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CONTENTS

THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE POSTMODERN SOCIETY'S CONFLICTUAL FRAMEWORK.....	7
<i>Lucian STĂNCILĂ</i>	
<i>Marius-Iulian BADIU</i>	
RISKS, VULNERABILITIES AND ASYMMETRIC THREATS IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION.....	13
<i>Lucian STĂNCILĂ</i>	
<i>Marius-Iulian BADIU</i>	
THE INFLUENCE OF NON-STATE ACTORS ON THE GLOBALIZATION VECTORS, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SECURITY PARADIGMS GENERATED BY GLOBALIZATION	22
<i>Cristian Sandu CUTURELA</i>	
TERMS, CONCEPTS AND ELEMENTS USED IN THE THEORY OF CRISIS AND CONFLICT ANALYSIS	30
<i>Mirela ATANASIU</i>	
THE IMPLICATIONS OF CONTEMPORARY CRISES ON STATE, SOCIETY AND SECURITY	39
<i>Cristian BĂHNĂREANU</i>	
CONFLICTUAL INTERACTIONS BETWEEN ACTORS ON THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA.....	48
<i>Daniela RĂPAN</i>	
<i>Visarion NEAGOE</i>	
CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING DEFENCE DIPLOMACY AS POSSIBLE SOLUTION FOR COUNTERACTING THE MAIN CURRENT RISKS AND THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY	57
<i>Daniela RĂPAN</i>	
INSIGHT INTO THE MILITARY POWER OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS	64
<i>Iulian-Liviu GORGOS</i>	
PARTICULARITIES AND TRENDS OF POLITICAL-MILITARY CRISES IN WIDER BLACK SEA AREA AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE.....	72
<i>Cristina BOGZEANU</i>	
ANALYTICAL APPROACHES TO THE UKRAINE CRISIS AND THE RECENT UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS	84
<i>Péter TÁLAS</i>	

CRIMEA 2014 – BETWEEN STRATEGIC SHOCK AND STRATEGIC SURPRISE	97
<i>Stan ANTON</i>	
RUSSIA’S STRATEGY IN SUB-SAHARAN SECURITY IN THE WAKE OF THE UKRAINE CRISIS	106
<i>Alba Iulia Catrinel POPESCU</i>	
THE IMPACT OF UKRAINE CRISIS ON CHINA’S POSITION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA	116
<i>Diana Stefania DUCU</i>	
THE EU AND RUSSIA: AN IMPOSSIBLE TWO AS ONE?.....	123
<i>Ana Maria COSTEA (GHIMIS)</i>	
NEW CHALLENGES TO THE EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND THE FUTURE NATO STRATEGIC POSTURE.....	130
<i>Liviu IONIȚĂ</i>	
EUROPE BETWEEN STATE TERRORISM AND INDIVIDUAL TERRORISM. THE SHOOTING DOWN OF PASSENGER AIRCRAFT MH17	138
<i>Luminița Ludmila (CÎRNICI) ANICA</i>	
THE EAST EUROPEAN INSECURITY ENVIRONMENT IMPLICATIONS OF TERRORIST GROUPS IN ETHNIC CONFLICTS.....	147
<i>Raluca COȘEA</i>	
<i>Dorin RÂNCEANU</i>	
RECONFIGURATION OF POWER RELATIONS THE ISIL ISSUE	156
<i>Petre Vlad IRIMIE</i>	
<i>Gabriela Amalia GRIGORE</i>	
THE RISE OF ISIS. THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT	166
<i>Corneliu VISOIANU</i>	
IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT, MILITARY AND ECONOMY	171
<i>Josef KRAUS</i>	
IMAGOLOGICAL IMPACT OF THE MEDIATION OF THE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE PUBLIC	176
<i>Daniel PÎSLARIU</i>	
THE NEGLECT OF ‘DROIT/DEVOIR D’INGÉRENCE’ BY ENGLISH LANGUAGE SCHOLARS WRITING ON THE ‘RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT’ (R2P)	182
<i>Alexandru LUCINESCU</i>	

THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT	192
<i>Iuliana Simona TUTUIANU</i>	
EUROPOL. EUROPEAN JUDICIAL INVESTIGATIONS	200
<i>Marian SECĂREANU</i>	
ANALYSIS OF ARMS TRANSFER NETWORKS	205
<i>Ciprian LUNGU</i>	
SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS AND ARMED CONFLICTS	212
<i>Ciprian LUNGU</i>	
ON THE MEANING OF VICTORY: SOME COMMENTS ON THE GEOSTRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE OPERATION ‘PROTECTIVE EDGE’ (2014)	221
<i>Florin DIACONU</i>	
THE CHINESE NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND POLICY IN THE 21st CENTURY	230
<i>Alexandru-Tudor DIACONU</i>	
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FALKLAND: FROM 1982 TO PRESENT	237
<i>Ioana Corina JULAN</i>	
THE ROLE OF GERMANY IN EURASIA IN 21ST CENTURY – EFFECTS OF CONSOLIDATING EUROPEAN UNION.....	245
<i>Maria Ruxanda URSA</i>	
CZECH REPUBLIC IN NATO - FROM ADMIRATION TO RELIANCE.....	253
<i>Lukáš DYČKA</i>	
<i>František MIČÁNEK</i>	
HUNGARY’S 15 YEARS WITHIN NATO: LESSONS LEARNT AND UNLEARNT	259
<i>Tamás CSIKI</i>	
REGIONAL SECURITY AT A CROSSROADS: VISEGRAD GROUP AND THE CHALLENGES OF UKRAINIAN CRISIS.....	268
<i>Carmen RÎJNOVEANU</i>	
PARALLEL BETWEEN THE HUMAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURES OF AFRICA AND SOUTH ASIA.....	280
<i>Filofteia REPEZ</i>	
LATIN AMERICA HUMAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AT THE BEGINNING OF XXI CENTURY	289
<i>Filofteia REPEZ</i>	
GEOPOLITICAL AND SECURITY ASPECTS OF IMMIGRATION. A DEMOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE. STUDY CASE ROMANIA	297
<i>Cătălina TODOR</i>	

SOCIETAL SECURITY AND THE MIGRATION PHENOMENON. RISKS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY	315
<i>Elena Adelina ANDREI</i>	
DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENT AS SECURITY FACTOR: THE CASE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC	322
<i>Libor FRANK</i>	
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS AS EU POST-COLD WAR SECURITY ISSUES.....	328
<i>Alexandra SARCINSCHI</i>	
ANTICIPATORY METHODS AND TECHNIQUES APPLIED IN SECURITY STUDIES	338
<i>Răzvan GRIGORAS</i>	
CULTURAL GLOBALISATION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21st CENTURY.....	346
<i>Mădălina Virginia ANTONESCU</i>	
FORMS OF GLOBAL CULTURES AT THE BEGINNING OF 21st CENTURY	354
<i>Mădălina Virginia ANTONESCU</i>	
CULTURE AND SECURITY IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY	364
<i>Veronica PĂSTAE</i>	
THE RISE OF DEVELOPMENTAL NATIONALISM: REFLECTION OVER THE ELECTION OF NARENDRA MODI AND THE INDO-JAPANESE ENTENTE	372
<i>Silviu PETRE</i>	
THE IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMY AND ENVIRONMENT IN ENSURING NATIONAL SECURITY	382
<i>Irina TĂTARU</i>	

THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE POSTMODERN SOCIETY'S CONFLICTUAL FRAMEWORK

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***Abstract:** International Relations (IR) could be seen like a show staged by various actors. When we refer to these actors we should consider any person or entity which has a role that is accountable in international relations. Even if impressive, the multitude and the variety of these actors is organized in two categories: states and non-state actors.*

In spite of the fact that states remains the most important actors in the global system, the non-state actors in nowadays' world have an enlarging power and importance in IR. International and regional Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), traders in arms, multinational companies and professional organizations, drug-traffickers, organized crime and, of course, individuals, all of them are seen to play an increasing, sometimes even a determining, role. Sometimes positive, sometimes negative, this is a foreseeable evolution but, most especially, unmanageable.

The continuous globalization of the world will make difficult for us to distinguish corporations, countries and other actors, in a postmodern society with re-emerging states and collapsing nations.

***Keywords:** non-state actors, postmodern society, international relations, globalization.*

Introduction

The most important actors of the international relations are nation-states, but they are not the only players. The world politics system consists of nation-states, international organizations, and private actors. Despite the fact that there were thousands of international organizations established after the World War II, the specialists underestimated them. The increasing number of these organizations is related to the increasing levels of dealings between states, individuals and societies at political, economic, social or cultural level. This growing number of so many kinds of non-state actors changed the international environment in a more complex one, with more complex relationships. In this new environment, a “transnational” system take the place of the “state-centric” concept and, according to some specialists of international relations, non-state actors are gaining status and influence in nation-states' detriment which are declining in primacy.

The non-state actors' scene is extremely complex because interconnections between players often evolve, and because their activities frequently converge. Non-state actors network sometimes work as a second state or, other times, as the exclusive form of legitimacy. It experiences important levels of power, local authority and responsibility mainly as a consequence of these numerous functions, which normally are attributes from the states' sphere.

Non-state actors are represented by persons or formations that have an influential power, easily perceived in political, economic, or social field and are capable to express authority at a national or sometimes international level. Despite of this, they are not belong or related to any state.

There are a lot of definitions related to non-state actors but the most comprehensive concept admit that non-state players are all entities who differ from states. The majority of theories agree that non-state entities are substantially different between themselves.

The authority and the capacity to be influent are not the only characteristics of non-state actors. They are also able to operate abroad, outside and not only in the state where is located the base or headquarter of this entities.

The Typology and the Purposes of Non-state Actors

The sphere of non-state actors includes all actors from the civil society. Some examples could be constituted by regional non-governmental organisations (NGOs); organizations based on religious faith; traditional, ethnic and other structures and systems of authority; private sector networks; workers' organizations; youth and women organizations; media, academics or local community-based groups; and even influential persons. All these actors are usually regarded as "civil society". Nevertheless, these players should be perceived as informal systems of authority. Sometimes, these unofficial systems exist or struggle with each other or even with the state. These informal systems direct their actions and their opinions in the direction of and relations with official institutions, contributors and external actors. Regardless a possible spoiler or a valuable partner, non-state actors are important for every changing process. It should be remarked that non-state actors' concept clearly excludes the factions or parties who are clearly engaged in illegal activities or armed violence in order to achieve their purposes.

Sub-state Actors

Sub-state actors represent domestic actors consisting in groups of peoples with homogeneous interests outside the range of the states that are capable to influence the foreign policy of the state.

An example of sub-state actor is the trade union which represents "an organization of workers who have united together to achieve common goals such as protecting the integrity of its trade, achieving higher pay and benefits such as health care and retirement, increasing the number of employees an employer assigns to complete the work, safety standards, and better working conditions. The trade union, through its leadership, bargains with the employer on behalf of union members (rank and file members) and negotiates labour contracts (collective bargaining) with employers"¹.

Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)

An IGO is a voluntary association of three or more nations-states called international organization. They are established by a treaty and constituted mainly by sovereign states in order to achieve many objectives for which states want to act together. There are hundreds of IGOs in nowadays' world which are representative in different fields. The mainly difference between IGOs and other simple associations or coalition of states is that the last one exist only as groups founded for a task and have not been created by a basic and fundamental document. IGOs are created especially by stronger states that need to collaborate with other states in the context of IGOs with the intention to protect their interests. That is why decisions taken by

¹ *Trade union*, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trade_union, accessed on October 27, 2014.

IGOs are the result of negotiations between the governmental representatives designated to them.

It is well known that establishing of the rule, the setting of the agenda, and the collection of information are the main purposes of IGOs. Additionally, they make the level of uncertainty between states lower and looking for joint actions in order to bring solutions to international problems.

The scope and the function are two criteria by which IGOs may be classified. By the scope, we can distinguish regional or global IGOs, while by function we will find political, economic, social or environmental IGOs.

International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO) or the United Nations (UN) is good examples of global IGOs. These organizations have universal or almost universal participation which means every state is a member. Regional IGOs are a subset of states as members established on a specific interest or region, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization of American States (OAS), European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), the Arab League, Pan American Health Organization (PHO), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Council of Europe (COE), Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) and others.

Due to the fact that multiple ways of cooperation and numerous channels of communication and collaboration among states are provided by the IGOs, these play a very important role for the nation-states and bring advantage for the majority or all the states.

States demand to collaborate with each other and supervise other states to be sure that they are fulfilling their responsibilities to reply too many of the problems. In some situations IGOs are not only created to solve problems but to furnish a forum for discussions. For example, the General Assembly of the UN has no prearranged agenda but ensures a platform for states to talk about and reflect on the issues that show up. In the same manner, bringing together states for negotiation in order to solve problems is one of WTO's goals.

Transnational Actors

Transnational actors are those actors that operate under the level of the state but its running is across the state borders. The multinational corporations (MNCs) or transnational corporations (TNCs) and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are the two types of transnational actors.

Multinational Corporations (MNCs)/ Transnational Corporations (TNCs)

Multinational corporations (MNCs) are those establishments that are based in one state but perform and invest on a large scale in other different states. MNCs have headquartered in one state but have divisions or subdivisions running in other states. Due to this, MNC is seen as a large organization with established facilities and employees in many states and involved at the same time on a worldwide basis.

MNCs can be classified as determined by the types of business activities they pursue such as industrial products, banking, extraction of the resources, transportation, tourism and others. The most notable MNCs are:

- *Industrial corporations.* Those companies create products in factories in many countries and sell them to buyers in different countries. Automobile, electronic and oil industries are the most important and extended MNCs. The majority of the most important MNCs are headquartered in the states from G7.
- *Financial corporations* (for example banks). Those are operating transnational with more limitations than industrial corporations. A good example is Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited (OCBC Bank).

- *Services* such as the fast-food chain McDonald's, hotels (Hilton Hotels & Resorts) or international airlines (MAS, Asiana Airlines) and many others.

MNCs are progressively influential as independent actors. The majority of the industrial MNCs have each one, sales of hundreds of billions of dollars per year. MNCs are capable to compete in size and financial resources the majority of the international organizations (IOs). For example, the largest MNC has about 250 billion dollars a year incomes and the largest IGO (UN) has about 2 billion dollars. The largest state (United States) has government revenues of 2 trillion dollars. In spite of the fact that the power of MNCs does not compete the largest states (United State has administration incomes of 2 trillion dollars), it surpasses many IOs and many poorer countries.

MNCs are driven by the need to obtain a maximum profit. They are view as citizens who are under obligation of no government. That is the reason MNCs activate at the global level in the advantage of their international investors and have no loyalty to single state.

By their transactions, MNCs interconnect an international group of business people and support a worldwide business network.

MNCs also play an important role in the development of the country where they are hosted. Providing job possibilities for the citizens in the states where they are operating, MNCs will have a significant contribution to the stabilization and development of the economy.

Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)

In nowadays world, many people discover that they could be a part of the international system and they could have an influent role inside the international organizations by becoming a member of the NGOs. That is the reason for the majority became members of at least one of this NGOs which number today about 30000 peoples.

The constituent parts of the NGOs are private global actors, which not involve states, composed by participants from more than one country.

The members of the NGOs are grouping in order to promote their common objectives and ideology. Their aim is to shape the programs of the IGOs and states' administrations. Issues such as human rights violation, proliferation of nuclear weapons, environmental pollution are faced up in NGOs' attempt to pursue goals that are helpful and admired and for this reason do not cause any dispute or do not raise considerably opposition.

There is a close interaction between NGOs and states or other non-states actors such as MNCs or other NGOs. Despite the fact that UN or other organizations recognize the important role of the NGOs as legitimate actors, they o not consider them equal to states as importance. Even if the purposes cover a wide range and different fields such as politics, humanitarian aid or economy, a nongovernmental organization do not cover all this fields at a time but only one or a part of them.

The religious movement is another form of presentation for a NGO. It consists in a series of principles and opinions politically managed by a religious faction in order to attempt to popularize the creeds of the lead. They action as a political organization and their opinions are strongly based on religious beliefs. The religious movement functions as a conciliator between states.

Political Groups that Encourage Violence (Terrorist groups)

Terrorist groups or political factions that encourage violence might not use the name of nongovernmental organization, but they act in the same way. They interact with countries and with significant populations and organizations but by using force and preparing attacks.

These factions keep in the hand a significant power and are capable to determine the international relations between nations. Examples of groups that are acting now are the Al-Qaeda and Islamic State.

The happening of the stunningly devastating attack of 9/11 by members of Al-Qaeda, has demonstrated the strongly power that technology place in the hands of terrorists as non-state actors. In addition, the Al-Qaeda also used suicide bombers and manages their actions and supplies using Internet and international banking system.

In the last months, the Islamic State has been setting up a strong position in Iraq. The faction passes from Syria and seized a number of very important areas, such as Mosul, the second largest city from Iraq. The IS has conducted a bloody movement to counter the religious minorities. There were thousands of Yazidis refugees trapped in the Sinjar Mountains while gradually decreasing supplies.

International Criminal Groups

Regarded as transnational actors, these actors behave in an illegal way. The majority of these actors has a significant ability of financial resources and in this manner is capable to determine the policy of the states. A part of these actors are even able to threaten the security of the states. The majority of this organizations are dealing with drugs, human trafficking, armament trafficking, prostitution, and many other illegal activities. They are acting in secret and this makes hard for the authorities to find them.

Yakuza, Sicilian Mafia, Triads are a few examples of international criminal organizations engaged in illegal activities, especially for financial benefit.

Conclusions

To refuse to pay attention to the non-state actors in nowadays world is to lose the most favourable and productive feature of international relations. Even the non-state actors may never become as important as the state actors, and may never become so absorbed with so many different issues as national administrations do, their efforts to realize their purposes are enough prominent characteristics that belong to international scene to determine the course of circumstances and make the governments to be interested in them. Therefore, we should pay attention to the evolution of the non-state-actors on the international affairs scene.

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RISKS, VULNERABILITIES AND ASYMMETRIC THREATS IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

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Abstract: *The risks, vulnerabilities and asymmetric threats addressing nowadays' society's security are difficult to be efficiently dealt with using designed methods and means, for one of the most important features of security policy today is uncertainty. This is due to the fact that the capabilities, intentions and motivations of non-state adversaries are often unknown. Despite the fact that each circumstance introduce particular challenges to states and security organizations, all represent distinguishable states of uncertainty and call for different manners for informed action.*

A new sets of complex and interconnected risks oblige nations to reconsider their security needs, in a world defined by globalization,. Risks are indirect, unplanned, undetermined and they are also, by definition, specific for the future. Moreover, risks exist in a constant mode of virtuality.

Employing a holistic approach, this paper looks at what the shift from a security framework characterized by traditional threats to one largely consisting of spread out risks means for our capacity to foresee future challenges.

Keywords: *risks, asymmetric threats, vulnerabilities, globalization, terrorism.*

Introduction

The intrinsic nature of the threats, risks, challenges and vulnerabilities facing security is analyzed related to the economic, political, military, scientific, cultural and other tendencies which maintain its operational potential at a given moment. The security issue is debated at all levels – the individual, national, regional, global ones. It is well known that maintaining security in its multiple instances is vital to the survival and development of the socio-political systems. It is from this point of view that we will analyze the threats, risks, challenges and vulnerabilities manifested in the international security environment.

1. Risk and vulnerabilities in the international security environment

As to the vulnerabilities that influence and affect the healthy flux of the international security, we will tackle the nodal ones, approaching them from the perspective of their main features.

Globalization, per se, does not represent vulnerability, but it is through its systematic details which are impossible to manage that it creates a large range of vulnerabilities in the security environment. These vulnerabilities are determined by process inherent to globalization, sometimes themselves becoming vulnerabilities. As to this we bear in mind the following aspects:

- the dominant tendency to get integrated at a global scale of the main economic forces, as well as of the less national economies which are dependent on the globalizing

centers; in line with this tendency, the interdependence became stronger and consequently the international situation determines the national one increasingly, even for the mere fact that exports represent an even greater part of the production; therefore, a negative economic event in a state generates reactions of the same kind in other states;

- in the technological and economical fields, globalization marks the increasing quasi-completeness of the social life arena – of the political, social, demographic, environmental, military, cultural, religious ones and those regarding the civilization and mentalities. It manifests as a process through which the world tends to become a sole space, which determines significant acts of contestation;
- globalization creates both opportunities and vulnerabilities, the expansion of the market of ideas and of the operationalization of the concepts of liberty and democracy, determining attitudes of local, regional and even national contestation;
- globalization exposed the social systems to new challenges and implicitly to vulnerabilities, changing the mode in which the old social organizations responded to the interests and values that they contained in our enterprise of response and reconfiguration;
- the current vulnerabilities specific to the globalization process are to be found in: the treats to the public health, such as the epidemic ones, which know no bounds; the illegal trade of drugs, human beings or weapons exploiting the availability and easiness in transport and exchange offered by the modern era; the destruction of the environment caused by humans or great disasters such as floods, hurricanes, earthquakes or tsunami.

The energetic resources. Their limited condition, their unequal distribution on the planet and the reckless exploitation of the resources project them in a major vulnerability of the international environment of security. The industrial expansion and the economic globalization act as ‘real’ eaters of raw materials and the energetic products while the energetic security relies on fossil and nuclear resources and not on regenerative ones.

Assuring food and the insufficient water resources also constitute major vulnerabilities of the global society, assimilated as such by the status and the condition of the security of the international environment. Assuring the food is an essential problem, a survival one, especially for the overpopulated countries or poor in natural resources. Besides the lack of education and of qualified medical assistance, famine endangers and condemns the lives of over one million people, which is inexcusable. The insufficient water resources are a vulnerability that affects to a very great extent specially the countries and societies in the Saharan Africa, Near and Middle East or Central Asia. This situation makes it impossible to prevent the intensification of the competition for the water resources which increases the probability that this transform in violent conflicts.

The degradation of the environment is a reality affecting significantly the natural equilibrium of nature. Although very diverse in manifestations, the degradation of the environment is largely exemplified by the decisive transformations in intensity and expansion of the problems regarding global heating and the thinning of the ozone layer. Global heating is known to be caused by the accumulation in the atmosphere of dangerous quantities of carbon dioxide, methane, azoth and sulfa oxide. If highly concentrated, these gases rushed the process of ‘green house’ effect, with the melting of the polar ice caps, the rising of the sea level and the degradation of the soil fertility as consequences.

Population problems. The tendency of rhythmic increase of the population, manifested emphatically in China, India and South-East Asia, Near and Middle East, by comparison with the negative population growth rate in the Western states of the global hemisphere (which are not randomly historically developed states, creates major demographic disequilibria at global

level which weaken the status and condition of the international security. In this sense we may notice a number of obvious aspects: demographic expansion, with direct consequences in the economic field, able to generate political and military shocks, which converge with the alarming aging of the population – the Russian Federation, USA and the European Union are in this sense relevant examples; overpopulation in certain regions and countries, which adds to the annihilating accentuation of impecuniousness, feed the waves of immigrants that almost flood the developed countries hoping for a better life. There is direct connection between the demographic expansion and the wild irrational exploitation of the environment; soil degradation, woods deforestation, the economic and ethno-cultural conflicts.

Diseases, extreme impecuniousness and the degraded education represent other important vulnerabilities with consequences over the international security. The contamination of millions of people with epidemic diseases or easily transmissible, specific to the economically, politically, culturally and educationally underdeveloped countries is complemented with the unhappy support of the current systems of distribution of the material resources. This will continue to feed the local and regional instabilities causing deep and almost ineluctable breaches in the stability of the international security.

The asymmetries between the rich states and those affected by chronic poverty create vulnerabilities because they have an impact on the economy – in all its spatial instances (local/national, regional, global), as well as on the social stability on important surfaces of social organization in the world. A good example in this sense is the percentage representation of the global VNB quantum as follows: the NAFTA group (USA, Canada, Mexico) – 35%; Western Europe – 27%; West Pacific – 24/25%, Central and South America – 4,2%, Maghreb and Middle East – 3%, Sub-Saharan Africa – 1%, South Asia – 1,9%. The imbalances in this sphere are almost untreatable, in spite of all efforts – some of which are systematic – that a number of international organizations carry on.

The precariousness of the agriculture represents, perhaps due to its direct and indirect consequences, one of the major vulnerabilities of the international security. The general causes consist of: the lack of (at least symbolic) exploitation of some vast agricultural fields, especially in Africa and Central Asia; the lack of some systematic programs aimed at giving back to agriculture of some fields which can be fertilized and capitalized with very good results; the lack of some sedentary culture of the populations and of education regarding the cultivation and the superior capitalization of the soil. Simultaneously, we are facing phenomena connected to the agricultural policies of the states: the exiguity or the inexistence of the agricultural financing and the inability to offer subsidies for export; the limitation of the access on the regional macro-markets of produce in the developing countries which fail in this way to offer the stimulation of their own agricultural production; the anachronism of the UN policies aimed at supporting the underdeveloped countries; the indebting more than their power of survival of the states with poor societies.

The status and condition of governing and the observation of the human rights constitute, no doubt, an essential condition in determining the security potential, in both its opposing instances – security and insecurity. Because of the weakening of the military dimension in the geostrategic and geo-politic equation of security regarding the non-military dimensions it remains, though, a permanence, e.g. the vast military threat diminished, being replaced by new economic, political, social and ecological risks, perils and threats. To this we must add another important thing in the general or contextual evaluation – direct or indirect – of the security status: the ever stronger need for democratization and development on durable foundation of the society. This desire is the first prerogative of a government.

We obviously did not exhaust the vulnerabilities that can affect the status of the international security. The unification of the world that happen under aegis of the Occident and that we call globalization paradoxically needs that it invent new languages and new

rappports with the others. Moreover, to stop inventing them alone and to let the others participate, instead.

2. Asymmetric threats to the international security environment

Theorists in the global replacing of the international system consider that there is a whole range of threats that target both powerful and weak states. These threats are generally remarked through the negative effects of the globalization of the economy, with consequences in the impoverishment of a great mass of the population, the epidemics that diffuse very rapidly on the huge surfaces impossible to handle; the proliferation of mass destruction weapons, especially the nuclear ones; the non-state actors that seem able to get means for fighting in this category; the international terrorism that exploit the advantages of globalization, of knowledge, transport and communications, with the weak states becoming easily their victims; the local and inside, inter-religious and interethnic conflicts that intersect with the international terrorism causing regional insecurity; poverty, epidemics, the environment degradation. All these phenomena stimulate the local wars and the international terrorism and the networks of organized crime that threaten the international security. We will further refer to the most significant threats.

Proliferation of armament. It is unanimously agreed that both mass destruction weapons and modern conventional armament systems can be a major threat when these are in the hands of terrorist networks or Islamic states, which makes it necessary to elaborate an international common strategy for reaction and prevention. It is relevant that USA conceptualized their policy about this issue following three principal directions for action: counter-proliferation in order to combat the use of mass destruction weapons; the strengthening of non-proliferation; the adoption of a system of management of the consequences able to respond properly to a potential use of mass destruction weapons. The general attention on this threat is maintained by the inside movements of this issue, the most important being those denoting situations like the following: the speed at which the biochemical technologies spread, the states owning sophisticated infrastructures and supra-structures and that become weaker and more vulnerable; the possibility of the states engaged in local conflicts of choosing mass destruction weapons as the optimal solution for victory in the case when the conventional ones would not assure them the success they desire; the existence of international agreements among the great powers that prevent them to be the first to use such weapons.

Regarding *nuclear and radiological weapons*, the hallmark of an international regime of non-nuclear proliferation is represented by The Treatise for Nuclear Non-proliferation signed in 1967 by the five nuclear powers of that time – the USA, the UK, France, China and URSS. Through this treatise the subscribers pledged to not export nuclear weapons, their components or specific technologies to the non-nuclear states; they also agreed upon a set of measures to take in order to streamline their management. However, the evolution of the nuclear arming continued with such events like:

- ✓ India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998;
- ✓ South Africa renounced nuclear arsenal through self-disarming after the abolition of the apartheid regime;
- ✓ Brasilia and Argentina renounced their nuclear programs in the same manner;

- ✓ Israel developed its own nuclear capability as a protection measure against the nuclear ambition of the Muslim states in the Middle East;
- ✓ North Korea denounced its agreement signed with the USA in 1994 to freeze its nuclear program and retreated from The Treatise for Nuclear Non-proliferation in 2003;
- ✓ Iran decided at the end of 2004 to resume its activities aimed at enriching uranium;
- ✓ Certain states continue to develop their own nuclear programs with the support of versed nuclear actors, since they do not possess their own capabilities to this end.

Taking into consideration these evolutions, the engagements of the two great powers – the USA and the Russian Federation – are salutary; they reduced their nuclear arming with 75% less than the level existing in 1991 on the basis of SALT Treatise.

The chemical and biological weapons are easier to produce and this is why they are to be found in the arsenal of many states. The efforts of the international community to prevent the use of the chemical and biological weapons materialized in the signing of The Convention on Chemical Weapons by 130 states in January 1993. This document reviewed and extended the guidelines established in 1925 by the Geneva Protocol. By assuming the Convention, the signatory states decided to not develop, produce, acquire deposit or transfer such weapons to others, to not use nor offer assistance or encourage other states to engage in such activities; to destroy the stocks of chemical weapons and the production installations.

Conventional armament. Due to its production at the highest technological level possible, this armament is increasingly efficient and lethal, consequently more dangerous, especially because the most of the performing modern fighting systems can be used very easily after medium-length duration of preparation. The efforts regarding the limitation of the use of conventional armament materialized in 1993 in the launching of the Wassenaar negotiations at which 33 producing and exporting countries participated. The engagement assumed ended in 1996 with obligations regarding the following:

- the export of conventional armament and of dual goods and technologies;
- reunions aimed at increasing the responsibilities of the parties regarding the transport of conventional armament and of dual goods and technologies, observing the consolidation of peace and international and regional security;
- the promotion of transparency and openness, ensuring the exchange of viewpoints and information as to armament sales;
- the increase of responsibilities and the provision of transfer for conventional armament and of dual goods and technologies, preventing thus their accumulation in excess because would cause a destabilizing effect for security;
- the advance in cooperation in order to prevent the acquisition of armament and special dual materials to military purposes;
- making sure that the transfer of armament and of dual goods and technologies does not contribute to the development or improvement of military capabilities;
- keeping under real control of the export of items on the list previously agreed upon;
- the reporting of the armament transfer to other countries and of the refusal of such transfers for items under control.

Organized crime. It was completely inevitable that the transformations in the global politico-economic fields gave a strong impulse to the international criminal activities; this consolidated significantly the organizations which in fact projected them, organized them and managed their development. The specialists in the analysis of the combat against organized crime as a threat to the international security came to the conclusion that:

- through the organized crime the international strategic environment becomes eroded and degraded;
- the vision upon what represents a stable and desirable society is threatened;
- the groups belonging to the organized crime differ a lot among each other as to their wealth, size and gathered resources, internal structure and cohesion, basic illegal activities, international and transnational connections;
- the increase in the volume of economic activities at regional, continental and global levels allows crime organizations to act under favourable conditions;
- in the states with a precarious economy organized crime focused upon a number of specific activities such as: drug, products, cigarettes, art objects, vehicles, weapon, human beings and organs smuggling;
- the crime organizations, just like modern corporations, developed new strategies and structural arrangements in order to become more competitive and efficient on the global market, becoming in this way transnational.

We may now conclude that organized crime is one of the specific threats of our society, being the instrument used to fulfil a number of objectives of the organizations that commit crimes.

The ethnic and religious violence. Territorial conflicts. The values that determine the social existence and the vitality of the ethnic and religious groups refer to culture, traditions and customs, language, life style and a certain common psychology, all these constituting the basis for the definition of any ethnic group. The values mentioned represent an objective reality, and thus being impossible to remove or destroy. This is the reason why, if handled destructively, can become vectors of certain severe threats to security, especially in the areas or regions of interference of some cultures and civilizations. Laying their account on the fact that the re-emergence of the ethnic and religious phenomena is not difficult to trigger and that conflicts are easy to be started, the ethnic and religious confrontations may be real Trojan horses that forces interested in implementing a certain evolution in a certain geographic or geopolitical area or region can use in order to initiate destabilizing actions. The cursive characteristics of the ethnic and religious conflicts lay bear aspects of their manifest nature such as:

- the manners in which the ethnic or religious interests express themselves are not always clear for those outside the respective groups, and not rarely were they concealed under the mask of apparently legitimate claims – focused on the observation of human rights, minority rights or, sometimes, on the procurance, one way or the other, of their autonomy;
- ethnic conflicts have complex causes (historical, cultural, territorial and political).conflicts that materialize a lot more in confrontations of interests rather than of values, as it is expected. Ethnic or religious conflicts are based on value systems,

but are not a direct result of these; these are actually the consequence of the need to live in a certain geographical area where the ethnic groups accept, or, on the contrary, deny or defy the states in which they have to live;

- ultra religious movements tend to have a universal character, imposing the tendency that the opinions they express must be unconditionally appropriated by all the believers in the respective religion, the tendency being to create a motivation, and implicitly a support which cross borders.

The international organizations, especially the UN, get involve in and most often succeed in appeasing the international security environment.

International terrorism is, beyond doubt, the most severe threat to the international security, with consequences difficult to estimate for the social space in which they manifest. The complexity of this threat is showed by the multifarious nature of its definition – until today there has been no definition able to contain all the evaluations regarding terrorism. We will nevertheless tackle some aspects like:

- ‘terrorism is theatre’¹ - it is perceived as a voluntary presentation to a large audience in order to send a message or to get attention to itself;
- terrorism is tactics, strategy, crime, a holy duty, a justified reaction or an abominable mistake; it depends on how it is looked at (to some, an individual may be a terrorist, whilst to others he may be a peace fighter);
- terrorism means the sensible use of illegal vigilance or the threat to use it, in order to stir fear, aimed at forcing or intimidating governments to attain certain political, religious or ideological purposes;
- according to the UN, terrorism is a condition of anxiety that inspire repeated violent actions from the part of state actors, groups or individuals that act illegally for diverse reasons, be they criminal or political, and their direct target is not, by contrast with the assassinations, the principal target;
- according to the UK’s government, terrorism is the use of violence to get to a final political situation; it may involve any kind of violence in order to induce fear among citizens.

All these definitions emphasize a common set of features of the international terrorism which are generalized in several aspects:

- *political* (terrorism is apolitical act or an act committed to obtain a political result);
- *psychological* (a terrorist act causes a psychological effect or terror, the victims of it being others than the desired ones);
- *violent* (violence, coercion or destructive phenomena are used together to get to the final purpose);
- *dynamic* (when the political groups demand social changes, revolutions or political movements);
- *deliberate* (meaning that the actions of the terrorists are timely and rigorously planned and their specifics goals are clearly named).

¹ Lars Erik Cederman, *Emergent Actors in World Politics. How States and Nations Develop and Dissolve*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 1997, p. 43.

Kofi Annan, ex - Secretary - General of the United Nations, said that “By its very nature, terrorism is an assault on the fundamental principles of law, order, human rights and peaceful settlement of disputes upon which the United Nations is established... The United Nations has an indispensable role to play in providing the legal and organizational framework within which the international campaign against terrorism can unfold”².

The international legislation in which counter-terrorism activities should take place at every level, from national to intergovernmental level, has been increased, and this is because of the nature of terrorist actions which become more and more transnational.

The terrorist activities represent an attack against society and its values, and these acts constitute a danger for all the civilized societies. That is why, all the legal methods available must be used and directed to stop this phenomenon. The full range of principles and norms included in the international law are suitable to prevent and punish the terrorist acts.

Lately, states made a resolution to fight against terrorism with the help of the law norms and implicitly of justice. Their decision was motivated by the amplification of the terrorist acts at world level, their brutality and unpredictability, the various forms under which the terrorist phenomenon manifests itself, which brings to the population feelings of fright, fear and terror.

Conclusions

The international relations are ruled by a globalised system which call for a promptly answer to the critical events from the worldwide stability scene. This is the only solution to keep away from an irrevocable international depreciation that set the risk for the global peace.

Decisive aspects which took place during Cold War, such as CBRN war, seem as a far possibility. However, the probability that a terrorist organization to use CBRN elements to perform a terrorist attempt is a studied eventuality in counter-terrorism plans of some states and law enforcement organizations.

As claimed by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, “We can expect that asymmetric warfare will be the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time. These conflicts will be fundamentally political in nature and require the application of all elements of national power. Success will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of shaping behavior of friends, adversaries and, most importantly, the people in between”³.

States have to do all in their power to develop a durable, integrated, and broad strategy for facing the asymmetric risks and threats now and hereafter. They have to deal with the new menaces from 21st century opponents.

These strong arguments make clear the reason for the nowadays global circumstances call for strengthened many-sided attempts to deal with symmetric and asymmetric risks to

² Avtar Singh Bhasin, *India's Foreign Relations-2008*, Geetika Publishers, New Delhi, March 2009, p. 332, available online at: http://www.mea.gov.in/images/pdf/main_2008.pdf, accessed on October 27, 2014.

³ Thom Shanker, “Defense Secretary Urges More Spending for U.S. Diplomacy”, *New York Times*, November 27, 2007.

international security. This makes clear why “No single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own”⁴.

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⁴ *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy*, 2003.

THE INFLUENCE OF NON-STATE ACTORS ON THE GLOBALIZATION VECTORS, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SECURITY PARADIGMS GENERATED BY GLOBALIZATION

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***Abstract:** The phenomenon of globalization is a complex social phenomenon prompted by the evolution of human society itself, which is manifested through five principal vectors: military, economic, political, religious and cultural. During the historical evolution of human society, the results of the actions of these five vectors have been influenced both by state and non-state actors. In the 21st century the non-state actors have become more and more important as a consequence of two factors. The first is the diversification and specialization of non-state actors in terms of their social purpose and the second one is prompted by the complex development of globalization, which has turned our world into an interdependent and interconnected one. The evolution of State as a central institution for decisions for the management of the national interests, requires continuous analysis of globalization vectors to be able to predict and / or to be able to reduce the influence of non-state actors both as representatives of society's interests, as well as the power of constraint and influence on the activity of its components.*

***Keywords:** culture, government, interest, non-state actor, organization, policies, security, vector.*

1. The emergence of the phenomenon of non-state actors

Our work aims at analysing the significant and growing importance of the role of non-state actors in international conflicts, which has been heightened by the phenomenon of modern globalization. Hence, we consider we have to make a brief presentation on the history of their emergence.

According to our theory, globalization is a complex social phenomenon, a phenomenon which directly influences the evolution and development of social relations in a world which is increasingly interconnected and interdependent and it manifests itself by actions and reactions prompted by the five main vectors: military, economic, political, religious and cultural.

