, in „Spațiul sud-est european în contextul globalizării”, The scientific communication session, Section: Security and defense, National Defense University Press „Carol I”, Bucharest, 2007;

9. KISSINGER, Henry, *Diplomația*, Bic All, Bucharest, 2007;
10. MOŞTOFLEI, Constantin, *Evoluția Conceptului Strategic al Alianței*, http://www.presamil.ro/SMM/2004/03-04/pag%206-8.htm;
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12. RANELAGH, John, *Agenția CIA. Ascensiunea şi declinul*, Bucharest: B.I.C. ALL, 1997.

SECURITY INTEREST PROTECTION INSIDE REGIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS - ASEAN CASE

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ASEAN has been always understood as an Asian replica of the European model of integration but, the reality of the past 40 years of existence pointed a major difference between those two types of organizations. The present study hopes to clarify one of these differences: the security concept that was understood by ASEAN as a comprehensive security, as well as the way it was put in practice.

***Keywords**: ASEAN, regional organization, security concept, community, security dimensions.*

Introduction

ASEAN project was considered to be an ambitious attempt of a group of five emerging states which were struggling to offer an answer in front of ideological confrontation pressures, in the second half of the XX century. Specialized articles characterized this process as remarkable attempt based on the local history and tensions, but also a victim of his own inherent deficiencies.

ASEAN creation appeared to be not only the outcome of the conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia but also the result of the conflict situation from South – East Asia. ASEAN opened the path for a long cooperation between neighboring states although the organization existence consisted in a long series of conflicts between states in different domains.

Even though it was not visualized as an organization with security specific, the signs of a security need emerged through integration on different lines. As a result of different factors (strategic position, economy and finance globalization, development need) ASEAN changed the perspective of the future course of development.

The academic debate between International Relations paradigm tried to offer an inner perspective upon ASEAN attempt to solve the security environment creation in an area where global actors' interests crossed each other; each one tried to transmit the perception related to ASEAN activity, by analyzing its functionality in several domains.

From a realistic point of view, ASEAN construction confirms the principles of anarchic society and the balance of power with the need to formulate a response to address regional security dilemma[1]. Liberals welcomes

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[1] Anindya BATABYAL, *ASEAN's Quest for Security: A Theoretical Explanation*, in "International Studies", Vol. 41, No. 4, 2004, pp. 352-353, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002088170404100401, accesed at 29.05.2012.

peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms that are considered more important than the violent, while constructivists have emphasized the importance of integrating a system security states Southeast Asia in terms of the benefits of cooperation[2] within a community security. In addition, like the Liberals, and they agree with the decision-making mechanism within ASEAN, which focuses on the permanent search for consensus[3] through consultation, which helps eliminate grievances that can degenerate into conflict.

This prompted Timo Kivimäki describes ASEAN experience in long term peace[4], a period of supranational riots without jeopardizing the unity of the organization. In our opinion, however, this was due to internal networking principles, ASEAN Way, whose specificity (informality, non-intervention, consensus, and consultation) allowed a different experience of integration than other regions experienced.

This paper aims to understand the extent to which ASEAN can be considered a regional security organization by analyzing security in terms of its size that can provide an answer to this. We try to combine quantitative methodology (statistical analysis) and qualitative (content analysis of concepts) to provide a more comprehensive and objective analysis on the issue.

1. The specificity of ASEAN security environment

ASEAN has sought to inglobe all the states in the Southeast Asian region in a community to provide the favorable development of countries in the region. In this situation, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand have provided an answer to these needs security through cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative[5].

A feature of the model is the lack of defining effective ASEAN as a security community, an attitude that was due to a conflict between the desire to maintain consensus members (failure to reach a common position against management methods at national issues) and the need to ensure security of members against disturbances (the spread of communism, ideological conflicts, ethnic, economic).

Horizontal integration was performed sequentially as bilateral disputes between ASEAN Member States and third baseline resolved: Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam joined soon after found a compromise between the principles of the organization and the national character of each country.

The 90's major change in foreign policy confirms ASEAN as an active attitude to create formal channels of discussion with states in the Asia -Pacific.

[2] Anindya BATABYAL, *op. cit.*, pp. 354-355.
[3] *Ibidem*, p. 356.
[4] Timo KIVIMÄKI, "The Long Peace of ASEAN", in *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 38, Nr. 1, 2001, pp. 5-25, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343301038001001, accesed at 14.05.2012.
[5] "ASEAN's record", in *The Adelphi Papers*, Vol. 39, Nr. 328, p. 16, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05679329908449588, accesed at 29.05.2012.

Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in 1994[6] by 27 countries was intended to ensure regional peace. Under informality and equality, ARF was built without an institutional structure and vertical supports intergovernmental meetings chaired alternately by a member of ASEAN.

2. ASEAN from security dimensions perspective

2.1. Politico -military dimension

When we intend to analyze the political dimension of ASEAN, we are tempted to fall into the trap of those who said that this association imitates the European model, so the integration of the South -East Asia tends to a depth from all points of view. Unfortunately, the reality is quite different. Governments have shown no willingness to exceed the boundaries set by the original purpose of the regional units. Both operating principles and practice have showed that the elites do not claim any regional ownership, but it still remains at a national stage.

At the ASEAN level, the policy was understood in the sense of promoting national interests at a roundtable discussion, recognizing the diversity of visions that are permanently heading towards a consensus. In this context, this model of organization tried turning intergovernmental ASEAN way through an emphasis on non-intervention in domestic affairs, which was the essence of that *ASEAN*[7] *unchanged melody*. Whether we look at the perspective of ensuring the longevity of ASEAN, whether we see the consequences of reporting the decision to this principle as they sketched Lee Jones in the work already cited, it is a fact that ASEAN's long existence is a reality that should not be ignored. In addition, when you consider the negative implications of this principle, we tend to do not take into account the local Oriental experience which is totally different from the western democracy.

Born from the desire to coordinate national policies, ASEAN Way[8] is a personal solution for these states to achieve ideal security but it lacks an understanding of the thinking substance ASEAN model of reality, criticisms that were released were numerous and highlighted the lack of functionality of the ASEAN way, but they determined a reanalyze process of the vision in question, in the sense that it will reach to establish a mechanism for monitoring and reporting of global and regional developments in the economic and financial, ASEAN Surveillance Process[9].

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[6] Evelyn GOH, *Institutions and the great power bargain in East Asia: ASEAN's limited 'brokerage' role*, in "International Relations of the Asia-Pacific", Vol. 11, No. 3, 2011, p. 383, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcr014, accesed at 29.05.2012.

[7] Lee JONES, *ASEAN's unchanged melody? The theory and practice of 'non-interference' in Southeast Asia*, in "The Pacific Review", Vol. 23, No. 4, 2010, pp. 479-502, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2010.495996, accesed at 29.05.2012.

[8] Lee JONES, *op. cit.*, pp. 481-485.

[9] Jürgen HAACKE, *ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture: a constructivist assessment*, in "International Relations of The Asia-Pacific", Vol. 3, No. 1, 2003, p. 60, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/irap/3.1.57, accesed at 29.05.2012.

Another feature of the political dimension of security cooperation in ASEAN is having an active foreign policy in the Asia - Pacific by supporting the creation of discussion forums with countries that have importance in the region: China, South Korea, Japan. We refer here to the ASEAN +3 and ASEAN Regional Forum, which tried to find solutions to resolve territorial disputes or prevent a potential common position would be to the detriment of the object pursued by ASEAN (US-China[10]).

From the politico -military perspective, the question of the creation of mechanisms for conflict management within the organization was rise in order to help to achieve the goal of ensuring peace. Since the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) of 1976 and reaching the ASEAN Charter, it was stated the desire to decrease the latent tensions among its members[11].

Since most of them were caused by disputes of territorial claims, we believe that territory factor is undoubtedly fundamental to building security community. Academic opinions thought that ASEAN has largely succeeded in avoiding conflict rather than to resolve it[12], and exacerbated the principle of national sovereignty to the extent that the state will prevail. The best example of this, is the lack of meaningful intervention in the matter of annexation of East Timor by Indonesia that put issues on the validity of the principles fundamental to building ASEAN as the supranational level; priority was maintaining good relations with Indonesia than self-determination of east Timorese's[13].

Maritime disputes are another sensitive issue of ASEAN in the context of disputes with China are influenced energy policy within the organization or members can raise unresolved issues of internal consistency. Anushree Bhattacharyya[14] reminiscent of the disputed Niger Gosong Indonesia - Malaysia or known Miatan and Spratly islands claimed by Indonesia and Philippines, or Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines, as examples of disputed territories of ASEAN members and by their persistence, cause divisions internal.

Even though there have been proposals to create a joint military instrument (Indonesia - 70 years, Singapore - Malaysia 1982 - 1989[15]), they have not gone through the intergovernmental discussions both internal diversity (economic development, access to technology, production capacity, different political views) and the role that countries like the U.S. and Britain have in maintaining regional security environment.

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[10] Evelyn GOH, *op. cit.*, pp. 379- 380.

[11] Shaun NARINE, *ASEAN into the twenty-first century: Problems and prospects*, in "The Pacific Review", Vol. 12, No. 3, 1999, p. 359, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09512749908719296, accesed at 29.05.2012.

[12] *Ibidem*, p. 360.

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[15] Amitav ACHARYA, *The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: "Security Community" or "Defence Community"?*, in "Pacific Affairs", Vol. 64, No. 2, Vara 1991, pp. 159-160, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2759957, accesed at 14.05.2012.

2.2. Economic dimension

Economic integration is an upper stage in the evolution of regional organizations and was a starting point for the European Union through the European Economic Community. For ASEAN, the idea was taken into consideration so long as the national interest was also favored initiatives. Therefore, proposals aimed at streamlining trade inside of the organization and encourage members to establish relations with third parties. In this regard, the establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade Area remember (AFTA) after a Thai proposal[16] was voted unanimously. It was intended to be a protective mechanism of ASEAN economy by regulating the influx of foreign companies (especially the Japanese) that have invaded the market in Member States and by attracting foreign investment[17].

Internal deficiencies deepened soon and the 1997 financial crises appeared in Asia. This represented a challenge to the supranational economic cooperation and competitiveness of national economies in a globalized world. The effects were profound and meant, among other things, the decrease of foreign investment by 96%, the rise of China which claim regional leadership and inability to negotiate on equal terms with Japanese firms[18].

In addition, in the current global crisis emerged the primacy of national[19] responses. We should take into consideration that ASEAN does not benefit from a joint action plan, implemented in such situations. To overcome this bottleneck, think tanks such as the ASEAN Studies Center, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies emphasized on the importance of dialogue in the financial community, common policies and national coordination and discipline[20]. However, disappointed supporters of EU integration type of ASEAN, we say that the efforts made by Member States in this direction have resulted in a hybrid form of economic integration, more than a Free Trade Area, less than the Common Market[21] which tried a simple adaptation of the ASEAN way the idea of a common market. However, supranational initiatives should not be neglected, but not overpriced for managing these issues from a national perspective is still a priority.

2.3. The societal dimension

For ASEAN, human security was understood supranational level through an emphasis on the role of the individual in creating a Southeast Asian

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[16] Paul BOWLES, *ASEAN, AFTA and the "New Regionalism"*, in "Pacific Affairs", Vol. 70, No. 2, Summer 1997, p. 222, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2760773, accesed at 14.05.2012.

[17] Alfredo C. ROBLES Jr., *The ASEAN free trade area and the construction of a Southeast Asian economic community in East Asia*, in "Asian Journal of Political Science", Vol. 12, No. 2, 2004, p. 92, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02185370408434243, accesed at 29.05.2012.

[18] *Ibidem*, p. 94.

[19] Institute Of Southeast Asian Studies, *Global Financial Crisis- Implication for ASEAN*, raport preliminar, Pasir Panjang, 2008, p. 7, available at http://www.iseas.edu.sg/aseanstudiescentre/ascrs6.pdf, accesed at 14.05.2012.

[20] *Ibidem*, pp. 8-10.

[21] Alfredo C. ROBLES Jr, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

communities with no major discrepancies in the options and possibilities for development. Intergovernmental cooperation has remained essentially left their management competence internally by political authority. It was felt that in view of respect for national sovereignty, ASEAN will not rule on how a Member State exercises the monopoly of violence against citizens because there were deep ideological differences between nations: military junta in Myanmar, human rights violations in Indonesia under Suharto, violence excessive on the opposition and the media in the Philippines.

In the history of ASEAN, we can identify some important moments in the way of constructing an own vision of the concept of human and social security. An important example of this is the deepening of the integration process of ASEAN Concord II once signed on the 9th Summit in 2003[22], where the second pillar of support for the organization, ASEAN Political -Security Community (APSC) constituted a substantial step defining the role of the ASEAN security community. The commitments made by Member States through the introduction of this action will reiterate umbrellas, two years later, when ASEAN representatives at the World Summit condemns the use of extreme violence (genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity[23]) of man by availability adopting the principle of the responsibility to protect (R2P)[24].

Implications that would require integration into ASEAN legislative documents are quite profound because practice may conflict with ASEAN way: in addition to the obligation to protect individual citizens from the four international crimes specified and to assist other states in this approach, countries may act in violation of national sovereignty[25] (in the case of non-compliance principle) which affect in particular habit ASEAN members of nonintervention in internal affairs.

Another initiative was the establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights on which negotiations started since 2005[26] and would provide an approach to a future common policy on human security by the existence of a specialized supranational body. Difficulties negotiations were conducted remember reality experience exponential[27] human rights in ASEAN, and its role remains rather obscure since it is defined as a consultative[28] institution whose efficiency is being seriously questioned.

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[22] Rizal SUKMA, *The ASEAN political and security community (APSC): opportunities and constraints for the R2P in Southeast Asia*, in "The Pacific Review", Vol. 25, No. 1, 2012, p. 136, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2011.632975, accesed at 29.05.2012.
[23] *Ibidem*, p. 138.
[24] *Ibidem*, p. 135.
[25] *Ibidem*, p. 138.
[26] James MUNRO, *The relationship between the origins and regime design of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR)*, in *The International Journal of Human Rights*, Vol. 15, No. 8, 2011, pp. 1189, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2010.511996, accesed at 29.05.2012.
[27] See Table 1 in James MUNRO, *op. cit.*, p. 1199.
[28] Yung-Ming YEN, *The Formation of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights: A Protracted Journey*, in "Journal of Human Rights", 2011, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2011, p. 400, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14754835.2011.596070, accesed at 29.05.2012.

2.4. Energetic dimension

The fourth dimension of security that we consider in our analysis is the case of ASEAN energy, vital for ensuring the subsistence of the Member States. Geopolitical context explains the crucial role of resources at stake for many regional conflicts and, therefore, we intend to highlight the main features of ASEAN in terms of energy security cooperation in ASEAN +3.

First, we consider the regional specificity (energy vulnerability of Japan and Chinese influence) and needs posed by the status of developing countries they have members of ASEAN, when, analyze important forum for ASEAN +3 potential common energy policy of the organization. We begin by emphasizing the diversity of the 10 states which place some of them in a state of pre-industrialization (Cambodgia, Laos, Myanmar) or an upper stage (Singapore, Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia[29]).

Secondly, we emphasize the substantial quantities of oil and gas resources in their possession ASEAN could contribute to energy independence of the organization, even to become a player on the world stage in this domain. On the whole, we see that the organization has some major pluses, Indonesia was a member of OPEC by 2009[30] and production of oil and gas to the Member States provides the ability to export to neighbors. All this exerts a force of attraction to the attention of many countries of Southeast Asia, creating the premises for the use of soft power. In the first part of the 2000s, Korea and Japan were among the countries with a fairly large dependence to energy resources of ASEAN[31]. Therefore, there have been diplomatic efforts to regulate this cooperation under the ASEAN +3 meetings of the ministers who have had a practical purpose, signing Forging Closer ASEAN +3 Energy Partnership in 2004[32].

Third, energy represented as a matter of conflict between ASEAN and China for territorial boundaries in the South China Sea. The difference in power between the two is quite large and the net against ASEAN members as the Chinese state is favored position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the possession of numerous armies in the world and being the second world economic power, while on the other hand, the ten nations are a heterogeneous community with great national discrepancies, without having a leader that could become a counterweight to Chinese influence in the region.

2.5. The environmental dimension

Environmental vulnerability of the South East Asia is a hot issue on the UN agenda due to the disastrous effects of climate change: over 600 million people died[33] by cause of natural calamities. In this situation, the environmental

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[29] Elspeth THOMSON, *ASEAN and Northeast Asian Energy Security: Cooperation or Competition?*, in "*East Asian Energy Security*", Vol. 23, No. 3, 2006, p. 69, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12140-006-0011-4, accesed at 29.05.2012.

[30] OPEC, *Membrii*, available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm, accesed at 29.05.2012.

[31] Elspeth THOMSON, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

[32] *Ibidem*, p. 67.

[33] United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific, *Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 2009*, p. 219, available on http://www.unescap.org/stat/data/syb2009/, accesed at 14.05.2012.

dimension of security is proving to be a major player in the area of regional integration, since there is a need for joint solutions disaster management.

Outlining a common position on the issue of ASEAN environmental security began in 1977[34] under the ASEAN Subregional Environment Programme (ASEP) as a result of collaboration with UNEP. It opened the door to ministerial level meetings that sought to find common solutions to reduce environmental vulnerability through effective management domain state involvement.

Excessive damage to the environment through land use and destruction of important surfaces of vegetation sounded the alarm states in Southeast Asia to the importance of nature protection measures. The fog that covered the region, repeatedly, in-between 1982-1998, is a crucial factor that contributed to the definition of an attitude on stopping harmful actions on the environment. But perhaps the most substantial one remains the Regional Haze Action Plan (RHAP) that integrated national action towards following three main objectives[35]: better management and increased capacity to prevent fire, the establishment of cooperative mechanisms for monitoring their and capacity to fight fire.

Far from political influence, the issue of protecting the environment has great potential to surpass the local government authority and reach to the international institutions inside ASEAN.

Conclusions - gaps and potential

In conclusion, we find that ASEAN has a number of failures that we consider vulnerabilities towards what we define ASEAN as a security community.

Firstly, regional diversity leads to a paradoxical situation : "communism, monarchy, soft - authoritarianism, running a military junta and democracy coexist in a network of regional cooperation aimed at preserving harmony interstate and maintaining regional peace and stability"[36]. However, this politico-ideological mosaic caused the establishment of ASEAN as a foundation on which way are reported intra-ASEAN relations: they overlooked successive violations of human rights, the rule of illegitimate violence or poor level of living of citizens.

Secondly, we emphasize the exaggerated tendency to apply ASEAN way externally and internally principles ignore these. For example, the principle of non-intervention was pursued excessively so no action was taken in violation of democratic principles abusive. Also, foreign policy, ASEAN has allowed

[34] Secretariatul ASEAN, *Environment*, available at http://www.aseansec.org/10371.htm/, accesed at 14.05.2012.
[35] James COTTON, "The "Haze" over Southeast Asia: Challenging the ASEAN Mode of Regional Engagement", in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, Autumn 1999, p. 343, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2672225, accesed at 14.05.2012.
[36] Rizal SUKMA, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

individual or joint involvement of states in border conflicts with third parties, and sometimes not at all taken into account the sovereignty of the latter.

Third, note the lack of substance in relation to treaties factual reality. Here we refer in particular to the economic size of ASEAN showed that intergovernmentalism is a factor that has contributed to the creation of competent national economy, but distract from the development gap among members.

Finally, ASEAN paradox was stated in the conflict between the expansion and deepening[37] integration between the application of the Orientalism and the inherent west model. Finally, ASEAN failed to ensure its security environment pictured in 1967 in the absence of coagulation supranational vision to encompass national ones in a unified form.

Security versatility bring into attention once again the complexity of the regional security of the South - East Asia due to the geopolitical importance coupled with an inability of states to assume ASEAN leadership independent of American or European support.

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[37] Jörn DOSCH, Manfred MOLS, *Thirty years of ASEAN: Achievements and challenges*, in "The Pacific Review", Vol. 11, No. 2, 1998, p. 175, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09512749808719251, accesed at 29.05.2012.

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SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION - LEGAL COORDINATES, PRESENT AND PERSPECTIVES

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Successor in rights and obligations to the Shanghai Five, Shanghai Cooperation Organization represents a regional cooperation centre, an international forum meant to facilitate, in an integrated format, the resolution of some issues, common or not, encountered by Member States, both locally and globally.

The Organization, designed from the very beginning to have legal personality and general competence, was built around China and Russia and represents, in an original format, an Asian replica of both the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Among the priorities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization we mention, on the one hand, strengthening its own role in the regional geopolitics, being in the same time a pole of regionalization, and, on the other hand, transforming itself in the main multinational interlocutor of the United Nations for the area, counterbalancing as a result, the United States and the European powers in the area of concern.

Keywords: *Shanghai Cooperation Organization, cooperation, regionalisation.*

Introduction

Successor to the Shanghai Five, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) represents a pole of regional integration developed on Chinese and Russian coordinates that engage in cooperation, with leading role, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

The main objectives of the SCO, declared as such in the Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization[1], consist in: consolidating the multidisciplinary cooperation in terms of regional peace, security and stability strengthening, promoting a new international political and economic order; preventing any illegitimate act directed against SCO's interests; fighting against terrorism, separatism, extremism, illicit drugs and arms trafficking and other forms of transnational crime, including illegal migration. We may notice that SCO has a general vocation considering that it pursues also: the encouragement of cooperation in the fields of politics, trade and economy, defence, law enforcement, environmental protection, culture, science and technology, education, energy, transport, finance and lending, unified approach by the member states regarding the foreign policy issues of common interest and the foundation of common international positions as well as the facilitation of the balanced growth and the coordination of the regional approaches of integration into the global economy. Moreover, the SCO is growing all the time, and, due to the fact that it promotes regional economic cooperation in various forms, all

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[1] Available at web address http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=69, accessed on 27.08.2013.

likely to promote an environment conducive to trade and investment in order to achieve the objective of free movement of goods, capital, services and technologies, we can assert that the organization under consideration constitutes an initial replica of the European Union.

1. SCO members, observers, partners and organization

1.1 SCO members, observers and partners

So far, with the status of full member, SCO comprises China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan's accession to the above-mentioned group of countries was one of the reasons that have led to the development of the Shanghai Five into SCO.

The observer states of the organization are Afghanistan, India, Iran, Pakistan and Mongolia, and the dialogue partners are Turkey, Belarus and Sri Lanka.

The quality of SCO observer state was recognized to Mongolia in 2004 (during the meeting of the Council of the Heads of the member states in Tashkent), to India, Iran and Pakistan in 2005 (in the framework of the summit of the Council of the Heads of the Member States in Astana), and to Afghanistan in 2012 (in Beijing). According to the Declaration of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on building a region of lasting peace and common prosperity made in Beijing in 2012[2], the member states of SCO pledged to support Afghanistan's efforts to build an independent, neutral, peaceful and prosperous country, being convinced that the national reconstruction efforts must be coordinated and led only by this country.

The decision regarding the acceptance, as partners of dialogue, of Belarus and Sri Lanka was adopted in 2009 (during the meeting of the Council of the Heads of the Member States of SCO in Yekaterinburg), and, in the case of Turkey, in 2012 (at the meeting of the Council of the Heads of the Member States of SCO in Beijing).

Regarding the differences and similarities between the qualities of the observer, respectively the dialogue partner in the relationship with SCO, a number of clarifications are requested, the first one being that the status of SCO dialogue partner is not, necessarily, a step in acceding to the quality of observer, a case in point being Afghanistan, state that has not gone through the stage of dialogue partner.

Basically, according to the Regulations on Observer status at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization[3], an observer state may participate to the meetings organized in the open format of SCO, without being allowed to vote in the process of adopting decisions and may be involved in the conduct of certain cooperative projects that may be embodied in a multitude of areas.

[2] Available at web address http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=442, accessed on 27.08.2013.
[3] Available at web address http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=65, accessed on 27.08.2013.

The dialogue partner status, established by the Regulations on the status of Dialogue Partner of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization[4], involves the representation of the partner at some SCO meetings with a predominant technical nature, as well as, most importantly, the course of projects in common with fitting onto the areas of cooperation that have been set out in the memorandum of partner's interaction with SCO (document whose signature signifies the completion of the process of accession to the position of partner). In fact, the cooperation between SCO and the dialogue partners is a specialized one aimed to flesh out, with the aim of obtaining certain mutual benefits, certain projects from predefined number areas.

1.2 The SCO structure

At the macro level, the organizational structure of the SCO includes the Council of the Heads of State, the Council of the Heads of Governments, the Council of the Foreign Affairs Ministers, the Council of the National Coordinators, the Regional Anti-terrorist Structure and the Secretariat. The SCO decisions are adopted by consensus and they are brought to fruition by the member states according to their national law.

The Council of the Heads of States is the supreme body of SCO, the sole authority with strategic leadership role. It ordinary congregates once a year to decide on priorities, the major areas of activity and the internal structure of the SCO, upon developing relationships with other countries and organizations, as well as on various international issues. The Council of Heads of State decides on granting the status of SCO member, observer or dialogue partner. For the first time, long time after the establishment of SCO, in the year 2010, the Council of Heads of States approved the Regulations on the procedure for admission of new members into SCO, reporting thus new organizational perspectives for development and expansion. Although SCO declares itself to be an open and transparent organization, the rules regarding the admission of new members have not been brought to public attention. Then, a year later, at Astana, the Memorandum with respect to the obligations of a candidate country for the position of the SCO member was signed; this document has also not been made public.

The decisions of the Council of Heads of States are brought to fruition by all the other structures of SCO.

The Council of Heads of Governments has skills in approving the budget and making decisions on issues regarding certain particular fields, especially economic, of interaction within SCO. Similar to the Council of Heads of States, it congregates in ordinary session once a year.

The Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers pronounces itself upon the routine activities of SCO, organizes the meetings of the Council of Heads of States, prepares the consultations on international issues within the organization,

[4] Available at web address http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=64, accessed on 28.08.2013.

plays the role of the spokesperson and represents SCO outside. It ordinarily congregates once a year, a month before the Council of Heads of States takes place.

In the implementation of decisions of the Councils of Heads of States or of Heads of Government, meetings with ministries/agencies of the member states are organized in order to achieve the cooperation of state authorities on the various levels of activity. For example, according to the Press Communiqué of the Meeting of the Council of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization organized at Beijing during 06-07.06.2012[5], in 2012, the heads of national agencies involved in combating trafficking and consumption of narcotic drugs, the heads of supreme courts, the heads of courts of auditors, the defence ministers, the ministers for foreign affairs, the finance ministers, the heads of national banks, the ministers of culture and the attorneys generals congregated. The variety of the above-mentioned fields induce the idea of a very close cooperation between the SCO members, based on plans/common cooperation strategies, such as, for example, the Action plan for the implementation of the Multilateral programme of trade and economic cooperation between the SCO member states, approved in Astana on 30.10.2008 or the Strategy of the SCO member states against narcotics 2011-2016, but it does not indicate unequivocally a significant stage of regional integration. Also, after the SCO establishment, in the region it has not been noticed any date regarding the reaffirmation of human rights and democratic values.

The Council of National Coordinators organizes and executes the routine activities of SCO and prepares or participates to the preparation of meetings of the Council of Heads of States, the Council of Heads of Government and the Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers. It congregates three times a year and it may be empowered to represent SCO outside this organization.

The Regional Anti-terrorist Structure, operative body of SCO, has the mission to fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism and has its head office located in Kyrgyzstan. Within its concern we can mention combating terrorism, separatism and extremism, as defined by art.1 of the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism[6] completed in Shanghai in 2001.

The Regional Anti-terrorist Structure acts directly to ensure the security of the member states through providing additional guarantees regarding their territorial integrity.

The structure activity is based on the exchange of information between the authorities of the member states, the on-demand execution of search actions, the exchange of expertise, the joint exercises and other forms of cooperation between the relevant institutions of the member states.

Also, the regional structure organizes, with the participation of all SCO

[5] Available at web address http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=443, accessed on 28.08.2013.
[6] Available at web address http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=68, accessed on 27.08.2013.

member states, anti-terrorist international exercises, until now events such as Peace Mission 2007 (attended by over 6,500 specialists) or Peace Mission 2010 having been passed.

The Secretariat is the administrative structure of SCO. This provides organizational and technical support for the activities developed by the other structures of the organization and formulates the budget proposal. The Secretariat is headed by an Executive Secretary appointed by Council of the Heads of States, upon the proposal of the Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers. The Secretariat is based in Beijing.

SCO has authority over *Business Council* (consultative body established according to the decision of the Council of Heads of States and which is made up of representatives of business community of member states, in order to enhance the economic cooperation), the *SCO Interbank Consortium* (dating from 2005, it contains banks, national companies, as well as development banks of the member states, realizes the *Action plan for supporting the regional economic cooperation* and supports the Business Council) and the SCO Forum.

2. Present and SCO perspectives

Through the Joint Communiqué of meeting of the Council of the Heads of the SCO Member States commemorating the SCO 10th anniversary[7], SCO self-defined as a multilateral organization which contributes to ensuring the regional security, the social and economic development, being "an example of developing intercultural dialogue and an active factor in the global efforts on the democratisation of international relations". It was noticed that the SCO route is a consistent, long-term planned one. In support of the last assertion we mention that, in 2009, the heads of SCO member states, recorded, under paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Declaration from Yekaterinburg[8] that the passage to real multipolarity is irreversible and only the cooperation represents a guarantee of the access, on an equal basis, of the SCO member states to the benefits of globalization. Therefore, SCO represents a reaction to the widespread deployment of the process of globalization, a process that enhances the interdependence of states.

The relations between the SCO members have gained a new impetus after signing, in 2007, the Treaty on Long – Term Good – Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation between the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization[9], a framework document, on the basis of which the parties committed themselves to not support activities directed against the other members, to coordinate with them regarding any threats and to cooperate in a wide range of areas.

The initiation of the cooperation channels with Afghanistan represented a

[7] Available at web address http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=293, accessed on 29.08.2013.
[8] Available at web address http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=87, accessed on 29.08.2013.
[9] Available at web address http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=71, accessed on 27.08.2013.

SCO priority, marked by signing, in 2005, the Protocol on Establishment of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group between the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan[10], document which allowed the official cooperation on issues of common interest. Moreover, since 2005 and until the year 2012, Afghanistan attended, year after year, the meetings of the SCO Heads of States as *a guest of the host state*.

We appreciate that by becoming close to Afghanistan, SCO seeks to achieve many major objectives, such as: increasing the SCO influence in the region and, thereby, weakening the position of NATO and the United States; the intensification of the process of controlled regionalization, on the model promoted by SCO; the amplification of the status of relevant partner in relations with the United Nations (UN), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc) or the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Also, the specified cooperation, presents mutual benefits, Afghanistan trying to realize the national reconstruction and to strengthen its internal security. Moreover, according to the Chronicle of main events at SCO in 2007[11], during the meeting dated 02.11.2007 between the SCO Secretary-General and the First Vice President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ahmad Zia Masood, the last one mentioned that the country he was representing was interested in getting assistance in order to meet the problems generated by the social and economic reconstruction process.

Turkey's entry into the SCO gear as a dialog partner, opens, in the first place, new possibilities for mutual development. Through facts, SCO pinpoints the image chapter trying to confirm what it has been said over and over again, respectively that it is not a threat to NATO. On the other side, the organization has created its prerequisites for strengthening its own role, both at European level and at Asian dimension, exercising in cooperation an economy in full growth. In return, Turkey has the possibility to make the most of its economic potential in the conditions under which, until now, the desired European path has been denied to it. From the press releases issued when Turkey acquired the status of SCO dialogue partner, it follows that the memorandum signed by the parties constitutes the basis for cooperation in various fields, such as: economics, culture, regional security, the fight against terrorism, the prevention of illegal drug trafficking, and combating organized crime.

In order to strengthen its regional and global position and to acquire extra legitimacy, SCO encourages the international relations primarily with the UN, ASEAN, CIS, CSTO and EurAsEc. The enhancement of the cooperation with CSTO reflects, in fact, the materialization of some Russian efforts of repositioning within SCO, respectively of exploiting the ascending position gained in other organizations. We remind, as an example that, on 05.10.2007, a

[10] Available at web address http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=70, accessed on 27.08.2013.
[11] Available at web address http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=97, accessed on 28.08.2013.

Memorandum of understanding between the SCO and CSTO Secretariats was signed, document that regulated the common involvement in ensuring regional security and stability, as well as in the fight against terrorism, illicit trafficking in arms, narcotic drugs and organized crime.

The attention of the international opinion turned over time to SCO, being reported two major paradoxes: on the one hand, the community of geopolitical interests of the SCO member states doubled by the absence of shared values, and, on the other hand, the numerous human rights violations documented in the region as against to the declarative positions of SCO. For instance, the relevance of the SCO role in the region justified the delegation, on behalf of this organization, of certain observers to monitor some conducting elections from the member states. Therefore, elections (parliamentary, presidential, and derived from the organization of certain referendums) as well as those of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (2007), Russia and Kazakhstan (2008) and Kyrgyzstan (2010) have been passed to the attention of the observers teams. Without exception, the press releases that marked the monitoring mission completion signalled the compliance with the legal procedures and the lack of incidents. On the other side, for example, in the case of the presidential elections held in Russia during 2008, the rapporteur Andreas Gross noted in chapter IV of the Observation of the presidential election in the Russian Federation (2 March 2008)[12] report drawn up for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, that even though the elections were well organized, the same mistakes have been repeated as in the case of the previous parliamentary elections, and the equality of the candidates` access to public and media was not assured, the fairness of the vote having been put into question.

Also, considering the membership of the SCO, it's no wonder that, regarding the conflict from South Ossetia from 2008, this organization was positioned on the Russian side claiming its active role in promoting peace and cooperation in the region, the Declaration of leaders of the SCO member states from Dushanbe[13] advocating this.

From the security point of view, SCO represents the greatest constant counterbalance of the American global interests, in circumstances where an "energy club"[14] can be created, "an OPEC of the natural gas" together with Iran. The Afghanistan and Turkey involvement in the SCO projects, along with the continuous strengthening of the multi-directional relations between the SCO members, observers and partners, guarantee the increasing of the SCO influence in the region and marks the consolidation of a powerhouse.

The immediate prospects of SCO may include the organizational arrangements' intensification carried out at the level of India in order it to assume the member status, raising Pakistan at the level of membership,

[12] Available at web address http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=11910&Language=EN, accessed on 27.08.2013.
[13] Available at web address http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=90, accessed on 28.08.2013.
[14] Cristian TRONCOTĂ, *Shanghai Cooperation Organization*, Psihologia&mass – media Magazine no. 3/2006, pp. 139.

intensifying the cooperation with Afghanistan in order to significantly increase the influence of the SCO in the region and intensively exploiting the partnership with Turkey, both from the point of view of the mutual economic benefits, as well as from the perspective of strengthening the SCO's role globally. Given that SCO has a long way to go on the regional integration dimension of the member states, which are at varying levels of development, the next period of time may mark the intensification of intra-organization cooperation.

Conclusions

Taking into consideration the high proportion of minorities at member state level, the national interconfessional conformation and certain separatist trends that are specific to some regions, with relatively high potential for expansion, the SCO role of combating separatism, extremism and terrorism looks like fully justified. This manifests itself mainly as an additional guarantee of maintaining the integrity of the member states.

SCO represents an international organization recognized globally and geared towards promoting the regionalization and the achievement of the synergy effect in channelling the developing efforts of member states. The organization may be analyzed, on the one hand, by the light of materializing China's and Russia's contribution to consolidate the regional security, and, on the other hand, by the reaction of states occupying the Central Asia to the effects of globalization and to the transition to multipolarity. Taking into account that SCO was built by and around China and Russia, it can be easily concluded that the organizational ambitions will not be constantly reduced regionally, but they will be expressed globally, even more the entity vocation is a general one.

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3. *Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism*, Shanghai, 2001, http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=68;
4. *Declaration of the Heads of State of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Building a Region of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity*, available at web address http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=442;
5. *Dushanbe Declaration of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*, available at web address http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=90;
6. GROSS, Andreas, *Observation of the presidential election in the Russian Federation (2 martie 2008)*, available at web address

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9. *Protocol on Establishment of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group between Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan*, available at web address http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=70;
10. *Regulations on the Status of Dialogue Partner of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*, http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=64;
11. *The Regulations on Observer Status at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*, Tashkent, 2004, http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=65;
12. *The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism*, http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=68;
13. *Treaty on Long-Term Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation between the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*, http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=71;
14. TRONCOTĂ, Cristian, *Shanghai Cooperation Organization*, Psihologia&mass – media Magazine no. 3/2006;
15. *Yekaterinburg Declaration of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*, http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=87.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE SYRIAN SITUATION, THE 15TH OF MARCH 2011 – THE 12TH OF SEPTEMBER 2013

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The present research is aimed at understanding the developments that have led to the violent situation in Syria. I shall therefore conduct an open source analysis report on sources such, as online media, in order to try to capture the most emblematic moments that have unfolded since the beginning of the violence in Syria, but also in order to understand what the media sees as being the most important reasons for the conflict in the first place. This chronologic endeavor will finally try to draw a series of up-to-date-conclusions regarding the impact of the conflict itself within the international arena.

***Keywords**: Syria, the United Nations, international impact, overall up-to-date assessment.*

1. Introduction, the civil conflict

On the 15th of March 2011 the international press started reporting the fact that Bashar al-Assad had been asked by somewhere around 200 protesters in Damascus[1] to release all political prisoners and give way to democratic reforms.[2] As in the case of Egypt, the protesters had formed and had apparently managed to obtain support using social media instruments such as Face book.[3] Although initially reports had stated that the security forces on the spot did not meet the protesters with violence and only detained 6 of them[4], the situation rapidly changed and on the 16th of March Reuters was already reporting that security forces were using batons to disperse a crowd of roughly 150 protesters in front of the Ministry of the Interior, with reports of mild injuries noted.[5] The protesters seem to have been quietly demonstrating for the release of somewhere between 3.000 and 4.000 political prisoners that where mostly detained without trial.[6] The situation took a heavy turn towards the worse when Washington Post announced to the world that Syrian forces were starting to use live rounds

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[1] Elizabeth FLOCK, "Syria revolution, a revolt brews against Bashar al-Assad regime", *The Washington Post*, the 15th of March 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/syria-revolution-revolt-against-bashar-al--assads-regime/2011/03/15/ABrwNEX_blog.html, consulted on the 18th of August 2013.

[2] "Mid-East unrest: Syrian protests in Damascus and Aleppo", *BBC News*, the 15th of March 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12749674, consulted on the 18th of August 2013.

[3] Elizabeth FLOCK, "Syria revolution, a revolt brews against Bashar al-Assad regime", *The Washington Post*, the 15th of March 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/syria-revolution-revolt-against-bashar-al--assads-regime/2011/03/15/ABrwNEX_blog.html, consulted on the 18th of August 2013.

[4] "Mid-East unrest: Syrian protests in Damascus and Aleppo", *BBC News*, the 15th of March 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12749674, consulted on the 18th of August 2013.

[5] Khaled Yacoub OWEIS, "Syrian forces break up Damascus protest", *Reuters*, the 16th of March 2011, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/03/16/uk-syria-protest-idUKTRE72F2V720110316, consulted on the 18th of August 2013.

[6] *Ibid.*

against protesters.[7] The bullets where accompanied by tear gas as "at least 14 people" were killed initially.[8] In an attempt to stop what clearly was becoming a nation-wide issue, Bashar decided to release some political prisoners. This was no solution however as the political prisoners that had been released provided protesters with even more to fight for as their stories became known. The Guardian made some of these public on the 25th of April 2011 when a certain Mahmoud gave account of severe detention conditions on account of defending his right to speak.[9] By the time Mahmoud got out however, the situation in Syria had already become a lot more complicated than initially envisaged, with as much as 200 people gone missing "in the last three days alone according to human rights monitors."[10] The protesters that had not been missing but had been taken into custody told unbelievable stories regarding torture practices such as walking on fire.[11] On the 20th of April the Syrian government had "lifted the country's 48-year-old state of emergency."[12] However this had little effect on the protesters who were asking for freedom rather than some political concessions.[13]

By April the Government was letting the whole world know that it would do all it takes in order to stay in power after tanks were used to shell Deraa.[14] The same happened with some consistency over time in cities like Baniyas[15], Homs[16] and Jisr al-Shughour.[17] The government had claimed that over 120 troops have been killed here by protesters.[18] In response 200 military vehicles were sent, including tanks, along with military personnel and even army

[7] Leila FADEL, "Protesters shot as demonstrations expand across Syria", *The Washington Post*, the 25th of March 2011, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-03-25/world/35261439_1_sanamein-security-forces-protesters-shot, consulted on the 18th of August 2013.
[8] Leila FADEL, "Syria's Assad moves to allay after security forces fire on protesters", *The Washington Post*, the 26th of March 2011, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-03-26/world/35260990_1_syrian-unrest-egypt-or-tunisia-security-forces, consulted on the 18th of August 2013.
[9] Katherine MARSH, "Syria's political prisoners: it's hard to imagine how I got through it", *The Guardian*, the 25th of April, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/25/syria-political-prisoners, consulted on the 18th of August 2013.
[10] *Ibid.*
[11] *Ibid.*
[12] David WILLIAMS, "Syria lifts 48-year state of emergency as thousands of protesters refuse to leave city square until Assad is ousted", *Daily Mail*, the 20th of April 2011, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1378406/Syria-protests-48-year-state-emergency-lifted-thousands-demand-Bashar-Assad-ousted.html, consulted on the 18th of August 2013.
[13] *Ibid.*
[14] "Syrians protest from rooftops after enemy action", *Reuters*, the 30th of April 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/30/us-syria-idUSLDE73N02P20110430, consulted on the 18th of August 2013.
[15] "Syrian tanks and troops' enter flashpoint Baniyas city", *BBC News*, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13320326, consulted on the 18th of August 2013.
[16] Martin CHULOV, "Syrian tanks shell Homs after Arab League peace deal", *The Guardian*, the 3rd of November 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/03/syrian-tanks-shell-homs, consulted on the 18th of August 2013.
[17] Hannah GODFREY, Martin CHULOV, "Syrian Army tanks move into Jisr al-Shughour", *The Guardian*, the 12th of June 2011, https://www.google.ro/?gws_rd=cr&ei=SGgzUpHdHM3Iswa3vIGgDg#q=Syrian+Army+tanks+move+into+Jisr+al-Shughour, consulted on the 18th of August 2013.
[18] *Ibid.*

helicopters[19]Around 10.000 citizens fled in refugee camps within Turkey.[20] With violence inside Syria mounting at a rapid pace the international community begun assessing the situation and trying to understand the possible risks that had derived from Bashar's regime.

2. Some international inputs and outputs

The International Atomic Energy Agency actually accused Syria of building a North-Korean technological based nuclear reactor for malicious purposes that was destroyed in 2007.[21] This however added to the rising international adversity against a government that proved avid of power and that tried to violently discipline its citizens. As violence continued to rise within the borders of Syria, the international community took further action with the Arab League suspending Syria for not keeping a peaceful environment, for destabilizing the overall security of the region and for using violence against its own citizens.[22] The Arab League also decided to put pressure on the Syrian power structures by undertaking a number of economic restrictive measures.[23] The U.N. subsequently decided to draft a peace plan as violence continued between the opposition and the regime. The plan envisaged "a call for a daily two-hour ceasefire, troop withdrawals, and talks between the opposition and the regime."[24] However no fully blown sanctions were mentioned by the UN in this regard,[25] some say, because of the continuous lack of cooperation that Russia and China have shown in sanctioning the Syrian regime trough a U.N. resolution.[26]

Fearing the worst, protesters within Syria have stated on the 29th of May 2012 that as they gain eventual momentum in tumbling the Government, their primary concern will be to take control of all chemical weapons.[27] This was a highly important piece of news for three main reasons. First of all it showed that

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[19] "Syrian unrest: army in control of Jisr al-Shoughor", *BBC News*, the 12th of June 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13741106, consulted on the 18th of August 2013.

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] Dan BILEFSKY, "U.N. Nuclear watchdog pressed case against Syria", *The New York Times*, the 4th of June 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/10/world/middleeast/10nations.html?_r=0, consulted on the 19th of August 2013.

[22] Neil MacFARQUHAR, "Arab League votes to suspend Syria over crackdown", *The New York Times*, the 12th of November 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/world/middleeast/arab-league-votes-to-suspend-syria-over-its-crackdown-on-protesters.html?pagewanted=all, consulted on the 19th of August 2013.

[23] David BATTY, "Syria suspended from Arab League", *The Guardian*, the 12th of November 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/12/syria-suspended-arab-league, consulted on the 19th of August 2013.

[24] "Syria: UN security council agree to back Kofi Annan's plan Wednesday 21 March 2012", *The Guardian*, the 21st of March 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/world/middle-east-live/2012/mar/21/syria-crisis-live-coverage, consulted on the 19th of August 2013.

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] "US urges Syria to work with Annan peace plan", *BBC News*, the 21st of March 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17466453, consulted on the 19th of August 2013.

[27] Brian WHITAKER, Tom McCARTHY, "Governments around the world expel Syrian diplomats", *The Guardian*, the 29th of May 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/global/middle-east-live/2012/may/29/syria-bashar-al-assad, consulted on the 19th of August 2013.

some opposition forces where taking the issue of commanding the new state very seriously and that they were aware of the fact that the chemical weapons supply is vital for the stabilization of the situation. Secondly however this was a grim reminder and at the same time a grimmer premonition regarding the fact that the regime was still in control of these weapons and that it could use them in any situation. The third reason why this piece of news was important is the fact that the statement was made, according to the Haaret Israeli newspaper, by a "an opposition figure described as a former senior officer in the Syrian army"[28] which was to some extent a indicator of the fact that the opposition forces clearly gained a strategic advantage as some military figures had fled from the regime and joined the fight against it. Still this seemed to not be enough as Syria was continuing on the path of destruction. Another barrier of decency had been breached on the 25th of May 2012 when government forces attacked a farming community in the Houla province killing 108. Among these were 49 children and 34 women.[29] Some of them had been reported to be executed at point blank.[30] This major violation has been sanctioned by the international community with a immediate response as France, Germany, Italy, Spain[31], Australia[32] decided to expel Syria's diplomats.

The opposition within Syria itself begun to show signs of proper organization and implementation of a strategic overview on the conflict as three of Assad's security chiefs were killed in a bombing.[33] The 18th of July demonstrated another two trends however. Defections among the military begun to increase[34] and secondly, but more important, this was due to the fact that the security forces employed by the regime were being issued gas masks. [35] The bombing itself is hard to properly judge however. First of all it might seem as a just response to unforgiving violence spread out by the regime. But still, it is obvious that terrorist measure were used. Although it was probably the only asymmetric way in which the rebels could assume a superior advantage, it may give way to further questions like how will these future leaders of Syria act when they gain power and how they will resolve differences among a complicated ethnical and religious landscape? Only time will tell.

The chemical situation however was of immediate threat and the international community responded with haste as reports came pouring in over

[28] *Ibid.*
[29] "Syrian diplomats around the world expelled", *The Telegraph*, the 29th of May 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9297399/Syrian-diplomats-around-the-world-expelled.html, consulted on the 19th of August 2013.
[30] *Ibid.*
[31] *Ibid.*
[32] Brian WHITAKER, Tom McCARTHY, "Governments around the world expel Syrian diplomats", *The Guardian*, the 29th of May 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/global/middle-east-live/2012/may/29/syria-bashar-al-assad, consulted on the 19th of August 2013.
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] Martin CHULOV, "Syria crisis: three of Assad's top chiefs killed in rebel bomb strike", *The Guardian*, the 18th of July 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/18/syria-rebels-kill-elite-damascus, consulted on the 19th of August 2013.
[35] *Ibid.*

the Assad regime's decision to move several of these across country.[36] The Syrian regime said that this was not true,[37] despite Western intelligence agencies stating the contrary. Barack Obama warned that such actions would attract consequences.[38] He stated that "we have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is when we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus."[39] Hilary Clinton held the same position by stating that "I am not going to telegraph any specifics what we do in the event of credible evidence that the Assad regime has resorted to using chemical weapons against their own people, but suffice to say we are certainly planning to take action if that eventuality were to occur."[40]

Meanwhile the conflict was irradiating across borders. On the 6th of October 2012 Reuters was reporting that "the Turkish military returned fire after a mortar bomb shot from Syria landed in countryside in southern Turkey."[41] The immediate political response given by Ankara was that the country "did not want war but warned Syria not to make a *fatal mistake* by testing its resolve."[42] Spirits also became fully inflamed as Turkey claimed that "it had found Russian munitions aboard a Syrian passenger jet force to land in its capital, Ankara."[43] The alleged munitions were retained by Turkey but the event added insult to injury as Moscow had been a continuous adversary of an intervention in Syria. The event of a projectile hitting Turkey from Syria also had immediate effects as Turkey turned to the United States for help. Thus, on the 20th of November 2012, The New York Times cited the Turkish Foreign minister who stated that "NATO states had signed off on deploying an advanced Patriot missile system to Turkey to defend against Syrian attacks. Talks over the deployment [were] in their final stage."[44]

The situation within Syria was equally confusing as rebel forces seem not to be on the same page in regard to recognizing a common leadership. In November 2012 a part of the rebels organized into what they call "the National

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[36] Matt WILLIAMS, Martin CHULOV, "Barack Obama warns Syria of chemical weapons; consequences'", *The Guardian*, the 4th of December, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/04/barack-obama-syria-chemical-weapons-warning, consulted on the 19th of August 2013.
[37] *Ibid.*
[38] *Ibid.*
[39] James BALL, "Obama issues Syria a *red line* warning on chemical weapons", *The Washington Post*, the 20th of August 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-issues-syria-red-line-warning-on-chemical-weapons/2012/08/20/ba5d26ec-eaf7-11e1-b811-09036bcb182b_story.html, consulted on the 19th of August 2013.
[40] *Ibid.*
[41] "Turkish army returns fire after Syrian mortar strike", *Reuters*, the 6th of October 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/06/us-syria-crisis-turkey-mortar-idUSBRE89503H20121006, consulted on the 20th of August 2013.
[42] *Ibid.*
[43] Liy SLY, "Turkey says Syrian jet carried Russian arms, drawing Moscow deeper into crisis", *The Washington Post*, the 11th of October 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-11/world/35501159_1_syrian-mortar-strike-syrian-air-plane-syrian-passenger-jet, consulted on the 20th of August 2013.
[44] Neil McFARQUHAR, "Citing a *credible alternative* to Assad, Britain recognizes Syrian rebel group", *The New York Times*, the 20th of November 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/21/world/middleeast/britain-is-latest-power-to-recognize-syrian-opposition-coalition.html?_r=0, consulted on the 20th of August 2013.

Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces."[45] The National coalition was immediately embraced by the Western world as an "opposition that reflects the full diversity of the Syrian people."[46] It has been subsequently been recognized by France, Turkey, the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and also by Great Britain.[47] Unfortunately however, the Al Nursa and Liwa Al Tawhid Islamic groups "refused to endorse it"[48] and have labeled it to be a "conspiracy."[49] Although there is no power to share just yet as Assad continues his reign, it is clear that if he will disappear, the country will inevitably face more confusion and possibly violence as militant Islamists may not see a Western recognized organization as a solution for the future of Syria.

As time went on it appears that Assad has also allegedly tried to get rid of some of the weapons of mass destruction by supplying them to Hezbollah.[50] This deed seems to have been sanctioned by Israel trough the usage of aerial attacks that have dismantled the plot while apparently killing Hassan Shateri, an Iranian General who is said to have accompanied the convoy.[51] The piece of news is most disturbing because it confirms the idea that other open sources had released in regard to which Assad is being actively influenced by Iran in its violent endeavors. Israeli intelligence sources have even stated that Iran in itself has been working hard with Hezbollah in order to prologue the life of the Assad regime.[52] 50.000 troops have thus been reported by Israeli Intelligence to have been sent in order to keep the Syrian army afloat amid the rebels wining more and more ground.[53]

This became obvious as rebels managed to capture governor Hassan Jalili of the Raqqa province and Suleiman Suleiman, the secretary general for the Baath party, while also managing to apparently free the city of Raqqa in the Northern part of the country.[54] It has been the highest profile capturing of

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[45] Arthur BRIGHT, "What is the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces?", *The Christian Science Monitor*, the 12th of November 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2012/1112/What-is-The-National-Coalition-for-Syrian-Revolutionary-and-Opposition-Forces-video, consulted on the 20th of August 2013.

[46] *Ibid.*

[47] Neil McFARQUHAR, "Citing a *credible alternative* to Assad, Britain recognizes Syrian rebel group", *The New York Times*, the 20th of November 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/21/world/middleeast/britain-is-latest-power-to-recognize-syrian-opposition-coalition.html?_r=0, consulted on the 20th of August 2013.

[48] "Syria's opposition coalition suffers first setback ", *AFP*, the 20th of November 2012, http://gulfnews.com/news/region/syria/syria-s-opposition-coalition-suffers-first-setback-1.1107466, consulted on the 20th of August 2013.

[49] *Ibid.*

[50] Phoebe GREENWOOD, Richard SPENCER, "Bashar al-Assad accuses Israel of trying to destabilize Syria", *The Telegraph*, the 3rd of February 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9846032/Bashar-al-Assad-accuses-Israel-of-trying-to-destabilise-Syria.html, consulted on the consulted on the 20th of August 2013.

[51] Gabe FISHER, "Israel's strike on Syria last month killed top Iranian general", *The Times of Israel*, the 24th of February 2013, http://www.timesofisrael.com/top-iranian-general-said-target-of-israeli-strike-in-syria/, consulted on the 20th of August 2013.

[52] Julian BORGER, "Iran and Hezbollah have built 50.000 strong force to help Syrian regime", *The Guardian*, the 14th of March 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/14/iran-hezbollah-force-syrian-regime, consulted on the 20th of August 2013.

[53] *Ibid.*

[54] "Syria crisis: warplanes bomb Raqqa after rebel gains", *BBC News*, the 5th of March 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21666917, consulted on the 22nd of August 2013.

regime representatives since the bloody civil war begun.[55] Nevertheless, Syrian forces have bombed the city as a response to what the media called a strategic moment for the forces battling Assad which had still failed to control air bases surrounding the city itself.[56]

3. The chemical issue

First reports regarding full use of chemical weapons are available to us ever since March 2013 when Reuter announced that the rebels and government forces started to blame each other of using chemical weapons near Aleppo.[57] It is interesting to note the fact that this is not a first and that government and rebel forces often accuse each other over the same bombings or suicide attacks, which creates a volatile security environment that is hard to follow and understand. Western sources obviously tended to underline the fact that rebels have not been reported as having such weapons as "Russia, an ally of Damascus, accused rebels of carrying out such a strike."[58] It is also worth noticing that "the pro-opposition Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, which monitors the conflict, said 16 soldiers were among the dead."[59] The fact that rebels had stated in the past that securing chemical weapons would be of primary concern did not, and does not help at all because this may very well have given sufficient grounds for speculations that are ongoing. Of course Russia does not want to change sides and has done several investigations that have lead it to believe that the "round of ammunition used near the largest Syrian city of Aleppo in a purported chemical weapons attack in March was not a factory-made item of the Syrian armed forces"[60] and that "the used round of ammunition was a homemade item on the basis of rockets made in Syria's north by the so-called Bashair Al-Nasr brigade."[61] Debates on this issue are still far from being over however.

There have been numerous alleged nerve gas attacks, but by far the biggest seems to have been that which has taken place in Damascus on August the 21st 2013. Initial reports stated that around 1.300 had died after nerve gas was used by supposedly Syrian governmental forces.[62] At that time "Syrian

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[55] *Ibid.*

[56] "Syrian jets bomb northern city overrun by rebels", *The Guardian*, the 5th of March 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/05/syrian-jets-bomb-city-rebels, consulted on the 20th of August 2013.

[57] Oliver HOLMES, "Alleged chemical attack kills 25 in Northern Syria", *Reuters*, the 19th of March 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/19/us-syria-crisis-chemical-idUSBRE92I0A220130319, consulted on the 22nd of August 2013.

[58] *Ibid.*

[59] *Ibid.*

[60] Dimitar DILKOFF, "Ammo used near Aleppo, Syria in March was homemade - Russia", *Ria Novosti*, the 5th of September 2013, http://en.ria.ru/world/20130905/183172658/Ammo-Used-Near-Aleppo-Syria-in-March-Was-Makeshift---Russia.html, consulted on the 8th of September 2013.

[61] *Ibid.*

[62] Sam WEBB, "Syria's darkest hour: hundreds of children's bodies piled high after nerve gas attack near Damascus leaves up to 1.300 dead", *Daily Mail*, the 22nd of August 2013, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2398691/Syrias-darkest-hour-Hundreds-childrens-bodies-piled-high-nerve-gas-attack-near-Damascus-leaves-1-300-dead.html, consulted on the 24th of August 2013

activists accuse President Bashar al-Assad's forces of launching the nerve gas attack in what would be by far the worst reported use of poison gas in the two-year-old civil war."[63] However, "the accounts could not be verified independently and were denied by Syrian state television, which said they were disseminated deliberately to distract a team of United Nations chemical weapons experts that arrived three days ago."[64] Again "a foreign ministry spokesman in Moscow said the release of gas after UN inspectors arrived suggested that it was a rebel 'provocation' to discredit Syria's government."[65] The United States of America have fought hard however to prove that this perspective is far from the truth and have issued a statement, based on intelligence sources which found the following: "The United States Government assesses with high confidence that the Syrian government carried out a chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburbs on August 21, 2013. We further assess that the regime used a nerve agent in the attack. These all-source assessments are based on human, signals, and geospatial intelligence as well as a significant body of open source reporting."[66] For the President of the United States in America this has meant the crossing of the red line which he had already mentioned in the past. "President Barack Obama addressed the crisis in Syria on Saturday, saying he has decided the United States should take military action against regime targets, but that he will seek authorization from Congress before taking action."[67] British Prime Minister, Cameron did the same with his Parliament but has failed "after dozens of Tory MP's joined forces with Labor"[68] despite the fact that British Intelligence had gone to great extent to create a document that showed, from their perspective, that Syrian government forces were responsible for the attack.[69]

4. Conclusions, short term solutions and questions that remain

The G20 Summit held in St. Petersburg started out with president Obama pushing for support on the issue of military intervention in Syria[70] with Brazil, Russia, China, India and South Africa being apparently afraid that their

[63] *Ibid.*
[64] *Ibid.*
[65] *Ibid.*
[66] The White House, "Government assessment of the Syrian Government's use of chemical weapons on August 21, 2013", *Office of the Press Secretary*, the 30th of August 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/30/government-assessment-syrian-government-s-use-chemical-weapons-august-21, consulted on the 3rd of September 2013.
[67] "Obama says U.S. should take action in Syria, will seek Congress' authorization for use of force", *The Huffington Post*, the 31st of August 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/31/obama-syria-announcement_n_3849108.html, consulted on the 5th of September 2013.
[68] Nicholas WATT, Rowena MANSON, Nick HOPKINS, "Blow to Cameron's authority as MPs rule out British assault on Syria", *The Guardian*, the 30th of August 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/aug/30/cameron-mps-syria, consulted on the 6th of September 2013.
[69] *Ibid.*
[70] "Divided G20 discusses Syria crisis in St Petersburg", *BBC News*, the 5th of September 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23967567, consulted on the 8th of September 2013.

emergent power status could be negatively touched by an economic situation that would derive from opening a Syrian front.[71] Iran of course baked Russia's position on the international arena which again has manifested doubts in regard to the source of the attacks.[72] Vladimir Putin actually stated that out of the G20 Group only Turkey, the U.S., Saudi Arabia and Canada favored an intervention while Russia itself would more probably side with Syria in case Americans decide to attack, a prospect and strategic declaration that rather reminds us of the Cold War and that was probably meant at intimidating the external agenda of Washington in general.[73] Putin called the nerve gas incident as a "provocation" set out by the rebels themselves in order to receive help from abroad.[74]

However, on the 9th of September Russia came with a rather unexpected solution to the crisis, in which it suggested that Syria places all its mass destruction weapons, nerve gas and all, under international control, a prospect that has been accepted by Walid Muallem, Syria's Foreign Minister[75] and that has been seconded by Syria's apparent resolve to join international agreements against the use of chemical weapons.[76] Thus Russia has managed to keep relatively intact, for now at least, one of its most important strategic outposts in the Middle East. The move seems to catch on quite a bit all around the world as some French initiatives see Putin as a possible candidate to a Nobel Peace Prize.[77]

The conflict in Syria is more than could have been envisaged when it initially started. What appeared to be a form of Facebook revolution proved itself to become a cornerstone in international politics for sovereign actors with power statuses far beyond that of the Assad regime. All events have put the world at odds by reviving strategic patterns that resemble those during the Cold War period, when weapons of mass destruction were used as a diplomatic solution and where the struggle for power was fought not between the main actors of international politics directly, but indirectly within foreign influence lands. But the situation in Syria is far from being over. After the violence will have somehow subsided, we do not know how exactly, there still remains the

[71] "BRICS states fear strike on Syria could hurt world economy", *Reuters*, the 5th of September 2013, http://news.yahoo.com/brics-states-fear-strike-syria-could-hurt-world-144525967.html, consulted on the 9th of September 2013.
[72] Greg BOTELHO, Michael PEARSON, "Iranian leader: U.S. will definitely suffer if it leads strike on Syria", *CNN News*, the 6th of September 2013, http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/05/world/meast/syria-civil-war/index.html, consulted on the 9th of September 2013.
[73] James KIRKUP, "Syria: Russia will stand by Assad over any U.S. strikes, warns Putin", *The Telegraph*, the 6th of September 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10291879/Syria-Russia-will-stand-by-Assad-over-any-US-strikes-warns-Putin.html, consulted on the 9th of September 2013.
[74] *Ibid.*
[75] Simon SHUSTER, "Russia's Syria calculus: behind Moscow's plan to avert U.S. missile strike" *Time World*, the 10th of September 2013, http://world.time.com/2013/09/10/russias-syria-calculus-behind-moscows-plan-to-avert-u-s-missile-strikes/, consulted on the 13th of September 2013.
[76] "Kerry, Lavrov' committed to trying' for renewed Syria talks", *Deutsche Welle*, the 13th of September 2013, http://www.dw.de/kerry-lavrov-committed-to-trying-for-renewed-syria-talks/a-17087033, consulted on the 13th of September 2013.
[77] Alexander WARKENTIN, "Russia's clever move on Syrian crisis", *Deutsche Welle*, the 13th of September 2013, http://www.dw.de/russias-clever-move-on-syrian-crisis/a-17085986, consulted on the 13th of September 2013.

problem of competing forces within the country that will probably fight themselves for supremacy. The issue of chemical weapons to be placed at some point in international hands represents a solution to half of the problem as it is unclear whether Bashar al-Assad will want to stay in power or not and with what costs and with what effects on the rebel-government dichotomy. The conflict still has very boiling spots and the fact that the proposition for solving some of them has brought some prestige to the power politics envisaged by Moscow does not mean that the Syrian issue is to some extend over. Far from it, as Syrians have been fighting among each other in a historical matter, and will probably continue to do so for some time. The question is with what means in the future? The Syrian conflict, besides opening questions that may take years to answer, has demonstrated another thing as well. The fact that the United Nations seems to lack the proper instruments of tackling such situations before they get out of hand. In this regard we must ask ourselves how do the United Nations help us within the global arena today and are their structures efficient enough in order to avoid such issues in the future?

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CHALLENGES IN THE PROCESS OF CREATING LONG-TERM STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS WITHIN THE CZECH REPUBLIC'S DEFENSE SECTOR

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As the Defense sector in the Czech Republic (and elsewhere) is currently in the process of ongoing revision of its strategic documents, several challenges appeared. Political instability and lack of clear and coherent Political guidance, as well as austerity of resources constitutes the most serious obstacles on the grand scheme, but these can be hardly dealt with by the MoD or Armed Forces only. However lack of cooperation, genuine interest of individuals or even lack of basic (long term) vision of the future hinders the process from within. Having participated in this process, authors would like to offer their view on both the challenges and the outcomes.

Keywords*: Czech Republic, strategic documents, military.*

Introduction

Year 2013 will be forever marked as year when Milos Zeman was sworn in as the third president of the Czech Republic, having won almost 55 percent of the votes in the first-ever popular presidential ballot in the country where previously the head of state was selected by parliament. It will be marked as a year when the government was deposed following an alleged abuse of military intelligence by the prime minister close collaborators. And last but not least it should be remembered as year, when Czech Republic made yet another attempt to revise its long term defence documents.

Long period following Czech admission to the European Union in 2004, may be characterized as time, when both politicians and population had seen the tasks of the armed forces largely through the lenses of Afghanistan mission and as a consequence long term defense planning was neglected[1]. Change in this notion was swift and came in 2010 when work on the first large group of defense documents was initiated and within two years there were three new texts (and one another which is in classified mode) successfully published. This was probably caused both by lack of resources, which necessitated review of current level of ambitions and also by the person of the then minister of defence Alexandr Vondra, who involved wider expert community on this task. "Second round" is in progress right now, with finalizing touches on so called Long Term

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[1] http://www.onwar.eu/2013/07/17/umet-vsechno-neni-dobrou-cestou-pro-budoucnost/

Perspective for Defence 2030 and with work commencing on Development Concept of the Czech Armed Forces (on which both authors participate). However this process is full of challenges – some of which are discussed in this paper.