We can argue that the phenomenon of “non-state actors” started to be visible within society with the emergence of private organizations or societies with a public purpose at the end of the 18th century. The first types of NGOs focusing on social issues, fighting slavery or poverty, were established by small groups of citizens becoming aware of the ethical and social problems of the evolution and globalization of the known world.

This commitment generated the group social activities at the time, organized by associations of citizens and sometimes by churches. Their actions would often include appeals to local, regional or national authorities.

The establishment of societies, associations or committees in the United Kingdom from the mid-eighteenth century on, was related to the emergence of “the polite society of

gentry and nobility” and by the increased mobility facilitated by the progress of transports through the construction of carriages and the improvement in the road system.

The nineteenth century saw the rise of the middle classes and consequently the increase in the number of people who had the time, education and resources needed to take part in such societies and civic activities.

At the time, increasingly more states had already faced similar problems, and their citizens had started to correspond with each other about them, or had established other types of trans-border contact like visits, meetings or conferences and thus emerged the transnational private networks, initially for the abolition of slavery and soon followed by networks concerning peace and women’s rights.

Local and regional ideas, experience and expertise were passed from the citizens of one country to those of another country, resulting in the establishment of international issue-oriented societies, with member organizations in several countries, now known as international NGOs, and one of their characteristics was that they benefited from international support.

Their inclination to address citizens by multilateral conferences started with the British movement for the abolition of slavery, which began by petitions presented to the House of Commons, requesting it to address this problem at an international level.

At that moment, counting on the support of the white citizens, the British government felt it had to include the issue on the agenda of the Vienna Congress of 1814. The movement’s representatives mobilized and went to Vienna to explain their points of view. As a consequence of this new kind of pressure of the citizens on governments, but also of the understanding of this phenomenon by the citizens during the following period, 266 international NGOs were established between 1815 and 1909, rising from 400 in 1920, to 700 in 1939, 1470 in 1964 and 7,300 in 2005 (or, we could say 13,600, if we take into account all the internationally active NGOs).

We can state that the presence in Vienna of the representatives of these associations represents the acknowledgement of the beginning of social activities beyond state borders and hence the globalization of a non-state actor’s interest. This shift marks in fact the trigger of the organisation of transnational networks and international NGOs, but also the form of political and economic support of Non-State Actors (NSAs) and we can state that globalization’s political vector is beginning to be influenced by the component of international private politics.

By this type of politics of international solidarity built-up around a societal purpose, non-state actors address governments, multilateral conferences and Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) directly. Thus the state as an institution is pressured from within to listen to the voluntary organizations which have both a public and private action. In essence, NSAs are private, fighting for the interest of a group of citizens, but they manifest themselves publicly, as form of activity. The double activity of NSAs is currently expressed by unanimously accepted terms such as pluralism, lobby, maintenance of open political systems and civil society.

In our interconnected and interdependent world, NSAs must be analyzed as a dual system. On the one hand, there are the conceptions of the citizens when they pressure governments and international bureaucracies, which represents the level of reaction and, on the other hand, there are the opinion leaders/investigators, who explain to their members and constituencies the reasons for which international policies should be sustained.

The NSAs are very flexible when they exercise their influence and succeed in using their power resources through the access they have to international institutions. These methods of influencing the agenda, the development of coalitions or the monitoring of the implementation are effective due to the emotional impact they have on civil society.

By clearly stating the societal purposes they were established for and especially by their media-covered actions, ever since they came into being, civil associations have led to the effectiveness and quality of official decision-making and last but not least to the legitimacy of IGOs.

The state has always preferred to get involved in and coordinate the activity of NGOs to turn them into effective instruments in the process of resolving the problems between NGOs and the government. The big global issue is that this dual system of private influence of any type of NSA depends on the existence of a civil society aware of its power and committed to societal monitoring and development. Consequently, we can affirm that states, without an active civil society, cannot contribute to the improvement of governmental systems and thus cannot benefit from the advantages of public wellbeing.

Once the Napoleon wars were over, the modern world created the premises for the emergence of civil organisations and their development in a stage of internationalization. Among the social premises created after 1814, we can mention the following: states started to function independently as well-defined political units; states generated relating systems with a high degree of interconnection; governments became aware of their interdependence from a point of view of the civil society and, last but not least, decision-makers at a governmental level were forced to create social and institutional mechanisms and regulated systems for inter-state relationships, due to the interconnection of economic and social systems.

Thus, appeared the idea of building medium and long-term security by political and economic treaties which at the time meant state commitments hard to go back on. These systems and rules of interdependency and interconnection are made up by interstate treaties and intergovernmental organizations and they have created an incipient form of management and common standard for a unitary civil society based on principles jointly agreed and approved.

This type of mechanisms resulted in two types of pressure, an economic type, based on the higher costs of leaving these mechanisms and the second one, media pressure, by the emergence within treaties of the opportunity for the smaller or disadvantaged states to make themselves heard.

An example of visionary attitude at the time is the United Kingdom of Great Britain which, to reach a stable and substantial agreement in Vienna, was generous during negotiations and lenient with regards to matters concerning long-term state administration that it considered less important for Europe's future, so it accepted them even if it meant compromising and spending some of their financial resources.

2. The change in the approach of the state system

An important challenge for the Great Powers at the Congress of Vienna¹ of 1814 was to acknowledge the fact that the state system which had worked until then was no longer viable and that they had to find new institutional solutions. If until then the military vector of globalization prompted the significant institutional changes, the states had to find, through the political and the economic vector, solutions for their inter-state relations, prefiguring the foundation of what we now call IGOs.

These so-called innovations are: international control conferences for monitoring the legislative implementation treaties, multilateral conferences for regulating national legislation, processes for institutional cooperation and experimentation. They had to find practical and acceptable modus operandi for the promotion of the international public legislation. The media, as it was organized at the time, with a strong national and/or political orientation, was

¹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congress_of_Vienna.

always on the job and ready to present the non-state actors with the result of multilateral conferences and of their written documentation.

This process of institutionalization of the first half of the 19th century, replaced the previous mechanisms, which were based on local or regional agreements and were established ad-hoc, becoming permanent on the grounds of the legal authority granted by the westphalian state.

When the first IGOs were established, they were called International Public Unions, which would usually hold conferences or multilateral meetings on an annual or biannual basis and, most importantly, these unions had permanent secretariats. During a year, the NSAs could be informed about the agenda of the following conference, influence it or put pressure on governments, so that the documents that were developed at the end of these meetings would become law sources and serve as institutional memoranda.

These meetings had a high degree of orientation towards social development as a whole and played an important role in the development of research and industry. And thus it was possible to attract different types of entrepreneurial organizations which, in fact, were the builders of the modern public system, of the public transport system, of the welfare system, of the public health system and, last but not least, they succeeded in managing the pressure of NSAs.

The establishment of the court of arbitration facilitated cooperation between states and enhanced their confidence in an unprecedented way². The expansion of capitalism and modern technologies modernized the old westphalian state which started managing its administrative territories, thus smoothing the way to cooperation and interconnection with rival states.

Free trade, through the economic vector and the practical politics promoted by the political vector, prompted the establishment of forms of organization and modern competition systems, like the Cobden Clubs in Great Britain (named after the advocate of free trade and peace, Richard Cobden³), or the Customs Union (Zollverein) established by Prussia, GB's continental rival.

The factors, by which we can explain the results of 19th century multilateral conferences and IGOs, were industrial economy and the active role of internationally-oriented entrepreneurs. It was the modern Westphalian state that facilitated the emergence and functioning of an independent commercial class, so that the entrepreneurs had the freedom to develop and implement their own economic strategies⁴.

The development of states in the 19th century was based on the creation of a new legal, political and social environment, based on the globalization of knowledge and technologies, on the existence of a globalized resource base, and thus established a more complex structure of social classes, totally different to the traditional dynastic organization.

Companies started to compete with each other, to unite, to extend beyond the states' formal borders and to create the environment for the transnational development of companies. The possibility for the firms in one state to trade shares on the Stock Exchange led to the globalization of capitals and the transformation of modern industrial capitalism into a global phenomenon.

² The number of IGOs rose from 37 in 1909 to 246 in 2005, with the 20th century IGOs, the League of Nations and the United Nations, built on these prototypes. The secretariats' personnel increased in number and became profession-oriented, often acutely aware of their organization's mission and its limited room for manoeuvre within the international state system.

³ <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/123328/Richard-Cobden>.

⁴ WEBER, Max, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Protestant_Ethic_and_the_Spirit_of_Capitalism (1904-1905), Max Weber argues that after the Middle Ages, war and state building ran parallel with the development of the capitalist world economy.

The governments of modern states started to get involved in the process of industrialization and thus contributed to the horizontal economic development of society. Up to a certain point, we can say that the modern state and 19th century capitalism reinforced each other, but once it was clear that there was economic competition between states, investors developed their own international strategies.

At this time of expansionist industrial development, NSAs had an essential role in regulating the activity of transnational companies by exerting civil and social pressure on governments which, yearning for economic power, kept their distance from the companies' commercial policies. The constraints imposed by NSAs, which in fact represented the electoral base of politicians, prompted the international regulation of both the European and the American continental markets. By the non-binding power of NSAs, this regulation led to the systematization of international public policies and the ordering of the world market, in the late 19th century.

By the multilateral conferences they held regularly and by their international agreements, the international public unions influenced both public activities and the controlled development of the industry, which led to the management of potential social conflicts and the bolstering of states and societies⁵.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the analysts considered that the general liberal business conditions had nothing to do with the political state and thus promoted economic and social internationalization through IGOs, which resulted in a relaxed relationship between the state's national identity and the international orientation of entrepreneurs and citizens.⁶

3. A modern analysis

In 1993, Samuel Huntington⁷ launched a theory whereby he stated that in the future, national states will keep their power positions as international actors, but major global politics conflicts will burst, not between nations, but between nations and groups of different civilizations.

Huntington's theory, launched at the end of the 20th century, hasn't yet been confirmed, but we cannot not take into account the aspects of the cultural vector they raise, namely the conflicts recently prompted by the globalization of the modern world, both by the excessive valorisation of the symbols of the cultural identity matrix of certain communities, and by the conflicts prompted by the pressure created by certain communities for the return to certain traditional values which are anachronistic in relation to the values of the modern civilized world.

⁵ The public works led to the development of industry : infrastructure works for telecommunication, railways, shipping and road traffic, the creation of international industrial standards, which allowed for comparison and international cooperation, the creation of a functional patent system and the promotion of a trade regime with international statistics, the promotion of a monetary regime which encouraged investment in industry and trade in industrial goods. Multilateral conferences and IGOs were the catalyst that got things moving.

⁶ Through the process of political centralization that took place in the "nation-state", rising from the nineteenth century on, the idea of "national identification" with the state became stronger. By establishing its political institutions, the national government created and favoured a common identity by symbols and meanings that young citizens were taught in school and in the army. Symbols such as flags, anthems, royal robes, orbes or ceremonies opening the parliamentary year, represented the new identity. Besides these governmental symbols, they started cherishing as memories, places which kept alive the memory of events considered important to the national identity, such as battles, disasters or occupations. They were reflected in buildings, statues and museums and national stories and myths and history books. The cultural vector fully manifested itself by this process which was stronger, faster and more intense in some states.

⁷ Samuel P. HUNTINGTON, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York, Published Simon and Schuster, 1996, p. 367.

Our analysis shows that in our modern world, the non-state actors have an increasingly powerful influence on government decisions and in the future we have to take into account that it's become a real and undeniable fact that the non-state actors, through their actions have a direct and/or indirect influence on international relations. The five globalizations vectors: military, economic, political, cultural and religious create the necessary conditions for the emergence of regional enclaves of conflicts in the globalized areas.

The legal framework in international relations is established by the UN Charter, the provisions of paragraph 4 of article 2, namely "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."⁸

As a reference point in the institutionalized international relations, the UN Charter shows us that the non-state actors are the ones that can evade article 2. When the UN Charter was ratified, the actors were national states and they were the managers of the main conflicts in the world. When we talk about state national security in international conflicts or regional national interests, all the parties involved in the conflict resort to article 2.

A current example is the international issue concerning the killing of terrorist leaders as predetermined targets and the taking of prisoners for gathering information. The non-state actors that promote human rights and fight for the protection of the civil rights of citizens within the society governed by a state, are in conflict with the interpretation of article 51 of the UN Charter which entitles self-defence.

The broadened interpretation that the US give article 51, namely that for the national security of the state, they are entitled to kill targets and take prisoners on the territory of other states, if the said terrorists are part of enemy terrorist organizations, whose statements and actions are directed against the USA.

In our globalized interconnected and interdependent world, the international relations analysts are debating whether or not there is a need for the state which is defending itself to obtain the agreement of the state on whose territory are the enemies that must be eliminated. The issue revolves around the need for conflicts to take into account formal borders, or extend to informal borders, when it comes to the security of the modern state.

We would like to point out that in the current conflicts between terrorist groups and faraway countries, there are volunteers who are citizens of the so-called civilized states. The presence of volunteer soldiers from states like England, Germany, France and the US, raises another problem of administrative jurisdiction and the citizens' accountability to the laws of the state. In this dispute, we can argue that the cultural identity matrix of a community has an important role because it has facilitated the emergence/reinvigoration of the so-called churches, through conversion, that appeal to the citizens of a certain ethnicity and draw them back to traditional values.

These traditional values are historical values of the community of a different continent or a different area and in most cases they are anachronistic in relation to the democratic values of the modern, civilized states. The non-state actors do not always have clear and well determined funding, so that there is a great chance that they are financed by networks of drug dealers and producers, terrorist networks, human trafficking networks etc. In this context, article 2 and article 51 of the UN Charter give legitimacy to the capture of an enemy, in the context of the need for national security in our globalized world.

The international legality of an enemy capture on the territory if another state is debatable and, theoretically, there should be an agreement of the NATO state. All these debates show that in the current world conflicts, the non-state actors have acquired a major

⁸ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations

importance and that the concept of state sovereignty and the concept of threat to the national security of a state, should be seen separately.

The challenge we are facing today in international relations is given by the need to change the model of the UN Charter by the alteration or even the repeal of article 2 and the extension of the limits of applicability of article 51 from a state, to state alliances.

Through its five vectors, globalization generated three main types of nongovernmental actors in the 21st century. The first and most important nongovernmental actor with implications in social, economic and political problems, are transnational corporations. Having a direct economic interest with two components, the end product and the resources, they can directly and indirectly influence state policies.

The second type of non-state actors is represented by nongovernmental organizations. They are experts and advocates of the rights of the civil society and because they are the exponents of the electors, thus representing the electoral cycle, they are a direct pressure factor on the state's governmental components.

The third important non-state actor is represented by intergovernmental organizations. They are controlled by states and through their state they received from the beginning the position of state agent. From the three non-state actors, the IGOs face the biggest challenge from the civil society of the state they represent, as they must always keep to the national interest.

The conflicts between the representatives and/or the exponents of the civil society have gained great importance in the 21st century because most military or non-military conflicts are asymmetrical, which means that the state authority needs to mobilize its society's resources. By resources we understand all types of resources, which mean that the modern state, in its current form, needs the support of its society when it wishes to promote its national interest within alliances, in conflict areas and/or in resource areas.

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TERMS, CONCEPTS AND ELEMENTS USED IN THE THEORY OF CRISIS AND CONFLICT ANALYSIS

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Abstract: *Crises and conflicts may occur on different social levels: minor crises and conflicts generated on the individual inter-personal level due to the lack of basic proper civic attitudes; on the middle intra-organizational level where errors may occur due to the lack of tools for disaster management or on the high organizational level as the societal crises or even armed conflicts bursting out as result of negative social phenomena such as political instability, gender intolerance, economic recession, etc. Therefore, the wide range of crises and conflicts involve wide range of terms, concepts and elements used in theory of crisis and conflict analysis. Often, these theoretic approaches raise discussions and misunderstandings among the field’s specialists and academics.*

Thus, in our paper, we intend to clarify some of the terms, concepts and elements most relevant for the crisis and conflict analysis theory in order to promote a better understanding and more adequate use in the future of field’s specific terminology.

Keywords: *crisis, conflict, uncertainty, war, peace, violence, chaos theory, systems theory, crisis management.*

Introduction

Crisis and conflict analysis represent a wide field to study. This theme gets more importance in the present dynamic world wherein competition can easily transform to intricate forms of contradicting relations. Therefore, may easily appear crises or armed conflicts.

The triggers of the contemporary crises and conflicts intervened in the international relations system is related to the complexity of interactions between the actors involved and the domino effect¹. Crises turn up side down the international relations and increases costs of merchandises, worsens the battle for markets and resources, grows budgetary deficits, bankrupts enterprises, destruct structures and infrastructures, and generate major conflict, even wars. Therefore, there is needed a thorough analysis of typologies, under-layers, meanings and levels of diversification of crisis and conflict leads to the growth in terms of certainty and thus to raise the chances of the decision-makers to take more opportune and timely decisions.

¹ Dwight D. Eisenhower, in his paperwork „Domino Theory Principle”, published in *Public Papers of the Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower*, pp. 381-390, 1954, referring to some of the Asian states, particularly to Indochina (but also Burma, Thailand or Indonesia, author’s note). He considered to be domino pieces related one to each over and therefore he said about them: “if in the row of existent domino pieces (states, author’s note), the first are down (under the communism influence, author’s note), the other states of the region will have quickly the same fate because of the domino effect”. See largely at: <http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/~hst306/documents/domino.html>, Domino theory was afterwards used by the chiefs from the White House in all the Cold War period in order to justify the need of American interventions initiated in some zones of the globe.

Under the given circumstances, we conclude a better clarification in terminology specific for the approached topic and the identification of different types of existent or possible relations to be created between the used terms is a good start for our wider scientific initiative.

1. Terms specific to crises and conflicts analysis

Conflict analysis is the starting concept for our topic. Some American specialists in Law consider it “to refer to the systematic study of conflict in general and of individual or group conflicts in particular”² and “aiming to gain a comprehensive and shared understanding of potential or ongoing violent conflicts ... undertaken at local, national, regional and international levels”³.

As terms important for the analysis of conflict we identified as follow: “uncertainty”, “conflict”, “crisis”, “tension”, “risk”, “threat”, and “vulnerability”.

Specialists⁴ identified one of the main characteristic of crises and conflict analysis to be *the uncertainty*. This is owed to the complexity of the analysed phenomena in the recent times when all the crises and conflicts hybridized because “the threats are hybrid”⁵. They are considered to be hybrid because threats are a mixture of conventional and unconventional attributes. So, the hybridized crises and conflicts of our contemporary era have also conventional and unconventional elements.

World is the scene of perpetual conflicts taken place in simple systems constituted by micro-organisms built at the cellular level and also in the complex systems of the international organizations of the world.

Conflict is present everywhere and without a crisis to be present as well. But, in our study we will refer only to those categories of conflicts related to the human interaction that have the possibility to reach to the national or international spatial dimension and generate wide spread crisis. Therefore, *conflict* lies in open opposition, a battle between individuals, groups, classes, parties, communities, countries with economic interests, political, religious, ethnic and racial divergent or incompatible with disruptive effects on social interaction.

Crisis is different than conflict. It is not a continuum, but is a subject that becomes more interesting for specialists when it occurs, when people have to deal with it in a way or another. We consider crisis announces its presence by the situations called *tensions* which are “concretized in hostility feelings, which are still not manifest but are direct consequences of the existence of a misbalance between opposed trends or elements”⁶.

Overall *crises* are complex. They affect in a form or other all the states, all or almost all public and private institutions as well as the international and regional organizations and bodies. They have different natures as: economic, financial, political, military, social, etc.

² US Legal, *Conflict Analysis Law & Legal Definition*, available online at: <http://definitions.uslegal.com/c/conflict-analysis/>, accessed on September 27, 2014.

³ Idem.

⁴ See in details in: Iwan J. Azis, *Crisis, Complexity and Conflict*, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2009.

⁵ See the papers of a series of specialists in the field of crisis and conflict referring to threats as hybrid: Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict” in *Strategic Forum* no. 240, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington DC, USA, April 2009. See details on: http://iripaz.org/listado_docs/res_conflictos/Hofmann%20Naturaleza%20evolutiva%20del%20conflicto.pdf; Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, “Bankrupting terrorism: The role of US Anti-Terrorism Litigation in the Prevention of Terrorism and Other Hybrid Threats: A Legal Assessment and Outlook”, in *Liverpool Law Rev* (2012)no. 33, pp. 91-109, published online 1 September 2012, Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2012, available online at: <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10991-012-9115-7#page-2>, accessed on September 28, 2014.

⁶ Alexandra Sarcinschi, *Vulnerabilitate, risc, amenințare*, Editura Militară, București, 2007, p. 183.

Military crisis is a situation created by the transition from a latent crisis - characterized by certain tensioned conditions – to the state of conflict in which one or all parties have used violence to impose by force their objectives or interests in order to defend own fundamental values.

In the Romanian Explicative Dictionary, linguistic specialists consider the *risk* term to be “the possibility to reach in a dangerous situation, to confront a difficulty or to be the victim of a loss”⁷. Also, risk is seen to be strongly related to uncertainty⁸, it is the equal of expected loss. It has the same characteristic of continuity as the conflict; it is perennial. Risk is also considered to be the “known threat”⁹ or “the possibility to confront a danger or imminent malfunction”¹⁰.

Briefly, the *risk* consists in the imminence of a *threat* as “an expression of intention to impose disadvantages or infringements to a person by coercion means”¹¹. Thus, we might define the concept as imminent danger, expressed by speech or facts. The threat itself has elements as: author, goal, objective and target.

Vulnerability is a weakness; a security breach if exploited can endanger the entire complex system. Usually, vulnerabilities come from the inside of a system.

In the security context it intervenes the relation between risk and threat as the “*risk* represents a possible event that can produce damage; *threat* represents a method to initiate a risky dangerous event”¹². Thus, security is seen as the absence of threat.

2. Peace - war paradigm

In the analysis of peace – war paradigm we consider there are specialists who caught very well the dynamics of a context from peace to war. Among them, Michael Lund analysed conflict as a curve on its development phases related to actions taken on those as is seen in the below graphic. In this figure, there are present crisis and conflict as items but also some related concepts as “durable peace”, “stable peace”, “unstable peace”, “conflict prevention”, “conflict management”, “crisis management”, and, of course, “conflict resolution”.

⁷ *Dicționarul Explicativ al Limbii Române*, Editura Univers enciclopedic, ediția a II-a. București, 1998, p. 929.

⁸ Terje Aven, Ortwin Renn, *Risk Management and Governance: Concepts, Guidelines and Applications*, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2010, p. 8.

⁹ S. Dimas, Hans Günter AFES-PRESS, J. Dean, H. van Ginkel, Úrsula Oswald Spring, Ú. Oswald Spring, V. Shiva, K. Töpfer, Czesław Mesjasz, N. Serra, John Grin, Pál Dunay, Navnita Chadha Behera, Béchir Chourou, Patricia Kameri-Mbote, P. H. Liotta, *Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualization Security in the 21st century*, vol. 3, “Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2008, p. 575.

¹⁰ *Dicționar Enciclopedic Ilustrat*, Editura Cartier, Chișinău, 1999, p. 482.

¹¹ Grigore Alexandrescu, *Amenințări la adresa securității*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, București, 2004, p. 6 (apud: *Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged*, vol. III, Editura Merriam-Webster, 1993, p. 2382).

¹² Mirela Atanasiu, ““Security” concept between internal and international laws”, in *Strategic Impact*, no. 3 / 2008, “Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest, p. 69.




Figure no. 1 – Lund’s Curve of Conflict; Source: United States Institute of Peace, 2008.¹³

It is seen in the figure that *durable peace* is the first phase on the conflict’s curve and means lasting peace. It “involves a high level of reciprocity and cooperation, and the virtual absence of conflict therefore the lack of self-defence measures among parties, although it may involve a military alliance against a common threat”¹⁴. Then follows the *stable peace* as a relationship with higher ratio of tensions when is “caution communication and limited cooperation within the overall context of a basic order or national stability. There exist value or goal differences and no military cooperation is settled, but disputes are generally worked out in more or less predictable non-violent ways”¹⁵. The third phase of conflict is constituted by the *unstable peace* as “a situation when tensions and suspicions among the parties are running high, but violence can be absent or sporadic”¹⁶.

Conflict prevention includes all possible measures to prevent incompatibilities and behaviours that could lead to conflict. In this stage, the parties are looking for alternative resolutions of disputes and they use deterrence as basic approach.

Conflict management has two main meanings: a generic term for all conflict management actions (prevention/pre-emption, resolution, and treatment of consequences); control strategy for conflicts lasting and resistant to positive solutions¹⁷. Note that in the conflict management stage, the conflict management resolution is not reached but are mitigated the violent forms of action.

Conflict management has become a key concept in the discussion of the new structure of peace and security in Europe because of the recent change in the Russian politics and the undergoing Ukrainian crisis, particularly damaging the Eastern European Union’s Border States’ perception on their provided security in the region.

In its most general form, we define *crisis management* as “a system of rules and procedures to maintain normality in all parts of social life”¹⁸. Conceptually, the crisis can be defined as a national or international situation characterized by the existence of an imminent threat to the objectives, interests and priority values of a state or group of states¹⁹. In fact, crisis

¹³ United States Institute of Peace, *Certificate Course in Conflict Analysis*, Education and Training Center, 2008, p. 7 (apud. Michael Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*).

¹⁴ United States Institute of Peace, *Certificate Course in Conflict Analysis*, Education and Training Center, United States of America, 2008, p. 7 (apud: Michael Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*)

¹⁵ *Idem*, p. 10.

¹⁶ *Idem*, p. 11.

¹⁷ Ana Stoica-Constantin, *Fundamente teoretice ale conflictului*, Universitatea “Al. I. Cuza”, Iași, 2008, p. 8.

¹⁸ Mandu Petrișor, *Managementul crizelor*, Editura Lux Libris, Brașov, 2005, p.76.

¹⁹ Dănuț Manta, *NA TO în operații post-conflict de stabilizare și reconstrucție*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, București, 2007, p. 39.

management is a complex process undergoing many stages (pre-crisis²⁰, effective crisis²¹ and post-crisis²²).

Michael Lund considers “*conflict resolution is a similar term for post-conflict peace building and usually is associated with the phase of de-escalation from crisis situation to unstable peace and stable peace*”²³. There are specialists considering different approaches of conflict resolution can be seen as “*a continuum between shorter-term intervention and security approaches, known as peacekeeping and longer-range prevention and institutional changes known as peace building*”²⁴. We think conflict resolution appears in the moment the parties to a conflict get the openness to discuss on their incompatible interests and try to bring those to a common sense in order to create a win-win situation for all of them.

3. System theory and chaos theory

We call chaotic an unpredictable behaviour in a real system characterized by three coordinates. The first refers to a dynamic system related to change. The second relates to the complexity of the systems, which makes them to be determined by a variety of parameters. Last coordinate denotes the real systems are iterative as regularities directing their behaviours can be described by their feedback.

Laplace²⁵ and Newton²⁶ seen the universe to be rationalist, determinist and temporally ordinate. Thus, effects sprang from motives, therefore simple triggers produced minor (and usually predictable) effects and complex triggers produced major and unpredictable effects.

Afterwards, when A. Einstein was asked by other specialists what exactly helped him to formulate the relativity theory; his answer was „it took me some time to figure out how to think the problem”²⁷. Thus, in the contemporary context of existence „of a great number of independent variable multiplications’ interacting in interdependent and unpredictable manners”²⁸, meaning in complex systems.

In result, the crises and conflicts we confront nowadays needs new patterns of thinking and the world must be perceived as a complex, interconnected and dynamic environment and consequently the study of complex systems help us to extend our approaches in the analysis of

²⁰ *Pre-crisis* (or ante-crisis is the preliminary stage) has variable duration and starting time when ordinary interactions between system elements that constitute threats appear and dismantle the system objectives.

²¹ *Effective crisis* (critical stage) may be shorter or longer, more violent or calm, expected or unexpected.

²² *Post-crisis* is the recovery stage due to the fact that either the normal practice of a system resumed with some regularity and that clashes had stopped and actors involved in crisis overcome crisis declare themselves or the organization (system) broke apart and projecting a horizon of expectation for a new organization.

²³ Michael Lund, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

²⁴ William J. Pammer, Jerri Killian, “Handbook of Conflict Management”, in *Public Administration and Public Policy/104*, published by Marcel Dekker, United States of America, 2003, p. 3.

²⁵ Pierre Simon Laplace, *Essai Philosophique sur les Probabilités* forming the introduction to his *Théorie Analytique des Probabilités*, V Courcier, Paris, 1820 (apud: Carl Hoefer, „Causal Determinism”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, January 21, 2010, available online at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/>), accessed on August 15, 2014.

²⁶ In 1686, Isaac Newton published his first volume called “Principio”, wherein he presented three laws of Mechanistic: „a body maintains its inert or motion stage as long as nothing intervenes over it from outside; force = mass x acceleration and for each action is a reaction of similar and opposed intensity”. See in details: Reuben R. McDaniel (Jr.), Dean J. Driebe (eds.), *Uncertainty and Surprise in Complex Systems. Questions and Working with the Unexpected*, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, 2005, p. 71.

²⁷ S Hawking, *What is complexity?*, The Washington Center for Complexity, available online at: <http://www.complexsys.org/downloads/whatiscomplexity.pdf>, accessed on August 19, 2014.

²⁸ T. Irene Sanders, *Strategic Thinking in a Complex World*, Washington Center for Complexity & Public Policy, Washington, 2003, p. 5.

contemporary crises and conflicts and implicitly to enrich security culture and to improve crises management and conflict prevention and resolution methods, procedures and techniques.

Complex systems refers to each systems containing a large number of entities (agents, processes, etc.) interacting interdependent. System behaviour can be identified only by each entity or combination of them, but the ways in which the relationships between entities undergo affect globally behaviour. The main properties of complex systems include emergence, self-organization and adaptability. Complex systems oscillate between states of order and disorder without remains permanently fixed. Thus, these characteristics made them the subjects of *system theory* as “the trans-disciplinary study of the abstract organization of phenomena, independent of their substance, type, or spatial or temporal scale of existence”²⁹. John Gleick said also: “Where chaos begins, classical science stops”³⁰. This we consider it to be clear invitation to thinking “outside the box”, in a multidisciplinary scientific perspective.

Thus, physicists and mathematicians of ‘80 founded deterministic chaos theory that overturns the laws of Newtonian physics. The only apparent chaos is a disorder resulting from the interaction of complex systems with dynamic rules.

The first idea is about order in the chaotic world, about a core set of elements that remains the same in times of chaos. The latter idea is related to the “Butterfly Effect” of John Gleick considering “a butterfly stirring the air in Peking can transform storm systems next month in New York”³¹.

One definition about chaos theory as “the study of nonlinear dynamics, in which seemingly random events are actually predictable from simple deterministic equations”³² drawn my attention because it sound so right. Why? Just because the meteorological phenomena seem to be the most proper subject of this theory: we have the nonlinear dynamics of weather but we can make a prognosis grounded on probabilistic events when a matrix is identified. And I also agree with the main components ideas settled in the same online dictionary. First, it is the idea that “systems - no matter how complex they may be - rely upon an underlying order”³³, and the second “that very simple or small systems and events can cause very complex behaviours or events”³⁴. We might think our planet in its shape and existence is steady coordinate, also the main elements of it: earth, water and air. Seasons can be a steady coordinate for a time being. And world geography with its continents and oceans it can be a constant. And these are overall steady coordinates but are also particular coordinates remaining still in times of chaos. But we also agree Prigogine thinking that “in far from equilibrium conditions, we may have transformation from disorder, from thermal chaos, into order”³⁵. So, the goal of a change in disorder is to bring order. Thus, “chaos” in chaos theory means order in the simplest sense of it. Way, chaos theory does not emphasize the disorder (inherited unpredictable nature of a system), but the inherited order system (universal character of similar systems).

In the same time, chaos theory contains many principles (Gleick³⁶ - 1987, Stewart³⁷ – 1990, Morrison³⁸, 1998). For example, one of the principles promoted by Gleick is as follows:

²⁹ System Theory, *University of Twente*, available online at: http://www.utwente.nl/cw/theorieenoverzicht/Theory%20clusters/Communication%20Processes/System_Theory/, accessed on October 20, 2014.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 3.

³¹ James Gleick, *Chaos-Making a New Science*, Viking, New York, 1987, p. 8.

³² *What is Chaos Theory?*, available online at: <http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/chaos-theory>, accessed on September 29, 2014.

³³ *Idem*.

³⁴ *Idem*.

³⁵ Ilya Prigogine, Isabelle Stengers, *Order Out of Chaos*, Bantam Books, New York, 1984, p. 12.

³⁶ James Gleick, *Chaos: The Making of a New Science*, Penguin Books, 1987 (book nominated for Pulitzer Prize in 1987). See largely at: <http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/64582.Chaos>, accessed on September 13, 2014.

³⁷ Ian Stewart, *Does God play dice? The New Mathematics of Chaos*, Penguin, London, 1990.

„The normal law of nature is evidenced in humankind experience as one of the widest generalization of natural philosophy. The law serves as basic instrument of research in different fields as Physics, Social Sciences, Medicine, Agriculture and Engineering. It is an instrument undependable instrument for analysis and interpretation of basic data achieved by observance and experiment”³⁹. This kind of expression leads us to think about interdisciplinary issues and, extrapolating, to a theory of complexity.

Thus, it appears the chaos theory assumes we must seek in nature contrary terms, tension generated by the contradictions as accumulation and relaxation, learning and forgetting, simple and complex, etc. Most common misconception about chaos theory is that the theory refers to the disorder. Nothing is further from the truth as this claim.

Conclusions

Crises are large-scale social and complex phenomena interesting for multiple logical disciplines. Generally, experts seek to highlight the characteristics and mechanisms of crisis using their specific arguments of own disciplines.

Generally, crisis designates a threat to the existence of organizational dynamics and causes a breach in the previous balance, training the disintegration of that system with unpredictable consequences. A perfect example is the Ukrainian crisis determining a change in the international relations system and the rearrangement of the actors in regard to the power balance.

Uncertainty is the perennial characteristic of nowadays complex world and risk increases with an increase in threat and vulnerability. If there is no vulnerability in the absolute sense, there is no risk but in the real sense there can be vulnerability without risk.

Risks, threats and vulnerabilities are hybridized and thus the conflicts and crises growth in complexity. Thus, the manifesting phases of conflict are complex, starting from the „0” stage of conflict, continuing in its constructive form of *cooperation* (of different actors in order to reach some common interests in a common framework). Then it follows *competition* (resulted from the trials to reach some goals even by undermining the possibilities of the others to do the same). Furthermore, it is stepped into a stage of *diplomatic tension* or static conflict (expressing the situation of existing different visions of the actors on matters of common interest) and, at last, the *conflict* reaches its climax in the stage of *crisis* (as the threat with the use of threat) or *armed conflict* (or war). Thus, conflict situation passes through three stages and each of them effects over the complex system in all its dimensions: the neutral (0 conflict potential), by a productive stage (in cooperation and competition stages), and afterwards reaching to a non-productive stage wherein crisis and conflict are present in there extreme form as armed conflict or war.

If we imagine an algorithm of direction intensification of conflicts, the crisis is a condition that precedes strong conflict: competition - incipient rivalry - declared rivalry - intense dispute - early conflict - crisis - strong conflict. Thus, crisis has three essential features that can be stages of its development: awareness of a crisis, uncertainty given by the complexity of the phenomenon and urgency in taking a decision.

The deterministic chaos theory overturned the laws of Newtonian physics. The only apparent chaos is a disorder resulting from the interaction of complex systems with dynamic

³⁸ Keith Morrison, *Management theories for Educational Change*, Paul Chapman Publishing Ltd., A Sage Publication Company, London, 1998.

³⁹ James Gleick (1986), *Excerpts from Chaos: The Making of a New Science*, Penguin Books, 1987, available online at: http://www.mountainman.com.au/chaos_03.htm, accessed on August 15, 2014.

rules. World as a whole is a complex system. Crises and conflict must be also seen as complex systems.

The name “chaos theory” comes from the fact that the systems described by this theory are apparently disordered, but chaos theory actually seeks internal order in these seemingly random phenomena. Thus, *chaos theory* explains many seemingly random events that do not follow the rules of Newtonian ongoing and are confusing and contain a strong note of hazard. Some examples are: sudden outbreak of epidemics, fluid turbulence, the evolution of meteorological phenomena, etc.

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THE IMPLICATIONS OF CONTEMPORARY CRISES ON STATE, SOCIETY AND SECURITY

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Abstract: *In the contemporary world, crises are multiplied and diversified and their cascade/contagion effect is more obvious, with direct and indirect effects on people, property, material assets and cultural environment. After recent economic and financial crisis, their management became a major concern for the involved actors in order to avoid potential destructive effects in all other aspects of security.*

The theory of crisis and main types of crises (political, economic, financial, social, military and environmental) will be analyzed in our paper to emphasize how they may affect the state, the society and the national security and underline the need to diagnose the problems we face in order to prevent, limit and solve the crisis situations.

Keywords: *crisis, cascade/contagion effect, state, society, security, crisis management*

1. The concept of crisis and the cascade/contagion effect

In the evolution of a state or a society, the *crisis* represents a critical moment, which leads either to conflict to impose the interests of a side or to the return to normality by harmonizing divergent interests. Crisis is a constant of the contemporary world and usually occurs as a result of economic, social, political difficulties and represents a period of tension, disorder, testing, often decisive, which is manifested in society¹. The crisis definition can be simplified to the *need for change*, meaning disorganization to a new organization.

Crisis may be that form of unspecified confrontation, designed to weigh heavily in the decision making process of other side in order to coerce it to abandon its legitimate interests and make substandard stake concessions to avoid the risk of total war². According to the American approach, the crisis is “an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States (author’s note: or a nation), its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives”³. Threats can target territories, resources and citizens of a country and its values, institutions or strategic infrastructures, with negative effects on security.

The crisis can be defined as a situation that meets one or more of the following circumstances: a fundamental disagreement breaks out over what at least one side believes is a core interest; a sharp break occurs in market and social interdependence between; an institutional breakdown occurs regarding the rules and norms of process; and/or a breakdown

¹ The Romanian Academy, „Iorgu Iordan” Institute of Linguistics, *DEX – Dicționarul explicativ al limbii române (The Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language)*, Second Edition, “Univers Enciclopedic” Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998, p. 241.

² Jean-Louis DUFOUR, *Crizele internaționale. De la Beijing (1900) la Kosovo (1999) (International crises. From Beijing (1900), Kosovo (1999))*, “Corint” Publishing House, Bucharest, 2002, p. 15.

³ US Department of Defense, *JP 1-02. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 8 November 2010 (As Amended Through 15 August 2014), p. 60, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.

occurs in a sense of community⁴. In most cases, it is caused by the fact that decision makers lose control on levers of political and diplomatic, financial and economic, social and cultural, and military activities and processes, leading to breakdowns in the organization and operation of the system. Getting out of the crisis is done by structural change of the system or by major adaptive changes in its structure⁵. Therefore, the returning to normality of that system can be achieved only in the condition of adaptation or modification of its form, content and structure.

Currently, when addressing security issues we should consider its many dimensions, from the political to the ecological⁶. The requirements of providing security are deeply interrelated and any breakdown in one area seriously impairs other security dimensions. Therefore, crises from a system are transfer in other systems and even in systems of systems. Maintaining a state of generalized crisis⁷ or permanent crisis, by moving from one crisis to another, from the economic one to the social one, from the social one to the political one, inevitably leads to creation of favorable conditions either for failure or collapse of that state or for an armed aggression.

The interconnection of different types of crises for triggering an armed conflict could be: *financial crisis – economic crisis – social crisis – political crisis – military crisis* and ultimately *military aggression*. Such model is purely theoretical and this cascade effect cannot be easily identified in practice given that progressivity of events is quite fast, and phases (crises) often overlap, resulting in a generalized crisis in that society.

The transition from financial and economic crisis to armed aggression/conflict takes place in several phases, summarized below. Thus, abnormalities of most macroeconomic indicators used to assess an economy reveal the triggering of a crisis and even an economic recession, which will be usually combined with a financial crisis due to the incapacity of that state to pay its debts. This inevitably leads to rising prices, inflation and unemployment, lower production, consumption and investment, and most important to a decrease in population income and savings. Therefore, the living standard will be seriously affected, especially the people with fixed income, which will trigger social crisis.

In this phase we deal with the inefficiency of political power – lack of effective governmental decisions and transparency, discrepancies between population needs and economic and financial policies, improper allocation of resources to meet needs, poor internal instruments of intervention, lack of economic competitiveness etc. – to achieve the economic policy objectives and support an acceptable level of quality of life. Misgovernment can trigger so-called political crisis, characterized by: internal instability, political struggle and shortening political regime; improper political structure; lack of responsibility of decision-makers; low degree of decentralization of decisions and legislative changes; poor quality of regulations, public policies and social programs; unrealistic ratio between political decisions and available capabilities; low level of political representation; loss of public confidence in state institutions and, even, disrespect of political power etc. These circumstances can sometimes cause a military crisis and, later, a possible armed aggression.

Depending on the actors involved and implications, crises can occur at local, national, border, regional (zonal), continental and international (global) level. Contagion effect from one level to another is extremely fast, given the high degree of interdependence that is specific to globalization.

⁴ Jeffrey J. ANDERSON, G. John IKENBERRY, Thomas RISSE (eds.), *The End of the West? Crisis and change in the Atlantic order*, Cornell University Press, 2008, p. 12.

⁵ Cătălin ZAMFIR, Lazăr VLĂSCĂANU (eds.), *Dicționar de sociologie (Dictionary of Sociology)*, “Babel” Publishing House, Bucharest, 1993, p. 144.

⁶ Barry BUZAN, *Popoarele, statele și teama. O agendă pentru studii de securitate internațională în epoca de după Războiul Rece (People, States & Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era)*, “Cartier” Publishing House, Chisinau, 2000.

⁷ The *generalized crisis* means that most of the or all of one state’ systems are in a state of crisis.

2. Types of crisis that can affect state, society and security

All crises affecting political, economic, social, ecological and military systems have in essence political origins. Certain political decisions or circumstances may cause a dysfunction that generates a crisis in the system. They come from the occurrence and development of serious dysfunctions primarily in flows that define the relationships between systems or system components. Unless immediate action is taken they can deepen.

The power of a state can be impaired by the manifestation of a crisis in any of its components (political, economic, technological, social, demographic, cultural, ecological, military, informational, etc.), that are in a strong interdependent relationship. Next, we will focus on the most important types of crises that may affect state, society and national security.

The **political crisis** is defined as an extraordinary moment when the existence and viability of the political order are questionable. This type of crisis occurs when conflict threatens the integrity of the order⁸. At this stage, there are developing certain contradictions and dysfunctions that cannot be resolved within the system, only by its replacement.

The political crisis is caused mainly by the apparent ineffectiveness of policies or failure of rational control of the economy and the legitimacy problems when public support is withdrawn. It is a time when the “power” (President, Parliament, Government, the party with the majority, all together or just some of these institutions) has no legitimacy during the exertion of its mandate. This type of crisis occurs when changing the governmental team through early or term elections is not quickly enough to alleviate the relationship between political power and society.

Democratic practice gives many examples of different tensions and incompatibilities that have caused serious political crises. Such a crisis can be triggered by certain internal mechanisms or political game (parliamentary strike, resignation en bloc, Government falling thru motion of censure, etc.), but also by increasing the number of political parties and perpetuation of outdated and rigid structures. Some regional and international major changes make the team in power unable to manage the country’s problems by old principles. Therefore, the political crisis occurs when policy makers are not aware of these weaknesses or they don’t do everything to make things right.

For example, because of disagreements between Flemish and Francophone parties, Belgium has worked for over a year and a half (2010-2011) with an interim Government. After 535 days of political crisis, the six parties involved in the negotiations have reached a consensus to form a Government. Political crises occur periodically in European Union, especially in solving problems that require consensus of Member States. Thus, a political deadlock situation emerged in 2005, when the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was rejected by referendum in France and the Netherlands. According to Marxist ideology, the **economic crisis** emerges from class antagonism, accumulating wealth in one side and poverty in the other⁹. In practice, it is generated by the fact that decision makers get out of control most or all levers of economic activity and processes, leading to a series of dysfunctions.

In recent decades, economic and financial crises occurred around the world, even in developed countries. Due to the increasing dynamics of the business environment and global economic circuits, no economy is immune to crisis. Moreover, the crisis is part of any economic cycle and refers to the gradual transition towards recession, a period when the normal process of economic or financial activity is affected by a temporary breakdown.

Over the time, economic activities and processes don’t have uniform, linear evolution, but are disturbed by some fluctuations that can be: seasonal (occurring in some periods of time and

⁸ Jeffrey J. ANDERSON, G. John IKENBERRY, Thomas RISSE (eds.), *cit. op.*, 2008, p. 12.

⁹ Karl MARX, *Capitalul: Critica economiei politice (Capital: A Critique of Political Economy)*, “Alexandria” Publishing House, Suceava, 2009.

can be generally predictable), random (accidental, short time, determined by random factors) and cyclic (characterized by a longer time, higher intensity and a certain regularity, alternating periods of expansion and depression of economic activity). However, the transition from expansion to economic slowdown/stagnation does not necessarily mean the rise of an economic crisis. This transition can be generated either by restrictive measures (adopted by the Government or external partners) or by disappearance of causes that sustained the expansion.

During the crisis phase of economic activity, which may include various sectors and industries of the national economy, the business environment faces some imbalances. Macroeconomic indicators record abnormal values and tend to decrease in investment, production, consumer demand, employment, wages, profits, sales, exports or securities, which restricts and make the credit more expensive. Simultaneously, it reaches high rates of inflation (imbalance that result in general rise in prices and decrease of purchasing power of the monetary unit), which may lead to lower standard of living, especially for people with fixed incomes. Also weakening the competitive strength of domestic companies affects credit and savings, favors debtors, causes redistribution of income between different sectors, industries and categories of population, increases unemployment, imports, and budget deficit, expands the underground economy and economic and financial crime, generates fluctuations in the exchange rate of the national currency.

Undoubtedly, a major economic or financial crisis can be caused by sudden and profound change in the political regime or by trade liberalization¹⁰. At this stage of the economic cycle, we have to deal with the lack of good governance and its ineffectiveness in achieving the objectives of economic policy. Although the economic crisis may occur due to a political crisis, the Government remains the institution able to adopt crisis measures (anti-cyclical) as regulator of the economic activity. The economic levers - price, credit, wage, interest, profit, cost - and instruments of economic, financial and fiscal, monetary and credit policy have an important role in overcoming the crisis period and boosting the economy. Therefore, some economic balances must be restored by widening access to resources and restructuring/renewal of production factors, which will require a higher social cost.

In the global economy, the alternation of contraction and expansion has proved that it is impossible to fully avoid a **financial crisis**. Finance is the “engine” of any economy in the world, extremely powerful and complex, but sometimes extremely vulnerable and fragile.

The financial crisis may be interpreted as any situation where the national financial system is not able, for whatever reason, to provide sufficient financial resources to undertake the state’s duties and obligations (e.g., payment of debts), which may disrupt the normal functioning of other systems and even enter into insolvency. They can take various forms such as monetary crisis, collapse of the banking system, sharp increases in short-term debts, pressure on domestic interest rates, high inflation periods. Such type of crisis causes loss of confidence in the national currency and other financial assets, leading to the withdrawal of foreign investors and international capital.

The financial crisis can be triggered by many factors, such as: inappropriate macroeconomic policies and lack of transparency of central banks and governments; maintaining a fixed exchange rate or devaluation/overvaluation of the national currency; offensive of speculative capitals; financial crisis triggered in one country may cause crises in other countries; too large foreign loans; payment of external debts from foreign reserves; country transition from net exporter to net importer.

Countries deal periodically with economic and financial crises and the non-industrialized and Third World economies are the most vulnerable. The causes that lead to such crises are multiple, national or international, from mismanagement of economic activity,

¹⁰ Nauro F. CAMPOS, Cheng HSIAO, Jeffrey B. NUGENT, *Crises, What Crises?*, IZA Discussion Paper No. 2217, July 2006, p. 4.

imbalance between Government spending and revenues, to changes in the world economy as: decreased demand and lower prices of exported goods, oil price volatility and fast circuit of capital in search of quick profits or hedge. As a result of the cumulative action of these factors, the Government cannot finance certain activities in the public sector and public services, payment of debts and infrastructure development. To overcome these periods of incapacity, authorities often make use of the funds and assistance provided by the competent regional or international organizations (International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, European Union).

In conclusion, we can say that the economic crisis is a complex, negative condition which occurs as a result of events, measures or economic reforms affecting fundamental values of economic development of that state. Most previous cases demonstrate that such crises are inevitable and “contagious”, but they can be managed. The main problem is not how the crisis can be avoided, but how the period of manifestation can be shortened in order to attenuate its intensity and effects.

A conclusive example of complex economic and financial crisis, probably the same or even worse than the one in the '30s, is one that continues to manifest globally by the end of 2008 and onwards. It was followed by recession, then some economic recovery and most likely a new possible collapse. Economic and financial crisis has caused major problems in the most developed, developing or less developed countries and generated many other types of crises. The most serious crisis proves to be the social one, the citizen supports the most effects of the difficult economic situation.

Social crisis can be defined as a set of conditions that determine an unstable and dangerous situation in society, involving an imminent change, which cannot be solved by the state. These conditions include certain decisions, adverse events or circumstances that disrupts the social life of the individual.

According to Richard La Piere, social crisis can be defined as a situation where “... progressive adversity leads people to doubt and then abandon their hope for the future – i.e., the ultimate fulfillment of their social expectations - and thus lose their faith in the inherent value of the traditional social practices, devices, and structures by which those expectations are normally fulfilled...”¹¹. Therefore, the social crisis is the critical moment when hostile internal forces reach a turning point and tensions increase to a peak. Population loses confidence in the authorities. Social situation cannot be tolerated or managed and a major and decisive change is impending.

This type of crisis is unlikely to have only social causes, but often occurs as a consequence of political, economic and environmental bad decisions or circumstances. Usually, the social crisis is triggered as a result of unsettled crises in the political and diplomatic, economic and financial or environmental area, which directly or indirectly have an impact on the individual and the community.

Therefore, the social crisis is a newly created situation in society due to the occurrence of risks and threats to social goals or interests of a nation that affect fundamental values or some values of a social priority¹². Under the effect of a triggering social event, it is a process which favor a series of dysfunctions at either one or more local communities or nations.

Although social crisis is based on a fairly high subjectivity, meaning individual perception assigned to an event or another, members of a community facing a crisis of this type tend to adopt attitudes and common behavior. Social crisis may weaken the mechanisms

¹¹ Richard T. LAPIERE, *A theory of social control*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954 apud Ronald A. KUYKENDALL, *Social Crisis and Social Demoralization: The Dynamics of Status in American Race Relations*, First Edition, Arissa Media Group, 2005, p. 41.

¹² Mircea MUREȘAN, Gheorghe VĂDUVA, Eugen BOAMBĂ (eds.), *Criza, conflictul, războiul (Crisis, conflict, war)*, Vol. III, “Carol I” National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2007, p. 40.

of social control and inspire members of society, on the one hand, or it can weaken the morale of the population and lead to social demoralization, on the other hand.

Our world offers many examples when the forces operating in society cannot be tolerated because they do not meet the aspirations of the people, which requires assessment and possibly change of the social relations system. The main factors that can lead to social crisis are given by recession, war, terrorism, etc. In the contemporary world, the social crisis usually occurs amid the economic contraction, the inability of the economy to develop itself, to generate sources of income and wealth or excessive indebtedness. It is the case of Greece, a country that is required to implement a series of unpopular measures to reduce its huge debts on long term, which generates widespread protests and social movements.

The *environmental crisis* or the *ecological crisis* can be understood in terms of declining capacity of the Planet to sustain life thru breaking three basic laws of ecology, namely: the interdependence of all forms of life, the stability of ecosystems due to the diversity and complexity, the finite nature of resources.

It is a dramatic, unexpected, rapid and irreversible deterioration of the environment which leads to significant reductions in welfare. For example, a slow decrease in the number of species worldwide is not an ecological crisis. The event must have a low probability of occurrence which is not the case of excessive exploitation of hydrocarbons where the element of uncertainty no longer exists – in the end they will be completely exhausted. Also, the irreversible component is required. If recovery after an ecological disaster takes a long time, then no doubt there will be much more concern and care for the environment.

The latest example of ecological tragedy that had very serious effects on the environment was the earthquake of 9 Richter scale magnitude that occurred near the coast of North-Eastern Japan on 11 March 2011. It caused a huge tsunami which inundated the Fukushima plant, causing the worst nuclear disaster in the last 25 years.

Military crisis can be defined as a national or international situation characterized by the existence of a threat to the objectives, interests and fundamental values of the involved parties and in solving this situation they use armed violence to impose by force their goals or interests¹³. Given the Carl von Clausewitz statement, “war is the continuation of politics by other means”, we can say that such type of crisis always comes amid political decisions, meaning that it becomes a political-military crisis.

Specialized American studies define the political-military crisis by three factors: involvement of key or core interests of the actors; existence of the time element or sense of urgency; great advances or threats (or both) to the interests of all sides are possible, including the threat of military conflict, and, in the case of major powers, a potential threat to the structure of the international system¹⁴.

This type of crisis is customized by a number of parameters¹⁵, such as: concentration of forces near the national borders with notification or not of such activities; establishment of military alliances with unreported or masked purpose; reorganization of the military system in some neighboring countries; redeployment of the headquarters of major units and units near the border; intense preparations of major aviation units; concentrations in military bases, exercises, simulations, training in a conception of “education” or other forms of masking; doctrinal shifts as a result of changes produced in military policy of some neighboring

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 57.

¹⁴ Michael D. SWAINE, *Understanding the Historical Record*, in Michael D. SWAINE, Zhang TUOSHENG, Danielle F. S. COHEN (eds.), *Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006, p. 1.

¹⁵ Lucian STĂNCILĂ, Gheorghe SAVU, *Crizele ca manifestări ale dezechilibrului social (Crisis as manifestations of social imbalance)*, in Scientific Session Proceedings „Tendințe în evoluția fenomenului militar la început de secol” (“Trends in the evolution of the military phenomenon at the beginning of the century”), “Carol I” National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, p. 271.

countries; not complying the international flight corridors by military and civilian aircrafts; large equipment of armed forces with modern military technique and weapons in some neighboring countries; using tactical scenarios focused on areas of the national territory during staff applications; breaking the military communications networks to get information and data about the status of military units in a given area; increasing number of weapons, ammunition and military equipment thefts from army depots; repeated thefts of explosives from the mines and geology sites; emergence and proliferation of illegal organized groups pursuing terrorist actions.

In the contemporary international system, divergent interests and conflicts of interest are common in intervention and non-intervention, separatism and anti-separatism, commercial, territorial and sovereignty disputes, ethnic problems, etc., which can lead directly or indirectly to triggering a military crisis. Under normal circumstances, any country or political groups trying to resolve conflicts of interest between them by political, diplomatic and economic means. Military crisis occurs when there is not a solution that satisfies all parties, when divergent interests cannot be effectively harmonized. One or both parties will desire to use military power to end the conflict of interest. However, the use of force is limited at this time and it is still the possibility to get a solution by non-military means.

In the recent years, there have been a series of military crises more or less serious, especially where security environment is characterized by instability. The military crisis and, later, the conflict between Georgia and Russia in the Summer of 2008, the one in Libya in 2011, and more recently the crisis in Ukraine are just a few examples that demonstrate how political decisions creates tensions and disputes, crisis and even armed conflict.

3. Crisis management

Crisis management is one of the most important aspects of the new policies in an increasingly globalized world that faces all sorts of problems such as: poverty, terrorism, overpopulation, misgovernment, global warming, political, economic, ethnic, religious, territorial tensions and disputes, etc. Crisis management is a set of actions that can be taken by the competent authorities and regional/international structures for controlling a crisis situation and avoids potential destructive effects on the system.

Crisis management at the national level includes all measures and actions set by local and central authorities to ensure national security and a state of social, political, military, economic, and environmental normality. Therefore, crisis management can be understood as a highly complex process that involves organizing, planning, concrete and targeted measures to bring the crisis under control, to stop its evolution and to find an acceptable solution¹⁶. According to John Burnett, any crisis can be characterized by time pressure, control issues, threat level and constraints on response options.

		Time pressure	Intense		Minimal	
Threat level	Degree of control	Low	High	Low	High	
	Response options					
Low	Many	(4) Level 2	(3) Level 1	(2) Level 1	(1) Level 0	
	Few	(8) Level 3	(7) Level 2	(6) Level 2	(5) Level 1	
High	Many	(12) Level 3	(11) Level 2	(10) Level 2	(9) Level 1	
	Few	(16) Level 4	(15) Level 3	(14) Level 3	(13) Level 2	

Figure no. 1: The classification matrix of crises¹⁷

¹⁶ Marian-Valentin Grigoroiu, *Crizele și conflictele contemporane (Contemporary crises and conflicts)*, Ministry of Administration and Internal Affairs Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, p. 113.

¹⁷ John J. BURNETT, *A Strategic Approach to Managing Crises*, "Public Relations Review", Vol. 24, No. 4, Winter 1998, p. 483.

The time pressure refers to the fact that when a crisis occurs, it should be given immediate attention. In a crisis situation, the organization/state has a low degree of external control. Moreover, crises create concerns about threat level, especially for the formulation, evaluation and implementation of the strategy. The constraints on response options mean that the organization/state has limited solutions to react to a crisis. Using these features, crises can be classified in a matrix. For example, a crisis will be classified as a Level 4 situation when pressure of time is high, degree of control is low, threat level is high and response options are limited.

The management of an economic, social, political, environmental or military crisis to be accurate, opportune and efficient, must meet some prerequisites, such as: to be given an informed form, which means deep analyses to understand the characteristics and personality of the phenomenon; to be preventive, proactive and, if possible, ante-factum; to provide solutions; to be translated into action; to include risk-taking and, therefore, bear the consequences of failure¹⁸. In this sense, crisis management involves two phases: crisis prevention by knowing phenomenon; organizing and conducting activities for oversight, limit and solve it. Also, the post-crisis actions should be well organized for elimination of the consequences and resume the normal life.

Preventive actions include: identifying risks and vulnerabilities of any kind; centralization of findings, formulating priorities and recommended measures; implementation of the recommended measures. The cycle should be repeated by other assessments to identify areas with potential constraints and problems, new sources of vulnerabilities. At the beginning of crisis, the identified solution determines both its duration and extent. If a crisis isn't quickly solved, it leads often to an outbreak of conflict.

Given the complexity and the impact of different types of crises on people, property, material assets and cultural values, environment, we believe that more consistent efforts from national authorities to collaborate and cooperate in order to prevent, limit and solve crisis situations are needed. At the international level, more active involvement of world states and specialized organizations in crisis management joint effort is also needed.

4. Conclusions

The crisis is not new to contemporary world and tools and policies that can be adopted to manage it did not changed substantially. But crises are multiplied and diversified after 1990 and the cascade/contagion effect is more obvious taking into account that a crisis is not purely political, economic and financial, social or environmental, but a highly complex and dynamic combination of most of these types of crises. Consequently, the forms and techniques of preventing, limiting and solve the crisis situations are also numerous and diversified.

Any crisis that occurs on national or international level adversely affects the state actors involved, especially their power and security. Therefore, we believe that the adoption, implementation and success or failure of crisis management tools depend on the ability of competent local authorities and regional/international structures to coordinate and take the best decisions. Authorities and structures involved in crisis management should act in close cooperation with each other and with regional/international bodies and organizations to positively influence local developments. Therefore, special emphasis should be placed not necessarily on enhancing cooperation, but on its consolidation.

¹⁸ Mircea MUREȘAN, Gheorghe VĂDUVA (eds.), *Criza, conflictul, războiul (Crisis, conflict, war)*, Vol. I, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2007, p. 309.

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CONFLICTUAL INTERACTIONS BETWEEN ACTORS ON THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

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Abstract: *The actors of the international arena, especially states, interact either peacefully or conflictually, a tension being prone to lead to a crisis which could, in turn, generate an armed conflict or even a war. The progressive paradigm of conflictual interactions between states can be set out as follows: dispute, tension, crisis, armed conflict, war. In order to determine which is the most efficient method to combat the factors generating conflicts and wars or to mitigate a conflict/resolve a crisis, we think it is necessary first and foremost to understand the mechanisms behind these interactions, as well as the typology of conflicts and wars.*

Keywords: *international relations, interactions between states, dispute, tension, crisis, armed conflict, war, diplomacy.*

Introduction

In over 5500 years of civilization analyzed (from 3600 BC), just 292 years were without wars, that is about 5%¹. Another statistics inventories conflicts in the second half of the nineteenth century to the present, their number being 120 (including civil wars, revolutions and genocides). It is estimated that 160 million² people died in the twentieth century wars.

Only in the post-Cold War there occurred worldwide, a total of 56 major armed conflicts, located in 44 different areas³. What is even more worrying, of about 4 million people killed in armed conflicts throughout the world since 1990, 90% were civilians.

In order to detect which is the most effective way to combat the factors that lead to conflict and wars, it is necessary first of all to understand their mechanisms.

Balance of power (or lack thereof) indicates the state of the international system. Thus, while the balance is reflected in peace and security, the imbalance gives rise to conflicts and leads to insecurity. The intensity level of the existing imbalance at some point in the power

¹ Mircea MALIȚA, *Jocuri pe scena lumii. Conflicte, negocieri, diplomație*, Bucharest, CHBeck Publishinghouse, 2007, p. 39.

² Piero SCARUFFI, *Wars and Genocides of the 20th and 21st Centuries*, <http://www.scaruffi.com/politics/massacre.html>, accessed on August 6, 2014; Mircea MALIȚA, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

³ Armed Conflicts Report 2001, Project Ploughshares, Waterloo, Ontario, 2002, p. 4, apud Daniel DUMITRU, Dorel BUȘE, Ovidiu BELEA, *Mecanisme instituționale ale Organizației Națiunilor Unite pentru soluționarea crizelor și conflictelor*, Bucharest, “Carol I” National Defence University Publishinghouse, 2007, p. 102.

equation generates a crisis – with early manifestations in one of the following fields: diplomatic, economic, ideological, social, etc. – which, if are not managed effectively, can degenerate into conflicts of varying intensity up to war⁴.

1. Factors that can generate conflicts

Many theorists have tried to find the causes of war, differentiating between *necessary causes* (conditions that must exist in order for a war to break out, but not automatically produce one) and *sufficient* ones (conditions that will cause a war, but are responsible only for some wars)⁵.

Multiple theories of war do not have universal validity, but levels of analysis help to understand the mechanism of war. Wars were perceived as the result of forces and processes operating at all levels, namely the *individual level* (human nature), the *state level* (or internal/domestic, societal), the *interstate level* and the *global or systemic level* (international system).

Of these, we will focus only on the individual level, which refers to the idea that appeal to a violent form of influencing international relations, such as war, is normal, reflecting the rational decisions of national leaders: “wars begin with conscious and reasoned decisions, based on the calculation, made by *both* parties, that they can achieve more by going to war than by remaining at peace”⁶. In reality, only some wars reflect rational decisions or calculations of leaders, while others are just mistakes.

2. From dispute to warfare

Next, we shall make a brief analysis on the typology of conflictual interactions, starting from the definition and characteristics of each term.

Most international relations theorists refer to these terms in different ways, without setting precise borderlines between a conflict’s development stages. The crescendo paradigm of conflictual interactions between states is outlined as follows: *dispute, tension, crisis, armed conflict, war*.

The dispute⁷ between two states relates to a punctual misunderstanding, which can be, for example, of technical nature in one of the areas of cooperation⁸ between these countries. Further development of the dispute depends entirely on the reaction of the state that considers itself harmed in the problem identified. Thus, the dispute may be an “accident” in a (relatively) positive relationship between two states; on the other hand, however, the dispute may be the starting point of a major conflict.

Because of the devastating potential of a dispute, a whole arsenal⁹ of methods to solve them is meant to avoid the aggravation and escalation to a major conflict that would destroy the relationship potentially irretrievably and have unpleasant consequences for the parties.

⁴ Teodor FRUNZETI, Dorel BUȘE, *Politici și instituții de securitate*, Bucharest, “Carol I” National Defence University Publishinghouse, 2010, p. 79.

⁵ Benjamin A. MOST, Harvey STARR, *Inquiry, Logic and International Politics*, South Carolina, 1989.

⁶ Michael HOWARD, *The Causes of Wars, and Other Essays*, Harvard, 1983, p. 22, *apud* J. GOLDSTEIN, *International Relations*, sixth edition, Pearson Longman, 2005, p. 172.

⁷ Dispute means a debate, controversy, or difference of opinion; a quarrel, according to <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/dispute>

⁸ Author’s note: An example of dispute can be a legal aspect, for instance in connexion with the consular domain, such as visa granting from a state to another.

⁹ See Charter of United Nations.

The study of literature revealed that the term corresponding to the phase called *tension* is less approached. Tension can be defined as a state of strain in relations between two or more state actors. This state indicates that a conflict may be imminent.

The *crisis* can be understood either as a violent manifestation of contradictions (economic, political, ideological, military, etc., or as a critical, dangerous and decisive time¹⁰. Referring to an international crisis, it represents that form of unspecified confrontation intended to weigh hard in the decisional balance of the other, in order to compel them to give up their legitimate interests and get from them concessions that do not correspond to the stake, in order to avoid the risk of total war¹¹. A comprehensive definition of the term is offered by the American Defence Department, according to which the crisis is “an incident or situation involving a threat to [a nation], its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives¹²”. Those threats can target territories, resources and citizens of the respective country, as well as its strategic values, institutions or infrastructure, with consequences more or less serious in the field of security¹³.

Depending on the intensity of the pressure to which an actor is subject to, crises can be classified into three categories: low-intensity crises, medium intensity crises and high intensity crises.

Since crises can occur in any society, given their complexity and imperfections, they have to be managed through prevention, limitation and resolution actions. Otherwise, a crisis can turn into violent actions and even military aggression¹⁴.

Conflict (which in the literature, often has the meaning of *war*) is a deepening of the crisis in the evolution of antagonistic contradictions; the conflict may be a misunderstanding, a clash of interests, disagreement, dispute or, in the case of armed conflict, it can even be referred to as war¹⁵.

International conflicts are dynamic situations characterized by an intensity that varies over time, according to life cycle phases of such conflicts. They begin by escalation of a tension between adverse parties which, unless immediate action is taken to prevent or stop it, by the dialogue between the parties, degenerate into violence with increased intensity, whose episodes become more and more frequent, risking to affect at an ever larger scale the political, social and economic spheres. Thus, the conflict passes from a latent state to a manifest state, becoming an open conflict.

Interstate conflicts are caused by divergent interests of different natures between states. Thus, some international conflicts occur because of *tangible material interests* – there are three types – as follows: territorial disputes (including disputes regarding borders and secession attempts – as currently the case between Russia and Ukraine), control of national governments and economic conflicts (in turn, of several types). On the other hand, there are

¹⁰ Florin MARCU, *Marele dicționar de neologisme* (Large dictionary of neologisms), Ed. Saeculum, 2000. (Author's translation)

¹¹ Author's translation from Romanian after Jean-Louis DUFOUR, *Crizele internaționale. De la Beijing (1900) la Kosovo (1999)* / “Les crises internationales de Pekin (1900) au Kosovo (1999)”, Bucharest, Corint Publishinghouse, 2002, p. 15, apud Cristian BĂHNĂREANU, *Crize potențiale ce pot afecta securitatea națională: prevenirea, limitarea și soluționarea situațiilor de criză*, Bucharest, “Carol I” National Defence University, 2011, p. 7.

¹² US Department of Defense, *JP 1-02. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 8 November 2010 (As Amended Through 15 August 2014), p. 73, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf, accessed on 20 August 2014, p. 60

¹³ Cristian BĂHNĂREANU, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 8.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 8.

international conflicts caused by *interests of nonmaterial nature*, less tangible: ethnic conflicts; religious conflicts; ideological conflicts¹⁶.

We are going to advance a brief analysis of interstate conflicts based on *tangible material interests* and, given the relatively limited space, only a review of the interstate conflicts triggered by non-material nature interests.

Territorial disputes regarding boundaries tend to be among the most difficult, as it is almost inconceivable for a country to cede territory in exchange for other rewards or forget the territories they lost involuntarily. On the one hand, the state integrity and sovereignty are at stake, and on the other hand, historically, the territory has been the basis of economic production, namely agriculture (food resources, hydrological resources) and extraction of raw materials (energy, underground riches). In addition, some areas have an important strategic value. To this is added the affective dimension. Not seldom, however, the human and material costs of territorial conflicts exceed the economic benefits that could result from the disputed territory¹⁷.

Although throughout the world there still exist today numerous territorial disputes, their stake is not always connected only to change of frontiers, but also takeover of control and power. International regulations prohibit interference by a state in the governance of other countries, according to the principle of sovereignty, but in practice, some countries with major interests in taking the lead of other countries resort to different forms of influencing their governments.

These conflicts over the control of governments can take many forms: sometimes they are weak in intensity, sometimes they are more serious, some are bilateral, others imply third parties. In some cases, a state exerts subtle influence on the elections taking place in another country; in other cases, a state may provide support to rebellious elements who are trying to remove from power the government of the concerned state. In the extreme, a state can invade another one in order to change its government, as happened in Iraq, when the United States intervened in 2003. However, there arises the problem of legitimacy, both domestically and internationally.

Economic conflicts can involve stakes representing trade with certain goods, financial or natural resources etc. With regard to commercial disputes, for example, a country exporting a good that is produced mainly in its geographical area wants to increase prices for those goods, while importing countries are interested in keeping prices as low as possible. This happens similarly with oil exporting countries.

There are types of economic conflicts with powerful effects on international security. In this regard, we mention the mercantilism shown by many countries in their foreign policy, manipulating economic policies to create a cash surplus that could be used to finance war¹⁸. In addition, an economically strong state is, in the long term, in the advantage in terms of security as well.

The theory of lateral pressure is also falling into the category of economic conflict; according to it, states' economic growth leads to geographic expansion beyond their borders (either through peaceful or violent means), motivated by the wish to gain access to natural resources. As several theorists state¹⁹, this thesis is illustrated by both World War I and Japan's expansion prior to World War II.

¹⁶ J. GOLDSTEIN, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

¹⁷ For more details regarding territorial disputes, see J. GOLDSTEIN, *op. cit.*, pp. 176-179.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 184.

¹⁹ Nazli CHOUCRI, Robert C. NORTH, *Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International Violence*, W.H. Freeman, San Francisco, 1975; Richard K. ASHLEY, *The Political Economy of War and Peace: The Sino-Soviet American Triangle and the Modern Security Problematique*, Frances PINTER, London, 1980; Nazli CHOUCRI, Robert C. NORTH, Susumu YAKAMAGE, *The Challenge of Japan: Before World War II and After*, Routledge, New York, 1993, *apud* J. GOLDSTEIN, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

Also, *economic conflicts related to military industry* directly affect international security. Military equipment, especially high-tech weapons, is also subject to international trade. To ensure that manufacturers' interests do not prevail before national interests, governments try to maintain control over the military industrial production. There are two main issues here: a security-related one over the question what states get access to weapons and another issue of economic competition – who profits from those sales. And, last but not least, a related concern is the transfer of knowledge regarding state of the art weaponry and military technology towards potentially hostile states.

Another interweave between economic competition and security is represented by *trade of strategic materials* – such as uranium needed for atomic weapons, minerals and metals, such as wolfram/tungsten, or alloys needed for aircraft production. Few countries possess enough of these resources.

An additional type of economic conflict is related to the *distribution of wealth* both within and among countries. Despite initiatives to eradicate poverty in the world – for instance, programs of international organizations as UN, EU, but also of some countries, such as Brazil – currently there are huge differences regarding wealth. This causes a multitude of problems for international security, with potential for violence, including terrorist attacks upon rich countries by groups in poor countries.

Referring to the types of economic conflicts reviewed, we can say that, in a global capitalist market, economic exchanges involve a form of conflict of interest, but there prevails the strong component of mutual economic gain. Therefore, in general, economic conflicts do not lead to violence or the involvement of armed forces. That is because on the one hand, violence would lead to the reduction of disruption of profit and, on the other hand, the costs assumed by a war would bring further economic disadvantage. In addition, military forms of leverage are not very effective in these cases nowadays. So, given the increased economic interdependence between states, it is unlikely for a war to start over economic issues²⁰.

Next, we are turning our attention towards *international conflicts of ideas* that are more difficult to understand and even to resolve, as there are at stake non-material elements as ethnic hatred, religious fervour or ideologies.

Of these, *the ethnic conflict* is perhaps the most important source of conflict in the numerous wars currently taking place all over the world²¹. It can be said that ethnic groups lie beneath nationalist feelings. The ethnic conflict is rooted in feelings of hatred that members of an ethnic group feel towards another ethnic group; thus, we speak of non-material causes, but can also comprise material issues (especially related to land – up to reconfiguring borders – and control of the government).

There are places in the world where members of an ethnic group represent the majority of the people living on the land of their ancestors, considering themselves a nation. In these circumstances, they wish to have their own state with formal international status and territorial boundaries²². Therefore, there emerges a potentially dangerous situation in which part of an ethnic group controls a state and another part lives as a minority within another state, controlled by another ethnic group, possibly even a rival one. In this case, minority

²⁰ J. GOLDSTEIN, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

²¹ Ted Robert GURR, *Peoples Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century*, US Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 2000; Stephen M. SAIDEMAN, *The Ties That Divide*, Columbia, 2001; Donald L. HOROWITZ, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, California, 1985; Donald ROTHCHILD, *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation*, Brookings, Washington, DC, 1997; Amy CHUA, *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability*, Doubleday, New York, 2003; Robin M. WILLIAMS, *The Wars Within: People and States in Conflict*, Corneli, 2003, apud *ibidem*, p. 187.

²² Lars-Erik CEDERMAN, *Emergent Actors in World Politics: How States and Nations Develop and Dissolve*, Princeton, 1997.

group members are often subject to discrimination within the other state, the mother-country trying to save them or even avenge them. It is a common fact in international relations for states to show their concern about the fate of “their people” who live as minorities in neighbouring states²³.

It is interesting to note that, during the Cold War, when there was a well established system of alliances and authoritarian communist governments, there were no ethnic conflicts, or better said, they were kept under control. Both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were powerful multinational states that managed to impose peace among neighbouring communities. After their disintegration in the '90, some ethnic and religious conflicts broke out, bringing about violence and wars. These examples may indicate to that theory according to which freedom is obtained at the risk of losing order, and vice versa²⁴.

One example is the current ethnic conflict in Cyprus between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots. Here are ethnic groups who lack a country of their own. The Kurds, who aspire to create a state of their own, Kurdistan, live in four countries: Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. Another example is the case of Albania: it was formerly occupied by the ethnic Albanians representing the majority population in Kosovo (up to the self-proclaimed independence of the province in February 2008²⁵). Similarly, in the former Soviet Union, there were wars between Armenia and Azerbaijan and between India and Pakistan. It is not excluded that in the future, ethnic conflict and territorial disputes lead to the emergence of other wars.

An extreme case of ethnic conflict is *genocide* – the systematic extermination of ethnic or religious group in whole or in part (as that of Nazi Germany against the Jews).

Many conflicts are caused by ethnocentrism, or bias in favour of the in-group; it represents the excessive nationalistic tendency to see their own group in favourable terms, and the unsupported group in unfavourable terms only. But the positive experience in Europe shows that, through education, in time, ethnic animosities between traditionally hostile nations can be overcome; such a case is that of France and Germany, traditional opponents in the two World Wars, currently allied voices in the European Union.

More often, ethnic conflicts find expression in *religious conflicts*, as religions involve core values considered absolute truth²⁶. When it overlaps with the territorial or ethnic conflicts, the religious factor comes above as the main element of division between groups.

Like religion, ideology symbolizes and intensifies conflicts between groups and states, rather than causing them; ideologies are still significantly less powerful over people, compared to religion.

In practice, these types of conflicts are not mutually exclusive and may overlap, since cases can influence and determine each other. For this reason, when analysing a conflict, it must be treated taking into account the whole political and economic context, including history, geography, geopolitics, etc.

Concluding the exposition on types of conflicts, we can state that all these types of conflict can be worn not only through violence, but also by peaceful means.

War, the most serious type of conflictual interaction between state actors received numerous definitions in the literature; we propose the following: sustained violence involving armed forces of the parties – two or more countries – where death or injury is caused deliberately towards the opposing party in order to achieve economic and/or political interests.

²³ J. GOLDSTEIN, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 189.

²⁵ The independence of the province of Kosovo was not recognised by Romania and 4 other EU countries (Spain, Greek, Slovakia and Cyprus).

²⁶ R. Scott APPLEBY, *Tire Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.