1 Where are we?

Most recent and valid long term strategic documents concerning defense of the republic are the Security Strategy from 2011 and Defence Strategy from 2012. There is also The White Paper on Defence from 2011. While the two former documents are interconnected and were written in sequential order, the White Paper is much loosely related to them. This alone poses problem since it is not clear how much binding are the conclusions found in the White Paper.

For any further discussion it is thus necessary to sum up what are the findings of Security and especially Defence Strategy which form the base for currently prepared documents.

While Security Strategy provides basic overview of Future Security Environment, Principles of the Security Policy of the Czech Republic and The Security Interests of the Czech Republic[2], Defence strategy is naturally more "Armed Forces" oriented. Besides strategic context it especially defines Political-military ambitions for the development of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic These provide the political guidance for the Armed Forces in terms of their development and fulfillment of legal obligations, the commitments to Allies and possible additional tasks. The development of the Czech Armed Forces' capabilities follows (at least in theory) the conclusions of the 2011 White Paper on Defence and is determined by qualitative and quantitative criteria[3].

Following seven points constitutes Qualitative Criteria:

1. A single set of forces for the fulfillment of both military tasks and in support of civilian authorities in non-military crisis situations.
2. Force effectiveness with respect to the missions of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic within the framework of the Czech Republic's National Defence System and the most likely means of their employment while maintaining the ability to respond across a broad spectrum of operations in a flexible manner.
3. Force efficiency with emphasis on achieving the proportion of maneuver and combat elements (60%) to support elements (40%) across all components of the Armed Forces.
4. Force modularity enabling the formation of mission-tailored task forces based on organic units.
5. Deployability of forces and their usability for the performance of

[2] http://www.army.cz/images/id_8001_9000/8503/Czech_Security_Strategy_2011.pdf
[3] http://www.army.cz/images/id_8001_9000/8503/STRATEGIE_an.pdf.

missions in allied operations while at the same time increasing force sustainability in international operations.

6. Interoperability of forces ensuring cooperation with allies and performance of missions in the Alliance's integrated information environment.

7. Force specialization in areas with a higher added value, such as defence against weapons of mass destruction, special operations forces, military medical service, multinational logistics and helicopter capabilities.

Quantitative Criteria were subject of fierce debates as they basically describe size of the units which can be deployed into operations.

1. In case of an armed conflict which threatens the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Czech Republic, all forces and assets of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic are employed, including an option to invoke conscription.

2. For NATO Article 5 collective defence, the Czech Republic provides land and air forces earmarked to that effect in the framework of the NATO Defence Planning Process. Their core element consists of a brigade-size task force formed on the basis of a mechanised brigade.

3. Subject to a given situation, the Czech Republic is able to concurrently or gradually assign the following forces and assets for international crisis management operations:

a. a land battalion task force, or an air force equivalent, rotated after a six-month period; as part of this deployment, the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic are able to provide a multinational task force command element for up to twelve months;

b. a company-size land or air task force rotated after a six-month period;

c. a battalion-size task force assigned for high readiness stand-by arrangements of NATO (NATO Response Force) or the EU (EU Battle Group).

4. The Czech Republic is also able to contribute to additional operations with specialised forces or expert teams, including but not limited to the Special Operations Forces and mentoring and training teams.

This level of Political-military ambitions was very hard to define. Firstly it was not clear what is understood under the term "ambitions". If these represent certain (ideal) point in the future, which Czech Republic may or may not reach. Or if they represent clear commitment – something we must under every circumstance fulfill. It took a long time before the second notion has been accepted. Today it serves as undisputed base for future defence planning.

2. Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030 and Development Concept of the Czech Armed Forces

Documents discussed in the previous chapter form the basis for the ongoing works on "Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030" and "Development Concept of the Czech Armed Forces" (known under Czech abbreviation KVAČR). Overview of some of the most peculiar challenges

encountered during their development is discussed here.

Probably the most fundamental challenge encountered during the development stage of "The Long Term Perspective" is unclear motivation for actually developing it. There was shared belief, that some kind of long term foresight document providing detailed idea about the way forward is necessary. However mostly every other aspect of this document has been disputed - starting with the title itself. In Czech language, the terms such as "Long Term Perspective", "Vision", "Foresight" etc. have similar meaning and the differences between them are somewhat blurred. To simply put it the title did not indicate clearly if we are looking for a document that should only suggest the desired state of defence in Czech Republic in 2030 without any detailed information about the ways how to reach it – hence the term "vision" would be more appropriate. The other approach suggested, that this should be much more elaborate paper that details what kind of armed forces will the Czech republic have in 2030 and how should these be prepared and build in accordance with financial resources. Thus using the term "Foresight" would be more fitting. And since no clear political guidance has been provided at the beginning – and proved impossible to get later – the position of this document remains unclear and disputed.

Formal position of the Long Term Perspective aside, there is also critique concerning the content. Especially the definition of Future Security Environment has been done rather poorly. With no clear methodology behind it, it seems to be simply copied from contemporary NATO documents such as Strategic Foresight Analysis or Framework for Future Alliance Operations which is still under development. Moreover this transfer of view on Future Security Environment from Alliance context to Czech reality is done repeatedly with serious consequence which will be discussed later.

One of the few things expected from the "Long Term Perspective" from the beginning was that it is supposed to form the basis for "Development Concept of the Czech Armed Forces". While the "Long Term Perspective" is more "security" related and assessing Military Implications based on Future Security Environment, "Development Concept" should (at least in theory) specify in detail what kind of Military capabilities will the Czech Armed Forces develop to meet the needs defined by the "Long Term Perspective". As simple as this logic may sound, the sequential order of each respective part proved almost impossible to achieve and we are witnessing difficulties to link both documents together. This may be partially caused by bad interpersonal communication but more importantly it may be result of serious flaws in the defence system itself. And given the result of parliamentary elections, it is not clear if works on this document will go on – or rather how will the new political elite's ideas about the future armed forces be included in it.

3 General Challenges

As the last two chapters suggested, challenges encountered during the most recent phase of strategic documents development are just the tip of the iceberg. More than that – they are far from case specific.

As has been already mentioned earlier, lack of interest of the political elites is the underlining factor of the situation within the defence sector. This hinders any serious debate about the future security environment and consequentially about the military implications. And as these debates are left just for the experts, they very rarely elevate higher to the political level and thus usually do not transform themselves into political guidance.

For example before the parliamentary elections in October 2013 Czech Republic faced the situation when military was the least important part of programs of all seven relevant political parties[4]. Moreover those programs differ immensely and there were very few ideas shared through the political spectrum. Therefore wide range of ideas about the future role of the Armed Forces could be observed – stretching from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as one of the main tasks (Social democrats, TOP09) to abolition of NATO (Communist party)[5].

As a result of political disinterest in military matters, the financial crisis hit defence sector severely. Last five years were dominated by budget cuts and army has been frequently seen as a source of money into such extend, that main Political-military ambition was virtually only to cut expenses. This logic continues to prevail even up today - as illustrated in numerous debates before the 2013 parliamentary elections. The sharpest fall in expenses came in 2010 – when these dropped from 1.43% of GDP to just 1.29%. Interestingly this coincided with the new phase of long term documents development (see chapter 1). The bottom has been hit in 2013 when defense expenditures amounted only to 42 billion CZK (1.08% of GDP)[6] - again coinciding with commencement of works on Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030 and Development Concept of the Czech Armed Forces. This may suggest that reform of strategic documents is carried out only in time of scarcity – which implies that such reform is always about "*downsizing*" rather than "*developing*" of the Armed forces.

However it is not for the first time that Czech Armed Forces suffer from fluctuations of the defence budget. And not for the first time suggestions about the need to have fixed financial resources with at least some degree of stability have been made. After all there is the example of Poland, which successfully implemented similar measure into its legislature. These propositions in Czech republic – usually setting defence budget somewhere near 1, 5% GDP annually -

[4] http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ct24/domaci/246532-vojaci-si-polepsi-strany-chteji-armade-pridat/.
[5] http://zpravy.idnes.cz/plany-stran-s-armadou-0ta-/domaci.aspx?c=A130923_115952_domaci_jw.
[6] http://www.mocr.army.cz/finance-a-zakazky/resortni-rozpocet/resortni-rozpocet-5146.

came mainly from the Social Democratic party, however given the changing growth of GDP this does not really stabilize the budget. Within the military, preferred solution would be fixing the expenditures in absolute numbers at least in 5 years perspective. This would make acquisition of new materiel easier and perhaps cheaper than today. In any case spending 2% of GDP on defence as requested by NATO is simply not going to happen any time soon.

Lack of resources – or better to say stability in defence spending – had to be reflected in last defence strategic documents update. It affected especially the level of ambitions which have been downsized in past years – to match the sources available. While before the 2010 the Czech Republic was able to assign a brigade-size task force for international crisis management operations, nowadays only the land battalion task force is provided under the normal circumstances. The brigade-size task force is left only for NATO Article 5 collective defence. To illustrate the immense financial burden required in such unlikely situation, the brigade-size task force would cost 22 billions CZK (or almost 1 billion EUR) during the first month of its deployment – which is more than half of the annual defence budget today. Not mentioning the fact, that especially ammunition would not be available in the numbers required. On the other hand land battalion task force has repeatedly served in Afghanistan and there are sufficient experiences with its deployment into operations. How would the Czech Republic cope with overambitious programs – such as participation in common V4 Battle Group planned for 2016 – remains to be seen.

And finally the never-ending story of lack of common threat perception must not be overlooked as a serious challenge. It is fair to say, that this problem descended from the NATO, but it is ironic, that Czech Republic mimic the Alliance flawlessly in this matter. The process of "*transplanting*" every finding about every possible threat from NATO perspective on Czech Republic has grown enormous proportions. It is not uncommon to hear even the most respected scholars to asses the importance of power shift in Pacific Ocean on the Central Europe – but to clearly say, that we face far more urgent local security issues is perceived as a heresy. On a positive side, in a study conducted within our Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies at the University of Defence, it has been found out, that the most important task carried out by the Armed Forces will probably be the participation on disaster relief (repeating floods almost yearly) and that above all the Future Security Environment in Czech Republic will be defined by corruption and demographic change rather than by any geopolitical issues. So not all is as negative as it may sound – it shows us, that "*big problems*" of this world are probably not going to affect us seriously. Thus being realistic about the future security environment may help us to prepare the Armed Forces much more effectively.

Conclusion

The ongoing process of strategic documents revision is full of challenges.

Some of them are caused by political instability, some by lack of finances and some are caused by flaws within the defence system itself. But several positive trends may be already observed as well. This include setting realistic level of Political-military ambitions or even realization, that the threat perception in Czech Republic is not always necessarily the same as within the NATO. There is slowly growing optimism within Czech security community that if these underlining problems are solved or better understood, than given the end of financial crisis, there is the potential for stabilizing the situation of Armed forces. The key external factor – political (in)stability – is however hard to predict today more then ever in the last decade.

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THE IMPERATIVE OF A NEW STRATEGIC CALCULUS IMPOSED BY THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

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The international system goes through a period of radical changes with a deep impact on international actors' strategic calculi. The present paper illustrates the major trends which should be taken into consideration when thinking about new policies and strategies. Among them, we refer to the increased frequency of strategic shocks, the implications of the global economic and financial crisis, new geopolitical tendencies, such as the relative decline of US power, the emergence of new centers of power such as China, as well as to the preservation of the risks posed by international terrorism, failed states and their impact on security preoccupations. Additionally, the approach of social and military evolutions can contribute to a clearer image on international system's current state.

Keywords: *security environment; geopolitical tendencies; strategic shock; EU; NATO.*

1. Argumentation

In the context of the less predictable evolution of the current and future security environment, due to various factors belonging to, on the one hand, the dynamics of the balance of power at regional or world level and on the other hand the phenomenon of globalization in its many aspects (political, military, economic, cultural, social, etc..), thinking in conventional terms to security and defense, will not result in an adequate, timely and effectively response to new threats, risks and vulnerabilities arising from the dynamic of events that characterizes the beginning of the century.

The strategic impact caused by certain dynamics in the evolution of international relations, the use of force in promoting the interests of both state and non-state actors opens the door to a disruptive potential that will require an increased interest in early identification of destabilizing conditions and effects, this can lead to their characterization as being strategic shocks.

Historically, security and strategic analyses, as well as the processes of development and conception of defense and security strategies have demonstrated a number of critical shortcomings. The first aspect that can be subject to critique is that, conceptually, they had a reactive character, lacked creative imagination and, consequently, have created necessary conditions for the emergence of vulnerability to surprise. Secondly, more often than not, recent history shows us quite clearly that defense strategies and strategic planning failed in their predictive character.

In order to "scan" effectively the strategic horizon, strategists need to apply different methodologies, such as risk analysis, which are available tools to prevent strategic surprise and shock and timely adjustment of strategic options

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for responding to major events that can induce such effects.

The definition of security was shaped between the two world wars with the emergence of security studies, but has changed drastically in recent decades. The differences between the interests of the states, coupled with the limited resources available to them, led to a widening gap between problems, actors and solutions that are specific to the security environment. The direction of transformation was from an approach that argues for the central position of the military threats and response in the analysis and international security policy and, to a broader approach, which emphasizes the non-military issues, including those relating to internal security and their impact on human individuals and states.

Because mutations in the international security environment the relationship between various dimensions of security has changed in the sense of change of priorities. It is not sufficient to focus the attention on the military dimension of security for providing security and winning the war against terrorism or other types of asymmetric threats. Providing security depends on addressing simultaneously all its dimensions (military, political, economic, social, cultural, psychosocial, environmental, and the list can continue) because we live in a time when peace and security depend on deep knowledge of the causes of conflict, social and political instability and a whole range of other aspects of our global society; the failure to understand the complexity of security problems would only worsen them. [1] It seems that in order to meet the future security needs and requirements raised by individual, national and even international actors, we need to focus on cooperation and promoting universal human constants. The main actors of these forms of cooperation are the states.

Confronted with the security environment changes, the state focuses on one of its most important functions, namely security. Democratic states do not militarize their policies, economy or society as a whole, but rather maintain a balance between quality of life and military capabilities of the state, between civil and political society, on the one hand and the armed forces, on the other hand. Thus, these countries maintain the democratic civilian control over military policy, armed forces, and defense budget.

Security studies have tried over time to provide a coherent approach on national security. Since 1957, Samuel P. Huntington argued that national security could be achieved by improving national economic, political, and social security institutions against threats from other independent states[2]. Based on this premise, Huntington distinguishes three types of security policies, both at the operational level (immediate measures taken to prevent security threats) and at the institutional level (how the security policy is formulated and executed at the operational level):

- *Military security policy* that establishes and coordinates activities

[1] Alexandra SARCINSCHI, *Vulnerabilitate, risc, amenințare. Securitatea ca reprezentare psihosocială*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 2007, pp. 13-14.
[2] Samuel P. HUNTINGTON, *The Soldier and the State. The Theory and the Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Vintage Books, NY, 1957

designed to reduce or neutralize the efforts to weaken or destroy a certain nation through armed attack from outside the institutional and territorial borders;

- *Internal security policy* centered on the threat to the state, produced by forces acting within its institutional and territorial boundaries;
- *Situational security policy* concerned with the risk of erosion resulting from long-term changes in political, economic, social and demographic areas that tend to reduce the power of the state.

Huntington clearly delimits the nonmilitary security from the military one, but he does not highlight the importance of the former. Later, the postmodern studies brought to the fore the military - non-military dichotomy, in this regard Barry Buzan makes a clear distinction between the military and the nonmilitary security[3]. According to this concept are distinguished:

- *The military dimension* that refers to the mutual interaction of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states with their perceptions vis-à-vis the intentions of other actors;
- *The political dimension* that considers organizational stability of states, systems of government and ideology that gives them legitimacy;
- *The economic dimension* that includes access to resources, finance and markets necessary to maintain an acceptable level of wealth and power of the state;
- *The social dimension* that consists of sustainability, of the acceptable conditions of evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, religion, national identity and customs;
- *The environmental dimension* that designates the maintaining local planetary biosphere as the essential support system of human existence.

All these dimensions of security involve many aspects. The political dimension covers both the relationship between the state and its citizens and the international relations in which the state is involved. The economic dimension is considering the economic foundation of military power, but also the economic component of security in all its four levels, with emphasis on the one regarding the individual. This last level is the one related to the social dimension of security: national security is extremely important, but cannot be achieved without the security of individuals. Finally, the environmental dimension, which brings new issues under study, includes three aspects that cannot be ignored: the environmental problems caused by war, natural resources whose possession can trigger international disputes and natural disasters.

Therefore, one can argue that achieving security, especially the national security, requires addressing simultaneously all these dimensions, which

[3] Barry BUZAN, *Popoarele, statele şi teama. O agendă pentru studii de securitate internaţională în epoca de după Războiul Rece*, Ed. Cartier, Chişinău, 2000.

involves the creation and implementation of coherent and effective policies, which are subsumed to the process of good governance.

2. General tendencies of the international security environment dynamics

Although security, prosperity and well-being seem to be in the natural order of things, they actually do not occur spontaneously and are not simple effects of human action. They are the result of our societies' efforts, that have worked and sometimes fought hard to achieve them, and these values must be protected in a world whose future is uncertain. Relations between economic, political and military factors are changing, old threats disappear, while new ones are born and rise in their place. The climate is changing and natural resources become scarce. The world population continues to grow, and aging in Europe is a trend with limited correction possibilities. Technological advances continue to create new opportunities, but at the same time, new dependencies and risks. In this evolving world, the feeling of uncertainty about our future position becomes a certainty.

The future security environment will be characterized by a high potential for intra-state conflicts, by continuous evolution of asymmetric threats, non-state actors and states that do not obey the rules of the international political game, of social, economic, environmental and resources developments that could potentially lead to instability. Although states recognize that economic welfare, international trade and nuclear weapons are major disincentives to inter-state conflicts, there will always be tensions on economic growth, social development and competition over resources that could possibly justify attacks against other countries. Asymmetric attacks of non-state actors or of smaller states, dissatisfied with the situation they find themselves at a point in time - be it political or economic, have been proved to be an effective means of allowing entities to impose their agenda on the world stage.

The failed and fragile states that continue to exist will mean that these regions, potentially ungovernable, will continue to serve as a shelter for terrorist and criminal organizations, will be the source for recruiting fighters and serve as the basis for launching attacks. This will also mean that these regions could collapse into chaos, an effect that will require humanitarian missions, stabilization and reconstruction to improve the security situation.

Poverty, unemployment, the devastating effects of climate change, resource scarcity, especially the water, widespread, possibly at continental level, will worsen the security situation and generate instability, requiring deployment of humanitarian or crisis stabilization in poor regions struggle with mass migration, refugee and displaced populations existence, will increase competition for food resources, water and other resources.

Given this security environment, the future battle space will include areas of physical and cyber engagement, operations within national borders or abroad,

within alliances or coalitions. At first glance, it would seem that asymmetric warfare became the dominant mode of warfare of the last decade, the growing interdependence of global financial and commercial markets discouraging interstate conflict in order to avoid disrupting trade and capital flows.

Conflicts that will arise in this complex security environment will have implications in the following fields: geopolitical, social (ethnic, religious, ideological), economic, distribution of resources, environment, science and technology, military and security in general; these factors are at the same time generators of geopolitical and geostrategic developments. Therefore, it will not be possible to successfully prevent and resolve disputes using military power alone, because addressing security threats causing instability and conflict involves addressing issues in all parts of society. In developing sustainable solutions, military power will be just one component among many others, to create and maintain security, but it will not be the main component.

The new global security system rapidly leads to eliminate boundaries between foreign and domestic policy, between the economy and national security. Developments in a particular area have a rapid and surprising impact on other areas, which require the ability to change the way of thinking on global issues and formulate, as a consequence, counter-balancing policies, requiring both synergy and dynamism in economic development, to identify methods to resolve security threats and in the formulation of transforming government policies. Ever-increasing differences between states with strong democracies and developing states, or what is far from democratic norms, cause regional instability due to the inability of the latter to compete in the international market, making them accumulate the negative consequences of globalization: unemployment, poverty, diseases, etc.

From the historical point of view, poor economic performance, social disparities and economic and class polarization have often contributed to exacerbating ethnic tensions, the resumption of historic intercommunity strifes, that, in turn, fueled terrorism and armed conflicts, putting pressure on regional and international institutions to solve these problems.

3. Geopolitical developments

Due to globalization and reducing the occurrence of inter-state wars, dealing with non-state actors has become the most prevalent form of conflict and will be in the predictable future. However, inter-state conflict will never be completely eliminated. As long as there are states, triggers of conflicts will be found within them: economical competition, nationalism, internal political fight, sometimes influenced by foreign powers, external political fight etc.

To the same degree as Tanugi Laurent Cohen stated[4], geopolitics of the early 21st century is chaotic, and is the result of the actions of conflicting forces:

[4] Laurent Cohen Tanugi, The Shape of the world to come – charting the geopolitics of a new century , Columbia University Press, New York, 2008, p. 54.

on the one hand, the increasing division and conflicts arising from national differences, regional, ethnic, religious or cultural and, on the other hand, as a counterbalance, diplomatic efforts to promote adhesion of various so-called "derived states" modern multilateral international system and globalization, along with the benefits of democracy. At present, the economic and financial crisis has a significant impact on geopolitical developments targeting, favoring the emergence of power centers (China, Russia, India) triggering the relative decline of the US, requiring the need for strategic recalculations. For example, US has already announced reconfiguring its strategic priorities to the Asia-Pacific, which demands the redefining of the transatlantic partnership.

International multilateral organizations, especially after the Second World War, were a crucial element in international relations becoming an increased occurrence, so nations of various parts of the world could take part in the global political game. The nature and complexity of today's threats ranges from failed states and terrorism and requires a coordinated approach and a grater investment in resources that could not be achieved by governments acting on their own.

Since its establishment, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has undergone a continuous process of adaptation to a rapidly changing security environment. We believe that, while its main objective remains collective defense in order to remain a relevant security organization for European and global security, although on the short and medium term are no conventional threats directly affecting the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO will continue to expand its interests in non-traditional operations, such as stabilization and counter-insurgency missions. However, it is likely that the organization will become more politically focused, its operations being developed on developed by coalitions consisting of a limited number of NATO members that have niche capabilities and political will, on the one hand due to political risks and the difficulty of receiving a consensus in the alliance, and on the other hand for reasons of internal political agenda and specific national interests of the members. Dragging US interests into Asia-Pacific will certainly have an impact on NATO's role in the European sector, in the sense that the Europeans are subject to the need to take greater responsibility towards their own safety and security in its close vicinity. Defense planning initiatives like "smart defense" (in NATO) and "pooling and sharing" in EU leans towards this new trend. Yet, what is noteworthy is that on the medium and long term, NATO will continue to play an important role in ensuring peace in Europe being the main pillar of Euro-Atlantic security, but also the Alliance is likely to be engaged in more "in politically sensitive missions or with a highly emergency character."[5]

European Union (EU) has recorded an increased foreign influence over the past two decades, the EU model of economic integration, despite the crisis of the euro area, it is a success serving as a model for other integration projects around the globe. However, most of the EU development, is due to what has been able to perform within its borders. The responsibility for all the legislation

[5] Ibidem. p. 53.

relating to issues of common market passed from the hands of individual states to the EU institutions, as the movement of labor and goods within the borders of Europe has liberalized. In light of recent events occurring internationally, we believe that the EU needs as soon as possible by a new strategic document to reflect recent developments, adapted to the new international relations and with a strong proactive nature. The reasons for a new strategy could be: the current security strategy is outdated, the EU needs a new strategy for the current objectives, does not cover all the dangers facing Europe, the number of states which joined the EU from 2003 increased to 15 to 27, the EU has acquired legal personality, and not least, Europe is in the process of recovery from the global economic crisis, which is not in the current security strategy[6]. Due to the economic crisis and wars involving the new U.S. interests were channeled towards Asia, which contributed to the implementation, in the EU and NATO, initiatives known as "smart defense" and "pooling and sharing"[7]. We believe that, in the medium and long term, the EU will play a growing role in European security affairs, but in the absence of clear and direct threat to European security, the EU will likely continue to focus more on governance and domestic issues than international security.

4. Social developments

In demographic terms, the global population is likely to increase from 6.9 billion in 2010 to 8.8 billion in 2040[8]. Developing countries will have the highest growth rate, the population will remain relatively young, in contrast to developed countries and China, which will have a low population growth rate and a significant increase in average age across the country[9]. In the west, the aging process can lead to the adoption of new employment policies, the "young old" who enjoyed longer periods of retirement. It is estimated that this cultural change can result in a demographic and social benefits, which could result in both a lower demand for migrant workers and a decrease in government spending[10].

Migration phenomenon. The number of international migrants increased from a total of 75 million per year in 1965 to 191 million per year in 2005, of which approximately 10 million are refugees and 40 million are illegal immigrants[11]. It is estimated that the number of migrants may rise in 2050 to 230

[6] Margriet Drent, Lennart Landman, „Why Europe Needs a new European Security Strategy", *Clingendael Policy Brief*, 9 July 2012.
[7] Cristina Bogzeanu, „NATO-EU relation from the perspective of the implications of smart defence and pooling and sharing concepts", in *Strategic Impact*, nr. 3 [44]-2012, pp. 34-41.
[8] Global strategic trends – out to 2040, UK Ministry of Defence, 2010, pp. 24
[9] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division - World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision
[10] Global strategic trends – out to 2040, UK Ministry of Defence, jan. 2010, p. 94
[11] UN Department of International Migration and Development - International Migration 2006 data; http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/2006Migration_Chart/2006IttMig_chart.htm

million[12]. Environmental and climate pressures, economic incentives, conflictuality, political instability growth will continue to cause population to move from affected regions to areas with better economic and living standard potential. Crises and conflicts will also continue to have the effect that large parts of the population will be displaced from the proximity of conflict zones, particularly in the areas of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia[13].

Identity shifts. Identity can be viewed from multiple perspectives. The most important, in our opinion, is the cultural identity, which together with social identity plays the most important role in defining an individual, community or population in terms of social interaction, based on social standards. Generally, identity is a term used to describe, on one hand, how people perceive themselves and on the other hand describes individuals' perception of the social group or community to which they belong. An individual belongs usually to groups with multiple identities, ex. through birth, assimilation or professional achievements and the group influence the values and beliefs of each group member. From a historical perspective the key influences on identity factors were determined by ethnic, racial, national and religious. However, new types of influences, such as those caused by the almost total use of technology in human socialization, it is possible to act on the perception of individual and group-level social. For example, on-line social interaction is likely to increase on level of sophistication and size.

Today, anywhere in the everyday environment, we are surrounded by smartphones, laptops, tablets, devices that we "put" the internet and technology in hand. Because of technological developments, the risks of using his technology have grown, and individuals and small groups of individuals began to acquire increasingly greater access to genuine power tools that emerge from this space. Attacks in the virtual environment, in cyberspace, often came to be news stories as they require little resources to be implemented and have major effects on the target. Today we frequently talk about cyberpower, which is a set of resources to create, control, communication of electronic information, infrastructure, networks, software and human skills, the ability to obtain the desired effects by using the electronic and networked information resources (internet, internal network cell phones networks, satellite communications, etc..) in the cyberspace.

The society changes in developing countries are also a major importance, the middle class will increase and it will have a better education and a health system. Because of this development, the middle class will become the center of financial and social power of the society. The population of this class will have a higher chance of affirmation but also appears forming risk groups seeking to

[12] United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs - Population Division - International Migration Report 2002, New York-2002; http://www.un.org/esa/population/ publications/ittmig2002/2002ITTMIGTEXT22-11.pdf.

[13] United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs - Population Division - International Migration Report 2002, New York-2002; http://www.un.org/esa/population/ publications/ittmig2002/2002ITTMIGTEXT22-11.pdf.

achieve their goals through violent means[14].

5. Economic tendencies

Global economic growth has been driven by economic globalization in the last 30-40 years, generating connections and interdependencies among major economic powers. The economic landscape evolved rapidly, centrally planned economies collapsed, Asian economies have enjoyed tremendous growth, particularly China, which has consciously embraced a philosophy of the market economy, the EU has matured into a block of economic cohesion and all these changes created a multipolar economic landscape.

After years of strong growth, the global economy is decelerating rapidly. The global economics are crushed by financial shocks and high energy prices and many advanced economies are close to or heading towards recession, while growth in emerging economies is also weak. Looking ahead, financial conditions are likely to remain very difficult, restraining global growth prospects. The baseline of economic forecast assumes that actions taken by the US and European authorities will succeed in stabilizing financial and economic conditions, managing to avoid systemic economic events and the development of the global economy will continue to be accompanied by improvements in material welfare.

However, economic growth, combined with continued global population growth will increase the demand for natural resources, minerals and energy, and when these factors are related to the aging demographic trends, environmental and political challenges, the most likely outcome will be a reduction in the rate of global economic growth[15].

The errors and the limited capacities of the policy makers, especially in Europe and the United States to solve jobs crisis and to prevent sovereign debt of states, to eliminate the fragility of the financial sector will influence the most acute global economy risks in 2012-2013[16]. The developed economies are on the edge of a downward spiral based on the existence of four weaknesses that mutually influence each other: sovereign debt of countries, fragile banking sectors, weak aggregate demand for goods and services (associated with high unemployment and fiscal austerity measures imposed by the government and international finance) and policy paralysis caused by political and institutional shortcomings immobility. In these circumstances it is considered that a global recession lurks around the world[17].

[14] National Intelligence Council, Global trends 2030: Alternative Worlds.
[15] Global strategic trends – out to 2040, UK Ministry of Defence, jan. 2010, p. 119
[16] United Nations - World Economic Situation and Prospects 2012, Global economic outlook, New York, 2011 , p.18
[17] Idem, p.18

6. Military trends

It is impossible to evaluate the trends of future wars without trying to understand contemporary military context, both globally and regionally. Military power is an agent of the policy and will remain so. However, once started, the conflict has its own dynamics that may affect national or political unity at the level of an alliance or coalition. In the exercise of military influence and power of a state, military power can not be separated from diplomatic and economic levers of power. In addition the use of the military instrument can not be considered isolated in the current strategic environment characterized by complexity and chaos. These levers of power, amplified by the growing power of information, using a balanced mix of hard and soft power in pursuit of national interests will be the recipe for success in crisis management.

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Some political-military analyses provide for the future a translation of military power at global and regional level, and the influence on emerging powers and security will be diversified and include a wide range of countries, among them those that traditionally oppose the West. The emergence of China and India and the relative decline in Russia is likely to indicate a tendency of revival of great power behavior[18]. This rivalry between the emerging powers could likely lead to the resumption of regional conflicts of low intensity or of those known as *proxy wars*, to increase proliferation and competition for resources[19].

In the military field, conflict and crisis in general, whose characteristics are difficult to express, will continue to take the form of irregular actions, at least until around 2020, expressed through terrorism, insurgency, crime and large-scale instability. Although the risk of conventional conflict is considered to be low in the near future, one of the findings of analyzes carried out at different levels and expressed in planning documents of some states is related to the increasing risk of a conventional military confrontation between states after 2020, due to the increase that will accumulate on the background of competition

[18] Idem, p.18.
[19] *op. cit.,* Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040, Executive Summary, p. 9-14.

for resources, especially for energy and food, along with population growth[20]. Preventive action as a form of addressing security challenges is officially embraced in more and more states. The first country that initiated this transformation was the USA and from the development of the new Security Strategy of the United Kingdom[21], the issue was present, publicly and officially in the foreign and security policy of this country. Clearly, capabilities, including military ones, will take the characteristics of this course of action, to the idea of allowing early engagement, to minimize the impact of threats and manage the effects they can produce. Thus, the British Security Strategy 2008 was aligned and become "interoperable" with the US strategy of preventive war (NSS 2006) which considered that the simultaneous fulfillment of the conditions of weapons of mass destruction detention by non-state actors cancels the principles of classic self defense that supports the use of the use of force only in the event of direct and imminent attacks.

7. Perspectives in the field of strategic planning

But what is the strategic context in which the armed forces will be able to act? The strategic context of the future operating environment will be configured by the manifestation or appearance of factors such as: maintaining a state of insecurity and uncertainty marked by ***strategic shocks***[22], the persistence of *ungovernable areas*, the increasing demand of the civil society for the *legality and legitimacy* in the preservation of national interests, technological development and undifferentiated and non-discriminatory access to new technologies. National security policy considers essential national classification in the political-military context provided by allies and partners: NATO, EU, and in particular, the strategic partnerships as that with US or Turkey continue to represent parts of the political and military interoperability. The spatial scale of national interests will continue to put pressure on achieving expeditionary character of armed forces. Comprehensive and integrated approach requiring crisis stabilization efforts will demand the armed forces to adapt to the diplomatic and economic dimensions of problem solving destabilizing problems and occupation, in this three-dimensional framework, of the appropriate place, which is not always the management or coordination place. Acceptance to take action together with proxy actors such as: corporations with global action, contractors, regional military forces or Private Military and Security Companies

[20] Joint Concept Note 2/12 - Future Land Operating Concept, UK Ministry of Defence, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) May 2012, www.mod.uk/dcdc , p, 1.
[21] The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, Security in an interdependent world, 2008, pp. 4-7.
[22] ***Strategic shock*** is defined as an event, These are either, typically, very unlikely, or likely to occur at extremely infrequent intervals. Historical examples of the sort of discontinuity which the Strategic Shocks highlight include: the destruction of Minoan civilization as a result of volcanic eruption in 1450 BC.; the impact of the Black Death on 14th century Europe, the attack on the United States in September 2001., *The DCDC (Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre) Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007 – 2036*, available at http://www.cuttingthroughthematrix.com/articles/strat_trends_23jan07.pdf, p. xii.

(PMSC) will be, if not desired, required by the nature of operations. Where operating environment will be hostile to such an extent that civil partners will not be able to deploy, armed forces will have to be able to take their role and conduct civil capabilities. The joint character and inter-agency of the operations will require a special capacity to integrate land forces, to be developed by planning joint exercises and training staffs in this environment since the early stages of operations.

Continuing the analysis, the armed forces must be prepared to act on the continuum of conflict along which will interpenetrate humanitarian activities and post-disaster recovery disaster relief stabilization operations with major combat operations. Thus, stabilization operations, while aiming to restore security and governance in some areas, will be able to include high-intensity warfare, which might require the full spectrum of joint capabilities and a greater number of forces than that required for actual warfare.

As for the nature of the threat, we can identify and classify, together with irregular and hybrid threats, those that are state-centered and hybrid threats in which state or non-state actors simultaneously make use of all instruments and methods of warfare, the use of advanced conventional weapons to irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal acts with destructive effects to destabilize the existing order. *Through the nature of this type of threat, these actors will follow the production of strategic shocks* by employing cyber attacks (such as those in Estonia – 2007, Georgia – 2008 or Kirghizstan – 2009), novel arms or radiological weapons of mass effect.

Conclusions

We can state that the current and future operational environment will be influenced by different factors such as economic, political, cultural or social. The current economic uncertainty in the Western societies (the US and the EU in particular) can result in long-term creation of a deficit in the Euro-Atlantic security, and the financial austerity that is expected to be the defining characteristic of government spending at least for an average term of 5 - 10 years may have as major impact reducing investment in NATO collective defense and at the countries level, taken separately. This risk will be reflected, if we refer to NATO, in a reduction in the effectiveness of allied military action[23], especially if the view that Western domination of Western societies and the technological advantage will continue to erode so much to the possibility to even disappear in horizon of 2020 becomes a reality[24].

[23] Joint Concept Note 2/12 - Future Land Operating Concept, UK Ministry of Defence, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), May 2012, pp. 1-11
[24] Idem p.1-11

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PERSPECTIVES ON THE NEED OF TRANSFORMATION OF THE ROMANIAN NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY IN EUROPEAN CONTEXT

Vasile ROMAN, PhD.*

Global actors adjust their priorities, review and change their interests and areas of influence, develop appropriate diplomatic, economic, military and intelligence means to achieve their goals.

A recent report presented to the Chiefs of Defense (CHODs) of the EU Member States proves once again, if necessary, how precarious the unity of the EU security is and which are the avenues required to be followed to reduce exposures and immediate risks.

In this respect, the political-military level of decision of Romania has be reflected into the sizing of its defense structures considering the regional context, the budgetary limitations and the emerging trends of the modern warfare.

This trinomial of factors should be prioritized and quantified in accordance with their importance and finally converted into operational requirement.

Security and defense entail costs, and these costs may be accepted, strategically speaking, by visualizing long-term benefits. They are tangible in time of crisis (not desirable though), but measurable and highly visible in the economic and foreign policy achievements of a state.

Keywords**:** *security, defense, strategy, pool of forces, defense industry.*

"In an era of globalization, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand…"

(European Security Strategy)

1. Current context

The world is changing, desired or undesired, controlled or uncontrolled (more uncontrolled), known or less known, hallucinating, unpredictable and yet...

Globalization and regionalization are words on the agenda, for the world, for Europe or even for our own country.

Everything expands and unifies while everything crumbles inside unification. This paradox could be explained by the EU financial policies that seek a more visible decentralization.

We talk about financial crisis, job crisis, culture crisis, communication crisis and more recently about crisis of confidence (after Wikileaks phenomenon there is no world leader to resolutely address sensitive issues for fear of seeing leaks of confidential information).

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In this context, global actors adjust their priorities, review their interests and areas of influence, and develop appropriate diplomatic, economic, military and intelligence means to achieve their goals (more or less revealed).

US rethinks its centre of gravity as it shifts to Asia, leaving Europe to manage its own problems, while keeping an eye on the former communist countries such as Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, or on countries in the Caucasus such as Georgia, with the thought that they (having Russia as their neighbor) are more willing to pursue its foreign policy.

Russia continues both its economic and military power development, still relying on the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), but especially on the oil and gas resources in the Caucasus, without sacrificing the "cordon sanitaire" formed by Ukraine, Moldavia, and Georgia (even though they partly seek to comply with the economic and security norms that would ensure their NATO and EU accession).

Turkey wants to be recognized as regional leader and it advocates, through its leaders, for this, however this does not go the way they want because of both the internal struggles and the crises in proximity of its borders (especially in Egypt, where the Turkish government supports the Muslim Brotherhood).

Europe tries to solve everything at once, in spite of the crisis. Its problems are diverse in nature and in spite of its holistic approach to them they continue to remain fragmented, especially in terms of security and defense.

EU has an External Action Service with approximately 500 employees and it is in charge of conducting the common foreign and security policy. It has a world wide representation that mirrors extremely well the Strategic Commands of the U.S. Armed Forces. Its role is to harmonize both the EU and the Member States interests, but it has limited powers, because of both national interests and the lack of common vision.

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has also responsibilities in terms of security with specialized bodies in support of this, but the strategy (also known as SOLANA strategy), which has been developed back in 2003, provides with general guidance and no specific tools to approach it, focusing particularly on the asymmetric threats in the proximity of the EU borders.

The security threats and challenges to the European security never cease to exist, both internally and externally. In this regard, Russia's political and military actions (even if the latest ones seem to be less dramatic) and the effects of the Arab spring in Egypt, Libya, and Syria are clear indications of vulnerabilities and risks in vicinity of Europe.

The prevailing tendency of states to reduce their defense budgets (hence defense research) perfectly and noticeably contradicts what is happening in the Russian Federation and China. Although they are also affected by the financial crisis, the two countries are manifesting themselves as global actors both in the economic and security fields.

US option to focus on the Asian (even if this aims at limiting Russia's influence) leaves Europe to solve its security problems in a new environment.

Reduction in the US military presence in Europe, budget cuts, and reviewed military options (especially in Syria) proves that Europe must undertake clear-cut responsibilities when it comes to security.

The crisis in the Near and the Middle East (from Arab spring to internal conflicts) challenge Europe at a different level (options for action are often contradictory) and calls for a commitment determined by the possibility that these crises would go beyond the national borders. However Europe hesitates to take action as there are no clear options for commitment and besides there is no foreseeable common interest.

Romania's security in its turn is influenced by the reduction in its defense resources, by the retention of the Member States (NATO and EU) to materialize the concept of "Smart Defense" or "Pooling and Sharing", by the lack of involvement of the States in specific and quantifiable projects (with the permanent excuse from the policymakers that there are no funds for the defense).

Our country benefits from the presence of some elements of the US projected and designed anti-missile shield (NATO wants it in the future too) and from the strategic partnership with US (confirmed in the last ten years by the deployment of the Romanian troops in Iraq and Afghanistan and US large investments in the Romanian economy, although less visible.

The lack of a NATO - Romania contingency plan (actually discussed) makes our national security, in case of conflict, subject for negotiation and agreement within the Alliance. In this respect, the strategic behavioral model of Poland (to ask for a contingency plan) is not a sign of fear or distress but a precaution that needs to be stated in an official document. The desire for integration not only requires compliance with rules but also calls for solutions, materialization of plans and turning the concrete into reality.

In this context, Romania seeks to maintain course and to stay involved in decisions, although they often lack in the EU.

2. Security and national defense in the European Union

A recent report presented to the Chiefs of Defense (CHODs) of the EU Member States proves once again, if necessary, how precarious the unity of the EU security is and which are the avenues required following in order to reduce exposures and near risks.

Without going into the details of this document and without citing passages (authors prohibit this, while the readers can access it on the Internet[1]) another point of debate is related to those statements and suggestions that ought to be found in the Romania's National Security Strategy within the current

[1] http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Report_16.pdf (accessed on 24.07.2013).

European context. At the same time, without being Euro-skeptical, one must analyze the national security requirements and the procedures to materialize them, with references to European problems and solutions.

The analysis below refers to regional security necessities, to the size of the Armed Forces, the share of each Component Command within the Romanian Armed Forces, the endowment programs and hence the national defense industry. It is a comparatively analysis, within European context. We will consider Poland for our analysis, which is a country of average size, located as Romania, at NATO and EU borders, and which also faced in the past century same problems and conditions as our country does.

The first element of this analysis, otherwise regional in European context, refers to the position and the responsibility of Romania as NATO and EU border country.

Article 42 (7) of the Treaty on EU introduces mutual assistance clause in the event of an armed aggression. Although legally recognized, this commitment is not mentioned in the EU Security Strategy which does not cover aspects related to the European contingency plans either. There is hope that the forthcoming summit, scheduled at the end of 2013, would bring some clarifications and thus would close the gap in SOLANA strategy, adopted in 2003. It must be mentioned that there hasn't been drafted another strategy ever since.

SOLANA strategy was drawn up following the lack of cohesion between NATO member states (EU implicitly) to channel their energies in managing conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Balkans (explained by the fact that UK and the U.S. had evident economic disputes with France and Germany, at least in the case of Iraq).

In his "double hat" capacity (Secretary of NATO and EU security officer) Javier Solana tried to bring to the attention of Europe a starting point for the analysis, preparation of options and management of crisis that might affect the continent, especially from outside its borders. Its general terms with superficially defined instruments, the bureaucracy and the disagreement between the member states with regards to their commitment led to a non-lucrative strategy. Now, in view of Lisbon Treaty, the strategy is considered outdated and requires redrafting so as to better reflect the new security environment of the second decade of the twenty-first century.

Same situation continues nowadays. This is in spite of the fact that there is an External Action Service and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy whose main objectives are cooperation programs on foreign policy, whereas security and defense benefit from less attention. The department that manages security and defense issues is far smaller than the one dealing with foreign policy issues. Defense issues are not really tackled and that's why the analysis presented to the CHODs seeks to bring up to their attention the main problems of the defense.

The way the conflicts in Africa (Mali – Sahel, Libya, and Syria) were

managed only proves that countries commit themselves to certain situation depending on “centers of influence”.

This approach is explained by the way different states manifest their own interests, but it remains clear evidence that lack of common vision and unity of effort weaken the capabilities of the national Armed Forces. It is known that States project the strength of their Armed Forces based on the financial crisis and not on the threats or the security challenges. They also consider that Europe can no longer be affected by classic conflicts.

The solution can only come from a new EU Security Strategy, from plans in place to transform military organizations, from the pool of forces financed from the common budget (and not from national contributions by type of missions) and last, but not least from common equipping programs.

When addressing the security and defense of Romania, the question to ask is "what should be done?”

Intentionally we said "should", but not "is", having in mind that during the World Wars Romania was both subject and object of the conflicts, without being actually prepared for them. In fact Romania received a late and poor logistical support in training and equipping its Armed Forces (from France and UK during WW I and from Germany during WW II). Such support was determined not by the needs of Romania, but by the role the Allies were expecting it to play.

In this respect, Romania’s option (otherwise expressed with pragmatism and consistency by Poland too – the subject for our comparative analysis) is to train its national Armed Forces to defend the borders of Europe and NATO, which partly overlap with our national borders in the North and in the East.

We do not consider it necessary to anticipate a conflict in order to train and equip the Armed Forces for classic actions. It is required though to analyze the behavior of the strategic actors in the East, their “modus operandi” during various historical events and to identify the interests they have and manifest in order to understand why the military organization is needed. Predicting the future without looking to the past, represents a huge assumed risk, which may have disastrous effects.

National defense implies highly mobile aviation, navy and land forces (armors, artillery and rotary wing for maneuver and fire support), combat support and combat service support units. The size and the structure of the forces are generally strategy-driven (being defensive or offensive), as well as by the latest technological developments.

Without looking at the pools of forces, a brief analysis of the existing armors, whose figure exceeds five thousand in Europe, indicates that states still maintain a large number of armored units (though with a poor logistic support). It is also noteworthy to mention that states completely rule out a classic conflict. Besides some of the armors belong to the newly admitted countries and they are produced in the 1970s after the Soviet model. If the number of armors may be subject for analysis, their presence, mainly in the Central and the Western EU countries, is a concern. Within the logic of the security these EU countries

should not be subject of a classic attack.

It might be in the interests of the Union and of the member states to transfer some of the military equipment the Western countries have to the countries at the border of EU. This solution may seem utopian and yet not, given that those states could, through their defense industry, provide maintenance and modernization of the transferred equipment (economic benefits are without doubt foreseeable). At the same time the defense industry of the receiving countries could be connected to a potential European defense industry consortium.

Same system might be used when considering other types of combat and combat support equipment, communications or intelligence gathering, because European defense should not be limited to maneuver forces, but to a functional body.

Within this context, when addressing the role of Romania and of its Armed Forces, one needs to again ask himself or herself a question.

It is not desirable for any country at the border of EU to transform itself in a deposit neither for Leclerc or Leopard armors, nor for Apache or Alouette helicopters (the older generations) or any other old military equipment. It is therefore imperative to establish, considering the Romanian defense industry too, which will be the suppliers of military equipment for all the services (Land Force, Air Force or Navy). The costs for procurement and maintenance should be considered when selecting the suppliers, but especially the political and economic relations they have or want to further develop with our country.

Coming back to the size of the Land Forces (we are not going to refer too much to the other services as the author lack the required expertise), it seems only objective to consider the size, the location, and the combat readiness level of the large mechanized tactical units as main maneuver forces, clearly meant for national and common European defense.

In this regard, using Poland as example, we will find that this nation of about 38 million and 313,000 square kilometers, sharing about 1,200 kilometers of border with its North-Eastern neighboring countries (535 kilometers with Ukraine, 418 kilometers with Belarus, and 210 kilometers with the Russian Federation) has an approximately 45,000 strength Land Forces component, organized in three division level large formations. We can consider this as being practically reasonable from both the purpose and the financial power point of view.

Romania, on the other hand, with a population of 20 million, a surface area of two thirds of that of Poland, and a land and sea border of 1,900 kilometers in the North and East has a little over 30,000 troops serving under Land Forces, in three divisions. Due to the downsizing of the personnel number (triggered, mostly, by the 2010 financial crisis) a Romanian division counts up to 10,000 personnel, while a Polish one has a complement close to 15,000.

A brief estimate allows us to state that the actual size of Romanian Land Forces seems to be related more to the size of the national territory and the span

of its borders, and less to the population number (which is the generator of the national GDP, and the source for the revenues allocated to defense spending). Reasons and explanations varies in accordance with the type of analysis however, the differences between the two nations and their Land Forces components ought to require a new kind of approach. Thus, the political level of decision has to agree upon a national defense system considering on the regional context, the budgetary limitations and the emerging trends of the modern warfare. This trinomial of factors should be prioritized and quantified in accordance with their importance, and finally converted into operational requirement.

The main reference points when debating the size of the military should be mobility, firepower, force protection, logistics, and the command and control capability, as well. Moreover, it is necessary to re-think the geographical location, taking into account both, the first response capability, and the gradual build-up of the main body. As an example, the Polish Armed Forces are still located mainly in the Western part of the country; however they are capable of rapid redeployment due to its highly mobile combat and transportation equipment.

In the recent past years, the Polish Armed Forces has been equipped with imported weapon systems (some of them upgraded versions of older models, such is the case of the jet fighters) and this is manifesting as a force multiplier.

The quantity, the quality, and the availability of modern equipment should be the catalyst in the process of force transformation, and not the pre-established number of units, their locations, or the corresponding amount of command positions.

It is our personal opinion that the current three divisions (with the same level of combat readiness) are a burden for the Land Forces, way too complex in order to be properly administered and trained. A potential solution for mitigation could be indentified by reviewing the force transformation processes of the US Army and the British Armed Forces.

A more realistic model, including the financial point of view, could consist of:

- One fully operational division located in the proximity of the Eastern border of Romania;
- One low readiness division, with sufficient resources allocated in order to train reservists, and reach the pre-established IOC and FOC subsequently, and
- One reserve division with a similar structure and mission like the low readiness division, but less resourced and more extensive pre-established IOC and FOC timeline.

The model should encompass as well, the equipment transfer flux, from one formation to another, based on modernization, upgrade or acquisitions of new equipment.

Another point of debate must be the rotary wing capability, currently part

of the Air Force, though there are many opinions that support the idea of attack and transport helicopters belonging to the Land Forces. The reasoning for this takes into account, mainly, the anti-armor capabilities and the maneuverability of these airborne weapon systems, and the simple fact that for the moment the Land Forces budget is scarce, cannot simply dismiss it.

This analysis would be utopian without approaching the aspect of the financial dimension of the force transformation process. We don't focus on the numbers but pointing towards the potential ways of providing funding for the process.

As previously stated, we do believe that Europe must develop its own capabilities in order to research, design and develop new defense technologies, to avoid being surpassed by countries such as China, India or Russian Federation (there is already a significant technological gap between U.S. and Europe).

The political level of decision must ensure that the Romanian defense industry is connected to the EDA - European Defense Agency, beyond the declarative level. The aforementioned agency, as the specialized European body, plays a major integrative role by formulating common requirements, building strategies, identifying potential technology providers for specific national requirements. EDA could be the entry point for the Romanian defense industry into the European club and find its potential niche. How this is going to be achieved is closely related to the national will to commit resources in order to sponsor research and development in the defense sector, and to stimulate its own industry by placing orders to domestic manufacturers for the acquisition of new equipment for the Armed Forces.

Though we do not intend to formulate recommendations, it is our opinion that time has come to decide which European or Atlantic manufacturing enterprises will be selected in order to fulfill the specific requirements for the various services and branches of the Armed Forces.

Again, the Polish example shows us that U.S. manufacturers appear to be selected to cover the Polish Air Force requirements, while the Land Forces are being provided through Polish Defense Holding (PDH) - the national specialized body, closely connected with the EDA. In this case, the Polish DoD issues the requirement to the domestic defense sector, while the latter seeks to develop the required product through cooperation with other European companies. In this regard, at the MSPO 2013 International Defense Industry Exhibition in Kielce, Poland unveiled a new universal tracked platform concept. This is a joint venture between BAE Systems and PDH to develop a new platform for an upcoming requirement from the Polish Army for a family of light tanks and infantry fighting vehicles[2].

Romania has the capability to identify potential economic relationship in various areas, estimate possible strategic investments opportunities, and select

[2] http://www.targikielce.pl/?k=mspo_en (accessed September 2013)

the most likely partners within EU to develop defense focused economic relationships. Our national history and the European evolution should be the starting points in establishing these relations, history being the one that showed us who were our friends, constantly, throughout the time.

Our approach will not be limited to the European geographical borders. Lines of Communication is also an item, encompassing the security of raw materials and refined goods hauling, industrial fishing, piracy on the Eastern African coast, along with the control of armament, military technologies, and hazardous material shipping.

Romania has a constant contribution to the NATO anti-piracy operations, nevertheless with some significant costs, given the fact that Romanian Navy is performing the assigned missions by deploying in the operation areas its Type XXII frigates. In order to accomplish the assumed NATO commitment, a burden has been placed on the military budget. We suggest that, taken into careful consideration the distances, the objectives, the operational risks, and potential operation bases, new types of vessels could be considered to replace the frigates. Lighter, faster, more maneuverable, and cheaper to operate, these types of vessels are actually better suited to cope with the pirate's small boats.

Concerning the above, Romania's commitment should match our national interests given how much of Romanian export/imports of goods are being shipped along maritime commercial routes. In our opinion our commitments for the protection of the shipping lines should focus on the Danube Area, Black Sea basin (joint effort with Bulgaria), and the Mediterranean (as a NATO commitment).

Possible commitments to some EU common efforts should not be excluded, especially if we are to accept the "pooling and sharing" concept (both, in terms of resources and operational effects), which may require to a nation to assume some responsibilities in the European proxy. Therefore, the Naval Forces should identify its specific requirements based on the "costs vs. benefits" approach, along with the prerequisite of being capable to secure and defend the Black Sea seacoast.

Black Sea should not to be perceived as a "Russian lake". Romania, as a riparian nation must promote a clear economic and defense policy. It must act as a catalyst for the relationship within the Black Sea area, and thus consolidating its security provider potential in the region.

EU Crisis Response capabilities are to be analyzed, from the point of view of the security strategy and the reality of crisis in the proximity of EU borders.

These capabilities should be capable of achieving higher standards of readiness along with pre-established force build-up timelines, which should not exceed 6 months. From this perspective, the Battle Group concept appears to have missed the target, mostly because of its heterogeneous nature.

Romania, as a NATO member, has been gathering experience by deploying a sizable number of battalion level tactical units in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Western Balkans, showing certain deployability capability (with some

logistical limitations), and thus demonstrating a clear contributive potential in the Crisis Response area.

Generally speaking, the EU Crisis Management Policy can be considered as a "soft" one. Watching the latest conflicts cycle, one can observe a pattern which starts with the en force intervention of the nations forming the so called "coalition of will" (Western Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq), followed by NATO commitment (IFOR, ISAF), and eventually EU commitment, comprised mostly from judicial know-how, police (EUROPOL, gendarmerie), and economic reconstruction.

EU tendency is to manifest itself in the proximity of its geographical borders, in Caucasus, Balkans area, and Africa at most, though the representation of the EU in international bodies is far more extensive, suggesting more of a global scope.

Having said that, Romania is challenged to reconsider its engagement strategy (which currently seems to be decided by the "hardcore" group of nations - Germany, UK, and France, with an apparent focus on theirs former colonies), and make an option for one response or another, following its own interests, as a result of negotiation and the implementation of the "pooling and sharing" concept. Though should not be limited to close proximity, Romania's interests cannot be pursued, at least for the moment, at the global level.

As an eloquent example of a possible future strategic approach, we will mention the August 2013 statement of the Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski, regarding the Syrian conflict and according to whom Poland will restrict its commitment to military operation away from its national territory, will focus on the modernization of the Armed Forces deployed along national territory, and will abandon the 2007 policy on the international military commitments, considered to be hasty and lacking consistency[3].

Romania should be capable to take part into a possible crisis management (Airspace interdiction, Controlled Areas) conducted at a long distance, with the Air Force assets as an option (especially after the expected addition of the newer generation fighters).

France's experience during Libyan conflict could come in handy, as a starting point for a potential commitment, taking into consideration that the trinomial "ammunition consumption – domestic manufactured ammunition – economic profit" does not work, at the moment, not even for the European major military powers.

In order to retain options, Romania has identified, or it is in the process to select new ones, certain capabilities, mostly belonging to Intelligence/HUMINT and Special Operations Forces, along with the corresponding force projection assets (C-130 and C-27 aircrafts).

[3] http://www.ziuaveche.ro/top-secret/armata-2/razboiul-din-siria-ce-zic-bulgaria-georgia-si-polonia-187027.html (accessed in august 2013).

Conclusion

Currently, the EU requirements match the new NATO concept - The Connected Force Initiative. According to this concept, the Alliance (Romania implicitly) should poses modern deployable and interoperable military capabilities.

Logistical aspects regarding both, the equipping and sustenance of the force, at the national and EU level, becomes the greatest challenge. Integrated logistics, in terms of acquisition, production, and consumption can provide a potential solution to merge the national and UE requirements for the Armed Forces. We consider that a common body established at the General Staff level, responsible with the management of the Component Commands national level requirements, could be a viable solution. In support of this, the General Staff is already engaged in the process of matchmaking the political and military objectives with the allocated resources and the operational capability requirements.

The necessity to connect the national defense industry sector to the European consortiums could be fulfilled only by overlapping the national manufacturing partnerships with the European ones. We have to accept that there is no production without consumption, and therefore Romanian Armed Forces has to manifest a certain “appetite” for consumption, in order to “kick start” the production cycle within the defense segment of the industry, and such generating revenues through taxes.

Imposing extensive limitations, regarding consumables during the training process and operational deployments causes blockages in the manufacturing process and degrades the ability of the state to manifest as a security provider.

Security and defense entail costs, and these costs may be accepted, strategically speaking, by visualizing long-term benefits. They are tangible in time of crisis (not desirable though), but measurable and highly visible in the economic and foreign policy achievements of a state.

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THE INCREASE OF NON-STATE ACTORS' ROLE ON THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA AND THEIR IMPACT UPON DIPLOMACY

Daniela RĂPAN*

In the last decade, there could be noticed that non-state actors have grown more and more important, this tendency becoming most visible in the new millennium.

The current paper, starting from the taxonomy of a prominent type of non-state actor – multilateral institutions – offers a thorough analysis of each category and an argumentation of non-state actors' current growing role in modern diplomacy.

Keywords: *state actors, non-state actors, diplomatic relations, INGO, TNC, diplomatic venue, diplomatic actor.*

Introduction

If classical diplomacy used to put emphasis on states as main actors, in modern diplomacy, non-state actors have gained an increasing role. Thus, although the state represents a fundamental subject of international law, having in mind its character of sovereign political entity creating international law and determining the legal status of other participants of international relations[1], the quasi-totality of the states are members of several organizations, through which they interact with other state actors. According to statistics, the total number of non-state actors has grown over five times since 1945 up to now, exceeding even the number of states[2]. In this total were included both inter-governmental international organizations such as UN, OSCE, ASEAN and International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs) such as International Olympic Committee, International Committee of the Red Cross etc.

1. Non-state actors taxonomy

Non-state actors (NSA) are divided in *sub-state* or *sub-national actors* and *supra-national* or *trans-national actors*.

Sub-state actors are certain economic actors, individual leaders, terrorist groups, religious groups, NGOs (non-governmental organizations). However, due to globalization, many such actors become regional or global supra-national actors.

Among the *supra-national actors*, we mention IGOs (inter-governmental organizations), INGOs (International Non-governmental Organizations) such as Greenpeace, International Olympic Committee, multinational corporations

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[1] Marian MITEA (editor), *Elemente de drept*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1991, p. 143.

[2] See Joshua S. GOLDSTEIN, Jon C. PEVEHOUSE, *International Relations* (Romanian edition - *Relaţii Internaţionale*), Polirom, Iaşi, 2008, pp. 339-340.

(MNC), also called trans-national corporations (TNCs), international media, cross-border criminal organizations, religious groups, terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and, most recently, even social networks[3].

Non-state actors that fall into MNC/TNC category have become more prosperous and multiplied in number beginning with the 1950s and, most importantly, have expanded their action span and influence by means of and at the pace of globalization. MNCs are advocates of free trade and active contributors to the globalisation of world politics. Their resources are considerable, such as the power they wield, some of the MNCs being the standard-bearers of the public diplomacy of Western states which they represent in other areas of the world. On the one hand, MNCs can be thanked for the positive aspects of free trade and globalisation, while, on the other hand, they can be blamed for their costs[4].

2. A special case of non-state actors: multilateral institutions

On the international arena, a prominent role is played by non-state actors of the type of *multilateral institutions*. A classification proposed by Geoffrey Pigman[5] divides this type of actors into four categories:

- Institutions involved in the global governance process, such as UNO, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), World Trade Organisation (WTO);
- Knowledge-generating organisations that have a consultative role, for instance G7, G8, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), World Economic Forum (WEF), International Chamber of Commerce (ICC);
- Supranational polities such as the EU and
- Regional governance bodies and development banks, such as North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and even NATO.

In what follows, we are going to tackle each category, emphasising its main individualising features.

Global governance bodies

This group includes bodies through which are managed important domains for all members of the International Community. During the twentieth century, there was created a wide range of multilateral institutions.

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[3] An idea launched on Facebook for instance can become more powerful than one promoted by a state institution. Eloquent examples are the "Facebook effect" on young people in Midlle East and Northern Africa (MENA) or "Twitter revolution" in the Republic of Moldova.

[4] Charles W. KEGLEY Jr., Eugene R.WITTKOPF, *World Politics, Trend and Transformation*, Sixth Edition, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2012, p. 176.

[5] Geoffrey Allen PIGMAN, *Contemporary diplomacy. Representation and communication in a globalized world*, Polity Press, 2010, USA, p. 53.

For instance, *global economy* principles are discussed in fora such as IMF, World Bank and Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trades (GATT), whose successor is the World Trade Organisation (WTO). All these three bodies were created in 1944, at the international conference in Bretton Woods.

For tackling more *complex issues of concern for the main state actors*, there were created *consultative fora* attended by heads of governments – G7, G8, G20. These institutions approach major projects for which constant and consistent diplomatic talks, as well as a good communication between Member States, are necessary.

The UN, successor to The League of Nations, was created in order to *promote global peace and security*.

From the point of view of institutional structure, i.e. number of personnel, the above mentioned organisations vary a lot in the sense that, while G8 functions with a minimal institutional system and a rotating Secretariat among its members, at the other pole, the UN has produced a gigantic network of organisations and structures, with almost 16,000 employees in the Secretariat and another 47,000 in the other related institutions and programmes that cover a very wide range of fields and projects to which its members agree, from military operations like peacemaking and peacekeeping[6] to environment research and protection of children's and women's rights, eradication of poverty etc.

These institutions, apart from the fact that they established permanent venues for ongoing diplomatic cooperation among member governments, "also provided structures for a measure of global governance that would be conducted by means of that ongoing diplomatic interaction"[7].

Consultative, knowledge-generating bodies

Consultative organisations (G7, G8, OCDE, WEF, ICC) have a rather indirect role – we could call it ideational – in global governance, their main mission being to disseminate knowledge among their members and to offer their members information in their field of competency.

Sometimes, these missions may involve mediation among their members, as in the case of International Court of Arbitration of ICC, which is directly involved in resolving cross-border business disputes.

This category of institutions is involved in joint external projects on behalf of their members. However, these activities do not have global governance function at the extent of the first category of institutions. Also, another aspect that makes it different from the first category is related to membership. Thus, members of such consultative bodies are not necessarily governments; they can also be multinational companies (such as the World Economic Forum). That is why gathering necessary information from Member

[6] For more details, see Daniel DUMITRU, Dorel BUŞE, Ovidiu BELEA, *Mecanismele instituţionale ale Organizaţiei Naţiunilor Unite pentru soluţionarea crizelor şi conflictelor*, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2007.

[7] Ibidem, p. 52.

States' governments, especially from less transparent governments, is a diplomatic challenge.

Supranational polities

This represents the most recent and, at the same time, the most peculiar category, on the one hand because this type of structure is both *venue* for diplomatic activities and *actor* in itself, and on the other hand, according to some opinions, they are seen as a form of state, but not in the traditional sense of nation-state[8]. An important element is that the structures of these entities resemble, more than in the case of the above-mentioned categories of organisations, the structures of nation-state governments. At present, the only actor falling in this category is the EU. Nevertheless, there are some elements that could lead to the conclusion that, in time, other regional integration bodies could develop in this direction; the African Union illustrates this the best.

Regional governance bodies and development banks

The fourth category, of regional governance bodies and development banks, is the correspondent at regional level of the first category of global governance institutions. Similarly, they are composed of national states. The aspects in which they differ are their "age", area of concern, the degree of institutionalization and their ambition or evolutional trajectory – widening (acquiring new members) and deepening, or, on the contrary, stagnation[9]. This category includes NATO, NAFTA, the African Union.

3. Arguments regarding the increase of non-state actors' role in diplomacy

Many of these *multilateral cooperation institutions were initially designated* by the governments of national states of which they are composed to serve *as diplomatic mechanisms or venues* where representatives of national governments can communicate or solve problems of interest. But, since the phenomenon of globalisation has gained in importance, *many of these fora have become themselves diplomatic actors in the international system*.