In the world, there are taking place numerous acts of utmost violence, but political scientists use a range of criteria to determine whether a militarized dispute or an international conflict is a war: it is the number of victims – more than a thousand dead, the forces involved, the existence of a declaration of war or explicit threats.

Industrialization, and later on developments in telecommunications technology have changed the way of waging wars as well. Wars are becoming increasingly *irregular*, being very much different from *classic wars*, also called *conventional wars*.

Mapping wars throughout the world in recent history, we can see that less than a decade ago, in 2006, there were 15 wars in progress, all – with the exception of Chechnya in the Southern part of the world, particularly in Africa, South Africa and the Middle East. Of these, most were conducted within a state, and of inter-state wars, the most important in terms of international involvement and the number of victims is the US-led NATO coalition against Iraq, conducted between 2003-2011 and that in Afghanistan troops waged by NATO countries, began in 2001.

On the other hand, we want to emphasize, in terms of conflict resolution, that in the recent past there have ended several intense and prolonged wars that caused numerous casualties. We refer, for example, to those in Sierra Leone, Angola, East Timor, Lebanon, Guatemala, Northern Ireland and the former Yugoslavia. To the termination of hostilities there contributed defence diplomats, whose actions were undoubtedly decisive.

For instance, after 2000, Liberia, DR Congo and Ivory Coast have benefited from peace keeping foreign troops²⁷ and established governments based on separation of powers in the state. In 2005, between India and Pakistan there took place a first cease-fire agreement. In Sudan, after a civil war that lasted for a decade and left behind a million casualties, there was signed in 2003, a peace agreement, but things did not turn out as desired, and violence went on in the following years. The involvement of the international community proved itself insufficient in this case.

In terms of typology, war has its own taxonomy. Thus, we can distinguish, according to its causes, the following main categories of wars: hegemonic war; total war; limited war, civil war; guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency; terrorist and anti-terrorism war.

Hegemonic war, also called world war, global, general or systemic war is a war waged in order to control the world order, that is, the rules of the international system as a whole. The most eloquent examples are the two World Wars.

Total war refers to violence waged by a state against another in order to conquest and occupy it, by invading the capital, thus forcing the government to surrender and replacing it with another one, whom they like. In this type of war, the society of the enemy is considered legitimate target, so that even civilians can easily become victims. WWII was a total war and Iraq as well.

Somewhat in contrast to total war, the *limited war* is reduced in duration and end, military action being taken following a specific purpose. These wars can take the form of a *raid* – a single round of bombings or a single land attack. Because they have limited duration – sometimes just a few hours – and the damage is limited, they fall into a gray area between war and non-war²⁸.

The *civil war* is an armed struggle between two or more political groups of different orientations within a state, which pursue either keeping or changing the current political and state order, or to obtain the autonomy of a region as a new state. Despite the fact that in this type of war, combatant forces are civilians, the level of the violence is not less intense than in other types of wars.

²⁷ See UN website, http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/subsidiary_organ/peacekeeping_missions.shtml, accessed on August 3, 2014.

²⁸ J. GOLDSTEIN, *op.cit.*, pp. 202.

Guerrilla warfare is a type of battle that does not have well demarcated front lines. Irregular forces operate among the civilian population, which may become, in turn, partisan. Confrontation of the enemy is not direct, the method used by this type of irregular forces being to harass the enemy's armed forces and to produce losses, thus limiting its actions and freeing the territory from their control.

The way to combat guerrilla forces is called *counterinsurgency*. It aims to win the "hearts and minds" of the rural population, so that it gives up accommodating guerrillas. Since in this type of war there is no established front line, civilians suffer the most, often falling prey to conventional armies, because they can not be distinguished from actual guerrillas.

Terrorism is a form of violence deliberately directed against civilians, with strong psychological effects on the masses, which amplify their strength; the dramatic nature of terrorist attacks is amplified by the manner in which these events are presented by the media, the terrorist phenomenon managing to capture the attention of people and authorities. There are terrorist movements supported by some states for political purposes. After the attacks of September 11, 2001 in Washington, USA officially declared war on terrorism.

A special type of war is *the cold war*, which is actually a state of tightness, of tension in international relations caused by the hostile policy of some states towards others, but not taking the form of armed conflict. Given the situation in Ukraine this year (2014), political scientists are speaking of a new Cold War between the USA and the Russian Federation.

Other types of wars are *psychological warfare* (a state of tension, nervous or psychological harassment, initiated and maintained in order to shatter the morale of adverse forces and to demoralize the population); *information warfare*; *electronic warfare*; *economic warfare*; *asymmetric warfare*; *network centric warfare*; *ongoing warfare*; *unrestricted warfare*.

Ways to resolve conflicts

The main document of international law which refers to ways of resolving conflicts – the UN Charter, signed in San Francisco in June 26, 1945–, provides a number of ways to solve conflicts peacefully, applicable not only to states, but to a much wider system than that of states.

Thus, “the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”²⁹

Conclusions

In today's context of interdependent relations between states, it is assumed, according to the liberal approach, that given the multitude of common interests of state actors, they would be less prone towards conflict.

Even so though, certain factors or combination of factors lead to disputes between states, with the possibility of escalation and expansion of insecurity at regional level.

Therefore, it is important that through the specific procedures of diplomacy, especially defence diplomacy, to intervene immediately to prevent disputes escalating into a major conflict that would destroy potentially once and for all the relationship between the parties, with unintended consequences and at least unenjoyable for them.

²⁹ Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VI, Article 33, 1, available at www.un.org/en/documents/charter/

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CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING DEFENCE DIPLOMACY AS POSSIBLE SOLUTION FOR COUNTERACTING THE MAIN CURRENT RISKS AND THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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Abstract: *This paper reviews, following a comparative study of strategic documents belonging to NATO (Strategic Concept of 2010), EU (European Security Strategy, 2003; Internal Security Strategy, 2010), the US (National Security Strategy of the USA, 2010) and Romania (National Defence Strategy of Romania, 2007), the major risks and threats of the current security environment. Furthermore, it highlights a number of possible solutions related, primarily, to defence diplomacy.*

Keywords: *international security, security threats, diplomacy, defence diplomacy.*

Conceptual landmarks

The paper aims to make a comparative study of the risks and threats of the international security environment, analysing, in parallel, different perspectives as reflected in the most relevant strategic documents¹ for the Euro-Atlantic area, from our point of view (as Romanian citizens), namely those of NATO, USA, EU and of course, that of Romania. Before doing so, we consider it necessary to define the two basic concepts.

Many authors define *threats* in relation to *risks*, threats being risk factors turning towards the concrete, getting, in a certain context, direction and intention.

Risk, on the other hand, represents a potential situation which may become effective under certain conditions. But risk, unlike threat, is caused by indeterminateness, by the impossibility of knowing for certain future events².

We consider important the idea that usually threats are established in relation to a particular state/country, fact for which security policy must take into account not only threats, but also vulnerabilities of the state as an object of security³.

¹ See, in extenso, the following strategic documents: *NATO*: NATO's Strategic Concept (2010); *EU*: European Security Strategy (2003), Internal Security Strategy (2010), EU 2020 Strategy (2010); *USA*: National Security Strategy of the USA, 2010; Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World (2008), Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (2012), Strategic guide on US Defence (2012); *Romania*: Strategia națională de apărare a României (Romania's National Defence Strategy (2007, in force), National Strategy of Defence, 2010.

² Alexandra SARCINSCHI, *Vulnerabilitate, risc, amenințare. Securitatea ca reprezentare psiho-socială*, (Vulnerability, risk, threat. Security as psycho-social representation), Bucharest, Editura Militară, 2007.

³ Petre DUȚU, *Amenințări asimetrice sau amenințări hibride – delimitări conceptuale pentru fundamentarea securității și apărării naționale* (Assymetric threats or hybrid threats – conceptual landmarks for the conceptualisation of national security and defence), Bucharest, “Carol I” National Defence University Publishinghouse, 2013, p. 151.

Current security risks and threats in the perspective of NATO, USA, EU and Romania

The manner in which main risks and security threats at national, regional and international levels were defined or perceived has changed radically in the last hundred years and in the last decade we have witnessed accelerated and relatively unpredictable changes. The rapidity with which changes occur brings upon the need for strategic documents of state and supra-state organisations to be reviewed at shorter intervals. This is the case of analysed strategies for the purpose of this paper. Although the main threats identified in these documents remain valid, added nuances are required (eg. the relation with Russia) and the current moment security context should be considered.

After WWII, the only time the security strategies of state or non-state actors (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) identified security threats with other state or non-state actors was the Cold War, when ideological confrontation between the two blocks and the escalating arms race has favoured this⁴.

Later, after the Cold War ended, risks and threats have taken a different form, being associated, most often, with phenomena manifested internationally. Most state or non-state actors do not build their security and defence strategies on the premise that the balance of world power or even its own security is threatened by another state. In general, threats towards a state are not exclusively the result of increasing the power of another state, but are related as well to non-state actors such as terrorist organizations.

Threats and risks that define the new security environment combine aspects of military, political, social, economic, environmental and human, becoming ambiguous or hybrid. We will stop to the most dramatic ones, of which it can be said that they have a strong military component, or that they require solutions in the military sphere.

The strategic documents studied identify as main threats to international security proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, organised crime, but also internal conflicts and failed states that may contribute to the amplification of such phenomena.

It is, however, possible that the threats mentioned to be associated with a state (be it a remote state), which is considered to be a favourable territory for conducting such activities. An example is Afghanistan, against which US and then NATO have been waging war to destroy terrorist bases.

Perceiving a distant state as a threat is justified in the following way: in the highly globalised world we live in, having in mind that the means of communication and infrastructure such as transport have developed unprecedentedly, cyber attacks, as well as terrorist attacks are all more numerous. Although the source of such threats is more often than not far from the borders of the state concerned, technological progress, fuelled by globalization, makes the term “proximity” to be ubiquitous in the equation of threats⁵. This is because new evidence of the irreversible process of globalization, thereby understanding the elimination of time and space barriers makes states or regions to abandon the isolation and indifference of the past.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) of nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological weapons type (CBRN) (especially nuclear ones), and of conventional weapons

⁴ Teodor FRUNZETI, *Geostrategie* (Geostrategy), Bucharest, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, 2009.

⁵ Teodor FRUNZETI, “Echilibrul amenințării și echilibrul de putere” (Balance of threat and balance of power), in Petre DUȚU (editor) *Sesiunea anuală de comunicări științifice cu participare internațională* (Annual session of scientific communications with international participation), CDSSS, Bucharest, “Carol I” National Defence University Publishinghouse, 2011, p. 17.

are considered to be the most serious threat to global security. Non-state actors have proved able to procure such means of struggle.

One aspect is directly related to the proliferation of WMD is *arms race*. The Report *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World* conducted in 2008, as well as the most recent one, *Global Trends 2030, Alternative Worlds*⁶ identify the risk generated by nuclear arms race in the Middle East, triggered by the fact that Iran has acquired nuclear military capabilities, which can have destabilizing consequences both for the region (which is so unstable) and for the world as a whole. Moreover, Iran seeks to maintain local hegemony, its fragmented political system and its nuclear program. This had a significant influence on many countries' foreign policy. For instance, USA developed an anti-ballistic missile defence system in Europe and at the end of 2011, has signed with Romania an agreement to establish it in our country. As we know from diplomatic declarations, this has increased tensions with the government of the Russian Federation, the situation being at the time a real security dilemma. To this day, Moscow is sending warning diplomatic messages regarding this project, as the program is being gradually implemented⁷.

International terrorism exploits the advantages of globalisation, knowledge, communications and transportation; thus, any state can become a victim, especially weak states. Terrorists have access to international financial networks and to those of organised crime.

With regard to terrorism, though September 11, 2001 is recognized as a turning point for the US rather than for Europe, there appears more and more strongly the belief according to which international terrorism is a non-traditional threat, with global span, with possible access to weapons of mass destruction, which makes it fundamentally different from the type of local terrorism that Europe had known before this date. In addition, given the current civilisation crucible or mosaic of the Euro-Atlantic countries, there cannot be ignored the possibility that some of the immigrants who have acquired citizenship of the residence state to cooperate with international terrorist groups.

Globally, terrorism increases the other threats: WMD proliferation and diversification of, failed states, organised crime, limited access to resources, pandemics and much more. Although, most often, highlighted threats originate outside the Euro-Atlantic area, they can not be ignored, since it is possible that the listed items to produce casualties in this space.

Both NATO and the EU attach the utmost importance to phenomena of WMD proliferation and terrorism, having in mind the scale of the potential danger represented by the combination of these risks, in other words, the possibility that terrorist networks obtain weapons of mass destruction, because of consequences that such an attack would have on the civilian population and the difficulty of managing them.

Organised crime networks (illegal drug trade, arms trafficking, human trafficking, etc.) threaten international stability. Organised crime can be achieved by establishing or by affiliating such functional cells abroad; conducting relations based on corruption with foreign leaders; cross-border strategic alliances; illegal investments in other countries.

Local/national type conflicts also involving ethnic causes intersect with international terrorism and cause insecurity at regional level, as do failed states.

⁶ Global Trends 2025, *A Transformed World*, 2008, <http://www.aicpa.org/research/cpahorizons2025/globalforces/downloadabledocuments/globaltrends.pdf>; Global Trends 2030, *Alternative Worlds*, *National Intelligence Council*, <http://globaltrends2030.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/global-trends-2030-november-2012.pdf>

⁷ Author's note: on October 10, Naval Support Facility (NSF) at Deveselu was established as a US military base and there was organized an assumption of command ceremony. See press release of US Embassy in Romania of October 10, 2014 at <http://romania.usembassy.gov/policy/media/deveselu-10102014.html>, accessed October, 11 2014.

On the other hand, *conflicts over access to resources and energy routes* aim resources necessary for life, such as energy, water, food. Related to energy, conflicts target access to energy reserves⁸; terrorism and piracy as well target locations of deposits and energy transit infrastructure; in addition, it goes without saying that instability in certain regions of the globe threatens energy supply routes.

Cybersecurity is also a very important aspect, given the increased reliance of states, national and international systems on the optimal operation of IT communication systems. The aim of the attacks is to jeopardize the security of concerned countries; in addition to security systems, other elements of critical infrastructure of strategic importance, such as economic elements, transportation (especially, by air), trade or energy resources transportation elements are based on such technologies, so that an attack on them would have a considerable negative effect on security as a whole.

Regarding the possibility of a direct military attack to take place within the Alliance, the prospect seemed minimal up to this year (Ukraine crisis); on the short-term and relatively medium term, the attention was directed towards potential less conventional threats that could have arisen far from NATO boundaries, resulting in a direct impact on national security of its Member States. However, given the imperialist ambitions of the Russian Federation recently manifested towards Ukraine – a state located in the immediate vicinity of NATO's Eastern border and especially of our country – the threat perspective had to be rethought very fast. I am of the opinion that it is imperative for this new perspective to be reflected as soon as possible in strategic documents as well. If until recently Russia was NATO's partner, currently we can notice in various analyses terms reminding of the Cold War.

Intensification of cooperation among states and among organisations in order to counter current security risks and threats

In a globalised world, an actor can act anywhere in order to get somewhere specifically to achieve a certain goal, which requires that countries belonging to the European and Euro-Atlantic spheres to have a presence and involvement at global and multidimensional levels. Given that present threats have no borders and their effects can not be stopped at the borders between states, they can be combated only through close international cooperation, particularly in the field of defence, by diplomatic means.

It is quite obvious that both NATO and EU institutions as well as their Member States are not fully prepared in terms of capabilities, organisation and policies in the field of defence in order to meet the current challenges. Most state actors involved in alliances and security partnerships agree that beyond their own interests, security concerns can be addressed more effectively and better together than individually (collective security, cooperative security, Pooling and Sharing, Smart Defence).

Regarding this two organisations, NATO and the EU, though recently, some analysts felt that they could be disintegrated from within, having in mind that the members are coming from different areas in geopolitical terms and having, in part, different interests they want to defend within the organisation, and on the other hand, not disposing of similar financial resources, *at present*, given the threat posed by the Russian Federation in the immediate vicinity of the Alliance, members are summoned, once again, to prove that they are united and speak with one voice. No state belonging to NATO or EU community can walk alone in

⁸ For more details on the subject, also see Gheorghe STAN, Florian RĂPAN, Vasile STAN, *Transformări geopolitice și geostrategice în Europa după încheierea Războiului Rece* (Geopolitical and geostrategic transformations in Europe after the end of Cold War), Bucharest, Editura Militară, 2011, pp. 224-225.

imposing its own vision regarding security on other countries, because all these countries share common values and form a community of converging interests.

For example, if we consider international terrorism with all its aspects – political, military, economic, legal and financial, we can state, similar to the trends manifested in NATO and the EU, that it is not an area that can be managed individually by a state or even by an organisation. On the same level with international terrorism there is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, perhaps the most serious security threats nowadays.

In this regard, the two major supra-state organisations, NATO and the EU are forced to intensify their collaboration. Accordingly, a particular large emphasis is put on the civil protection against a possible attack with CBRN weapons, in the exchange of information, but also in planning measures to respond to civil emergencies. With regard to consequence management – the response to a possible attack – the relationship between NATO and EU is characterised by cooperation and complementarity, aiming to avoid duplication of functions and roles that the two would have in such a situation⁹. Thirdly, the EU wants to promote an international order based on effective multilateralism, specifically, through its relations with NATO and through support granted to UN consolidation as well as other regional and international organizations.

Below, I highlight, in a very summarised manner, some solutions for the current major security threats.

Weapons' proliferation can be traced through export controls, and, in addition, can be countered by exercising political pressures, economic or otherwise, while finding and attempt to resolve the political causes that determine it.

In fighting terrorism there can be used, at the same time, intelligence and police systems as well as judicial, military and other systems.

In the case of failed states, which are a security risk, there may be necessary to resort to military instruments to restore order, apart from other means, such as humanitarian ones to solve the immediate crisis (not forgetting, though, economic, political and social means).

In internal and regional conflicts, political measures are asked for; in the post-conflict phase, military assets, as well as effective police forces may be needed, while economic means are meant for the reconstruction process; to restore civil government, civilian crisis management would be preferable¹⁰.

In all cases, an accurate description and explanation of the phenomena that occur in the world can be useful in forecasting events impacting the international system. All these pieces of information are vital for decision makers to be able to process so as to make decisions on the basis of pragmatic approaches to problems in the world.

Conclusions

Given the risks and threats identified, we can say that drafting national security policies or strategic documents of a supra-state organization is at the same time complex and difficult, requiring careful and constant monitoring of developments in the world and their implications.

In addition, the establishment and development of criteria to decide which is the moment when threats become strong enough to justify concrete military action is of strategic importance, the more so in the case of an alliance of states/supra-state organisations.

⁹ For details, see Cristina Bogzeanu, *Evoluția relației NATO-UE față de determinarea polilor de putere (The Evolution of NATO-EU Partnership in Relation with the Determinations of the Poles of Power)*, 2013, Bucharest, CDSSS“Carol I” National Defence University Publishinghouse.

¹⁰ See *European security strategy*, 2003, p. 7, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.

Compared to the visible and massive threat of the Cold War period, we can state that none of the new threats is purely military, so they can not be confronted through purely military means. Thus, each of these new threats requires a combination of military and non-military instruments, in other words, of the *hard and soft power*.

Thus, some of the current threats can be countered by military means alone, but most of them require the complex use of military and civil capabilities, combining institutional instruments both at national and multilateral levels. Military capabilities are rarely sufficient, but most often they are necessary, having a potential rapid response, expeditionary and sustainable, capacities with sufficient flexibility and adaptability to cover a wide range of missions.

Consequently, the need to improve capabilities is recognised – first at national and institutional level as well as at European and Euro-Atlantic level – both military capabilities when using hard power, non-military capabilities when using *soft power*, and joint capabilities for both uses.

Global threats require global efforts to counter, and defence diplomacy may prove the most effective tool in this direction.

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INSIGHT INTO THE MILITARY POWER OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

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Abstract: *The current conditions of the international environment determine the different views of the theorists regarding the international relations and military diplomacy. These concepts, already operational, tend to "shape" the manner of approach to relations between the international actors. Thus, while, on the European continent, the EU States tend to focus mostly on a neo-liberal approach, in the Eastern neighbor area, and also in the Asian region, variants of external force policies, including military one, are increasingly being emphasized as arguments of the external acting of the regional powers that are experiencing a trend of changing the forces ratio in their areas of interest. These observations, which are occurring in disharmony even in the European space, are making desirable a conceptual and operational analysis of the phrase "military power of the State", given the need to adapt the external policies of international actors to the new challenges at the security of the geopolitical regions with high conflicts potential.*

Key words: *international environment, conflict, international actor, military power, neo-realism, neo-liberalism.*

Introduction

The existence and manifestation of the military, led to the building of the first powers with global vocation - the Empires. Military power is the traditional tool through which great military and political leaders were able to subdue and to keep in state of servitude other populations and civilizations. Nowadays, there are two main thinking trends regarding the power of the State as primary international actor in the international environment, swinging between the priority of the military power or of the economical power, in determining its true power of manifestation externally.

Neo-Idealists/neo-Liberals assert that, nowadays, the economic power is the one determining the power of manifestation of the State in the internationally, to the detriment of the military power and, theoretically, as result of the evolution that happened in the last 40 years, for the relief of the political-military relations between *East* and *West*, particularly in the *Post - Cold War Era*, during which there have been profound transformations by including, among the democratic European States of some important States, former members of the Eastern/Communist Block. In contrast, adherents of *neo-Traditionalism/neo-Realism* claim that military power continues to be the only true determinant of a country's power in the foreign relationship in the actual international environment¹.

Experience, even more the one in the last 20 years, demonstrates that the militaristic approach continues to be still used traditionally, to unlock the political situations in specific solution by calling the military capabilities. It also plays a major role in the setting up of international relations and global security environment, in terms of the proliferation of

¹ Anca Dinicu, *Puterea pe plan internațional și factorii care o condiționează*, Land Forces Academy Review, No. 4 (32)/2003, p. 66.

complex phenomena that are increasingly worrying the Governments of the Countries, due to the huge negative effects that they have simultaneous, one side, for the elites that contribute to maintaining social balance (political, diplomatic, cultural, religious and otherwise), and, on the other side for the general public. This statement refers to the last period resurgence of the cross-border crime, more about its "tip of the spear", the international terrorism, but also the increasing political options about military capabilities of countries situated on the Russian Federation geopolitical area and from Asian region, in contrast with the simultaneously lower participation to the development of military capabilities of the EU. This peacemaking behavior is according to declared intentions embodied in the UN Charter, by which "*all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.*"² This inconsistent behavior among the contiguous groups of states situated in a sensitive geo-political area justifies the conceptual approach and designed analysis of the phrase "*military power of international actors*" that is now available.

1. Military Power – Conceptual Delimitation

Although it is a commonly used term, we can observe there is no established definition for the concept of *military power*. For example, the United States used the concept of "*military capability*"³ to express the ability to achieve a specific purpose in military conflicts, for example to defeat the enemy, to win a battle, to destroy strategically targets and so others. The actual main military power of the world includes, in the concept of *military capability*, some fundamental military issues such as *force structure, modernization projects, the level of response* and the *ability to sustain the military effort towards fulfilling the objective political and military commitments*. It emerges from this perspective, the clear orientation of USA to a specific crystal defined purpose. American political and military experts also consider all supporting issues of military effort⁴ by focusing in a simple and logical way of thinking about all other/civilian major projects that cooperate to fulfill the military goal.

For the Russian Federation situation is obvious the striving behavior of avoiding a conceptual delimitations of its military power. The political leaders from Kremlin only presents as critically the current level of this issue, in order to justify the needed reform of its military system, and to demonstrate the ability the political elite to manage that reform⁵, also. It seems to be more obvious, for Russian Government, the interest to show its power by using the argument of the main energy power in the relationship with the EU and the former satellite countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, in particular by setting almost discretionally the prices for oil and natural gas exportations, even they are extracted from its own territory or from other adjacent areas or far away economically controlled areas by Russian monopolistic companies. It is similar the case of the People's Republic of China – PRC, that seems to be focused mainly to the economic aspects of its security. It's very known the PRC offer of extremely cheap goods that sustained its *One Country, Two Systems* policy⁶.

² Charter of the United Nations, Article 2, Paragraph 4.

³ Department of Defense, *Military Capability*, usmilitary.about.com/od/glossarytherm/g/m3958.

⁴ Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 9 May 2005).

⁵ Dmitry GORENBURG, *Putin spells out national security strategy*, 22 February 2012, <http://russiamil.wordpress.com/2012/02/22/putins-spells-out-national-security-strategy>.

⁶ *One Country, Two Systems*, 22-23 June 1984, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/dengxiaoping/103372.htm>.

However there cannot pass unnoticed, even of both situations, all military parades designed to show the confidence that Governments give to their defensive military systems that hardly and obvious compete their *power politics* the Asian region, corresponding to a *neo-Realistic* vision, in contrast with that type of *soft power* mainly based, on the far lands, on the economic war, corresponding to a neo-Liberal vision of *supply and demand*.

So, all facts reveal that almost all countries consider being desirable usage of military potential to fulfill political interests, more in their neighbor area, as von Clausewitz said. That is why, in order to manage the challenge of security and defense, there were created many security and defense arrangements. Some of them are *The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)* for EU, *Collective Security Treaty Organization CSTO* – in the Near East area, *Shanghai Cooperation Organization – SCO* – in Central Asia, and they are expressions of *non-States security international actors*, as a neo-Realistic military vision of reacting to the risks to security grouped countries on collective organizations.

Previous affirmations should induce the idea of establishing that *military power means the State's ability of the military action, ensured by its military potential, to achieve the objectives/political and military objectives/interests*.

The manner in which US makes decisions in military issues could be amply debated because their documentary sources are more "opened" than those other competitors in the race of political and military supremacy from different regions of the world. USA, being the main military global power, it is expected for all of other international actors, by the principle of conceptual influence, to be aligning with their vision of military power, as it happens till now.

Of course, it is not less important that the USA recorded lamentable military failures. During the Cold War they occurred mostly in the Far East (see the failures of the wars from Vietnam or Korea). These military failures led, first of all to the enriching experience of engaging the American state in open conflicts, but on the other hand, they showed that the United States' force policy is not absolute efficient, and that the balance of military power not only tilts in the advantage of the country holding the most advanced technical equipment or technological superiority. Such situations were repeated and should be founded again, and one of the latest such situation is given by partial achievement of the targets sited by the *Anti-Terrorist International Coalition* led by them in the Near and Middle East regions after the events from September 2001. That is why is very important to analyze, in the following chapter, the main issues that contribute to a true/efficient military power for supporting the commitments of the Government, even this is from a classic from a or non-classic actor.

2. The Military Power Components of the Contemporary International Actors

In the process of debating the operational concept of an *international actor's military power* it must be considered the net military capabilities and any other elements that could be used immediately or in the near future in order to sustain for a period the military effort, especially in order to achieve the strategic advantage. Net/current military capabilities are grouped, anywhere, in systems of capabilities - for Romania is valuable the term of "national defense system". Those capabilities define what resources could be used, in a unique conception and command in order to enforce the Governmental decision beyond borders and they include the *management system*, the *forces*, and the *territorial resources* and *infrastructure*⁷.

⁷ *Legea nr. 45 din 1 iulie 2004 - Legea apărării naționale a României (Law no. 45/1 July 1994 - Law on the national defence of Romania)*, art. 6, published in Official Journal of Romania, Part I, No. 172/1994.

2.1 The management

The management of military power is the constitutional attribute of the international actor's political and decisional legal authorities as Parliament, representative institution that should be Presidential / monarchical and others. The political authorities decide on *military policy* and on the development of the *defense plans*. In this respect and according to the observation that almost all countries operate with that three paradigms of *power, interest and perception*⁸, there are two essential elements that can ensure credibility of Governmental ability to support the competition during the international political game's instruments of negotiation, intimidation, threat, and others. They are: 1. *the potential of the management to effectively use the existing military system*, with their crucial elements, the number and quality of exercises and applications for efficiently using the military system through in real/almost real simulated scenarios of conflicts and 2. *the predictive and action capability that determines the capacity to comply with the international environmental trends in the near and relative to a long term future*.

2.2 Forces

Forces (Armed Forces) particularly include *the military command central structures-HQ, combat forces, active and reserve forces, support forces and the logistic system*. Some of forces' critical key indicators need to be analyzed are:

- *the size and quality of the personnel within military structures*, with its important indicators of *distribution on categories of forces, on tactical, operative and strategically task forces* that are prepared to act in the area of political interest;
- *the level (number and the quality) of weapon systems that are crucial to ensure military superiority* including the hitting power systems as *tanks, guns, planes, helicopters, surface ships*, operational or able to be operated in a short time, and
- *the level of communication systems*, which recorded an unprecedented technological progress that designed, in 10 years from the concept of *CCI* to the *C4I2SR* nowadays' concept that ensure the interoperability in an integrated system, of the military equipment with the *effect of improving the responsiveness, the ability to maneuver troops and, especially, the fire* in a dynamic battlefield. These communication capabilities were able to design some modern military concepts of *Air-Land Battle*⁹, *Air-Sea Battle*¹⁰ Doctrines, and, also, concepts of *Network-centric warfare* or *Joint Operations*¹¹.

2.3 Resources

When it comes to **resources**, it have to consider the *financial, material, human, informational (intelligence), diplomatic* and otherwise that should have a decisively contribution for supporting the military effort. By this perspective it's easily to extract the military value of starting governmental projects/programs in the areas of economics, financials, social, diplomatic, for realizing an efficient network communication system. For example, socially, there can be carried out projects in educational or in the health system in order to increase the quality of human resources in terms of training and physical availability that should influence the reducing time and costs of military training and for maintaining the physical and psychological level of combatants, later.

⁸ Constantin Hlihor, *Geopolitica și geostrategia în analiza relațiilor internaționale contemporane: considerații teoretice și metodologice*, "Carol I" NDU Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005.

⁹ Thomas J. Gill, *The Air Land Battle - The Right Doctrine for the Next War?*, 1990 Reports, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/GTJ.htm>.

¹⁰ Mihail Orzeacă, *Securitatea și continua transformare în secolul XXI. Eseuri*, Militară Publishing House, Bucharest 2004, pp. 36-37.

¹¹ Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 25 March 2013, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf.

The analysis of the **financial resources** of military business should be oriented towards the way of initializing and of execution of *defense expenditures/budgets*. It's about quantitative and qualitative analysis of military expenditures by taking into account the level and the rhythm of expenses – especially the costs for modernization and procurement of the Armed Forces. It should analyze some civilian funds are indirect linked with the military capabilities such as those for central and local administrative institutions, economic infrastructure, research, technological development, diplomatic support or economic programs and for social welfare projects in demographics, health, education, too. *Budget's planning and execution* and its dynamics are consisting of decisive elements of financial strategic analysis that provide conclusions about the international's actor ability to complete the projects in progress, mainly the military progress.

Material resources largely depend on the levels of inventories of strategic material resources (e.g. *energetic resources, pig iron, steel, nuclear, tungsten or vanadium*), and also on the power and the ability of the economical capacities to produce during the peacetime or of converting in short to the production of military equipment on military crisis' case. The material resources analyze should be done on *standard period*, most often in a year, or according to *the strategic military project* to be met (e.g. *to achieve a military victory, to achieve and/or to keep the air supremacy for a period, for the post-conflict stabilization operations, or to overcome an extreme situation*, such as the economic or political crisis).

When it comes to **human resources** we should have in mind, in particular, the resource that can be employed for realizing (the generation) and for keeping afterwards (the regeneration) to an acceptable level of military forces according with military operations. This category includes all individuals that passed the military training, or those who should be included in the military system in order to complete the reserve forces. Some assets, such as the fact that social policies, particularly demographic and health ones are paying back in relatively long time of 8-10 years or that the efficiency of using the human resource is limited just by the system designed to manage it, are important from the perspective of the combatants of an international actor. Of course, it should be noticed the link between the specific cultural features of the human resources and the effectiveness of its using, for example, as combatants in a war. About the last two issues, it should be considered that the *HR military system* has to get the real-time evidence based on significant criteria - age, sex, health status, level of education, etc., while in terms of quality, it requires effectiveness structures for promoting, recruitment, selection, training and promotion for military careers able to ensure "the best placement in space, in time and to the right job" for each combatant.

Intelligence resources constitute a decisive element, able to provide any other directing efforts in order to get maximum efficiency of the decision making and execution, as well. Living in a highly competitive world it is a truism that *knowledge/information is power*, the accurate and timely information is necessary to achieve the fundamental requirement of two main principles of the battlefield: *surprising the enemy* and *prevent the own surprise from the opponent*. Knowing permanently its own position and competitors' position is a real asset, so the awareness of the own risks and vulnerabilities and the ones of the opponent's reaches the point of being supposed to be able to operate a variety of potential scenarios with increased certainty and to decide thereby knowingly, upon the most effective way of using the military effort. Sun Tzu postulated otherwise: "... Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible; and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands"¹².

¹² Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Classic Edition, English Translation and Commentary by Lionel Giles, El Paso Norte Press, 2009, p. 17.

Adequate preparations that the famous ancient military strategist refers to could be summarized in the information system, aimed at *ensuring the informational supremacy* could be achieved through three main directions of action: 1 *achievement and maintaining an effective intelligence system* able to produce the opponent's surprise; 2 *counteracting the opponent intelligence actions* in order to prevent surprise from the opponent and 3. *Prevent the counter-activity of the opponent* oriented for avoiding manipulation techniques (information diversion, spying information, etc.). Of course, it could become counterproductive if all of those three main directions of intelligence would not be effectiveness managed, but the modern battlefield cannot be separated by *intelligence support* at all levels that require effective decision-making processes based on accurate and timely analysis of the key military scenarios: critical points, staging actions at strategic and operational level by the changing perspective of the balance of forces, spatial and temporal dynamics of the resources for military actions and so on. In this respect, it can be postulated that *learning step by step, through the assimilation of the all lessons is the basis for ensuring an effective intelligence system*. That is why, there is essential to ensure a systematic allocation of financial and material resources for the intelligence system.

Diplomatic resources constitutes the ensemble of the formal relations completed by bi or multilateral formal agreements, the activity of diplomatic institutions that can influence crucial political decisions in favor of an international actor at a particular time. Such relationships can be *formally* developed - at the level of decision making, and of executive authorities, too or *informally* - involving groups (including the Diaspora), personalities who are or may become promoters of the cause of the international political actor, in relation with the general public or, particularly, with decision-makers. Therefore, can be seen a *formal diplomacy*, whose principles and operating rules are often stated in official documents as government programs, security strategies and the *informal diplomacy* that could be located sometimes, somewhere on the border of intelligence activity.

Diplomatic solutions will be in line with the main view about the international actor's business of the diplomatic targets (political, cultural, religious, military and other types of leaders). That is why there is a correlation between the political orientation and diplomatic vision of those named as diplomatic targets and their activity for getting and keeping of a favorable or not favorable international climate, in relation with the interests of an international player. This statement justifies the conclusion that international actors that have not developed a real and, I would dare to say, "high-life" *diplomatic caste*¹³ will waste other significant material and financial resources, that should be counterproductive for the political leaders, and for the national interest, too. For the small and medium international actors there is a need to diversify this diplomatic class, so there is always the possibility of "castling" diplomatic personalities in situations where a particular political opinion or representation is not accepted anymore among the powerful international actors.

As part of the military power of any international player, the **territorial infrastructure** incorporates buildings, territorial works and land objectives, which, through their nature, were designed to be used or could be used by conversion/adjustment in order to gain an advantage previewed in the military scenarios. For example, diversity and quality of the *elements of transportations* as bridges, viaducts, rail roads, tunnels, great ways of transportation for energetic resources - oil-pipelines or gas-pipelines. Some of those building masterpieces could be passed just by tactical units, and others by operational or by strategically ones. *The telecommunications civilian infrastructure* is very important, one side to increase the efficiency of the economic activities, as are the specialists in economics are claiming, and, on

¹³ Geoffrey R. Berridge, Alan James, *A Dictionary of Diplomacy*, 2nd edition, Palgrave-Macmillan: Basingstoke and New York, 2003.

the other side to ensure the interoperability between the forces structures that are cooperating in joint military actions.

Discussing about the elements that can be used immediately or in the future for supporting the military effort, especially for achieving strategic advantage I focus on the *economic infrastructure* that provides, for example, the refreshment military equipment for replacing of military equipment that should be destroyed by the enemy strikes, and also the technological military advantage. It is well known in this direction, that towards the end of the last World War, the Germans were concerned about the development of new technologies - the missiles and nuclear materials. Some political military analysts concluded that the fate of the WWII should be modified if Germans could extend the war about six months, and this assessment could be sustained by the unconditional surrender of Japanese Empire after the famous bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Later holding this new technology the US was still awarded for a period of about four years military rule until August 29, 1949, when the USSR, in turn, detonated its first nuclear bomb, marking the beginning of a *bipolarity era* and of the nuclear arming race that introduced the World in the most dramatic part of the Cold War Era.

Conclusions

Given the experience of the two world wars and the postwar time we can easily conclude that the limitations imposed by treaties and agreements may be submitted to be re-negotiated. Thus, after more than 50 years after, we find Germany being the main "engine" of the European Union and Japan, the most "technologically society" – as two of the main defeated states of the last World War, being in the position of world economic power and also as regionalized military powers. We can also notice the China's case of managing politically and economically the advantage of being the main population power that conducts this country in the pole-position of today economic powers and to be one of the main military powers on the most unstable and nuclear unsafe area from the world¹⁴. Moreover, we are witness of using by military power, by the recent concept of *hybrid war*, in the neighborhood of the EU, between Russian Federation and Ukraine, the most important European satellite of Russian Eurasian strategic area as till a year ago, now a candidate for EU integration.

We also witness the discussions so far, on the declared support, unreported that has not been formally assumed yet - politically, economically, and militarily, of the main European Regional and USA in the internal issues of a sovereign state, according to international regulations, and simultaneously, the democratic rights of ethnic minorities, with clear effects on the equilibrium of forces in the Eastern Europe, given that, in terms of political and military there was similar precedent of the former Yugoslavia; from the economic perspective, a domestic dispute escalated inside EU due to the prolonged economic crisis through which it passed, and also of the trends in the Kremlin power to negotiate the position of the Russian state reconsidering its position in regional power relations, because of the increasing dependence that EU member states have shown for the energy resources in the Caucasian-Caspian space, and a recrudescence of terrorism directed against the members of the former International Anti-Terrorist Coalition that becomes "*a strong coalition of regional and international partners who are willing to commit resources and will to this long-term endeavor*"¹⁵.

¹⁴ Udaibir S. Das, Jonathan Fiechter, Tao Sun, *China's Road to Greater Financial Stability: Some Policy Perspectives*, International Monetary Found, 23 August 2013.

¹⁵ *FACT SHEET: Strategy to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)*, 10 September 2014, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/fact-sheet-strategy-counter-islamic-state-iraq-and-levant-isil>.

It should be concluded that neo-Traditionalism/neo-Realism concepts still have the decisive role in the *international framework* and this situation will be continued. This means almost all Governments will continue efforts of developing their military power, as the sole instrument for achieving political interest in the actual *international warrior framework* as it could be defined. In order to manage this situation, political and military leaders should base their decisions of the *coherent planning of the national/alliance strategy* according to *increasing social welfare* to the geo-strategic context. So, during the “*peacetime*”, it is expected the strategic power to be mainly influenced by elements of *generating security power*, including a lower level of *military capabilities* and the *economic power* convertible to support the military effort, that than *wartime* when *the military power, the correlation end-goals and willingness* dictates the *economic and territorial development policies* in order to increase the components of the *critical mass* such as *military personnel, the territory and the strategycal position* as they were presented by *Ray S. Cline*. In the *post-conflict time*, once with the sharp deterioration of the military power, psychological aspects are determined. Then the economy's ability to provide sufficient support in the recovery action of the society and of the military capacity becomes a priority. It will be a real trend to make hard diplomatic efforts for realizing keeping *alliances*, as *non-classic actors*, because of all states' limits on managing alones their security challenges, as *classic actors*.

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PARTICULARITIES AND TRENDS OF POLITICAL-MILITARY CRISES IN WIDER BLACK SEA AREA AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

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***Abstract:** The events happening in Ukraine since the end of 2013 and continuing in 2014, as well as their echo at the level of the relations between major actors of the international arena constitute the uncontested proof of this space potential to generate political-military crises with regional and trans-regional impact. Moreover, as far as the areas considered by the present analysis are concerned, respectively Wider Black Sea Area (WBSA) and South-Eastern Europe (SEE), despite the fact of being the object of numerous initiatives of stabilization, conflict mediation, transition towards democratic systems and post-conflict reconstruction, the results, though visible in certain particular cases, have varied considerably.*

The present paper departs from setting the essential conceptual landmarks in the analysis of political-military crises, which are subsequently used in identifying the main features and trends of the dynamic of this type of crises occurring within the aforementioned spaces.

***Keywords:** political-military crisis, regional security, Russia, US, NATO and EU.*

Conceptual landmarks

Recently, international security environment seems to be under the sign of the crisis and, particularly, under the sign of rapidly succeeding crises. Since the end of 2007, world security has been constantly reported to the global economic and financial crisis. At the end of 2010, came the “Arab Spring”, a legitimacy crisis of governments of North African and some Middle Eastern states, accompanied by street protests, human rights abuses, frequent cases of violence, and resulted in the change or reform of the respective governing regimes. Since 2013, international community’s attention has been attracted mostly by the Ukrainian crisis, with considerable implications for regional security, for the relations between the major regional powers, with a high potential to destabilize the entire region and often regarded as a significant risk for security in the WBSA and even in Europe.

So, presently, “crisis” seems to be a keyword in any security study, with the sole problem that it has not been given a unanimously accepted definition, as it is attributed various and different meanings, according to the domain concerned by the authors. However, there can be identified a series of common aspects such as: a) the involved parties consider crises as a set of dangers, threats, and risks; b) a break of the interior equilibrium specific to the organizational environment; c) there is a real possibility of confrontation, inclusively of military nature; d) the need of making high importance decisions; e) a concern-loaded atmosphere; f) the limited character of the reaction time.

Generally, a crisis creates an atmosphere marked by a range of common features, among which there are the following: distrust; polarization of social and political differences; use of weapons; sporadic, unorganized, low-violence provocative actions; the belief that the parties’

interests are incompatible; inter-group hostility; repression; insurgency; systematic violation of human rights; the erosion of government's legitimacy; national mobilization, etc¹.

Also relevant for our demarche is the fact that crises occur in all the areas of human life, their taxonomy being extremely complex, including classifications in terms of the domain (social, financial, economic, political, military, environmental, human etc.), amplitude (national, regional, international), all of them with a long range of subcategories. Additionally, security interdependence in times of globalization and regionalization and the multi-layered character of "security" concept (political, economic, social, military, environmental) increase the complexity of crisis analysis.

As far as the theoretical developments are concerned, our premise is that, irrespective of the domain in which it might emerge and of its geographical amplitude, a crisis always has multiple causes, quartered in the various security dimensions.

1. From "crisis" to "political-military crisis". A conceptual approach

International crises were briefly defined as unique phenomena of exceptional importance², with extended space amplitude in a certain domain³. The world economic and financial crisis represents a good example in this respect. Further, a regional crisis is defined as a crisis taking place on the surface of at least two states and in at least one domain⁴.

In this respect, it is notable that crisis theory includes various divisions of crisis dynamic (Figures no. 1 and 2). It is also noteworthy that the two approaches graphically illustrated imply a difference in crisis definition.




Figure no. 1. Harmony – Total war continuum⁵

¹ Ioan CRĂCIUN, *Prevenirea Conflictelor și Managementul Crizelor*, „Carol I” National Defence University Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2006, p. 40.

² Jean-Louis DUFOUR, *Un Siècle des Crises Internationales. De Pékin (1990) au Caucase (2008)*, excerpt accessed at URL: <http://www.andriversailleediteur.com/upload/args/crisesinternationalesextraits.pdf>, accessed at 7 September 2014, p. 15.

³ Ioan CRĂCIUN, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

⁴ Ibidem.

⁵ Ibidem, pp. 54-56.

A certain difficulty occurs when it comes about defining political-military crises, as most theoreticians are bent to analyze political and military crises as two different categories. Nevertheless, in our opinion, political and military security dimensions are so interconnected that it isn't possible to analyze them separately. In this line of thought, we consider relevant the approach of Copenhagen School scholars, who argue that military security problems originate, first of all, in internal or external processes by which human communities set and maintain, or fail in maintaining, their governing apparatus⁶. Even more, the political and military security dimensions are so interconnected, that it was argued that, in fact, there is no such thing as a military crisis as all military crises are of political-military nature⁷.

At a bird's eye view on the theoretical approaches on political-military crises, there can be found two main opinion trends. Firstly, there is a well argued opinion, according to which political-military crisis consists in a relation of dependency of the state on its own military power, turning the security management states' function in decision center, which can ensure neither the social function, nor the protection of the individuals⁸.




Figure no. 2. Crisis evolution⁹

Also relevant for the purposes of our analysis is the state in which the respective crises are at a certain moment. Therefore, even though, generally, political-military crisis can be considered as an intermediary phase between peace and armed conflict, crisis state itself has a series of stages (Figure No. 3).

This perspective originates in Clausewitz's theory: "Subordinating the political point of view to the military would be absurd, for it is policy that has created war. Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice versa"¹⁰. In this line of thought, this

⁶ Barry BUZAN, Ole WÆVER, Jaap de WILDE, *Securitatea. Un nou cadru de analiză*, CA Publishing, Cluj-Napoca, 2011, p. 78.

⁷ Gheorghe VĂDUVA, Mihai-Ștefan DINU, *Crizele politico-militare ale începutului de mileniu*, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2005, p. 27.

⁸ Gheorghe NICOLAESCU, *Gestionarea Crizelor Politico-Militare*, „Carol I” National Defence University Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2003, p. 87.

⁹ ***, *Criza, conflictul, războiul. Vol. 1. Definierea crizelor și conflictelor armate în noua configurație a filosofiei și fizionomiei naționale și internaționale de rețea*, „Carol I” National Defence University Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2007, p. 55.

¹⁰ Carl von CLAUSEWITZ, *On War*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2006, p. 254.

definition of political-crisis could describe a national state of art, in which the military get the political power in a given state. In our opinion, such a situation could be indeed characterized as a political-military crisis, but is not only an *in extremis* instance, but also refers to a national level of analysis.

However, there is another category of political-military crisis, more frequent and more relevant for the aim of this paper, namely the situation in which political tensions result in military confrontations, at national, regional or international level. At regional level, these crises occur, first of all, when different states' interests overlap, leading to the search of a balance between them. It is a crisis originating in a political confrontation at regional or international level, determining the involved actors to consider using military force for defending their interests. In this respect, intra-region interactions in Western Balkans and WBSA are eloquent.




Figure no. 3. Elements of crisis evolution¹¹

Even more, according to an ample study on crisis theory, all the crises affecting the political, social, economic, information and military systems are fundamentally of political nature, as they emerge from the apparition and development of serious malfunctions firstly within the fluxes on which relations between systems are defined or between the systems' components¹².

Subsequently, the analysis of political-military crises, especially those of regional extent, delineate as extremely complex demarches, implying the consideration of a wide range of factors, both internal and external.

¹¹ Teodor FRUNZETI, *Soluționarea crizelor internaționale. Mijloace militare și nemilitare*, Editura Institutul European, Iași, 2006, pp. 54-56.

¹² ***, *Criza, conflictul, războiul. Vol. 1. Definierea crizelor și conflictelor armate în noua configurație a filosofiei și fizionomiei naționale și internaționale de rețea*, „Carol I” National Defence University Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2007, pp. 88-89.

Given the fact that the purpose of the present paper is the analysis of some key aspects on regional political-military crisis, in a top-bottom approach, we consider of utmost importance for this study to be based on three main axes, as follows:

a) *influence of foreign actors*, especially of regional and world powers – interests, security visions reflected in key official documents, instruments of exerting the influence, privileged relations and partnerships, relations between these major powers etc.;

b) *relations between the states included in the respective region* – patterns of interaction, causes of tensions and conflicts, history of interactions, their belonging to a regional/ several regional security organizations;

c) *political, economic, and social profile of the states included in the region* – form of governance, economic development, good governance, ethnic and religious factors, life quality etc.

It is noteworthy that there is a strong connection between these axes of regional political-military analysis. Thus, the political, economic, and social profile of the states included in the region shapes the relations between them and, furthermore, can be capitalized by the major actors in exerting their influence for the pursuit of their own national interests.

2. Crisis prone South-Eastern Europe

History has repeatedly proved SEE potential to generate regional and even international crises, the main source of them being located in the Western Balkans. Nowadays, after more than two decades since the end of the wars determining the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Western Balkan states are seen “as far off from disaster as from success”¹³. In this line of thought, the region can be assessed as being in a fragile state of balance between chaos and stabilization. Also relevant for this particular case is the inter-play of other major regional powers and here we have in view both European and Euro-Atlantic actors (European states, EU, U.S., and NATO), as well as Russia.

As far as the European actors are concerned, their interests in the Western Balkans mainly gravitate around the idea of keeping them stable, as far away as possible from tensions’ escalation, which could easily and certainly impact on European security, which made EU the main external actor involved in their stabilization, especially through its efforts to include them in the organization as Member States. Additionally, Western Balkan states are crossed by the main energy pipelines connecting Europe with Caucasus, Caspian Sea Basin, Middle East and the Mediterranean Sea.

At the same time, the region, due to the high dependency on Russian hydrocarbons and to its importance for EU’s energy security, comes under Moscow’s interest in controlling Europe’s periphery, by building an energy monopoly¹⁴. By this strategy, Russia succeeds in creating a counterbalance to NATO and US strategic influence in this space. Moreover, Russia’s influence in the region is not limited only to the energy plan, but it also includes its strategic partnership with Serbia. Thus, even under the conditions in which it would be easy to make a parallel between Kosovo issue and the recent events in Ukraine, and given the fact that EU integration is one of Serbia’s main national interests, Belgrade announced that it will not sanction 2014 Kremlin’s actions in Crimea. Serbian vice prime minister argued this position by the fact that Russia has never undertaken such a measure against Serbia and, as a

¹³ Corina STRATULAT, “EU enlargement to the Balkans: shaken, not stirred”, in *Policy Brief*, European Policy Center, 4 November 2013, URL: http://www.epc.eu/pub_details.php?pub_id=3892&cat_id=3, accessed at 10 August 2014.

¹⁴ Stefan RALCHEV, *Energy in the Western Balkans: A Strategic Overview*, Institute for Regional and International Studies, 2012, URL: http://iris-bg.org/data/Energy_in_the_Western_Balkans_Overview_%20Aug12.pdf, accessed at 26 August 2014.

consequence, such a position would be neither moral nor in accordance with Serbia's national interests¹⁵. In this context, we can expect Belgrade to find it more and more difficult to keep the balance between its relations with the EU, on the one hand, and, on the other, the relations with Russia.

Also, Western Balkans states have a considerable degree of dependency on the foreign financial support, a context in which the EU plays a major role. Their recent economic and social unrests could be also explained by the economic and financial crisis' effects on EU's capacity of providing such assistance. Plus, governments of these states are facing a legitimacy crisis, one of the most eloquent examples in this respect being Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), where, at the beginning of 2014, took place violent street protests, associated with a "Bosnian spring", after the model of the events in North Africa. In this respect, it is noteworthy that BiH is only the most eloquent example as similar problems happened in Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Kosovo, and Croatia.

Although the risk of a military confrontation in the region has been diminished, the region maintains a high potential to generate or be attracted in conflicts, which make the international support for stabilization and reconstruction to remain a necessity. The main sources of conflict reside in border delimitation (Slovenia-Croatia), in constructing and developing democratic states (Kosovo, BiH), and in inter-ethnic relations (BiH, Serbia, Kosovo).

Belgrade-Pristina relations improved in 2013, due to the agreement on the normalization of their relations, a project facilitated by the EU. The document is proof the two parties can reach compromise for the sake of EU integration¹⁶. Nevertheless, this agreement's viability was seriously questioned in the context of local elections in Kosovo (November, 3rd – December, 1st, 2013), when tensions between Serbia and Pristina escalated again due to Pristina's decision to ban Serb official's access in Kosovo during the campaign. Kosovo argued this measure by the need of preventing Serbs from influencing elections, but Serbia considered it incompatible with peace maintenance process. Even more, diplomatic tensions also had a correspondent in street violence.

However, by far, the most notable case of stagnation and even involution is BiH, which seems caught in constitutional and ethnic disputes, characterized by flawed governance and economic stagnation. In 2014, BiH was the scene of anti-governmental revolts, begun in Tuzla and rapidly spread in the entire country, argued by population's revolt on unemployment high rate and governance's inertial character.

Another major possible source of destabilization attached to BiH is related to the development of terrorism in the region, due to the fact that Islamic community has begun to assert itself on the political scene, assuming the leading role in channelling population's frustrations and anger, filling the power vacuum left by the other political parties¹⁷. To all this, it is worth recalling BiH strongly polarized ethnic and religious profile, as well as its form of governance¹⁸. Besides the flawed governance, inter-ethnic and religious tensions

¹⁵ *B92 News*, "Belgrade-Priština Relations Far from Being Normalized", 6 May 2014, URL: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2014 &mm= 05& dd=06&nav_id=90215, accessed at 12 August 2014.

¹⁶ *First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations*, 19 April 2013, URL: <http://www.europeanvoice.com/page/3609.aspx?& blogitemid=1723>, accessed at 23 August 2014.

¹⁷ ***, "Bosnia's Dangerous Tango: Islam and Nationalism", Europe Brief No. 70, International Crisis Group, 26 February 2013, URL: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/b070-bosnias-dangerous-tango-islam-and-nationalism.pdf>, accessed at 25 August 2014.

¹⁸ BiH population is composed of 48% Bosniaks, 37.1% Serbs, 14.3% Croats, and 0.6% other, according to the data provided by CIA World Factbook, URL: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html>, accessed at 5 September 2014. Also, the Bosniaks are mostly Muslims, the Serbs are Orthodox, and the Croats are Catholic. According to the Dayton Agreement (1995), Bosnia and Herzegovina

could easily penetrate the political environment. All these make BiH the most notable possible source of destabilization of the entire region, on the background of economic, social, and political lack of stability and malfunction, of increasingly high population's frustrations, nationalism, and political Islamism.

Even more, all the composing ethnic groups have relations and support from the majority groups of the neighbour countries, BiH having also a separatist tendency in Srpska Republic, where the Serb majority claims independency in relation with Sarajevo and unification with Serbia. Thus, every internal crisis in BiH, ethnically or religiously motivated, could easily spread at the level of the entire region.

Also, BiH is not the only one generating concerns over the rise of Islamism. Recently, Kosovo¹⁹ police announced the arrest of 40 individuals for fighting shoulder to shoulder with Islamist insurgents in Syria and Iraq. In this respect, it is eloquent President Atifete Jahjaga's declaration that Kosovo will never be "a shelter of extremism"²⁰, revealing the emergence of a serious concern that these volunteer militants could add to the region's security threats.

3. Wider Black Sea Area hotbed

Recent events revealed that the potential of such a space to generate region wide crises is not just a "scary story", but often an announced risk, only waiting the convenient time to happen.

WBSA is a strategic area both for the West and for the East, for EU and NATO and for the Russian Federation as well. Its strategic significance emerges from the energy resources, from its quality as transit space for the hydrocarbons towards Europe, from the impossibility of finding acceptable solutions to the "frozen conflicts" (Transdnier, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabach). To all these, shall be added the importance attached by Moscow to this region, traditionally considered its area of influence, as well as its rather difficult relations with NATO and EU.

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation stipulated ever since 2008 that "Russia maintains its negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO, notably to the plans of admitting Ukraine and Georgia to the membership in the alliance, as well as to bringing the NATO military infrastructure closer to the Russian borders on the whole"²¹. On the other hand, NATO has continued its enlargement eastwards and the EU has made constant efforts in attracting Russia's close vicinity in strategic partnerships. Even more, it is enough to take into consideration only the events in 2008. It was the year when, NATO held its yearly summit in Bucharest inviting Ukraine and Georgia to adhere to the Alliance, as well as the year when the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation was issued, the year when Russia invaded Georgia, as well as the year when EU revealed its intentions about launching the Eastern Partnership. This long range of critical events should have been considered as a clear token that Russia's aggressive rhetoric unto NATO and EU presence in its strategic vicinity is void neither of significance, nor of intention and will.

three bicameral parliamentary representations (one for each entity and one at the central level); a triple presidency (a president representing each one of the three main ethnic groups – the Croats, the Bosnians and the Serbs). For details, see Cristina BOGZEANU, "Bosnia and Herzegovina – Political Impasse and Security Issues. Repercussions on the Relation with the European Union", in *Strategic Impact*, no. 3 [36]/2010, pp. 48-61.

¹⁹ Kosovo has an Albanian majority (92%), where Islam is the main religion, according to CIA World Factbook, URL: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html>, accessed at 15 August 2014.

²⁰ Fatos BYTYCHI, "Kosovo police arrest 40 for fighting in Iraq, Syria", Reuters, 11 August 2014, URL: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/11/us-syria-crisis-iraq-kosovo-idUSKBN0GB0R920140811>, accessed at 15 August 2014.

²¹ President of Russia, The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 12 July 2008, URL: <http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml>, accessed at 5 September 2014.

This is the reason for which U.S. and its European allies are considered to bear the major responsibility for 2014 Ukrainian crisis²². J. Mearsheimer considered that NATO enlargement, EU expansion, and democracy promotion in this space “added fuel to a fire waiting to ignite”²³, comparing Moscow’s reaction with the one that Washington would have had if China had built an impressive military alliance and had tried to include Canada and Mexico.

Thus, the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis is eloquent in this respect. Ever since 2013, Russia has undertaken more and more obvious measures for increasing its influence on the former soviet states. The third Summit of the Eastern Partnership, held in Vilnius, 28th – 29th November 2013, meant to be the official framework for the formalization of some Association Agreements with the states from this space (including their acceptance in the *Deep and Comprehensive Free Exchange Area*), was the major stimulus for Kremlin’s actions in this respect. The reason for this is the fact that Moscow has tried to attract these states towards the Customs Union (Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) – the core of the future Eurasian Union, an organization of economic integration, created after EU model. The Treaty of the Eurasian Union was signed on May, 29th, 2014 and is to enter into force on January, 1st, 2015.

In 2013, Russia has undertaken a series of measures, meant to press the states which were expected to deepen the cooperation with EU at Vilnius, aiming at preventing them from getting closer to the European project while attracting them on the Eurasian one. Thus, Moscow banned wine imports from the Republic of Moldavia, wine and spring water imports from Georgia, as well as chocolate imports from Ukraine, under the pretext that all of them were dangerous for consumer’s health. Even more, under the conditions in which Armenia’s security is highly dependent on the Russian guarantees, and given the fact that Yerevan is still in conflict, often violent, with Baku regarding the status of Nagorno-Karabach, in August, 2013, Putin visited the Azeri capital and agreed to sell the Azeri 4 mld. dollars worth military equipment. And this, under the conditions in which, on the one hand, Azerbaijan’s military expenditures had also increased previously, due to the income resulted from hydrocarbons’ export, and, on the other, the Contact Line (Nagorno-Karabach) remains the most dangerous militarized area from Europe, being the scene of occasional fire exchanges between Azeri and Armenian militaries.

In this context, after ending the three year long negotiations, Armenia gave up signing the Association Agreement with the EU, three months before the official sealing for joining the Customs Union in the East. In November, 2013, Ukraine made a similar announcement, motivating its decision by the fact that its national security interests imply an active dialogue with Russia and the other members of the Customs Union and Commonwealth of Independent States for revitalizing trade and economic connections, which determined the three month long street protests in Kiev. Government’s attempt to end these protests by means of force, in February 2014, generated street protests, resulted in a considerable number of injured and death toll among civilian population, which subsequently triggered condemnations of international community and the flee of the Ukrainian president in Russia. On 1st of March 2014, Putin ordered the occupation of Crimea, justified through the necessity of protecting Russian ethnics from thus space.

The annexation of Crimea was followed by unrest in Southern and Eastern Ukraine, where armed men, self-declared local militias, seized government and police buildings,

²² John J. MEARSHEIMER, „Why the Ukrainian Crisis is West’s Fault. The Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin”, in *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2014 Issue, URL: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-ukraine-crisis-is-the-west-s-fault>, accessed at 15 September 2014.

²³ Ibidem.

determining diplomatic measures undertaken jointly by EU, US and Russia, as well as a military engagement to end the insurgency²⁴.

Subsequently, during Vilnius Summit, only Georgia and the Republic of Moldova signed the Association Agreement, the EU still keeping its offer on the table for Ukraine. Also, it was adopted an agreement for visa facilitation for Azerbaijan and a framework agreement for Georgia's participation in EU crisis management missions.

Therefore, as far as Ukraine is concerned, one could speak about a clear example of a regional political-military crisis of historical importance, with a major significance for the security of WBSA and of the entire Europe. Undoubtedly, the regional nature is present from its causes to effects. Ukrainian crisis was triggered by EU and NATO interests for the states in Eastern Europe overlapping the Russian's ones. Ukraine's political, social, and economic vulnerabilities contributed to the rapid escalation of this crisis.

2014 political-military crisis also has regional effects and, here, there could be found at least two dimensions. Firstly, it is about the notable deterioration of Russia-EU and Russia-NATO relations, due to the repeated sanctions against Moscow adopted by the West. Even more, the success of Russia's pressures, blackmail, and threats in determining WBSA states to give up the Association Agreement with the EU was interpreted as a successful attempt to empty EU's Eastern Partnership of significance²⁵.

Secondly, the other WBSA states are expected to be influenced by this crisis, Azerbaijan meeting the most conditions in this respect. Azerbaijan is one of the most prosperous states in the region, due to the incomes resulted from hydrocarbons' export, having a considerable importance both for the EU and Russia. Having in view the projects of developing the gas pipeline which are to connect Azerbaijan with Europe, Baku has the potential to become a major partner for Brussels and a key contributor to Europe's energy security. Under these conditions, Russia is expected to increase its pressures on this actor, making it increasingly difficult for Baku to maintain its neutrality on these two actors.

Most WBSA actors are envisaged and influenced by both economic blocks (EU and the Customs Union) in between which they are placed, by their efforts to attract them to themselves, soft measures from the West and hard measures from the East.

Georgia is one of the few cases in which there can be found a certain constancy regarding foreign policy. With a firm Euro-Atlantic orientation, established ever since Saakashvili's ruling, Tbilisi proved its engagement on this road even under the increased pressure of Russia in 2013. It is relevant in this respect that, although it imports almost all its natural gas and oil necessary from Russia, Georgia has developed considerably its hydro-energy sector and that the construction of gas and oil pipelines connecting Europe and Asia to allow it to capitalize its geostrategic position from this perspective.

Although at the end of 2012, Georgian Prime-Minister attempted to "reset" Georgia's relations with Russia, especially on the economic dimension, in spite of Moscow's support for the two separatist Georgian republics (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and even of South Ossetia's military occupation, 2013 proved the limited character of the successes achieved on this direction²⁶. The most obvious example in this respect is represented by the delineation of

²⁴ Julian BORGER, Alec LUHN, „Ukraine Crisis: Geneva Talks Produce Agreement on Defusing Conflict. US, Russia, Ukraine and EU Agree Measures Including End of Violence, Disarming of Illegal Groups and Amnesty for Protesters”, *The Guardian*, 17 April 2014, URL: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/17/ukraine-crisis-agreement-us-russia-eu>, accessed at 3 September 2014.

²⁵ Michael EMERSON, Hrant KONSTANTYAN, „Marele proiect al lui Putin de a distruge Parteneriatul Estic”, adapted in Romanian by Simona Solomon, *Revista 22*, 24 September 2013, URL: <http://www.revista22.ro/marele-proiect-al-lui-putin-de-a-distruge-parteneriatul-estic-31356.html>, accesat la 12 august 2014.

²⁶ Russian-Georgian relations "reset" after the change of the Georgian government subsequently 2013 presidential elections, consisted in canceling Moscow's embargoes on grape, fruit, wine and spring waters

South Ossetia's borders. The process started in 2013 and consisted in the installation of barbed wire fences by the Russian militaries, in order to separate South Ossetia's territory from Georgia.

Conclusions

Both South-Eastern Europe, especially Western Balkans area, and EU's Eastern neighbourhood are the scene of ongoing regional political-military crises. The major difference between the crises occurring in these spaces resides in the fact that they are at different stages of their evolution. Western Balkan states have already undergone a long process of stabilization, but without succeeding in finding a solution for all the issues undermining their relations, which often make the area to have a crisis characteristic atmosphere²⁷. In this particular case, although there aren't notable violent confrontation, Western Balkan states, although clearly on the EU integration way, are still passing through crises of political-military nature or, at least, they present a high risk for such a crisis to occur and spread within the entire region.

WBSA, on the contrary, is the most eloquent example of a regional political-military crisis, determined by the overlap of West and East strategic interests. In fact, both regions are under the influence of the Western powers and Russia. Nevertheless, it is obvious the importance attached to them by these external actors and the relations they built in this respect.

Another difference regarding the regional political-military crises happening in SEE and WBSA is related to the weight of the influence of NATO and EU, on the one hand, and, on the other, of the Russian Federation. Both regions bear the ascendant of these powers, but, Western Balkans states are influenced at a much more larger extent by NATO and EU, given the high impact of the military and civilian missions on the security environment in this space, as well as the financial support and their clear situation on the EU integration path. Additionally, Russia's influence is visible in its strategic partnership with Serbia and its energy-related actions.

As far as the WBSA is concerned, external powers' leverages are reversed. Thus, NATO and EU have had a considerable influence through the promotion of democracy and their efforts to attract WBSA actors within Euro-Atlantic structures. On the other hand, Russia's ascendant is notably higher, Moscow making use, in this respect, on its hard power, especially by energy blackmail, economic pressures, and military force.

It is equally important that these influences manifest on the background of consistent vulnerabilities of the actors comprised in this space. Therefore, a thorough analysis of the crisis in SEE and WBSA imply taking in consideration the evolutions and flaws experienced by these states at economic, political, and social levels.

Concomitantly, recent events in WBSA stand as a proof that cooperation relations between great powers shouldn't be considered unalterable. Despite the liberal rhetoric having marked international relations since the end of the Cold War, world still functions in Realist terms.

Finally, contemporary history shows, beyond any doubt, that we all shall reconsider the importance of history and political geography and to refresh the knowledge in this area.

imports. According to Vladimir SOCOR, "Georgia between Russia and the European Union: Towards Vilnius Summit and Beyond (Part One)", in *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 10, No. 2012/2013, URL: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41676&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=685&no_cache=1#.VCMJ7pSSyII, accessed at 1 September 2014.

²⁷ Ioan CRĂCIUN, *Op. Cit.*, p. 40.

Ukraine crisis' roots are in its past and nobody shall underestimate the importance of Western Balkan states' history, strewn with conflicts, inter-ethnic and inter-religious divergences, flawed governance and weak economy.

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ANALYTICAL APPROACHES TO THE UKRAINE CRISIS AND THE RECENT UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

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Abstract: *The Ukrainian parliamentary elections held on October 26, 2014 are, for many reasons, an important milestone in the crisis that has been going on for almost a year now. First, the elections ended a period of almost eight months, during which many have accused Ukrainian leaders of the illegitimate use of power, given that they came to power at the end of February as a result of an uprising, rather than having been elected via a constitutional process. Second, the election results fundamentally changed the Ukrainian legislation and the composition of the Ukrainian political elite, allowing representatives of several new political groups into the Supreme Council that have been all but unknown to the public even a few months ago. Third, the elections ended an extraordinary period during which the political leaders of the country could stay in power without having to implement far-reaching reforms. These changes now offer us the opportunity to review the main turning points of the Ukrainian crisis, framing various analytical approaches to foster a better understanding of the ongoing processes and map up the main challenges that lay ahead of the newly elected leaders following the elections.*

1. The stages of the Ukrainian crisis

In a previous study in March 2014 I have already offered an overview of the main events of the Ukrainian crisis.¹ Now, with almost a year since its inception has passed, it is possible to review events in the crisis within a longer timeframe. Our primary emphasis will be on how the international community and public opinion perceived and interpreted the events of the crisis. Given that this is our primary approach, the first phase of the crisis is identified as *the agony of the Yanukovich regime* beginning with the November 2013 protest wave and ending with the flight of Victor Yanukovich in February 2014. While we can certainly identify further decisive points within this timeframe which affected the dynamics of the crisis,² the main attribute of this first phase of events was that Victor Yanukovich and his administration – although having the appropriate political, financial and internal security resources at their disposal – were unable to effectively handle the internal protests that led to the change of leadership. Those who have a critical view on this phase of the crisis often stress the involvement of the West and the advance of the Ukrainian radical far-right. These views are somewhat exaggerated as the Maidan movement was primarily financed and supported by Ukrainian oligarchs left outside the circles of power, while the results of the presidential elections show no evidence that the far-right has made significant advances.³ We also have to argue that the Yanukovich administration was in no way constrained to forcefully and repeat-

¹ Tálás Péter: A jelenlegi ukrán válságról. *SVKK Elemzések* 2014/3; Tálás Péter: A jelenlegi ukrán válságról 2.0 *SVKK Elemzések* 2014/8.

² The brutal attacks against the protestors on November 30, the December 17 Yanukovich – Putin agreement, the laws passed on January 16, 2014 that radically curtailed freedom rights and the clashes between the protestors and the ruling power resulting in many casualties on January 19-23 and February 18-21.

³ The two candidates of the far-right only got 2% of the votes. See Olszański, Tadeusz A. – Wierzbowska-Miazga, Agata: Poroszenko prezydentem Ukrainy. *Analizy OSW*, May 28, 2014.

edly quench social protests. We must also mention that in this period the international community and the international public opinion considered the Ukrainian crisis as a domestic struggle for political power and did not assign Moscow a role of major player in it.

Based on its specificities, the second major phase of the crisis is the period beginning with *the Russian aggression that started on February 27-28 up to the shooting down of the Malaysian Airlines flight MH-17 Boeing 777 on July 17*. This was also the period during which Russia occupied and later annexed Crimea (February 28 to March 18), stoking armed separatism in Eastern and Southern Ukraine (beginning in early April), and the proclamation of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics (April 7 and 8, respectively). Metaphorically speaking, this was an attempt to organize and initiate a 'Russian Spring' in Ukraine. During this period of the crisis, Petro Poroshenko was elected president on May 25, thus ending the illegitimacy of presidential power. Also during this period, Ukrainian forces in June and early July reclaimed some of the territories occupied by the armed separatists supported by Russia. This latter achievement was possible because the separatists in Eastern Ukraine lacked wide-ranging social support.⁴ By this time, the annexation of Crimea and later the support of the armed separatists in Eastern Ukraine triggered the first wave of U.S. and European Union sanctions against Russia (the U.S. sanctions were introduced on March 19 and 20, April 28 and July 16, while the EU's on March 17, 23, April 29 and May 12).⁵ Despite these sanctions, the majority of international and particularly European public opinion continued to regard the Ukrainian crisis as an internal Russian-Ukrainian conflict in which the Russian Federation was nothing more than an external player supporting the pro-Russian separatists. Already during this stage of the conflict it became evident that the West did not intend to challenge Putin, nor did it wish to trigger a new Cold War. The reluctant and cautious adhering of the West to introduce sanctions was another clear signal that it did not wish to be militarily involved and formally side with Ukraine.

The third period of the Ukraine crisis began with *the shooting down of the Malaysian Airlines Flight MH-17 Boeing 777 on July 17 and was concluded by the suspension of the economic provisions of the EU – Ukraine Partnership Agreement on September 12*. This was the first time that the Ukrainian events acquired first a European, then a global dimension (mainly due to the change of the EU's stance in the wake of the shooting down of Flight MH-17). This was also the time when the majority of the European public opinion finally realized that Moscow is a direct, pertinent and essential player in the crisis. This realization came due to the fact that on August 27 – in order to prevent the fall of the 'breakaway republics' – new frontlines have been opened in Southern Ukrainian territories that previously had shown no signs of separatism. Beyond this point Moscow became more and more considered as a key player who supports and defends Eastern Ukrainian separatists – who obviously lacked popular support –, thereby openly admitting its violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity, in order to retain its political influence over Kiev. For this, Russia was even willing to accept prolonged tensions with the West.

The main events in this period of the crisis were the following: the opening of the Russian border by Ukrainian separatists (July 25), the offensive of Russian troops against Southern Ukraine (August 27), Putin's peace plan between the Ukrainian government and the sepa-

⁴ Sadowski, Rafał – Wierzbowska-Miazga, Agata: Separatyści oddają inicjatywę Kijowowi. *Analizy OSW*, July 9, 2014.

⁵ U.S. Imposes Second Wave of Sanctions on Russia. *jmnjournal.com*, March 20, 2014; Declaration by the High Representative on Behalf of the European Union on the Alignment of Certain Third Countries with the Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP Concerning Restrictive Measures in Respect of Actions Undermining or Threatening the Territorial Integrity, Sovereignty and Independence of Ukraine. Council of the European Union, April 11, 2014; U.S. Levels New Sanctions Against Russian Officials, Companies. *Haaretz.com*, April 28, 2014; EU Restrictive Measures. Council of the European Union, April 29, 2014; Third Wave of Sanctions Slams Russian Stocks. *The Moscow Times*, July 17, 2014.

ratists (September 3) and the ceasefire agreement reached on September 5. As for the international dimensions of the crisis, the milestones were the EU sanctions (of June 25, July 30 and September 12), the U.S. sanctions (of September 12)⁶, the August 6 counter-sanctions by Russia⁷, NATO's Wales Summit (September 3-4)⁸, and the suspension of the economic provisions of the EU – Ukraine Partnership Agreement – under Russian pressure⁹ – on September 12. It is important to note that even by this time the Western stance had remained unchanged: the West still did not want to challenge Vladimir Putin and the Russian leadership, nor did it want a new Cold War, but at the same time, it could not and still currently cannot leave un-sanctioned the Russian steps that contravened international law and standards. Although a part of the international and particularly of the European public opinion tends to interpret Western restraint as a weakness, it is important to see that major Western powers considered other issues (such as the Islamic State and the prevailing effects of the economic crisis) as more pressing than the Ukrainian crisis. Also, some perceive Moscow's stance as a display of weakness rather than of strength. Finally, economic interests also dictate that Europe should not increase and further aggravate Western-Russian tensions.

2. Possible levels of analysis for the Ukraine crisis

Analysts agree that the Ukraine crisis is a complex one, with three overlapping levels: a *geopolitical* level, a *regional* level and a domestic *Ukrainian* level that have manifested in various parts of Ukraine. Most analysts – and consequently, the majority of the international public opinion – agree that, *on the geopolitical level, the crisis is a fight over spheres of interest*, primarily between the United States and the Russian Federation, respectively the European Union and the Russian Federation.¹⁰ In this geopolitical game Ukraine is rather the object than the subject of the struggle. This struggle originally began in 1989-1991 with the break-up of the Soviet Union and Ukraine gaining independence, but the current crisis is different from the previous stages of the struggle in that it is evolving among different power relations. The most pertinent aspect of these new power relations is that as the United States' supremacy and indeed, international level of ambitions have decreased, this has opened up the field for regional major powers – such as Russia or China – to better assert their interests in their immediate environment.¹¹ Some analysts and commentators consider that current events and those that have happened since 2008 (since the Russo-Georgian War) are but the delayed answer of a currently stronger Russia to geopolitical advance of the West.¹² NATO's 1999,

⁶ EU Sanctions Against Russia Over Ukraine Crisis. *European Union Newsroom*, September 2014; Ukraine Crisis: Russia and Sanctions. *BBC*, September 12, 2014; European Sanctions Blog: Russia, *europeansanctions.com*, October 01, 2014.

⁷ MacFarquhar, Neil – Smale, Alison: Russia Responds to Western Sanctions With Import Bans of Its Own. *The New York Times*, August 07, 2014.

⁸ Csiki Tamás – Tóth Péter – Varga Gergely: The agenda and assessment of the Wales NATO summit. *Nemzet és Biztonság*, 2014/4. pp. 112-128.

⁹ Sadowski, Rafał – Wierzbowska-Miazga, Agata: Russia is Blocking a Free Trade Area Between the EU and Ukraine. *OSW Analyses*, September 17, 2014.

¹⁰ Trenin, Dmitri: The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great-Power Rivalry. Carnegie Moscow Center, 2014. p 38.; Mearsheimer, John J.: Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault. The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin. *Foreign Affairs*, 2014 September/October.

¹¹ Richardson, Bill: A New Realism. *Foreign Affairs*, 2008 January/February; Magyarics Tamás: Vissza a kezdetekhez. *Nemzet és Biztonság*, 2008/2, pp 3–12.