Although classic diplomacy would not accept this theory, the argument is that the type of interactions that representatives of national governments have with this type of non-state entities is similar to diplomatic activities among states. Thus, there are mechanisms of diplomatic representation and communication among these international fora (i.e. non-state actors) and governments, including bodies with personnel specialized to this end. Then, the diplomats of both parties are involved in typical diplomatic practices, sending and welcoming representatives, gathering information, communicating regularly on developing aspects of common concern, either ordinary issues or special

[8] Ibidem, p. 53.
[9] Ibidem, p. 54.

events, expressing and supporting the interests of each party. Diplomats of each party engage in negotiations with the other party's representatives, with a view to achieve certain goals, from the conclusion of agreements that are beneficial to both parties, to the settlement of disputes and conflicts and crisis management. That is the reason why non-state actors, such as regional and international organizations, have become diplomatic actors – due to the process of globalization, through which the resources, the population and the economic activities of countries have become more closely connected, under the rule of technology development, becoming thus more and more interdependent.

Among the *currents studying the international relations theory*, the *liberal (ideal)* one supports the maintenance of diplomatic relations for a safer world. One of the ideas promoted by this theory is that states' power to influence the state of the planet is decreasing, as the world we are living in becomes more and more complex and interdependent, and, at the same time, as non-state actors show an ascending tendency, both concerning their number and their influence on the international community.

In this context, the leaders of the planet embrace a new meaning of the phrase "responsible sovereignty", a concept requiring states to protect not only their citizens, but also to cooperate with other countries to preserve the resources of the planet and manage cross-border threats. This is a principle involving a duty to all the inhabitants of the planet, attaching a significant role to intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, unlike the classical Westphalian interpretation of sovereignty, promoting non-interventionism in states' domestic affairs.

Another argument showing the special importance gained by intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations is that summit diplomacy, at multilateral level, also allows smaller or less developed states to carry out diplomatic activities destined to defend their interests in the fora of great international organizations such as the UN, IMF, WB, WTO, as well as in the framework of regional financial organizations for integration and development, such as AU, ASEAN, etc. Moreover, at international meetings, either at the level of experts, government representatives, or at high level, Prime Ministers or Presidents, states have the opportunity to discuss with a view to establish bilateral diplomatic cooperation – with various countries, one at a time – since peers from all over the world are gathering there with the same goals. If we examine the development level of countries around the world, almost half of them are small and poorly developed economically. Therefore, although, from a formal standpoint, as diplomatic actors at the round table, they are on equal footing to more developed countries, one must admit that many of the former do not afford, financially, to fulfil many of the basic functions of diplomatic representation and communication at the same level as the latter. Moreover, more recently formed countries have rather limited possibilities to train and pay professional diplomats, so they have a relatively small Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they establish few permanent missions abroad at bilateral level, their

capitals in return accommodating few missions. That is why the states we refer to dedicate their few resources to diplomatic representation and communication with or through IGOs and NGOs.

Throughout the 20th century, governments of nation-states had to approach, from a diplomatic point of view, an increasing number of multilateral institutions from various fields created by themselves, also through diplomatic negotiations.

These entities are very different in terms of their size, goals, governance and decision-making mechanisms and especially in terms of power in relation to the governments that created them[10].

Conclusions

Given the increasing degree of interdependence among states, it can be noticed that, over the last decades, especially in the new millennium, non-state actors have become more and more important on the international arena and, consequently, have gained an increasingly significant role in the development of diplomatic relations.

The evolutionary transformation – in line with the rapid changes in the international security environment –, of supra-national fora, such as UN Security Council (UNSC), the EU, NATO, are eloquent examples to this end.

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[10] Ibidem, pp. 51-52.

RECONFIGURATION OF POWER RELATIONS IN THE GLOBAL CRISIS CONTEXT AND THE ECONOMIC FACTOR'S PRESSURE

Adrian Marius DOBRE[*]

We are witnessing a reshaping of the relationship between politics and economics in a world constantly changing itself, marked by a dynamic where the unpredictable has an increasingly larger share.

The phenomenon of globalization, or the developments in the international system, led to an interdependence that has the ability to organize the relations between states and to shape international politics. More recently, we have seen that political decisions have an economic pronounced character, or put it more simply, "economic decisions" are being made. The age of military power was overcome by the ability or inability of states to support defence expenditures and the balance tilts towards countries with economic growth.

We are speaking more and more about GDP, budget deficits, banking and financial sector, an economic crisis which rolls for years and who reveals structural deficiencies in national economies and global economic relations.

The challenge of preponderance between economic and political is finding the best system in the world for overcoming the current impasse and creating stability, a balance that ensures prosperity and growth. The conquest of politics by economic interdependencies is already a reality. The future manner of replication of the relationship between economics and politics can create a new world based on different principles from the ones we know.

Keywords**:** *Economic interdependence, relationship, political decisions, global system, growth measures, economic crisis.*

Introduction

The world is going through a complex deadlock which has profound effects on the current world order, or rather, upon the one we are used to. The global economic power is currently undergoing through a reconfiguration process as a result of the economic crisis. The global economic crisis is the trigger of a huge wave of changes in the global power relations.

The present setting confirms the assumptions of a post-crisis political economy where China, India and other large emerging economies are rising, while the U.S., the epicentre of the financial crisis, remained without the monopoly it enjoyed until a few years ago.

This article shows how power relations in the post-crisis era are strongly shaped by the economic factor, by the economic powers, and by the distribution of this kind of power. Inevitably the discussion will also focus on the emerging powers' role in the new global architecture and their ability to tilt the balance in their favour. The geopolitical and geo-economic interests thrown on the game

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table have become more numerous and intricate, thus the variations of framing a new world order are multiple.

1. Economic Power – A Power-Relation Reconfiguration Factor

According to the global economy expert John Walley the economic power is made up of several key elements that are interconnected and mutually reinforcing. The first element involves the current and future size of an economy and the power it can unilaterally exercise by using the market.[1]

It refers to the ability of the countries, of the groups of countries or of the groups within states to compel or persuade other countries to act (or at least assist) just like them, without resorting to threats or without using sanctions or incentives. The power of this size is a reflection of the degree of economic interdependence (or integration) between countries as J. Nye theorized in his book *Power and Interdependence*[2].

A second element of the economic power is reflected in the willingness of countries (or groups of countries) *to act by the means of cooperation*, either in international negotiations on the modalities mutually agreed, *or other mutually agreed activities.*[3] In this sense power reflects not only the current size of the economies, but also the future size that will have resulted from their growth. Thus, in the framework of global negotiations, the norms establish the framework for interaction and provide the international legal basis. Large economies are able to agree on them.

A third dimension of global economic power reflects the *soft power considerations*, of intellectual aspect, of reputation and embodies beliefs and philosophical arguments in order to influence the rivals, to convince them that the actions to be undertaken are also for their own interest. Globally, this kind of power is based on the acceptance of intellectual arguments by others to adopt cross-border collective agreements.[4]

Therefore, the economic power in the above mentioned size, is based on three pillars: the countries' ability to individually or jointly force changes by limiting the economic opportunities of others, the influence of a country upon the possible collectively negotiated actions, such as the negotiations for the establishment of global norms, and the influence that countries (or the residents of the country) may have on the intellectual climate that grants legitimacy to common global arrangements.

[1] John WALLEY, „Shifting economic power", Centre for International of Governance Innovation and CESifo, Munchen, 2009.
[2] Joseph NYE, Robert KEOHANE, *Putere si interdependenta*, Polirom, Iaşi, 2009.
[3] John WALLEY, *op. cit.*
[4] J.F. HOGE, „A Global Power Shift in the Making" in *Foreign Affairs*, July – August 2004.

1.1. The Economic Power Reflexion in the Current Configuration of International Relations

All these elements are put into reality in multiple ways. Simplified under the form of theories, the current events are only steps towards a new global configuration, new power relationships. We thus leave behind the paradigm of military alliances and enter into the one of economic alliances. Building-up sound economic relations between different actors has become the nucleus around which the new global architecture is built. Perhaps this trend will continue and will grow more and more in the future.

In his February 12th, 2013 speech[5], Barack Obama announced the official launch of the Free Trade Zone between the U.S. and Europe, an old project upon the democratic government has not been so strong until recently. The Americans' reluctance to get involved in European affairs, noticed in recent years, is basically obsolete with this new impulse.

The importance of this step is given precisely by the fact that Europe is not in a very flourishing period, and the project profile is not one of political cooperation, but of economic cooperation, given that the EU needs to expand on new markets before it suffocates.

The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP) is added to the implementation of a Free Trade Zone between the U.S. and Europe; this is mainly formed by the U.S., Australia, Chile and Peru. Thus, this forms a complex economic network alliance, but the idea is not seized only by the Americans. The Russian Federation has the Eurasian Union project which has considerably been developed in recent years, and moreover, it competes with China in awarding grants to the European countries with financial problems.

Such economic configurations have been initiated between the BRICS states or between smaller groups of countries with emerging economies that have common interests. In this regard, we point out a very interesting phenomenon, that of non-OECD countries' activism in recent years to negotiate new regional agreements, both commercial and on economic cooperation outside the WTO framework[6]. The profile of these pacts concluded by the emerging countries is mainly one of non-competition covenants or agreements on the sharing of currency reserves.

Instead, they also try lobbying associations, placed in a less traditional domain, and thus the negotiations of non-OECD countries have resulted in the creation of political forums in order to increase the bargaining power and strengthen the voice of developing countries at the global level, and to promote cooperation and tighter commercial relations between these countries. One example is the Trilateral Commission comprising India, Brazil and South Africa (the so-called IBSA Commission), countries that have also agreed to work

[5] Barack OBAMA, *State of the Union discourse*, February 12, 2013, accessed online on September 25, 2013 at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-union-address.

[6] Peter DRYSDALE, *Can Asia Help Power the Global Recovery?*, Brookings Institute, accessed online on September 26, 2013 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/6/think%20tank%2020/tt20_drysdale_asia.

together to reform the Security Council of the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, and to cooperate in areas of common interest in the WTO framework.[7]

The volume of bilateral and regional negotiations outside the WTO framework has boomed, more than 800 regional trade agreements (RTA) have been concluded or are being negotiated between large non-OECD countries[8]. Most of the agreements recently concluded go beyond the WTO framework and cover some areas, such as service trade, mutual recognition, intellectual property and competition policy[9]; all these could be perceived as a new global structure that develops in parallel with the multilateral WTO rule-based system. Taking into consideration the new developments, an increase of the non-OECD countries' influence is expected in existing forums of negotiation and new forums are expected at a sub-global level, in addition to an increase in economic size.

All these facts and projects demonstrate a reconfiguration of the world we are living in and the establishment of new rules. Today's world certainly will not resemble the world of our future generations. This is a self-contained reason to pursue long-term goals and place ourselves on a visionary position, favourable for the negotiation of a new future.

2. Power Relation Reconfigurations and Predictions

Events and global developments clearly indicate that slowly, but surely, a change is taking place. We are in a transition period in which new power poles, highly "polished", are settled under the impact of the economic factor. The trend can also be noticed easily; it roughly shows a transfer of power from the Western states to those in the East. Regarding this strategic move, Robin Niblett, the Director of Chatham House, fears that the international order could easily disintegrate in the coming years, while countries such as China, India, Brazil and other emerging powers can ignore the rules and institutional arrangements applied by the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and European countries after 1945, or try to redefine them into their advantage. At a minimum level, they may limit the efforts of some Western countries to broaden or deepen these norms or institutions.[10]

In fact, as shown in the previous chapter, these processes are already happening, some norms are ignored, others are under siege because of the desire to redefine them, following new interests of new actors ("new" in the sense that

[7] Robin NIBLETT, *The Economic Crisis and the Emerging Powers: Towards a New International Order?*, Real Instituto Elcano, February 2012, accessed online on September 25, 2013 at: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/
[8] John WALLEY, *op. cit.*
[9] Mark DINCECCO, Gabriel KATZ, *Political Transformations and Economic Performance*, IMT Lucca Institute for Advanced Studies, August 2011.
[10] Robin NIBLETT, *op. cit.*

they have acquired the ability to influence the processes at global economy and politics levels).

By 2030, Asia (excluding Japan) and the sub-Saharan Africa will account for about half of nominal global GDP, compared to about 20% in 2010, while the contribution of the U.S., EU and Japan will be reduced to half, at about 30%[11].

Najim Azahaf, a researcher at Bertelsmann Stiftung, argues that BRICS is going to change the power structure within the framework of the global economic system[12]. The block's increase dropped in 2012, but its success compared to the decrease of developed economies is very important, Brazil, Russia, India and China accounting for 20% of global output in 2012, a fourfold increase over the past decade. Together with South Africa, the newest member, these countries cooperate to put their mark on global governance as they did in the case of global economy.

2.1. The implications of Economic Power Reflexion in the Power Relation Reconfiguration

Another approach points out a different scenario situated at the opposite end, one in which the power does not move from West to East, but in which the developments bring West and East, North and South closer. The guidelines of this approach is based on the fact that both the Western powers and the emerging powers confront with their own structural problems and the West still has a significant number of attributes in relation to them.

At the same time, one must not forget that the present and long economic crisis deepens the ongoing process of political and economic interdependence among all countries, be they developing or developed ones.

For the time being, there are two major forces that try to grab as much power as they can. On the one hand there are the Western powers, still the most powerful states in the world who try to manage their interdependence through international political negotiation rather than through new forms of global governance. On the other hand, as emerging powers gain greater political power and autonomy, they are likely to repeat what the Western powers did, promoting their interests within the framework of the institution rather than giving them more power.

There must be kept in mind that the future challenges towards the international order will not be generated only by these two categories, the existing powers or the developing ones, but also by the global forces that are beyond their control (non-state entities and groups that seek to undermine the process of globalization).

As a consequence, the impulse to ensure a status quo, which is comfortable and favourable to the global economic growth, determines and will

[11] Wendy DOBSON, *How Asia's New Economic Powerhouses Will Shape the 21st Century*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2009.
[12]Najim AZAHAF and Daniel SCHRAAD-TISCHLER, *Governance Capacities in the BRICS*, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012.

continuously determine the governments to resort to regional cooperation as a basis for higher levels of international cooperation.

The core of the Western force, represented by the U.S., most European countries, Japan and Canada, is facing a structural weakening of the economic growth engines who could build the new international order on the same principles that it has been built upon until now – economic growth and military supremacy.

On the one hand, European states are subject to structural constraints who do not allow supporting a rapid economic growth, and they present a number of serious risks generated by demographic problems (by 2050, 30% of the European population will be old)[13]. Defence budgets have also fallen below the 2% limit.[14]

Unemployment and the employment rate differences among young people, women and older people reprezent further constraints on growth. Moreover, there are significant differences in the level of education– especially between the Mediterranean and Northern states of Europe. These generate other risks for Europe's economic competitiveness at the international level.

Although the U.S. does not face the same demographic challenges, it has its own structural problems: high unemployment and the slow pace of job creation, more and more American multinationals create more jobs abroad, especially on East Asian markets where the workforce is well-educated and cheap.

Japan has experienced two decades of growing at a slower pace, its share of world GDP steadily declining.

Traditional powers go through a period of time when the risks and challenges are both internal and external, and keeping the lead in international politics is a complicated mission.

The battle is on several fronts, amid the rise of regional powers, against the regional organizations, be they called ASEAN, East Asia Summit, UNASUL, the African Union and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, within international institutions such as the UN, IMF and WTO, as emerging powers are now on a more independent course, and the influence of powers with developed economies is steadily decreasing. An example of the change within the institutional sphere, an actually inevitable compromise, is the appointment of the G20 as the main global forum for international economic coordination instead of the Western G7.

2.2. The Emerging Powers – Economic Powers?

On March 27th, 2013, during the meeting in Durban, South Africa, the BRICS discussed on the establishment of financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The reason for this would be to combat economic imbalances and currency volatility.

[13] Sarajit MAJUMDAR, „Global Power Shift – West to East?" in *Asia Sentinel*, January 2009.
[14] Robin NIBLETT, *op. cit.*

Here is another action of the emergent block to tilt the balance of power in its favour, directly threatening the position of the World Bank and IMF. The fact that the emergent states' influence on the decision making at the level of World Bank and IMF is not up to their needs led to the initiative of establishing "clones" for the developing economies areas, which according to statistics provide global growth.

The BRICS states, or the BRICS group, were not perceived as a block until now, but in the context of such actions one can say that one more centre of power emerges, one that has the ability to be a counterweight for the developed world.

Their accumulated foreign exchange reserves reach 4.400 billion and they also account for 43% of the world population. The aim of the group is to get as much influence in global economic and financial system as possible, by any means.

In 2011, BRICS and the new MIST (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, and Turkey) obtained nearly 3 trillion dollars, an economic force equivalent to that of the United States, with an annual output of 16 billion dollars, which means 25% of world economic output.[15]

MIST is a new group of countries, taken by the Goldman Sachs from the N11 capital fund (Next 11: MIST and Bangladesh, Egypt, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Vietnam and Iran). In 2012 Jim O'Neill from Goldman Sachs said that he wanted to establish the capital fund to help investors benefit from the growth of other countries, not only from the one of the BRICS. Established in 2011, the N11 fund increased by 12% in 2012, compared to the 1.5% growth of the BRICS fund, it is a mixture of states that grows at its shadow and who promises a faster economic expansion than anticipated.[16]

Asia remains on top as the continent with further more surprises to offer. If until now we were used to the Asian Tigers – Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan – now we have to acknowledge the Asian Tigers Cubs – Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam and Myanmar.

In a special report on emerging markets, MarketWatch looks at Indonesia and the Philippines: "With rapidly growing economies and rising incomes, the two countries are home to a large and young labour force, an expanding middle class and have stable, elected governments with policies inspiring investor confidence. They also have sturdy banks and enough foreign-exchange reserves — more than a year's imports in the Philippines's case — to rebuff a misguided run on their currencies."[17]

In the midst of the global economic crisis, the changes are highly probable and the power of emerging states must be judged in relative terms, before

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[15] *Building a new power balance BRIC by BRIC*, OECD Blog, July 2012, accessed online on September 25, 2013 http://oecdinsights.org/2012/07/19/building-a-new-power-balance-bric-by-bric/

[16] *Building a new power balance BRIC by BRIC*, op.cit.

[17] V. PHANI KUMAR and Virginia HARRISON, „Indonesia and Philippines come of age", *MarketWatch*, accessed online on September 26, 2013 at: http://www.marketwatch.com/story/indonesia-and-philippines-come-of-age-2012-09-25.

assessing the potential impact on international order. It should also be noted that each emergent power has its own major internal problems, even if their gravitational economic attraction strengthens.

In order to have a complete picture some clarification is required about the emergent powers. For example, China's rapidly aging population and the lack of social safety nets stimulate saving to the detriment of investment. The growth rush has led to a growing discontent of the population disadvantaged by the current wealth distribution, and the Communist Party has increasingly more difficulties to retain legitimacy even if it manages a more and more complex set of economic dynamics and internal politicise.

Even though India has recently reached a level of annual economic growth close to the Chinese one, and some of the biggest companies like Tata, Reliance, Wipro and Infosys, have become international actors, it still struggles with the burden of high levels of poverty and illiteracy, widespread political corruption, rising inflation, a lack of skilled force labour and locks in producing energy, transport sector and other aspects of physical infrastructure.

Brazil has become one of the global food exporters, while the aerospace industry and the energy sector reduce the gap between them and their Western counterparts. On the other hand, inflation becomes a serious economic problem, not only because of the rising food and energy costs, but also due to the increased stratification between a large number of poor people, uneducated young and well-educated smaller class, which becomes more integrated into the global economy.

Internal problems have a significant contribution to braking the growth impulse, and the risks are not limited to the national sphere only. Geopolitical risks are also large and make the other international actors respond. For example, China's claims in the South China Sea led Southeast Asian nations to look towards the U.S., hoping that it will maintain its external provider of security and stability in the region.

All this emphasizes that both sides of the coin must be looked at when it comes to emerging powers. There are thus limits of the emerging powers' influence at the international or regional level. What they lack is the element of "soft power", of attraction or representing a model for their neighbours or other countries, as the U.S. and the most successful European countries did. The European and American democratic political systems continue to serve as a model.

Along the same line, the emerging powers have acquired the custom of concerted action within the framework of the institutions or international conferences. Choosing a new managing director in 2011 is such an example; the emerging powers were unable to act as a unified group and to propose an alternative candidate for Christine Lagarde.

Furthermore, the emerging powers' dependence on Western powers for the proper functioning of an open global economy, important for their economic success and political stability, should not be omitted. The EU and U.S. are the

first and second largest China's trading partners, and together with Japan they are the main sources of foreign direct investment.

Thus, instead of making it seems like a zero sum game for geopolitical influence and economic supremacy of the West, the emerging powers' growth accentuates their levels of interdependence upon the West.

Conclusions

Today's power will largely come from tomorrow's expected economic growth.

The economic power is changing according to the transformation of economic and non-economic circumstances. It has not yet been fully established how large are the regime and power changes at the global level and how much power goes from the OECD countries to non-OECD ones, from East to West, from developed economies to the emerging ones and whether this power transfer will accelerate in the future. But the impact of rapid changing expectations suggests that the global economic power is rapidly gained by the developing countries.

Many economists have said that there is now a third wave of globalization[18]. While the first waves were generated and dominated by the Anglo-Saxon, British and American forces, the present economic crisis and the BRICS continuous growth have led to shifting the economic power balance.

Unlike the two previous waves of globalization, the "third wave" is characterized by a single economic paradigm or one dominating country. The world becomes more diverse in its approaches to economic policy.

The growing economic interdependence between developed and emerging powers will probably be the defining feature of the new international order. Given the residual power of the West and the continuing vulnerability of emerging powers, a zero-sum rebalancing of power in favour of the East and a fundamental change in the international order are unlikely. A potential source of conflict between states in the coming years will be the competition for natural resources that accompanies the rapid global economic growth and the increase of personal income.

Firstly, the economic interdependence brings its own set of vulnerabilities for the companies. Natural disasters have now global effects, and significant climate changes have the risk of cascading effects. The interdependence also increases the vulnerability of worldwide societies in front of the extremist or anarchist distorting actions, or criminal groups and individuals.

The main challenge of the international order is that the Eastern and Western, Southern and Northern governments, companies and societies fail to understand their level of interdependence and therefore neither fathom nor build

[18] Stéphane GARELLI, *New waves in globalization and competitiveness. The shifting roles*, 2008, accessed online on September 24, 2013, at: http://www.imd.org/research/challenges/TC057-08.cfm.

common norms, rules and institutions to raise the levels of strength and the ability to manage the impact of such developments. Given the approach based on the establishing of new multilateral agreements, the adaptation of the existing international institutions to manage these risks will last for a long time.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF QUANTITY, AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHIC POWER PERSPECTIVES IN CHINA

Mihai Cătălin AVRAM*

The present research is aimed at understanding the full potential of the Chinese demographic power status. Despite the fact that I do take a look at present numbers, I shall rather be more interested in understanding the specific medium and long term trends that experts identify in regard to this issue. The aim of the text will be to understand to what extend does the Chinese demographic power assure Beijing a solid framework to use in its efforts of continuous economic growth and all issues derived from it. After taking into account a number of open source reports as well as some indices available and some press accounts of interest I shall conclude that China will probably be struggling in the future with severe demographic issues derived from a growth in the number of the elderly and the lack of a reasonable social services framework.

Keywords*: Realist paradigm, demographic power, economic decline, social services.*

1. Introduction

While speaking about the specific elements that tend to recommend a sovereign actor as having either the potential or the necessary characteristics needed to develop a great power status within the international arena, Hans J. Morgenthau identifies the population as being one of the constitutive elements of national power. As such he will thus observe that "although it is not correct to assume that a country is powerful just because its population is more numerous than the population of most states, still no country can become or maintain a great power status if it is not part of the most populous states on Earth. Without a massive population, it is impossible to stabilize and maintain in function the industrial framework needed in order to successfully wage modern war; to develop large groups of terrestrial, naval or areal forces and finally to complete the troops - which are even more numerous than combating forces - which have to supply the latter with food, means of transportation and communication, ammunition and armament."[1] But the population of a sovereign actor is not relevant just for the matter in which it influences the possibility of applying violence, since this resource, which forms the base of all state activities, is actively responsible for "creating and implementing the material instruments of national power."[2] In other words, a state's population is directly responsible for actively and rationally engaging all available resources in different efforts,a deed which offers the state sufficient force in order boost itself towards a great power status or to ground itself to a more mediocre level. The structure of the population itself, as well as potential trends, are relevant as these two sets of

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[1] Hans J. MORGENTHAU, *Politica intre națiuni: Lupta pentru putere şi lupta pentru pace,* Polirom, Iaşi, 2007, p. 165.

[2] *Ibid.,* p.166.

specific elements offer us a interesting insight in regard to the ascent that a certain state may undertake towards great power status. While having a rather old population which lacks the necessary attributes needed in order to turn any type of resources into the building blocks of the architecture of power, a sovereign actor cannot view itself as striving for greatness. In light of such theoretic assumptions, which are specific to a realist paradigm of international relations, the present research is aimed at measuring the actual as well as the potential power of the People's Republic of China from a demographic perspective .

There is no doubt about the fact that the population, along with its attributes such as its nature, volume, geographical dispersion and dynamics within given time frames, represents one of the key elements of national power. Moreover, nowadays, "the evolution of the volume and structure of population offers us a useful perspective which allows us to draw the borders of a new geography of power"[3] which finds itself not only in direct correlation with the regional power phenomenon of Asia and Oceania but also in direct correlation to demographic power as seen on a global scale. The study of the demographic phenomenon thus becomes essential in order to decide the manner in which the Chinese state will continue to generate a satisfying level of labor force necessary for the continuity of all the enormous infrastructure projects that Beijing is seeking to achieve, while hoping to modernize a vast area of rural landscape as well as while hoping to assure sufficient labor options that would favor consumption within the internal market. Although it is well known that Beijing is more dependent on revenues obtained trough rigorous export activities, the role of internal consumption may very well be a factor that may favor and maintain an acceptable level of stability of the continuous economic Chinese development project. Also, while speaking about China, from a historical point of view, we tend to argue and observe that "its internal dynamic creates external ambitions"[4]. It may very well be that this Chinese demographic dynamism might have driven Beijing's policymakers to expand their diplomatic and economic interests far beyond China's borders. Also, while having a purely classic military perspective on the issue, one may observe the fact that within China's efforts of modernizing its military framework, Beijing needs a numerous and stable population, not necessarily for the aim of military service, but in order to engage it within the industrial processes which are essential for the creation of arms and ammunition which are in their own turn indispensable to a truly modern armed force.

[3] Gaylor RABU, "La démographie comme facteur stratégique", *Revue Défense National*, np.736, January, 2011.
[4] Robert D. KAPLAN, "The geography of Chinese power, how far can Beijing reach on land and at sea?", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 89, no. 3, May-June, 2010, p. 23.

2. Brute numbers

On a global scale we may witness some evolutions which "may alter the hierarchy of demographic powers; the next few years will be heavily marked by the predominance of Asia, and more exactly of Southern Asia, as well as by the formidable unveiling of the African discovery"[5], a perspective that discourages Western hopes of demographic greatness and which suggests a considerable growth of demographic related power within the southern hemisphere. This is surely happening as "the French Delegation for Strategic Studies of the Ministry of Defense states that all demographic evolutions force us to state that Western, and most of all European powers, seem to be in line with the announced dynamics that suggest a relative decline which clearly impacts their strategic power."[6]

By comparison, in 2011 the World Bank stated that China's population was estimated to be somewhere around 1,331,460,000 inhabitants (the figure was estimated for 2009)[7]. On the other hand, the Central Intelligence Agency estimated China's population in 2010 to have been of about 1,336,718,015 inhabitants.[8] Of course a difference of about 5 million does not mark e considerable growth of China's power status, but suggests a seemingly interesting growth trend, preserved by the 1.351 billion landmark announced by the World Bank for China in 2012.[9] China's population is thus undoubtedly the biggest in the world. It surpasses India's population by about 131 million inhabitants[10], Russia's population by over one billion[11], the U.S. population by over a billion as well[12] and Australia's population by 1.300 billion inhabitants.[13] All these figures speak for themselves and in terms of demographic power, as quantified by strictly brute numbers, China demonstrates a net superiority to all countries in the world and perhaps even more important, it is superior in numbers to all the regional and global actors that the literature suggest as being China's somewhat natural enemies. Overall, the literature also suggest that the present global demographic tendencies constitute "a un-doubtable fortune for emerging powers, especially in regard to BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) with the notable exception of Russia."[14]Although superior to India from thus very perspective China finds itself at a relatively small distance from it if we

[5] Gaylor RABU, *op. cit.*, p. 44.
[6] *Ibid.*
[7] World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/china, consulted on the 1st of October 2010.
[8] CIA, World Fact Book, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html, consulted on the 1st of October 2010.
[9] World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/china, consulted on the 26th of August 2013.
[10] World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/india, consulted on the 1st of October 2010.
[11] CIA, World Fact Book, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html, consulted on the 1st of October 2010.
[12] World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states, consulted on the 1st of October 2010.
[13] CIA, World Fact Book, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/as.html, consulted on the 1st of October 2010.
[14] Gaylor RABU, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

wish to acknowledge the fact that 131 million inhabitants make for just 9% of China's population. But even so, a superiority of over 100 million is still superiority. If we should decide to link the ideological nature surrounding Beijing with China's massive population we will observe that "due to centralized control, the regime may, for example, enroll the labor force of millions in order to bring to life major infrastructures. This very fact transforms China into a tireless power, in a dynamic way in which democracies with all their delay could never achieve."[15] China's immense population represents, without any doubt, a present strategic advantage linked to the very nature of the economic project that has been so well tackled by Beijing's policymakers in the past.

3. The risk of aging, why should you visit your parents and most of all your grandparents and what are the long term implications of such a deed?

On a related issue however, in the 2nd of July 2013 Bloomberg Business week informed its readers of the fact that all grandparents and parents in China may actually sue their children or grandchildren in court if they the latter do not visit them frequently enough.[16] The problem that Beijing seems to be trying to solve trough this instrument is the lack of a sufficiently efficient social net within the country, which tends to make elderly citizens dependant on the income of their children in order to survive once retired.[17] Moreover, the law which aims at tackling a growing pensioned population in China, which is becoming ever more evident as "the number of working-age Chinese last year fell by 3.45 million, to 937.27 million, according to the National Bureau of Statistics. Not a big drop. But it marked the first fall in working-age population and marks *the start of a trend expected to accelerate in the next two decades.*"[18]A lot more people retired personnel without the prospects of a proper security net creates a severe problem which Beijing is trying to solve trough the contribution of those that are still fit for work. Still the limitations of such an artifice are self evident if we decide to further look at present day situations and long term demographic trends.

In terms of dynamics, China's population seems to be, to some extent, relatively advantaged. In 2004 the yearly growth rate of China's population had been 0.57%[19], in 2006 0.59%[20], in 2007 0.6%[21], in 2008 0.62%[22] and in 2009 0.65%.[23] The dynamic of China's population is thus apparently continuously

[15] Robert D. KAPLAN, *op. cit.*, p. 23.
[16] Bruce EINHORN, "Why China is ordering Adult Children to visit their parents", *Bloomberg Business week*, the 2nd of July 2013, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-07-02/why-china-is-ordering-adult-children-to-visit-their-parents, consulted on the 19th of August 2013.
[17] *Ibid.*
[18] *Ibid.*
[19] Military Technology, "World defense almanac", issue 1/2006, Vol. XXX, ISSN 0722-3226, p. 329.
[20] Military Technology, "World defense almanac", issue 1/2007, Vol. XXXI, ISSN 0722-3226, p. 347.
[21] Military Technology, "World defense almanac", issue 1/2008, Vol. XXXII, ISSN 0722-3226, p. 351.
[22] Military Technology, "World defense almanac", issue 1/2009, Vol. XXXIII, ISSN 0722-3226, p. 354.
[23] Military Technology, „World defense almanac", issue 1/2010, Vol. XXXIV, ISSN 0722-3226, p. 354.

raising despite already well known attempts of tackling this very issue trough the usage of the One Child Policy. On average, ever since 2004 and calculating until nowadays, China's population has risen at a pace of 0.6% per year. Such a satiation should in theory help China to continue developing at quite a good pace all its industrial and infrastructure projects. Punctually, the statistic referring to China's annual population growth rate should offer Beijing a well balanced perspective of demographic power with a growth rate rather resembling a well balanced hybrid which observes a population growth sufficient in order to keep the Chinese economy on track while not derailing it through its sheer rapid rate of unfolding. But still it is worth having in mind that "the correlation between demographic and strategic power remains, of course, relative and needs a correlation of given demographic data with other factors."[24] In other words, while being completed by different inputs set forward by other specific indices as well as compared to the dynamic of demographic power which other states exhibit, China's population,may not be heading towards a bright future after all, at least not as bright as we might have thought.

For example, in 2010, it has been estimated that around 73.6% of China' s population was between 15 and 64 years old[25], which might also be regarded as a advantageous situation for Beijing's long term plans. However, China may be threatened by a form of advanced aging process of the population if we ad into account, the fact that "*Baby Boom* is usually followed by *Grandpa* doom and *Baby Doom*"[26]The pace in which such a process takes place is different from case to case but it is obvious that such a scenario may seriously hinder Beijing's industrial and infrastructure projects which are dependant of a considerable volume of work force, bigger than any other in the world. "Starting with 2015 China's retirement rate will rise in a systematic manner, a situation that will produce a serious challenge to a communist country which has not yet been able to construct a modern welfare safety net."[27] Such a deed would be difficult since "in China, the idea of an enlarged pensions fund assured by the state would immediately hit the brick wall of demographics: the rate of births has fallen as life expectancy has risen considerably. Over the last 30 years, due to the single child policy the number of assisted (children and old people) per capita has fallen by 50%, a factor that has itself contributed to China's economic growth. But over the following three decades it is estimated that the number of assisted citizens per worker will rise by 50%. It is quite doubtful that the labor force that China will be able to generate tomorrow will either be willing or able to sustain such a large number of assisted."[28] Moreover, even nowadays the situation is far

[24] Gaylor RABU, *op. cit*., p. 48.
[25] CIA, World Fact Book, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html, consulted on the 1st of October 2010.
[26] Gaylor RABU, *op. cit*., p. 48.
[27] *Ibid.*
[28] Brian P. KLEIN, Neil Kenneth CUKIER, "Tamed Tigers, Distressed Dragon, How export-led growth derailed Asia's economies", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 88, no. 4, July-August, 2009, p. 15.

from ideal as only 40% off all pensioners actually receive a pension, with only 26% of employees contributing to the system.[29]

The signs of a constantly aging China are becoming more and more evident. Beside the fall in the sheer number of workers, analysis sources such as Stratfor observe how "The Ministry of Education reported Aug. 21 that more than 13,600 primary schools closed nationwide in 2012. The ministry looked to China's dramatically shifting demographic profile to explain the widespread closures, noting that between 2011 and 2012 the number of students in primary and secondary schools fell from nearly 150 million to 145 million."[30] It is interesting to observe that Beijing itself recognizes the fact that it is on the verge of falling from a cliff as "People's Daily, the government newspaper, warned of China's impending social security crisis as the number of elderly is expected to rise from 194 million in 2012 to 300 million by 2025."[31]

By contrast, in India, the average age is 25 and is continuously dropping. The continuous rise in India's youth will thus probably lead to a visible and significant improvement of economic status. From this point of view it seems that the cost of democracy that India tends to pay, in comparison to China, is beginning to "serve as an advantage." [32] Authors such as Edward Luce for example state such a thing in direct correlation to the way in which the dynamic of demographic had been seen in the past. For example, "in the 1970's and 1980's, both Indian citizens and foreigners used to sigh over the fact that New Delhi, unlike Beijing, could not control the galloping growth of the population. It was thought then that an autocratic China had an advantage over India because it could impose limits to the growth of a certain population, like in the case of the One Child Policy. No Indian politician could have proposed such a measure because such a thing would have been directly quantified in ballots."[33] After only four decades however the Single Child Policy imposed by Chinese policymakers is starting to produce unwanted effects on the dynamics of its population and India's democratic ideology, which has censored it from taking draconic measures in order to control its population in the 1970's, seems to have been a accident that may in the long run assure India of better economic, industrial and even potentially military prospects. To this we might add that a "considerable decline of the number of people which inhabit a nation by comparison to its rivals within the international arena is seen as a decline in power, while a enhancement of such a number, under similar conditions, is equivalent to a rise in national power."[34] In laymen's terms, a population which

[29] Il Houng LEE, Xu QINGJUN, Murtaza SYED, "China's demography and its implications", *International Monetary Fund working paper*, March 2013, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1382.pdf, consulted on the 24th of August 2013.
[30] Stratfor Global Intelligence, "In China, an unprecedented demographic problem takes shape", the 21st of August 2013, http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china-unprecedented-demographic-problem-takes-shape, consulted on the 24th of August 2013.
[31] *Ibid.*
[32] Edward LUCE, "India's fortune, the prospects of a country on the rise", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 88, no. 4, July-August, 2009, pp. 146-147.
[33] *Ibid.*, p.146.
[34] Hans J. MORGENTHAU, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

is aging is bound to drop in numbers which means, by applying the reverse, that a population which finds a age average on the fall is bound to have a bigger population, in which case the same thing will happen to its power indices.

While looking ahead and trying to invert the unfavorable demographic trend which will affect its long term policies, Beijing has already started to envisage the perspective of implementing various government strategies. The signs of a first such policy envisage the reevaluation of the One Child Policy after the implementation of a pilot program in Shanghai[35]. By this act, the policymakers aim at allowing a couple in which at least one parent is a single child and that have had only one child, to have another.[36] Some effects of such an endeavor might immediately prove themselves to be quite global, as specialists conclude that because of the lack of faith manifested in Chinese formula milk, companies like Danone, which have already benefited from the insertion on the Chinese market, will whiteness an immediate rise in profits.[37] The same sources also like to point out that computer gaming producers that have access to the Chinese markets, such as the creator of Call of Duty, the developers at Activision, would see a dramatic increase of yearly income.[38] Still, less optimistic sources look at China and observe that "it is no longer clear that the one-child policy has any appreciable impact on population growth in China. China's low fertility rate (1.4 children per mother, compared with an average of 1.7 in developed countries and 2.0 in the United States) is at least as much a reflection of urban couples' struggles to cope with the rapidly rising cost of living and education in many Chinese cities as it is of draconian enforcement of the policy."[39] In other words, and almost in a ironic manner, the modernization of Chinese urban spaces has a backfire effect which complicates the very conditions necessary for the rise of a satisfactory fertility rate that might solve Beijing's demographic perspective. This is directly linked to the high cost of services necessary in order to either sustain or educate a child which are already prohibitive for families under the One Child Policy. The theoretical perspective of a Chinese government that would itself cover some of these costs is not feasible since we have already seen that social services in China are lacking proper backbone and it is reasonable to assume that such services will not become functional in the near future. This theoretical approach that envisages couples only wanting to have one child, or less, in the first place, has already been empirically tested by New York Times' journalists ever since 2011. A couple in China was thus asked if it would consider having a second baby. The family did not exactly have high living standards as reporters state that they warmed the house by burning wood. They have declared that over two fifths of their yearly income, this meaning about 3000$, was already directed towards the

[35] Stratfor Global Intelligence, *op. cit*.
[36] Louis BASENESE, "China's two child policy will set these super hot stocks ablaze", *Wall Street Daily*, the 15th of August 2013, http://www.wallstreetdaily.com/2013/08/15/china-two-child-policy/, consulted on the 24th of August 2013.
[37] *Ibid.*
[38] *Ibid.*
[39] Stratfor Global Intelligence, *op. cit*.

education and maintenance of their sole boy child.[40] The mother actually was quoted as saying that "if I had another child, what would our living circumstances be like?"[41] The inevitable conclusion, which other demographic experts tend to back up, is that "most Chinese want only one child anyway"[42] which means that the advantages derived from a certain relaxation of the single child policy would be close to none.

Another solution that Chinese policymakers envisage would be "the rise of the retirement age of women and men to 65 until 2030 from the current 60 for males and 50 for females"[43] But such a solution would do nothing more but to "delay the inevitable, and in the meantime it will meet stiff opposition from an important constituency of professionals, including many civil servants. In adjusting the retirement age, the government also risks aggravating an employment crisis among the rapidly growing population of unemployed college graduates in cities, many of whom are looking to filter into the employment ladder as elderly workers exit the workforce."[44] In this regard it is already estimated that "within the following period China will have a labor market that will look more and more like that of other states. This will imply a rise in production costs as well as friction and structural unemployment derived especially from the misalignment between the abilities created by universities with the highly specialized needs of corporations."[45] And even under the conditions that such specialized labor needs would be eventually met and the efficiency of labor would create a superior productivity, "the rate of economic growth will probably eventually slow down"[46] such as Arthur Krober, manager of a economics research company stationed in Beijing, observed ever since 2009.

4. Conclusions

While evaluating the current power capacity of Chinese demographics two things become absolutely obvious. First of all, China's demographic power is unrivaled nowadays if we decide to take into account an analysis focusing on the present which does not take into account data derived from the different strata of society, such as data broken down into age groups. Since such an endeavor would be however scientifically contra productive, we will this have to conclude secondly that current demographic trends do suggest a compression of China's demographic power on short and medium term. Up to date projections

[40] Sharon LaFRANIERE, "As China ages, birthrate policy may prove difficult to reverse", the 6th of April 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/07/world/asia/07population.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, consulted on the 25th of August 2013.
[41] *Ibid.*
[42] *Ibid.*
[43] "Plan to raise pension age stirs debate", *CNC World*, the 23rd of August 2013. http://www.cncworld.tv/news/v_show/35657_Plan_to_raise_pension_age_stirs_debate.shtml, consulted on the 25th of August 2013.
[44] Stratfor Global Intelligence, *op. cit*.
[45] Il Houng LEE, Xu QINGJUN, Murtaza SYED, *op. cit.*
[46] Sharon LaFRANIERE, *op. cit*.

suggest that all policies announced by Beijing in order to tackle such a difficult situation are predictably inefficient and that a straightforward solution is out of sight. The greatest future disservice brought forward in the face of continuing the modernization process of China is thus modernization and economic growth itself, since the high costs of living that have followed the economic growth of the Chinese colossus tends to discourage young couples from having a second baby while condemning pensioned citizens to a uncertain future that puts supplementary pressure on working families. But such bad news may not be equally bad for everyone. As China will see its industrial growth capacities getting sluggish, the economic needs that are been satisfied by Chinese industry may have to be satisfied by other international actors of the global arena, which might create an interesting opportunity either for other growing economies and emergent markets, such as India, either for already steady ones.

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THE EVOLUTION OF THE SECURITY DILEMMA AFTER THE COLD WAR. THE MIGRATION - SECURITY DILEMMA NEXUS

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This paper analyzes the concept of security dilemma in a both diachronic and synchronic manner, with emphasis on the post-Cold War period. Beside the typical military image that used to prevail when this notion appeared, the time frame under discussion reveals the existence of trans-sectorial security dilemmas that need to be understood within a multi-level paradigm. The idea of a security dilemma- migration nexus is considered in the final part of this article.

Keywords*: security dilemma, securitization, post- Cold War period, migration.*

1. General Considerations on the Concept of Security Dilemma

The concept of security dilemma was defined and explained in the '50s by John Herz[1] who deals with the concept from the perspective of groups. In the attempt of avoiding dangerous situations in order to relieve the effects of their influence on other groups, they tend to accumulate more and more power. The consequences materialize in the uncertainty of other groups, involving their affinity towards preparing for the worst. He states that "a structural notion in which the attempts of states to help themselves, pursuing their needs for security, regardless of their intentions, tend to lead to an increase in insecurity for the other actors, when each interpret their own measures as being defensive and the measures of others as a potential threat".

In the '70s Robert Jervis addresses the issue of the security dilemma in terms of the offensive - defensive binomial stating that "many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security result in the reduction of the security of other states."[2]

As an expression of realistic theory, "security dilemma" tries to explain conflict as being a constant historical feature of international politics, being unlikely to disappear while the international system is an anarchic one. Thus, at the basis of the security dilemma lie distrust and fear. It is our opinion that in close connection to the term of power, the security dilemma derives precisely from it. This opinion is sustained by the principles formulated by Hans Morgenthau in *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* who

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[1] The term appeared for the first time in „Political realism and political idealism" in 1951.

[2] Jervis, R.,"*Cooperation under the Security Dilemma*",World Politics,Vol.30, No. 2,1978, p.169.

claims that "power is not merely the ultimate master, but it is unequalled; it creates the rebellion against power, which is as universal as the aspiration for power itself."[3]

From the perspective of the states, as leading actors in international relations, even when they are thought to have only benign intentions, the concern that these intentions could change remains. Referring to this aspect, Noam Chomsky stated that: "Following a complete security provided by a single state, including the right to wage war at will and *remove nuclear brakes* (*Pedatzur*) implies the insecurity of others, who are expected to react at this situation"[4].

2. The Evolution of Security Dilemma after the Cold War

The paradigm shift in security studies after the Cold War naturally leads to the question of whether or not the security dilemma is outdated. According to some views, humanity has not proven to be able to overcome this irreducible dilemma.

We find that the possibility of being involved in wars and conflicts has disappeared for much of the world[5]. Nonetheless, other elements and factors have appeared within societies, as well as in companies and in the international environment, which can generate feelings of insecurity and new security dilemmas. Security and insecurity can both be states of systems (social, political, economic) that exist at a societal level or at the international one, as well as individual and collective experiences of people[6]. Peace and war have characterised the relations between states (or other political organisations of human communities) from classical Antiquity up to the present day[7]. Therefore, whether we speak of the peaceful and cooperative nature of man, of if man, in his natural state is aggressive and dominant, that which matters is his uncertainty regarding the other's intentions. This determines the classification of the famous statement made by Thomas Hobbes, "homo homini lupus" in the category of primary factors of social life.

Starting from the individual's security and moving to that of groups, we can claim that each level of this state's achievement is important for the higher one[8]. The factors that leave their mark upon the security dilemma were identified by Jervis as being both of an objective (geography) and a subjective (erroneous perceptions of situations) nature. They are therefore of the same degree of topicality as they were during the Cold War. The catalyst of all

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[3] H.MORGENTHAU, *Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace* Ed. Polirom, Iaşi, 2007, p. 13.
[4] Noam CHOMSKY, *Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy*, translation by Henrieta Anişoara Şerban, Editura Antet, 2007, p. 14.
[5] Henry KISSINGER, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy*?, Editura Antet, f. a., Bucureşti, p. 14.
[6] Constantin HLIHOR, *Security policies in the contemporanieus international environement*, Ed. Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare „Carol I", Bucureşti, 2007, p.6.
[7] Mircea MALIŢA, *Between war and peace*, Editura C.H. Beck, Bucureşti, 2007, passim.
[8] Liviu Petru ZĂPÂRŢAN, *International relations. Tendencies and processes in actual international relations*, p. 216.

consists of the "historical circumstances"[9] and the manner and the degree of their exploitation.

The concern of the world's most powerful countries to find efficient solutions to protect their national security interests, driven by the changes of the international strategic environment, outlines as being priorities of the present:

- Avoiding a new war between the great powers;
- Economic development;
- World pyramid of power.

Recent security studies speak increasingly more of the two types of power: *hard power* and *soft power*. The first derives from the economic and military capabilities of an actor, in order to force upon or induce to another actor certain behaviour[10]. The latter, as defined by Joseph S. Nye Jr. in his *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* is the ability of a political actor, for example a state, to influence the behaviour or the interests of another actor, through cultural attraction, ideology or international institutions[11]. Thus, they derive from cultural-imagological sources of the actors. The recent concept of smart power combines the two types mentioned above.

If we see power as being a potential source of security dilemma, the inference is that the new security dilemmas will take both the hard and the soft form. We thusly have on the one hand the politico-military aspects of the security dilemma and on the other hand the so-called soft dilemmas which derive from societal problems of security.

If the hard aspects of security dilemma are rooted in the classical realist theory of the balance of power, where states tend to maximize their position of power, post-communist realities highlight new dilemmas, generated by economic competition, especially the fight for resources and cultural-civilization dilemmas.

The new relations between the U.S. and Russia (the Russian reaction to U.S. missile defence initiative is relevant here) on the one hand and the relations between NATO and the EU on the other hand mark today the international security environment - a new partnership, as well as new tensions. In these circumstances the lack of money, time, vision and political will could affect not only national security, but especially international security[12].

Economic security should, in our opinion, be understood as an essential factor of security, which provides the resources and the dynamic balance of the other components of the system. The limited and uneven distribution of resources - be it energetic resources, raw materials or food and water, seriously affecting the natural balance of the world by degrading the environment, the high discrepancies between the rich and the poor of the North-South axis of the

[9] Barry BUZAN, *People, States, and Fear*, Editura Cartier, Chişinău, 2000, p. 142, 145.
[10] Teodor FRUNZETI, *Geostrategy*, Editura CTEA, Bucureşti, 2009, p.38.
[11] Joseph S. NYE Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, Basic Books, Inc.,Publisher, New York, 1990, p. 188.
[12] Liviu MURESAN, *The New International Security Landscape*, in "Defense and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe:Insights and Perspectives", Second volume: Macedonia, Geneva/Belgrade, 2003.

planet are potentially explosive vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are insufficiently assessed and can manifest in both ways: internally - the consequences can mark a severe instability and externally - exports cannot be stopped but, at best be managed.

The economic dimension of security will be determined and the national interest will function as Procrustes' bed[13]. Security problems in the economic sphere can lead to security dilemmas not only in the economic domain but could also cover other security dimensions, especially areas of societal security. If we view security analysis from the perspective of the representatives of the Copenhagen School sectors can be identified by distinctive patterns, yet remaining inseparable parts of a whole. The purpose of their selection is reducing the complexity and thus facilitating analysis[14].

The combination of tensions and social movements caused by economic inequalities on the one hand and anxiety caused by the destruction of the classical hierarchy of values on the other, can give rise to an increasing sense of insecurity, of social disorder which finally leads to the security dilemma. The widening of the spectre of unconventional risks with a transnational characteristic, the diversifying of the types of crises and conflicts generate multiple challenges that require multidirectional reactions based on mobility, opportunity, diversity, coherence and complementarity and can cause security dilemmas that can get in the current predicament can gain global, unpredictable meanings. The threats we face today are more diffuse, hidden and vaguely defined in relation to the early years of the post-Cold War era[15].

We consider that, for this aspect, the comparative analysis of the insurgency in Libya and the counterinsurgency operations from Afghanistan, are relevant, both of which take the form of social violence. If we were to represent the frame of both the insurgency and of the counterinsurgency (Image 1), it could be seen that both insurgent movements, specific to the "Arab spring", and the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, have their focus on the population and in most cases, the claimed objective is human and societal security. The differences arise from the fact that if in the first case the objectives are totalitarian, repressive regimes and ensuring fundamental human rights and freedoms, in the second one the protection of the population from insurgent groups is sought. If insurgents try to overthrow or undermine a government or an constituted authority, counterinsurgency uses all the instruments of national power to support the government and to restore the rule of law, thus involving the controlled application of national power in politics, information, economy, society, military and diplomacy.

[13] Teodor FRUNZETI, Vladimir ZODIAN, *Lumea 2011 enciclopedie politica si militara (studii strategice si de securitate)*, Editura Centrului Tehnic Editorial al Armatei, Bucuresti, 2011, p. 15.
[14] B., BUZAN, O. WAEVER, J. De WILDE, *Security: A New Framework for análisis*, Ed. CA Publishing, 2010, Cluj-Napoca, p. 23.
[15] Timothy Garton ASH, *Lumea liberă. America, Europa şi viitorul surprinzător al Occidentului*, traducere Anton Lepădatu, Editura Incitatus, Bucureşti, 2006.



Figure 1: The operational manifestation of insurgency and counterinsurgency actions

Insurgent movements of the Arab Spring had as objective the overthrowing of totalitarian regimes, validating the definition of Bard O'Neill that insurgency is a battle between a group that does not hold power and the authority that do hold it, in which the group that does not have the power deliberately uses political resources and violence to destroy, reformulate and support the claim of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics[16]. It is further proof of the fact that globalisation, besides its beneficial effects can also affect the behaviour, the social psychology, increasing animosities and resentment and can also generate conflicts.

By claiming an increase in societal security, we are concerned, on the one hand with the upholding of fundamental rights, minorities' rights, the freedom of expression aimed by insurgent groups and on the other hand with political instability which results from the perspective of target states, a decrease in security and a socio-political change of repressive regimes and last but not least, the affecting of human security. Thus, we can state that this is a security dilemma.

The asymmetric evolution of demographic resources, migration, disease, poverty and the degradation of education or lack thereof may be other sources of the security dilemma. The potential of power derives from several sources including population, economy, geography and national will. Here can raise the so-called dilemma of the "empty state"[17] in which civilian actors speak rather with their counterparts from other countries rather than with internal entities. The concept of diaspora, once applicable only to Jews became widespread if looked at from the perspective of transnational groups based on ethnicity and religion, which often aim at increasing the group's economic security determines a decrease of the native state's security from the perspective of

[16] Bard E. O'NEILL, *Insurgency & Terrorism, Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, Brassey's, New York, 1990 p. 13.
[17] Mary KLADOR, *Securitatea umană*, Editura CA Publishing, Cluj Napoca, 2010, p.187.

economic security, but also of the state of residence from the perspective of societal security. Migration, disease, poverty, the degradation of education or lack thereof can create dilemmas in all fields of security.

Globalisation, in addition to the beneficial effects, can affect behaviour and social psychology, increasing animosities and resentment and can even lead to new forms of security dilemma, which ultimately evolve into conflicts.

3. The migration-security dilemma nexus

As previously stated, among the origins of the security dilemma, one can notice fear and distrust. These feelings and, implicitly, the likelihood of the existence of a security dilemma, appear often in case of interaction with immigrants, especially in this global age. Since immemorial times the interaction with "the other" led not only to cooperation, but also to conflict. And not few were the cases when unidirectional migration was thought to threaten sovereignty rights. Hence, "a state adopts measures to protect itself, measures that, at turn, threaten the other state. Hence, efforts to increase security lead to its reduction"[18].

In this global age of high speed, "people are moving in millions as never before […]At the same time, the global and continental environment which sets the parameters for immigration is changing"[19], leading, at the same time, to various, multilateral security initiatives measures. Christian Leuprecht stated "conventionally, the diversity is posed as being `the problem` to which `security` is the solution"[20]. As pointed throughout this article, this traditional way of thinking can lead to security dilemmas.

It must be stated that security is considered primarily within the framework of the Copenhagen School. Still, within this multi-sectorial approach[21], the political, economic, societal and military sectors bear analysis, the environmental security being theme for another piece of research.

The political sector implies representation of immigrants for a proper democracy Western countries claim to have, but, as it can be noticed from this paper, minorities are under-represented in politics. For example, previous research shows that "23 percent of Vancouver's elected representatives are visible minorities"[22] (taking into account that the percentage of visible

[18] "Dilema de securitate" in: Paul ROBINSON, *Dicționar de securitate internațională*, Cluj-Napoca, CA Publishing, 2010, p. 77.

[19] Janice Gross STEIN, *The Global Context of Immigration*, in: Charles Beach, Alan Green and Jeffrey Reitz, *Canadian Immigration Policy for the 21st Century*, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003, p. 27.

[20] Christian LEUPRECHT , "Introductory Note" in: Christian Leuprecht (ed), *Defending Democracy and Securing Diversity*, Routledge, 2011, p. 1.

[21] So as to facilitate analysis and comprehension, the representatives of the Copenhagen School divide the concept of security in five sectors, namely: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. For further details, please consult Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Securitatea, un nou cadru de analizã, Cluj-Napoca, CA Publishing, 2011.

[22] Irene BLOEMRAAD, *Diversity and Elected Officials in the City of Vancouver*, in: Andrew, Caroline, Biles, John, Siemiatycki, Myer, Tolley, Erin (eds.), *Electing a Diverse Canada. The Representation of Immigrants, Minorities and Women*, Vancouver, UBC Press, 2008, p.56.

minorities in the city, 49 %, is more than double of that of their representatives). Still, from this point of view, Vancouver can be situated at the positive side of the issue, since in European cities and countries with a stronger national tradition minorities' representation is much smaller. And the percentage of immigrants is not that high, either. Hence, there is a relatively direct proportionality between politicians and electors and the idea that 23 percent of the local representatives are visible minorities -or, according to the United Nations' Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, "racialized minorities"[23] - can somehow be explained by the fact that "in general population, about half of Vancouver's residents are of non-European origins, making the city of Vancouver a "visible majority" municipality. Almost half were born outside of Canada"[24].

The societal sector refers to potential threats to (national, ethno-cultural) identity, by creating hyphenated identities or even by assimilation of the one culture. Within the framework of a rising security dilemma, strong nationalism might appear, leading to discrimination and violence. Regarding the impact of the interaction between the cultural resources the immigrants bring with them and the host society, it must be mentioned that this is generally in a relation of direct proportionality with the ethno-cultural and confessional differences existent between the two groups (immigrants and host society). More exactly, if a French citizen immigrates to Quebec, the impact if interaction with the host/ receiving society would be a smaller than in case of an Asian immigrant, for instance. Of course, important variables in this respect are, first of all, linguistic knowledge of the host society and the existence of ethnic networks there, which may influence the future of newly-arrived immigrants, since "[t]he ethnic network- the concentration of people in the same geographic area who are of similar ethnic background, culture and language- can be an important source of financial or personal support, information and guidance, and social mores"[25], providing "a sense of community and security to immigrants moving to a new and unfamiliar country"[26].

With regard to the economic sector, there are two major issues that require special attention: one is the potential zero-sum game of more immigrants' jobs representing fewer jobs for the other citizens, whereas the other question refers to transnational remittances. Furthermore, these is a proven

[23] Term preferred by the United Nations's Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination considers the syntagm "visible minorities" a discriminatory one, since one should be colour-blind. For further details, please consult the *International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination*. Adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 2106 (xx) of 21 December 1965 entry into force 4 January 1969, in accordance with Article 19, accessible online at: http://www.ohchr.org/ EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ CERD.aspx , as well as press releases such as *CBC*, "Term "visible minorities" may be discriminatory, UN warns Canada", http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2007/03/08/canada-minorities.html, accessed on March 9, 2007.

[24] Irene BLOEMRAAD, op. cit., p. 46.

[25] James Ted McDONALD, "Location Choice of New Immigrants to Canada: The Role of Ethnic Networks", in: Charles Beach, Alan Green and Jeffrey Reitz, *Canadian Immigration Policy for the 21st Century*. McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003, p. 164.

[26] Idem, p. 167.

tendency to blame immigrants for lack of success (in this respect, measured as "lack of jobs"), by scapegoating them.

These sectors mentioned above are also influenced by the proven aging of the population in well-developed countries. By simply observing the median age of immigrants - which, in turn, represent a highly heterogeneous category -, one can notice that they are, generically, younger. This aspect might lead to feelings of rivalry or discrimination towards perceived competitive threats. The role of political demography is emphasized at this point, especially in a global context in which "[i]n the poorest countries, the majority of the population is under 15 years of age. The social impact of a young population is amplified by a growing pattern of global urbanization"[27].

The military sector is observed, as well, since it is commonly believed, especially in national countries, that security and diversity are rather dichotomous aspects. Still, a stronger securitization of migration would imply a greater degree of discrimination and exclusion, which could further lead to a security dilemma. It is questionable to what extent the idea according to which "the demographic imperative for diversity as a functional complement to security and defence"[28] is applied and how many actors actually share the idea according to which "[d]iversity in the security sector is the ultimate litmus test of just how free, equal, and fair a democratic society really is"[29].

Some immigrant-welcoming countries such as Canada are believed to have indirectly nurtured terrorism by encouraging transnational immigration. This way, certain categories of immigrants' remittances have contributed to the creation of weapons and to the facilitation of organized crime[30]. This is analysed starting from Stewart Bell's assumption that the Liberal Government turns a blind eye on the Tamil Tigers, since they, in turn, financially contribute to politics. In Germany, the starting point is represented by the consequences of Christian Wulff's assumption that "Islam is part of Germany", going on with the impact of Thilo Sarazin's *Deutschland schafft sich ab*. The reactions of both Germans and Turks in after such episodes are well-known and definitely represent issues of a security dilemma.

Managing security and preventing the outburst of such security dilemmas can be done, above all, by means of integration be it in societal, economic, political or religious terms. Furthermore, it has been acknowledged that immigration is highly politicized[31]. Not that this issue would not be one of political interest, but "it should not be addressed solely as a political issue. Many of the negative perceptions surrounding immigrants have their origins in partisan

[27] Janice Gross STEIN, "The Global Context of Immigration", in: Beach, Charles, Green, Alan, Reitz, Jeffrey, *Canadian Immigration Policy for the 21st Century*. McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003, p. 28.
[28] Christian LEUPRECHT, "Diversity as Strategy: Democracy's Ultimate Litmus Test", in: Leuprecht, Christian (ed.), *Defending Democracy and Securing Diversity*, Routledge, 2011, p. 220.
[29] *Idem*, p. 221.
[30] Stewart BELL, *Cord Terror. How Canada Nurtures and Exports Terrorism around the World*, John Wiley& Sons, Ltd., Canada, 2007.
[31] *World Migration Report 2011- Communicating Effectively about Migration*, p. xiii.

interpretation, rather than facts"[32]. And the changing of perceptions is in itself an issue worth analyzing.

Conclusions

The sources of security dilemmas vary, from the asymmetric evolution of demographic resources, to diseases, poverty, degradation or lack of education. Among these multi-facetted causes, one can also notice cases of poor management of migration and, further on, of integration; or, as Durkheim would state, from the lack of that "organic solidarity", nowadays called social cohesion.

Finally, let us take two contrastive examples, as stated by World Migration report 2011: a survey of life in Qatar found that "an overwhelming majority of Qatari nationals value the contribution of foreigners to the development of their country because of their hard work (89%) and their talents (89%) (SESRI, 2010). They also agree that foreigners – expatriates as well as labour migrants – make the country more receptive to new cultures"[33]. By contrast, "a 2006 survey in South Africa concluded that migrants were largely considered a threat to the socio-economic well-being of the country, with 67 per cent indicating that migrants "use up resources" and 62 per cent claiming that they "take jobs""[34]. Where are security dilemmas concerning immigrants more likely to appear, if we consider relatively similar categories of immigrants?

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[32] *Idem*, p. 37.
[33] *Idem*, p. 11.
[34] *Ibidem*.

8. FRUNZETI Teodor, Vladimir Zodian, *Lumea 2011 enciclopedie politica si militara (studii strategice si de securitate)*, Editura Centrului Tehnic Editorial al Armatei, Bucuresti, 2011;
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as press releases such as *CBC*, “Term “visible minorities” may be discriminatory, UN warns Canada”;
24. *World Migration Report 2011- Communicating Effectively about Migration.*

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS

***Andreea Emilia DUȚĂ*•**

The context of nuclear balance is fundamentally determined by the competition between the U.S. and Russia. For more than 24 years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the nuclear stability is undeniable, accepting the threat thesis of the other as a mutual nuclear threat, generating a comfortable and stable balance.

The reductions of nuclear equipment have meaning when the entire system of nuclear warheads is removed. Reducing the number of nuclear warheads, but keeping the warhead system, does not bring significant savings.

In the U.S.-Russia relationship the reducing of the number of nuclear warheads admitted by both parties, is altered by Russia together with the revitalization of its strategic nuclear forces.The relationship between the United States and Russia and other nuclear States is outside a regulatory framework regarding the reduction of nuclear warheads.

Keywords: *nuclear superpower, START I, START II, NEW START, Global Zero Movement*

The policy of reforming the Soviet Union led to the cold war commemoration of new perspectives on the balance of weapons of mass destruction, in particular of the nuclear field, in the negotiations for limiting and controlling the nuclear weapons in the United States and the Soviet Union.

In May 2010, in the framework of the Conference for Reviewing the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon in the opening of the Conference, remarked that "after sixty-five years after the world's first nuclear explosions the world still lives under the nuclear threat."[1]

1. START I

In 1991, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union signed "the Treaty on Strategic Arms reduction (START I).[2] In December 5, 1994, on the occasion of the

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[1] Address to the 2010 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, General Assembly, 03 May 2010. http://www.un.org/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments_full.asp?statID=802#.UZywsrUvlyI; (accesed September, 5, 2013).

[2] Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty - START I. Five months later, the Soviet Union dissolves and four independent States inherit strategic nuclear weapons on their territory, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. By the Protocol signed at Lisbon on 23 May 1992, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine have become parties to the START I Treaty as successors of the Soviet Union. http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/starthtm/start/toc.html; (accesed September, 5, 2013).

Summit in Budapest, the INF parties[3] exchange instruments of ratification. START I have duration of 15 years and may be extended for successive periods of five years by means of an agreement between the parties. Subsequently, nuclear warheads are removed from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Russia remains the sole heiress of the Soviet nuclear strategic forces and continues modernization of system of weapons carrying nuclear warheads. The START I agreement requires primarily a drastic reduction in the number of heavy strategic bombers and ballistic intercontinental vectors, which resulted in the elimination of about 80% of the nuclear warheads existing at that time, but does not impose limits on modernization trends.[4]

In 1993, there is signed by the President of the United States, George H.W. Bush and the Russian President Boris Yeltsin "The Treaty to reduce the Strategic Offensive Arms (START II), to limit the number of MIRVs, unratified by Russia. [5] There was stipulated the Reduction of the nuclear armaments up to 3,500 warheads on both sides. The internal crisis in Russia and the tendency of American domination led to the postponement of the signing of the Treaty, even in the presence of the imposing some conditions, until 1996, by the U.S. Congress and until 2000 by the State Duma of Russia, provided supporting the U.S. of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM).