¹² Michael Auslin: Why Did Russia Invade Ukraine? Because The West Is Weak. *Forbes*, March 3, 2014.; Why Russia is Strong and The West is Weak? *dobrisratings.com*, March 22, 2014.; Bump, Philip: Obama: No, Romney Was Wrong. Russia Is Weak, Not Strong. *The Wire*, March 25, 2014.; Champion, Marc: Weak or Strong, Obama Can't Save Ukraine. *Bloomberg View*, May 13, 2014; Morici, Peter: Exposing the Weakness of the U.S. and Europe. *realclearworld.com*, July 23, 2014; Grygel, Jakub: The Weak Attack the Strong. *The American Interest*, October 05, 2014.

2004 and 2009 enlargements, EU enlargement in 2004 and 2013, Western support of the Color Revolutions (Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, Kyrgyzstan in 2005) and the European Union's Eastern Partnership policy since 2008. These analysts argue that Russia has become affluent due to its oil and gas revenues, becoming a major energy player and is likely to feature among the world's 8 largest economies for the coming 15 years. As a consequence, Russia did not reduce its military spending despite the 2008 financial and economic crisis, but has rather implemented a sizeable armed forces reform and military technology modernization.

Other analysts, however, suggest that everything that has been happening since 2008 is not indicative of a stronger Russia, but were the responses of a gradually weakening Russia to the West's past and planned geopolitical steps.¹³ According to this approach, Russia suffers from a slowing economic growth and faces serious modernization challenges. These are, as argued, the responses of a regional major power that has been facing a certain kind of strategic solitude: the 'Reset' policy announced by Obama in 2009 has failed, Europe did not become a significant partner in modernization due to the 2008 economic and financial crisis, while China is as much a strategic partner for Moscow as it is a competitor.¹⁴ They do not contest that Russia has become more affluent, but they definitely state that it has not become more modern either. These analysts argue that Russia has chosen the means of war – or, in the case of the Ukraine, a proxy war – because the non-military means (economic, financial, political, cultural, etc.) of asserting Russian interests have either been exhausted or have proven insufficient. This aspect is worth mentioning mainly because the majority of the Western public opinion was probably not so much shocked by the mere fact of Russia asserting its interests, but rather by the means of doing it.¹⁵ Very few would question whether Russia can have legitimate interests vested in Ukraine, and that Russia could even assert them, but not through a proxy war, annexation or the destabilization of the Ukrainian state.

Yet other analysts are even more lenient. They accept the fact that Russia has annexed Crimea and even consider Moscow's attempts for creating a geopolitical buffer zone in Ukraine legitimate in the geopolitical sense given that Russia does not have natural borders with Europe (and the former Soviet Union did the same with Eastern and Central Europe).¹⁶ This, however, opens up for the question: What is the strategic value for Russia of carving out a portion of Ukraine, or creating a Ukraine which could well become anti-Russian – and thus pro-Western – for the time to come? The latter question is even more pertinent given that on a geopolitical level, the Ukrainian crisis is also a fight for the position of lead integrator in the Ukrainian theatre of the post-Soviet region.¹⁷ The key question in this respect is: Who is better suited to support the modernization of Ukraine in the long term?

On a regional level, the Ukrainian crisis is a strategic rivalry between Ukraine and the Russian Federation over the foreign and wider security policy orientation of Ukraine.

¹³ The Real Weakness of Russia. *abovetopsecret.com*, May 10, 2014; Miller, Chris: War in Ukraine Exposes Russia's Weakness. *Yale Global Online*, September 16, 2014; Removska, Olena: Russia Is Weaker than It Seems — James Sherr. *Euromaidan Press*, September 25, 2014.

¹⁴ Sz. Bíró Zoltán: *Russia and the Post-Soviet Region*. In: Háda Béla – N. Rózsa Erzsébet (ed.): *Regional Security Challenges – Europe-Asia*. National University of Public Service, Institute of International Studies, Budapest, 2014. p. 63.

¹⁵ Regarding the changes in Russia's international image, see: Russia's Global Image Negative Amid Crisis in Ukraine. Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, July 09, 2014.

¹⁶ On this topic, see Friedman, George: Ukraine: On the Edge of Empires. *Stratfor Geopolitical Weekly*, December 17, 2013; Geopolitics of Ukraine. *diploweb.com*, March 19, 2014; Menkiszak, Marek – Sadowski, Rafał – Żochowski, Piotr: Rosyjska interwencja zbrojna we wschodniej Ukrainie. *Analizy OSW*, September 03, 2014.

¹⁷ Inozemtsev, Vladislav L. – Barbashin, Anton: Eurasian Integration: Putin's Futureless Project. Aspen Institute, Prague, 2014; Trenin, Dmitri: The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great-Power Rivalry. Carnegie Moscow Center, 2014. p. 38.; Mearsheimer, John J.: Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault. The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin. *Foreign Affairs*, 2014 September/October.

(This includes the relations European Union vs. Eurasian Customs Union and NATO vs. Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)?).¹⁸ In this particular rivalry, some analysts on the one hand portray Kiev as the party fighting for the stabilization of the Ukrainian state, and Moscow as the party attempting to destabilize the Ukrainian state. Accordingly, they criticize Russia for supporting the armed separatists in Eastern Ukraine, stoking the constructed Novorossiia identity and annexing Crimea.¹⁹ On the other hand – primarily the Russians themselves – some blame Ukrainian nationalism as the chief motivation beyond the revolution, while at the same time considering the Russian stance as fundamentally justified in protecting the Russian minority living in Ukraine.²⁰ While it is hard to contest that radical nationalism can seriously harm the Ukrainian case on the international stage, this cannot be a reason for a wholesale condemnation of Ukraine’s striving to build a nation and nation-state in a region (i.e. Eastern and Central Europe) in which the creation of new nation-states was one of the most important processes in the past 25 years.²¹ In addition, history teaches us that losing a portion of national territory will stoke nationalism and promote the cause of the nationalists in every nation.

In this struggle for orientation the European Union is not exempt of the responsibility of misjudged steps either. Past experience shows that the EU is prone to overestimate the opportunities it presents and to paint a much brighter picture than the reality, creating the illusion that adhering to and joining the Union will solve every problem of proposing members. The EU has repeatedly made this mistake in case of Ukraine too, by failing to warn that despite the Partnership Agreement Ukraine is still a long way from effectively joining the European Union, while a distant membership is but an opportunity for modernization and by no means a guarantee for it.

The struggle for Ukraine’s foreign and security policy orientation should primarily be approached from the perspectives for the modernization of Ukrainian society, for the simple reason that for the East-Central European region a modern and stable Ukraine is a desirable outcome. The question – as we have previously indicated – is whether Russia or the European Union would offer a more viable modernization perspective for Ukraine. It is safe to assume that in case of Ukraine and countries similar to it – that is, countries who are forced into modernization by lack of energy resources or raw material reserves, and where creating wealth and welfare is not a simple question of choice (i.e. achieving it through modernization or through oil and gas revenues) – a Russian-led integration does not offer a substantial strategic perspective. It is highly questionable whether Ukrainian modernization can indeed be achieved by following the lead of another country which is itself struggling with a serious and structural modernization deficit. On the other hand, we cannot be certain that the modernization blueprint of the EU can guarantee success in Ukraine. Thus, the choice in socio-economic orientation should be left for Ukrainians.

International discourse regarding the Ukrainian crisis almost never refers to *the domestic level of the crisis: conflicts and clashes*, nor do they usually mention the fact that that Ukrainians themselves have been instrumental in creating the current situation.²² They have contributed to it through the structural crisis of the Ukrainian state, by failing to create a solid state in the past 22 years. They have also contributed to it through establishing private armies, through the fact that the Ukrainian state and society are dominated by oligarchs with their

¹⁸ Regarding the changes in Ukrainian opinion versus NATO and the European Union, see Как изменилась Украина накануне парламентских выборов. *belaruspartisan.org*, October 23, 2014.

¹⁹ Menkiszak, Marek – Sadowski, Rafał – Zochowski, Piotr: Rosyjska interwencja zbrojna we wschodniej Ukrainie. *Analizy OSW*, September 03, 2014.

²⁰ Menkiszak, Marek: Doktryna Putina: Tworzenie koncepcyjnych podstaw rosyjskiej dominacji na obszarze postradzieckim. *Komentarze OSW*, March 27, 2014.

²¹ Tólas Péter: Kelet-Közép-Európa az integrációk szorításában. *Nemzet és Biztonság*, 2008/3. pp. 65–76.

²² Grennes, Thomas – Strazds, Andris: Ukraine, Russia and the West. *economonitor.com*, October 20, 2014.

own pet members of parliament. Within this system, state institutions (the armed forces, police and law enforcement as well as the judiciary) had been weakened and the state has lost its monopoly over violence and its ability of governance.

The current crisis is also a struggle among Ukrainian oligarchs, and – even worse – a struggle between groups of oligarchs who have all been tainted in the past 22 years. The most outstanding example is that of those supporting the Orange revolution between 2005 and 2010 and those who sided with Yanukovich between 2010 and 2014.²³ These oligarchs have now been reduced to financing the anti-Yanukovich Maidan movement (those who fell out of favor after 2010), respectively to financing the armed separatists (those who were ousted from power in February 2014). There is little doubt that the crisis also has an Eastern versus Western Ukraine component (which, to some extent, is also a struggle between various political identities)²⁴, but most analysts believe these struggles should not be assigned excessive importance.²⁵

In an order of importance, the society versus political elite aspect of the Ukrainian crisis should have precedence over all other aspects. I am referring to a social dissatisfaction that has both been caused and perpetuated by the fact that for 22 years, the Ukrainian elite was unable to come up with an acceptable development blueprint or perspective for the country (even if the protests themselves don't always exhibit this expressly). Neither did it stabilize and consolidate the Ukrainian state politically or economically. In fact, they perpetuated the crisis and left the overwhelming majority of the population in a vegetative state both in an economic (poverty) and political sense (lack of change, despite elections).

3. The parliamentary elections of October 26

President Petro Poroshenko called for early parliamentary elections to be held on October 26, 2014. Fifty parties or political groups ran at the elections, 29 of which could field national lists,²⁶ while the remaining ones only had candidates in individual constituencies. Out of the 29 parties with a national list, only 12 were able to field more than 100 candidates nationwide, while another seven had candidates in individual constituencies. The number of registered candidates was 6,627 of which 3,120 featured on party lists. The Central Electoral Commission registered every candidate from the Donetsk and Lugansk districts as well, despite that it had already been certain before the election date that no elections will be held in 13 or 14 local constituencies and conducting elections in further six constituencies was doubtful. (The separatists announced that they would hold elections in the occupied territories on November 2.)²⁷ Elections were not held in the Crimean peninsula, previously de facto annexed to the Russian Federation.

²³ Regarding the Ukrainian oligarch groups, see: Matuszak, Sławomir: Demokracja oligarchiczna. Wpływ grup biznesowych na ukraińską politykę. *Prace OSW*, October 16, 2012, p. 113.

²⁴ These are so complex, that taking into account only the language, ethnic and political aspects, we can enumerate the following identities: Ukrainian-language ethnic Ukrainian, with a Ukrainian political identity; Russian-language ethnic Ukrainian, with a Ukrainian political identity; Russian-language ethnic Russian, with a Ukrainian political identity; Russian-language ethnic Russian, with a Russian political identity.

²⁵ Regarding the inner divisions and fault lines in the Ukraine, see Olszański, Tadeusz A.: Więcej jedności niż podziałów. Zróżnicowania wewnętrzne Ukrainy. *Punktwidzenia OSW*, March 07, 2014, p. 35.

²⁶ Regarding the elections, see Olszański, Tadeusz A.: Ukraińskie partie polityczne na starcie kampanii wyborczej. *Analizy OSW*, September 17, 2014; Olszański, Tadeusz A.: Przed wyborami parlamentarnymi na Ukrainie. (Before the parliamentary elections in Ukraine) *Komentarze OSW (Commentary OSW)*, No. 149. Oktober 15, 2014; Ukraina przed wyborami. Stare elity trzymają się mocno. *Gazeta Wyborcza*, October 25, 2014; Ukraina wybierze przyszłość. *Gazeta Wyborcza*, October 25, 2014; Olszański, Tadeusz A.: Mocny głos na rzecz reform: Ukraina po wyborach parlamentarnych *Analizy OSW*, October 29, 2014.

²⁷ Poór Csaba: Hősökkel indulnak a pártok. *Nol.hu*, October 25, 2014.

The Ukrainian election campaign was short – barely six weeks – but very aggressive and dynamic. The contest took place between two sides – called at times *‘patriotic-revolutionary’* vs. *‘old regime-pro-Russian’* or *‘European-oriented’* vs. *‘Russophile’*. The dominant topics were war and peace, the economic crisis and issues of political renewal. Preliminary opinion polls showed that the parties and groupings which could give relevant answers to those questions and those that fielded new faces among their candidates had a distinct advantage among the people. Before the elections, analysts unanimously predicted that the October 26 election’s dominant feature will be the appearance of new political groups or ones that were all but unknown half a year earlier and that six to nine parties will make it into the legislation. ‘New’ being a relative term in this context: some of them are indeed entirely new, while others were comprised of the second or third line of people from parties that managed to retain some of their appeal following the February revolution. The elections were expected to be special also because forecasts showed that for the first time in the history of independent Ukraine, the pro-European parties could garner as much as 75-80% of the votes, even so that a majority that could rewrite the constitution.

Preliminary opinion polls predicted the victory of Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc (BPP), widely regarded by analysts as pro-European, expecting it to score between one fifth to one third of the votes. At the same time, it was evident that BPP would not be able to govern on its own, thus the relative strength of other parties on this side was also an important issue. Polls predicted that either the People’s Front headed by Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and former interim President Oleksandr Turchinov,²⁸ or populist, national-liberal Radical Party led by Oleg Lyashko could finish as runner-up. Just before the election a surprise contender has emerged, the Self-Reliance party led by the incumbent mayor of Lviv. Other groups widely regarded as certain participant of the new parliament were Yulia Tymoshenko’s *Batkivshchyna* and the conservative, pro-European and anti-Russian Civic Position (*Hromadska Pozycja*) led by Anatolii Hrytsenko.

Given that the main parties of the previous regime had been weakened (the Party of Regions fell apart and the Ukrainian Communist Party has been weakened), the opposition to the pro-European bloc primarily consisted of the Opposition Bloc led by Yuriy Boyko and the Strong Ukraine led by billionaire Serhiy Tihipko (with a strong backing in Eastern Ukraine), if the latter would be able to pass the 5% parliamentary election threshold. It also has to be mentioned that half of the members of parliament were to be elected from individual constituencies, thus representatives of the old regime could also make it into the legislation. Preliminary expectations were for the anti-European and pro-Russian camp to tally a total of 20-25% of the votes. This was even more likely because the direct purchase of votes remained a fixture of this election, although at a lower level. Preliminary polls also showed with a high degree of certainty that the Right Sector (*Pravy Sektor*) and the nationalist *Svoboda* (Freedom) party will not receive enough party list votes to make it into the parliament. This meant that the national radicals most criticized and opposed by Moscow would either be left out of parliament or would only have a marginal presence. It was also widely expected that the armed forces and security institutions would have a significant presence in the legislation, through Defense Minister Anatolii Hrytsenko’s Civic Position as well as having secured many positions on other parties’ lists, such as those of Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc, the People’s Front, the Radical Party, *Batkivshchyna* and *Self-Reliance*.

²⁸ Given that in the past few months there was a serious political debate between Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and President Poroshenko regarding the firmness of the political stance against the separatists backed by Russia, the People’s Front was often billed as ‘pro-war’ as against Poroshenko’s ‘pro-peace’ stance.

<i>Party/Alliance</i>	<i>Exit poll (1)</i>	<i>Exit poll (2)</i>	<i>Exit poll (3)</i>	<i>Final result</i>	<i>Number of MPs</i>	
<i>Petro Poroshenko's Bloc</i>	24,3%	23,0%	22,2%	21,82%	132	<i>I n p a r t l i a m e n t</i>
<i>Independents</i>					96	
<i>People's Front (A. Yatsenyuk)</i>	21,8%	21,3%	21,8%	22,16%	82	
<i>Self-Reliance (A. Sadovyi)</i>	12,5%	13,2%	14,2%	11,00%	33	
<i>Opposition Bloc (Y. Boyko)</i>	6,6%	7,6%	7,8%	9,36%	29	
<i>Radical Party (O. Lyashko)</i>	7,1%	6,4%	6,4%	7,44%	22	
<i>Batkivshchyna (Y. Tymoshenko)</i>	6,0%	5,6%	5,6%	5,68%	19	
<i>Left vacant (Crimea, breakaway regions)</i>					27 (12+15)	
<i>Freedom (O. Tyahnibok)</i>	6,3%	6,3%	5,8%	4,73%	6	<i>B e l o w 5%</i>
<i>Ukrainian Communist Party</i>				3,84%		
<i>Civic Position (A. Hrytsenko)</i>				3,11%		
<i>Strong Ukraine (S. Tihipko)</i>				3,10%	1	
<i>Pravy Sector (D. Yarosh)</i>				1,8%	1	
<i>Volia (Y. Derevyanko)</i>				-	1	
<i>Zastup (V. Davidenko)</i>				-	1	
					450	

Figure no. 1: Preliminary and final results of the October 26, 2014 Ukrainian parliamentary elections²⁹

Exit polls already suggested that the predictions of the Ukrainian public opinion research institutes were far from reliable.³⁰ The exit polls predicted a marginal victory of Petro Poroshenko's Bloc, with the People's Front second and the Self-Reliance led by Lviv mayor Andriy Sadovyi in third place. Other parties that would make it into the legislation passing the 5% threshold but staying below 10% would have been the Radical Party, Svoboda (Freedom Party – this prediction proved to be wrong) and Yulia Tymoshenko's Batkivshchyna. Exit polls also showed that both the Radical Party and Tymoshenko's party performed below expectations, while Civic Position and Strong Ukraine failed to even reach the 5% threshold.

The final results were even more surprising: even though Petro Poroshenko's Bloc won the elections based on the combined individual constituency and party lists, the party list contest was won by the People's Front. It also became evident that despite the expectations and forecasts, the Svoboda (Freedom) failed to pass the 5% threshold.³¹

The Ukrainian parliamentary elections resulted in the clear victory and absolute parliamentary majority of the pro-European and moderate camp (Petro Poroshenko's Bloc, People's Front, Self-Reliance and Batkivshchyna). The ruling coalition will probably consist of

²⁹ Turnout at the election was 52.4% of the 31 million voters (with regional figures ranging from 32.4% to 70%). This was both lower than the turnout of the May presidential election (60.3%) and the 2012 parliamentary elections (57.9%).

³⁰ Экзит-полл "Университас": в Радупроходятдвеновыепартии. *korrespondent.net*, October 26, 2014; Экзит-поллШустера: выборы в РадувыйгралапартияБлокПорошенко. *korrespondent.net*, October 26, 2014.

³¹ Результаты выборов-2014: обработано 99,72% протоколов. *korrespondent.net*, October 31, 2014.

PPB, the People's Front and Self-Reliance; and should the need arise to modify the constitution, this could also be secured with the support of the Batkivshchyna and independent MPs joining the pro-European parliamentary factions. It seems certain that Arseniy Yatsenyuk will remain Prime Minister, who is Petro Poroshenko's ally, – but as of now also his competitor. The Ukrainian parliament will not have a single dominant party, and while this could result in more debates between the parties, it could also lead to making the Ukrainian political elite more inclined towards compromise and pragmatism, given the pressure for reaching agreement. Another important result is that the defining and important parties of the previous regime (Batkivshchyna, Ukrainian Communist Party, Freedom) and their successors (the Opposition Bloc and Strong Ukraine for the Regions' Party) have been relegated to the background, as have been – from another perspective – the pro-Russian political forces (Opposition Bloc, Ukrainian Communist Party, Strong Ukraine). The pro-Russian camp will only be represented in the legislation by the Opposition Bloc, with some additional support from individual MPs joining Strong Ukraine and independents joining the Opposition Bloc. The radicals have also been marginalized: Svoboda secured 6 individual seats, Pravy Sector only three and the Radical Party remained under 10% with 22 seats. It is also worth mentioning that none of the Svoboda MPs are from the ranks of the party's leadership. The election failure of the party also means that President Poroshenko will likely replace the party's members previously given regional administrative positions in the Western Ukrainian counties as will replace government members of the Pravy Sector.

Half of the parliament – or some 250 MPs – are newcomers to the legislation, although many of them probably have some experience in municipality administration. The majority of those with previous legislative experience – a few scores – are likely to cooperate with the faction of the Opposition Bloc. The pro-European factions will mainly consist of NGO activists, entrepreneurs, journalists, the military and armed volunteers. Most of them are well-educated, but lack political experience. Many observers point out that members of the military and armed volunteers with close tie to different military formations in the new legislation constitute a serious political hazard. The new government must also contend with the – somewhat reduced – legislative presence of those representing the oligarchy. Igor Kolomoisky would keep his influence through Petro Poroshenko's Bloc, Dmytro Firtash and Serhiy Lyovochkin through PPB, the Radical Party and the Opposition Bloc and Rinat Akhmetov through the Opposition Bloc.³²

4. The situation after the elections

Now the main question is what tasks lay ahead for the new president and the new parliament and how the new political elite will be able to solve the accumulated problems. They will certainly need Western assistance in issues such as the reconstruction of the Donetsk Basin (Donbas), securing electrical power supply during winter (given the reduced output of the Donetsk Basin mines), and in general in the consolidation of the Ukrainian economy. This latter aspect is of particular importance, because the Ukrainian economy – due the failures of the previous governments – has fallen into a catastrophic state even without the war in Eastern Ukraine.³³ It is important to note that the new Ukrainian government can only hope for – but cannot be assured of – substantial Western assistance if it tackles all-pervasive corruption, begins to dismantle the oligarchic establishment and implements market economy reforms.

Most likely Ukraine will have the opportunity to prove itself in the coming months, because it is unlikely that Russia – after its attempt to trigger and stage a 'Russian Spring' in

³² Olszański, Tadeusz A.: Mocny głos na rzecz reform: Ukraina po wyborach parlamentarnych *Analizy OSW*, October 29, 2014.

³³ Iwański, Tadeusz: Gospodarka Ukrainy w cieniu wojny. *Komentarze OSW*, October 08, 2014.

Ukraine and federalize the country suffered an initial failure – will make another attempt at influencing Ukrainian policy with arms (through mobilizing and deploying tens of thousands of troops). It is much more likely that the Russian leadership – both internationally isolated and constrained by sanctions – will also attempt to seek positions in the Ukrainian parliament in order to hinder the new president and government.³⁴

The future of the separatist-controlled Eastern Ukrainian territories is also unclear. Although point 5 of the Minsk Agreement expressly forbade it, the Russian-backed separatists held elections both in Donetsk and Lugansk on November 2, 2014, eventually not having the elections recognized as legitimate even by Russia. The current leaders won the election in both cases: Alexander Zakharchenko in the so-called Donetsk People's Republic and Igor Plotnitsky in the so-called Lugansk People's Republic.³⁵

The parliamentary elections in Ukraine had a fairly negative outcome for Moscow, confirming that Russia has very little influence upon Ukrainian politics. In the current scenario, Moscow's most effective play would be to freeze the Eastern Ukrainian conflict in its existing stage, much like what happened in the disputed territory of Transnistria.³⁶ The future of the Donetsk Basin reconstruction is also unclear, because Kiev is unlikely to make efforts to consolidate a region that is still controlled by pro-Russian separatists. It is similarly unclear whether – in addition to armament and political support – Kiev would be willing to allocate resources to the reconstruction of the region. In addition, Moscow is not really interested in finalizing the status of these breakaway territories, because that would also mean an open admission that it has 'lost the rest of the Ukraine' – and that would be a major strategic loss for the Kremlin.

One of the most significant political tasks for the new Ukrainian administration will be gaining the support of the population of regions and social groups that have not been affected by the separatist movement, but where voters still expressed their dissent through absenteeism. Such regions are Odessa (39.7% turnout), Kherson (41.4%), Mykolaiv (42.8%), Kharkov (45.3%), Zaporozhye (47.2%) and Dnepropetrovsk (47.9%).

The new Ukrainian government's inclination towards reforms could be increased by the fact that within the reformist camp, the parties calling for more resolute reforms (People's Front and Self-Reliance) fared well in the elections. Many analysts explain the (relative) 'defeat' of the PPB and the 'victory' of Arseniy Yatsenyuk's People's Front by saying that pro-European voters were dissatisfied with the cautious reformist stance of President Poroshenko

³⁴ Most analysts agree that European and American sanctions have a significant impact on Russian economy, which has traditionally been vulnerable in at least three areas. First, on international energy markets that the country cannot influence on its own, while half of the Russian budget's income and 67-69% of the country's currency inflow comes from the export of crude oil, refined derivatives and natural gas. Second, during the import of high technology products, where except for certain military technologies even true the energy industry relies on technology import, such as technologies necessary for the extraction of shale gas and shale oil, as well as the construction of deep-sea pipelines. Third, Russia is vulnerable on the international financial markets, because Russian banks and enterprises are short on capital. Although the international literature often refers to Russia's significant currency reserves (which supposedly amount to \$600 billion, while central bank reserves sum up to \$450 billion), they fail to mention related issues. On the one hand, these reserves have been reduced by \$80 billion since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis in 2013, primarily because Russia attempts to prop up the ruble (despite, the ruble rate has declined almost 25%). On the other hand, Russian foreign debts exceed the central bank's reserves by at least \$200 billion. In addition, Russian economic growth has been slowing since the first half of 2012, amounting to 1.3% in 2013 and expected to barely reach 1% this year (practically stagnation), while this slowdown has occurred in a period when crude oil prices were still above \$100 and the country hasn't yet been hit with sanctions.

³⁵ Po wyborach na Ukrainie. Moskwa: Będziemy współpracować. Zacharczenko: Jestem gotów do dialogu z Kijowem. *Gazeta Wyborcza*, November 03, 2014.

³⁶ Andrusieczko, Piotr: Donbas stopniowo odpływa od Ukrainy. *Gazeta Wyborcza*, November 03, 2014.

as well as his willingness to compromise with the separatists.³⁷ And an even stronger impulse for reforms will be that should the new political elite abstain from wide-ranging reforms, most analysts predict that the existing dissatisfaction could trigger a new wave of major societal movements in the country.³⁸

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CRIMEA 2014 **– BETWEEN STRATEGIC SHOCK AND STRATEGIC SURPRISE**

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***Abstract:** The present international security environment is subject to dramatic changes having a strong impact on societies, nations, organizations and individuals. The increased frequency of strategic shocks, or the manifestation of what is called strategic inflections, be it the effects of the economic and financial crisis, the new geopolitical trends, such as the resurgence of Russia, the relative decline of US involvement in hotspots around the world, the emergence of centers of power such as China or India, or the ISIL military influence in Middle East, needs a new approach and a new understanding of the international relations and power processes.*

***Keywords:** security environment, geopolitical trends, strategic shock, strategic inflection, Crimea.*

1. Dynamics of security environment

The strategic impact caused by certain dynamics in the evolution of international relations, the use of force in promoting the interests of both state and non-state actors opens the door to a disruptive potential that will require an increased interest in early identification of destabilizing conditions and effects; this can lead to their characterization as being strategic shocks.

Because of the changes in the international security environment, the relationship between various dimensions of security has changed. The military dimension of security and the military power for providing security and winning the wars or countering specific types of asymmetric threats is not by itself sufficient. Achieving security depends on addressing simultaneously all dimensions of national security (political, diplomatic, military, economic, social, information, cultural, psychosocial, environmental, etc). We need to make careful analysis from multiple perspectives. The political and diplomatic dimension covers both the relationship between the state and its citizens and the international relations in which the state is involved. The economic dimension is influencing not only the military power, but also the economic component of individual or human security. This level of human security is one related to the social dimension of security: national security is extremely important, but cannot be achieved without the security of individuals. The environmental dimension, which brings new issues under study, includes three aspects that cannot be ignored: the environmental problems caused by war or manmade catastrophe, natural resources whose possession can trigger international disputes and natural disasters.

Therefore, one can argue that achieving security, especially the national security, requires addressing simultaneously all these dimensions, which involves the creation and

implementation of coherent and effective policies, which are subsumed to the process of good governance.

The contemporary security environment is characterized by an extremely high potential for intra-state conflicts determined by conflicting dynamics of the balance of power at regional and global level and at the same degree by the effects of globalization process. We cannot discard also the arising trend of non-state actors and smaller states to influence the overall security at regional level – ex. ISIL and North Korea, and continuous evolution of asymmetric threats.

Another issue is related to failed and fragile states which can and may serve as a safe-haven for terrorist and criminal organizations.

The proliferation processes, in all forms, combined with the technological advance of weaponry, for example the extended use of drones for combat missions or use of CBRN weapons (which may fall into the hand of non-state actors), the employment of new forms of warfare such as hybrid tactics, create conditions to change the traditional battlefield, thus creating more complex security and defence challenges. The potential acquisition and use of chemical, biological, and radiological/nuclear (CBRN) materials and weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and other non-state actors indicates a significant threat to international peace and security system.

Poverty, unemployment, the devastating effects of climate change, resource scarcity, all these are defining factors for future evolutions of the security.

The future battle space will be complex, chaotic, and multidimensional with multiple actors and sophisticated operating systems. The physical engagement will be violent, precise and joint in nature. The traditional joint nature of combat will be supplemented by the cyber engagement, with military actions and activities executed by multinational forces, within an alliance or coalitions, across borders and beyond the national territory where the national interests can be protected early and in advance.

2. The concepts of strategic shock, strategic surprise and strategic inflection

The *strategic shock* can be defined as an event, normally very unlikely or likely to occur at frequency intervals extremely unpredictable and producing major strategic discontinuities in societies' development.¹

The combination given by the existing global situation in geopolitical terms, by globalization in general, or by the movement of persons and the large use of information systems in all areas of social life, is a fertile ground for creating the conditions to achieve strategic shocks.²

The origins and roots of this concept can be traced back to the paper issued by the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, UK, “Strategic Trends. Methodology, Key Findings and Shocks” (March 2003), where can be found a definition for strategic shock. Thus, a shock is “a high impact, low probability event. An example of a shock is: global collapse of financial system undermines confidence in capitalism”. Other sources in which we may find conceptual interpretation of strategic shock can be found in the works of Sam J

¹ For more details see Stan ANTON – “Conceptual insights of strategic shock and strategic surprise”, *Strategic Impact nr. 1/2013*, Center for Defense and Security Strategic Studies, National Defence University Carol I, Bucharest, 2013, p.59.

² *Ibid.* p.60.

Tangredi, “All Possible Wars? Toward a Consensus View of the Future Security Environment, 2001–2025”³, where, in his predictions for the future wars and possible scenarios, he uses a similar concept, naming the events that cannot be fully anticipated „wild cards”. There are also valuable scientific insights on this concept in different works such as: The US OSD Project “Strategic Trends and Shocks”, (2007) or iKnow Project Consortium⁴.

Strategic shocks, with their impact and violent potential, multidisciplinary in nature character, both military and non-military, should require focused attention of the political and military decision makers to use the whole range of capabilities available to a State in order to the respond timely and efficiently to those conditions that can produce such an effect.

The complexity and the scale of the strategic shock process (*see figure 1*) requires adaptation and flexibility, a system of an early warning and specific criteria and indicators which should be used in identification of those conditions (political, economic, military, societal, and physical in nature) which can produce the effect of strategic shock.




Figure no. 1. Strategic shock development process

On the other hand, the *strategic surprise* differs from strategic shock in terms of scale, intensity and probability of an event to occur.

As it can be seen in *figure 2*⁵ the differences lies in the probability of occurrence of the events. Another element which may help us in assessing the differences between shock and surprise is the emotional factor as it was proposed by Helene Lavoix in

³ Sam J. TANGREDI, “All Possible Wars? Toward a Consensus View of the Future Security Environment 2001–2025”, McNair Paper no. 63, Institute for National Strategic Studies, US National Defense University, 2000 apud. Stan ANTON - Conceptual insights of strategic shock and strategic surprise, Strategic Impact nr. 1/2013, Center for Defense and Security Strategic Studies, National Defence University Carol I, Bucharest, 2013, p. 58.

⁴ iKNOW National Studies, European Commission, (Directorate-General for Research and Innovation Directorate B – European Research Area Unit B.5 Social Sciences and Humanities, 2011.

⁵ For more details see Stan ANTON – “Conceptual insights of strategic shock and strategic surprise”, Strategic Impact nr. 1/2013, Center for Defense and Security Strategic Studies, National Defence University Carol I, Bucharest, 2013, p. 64.

Looking out for Future Shock. Combining all these elements we can use a simple equation in determining the shock or the surprise and it may look like this:

$$S = P \times I \times E, \quad (1)^6$$

where S signifies the category of shock or surprise, P is the probability of an action that can create the conditions necessary to achieve an effect of shock or surprise and I is the impact of the event, and E signifies the emotional factor.




Figure no. 2. Impact – probability relation in determining the shock and surprise


The next concept – *strategic inflection*, is rooted in the ideas of Andrew S. Grove, co-founder of Intel Corporation, presented in his book “Only the Paranoid Survive”. In this book the author defines the *strategic inflection point* as follows: “a *strategic inflection point* is a time in the life of business when its fundamentals are about to change. That change can mean an opportunity to rise to new heights. But it may just as likely signal the beginning of the end.”

From mathematics and differential calculus “the inflexion point is the point where the curve changes the sense of concavity” (Romanian Explanatory Dictionary, DEX, 2009).

Translating into the defence and military strategic thinking this concept we can achieve a new perspective on the developments of strategic choices and better understand the factors which can contribute to transformation and adaptation to new reality conditions.

In figure 3, the strategic choices which may be expressed in policies and strategies are ultimately decisions to adapt to changing situations. If there is a lack of adaptability to change, remaining anchored in the initial paradigm can drive us to a failure, and maybe to a strategic shock.

⁶ *Ibid.*



Adaptation from Andrew S. Grove, Chairman of the Board, Intel Corporation
 San Diego, California, August 9, 1998; <http://www.intel.com/pressroom/archive/speeches/ag080998.htm>

Figure no. 3. Strategic inflection⁷

3. Crimea 2014 - effects and consequences

Year 2014 was a new beginning for Russia. None of the events in the beginning of the year 2014, such as the Winter Olympics in Sochi, does not foreshadow what's to come. Reaffirming the lines of force and the force of its traditional foreign policy packaged in so-called "new foreign policy doctrine" is a proof that geostrategic and geopolitical Russia's revival is not accidental and that its external actions this year are subscribed to a comprehensive plan aiming to promote its strategic interests in a manner similar to historical periods long gone, but with specific accents and conditionality that resides in the current economic development and present global geopolitical games. As Iulian Chifu stated, "the today Russian geopolitics take the shape of old forms of territorial control and close neighborhood in the name of protecting the Russians (...)"⁸

We can say, however, that these measures and actions do not come as a complete surprise. The indicators of this behavior - which are different - from diplomatic factors, military and economic, can be identified from recent historical perspective, for example, Russia's position at the NATO Summit in Bucharest or the war in Georgia, its position on the EU's Eastern Partnership, the one related to the independence of the Serbian province of Kosovo or diplomatic and military action in support of Syria and promotion of an energy policy with "special" partners from EU. The latter, behold, being bound umbilical

⁷ The author wants to express his appreciation to Professor of Strategic Art Harry Tomlin from the US Army War College, for the academic discussions during which new perspectives for understanding strategy and national security, and in particular the issue of strategic inflection, were scrutinized and assessed.

⁸ Iulian Chifu – "The geopolitics of the Extended Black Sea Area after the Ukrainian Crises", *Strategic Impact*, nr. 3/2014, Center for Defense and Security Strategic Studies, National Defence University Carol I, Bucharest, 2014, p. 9.

with their primary source of energy, have a limited strategic freedom of action, favoring directly or indirectly the Russian games aimed primarily on keeping them under its influence, resulting in specific external policy instruments represented by "gas valve" and easy access to energy resources. It was found, however, that Europe is extremely prudent to move from a purely verbal polemic and rhetoric to concrete actions directly undertaken by the main actors of the Union.

Russia's actions must also be analyzed from the perspective of domestic policy objectives and internal context - economic, social and even cultural. The prerequisites of economic development of Russia in the coming years, although optimistic⁹, in accordance with the macroeconomic governmental estimates, will be marked by the effects of the economic sanctions imposed by the Western countries, which have already begun to unfold.

The onset of Russia's actions in the 2014 "campaign" was the intervention in Crimea. What happened is a clear illustration of the policy of *fait accompli*, politico-military and diplomatic actions that are not alien to Russian strategies applied in different historical periods, a good example being Romania. Let us not forget the year 1940 seeing the USSR invasion in Bessarabia, when the military action contributed decisively to the policy of *fait accompli*, or closer, in recent history, and also close to the borders of Romania, the example of Russian forces action in the Balkans, in 11/12 June 1999, occupying by surprise Pristina airport, detrimental to NATO-led multinational forces. The Pristina scenario was repeated in carbon copy with the airports in Crimea, the forces engaged, although without unmarked military affiliation, being especially effective in action, paralyzing *de facto* the Ukrainian army and security forces charged with guarding the airports or naval bases or other military objectives.

The answer of Russia to the fall of the Ukrainian government in February 2014 confirmed the worries of the international community about the high political risk, which actually proved to be valid and demonstrated by the follow on actions of Russia. The events following that fall can also be viewed from another perspective, namely the *renaissance* of the Ukrainian state, with a new political class, westward oriented, stimulating a new development of Ukrainian nation.

Presently, can be assessed that, on short term, is very unlikely that Kremlin is looking forward to achieve new territories or land masses from Ukraine, and this is due to both external and internal challenges. Presumably, majority of Russians will oppose a direct intervention in Ukraine; the effects of the fall of oil prices and the losses of Russian national currency on the financial market are worrisome factors not only for political decision makers, but also for the population. Apart from this a continuation of an *offensive external policy* will trigger more economic and political sanctions from the West, in which case, on short term, the Russian economy will be stranded by limited access to international market and financial resources. The acceptance of Russia as a major actor on future global politics will largely depend on the way in which understands to behave in relations with neighbors and other major global players, such as EU and USA.

The answer of Russia to the economic sanctions of the West, by banning imports from countries of EU, from US, Canada, Australia or Norway, is a good indicator of Russia determination of not intending to cede West's pressure in regard to the issue of the

⁹ For 2015, the federal budget foresees a deficit of 0, 6% from GDP and the Central Bank of Russia is aiming its efforts in targeting the inflation – Oxford Analytica, Country Report: Russia, October 2014.