In 1997, using the of ICBM SS-27 Topol, regarded by the Russians as a "new type" of missile ICBM, is regarded by the Americans as an improvement of the SS-20, an 2 Variant SS-13, also known as RS-12 M 2 Variant known as the Topol M Variant 2.13 contrary to INF.[6]

In 1999, the Russian army is conducting the first strategic exercise after the end of the Cold War, "Zapad 99"-including simulating a nuclear attack upon the intervention of NATO forces in Belarus, which the Russian conventional forces were unable to counter it, originally. The strategic exercises Zapad "1999" and "Zapad 2009" highlights the conventional limited ability of Russia and a clear choice in favour of nuclear weapons to deter any interventions in

[3] Dismembering of the Soviet Union delays the entry into service of the START treaty which was in force for almost three and a half years until each of the four States has not ratified the treaty and joined INF. See Nina Tannenwald, *The NuclearTaboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007); Thomas Schelling, 'The Nuclear Taboo', *MIT International Review*, Spring 2007, http://web.mit.edu/mitir/2007/spring/taboo.pdf; T.V. Paul, *The Traditions of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009); and William C. Potter, 'In Search of the Nuclear Taboo: Past, Present, and Future', *Proliferation Papers*, no. 31, Winter 2010, available at http://www.ifri.org. (accesed September, 5, 2013).

[4] See, Polina Khimshiashvili and Natalia Kostenko, "Sokratiat minimalno", *Vedomosti*, Mars, 29, 2010.

[5] On June 14, 2002, Russia cancels the treaty both due to the U.S. intervention in the former Yugoslavia and in response to the US withdrawal of the ABMT. See Andrew C. Kuchins and Igor A. Zevelev, 'Russian Foreign Policy: Continuity in Change', *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 35, no. 1, Winter 2012, p.159.

[6] The Clinton administration's 1995 arms control compliance report stated, … on December 25, 1993, Russian officials exited what Russia declared to be a training model of the RS-12 M Variant 2 ICBM for silo launcher (the Russian designation for the follow-on to the SS-25 ICBM) [which we now call the SS-27]. Second on July 18, 1994, a rail car exited Votkinsk which contained an empty, canister-like cylinder. The United States concluded that these exits failed to comply with several provisions of the INF Treaty. *Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements, 1995*, Washington, DC: The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, May 30, 1995, 7.

border areas of Russia.[7]

In 2000, there is signed 'the Memorandum for Missile Launch Notification "but discussions about implementation shall take place after several delays, in 2010.

In 2001, Russian Strategic Forces are divided into Space Forces and Strategic Missile Forces (RSVN).[8] In the same year, the Bush Administration will inform Russia of its intervention to withdraw of the ABMT, regarded as a relic of the Cold War; Russia reacts by declaring that "it would be a mistake."

In 2002, after 30 years from the signing of the ABMT, the U.S. unilaterally withdraw from this Treaty, a gesture with very serious consequences for the future of nuclear disarmament efforts. ABMT is constituted within the framework of the U.S.-Russia nuclear competition by which the conduct of destruction of ballistic missiles launched by the adverse party, maintaining the potential of each of the parties executing the second blow in response to the attack of the other party. The Russian Government raises clear objections to U.S. Administration's unilateral decision to withdraw from the ABMT, emphasizing the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive systems. The consequence of the U.S. decision was blocking U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia cooperation in both the nuclear field, but also in international matters.[9]

In the same year, Moscow signed The Treaty of Reducing the Offensive Capability (SORT),[10] as "an important element of the new strategic relationship" between the two countries, both sides agreeing to limit their nuclear arsenals, between 1,700 and 2,200 deployable operational warheads. Signed on May 24, 2002, ratified by the U.S. Senate and the Russian State Duma, it enters into force on June 1, 2003 and valid until December 31, 2012.[11] As a novelty, SORT limits the deployed operational warheads, while START I indirectly limits the warheads.[12] The Treaty stated the lack of verification, based on bilateral

[7] A. Kramchikhin, " Inappropriate East", *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, July 23-29, 2010, p 1.

[8] See, Presidential Decree No. 337; http://www.iss.niiit.ru/ksenia/catal_nt/. (accesed September, 9, 2013). Hans M. Kristensen and Robert Norris, "DOD: Strategic Stability Not Threatened even by Greater Russian Nuclear Forces', FAS

Strategic Security Blog, 10 October 2012. http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2012/10/strategicstability.php. (accesed September, 5, 2013).

[9] Ramesh Thakur and Gareth Evans, eds., *Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play*, Canberra, Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, 2013, p.58, http://cnnd.anu.edu.au. (accesed September, 5, 2013).

[10] Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty – SORT.

[11] SORT continues a long series of treaties, on mutual nuclear disarmament between Russia (Soviet Union) and the United States, which includes SALT I (1969–1972), ABM Treaty (1972), SALT II (1972–1979), INF Treaty (1987), START I (1991), START II (1993) and New START (2010) http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/140035.pdf; http://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/ New-START-factsheet.pdf; New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), http://dpc.senate.gov/docs/ lb-111-2-183.pdf, CDOC-111tdoc5(1).pdf; http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-111erpt6/pdf/CRPT-111erpt6.pdf;http://www.gpo.gov/ fdsys/ pkg/CRPT11erpt6 /pdf/ CRPTpdf. (accesed September, 5, 2013).

[12] At about 6,000 on each side, reducing the number of ICBMs, SLBMs and of heavy bombers to about 1600. Specialists have criticized the treaty for several reasons, stressing that there were no provisions for verification to strengthen confidence, reductions in arsenals were not made to be permanent the removed warheads were not subject to destruction, with the possibility of being placed in landfills and subsequently redistributed. http://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/ New-START-factsheet.pdf; New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). (accesed September, 5, 2013).

consultations for implementing.

In 2003, Bush and Putin signed a joint statement "to enhance confidence and transparency in the field of missile defense."

In 2004, Washington expresses concern that Russia has not fulfilled their commitments to reduce tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.[13] The United States respected the commitment of U.S. President, dismembering approximately 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons. [14] Maintenance of the entire arsenal of tactical nuclear implies costs that Russia cannot afford, being constrained to only a certain nuclear weapons of war, including the battle of vessels equipment; on the other hand, storing them in one place is considered suspect.[15] There are enough signals, according to which in Kalinigrad there are still tactical nuclear weapons, a matter of serious concern to NATO.[16]

In the case of commitments - political acts - the situation is different with respect to the agreement/arms control treaties.[17] Unilateral declarations of the heads of state cannot be penalised, their significance being linked to the fulfillment of those commitments; they can be reciprocal but not automatically corresponding as effects. However, in the field of tactical nuclear weapons these are the only achievements and as opposed to strategic control they are more difficult.[18]

In 2007, the SS-25 ICBM testing as MIRV violates the provisions according to which the rocket was not supposed to have only one warhead; Russian specialists change the name "RS-12 m 2 Variant" in "RS-24", in fact being the SS-27 Topol M "rebranded."[19] According to the provisions of the home tests ICBM or SLBM with more than one additional warhead than that stated, or it is prohibited to carry out SS-27 MIRV missile enables with six instead of three warheads.

2. The Global Zero Movement

In 2008, the Global Zero movement, a movement of scale involving policymakers, military, business and civic leaders started a campaign for the

[13] "Press Roundtable at Interfax—Stephen G. Rademaker, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Moscow, Russia, October 6, 2004," http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/37275.htm. (accesed September, 5, 2013).

[14] "New START: Increasing the Risk of Nuclear War," Heritage Foundation, August 11, 2010, http://blog.heritage.org /2010/08/11/new-start-increasing-the-risk-of-nuclear-war/. (accesed September, 5, 2013).

[15] See, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, September 4, 2009.

[16] Walter Pincus, "Russia Moving Nuclear Arms to Baltic Sea Base/Possible Reaction to NATO expansion," *Washington Post*, January 4, 2001, http://articles.sfgate.com/2001-01-04/news /17579040 1 nuclear-free-zone-nuclear-weapons-nuclear-warheads. (accesed September, 5, 2013).

[17] "Text of the Gorbachev Reply to President's Nuclear Initiative," Moscow 28671.

[18] "Yeltsin Makes Statement on Disarmament," January, 29, 1992.

[19] *Novaya Gazeta*, June 4, 2007. "Russia's Missile Forces to Replace Topol-M with Multiple-Warhead RS-24," *Ria Novosti*, November 30, 2010, available at http://defenseblog-njs.blogspot.com/2010 11 01 archive.html. "A new SS-27 derivative with a Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) payload [which] the Russians call the RS-24." *National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: Department of Energy and Defense, September 2008), 7, available at http://www.fas.org/programs/ ssp/nukes/doctrine/Document NucPolicyIn21Century 092308.pdf. (accesed September, 5, 2013).

abolition of international nuclear weapons for halting nuclear proliferation, reducing and eliminating the threat of nuclear war spectrum.[20]

The principles of this movement are: the threat of mutual nuclear destruction is no longer the basis of the mutual security relationships between USA and Russia. 21st century problems cannot be solved by using nuclear arsenals designed and developed during the Cold War.[21] The development of a multilateral process of nuclear arms reduction must be less than the main deficiency of negotiations on reductions, discussions of the transformation that the US and Russia in an official setting, to be attended by India, Pakistan and Israel, China, United Kingdom, France.[22] Huge reduction of costs with the production and maintenance of nuclear arsenals, environmental protection and remedy of the consequences on the health of the population. In addition, the permanent state of operability of the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the U.S. as an unnecessary risk.[23]

A strategic proposal of great resonance concerns the replacement of the efficiency stage of nuclear forces in alert and the decision is accomplished in minutes and seconds with threat assessment, decision making and display of nuclear forces within 24-72 hours, to reduce the risk of mistakes, incorrect assessments or accidental launches.[24]

President Obama joins the "Ground Zero" setting out a strategy for cooperation with Russia. According to an opinion, "The Concept of Nuclear Zero" is an anachronism. "No holder of nuclear weapons will accept this concept; it is a technical and political impossibility. (...) Nuclear weapons are immoral and destructive but prevent the war. The fear of mass destruction inhibited the actors during the Cold War.[25]

Russian nuclear strategic armament prevents the U.S. and NATO to venture to the detriment of her own, and on the other hand provides China a security element that allows it to play an important economic role in Asia without the risk of American military intervention against it. At the same time, Russia's tactical nuclear weapons prevent the Chinese intervention in Eastern Russia and Siberia.[26] Differences of opinion over the "Global Zero" between the U.S. and Russia are rapidly clarified by a Russian dignitary, "the world is safer with nuclear weapons than without them, or with insignificant nuclear

[20] The Global Zero movement, available on www.globalzero.org/en/about-campaign. (accesed September, 1, 2013).
[21] *Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission Report. Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and Posture*, p.1. (accesed September, 4, 2013).
[22] *Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission Report. Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and Posture*, p.2. (accesed September, 4, 2013).
[23] *Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission Report. Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and Posture*, p.4. (accesed September, 4, 2013).
[24] *Global Zero NATO Russia Commission Report*, p.21. (accesed September, 4, 2013).
[25] S. Karaganov, Council of Defense and Chief of the Russian foreign policy ”START promotes US cooperation and reaprochement with Russia: a world without nuclear weapons is a dangerous concept which must be abandoned." *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, April 23, 2011, p. 58.
[26] S. Karaganov, Council of Defense and Chief of the Russian foreign policy, "Global Zero and Common Sense," Russia in Global Affairs, no. 2, 2010, p. 26.

arsenals."[27]

In 2009, Washington expressed willingness to consider Russia's participation in the missile defense system in Europe.[28] In the same year, in Prague, the American president presents strategic reductions, namely the objective of the "Global Zero" project ("Nuclear Zero Concept ") for a future abolition of nuclear weapons, in the medium term.

In 2010, one of the threats included in Russia's military doctrine[29] is "the creation and setting of antimissile systems that undermine global stability."[30]

It is considered that the development and use of anti-missile defence system, undermines global stability and disrupts strategic balance of power, along with the militarization of space and the deployment of strategic nuclear weapons.

3. New START

In 2010, in Prague is signed a bilateral agreement on "New Treaty to Reduce Strategic Arms" (New START)[31], as a continuation of START I, including the SORT provisions. According to the International Institute for Peace Research in Stockholm (SIPRI)[32], in January 2012, the nuclear balance is presented as follows[33] [see fig. 1]:

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[27] He described nuclear weapons as a weak point of the Cold War and noted that the most significant development occurred in the aftermath of the Cold War. Sergei Karaganov stressed the idea that in the absence of nuclear arsenals, they would not longer fear and such could waken risky behaviors. Karaganov concluded that it is more useful that Russian-American relations are bilateral and not under the aegis of "Global Zero" to improve relations. See, Dmitrz Petrov, "Nuclear Zero aze naz abstained", *Rossiia*, 6 June 14 June, 2009.

[28] In a confidential letter to Medvedev, Obama mentioned that the U.S. wanted to abandon the interceptor system that the Bush administration wanted it located in Europe, provided that Russia would reduce the trafficking of arms to Iran, which has also caused the missile location because of its nuclear ambitions. See, Peter Barker, "Obama suggets Russia an agreement in a secret letter", *The New York Times*, March, 2, 2009.

[29] See, *Russia's Military Doctrine* http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Russia2010_English.pdf. (accesed September, 7, 2013).

[30] The principles of State policy in the field of Nuclear Deterrence until 2020 foresees that "Russia can use precision weapons as deterrence, can send troops abroad to protect its national interests or those of its citizens, in accordance with the rules of international law, international agreements and with the provisions of federal law. The main tasks of the Russian Armed Forces in time of war are to reject any aggression against Russia and its allies, to defeat the aggressor and to force it to halt military actions. A number of senior officials of the Russian Federation stated that the US anti-missile shield elements in Romania represent a real threat to Russia's security. Therefore, the expression "in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation" is ambiguous enough to allow a wide room for manoeuvre to the rulers in Moscow. Unlike the U.S., so Russia will respond to an attack with conventional or chemical and biological weapons, with nuclear weapons. A broadening of the circumstances for using the nuclear threat by Russia may be interpreted as a weakness of Russia, in terms of conventional forces. If the USA knows that it can cope with any conventional Army-wide, without the need to inflict civilian casualties and nuclear weaponry, contamination with Russia is based largely on the strength of their opponents, the deterrence of nuclear component. Russia, as the United States, has developed strategies of nuclear war-fighting both at the tactical level and especially strategic task force". http://militar.infomondo.ro/actualitate/rusia-are-o-noua-doctrina-militara.html.

[31] The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty - New START.

[32] http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/nbc/nuclear. (accesed September, 4, 2013).

[33] Shannon N. Kile, "World Nuclear Forces", *SIPRI Yearbook 2012* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2012), pp. 307-350.

Country	Year of first nuclear test	Deployed warheads[a]	Other warheads[b]	Total Inventory
United States	1945	2 150[c]	5 850	~8 000[d]
Russia	1949	1 800[e]	8 200[f]	~10 000[g]
United Kingdom	1952	160	65	225
France	1960	290	10	~300
China	1964	..	200[h]	~240
India	1974	..	80-100[h]	80-100
Pakistan	1998	..	90-110[h]	90-110
Israel	..	..	~80[h]	~ 80
North Korea	2006	..	..	?[i]
Total		**~4400**	**~14600**	**~19000**

Fig. no.1 - World nuclear forces, January 2012[34]

In 2011, comes into force the New START with validity at least until the year 2021. The Treaty provides a reduction of the warheads to 1550 for each part involved (air force, land force, submarines), limit to 1550 warheads located, 800 ballistic missile launchers located and unlocated (ICBM), ballistic missiles launched on the sea (SLBM) and heavy bombers and a separate limit of 700 ICBM and SLBM located; compared to other previous treaties the reduction is significant, and it is also stipulated technical checks, plus 18 in-situ inspections per year.[35]

New START provides lower limits with 74% in the number of nuclear warheads compared to START provisions and by 30% in relation to SORT provisions .As regards the limit of 1,550 nuclear warheads installed on transport of nuclear[36], reductions are more than half in relation to START; limit of 800 nuclear means of transport[37] limit of 800 nuclear transport of not more than 700[38].

According to the Treaty, the number of strategic nuclear missiles

[34] *All figures are approximate: a. "Deployed" means warheads placed on missiles or located on bases with operational forces; b. These are warheads in reserve, awaiting dismantlement or that require some preparation (e.g. assembly or loading on launchers) before they become fully operationally available; c. In addition to strategic warheads, this figure includes c. 200 non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons deployed in Europe; d. The US Department of Defense nuclear stockpile contains c. 4900 warheads. Another c. 3100 retired warheads are scheduled to be dismantled by 2022; e. These are warheads earmarked for delivery by deployed strategic launchers (intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and long-range bombers); f . This figure up to 4000 non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons for use by short-range naval, air force and air defence forces. In 2010 the Russian Government declared that all tactical nuclear weapons were in storage and not deployed; g. This includes a military stockpile of c. 4500 nuclear warheads and another c. 5500 retired warheads await dismantlement; h. The nuclear stockpiles of China, India, Pakistan and Israel are not thought to be fully deployed; i. North Korea conducted nuclear test explosions in 2006, 2009 and 2013, February 12, a spokesman for North Korea's army command said it had successfully conducted a third underground nuclear weapon test, according to the Yonhap, but there is no public information to verify that it possesses operational nuclear weapons.*

[35] See, *New Start Protocol*, Washington DC, White House, April 8, 2010, www.whitehouse.gov/new-start-treatz-and-protocol. (accesed September, 9, 2013).

[36] ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers.

[37] ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, located in wearehouses

[38] See, Ramesh THAKUR and Gareth EVANS, eds., *Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play*, Canberra, Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, 2013, p.33, http://cnnd.anu.edu.au. (accesed September, 9, 2013).

launchers will be halved. The verification and inspection regime will be established later by replacing the SORT mechanism. New START does not limit the number of operational nuclear warheads inactive stored, so they can be thousands in the Russian and American inventories.[39]

There are some semantic differences related to terminology used in nuclear arms talks. New START does not define the meaning of the terms "deployed" nuclear warheads (deployed) or "stored" (put into reserve, storages); in the economy of the Treaty is of interest to only the warheads installed on transport vectors (delivery vehicles). Another "strategic" term regarding the range of the vector of transport, allows some vectors to be employed in non-strategic categories or tactics. Note that in the language of other nuclear powers, their nuclear forces are considered "strategic", regardless of the range of the vectors of transport on which they are installed[40].

The Treaty establishes a body to comply with its provisions and the implementation of the Bilateral Advisory Commission (The Bilateral Consultative Commission). In the New START agreement of the parts is inserted to negotiate new limits for offensive nuclear weapons by 2018.

Entry into force of New Start is considered a major achievement in the field of armaments control after the START I is signed by establishing a system of official controls[41]. Despite gaps regarding tactical nuclear weapons arsenal and offensive-defensive rating, the treaty lays down an international official regime of control after a period of uncertainty. The technical problems that New START involves can generate false and non-viable solutions away from the real issues of security. Moreover, it creates an opportunity for Russia to block further progress in arms reduction process[42].

In the case of nuclear warheads, the stocks are adjusted more than a warhead for delivery systems; two warheads for each ballistic missile, two main types of gravity bombs and warhead for each cruise missile. SLBMs are the least vulnerable in case of a massive nuclear attack, and are intended primarily for secondary insured shot depicting the characteristics and missions, warning that the U.S. cannot be defeated through a first nuclear strike.

ICSMs ensures through hundreds of locations spread out over large areas, the capacity of response in the event of nuclear attack even if the first blow will inflict heavy losses on the U.S. ICBM is the main structure of the nuclear triad

[39] It seems to US that they will count on the efficiency of a large number of carrier vectors and a small number of deployed nuclear warheads, a fact that may make changes in the future strategy of allocating funds for the arming of Russia, currently being evident concern for the entry into service of new SLBM R-29RMU Sineva, and RSM-56 Bulava, but especially of the new submarines will wear them in class Borei. "New START: Increasing the Risk of NuclearWar," Heritage Foundation, August 11, 2010, available at http://blog.heritage.org/2010/08/11/new-start-increasing-the-risk-of-nuclear-war/(accesed September, 9, 2013).

[40] See, Ramesh Thakur and Gareth Evans, eds., *Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play*, Canberra, Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, 2013, p.43, http://cnnd.anu.edu.au. (accesed September, 9, 2013).

[41] See, Wolf, A.F., Nikitin, M.B. and Kerr, P.K., 2012, *Arms control and nonproliferation: a catalog of treaties and agreement*, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, p.3.

[42] See, G.N. LEWIS, and T.A. POSTOL, 2010, "A flawed and dangerous US missile defence plan", *Arms control today*, 40(4), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_05/Lewis-Postol.

both for that, other components of the triad can be more easily destroyed and when nuclear war takes place outside of the American space. This Treaty in a specialist's opinion marks the end of an era of arms control and the onset of a new control system with global ramifications, but its occurrence depends not on a global security system dedicated to regional conflicts but also to the success of the implementation of the Treaty by Washington and Moscow.[43]

In 2012, American nuclear doctrine[44] stipulates that a state which is not equipped with a nuclear weapon and which complies with the NPT[45] is not in danger of becoming a target for American nuclear weaponry. The U.S. will not respond with nuclear weapons to an attack with chemical or biological weapons, conventional, while Russia responds with nuclear weapons to a conventional attack, chemical or biological, "in critical situations to the national security of the Russian Federation".

The reduction of undeployed strategic stocks will diminish the U.S. capacity for the deployment of reduced forces but adapted for the deployment theater; under the terms of the limitation of production capacity, it is preferable to replace faulty equipment with the same type of equipment in inventory of the same kind than with new products. Analysis of this Treaty, in the opinion of some specialists, denotes an asymmetric advantage U.S. to Russia with respect to missile defense, the conventional system of precision tapping and nuclear undeployed warheads.[46]

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THE NUCLEAR TRIADS AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS

Andreea Emilia DUȚĂ[•]

The speech is made all the more insistent about the unknowns of the future strategies of the nuclear balance, even about the possibility of giving up to the American.-Russian balance; in the event that future negotiations will reduce the maximum level to 1,000 nuclear missiles deployed and nuclear missiles deployed by other states will reach the limits of 500 nuclear missiles then, balance, must be rethought.

Nuclear arsenals are organized on the triad system mirrored in the provisions of New START. To these are added nonstrategic and defence systems. Strategic offensive nuclear arms systems, according to open sources, consist of ICMB, SLMB and nuclear bombers.

The defensive missile issue is closely linked to national security. The offensive nuclear arms reduction and the development of a global nuclear alert induce a new role of defensive missiles and of conventional forces in future strategies.

Keywords**:** *nuclear triad, nonstrategic and defence systems, global nuclear alert*

1. The nuclear triads

The nuclear triads - by land, by air and by sea - have only the United States and Russia. The deployment of strategic nuclear armaments, significantly reduced by the New START limitations continues to be enormous. The speech is made all the more insistent about the unknowns of the future strategies of the nuclear balance, even about the possibility of giving up to the American.-Russian balance; in the event that future negotiations will reduce the maximum level to 1,000 nuclear missiles deployed and nuclear missiles deployed by other states will reach the limits of 500 nuclear missiles then, balance, must be rethought. A possible situation of confrontation one-to-one can find solutions in former situations, but a confrontation between several nations on the nuclear segment when only two military blocks are defined, at the end will come?

The philosophy of the New START sees role of nuclear bombers as a weapon, but also as a component of the nuclear triad, which is possible in the event of future negotiations to be placed under the sign of removal [see fig.1].

Type	Limit	Future structure
Deployed missiles and bombers Each side is limited to the provision of 700 strategic vehicles: 700 intercontinental ballistic missiles ((ICBMs); Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs); Airplanes with nuclear capability; stored missiles or on submarines.	700	420 x 1warhead deployed ICBMs
Deployed warheads (RVs and bombers) Each signatory agreed to no longer provide strategic cars,	1550	60 x 1 bombers (?)

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limitations to be implemented until February 2018, and checks shall include the exchange of data, notifications, inspections.		
Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers (missile tubes and bombers) Each part has a limit of 800 launchers ICBMs/SLBMs and bombers with nuclear capabilities. Non-deployed launchers are of ICBMs or SLBMs type on submarines that do not contain rockets. Limitation of warheads location: each side is limited to 1,550 warheads located on strategic vehicles; All warheads are of ICBMs/SLBMs type and the inspections allow checking to confirm the number of warheads; each bomber has assigned a nuclear warhead.	800	14 SSBNs x 20 SLBMs no more 240 SLBMs

Figure no.1 - Summary of New START limits[1]

Complying with the provisions of the Treaty, the United States cannot make cuts in the nuclear triad because risks would be very high but also because the number reductions / cuts do not bring savings but would endanger the balance of forces; thus, the SLBM type-missile Trident II, type ICBM-Minuteman III missiles and at the level of nuclear bombers two models-B52H and B-2. An analysis of expenses with the nuclear triad stresses that fund reductions will prejudice the the soundness of the system and strategic flexibility by inducing significant risks; in any case, the structure of the bombers is the last to be affected because the alert continues 24 hours/24 and conventional missions would be affected very seriously.

Health and economic risks are to everyone in the case of a nuclear conflict between the two countries which are outside military blocs. A multipolar nuclear century accompanied by the increasing the risk of a nuclear war, the increase of a huge nuclear destructive force.

Nuclear arsenals are organized on the triad system mirrored in the provisions of New START. To these are added nonstrategic and defence systems. Strategic offensive nuclear arms systems, according to open sources, consist of ICMB, SLMB and nuclear bombers. The present report estimated between deployed nuclear warheads and those in warehouses is 1: 2.25 given that in 10-15 years to become 1: 1.

The criticisms of the Treaty by several American specialists: do not bring benefits to US, even hardening its position towards Russia as regards the nuclear warheads by substantial reductions imposed on US towards those established to Russia; the Treaty focuses on the strategic plateau and not on the tactical one[2]; the advantages obtained by Russia at the expense of the US are too high. "The requests of the Treaty for the United States are to reduce nuclear weapons while

[1] http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-111erpt6/pdf/CRPT-111erpt6.pdf, pp.141; (accesed September, 5, 2013).
[2] "Russia Expands Production Of Precision Guided Weapons," *Ria Novosti*, February 2, 2009, http://en. Rian.ru/russia/20090211/120090354.html. (accesed September, 1, 2013); *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, January 21. 2005; "Russian Experts Praise Medvedev's Moves against US Missile Shield," *Interfax-AVN Online*, November 5, 2008, www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-188575274/russian-experts-praise-medvedev.html. (accesed September, 1, 2013); Aleksey Arbatov, Moscow *Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online*, May 5, 2010, *Izvestiya*, May 6, 2010.

Russia is allowed to grow. This reality has no strategic sense.[3] This vision is shared by several specialists[4] [see fig.2].

Type	Limits	U.S.A.	Russia
Deployed missiles and bombers SDVuri	700	812	494
Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers (missile tubes and bombers) Located/unlocated launchers	800	1040	881
Deployed warheads (RVs and bombers) Located warheads	1550	1737	1492

Figure no.2 - The application of New START in March 2012

In 2013, Russia holds 4,500 nuclear warheads, of which 1800 are deployed on missiles or bombers; in warehouses, there are 700 nuclear warheads and 2,000 nonstrategic warheads.

ICMBs of Russia are estimated at 1,500 nuclear warheads[5] in the Strategic Missile Forces equipment (Strategic Rocket Forces-SRF)[6] on 3 forces with a total of 12 divisions. 90% of today's missiles will be withdrawn and will equip the SS-27 Mobile. The U.S. Minuteman ICBM is to be eliminated as a result of their trajectories that pass over or near Russia (in case of their use against China or Syria) and China (in the case of Iran, North Korea).

The risk of confusion generated over Russia - as an attack against its territory-make them inoperative. Furthermore, fixed deposits are safe targets in enemy attack scenarios, and the risk of launching missiles due to a false alarm or as a result of an accident, is very high.[7] A modern type of the conventional ICBMs -Hypersonic Vectors (Hypersonic Technology Vehicle, HTV) is being developed to strike in an hour a target wherever located in the world; Russia was the first that began the developing of HTV (with some aerodynamic stability issues) followed by the US (with some trouble at the cooling systems). In the case of the U.S., 12-20 conventional systems moving through the stratosphere bypass the issues of penetration of airspace of Russia and China; given the limited number of these U.S. systems, Russia will not be threatened.

SLMBs of Russia include the SS-N-18 (RSM-50), M1Stingray (RSM-54

[3] See, Palin Sarah, "Senate Republicans: vote no on New START". *National review* http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/255568/senate-republicans-vote-no-new-start-sarah-palin. (accesed September, 3, 2013).

[4] See, Vajdic D., "Why the GOP candidates should talk about Russia Palin Sarah, Senate Republicans: vote no on New START". *National review*, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/288388/why-candidates-should-talk-about-russia-daniel-vajdic. (accesed September, 2, 2013).

[5] ICMBs include the following types of nuclear complex: SS-Satan 18M6, SS-19M3 Stileto, SS-25Sicklo, SS-27 Mobile SS-27 Silo. In the operational forces there are 4,000 intact warheads that will be decommissioned. Kuchins, A., 2012. *The demise of the US-Russia reset: what's next?* Chatham House [online]. Available from: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/181012summary.pdf (accessed 11 January 2013).

[6] Strategic Rocket Forces – SRF.

[7] *Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission Report*, p.9.

Sineva) and SS-N-23 (RSM, Bulava). Nuclear fleet currently consists of ten ships: one class Borei, 6 Delta Ivs and three Delta IIIs with 160 launching appliances SLBMs with 624 of nuclear warheads.[8] The U.S. Trident submarine fleet avoids the disadvantages of cross country flights/territorial invasions that could violate national sovereignity of other countries uninvolved in the nuclear crisis and the risk of some nuclear attacks due to confusion; the submarines are not dependent on the time factor to ensure efficiency, and against their missiles there is no secure defense system.[9]

It is estimated that, for the U.S. 10 submarines equipped with Trident ballistic missiles with 720 nuclear warheads are sufficient (360 carried out and 360 in deposits).[10] Seven are suggested to be in the Pacific area and 3 in Atlantic, sufficient even in terms to meet the ratio of 70% of them to be operative and ensure the use of 270 nuclear warheads.

Nuclear warheads W-76 and W-88 for submarines are sufficient. It is estimated that Russia's adequate nuclear arsenal may have 900 nuclear warheads, hereby: 450 strategic nuclear warheads deployed, 150 strategic nuclear warheads in storage and 300 non-strategic warheads. Strategic nuclear warheads are organised in two variants: a) In 150 ICBMs (50 in silos and 100 mobile) and 300 SLMBs arranged in 8 submarines; b) 300 ICBMs (100 in silos and 200 mobile) and 150 SLMBs arranged in 4 submarines.[11]

Operational bombers belonging to the United States and Russia are under the sign of uncertainty, since the parties to New START did not publish any figures. It is estimated that Russia holds 72 operative bombers that can be equipped with 810 nuclear systems.[12] It is given a guess that, for US, 18 B-2 bombers with180 gravitational bombs are sufficient (90 carried out and 90 in deposits).[13] The nuclear warheads B-61 and B-83 for the bombers are close to the upper limit, requiring only some small additions.

Although the bombers require more time for equipping with nuclear bombs than ICBMs or SLMBs as well as for approaching targets, they have the advantage that they can move anywhere although they are slower than the other two components of the nuclear triad, being so vulnerable due to refuelling and anti-aircraft defense reaction.[14] Nuclear air force offers flexibility and choice of tactical support that SLBMs and ICBM cannot realize both in terms of the generation of force or conduct submitted and for the execution of "surgical" strikes.

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[8]Regular patrols of Russian SSBN aren't known, but they are assessed as being shorter than the American ones, but the reduced number of SSBN cannot ensure continuous patrols.

[9] *Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission Report*, p.9.

[10] *Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission Report*, p.7.

[11] *Global Zero NATO Russia Commission Report*, p.17.

[12] Nuclear bombers are Bear-H6 (Tu-95 MS6), Bear-H16 (Tu-95 MS16) and Blackjack (Tu-160). See, 'START-ing Over with Russia', GOP.com, February 2010, http://web.archive.org/web/20110614222022/http://www.gop.com/index.
php/research/comments/start-ing_over_with_russia/.

[13] *Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission Report*, p.8.

[14] *Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission Report*, p.10.

Substantial changes are expected in the U.S.-Russia nuclear balance which will be more than sufficient levels of reality. The balance allows nuclear weapons arsenal future negotiations for future approved limits between 500-900 strategic and non-strategic nuclear warheads [see fig.3].

	U.S.A.	**Russia**
ICBM located	400	192
Warheads on ICBM	400	542
SLBM located	240	128
Located heavy bombers	60	76
Distributed armament	60	76
Total located SDV	700	396
Total strategic warheads	1550	1258

Figure no.3 - The projection of New START application

The main aim of the Russian military is to prevent a nuclear conflict, as well as any other military conflict. Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to an attack against it or its allies with nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, or in response to a large-scale aggression with the use of conventional weapons, which would endanger the existence of the Russian State.

Reducing the number of missiles contrasts with the U.S. strategy to take strong positions on top of potential adversaries. In this context the priority targets of military coups may be revised, the management and industrial significance of the municipalities extending over more and more cities, especially in terms of reducing to very low levels of strategic forces and the fuzziness of NATO'S tactical nuclear weapons regime; the policy of "extended nuclear defense" to the US as the key element in the political-military strategy of relating with allies, and ensuring their protection under its nuclear umbrella.

2. Ballistic missile defense systems

Since 1960, in the framework of the U.S.-Russia negotiations, the subject of "strategic" missile defense systems was one of the most important, not being specific to NATO because it was limited only to defensive programs without the "strategic" attribute. Ballistic missile defense systems, in a reasoned opinion,[15] must be subject to "severe limitations" because it constitutes a serious impediment to both bilateral and multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. It starts from the premise that the system is capable of destroying all or most hostile missiles, ignoring scientific signals that such systems require unceasing technological improvements.[16]

[15] See, Ramesh Thakur and Gareth Evans, eds., *Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play*, Canberra, Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, 2013, p.58, http://cnnd.anu.edu.au. (accesed September, 2, 2013).
[16] See, Philip Coyle, "The failure of Missile Defence", *The National Interest*, 26 July 2012, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-failure-missile-defence-7248. (accesed September, 1, 2013).

American nuclear doctrine developments give a greater role to non-nuclear systems, including defensive missiles; the plans to expand the defensive systems of Europe with missions against threats from the Middle East and Asia-Pacific are heavily criticized for they promise a false sense of security for U.S. allies and at the same time a sense of insecurity for Russia and China. These feelings are both false since the deployment of interceptors both on land as well as on ships could not operate, their maintenance costs being over $ 8 billion annually.[17]

In 2010, at the NATO Summit in Lisbon after Clinton Administration had developed the U.S continental defence, the Bush administration develops a partnership with European States outside NATO; the Obama Administration brings the arrangements entered into by the previous NATO administration. Thus, defensive missile defence becomes a collective NATO mission as an expression of the protection's indivizibility. U.S. plans for missile-detection systems in the Czech Republic and Poland followed by bilateral cooperation agreements are changed through the design of the ”European Phased Adaptive Approach” in response to missile threats from Iran.[18]

By the end of 2011, the establishment of joint missile defence in Europe is registered in the nuclear arms control agenda with the guarantee that American defensive missiles systems will not be targeted against Russian strategic forces; a system of defensive missiles that uses intermediate-range missiles (IRBMS) and not strategic ballistic missiles. Moscow does not accept NATO's decision to locate defense devices on the coastal areas of Romania and Turkey.[19]

The American President's refusal to provide legal guarantees that the missile system will not be directed against Russia is followed by Russia's announcement of upcoming answers on its part to further development of the missile defense system. Possible reactions of Russia could be: retreat from New START, deployment of missiles along its borders to the South and West, the development of missile systems by breakage of systems;[20] furthermore, it is advanced the possibility of preemtive strikes against the defensive missile system infrastructures.[21]

A serious objection to the New START address is related to the classification of nuclear weapons in offensive and defensive, regarded as a favor done to Russia with significant consequences on the American system of missile

[17] See, Yousaf BUTT, ”Obama, Congress should push NATO missile defence program off ”fiscal cliff””, *Cristian Science Monitor*, 15 November 2012, http://csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/1115/Obama-Congress-should-push-NATO-missile-defence-program-off-fiscal-cliff. (accesed September, 2, 2013).

[18] http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/FACT-SHEET-US-Missile-Defense-Policy. (accesed September, 2, 2013).

[19] ”Litva prizvala mirovye derzhavy nachat peregorovory organixheniiu takicheskogo iadernogo oruzhiia dislotsipovannogo v kalingradskoi oblasti”, *DEFENS Eskress: Ezhennedelnaia lenta novostei*, February, 8, 2011.

[20] See, Medvedev, D., 2011, *Statement in connection with the situation concerning the NATO countries missile defence system in Europe*. http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/3115. (accesed September, 1, 2013).

[21] RIA Novosti 2012, *Russia does not rule aut preemptive missile defence*. http://en.rian.ru/world/20120503/173188049.html. (accesed September, 1, 2013).

defense. Furthermore, it is considered that this approach is a betrayal of Poland and the Czech Republic, who had made known the agreement with the locations of missile defense system despite strong opposition of Russia (Kramer 2009).[22]

Nonstrategic weapons systems of defence are constituted from AMB/Air/Coastal defence (S-300, 53T6-Gazelle, SSC-1B Sepal), Land-based air (bombers/combat aircraft- Tu-22M3/Su-24M/Su-34), short-range ballistic missiles of action (SS-21/SS-26) and ships (submarines/ships/ planes). There are an estimated 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads with air, naval use, at the disposal of land forces defense. In the category of nonstrategic air force weapons, the New START signatories are comparable both in number and type; it is also unlikely that the nonstrategic systems on submarines will be disposed. It is estimated the keeping of 430 nonstrategic nuclear warheads available to air defence, territorial defence and coastal defence

Technical discussions relating to the defensive missiles US-Russia-NATO are in a deadlock since correlative proposals of collaboration are unacceptable to the other. There are variants of the missile defense cooperation by which relations between the "opponents" can turn to a strategic partnership to make war unacceptable as a solution to political conflicts.[23] There is a proposal to increase confidence through the establishment of a 100 miles zone of exclusion adjacent to Russia's territory on which the defensive missile system is not disposed; in addition, they will be adapted to regional threats, and Russia and China will receive notifications in case of removal of the alert level of the American missile systems.

The defensive missile issue is closely linked to national security. The offensive nuclear arms reduction and the development of a global nuclear alert induce a new role of defensive missiles and of conventional forces in future strategies.

The missile defense system is intended for the initial phase (24-72 hours) of the nuclear crisis and also for regional hazards and terrorism control. For US, these are the main parts of protection in future threats; for Russia, the missile defense system is unacceptable as a threat to its national security due to its potential to destroy its nuclear defense system, more through the challenges that can affect the entire international system of arms control. The insurance but not the legal guarantees, that the missile defense system is not aimed at Russia, is insufficient for the future safety of Russia.

At the tactical nuclear weapons level, Russia is exceeding U.S; in the current situation, Russia is not interested in reducing their number because they represent a key part of its defense strategy in the balance with both NATO and China [see fig. 5]. With regard to non-strategic armaments, they propose the

[22] See, CROPSEY, S., 2009, "Obama s appeasement", *Weekly standard* http://www.hudson.org/ index.cfm?fuseaction =publication.details6478. See, Kramer, D.J., 2009, "Placating Russia won't work", *The Washington post*, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/17/AR2009091702303. (accesed September, 4, 2013).

[23] See, Dmitri Trenin and James Collins, *The Game Changer: Cooperative Missile Defense*, Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 29 November 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/ globalten/?fa=50173.

removal of them from equipping the operative forces in Europe and keeping them in deposits, up to 1,000 weapons each side.[24]

In February 2012, the US Senate calls for the initiation of negotiations with Russia on tactical nuclear arsenals disparities and verifying reductions in tactical nuclear weapons. The reason is that the U.S. says that between September 1967 - September 2009, 90% of the stock of non-strategic nuclear warheads were reduced.[25]

Russia has expressed its openness to negotiating future reductions in arsenals of non-strategic nuclear warheads, although the arsenal no longer represents more than 25% of the arsenal that they had available in 1991. Furthermore, it is suggested to be followed Russia's example to withdraw its non-strategic nuclear weapons on the territory of other States, the abolition of infrastructure for rapid overseas deployment.[26]

	U.S.A.	**Russia**
By air	500	730
Anti-aircraft missile	0	430
On ground	0	170
Naval	260	700
Total assets	**760**	**2000**

Figure no.4 - Non-strategic nuclear armament *(NSNW)*

Regarding the issue of missile defence, Russia makes the nuclear reductions of missile defence developments highlighting the interdependence of offensive defence, i.e. that the American missile defense systems in Europe threaten the Russian strategic force. In turn, the U.S. agrees with this interdependence but reaffirms that the missile defence is against Iran and not Russia.

Keeping certain defensive nuclear missiles by the U.S. is not necessary to obtain an advantage over Russia, but to be able to face the dangers posed by the emergence of new nuclear States — Iran and North Korea.

The U.S. missile defense in Europe is materialized through the U.S. Navy ships equipped with SM-3 interceptors operating close to Europe; in the following steps, the SM-3 interceptors will be placed in Poland and Romania. It is indicated that the SM-3 interceptors are to be improved. The U.S. defensive missiles layout does not overlap with the location of weapons systems that affect the nuclear balance, but protects its allies even if it has a negative impact on non-proliferation.

Russia calls for a legal guarantee that the anti-aircraft defense is not directed against it, in accordance with the political security of the U.S., the relations being in a deadlock. It is estimated that Russia will have difficulties in

[24] *Global Zero NATO Russia Commission Report*, p.15.
[25] US Statement (Under Cluster 1 – Disarmament) at the 2012 Preparatory Committee of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Vienna, 3 May 2012.
[26] See, Sergei Ryabkov, *US-Russian Nuclear Disarmament: Current Record and Possible Further Steps*, 25 October 2011, http: //europeanleadershipnetwork.org. (accesed September, 2, 2013).

maintaining a strategic force at the New START level. The serious problem of U.S.-Russia relations remains that of defensive missiles. With all the assurances given by the American President to Russia in the sense of a larger flexibility after the 2012 elections, the American domestic political game pressure does not allow it.[27]

The nuclear triad - ICBM, SLMB, bombers - continues to be fundamental to the projection of the U.S. conventional force. Although long- range nuclear air strikes have lost the importance of the accuracy of conventional, strategic systems' strikes have demonstrated in recent decades a valuable element for U.S; future negotiations will focus on further development of these in order to increase accuracy and rapid deployment of these.

A question with unclear answers is "how the strategic stability will be maintained at a very low level of nuclear stockpiles."[28]

Although there are some apocalyptic scenarios, like Russian preemption strike against the infrastructure of defensive missile system, the consequences of its failure to be solved will recoil on future progress in arms control.[29]

The application of the Treaty must be contextualized in the relations between particularly prudent parties, especially that the intended increasing security reduction can result in the opposite sense.

Acronyms

ABMT	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty	Tratatul privind Rachetele Anti-Balistice
DV	Delivery Vehicles	Vectorii de transport
GZ	Global Zero	Conceptul Nuclear Zero
HB	Heavy Bomber	Bombardier greu
IRBM	Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile	Rachete cu rază medie de acțiune
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile	Rachetă Balistică Intercontinentală
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty	Tratatul privind Forțele Nucleare de Rază Medie
MAD	Mutual Assured Destruction	Distrugerea Reciprocă Asigurată
MRBM	Medium Range Balistic Missiles	Rachete cu rază medie de acțiune
MIRVs	Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles	Rachete Purtătoare de Multiple Focoase Nucleare Independente
NSNW	Non Strategic Nuclear Weapon	Armamentul nuclear non-strategic
SALT I	Arms Limitation Talks	Discuțiile privind Limitarea Armamentelor
SLBM	Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles	Rachete balistice lansate de submarine

[27] New York Times 2012, "The never-ending Cold War". *The New York Times*, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/opinion/the-never-ending-cold-war.htlm. (accesed September, 2, 2013).

[28] Carl Bildt and Radek Sikorski, "Next, the Tactical Nukes," *New York Times*, February 1, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/02/02/opinion/02iht-edbildt.html: "Lithuania Claims Russia Deployed Warheads Near Border," *AFP*, February 8, 2011, www.spacedaily.com/reports/Lithuania claims Russia deployed warheads near border 999.html. (accesed September, 9, 2013).

[29] Cimbala, S.J., 2012, "Missile defense malpractice: US-Russian relations and nuclear fallacy", *The Journal of Slavic military studies*, 25 (3), 269-283.

SORT	Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty	Tratatul de Reducere a Capabilităţile Ofensive
START I	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty	Tratatul de Reducere a Armelor Strategice
New START	The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty	Noul Tratat de Reducere a Armelor Strategice

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22. US Statement (Under Cluster 1 – Disarmament) at the 2012 Preparatory Committee of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Vienna, 3 May 2012;
23. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-111erpt6/pdf/CRPT-111erpt6.pdf;
24. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/FACT-SHEET-US-Missile-Defense-Policy.

INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT OF RISKS

Marian Ştefan ZAHARIA[*]

The ability of an organization to operate in conditions of risk and uncertainty and respond to unplanned (positive or negative) events is a prime indicator of its capability to achieve its objectives. The implementation of a risk management process must involve the entire staff of the institution. Assessment of the Integrated Risks Management effectiveness of an organization is done by analyzing the presence and functioning of its components.

Keywords: *risk, integrated management, public institutions, standard.*

„If all is a matter of luck then risk management has no sense."
Peter Bernstein

Introduction

Terms, as risks' management, corporative government and internal control are used more and more in the public institutions in Romania. The approval of Code of Internal Control, comprising the management standards/internal control to the public entities[1], leads to the development of internal control systems in these entities by the agreement of the management rules from these standards.

The increasing manifestation also in the public sector of two main coordinates from the economic field, respectively the uncertainty and risk the activities are undergoing in, revealed the special importance of Standard 11 "*Risk management"*. This standard clearly states *"an efficient system of interior control supposes the implementation in the public entity of risk management"*. Still, the relation between the internal control and risk management as well as their importance is, still, insufficiently explained to the public entities management. Usually, managers of public entities associate the internal control with the elaboration of formalized procedures for activities.

Risks management is probably seen only as a stage to be passed in the implementation of standards of internal control or as simple "inventory" of risks from a public entity. Therefore, the awareness of management from public entities over the benefits obtained following the adoption and implementation of "*Risks' management*" in all the public entities is very important in the actual context.

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[1] Ordinul ministrului finanțelor publice nr. 946/04.07.2005 pentru aprobarea Codului controlului intern, cuprinzând standardele de management/control intern la entitățile publice, modificat şi completat ulterior.

1. Risks management in the public organizations

Each public entity exists with a certain goal: to provide a service or to obtain some results. Thus, the essential preoccupation of each entity leadership is to fulfil the assumed goals. In order to explain the necessity of risk management we start from the general accepted premises in the external environment of each public entity as well as in its internal environment there are producing changes generating risks able to damage the reaching of aimed goals by the respective public entity. In conclusion, the management task is to properly manage these risks thus to maximize the probability to reach the assumed goals under the circumstances when the resources it owns for the goal are finite.

Risks management doest not suppose the personnel of an organization *"to have aversion to risk"* but *"to be aware about the risks"* because the risks management[2] represents a logical and systematic method to settle the context of identification, analysis, assessment, fulfilling the actions, monitoring and communication of risks associated for each activity, functions or process as to allow the organizations to diminish the losses and to maximize the opportunities. There must be done the statement the assuming of risks is necessary because the single way to completely avoid a risk is to do nothing, and this offers us the safety of the fact we will not accomplish something.

The conformation to the managerial/internal control standards approved by the Public finance minister order no. 946/2005, also involves the obligation to implement the standard 11 "*Risk management*". In this standard there is provisioned "*the public entity systematically analyzes, at least once a year, the risks related to its activities undergoing, elaborates corresponding plans in order to limit the possible consequences of these risks and assigns the responsible employees in the application of the respective plans*"[3]. In the general requirements of the standard is provisioned the settled criteria for a risk to be considered acceptable, respectively if the measures regarding their avoidance does not justify on financial plan.

The connection between the internal control and risk management is, also, mentioned in standard, as can not be an efficient system of control without the implementation in the organization of risks management. Internal control represents just one of the possible answers of management to risk.

Manager disposes at least the following possible options in risks management, known in the good practise also as "*the 5 T":*

- *tolerance,* when risk is ignored;
- *transfer,* when risks are moved in somebody else task (for example an assurance organization);

[2] Standardul AS/NSZ 4360:1999 Risk Management, Australia 1999.

[3] Ordinul ministrului finanţelor publice nr. 946/04.07.2005 pentru aprobarea Codului controlului intern, cuprinzând standardele de management/control intern la entităţile publice, modificat şi completat ulterior.

- *termination*, meaning the elimination of risks (renouncing to the risks generator activity);
- *triggering usefulness* following the opportunities can go from the risk;
- *treatment*, when it acts over it by internal controls in order to become a residual risk.

A possible confusion refers to the perception of risks management as being integrated in the internal control system when, actually, the internal controls represent only a type of answer of the organization to the identified risks. Thus, there can be say about the internal control it practically represents, the final stage of risks management.

2. Evolution toward an Integrated Management of Risks

The exposure to risk grew bigger, more complex, more diversified and ore dynamic because of the rapid changes in technology, increase of communication speed, globalization phenomenon, etc. Thus, today, organizations function in a totally different environment comparatively to the last 5 years environment. The effectuated studies revealed many organizations perceive an increase as number and severity of risks they confront. Following the diversity of risks and their management needs wider approach. Normally, risks management was approached dividedly and executed in the so-called "stores". This approach leads to the failure in identifying some significant risks and to the ignorance with serious results of the interrelation between risks which damage the operational, technical and financial fields.

The activities undergone related to risks management (risks identification, assessment, treatment, monitoring, control, etc.) can foresee simple operations behaving lesser risks but also threats and opportunities the organization as a whole it confronts. Also, the effectuated studies on risks management showed the organizations manage better the low profile and predictable risks then the large and strategic risks. Therefore, it was chosen the coordinated approach of risks materialized in the adoption of Integrated Risks Management which extended in the late times while the organization understood its advantages. To the adoption of Integrated Risks Management also contributed "the pressure" from outside exercised over the organization to identify all the risks they confront (financial, operational, social, environmental, ethical, etc.) and the settlement of actions to bring these risks to an acceptable profile.

Integrated Risks Management (IRM) represents[4] structured, consistent and continue process in the whole organization for the identification, assessment, settlement of answers to risk and the report of opportunities and threats able to damage the reach of organization's goals.

The Integrated Risks Management is a relatively new approach wherein the risks are managed by an coordinated and integrated manner in whole the

[4] Adaptare după definiția II A (Institute of Internal Auditors – UK and Ireland).

organization being an answer to risks management based on stores in order to manage the growth of interdependent risks percentage. Actually, this process means the integration of the activities on risks management and responsibilities in the field in each component, each function and each level of the organization. All personnel of the organization participates to this process thus to be done rapid and efficient actions to manage risks. In this perspective, there must be understood the interdependencies between risks, as the materialization of risk in an area to increase the impact of risks in other area. Consequently, it is also about the possibility as the action of risks management to be able to be addressed to some multiple risks, from diverse activity sectors.

Integrated Risks Management can be seen as a common framework oriented to the reach of organization goals classified in four categories[5]:

- strategic, regarding the goals from the highest level supporting the goal for which it was created the organization;
- operational, concerning the efficient and effective use of resources the organization has;
- of reporting on the accuracy of report;
- of conformity on the respect of the legislation and applicable norms.

We can tell the risks management, to the operational level, it is not integrated when presents the following characteristics:

- it focuses on particular operational risks peculiarly on the risks there can be managed;
- it is managed by individual functions (compartments);
- it is seen as some specialists attribute, mainly in internal audit;
- it is perceived as number of isolated, bureaucratic processes distinctive from the daily preoccupations of management.

We can speak about an Integrated Risks Management if there are present the following elements:

- risks management is incorporated in the normal processes of the organization's leadership which it is not something different (the same as the internal control);
- it is each employee task being integrated in its culture;
- it is integrant part of good management practices;
- it is not treated as separated task needed to fulfil some requirements;
- it is focused on strategic risks and significant risks of the organization, not necessarily manageable;
- it is offered to the organization leadership an independent assurance on the fact the system of risks management, as a whole, accomplishes the goals.

[5] Vasile Ionescu, Horia Coroiu, *Managementul riscurilor – de la impunere la necesitate,* Sesiune de comunicări ştiinţifice cu participare internaţională, 15-16 aprilie 2010, „Securitate şi apărare europeană in contextul crizei economico-financiare", secţiunea 6 logistică, finanţe şi contabilitate, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare „Carol I", Bucureşti, 2010, p.25.

3. Structures with decisive role in the Integrated Management of Risks' process

The responsibility over the Integrated Risks Management on the organizational level is on the leadership council. In practise, this will delegate the attributions and tasks on managerial team risks management which will be responsible for these activities. Each person of the organization plays a determinant role in the provision of this process success but the primary responsibility to identify and manage the risks is of the management. A particular role in this process it also have the risk committees, risk officers and the intern auditors.

The risk committees have as main roles to follow the manner to implement the organization's policy on the risks management, to identify and to report to the leadership council the major risks the organization must confront, to verify how are managed the key (significant) risks and to promote the use of the best practices on the risks management in the organization's framework.

The risk officers promote the implementation of techniques, processes and procedures on the risks management in the structure they work and offer assistance in the assessment and reporting of risks.

In conformity with the speciality literature, the Integrated Risks Management is composed by eight correlated features[6]:

- Internal environment: regards the organizational culture influencing how is regarded risk, appetite and answer to risk. Many times, in risks management are taken into consideration only the processes and structures and are neglected the organizational culture, the groups of peoples strongly contributing to the efficiency of risks management;

- Settlement of goals: the goals must exist before the management to identify potential risks able to damage their reaching. Integrated Risks Management provides the implementation of a process to settle goals, the correlation of objectives with the goal for which the organization exists and their communication in the entire organization;

- Identification of risks: internal and external events able to damage the objectives of the organization must be identified with the settlement of the distinction between threats and opportunities;

- Assessment of risks: risks are analyzed from the perspective of probability and impact and then prioritized. There are regarded the inherent and residual risks;

- Feedback to risk: management selects the feedbacks to risks (tolerance, transfer, termination, triggering usefulness, treatment) by developing a set of actions in order to align risks with tolerances to risk of the organization and appetite to risk;

[6] *Idem.*

- Control activities: politicise and procedures settled and implemented to provide the feedbacks to risk function;

- Information and communication: relevant information is identified, collected and communicated in an adequate form and opportunely to allow to the personnel to fulfil their responsibilities;

- Monitoring: process on Integrated Risks Management is monitored and the necessary modifications are done. Monitoring is accomplished by management activities and/or independent assessment (audit) activities.

Thus, the Integrated Risks Management takes into consideration the activities at all the levels of the organization: at the top level of the organization, departments, units and subordinated structures. There is direct relation between the goals the organization must reach and the components of Integrated Risks Management representing what it has to be done in order to reach these goals. The relation is described by a three-dimensional matrix[7], wherein the fourth categories of goals (strategic, operational, of reporting, of conformity) are represented on columns, the eight components are represented on rows and the organization's subdivisions are represented by the third dimension.

The implementation and functioning in an organization of Integrated Risks Management presents a series of benefits:

- greater probability to reach the aimed goals;
- reporting strengthened to the level of identified disparaged risks' leadership;
- better understanding of key-risks and wide implications of those;
- better orientation of managers of essential issues;
- lesser surprises or crises in the activities undergoing;
- greater internal focusing on *"what it had" and "how it had"* to be done;
- growth of probability to accomplish change initiatives;
- capability to approach significant risks;
- better information to assume risks along the decisional process.

Although, Integrated Risks Management brings lot of benefits, there are also limitations. These limitations result from the reality of the fact the human judgement in the decisional process can be wrong, the decisions on risk feedback and settlement of controls must take into consideration the necessary costs relatively to obtained benefits, the failures can appear following human errors, controls can be avoided following the understanding among two or many persons and management cannot take into consideration the decisions resulted following the Integrated Risks Management. These limitations exclude the possibility for the management to get an absolute assurance over the reaching of organization's goals.

[7] Cf. Enterprise Risk Management-Integrated Framework-Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO).

Conclusions

Risk management is not linear process; its components interact. Risk management can impact over other risks or the identified measures as effective to control a risk can prove to be proper to use also in other risks control. Risk management is only part in the application of some principles stated on theoretical level. Risk management is continuous process of learning from own or others past experiences. It is extremely important in the initiative to reach to an effective risk management to permanently strengthen an organizational culture of risks.

Risk management is incompatible with attitudes as: "can work also like this"; "somebody else is taking care so I do not have to worry"; "we will live and see"; "the situation is not as bad as it looks like"; "it is fatality", etc. Risk management means assumed responsibility. This is the difficult issue ahead the implementation of an effective risks management and not the acknowledgement of some terminologies or techniques.

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MONITORING AND CONTROLLING THE RISKS

Marian Ştefan ZAHARIA[*]

In the military field, the risk can be appreciated as main feature particularly of military actions, its acceptation being defining element for political-military decision-makers. The inadequate management of risks can lead to the undone of the goal or can do for its fulfilment to get much expensive. The risks regulation by the elaboration of adequate types of reactions to risks became an activity to which to give enhanced attention.

In the present scientific initiative I will only refer to the monitoring and control of risks. The reason is the necessity to understand that risk management regards the future of the organization and the organization's results have great chances to be reached if there are adequately applied measures to monitor and control risks.

Keywords: *risk, monitoring, control, feedback, organization.*

1. Main aspects over the risk management process and types of reactions to risk

Risk management is associated to all the goals or missions of the organization in each environment of manifestation and along the whole range of initiatives, decisions or actions and refer to the following aspect:

- Defining the strategy to be applied;
- Identification and assessment of risks able to damage the organization and activities undergoing in regard to partners and environment;
- Monitoring the risks situation;
- Controlling the risks thus these to be framed in the limits of risk tolerance.

Risk management is a cyclic process with many stages: the context establishment, risks identification, risks analysis, risks assessment and risks treatment[1].

Context establishment is the stage when the next stages of risk management process are planed, the range of analysis extension is settled, the identities and goals of stakeholders are defined, which is the basis to start in the risks assessment and the framework where the process itself takes place and the plan of identification and analysis.

Risk identification presumes better knowledge of the organization, of the juridical framework, the social, political and cultural environment wherein is undergone the activity and goals.

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[1] Dr.ing. Iulian Bujoreanu, *Analiza şi evaluarea riscului in sistemul românesc de management al resurselor de apărare,* Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I", Bucureşti, 2006, p.91.

Risks analysis consists in the forecast of probability to appear risks and their effects. By this stage is allowed to the decisional factors of the organization to do complete and correct assessment of the relation between risks and the potential loss or win.

Risks assessment must have series of aspects as: a single risk factor can have multiple effects (for example the overlapping of delivery deadline of a military product effects in the un-accomplishment of the provisioned quality standards, the disrespect of the execution time, penalties); the opportunities and threats can interact in unanticipated ways (for example the overlapping of the time allotted to an activity can determine the choice for a new strategy to lead to the diminution of total period for its fulfilment); risk assessment depends by the experience and tolerance to risk of the manager in regard to which certain event can be perceived as having low, medium or high impact over the activity fulfilment.

Risk treatment or management itself comprises one or more answers or strategies to answer the risk. Each strategy goal to answer the risk is to eliminate the associated uncertainty associated to the visible part of risk.

In conformity to the statistics, the successful accomplishment of the managers owe 50% to the acquired management knowledge, 30% to the acquired knowledge following the relations maintained with their third parties, mentors and collaborators and 20% (this percentage represents the basic to fulfil the other two) owed to the process of education and training.[2]

In the diminution of risks and impact in the situation of risk materialization, special contribution are used strategies to answer to risk, applicable in regard to the concrete situation generated by risk.

In order to answer to risk, there were formulated the following strategies or types of reactions to risk[3]: risk avoidance; risk transfer; risk diminution; risk acceptance; risk monitoring. Settlement of the answer to risk depends by the nature or risks regarded from the perspective of possibilities of control by which dispose the military organization. Essentially, it is about the formulation of answer to the following questions: *risks can be or can not be controlled by the organization?; if yes, the organization can control risks to a satisfying profile?; if not, the organization can externalize risks or activities generator of risks?*

The risk management process must have permanent character because daily there can appear new risks which must be controlled before becoming implacable and leading to disaster.

2. Monitoring risks

Permanent monitoring of risks is the continuous strategy to identify the risk factors by which are followed the forthcoming aspects: implementation of

[2] Cf. Horea Coroiu, *Teoria şi practica riscului in managementul militar*, PhD thesis, Universitatea Națională de Apărare „Carol I", Bucureşti, 2012, p.18.
[3] Cf. Carmen Nadia Ciocoiu, *Managementul riscului, vol I, Teorii, practici, metodologii*, Editura ASE, Bucureşti, 2008, p.79.

contingency and risk management plans, monitoring the changes in the activities' risk profile, control over the profile of risk in the organization and the monitoring of measures to control risks. Actually, risks monitoring presumes a postponing of control decision making to until the moment the circumstances determines an increase of risks' apparition probability to be submitted to this treatment.

While the risk acceptance (tolerance) concept is result of Greek and Arabian civilizations, the risk monitoring concept is relatively new, shaping between 1950-1960 years.

The advantage this answer to risk strategy presents is related to the act the resources the organization disposes of can be used only for risks with great exposure; such, the organization has the possibility to prioritize its actions in treating risks in concern with the existent resources. If serious analysis is not done on the period of implementation of the measures of risks treatment, then a disadvantage appears in relation with this strategy application.

Actually, monitoring is a process by which the information about risks are gotten, corroborated and reported to the responsible structures of the risks observance and management. Along the monitoring, the brute data are collected and the results are corroborated and presented as entrances for the control function.

The activities undergoing along the monitoring are: information collecting, corroboration of acquired information and their reporting. Each activity uses specific methods or instruments, for example:

- To collect information: assessment of binary characteristics, assessment on levels;
- To corroborate the information: Bar graphic, management report, risk sheet, monitoring sheet, operational stages' graphic, etc.;
- To report: report on the management evolution, risk sheet, monitoring sheet, operational stages' graphic.

It is important as following the identification and analysis, the risks to be grouped in sets of associated risks in order to facilitate their management. When are grouped, risks can be easier monitored but it can not be excluded the situation for each risk to be individually monitored.

3. Risks control

By risks control is aimed to support decision by its optimization under the aspect of information, opportunities and efficiency. For the control measures settled there must be performance items. This items determines how the control measures accomplish their functions as well as how the system monitors and maintains the security system.

The control measures can be proactive or reactive, quantitative and qualitative. The settled control measures must be assessed by the regard of:

-Functionality meaning the accomplishment of function for which is designed;

-Individual liability or combination with other control measures;

-Importance in preserving the security situation;

-Independence.

The main characteristics of risks control are: elaboration of prevention, protection and control programs with goal to diminish the effects of risks by the decrease of risk exposure, diminution of risk aggression or the settlement of some action plans; it need supplementary activities and resources for the team designed to effectuate the control.

The management measures adopted to treat the risks are called as internal control measures or instruments. If the risks are materialized then the cause must be looked for in the defect of settled control measures.

Internal control is the ensemble of elaborated and adopted measures by the organization management to fulfil the goals, it results the risks management is one of the important means by which is accomplished this because the risk management aims the threats management with negative impact over the goals. By all means, for a qualitative, healthy internal control it is indispensable the implementation of risks management. The action plans must be seconded by the plan comprising measures to attenuate the risks.

Risks control measures which can be settled in an organization are different, but they can be grouped in the next categories: goals, means, organization, procedures, information system, supervising.

Measures or instruments for preventive control are regulated by normative acts also settling the sanctions for un-accomplishment (for example: the obligation to wear protection equipments along the undergoing of some dangerous activities).

Conclusions

In order to efficiently lead an organization it is necessary to know the types of risks able to influence its activity but is also necessary to calculate the size of risk meaning to assess the consequences which can appear following its influence.

The motivation of risk management implementation in each organization has the following arguments[4]:

- Risk management asserts the modification of management style;
- Risk management eases the efficient and effective fulfilment of military organization goals;

[4] Cf. Ministerul Finanțelor Publice, Unitatea Centrală de Amortizare a Sistemelor de Management Financiar şi Control, *Metodologie de implementare a standardului de control intern „Managementul riscurilor ”*, ianuarie 2007, p.5

- Risk management provides the basic condition for a qualitative internal control.

The implementation of strategies to prevent the risks must involve actions proportional with the risks, to be oriented toward the most important and harder to control risks, to be consequent and to apply the same methods for similar situations.

Proactive management in each organization is grounded on the *"it is better to prevent, then to see an accomplished fact"* principle and must be a continuous process to learn from own or other past experiences and always developing and it must methodically approach all the risks related to the military organization past, present or future activities.

Each organization must be prepared to accept the change. Risks management promotes action and prediction. Formation and development of an attitude to risk is based in each organization on a complex analysis, correct perception or risks becoming a determinant factor of attitude formation. It is an obvious aspect in the military organization because people answer to risk situations as they succeed to perceive it.

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

Anca Ioana STĂNIŞTEANU[*]

The more threatening perspective of the terrorist actions, the multiplication and difersifying of natural disasters and posibilities to produce some technological accidents with major consequences asserted in the late years the focusing on the Critical Infrastructures Protection. This action is deeper as long the national interdependencies as well as the international ones of the industrial cyber, communication, transport, energetic, banking, etc. infrastructures are hard to replace. Despite the approaching means of the critical structure protection from a country to another, from an organization to another, there can be identified common structural elements, concerted measures succesfully undergone, and compatibile functions and responsibilities.

Keywords: *critical infrastructures protection, dangers and threats, national security interests.*

1. Infrastructures and critical infrastructures categories. Critical infrastructures typology

Infrastructures can be classified, according to their place, role and importance for the system stability and functionality, and also for their security and safety, in three categories:

- Common infrastructures
- Special infrastructures
- Critical infrastructures.

Common infrastructures represent a framework structure, which assures system construction and functionality. Those infrastructures don't presents special qualities, than those who justify their existence and presence within the systems and processes. A country, for example, will always have communications means, towns, schools, libraries and others.

Along the way, some of them may become special or critical, depending on the new role that they can play, the dynamics of the importance and other criteria.

Special infrastructures have a special role in the functioning of systems and processes, providing them greater efficiency, quality, comfort and performance.

Usually, special infrastructures are high-performance infrastructures. One of them, especially those which can have, through extension or conversion (modernization), an important role in the systems stability and security, can become critical infrastructures.

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Critical infrastructures are, usually, determinants in the stability, safety and security of the systems and processes, having an important role in ensuring the security in system functioning and in economic, social, political, informational and military process development. Those are usually part of special infrastructure category. It isn't mandatory that all infrastructures which are or can become, at some point, critical, to be part of this infrastructure category".

It is used "the phrase" critical infrastructure" for any functional economic entity, which offers products/goods of public utility, vitals for the whole society, and whose destruction or degradation produces a major impact over the population and over the national or regional economy. In essence, critical infrastructures are complex networked systems or contain such subsystems, but may also be included national importance punctual objectives".

"An infrastructure or an ensemble of infrastructures can be considered critical for:

- Its unique condition, and complementarity, in the infrastructures system or process
- Vital importance they have, as material or virtual support, in functioning the systems and in ongoing of the economic, social, political, informational and military process development
- The important role it have in the systems stability, reliability, security, functionality, and, special, in security
- Increased vulnerability to direct threats, as well as to those which target the systems in which are included
- Particular sensitivity to changes and, particularly, to sudden changes of the situation".

"These kinds of infrastructures are all over the world and, of course, in every country and in every physical or virtual system, in all of human activities. They are not set arbitrary, but only identified and evaluated as critical. In other words, out of the infrastructures that are part of a system or contribute to a system (process), only ones of them are critical. Which ones? Here intervenes an identification and evaluation process. The criteria for making such evaluation are variables, even if their coverage area can remain the same. Among these criteria, we consider that it could be set also the following:

- Physical criteria, or presence criteria (the place among to the other infrastructures – size, dispersion, endurance, reliability);
- Functional criteria, or place criteria (what "makes" that infrastructure);
- Security criteria (which is its role in the system safety and security);
- Flexibility criteria (which shows that is a certain dynamic and flexibility, regarding critical infrastructures, one of the common turning, under certain conditions, in critical infrastructures, and opposite);
- Unpredictability criteria (which shows that some common infrastructures may be or become, unexpectedly, critical infrastructures)".

"Usually, each system and each process, dynamic or dynamic complex, has its critical infrastructures and structures. Critical structures are related to the significant increase of the sensibility and vulnerability at dangers and threats of the internal relations between system elements."

"For a better understanding of the critical infrastructure concept, the following issues must be considered:

- It represents *a network of processes and systems*, independent and of large proportions, realized by human, which work synergistically to produce a continuum of products and services, essential to the whole society (for example, energy system);
- Is *the subject of multiple threats* (technical-human, physical, natural, cybernetic, contextual) and raise risks by themselves (for example, transport networks);
- A critical infrastructure is extremely dynamic and complex, dependent on multiple information and communication technologies;
- The damage made to it may produce cascading effects;
- There is no only one owner/operator/regulator/beneficiary;
- It is based on objectives and logics, accede to other rules and principles, applies other technologies.

  Critical infrastructures:

  - *Represents national security values,* because their functionality and viability ensures the realization of some existential attributes of the state and constitutes the axiological reference system in developing any national security policy, according to the dynamics and imperatives of internal and international security area;
  - *Express national security needs,* materialized into opportunities, necessities and utilities needed for the development and normal functioning of the society;
  - *Allows promoting the national security interests,* which ensures domestic and regional stability, sustainability of the security system to which Romania adhered, national wealth, citizens prosperity, physical health of the population, environmental protection.

Critical infrastructures support the key strategic components of the national security (national defense, national security, public order) and need to be defended and protected by specific measures, because it contributes at:

⇒Defense and ensuring national sovereignty, independence and territorial unity, territorial integrity and constitutional democracy,

⇒Execution and protection of security objectives and interests, in the dynamic conditions of internal and international area, by preventing strategic surprises, economic, political, technical-scientifically, ecological or other,

⇒Normal functioning of state institutions".

"National and international security are dependent on the critical infrastructures of the society. But they are more and more vulnerable in front of

the increasingly sophisticated means of attack over them. The literature gives ample space to describe the methods for protecting the critical infrastructures.

Two axioms are accepted in the analysis of this area:

◊ It is impossible to ensure 100% protection of critical infrastructures;

◊ There is no single solution for resolving this problem".

"Critical infrastructure has at least a dual configuration:

- ✓ As structure with material value, concentrated in "heavy nuclei", which anchors the systems to an intrinsic connection network, generally, well defined and stable;
- ✓ As a material element which is part of a dynamic process, with significant movement and transformation effects".

2. Protection, safety and security of critical infrastructures

"Protection, safety and security of critical infrastructures involve at least three complementary approaches:

- ➢ As an intrinsic function of systems, actions and processes;
- ➢ As an adjacent security system, associated, created by other structures;
- ➢ As a function of metasystem or system of systems.

Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) requires a continuous and coherent partnership between the owners of critical infrastructures, personnel who is operating or managing them and state authorities or of the member states of European Union (regional) or of all the states (in the situation in which we are speaking about critical infrastructures with global value and importance, such as, for example, protection of the infrastructures which ensures air transport, communication and information networks, and others).

Obviously, the first responsibility for the protection of these infrastructures (physical facilities, supply routes,) is of the owners and the staff which serves them.

There is a rich national, European and international legislation which refers at critical infrastructures functioning and protection, and as well as at the necessary control".

3. European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection

"The development and implementation of an European program for critical infrastructure protection started from a complex reality and from a conclusion: *it is impossible for the European Union to be able to achieve, de facto, the protection of all critical infrastructures*. Because of that, the program refers only to the transnational critical infrastructures, the protection of national infrastructures remaining in the responsibility of Member States, but, obviously, into a common framework. In this respect, there are already many directives and regulations, which impose measures and procedures for reporting the accidents, development of contingency plans, in cooperation with civil protection,

administration, emergency services and others. There are, for example,a lot of action and reaction programs in military and civil emergencies, such as nuclear, industrial, chemical, petroleum, ecologicalaccidents and natural disasters.

The European Commission keeps a strict evidence of them, inform and report each year the situation regarding risk assessment, development of protection techniques and legal actions. The Commission is proposing to update the measures, meaning harmonization, coordination and horizontal collaboration.

This Commission Communication, in which are included all analysis and sectorial measures, forms the basis of a European program for critical infrastructure protection (EPCIP). The program must identify critical infrastructures, to analyze their vulnerabilities, dependences and interdependences and to find solutions for securing them.

The program objectives are:

- Identification and inventory, through the governments of the critical infrastructures situated on the territory of each state, according to the priorities set through the EPCIP;
- Collaboration through companies, within the respective sectors and with governments for the dissemination of the information and in order to reduce the risk of some susceptible incidents to the production of extensive and durables disturbances of critical infrastructures;
- Common approach of critical infrastructure security problem, due to the collaboration between all public and private actors.

The European program takes into account, through others, the reunion, in one network, of all the critical infrastructure protection specialists from all the European Union member states. This could contribute to the realization of a network warning with regard to critical infrastructures (Critical infrastructure Warning information Network - CIWIN). The network is already functioning since 2005."

4. Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN)

The Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN) "creates an information, communication and warning security system in order to support the member states in the information exchange regarding the common threats and vulnerabilities, and also the measures and strategies designed to limit the risks related to critical infrastructure protection."

"CIWIN fulfills the next two functions:

- Electronic forum for information exchanges regarding the critical infrastructure protection;
- Early warning which allows the participant member states and Commission to transmit warnings regarding the immediate risks and threats for critical infrastructure".

"The participant member states designate a CIWIN responsible and informs the Commission. The CIWIN responsible responds for providing or denying access rights at CIWIN in the respectively member state. The participant member states are providing the access to CIWIN in accordance with the guidelines adopted by the Commission. The participant member states provide pertinent information related to critical infrastructure protection, of community interest, and update them regularly."

"The Commission has the following responsibilities:

- Technical development and CIWIN network management, including its IT structure and the necessary elements for the information exchange;
- Developing guidelines regarding the conditions of using the system, including information confidentiality, transmission, storage, classification and deleting. The Commission also establishes the terms and conditions for full or selective access to CIWIN.

The Commission names the CIWIN responsible, which answers for according or refusing the CIWIN access rights. The Commission provides relevant information regarding critical infrastructure protection, of Community interest, and updates the regularly."

"CIWIN is designed as a secure classified system and allows information processing until the "RESTREINT UE" level. The Commission decides the most appropriate technological platform for CIWIN, and the users respects the technical demands of the Commission.

Security Classification of CIWIN is updating properly.

The rights of access to documents are given to the users based on the "must been known" principle and must respect at any time the instructions given by the author regarding the protection and distribution of a document.

Member States and Commission adopt necessary security measures for:

- Prevent any unauthorized person to access CIWIN;
- To guarantee that, at using CIWIN network, the authorized persons have access only at the documents from theirs area of competence;
- Prevent reading, copying, modifying or deleting information from the system by unauthorized persons.

Uploading information into CIWIN network doesn't affect the information property. The authorized users are the only responsible for the information provided and ensure the full compliance of their content with the existent international and intern legislation".

4. International cooperation in the critical infrastructure protection

The increasingly threating perspective regarding terrorist actions, the multiplication and diversification of natural disasters and the possibilities of producing technological accidents with major consequences imposed in the last few years the focusing of the attention over critical infrastructure protection. This is even deeper since the national, but especially international

interdependencies of industrial, cybernetic, communication, transport, energy and others infrastructures became difficult to substitute. Besides the fact that critical infrastructure protection approaches are different from a country to another, from an organization to another, it can be identified common structural elements, measures developed with success, functions and compatible responsibilities.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development treats critical infrastructure protection issue from the point of view al economic incidents and disasters. The measures refers especially to the reestablishment of communications in case of earthquakes, ensuring the traffic fluency in case of natural disaster, security in maritime area, removing the effects of chemical accidents and others.

In the European Union, the Council Europe realized "open partial agreement regarding major risks" which has as objective the cooperation in the risk management area. It is also concerned about creating a culture of risk through organizing university courses and masters. In October 2004, European Commission adopted a document regarding critical infrastructure protection (www.isn.ethz.ch/cr.n.),which propose additional measures for strengthening the existent infrastructures, especially, putting in application an European program for protection (EPCIP). Within it was established a permanent forum for realizing a balance between, on a way, the constraints imposed by competition, responsibility in information management, and on another way, by the advantages that arise from achievement an efficient critical infrastructure protection system.

From this point of view, European Commission has proposed to realize also a warning system for critical infrastructures (CIWIN).

At the beginning of the year 2005, European Commission and European Space Agency (ESA) organized an international forum, where were invited the most important space agencies. The theme of the meeting was strengthening the cooperation regarding the prevention of natural disasters or major technological accidents and facilitating rescue operations through an extensive supervision of the planet through satellites. Moreover, since 2001, European Commission launched GMES initiative – global monitoring for environment and security – which had as objective the achievement, until 2008, of operational autonomous capabilities for environment monitoring.

International Organization for Civil Protection it is a federation of national civil protection structures. This is intended to be a communication platform, experience exchanges and cooperation in this area. One of its major functions is represented by standardization of emergencies procedures.

European Commission for Europe from United Nations established a set of rules and standards in infrastructure, dangerous material transport and trans boundary accidents areas.

G8 develops critical infrastructure protection policies. At the 2003 Summit has been adopted a text which includes 11 guidelines which ensures

member states, but also another countries, a framework for the development of critical infrastructure protection strategies, especially in informatics area.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, like the others international organizations, it is in the middle of a process for defining new roles and structures in order to correspond globalization phenomenon and the new types of risks and threats. At the Annual Security Review Conference from 2004, there have been discussions regarding the intensification of risk information exchange and coordinate reaction in critical infrastructure protection area. In this way, a first measure established was organizing experts reunions, with the purpose of redacting a set of recommendations of the organization, on which to make a real "territorial OSCE security".

Center for Security Policy in Geneva organized, at the end of 2003, a forum dedicated to coordination in critical infrastructure protection area. It was the first forum in this way, at which participated over 180 experts from 28 countries. The conclusions were extremely interesting, referring to the general trends of critical infrastructure protection, wrong solutions at which has been appealed till present and modalities of "thinking different", of "thinking the impossible" and "changing the mentalities".

At 5 November 2005 was adopted Haye Program, in which was provided, through others, consolidation of the measures for transbordercrisis management, critical infrastructure protection and problems related to tensions specific to public order and security. In this way, European Council entrusted European Commission the task to achieve an operational integrated device of EU till July 2006. The device, according to the adopted program, must evaluate the capacities of EU member states, ensure the preparedness and development of common exercises and develop acommon operational plan for crisis civil management. It must realize, through others:

- Citizens and infrastructure protection against terrorist hazards and threats, in public spaces, but also against natural hazards and technological, maritime, transport, health calamities, inside of an integrate European strategy, through a good structured and interoperational reaction device;
- Promoting common safety rules, at EU level, establishment of scenarios and training exercises and implementation of crisis management, warning alert and civil protection mechanisms;
- Achievement of a rapid and efficient response system against terrorist attacks over infrastructures and for the liquidation of their consequences, which must be able to guarantee a soon return to the normal situation;
- Because European infrastructures are more and more interconnected and interdependent, there are needed an unit policy and a strategy, which can use all state and EU levers for protecting them.

The Council has made the following recommendations:

a) Fulfill the European Council recommendations regarding the establishment of an "integrated mechanism of crisis management in EU", essential for strengthening the relations between citizens and European

institutions and strengthening the interdependence and solidarity links between member states;

b) Center the integrated European strategy on counteracting the threats against critical infrastructures whose destruction could have serious effects over the health, security, safety and economic welfare of citizens, implementation and harmonization of critical infrastructures, vulnerabilities analysis, threats evaluation and proponing viable solutions for protecting them;
c) Establishment of an European program for critical infrastructures (EPCIP)
d) Considering the European program as complementary to national programs;
e) Admission situation according to which:
   - An European risks analysis system must be designed and implemented
   - Making a close link between all authorities which are holding information and which have competences in this area;
   - Correct and viable management of pertinent information (military and civil information, police cooperation), parliamentary control;
   - Creating, in the Commission, an early alert system in case of crisis, al European, national and international level, shared through a central network (ARGUS);
   - Association with European Standardization Committee.
f) Ensuring that European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) respects the following conditions:
   - To be placed under the control of European Parliament and national parliaments;
   - To form an essential element of the future continental and global device of critical infrastructure protection;
g) Improving European Solidarity Fund (for interventions inside EU) and ECHO (for interventions outside EU);
h) Creating an European Civil Protection Force;
i) Consolidating the partnership with civil society in order to achieve a strategy regarding protection against CBRN threats;
j) Ensuring the conditions in order that all this civil and military emergency alert and protection systems to be able to not affect citizens life and safety, to not worry and panic useless the population;
k) Guaranteeing the respect for private life, information protection and preventing its unauthorized divulgation;
l) Developing an European framework device for protection and nondisclosure of data, so that the basic human rights to be protected;
m) Ensuring conditions that population and critical infrastructure protection to be based on realist scenarios and verified experiments (for example, the experience acquired during the Olympic Games in Athens 2004).

These regulations and experiences are found, on a way or another, in national strategies for citizens and critical infrastructures protection of all European countries. In Germany, for example, there is, so called *basic protection concept* (Critical Infrastructure Protection – Basic Concept). The starting point is represented by an analysis process multilateral planning, which includes an evaluation of dangers, threats and associated risks, followed by a control and an adaptation of protection measures.

This German concept involves:

- Identification of different risk categories from different areas: natural disasters, accidents, terrorism and criminality;
- Fixing the level of protection based on this categories;
- Design threats scenarios;
- Weaknesses analysis;
- Formulation protection objectives and setting the protection and contra protection measures which derive from here;
- Formulation of emergencies (coordination between public and private measures);
- Implementation, as needed, of the formulated actions;
- Systematic control of this analysis and planning processwithin quality management".

5. Protection of national critical infrastructure

"Romanian critical infrastructure protection is included, in a way or another, in the European program for critical infrastructure protection through at least three ways:

- Adapting the law system, the actions and reactions in emergency situations at European demands, in the integration preparedness process and integration itself;
- Dependencies and interdependencies of Romanian critical infrastructures with European critical infrastructures;
- Participation in the development and implementation of policies and strategies for combating terrorism, illegal traffic, organized crime and asymmetric threats.

Romanian critical infrastructures are, almost totally, critical infrastructures from at least some main reasons:

- Come from the infrastructures of a giant economy, inflexible and hardly adaptable market economy, whose traces haven't been liquidated or improved;
- Romanian economy and society, as a whole, is in a state of chaos, specific to long and repeated periods of transition, in which everything or almost everything is vital, critic and vulnerable;

- Environmental actions without discernment, massive cutting of forests, chaotic land cultivation, agricultural disaster, lack of agrarian, ecological and environmental policy creates and proliferate extremely serious dangers for all infrastructures, especially critical ones;
- It is expected that Romanians participation at antiterrorist coalition and at others crisis and conflicts management missions and missions for maintaining the peace, to generate a new type of threats over the citizens and over the economy, society, information and living infrastructures.

Of course, the dangers and threats are more numerous. They are subject of legislative initiatives, are included in the National Security Strategy and in other important documents, bur are far from being fully monitored, managed, controlled and removed".

From our point of view, the existence of European forums which deal with critical infrastructure protection issue represents a particular importance. It is needed a close collaboration at European Union level, collaboration from which member states to be aware of the existing problems in all the Union countries.

For these reasons, we believe that, as more as the collaboration in critical infrastructure protection area at EU level is closer, the management and solving of the problems will be more efficient.

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THE PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES FROM ROMANIA'S EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE – AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE ENERGETIC SECURITY STRATEGY

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In today's economic framework, the geostrategic importance of the Black Sea, both for Romania and the Euro – Atlantic region, is enhanced by the perspective of exploring, and especially, exploiting the natural reserves of hydrocarbons from the Romanian continental shelf. From this point of view, ensuring the protection of oil rigs – an important part of national critical infrastructure – becomes a stringent necessity for Romania's energetic security. Integrated systems for command and control accompanied by cybernetic security systems represent a major component in the effort to protect critical infrastructures located within Romania's exclusive economic zone and, implicitly, contribute to fulfilling the main objectives of our country's energetic policy.

The present article wishes to discuss the current status of implementation of these systems, as well as to identify their vulnerabilities and propose possible solutions for minimizing the effects of a potential threat.

Keywords: *critical infrastructures, energetic security, protection, exclusive economic area.*

Introduction

The evolution of the international system especially during the latter half of the 20th century, on the one hand, determined the globalization of society by increasing the interconnectivity of socio- economic systems and, on the other hand, increased the vulnerabilities of these systems as well as the risks and threats which they must face. The interdependence of systemic elements has generated novel security issues that required new intervention strategies and innovative plans to minimize the effects of a potential natural disaster of a terrorist attack.

Contemporary society widely accepts the idea that prosperity, safety and development of states depend on the existence and operability of certain services which are sustained of facilitated by physical and cybernetic systems, such as communication, energy and transport networks, healthcare services, banking systems, food and water supply networks. Even the temporary failure of these systems to functions can present increased risk to state security.

Certain events from recent history, such as natural catastrophes and terrorist attacks, resulted in the incapacitation or destruction of specific critical infrastructure components, with significant impact on the economic and social development of the afflicted communities. Terrorist attacks particularly have demonstrated the vulnerability of certain state sectors that were considered essential both for social and economic development and for national security

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(such as public transportation) and contributed to highlight the importance that must be granted to protecting these areas.

1. Understanding the Concept of Critical Infrastructure

We consider the contemporary interpretation of the notion of critical infrastructure is derived from understanding the concept of security by analyzing systemic vulnerabilities. This manner of defining security has dominated the strategic thinking of the latter half of the XXth century and shaped contemporary security policies throughout the world. More specifically, the shifts that took place in the system of international relations, such as the increasing role and importance of non-state actors, which contributed to increasing the "anarchy" of the international environment, the change of the balance of power immediately after the end of the Cold War that allowed, for a brief period of time, the United States to be the sole global superpower, or the emergence of new economies, like China, that possess the potential of configuring a new world order, in which the emphasis is placed on the geo-economic dimension instead of on the geopolitical framework have lead to a new type of strategic thinking. This new paradigm furnishes a pluralist, interdisciplinary approach that takes into account the multiple asymmetric threats to security. As globalization seems to contribute to the erosion of state sovereignty, contemporary security strategies need to redefine national interest by constantly addressing the regional or international climate. At the same time, it is necessary for security policies to realistically and pragmatically address the need to restructure and adapt regional and state government bodies to the emerging systemic requirements.

In the present paper, we take into consideration two predominant visions on the concept of critical infrastructures, namely the American perspective and the European perspective. For example, in the American interpretation, the security of critical infrastructure refers to protecting vital elements for the economy, population, government and national security, whereas the criteria used for identifying critical infrastructure components take into account the affected population in case of destruction of incapacity to function of the analyzed infrastructure, the impact of such an event on the national economy and the costs for rehabilitation, the impact the threat might have on the activity sector to which the infrastructure belongs and on other sectors, which are connected with the analyzed vital infrastructure, the time span needed to restore the service provided by the afflicted infrastructure, and last but not least, the impact of the attack/catastrophe on the population's morale.[1]

By comparison, the European perspective on critical infrastructure considers that the identification criteria for its comprising elements are the surface and length of the critical sector, the magnitude and intensity of the effects in the event of a disaster or attack, the probability of the infrastructure to

[1] Radu ANDRICIUC, *Considerații privind protecția infrastructurii critice*, Ministry of Internal Affairs Publishing House, Bucharest, 2009, p.21.

be seriously threatened, and the time span of the effects of a potential threat.[2] The European Union defines critical infrastructure to be an element, a system or a part of a system, located on the national territory of Member States, which is essential for maintaining the vital functions of society, health, public safety, national security, social and economic welfare of the people, and whose disruption of destruction would have a significant impact on the state, as a result of its incapacity to maintain the above mentioned functions.[3]

According to the European approach, critical infrastructures consist of physical and technological IT and communication networks, systems, installations, services and actives that, in the event of malfunctioning or destruction, can produce serious incidents with effects on the health, security and welfare of citizens or on the activity of Member State governments[4]. The European Commission's classification of critical infrastructures[5] places in this category the following components: energy networks and installations for production, transport and distribution; IT and communication systems; the financial and banking systems, capital markets, stock and investment exchanges; the public health sector; the agricultural and food sectors; the water supply and distribution networks; air, road, railroad and naval transport systems; structures or installations that produce, deposit, transport and destroy hazardous material; public administration.

The global security dynamic of today has determined a multidisciplinary approach of critical infrastructure protection that accommodates both approaches of the concept. We therefore consider that critical infrastructure can be defined as the whole of physical and virtual elements that are indispensable to the normal functioning of a community or state and whose disruption of destruction seriously affects the production and service flow of the above mentioned entities[6]. In other words, a critical infrastructure must play a decisive role both in ensuring security and in supporting the optimum functioning of economic, social, political and military processes[7].

In Romania, critical infrastructure protection was regulated by an Emergency Goverment Ordinance (O.U.G. no.98/ 3rd November 2010) concerning the identification, classification and protection of national and European critical infrastructures. The Ordinance was a direct result of Romania's obligation to enforce the provisions of Council's Directive no.

[2] *Ibidem*, p.21.
[3] Cf. „Council Directive No. 114/2008/CE from the 8th of December 2008", p.43, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:345:0075:0082:RO:PDF, accesed on the 23rd of July 2013.
[4] Cf. „Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Critical Infrastructure Protection in the fight against terrorism. (COM(2004) 702 final)", available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do%3Furi%3DCOM:2004:0702:FIN:EN:PDF&usg=ALkJrhhfyoMTRFu3grD3fiizn9PAbVDSeA ,accesed on the 23rd of July 2013.
[5] *Ibidem*, p. 4.
[6] Adrian CERNĂIANU, „Considerații privind infrastructura teritorială şi militară a României în contextul deplinei integrări a țării în NATO" în *Buletinul Universității Naționale de Apărare "Carol I"(National Defence University's Bulletin)*, nr.2, National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, p.16.
[7] Grigore ALEXANDRESCU, Gheorghe VĂDUVA, *Infrastructuri critice. pericole, amenințări la adresa acestora. sisteme de protecție*, „Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, p.7.

2008/114/CE. In accordance to EU provisions, the Romanian legislation identified the following sectors that comprise critical infrastructure components: the energy sector, IT and communications, water supply, food, health, national security, public administration, transportation, the chemical and nuclear industries, the space industry and, last but not least the research and development sector[8]. Among these, the energy and transportation sectors are considered to be facilitated or sustained by European critical infrastructures.

Unfortunately, Romania is still confronted with a series of issues concerning critical infrastructure protection. The main challenge for Romanian national authorities is to maintain critical infrastructures in a state of relative performance, a difficult task as most of the national critical infrastructure components need to be renewed. An efficient strategy for ensuring the protection of vital national infrastructures should be based on clear and coherent criteria for identifying critical elements, an issue which is still being debated. Moreover, it is necessary that Romanian authorities continue their effort to elaborate regulations and take legislative actions for the protection of critical infrastructures, as well as the appropriate documentation such as guides for enforcing security. Furthermore, a periodic classification of national critical infrastructures should be implemented, as the critical nature of a certain infrastructural element may vary throughout time and may be influenced by a wide array of external factors. Existing infrastructures should be classified according to the economic or social sector which they serve, their specific vulnerabilities should be documented, the potential cross border implications of their disruptions should be investigated and a minimum set of defence solutions should be provided by the responsible operators. Last but not least, we believe it is necessary to elaborate local and regional procedures for protecting critical infrastructures, constructed on the idea of public- private partnerships.

An integrated security system for national critical infrastructure should fulfill the following requirements: to ensure an adequate level of security for each component of the national critical infrastructure, to minimize the number of infrastructural elements that are liable to produce major irregularities within the system, to enforce rapid reaction mechanisms for emergency situations and to maintain the prevalent equilibrium of the system. To conclude with, we consider that a coherent strategy to protect national critical infrastructures should comprise the consolidation of cooperation within the private – public partnership framework, the reconsideration of responsibilities and attributions of government institutions, the establishment of information exchange procedures concerning the risks and threats to vital infrastructures and the elaboration of up to date mechanisms for control, alert and rapid intervention.

[8] Emergency Government Ordinance „O.U.G. nr. 98/3.11. 2010 privind identificarea, desemnarea şi protecţia infrastructurilor critice" in *Monitorul Oficial al României*, nr. 757 din 12.11.2010, available at www.ccpic.mai.gov.ro/docs/OUG_98.doc, accessed on the 23rd of July 2013.

2. The Geostrategic Importance of the Black Sea and Romania's Exclusive Economic Zones

2.1. Romania as a Regional Geopolitical Regional Actor in the Black Sea Basin

International maritime law defines a series of maritime areas in which states can exercise their sovereign rights and are obliged, at the same time, to assume certain responsibilities. These areas are: the territorial seas (or territorial waters); the contiguous zone; the continental shelf; the exclusive economic zone; and international waters, in which all states have equal rights. According to international law, when taking into consideration the geographical location, the configuration of the coastline, the geomorphologic characteristics of the sea bottom as well as other elements specific to the shore line, states can have rights in all of the above mentioned areas or only in some of them.

To shortly define each of the areas, one can start by saying that the *territorial waters* represent the maritime area in which the effects of national legislation of the maritime state are unequivocally extended. The *contiguous zone* represents an adjacent aria to the territorial sea of a state, in which the said state can exercise the necessary control to prevent and/or repress the breaking of its border, fiscal, sanitary and immigration laws. *The exclusive economic zone* is a portion of the sea or the ocean located beyond the territorial sea and adjacent to it, up until the maximum outer limit of 200 Maritime Miles[9]. One must mention at this point that, by enforcing the concept of *exclusive economic zone*, the notion of *continental shelf* has somewhat lost the value it was granted by the 1958 Geneva Convention. None the less, the *continental shelf* still constitutes one of the important principles of maritime law, namely the *ab initio* and *ipso facto* right of the riverside state of the natural prolongment of its natural territory beneath sea level. Last but not least, the *open sea* (or *international waters*) represents the area of the seas and oceans that is not part of an *exclusive economic zone*, *territorial waters* of *continental shelf* of a state and in which all states have equal rights, whether they are riverain or have no coastline whatsoever.

After the Second World War, Romania's territorial waters, extending to a length of 12 Marine Miles (22,224 Km), were established by Decree no. 39/1956, which stated that, in its Southern border, the limit of Romania's territorial waters is represented by the geographical parallel that crossed the furthest point of land border between Romania and Bulgaria. Subsequently, another document, Decree no. 142 from the 26th of April 1986 stated the Romania is entitled to an exclusive economic zone with the length of 200 Maritime Miles from the base line of the territorial sea. Because during the negotiations, an agreement failed to be reached both with the Ukrainian and

[9] „United Nations Convention of Maritime Law", p.5, available at www.onuinfo.ro/documente /**conventie_asupra_dreptului_marii**, accessed on the 23rd of July 2013.

Bulgarian sides, the outer limits of the exclusive economic zones and of the continental shelf were not definitely established at that time.

As a result, in the South, the maritime border between Romania and Bulgaria has not been settled up until now. The bilateral negotiations on the issue have been going on for more than 20 years, with periodical consultations that took place both in Bucharest and in Sofia. In the absence of a bilateral agreement, the maritime border between Romania and Bulgaria is regulated in accordance to the 1958 Contiguous Zone Convention, to which both states have adhered. According to Article 12 from the Convention, when the shore lines of two states are not opposed or adjacent, none of the states is entitled, without a contrary settlement, to extend their territorial sea beyond the median line that separates the land border of the said states[10]. The negotiations between Romania and Bulgaria that have been carried out so far did not conclude with a new agreement on this issues, as some points of disagreement still exist (Bulgaria pleads for a demarcation line on the geographical parallel on which its last border crossing point is situated, while Romania insists for a delimitation in accordance with the Geneva Convention – meaning an equidistant line). The Bulgarian solution would minimize Romania's territorial waters with approximately 17 km.

The maritime border with Ukraine was delimitated on the 3rd of February 2009, as a result of an International Justice Court's decision. According to the Court's decision, the territorial waters of Insula Şerpilor (Island of the Snakes) were attributed to Romania – a surface or approximately 9.700 km^2 (with a medium depth of over 50 m). 2.500 km^2 of territorial waters were attributed to Ukraine, with a medium depth of under 50 m. However, certain portions are still disputed, such as Maican Island, on the Chilia arm, the Vâlcov area, and the Musura lagunary area, situated between the Chilia and Sulina arms and the Black Sea. The Musura area is one of heavy alluvionary deposits and its geomorphological evolution might change the configuration of the border between Romania and Ukraine, as well as the limits of the territorial waters located in the proximity of the Danube's river mouths, up until the demarcation line established by the Court's decision of 2009.

As an international and regional geopolitical actor, Romania remains inextricably linked to the geostrategic importance of the Danube and of the Black Sea. From a Euro – Atlantic perspective, with Romania's and Bulgaria's adherence to NATO and the EU, the Black Sea has become a border area for the

[10] „Convenție din 29 aprilie 1958 asupra mării teritoriale și zonei contigui", published in *Buletinul Oficial(Official Bulletin)*, no. 25 from the 14th of October 1961, available at http://www.monitoruljuridic.ro/act/conventie-din-29-aprilie-1958-asupra-marii-teritoriale-si-zonei-contigui-emitent-consiliul-de-stat-publicat-n-25984.html, accessed on the 23rd of July 2013.

two international organizations, thus increasing its geostrategic role. The significance of the Black Sea region is reflected in several policies and instruments of the European Union, designed to address the needs of its Eastern vicinity, such as the Black Sea Synergy, whose main objective is to "consolidate cooperation in the wider Black Sea Area"[11]. Its aim is to propose realistic cooperation projects between states from the wider Black Sea Area and the EU in order to consolidate democracy, promote human rights and good governance, manage border issues and solved frozen conflicts. Moreover, the Synergy also promotes cooperation in developing and protecting critical infrastructures such as those from the energy, transportation, education, research and environmental sectors.

Romania has constantly advocated the geostrategic importance of the Black Sea. Our country's main objective concerning the wider Black Sea Area envisage the consolidation of a region of stability in the Eastern proximity of the European Union as well as the infusion of euro -atlantic values in the region. Consequently, Romania is the adept of a peace and cooperation policy with other riverain states. As a result, our country has initiated or actively participates in various regional cooperation formats, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, The Black Sea Regional Security Conference, The Black Sea Naval Cooperation Group, the South - East European Brigade, The South – Eastern European Multinational Peace Force or the Border Defence Initiative. From all the above, perhaps the most significant cooperation format is the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, whose strategic objective is the stability, security and prosperity of its members. The Organization operates with the European Instrument for Partnership and Vicinity and with the Document concerning measures for increasing trust and security in the Black Sea area. Also, it functions in accordance with the European criteria for regional cooperation.

As far as military cooperation in the Black Sea area is concerned, it is focused on the prevention and combating risks and potential crisis situations that might have negative effects on regional security. The fundamental objective of military cooperation is to support the development of the operational potential of military units, generate/prepare and regenerate the forces needed to protect national territories, as well as to fulfill the commitments assumed as a NATO/EU member state or as a partner state.[12] The main military cooperation mechanisms in the Black Sea Area are BLACKSEAFOR, SEEBRIG, CSBMs and GUUAM.

Due to the fact that maritime transport and Black Sea ports represent vital, strategic interest point for riverain states, and because they use elements of critical infrastructure, it became necessary for states to cooperate in the area of maritime security. At an international level, the institutions responsible for

[11] Cf. http://www.mae.ro/node/1502 , accessed on the 22nd of July 2013.
[12] Gheorghe PETRIA, „Activitățile de cooperare militară internațională ale forțelor navale Române", in *Gândirea Militară Românească*, nr.1, Edited By the Romanian Army's General Headquarters, Bucharest , 2008, p. 95.

ensuring security in the Black Sea region are the International Maritime Bureau (IMB from International Maritime Office – IMO, under UN jurisdiction) and the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA)[13]. At a regional level, the responsible bodies for enforcing maritime security are The Black Sea Commission (BSC), the Maritime Regional Coordination Commission (MRCC) and other similar organisms. At the national level, ensuring maritime security is the responsibility of several state authorities such as Romanian Naval Forces, the Border Police, The Romanian Intelligent Service (SRI) and the Romanian Naval Authority. The latter has in its subordination the Maritime Coordination Centre, the SAR- Pollution Service and the Surveillance Service (VTS). Apart from the responsible state institutions, various civil operators contribute to the insurance of maritime security.

Last but not least, it is worth mentioning that the state structures with security responsibilities in Romania's Exclusive Economic Zone are the Ministry of Administration and Internal Affairs, through the Boarder Police (more specifically the Coast Guard), the Ministry of National Defence through the General Headquarters of the Naval Forces (SMFN), the Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure through the Romanian Naval Authority, the Ministry of the Environment and of the Forests, the Ministry of the Economy, Commerce and Business, as well as various private operators and/or economic agents that are responsible for the protection of certain critical elements located in Romania's Exclusive Economic Zone, such as the Romanian oil rigs.

2.2. Romania's Energetic Security Policy and the State's Exclusive Economic Zone

Generally speaking, the energetic security policy of a state should be defined from the perspective of socio-economic desiderates such as ensuring national security and energetic independence, avoiding political pressure from other state or international actors, promoting economic development and securing the welfare of citizens. From this point of view, a working definition of the term would be that the concept comprises the ensemble of assumed principles and orientations on which, within a given geopolitical framework, the methods of geological prospection and exploitation, an action plan and the usage of energy resources are established in such a way as to protect, defend and promote state interests[14]. An effective security policy concerning the energy sector is implemented by adopting inter – institutional economic, diplomatic, juridical, ecological, social, and informational methods.

The energy sector is one of the domains in which the consequences of the geostrategic implications of the European Union in the Black Sea region is most

[13] Cf. FN-1, *Doctrina Forţelor Navale* (Naval Forces Doctrine), Bucharest, 2010, p. 37.

[14] „Strategia de securitate energetică şi politica energetică. Abordări actuale în Uniunea Europeană şi în plan internaţional", The National Federation for Mining and Energy, p.2, available at www.fnme.ro/_.../Strategia%20de%20securitate%20energetica%20si%20.pdf, accessed on the 9th of September 2013.

visible and most pressing[15], especially since it is estimated that, in the near future, more than half of Europe's energy import will cross the Black Sea. The three major objective of the European Union's energy strategy are the security of energy sources, sustainability and creating competitive energy infrastructures. The strategy focuses on the existent regional energetic issues, as well as on consolidating cooperation in the Black Sea – Mediterranean and Caspian Sea region, and on improving the impact of EU financial aid. A special place amongst EU regional initiatives is represented by the plan to develop sub regional energy markets in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, by promoting the convergence of energy markets located in the immediate proximity of the Union with EU markets. The long term perspective of this plan is to develop a common EU- Black Sea – Caspian Sea energy market[16], with diversified energy sources, interconnected energy systems and synchronized national energy strategies.

In accordance with the European Union's energy policy, one of the major objectives of Romania's Energy Strategy for 2007-2020 is energetic security, equally meaning the increase in the level of energetic safety by ensuring the necessary energy resources and limiting the dependence on import energy, the diversification of import energy sources, national resources and transport routes, increasing the quality of national transport and distribution networks and protecting critical energy infrastructures[17]. As it can easily be observed, the critical infrastructures located in Romania's Exclusive Economic Zone, such as the oil rigs, contribute to fulfilling these strategic objectives, especially by ensuring the necessary energy resources and limiting the state's dependence on imports.

Romania's energy policy seeks to assure the energetic security of the country and is based on developing an efficient system of primary resource supply, production, transport and distribution of energy, that is capable of continuously provide energy for all consumers. From this point of view, the main points of the national action plan are to modernize transport and distribution infrastructures, to develop interconnections, to diversify transport routes for hydrocarbons, and to increase extraction capacities for oil and natural gases. Moreover, a special part of Romania's energy strategy touches on the need to increase transport capabilities for the resources extracted from the Black Sea continental shelf and to promote projects aimed to interconnect Romania with the Caspian Sea region (projects which, most likely, will cross the waters of the Black Sea)[18]. Romania's exclusive economic zone is, therefore, because of its natural hydrocarbons reserves, its critical infrastructures (the offshore oil

[15] Marius HANGANU, Georgică SLĂMNOIU, *Platformele de foraj marin româneşti şi securitatea acestora,* „Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010, p. 80.

[16] *Ibidem,* p.82

[17] Cf. „Strategia energetică a României pentru perioada 2007-2020"(Romania's Energy Strategy for 2007-2020), Bucharest, 2007, p.4, available at http://enero.ro/doc/STRATEGIA%20ENERGETICA%20A%20ROMANIEI%20PENTRU%20PERIOADA%202007-2020.pdf , accessed on the 9th of September 2013.

[18] *Ibidem,* p. 45

rigs primarily) and the potential of new regional transport routes that might cross it, an important part of our nation's energy strategy and contributes to ensuring national security in the energy sector.

3. Critical Infrastructures from Romania's Exclusive Economic Zone – the Offshore Oil Rigs

3.1. The Security of Romanian Offshore Oil Rigs

Offshore oil rigs are considered to be a part of a state's critical infrastructure, due to their importance to the national economy and energetic security. The security and protection of the vital infrastructural components have their specific particularities, mainly derived from the fact that they are generally located in isolate areas, thus being quite far away from the traditional enforcement of national and international law and even from the assistance of military security[19]. Because of their location, offshore oil rigs are easy targets for potential attacks, as they can simultaneously be attacked from the water, the air and the surface. Their vulnerabilities are increased by their isolation and by inadequate access control measures. The inadequate protection of offshore oil rigs represents a risk both to national critical infrastructure and to a state's energetic security, since their disruption or destruction would have considerable negative effects on the economy and the environment.

From this point of view, in order to ensure the protection of certain critical infrastructures located in the exclusive economic area and that are of significant importance to the energetic security, such as the offshore oil rigs, it is necessary to create adequate mechanisms and procedures that allow the following actions: identifying and analyzing key assents and vital infrastructures that require protection; identifying the critical infrastructures' vulnerabilities, including those generated by human interference; determining possible risks and threats and calculating the probability of their materialization; establishing the priority of measures designed to reduce vulnerabilities and counter potential threats; elaborating a security and defence plan for each individual critical infrastructure.

At a national level, the protection of critical infrastructure elements located in Romania's exclusive economic zone is sustained by Romania's vision of the Black Sea's strategic importance, as well as our country's political, economic, energetic and security interests. According to the National Defence and Security White Book (2004), the Black Sea Area is both an opportunity and a liability, since it is situated at the interference of two strategic axes: the Black Sea – the Mediterranean Sea, comprising the South flank of NATO and of strategic importance to the Alliance, mostly afflicted by trans-border threats such as organized crime; and the Black Sea – Caucasus – the Caspian Sea, a transit area for Central Asia's energy resources, defined by sub regional instability and frozen conflicts[20]. Romania's approach concerning the Black Sea

[19] Marius HANGANU, Georgică SLĂMNOIU, *op.cit.*, p. 54.
[20] *Ibidem*, p.51.

economic and security policies is summarized in the country's National Security Strategy, which places a particular emphasis on developing energy and transport corridors, as well as on consolidating national and regional capabilities for surveillance and rapid intervention[21] in order to prevent and counter security risks in the maritime area.

Furthermore, military interventions in the Black Sea aimed at countering asymmetric threats are regulated by Romanian and international legislation that sets a functional framework for critical infrastructure protection strategies. For example, according to Romanian legislation, in the event of a terrorist attack, the military and security measures are executed with the approval of the Supreme Council of National Defence (CSAT) and are carried out according to the methodology and procedures elaborated by the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI). Upon the latter's request, the deployment of other forces belonging to the Ministry of National Defence (MApN) is possible. In the event of a direct threat to the security of offshore oil rigs located in the contiguous zone or in the exclusive economic zone, the intervention can be carried out by MApN with the approval of CSAT.

3.2. Security Requirements for Offshore Oil Rigs. The Integrated Security System

Defining the concept of integrated security system for offshore oil rigs steams from the analysis of vulnerabilities, risks and threats with which these critical infrastructures are faced. In their turn, the vulnerabilities, risks and threats must be placed in the wider geostrategic context of the Black Sea area. From this point of view, an integrated security system designed to ensure the protection of critical infrastructures from Romania's Exclusive Economic Zone must comprise a series of human, technical and procedural measures meant to discourage, delay, detect, evaluate and ultimately intervene in the event of unauthorized access attempts[22]. Due to their location, at a considerable distance from the shore, and to the large surface which they occupy, a security system consisting exclusively of human measures (physical security ensured by security guards) is inefficient for offshore oil rigs. It is therefore necessary to design a multidimensional security system that combines human, mechanical and cybernetic or virtual components.

The most frequent difficulties encountered during the process of elaborating and implementing an integrated security system for protecting offshore oil rigs derive from insufficiently knowing all the data concerning the potential risks and threats, the poor/inadequate estimation of the resources needed for countering them and the unpredictability of environmental conditions

[21] *Strategia de Securitate Națională a României (Romania's National Security Strategy),* Bucharest, 2006, available at www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/SSNR/SSNR.pdf,, accessed on the 19th of January 2013.

[22] Georgică SLĂMNOIU, „Aspecte generale ale conceptului de sistem integrat de securitate pentru platformele marine de foraj şi extracţie româneşti" in *Perspective ale securităţii şi apărării în Europa,* Annual Scientific Communications Session with International Participation, 19-20 November 2009, Bucharest, vol.5,„Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2009, p. 56.

that affect the areas surrounding the offshore oil rigs. In order to integrate the system, both the subsystems and security components must be interconnected and the functions must be correlated. The latter task is realized with the aid of software developed through research that explores innovative solutions for harmonizing unrelated security and protection mechanisms and technologies.

The efficiency of an integrated security system is determined by its capacity to preserve its functions characteristic under the action of various destructive factors[23]. An efficient integrated security system increases the value of a critical infrastructure component. First of all, such a system acts a force multiplication device, acting to enhance the operational range of the security perimeter. Secondly, an integrated system is comprised of a series of sub systems or multiple systems, interconnected through a hardware and software platform that allows a pragmatic use of security resources. Furthermore, the characteristic configuration of an integrated security system permits the simultaneous surveillance of several working perimeters. Moreover, real time data is exchanged rapidly among operators. And last but not least, the performance level of such systems is improved by the fact that the different protection mechanisms that are part of the system are integrated in a coherent interface that allows the direct and efficient employment of command and control functions.

Other advantages of integrated security systems include the fact that, usually, they require a limited amount of time for training personnel. Since the basic functions of the systems require standardized procedures, they can easily be learned by employees, without needing additional financial investments from the employer. Generally, such a system ensures better communication with other operators, on account of its increased interconnectivity. Taking all of the above into consideration, one can state that an integrated security system not only increases the security of critical infrastructure components but also enhances their efficiency, by reducing maintenance costs and increasing the infrastructure's lifespan.

For example, an integrated security system for Romanian offshore oil rigs should include constructive measures and adaptable mechanisms, procedural and organizational measures as well as human resources and personnel measures. Concerning the procedures applicable to such a system, they must comprise mechanisms for perimeter protection, physical barriers for access control and detecting security breaches, systems for video surveillance, as well as IT equipment, command and control centers and, last but not least, independent sources for electric power.

Furthermore, in order to efficiently ensure an adequate protection of offshore oil rigs located in Romania's exclusive economic zone, the system should fulfill certain specific criteria[24]. For example, in order to effectively

[23] *Ibidem*, p. 59.

[24] Georgică SLĂMNOIU, „Model theoretic funcțional de sistem integrat de securitate pentru o platformă marină de foraj şi extracție românească" in *Perspective ale securității şi apărării în Europa,* Annual Scientific

counter a potential terrorist attack, the system should be modular, adaptable, should use state of the art technology and innovative software, should require low costs for maintenance, should ensure a low probability of false alarm and, last but not least, should be easily operated by human personnel, without requiring a lot of time for training.

Conclusion

Both at a European and a national level, the energy resources problem is one of a strategic interest, being an essential part of national and regional security. The energy policy is vital for states' security, this domain representing a strategic one for their economy and long-term development. From this point of view, insuring energy security represents a guarantee of national security, becoming a priority for the states. Moreover, energy infrastructure is considered a part of national critical infrastructure, being essential for state's functioning and defense. Disruptions or potential attacks against these infrastructures could inflict serious damage to national security, generating losses difficult to recover.

Critical infrastructures from Romania's exclusive economic zone, especially offshore oil rigs, are part of the national critical infrastructure, contributing to reaching strategic objectives of our country's energy security. The protection of these vital infrastructure elements must be understood in a broader effort of ensuring the protection of essential elements for economy, people, government and national security.

An efficient strategy for protecting Romania's Black Sea critical energetic infrastructures needs cross-sector communication, a clear vision of the objectives and implementing integrated systems of monitoring, command and control. Moreover, when facing present-day challenges, the organizational framework of energetic critical infrastructures needs to be clarified and the involvement of each administrative level strictly marked. Furthermore, each involved administrative level's tasks and responsibilities should be coherently outlined. Not of lesser importance, this framework should accommodate the idea of public-private partnership, especially regarding research and development of good security systems, able to ensure real-time reaction to possible threats.

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VULNERABILITIES OF THE ONGOING MILITARY CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TO DIFFERENT TYPES / CATEGORIES OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION

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Among other things, one of the tendencies of modern warfare is to provide the accurate hitting of targets that belong to the critical infrastructure, especially those objectives located in urban centers, where there also are the centers of political command and major economic objectives. On the other hand, not always these actions comply with the legal conditions, which are more and more strict and limitative, the armed attacks and the military aggression being strictly prohibited by the international public law- that generates the use of disguised military aggressions using unconventional and atypical means / forms of combat. The technological progress of the last decades, has enabled the development of new technologies which allow the achievement of disguised military aggressions that can target objectives of the critical infrastructure in urban areas.

Keywords: *critical infrastructure, aggression, unconventional.*

Introduction

As already demonstrated us on numerous occasions, the experience of the first decade of the third millennium, the worldwide conflict has amplified and the modes of confrontation became more and more complex and less common from the perspective of traditional modes of warfare and generally, the manifestation of the confrontation which includes military components or components with high level of violence.

The reasons for dispute have become more acute, especially against the background of a worldwide rearrangement of the whole political and military scene and particularly of the global balance of power. Against this background of the reconfiguration of the world stage of international relations, but also the emergence of new actors that have not any kind of precedent in the known history,- we witness the phenomenon of reviving of some of the old concepts that however come to new forms and seek to become the new challenges of the present or the near future.

Among other things, it is also the case of the „total war" concept. But this time, the above-mentioned concept tends to a multitude of nonconventional and atypical forms. However, in the end it leads to the same result and the same final

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effects. Ever since the emergence of the idea of „total war" it was mentioned that it should be a type of war that seeks to impose not only the political will but aims to the complete destruction of the enemy by any means.

As the end of the last world war already demonstrated, the NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) weapons allow the total non discriminatory destruction of large areas where are not only military targets but also political, economical, administrative targets, etc. Thus, they not only destroy the ability to fight or the combat potential but the entire human and economic potential of the opponent. The military action of unconventional and asymmetric type, including the hybrid action, allows at the present time the achievement of decisive effects by:

-hitting the enemy targets in strategic depth, using the infiltration of scout-diversion groups which despite being small, have the potential to produce significant effects, especially when acting directly on strategic points;

-the warfare using unconventional weapons other than NBC, with latent action or having difficult to detect sources (such as the devices which emit and focus infrasounds, microwaves, etc);

-means and / or methods of warfare that cause serious effects on the population, but without being easily detected and counteracted, for example, by altering the quality of air and water, also the quality of food or produce electromagnetic emissions of low or high frequency with harmful effects on living things;

-means and / or methods of warfare which aim the destroying of a particular enemy infrastructure;

-to attack and destroy of those specific resources for defense system;

-natural disasters caused or facilitated by the use of known anthropogenic factors or through the use of special weapons;

-hitting the components of critical military infrastructure and the disorganization of the ongoing enemy defense system, before the actual or official beginning of the armed confrontation, using atypical and nonconventional means / methods.

These new challenges induced by the technological development and the great dynamism of the XXI Century, becoming increasingly apparent day by day, so that we could make the following observations from the perspective of evolutionary tendencies of the armed confrontation in the near future:

-the increasing use of small battle groups which no longer comply with the general rules imposed by the so-called „laws of war "(uniform with insignia, weapon in sight, etc.) acting in the depth of enemy territory, mainly in the urban areas and having objectives regarding the infrastructure, particularly- the military and civilian critical infrastructure;

-the use of concealed forms of aggression, generally acting indirectly on people and aiming rather the direct alteration of infrastructure and resources;

-the identification and use of specifical vulnerabilities of the infrastructure, in order to achieve or facilitate the aggressions which aim the destruction of infrastructure elements and causing feed-back processes (the

special amplification of a disturbance, the domino effect or another way of interaction) and therefore causing the inability to work of the entire system;
-causing serious economic and social disorder, which become difficult to countered by the opponent and lead relatively quickly to its complete incapacity;
-the concealment of the military aggression under various, deceptive appearances (eg. natural disaster, strike or riot, industrial accidents, interethnic and interconfessional confrontations, revolutions, etc) and most often in combined forms.

These tendencies lead to the need to take specific measures to identify and cover the vulnerabilities of the defense system and especially, of the infrastructure, against unconventional and atypical military actions.

1. The hybrid warfare against the urban critical infrastructure

From the perspective of the attack against the specific urban critical infrastructure, we can illustrate the manner of use of some unconventional weapons, which can achieve the hybrid and asymmetrical warfare. With regard to the critical infrastructure, according to the typology already established, we believe that it is composed[1] of:

-the systems and networks in the energy sector (including particulary the electricity generation systems, power plants and oil and gas storage facilities, fuel processing systems and also, the systems of transport and distribution);
-the communications and information systems (telecommunications, broadcasting systems, programs of hardware and software, any kind of informatic material and operational network);

-the financial system (banking, securities and investment markets, etc.);
-the medical and health system (hospitals, nursing homes, blood banks, pharmaceutical laboratories, the emergency services);

-the food business (production, distribution and sale);

-water supply (reserves, storage, treatment and distribution networks);
-the transport system (airports, ports, railways, traffic control systems);

-the special industrial activities relating to the production, storage and transportation of dangerous goods (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear);
-the administrative system (services, information networks, assets of the state, national monuments and the objectives of public significance).

However, in a general sense, the critical infrastructures are included in the following typology:

-infrastructures in the physical space;

-infrastructures in the outerspace;

-infrastructures in the (virtual space) cyberspace.

[1] Grigore ALEXANDRESCU, Gheorghe VADUVA, *The Critical infrastructure. Hazards, threats. Protection Systems,* National Defence University "Carol I", Bucharest, 2006, pp.16-17.

Prof. Dr. Jean Clark[2], at the „*Homeland Security Europe 2006*", in Brussels (2006, June 27-29th) made this classification of the infrastructure:
-the physical infrastructures (water networks, energy, transportation, chemical industry, public health, emergency services, agriculture and food);
-the information infrastructures (networks, banking and finance, telecommunications);
-human infrastructures;

-the main goods (those goods which cannot be considered critical, but however, they have a symbolic value and thus, are important for the collective memory: eg. museums, government and commercial facilities).

Therefore, we can notice the following issues from the perspective of the vulnerability of critical infrastructure:

-the fields of communication and information, finance, transport and administration, are most vulnerable, especially their virtual component not only the physical part (except the transport system, to which the physical component has a high vulnerability); it means that by annihilating the databases and the equipment to use this database, it can at least neutralize the item of infrastructure;

- we can also note that most of them, the elements of critical infrastructure contain devices, machines or networks, such as electrical, electronic or electromagnetic devices and therefore they become vulnerable to the military aggression which uses destructive electromagnetic emissions;

- last but not least, all the elements of the critical infrastructure (even the the virtual ones) are vulnerable to the environmental factors.

Based on these observations, we can illustrate some unconventional means of attack on specifical urban critical infrastructure, as follows:
-*small-caliber projectiles* containing chemical warhead, which can be launched by means of individual weapons, working perfectly silent; in order to infect the potable water inside the water-treatment tanks, using chemical or biological agents that can not be filtered and therefore pass into the supply network;
-*infrasonic weapons* of medium / big power, capable of producing the destruction of reinforced concrete structures; because the „infrasonic projectiles" work below the audible range, the open fire cannot be detected by the eventual observers and the shooter's position remains imperceptible;

-*the electromagnetic-pulse weapons* (included in certain categories and types) capable to discharge of very high energies in very short periods of time, through their action realizing the destruction of the eletronic equipment and electrical networks, the annihilation of electronic databases, etc;

-*the focused and guided transport of electric charges fascicles* (electrons and cations inside the „minus channel" and anions in the „plus channel") conveyed to the target using an ultraviolet beam which is focused and shifted using a modulated (in frequency or amplitude) electromagnetic (radio) emission; when the ultraviolet beam hit the target (e.g., an antenna, a natural gas pipeline,

[2] Ibidem, pp.21-22.

etc) the two electric fascicles (+ and -) are placed in contact it achieve a high power electric discharge with thermal effects;

-the gathering and guided discharge of atmospheric electricity within a radius of several kilometers, using modernized versions of the method described in the patent of Constantin Văideanu[3];

-*the launch and transport to target of an electric high voltage / high power discharge* using laser beams as conductive and guiding channels;

-*to cause (extreme) weather events* in certain points or areas, using the ultrasonic generators that initiate and / or amplify the aerosol coagulation processes in the low-Earth atmosphere, leading (according to the working parameters) to mist, rain, hail, wind intensification, etc.;

-to cause local but extreme weather events, *achieving important (barometric) pressure differences* which result from the overheating of relatively small volumes of the low-Earth atmosphere by using weapons that allow the guided transport and discharge of the electric charges through the UV emission modulated with electromagnetic (radio) waves;

-*the use of small rockets* (model rockets) for scattering at low height (between 200 and 1000 m) clouds of the microparticles (aerosols) or chemicals which alter directly the environmental factors, or cab be used to facilitate the action of other unconventional weapons systems, for example, the cloud of microparticles is used as a „mirror" for the electromagnetic emission from an other system located on the ground; or for the scattering into the atmosphere of the substances that cause the coagulation of aerosols and therefore, the mist or the rain.

There were presented above, only a small part of the unconventional and atypical means/methods that can be used at the present time or in the near future. To note that it can perform hybrid military actions which could have very serious effects, in the current circumstances being very difficult to counteract that kind of actions.

2. The protection of the ongoing military critical infrastructure

In accordance with the directions and requirements of military defense doctrine, when it comes to the preparation and execution of military operations in urban areas, units of the Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Interior, population and civil protection intervention formations participate. Regardless of all the measures that are taken in this case, engaging all available forces to prepare for the defense of these urban environments, areas and industrial sites, the responsibility of all local decision makers, of the economic leadership and of the entire population capable of military effort, increases.

[3] For more details, see the french patent FR36728 titled „*Dispositif pour la transmission de l'énergie des ondes extrêmement courtes à grandes distances*", belonging to Constantin Văideanu, and also the french patent FR524839 titled „*Dispositif pour décharger l'électricité de l'atmosphère sur un rayon de 5 kilomètres*", same author.

It is required, according to constitutional responsibilities and obligations in matters of national defense, the continuous training of all supported capabilities in reference to sustaining combat efforts from urban areas. That is why joint plans of training activities and specific actions are required for developing complexity measures, and the time required for intervention methods, forms and procedures for engagement of all military leadership factors, civil defense formations and economic operators. An important element of the defense system for protecting effectives, people, goods, values, heritage and environmental factors is the *ongoing critical infrastructure* – equivalent to *underground works with engineering works intended for combat, those that are executed on the surface or buried in the ground*. The integration of permanent critical infrastructures suitable for combat needs, the use of forces, of technical means, of various materials for the execution and arrangement, determines streamline actions and the harmonization of bomb engineering works planning system, especially in non-combat stages, for having the desired purpose and the materialization of own ground advantage.

Including permanent critical infrastructure in the overall preparation for the defense of urban and industrial sites follows these steps:

-Preparation of studies and extensive plans on how usability, occupation of existing underground works and those new ones designed and built with the aim of creating an integrated final battle devices;

-reviewing of existing premises at the economic agent level, at the industrial platform level (area) and in the end, at the level of a town. Thus are established by civil defense premises destinations, methods of specific housing protection, arrangements needed to be made in case of necessity for the use of these spaces in special shelters or simple shelters; constitutive elements of design preparation and conducting the combat for the general territorial or regional defense unit provides all necessary measures to be carried on underground works for the best conditions in combat;

-Elaboration of evacuation plans of most people and goods from urban centers in areas of common facilities, but with a high degree of safety;

-Applications in the civilian population area, during non-combat periods, for optimum and orderly evacuation to shelters;

Military effectiveness is determined by important indicators expressing how permanent critical infrastructures in the urban areas influence the performance of goals and warfare actions; these indicators are determined by:

-The capacity of resilience and response of urban centers (areas, industrial sites) and related underground works;

-The reduction of the enemy's offensive rhythm;

-The production of losses in personnel and military equipment;

-Stopping the enemy’s offensive and creating conditions for the transition to offensive, gaining and maintain the initiative from the initial period of war, etc.

Adapted underground work systems (arranged) or directly build with specific activity are targeted after the operating mode in expanded directions and it is characteristic for differentiated destination objectives:

-Shelters for the civilian population;

-Shelters for materials with different destinations: food, equipment, fuels, lubricants, weapons and combat equipment, ammunition, explosives, spare parts, medical supplies, valuables, various machines and so on;

-Shelters for medical purpose;

-Shelters for workshops repair and technical maintenance stations for means of fighting, the production of material military goods necessary for people and for the effectives participating in battles;

-Shelters for military actions (support points, defense districts, points of order, works for moving and linking between work surface and underground groups, artillery subunits galleries, tanks, aviation).

Because of the national legal framework, it exists an extremely rigorous, strict and a constant interest for the development, planning and for the creation of underground shelters to civil newly designed and executed buildings (blocks, villas, residential neighborhoods), but also an interest for those buildings of administrative and social personnel who have considerable congestion.

Urban centers carried out on large areas with public facilities have special objectives (subways, tunnels, rail and road), and which, through minimal equipment, can be modified in reference to function level, in real underground shelters and for other necessities.

Depending on the size and final destination determined by the type of underground shelter and by category in terms of facilities, there are special locations equipped with special protection equipment: filter-ventilation plants, transmission systems, water sources, energy, food, medicine, rest areas, and many more exits for emergency situations.

The use of underground buildings in urban areas and centers is an ongoing issue that determines the foundation of emergency measures in order to use them effectively, according to the needs and peculiarities of the construction that has to be adapted to the combat needs. The study of efficient use of underground spaces in defense purposes is conducted separately for each urban center (areas, industrial sites), aiming at adapting functional and structural parameters to the proposed destination, the capitalization of tactical-operational level imposed by the conduct of warfare in urban areas (the area or the industrial site in question).

We distinguish some types and categories of permanent critical infrastructures in urban areas with have an important role against warfare actions, such as:

-*Basements of residential buildings* can be used by individual subunits of fighters, equipped with individual armament, with a look of pillboxes; in the case of hospital basements, with reasonable accommodations, can be used as medical facilities.

-*Underground passages* can be converted to simple shelters by blocking entrances (fitting resistant doors and walls of masonry). Long underground passages can be used for the displacement of journey-masked subunits and military equipment.

-*Underground garages* can be arranged as shooting locations for individual fighters that use weapons; they target communities as places of refuge for people or technical means, and for those small and isolated areas, as control points (in this situation, proper transmission means are ensured).

-*Disaffected railway tunnels* usually located outside the settlements and populated areas, because of their high protective level (the large thickness of natural ceiling, the dome buildings) with some facilities may be intended for the accommodation of heavy combat equipment, tanks, for armored amphibious carriers, heavy duty trucks.

-*Subway stations and galleries* offer battle and housing conditions; entries with stations as points of resistance, sites or firing platforms for individual fighters (at most groups), equipped with individual armament;

-*Mine galleries* can be used for effectives maneuver with individual armament; shelters for the military staff can be arranged, or can be equipped as command points or for storing large amounts of materials or equipment, taking necessary measures to protect them from water and excessive moisture.

-*Thermal galleries* can be used for the effectives maneuver equipped with individual armament, in safety conditions and in hiding. Manholes and entrances to the galleries can be set as firing (local) points, allowing military staff to take shelter in galleries. In this situation, stocks of ammunition, food and other materials are ensured.

All these subterranean buildings, designed and used properly, will lead to an overall reduction in vulnerability to asymmetric and unconventional aggression and also to an increase of the response capacity, quickly and effectively, against such aggressions.

Conclusions

From the foregoing, we can conclude that, in the first instance, before realizing special means and developing specific methods of defense and response to the unconventional / atypical or hybrid aggression, we can reduce the vulnerability of the critical infrastructure by arranging / the adaptation and the proper use of subterranean buildings, especially those situated in urban areas, but not only them.

Later, after gaining experience in terms of means and methods of fighting in unconventional and atypical warfare, it will establish and implement specific actions and measures (specific countermeasures) in order to counter these aggressions by using an improved system for early identification of aggressions, followed by a rapid and effective intervention.