Ukrainian crisis, although a natural thing to do would be to institute an effective administration in Crimea, and not supporting the separatists in Eastern Ukraine, given that the international community, especially Western countries, not make the Crimean Case an issue on the international agenda. Actually, by adopting such actions, Kremlin seeks to assert its position as a strong and independent international actor, capable of producing economic losses to his opponents. But, it seems that the victory of Russia in Crimea can be turned in an economic defeat. The oil prices fall down abruptly in the past three months, and there are estimations that by the mid 2015 the price per barrel can fall down to 50 dollars per barrel. If such scenario will be confirmed by reality, then Russia will face dramatic economic challenges as its economy is based on massive exports of oil and gas. Consequently, because the price for natural gas is linked with the price for oil, then there will be additional losses to the economy with unpredicted evolutions.

Certain effects Russia wanted to achieve can be identified as follows: countering the expansion of NATO and EU; demonstrate the capacity of maintaining own integration projects in Eurasia; deter the BMD process started by US and NATO in Central and Eastern Europe; maintain control of energy and natural resources routes; maintain stronger bridgeheads at the NATO and EU borders in order to create conditions to project its influence in the region.

The Crimean campaign was so effective that the effects achieved can be compared with the effects of an air campaign, in terms of military effectiveness.

We should also underline the efficiency of the strategic communication campaign¹⁰.

Looking forward into the future, we can say that the days when the military staffs will plan for the first cyber strike, superimposed with a strategic communication operation/campaign, as opposed to the first airstrike from a conventional conflict, are not too far.

Considering the framework for analysis given by the concepts presented above, categorizing the Crimean crisis as strategic shock is a valid assertion as it is based on the analysis of the effects of all nature, especially political ones and military. But, considering the scale, intensity and effects, this event is not conforming to the constituents underlined in the definitions of strategic shocks; it may be more close to reality to see the *Crimean crisis as a strategic surprise* for the international community. From a different perspective, it may constitute only a starting point in a new type of political behavior of a state which is trying to adapt to the effects of globalization. And that means we are witnessing a *strategic inflection period* in the international security environment and international relations system; as *for Russia, the Crimean Case could represent a strategic inflection point* for its international behavior and promotion of its national interests.

¹⁰ Janis Berzins - "Russia's new generation warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian defence policy", Latvia National Defence Academy, Center for Security and Strategic Research, Policy Paper nr. 2, April 2014, p.4.

Conclusions

The strategic shocks are able to generate cascading effects, changing the strategic context, creating conditions for transformation or indeed for collapse of an entity, be it a military organization, state or group of states.

As for the Crimean Case it can be said that the events represented the most important crisis in Europe from 2000 till the present days, followed by the developments from Eastern Ukraine. Major actors like the US, EU or NATO were surprised by the new offensive posture of Russia.

The situation from Eastern Ukraine can be clearly interpreted as a means of diversion, or in military terms a second axis of advance or secondary effort making the international community shifting its attention from Crimea, letting Russia establishing its administration in the peninsula.

The impact of Crimean Case is significant at both regional and global level, Russia looking at securing a strong foothold for the domination of the Black Sea, helping her in maintaining the necessary strategic initiative and freedom of action in projecting its influence at the regional level.

The Crimean Case demonstrated a new way to wage war against a state using a reinterpretation of the 5th column with covert intervention, based on a strong political will, using extremely efficient the influence operations instruments (information operations, psychological operations, strategic communication campaign, cyber warfare techniques a.s.o.). It can be assessed that this is the newest generation of war - the hybrid one, waged so effectively by a state actor. Although it may sound paradoxically, it was a new form of military non-violent intervention as a reaction to the extension of the EU and NATO influence towards Russia.

In terms of international community intervention and rally against such aggressions we should not forget the event that triggered a stronger reaction, and this is the MH 17 flight when an airplane is shot down over Ukraine, grief and outrage rippling the world. Going back to history the July 2014 event actually constituted the same trigger for international intervention as it was the case in the '90s with the two bombardments of the Markale Market from Sarajevo, when mortar shells killed dozens.

As these year dramatic events in the Black Sea Area and North Africa unveils a new way of involvement of both state and non-state actors to achieve their interests and use the power, we have full confirmation that the world is on the brink of a dramatic change. The strategic context of the following decades will be radically changed. The configuration of new centres of power shows not a linear trend in strategic developments but rather non-linear changes and discontinuities in the evolution of societies, interstate relations and overall development of humanity.

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RUSSIA'S STRATEGY IN SUB-SAHARAN SECURITY IN THE WAKE OF THE UKRAINE CRISIS

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Abstract: *Stung by the West's economic sanctions as a result of its role played in triggering and maintaining the present crisis in Ukraine, the Russian Federation is looking for solutions to help maintain its energy dominance of Europe and extend its economic, military, political and diplomatic strength. In this context, Africa's resources, upon which the international economic system depends, are in play. How will the West counteract Russia's increasingly aggressive penetration in Sub-Saharan countries which were traditionally in the West's sphere of influence? How will China react? Are we going to witness an understanding between the BRICS and the West relating to a new division of Africa? Will there be new conflicts?*

Keywords: *Ukrainian Crisis, Trans-Sahara Gas Pipeline, NIGAZ, NDB, AFROCOM, BRICS.*

Motto: *„Gas is a commodity, but it's a special commodity. (...) You get a bit grumpy if you don't have a cup of coffee, but you'll survive. Gas is different.” – Assis Malaquias¹*

Introduction

During September 2014, two new items have exploded in the Nigerian press. Australian negotiator Stephen Davis² has accused people from current President Goodluck Jonathan entourage of funding the terrorist organization Boko Haram³, while Nigerian intelligence sources claimed that Nigerian soldiers are being trained by the Russian Federation and that the Nigerian federal government has decided to buy Russian weaponry as traditional Western allies have failed to fully support Nigeria's against the insurgency of Boko Haram⁴. On the other hand, since August 2014, the alarm was sounded over on the Russian diplomatic and economic offensive in Africa which was intended to secure energy transport networks to Europe and dominate regions rich in strategic resource fields. Stung by the Westerners' economic sanctions as a result of the role played in triggering and maintaining present crisis in Ukraine, the Russian Federation is looking for solutions to help maintain Moscow's energy advantages and preserve its economic, military, political and diplomatic strength. How will the West counteract Russia's increasingly aggressive penetration in Sub-

¹ Dr. Assis Malaquias is Professor and Academic Chair, Defense Economics and Resource Management to the African Center for Strategic Studies, <http://africacenter.org/security/experts/assis-malaquias/>, accessed on 24.09.2014.

² G. Powell, *Australian Stephen Davis risked life in attempt to rescue kidnapped Nigerian girls*, 27.08.2014, ABC NEWS, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-08-27/australian-risks-life-to-rescue-kidnapped-nigerian-girls/5699676>, accessed on 20.09.2014.

³ *Exposing the CBN Boko Haram "sponsor"*, Vanguard, 19.09.2014, <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/09/exposing-cbn-boko-haram-sponsor/>, accessed on 20.09.2014.

⁴ B. Agande, *BOKO HARAM: FG turns to Russia, China as USA, UK fail Nigeria*, Vanguard, 20.09.2014, <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/09/boko-haram-fg-turns-russia-china-usa-uk-fail-nigeria/>, accessed on 20.04.2014.

Saharan countries which were traditionally in the West's sphere of influence? Will China accept BRICS transformation into a vehicle to serve Russia's geopolitical interests? Will the BRICS transform into a new Non Aligned Movement with Russia as a flag bearer? Are we going to witness an understanding between the BRICS and the West relating to a new division of Africa? Will there be new conflicts?

1. A revisionist Russian Federation and African gas stake

The Russian Federation's strategy for reaffirming itself as a great power has been based on two cards that are being played against the West: Europe's energy dependence on Russian gas, and emerging nation diplomatic support in the UN Security Council in matters such as Afghanistan, Iran and North Korea, as well as the international space program or agreements on strategic and conventional weapons.

The Ukrainian crisis has awakened the West to Moscow's true intentions of rebuilding the former Soviet Empire. Even if there weren't already so very clear signals, suffice it to say the Georgian⁵ crisis in 2008, the period of time since the dismantling of the Soviet Union was characterized by Western passivity toward the steps the Kremlin took in order to achieve that reconstruction. Russia was tolerated when she generated and maintained the so-called frozen conflicts in the former Soviet Union, when it infiltrated the internal economic, financial and political affairs of Europe, and when it fractured the common European energy policy with regard to the construction of the Nabucco gas pipeline. NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, emphasized on September 2014 Allied Summit that a revisionist Russia *"has shown that it is willing to use all means, including force, to extend its influence and control over independent sovereign nations in blatant disregard of international law"* which is why we assist to *"a fundamentally new security situation in Europe"* that requires a reshaping of Euro-Atlantic security in the next decade, in other words, the adoption of a new strategic concept. It is obvious that the annexation of the Crimea peninsula and the hybrid war tactics used in Ukraine have shrunk and diluted the soft power tools used by the Russian Federation in the relationship with the West.

What can Russia do in this context? Russia has Europe in an economic vice predicated on European dependence on Russian energy, she stimulates all kinds of disputes within the European Union using extremists, revisionists, and representatives of Euro-skeptic political parties, she promotes her views and interests through obedient media institutions in an effort to divide and rule Europe. How important is the control of alternative energy sources to Europe? In a word, it's vital.

In 2009, right after the Georgian crisis, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visited a number of African countries in a diplomatic tour aimed at rebuilding Moscow's dominance in the region and to accelerate trade in hydrocarbons, rare earth metals (REM), uranium, diamonds, ferrous and non ferrous ores⁶. The diplomatic tour included Nigeria – the largest oil producer in Africa and owner of untapped natural gas deposits, as well as iron ore, coal, uranium and REM; Angola – oil and diamonds producer; Zimbabwe – one of the largest global producers of platinum and diamonds, and Egypt, a former ally and holder of oil, natural gas, uranium and REM ores.

⁵*Presa rusa: criza georgiana a pus punct relatiilor amicale dintre Rusia si SUA*, Infomondo, <http://www.infomondo.ro/presa-rusa-criza-georgiana-a-pus-punct-relatiilor-amicale-dintre-rusia-si-sua-2556.html>, accessed on 21.09.2014.

⁶A. Cohen, *Russia's New Scramble for Africa, Moscow attempts to rebuild its sphere of influence in the African continent*. Wall Street Journal Europe, 02.07.2009, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124639219666775441.html>, accessed on 20.09.2014.

In 2005, Nigerian officials, along with those of Niger and Algeria joined in the New Partnership for African Development Initiatives (NEPAD), started construction of a Trans-Saharan pipeline meant to supply Europe with Nigerian gas. The pipeline, with a length of 4,128 km, was to be built and operated by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, NNPC, and Sonatrach Algerian National Oil Company in order to transport gas from the Nigerian Delta State to the Algerian terminals El Kala and Beni Şaf on the Mediterranean Sea,⁷ and from there, through Trans-Maghreb-Europe, Mediterranean, Medgaz, and Galsi pipelines to the Spanish and European distribution network. Completion date for this project is scheduled for 2015 at a total cost of \$12 billion. Major companies in the energy field like Total SA, Royal Dutch Shell, Eni and GAIL have declared an interest in this huge strategic and business opportunity. In this context, during President Medvedev's visit to Nigeria, an agreement between the Russian and the Nigerian Government was signed creating a joint venture with equal shares held by Gazprom and NNPC. The venture, named NIGAZ, saw the Russians assume responsibility for the construction of the 1,037 km Nigerian segment of the Trans-Saharan pipeline. This agreement represented a real blow to Europe because, again, the Russians can manipulate the gas flow buttons efficiently when geopolitical interests require it.

It appears the artisan of this agreement is Rilwanu Lukman, PhD, a Gazprom International employee since after the period when he was Minister of Petroleum in the Nigerian Government. He is also co-founder of Afren Plc., a Gazprom business partner with whom it shares the responsibilities and the benefits of this agreement⁸. The same Dr. Lukman, who was the Adviser on Strategic Issues and Energy of the President Yar'Adua, seems to have convinced state authorities to sign an agreement facilitating Russian-Nigerian exploitation of uranium ores, Nigeria being the holder of the seven percent of global uranium reserves. On the 4th of June 2012, in Moscow an agreement was signed between the Russian state owned company, Rosatom, and the Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Agency, the NNRA, to construct a nuclear power plant in Nigeria, the second in Africa since the Russians built the Koeberg nuclear plant in the South African Republic in 1984⁹.

On the 19th of September 2014, Nigerian mass media published a statement from the Australian negotiator Dr. Stephen Davis charging that the former Chief of the General Staff of the Nigerian Army Lieutenant General Azubuike Ihejirika, a still un-named high official of the Central Bank of Nigeria CBN, and Ali Modu Sheriff, a former Governor of Borno State (who was also an intimate of the current president, Goodluck Jonathan), are among the sponsors of the terrorist group Boko Haram. Dr Davis' statement is supported by the 1986 Nobel Laureate for literature, Wole Soyinka¹⁰. This very strong accusation concerning the Nigerian Central Bank's involvement in money laundering operations for the benefit of a terrorist organization that threaten the state's stability must be looked at in a broader context. On the 20th of September 2014, the Nigerian press disseminated another very interesting report the source of which was the Nigerian Secret Service. It stated that alleged Nigerian officials have decided to turn to Russian and Chinese expertise to fight Boko Haram after traditional Western allies failed to support the struggle against the insurgency. Consequently, staff belonging to the army, police, state security service SSS, are being trained in counterterrorism in the Russian Federation and, once training is concluded, will constitute the

⁷NNPC: *a pipeline of opportunities*, Pipelines International, Iunie 2010, http://pipelinesinternational.com/news/nnpc_a_pipeline_of_opportunities/041509/, accessed on 11.01.2012.

⁸ Y. Folawiyo, *Nigeria in a lame trans-Saharan gas pipeline deal with Gazprom*, Money Worth, <http://www.moneyworth.com.ng/nigeria-in-a-lame-trans-saharan-gas-pipeline-deal-with-gazprom/>, accessed on 23.09.2014.

⁹ *Rosatom signs international deals*, 04.06.2012, World Nuclear News, http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN_Rosatom_signs_international_deals_0406121.html, accessed on 23.09.2014.

¹⁰*Exposing the CBN Boko Haram "sponsor"*, Vanguard, 19.09.2014, <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/09/exposing-cbn-boko-haram-sponsor/>, accessed on 24.09.2014.

Nigerian Special Forces Brigade. Furthermore, Nigerian officials have decided to purchase heavy weaponry and logistics from Russia charging the West has refused to offer their support in this area as well, according to sources in the Nigerian Secret Service.

Starting in 2009, Boko Haram initiated attacks on representative institutions of state power marking a new stage in its evolution as a terrorist organization from an extremist group with anarchist-type events designed to destabilize and to create anxiety in the target population, to an organization of a political and military type that espouses a political program to set up an Islamic State, to purge Nigeria of all that does not belong to Islamic culture and civilization, and that organizes its actions following rules of military planning. This evolution, coupled with the end of the good relations between Russia and its western partners following the Georgian crisis, plus the current reports about Russian military and logistics expertise provided to the Nigerians as a result of a purported lack of Western support against interest the Boko Haram insurgency begins to gain new dimensions. The situation is more complicated whereas Nigeria is one of the pillars of the West in Sub-Saharan region, is the largest African market with one-quarter of the total population of the Sub-Sahara, and acquires an army listed among the best of the whole Sub-Saharan region and a consistently strong political-diplomatic influence both in the African Union and regional organizations.

Another point of attraction for the Kremlin is Algeria, the third largest supplier of natural gas to Europe after Russia and Norway, and the second natural largest gas producer on the African continent. Assis Malaquias, expert in economic defense at Africa Center for Strategic Studies in Washington, D.C., stated that, in 2015, Russia will reach an average of 40% control of the supply of gas in Europe as a result of her penetration in North African gas producer states, and he warned Spain and Italy about the possibility of losing alternative sources of supply from Algeria and Egypt¹¹. Energy dependence on Russia represents a limiting factor on the ability of Europeans to react in sensitive matters such as Ukraine, Syria or in potential further developments in the Republic of Moldavia. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, during 2003-2012 the volume of Algerian government expenditure for the acquisition of Russian weaponry and military equipment has reached 91% of a total of \$54 billion budget and representing 10% of the total Russian military exports¹². This special military cooperation started during the Cold War when the Soviet Union was the first state to recognize Algeria's independence from French domination and continued as Moscow was the main partner in rebuilding the country after the independence war. In 2009, in eastern Algeria, the Algerian-Russian El Assel Project for exploration and production of crude oil and natural gas was initiated with Sonatrach owning 51% of the shares and the remaining 49% belonging to Gazprom International¹³. During February 2014, Gazprom International was officially invited by Sid Ali Betata, president of the National Agency for the Development of Hydrocarbon Resources ALNAFT, to participate in the international tender for the exploration and exploitation of 30 new potential gas deposits plots, representing 19% of Algerian territory¹⁴.

The SAR, a bastion of Western culture in Sub-Saharan Africa, signed an agreement of strategic partnership in nuclear energy with the Russian Federation, in September 2014. The \$ 10 billion agreement provides for the construction by Rosatom of eight nuclear reactors, with a capacity of 9.6 GW by the end of 2030. These new production capacities will compliment

¹¹A. Neuhauser, *With World Watching Ukraine, Russia Makes Energy Moves in Africa*, U.S. News & WORLD REPORT, 25.04.2014, <http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/04/25/with-world-watching-ukraine-russia-makes-energy-moves-in-africa>, accessed on 20.09.2014.

¹²A. Neuhauser, *op. cit.*

¹³*In Algeria, drilling work on the new well begins*, Gazprom International, 18.06.2014, <http://www.zargaz.ru/en/news-media/articles/algeria-drilling-work-new-well-begins>, accessed on 20.09.2014.

¹⁴*Visit of Gazprom International Head to Algeria*, Gazprom International, 07.02.2014, <http://www.zargaz.ru/en/news-media/articles/visit-gazprom-international-head-algeria>, accessed on 21.04.2014.

two other nuclear reactors already in operation at the nuclear power station at Koeberg accounting for six percent of the total domestic electricity demand of the SAR¹⁵.

Russian interests are not confined to fields of energy or exports of weapons. African deposits of chromium, mercury, manganese, aluminum, REM, copper, zinc, nickel, and the mines for diamonds and platinum are targeted, too. At the present time Russia imports 100% of their domestic consumption of manganese, 80% of their chromium needs and 60% of bauxite, a large part of the latter from Guinea. According to the African Development Bank, in 2013, Russian companies invested in Africa around \$ 20 billion in the production of energy, mineral-extracting industries, fishing and agriculture. In 2009, the Coordination Committee on Economic Cooperation with African Countries, AFROCOM¹⁶ was created, as a body which brings together, under the leadership of the president of the Russian state-owned bank Vnesheconombank, various ministries, government agencies, economic agents interested in the African market. This committee collaborates with the Russian Agency for Export Credit and Investment Insurance EXIAR¹⁷ that was created in 2011 with the aim of protecting investors who enter the market from political and military risks. Creating such an agency demonstrates the Kremlin's determination to rebuild its influence and to take control of the Sub-Saharan region.

In this respect, a sample of strategic thinking represents the 2012 Russian governmental decision to delete \$20 billion of historical debt of African states initiated during the period of the USSR and subsequently transferred to the Russian Federation¹⁸. This decision is one of many in 2008, when Moscow canceled another \$16 billion in debt owed by the same countries. In addition, Russia has announced the transfer of \$50 million to the World Bank Foundation for the Poor with the aim of developing regions located in Sub-Saharan Africa, and has granted more than 8,000 places in its own universities for young Africans, of which 4,000 are study grants. Russia has signed agreements with Zambia and Tanzania through which the value of debts canceled will be used for development in those two states. Other similar agreements are to be concluded with Ethiopia, Mozambique and Benin. These states are not altruistically chosen. There are large deposits of REM in Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique, and some countries are located in the immediate vicinity of geostrategic targets, as well as Ethiopia, Tanzania, Benin, Mozambique, the latter additionally holding large deposits of natural gas.

In the first half of 2014, in Moscow, a series of meetings was held between high-ranking Russian officials and their counterparts in Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Eritrea, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sudan and South Sudan¹⁹, countries rich in energy resources and minerals. The purpose of these visits, according to Russian Foreign Minister Serghei Lavrov, was to strengthen bilateral political and economic relations and to develop a strategic partnership which is a part of a more consistent Russian penetration in unstable regions but which are extremely important geopolitically, as well as on the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, northern and central Africa. It should be mentioned that Russia has become a security provider in the Sub-Saharan region with peacekeeping troops under the aegis of the

¹⁵A. Phillips, *South Africa and Russia sign Multi-Billion Rand Nuclear Reactor Deal*, 25.09.2014, <http://www.africanbusinessreview.co.za/technology/1689/South-Africa-and-Russia-Sign-Multi-Billion-Rand-Nuclear-Reactor-Deal>, accessed on 27.09.2014.

¹⁶Vnesheconombank, Bank for Development, AFROCOM, <http://www.vneb.ru/en/strategy/iu/afro/>, accessed on 24.09.2014.

¹⁷P. Fradkov, *EXIAR: Russian Agency for Export Credit and Investment Insurance*, https://www.usrbc.org/pics/File/AM/2011/presentations/Pyotr_Fradkov.pdf, accessed on 24.09.2014.

¹⁸S. Vasilenko, *Russia writes off \$20 billion for African countries*, Pravda.Ru, 19.10.2012, http://english.pravda.ru/russia/economics/19-10-2012/122511-russia_africa-0/, accessed on 23.02.2013.

¹⁹K.K. Klomegah, *Africa: Russia's Investment in Africa - New Challenges and Prospects*, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201408211120.html>, accessed on 21.04.2014.

UN in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan and the South Western Sahara. At the present time, the Russian Federation has more troops in blue helmets in Sub-Saharan Africa than the USA, Great Britain and France together²⁰.

In relation to the African countries Russia benefits from the old connections laid down in the time of Soviet Union, from the tens of thousands of civilian and military specialists trained in Russian schools and universities, from the diplomatic and military support the Soviet Union granted to anti-colonial and Non Aligned movement, from the African economic, military, and political networks that span time to today, as well as by the pragmatism with which African leaders appreciate the existence of a competitor to Chinese, Indian or Western offers. Unlike the Chinese, whose presence in Africa has been visible, the Russians have preferred insidious methods, only now coming to light in all their amplitude, and demonstrating that Western afro-pessimism and the global spaces theory that disassociate Sub-Saharan Africa from political interest have been the biggest strategic mistakes of the past 20 years.

2. Are we witnessing a new partition of Sub-Saharan Africa?

In July 2014, in Fortaleza, Brazil, the 6th Summit of Emerging Powers took place. Ten extremely interesting meeting conclusions have been summarized by Alecsander Yakovenko, Russian Federation Ambassador in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland²¹. Among these, two are the most interesting. The first one is related to the establishment of the New Development Bank, NDB, perceived as a counterbalance of the World Bank. The other one concerns the establishment of the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, a reserve fund to protect against certain financial crises which are likely to undermine the economic development of the emerging powers. NDB headquarters will be based in Shanghai and its main objective will be supporting emerging economies of which are automatically counted the emerging African economies. The philosophy of the BRICS organization, which flows from the decisions compiled by Yakovenko, is the creation of alternative exchange markets which would become a counterbalance to the neo-liberal system and to Bretton Woods-type instruments which have ruled the political and economic-financial world over the last 70 years.

In 2015, Russia will attain the rotating presidency of BRICS. The next BRICS Summit is scheduled for July 2015 in Ufa, capital of the Republic of Bashkortostan. The Russian agenda, according to Yakovenko, will aim to create a strategy of multilateral economic cooperation, a map of cooperation in investments, the creation of associations in the field of energy and energy policies, a fuel bank, cultural cooperation, educational cooperation and a processing center specializing in the metallurgical industry. Professor Georgy Toloraya, department head for Regional Projects of the Russkiy Mir Foundation and chief executive officer CEO of BRICS National Research Committee, said that in the context of current developments in Europe, Russia is obliged to reorient itself and Africa is a priority objective.

If for the People's Republic of China and India, African space is, above all, a source of energy and ores, for Russia things are different. Russia is a leading producer of hydrocarbons and has huge deposits of ferrous and non-ferrous ores. Russia's presence in Africa is more related to the need of maintaining *an energy vise* on the Europeans by control and distribution

²⁰P.J. Pham, *Russia's Return to Africa Two Decades After Pullback, Russia Chases Gas Resources, Minerals and UN Votes*, 13.03.2014, <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/articles/russia-s-return-to-africa>, accessed on 23.09.2014.

²¹A. Yakovenko, *10 major outcomes of BRICS Summit*, 21.07.2014, <http://rt.com/op-edge/174344-ten-outcomes-brics-summit/>, accessed on 24.09.2014.

of hydrocarbons, of blocking access by competitors to African resources so as to hold diplomatic advantage which may be used in Ukraine type situations. The subject of the rebuilding of the former Soviet empire is more than just the annexation of ex-Soviet republics but rather the restoration of the Russian sphere of influence. The USSR was a major player in Africa and hidden supporter of the Non Aligned Movement. We have already seen Moscow's strong orientation toward Africa. Are the BRICS going to be the new Non Aligned Movement? Will the BRICS become a Russian tool for a new partition of Sub-Saharan Africa to Moscow's benefit? The answers are found in Beijing.

In 2013, at the Durban, South Africa, Summit, the BRICS decided to create NDB. The negotiations which have occurred since that date have been related to the percentages that each country would hold as shareholders in the new financial institutions. In September 2013, at the BRICS meeting held in St. Petersburg, Russia, China declared its readiness to allocate \$41 billion and to host the central headquarters of NDB, while the rest of the \$100 billion agreed to for NDB would be shared among the remaining participants, specifically, South Africa depositing \$5 billion, while the Russian Federation, Brazil and India would contribute \$18 billion each²². China's determination to become the leader of BRICS was made obvious by their proportion of contributions to the fund, despite the dissatisfaction Brazil and India expressed regarding the algorithm used for the NDB shares²³.

What do the Chinese leaders think about the Russian proposal to replace the US Dollar with the Russian Rubble as an international currency, as Russian ambassador Vadim Lukov proposed²⁴? They are certainly not very excited at such a prospect. Tensions within the BRICS are just at the beginning. China is undeniable the leader of the organization, with major interests in Sub-Saharan Africa which extend from hydrocarbon resources, uranium and REM, to diamond mines and agricultural land, up to the *Lebensraum* required by a population on the rise. Russia has become a competitor of China in the Sub-Saharan region and a contextual partner in the process of China's success as a superpower. Will China want to share its sphere of influence with another player? It's hard to believe it would. For now, China assumes the role of the "*wise old man who stands beside the river and waits*", the old concept, *Wu Wei*, the vigilant waiting. The Beijing leaders know that Moscow is clamped in a vice between Putin's boundless ambitions and geostrategic reality. Russia desperately needs China as an ally in coping with the West. Conversely, China has no need for Russia other than for its energy resources and minerals ores as well as for its extremely thinly populated Siberian taiga. Rather, China needs Western European markets to maintain its annual eight percent economic growth rate in order to reduce the population percentage that lives below the poverty level in the center part of the country. As recently as seven years ago some 800 million of that nation's total of 1.3 billion lived in poverty. Undoubtedly, China is the winner in the current Ukrainian crisis, because it will be able to put an assortment of questions on the table, with little effort, such as the status of Taiwan, the question of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, space exploration, as well as other international trade and customs matters.

The current Russian offensive in Africa is a two-edged sword for Moscow. On the one side there is the rebuilding of the super-power image of the Russian state, while on the other side that charge collides with the interests of three partners of BRICS, i.e. China, India and

²²R.M. Desai, J.R. Vreeland, *What the new bank of BRICS is all about*, The Washington Post, 17.07.2014, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/07/17/what-the-new-bank-of-brics-is-all-about/>, accessed on 24.09.2014.

²³L. Kelly, A. Soto, *BRICS may decide on \$100 billion fund early 2014 – Russia*, Reuters, 12.10.2013, <http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/10/11/g20-brics-fund-idINL6N0I13N720131011>, accessed on 24.09.2014.

²⁴O. Samofalova, *BRICS Countries to set up their own IMF, Russia beyond the Headlines*, 14.04.2014, http://rbth.com/business/2014/04/14/brics_countries_to_set_up_their_own_imf_35891.html, accessed on 24.09.2014.

the SAR. Within a few short years we will see how much cohesion remain among BRICS members.

On the other hand, in 2000, the Clinton Administration laid the foundations of a mechanism for the integration of the African market in the global economy called AGOA - Africa Growth and Opportunity Act²⁵, which is in fact a commercial agreement between the United States of America and 40 African states. The objectives of this agreement are to encourage trade between the parties by granting "*free access to the US market of products coming from these states, access to credit and to American free technical expertise and (to) encourage reforms and efforts for development*". This decision was followed by the building, in effect from the 1st of October 2008, of the United States Africa Command USAFRICOM, „one of six of the U.S. Defense Department's geographic combatant commands, responsible to the Secretary of Defense for military relations with African nations, the African Union, and African regional security organizations"²⁶. In June 2012, the Obama administration published the US strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa²⁷. In this document it is stated that "*Africa is more important than ever to the security and prosperity of the international community, and to the United States in particular,*" and that "*the United States will not stand idly by when actors threaten legitimately elected governments or manipulate the fairness and integrity of the democratic processes, and we will stand in steady partnership with those who are committed to the principles of equality, justice, and the rule of law*".

In 2013, USA president Barack Obama has made an official visit to Senegal, South Africa, and Tanzania where he announced the decision of some American companies to invest \$ 7 billion into African electrification networks and agriculture. Are these measures sufficient? It is obviously not. Clearly, the last 25 post-Cold War years of diminished interest on Sub-Saharan Africa by American administrations gave free way to China and Russia. Obviously, American administrations' weak reactions have allowed increasing Russian influence in Europe and increasing energy dependence of the European Union on Russian gas. Maybe reconsideration of restrictions on the export of American gas to Europe and, recognition of the Sub-Saharan Africa as an area of utmost importance to the *status quo*, as well a new strategy to Africa, would reverse America and the West's declining role in Africa.

Are there going to be new conflicts in the near future in the Sub-Saharan region? It might be possible. The spectrum of unified terrorist organizations operating in Africa in conjunction with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant ISIL can be very real. Would the great African players as China, Russian Federation and the USA be able to restrain conflicts after the pattern of those in during the Cold War? Yes, but not in the very near future, whereas the Ukrainian and the Syrian conflicts are limiting their options. It is most likely that, in the near future, Sub-Saharan Africa will become the subject of soft power tools only.

Conclusions

Sub-Saharan Africa is the global space which can ensure the rebuilding of revanchist Russia's sphere of influence and super-power image lost after the dismemberment of the USSR. Aware of Georgia and Ukraine's desire to escape her sphere of influence, the Russian Federation has prepared herself for the time when relations with the West will once again freeze into a Cold War. Since 2008, immediately after the conclusion of the Georgian crisis,

²⁵ *About the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)*, The Foundation for Democracy in Africa, http://www.democracy-africa.org/AGOA_Civil_Society_Network.html, accessed on 24.09.2014.

²⁶ *About the Command*, United States Africa Command, <http://www.africom.mil/about-the-command>, accessed on 24.09.2014.

²⁷ *U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa*, June 14 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/africa_strategy_2.pdf, accessed on 12.10.2014.

Russia has sought to make the EU increasingly dependent upon Moscow's gas and pipeline system. Control of the Trans-Saharan gas pipeline is such a tactic, as well as Russian dominance of the Algerian gas fields. The consistent and determined strategy toward reestablishment of traditional Russian spheres of influence aims, additionally, to an increase in the number of favorable African votes in the UN General Assembly for Russian positions and to extend control over as many African resources as possible.

To achieve these goals the Russian are employing a wide range of hybrid type tools. Recent news which has burst out in the Nigerian press regarding the financing of the terrorist organization Boko Haram by president Jonathan's intimates, and of the Nigerian government's decision to ask for Russian military expertise in counter terrorism due to a lack of Western support, even indirectly links to Russia. On the other hand, Russia wants to become the BRICS leader and to make use of that organization as a platform of its re-affirmation as a great power. But, the distance between aims and geostrategic reality is very great, indeed, over which both China and the USA both present many obstacles. Furthermore, the Ukrainian crisis and the cooling of the relations between the West and the Russian Federation will have echoes both in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as in the Taiwan and Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disagreements. Possible African developments, in the wake of the Ukrainian and Syrian crises, could vary from the broadened use of soft power tools, to major instabilities generated by an alliance of terrorist organizations Boko Haram and Al Shabab to ISIL, as well as the possibility of new bipolar-type conflicts in the medium and long term.

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THE IMPACT OF UKRAINE CRISIS ON CHINA'S POSITION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

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Abstract: *This study underlines the importance of states in the process of power reconfiguration on global arena which is inexorably connected to the impact of Ukraine crises. I intend to analyze China's relations with Russia, taking into consideration the strategic benefits China can acquire. Firstly, I will introduce the definition of "power", a major topic of international relations theory. The second chapter is focused on the emergence of China, as a major global actor. Given its increasing international influence, China's military modernization is focused on a complex program. I will debate the ascendant dynamics of China and we will present the consequences in terms of the strategic and military dependence. I will point out some negative aspects, including chances for investments in Crimea. In conclusion, I intend to present a key hypothesis focused on the way in which China can use the crisis in Ukraine for its long-term strategic goals.*

Keywords: *Ukraine crisis, China, Russia, balance of power, military modernization.*

Introduction

The purpose of this article is to highlight the fact that the entire world has been divided, not only from the perspective of the official declarations, but also concerning the major strategies dictated by every state's interests. This study underlines the importance of states in the process of power reconfiguration all over the world. I will analyze China's relations with Russia due to the Ukrainian crisis that had provided a proper base for unexpected changes.

We will take into consideration the fact that China can acquire an enormous and strategic benefit. Even if China does not represent a direct player in this game, it appears to exert a direct influence on the geopolitical pattern. So, the China factor became the main piece in this complex puzzle. China's rise is indisputably due to the more constructive role of the security system and advancing military technologies. The current geopolitical situation determined an entire process that describes the ascendant dynamics of China. On the other hand, sanctions against energy companies in Russia augment cooperation with China. Scenarios include new economic and trade cooperation agreements and transport routes for energy imports or natural resources.

For the beginning, it's essential to understand the concept of Ukraine crisis. People from all over the world have different ways they approach this subject. As we know, Ukraine was included in the Soviet Union until 1991. It is defined as „a less-than-perfect democracy with a very weak economy”¹.

The Crimean crisis is an international crisis, involving Russia and Ukraine over the control of the Crimean Peninsula. The effects are considerable, due to the fact that Russian

¹ *What is the Ukraine crisis?*, available online at: <http://www.vox.com/cards/ukraine-everything-you-need-to-know/what-is-the-ukraine-crisis>, accessed on 9 September 2014.

gas exports to Europe and Ukraine may become disrupted by the conflict. Also, the prices of products will rise, without any doubt.

“Beijing has struck an ambivalent posture regarding the Ukrainian crisis and the severing of Crimea, but it is not hurting China’s interests”².

1. Power

The definition of power is one of the most controversial subjects of international relations theory interrogation.

According to Henry Kissinger, power is defined as the ability of an entity to impose its will on others, or to resist this pressure. On the other hand, Walter Jones emphasizes the ability of an international actor to use their resources both tangible and intangible. Walter Jones describes the concept of power and finds a direct correlation between the position of the nation state and fundamental nature of powerful states represented by resources.

The fight for power has become the currency in international politics, being used as a means of obtaining a state autonomy.

International relations aimed at an assessment of the balance of power and politics of power, emanating from military means, economic capacity and geopolitical considerations.

The truths about political science with internal and external application are truths about power, about its manifestations, limits, implications and laws.

International relations belong to political science, due to the fact that the nation is the most relevant political reality. The study deals with international relations in general, the political relations between nations, which imply the existence of diplomacy, the struggle for power and war.

In the past, the battle for power and resources was mainly territorial. Nowadays, International Relations have been developed a new perspective of military and diplomatic confrontation between the great powers.

As Marcel Proust says “The life of a nation merely repeats, on a larger scale, the life of their component cells, and he who is incapable of understanding the mystery, the reaction, the laws that determine the movement of the individual, can never hope to say anything worth listening to about the struggles of nations”³.

Balance of power is declared as an instrument of International Relations which seek stability and peace, rather than conflicts and their extension. In fact, the accepted purpose of the balance of power as an instrument of international relations was to prevent a single power from dominating all others.

From a principle of international relations theory, the principle of power balance becomes a permanent institution of international relations on which all major powers of system is consenting. This fact radically changed the regulatory principle of international relations, from the policy of power to the policy of cooperation.

Already there are many worldwide rising powers both from military and economically perspective. Such major power in ascension is China whose economic growth (has exceeded her two decades in the American) has a growing military arsenal, which culminates with a program for nuclear weapons construction.

Thus, we can say that the major power is a state whose interests are essentially global and at the same time is a state that possesses military capacities required to achieve those

² Douglas H. Paal, *How Does the Ukraine Crisis Impact China?*, March 24, 2014, available online at: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/03/24/how-does-ukraine-crisis-impact-china>, accessed on 4 September 2014.

³ Marcel Proust, *Finding Time Again*, note 395, at 79.

goals even by force, anywhere in the world. Furthermore, they usually occur after a war against other major powers from coming out victorious.

2. Military capacity

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the role of military power in the international arena, according to the global and actual context.

The military capacity can be one of the most important elements in terms of supremacy. War implies a huge quantity of resources, energy and technology. The ability to convert the resources into military capacity is vital for survival in this area.

“The current world situation once again focuses the international community’s attention on the role of military power, due in part to the absolute and relative dominance of the world’s superpowers”⁴.

Scientist David Chapman claims that “War is profitable. Annually, the world spends an estimated \$1.7 trillion on military expenditures”⁵. Nowadays, the battle for supremacy is based on regional competition, military capacity and global cooperation.

Beside the discussions about general concepts, major events substantially influence state’s trajectory and future alliances.

In fact, China can gather a strategic benefit from any possible outcome of the Ukraine crisis. “Weakening Russia and applying sanctions would put China in a uniquely influential situation – rich, with veto rights at the UN, and accustomed to benefiting from sanction regimes to which it does not subscribe [...] Beijing does not need to pick a winner or a loser, because it stands to benefit whoever comes out on top”⁶. The Eurasian geopolitical pattern continues to be shaped by the inevitable influence that has been exerted since the crisis erupted.

“China is not a direct player in the Ukraine’s crisis, but it has special relations with the United States, Europe and Russia, and important interests in Ukraine, such as its economic, trade and military cooperation with Kiev”⁷.