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BRIEF CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE SECURITY OUTSOURCING

Costin-Mădălin ZOTOI*

In the last three decades, the process of outsourcing has gained an increasingly higher importance, getting to know an evolution that is chained with that one of the specialization concept. Originally designed to diversify and develop the specific activities of the economic size, consequence of the multiple mutations occurring worldwide (the end of the Cold War, the global economic-financial crisis etc.), the outsourcing has been extended including the security segment, both on the institutional and the non-institutional plan. Incidentally, one of the main factors that have supported the development of the outsourcing process on the security level is the labour market resorption of the specialized human resources, who, for various reasons, left the national public systems.

In consideration of the security domain specificity, the outsourcing involves equally, both the facilitation of certain goals achievement (related in particular, to the institutional flexibility and to the costs), and the compliance with certain legal restrictions.

Keywords: *externalization, outsourcing, security, safety, defence*

Introduction

Outsourcing already represents a global phenomenon that can be applied in a multitude of areas. Economic, technical, related to the organizational flexibility or to the simplification of certain internal procedures reasons underlined its progress and development and guaranteed in the same time the diversification of the economic life.

Purely economic phenomenon, the outsourcing generated, firstly, a saving of the financial resources and emphasized the division of labour, the specialization being accordingly pointed out in the market.

The outsourcing has not bypassed either the security field, producing effects in this area, too. Secondary activities were and are subject to outsourcing towards the specialised economic operators, the private sector contributing thus directly to the achievement, in good conditions, of the public sector activities.

1. Outsourcing - definition, scope, advantages and disadvantages

1.1. Concept, application domains

Active for a long time in the functional market economies and exploited as such, the outsourcing made its way in Romania of the end of the last century, since this phenomenon encountered a steady development. Imported initially by the corporations that opened business in Romania, the process came to the attention of the local economic operators, who subsequently applied it.

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The concept of *outsourcing*, translated into Romanian by *externalizare*, means "the practice of using outside employees"[1], or, more specific, "the procurement (of certain goods and services that are necessary for a business or organisation) based on a contract with an external supplier" [2]. In other words, outsourcing involves the realization of a private function of an organization through another entity, usually specialized, drawn into the circuit in terms of economic interests. According to some opinions, the concept of *outsourcing* is "a continuation of the process of globalization that started in the 1950s and 1960s, which led to the global wealth creation" [3].

Outsourcing represents, at its origins, an emanation of the economic life, a compromise version between the imperative of realizing certain activities and the related budgetary constraints, a way of orientation to a desired outcome. The outsourcing was facilitated by one of the goals of the economic sector, namely by the fact that the operators carrying out relevant activity in the private sector have, without exception, as final goal the profit maximization. This common denominator enables the recruitment of numerous interactions between the economic agents, the market dictating the supply and demand in matters.

One of the consequences of the economic life development has been materialized on the segment of the economic operators' specialization. The refinement of the object of activity of an organization involves its orientation towards its own essential functions, having as result the enhancement of the efficiency in the market, and thereby, the enhancement of the competitiveness. On the other hand, this endeavour may affect the performance of the secondary activities. In this case, the first question that the entrepreneurs addressed to themselves referred to the performance of the ancillary activities, which, on the one hand, had to be realized in support of the main functions and, on the other hand, could no longer be covered optimally by the entity in question. The identified options consisted in supplementing the budget assigned to the performance of the secondary functions, and thereby diminishing the profit, the removal of the secondary functions, situation that was not always possible, or contracting certain economic operators whose main activity object was similar to the secondary functions in analysis. In fact, the main advantage of the outsourcing is that the situation in which the auxiliary activities of an organization represent the main activities of another one is well speculated. Thus, by outsourcing substantial savings can be achieved by exploiting certain synergies that have been already established and consolidated.

Gradually, the outsourcing use has expanded including more and more branches of activity. The results of this phenomenon can be observed nowadays at every step, from the television commercials and the activity conducted on

[1] *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English*, Third Edition with New Words Supplement, Harlow, Pearson Education Limited, 2001, pp. 1007.

[2] Merriam – Webster Dictionary, available at web address http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/outsource, accessed on 12.08.2013.

[3] Rajan S. RAMKISHEN, Srivastava SADHANA, *Global Outsourcing of Services: Issues and Implications*, Harvard Asia Pacific Review, volume 9, no. 1, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 40.

behalf of the big corporations, up to roads, energetic infrastructures or transports.

The environment in which the outsourcing creates the best results is the private sector considering that, on the one hand, this one was its generator, and, on the other hand, that the supply and the demand of services and products are real, being a direct consequence of the economic situation. The private sector also favours the outsourcing considering that the constituent entities are oriented, by their nature, towards maximizing profit, every decision being accordingly founded, mainly by financial considerations. Last but not least, the outsourcing encounters a favourable ground for development in the private sector since the legal rules that are applicable there are quite permissive.

Once that the financial implications of each activity carried out by the public sector began to be weighed by the decision-makers with increasingly more attention and that the budget constraints increased, both on the macro and the micro plan, the outsourcing began to be considered a viable option in the budgetary framework. Therefore, in the cases and under the conditions provided by law, the public authorities were empowered to delegate the private economic operators to conduct certain activities which, traditionally, were attached to the budget sector. In some airports from Belgium, for instance, the activity of checking the passengers while boarding the aircraft is carried out by the G4S Aviation Security company. In France and England, the public-private partnership operates for constructing and subsequently for exploiting the highway segments. Last but not least, in Romania, the state outsourced, in the case of certain public companies in stalemate, their management services.

Related to all the above examples, we appreciate that the delegation of certain services towards the private sector does not relieve of responsibility the authorities that remain responsible in front of citizens. No matter the number and the nature of the penal clauses included in the outsourcing contracts, they have effect only in relation with the signatory parties and they don't concern the citizens of a state, whose rights are enshrined and protected by law and defended by specialized, central or local institutions. Therefore, although the delegation operates within the outsourcing sector, we appreciate that within the public sector this does not involve the full transfer of responsibility too.

1.2. Some of the advantages, disadvantages and limitations of outsourcing

The specialized literature categorizes outsourcing inclusively taking into consideration the motivation that led to the adoption of the decision to delegate a certain activity. Thus, outsourcing may be founded on: costs, strategy or organizational policy, "the first two often determining the outsourcing in the case of private industry"[4].

[4] Tibor KREMIC, Oya Icmeli TUKEL, Walter O. ROM, *Outsourcing decision support: a survey of benefits, risks, and decision factors*, Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, vol. 11, issue 6, Bingley, 2006, pp. 468.

An outsourcing operation, carried out in good conditions, leads primarily to budget savings. Therefore, realizing a project costs less than it was expected, the profit increasing directly proportional, or, within the public environment, realizing consistent budgetary savings. A successful outsourcing may often represent the mark of a performing management.

The outsourcing entails, first of all, the existence of a high stake to justify the internal analysis and, then, the releasing of a selection procedure of a contractor. If the activity that is wanted to be outsourced and the contractual terms are not attractive enough, the tendering will be uncertain. On the other hand, the outsourcing has to generate significant, quantifiable savings or to visibly simplify the internal activity. Otherwise, no legal entity will take into account the market consultation in order to achieve a process of outsourcing. We appreciate that only the secondary/ auxiliary activities that contribute to the achievement of the main object of activity of a legal person and that may be carried out by third parties may be subject of outsourcing.

The delegation of a task towards a specialized economic operator requires completing a specific procedure that ensures, on the one hand, that the operation has as result cost savings or internal simplification, and, on the other hand, that the partner that has been selected has the technical, operational and financial capacity, as well as the relevant experience that are necessary to attain the contract on the agreed period of time (usually mentioning as a rule, the possibility of extension too) and to required exigency standards.

Outsourcing, symbol of a healthy economic life, creates dependency, both for the organization that delegates a task and for the one that, under certain circumstances, it takes it over. The dependence may be translated, on the one hand, by the loss/atrophy of certain organizational capacities, and, implicitly, by the disappearance of the relevant experience and of the involved personnel, and, on the other hand, by the conditioning in relation with a specific source of finance.

The outsourcing of certain existing activities generates, as secondary effect, the loss of organizational tradition. Certain structures and substructures reorganize and their staff are restructured or acquire limited powers. In essence, this one loses the acquired experience. The outsourcing of an existing activity produces, at the level of organizational culture, final changes. Therefore, it is imperatively necessary that the entity to which it is outsourced to be stable, predictable, with high standards of quality that possesses all warranties of a lasting cooperation. In this way, the entity that outsources can minimize its risk of not being able to accomplish, because of the partner, certain activities that may affect the realization of the main own object of activity.

One of the outsourcing advantages is represented by the fact that an organization can delegate certain occasional activities or with a low degree of frequency or it can supplement certain efforts, without being necessary it to adapt the existing internal architecture. The option to outsource determines, in

this case, the minimum expenses commitment, maintaining the level of charging for the existing staff and eliminating the supplementary bureaucratic formalities.

The enhancement of the market segment that was allocated to the outsourcing develops continuously the economic operators which augment their competitiveness. The expansion of their activity causes the increase of the number of employees that can come from the ranks of redundant/retired specialists from different fields of public activity too. The employment of a recognized specialist for carrying out an activity adds extra value to it, and the expertise shall be forwarded to the other employees taking advantages of it inside the company and generating relevant history and tradition.

The adoption of an outsourcing decision of an activity may lead to the formation of an organizational current in this sense, the management being able to consider that what was suitable in a context, could be in another one too. In any situation, we appreciate that the outsourcing decision of a certain activity has to be preceded by a thorough analysis carried out at the level of experts.

The outsourcing of an activity may mean, in the private sector, a total transfer of responsibility, too. The organization that accepts taking over an activity is committed to its contractor, through a convention, to carry out a specific work, within a time limit and defined conditions, assuming the responsibility of the non-compliance of the clauses related to its own behaviour. As far as the public sector is concerned, the outsourcing of an activity of its own does not imply, in our opinion, a total transfer of responsibility, at least for two reasons: the public authorities are formed in accordance with the dedicated normative acts, a range of strictly determined and exclusive competences being established to them and they also represent the state in its relationship with its own citizens, attribute that cannot be delegated.

One of the major outsourcing disadvantages is that, in order to ensure a right contractual behaviour of the other party, that entity that has delegated the implementation of an activity has limited leverage. They may not take the form but of certain contractual clauses with a particular area of regulation, getting to be applied, depending on the situation, according to the common law. By contrast, within an organization (which, has not outsourced anything yet), the manager may inclusively engage to the disciplinary responsibility of certain employees in the event of the noncompliance of certain terms and conditions related to carrying out an activity.

Another outsourcing disadvantage is that this phenomenon puts in a close relationship entities found in different stages of development and whose organizational culture differs. Therefore, on this background, there may be some cooperation syncopation.

2. Security Outsourcing

Securing a structure represents an exclusive attribute of it, it may not be subject to external interferences and it is carried out strictly in accordance with

the applicable normative framework.

The outsourcing of certain activities that are specific to the security dimension is a particularly sensitive concern given the fact that the whole field of security is very sensitive. In this case, the approaches of this phenomenon involve a special kind of typology, never met in other areas that involve equally, both the analysis of each detail and the study of the suitability of each decision and the medium and long term outlining of some strategies.

The outsourcing of certain secondary activities of the security range is considered to be one of the viable solutions for the future, taking into consideration that, at present, it came to a "paradoxical situation in which the activity of the armed forces increases while the effort in terms of defence boils down"[5].

Currently, the providers of outsourcing services operate on global, regional and local levels in the field of security, offering services of physical, computer systems, consultancy, analysis (including security or political), auxiliary etc. security, both to the individuals and to the legal entities, no matter of their structure and membership.

Ensuring the security of a state, institution, economic operator or of any other form of social organization is a fundamental duty of their management. As a result, the managers of the systems are looking for ingenious solutions to allow their development in terms of cost-effectiveness, competitiveness and security. Doubtless, abreast of the global economic development stage, one of the variants that were identified in order to achieve the goal mentioned above involves the outsourcing of certain activities, which, until recently, were organized exclusively internally. Thus, more recently, the outsourcing of certain activities may be related inclusively to the security segment. And in this case, the specific makes the distinction between the private sector and the public sector.

The entities belonging to the private environment may outsource a wide range of activities that contribute to their own security, maintaining internally, in essence, only the segment of strategic leadership.

From the point of view of the public sector, the security outsourcing involves a number of limitations, advantages and disadvantages.

Firstly, the public sector is based on a whole system of laws which reserve certain exclusive competences in the charge of certain explicitly specified authorities. These can not be, in essence, the object of delegation. For instance, we appreciate that in the security sector, only auxiliary activities can be outsourced, those ones that don't involve a special degree of importance. Some of these were previously fulfilled by specialized components of the state authorities that, due to financial constraints or to reorganization, have been restructured, or they are in the process of institutional change. Also, in the public sector in general and in the security sector in particular, the outsourcing does not

[5] Petre DUȚU, *Fenomene şi procese definitorii pentru evoluția armatei naționale*, Bucharest, National Defense University "Carol I" Publishing, 2008, pp. 167.

imply a complete transfer of responsibility between the involved entities, related to the citizen and to the fulfillment of the duties legally conferred to a public authority.

The dependence consequences that were created using the outsourcing in the field of security can achieve, under certain contingencies which require the use of the specialized state apparatus at full capacity, a significant gravity. Without being possible the organization of a preliminary training, in some situations, some institutions need to operate at maximum capacity, being decisive, in the case of outsourcing, the determination of an economic operator to consistently provide the same services or, where appropriate, to supplement them. Therefore, we appreciate that the outsourcing of certain activities from the security sector must be based on a very well-founded objective procedure, which complies with the institutional strategic needs and priorities. We also appreciate that, in this case, the award criteria should not be the *lowest price* but *the most economically advantageous offer*, and the selection of an economic operator needs to be realized based on an algorithm to sum the economic, technical and organizational arguments. Once selected an economic operator, the contractual instrument that will cover practically all the rules of mutual cooperation has to be defined, in our opinion, in such a way so that to allow the outsourcing entity to realize at any time the delegated activity control, and certain possible corrective qualitative and quantitative measures.

The outsourcing of some activities from the security sector can lead, on the one hand, to focusing the efforts of the institutions staff with attributions in the field towards the priority objectives, but, on the other hand, it can generate the depopulation of the public segment of certain branches of activity of the institutionalized security. The outsourcing of some activities may also generate the diminution of the exigency regarding the contracted services, through the disappearance or the de-professionalization of the professionals from the outsourced field that were, eventually, the only ones able to rule over the quality of certain rendered services or delivered goods, or that could achieve a correct tender specification. The institutional memory can be thus lost or altered.

On the other hand, the outsourcing of some activities from the security sector generates the specialization and development of certain economic operators that can be enrolled in the national plans for preparing the economy and the territory for defense. Thus, in cases expressly provided by the legislation in force, the concerned economic operators may directly support the national defense effort. Also, the specialization of the private entities and their indirect involvement in the security sector, allow the maintenance of certain experts (some of them having previously activated in the public sector) in the labour market for which they have been trained and that, over time, can be used as instructors.

In order to achieve an integrated security approach, it is necessary that states turn their attention to the non-institutional areas of security and identify solutions. In terms of the non-institutional security, certain aspects of its own

may be subject to outsourcing, as long as the applicable rules framework is very well constructed and excludes equivoque. In fact, a solution for the institutionalization of the non-institutional aspects of security can be represented by the establishment of the legal framework followed by the delegation of certain punctual activities.

Conclusions

The outsourcing benefits can be capitalized under certain conditions and subjected to certain strict rules in the security sector too. Prior to the adoption of any decision regarding whether or not outsourcing some activities from the security sector, we appreciate that the advantages and the disadvantages must be carefully weighed.

Taking into account the special sensitivity of the field under consideration, the disadvantages of the outsourcing must be carefully analysed and countered both by countervailing measures that are geared towards them, as well as through the implementation of medium and long term strategies that integrate the delegated sector of activity and provide achievement alternatives.

It is recommended that the outsourcing performs after conducting certain detailed procedures that allow selecting the most appropriate economic operator, on the basis of an algorithm that combine not only financial, but also technical and administrative elements. It is essential that the selected economic operator to prove consistency, determination and, why not, loyalty.

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PRIVATIZATION OF SECURITY: FUNDAMENTAL FACTORS IN THE EXPANSION OF PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES

Andrei Alexandru BABADAC*

The end of the Cold War has fundamentally changed the nature of the conflicts on the world stage, bringing the private security companies into the spotlight. These are providing a wide range of services from logistics and auxiliary to the complete replacement of the national armies. This paper starts from the conditions that allowed a market for the private security companies in Romania and then examines how it evolved over the time.

The existing theories stress several factors that explain the social and political conditions that allow the private security market to expand over time. The analysis of the validity of these factors brings a more nuanced image, some of them giving relevant explanations. The organizational transformation of the structure of the armed forces and the trend of externalization for certain services resulted in a large number of military trained personnel being available on the labour market. The former is a driving factor in the expansion of the private security market, while the latter holds rather a collateral role.

Keywords*: European Union, expansion, military, private security.*

1. Introduction

In an ideal world, we wouldn't speak of the existence of any form of threat, with states being able to ensure the appropriate protection of their residents and belongings. It is difficult to talk about "public safety" and "public order" without connecting the two. This is the basic requirement for the functioning within the state of law. As independent units, the two should be understood as the sum of all regulations written or informal that must be taken into account as the base of the link between them. Safety earned a new collective meaning. It is difficult to create a perfect social model and to establish which aspects of public life have to be securitized.

The use of private military companies ever increased in international conflicts, contractors being used regularly to protect international personnel or their belongings. The first question that should be addressed is that of the rules governing the companies: what is their responsibility and who controls them? They can't be a direct subject of international law as they don't represent states, however, their employees are subject to the criminal law of the jurisdiction they belong to.[1]

On the other hand, in many communities it was the rise of criminality that was the driving factor in the expansion of the private security market. Therefore, those communities – the exact number is not known – started to use the services

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[1] Chia LEHNARDT, "Individual Liability of Private Military Personnel under International Criminal Law", *European Journal of International Law* 19, no. 5 (November 2008): 1015-34, accessed October 16, 2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chn058.

provided by private security companies. These are by no means military organizations. Their employees rise only to the status of civilian personnel under the Geneva Conventions on the laws of war and its additional protocols, at least as long as they are not directly involved in hostilities. In the latter case, private military companies can be held accountable under national criminal law. Private contractors involved in hostilities are considered combatant only if they are hired by a regular army or incorporated into one. Otherwise, they are classified as mercenaries under the Protocols I, II and III of the Geneva Conventions. Despite these, the boundaries between security missions and being involved in hostilities are highly volatile.[2]

The reduction of the armed forces at the end of the Cold War in the 1990s lead to a surplus of highly trained military personnel on the labour market, the United States andGreat Britain being the largest contributors for the private security industry. At the global level, the United States, Great Britain, South Africa and Israel are the largest contractors of private security. The same process affected the armed forces of the Russian Federation. In the case of Romania, the externalization of the security services took place at the same time with the professionalization of the armed forces and the decrease in the number of servicemen in the 1990s and early 2000s.

The end of the Cold War led to the disappearance of the so called “proxy wars," external state actors becoming less and less interested in the prevention and control of such disputes. This resulted from a series of low intensity internal conflicts, most of them being simply ignored by the international community in the sense of an absent intervention to control the respective conflict. The lack of foreign forces providing military assistance made the emergence of private contractors possible who filled their place. The multinational military companies proved to be less involved in corruption and little to none from an ethnic, religious or political perspective, contrary to local contractors, militias or mercenaries.

Developed countries, especially the United States, discovered the potential of the private security companies in the context of the Iraqi war in the 1990s and increased significantly after 2001 in the context of the Global War on Terror.

Furthermore, former servicemen provide security for maritime transports in highly dangerous areas, becoming known as individual security contractors. A majority of them are benefiting from the experience gained in military missions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Ensuring internal security and the respect for the law is the main preoccupation and the exclusive responsibility of States; even though it might not be mentioned expressly in their fundamental laws. With regards to ensuring the respect for basic human rights, the State holds the monopoly on the use of

[2] Dario AZZELLINI, “Die neuen Söldner”, *KJ / Kritische Justiz* (2008): 310-16, accessed September 10, 2013,http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0023-4834-2008-3-310.

force, this being one of its basic functions. However, the result isn't a guarantee of the monopoly on the use of force to ensure security. In fulfilling this task elements from outside, the structures within the state may also be involved, but the necessity to involve them must be clearly stated. The basic function to ensure security entrusted to the public authority establishes the obligation of the state to protect its citizens and to ensure their safety. Considering all of the above, we must not neglect the issue with the inclusion of the private security in preserving the public order and the legal limits imposed to them.
Moreover, there is a growing concern in the public sphere, at governmental level and among the professionals in the security sector regarding the emergence of another armed group that has to be controlled. These concerns resulted as effects of several unfortunate accidents in conflict zones such as Iraq that were later confirmed by unquestionable proof. In general, private security industry is dominated by former servicemen and policemen and other professionals generally accustomed with a certain conduct. Nonetheless, there is also the possibility of regrettable errors such would be the cases of killing innocent fishermen in the effort of ensuring the safety of shipping vessels. The possibility to prosecute such cases against private military companies remains much more limited than in the case of military operations.

The legal status of private security as given by the Additional Protocols of the Geneva Convention on the Law of War, especially in respect to their combative status, is subject to many debates. In 1989, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Convention against the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries, thus limiting the options for private security companies and generating a series of black holes in international law. A first attempt to build a common intergovernmental framework to establish a legal statute for the private military companies was done by the Montreux Declaration, adopted by 17 states in September 2008, despite its non-binding character.

The legal status of these companies is controversial for the perspective of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention in order to be able to avoid any possible sanctions as a result of work in areas such as Africa or Middle East. Even though they are bound to abide the law in a high number of jurisdictions they are also under the supervision of United Nations inspectors in matters of respecting embargoes. Even though they are restricted by the international law, the presence of armed personnel aboard of international cargo ships was negatively received by a large number of groups and international organizations.

2. A European perspective on private security

Private security business involves more than two million professionals at the level of the European Union, which are hired by more than 50.000 companies. In general, it is a mature and specialized industry. These companies are usually organized around the European Confederation for Security Services founded in 1989. This organization facilitated cooperation and bilateral relation

within it and at the global level, supporting the creation of work standards and harmonizing the national legislation regulating private security, one if its main goals being to harmonize the industry and the personnel training.

These add to the creation of a framework of sectorial rules that should cause a change between private security and private military companies and develop the cooperation based upon the professional and business structure from within the European Union, with a strong accent laid on critical infrastructures and the protection of strategic objectives.

The European Union eliminated its internal boundaries, created a unique currency and currently is heading towards a fiscal and monetary union. It is worth to be mentioned that the EU can represent a vector of development with solid unitary principles at the global level and that the security market in Europe finds itself within a set of conditions that can lead to the creation of a global model for the field. Effectively, in the author's opinion, there is a real possibility to establish a standardized model in the security industry, but this can't exist in the absence of the atomization of legislation, sectorial expertise and harmonizedrequirements, thus involving a great number of perspectives and realities. The question that should be addressed is how an EU member state can benefit of another's experience to increase the standards in the field.

Private security in the European Union represented a market of over 35 billion euro in 2011, bringing together a couple of hundreds of people protecting a couple of millions of square metres of buildings, public and private.[3] The rise of the industry also marked an increase of the quality of the human capital due to the increase of spending on their training. These also led to the preconditions that facilitated the adoption of the law no. 333 from 2003 regulating the industry of private security in Romania.

The legislation governing the private security in the European Union member states must consider the realities of an industry that in many times is influenced by the ever increasing need of society to ensure higher and higher levels of public security and at the same time by the obligations on the State to its own citizens – all these being in a continuous process of change that influences the legal framework, rules and others standards applied.[4] We believe that any changes into the legislation should consider the increase of the training of security personnel. In this sense there was a significant increase of continuous training programs, this being acknowledged by the competent authorities in the ministries of interior. The security personnel, from bodyguards to top management, should be part of a process of continuous learning under the direct supervision of the academic institutions.

Despite the big number of contractors involved in large-scale operations, it is reasonable to believe that the tates will continue to hold the control over the

[3] Confederation of European Security Services, "Private Security Services in Europe Facts and Figures 2011",*Confederation of European Security Services* (2011) p. 143.

[4] COESS „The socio-economic added value of private security services in Europe" http://coess.eu/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/CoESS_witboek_Socio_economic_study_2013_final.pdf , Madrid 2013.

monopoly on violence. Privatization involves, to a certain extent, the will of the private sector to find viable economic solutions, offering market-needed solutions for the identified threats and vulnerabilities. A fundamental element of this theory says that although privatization can be seen as a provocation to the idea of the monopoly on violence, it doesn't represent a new phenomenon. It must be remembered that the idea of the state monopoly on violence is relatively new, associated with the consolidated modern state. These are holding the effective control over the internal instruments, their use varying depending on time and place. From a larger historical perspective, the privatization of security will represent a return on the market to individual players.

3. Private security in Romania

According to a CoESS report from 2011[5], there were 1282 security companies registered, having over 107 thousands employees, 95 thousands of them holding professional licenses. A total of 35 thousands private security agents were authorized to hold lethal weapons. Statistically speaking, 85 percent of them are males. The use of canine units and of horses is not strictly regulated. However, their use is limited to security plans previously approved by the police.

The regulation of the market is done by The Law regulating the private security industry no. 333 from 2003 and its subsequent modifications done by the law 40 of 2010. The national authority competent in the regulation and management within the industry is the Ministry of Internal Affairs through the General Police Department.[6]

In what concerns the financial matters, the private security sector rises to 643.3 million euro yearly. The most important companies in Romania, G4S Romania and BGS, value together 77.8 million euro, servicing the major private companies in the country.[7] It is important to mention that the private security market in Romania is worth a third of the annual budget of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and it is expected that these numbers grow with the expansion of the market.

At the national level, the private security market is organized across several professional organizations among which we mention the Federation for Security Services, whose declared objective is to represent and support the interests within the industry in relation with the national authorities and third parties.[8]

[5] COESS 2011, .pp. 99-102.
[6] Law 333/2003.
[7] Răzvan Mureşan, "Romania's private army: How BGS transforms force into money," *Business Magazin*, 21 August 2013.
[8] Romanian Federation for Security Services, "About us," September 12, 2013, accessed September 12, 2013, http://www.fss.org.ro/despre.

Conclusions

The simple fact that the providers of private security within the areas of military interests are deployed in order to preserve critical infrastructures underlines the fragility of the privatization of the security. A company can easily go to strike, withdraw from a market or become bankrupt without the possibility to be forced to respect its contractual obligations, while in the traditional military structures this is impossible despite all other inconveniences. We must also evaluate the success rate of the private security companies, in order to determine if their services are superior in the use of conventional military forces, in the condition that the latter are far less costly.

The private security companies are constantly being criticized due to inherent deficiencies and comparisons – be they under military or governmental control. Moreover, they are being connected almost all the time with the military-industrial complex, their use being a cause for the continuation of an ongoing conflict.

The private nature of the security sector represents a provocation to the governmental authority, considering that the companies can go bankrupt, in contrast to the traditional military. Moreover, the economic element of the privatization of force makes the market economy rules to apply only partially considering that they are hired by governments or governmental agencies. All these make the market an oligopoly, where a few companies serve a short list of contractors. Moreover, the status of the contractors makes it very difficult to seal long-term contracts.

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24/7 SOLDIERS FOR HIRE. IMPLICATIONS OF USING PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES

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Private military companies (PMC) are a part of the private security industry recently entered into the arena, which generated both new directions of action as well as academic reflection, and raised new challenges facing the security environment consecrated actors. These challenges are in their nature prone to determine changes in the international relations structure, as well as generate alterations of the legal framework on which security environment has been build up. Amongst the tendencies of changing is obvious the one that determines the erosion of the national states violence application monopoly, through the appearance of a war and peace corporatization phenomenon. From the practical and stringent matters that this phenomenon raised, the analysis of the costs and benefits of using PMCs are approached in this paper, with the aim of the convenient integration of the mentioned phenomenon within the actual security environment.

Keywords*: national armies, private military companies, mercenary, security.*

1. The westphalian state and the monopoly of the violence

Starting with 1648, the year that Westphalia peace treaties had been signed on, Europe has become a sovereign states continent. These treaties included political and religious provisions which played the role of a true constitution more than 150 years and consecrated, during this period of time, the state's role as a peace warrantor. The treaty of Westphalia has recognized the principle of the states sovereignty. That meant that each signatory part had committed itself to observe the territorial rights of the other parts and not to interfere in the domestic affairs. There is no doubt that wars continued to exist, the difference being that after 1648, the states only had been able to exert the attribute of bearing the war.

Until recently, the westphalian state owned the violence application monopoly, so that the actors of the security environment, no matter how heterogeneous would have been, they have been coordinated by the state. However, the Charter of the United Nations is based on the premise of the force application monopoly by the states, proposing to avoid further suffering by limiting the Member States' right to appeal to a war as a solution for the settlement of disputes.

Things are about to change during the current period, mainly because of the appearance of new players of the security environment, whose behavior is dictated not by the state and the rules of law applicable in the field of international relations, but rather by the economics laws of the corporations. Amongst these actors we can find the private military companies, entities whose

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status transcends the states' framework and which aspire to erode the violence application monopoly they owe.

2. Security environment old and new actors.

The actual private military companies are firms that trade their services in the military field. The origins of these companies could be historically found in mercenariness, human activity with long tradition. Indeed, one could find soldiers fighting for profit in the war between Ramses II of Egypt and the Hittite king Muwatali, in the battle of Kadesh (1274 B.C.). In the Middle Age, the princes had often employed "the soldiers of fortune", which sometimes could change the end of a battle. Well known are the "condottieri", employed mainly for personal protection in the Italian cities-states. 30 years war has been waged with mercenaries. In the autochthon space, there are documents confirming employment of the "Seimeni" and "Germans" to protect the Transylvanian ruler Mihail Apafi, during the 1663 -1684 period of time[1]. A specific feature of the Middle Age mercenaries is their association, they grouping themselves within coherent structures, led by a leader providing leadership and deciding whose side they were fighting. Later on, the post-colonial conflicts witness the appearance of the individual mercenaries, like Jean Schramme and Robert Denard[2] or Mike Hoare and „Kongo" Muller, these ones becoming representatives for the modern mercenaries. Throughout history, this activity has been carried out by individuals who have made their available skills in the military area in exchange for a material advantage, usually money, fighting without support from any ideologies.

The above mentioned actors have been, in general, individuals in pursuit of profit form war-like activities. Anyway, the history notes non-state entities, endowed with the right to take military action. Most of the times, they were corporations, acting as an extension of the States of origin, in the interest of the state or in their own. A good example is the Dutch East India Company, which had the right to bear the war, to issue currency, and to detain, to judge and to execute detainees[3]. Similar rights had the British rival company closest in size, East India Company. Relevant to the subject matter is the right to bear military action, other than for the purpose of protecting their lives and assets, right conferred by a sovereign state.

Closer to our days, during the World War II, in 1941, the Japanese captured Wake Island, a North Pacific atoll, annexed by the U.S.A. in 1899. More than 450 American soldiers from Marine Corps and 1150 employees of the Morisson Knudsen Corporation have been taken prisoners of war by the

[1] George Bariț, Părți alese din Istoria Transilvaniei pe două sute de ani in urmă, ediția a II-a, vol. I, Braşov, 1993, p. 105.

[2] Opendo Mbula-Matari Barthélemy, http://www.congoforum.be/fr/congodetail.asp?subitem=21&id=9254&Congofiche=selected, accessed at 25.07.2013.

[3] *Allison Garett, Corporations as Sovereign, in Maine Law Review 2008, p. 133,* http://mainelaw.maine.edu/academics/maine-law-review/pdf/vol60_1/vol60_me_l_rev_129.pdf, accessed at *29.07.2013.*

Japanese and sent to forced labor camps. Part of the civilian employees rested on the island, the last 93 of them being executed in 1943. What is worth of mentioning is the Morisson Knudsen Corporation, which had been providing engineering and infrastructure building services to the U.S.A. army[4].

The last 20 years have witnessed the appearance of an increased number of companies, working on economical principles and whose field of activity is represented by activities traditionally reserved to the military institution. Various authors named these entities as private military companies (PMC), private security companies (PSC), private military firms (PMF) or a combination of these words, in coordination with the relation of these companies with the military field. Generally, these companies have appeared as a result of disappearance of the bipolarity, at the end of the Cold War, when the shrink of the threat have determined the shrinking of the national armies as well. On the background of these reductions, advanced states, detaining huge national armies, were forced to outsource a series of functions to the private sector. Thereby, under the pressure of the giant war machines decrease, it has been gradually given from the functions performed by the public institutions working in the security field. The transition has been relatively easy done, taking into accounts the existing background in some armed forces. For instance, the technological cooperation between Department of Defense (DoD) in U.S.A. and companies as Boeing or Northrop-Grumman is well known since years ago, so when Donald Rumsfeld had declared, at the beginning of the 2001, that the outsourcing of some functions from the edge of the military activities spectrum is necessary[5], this phenomenon was already in progress, due to the Logistic Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), implemented since 1985. This program included provisions as "advanced acquisition planning which provides for the use of civilian contractors during wartime and unforeseen military emergencies to augment the U.S. Army combat support service capability"[6].

The phenomenon represented by the private military companies is not entirely surprising; however, it has been brought to the both public attention and academic environment by several situations with major emotional potential. Thus, in 1990, DynCorp Company, while operating in Bosnia, under contract with U.S.A. State Department, has been involved in a scandal related to sexual trafficking of minor girls. Completed with dismissal of several employees, the scandal lasted for a long time in the attention of the general public [7].

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[4] Deborah C. Kidwell, Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA446127, accessed at 29.07.2013.

[5] Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld speach, at "DOD Acquisition and Logistics Excellence Week Kickoff—Bureaucracy to Battlefield" conference, at 10 september 2001, Pentagon, at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=430, accessed at 30.07.2013.

[6] Dennis C. Clements and Margaret A. Young, „The History of the Army's Logistic Civilian Augmentation Program: an Analysis of its Oversight from Past to Present", december 2005, at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-in/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA443282, accessed at 30.07.2013

[7] John Crewdson, „US: Sex scandal still haunts DynCorp", at http://www.corpwatch.org/article. php?id=11117, accessed at 02.08.2013.

Two other American companies appeared in the spotlight for a scandal caused by the behavior of the guards in the American prison Abu Ghraib, in Iraq. The firms, CACI and Titan Corporation, have been employed by the U.S.A. State Department to provide personnel for interrogation and interpreters for intelligence acquisition. Photographs and video clips leaked in media, showing interrogators and interpreters physically or sexually abusing the detainees. The legal actions taken against those employees have not been completed yet.

Blackwater Worldwide Company, operating in Iraq, under a license issued by the State Department in 2007 has been also extremely publicized. Four security details personnel, escorting a convoy, had opened fire in the crowded Al Nissour square in Baghdad, killing 17 civilians and wounding some other 20[8]. These agents had been accused, but no final sentence has been given so far.

The most recent event, intelligence leaking that Edward Snowden is accused for, involves his employers also, the private contractor Booz Allen Hamilton, company whose significant part of its income comes from governmental contracts. In this case, Booz Allen Hamilton participated in communications surveillance programs, for the benefit of U.S. National Security Agency. Public disclosure of the information by Snowden put U.S. and Great Britain government in an embarrassing position, without counting the security issues that has created.

Therefore, four important PMCs cases, working for various agencies or departments of the U.S. government went under the public spotlight, in situations generating questions and asking for answers. What PMCs are? Which is their role? Which are the advantages and disadvantages of using them? Is this legal? What can be done in order to keep the democratic control over these PMCs? These are the questions I will try to briefly answer in this paper.

The private military companies are economic nongovernmental entities which offer war like or war associated services, services which traditionally makes the object of institutions belonging to national states. The causes of appearance and fast development of these companies, can be retrieved at the end of Cold War, which has determined the conflicts recrudescence and the appearance of a security void that these companies hurried to fill in. According to the P. W. Singer[9], there are actually three types of companies, operating on the military realm:

1. firms offering purely military services,
2. firms providing consultancy and training in the military field
3. Firms offering support services in the military field.

[8] Jeremy SCAHILL, „Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army", Ed. Nation Books, 2007, p. 125 – 126.

[9] P. W. SINGER, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security*, in "International Security", vol. 26, no. 3. (Winter, 2001-2002), p. 200, at http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/3092094?uid=2&uid=4&sid=21102581641561, accessed at 03.08.2013.

The first category includes firms directly involved in the tactical framework, in fighting or in the field units command and control. Thus, these firms acting as force multipliers. The examples that Singer offers in support of his classification are the South-African Executive Outcomes (now disbanded), the British Sandline International (disbanded too, the precursor of the Aegis Company) and Airscan (company providing intelligence and air surveillance services). The second category, include firms which does not directly involve in fighting, but provide operational advise or improve the efficiency of their clients. The Military Professional Resources Incorporated – MPRI contract in Croatia, in 1994 – 1995 is a good example for this case. The third category of firms consists of companies dealing mainly with logistic support, engineering, demining or any other support services and is the beneficiary of some very big contracts, in terms of financial value. Usually, these PMCs are part of a bigger corporation, involved in a multitude of activities and which decided to enter the military arena too. The examples that Singer cites includes the well known Kellog, Brown & Root, (KBR), division of a better known Halliburton, corporation providing services in engineering and oil extraction, mainly.

Although this classification is generic enough, it sufficiently answers the existing companies' typology. The functioning of these firms generates not benefits for their shareholders, but also costs and benefits for the institutions whose attributions were outsourced, specifically for the national states institutions with powers in the field of security.

3. Costs and benefits of using PMCs

A first starting point in analyzing the costs and benefits of using PMCs is the economic-financial criteria. The main argument used by the executives of these companies is that using private services is less costly for the state, compared with the costs for training and maintaining a numerous military personnel. Indeed, at a glance, we can notice that these companies provide personnel on a on-demand basis, some of them being huge qualified available personnel databases. This way, these companies avoid the expenditures between operations, by simply firing the personnel at the end of a campaign. More than that, the employees don't have the full income package, many times the life insurance only being included. Additionally, it is widely accepted that the public sector is more efficient in managing the expenses than the public one.

The situation would be acceptable if the practice confirmed theory. Unfortunately, a deeper analysis precisely reveals the lack of efficiency of this system. Thus, if we consider the salary of the security personnel in the operation theater, we can find that they can be paid with up to 2000 USD per day[10]. Compared with the average American soldier salary working under the same

[10] Michael DUFFY, „When Private Armies Take to the Front Lines", in Time Magazine, 12 April 2004, at the address http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,607775,00.html, accessed in 15 October 2013.

pressure (a Marine, let's suppose), this is considerably bigger. Hence, there are no savings here. Is true, the PMCs personnel is paid during the time of the contract only, but it is usually not mentioned that their previous training had been done on the state's expenses, judgment that is prone to change the numbers somehow.

The PMCs from the logistic sector should theoretically better manage the resources, due to the profit maximization pressure. However, the KBR, has been accused[11] of lots of irregularities while performing duties related to the contracts or in billing their services. More than that, part of their contracts were signed without bidding; therefore their economic performance was at least arguable. As a matter of fact, a usual practice in the U.S. had been the adjudication of a contract whose value was lower than 50 millions USD, amount that comes under the Congress radar, followed by many other subsequent contracts. This way, the economic performance had not been validated by the Congress and the competitive framework had been evaded.

A second advantage is the political flexibility. It is known the MPRI case, whose activity indirectly led to the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords. In short, it is about a training contract which allowed the Croatians to mount a decisive attack against the Serbs in 1995. The attack led to relieving Krajina town and eventually determined the Serbs to negotiate the peace. This situation generated many advantages for the U.S. government. First of all, political involvement has been avoided, U.S.A. appearing as impartial. Secondly, no American soldiers were involved, thus no political costs related to human losses have been paid. Finally, the security balance in the region has been modified, without the U.S. intervention. On the other hand, this has been one of those situations in which public consent had been avoided, situation which is not tuned with democratic principles. As Deborah Avant and Lee Sigelman[12] have demonstrated, involving private contractors decrease the commitment of the regular troops; this is a significant political cost. The same authors also demonstrated that the media exposure is way bigger when considering the regular soldiers that the case of private contractors.

A last argument supporting the idea of PMCs efficiency is represented by military flexibility, sometimes superior to the military organization. Due to the changes into the security environment and threats' typology, it seems that these stand-by mini-armies are more effective in mobilizing their resources in shortest time; in the same time, the mobilized resources are better tailored on the mission's coordinates. More than that, using these PMCs does not suppose to create a security void somewhere else due to the redeployment of troops, for the

[11] Henry Waxman representative report, quoted at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/28/AR2006032801766.html, accessed at 19.09.2013

[12] Deborah AVANT, Lee SIGELMAN, „Private Security and Democracy: Lessons from the US in Iraq", in Security Studies, Volume 19, Issue 2, 2010, p. 255, at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2010.480906, accessed at 25.98.2013

personnel is already available or can be locally recruited, using the existing databases.

These are just few of the obvious advantages of using PMCs. With all these advantages, there are several problems which discourage their using and which need to be considered when configuring the security environment.

First of all, the way these companies work is based, mainly, on economic principles, like profit maximizing. This thing can easily create a conflict with own employees security, for instance. The well known case of the Blackwater employees, killed by the Iraqi insurgents in March 2004 and whose mutilated bodies had been publicly exposed on the bridge of Fallujah City, is a part of these savings on. It seems that those agents should have been three for each vehicle and the vehicle should have had a higher that had protection level. This thing did not happen, as just one year before, the company has reduced the assessment of the threat, making substantial savings in vehicles' armor protection.

Another disadvantage of these companies is the fact that their functioning circumvents the democratic framework and "check & balance" mechanisms. This thing is due to their corporatist character, which does not always and effective allow the intervention of the public surveillance mechanisms. In short, as Deborah Kidwell[13] notes, a dichotomist action framework is created, in which the public wars are borne by private armies.

A major deficiency of using these PMCs comes also from their corporatist character, but it is reflected in the way the regular military troops interact with the operation theater population. There are high officials within the U.S. Army which have declared that using PMCs are rather detrimental to counterinsurgency campaigns, due to the behavior of the employees, which are not working under the same constraints the military personnel is. While the last are struggling to "win the minds and hearts" of the population, the private contractors are rather oriented to maximize the profit and minimize the expenditures. Their behavior is not under moral or ethical restrictions. The situations created by the private military companies mentioned above (DynCorp in Bosnia and Abu Ghraib jail scandal) did not affected the American forces in Bosnia and Iraq only but have thrown a shadow of doubt on the way the USA is conducting its military operations. It is then obvious that this thing projects a negative image of the deployed forces as a whole and creates insurgency pools. More than that, the higher military official in an operation theater does not have the full command of all the personnel bearing weapons, so the command and control of the operation is gravely perturbed. Truth is that a manual regulating the activity of the contractors on the battlefield has been issued, but this is not enough to ensure the full military command.

[13] Deborah C. Kidwell, „Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies", edited by Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 2005, at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA446127, accessed at 29.08.2013.

The last argument against using PMCs is the legal framework under they are licensed. Classifying PMCs as mercenariness is, legally speaking, unclear; approaching this matter could stand as a separate paper. However, the I Additional Protocol of the Geneva Conventions from 1949 on the protection of the victims of the international armed conflicts, as well as the International Convention against recruiting, using, financing and training of the mercenaries, signed in 1989, similarly define the mercenary. The difference comes from the fact that the first law does not incriminate the person proved to be mercenary, but let the state which captured him and classified as such to give or not to give the rights that prisoners of war benefit of. The second law (1989 Convention) specifically and explicit ban the mercenariness. If we take into account the additional fact that a minority of states have signed the Conventions, the states which have the biggest number of PMCs not counting amongst them, we realize the complexity of the matter.

4. Conclusions

The private military companies represent an already existing phenomenon, with properties insufficiently explored, that cannot be contested. This phenomenon has changed, probably forever, the way the war is waged, hence needs to be analyzed and used with the aim of effective configuring the existing security environment. Several preliminary conclusions lead to available options for his regulation.

First of all, the legal framework that these companies are operating is likely the most difficult to solve. There are analysts of the phenomenon which support the idea that this problems needs to be solved by national states, through harmonizing the legislation; however, other analysts believe that the corporative laws are enough to regulate these companies' framework. It is my opinion that this is the international security organizations call and these organizations need to take into account the PMCs associations proposals.

It is insufficiently explored the aspect of the economic efficiency of using PMCs, as opposed to using regular troops. However, it is clear that these companies are not supposed to be black holes in the public expenditure. This imperative could be realized through better economic laws, designed to stimulate the competitiveness, and to better surveillance of acquisitions. Thus, the responsibility for the estimated results would belong to the government representatives and the number of cost overrun cases would decrease.

The last conclusion, but not the least important, is the one related to the democratic framework. We think that if these corporations go beyond the democratic and national framework and become multinational corporations, there is a real danger of eroding national sovereignty. Anyway, this concept is degrading more and more within the actual economic context; where giant corporations could subtle dictate the smaller states' politics. At least, the great powers seem to be unaffected by this danger. If these companies will act outside

of a national state jurisdiction and will have global force projection capabilities, this thing will undermine the traditional position of the state as unique player allowed to legitimately use the force. In my opinion, these companies should not overcome the national regulation framework, due to the shifting of the center of gravity in using the force, from the state as representative of the public interest to the companies driven by corporate interests.

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THE CONTROL OVER RARE METAL DEPOSITS THE KEY TO THE RE-CONFIGURATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

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In 2010, the European Union Working Group for Raw Materials Supply issued a report in which it established a list of 14 such raw materials considered "critical" for the economic development and security of the EU in the next decade. In the Rare Earth Materials in the Defence Supply Chain report issued by the USA Audit Office in the same year, it is mentioned that the American last generation military technology is dependent on rare metals and earths, some of which exclusively produced by China. The strategic character of these raw materials is determined by the domains in which they are used: modern military industry, aerospace industry, telecommunication industry, IT industry, mobile communication industry etc. Consequently, the technological advancement, the economic and military competition between players, the need to facilitate the research and production of future technologies, the capacity to preserve or increase the state power in the XXI century and finally to preserve the status quo of the current international system, will be implicitly dictated by the control and exploitation of these resources. The key to the entire geopolitical game lies in the control of the deposits outside the jurisdiction of the great powers, and the African continent became the global space of confrontation between the vital interests belonging to the main geostrategic players.

***Keywords**: REM - rear earth elements, rare earths, strategic resources, critical resources, unipolarity, Sub-Saharan Africa, high technologies, the third industrial revolution.*

The history of mankind bears the mark of the struggle for resources of any type, from the wood needed for making ploughs, carts and sailing ships to the iron in weapons, from the coal and steel of the XIX century industrial revolution to the oil of the XX century technological advancement. The XXI century shows a similar trend to the previous ones, the current military and civilian technologies relying on rare metals, known under the acronyms REM (*rare earth minerals*) or REE (*rare earth elements*).

European Commission Raw Materials Supply Group, the EU Working Group for raw materials, released a report entitled *Critical Raw Materials for EU, Report of the Ad-hoc Working Group on defining critical raw materials*[1] in which it established a list of 14 such materials considered to be "*critical*" for the economic development and security of the EU in the next decade. These are: the platinum group metals, antimony, beryllium, cobalt, gallium, germanium, indium, magnesium, niobium, rear metals or earths, tantalum, wolfram, fluorspar and non-metallic graphite.

The strategic character of these raw materials is determined by the domains in which they are used: modern military industry, aerospace industry,

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[1] *Critical Raw Materials for EU, Report of the Ad-hoc Working Group on defining critical raw materials* http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/raw-materials/files/docs/report-b_en.pdf.

telecommunication industry, IT, mobile phone technology, audio and video gadgets and the production of batteries, photovoltaic panels and electronic devices with a high degree of technology (see Table 1). Consequently, the technological advancement, the capacity to preserve or increase the power of the state in the XXth century will be implicitly dictated also by the control and exploitation of REM.

1. What are the rare metals?

According to the definition by *the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry* the rare metals are represented by the 15 chemical elements belonging to the group of the Lanthanides in Mendeleev's table, having atomic numbers between 57 and 71 and to which scandium and yttrium are added. The term "rare metal" comes from the rare and atypical mineralogical forms of the oxide type, which constitute the deposits. With the exception of promethium, which does not have non-radioactive stable isotopes and is consequently extremely rare in nature, all the other materials can be found in abundance, mostly in mixed deposits, which contain several such materials that are difficult to be chemically separated due to the disproportionate ratio between the atomic volume and the atomic number. Thus, elements such as the yttrium, having a small atomic number, are largely spread in the mantle of the earth, forming small size, rare and low-concentration deposits, compared to the cerium, a metal with a large atomic volume, which forms important and easily exploitable reserves. The first classification of the rare metals was done according to the solubility of the double phosphates of potassium and sodium of these metals. Thus three groups were formed: the sulphate of the cerium group (scandium, lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, samarium) are sparingly soluble, those of the terbium (europium, gadolinium, terbium) are moderately soluble, and those from the yttrium (yttrium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, lutetium) are highly soluble. Another classification was done according to the atomic mass in heavy lanthanides of the yttrium type and light lanthanides of the cerium type.

It is important to mention that the majority of exploitable yttrium and heavy lanthanides deposits are in Southern China in the area of the argil quarries. Deposits of cerium and light lanthanides have been identified in Brazil, India, Australia, **South Africa**, China, USA, Russia. The studies conducted in 2011 by Japanese researchers, among which professor Yasuhiro Kato, state the existence of underwater rare metal deposits, at the level of the continental plateau of the Pacific Ocean, where the heavy rare metals of the dysprosium type would be predominant[2]. Because traditional mining did not allow for the separate extraction of these metals until the years 60 of the last century, the

[2] Yasuhiro Kato et all, *Deep-sea mud in the Pacific Ocean as a potential resource for rare-earth elements*, Nature Geoscience, 03.07.2011, http://www.nature.com/ngeo/journal/v4/n8/full/ngeo1185.html.

industrial use of REM was limited. Due to the development of techniques such as electrolysis, fractional crystallization and liquid - liquid type extraction, the separation of these metals became possible and new industrial fields developed, which are now the object of the so-called high military and civilian technologies.

2. Which are the fields where rare metals are used?

RARE METALS and DOMAINS OF USE	
Heavy rare metals	Domains of use
Yttrium 39	audio-video equipment, glass, steel alloys, superconductors
Promethium 61	nuclear batteries
Europium 63	the red colour for the image on TV screens, monitors, lasers, lamps with mercury vapours, fluorescent lamps
Gadolinium 64	superconductors, magnets, lasers, X ray tubes, computer memories, additives for special steels
Terbium 65	lasers, fluorescent lamps
Dysprosium 66	magnets, lasers
Holmium 67	lasers, magnets, spectrophotometers
Erbium 68	infrared lasers, vanadium alloys, optic fibres
Thulium 69	portable X ray sources, lamps, lasers
Ytterbium 70	infrared lasers, nuclear medicine, reductive agents, stainless steel
Lutetium 71	tomographs with emission of positrons, high index refraction glass, scanners
Light rare metals	Domains of use
Lanthanum 57	high index refraction and alkaline resistant glass, hydrogen containers, lenses, electrodes for batteries
Cerium 58	oxidative agents, batteries, catalysts, glass polishing, yellow colours for glass and ceramic, lighters
Praseodymium 59	magnets, lasers, colours for glass and enamel
Neodymium 60	magnets, lasers, purple colour applied on glass, ceramic capacitors
Samarium 62	magnets, lasers, lighting systems
Scandium 21	aluminium alloys, aerospace industry, additives for mercury vapour lamps and halogen lamps

Table 1: Rare metals and domains of use[3].

According to a report of 2010 destined to the American Congress[4], the REM used in the military sector are part of two types of permanent magnets, samarium-cobalt ones and neodymium-iron-bromine ones. The neodymium magnets are essential in manufacturing offensive and defensive weapon systems, being the most powerful permanent magnets, while the samarium ones are

[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rare_earth_element
[4] Marc HUMPHRIES, *Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain*, Congressional Research Service, 08.06.2012, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41347.pdf.

essential in the manufacturing of ballistic guidance systems, intelligent bombs and aeronautic components. The terbium, gadolinium, neodymium and dysprosium magnets are fundamental components in the construction of generators for windmills, electrical and electronic components, the telecommunication and satellite communication industry, in the IT industry. The same report mentions the fact that the rare metals are essential raw materials in the car manufacturing industry, in obtaining catalysts for refining oil, in the manufacturing of last generation audio-video equipment, LCD screens, computers, mobile phones, rechargeable batteries, electrical and hybrid vehicles, components destined to last generation medical equipment from nuclear medicine, spectrophotometry to positron emission tomographs, portable radiological systems and scanners.

3. The geographical location of rare metal deposits

Country	Production (megatons)	% Total	Accessed reserves (million megatons)	% Total	Basic reserves (million megatons)	% Total
SUA	0		13	13	14	9,3
China	130.000	97,3	55	50	89	59,3
Rusia and CIS			19	17	21	14
Australia			1,6	1,5	5,8	3,9
India	2.700	2	3,1	2,8	1,3	1
Brazil	550	0,42	insignificant			
Malaysia	350	0,27	insignificant			
Other			22	20	23	12,5
Total	133.600		110		154	

Table 2: Production and resources of rare materials at global level in 2010[5].

The total deposits of rare metals, estimated at the level of the year 1994, were of 48 million megatons, out of which 79.2% were on the territory of China, 10.8% on the territory of the USA, 5.2% under the jurisdiction of India and only 1% within the CIS[6]. At the level of the year 2012, the total resources were estimated at 154 million megatons, meaning that the interest for the discovery of new deposits grew exponentially in parallel with the technological development. 59.3% of these deposits are on the territory of China, 9.3% on that of the USA, 14% in the CIS and only 1% in India. The demand for rare metals in 2010 at world level was estimated at around 133,600 megatons annually, due to reach a level of 185,000 megatons in 2015, according to the *Industrial Minerals*

[5] Marc HUMPHRIES, *Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain*, Congressional Research Service, 08.06.2012, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41347.pdf

[6] *Răspândirea geografică a zăcămintelor de metale rare.* Sursa: CRISTINA BUMBAC, PĂMÂNTURILE RARE - O NOUĂ PROVOCARE IN ECONOMIA MONDIALĂ apud Mineral Facts and Problems, S.U.A., 1985; Minerals Yearbook, S.U.A., 1994; Mining Annual Review, S.U.A., colecție.

Company of Australia[7]. An interesting aspect is related to the production capacities. In 2010, the *USA did not have even one REM production unit, while China had already developed 130,000 such units.*

4. Maintaining the current world order and the control of REM extraction and processing

The artisan of modern China, Deng Xiaopin, stated in 1992 that rare metals are to his country like oil is to the Middle East, meaning a spring of prosperity, a strategic weapon, a source of state power. And the enumeration does not stop here, the REM becoming with every day a lever with which the Chinese state can change the international order. The matter is extremely serious. At global level, the REM deposits are controlled by only a few states, most of them emerging powers and developing states from Asia and Africa.

China controls 97.3% of the current world production of rare earths, it holds a monopoly on the extraction and processing of heavy lanthanides of the yttrium group, it limited its exports of REM for the next decade and it finds itself in the full process of building stockpiles of these raw materials which have obviously become a factor of pressure with which the government in Beijing will be able to obtain a position of hegemony in the future. As a matter of fact, China's decision to interrupt for two months the export of rare earths toward Japan, following several political-diplomatic disputes, or to block the exports of REM toward the USA[8] remind us of Russia's energy policy, and the direct economic consequences suffered by the Japanese and American economies obliged the governments to look for alternative suppliers in areas like Africa, India, Australia, South America[9] and to develop technologies for underwater extraction. The diplomatic protests, the complaints filed by the USA, Japan and the USA against China at the World Trade Organization[10] for non-compliance with the rules of international trade, the cancellation of the visits by American and European presidents to China could not stop the political-economic strategy to consolidate the position of emerging power which may challenge the current unipolarity of the international system. Beijing's policy to create stockpiles of REM led to the exponential growth of the prices of these ores on the international market[11], it attracted foreign capital in China's extraction and

[7] Marc HUMPHRIES,*op.cit.*

[8] Gus Lubin, *China just banned exports of Rare Earth Minerals to the US*, Business Insider, 19.10.2010, http://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-has-just-started-ban-of-rare-earth-metal-exports-to-the-us-2010-10

[9] Keith Bradsher, *Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan*, The New York Times, 22.09.2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

[10] *US, Japan and EU Request WTO DSP for REM Complaint Against PRC*, http://www.techlawjournal.com/topstories/2012/20120710.asp

[11] „The prices for dysprosium and neodymium increased dramatically, according to the Ministry of Economy, Commerce and Industries in Japan. The price for 1 kg of dysprosium went up from 250 USD in April 2010 to 2840 USD in July 2011. The price for 1 kg of neodymium went up from 42 USD in April 2010 to 334 USD in July 2011. The prices for 2011 were published in the CRS Report R42510, China's Rare Earth Industry and Export Regime: Economic and Trade Implications for the United States, de Wayne M. Morrison and Rachel Tang" - Marc Humphries, *Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain*, Congressional Research Service, 08.06.2012, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41347.pdf

processing industry, thus generating a *monopoly on the entire economic chain, from extraction and processing to the obtaining of end products.* The *ad litteram* application of the OPEC type monopolistic policy is obvious, with the difference that, in this case, there is not a viable balancing, at least not at the present moment.

The former American state secretary Clinton stated in 2010 that the "*USA woke up to reality*" when *America's Government Accountability Office* (GAO) issued the report entitled *Rare Earth Materials in the Defence Supply Chain* which stated the fact that the American last generation military technology is dependent on the rare earths, some exclusively produced by China, also mentioning that only in 15 years from now will the Westerners be able to catch up with the Chinese expertise in the field of processing and production of these raw materials and the development of alternative sources[12].

China holds the monopoly on the extraction and processing of dysprosium, terbium, yttrium, europium and neodymium, covering between 96 and 99.8% of the world production. For example, dysprosium is vital for ensuring the permanence of magnetism at very high temperatures. This rare metal is produced by China in a proportion of 98.8%, and the price per kilogram increased 11 times between 2010 and 2011. According to the GAO report, China is the unrivalled leader of the world production of permanent magnets, 75% of the neodymium-iron-bromine magnets and 60% of the samarium-cobalt ones are produce din China, the fields of application of these components being consequently dependent on the production in this country and the economic policy of the government in Beijing. The same thing also happens in the case of the extraction and processing of cerium class light lanthanides in which China holds the monopoly of extraction with 92% of the world production[13]. In their turn, the Europeans declared themselves concerned with the economic consequences that the top industries in the fields of aircraft manufacturing, telecommunications and car manufacturing have to suffer following Beijing's decision to restrict exports of REM[14].

The fact that, since MacKinder and Haushofer until the present, all great geopoliticians have pointed to China as possible future world hegemon is not coincidental. In a speech at the 8th Conference of the *IISS Global Strategic Review*, Henry Kissinger stated that the "*centre of gravity of the world business left the Atlantic and shifted to the Pacific and Indian Oceans*"[15] where the

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[12] Stephen Foster, *Rare earths: why China is cutting exports crucial to Western technologies*, The Telegraph,19.03.2011,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/8385189/Rare-earths-why-China-is-cutting-exports-crucial-to-Western-technologies.html

[13] Keith Bradsher, *Unlocking a Grip on Rare Metals*, The New York Times, 15.12.2010, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9904EFDD133DF936A25751C1A9669D8B63&ref=rareearths&pagewanted=2

[14] *Producătorii auto germani, ingrijorați de aprovizionarea cu metale rare*, Green Report, 25.10.2010, http://www.green-report.ro/producatorii-auto-germani-ingrijorati-de-aprovizionarea-cu-metale-rare/

[15] Dieter Faerwick, Philipp Hauenstein, *The 8th IISS Global Strategic Review in Geneva – an emerging new world order*, 14.10.2010, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/Other/and-Philipp-Hauenstein-Dieter-Farwick/The-8th-IISS-Global-Strategic-Review-in-Geneva-an-emerging-new-world-order.

political-economic interests of the current hegemon and three of its competitors which may challenge the current world order (China, Russia and India) confront. The USA find themselves in the situation to look for solution to a problem with a medium and long term explosive potential. The stake of the game is represented by the preservation of the current unique world hegemon, a matter which implies both the discovery of alternative resources and the discovery, control and exploitation of new REM deposits, as well as the creation of a policy of alliances meant to counterbalance the Chinese monopoly. In an article published in *The New York Times* in October 2010[16] it is stated that the current Chinese monopoly is the consequence of the decision by the USA and their allies to abandon the production of REM for ecological reasons, being well known that the processing of these chemical elements implies very high risks of environment pollution, both by radiation adn by toxic agents. In the same article it is said that only 37% of the certain global reserves would be in China, the rest being on the territories of other states, like the USA, Canada, Australia, India, Brazil and others. In these circumstances, there are more and more opinions pleading in favour of the re-opening of the mines on American territory in parallel with the attempt to take over the control over the exploitation of these types of deposits in emerging states like the ones in Africa and Asia. It is highly unlikely that a remarkable increase in the production of rare metals in the North American and European states will succeed, because of the restrictive policies with regard to the protection of the environment and the opposition of the public opinion. However, the same thing is not valid in global spaces that are less sensitive to issues related to ecology, such as African and Asian states. In this sense, India decided to open off-shore mining areas meant to exploit the deposits in the tidelands of the Indian Ocean, while Malaysia and Kazakhstan[17] publicly announced their decision to develop rare metals extraction and processing capacities, signing agreements with American and European partners[18]. But the area that is most envisaged by the powers involved in this geopolitical game undoubtedly remains Africa, where states like *Egypt, Nigeria, Mozambique, Mali, Angola, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo* hold deposits of rare metals that are still not exploited. Because these ores come from an area known to be one of the most conflictual in the world, they received the name of *"conflict minerals"* and their use, at least at a formal level, was subjected to regulations decided by the EU and applicable only within the EU. These regulations, proposed by the *Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition*[19] and that entered into force on 1 April 2011, aim to stop the use of these raw materials if they originate in conflict areas and, due to their high price on the

[16] Keith Bradsher, *China's Rare Earth Embargo Changes Incentive for Toxic Work*, The New York Times, 29.10.2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/30/business/global/30rare.html?ref=rareearths

[17] Melissa Eddy, *Germany and Kazakhstan Sign Rare Earth Agreement*, The New York Times, 09.02.2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/09/business/global/germany-and-kazakhstan-sign-rare-earths-agreement.html?ref=rareearths&_r=0

[18] Keith Bradsher, *Malaysia Plan Meets Standards, U.N. Agency Says*, The New York Times, 30.06.2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/business/global/01lynas.html?ref=rareearths

[19] http://www.eicc.info/

free market, they become economic stakes for the maintaining of cleavages. At the end of 2010, the European Commission publicly announced that the Europeans are interested in drafting a long time strategy meant to counter the Chinese monopoly in the field of REM production[20], looking in this regard to the African states that have such deposits. The proposals, that had a diverse character from bilateral commercial agreements to investments in the transport, energy and environment infrastructure, were included in a strategic document[21] signed by the European Commissioner for Industry and Entrepreneurship, Antonio Tajani. The document stipulates the fact that these resources have a vital character to the industrial sectors like the car manufacturing and high technologies ones. Also, it mentions the fact that the Europeans will also look for rare metals in the countries of South America, they will strengthen their economic relations with Russia, Canada, India and other states that produce such resources. At the same time, the Europeans decided the allocation of funds for research on resources alternative to this type of minerals. In May 2013, Japan announced that will invest two billion USD[22] in projects related to the African energy and mining area, not accidentally aiming at states like the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique, known for having unexploited resources of REM. In June 2012 the Obama administration issued a document referring to the US strategy regarding the Sub-Saharan Africa[23], which demonstrates the importance that the Americans currently give to this space, in the past considered an area of marginality. President Obama states in this document that "*looking to the future, it is extremely clear that Africa is more important than ever to the security and prosperity of the international community and to the United States in particular*" and he supports the necessity to develop a "*comprehensive, proactive policy, focused on future developments that will balance the short term imperatives and the long term interests*" mentioning that two objectives will be of great importance to the future of Africa, (described in the document as "critical"), namely to "*strengthen the democratic institutions and to accelerate the growth of local economies through investments and trade*". The American strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa will be built on three pillars: the strengthening of democratic institutions, the stimulation of economic growth, trade exchanges and investments, the promotion of peace and security and the promotion of development opportunities, each with well established steps, the final target being, of course, to re-gain the US dominant position in Africa and, *in extenso*, their control over the African rare metals and oil deposits.

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[20] Judy Dempsey, *E.U. Seeks Strategy to Reduce Reliance on China for Rare Earths*, 25.11.2010, The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/26/business/global/26rare.html?ref=rareearths

[21] http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/tajani/hot-topics/raw-materials/

[22] Mari IWATA, Yuko TAKEO, *Japan Set to Invest in African Resources*, The Wall Street Journal, Sunday, May 19, 2013 As of 10:57 AM, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323463704578492760704384652.html

[23] U.S. STRATEGY TOWARD SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 14 iunie 2012 http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/africa_strategy_2.pdf

From another perspective, Beijing's policy to economically conquer Africa, by way of advantageous loans without heavy political and economic conditions, put out of the game the financial instruments with which the Westerners used to impose their point of view in this area. The vehement criticism by Paul Wolfowitz, the president of the World Bank[24], of how China would breach the "*Equator Principles*"[25], a set of rules for the financing of developing states, based on economic, social, ecologic criteria voluntarily and unilaterally established by a group of Western banks, confirmed the fact that the Wall Street bankers lost the game to the Asian ones. The objections regarding China's collaboration with African tyrants remained without effect. Furthermore, this policy that the Westerners continue to use proved to be extremely disadvantageous. In 2012, Bernard Membe, the Tanzanian minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation considered China as "*the greatest ally of the African continent*" who, "*regardless of whether an African country is devastated by civil war, drought, floods or epidemics, it is there to stretch a helping hand*".[26] Compared to 2010, the commercial exchanges between the two global spaces increase by a third[27] reaching an amount of 114 billion USD, challenging the American-African commercial exchanges and outnumbering by far those of the former colonial powers. All these powers find themselves on the African chess board in an attempt to gain as much of the control over the resources of this space as possible. In this context, the resources of African rare earths become a geostrategic stake of maximum importance.

Conclusions

The future belongs to high civilian and military technologies. The American economist Jeremy Rifkin stated that the technology of the internet and the renewable energies are the engines of the *third industrial revolution* [28]that will mark the end of the dominance of fossil fuels and of the current world order. But the wind turbines contain rare materials and so do the photovoltaic panels and all that is last generation technological system. Consequently, those who produce and process these resources will be the main beneficiaries of the new industrial revolution and will preserve or change the current world order. Dependency gives birth to vulnerability. We are witnessing a paradox, the great Western powers become dependent on emerging powers, an extremely sensitive and potentially explosive issue unless strategies to counter the current Asian monopoly on REM concretize. The key lies in a space left outside any interest

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[25] *Equator Principles*, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equator_Principles .
[26] *Membe says FOCAC crucial in boosting Africa-China ties*, The Guardian, 18.07.2012, http://www.ippmedia.com/ frontend/index.php?l=43773.
[27] *Africa–China relations*, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Africa%E2%80%93China_relations.
[28] http://www.thethirdindustrialrevolution.com/.

by strategists lacking global vision, namely Africa and especially Sub-Saharan Africa.

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SECURITY AND FOOD SAFETY

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In the wider context of cutting-edge approaches in the field of security, we do not neglect to be emphasize the fact that alongside areas already known, or in full affirmation, such as cyber security and energy, another area is about to represent a challenge for the security environment- food security. Demographic imbalances and a world divided between North and South, between rich and poor, to which a needed resource in geometric progression is added, have determined that food issues having a stringent character, especially in the underdeveloped world. Poverty and famine go hand in hand, giving expression to social inequities and negative effects of globalization, and food security, with its product, food insecurity, has counterbalance devastating effects of food safety, expression of food excess and unhealthy food.

Keywords: *food security; food safety; severe Poverty; famine;Obesity; minimum basket.*

Introduction

The starting point of our approach, may be constituted by the etymology of the term security, coming from the Latin word securitas/securitatis, maintaining the original meaning, relating to the lack of care, unbarring the human phenomenon, or a life reality. According to DALY, security refers to the certainty "of being sheltered from any danger; the feeling of confidence and serenity given by the absence of harm". The term is the source for the structuring of other phrases, such as "national security", "energy security", "food security" and other phrases. Theoretical approaches are far from unanimous acceptance of a comprehensive definition of the concept of security. Semantic content is in a permanent change in the interests of the States, the thought platforms of some schools or a series of subjective elements. Thus, it can be affirmed that the conceptual and operational aspects of national security are in constant motion.

In light of these determinations, the strategy of national security of Romania considers that "national security is the fundamental condition for the existence of the nation and of the Romanian State and a basic objective of governance; It has the range of reference values, national interests and objectives ". More specifically, national security refers to the ability of a geopolitical actor regarding protection of fundamental national values, the preservation of the capacity of effective engagement in the international context in the light of their own interests. In this connection, it may be argued that national security concerns unitary ensemble of measures and actions of the political-diplomatic, economic, military, social, technological, environmental and other sanctions designed to ensure independence and national sovereignty,

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territorial integrity, national constitutional order, along with the affirmation of one's own system of professional values in the regional and international system.

Safety can be assessed as also being a balance between the power factors of internal or external origin, which manifests itself at a state level, and where appropriate, as a counterweight to hostile induced/product level, will be assessed against and ability to reduce aggression through different measures (the use of force, alliances and deterrence, peaceful forms). Safety assessment requires weighting of elements of manifestation and effort to counteract any imbalance prevailed in global, regional, and national. That way the analysis is determined by damage to their own balance member affected, produced from external reasons major which can degrade the steady state. It should, however, be considered that democracies don't fight one other, and the democratic states finding themselves in a complex interdependence. Political and economic integration should be designed to be a real source of security. Also, globalization must generate more security for human groups, even in the conditions of a reduction in the sovereignty member, as well as an increase in the overall authority and regional organizations.

1. The manifestation context of food security

The dimensions on the definition food safety can be of several types. Hold between them on those not symmetrical, explanatory and instrumental. Benchmarking means providing an image, a representation, a model of current global phenomenon, a form of manifestation of the contemporary world. This guidance takes account of the facts that highlight the connections which exist in national security. Instrumental errors (praxiological),provide models of work already constructed, ensure seamless action guides. Food security is driven by the decisive elements relating to human society, and is marked by the presence and development of various factors, at stages known for the development of human society. With regard to the forms of application, food security can be analyzed under multiple forms. Based on levels of application, it can be analyzed through the prism of individuals, family, state (national), regional or global. The individual is considered to be the baseline level of expression. The family may be relevant for the analysis on-the-spot possible situations, especially on the angle of interest of the media. National level can be considered to be the most important level of analysis. This priority results out of that specific elements of the role of specific international community (sovereignty, place, weighted), as well as developing relationships with other similar systems.

In the context of the international environment, regional or global analysis' can be made. The analyses may also be carried out at the national level, either individually or through the systems of States (alliances, coalitions, partnerships, other systems). Regional data are less relevant compared to the overall level or national, so it must be emphasized the interest of the analyses

conducted and completed at the national level, continental and global, because of their relevance.

In 1996, countries participating at the World Food summit took the view that food safety consists in ensuring physical access and cost of the whole populations, at any time, to the food, under conditions of sufficiency, security, and having a high nutrient content, in order to ensure that they meet requirements and preferences, in order to achieve active living and healthy conditions.

Food security is given by the capacity of each statute relating to the planning, insurance, distribution, protection, processing and on the use of the resources of food for consumption needs of the population, while maintaining free access to economic resources originating from outside country. It involves ensuring the necessary resources in requested quantities, total or partial industrialization of food production, support and food distribution in the territory, making it possible to store and market listed varieties, as well as viable alternatives and the existence of internal circuits of supply and distribution. Resource availability in social programs represents a mandatory condition for ensuring food safety. Food safety is, first and foremost, a quantitative element, illustrating the amount of food necessary to a human being at the same level as the common human metabolism. According to statistics, the achievement of food safety is possible only for a maximum of 25 - 30% of people around the world. It is a known and painful reality that access to the resources of food is not possible for all the people, for various reasons (Berca, 2004).

Specialized data analysis has shown that, for human food, organic matter derived from agricultural ecosystems, accounts for more than 93 %. The difference of food may be procured from natural ecosystems, terrestrial (harvesting of forest berries, fungi, hunting, etc.), or belonging to aquatic ecosystems, natural or artificial, (fish, marine creatures, crustaceans). It is noted that agriculture is the basis of food production, holding an important role in food security (Berca, 2004). It is essential that food security is examined in close connection with two concepts whose social consequences are of the highest importance, if not essential in any aspect of society that has to do with stability/instability: the threshold poverty and severe poverty threshold.

The poverty threshold is reflected by the total expenditure allocated for food on a family level, an amount equal to the minimum cost basket. It is considered that these families structure only the necessary for food consumption per day.

The severe poverty threshold. As it is known, in practice families add the non-food services costs to the food costs. In the gritty reality (being required to cover taxes, duties, needs of drugs, other extra costs), poor families are spending only strictly necessary to cover various other components of consumption, the result being a dramatic decrease of the food basket.

The social phenomenon of poverty comes with an obligation to review several issues. The causes of poverty should be explained on a fundamental

basis, as part of the political reality of each state with limited financial and economic possibilities. In this sense, poverty is an unfavorable social status, the pauperization of broadening social isolated cases.

The social protection expenditures are relatively difficult to manage. They mainly consist of : expenditure on social benefits, administrative costs, and other expenses. Expenditure on social benefits are represented by the amount of resources allocated to social protection, to the beneficiaries, in the form of money or payment in kind (goods and\/or services). Administrative costs are the expenses for organization and implementation of systems and means of social protection. In this context, the citizen's income must be carried out in accordance with a minimal threshold, which should not be placed under the minimum allowable quota.

Severe poverty: as it is known, in practice, the food costs and adds families the cost of manufactured goods. In the harsh reality (to cover taxes, needs medication, other additional costs), families spend pauper that necessary to cover various other components of consumption, making drastic reductions of the food basket.

In our country, the methodology of work regarding the minimum monthly consumption is approved by the National Commission indexing (CNI), the structure what has worked as advisory body in addition to the Government of Romania. Among other things, CNI adoption was that the task structure, components, and in minimum monthly basket (CMCL). CMCL has been reported to the prices of October 2000 by Ordinance 217/2000, which was approved by the law 554/2001. The minimum monthly basket has a hypothetical consumption for "the 2,804 person family". CMCL structure was comprised of expenses for the acquisition of medium products, needed for living, according to the table below: The content minimum monthly basket (according to Internet).

Food products	
- 3,08 kg of flour	- 5,8 kg of cornflower
- 31,9 kg of bread	- 1,4 kg of rice
- 0,5 kg of bakery products	- 0,7 kg of pasta products
- 2,1 kg beans	- 13,1 kg potatoes
- 1,6 kg root	- 3,8 kg sauerkraut and pickles
- 2,5 kg dry onion	- 0,8 kg bile
- 0,6 kg tinned vegetables	- 3 kg apples
- 0,5 kg citrus fruits	- 0,7 kg canned fruit
- 0,7 kg of meat of bovine	- 2,5 kg pork
- 2,8 kg of meat of poultry	- 0,4 kg of sheep meat
- 2,5 kg of meat products	- 0,8 kg of fresh fish and frozen
- 14,8 liters fresh milk	- 0,7 liters of buttermilk
- 1,1 kg cow's cheese	- 0,7 kg cottage cheese from sheep
- 0,9 kg fresh cheese and sour cream	- 42 eggs
- 2,8 liters edible oil	- 0,7 kg lard
- 0,561 kg margarine	- 2,8 kg sugar
- 0,1 kg chocolate and candy	- 2,3 liters of non-alcoholic

	beverages
Non-food products	
- clothing	- knitwear
- footwear	- books and scholastic materials
- drugs	- articles of hygiene etc
Others	
- water	- drain
- health	- electricity (84,10 kwh)
- thermal energy (0.86 Gcal)	- gases (29,16 Cubic Meters)
- subscription radio, TV	- telephone (50 pulses)
- public transport (42 passengers)	- medical services
-taxes	- other.

The CMCL has been updated quarterly by the National Statistics Institute, the values being approved by Executive Decision. Last judgment was promulgated in 2003 for the approval of the second quarter basket of the year in question. Subsequently, the calculation of the minimum monthly basket was not published. In the year 2004 CMCL approval has been eliminated by law, not further being the basis for calculating minimum monthly wage in the economy. We mention that CMCL has a value of at least 2,000 RON. Also, in reality,as from 01 July 2013, the minimum wage in the economy is 800 RON.

2. Absolute dimension

It refers to the amount of funds necessary to ensure the minimum existence, procured at the lowest prices. For this analysis, costs for components of a monthly minimal basket are pictured, that cumulates the food demands and the medical care. In calculating this, specialists in nutrition and health care are involved, structuring their analysis on representative samples (genre, age, physical or intellectual activity). Out of the reality of these calculations, the share of the food cost exceeds 50% in the case poor families. Of course, there might be many imperfections to this modality of calculation of the minimum cost, such as:

-the minimum caloric theory is valid only as a tool, because the practical need of calories for large periods of time has increased a lot, generating major health disorders when not met;

-calculation theoretically loses sight of high costs, such as housing, transport, maintenance of various unexpected expenses, payment of duties and taxes, attending social or religious events, etc.;

-certain social categories, such as children, pregnant women, people with medical conditions, require a different basket daily, structured to carry out an optimal level, at the expense of minimal threshold;

-theoretical calculations concerning the consumption of disadvantaged categories are majorly influenced by the geographical layout, culinary traditions, individual requirements, age structure, habits, sex or religion.

The absolute dimension contributes to the approximation of the poor elements of the state, through statistical estimation of the population living below the minimum threshold for subsistence. Through absolute poverty the target group situation is examined, situated within the limits of ensuring a minimum or partial monthly basket. The Calculation does not necessarily mean the starving of individuals, but the insufficiency of life possibilities and access to resources that ensure a minimum social comfort. On a medium term, absolute poverty generates damage to the psycho-social opportunities and on the long-term generates irreversible biological damage.

3. Relative Size

It is a method of reporting self-perception at individual level. As a method of calculation, self perception requires reporting the living standard of an isolated citizen with a target group or an adjacent social environment. The pauper category of the society feels it is considerably disadvantaged, compared to other privileged categories. In order to estimate the share of poor people out of the entire population polls and surveys can be used. The subjects might state their position on the revenue scale. It is clear that the method in question is prone to subjectivity, since most of the people questioned have a tendency to overstate earnings as opposed to expenses. Using relative dimension calculation, the pauper category number of the can be greatly increased, compared to using the absolute dimension method. Relative poverty relating to households per diem includes the sample socio-human that provides low-income, but which nonetheless opposed with a little "daily basket", look that it located at the top of survival.

Relative poverty regarding subsistence households comprises the social human sample that ensures limited earnings that exceed by little the daily basket. This aspect situates it at the top level of subsistence. Relative poverty is based on the lack of minimal level of resources that ensure a normal functioning of the individual and the family in the existent social and cultural environment. It draws the individual away from the social life mechanisms, reducing the chances of normal social involvement. Relative poverty does not exclude the individual out of the social and economical frame, but can generate multiple frustrations due to the lack of resources that ensure active involvement in the organization’s existence.

The relative dimension ensures a strictly statistical dimension regarding the calculation of the poor population quota, done by comparison to the medium income, minimal wage and other markers. In a market economy the social protection expenses are some of the most important expenses. These measures comprise: unemployment, professional integration aid, welfare, professional formation expenses, payments for the stimulation and support of unemployed persons that find jobs prior to the expiration of their unemployment aid,

payments for stimulating the work force, compensatory payments for restructuring, close-outs and buy-outs (Statistical almanac of Romania 2009).

Unemployment constitutes an economic phenomenon with broad negative influences to society, being generating by the processes of recoil, restructuring and adaptation of the national economy to the demands of competition characteristic of the market economy. Functioning of the internal economy in market economy conditions allows for the emergence and growth of unemployment, magnified in Romania during the last few decades.

In countries with a consolidated economy, unemployment may be seen as a natural phenomenon, generating a competitive climate, generated by the surplus of manpower. These states, having economic power at their disposal, are able to control the phenomenon, providing effective social protection for those who have lost their jobs. Romania faces the dramatic reality that unemployment constitutes a catastrophic phenomenon, owing to the disastrous economic situation, poor governance and degradation of the labor market, as well as the lack adequate social protection. Adding to this is the mentality of the population towards the phenomenon of unemployment (fear, as this phenomenon did not exist prior to 1989). Unemployment, as a chronic disease of the economic system, cannot be completely eradicated, but only improved and maintained decent levels. For correcting it, specific policies concerning employment need to be applied, along with the creation of a legal framework adequate to sustain citizen affirmation and institutions specialized in the internal labor market.

4. The ratio existing between food security and safety

The ratio of security and food safety is close enough. The two terms are far from being synonymous, but are complementary.

Food Safety defines the qualitative function of human food. This term has been used on a more recent date, in order to define the role of food, in particular as far as being part of security.

Twenty percent of the world's population consumes about 80 percent of the food resources of the world. The current population of 6.8 billion people can reach 8.9 billion in 2050, stabilizing itself to 9 billion inhabitants in the year 2300. It is already known that food is insufficient to 2/3 of world population. In the course of the present degradation of the soil’s fertility, in conjunction with the increase in population, the deficit of food will deepen dramatically in the future.

Ensuring food safety interacts with the mechanism generating crisis. At the top of the hierarchy we find the interests of big finances on a global level, followed by the battle for power and influence. Next bearing is given by the battle for resources, which can generate a multitude of crises: political, economic, financial, environmental, power, others. What's important is that these crises coexist, further increasing the difficulty in managing these conflicts.

Malnutrition is in reality an imbalance (deficit or surplus) for the intake of nutrients and other food components, strictly necessary for a healthy life. Healthy life contributes to the achievement of macro elements and trace elements. Macro elements provide the basis for cell development and constitute a source of energy, being represented by protein, fat and carbon hydrates. Energy intake brought the body is four calories per gram of carbohydrates and proteins and nine calories burned when grease. Trace elements provide training and harmonious functioning of the body, being represented by the vitamins and minerals (iron, calcium, and vitamins A-E). In essence, they help macro elements to produce effects in the body (Postel, 2000).

Malnutrition knows three forms: hunger, lack of vitamins and minerals and .overeating. Hunger is the most severe form of malnutrition, affecting nearly a quarter of the world's population. FAO estimates that 21% of the Indian population is affected. But it turns out that 49% of adults and 53% of Indian children are underweight. The current state is likely to worsen, given the increase in population and the galloping precarious economic and social life, including the assault on the natural environment (Postel, 2000). Poverty is not necessarily due to lack of food but can also be caused by the limited access of the target groups to the food market.

Overeating knows a higher prevalence than ever. And so, to the food security analysis in terms of food safety, you must add the human factors that lead to increased body weight of the human person (causing obesity), lowering the possibility of combating human diseases, increased dependency on drugs and excess food, obtaining reduction potential of counteracting aggression factors on the human body.

The number of overweight people tends to equal the number of underweight. Excessive feeding leads to obesity. As body weight increases, the average life expectancy decreases. The risk of dying increases with each additional ½ kg of body weight. Eliminating the risk of overweight, requires the use of simple solutions: reducing by consent the quantity of consumed foods, giving up on driving to work and home, reducing hours of TV viewing, using a bike, daily exercising. The local municipal administration needs to take appropriate measures, such as walking, biking, promoting campaigns to increase awareness of the risks posed by obesity (Brown, 2000).

From a medical point of view, the body mass index (BMI) is well known, calculated by the ratio of weight and height. As an evaluation method, the index may place the person being tested in one of the following categories:

-18.49-or less-underweight could;
-18.50-24.99-normal weight (healthy);
-25.00-29.99-overweight;
-30.00-34.99-obesity (grade I);
-35.00-39.99-obesity (grade II);
-40.00 or more-morbidly obese.

Due to massive consumption, unbalanced and abundance of harmful chemicals in food, the US leads the obesity chart. The proportion of obese individuals is located at more than 23% of the total population. It is significant that the proportion of overweight individuals has increased as well in China, Brazil, Colombia, as well as in Europe. The biggest role in this was played by advertising. The most publicized foods actually have a questionable nutritional value (Brown, 2000).

People having an inadequate consumption of vitamins and minerals can be found both undernourished and a part of supercharged macro groups . Deficiencies are induced by the unbalanced consumption of food, given the lack of variety in food (French fries, hamburgers or rice). It is known that a low consumption of three micronutrients (iodine, vitamin A and iron) is quite spread out, forming a global problem. Lack of iodine affects about 13 percent of the world's population, leading to mental disorders or blindness. The remedy may consist of regular administration of iodine pills or iodizing the salt use in foods. Lack of iron affects approximately 80% of mankind (almost 5 billion people). Lack of iron can cause anemia and cognitive impairments. The remedy is a permanent consumption of green-leafed vegetables (Postel, 2000).

Conclusions

Food security must guarantee the human right to existence. Food safety should represent the balance state through which citizens can protected from hazards induced by the production, preparation, processing and consumption of food, bringing a feeling of confidence, peace and comfort at the macro social level induced and the individual. It should summarize the efforts and measures for the protection of the citizen against a wide range of threats, including the dangerous use of constituents that pose a health risk.

The state of comfort comes with a regular consumption of vegetables and animal food necessary to the human existence. Food safety is reported to the biological qualities of agricultural, plant or animal production, as the case may be. As a result, the bio-economical sciences need to consider the interdependency of them and the natural environment, as well as the evolution of human economy and of the natural frame in time and space. As a result of multiple implications, food safety, and food security can be reviewed on different levels of global, regional, national and local interest.

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THE PECULIARITY OF FEMINIST APPROACH OF SECURITY

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In our study, we start from the basic premises of the need to reassess the methodology deriving from the paradigmatic innovations appeared in time and as well as the transformation of the national and international security environment.

One of the new faces of security is given by the peculiarity of feminist approach in regard to this concept in the International Relations framework. This new approach we want to emphasize in our paper.

Keywords*: security, IR, feminism, think-tanks, paradigm.*

Security is a complex and intriguing concept - charged with feelings and deeply enrooted values. The great majority of the people agree a security matter appears when somebody - a person, a gang or a group of a state - threatens the living, physical integrity or the subsistence means of somebody else; for example, on a dark alley an armed individual attacks somebody else's wallet or life.

If we start from a wide and comprehensive understanding of security, synonymous with any other thing in the observer's mind, then it means to affirm almost each human value and interest, if the damaged part perceives as threat, it constitutes a security matter. Maybe happens because we involve to many information in our definition on security thus the issue makes it impossible for us to find out more about this human preoccupation of such vital importance. This can happen also inversely, if we will adopt more limited conception on security, identified only with force and coercive threats, we might exclude actors and factors of essential meaning.

If we do not discover a common basis for this, we will speak about different things assigned as security. We unconsciously will be grounding on conceptual filters projecting contrasting and reflected images of security and the means to approach it.

1. Re-theorization of security paradigm

The necessity to reassess the methodology derives from the *paradigmatic innovations* appeared in time as well as from the transformation of the national and international security environment. Under this concept, the classical example is of the post-Cold War period. Thus before it, the problem of economic dimension of security was considered adjacent to the core problem of military security. Nowadays, the specialty studies try to infirm this theory by the approach of the multidimensional nature of national and international security. The social dynamics scheme ongoing transformation is simple: the modification

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of external circumstances determines the modification of the social practises, which, at their turn, transform the conditional provisions and, in the end, the absolute provisions. The scheme reflects the connection between social representations and social changes, the historical evolutions of society. The events reach social groups and involve their subjects constituting a stake that cannot be neglected.

Consequently, security cannot be analyzed anymore in terms of political choices, capabilities and intentions of state, because the vulnerabilities, risks, dangers and threats against security gained today systemic significance. For example, the restraining of security definition to the *territorial integrity* or *national interests* concepts determines the exclusion from analysis of social threats against the internal or international security. The redefining of security thus to also involve the economic dimension as separated elements with equal importance it is concomitant with the preoccupation to also identify the other dimensions of a new security agenda (macroeconomic policies, cultural, political, environmental etc. factors).

2. Feminist theories in the International Relations

Feminism[1] is a theoretical and action doctrine supporting the fight against the genre inequalities, promoting the woman affirmation in society by the improvement and enlargement of her role and rights. *„The doctrine should not be confused with the simple request of some rights*"[2].

Feminist contributions comprise a variety of directions to approach but all have in common the intuition that the genre counts in the understanding of functioning manner of the International Relations, particularly in issues of war or international security[3].

There are distinguished three types of feminist theories offering heuristic instruments for this field of research:

1) *empiric feminism* - is focused on women and/or explores the genre as empirical dimension of the International Relations, corrects the denial or misrepresentation of women in the world politics, produced by false assumptions the men experiences can be representative for men, as well for women, and the women are absent from the international political activities or irrelevant for the global processes - the feminist researches show the states wherein is greater inequality of genre are more predisposed to involve in a war or to use the violence;

2) *analytical feminism* - uses genre as theoretical category to emphasize the pre-judgements of genre associated to the International Relations concepts and to explain the constitutive aspects of the International Relations. Thus, the hegemonic image of manhood is associated with the autonomy, sovereignty, the

[1] Ştefan MIHĂILESCU, *Din istoria feminismului românesc. Studiu şi antologie de texte* (1929-1948), Editura Polirom Bucureşti, 2006, p. 52.
[2] Mihaela MIROIU, *Drumul către autonomie. Teorii politice feministe,* Editura Polirom, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 110.
[3] Joshua S. GOLDSTEIN, Jon C. PEVEHOUSE, *Relaţii Internaţionale,* Editura Polirom, 2008, p. 160.

inclination to thinking, objectivity and rationalism and the term dominated by womanhood is associated with the lack of these characteristics;

3) *normative feminism* reflects on the theorization process as part of normative agenda for political and social changes in the sense of doubting certain senses and interpretations from the International Relations Theory[4].

As branches of feminism we can list the following:

a) difference feminism focused on the valuation of feminism, of unique contributions of women as women;

b) liberal feminism regards the "essential" differences or perspectives of women and men as being trivial or inexistent;

c) Marxist feminism understands the genre relations as constitutive elements of social relations, as fundamental institutions for the good functioning of society;

d) *perspective feminism* considers the historical, social genre identity of the author influences the theorization manner;

e) *postmodernist feminism* tends to reject the assumptions about genre done by difference and liberal feminist by considering those differences to be arbitrary and flexible.

In our country, Mihaela Miroiu and Laura Grunberg studies are among the first trials to present to the public the ideas and problematic of feminism.

In Romania, between 1866 and 1932, women did not have the right to sign any administrative act but with the permission of the husband or justice, they could not take advantage of their heritage either of their revenues accomplished along their marriage, they did not have the tutoring right and they also were compelled to have their domicile settled by the husband, they do not have heritage rights if they do not have children, they have limited access to education, they were forbidden the right to vote or profess in certain fields etc.

Among the feminine personalities who wrote the history for women civilian and political rights are: Sarmiza Bîlcescu (1867-1935) - the first woman in the world getting the award as PhD in Law (Sorbonne University) and first woman lawyer in Europe; Ella Negruzzi (1876-1948) – the first lawyer woman in Romania; Alexandrina Cantacuzino (1877-1944); the writer Adela Xenopol; Margaret Hilda Thatcher (13 October 1925) - former prime-minister of the United Kingdom since 1979 until 1990; Madeleine K. Albright, the first woman as US Secretary of State; Condoleezza Rice – former US Secretary of State (2005-2009) and Counsellor on homeland security matters of G. W. Bush (2001-2005); Angela Dorothea Merkel – the first woman-Chancellor from the history of Federal Republic of Germania; Veronica Michele Bachelet Jena (29 September 1951) - president of Chile, the first woman occupying this function in her country history; Pratibha Devisingh Patil (l9 December 1934) - the twelfth and the actual president of Republic of India and the first woman with such function in her country.

[4] Andrei MIROIU; Radu Sebastian UNGUREANU (coord.), *op. cit.*, p. 166.

An approach of the feminist contributions ensemble to the study of International Relations is a difficult trial because it presumes a synthesis of many theories or think-tanks.

The second observation is when we discuss about feminism in the International Relations, if we wish to respect the scientific rigor; we must clearly treat few distinctive types of theories of feminist inspiration in the International Relations and, consequently, the genre approaches of some concrete phenomena of today reality and international relations.

Feminism brings in the International Relations a new theoretical agenda and a new research agenda by rethinking older international phenomena and communicating in a new language or putting in the centre of focus of international realities ignored until now in the traditional researches.

Very brief characterization of each feminist theoretical trend of international relations can bring more content and clarity to these introductive considerations. Their diminution to a single trend is impossible owed to the diversity and, particularly because between them there are significant epistemological, methodological, ontological and axiological disparities, in the late decades, the main feminist political theories acquired projections in the International Relations field as discipline although appeared latter then their "equivalent" in pure political theory.

The Marxist feminism is the second phase to theorize the genre as support element for the critics of consecrated international theories and practices. The characteristics of Marxist feminism is the understanding of genre relations as constitutive elements of the social relations, as fundamental institutions for the good being of societies installed on imposition or negotiation between the groups which power is substantially different. The genre difference is an individual matter, as the relations among sexes are not at first a private matter. They are social realities manipulated in time in order to serve by the understanding and organization of these relations the dominant class interests.

The critical theory feminism is other main theory in the contemporary feminist studies of the International Relations to be comprised in the phase of genre as constitutive element. As more recent trend ('90s), over it are spread Marxist influences particularly the importance of material accuses in the societies evolution, Gramscien influences - each society is the scene of a dialectic conflict between the forces interested in the statu-quo and the forces interested in change - and post-positivist influences as conceiving knowledge as subjective, limited and always asserted to some hardly perceived interests. The critical theory feminism embodies the basic distinction operated by Robert Cox among the theories oriented toward the problems resolution and the critical ones.

The constructivist feminism is the fourth main theoretical trend in the study of the International Relations mainly characterized by the approach of identity issues in the international politics, the mechanisms to produce the collective and institutional identities and the interactions implications:

international to build, recognize or infirm the identities assumed on external plan.

The perspective feminism is today one of the best represented lines of feminist research in the International Relations, the analysis and critics of genre assumptions implicitly in the field, as it was defined and theorized until now. The perspective feminism considers the historical, social genre identity of the author; the theoretician influences the manner of theorization. The masculine identity of all the authors from the International Relations constitutes one of the explanations of the fact the discipline and the international reality are understood and projected in conformity to a masculine vision over the world.

The postmodern feminism is a trend of International Relations theorization winning importance in the second part of '90s and in 2000[5]. Of course, if we respect the general postmodernism ideas as the postmodernism contests any objective essence, "natural" of realities, including a common identity of women in space and time, which can feed a feminist approach.

A honest approach but less informed referring to the genre problematic in the International Relations but particularly in the existent speciality literature scenery in Romania would start, most probably, from the idea little things can be more different and lacking connection to the international world then the incontestable existence of some genre differences.

Owed to the standard image of the International Relations - as world of power, conflict, war and anarchy; indeed, what can be far from apparent then the existence of women and the universe of specific feminine assumed values of the emotional, aesthetics, natural, caring, weakness and dependence without intersections with the international world values. Nevertheless, the present study synthesizes the most important feminist theoretical trends in the International Relations showing step by step the mean how the redefinition of the field lead to the excluding of other values, concepts, behaviours in the international sphere and as corollary the mean we redefine the redefinition can enlarge and modify the international sphere.

By studying the feminist papers on the international world, we can see this orient the most often to three directions. The first intends to emphasize the women existed in the International Relations and until now but their role was ignored. It is an approach present particularly to the liberal feminist without limiting to these. The war itself is described in another form.

The second main category of feminist literature in International Relations is focused on the thorough critics of consecrated theories from the premises to the last theoretical and even practical consequences. It is the best represented category in the literature of the late decades and in the great majority of feminist theoretical trends.

Finally, the third type of feminist literature in the international field caught shape in the late ten decades as the departure from the timid beginnings

[5] While the perspective feminism asserts since `80, by few reference papers of Cynthia Enloe, Jean Bethke Elshtain and Sara Ruddick.

and the amazing development of sub-domain facilitated a qualitative jump of research. The third category reunites these papers which transcend the critics or lead further in order to propose coherent, grounded re-theorization of international realities and even more in order to generate processes of innovation of practices, actors and rules.

Postmodernism, as feminism and constructivism, is wide approach of research which left the print on different academic disciplines, particularly on the literature study. Because of the literary roots, postmodernists grants particular attention to texts and speeches - the manner how people speak and read about their subject (International Relations).

In their vision, the speeches are not controlled by individuals, but rather they have power of their own by the fact it generates a particular knowledge including the central concepts and definitions of problems with which operates and which many times accepted without discussions. This means there is none undisputed "truth" about "nature" or human life. Still, this does not means the postmodernist would not look critically the hierarchic structures. A truth they contest is, for example, the distinction between the knowledge strives taught in schools and universities and the myths, legends, the "good sense" terms transmitted from generation to generation through families and local communities[6]. In conformity with the postmodern thinkers, a speech is not only a narration or a story about something or somebody but a practise systematically forming or creating objects about which are speaking about.

Postmodernism is preoccupied by the exposure of "textual interferences behind the power politics". "The reality" of power politics is always already constituted by textual and the written issues.

From these positions, the postmodernists criticized the realism saying it cannot justify the vindication the states are the central actors of the International Relations and the states functions as united actors with coherent sets of objective interests. Moreover, the postmodern critics of realism do not see anything objective or universal in the states' interests and the states it considers them as "fictions" without a tangible reality but they were created to give sense to the individuals actions. For modernists, states are not united actors but they are multiple realities and experiences hidden under the surface of the fictive entities built from realities (for example, the Soviet Union was treated by the realists as a single actor, but it disguised the divergent experiences of the component republics).

The double reading exposes the relation between the stability effects and destabilizations by using an analysis grounded on a double reading - the first reading is a commentary/repetition of the dominant interpretation and closely represents the dominant narration by repeating the fundamental steps of the argument and proving how the text, the speech are coherent and consistent with themselves; the second reading destabilizes it emphasizing those instability

[6] Jill STEANS, Lioyd PETTIFORD, *Introducere in relațiile internaționale,* Editura Antet, Filipeştii de Târg 2008. p. 163.

elements from the text/speech, showing the internal tensions and how they are covered or excluded[7].

Other critics of the realism are that omits women and the genre focusing on the great powers. The postmodern feminist agrees the difference feminist that the realism bears hidden understandings about the genre roles, in the study of war. The post-modern feminist renounced to the archetypes of "right warrior" (masculine) and beautiful soul" (feminine" sustaining women are not just passive witnesses, but active participants in a system of war related to the both genres.

Conclusions

The theoretical debates from the International Relations field are fundamental but unsolved. These leave the International Relations field in a turbulent situation striving in the trial to make some light in a world in a rapid change, wherein the old ideas do not work anymore.

The integration of feminist perspectives in postmodernist approaches, political theory and constructivist approach represent an important strategy for the interaction with other researchers in the International Relations field and the recognition of close relations between genre, ideas, identities, norms and aspects of international politics and economy can have many benefits for the generation of clues over the processes associated to the local and global transformations. Thus, the feminist theory opens a subtle intellectual manner to study the security issue regarded from new social perspectives.

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VIEWS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION IN "INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY" (I&S)

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Large and growing number and diversity of institutions offering undergraduate courses in the field of "Intelligence and security" do, if not impossible, at least extremely difficult a comprehensive analysis of this segment (or, from a marketing perspective, the "market" for specific services). For these pragmatic reasons, we opted for a narrow approach, based on a review of a number of representative actors in the field, from different countries and of different types. Following this selection, through a brief preliminary analysis, we have tried to highlight the objectives, the types of courses offered and their structure and the way in which the public notice is realized by submitting such institutions on the Internet. Obviously, the analysis can be deepened to the feed-back management in the meaning of detailing of "best practices" that are considered to be taken and adapted in order to optimize their activities.

Keywords*: intelligence, security, studies, university, state, private, courses, national, institutions.*

1. Development of intelligence and security studies as an academic discipline

In the context of increasing need for information security and its role in managing the new security environment, education in *"Intelligence and Security"* (I & S) has grown considerably in recent years, becoming an institutionalized discipline in many universities.

At the end of the last century, American College of Military Intelligence finds intelligence studies proliferation in institutions of higher education: about 200-300 courses on intelligence topics are taught in American universities at that time, either by itself or included in the subjects of political science, history or international relations.

Currently, in the United States can be identified three formal education university in I & S:

• Educational institutions and training of the intelligence agencies, U.S. security and defense;

• The *partnership* established between the various U.S. intelligence agencies and a chain of U.S. universities;

• Associations, think tanks and *private* institutions that promote the study and training in intelligence.

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For mention that intelligence and security studies have proliferated after 11 September 2001, being included in the programs of many universities in Canada, Australia, Israel, Great Britain and other European countries like Spain, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy and Germany[1].

2. Objectives, typology and structure of university courses of I & S. Intelligence education goals

University studies in the field of intelligence are not devoted exclusively to preparing future intelligence agents, but rather for educating students about the work, strategies, structure and functioning of intelligence community from a historical and contemporary perspective. In addition, the study of the intelligence in the frame of international relations disciplines can help prepare students towards strategic analyst profession. Also, the inclusion of security and intelligence studies in the curricula of the faculties of engineering or management allow the training of specialists in the field of defense of strategic infrastructure. Not the last, educating young people in the history of national intelligence can generate the necessary demystification of intelligence services activities by emphasizing the important role of community intelligence in national security and in diplomacy[2].

The inclusion of the discipline of intelligence in academic curricula has been achieved at the university, masters and PhD level. At the university level, intelligence studies are rarely independent discipline, being inserted into the curricula of the disciplines of political science and international relations. At the doctoral level, focus is usually the preparation of research papers that are finalized by dissertation / thesis, in which doctoral candidate must make an original contribution in the field of intelligence studies. At master level, in the field of international relations the curriculum is interdisciplinary, integrating compatible field of intelligence studies.

Based on the specific curricula of universities in the U.S., UK, Europe and Australia, it is clear that the prototype of a curriculum for the discipline of intelligence comprises three elements:

• *Required courses*: courses on intelligence field that provides the necessary conceptual academic advancement in the field; addresses the topic compulsory courses such as: compared intelligence systems, the relationship between intelligence and policy making, intelligence operations and strategies, national legislation in the field of national security.

[1] Extensive studies on the evolution of intelligence studies in the western academic centers, see remarkable analysis by Martin Rudner, *Intelligence Studies in Higher Education: Capacity-building to meet societal demand* (in „International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence", no. 22, 2009, pp. 110-130), and see also Michael S. Goodman and Sir David Omand, *Teaching Intelligence Analysts in the UK. What Analysts Need to Understand: The King's Intelligence Studies Program* (in *„Studies in Intelligence"* Vol. 52, No. 4, December 2008).

[2] Cf. Martin Rudner, op. cit., *The goals of security studies*.

• *Complementary courses*: courses included in the areas of academic disciplines related, complementary courses focus on: regional studies, conflict analysis, philosophy of law.

• *Elective courses*: Recommended courses on the intelligence topic's targeting specific issues / private information of the domain; academic elective courses address the following topics: intelligence history, ethics, intelligence community, spying in war and peacetime, financial intelligence, counterintelligence, intelligence of peacekeeping operations, informative analysis techniques, intelligence and the media, the intelligence and individual freedoms etc.

This combination of compulsory, complementary and optional courses ensures consistency to the interdisciplinary curriculum in intelligence studies, coupled with ensuring flexibility to attract student interest.

Influence of different paradigms for the interpretation of field I & S on ways of teaching

In one of the first theoretical approaches to the field of intelligence studies, Stafford Thomas identifies four interpretative paradigms of the discipline:

- *Historical-biographical approach* - based on past experience, timeline events, personalities;

- *Functionalist approach* - focusing on operational activities and processes;

- *Structured approach* - focusing on the role of intelligence services in managing foreign policy and international relations;

- *Political science approach* - focusing on the political dimension of the intelligence community, namely the processes of decision making and policy formulation.

The Canadian researcher, Wesley Wark, had nominated other eight potential approaches to studies of intelligence: approach to research using primary sources such as archival documents, historical approach, definitional approach, the approach based on use case studies to test the theories, the approach of the memories of the former informative practitioners, the approach in terms of civil liberties violated by intelligence work, journalistic approach, cultural approach focuses on editorial and journalistic productions on intelligence issues.

Beyond the seemingly abstract formalism of such taxonomies, we highlight the practical conclusion that *many approaches to the study of intelligence has led to a variety of manners to teach discipline*. Thus, in the United States, intelligence studies are taught in the departments of political science, which has an effect on how the discipline is dealt: put less emphasis on case studies of historical invoice, favoring theoretical debates. In Britain, by

contrast, involves teaching intelligence studies using largely case studies and event-chronology[3].

In the UK there are at least five universities offering postgraduate studies in the field of intelligence. *University of Salford* (http://www.salford.ac.uk/ study) holds two master degrees in the Faculty of Arts, Media and Social Sciences and the Faculty of English, sociology, political science and contemporary history, providing multidisciplinary master's course *"Intelligence and Security Studies"* focused on "the theory, practice and history of the intelligence community". Courses last one year (full-time) or three years (part-time, one year for dissertation)[4].

Master course *"Intelligence and Security Studies"* organized by the *Faculty of Business at Brunel University* offers a combination of rigorous study of intelligence field and security policies study with reference to practical opportunities for skills development through informative case studies and simulations. *Brunel University West London* is the first academic research center in the British intelligence (2003). Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies (BCISS) was established in the Faculty of Social Sciences[5].

Another approach offers master study *"Intelligence Studies"* organized by the *Department of American and Canadian Studies* at the *University of Birmingham* and its emphasis on an interdisciplinary approach to intelligence community in terms of diplomacy and international relations. *Department of International Politics Aberystwyth University in Wales* offers four master programs: *"Intelligence and Strategic Studies", "Intelligence Studies and International History", "Intelligence Studies (Research Training)" and "Intelligence"*, plus an academic specialization in "International Politics and Intelligence ". At the *Department of War Studies at the King's College London* works master program *"Intelligence and International Security"* whose general objective refers to "examine the nature, processes, roles and case studies in terms of intelligence and their interaction with international security".

Beyond masters programs, British universities also offers undergraduate intelligence courses in the curriculum embedded in the disciplines of political science, history or international relations. For example, the *School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham* suggests the "*The Vigilant State"* focusing on the state intelligence means.

Aberystwyth University provides the module *"War, Strategy and Intelligence"*, which puts intelligence as having the role of force in international relations. The *"Intelligence and International Security"* Module presents the intelligence evolution as a key factor in international relations, while *"The Past and Present of U.S. Intelligence"* focuses on the history of American intelligence and Module *"Intelligence and American Military Power: 1917 to Present Day"*

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[3] Claudia CRISTESCU, *Studiile de intelligenceîn învățământul universitar public. Prototipul programei analitice a studiilor de intelligence*, in vol. Sesiunea de comunicări științifice cu participare internațională *„Strategii XXI"*, Universitatea Națională de Apărare „Carol I", București, 09-10 aprilie 2009, pp. 790-805.

[4] http://www.salford.ac.uk/course-finder/course/.

[5] http://www.brunel.ac.uk/.

examines the role of U.S. intelligence in maximizing the power of the U.S. military. *University of Mississippi*, through *Center for Security and Intelligence Studies* prepares students for careers in intelligence analysis[6]. *Faculty of History, University of Cambridge* offers the "*The Rise of the Secret World: Governments and Intelligence Communities Since 1900"*, which examines the development of modern intelligence community and the use / abuse information by political power. The Module *"Britain's Secret History, 1908-1951"*, offered by the *Department of History at the University of Sheffield*, focuses on internal oversight and the contrast between the intelligence practiced in totalitarian and democratic societies. Lastly, *Faculty of History, University of Edinburgh* provides module *"American Secret Intelligence 1898-2004"*, which focuses on the study of the history of American intelligence, with emphasis on the role of institutions.

One of the newest appearances in the field is the *Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies in the Buckingham University* (BUCSIS)[7]. BUCSIS was launched in 2008 as the academic basis of the Buckingham University, offering postgraduate training and research by the master course of *Intelligence and Security Studies* at the *Faculty of Economics and International Studies* of University.

Faculty of Arts and Sciences from La Salle University, Philadelphia offers *"Diploma in Intelligence and Security Studies"*, specializing in the study of Central and Eastern Europe. The courses focus on introductory concepts of intelligence and security issues specific to Central and Eastern Europe. The areas studied are: geopolitical issues in the Balkans, the Caspian and Caucasus region - historical account of the main events and trends, policies adopted by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe - courses analyze the situation and the conditions that led to the establishment, operation and dissolution of the Eastern Bloc, democratic transformation in the region[8]. Particular attention is given to contemporary issues of intelligence and security. Topics addressed include:

- Eastern Europe's democratic evolution;
- Espionage in Central and Eastern Europe: The Cold War and after;
- Current policies in Russia;
- Russia's foreign policy;
- Terrorist Trends in Central and Eastern Europe;
- Transnational Security Threats in Central and Eastern Europe;
- Security policy in Central and Eastern Europe.

American Vision regarding general skills specific to the intelligence professionals

In 2005, Lenora Gant, professor of International Relations at Trinity University in Washington DC, at the suggestion of former CIA director, George

[6] http://www.olemiss.edu/ciss.
[7] http://www.bucsis.euro-site.co.uk/.
[8] http://www.lasalle.edu/admiss/grad/european/cert.

Tenet, has started a pilot program that would be reflected in the Centers of Academic Excellence of the Intelligence Community (IC CAE). Sponsored by the Office of the Director of the Intelligence Community, IC CAE program aims to include in the academic curricula the study of intelligence whose graduation is meant to facilitate students a career in intelligence field.

As they were originally formulated academic components of the original concept that IC CAE aimed were: interdisciplinary; encourage intercultural relations by attending international trainings and scholarships for studying foreign languages, facilitating intelligence specific to teaching concepts still in school education; providing by the high education institutions to a list of core areas connected with intelligence studies and national security (determined by IC CAE, areas include scientific and technical disciplines, political-economic disciplines specializing in information technology and information systems respectively majors in foreign languages).

According to the document *"Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence: Guidance and Procedures"*, the operational structure of IC CAE program covers two levels of the program: undergraduate and graduate. *The undergraduate component* of IC CAE program aimed at generating interest in young people to follow intelligence careers, this is recruiting young people for university level of IC CAE program. Specific activities in this regard are: *the organization of summer schools at least one week in which young people are trained in critical thinking, logic, mathematics, ethics and organization of local and national seminars to be attended by high school students.* IC CAE academic component of the program aims at providing intelligence studies courses, and the development of skills and competences for intelligence careers[9].

According to the document, specific powers of intelligence professionals are:

- Analysis;
- Data collecting from open sources;
- Analytic reasoning;
- Communications skills (writing/speaking);
- Mathematical reasoning;
- Project management;
- Critical thinking;
- Management sciences;
- Consequences management;
- Activity management;
- Research and rational development of alternative conclusions/solutions to ambiguities/data synthesis;
- Political strategies;
- Teamwork, team composition;
- Strategies and techniques for forecasting
- Governmental priorities;

[9] *Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence: Guidance and Procedures,* april 2005, pp. 6-7.

• Governmental Operations;
• Interpersonal Skills.

3. The sites presentation of some universities from USA in the "I & S field"

Comparison of the websites belonging to some prestigious higher education institutions in the U.S. reveals a clear (and explainable) difference between private and state universities in terms of the volume of information and communication style.

The first category of institutions receiving more and different information to enable an unlimited transparency to rigors of secrecy, as well as a "friendly" link with the audience (users) using a marketing approach to attract and retain "customers" highlighting the advantages, benefits, solutions to their problems. Unlike private universities, state institutions (military or intelligence) use usually more concise communication, more "disciplined" and official (sometimes formal or bureaucratic), the message is centered on the interests of the issuer, not on those of the target audience.

Despite this distinction, there are no insurmountable differences between the two types of online presentations so that site analysis allows drawing lessons that can be used for the purposes of public communication online optimization of the state institutions in the field of "Intelligence and Security".

Conclusions

The education and research in intelligence in the U.S. showed a practical conclusion according to which, those many approaches of the study of intelligence has led to a variety of manners to teach this discipline. Thus, the intelligence studies are taught in the departments of political science, and this fact has an effect on how the discipline is dealt: *put less emphasis on case studies of historical invoice favoring theoretical debates.*

Based on this conclusion, we note that in Romania, education and training/preparation in National Intelligence is done primarily in military higher education institutions (National Intelligence Academy "Michael the Brave" and in High Education institutions within the Ministry of National Defense) and very little in civilian universities (public and private), and only in the format of masters or postgraduate studies (University of Bucharest, Faculty of Sociology and Social Work, Master in Intelligence Analysis / Faculty of Political Science and Babes-Bolyai University, Faculty of History and Philosophy and Integrated Corporate Security Services), but hopefully it will expand to other universities through partnerships or other forms of collaboration.

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CYBERSPACE GOVERNANCE. NEW GOVERNANCEAPPROACH IN SUPPORT TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Iulian F. POPA*

There is no doubt the governance of cyberspace is of global concern. The Information Age most probably entailsa new wave to the conduct of entire world affairs. David Bollier describes The Information Age as a period of blurring borders, flattening hierarchies, heightened uncertainty, and ambiguity.Hence we witness new governance concepts which include more nations, more players, and more tools. The purpose of this paper is to formulate a convincing and realist explanation concerning a possible feasible model for global governance of cyberspace as there is a continuous disagreement regarding the establishment of international laws to govern the cyberspace.First and foremost this paper aims to reveal that governance of cyberspace is critical for the nationstates as the computer networks are now able to change the power relationships between nationstates and individuals. I argue that the governance of cyberspace has tremendous consequences for both national and international security. On the other hand, the paper draws the attention to the challenges encompassed by the ICT.

Keywords*: cyberspace, national security, cyber governance, international cyber security.*

1. Theoretical background

Cyberspace has become one of the main drivers for global economic growth nowadays[1]. Nonetheless, there is no academic consensus about what cyberspace really is. As Benjamin S. Buckland argues, the cyberspace *has many competing definitions*, mainly being defined as a broad network of huge ICT infrastructures[2], including Internet, telecommunications networks or SCADA computer systems in various industries. While a more formal agreement may never be reachable, both public and private actors around the world have shown a clear interest in defining the rules and best practices for behavior in cyberspace.

Therefore, for the purpose of this paper,I define the cyber governance as a method or system of government or management for the domain characterized *by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures*[3].

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[1] Steven S. MYERS, "Cyber-insecurity: dealing effectively with the greatest threat to global economic development in the 21st century", in *Where Cyber Security is Heading – An independent discussion paper on cyber security*, Security&Defence Agenda, 2013, p. 52, available at http://www.securitydefenceagenda.org, accessed 8 August 2013.

[2] Benjamin S. BUCKLAND, Fred SCHREIER, and Theodor H. WINKLER, "Democratic Governance Challenges of Cyber Security." in *DCAF Horizon*, no. 1, p. 50, 2012, available athttp://www.dcaf.ch, accessed August 7, 2013.

[3] US Air Force, "Air Force Cyber Command Strategic Vision (unclassified)", 2008, available athttp://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA479060, accessed June 22, 2013.

However, the last decade is characterized by the amazing growth of ICT which fosters continuously the progress of the human kind. The explosion in interoperability and functionality of the global cyberspace has undoubtedly redefined the way we think about traditional forms of governance.

While many scholars share different views about what cyber governance is, many agree that *the computer-generated public domain (cyberspace) has no territorial boundaries, is controlled by no single authority, it enables millions of people to communicate around the world* and maybe encourages threats to international security and internal stability of states[4].

Some of the first pathfinders who theorized the cyberspace[5] used to consider it a structurally ungovernable, anarchic and libertarian[6] domain, ICT continuous development being the main driver of its current structure. This rhetoric is largely agreed even nowadays as the original purpose of the cyberspace (scientific data exchange, global economy support, freedom of information and communications, etc.) has changed dramatically in the past decades.

I strongly arguethat afeasible and broadly agreed cyber governance model is a must for international security. The first reason is given by the fact that there are numerous ideological divergences regarding both understanding of issues and challenges, as well as technical capabilities required to confront the threats and vulnerabilities to international security.The second reason is given by the former Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) experience which has shown to the world that we still face many democratic concerns about control, oversight and transparency of cyberspace governance[7], ACTA being considered an international overhasty agreement.

When faced with challenges to national security within cyberspace, I strongly argue that states should respond by promoting approaches based mainly on public private cooperation at all cyber governance levels. As Cornish, Hughes, and Livingstone pointed out, *cooperation is essential in the management of cyber threats and impossible without a well-developed political-strategic framework*[8]. Hence in order to assure a chained interoperability, state and non-state actorsshould acknowledge that such initiatives entail building of democratic cyber governance mechanisms for public private cooperation. Such cooperation must be achieved within international communityby all state and relevant non-state actors which are able *to subscribe to a common analytical pictureand able to combine their efforts at the right moment and in the right*

[4]*See more in* Brian D. LOADER, *The Governance of Cyberspace: Politics, Technology and Global Restructuring*, London, Routledge, 1997.
[5]*See more in* Lawrence LESSING,*Code and other laws of cyberspace*, New York, Basic Books, 1999.
[6]John Perry BARLOW, *A declaration of Independece of Cyberspace*, February 8, 2006, available at https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html, accessed July 27, 2013.
[7] RonaldZITTRAIN *et al*, *Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace*, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2012, pp. 3-12.
[8]Paul CORNISH *et al*,*Cyberspace and the National Security of the United Kingdom*, London, Chatham House, 2009, p. 26, available at http://www.chathamhouse.org, accessed July 27, 2013.

manner[9]in order to confrontcyberspace governance challenges. On the other hand, questioning such approach, Alyson Bailes points out that *cooperative cybergovernance becomes trickier to apply in an environment increasingly shaped by non-traditional, non-state, multinational or transnational forces and actors*[10].

2. The Cyberspace Governance Concept

The current *status quo* of cyberspace poses substantive challenges to international stability, peace and national security. The emergence of cyberspace challenges has offered another experience of governance: *no governance*[11].Even and Simantov observe that cyberspace regulation process so far has been slow and not in pace with its current development.

As like the security itself, the cyberspace is a very complex and important public asset. The governance of cyberspace, as a prerequisite of Information Age, is still a relatively new topic, and there is no theoretical consensus about how it should look like. Harold Kwalwasser points out that the concept of cyber governance is a challenge to understand as no single actor dominates collective decision-making within cyberspace. The need for an adequate governance of cyberspace has shown that the traditional pillars of governance itself have changed radically in the last decade. As Toure previously summarized, cyber governance is founded on five main pillars: legal measures – essential for adequate threat responses and deterrence; technical and procedural measures – to help increase the cyber resilience; organizational structure –essential to maximize cooperation and partnership between stakeholders; capacity building, and international cooperation[12]. Therefore, the current expansion of cyberspace *has not been accompanied by an adequate increase in security and governance*[13].

The governance of cyberspace is largely a multi-stakeholder activity, and is probably the most international of all governance types[14].Joseph Nye argues that virtual communities freely expand across any offline territorial jurisdictions and develop their own patterns of governance while nation states become much less important to people's lives[15]. Nowadays, the key point to note is that

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[9]*Ibid.*

[10]*Look for more in* Alyson BAILES "Private Sector, Public Security", in*Private Actors and Security Governance*, ed. Alan Bryden and Marina Caparini, Berlin, Lit Verlag, 2006.

[11] Athina KARATZOGIANNI, *The Politics of "Cyberconflict"*, London, Routledge, 2006, p. 198, available at http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1467-9256.2004.00204.x, accessed July 26, 2013.

[12]Hamadoun TOURE, *Defining cyber-security and cyber-resilience*, in*Where Cyber Security is Heading – An independent discussion paper on cyber security*, Security&Defence Agenda, 2013, p. 14, available at http://www.securitydefenceagenda.org, accessed August 8, 2013.

[13]HaroldKWALWASSER, "Internet Governance", in*Cyberpower and National Security*, Franklin D. KRAMER *et al.*, Washington, DC, National Defense University Press, available at http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/TFX_Cyberpower%20Compilation.pdf, accessed July 23, 2013.

[14] Evan H. POTTER, *Cyber-Diplomacy: Managing Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, Quebec, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002, p. 7.

[15]Joseph NYE Jr., *Cyber Power*, Cambridge, Harvard Kennedy School, 2010, available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/cyber-power.pdf, accessed August 9, 2013.

cyberspace regulation can be achieved only through inter-state cooperation, adaptation of international law to cyberspace, and formulation of a compelling international treaty[16].

Despite previous[17] and current efforts[18], the cyberspace is still an insecure domain with no universal accepted policy, regulatory and normative framework due to the continued disagreement on the new rules that are required to govern such 'new domain'[19]. Even though there is a substantial expansion of the cyberspace and ICT in the last decade, international organizations along with law enforcement ones and private sector reached the consensus for a few times, despite appearances.

In any case, it seems clear that the current major challenge for international community consists in developing of efficient methods and cyber governance tools in support to international policy decision makers to offset their lack in understanding of cyberspace and its associated complex structure and recent developments. As Star outlines, such methods and tools should be based upon *open, democratic, transparent, dynamic, adaptable, accountable, efficient, and effective criteria*[20]to foster the comprehensive and extensive intelligence exchange on attacks, cyber threats assessment, and vulnerabilities between government and private sector in compliance with international human rights laws. As the private sector owns and operates most of the critical cyberinfrastructures, their own security is of vital importance for national security. Hence most nations acknowledge that governance and security within cyberspace are shared responsibilities[21].

Even though the cooperation[22]and awareness raising are both encouraging and critical, there are still unanswered questions yet. The main concerns focus on transparency, accountability, and costs related to cyber governance in support

[16]Shmuel EVEN, David SIMANTOV,*Cyber Warfare:Concepts and Strategic Trends*, Tel Aviv, 2012, p. 8, available at http://www.inss.org.il, accessed July 26, 2013.

[17]In the past few years, global powers have decided to approach the issues of cyber governance by strengthening cooperation at both bilateral and international level. While many states are willing to cooperate, some still share fundamentally different legal perspectives: for example US considers primary threats as being the criminal ones rather than political ones, while Russian Federation is supporting the idea of state censorship and repressive domestic policies as best cyber governance practices, and so on.In February 2010, the head of the UN agency for information and communication technologies (ITU)called on nations to support an international cyber treaty before the world heads for cyberwar. More information is available at http://www.cpccci.com/blog/2010/02/02/ un-calls-for-global-cyber-treaty/, accessed July 23, 2013.*See also* MichaelPORTNOY, SeymourGOODMAN, *Global Initiatives to Secure the Cyberspace – An emerging landscape*, New York, Springer, 2009.

[18]Relevant international law is based upon the United Nations General Assembly resolutions no. 55/63 of 4 December 2000 and no. 56/121 of 19 December 2001 on "Combating the criminal misuse of information technologies"; "Guidelines for the cooperation between law enforcement and internet service providers against cybercrime," the Council of Europe Recommendation No. R (89) 9 on Computer-Related Crime and the European Convention on Cybercrime.

[19] Louise ARIMATSOU, "A Treaty for Governing Cyber-Weapons: Potential Benefits and Practical Limitations", in *2012 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict*, eds. Christian CZOSSECK, RainOTTID, Katharina, Tallinn, NATO CCD COE Publications, available at http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/, accessed July 21, 2013.

[20] Look for more in Stuart H. STARR, *Towards an Evolving Theory of Cyberpower*, Washington, DC, Center for Technology and National Security Policy – National Defense University, 2009.

[21] Alexander KLIMBURG, *National Cyber Security - Framework Manual*, Tallinn, NATO CCD COE Publications, 2012, p.39, available at http://www.ccdcoe.org, accessed June 23, 2013.

[22]Between the public and private sector.

to improved international security and risk mitigation. Therefore I believe prior establishing globally agreed cyber governance policy tools, it should be firstly accepted that we face many *gaps in our understanding of such complex governance networks,* even though public and private actors are increasingly linked by versatile regulatory frameworks within cyberspace[23].

Secondly, it should the broadly agreed that effective cooperation[24]on cybersecurity resilience and response capabilityamong stakeholders implies mutual trust, transparency – which has been almost entirely absent from the debate[25],transnational interoperability, and coordinated common approaches in security, intelligence collectionor analysis, and risk assessment[26].As governments start building partnerships with private sector to protect national interests, new tools to foster mutual trust and transparency should be considered by both sidesto overcome the reluctance to share sensitive information relevant to national security. Real time classified cyber-threat information sharing with approved private actors is desirable to protect national interests[27], to reduce security risks, and tobolster stability and smarter actions. A combined *need-to-share* tampered with *need-to-know* approach is vital for both sides[28].

Thirdly, there is no doubt that the governance of cyberspace is of international concern.Almost everyone is dealing with cyberspace nowadays. Cyber governance and security policy development is no more an issue only for government as non-state and civil society actorsemerge continuously on cyber arena.Due to the globalized nature of the world we live in,everyone shares the responsibility to keep the "cyber arena" secure. Although nationally coordinated approaches to cyber governance and security are preferred sometimes[29], international cooperation is desirable as future cyberspace might become fragmented due to national firewalls or virtual borders[30].Both state and non-state

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[23]*Idem 1.*

[24]International cooperation in terms of cyber governance and security entails cooperation between nation states seeking common ground and between public and private actors through information sharing and awareness raising. See also Artur SUZIK, Liis VIHUL, "Applying existing international legal tools to cyberspace: the Tallinn manual", in*Where Cyber Security is Heading – An independent discussion paper on cyber security,* Security&Defence Agenda, 2013, p. 47, available at http://www.securitydefenceagenda.org, accessed August 8, 2013.

[25]Benjamin S. BUCKLAND, Fred SCHREIER, Theodor H. WINKLER, "Democratic Governance Challenges of Cyber Security," in *DCAF Horizon,* no. 1, 2012, p. 50, available at http://www.dcaf.ch, accessed August 8, 2013.

[26] Lorenzo FIORI, "Defining Cyber Security", in*Where Cyber Security is Heading – An independent discussion paper on cyber security,* Security&Defence Agenda, 2013, p. 17, available at http://www.securitydefenceagenda.org, accessed August 8, 2013.

[27]Thomas GANN, "The double edge of connectivity and security in public and private sectors", in*Where Cyber Security is Heading – An independent discussion paper on cyber security,* Security&Defence Agenda, 2013, pp. 53-55, available at http://www.securitydefenceagenda.org, accessed August 8, 2013.

[28]Marieke KLAVER, Eric LUIIJF, Albert NIEUWENHUIJS, *The RECIPE Project: Good Practices Manual for CIP Policies*, Brussels, European Commission, 2011, available at http://www.tno.nl/recipereport, accessed August 9, 2013.

[29]Alexander KLIMBURG, *National Cyber Security - Framework Manual*, Tallinn, NATO CCD COE Publications, 2012, p.130, available at http://www.ccdcoe.org, accessed June 28, 2013.

[30] Fredrik ERIXON *et al., Protectionism Online: Internet Censorship and International Trade Law,* ECIPE Working Paper no. 12/2009, Brussels, European Center for International Political Economy, 2009, available at http://www.ecipe.org/media/publication_pdfs/protectionism-online-internet-censorship-and-international-trade-law.pdf, accessed August 4, 2013.

actors should focus their attentionon identifying like-minded partners to create common security standards and tools, to buildcoalitions to enhance the overall cyber security levels and resilience of critical infrastructure, to provide mutual assistance, to develop trustedcyber early warning and public awareness tools[31], to stimulate event reporting, to invest in education and scientific research[32], and share relevant data on cyber-threats mitigation.In other words, common means, mechanisms, procedures, instruments,vocabularies, ideas, and values[33] are required along with dispersed responsibility and bridged cooperation between policymakers.Therefore obsolete policies, legislation vacuum, lack of information, and stovepipes are higly undesirable[34].

Furthermore, as cyber diplomacy is mostly a multilaterally or bilaterally-focused activityaimed at managing stakeholders relationships relevant to cyber security[35], the public private cooperation to define international regulations relevant to international behavior in cyberspace must involve *not only the actors from critical sectors, but also specialized internet security firms, software developers, hardware manufacturers, online services providers, banks, financial sector actors, universities, research & development organizations, specialized defense and security contractors, and the individuals at large*[36].

Conclusion

In contrast to Barlow's views on "global social space", I strongly believe that international policy makers should not abstain from imposing regulations tocyberspace[37].In my opinion, there is no doubt that the cyberspace governance is of international concern. Even though development of consensus takes time, cyberspace should be globally regulated as the online threats to international security are emerging continuously.Notwithstanding comprehensive and thorough legal and technical frameworks may be difficult to adopt, such measures are the best solution to current cyber security and governance challenges.

Despite the fact that public private cooperation has broadly shaped the concept of cyber governance and it has increasingly been the response to Information Age challenges, I agree with Bailes and I doubt that any "ad-hoc" cyber governance model is enough to replace the globally agreed approaches to

[31] Protection of personal data, intellectualproperty, free speech, and user privacyusing non-discriminating approaches between domestic and foreign actors is mandatory.

[32]Peter SOMMER, Ian BROWN, *OECD/IFP Project on Future Global Shocks-Reducing Systemic Cybersecurity Risk*, OECD, January 14, 2011, p. 85, available at http://www.oecd.org/governance/risk/46889922.pdf, accessed August 4, 2013.

[33] Mitchell DEAN, *Governmentality: Power and rule in modern society (2nd ed.).* London, SAGE Publications, 2010, available at http://www.sagepub.com/books/Book232754, accessed June 21, 2013.

[34]Alexander KLIMBURG, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

[35]*Idem 13.*

[36]Benjamin S. BUCKLAND*et al*, "Democratic Governance Challenges of Cyber Security.", in *DCAF Horizon*, no. 1, 2012 available at http://www.dcaf.ch, accessed June 28, 2013.

[37]John Perry BARLOW, *A Declaration of the Independence in Cyberspace*, 1996, available at http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html, accessed June 14, 2013.

ensure full democratic oversight over cyberspacein compliance with international human rights laws.

Robust international cyber governance requires a multidisciplinary approach besides traditional military and intelligence one as the new paradigm ofnational and international cyber security acknowledges the increasing roles and responsibilities of non-state actors.[38]

In any case, it seems clear that the current major challenge for international community consists in developing of efficient methods and cyber governance tools in support to cooperation and intelligence exchange on attacks, cyber threats, and vulnerabilities between government and private sector.Publicprivate partnerships are necessary to enhance and support cybersecurity and users safety, incident response, and the overall security of critical infrastructures or processes.Although the cooperation between the public and private sector is both encouraging and critical[39], I believethe globalized nature of cyber governance diminishesthe transparency and control within cyberspace as the democratic governance concerns related to it have never been more pressing than nowadays.

As the cyber challenges and threats evolve continuously, I strongly believe that a cooperative cyber governance model is a major development opportunity for both public and private actors involved in prevention, mitigation, and response to cyber threats. Therefore I agree with Buckland, Schreier, and Winkler as I believe that full cooperation is crucial not only among the actors involved in critical sectors, but also among specialized internet security firms, software developers, hardware manufacturers, online payment providers, online content hosts, banks, financial sector actors, online commerce actors and private individuals.

Nevertheless I argue that every nation state should be aware of the behavior of its citizens in cyberspace to guarantee the safety of the others. The law and cyber order should be enforced and continuously updated for best cyber governance practices.

On the other hand, I strongly believe that the scope of any national governing mean, policymaking, law enforcement along with control and monitoring must fully comply with international law. Therefore any censorship practices against human rights must be strictly avoided by any actor confronted with cyber governance challenges.

To sum up, a number of things are clear from the discussion above:

a. the governance of cyberspace requires a governance conceptbased upon new matrices of power[40];

[38]Maeve DION in *International Cyber Incidents – Legal Considerations,* Eneken TIKK *et al*, Tallinn, NATO CCD COE Publications, 2010, preface, available at http://www.oecd.org/publications, accessed August 23, 2013.
[39]Steps have been made so far by The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) which enacted several private-public partnerships in support to international cyber security and assistance for partner countries.
[40]*Citing* David LYON, in Brian D. LOADER, *The Governance of Cyberspace: Politics, Technology and Global Restructuring*, London, Routledge, 1997, p.44.

b. given that challenges to cyberspace governance are international in nature, transnational approachesare mandatory; the current lack in global cyber governance should the tackled by international policy makers and by all relevant actors[41];
c. the challenges to international security within cyberspace require states to look beyond the whole of government paradigm and adopt an approach that places public private cooperation at its heart*[42];*
d. challenges to cyber security andgovernance are real and significant in many countries, and pose direct effects on the overall economy;
e. both international private and public actors should work with the UN, ITU, OECD, NATO, CoE, ENISA, ICANN, and other relevant actors such as global forums, civil society, and NGOsmore closely, consistently and persistently[43];
f. an international cyber treaty[44]to impose proliferation control on cyber weapons is possible but unlikely; due to the"software" type of such weapons I do not expect too much of this conventional approach to the problem[45];
g. there is no one single international action nor treaty *per se* that can be pursued to solve the entire cyber challenges spectrum;
h. common mechanisms, protocols, early warning cyber exercises, flexible frameworks, and standards for the real-time sharing of information and event reporting among governments and private actors are critical for cyber security;
i. cyber governance policies should promote the neutrality,openness, and transparency of cyber technologies
j. any revelevant cyber governance actor should encourage and bolster the investments in cyber security education, training, and infrastructure upgrades.

Therefore I agree the global cyber governance lacks in international regulation robust mechanisms, and that may foster extreme behavior from citizens (hacktivist group called "Anonymous" is a famous example). At the moment, *the triangular relationship between states, companies – which are heavily present in cyberspace – and citizens – who use it massively – raises the*

[41]Ulf HAUBLER, "Cyber Security and Defense from The Perspective of Articles 4 and 5 ofthe NATO Treaty", in EnekenTIKK*et al*, *International Cyber Incidents – Legal Considerations*, Tallinn, NATO CCD COE, 2010, available at http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications, accessed June 23, 2013.
[42]Benjamin S. BUCKLAND, Fred SCHREIER, Theodor H. WINKLER, "Democratic Governance Challenges of Cyber Security," in *DCAF Horizon*, no. 1, 2012, p. 50, available at http://www.dcaf.ch/, accessed July 14, 2013.
[43]John D. NEGROPONTE, Samuel J. PALMISANO, *Defending an Open, Global, Secure, and Resilient Internet*, Washington, D.C, 2013, available at http://www.cfr.org, accessed August 12, 2013.
[44]Phillip A. JOHNSON, "Is It Time for a Treaty on Information Warfare?", in *International Law Studies*, Vol. 76, Michael N. SCHMITT and Brian T. O'DONNELL (eds), Newport, Naval War College, 2002, pp. 439-455.
[45]Paul CORNISH *et al*, *On Cyber Warfare*, London, Chatham House, 2010, p. 26.available at http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk, accessed June 19, 2013.

issue of world [cyber] governance striking a new balance in order to respect the rights and interests of every actor[46].

Hence, like the governance of space and the oceans, the cyber governance requires globally accepted norms and regulation mechanisms. These are strongly requiredin order to mitigate and control the actual threats in cyberspace by creating *new and innovative ways to enhance protection of vital computer networks without inhibiting the public's ability to live and work with confidence on the internet*[47].

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[46] Patrice TROMPARENT, "French Cyberdefence Policy", in *2012 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict*, eds. ChristianCZOSSECK *et al*, Tallinn, NATO CCD COE Publications, available at http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications, accessed June 13, 2013.

[47]MyriamDUNN CAVELTRY, "Unraveling the Stuxnet Effect: Of much Persistence and Little change in the Cyber Threats Debate", in *Military and Strategic Affairs*, vol. 3, no. 3, 2011, available at http://cdn.www.inss.org.il.reblazecdn.net/upload/(FILE)1333532883.pdf, accessed July 25, 2013.

13. TROMPARENT, Patrice,“French Cyberdefence Policy”, in *2012 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict*, eds. Christian CZOSSECK*et al*, Tallinn, NATO CCD COE Publications, 2012, http://www.ccdcoe.org/;
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CYBER COMPONENT'S VALUE IN MODERN CONFLICTS. AN OVERVIEW ON THE SYRIAN CONFLICT AND THE LATEST EGYPTIAN UPRISING

Ecaterina CEPOI*

This paper examines the importance of cyberspace as a tool in modern warfare; a space which is used as a genuine and effective weapon by parties involved in nowadays conflicts in order to manipulate public opinion, especially due to some characteristics such as: the speed in spreading information, difficulties in information flow control and its immediate effect, as long as the main target-ordinary people- tend not to verify information source and compliance with reality. In this respect, a study of how cyberspace has been used in Syrian conflict till recent will be carried out, in comparison with that used in Egyptian revolt during post-Morsi period. Conclusions will point out that while controlling cyberspace matters, as long as it can produce tremendous societal and economic disruption, difference is made also by particular factors characterizing the conflict's parties, which cannot be overlooked such as ideological influences and, or inner motivation, that matter much more, especially when it is related with profound religious rooted principles as it was and still is in Muslim-Arab territories.

Keywords**:** *cyberspace, cyber warfare, Muslim Brotherhood, Tamarod campaign, Rabia sign, ideology.*

1. A short overview on cyberspace & cyber warfare

The Coral Sea Battle, between naval forces of Imperial Japan and the allied forces of United States and those of Australia, which took place at the beginning of May, 1942, is known as the first battle in which parties did not shoot upon, or even see the enemy as it is/was used in conventional wars. It was a fight between aircraft carriers that used long-distance reach as only weaponry, based on the use of radio, radar and air. Actually it was the beginning of new type of warfare, where the technology was crowned, and since when the invisible world became the leader in any type of conflict around the world, because that moment was also the start of a revolution series in military affairs, especially the number of troops required, started to be diminished more and more, and being replaced with technological advances[1].

As such, the evolution of conflicts around the world in the aftermaths of World War II has changed, and implicitly the way in which major military nations were/are devoting money to a new dimension of war: that of cyber warfare, which after 1991 (more precisely starting with 1993) became - at the official level - main way of waging modern wars, signal that was given by the

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[1] Tim Hsia, Jared Sperli, "How Cyber warfare and Drones Have Revolutionized Warfare", *The New York Times*, June 17, 2013, accessed 30 August 2013, http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/17/how-cyberwarfare-and-drones-have-revolutionized-warfare/?_r=0.

United States[2], which launched the Air Force Information Warfare Center, then, the U.S. Cyber Command and the Joint Task Force-Computer Network Defense (JTF-CND) just in one decade, to deal with both cyber offense and defense. But starting with 2004 the two divisions (offense and defense) were split apart and N.S.A. (National Security Agency) got an offensive mission, while the D.I.S.A. (Defense Information Systems Agency) was in charge with cyberspace defense[3].

However, that division lasted only few years, due to its growing importance. They have been redirected to new created USCYBERCOM (U.S. Cyber Command) which "*plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes, and conducts activities to: direct the operations and defense of specified Department of Defense information networks and; prepare to, and when directed, conduct full-spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in all domains, ensure US/Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to our adversaries*" according to its website[4].

Advances of military communications and military weaponry, such as WMD (weapon of mass destruction), CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons), as well as drones, and their dependency on technology (which is seen as an "Achilles' heel[5]") are living proof of the ever-increasing importance of cyberspace in modern conflicts, and implicit of cyber warfare.

The word *cyberspace* has been fully associated with cyberspace and more proeminently used, starting with the well-known novel *Neuromancer* in 1984 by Wiliam Gibson, a science fiction writer[6], by which he looked to describe the vision of global computer network, connecting all people, sources of information and the machines around the world, where everybody could move as in the real world, but faster; the word is derived from the Greek verb "Kubernao" which means "to steer", and which is also the root of "to govern". It signifies "*both the idea of navigation through a space of electronic data, and of control which is achieved by manipulating those data*"[7] or "*A graphical representation of data abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the non-space of the mind, clusters and constellations of data*"[8]. On the other hand, as Professor Francis Heylighen from Vrije Universiteit Brussel underlines, it shouldn't be forgotten that there is also the word *space* which connotes several aspects: it has a virtually infinite extension, as long as it expresses the idea of a unlimited freedom (given by the sense of anonymity), and very important it is a space that

[2] Healey Jason, "The Future of U.S. Cyber Command", *The National Interest*, July 3, 2013, accessed 31 August, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-future-us-cyber-command-8688
[3] Ibid.
[4] U.S. Army Cyber Command / U.S. Second Army Website, accessed 31 August, http://www.arcyber.army.mil/
[5] Timothy Shimeall, Phil Williams, Casey Dunlevy, "Countering Cyber War", *NATO Review*, Vol. 49, No. 4, 2001-2002, pp. 16-18, accessed 30 August 2013, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2001/0104-04.htm
[6] Larry McCaffery, "An Interview with William Gibson", accessed 31 August, http://project.cyberpunk.ru/idb/gibson_interview.html
[7] Francis Heylighen home page, *Principia Cybernetica Web*, accessed 31 August, http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/CYBSPACE.html
[8] "Cyberspace", *Techterms.com*, accessed 30 August 2013, http://www.techterms.com/definition/cyberspace.

has "*some kind of geometry, implying concepts such as distance, direction and dimension*"[9], which has a different meaning in virtual world.

Therefore, as computer technology became increasingly incorporated into military organizations, cyberspace started to be seen and felt both as a target, as well as a weapon. Hence, computer technology became a critical component for most of countries around the world, which started to develop and implement cyber strategies, created to impact the foe's command and control structure, early warning and other military key functions. Moreover, states are increasingly aware that the cyber space can be used as a major force multiplier, or equalizer, especially by those small countries, that can never win in a conventional war[10].

On the other hand, cyber warfare defined through one of its multiple definitions: "is the use of hacking to conduct attacks on a target's *strategic* or *tactical resources* for the purposes of *espionage* or *sabotage*"[11]. Another definition, points out that cyber warfare is "*Internet-based conflict involving politically motivated attacks on information and information systems. Cyber warfare attacks can disable official websites and networks, disrupt or disable essential services, steal or alter classified data, and cripple financial systems - among many other possibilities*"[12].

It is known that cyber warfare targets any critical and sensitive industry of the opponent's infrastructure; starting from weapons manufacturers, national power grid, communication, airports, and any other things related to critical infrastructure. But cyber warfare can also target most important asset of a country: its population. Its aim is to destabilize, mislead or dishearten population to fight or to support government.

What makes the cyberspace extremely dangerous for a modern conflict is the impossibility to figure out who launched/launches cyber attacks, and, as a result those responsible for the attacks cannot be held responsible, as long as identifying the person sitting behind the keyboard is impossible, much less whether or not it/he was a state, a hacker paid by a government, or a specific government agent. And as Margaret Rouse pointed out when she tried to define cyber warfare, by quoting Jeffrey Carr the author of "Inside Cyber Warfare": "*Any country can wage cyber war on any country, irrespective of resources, because most military forces are network-centric and connected to the internet, which is not secure. For the same reason, non-governmental groups and individuals could also launch cyber warfare attacks*"[13].

Amongst the most well-known cyber attacks to date, at the global level, are: the *Moonlight Maze,* 1998-2000 (which is still a highly classified incident of the U.S. intelligence), the *Code Red* worm, which appeared first in 2001, *Mountain View, Nimda,* or *Slammer,* all of these threats being discovered by the

[9] Ibid.
[10] Timothy SHIMEALL, Phil WILLIAMS, Casey DUNLEVY, *op. cit.*
[11] Andy MANOSKE, "How Does Cyberware Work?", *Forbes*, July 18, 2013, accessed 30 August 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2013/07/18/how-does-cyber-warfare-work/
[12] Margaret Rouse, "Cyber warfare", *Search Security*, May 2010, accessed 31 August, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/cyberwarfare
[13] Ibid.

U.S. intelligence[14], until one decade ago, while in 2007 an unknown foreign party hacked into high military agencies of the United States and downloaded terabytes of information. Also it worth mentioning the 1998 moment when the United States hacked into Serbia's air defense system in order to facilitate the bombing of Serbian targets; or the cyber attack from 2007 in Estonia, when over one million computers were brought down government, business and media websites; the *GhostNet* in 2009 that accessed confidential information in over 100 countries around the world[15], the *Conficker,* or the *Stuxnet* virus which decimated Iranian nuclear facilities, created by the NSA and co-written by Israel, according to Edward Snowden[16] as well as the latest *Flame, Duqu,* or *Mahdi,* all of them being just a few of the known examples, to date.

Besides the cyber attacks as those mentioned above, the cyberspace also is used by states, or non-state actors, with various interests, through use of different instruments/methods in order to fulfill their purpose(s). Methods, whose aim is perhaps the worst of any cyber attack. Among these, the information manipulation seems to be a useful tool in the ongoing conflict in Syria as well in the post-Mursi Egypt that transformed, at least the war in Syria, rather in dangerous cyber warfare than in a civil war, as it is labeled in media (an inaccurate definition, in the end[17]), as long as it is carried out mainly through posting different images, short videos, or statement via You Tube, Facebook or Twitter, not to mention what cannot be identified[18].

2.1. Cyber psihological operations used in Syrian war

"*Cyber attacks are the new reality of modern warfare*".. "*We can expect more... from all directions. In war, the greatest casualty is the truth. Each side will try to manipulate information to make their own side look like it is gaining while the other is losing*"[19].

In a high technological era, waging cyber warfare is easier than to spend billions of dollars to hire a P.R. company for teaching top officers to avoid well-known or past mistakes. In other words, constructing media spectacles before or during the war is much more expensive as it was proved starting with 1991 in the Gulf War or of those in ex-Yugoslav's space, than to wage war in cyberspace. This lesson has been learned not only by the United States, but also by any state or non-state actors which were/are involved in recent/ongoing

[14] "The warnings? Cyber war!", *Frontline*, April 2004, accessed 31 August, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cyberwar/warnings/

[15] Margaret ROUSE, *op. cit.*

[16] Thomas PETER, "Snowden confirms NSA created Stuxnet with Israeli aid", *Russia Today*, July 9, 2013, accessed 31 August, http://rt.com/news/snowden-nsa-interview-surveillance-831/.

[17] „A war between factions or regions of the same country" according with Free Dictionary definition, accessed 04 November, 2013 at http://www.thefreedictionary.com/civil+war.

[18] Marianne BARRIAUX, *Growing Syria cyber war: who is winning?* Accesat 04.11.2013 la http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=53877.

[19] Hayat ALVI, lecturer in Middle Eastern studies at the US Naval War College, in Peter Apps, "Disinformation flies in Syria's growing cyber war", *Reuters*, August 7, 2012, accessed 30 August 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/07/us-syria-crisis-hacking-idUSBRE8760GI20120807.

conflicts around the world. As a result, the world witnessed different cyber attacks as those mentioned above, and also to a manipulation of the international community's feelings by using videos, or images especially with dead, wounded, crying children, or horrendous live crimes posted on social networks in order to achieve specific objectives, by a part or another as the ongoing war in Syria, demonstrates. Except the cyber warfare's characteristics mentioned already, there is another one, which deserves to pay attention at: hidden elements and interests, which if known, the evolution of conflict/war would be different. The war in Syria is an example in this respect. A brief look in the recent history of this country can reveal some interesting data, which may determine the international community to see ongoing war through a different perspective.

Aftermath of the chemical attack[20] in the suburbs of Damascus that killed hundreds of civilians, confirmed what was already known: the information manipulation by the all parties implied in conflict, not only exist, but also, acted/acts as a double-edge sword. Actually the issue of chemical weapons used or not, on the 21st of August in Syria, brought to the foreground of public opinion, and on the top of the international agenda, a well known, but untold, almost a taboo subject. It revealed that the worst side of Syrian war is carried out in cyberspace, as long has to do with deceiving, not only of those considered reciprocal as foes, but also the international actors, states or non-states, the international institutions, or community. For example, on the one hand, U.S. claims intercepted phone conversations prove the perpetrators were Syrian government top officers, and, on the other hand, on social networks are circulating videos, allegedly showing a rebel group talking about usage of chemical weapons. And as G. Ivanov stressed, "*What remains visible, however, is that partial and manipulated information coming from all sides, without solid proof to be offered, by any of them*"[21].

But until the 21st August, 2013, when suspicions were confirmed, the cyber space was used without any restraint by all parties, if it is looked back in the last two years of social networks' history. Revolt in Syria commenced in the spring of 2011 as a movement inspired by the wind of so-called the „Arab Spring". Syrians, copying the Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan models, started to oppose dictatorial ways of their government, and looking to inflame an own revolution, began to use the latest tools of the technological era. Thus, the anti-Assad "*Day of Rage*" was announced via Facebook, Twiter and other social networks. Soon, hacktivist groups such as Anonymous and Telecomix joined them. Thus, the two hacktivist groups, broke into Syrian government computers, and exposed companies that were providing services to Syrian government.

[20] Till today the 1st of September, there is no official statement on behalf of the U.N. regarding the results of investigation.

[21] Georgi IVANOV, "In Syria, Facts Are Manipulated As We Get Lost in the Fog Of War", *Policymic*, August 30, 2013, accessed 1st September, 2013, http://www.policymic.com/articles/61601/in-syria-facts-are-manipulated-as-we-get-lost-in-the-fog-of-war.

Also, Anonymous broke the e-mail server of the Syrian Ministry of Presidential Affairs and made public hundreds of e-mails[22].

On the other hand Syrian intelligence, reacted by attacking on Facebook, YouTube, and other social networks, the accounts of Syrian residents, according with the Electronic Frontier Foundation's reports. The EFF said that it discovered malicious software program hidden in images circulated among Syrian Diaspora; and despite they couldn't confirm the identity of authors, suspected that Syrian telecommunications ministry was/is behind the attacks[23].

Starting with August, 2012 when UN monitors reported that Assad's forces committed "crimes against humanity"[24], amidst the rubble, fire and smoke specific of an increasingly violent war (it cannot be called a civil war, because there are implied also foreign groups, see definition[25]) radio waves and fiber-optic cables, as well as social media platform, started to be used, intensively. Thus, Syrian government forces adapted their counter-insurgency tactics to cyberspace. As the conflict unfolded, Syrian Forces stepped ahead in the surveillance domain, by using high-tech equipment, provided mostly by Western companies, accompanied by the necessary services[26].

According with a series of investigative reports carried out by *Bloomberg News*, it was revealed that Area SpA, an Italian company was about to install/installed a surveillance system which could enable/enabled the Syrian Intelligence to intercept, scan, and catalogue emails flowing around the country[27]. Further, the Citizen Lab[28] participated in revealing that rooters which were widely deployed across the internet in Syria belonged to *Blue Coat Systems*, an American company, with headquarters in Sunnyvale, California. Two aspects have to be taken into account here, when trying to have a clear picture upon Syrian war. One is the fact that, at that moment Syria was, and still is, under U.S. sanctions against the sale of products and services, being labeled as a "state sponsor of terror", meaning that any kind of business relationship between an American company and Syria was illegal, and the second aspect-which actually is a question, a very important one: how can such a relationship, even a commercial one, to go on, unnoticed by the federal authorities from the

[22] Ronald DEIBERT, "Waging the cyber war in Syria", *National Post.*, May 21, 2013, accessed 1st September, 2013, http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2013/05/21/ronald-deibert-waging-the-cyber-war-in-syria/

[23] Citizen Lab and Canada Centre for Global Security Studies, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, *The Canadian Connection: An investigation of Syrian government and Hezbullah web hosting in Canada*, November 17, 2011, accessed 30 August 2013, http://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/canadian_connection.pdf.

[24] Elizabeth Hewitt, Abby Ohlheiser, "U.N.: Assad Forces Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity", *The Slatest*, August 15, 2012, accessed 1st September, 2013, http://slatest.slate.com/posts/2012/08/14/former_syrian_prime_minister_assad_controls_just_30_of_syrian_territory_.html.

[25] "Civil war", *The Free Dictionary*, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/civil+war.

[26] Citizen Lab and Canada Centre for Global Security Studies et al., *op. cit.*

[27] Ibid.

[28] *The Citizen Lab* is an interdisciplinary laboratory based at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, Canada focusing on advanced research and development at the intersection of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), human rights, and global security: https://citizenlab.org/

United States, as long as any kind of product to be exported outside of U.S. needs more than one stamp of approval, including the one of the Department of State's office? This question is a genuine one, unless, there are other unknown interests. It is necessary to be pointed out that the Blue Coat devices could be used to monitor and filter communications in fine-grained detail. Moreover, it seemed that most of Syrian state servers, including the Hezbollah's were hosted in Canada, U.S and Germany, the latter's one server only in Canada and U.S[29]. The above mentioned information were published by Telecomix[30], and as well as the Citizen Lab in November, 2011, which showed that Syrian government converted from a censorship state to a high-tech surveillance state, helped by the Western powers for economic, political or unknown reasons. While today, as the situation on the ground becomes even bloodier (taking into account more than 110,000 casualties) all sides implied in Syrian conflict are intensifying the conflict in cyberspace, by using misinformation, and rumors, to incline the war in reality.

2.2. Cyberspace and social media, during latest Egyptian uprising

"*The working conditions in the private sector are catastrophic*" says Habib. "*But I cannot find a job in the public sector. I have two children. I have only four guineas [about 50 cents] in my pocket. There is no work, no security, no state*"[31]

Arab Republic of Egypt and Syrian Arab Republic have more than the two words from their official name, in common. They share same religion (as their majority is Sunni Muslim), language (Arabic), and many other cultural elements. Also, for more than two years they have encountered unrest, riots, revolution and foreign interference in their internal politics, without any clear ending sign, yet. But in comparison with Syrians, the Egyptians were lucky during their Revolution, as long as they were supported in February, 2011 by Army and as a result, the number of casualties was limited. One year later, after the democratic election of their President, which was marked by continuous protests and riots due to Islamist character of the new elected government's policies, including a new Constitution, the Egyptian Army arrested President Muhammad Mursi, who was also the highest representative of Muslim Brotherhood at official level[32]. And again, Egypt is approximately in the same

[29] Eman ESH-SHENAWI, "Canada, U.S. servers host Syria, Hezbollah-affiliated content", *Al-Arabiya News*, 20 November, 2011, accessed 1st September, 2013, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/11/20/178212.html.
[30] More info at http://telecomix.org/
[31] Perrine MOUTERDE, "Opposition eyes revolt on Morsi's first anniversary", *France 24*, 29 June, 2013, accessed 30 August 2013, http://www.france24.com/en/20130623-egypt-morsi-opposition-tamarod-revolt?ns_campaign=nl_quot_en&ns_source=NLQ_20130630&ns_mchannel=email_marketing&ns_fee=0&ns_linkname=20130623_egypt_morsi_opposition_tamarod_revolt&f24_member_id=1104250754724.
[32] David KIRKPATRICK, "Army Ousts Egypt's President; Morsi Is Taken Into Military Custody", *New York Times*, July 3, 2013, accessed 2nd September, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html?hp&_r=0.

situation as it was in February, 2011, even worse, if counting casualties number from July, 2013 to date. It has a president in jail, a former president very sick, recently released, a Muslim Brotherhood organization, literally and figuratively beheaded, a provisional government appointed by military junta, a suspended Constitution, and a country politically divided between the pro-Mursi/Islamism's supporters on the one hand, and General Abdul-Fattah As-Sisi's ones, on the other. But why a country as Egypt, which used to be until 3 years ago main touristic attraction in the North Africa, with a strong and respected army, well positioned in Arab League, strategic location, and historically the most influential country in region, has reached such a deadlock?

Firstly, Egypt has almost 86 million citizens[33], among which, according with The World Factbook, 24,1% were unemployed in 2010, from which more than 50% were women, while a significant present of those that have a job, were/are underpaid and overworked, and secondly, because after the January 2011's unrest erupted, the Egyptian Government tried to increase the social spending to address public dissatisfaction, but political uncertainty affected the economic growth, thus reducing the government's revenues. Moreover, in the aftermath of January 2011's Revolution, tourism, construction and manufacturing have been critically hit. Despite government's efforts, 2013's year brought a severe payment crisis[34] which alongside the Islamist tendencies, already implemented in the 2012's Constitution, determined Egyptians to take the streets and ask for the rights they won in Tahrir Square at the beginning of 2011. And again the Egyptians best friends proved to be the social networks, when the Facebook page created in honor of Khaled Said, a young man that have been killed[35] by police, became the early catalyst of the Revolution from January, 25. At that time the page became a central point around which 470,000 fans organized their dissent, while a YouTube video, about Khaled murder was viewed more than 500,000 times[36].

2.3. From Tamarod campaign to Rabia sign

Muslim Brotherhood has a long and interesting history in the social, political and economic life not only in Egypt where it had been established by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, but also in the Middle East area. Mainly, it acted/acts as an Islamist charity organization, and despite their political orientation, they claimed for a long period of time that are not interested by political scene. But in Jordan they have a very important and feared political party, in other countries

[33] The World *Factbook*, accessed 2nd September, 2013, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html
[34] Ibid.
[35] Simon MAINWARING, "Exactly what role did social media play in the Egyptian revolution?", *The first we blog*, February 13, 2011, accessed 2nd September, 2013, http://simonmainwaring.com/facebook/exactly-what-role-did-social-media-play-in-the-egyptian-revolution/
[36] Ibid.

strongly influence the political decisions, while in Egypt, won the President seat, last year.

After Mubarak was removed from power, Muslim Brotherhood organization started to be seen as an alternative to the old regime and on the ground that they can fulfill majority's expectations. One year later after Muhammad Mursi was elected, he was ousted from power by military forces led by General Abdul-Fattah As-Sisi. This happened as a result of a popular uprising which began with the *Tamarod* event (rebellion, in Arabic), which is a movement signature campaign calling for an early presidential election, as long as their democratically elected President, has lost the trust of people, according with their members 'opinions.The movement was launched at the beginning of May by a group of young people, including some members of *Kefaya*, which is one of the oldest Egyptian's opposition movements. Shortly, it spread around the country especially through and helped by social networks.[37] The petition, which is available on the Internet, has been photocopied and printed by volunteers that collected/collect signatures in different places such as markets, metro stations or traffic intersections. Trusting in their cause, several opposition parties opened premises to the campaign and mobilized their members. Thus, *Tamarod* campaign has been organized in towns, such as Kafr Zayat, and Ismailia, not far from Cairo, while *Tamarod*'s Facebook's page counted nearly 400,000 fans (from Aswan to Sinai) and the organizers said that they have collected 15 million signatures, meaning with 2 million voters more than the 13 million voters who helped Mursi to win the presidency seat[38]. At the end of June, meaning the first anniversary of Mursi's investiture, *Tamarod* succeeded to transform the million of signatories, into a huge rally against Mursi. As a result, technology associated with social media and communications proved once again that it can play an important role in any kind of conflict around Egypt, as long as after only two months after the *Tamarod* campaign started, Muhammad Mursi, the elected president of Egypt, has been ousted by Egypt's powerful military forces, after they gave Mursi a 48 hours ultimatum to solve the dispute[39]. Important to note is that, the poorest people signed the petition, primarily for economic reasons, according to Sherif Al-Hagaty, the *Tamarod* coordinator of the Social Democratic Party, who further added: "*current regime has been repeating same mistakes as the previous one concerning civil rights, corruption and constitutionally -guaranteed liberties*"[40]. As it was expected by *Tamarod* members, Muslim Brotherhood supporters didn't accept the aim of this campaign, and as a result, clashes between the pro and anti-Mursi demonstrators were are still are inevitable to date. Starting with Mursi administration, that

[37] Perrine MOUTERDE, *op. cit.*
[38] Ibid.
[39] Simon MAINWARING, *op. cit*.
[40] Perrine MOUTERDE, *op. cit.*

considered *Tamarod* an illegitimate movement, and continued with tenth of thousands of the last year elected president's supporters, who took and still taking the streets to protest against the ousting of their Chief of State, led to an inevitable chaos, and a crackdown, on the streets of Egypt[41].

Here, worth to be noticed the fact that Egyptian media were criticizes of being biased in reporting the events from the streets starting with the 30th of June moment. Also, the international media were accused of being pro-Morsi, in their reporting, such as *Al-Jazeera* that played an important role in these protests as it done in most of the riots in the Middle East and North Africa, backing the Muslim Brotherhood. CNN reporters were forced to leave Tahrir square while recently most of the pro-Mursi media were silenced. Nevertheless, the Muslim Brotherhood's supporters continued their protests not only on the street but also in cyberspace by using social networks to spread the anti-coup sign which is quickly spreading across the globe, having even its own multilingual website explaining its appearance and meaning (www.r4bia.com). This already well-known sign was born in Rabia al-Adawiya Square that became the symbol of resistance against the military coup that overthrow Mursi. The sign's logo featuring four black fingers on a yellow background has been transformed into an avatar image for millions of Muslim across the world from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, or Malaysia to Morocco, even in Romania, on their social media profiles. A senior Muslim Brotherhood leader's daughter, who has been shot during protesting the coup, became a symbol of sacrifice for those who believe in this sign. Important to notice is that on the above mentioned website, there is no information about its administration, except a short explanatory notice: "*The administrators of this website does not own or manage this sign either; they are simply servants of Islam*" [42].

Conclusions

Drawing the conclusions on a sensitive, complex and dynamic subject is not easy, as long as it regards a domain which is in a continuous change, and also related to two still ongoing conflicts, with an unpredictable ending. Events analyzed in this paper, and also recent history of the Greater Middle East showed us that social media, represented by Facebook, YouTube and Twitter, meaning the use of cyber space, played an important role in accelerating or instigating, even organizing uprising, in this part of the world, as it was in Egypt in January, 2011, as well before or after this summer's military coup, until present. Even so, from this point of view it is hard to state (according to

[41] Ibid.
[42] Anadolu Agency, "Multilingual website devoted to R4BIA sign now running", *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, 27 August 2013, accessed 2nd September, 2013, http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/155151/multilingual-website-devoted-to-r4bia-sign-now-running.html.

definitions of cyber warfare provided in this paper) whether or not the cyberspace was used as cyber warfare's tool, in the Egyptian uprising. This, despite it contributed to political changes, and there are counted hundreds of casualties during the latest confrontations, in comparison with Syrian war, whose most dangerous dimension is taking place in cyberspace with its effect counted on the ground: approximately 110,000 casualties until now, and worse with an alleged chemical attack. Taking into account the high technology development, the present and especially the future (will) require a nimble military that will be able to wage full spectrum warfare from counterinsurgency to cyber warfare initiated in a basement of a state or non state actor, meaning that unknown must be considered, thinking that the future belongs to more and more new high technology discoveries.

Nevertheless, there shouldn't be forgotten the lesson learned by the international community after 9/11 and especially these days, in Syria: owning the best technology or controlling the cyberspace is not equal with a guaranteed quick success, or victory. The war in Iraq, in Afghanistan and Syria are a living prove that is not enough to be (backed) by the hegemonic military power of the world, with a very well trained agency in cyber warfare, and not only, to succeed. The military forces 'inner motivation, and also of civilian matter, much more, especially when it is related with profound religious rooted principles as it was and still is in those territories mentioned above. Also, the increasing international community's awareness on the use of cyber space for misleading is a new important factor at the formal level, that weighs heavily in present, as it can be seen the division of the international community regarding the intervention in Syria.

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NEW MEDIA COMMUNICATION RISKS

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Switching humanity in the new millennium has been marked by the symbiotic relationship between the growth of the Internet and information and communication technology revolution, which determined by changing the World Wide Web into New Media a radical, unprecedented, transformation of mass-communication process.

This paper intends to highlight the dangers of unprotected communication in cyberspace while the only certainty offered by the online environment refers to the impossibility of a full secrecy regarding the sender identity or securing the message information.

In the context of an insufficiently explored approach at institutional and individual level, in order to deepen the understanding of communication vulnerability raised by the New Media phenomenon, the paper presents some aspects of protective conduct, intending to provide the Romanian net surfer an additional protection against threats from within the digital space.

Keywords: *WEB 2.0, New Media, social networking, discussion forums, anonymization, mass communication*

Introduction

In cyberspace communication is an essential phase of virtual social interaction, which exceeds the spatial proximity of the transmitter by employing impersonal ties in relation to current reality, but no less powerful from an affective-behavioral perspective.

The total dependence of the communication process specific to the current stage of development of the society on the information and communication technology tools, which are, in fact, an explicit materialization of the gateway to virtual, therefore simulated, reality may be the premise of a deviant human behavior based on altered rules of conduct, on the long term.

Also, given that the only certainty offered by the digital environment refers to the impossibility of a full secrecy regarding the sender/transmitter identity or securing the message information, distorting communication allows, by altering data, wide social engineering operations on a global scale.

The structuring of the paper aims at presenting a minimal set of theoretical explanatory elements in the evolution of the communication process, explaining the risks derived from the dissemination within New Media of seemingly innocuous data, researching issues of protective conduct on Web 2.0 platform as well as considerations concerning the applicability of legal regulations related to military personnel's communication in the virtual space.

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1. Mass communication development

1.1. Brief explanatory theorizing

In the late '90s, mass communication means were separated into three components, apparently intangible in terms of technological advancement, namely:

- Autonomous - represented by independent external devices, on magnetic or paper support (newspapers, audio, video, etc.);
- Broadcast media - such as television and radio, allowing an extended geographical coverage and unidirectional communication;
- Telecommunications - such as telephony and video text which employed a two-way communication with global coverage.

Subsequently, digital technologies have enabled the fusion of the basic elements which defined the three components, with a "nuclear" effect on the communication process.

At the beginning of the new millennium the symbiotic relationship between the occurrence and evolution of the Internet, on one hand and the revolution of the information and communications technologies, on the other hand, led to the evolution of World Wide Web (on the WEB 1.0 platform) to New Media (on the WEB 2.0 platform), an essential element that radically transformed the mass communication process.

The Internet offers the possibility of conducting interactive communication; the transmitter can better direct the flow of communication and orient it towards the targeted recipient. Thus, each user is able to send messages to multiple receivers, which, in turn, may deliver the message as received. The conclusion is that each participant in mass communication on the Internet is both transmitter and receiver.

Understanding how communication in the digital environment works needs to group communication opportunities on the Internet in four categories[1]:

- Asynchronous communication one-to-one, one-to-few and one-to-many - Email;
- Asynchronous communication many-to-many - discussion forums;
- Synchronous communication one-to-one, one-to-few, one-to-many and many-to-many - messenger applications or chat rooms;
- Asynchronous communication many-to-one, one-to-one, one-to-many receptor characterized by the need to search websites in order to access various information - websites, FTP.

Considering as reference point the communication model developed, in the last century, by the scientist Norbert Wiener (Image no. 1), it could be found that intensive use of the technological platforms offered by the Internet has

[1] Merrill MORRIS and Christine OGAN, *"The Internet as Mass Medium"*, Indiana University Review, accessed on 4 August 2013 at http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol1/issue4/morris.html.

increased the depth of the mass communication process with new elements such as instant feedback and the ability to respond using the same channel as the transmitter, but also using additional channels.



Image no. 1

In this context, it can be assessed that although the fundamental communication trinomial sequence remained unchanged (transmitter - communication channel - receiver); the technological revolution of the transmission channel has led to significant changes that shaped the model of communication from linear (classical) to a molecular shape.

1.2. New Media and WEB 2.0

It is difficult to appraise a precise definition of New Media as it relates to a wide range of references and a fluid, continually evolving domain. A particular understanding of the term useful for this paper refers to the multiple forms of electronic communication that allow social interaction including social media, made possible by the existence of the technological platform called WEB 2.0.

WEB 2.0 technologies, representative of what is called New Media include:

- *Social networks;*
- *Discussion Forums, message boards and chat rooms;*
- *Blogs;*
- *Instant messaging (messenger type applications);*
- *The integration of mobile telephony into the digital space;*
- *The virtual worlds.*

Likewise, each of these open source categories can be subject of concern to information technology tools used in the intelligence activity to prevent and counter threats against national security.

In this respect, is worth mentioning some relevant issues:

Social networks are valuable sources of information in terms of data collection required to develop psycho-social profile of users.

Forums and chat rooms provide data of interest on behavioral attitudes on target geographical areas or the possibility of obtaining technical information or imagery.

Blogs allow unrestricted comments from geographical areas where traditional media is heavily censored and the possibility of collecting feedback from the target audience is an essential attribute in the development of operational analysis.

Instant messaging gives the opportunity to anonymously provoke and manipulating the communication process of "one-to-many".

The integration of mobile telephony into the digital space delivers a constant flow of location data, activities and social interactions of the users.

Virtual worlds enable the aggregation of useful data needed for the development of relational schematic and behavioral patterns of the targets.

The amplitude of the propaganda spread through New Media specific information and communication tools should not be underestimated. The most representative example is the use of social media in the onset and development of the "Arab Spring".

If there is any trace of skepticism to this statement would be sufficient a short consultation within the Facebook' page *We Are All Khaled Said, which* is covering in real time the events in Egypt as this paper is written, or **We are all** *Hamza Akhateeb*, which is broadcasting multimedia related to serious abuses committed by the regime in Damascus against the civilian population. Both pages ensure a continuous multimedia stream and instant feedback on the events.

2. The vulnerability of New Media Communication

2.1. Risks

The development of Web 2.0 technologies has caused, besides the unquestionable benefits provided by the "explosion" of mass communication (trafficking a large volume of information and enhancing social cohesion), negative effects, as the upward trend of cybercrime with the objectives as identity theft, harassment, impersonation or extracting sensitive information from personal or service computers belonging to uninformed Internet users.

Since the society cannot be held accountable for not securing its own data, if is not informed by both the threat and ways of protection, it is required a sustained and continuous endeavor at institutional and individual level, in order to deepen the understanding of communication vulnerability in relations governing user-cyberspace binomial functionality, likely to materialize afterwards in dysfunctions which have the potential to jeopardize peoples' integration in a future knowledge society.

For intelligence purposes, New Media, especially social media, is an inexhaustible source of information, due to relational structures and the impressive volume of personal data or concerning activities with deeply personal implications, provided "by free" by users not informed against the lack of a real anonymity of identity.

In terms of perspective described by this paper, it is to highlight the following sequence of risks at communicational level:

- *Providing Personal Data*

Any piece of information about the private life of an Internet user, family circle and close relationships, preferences and passions can be arranged by a profiler, similarly to achieve a puzzle for sketching a psychological profile. In terms of sales and marketing, this action normally takes place in the case of search engine's users belonging to multinational corporations like Google or Yahoo or adherents of Facebook, Twitter, Qzone (China), Vkontakte (Russia) etc. Except the commercial interest that involves user consent, the objective of this comprehensive, resource consuming approach just aims at documenting a wide range of criminal actions starting with identity theft and impersonation, and ending with violence, burglary, kidnapping or extortion[2].

The best known effect with negative connotations is Internet publishing of personal information, daily agenda of leisure activities or at work, listing the circle of friends, personal photos or publishing messages concerning intimate communication. For example, the publication of photographs of the victim's home, accompanied by precise spatial location via Google Maps, in conjunction with holyday messages posted on Facebook, is an open invitation to interested individuals for conducting criminal activities.

On the other hand, cannot be ruled out intelligence operations regarding data collecting and intelligence exploiting performed by civilian or government entities located on different geographical areas. In 2008, to the Canadian Expeditionary corps in composition of ISAF [3] was denied disclosure of personal information or photos on the Facebook, in order to protect soldiers against localization and identification by terrorist groups that monitored this networking platform.[4] Also, according to Israeli intelligence services, Hezbollah has often used the social network Facebook striving to set up "friendships" and "meetings" with Israeli soldiers targeting them as sources of “blind” or “direct” intelligence exploitation and finally trying to kidnap them[5]. Moreover, since 2009, Shin Beth started issuing public warnings on proven intelligence exploitation of Israeli

[2] Kevin MITNICK, Simon WILLIAMS, Steve WOZNIAK, *The Art of Deception*, John Wilwz & Sons, 2002, p. 61.
[3] International Securiry Assistance Force.
[4] http://cluj.time4news.ro/ultima-ora/alqaida-monitorizeaza-*Facebook*, accessed on 5 September 2013.
[5] Philip SEIB and Dana JANBEK, *Global Terrorism and New Media: The Post-Al Qaeda Generation* (New York, Taylor & Francis Group/Routledge, 2011), review accessed on 10 August 2013 at www.routledge.com and http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2008/09/hezbollah_using.php.

citizens by terrorist elements through Facebook[6].

- *Dissemination of information which may be used for documenting behavioral vulnerabilities*

It should be stressed that the instant messaging communication platform, private chat rooms or discussion forums are favorite targets for collecting information on the character and personality of the user, concerns, frustrations, attitudes and issues of privacy etc.. Subsequently, collating and integrating this documentation data can be the basis for actions like corruption, compromise or blackmail.

- *Disclosure of confidential information concerning the professional domain*

This type of risk defines the action of accessing and disseminating classified information content and is a common way by which a sloppy social media consumer can turn into an undesirable person.

The action can be committed intentionally, a situation that is a detrimental outcome of the operational sequence enumerated above (neglection-blackmail-compromise), but may be committed unintentionally, negligently, as a result of accessing from a service computer a message or email infected with an IT contaminant such as botnet virus sent from a social platform by a new found "friend"[7]. Accepting an informational message encoded with computer viruses or "Trojans" provides frequent gateway to leak classified information in both governmental and private sectors, for example by negligence of the civilian contractors carrying out government projects..

Frequently, attackers use methods of social engineering to exploit human vulnerabilities [8] such as sexual attraction, greed (the offer "cheap bargains"), vanity (the belief that the victim was chosen from millions of users), reliability (the attacker claims it represents a major corporation), convenience (attackers rely on indifference receiver to verify the identity of an unknown transmitter), compassion (the dramatic request for humanitarian aid) and urgency (stressing the urgency of the humanitarian aid).

2.2. Mitigation

The fundaments of a protective attitude within WEB 2.0 communication platform is derived from answers to the following questions:

- What personal information may be disseminated?
- What relevance has personal data from the perspective of potential criminal activity? What are the repercussions of unprotected communication within the digital environment?

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[6] *Shin Bet: Terrorists on Facebook trying to recruit Israeli spies* accessed on 10 august 2013 at http://www.haaretz.com/news/shin-bet-terrorists-on-facebook-trying-to-recruit-israeli-spies-1.276246.

[7] *Threat assessment on Internet facilitated organized crime*, accessed on 4 September 2013 at https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/publication/iocta-threat-assessment-internet-facilitated-organised-crime-1455.

[8] *Cisco 2010 Annual Security Report*, accessed on 4 September 2013 at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/security_annual_report_2010.pdf.

- How to ensure high quality protection to confidential data circulating in cyberspace?

Without claiming an exhaustion of the subject of protective behavior in cyberspace, for citizens of a future knowledge society it requires compliance with a minimum set of rules as follows:

- Do not share personal or family information on social networks;
- Never disseminate data concerning professional activity or personal life on social platforms;
- Deactivate GPS tracking applications, available in both Android and IOS operating system;
- Do not communicate in an unsecured environment credit card identification data;
- Disable Bluetooth or WiFi applications when not in use;
- IP terminal identity (desktop, Smartphone or tablet PC) when surfing the web 2.0 must be protected by anonymization;
- Do not open messages with attachments received from unknown persons who interact with New Media;
- Email traffic must be secured;
- The use of complex passwords that include numbers and random letters is a further precautionary measure;
- The use of antivirus software capable of identifying viruses including ”spy phone" software is mandatory.

Spy software for mobile terminals have been developed recently (2005-2007), along with the growth of the global annual sales of Smartphones. Installation is easy and requires no technical knowledge on behind of the aggressor and the software runs continuously in "stealth" mode. The application is particularly dangerous because it allows attackers to instantly gain access to the following categories of information:

- Precise location;
- Basic address book features;
- Mobile device and user identifiers[9], as IMEI (international mobile equipment identity), IMSI (international mobile subscriber identity), UDI (unique device identifier) and mobile phone number;
- Log calls, SMS and messaging;
- Internet browsing history;
- Internet and Email access;
- Passwords on social networking platforms, photos, videos.

Higher complexity "spy phone" software has an extra that transform the mobile terminal in a tool for intercepting ambient conversations by remotely

[9]http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-dosare_juridice_media-15509226-aplicatiile-mobile-care-nu-respecta-regimul-juridic-colectarii-date-caracter-personal-pot-aduce-amenzi-pana-2-din-cifra-afaceri.htm accessed on 5 September 2013.

activating the Smartphone's built-in microphone activation via the WEB 2.0 platform.

3. Legal considerations

Knowledge of issues related to cybercrime is a necessary approach and addressing the theoretical and practical aspects both from legal and procedural perspective and from the perspective of the technical requirements imposed by the digital environment and the electronic evidence represents concrete problems encountered by practitioners in the prevention, fighting and bringing to justice the facts of cybercrime.

The general legal object, in the case of cyber crime, is the security of information and all social relationships that are born around this value, identifying and proving them to be difficult due to their complexity. The results, though very severe in terms of the damage caused to the number of people affected are less visible immediately, usually echoing over a long period of time.

In fact, the danger existing within cyberspace is illustrated by the difference between real cybercrime and apparent criminality which consists of all antisocial acts covered by the law not brought to the attention of legislators.

The significant difference between common law offenses (murder, robbery, rape, etc.) and cybercrime is posed by the intangible nature of computer evidence; cybercrime tracks don't have a material character. To provide digital evidence characteristic with availability and utility is required specialized IT equipment and software.

Both behavioral and moral professional profile and desirability of military personnel is resulting from the interpretation and corroboration of the main regulatory provisions applicable to this category, taking into account the range of corrective measures including civil, disciplinary or criminal sanction.

The military obligations such as preserving the State or professional secret, the prohibition over the use of the professional data in its own interest, preserving the secrecy over classified intelligence or activities, banning public expression of opinions contrary to national and the armed forces interests, the obligation of not conducting activities contrary to human dignity, prestige and rules of conduct arising from the military status, prohibition to disclose incidental data known prior of conducting intelligence activities concerning the private life, honor or reputation of individuals, represent imperative elements that find their applicability in the cyberspace.

From a legal perspective, there is no normative act at general or internal level which prohibits military personnel of engaging in a process communication deployed within social platforms or any other element of New Media.

The legislator is thus obliged to corroborate two seemingly opposing values respectively the need for preserving national security (no person has the

right to disclose classified national security activities relying on free access to information, the right to freedom of dissemination and expression of opinions) and compliance / ensuring fundamental rights for all citizens, including military personnel (personal life, the secrecy of correspondence, freedom of conscience and expression, right to information, as they stated in the Constitution at the art. 26-31).

Therefore, these rights and freedoms must be exercised in good faith, in accordance with their true purpose for which they were created, otherwise the State having a valid reason to intervene in the situation, safeguarding national security and prosecuting the guilty individuals.

Fulfilling the constitutive content of a crime, such as treason by transmission of secrets (Article 157 Penal Code), the disclosure of secrets that endanger State security (Article 169 Penal Code), negligence in state secrecy (Art.252 Criminal Code), disclosure of confidential information that endanger state security (Article 21 of Law nr. 51/1991) or other types of offenses likely to be committed by military personnel soldiers within cyberspace, attract criminal liability thereof.

Failure to observe these dispositions may result, as appropriate, in civil or administrative sanctions for the military personnel. The actual penalty applicable to it, it will take into account the nature and seriousness of the offense, the circumstances of its commission, the form of guilt that the offense is committed (i.e. Whether willful or negligent act, possibly due to inadequate counterintelligence training), the previous behavior of the individual in cause, the requirements of the principle of presumption of innocence.

Conclusions

Information and communication technology revolution has triggered a fundamental transformation of the communication process, difficult to anticipate only a decade ago.

The development of WEB 2.0 platform and hence the New Media communication process has caused a "tsunami" of cybercrime equally favored by technological gaps and vulnerabilities of the human interaction, which increased the risk of disclosure of both personal data and classified information in the governmental and economic field.

It is important, especially in the double position of issuing / receiving messages transmitted via communication on the WEB 2.0 platform, the Romanian Internet users, regardless if they belong from civil or military organizations, to show a protective behavior based on knowledge and awareness of the implications of unprotected cyberspace communication, with repercussions on personal, and sometimes, national's interest level.

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7. http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-dosare_juridice_media-15509226-aplicatiile-mobile-care-nu-respecta-regimul-juridic-colectarii-date-caracter-personal-pot-aduce-amenzi-pana-2-din-cifra-afaceri.htm;
8. http://cluj.time4news.ro/ultima-ora/alqaida-monitorizeaza-*Facebook*;
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IMPLEMENTING A REAL-TIME RECOGNITION OF THE PERSON USING CHAOTIC SCANNING

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Ciprian RĂCUCIU, PhD.[***]

The paper shows an implementation of the software on a group of neural networks, which may lead to the best processing time for a few input parameters.

We have watched to determine the most effective extraction algorithm applications on some models, providing a graphical representation of them.

Also, we have watched to adjust parameters and to improve their algorithms for the ideal solution, but also the processing time.

We have used a personal database to create a set of test large enough, to obtain significant results. The data set was artificially constructed to illustrate a certain difficulty: selecting a set of features, when this feature does not provide individually.

Finally, we presented an application for recognition of a person from human crowds, proposing a series of implementations for military domains.

Keywords*: real-time, chaotic scan, cellular automata, real timing, chaotic counter.*

Introduction

Images are important sources of information based on the idea that people may make different decisions when it comes to the same problem.

Aerial vehicles, remote monitoring systems and other energy saving sensor applications require detection capability.

Reducing the amount of energy in the sensor, allows flexible operation adapted to the information content of the image.

The proposed video transmission system processing uses chaotic image scanning instead the traditional one. It runs for as low complexity algorithm, and leads to progressive compression of images or discovery swift relevant features of each image separately.

We used only a small part of the transmitted pixels and the core is represented by a meter based on a chaotic cellular automata.

We present a pseudo-chaotic behavior with a identical synchronization binary property.

In this paper we demonstrate using the traditional chaotic scan, will result major improvements in terms of image encryption and getting in a short time the characteristic features of a test database images used, without increase the complexity of the algorithm.

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1. Scanning images

1.1. Meter scanning properties

An automated counting is an automated binary property that over consecutive time steps it works in an infinite cycle C defined by a set of binary states C={ X_1.....X_N }. Whatever state the counter is the address of a pixel and is a binary vector X_i={x_1^i .....X_N^i } with n form elements X_j^i ∈[0,1],n represents the dimension of counter. A perfect algorithm to scan a counter should count the entire N=2^n possible states corresponding to the number of pixels in the array.

1.2 LFSR

Linear feedback shift register (LFSR) is a shift register that provides a secure synchronization without cryptographic properties applied in communications and is used in conjunction with computationally intensive schemes.

Using a binary clock signal can be improved switching properties of registers and increased processing times.

Recent discoveries demonstrated the existence of chaotic nonlinear dynamics to whose correction is necessary to implement the system with an analog receiver designed.



Figure no. 1, Schematic block LFSR

1.3. Cellular automaton

A cellular automaton is a system that evolves in discrete steps as a discrete spatial geometry; it is defined by the rules that determine how it changes and evolves over time machine. Emergent behavior and computational complexity of a system can be analyzed and better understood by studying dynamic CA (state, neighborhood and transition function).

The method used to update the state of a cell is synchronous, where all cells are changed simultaneously. Considering, however, that update is not simultaneous, most real complex systems that can be simulated using cellular automata, asynchronous application of the rules has been recognized as an important issue[1].

[1] http://www.cs.ubbcluj.ro/te320/docs/AutomateCelulare.pdf. Emergence, self-organization and evolution: New computational models in the study of complex systems research projects to stimulate formation of young independent research teams, project code TE_320, link accessed at 07/30/2013.

Asynchronous update rules induce a very different behavior for some cellular automata, while for others the change is not significant.

A-synchronicity was induced by status update each cell with some probability. This rule could only help to the improvement of understanding complex biological systems.

1.4. Chaotic scanning vs. raster scan

Raster scan requires that the image is divided into several subdivisions, usually horizontal, called scan lines.

Each scan line can be transmitted in analog form to a video source, eg. television systems, or may be again divided into pixels of discrete form for a new computer processing systems.

To demonstrate the essential difference between the scanning raster chaotic and we started from a vector with N = 30 pixels ask the two possible types of accounts as in Figure 2 (a, b, c).



Figure 2: Scanning chaotic vs. raster scan[2]

In the case of raster scanning (Figure 2) states correspond to adjacent pixels in a row, while in the case of chaotic counter states corresponding row of pixels quite clear. For Gray coding, visit the geometrical distance between consecutive pixels is:

$$d_K(i_k, i_{k-1}) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} |x_j^{i_K} - x_j^{i_{k-1}}|$$

Distance is constant (d_k=1) for a raster scan counter while we see a Gaussian distribution with mean equal to 0.5 * n chaotic scan counter (figure 2.c). Average distance between consecutive pixels ("jump") 'the following distribution is quite high (Figure 2.b) for a chaotic counter which provides a faster coverage of the visual field.

1.5 Solution Optimized

We use type and number of chaotic change in a linear record of previous information (LFSR) and HCA (hybrid cellular automaton). Diagram of two interconnected counters is represented in Figure 3.

[2] Radu DOGARU, *Member, IEEE,* Ioana DOGARU, and Hyongsuk KIM, *Member, IEEE, Chaotic Scan: A Low Complexity Video Transmission System for Efficiently Sending Relevant Image Features*.



Figure no. 3: Chaotic counter block diagram

Scanning image is using scanning transmission system and replaces the traditional chaotic one. The result will be a less complex transmission system with encryption and distribution of spectrum used for compressing images.

Due to re-correlation the scanning of pixels row, is allowed compression fit rapidly progressive and discovery relevant characteristics of images using only a fraction of the pixels transmitted. We proposed the solution using a number system based on cellular automata chaotic behavior, with a pseudo random syncronization with the property.

This is possible enables switching of the analyzed signal from the source by means of synchronization block binary signals to a cellular automaton that the LFSR, in the presence of a clock signal t +1.

The syncronization signals are analyzed preserving cryptographic properties of cellular automaton (LFSR has no such property) and recovery values under the following registry status register transfer property offered for LFSR (cellular automaton has this property).

1.6. Reading images

We used one personal Database and algorithm. The process envisioned involves the first part of the algorithm, the actual completion and processing of test images of the predefined database.

Followed by extraction of feature vectors that will be used later in the training process. Set the file path from which it starts going through the contents of each file. It will go through all the images, each image will be read and loaded into a variable. This process will take place for each image file. Training was performed with a database of images of size 90 x 120 pixels.

For video transmissions, the most important is the consequence of rapid property coverage and the possibility of adapting transmisie.Aceasta rate should ensure flexible image content, and to ensure accuracy in operation.

The database was made is personally and contains a number of 552 pictures in JPEG format, or photographs of 46 subjects, mens and womens, youngs and olders, and belonging at different ethnicities.

Each subject simulate many emotions that were labeled in the database as xy JPEG respectively subject's number and the position where it was photographed.

The subjects were photographed in these positions, numbered: 1. Normally, the front, eyes open; 2. Normally, the front, eyes closed; 3. normal from side, facing left, with eyes open; 4. normal side, facing left, eyes open; 5. happy, smiling; 6. sad, gloomy; 7. surprise; 8. disgust, loathing; 9. angry; 10. with glasses; 11. with cap, hat, or scarf (covered head); 12. with glasses, and covered head.

The photos were taken the day normal lighting conditions, uniformly pale background with a camera Samsung WB 100 type, with linear filter.

Images taken were transposed in format 90 x 120 pixels (horizontal x vertical) using Photo Paint, achieving a total of 552 photos.

We realized then films containing multitudes crowded it was intended to be included or not people photographed, contained in the first database.

Filming respectively shoot-screens were made with a camcorder Panasonic SDR-S70 standard-without using image patches.

Thus, future applications of real-time recognition with 8 of the 10 subjects of the photographs were taken video footage in a crowded lot.

1.7. Drive

The images will then go through a manufacturing process using a function called chao_feature created. This function is a simple algorithm for converting an image into a so-called "feature vector" F predetermined size N, (N = 100).

F will be in the form of a column vector and contains a number of relevant data of each picture in hand.

Chao_feature starts the scans from the chaos of the first N samples of the image, scanning from the same point regardless of the image used.

By converting all images in the database will create two sets of test data and the training that will be used as input into the neural network SVM / RBF for stage classification and performance analysis algorithm used.

The resulting data will be stored in two structures called Samples and labels (belonging to the class label vector result).

2. Experimental results

2.1 Face Recognition using scanning chaotic

To test the incorrect classifications can use several types of architectures (SVM, RBF-MOD) which will change the input parameters from the database.

The chaotic extraction will use only 100 pixels of the image (variable Ns of the program will feature extraction 100 value).

As a first example we used RBF neural network type-M, and the data obtained were stored as a table. We try to changing the input beam of RBF unit, in order to obtain the best classification performance.

The data set used is the Gaussian function, the Euclidean distance.

Ray	Number of RBF units	2D central vector projections/PCIC(%)
1,5	**1090**	 PCIC=88,33%
2,5	**300**	 **PCIC=83.59%**
3	**150**	 PCIC=87,25%
5	**30**	 PCIC=97,24%
6	**18**	 PCIC=99.02%

Figure no. 4: Incorrect classifications based on RBF unit radius

Dependence optimal performance RBF neural network model - M to the number of pixels (NS) that will process every image in the database resulting from the graph below:



Figure no. 5: Optimum performance for the number of pixel graphic

It is noted that optimum performance for a number of pixels of the image 100 is obtained for the percentage of incorrect classifications of 83.59% for the RBF a radius of 2.5. Processing time in this case reduced to 98.02 sec.

2.2 Classification

The issue was the classification can change how the results based on the neural network size and the number of selected models using principal component analysis (PCA)[3] [4]

Technique principal component analysis (PCA) enables the conversion of a number of original variables into a small set of uncorrelated variables by transforming vectors $X_i \epsilon R^n$(i=1…L) belonging to a n-dimensional space, the vector of the form $Y_i \in R^m$(i=1…L), are in an m-dimensional room, where m $<$ n[5] [6].

We optimized the classification process using Karhunen-Loéve. This is a linear method for selecting features. X is an n-dimensional random vector. Looking for an orthogonal transformation enabling optimal representation of the vector X in relation to minimum mean square error criterion. This transformation is called Karhunen-Loeve transformation. It describes the set of vectors V= $\{ X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_L \}$.

Each element of the set is a point in n-dimensional Euclidean space. The set V can be considered a cloud of points in space R^n.

The main components of the set V in Rn are the directions along which the cloud is the greatest elongation. Knowledge of these approaches can be used both for the purposes of classification and for detection of the relevant features of the cloud in the direction puncte.

After project the cloud data of its main components is carried out a compression set of information from the original data.

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[3] T. KOHONEN, „Self-Organizing Maps”, in Springer, Berlin, 2001.
[4] E. OJA; S. KASKI, „Kohonen Maps”, Elsevier, 1999.
[5] M.D. PÎRLOAGĂ, „Considerations on implementation of biometrics technologies in military surveillance systems’’, in Megabyte, ISSN: 1841-7361, București, 2011.
[6] M.D. PÎRLOAGĂ; M.I. MIHĂILESCU, „Optimisation strategies for data collections used in evaluating dynamic signature authentication systems’’, at COMM 2012 Conference, ISBN 978-1-4673-2573-8, IEEE catalog number CFP1241J-PRT, pp.343-349.

Been shown to reduce the size of the input space is accompanied by loss of a quantity of information, so in order to reduce data dimensionality is to keep as much information from the initial information[7] [8].

Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a simple statistical method for dimensionality reduction (compression) which has become probably the most commonly used to create portraits recognition Been shown to reduce the size of the input space is accompanied by loss of a quantity of information, so in order to reduce data dimensionality is to keep as much information from the initial information.

Eigenvectors could be viewed as a set of general characteristics of the variations of date. The images are normalized (made to size), they can be treated as a one-dimensional array of pixel values. Each image is an exact representation by a linear combination of these eigenvectors.Thus, using the above mentioned methods we performed the following tests:

- using the database have changed size neural network considering the following cases: 10x10 neurons, neurons 15 x 15, 20 x 20 neurons, neurons 25 x 25 and 30x30 neurons;

We changed the number of features from 25-200 in increments of 25. For each variant were performed three tests, whose results were presented in the table below.For each test, it was determined the number of images correctly classified a maximum of 200.

The best result is correctly classified for 184 of 200 images and it was obtained with a neural network with 30 x 30 neurons for a total of 75 features conservate. In table are shown the average of the three tests for each variant.

The results are given in percent.

	25	50	75	100	125	150	175	200
10x10	76,80	78,30	79,10	79,00	80,50	80,60	81,30	82,17
12x12	79,50	79,80	78,30	79,50	77,00	79,30	80,00	80,40
15x15	80,00	83,80	80.80	78.15	77.15	77,30	77,80	78,50
20x20	82,00	84,70	84,50	81,80	81.10	75,10	82,10	82,80
25x25	84.00	85,80	85,60	84,60	84,60	84,00	84,00	83,00
30x30	85,80	86,80	**88,30**	85,20	85,30	85,00	87,30	86,30

Figure no. 6: Average percentage of correct classification table representation



Figure no. 7: Average percentage of correct classifications graphical representation

[7] W. ZHAO, R. CHELLAPPA, A. ROSENFELD, P.J. PHILLIPS, „Face Recognition: A Literature Survey", ACM Computing Surveys, 2003.

[8] [8] E. OJA; S. KASKI, „Kohonen Maps", *Elsevier*, 1999.

It is worth noting that the results obtained with Bayes method are better than those obtained by neural networks, the explanation being that in these networks, the data set is too small to produce appreciable results.

Conclusions

Scanning is fast chaotic type when exploring the visual field.

This leads to the conclusion that a chaotic counter will explore the entire area of the pixel (m = N) after a period T = 2N / n cycles.

This observation leads to the construction of a simple compression algorithm taking progressive image resolution and image quality reconstructed compression rate used.

For each pixel addressed by chaotic meter in position m, the transmitter, the receiver takes an entire block of pixels from the same position identical L m resolution, the receiver is controlled to optimize the efficiency of the compression scheme. At the limit of L = 1, a transmission is obtained without loss as in the normal mode.

By choosing a gradual decrease of L can be obtained at a point relatively low compression. It may be added that there is no need for additional transmission circuit in order to obtain efficient compression.

In terms of the signal -to-noise ratio performance is reasonable as can be seen graphically in Figure 7.

Optimal Classification:

• By calculating the matrix using Karhunen - Loeve transform, the image size is halved analyzed, which reduces memory consumption and reducing processing time.

• By implementing Bayes function, it provides the same accuracy of the classification component analysis method.

• The comparative study allows determining with accuracy better choice depending on the size of the neural network classification, noting that for the same size of the network, the best classification is obtained in some cases.

• The comparative study is useful to determine the best result in the classification of the number of images classified into variants tested.

Using screen shots we proposed the future real-time face recognition in image sequences representing agglomerations specific tasks performed by the Romanian Gendarmerie.

Applications may concern:

- real - time recognition of persons under confinement at the border;

- recognition of persons prohibited from crowds of ex. sports events,demonstrations, cultural and religious events, etc.;

- recognizing the persons who entering in the restricted areas with limited access;

- recognition of visitors and prisoners in prisons.

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