”Having acquired Russia as a safe strategic rear area, as well as privileged access to its vast energy and minerals base and advanced military technologies, China would feel far more confident in its rivalry with the United States for primacy in the Asia-Pacific”⁸.

The recent conflicts are evidences that using „military power as an instrument of political purpose remains as relevant today as in the past. [...]”⁹. So, military power will

⁴ John F. Troxell, *Military Power and the Use of Force*, The US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume I, June 2012, available online at: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=119508>, accessed on 25 August 2014.

⁵ A World at War! What Does it Mean Today? Technical scoop chart of the week 21 August 2014, available online at: <http://news.goldseek.com/GoldSeek/1408644156.php>, accessed on 23 August 2014

⁶ *Ukraine: the silver lining for China*, 11 March 2014, available online at: http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_ukraine_the_silver_lining_for_china, accessed on 28 March 2014.

⁷ Relations not alliance of convenience, 20 August 2014, available online at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2014-08/20/content_18451037.htm, accessed on 2 September 2014.

⁸ ”Ukraine: And the Winner Is . . . China”, available online at: <http://www.fpri.org/articles/2014/03/ukraine-and-winner-china>, accessed on 8 September 2014.

⁹ J. Boone Bartholomees, *U. S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy*, July 2004, available online at: <http://books.google.ro/books?id=VXZbZXiUy8sC&printsec=frontcover&dq=J.+Boone+Bartholomees,+U.+S.+Army+War+College+Guide+to+National+Security+Policy+and+Strategy,&hl=en&sa=X&ei=te0yVMXGE4HnyQPgoDABw&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=J.%20Boone%20Bartholomees%2C%20U.%20S.%20Army%20War%20College%20Guide%20to%20National%20Security%20Policy%20and%20Strategy%2C&f=false>, accessed on 12 August, 2014.

continue to play a crucial role in international politics, considering advanced military technologies.

The emergence of China as global military power is determined by a series of tangible evidences, including an obvious upgrade of military capacity.

“Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China for 2014” report analyses China’s military expenditures in order to maintain the statute of global power.

“The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to pursue a long-term, comprehensive military modernization program designed to improve the capacity of its armed forces to fight and win short-duration, high-intensity regional contingencies. [...] As China’s interests, capabilities, and international influence had grown, its military modernization program has also become increasingly focused on military investments for a range of missions beyond China’s coast, including sea lane security, counter piracy, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR)”¹⁰.

Leaders of China consider this situation as offering an opportunity to focus on sustaining a strong external environment for strategic space, in order to prioritize economic development. “At the same time, Chinese leaders express a desire to maintain peace and stability along their country’s periphery; expand their diplomatic influence to facilitate access to markets, capital, and resources; and avoid direct confrontation with the United States and other countries”¹¹.

But this strategy can be dangerous. As Robert Art pointed out: “Using military power correctly does not ensure that a state will protect all of its interests, but using it incorrectly would put a great burden on these other instruments and could make it impossible for a state to achieve its goals. Decisions about whether and how to use military power may therefore be the most fateful a state makes”¹².

Of course, “War is merely the continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means”¹³.

Kenneth Waltz describes the problem and he quoted: „In politics force is said to be the last ratio. In international politics force serves, not only as the last ratio, but indeed as the first and constant one”¹⁴.

In my opinion, military power must be integrated with other economic, diplomatic, and informational elements.

According to Morgenthau “The quality of diplomacy is the most important element of state power. The leadership of foreign policy consist in its diplomacy which is based on military strategy and tactics in war. It is the art of combining different elements of national power to achieve the maximum effect on those matters of international relations affecting more than national interest. We could say that diplomacy is the brain of national power, as is moral the soul”¹⁵.

The perception of power balance shifting between United States, Russia and China is likely to happen.

¹⁰ *Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China for 2014*, available online at: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf, accessed on 18 August 2014.

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

¹² Robert JArt, *The Fungibility of Force*, available online at: http://books.google.ro/books?id=o61wPsoCDeK&pg=PA3&lpg=PA3&dq=Robert+JArt,+The+Fungibility+of+Force&source=bl&ots=-PEW6LRcTl&sig=d-3FnudWpk5JL9qchIKHy7Q5asw&hl=en&sa=X&ei=fu8yVL-cHOWAywP3_IIQ&ved=0CCAQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Robert%20JArt%20The%20Fungibility%20of%20Force&f=false, accessed on 1 September 2014.

¹³ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Princeton University Press, June 1, 1989.

¹⁴ Waltz, Kenneth, *Theory of International Politics*, Waveland Press, Long Grove Illinois, 1979.

¹⁵ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 1948.

Publics around the world believe the balance of power between the U.S. and China is turning in favour of China. While the U.S. is still viewed as the dominant economy by most, people are increasingly likely to say China is the world's leading economic power, especially in Europe and America. Many global publics also think China will eventually eclipse the U.S. as the world's leading superpower.¹⁶

There are estimates that include numerous scenarios with an enormous impact on the world economy, involving higher energy costs.

The European economy is clearly the most exposed area of the world economy. "Still, the direct impact on Europe from the tensions in Russia and Ukraine is likely to be rather modest given the limited direct trade links from Russia to Europe. Russia accounts for 4% of total exports in the euro area, whereas the US accounts for above 12% and China's share is around 7%."¹⁷

Belief in China's economic prowess has increased over the past few years along with China's growing economy. Among the 20 countries surveyed in both 2008 and 2013, a median of 20% said China was the world's leading economic power in 2008; that has risen to 34% today. The median percentage naming the U.S. has dropped from 47% to 41%.

"For now, though, China is a peculiar combination of both status quo power and rising power. Internally, China's Communist Party leaders seek to retain the reins of political and economic control in the hands of a select few even as they seek to expand their nation's rich and influence externally as a rising power"¹⁸.

Being in a prominent position and being interested in the potentially military and economic advantages that might gain from domination of vital sea lanes, Beijing appears to be determined to sustain sovereignty over a vast maritime frontier. The operation that will be used is named "salami slicing" tactics, in order to progressively achieve its strategic objectives.

We can identify some reactions from officials concerning this subject. On the other hand, the obvious lack of responses is notable.

According to the journalists of The Guardian: "Given the feeble US response to the crises in Syria, Ukraine, and other geopolitical hot spots, the American security blanket in Asia looks increasingly tattered. China is now testing the credibility of US guarantees, raising the prospect that America's friends and allies – starting with Japan – may have to take more of their security needs into their own hands"¹⁹. This assumption can be contradicted by others sceptics. On the other hand, a relevant element that must be taken into consideration is represented by the sanctions that might be the reason why China's power grows. China has two choices: the first supposition is based on a theory which claims that China is willing to approach with stronger energy partnership. On the other hand, others maintain the contrary: reserved relationships between Russia and China.

Sanctions against Russia appeared to have been examined, but as assumed, "In Ms. Rice's meetings with President Xi and senior Chinese officials, the U.S. administration

¹⁶ *America's Global Image Remains More Positive than China's*, July 18, 2013, available online at: <http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/18/chapter-4-global-balance-of-power/>, accessed on 20 July 2014.

¹⁷ *The Ukrainian Crisis, The Nordic angle*, 12 August 2014, available online at: [http://danskeanalyse.danskebank.dk/abo/ResearchUkrainianCrisis120814/\\$file/Research_UkrainianCrisis_120814.pdf](http://danskeanalyse.danskebank.dk/abo/ResearchUkrainianCrisis120814/$file/Research_UkrainianCrisis_120814.pdf), accessed on 15 August 2014.

¹⁸ Thucydides Trap, Karl Eikenberry, available online at: <http://americanreviewmag.com/stories/Thucydides-Trap>, accessed on 10 September 2014.

¹⁹ *Keeping China's rise peaceful is our biggest geopolitical challenge*, 30 April 2014, available online at: www.theguardian.com/business/2014/apr/30/project-syndicate-china-peaceful-rise-biggest-geopolitical-challenge, accessed on 2 September 2014.

official said there was no sign of China being willing to join Western nations in putting pressure on Russia over the conflict in Ukraine”²⁰.

Officials claim that there are signs of cooperation rather than competition: „Political and economic sanctions, now threatened against Russia by the West, will inevitably push Moscow toward Beijing, increasing the likelihood that the sides will align their policies toward the West”²¹.

Military analysts pointed out how this cooperation can be possible: Scenarios include joint anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-aircraft warfare simulations that will provide the Chinese navy with near wartime cooperation. [...] In addition to the war games, the two nations announced a 30-year, \$400 billion deal for China to purchase Russian natural gas. Another deal announced in Shanghai is for Russia and China to jointly develop Mi-26 heavy lift helicopters and large commercial aircraft. China wants to build 1,000 large-capacity commercial jetliners to compete with Boeing and Airbus. [...] The gas deal between state-run Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corp. calls for China to purchase 68 billion cubic meters of gas a year. [...] Technology cooperation includes a recent \$4 billion deal for Russia’s Sukhoi to supply 100 SSJ100 jet engines, including some to be built in China.[...] Nuclear trade deals include a \$1 billion contract for Rosatom, the nuclear supplier, to provide advanced fuel equipment to Chinese nuclear power stations²².

Space and naval cooperation is also extending, along with concerns that Russia and China will increase military weapons programs.

“We need to innovate our security cooperation [and] establish new regional security cooperation architecture”, “We should have zero tolerance for terrorism, separatism and extremism and should strengthen international cooperation and step up the fight against the ‘three forces’”²³, said President Xi Jinping.

Conclusion

The background of rising tensions also produced negative aspects after the crisis. Indeed, the current situation is defined as “being far from stable and in equilibrium”²⁴. Nevertheless, we can notice some weakness in business domains, reflected in suddenly higher energy costs. The world economy could encounter a “sharp slowdown” and questioning of some investments in Crimea.

The isolated China can perceive this period as a period of opportunity and it can be declared the absolute winner. Relations are brought to a new level. The strategic balance can be significant transformed due to recent events. In the near future, the new order seems to be very different, taking into consideration the outcome of the crisis. Tensions arising have an enormous impact on power balance as we used to know, and a new Cold War is very possible to appear.

²⁰ “U.S. Seeks China’s Backing for Coalition against Islamic State”, The Wall Street Journal, 09.09.2014, available online at: <http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-s-seeks-chinas-backing-for-coalition-against-islamic-state-1410271284>, accessed on 10 September 2014.

²¹ *Ukraine: And the Winner Is . . . China*, available online at: <http://www.fpri.org/articles/2014/03/ukraine-and-winner-china>, accessed on 8 September 2014.

²² Russia Shifts to China After Ukraine Crisis, 22 May, available online at <http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-shifts-to-china-after-ukraine-crisis/>, accessed on 8 September 2014

²³ China calls for new Asian security structure based on group with Russia, Iran that excludes US, 21 May 2014, available online at <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/05/21/china-calls-for-new-asian-security-structure-based-on-group-with-russia-iran/>, accessed on 22 August 2014

²⁴ The Ukrainian Crisis, The Nordic angle 12 August 2014, available online at : [http://danskeanalyse.danskebank.dk/abo/ResearchUkrainianCrisis120814/\\$file/Research_UkrainianCrisis_120814.pdf](http://danskeanalyse.danskebank.dk/abo/ResearchUkrainianCrisis120814/$file/Research_UkrainianCrisis_120814.pdf), accessed on 15 August 2014

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THE EU AND RUSSIA: AN IMPOSSIBLE TWO AS ONE?

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Abstract: *The crisis from Ukraine cannot be characterized as just a national or even an inter-state issue. Rather than that, it is a national event that has international consequences and, here, the Russian Federation and the EU have the top roles in managing the security of the European continent. But, although they speak about cooperation, mutual interests and respect, the Ukrainian crisis has proven that the two powers are part of a heterogeneous system that averts them from reaching a common point of view. Apart from its traditional rationality that is questionable nowadays, Russia is speaking about its right to protect itself from the Western expansion. Additionally, Moscow is speaking about its right to be a great power that has its own influence area and can play by its own rules, something that is incompatible with the EU values.*

Keywords: *the EU, Russia, Putin, regional security, interests.*

Introduction

Since March 2014, the security architecture of the European continent is being under a process of changing. The national situation from Ukraine has gained international attention especially since the Crimean Peninsula has been annexed by Russia¹. From the Russian diplomacy's point of view, Kremlin did not annex Crimea, annexation being a word that is too strong and making too much reference to an imperialistic behaviour. For Putin, officially this was not a revisionist act, but a natural and normal response to a democratic act of freedom like a referendum. Although it was catalogued as an illegal act, that did not leave a real choice to voters, the referendum offered Russia the needed legitimacy to "reunite" the peninsula with Russia under the Russian Federation umbrella and to keep the Russian influence over the Black Sea².

Since then, the situation escalated, the South-Eastern part of Ukraine was shattered by violent acts between the Ukrainian military forces and the pro-Russian rebels, the consequences resulting in thousands of deaths from the both sides. Within this framework of mutual accusations regarding the breach of the international law, a third player emerges, a regional actor with global vocation that has to secure its borders. The European Union, as in the case of the Georgian war, is in a situation in which the member states have to put aside their bilateral relations with Russia and to act as a unitary player in order to succeed in negotiating with it. Although they started as a single voice, at least at the level of the minimum common denominator, the relationship with Russia did not improve and the tensioned situation in Ukraine is far from being towards a predictable and stable track. The

¹ Video: "Putin Announces Crimea Annexation", *New York Times*, March 18, 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/video/world/europe/100000002774438/putin-announces-crimea-annexation.html?action=click&contentCollection=Europe&module=RelatedCoverage®ion=Marginalia&pgtype=article> accessed on April 8, 2014.

²Richard BALMFORTH, "Crimea Vote Doesn't Offer 'No' Option For Joining Russia", *Huffington Post*, March 12, 2014 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/12/crimea-vote-join-russia-ballot-no-option_n_4947557.html accessed on April 9, 2014.

present paper's hypothesis is that, apart from the different interests residing within the European Union, the EU and Russia are parts of different thinking systems, fact that will always represent a red point in their relationship. The present topic is of great importance for Europe since Russia becomes more and more unpredictable in its behaviour and as the months pass, the winter is approaching and the gas card is becoming more and more valuable.

1. The reawakening of Russia

The year of 2000 was a symbolic one from many perspectives, be them the change of the millennium, the religious symbolic ending, etc. For Russia it represented a new starting point in terms of prestige and status at the international level. After several failed attempts during Yeltsin's mandate to reform the Russian economic system, through what was called the "*shock therapy*" the country's quality of live deteriorated. The unemployment rate rose, the political climate was instable due to numerous misunderstandings between the executive and the legislative body of the state³.

The new president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, came to power as a man "from nowhere"⁴ in particular, with little known history and claimed the right to regain Russia's former status, be it a regional power if not a global one. Among the first steps to be taken, Putin ordered the reestablishment of the state's power over the energy recourses or energy companies. Once this domestic task was fulfilled and Gazprom became the largest energy company from Russia in terms of gas, Putin began to implement the external benchmarks. It started by controlling the energy production from the ex-soviet states in order to control their energy exports. This target was achievable given the fact that the critical infrastructure, the pipelines, mainly belonged to Gazprom. Since then, the general practice was to buy gas from those states and to sell it at a higher price to European consumers⁵.

At the level of discourse, during time, the presidential external discourse remained mainly the same as it continued to emphasize the right of Russia to be part of the group of powers that influence the international decision making. This belief was also mentioned in Putin's discourse at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy from 2007: "*Russia is a country with a history that spans more than a thousand years and has practically always used the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy. We are not going to change this tradition today. At the same time, we are well aware of how the world has changed and we have a realistic sense of our own opportunities and potential*"⁶. Therefore, we have a country that is exceptional in itself, comprising two continents, the largest state in the world that is claiming its right to be independent. For Putin the international balance of power should change as it comprised only one superpower that was creating a unipolar world and this order was not suitable for Russia's interest since he did not accept the American supremacy⁷. In his view Russia had the right; therefore it had the legitimacy to conduct a foreign policy that was independent from the one of the sole superpower. Taking this aspect into consideration, by itself this policy was different, if not divergent from the others. Russia declared itself as not

³ Fiona HILL, Clifford G. GADDY. *Mr. Putin Operative in the Kremlin*. Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2013, p. 18.

⁴ *Ibidem*.p. 3.

⁵ Nicklas NORLING, "Gazprom's Monopoly and Nabucco's Potential: Strategic Decisions for Europe", Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, 2007, <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/Silkroadpapers/2007/0711Nabucco.pdf>, p.11, accessed on March 5, 2014.

⁶ Putin's Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 10, 2007, Munich, President of Russia website, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82912type82914type82917type84779_118123.shtml accessed on May 2014.

⁷ Alec RASIZADE, "Putin's mission in the Russian Thermidor", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 41 (2008) 1e25, www.sciencedirect.com, accessed on 10 December 2013, p.17.

being constrained by the unipolar system/power in order to develop a certain behaviour that will fit into a predictable pattern. This aspect was seen one year later when Moscow proved that it must be taken into account by the Western powers especially when conducting politics in its area of interest (Eastern Europe-the Georgian war from August 2008). For Putin this was the potential that Russia had.

In terms of opportunities, the energy card was also used more and more often especially in what regards Ukraine, as we all can recall the 2006 or 2009 Ukrainian gas crisis that affected also the main consumer, the EU member states. This “*energy diplomacy*”⁸ proved to be effective in various ways. Firstly it increased the state’s incomes, as Russia became a major energy exporter especially to the European markets where the demand increased over the years. This aspect had a negative outcome also, since the Russian GDP soon became dependent on the energy export (“*The non-oil current account deficit reached a record 13 percent of GDP in 2011, underlying the oil dependence of Russia’s export sector*”⁹). Secondly, Russia created through its energy resources an imbalanced relation with the EU, its largest consumer. This dependency was exacerbated by both the political use of these energy resources and by a non-unitary approach of the EU member states vis-à-vis Russia. This breach was created through a traditional realist approach, the “*divide et impera strategy*”¹⁰.

Therefore, Russia is not just the largest country in the world. In order to understand Moscow’s behaviour we must look through Russian lens and not through the traditional accepted Western ones. In this sense, I would cite Emile Durkheim “*As long as there are States, so there will be national pride, and nothing can be more warranted*”¹¹.

2. The EU and the Russian Federation: a sustainable bilateral relationship?

The negotiations between the EU and Russia did not start with Putin coming into power. We can recall the Agreement from December 1989 between the European Communities and the Soviet Republics on Trade and Commercial and Economic Cooperation. Additionally, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) signed between the EU and the Russian Federation from 1997 searched to set the base for the minimum common denominator, this being the first stipulated objective of the agreement: “*The objectives of this Partnership are: to provide an appropriate framework for the political dialogue between the Parties allowing the development of close relations between them in this field*”¹². The agreement foresaw the development of four areas of cooperation (rule of law, an economic common space; a social common space, cooperation regarding the stability and security of Europe)¹³. Although the objectives of the agreement were encouraging, they were difficult to be accomplished, since it was seen as the first step in trying to create a mutual advantageous bilateral relationship between Moscow and the EU. They were part of different systems, as

⁸ Ibidem.p.18.

⁹The World Bank in Russia, Russian Economic Report- Moderating Risks, Bolstering Growth, No 27, Spring 2012, <http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/rer-27-march2012-eng.pdf>, accessed on August 2,2014,p.2.

¹⁰ Stefano GUZZINI. *Realism si relatii internationale: povestea fara sfirsit a unei morti anuntate: realismul in relatiile internationale si in economia politica internationala*. Iasi ; Institutul European, 2000.p.68.

¹¹ Emile DURKHEIM, *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, Routledge, London, 1992, p. 75.

¹² The Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between European Communities and their Member States and the Russian Federation, 1997, http://www.russianmission.eu/userfiles/file/partnership_and_cooperation_agreement_1997_english.pdf accessed on July 15, 2014 p.7.

¹³ Amelia HADFIELD, *EU–Russia Energy Relations: Aggregation and Aggravation*, Journal of Contemporary European Studies Vol. 16, No. 2, 231–248, August 2008, <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a902117795~db=all~jumptype=rss> ,accessed on May 5, 2014, p. 231.

the EU member states were consolidated democracies and Russia was recovering from the disbandment of USSR through the “shock therapy”¹⁴. Therefore the parties were more in a search for mutual interests and common perception regarding the security of Europe.

The Common Strategy is an agreement pertaining to the EU regarding Russia. It was signed in 1999 and it encompassed the EU’s desiderate for Russia to adhere to the World Trade Organization, but also the PCA’s provisions regarding the development of a free trade zone between the two parties. The aforementioned references make direct mention to the Russian energy resources that had transcended their economic use for political purposes¹⁵. At the opposite pole, for Europe, the energy is mainly an economic instrument that should establish an interdependent link between the consumer and the producer.

Russia’s response to the Common Strategy is the Russia’s Middle Term Strategy towards the EU 2000–2010. For it the perception of interdependence is not the most suitable one. Gas and oil are the most available tools through which it can regain its international prestige. Additionally, if we put this view in the context of Putin’s discourse about Moscow’s right to develop an independent policy as it is a unique state that encompasses two continents, Russia will not accept by will the development of an interdependent relationship. Therefore, the repeated need for independence is a leitmotiv in Putin’s discourses and it is understood as Russia’s trying to regain its prestige by not accepting the Western way of seeing the world. Instead it proposes a traditionalistic, realist way of conducting politics, choosing to balance rather than bandwagon. Russia does not perceive itself as a Western’s partner that needs to be helped or thought by the West, rather than that it perceives itself as an equal partner that must be respected and followed by others¹⁶.

Returning to the official documents, soon the European Neighbourhood Policy was released (2004)¹⁷ and offered another dimension of the enlargement strategy due to: an EU fatigue, geographical impediments and the lack of desire of several states to become EU member states. But a too general and unitary approach to all ENP member states lead to a lack of efficiency that proved the policy to be relatively failure in establishing a more secure Europe (see the Ukrainian crisis, the Middle East fragile stability, etc). Given the fact that the program adopted a top- down approach according to which the EU was the normative power that influenced its partners through its soft power, Russia did not accept to be part of the ENP states.

In 2009, after the Georgian war (episode that changed the European balance of power), the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was established. It encompassed: Ukraine, Moldova, Georgian, Belarus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Given the repeatedly discourse regarding its right to be a regional power, its numerous proves that it behaves by the realist and neo-realist perspectives, Russia saw the EaP as a competitor to its power especially in its region of influence fact that erupted with the Ukrainian crisis.

Although the EU member states imposed several sanctions, from the ones against individuals (March 2014)¹⁸ to the ones against economic sectors (September 2014)¹⁹, the EU

¹⁴ Fiona HILL, Clifford G. GADDY. *Mr. Putin Operative in the Kremlin*. Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2013, p.18.

¹⁵ Amelia HADFIELD, *EU–Russia Energy Relations: Aggregation and Aggravation*, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* Vol. 16, No. 2, 231–248, August 2008, <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a902117795~db=all~jumptype=rss>, accessed on May 5, 2014, pp.234-235.

¹⁶ European Commission’s Delegation to Russia (n.d.) *Russia’s Middle Term Strategy towards the EU 2000–2010*.: http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p_245.htm accessed on November 5, 2013.

¹⁷ “European Neighbourhood Policy, Strategy Paper”, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 12.5.2004, COM(2004) 373 final, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52004DC0373&from=EN> accessed on March 3, 2013, p.4.

¹⁸ “Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine”, Official

is still incapable in stopping what is called an unacceptable behaviour. But at the same time, the EU and NATO representatives must stop and look at their own behaviour and see that “*the EU’s expansion eastward and the West’s backing of the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine -- beginning with the Orange Revolution in 2004 -- were critical elements, too. Since the mid-1990s, Russian leaders have adamantly opposed NATO enlargement, and in recent years, they have made it clear that they would not stand by while their strategically important neighbor turned into a Western bastion*”²⁰. Therefore, maybe the unexpended was predictable.

Conclusions

All these mutual accusations and the prolonged crisis from Ukraine represent not only a state that is to be blamed, as both the EU and Russia share their part of responsibility. The two regional parties seem to be frozen in the same pattern/discourse that is developing for years.

From my point of view, in order to develop a mutual beneficial and trustfully relationship between Moscow and Brussels, they first must acknowledge that they are heterogeneous players and respect each other. Their perception about interests, rules, international system are different. They must stop asking questions about common interests and start understanding (not necessarily accepting) the other’s interests. 15 years later the words of Javier Solana is still valid: “*developing the Partnership with Russia is the most important, the most urgent and the most challenging task that the European Union (EU) faces at the beginning of the 21st Century*”²¹.

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Journal of the European Union, March 17, 2014, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2014:078:0006:0015:EN:PDF> accessed on April 9, 2014

¹⁹“Council Regulation (EU) No 959/2014 of 8 September 2014 amending Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine” and “Council Regulation (EU) No 960/2014 of 8 September 2014 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine”, Official Journal of the European Union, September 12, 2014, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2014:271:FULL&from=EN> accessed on September 20, 2014.

²⁰ John J. MEARSHEIMER, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault- The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2014 issue, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-ukraine-crisis-is-the-west-fault?cid=nlc-foreign_affairs_this_week-090414-why_the_ukraine_crisis_is_the_5-090414&sp_mid=46900441&sp_rid=YW5hbWFyaWEuZ2hpbWlzQHlhaG9vLmNvbQS2 accessed on September 11, 2014.

²¹Speech by the High Representative designate of the European Union For Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier SOLANA “ The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership”, Stockholm, Wednesday, 13 October 1999 http://www.consilium.eu.int/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/59417.pdf accessed on September 10, 2014, p. 1.

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NEW CHALLENGES TO THE EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND THE FUTURE NATO STRATEGIC POSTURE

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Abstract: *The worldwide geopolitical changes significantly decreased all the concerns which lead to the establishment of NATO. All Western concerns regarding the expansionist politics and methods employed by the ex-Soviet Block vanished with the dismantling of the Soviet Union. The unexpected fall of the Communism generated a significant number of international security arrangements. All these agreements lead to the false idea that the Euro-Atlantic community is no more threatened through conventional means. The possibility that Moscow would reach again its former Soviet glory is widely seen as an utopia. In the present-time political context, Russia has used military means in order to support its geopolitical interests, which induced major effects at regional level. This The newly displayed aggressive Russian posture is likely to change the Euro-Atlantic security paradigm and demands that NATO should again quickly and profoundly transform in order to deal with this newly-displayed Russian attitude.*

Keywords: *geopolitics, expansionism, spheres of influence, security and insecurity, strategy, Euro-Atlantic community etc.*

1. Security paradigms in the aftermath of the Cold War

1.1. The power balance in the aftermath of the war

The disappearance of the Iron Curtain and of the communist systems in Eastern Europe put an end to the so-called Cold War without any pre-negotiations between belligerents, war ending agreements or peace treaties to end officially the war or to set the terms to surrender weapons. As the “Cold War” term was given to a period of time when the two military blocs teased each other without being involved in an armed conflict, similarly the end of this period would be characterized by a lack of a truce which is normally signed at the end of a conflict. Given the fact that the belligerents had not declared war to each other, there was no need for a truce to be signed. The only agreements between the main powers of the two military blocs were those treaties meant to stop a dangerous arming race and the proliferation of some armament systems.

Under those circumstances, we can state that the end of the Cold War has not brought along peace, but on the contrary, the competition between the two main powers continued at a totally new dimension subordinated to globalization.

The fall of the communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union left behind such a state that Eastern Europe countries remained unaligned and with a strong will to switch sides, as the other side was organized in accordance with the capitalist principles. What followed next? More and more former-communist countries which could not afford to remain neutral started to embrace the principles of “Euro-Atlantism” and to show their will to adhere to the very organization that had been considered up to that moment as being the number one counterpart geostrategic ally. The output of this partnership between the Eastern European countries and NATO, as well as the intention to extend the euro Atlantic block, determined

that the border from the Eastern flank of the Alliance to be repositioned towards an area considered more than dangerous by Moscow.

One must also consider the fact that NATO and EU extension eastwards was done in the context of the economic, political and social collapse of the Russian Federation, which inherited the disaster caused by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Even though NATO approached the Russian Federation as a partner in adherence process, Moscow fought constantly the NATO extension. But the Alliance has not accepted the interference nor the pressures came from a third party, and the extension process was the exclusive decision made by the Alliance members and the states involved directly in this process. In this context, the failure registered after 1989 in setting up an even system for the former belligerent powers, in which the Russian Federation to hold a main role in a new world order brought along a decay in which the West proved strong and the Russian Federation weak. Similarly, nowadays Europe is caught in between a resurgent Russian Federation and a “*pax Americana*” in decline, which represents a great difficulty for the Alliance¹.

In order to have an image as realistic as possible of the reaction capabilities of the Alliance as a response to the challenges newly created by the Russian Federation, it is necessary to review the main transformations in the history after 1990 of the two entities and of the pre-conditions which led to the confrontational geopolitics today.

1.2. NATO-Russia relationship

The main concern of the Western European states and their allies in North America (USA and Canada), immediately after 1945, was the politics and the methods used by the Soviet Union in its expansion. The political leaders in the White House thought that the extension of the influence area of the Soviet Union in Europe could be stopped only through the use of power. The formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a European initiative, would constitute the basis for the development of the transatlantic relationships regarding the confrontation with the Russian bloc. Created in order to protect its members by all political and military means in case of an external threat, the Alliance has become the number one enemy of communism and, similarly, a key actor regarding security at world level.

Given the fact that the US was superior to the other states in industrial and military capabilities, at the end of World War II (WWII), the Soviet Union starts to develop its armed forces. Although the Soviet Union maintained more ground troops and air forces than USA, both Alliances reached the climax of power, the NATO armies being equal to the number of troops in the Warsaw Pact. Thus a long and costing arming race started, the Soviet Union being decided to reach number one position from a military point of view².

Before the fall of communism, the Alliance’s policies were focused exclusively on the reactions to the former Warsaw Pact and had as their main goal to counter the communist threat. In time, the conflict between the super-powers worsened, the two parties engaging in a fight for supremacy which embraced the whole confrontational display, less the military engagement, which led to the expression of “Cold War”. The ongoing competition for arming between the two superpowers had effects also on NATO, as the organization is under a steady adjusting process. An analysis of the strategic concepts elaborated at the level of the Alliance even since its inception underscore that up to the 1990s contained the objectives on the basis of which the Alliance had adjusted its policies and capabilities in close connection with the stance and reactions at international level of its main adversary – the Soviet Union. But the

¹ Michael STURMER, *Putin și noua Rusie*, Litera Printing House, Bucharest, 2008, p. 19.

² Cătălin TURLIUC, *Cursa înarmărilor în războiul rece*, LUMINA newspaper, electronic edition as of October 5 2008, posted on <http://ziarullumina.ro/pagina-de-istorie/cursa-inarmarilor-razboiul-rece>, accessed on September 7, 2014.

unannounced end of the Cold War triggered spectacular changes in the European geopolitics, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, and that changed dramatically the security paradigm of the Alliance.

The strategic concept adopted at the summit in Rome in 1991 anticipated the profound change in the Alliance that had to adjust the action principles to the new threats and that meant the establishment of a new cooperation framework, of new relations and concepts and doctrines. The new vision envisioned a totally new approach of the security environment, based on dialogue and cooperation, simultaneously with the keeping of a collective defence potential. The cooperation with the states of the Central and Eastern Europe became a priority for the Alliance's strategy and a series of decisions were intended to change dramatically the military dimension of the Alliance. The Alliance became less dependent on the nuclear weapons and the joint armed forces became more flexible and mobile as well as easy to adjust to various situations and also ready to act in a multinational framework. Moreover, measures were taken as far as the flexibility of the NATO command military structures was concerned; also the arrangements and procedures of the Alliance were adjusted in terms of defence planning but in close connection with the developments of the security environment in Europe and the requirements of the crisis management process and the peacekeeping operations³.

Nevertheless, the security environment evolved rapidly and triggered challenges that the Alliance had to tackle. The threats generated by the local conflicts (the Balkans and Iraq) or the transnational ones (expansion of the religious extremism) generated deep changes of the political and security situation at the global level and the Alliance had to overlook the classical threat that he was initially created for and to perform the main acting role in terms of security at the world level. The NATO's most significant involvement in global crisis settlement was the Afghanistan, a conflict where the goals were reached only after more than 12 years and which are far from being the desired ones and more under the level of the human, material and financial resources.

Within the relation with NATO, Moscow manifested a relative availability as long as its fundamental interests had not been affected. The domains of the Russia-NATO cooperation were subsumed to the struggle against piracy, drugs trafficking and terrorism and last, but not least, to counteracting threats coming from Afghanistan. But the decisions on the enlargement of the Alliance towards East and the deployment of the American anti-missile system in former Soviet states were reasons of concern for Moscow and thus it declared NATO as Russian Federation's main adversary.

Moscow considered that the Alliance infringed the red lines that the leaders of Kremlin wanted to be obeyed in Eastern Europe, the Balkans and Central Asia. The main discontents towards the West's policy averred by Kremlin's leader in 2007, at the Munich Security Conference clarified Moscow's stance in the relations with the United States and NATO. The allegations brought to the West and relating to the fact that the West won a geopolitical advantage in Eastern Europe and in most Central Asia on the grounds of the unilateral exploitation of the difficulties that the heirs of the former Soviet Union had to face or the complete disagreement towards the „expansion” of NATO towards Eastern Europe along with its missile defence system NATO and the attack to the US for its endeavours to become a global power are enough things to prove that Vladimir Putin's speech revealed the reasons why his nowadays overall foreign policy actions are subsumed to the goal of redefying the world and regional security⁴ system.

The West perceived following the Munich moment that in the future Russia could not be considered an invariable any more as Putin's message proved very clearly his intents to

³ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.), posted on <http://www.clr.ro/menu1/istoricnato.htm>, accessed on September 5, 2014

⁴ Michael STURMER, *Putin și noua Rusie*, Litera Publishing House, Bucharest, 2008, p. 21.

make Russia not enter the US's orbit and that he is against the exclusion of Russia from a world dominated by only one superpower.

Later on, in the Military Doctrine elaborated in 2010, the trend to confer NATO with global functions and the development of its military infrastructure near the Russian borders, including by the continuation of the enlargement process, NATO was defined as one of the main foreign perils to the Russia's national security.

1.3. Russian Federation, from the strategic glacis to a new vision on the world order

During the years of the WWII, Moscow's leadership thought and implemented the idea of establishing a protection area (in military terms *strategic glacis*) at the European borders of the Soviet Union⁵. The strategic glacis was done following two stages: 1939–1941 — through cooperation with the Nazi Germany; 1944–1945 — through the progress of the Red Army and the open or tacit agreement or through passivity of the United State and Great Britain towards the actions conducted by the Russians⁶. The situation at the end of the WWII allowed Stalin to establish an extended security belt comprising all states of the Eastern Europe. This belt was maintained through force by the Soviet power up to 1990, when it fell apart at the same time with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

In the post-Cold War era, the Russian Federation began the reconstruction of a country that encountered an economic collapse being torn apart by internal/secessionist conflicts until the political decision-makers decided that it should be a regional incontestable power but with goals to become a world power. That was done first of all as a result of the population support generated by a certain type of culture pertaining to the grandeur of the Eastern Empire.

The Russian Federation as the political successor of the former Soviet Union kept manifesting its intents to be its replacement within the international geopolitical milieu and it also took over the imperialist goals. Thus, the old Soviet concept of strategic *glacis* was replaced by the concept related to the establishment of a buffer zone around the Russian Federation, the so-called the Near Vicinity where Moscow has the right to exert the military power, to maintain military bases, to supply raw materials, to control the ethnic groups and to maintain the primacy of the Russian culture.

Thus, Kremlin's efforts relied gradually on the enhancement of the state as regional power by acting preponderantly in the former Soviet space and denying the influence of the US and the European Union in the states of the Central Asia and South Caucasus as well as in Belarus, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. For this reason, Moscow made use of the energy policy and of the consistent military presence in the area, using as the main tools the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and other regional integrationist projects promoted by Kremlin lately.

At the same time, Moscow tried to increase the integrationist economic projects, to enhance control over the former Soviet states and to implement a Eurasian economic organizational alternative to the EU, taking into account that it held the control leverages over the goods movement in the ex-Soviet area.

Militarily, as a response to the collective defence promoted by NATO and to the increased presence, including by military exercises of the Alliance in the proximity of Russia, Kremlin's leadership decided to upsurge military aviation activities in the proximity of the borders of the Alliance and to conduct ample military exercises. Moreover, it reshaped the Russian strategic military disposition, and forces and capabilities were focused on the Western flank and thus increased the role of the Extended Black Sea Area.

⁵ Dinu C GIURĂSCU, *Apud*, Laurențiu CONSTANTINIU, *Uniunea Sovietică între obsesia Securității și Insecurității*, CORINT Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010, p. 3.

⁶ Laurențiu CONSTANTINIU, *Glacisul Strategic în politica externă a Uniunii Sovietice: geneză și evoluție*, Erasmus Magazine, no. 12/2001, Bucharest, Ars Docendi Publishing House, 2001.

In Kremlin's vision, Moscow's foreign policy guidelines will remain under the imperative of making Russia top independent geopolitical actor whose interests would be taken into account by the US and the other significant world leaders. Moreover, the Russian foreign policy will aim at maintain and enhancing influence in the near vicinity nations, especially by promoting the Eurasian integrationist projects, the Customs Union, respectively (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan) and the Single Economic Space as a counterbalance to the enlargement of the EU towards East. Moscow acts by all the means to determine Ukraine and other former Soviet states with European goals maintain neutrality and develop economic relations with Russia.

2. Geopolitical Connotations of the Ukrainian Crisis

The invitation which President Vladimir Putin conveyed to ex - Soviet states, to adhere to new projects generates profound dilemmas. On one hand, there is a large segment of population that thinks nostalgically at the Soviet Union past, and on the other hand, there are millions of people who wish to be closer to the West and find a new road that removes past flaws of Russian ruling⁷.

This is also the core of the Ukrainian conflict, in which the Kyiv's dilemma to choose between the European Union and Eurasian Union led to high discontent, both inside the country and in Moscow and Bruxelles.

For Ukraine, the European Union is a tempting project but Kyiv cannot ignore and does not wish to make Moscow angry. Moreover, the future Eurasian Union may offer political and economic advantages, through the enormous market represented by its member states⁸.

The Ukrainian crisis started at the end of November 2013, on the ground of KYIV pro-Russian leadership being overthrown and with increase of Ukraine's orientation toward EU and NATO, after the government of Kyiv adopted the decision to reorient its foreign politics toward Moscow's integrationist agenda, detrimental to Ukraine's European path.

Shortly after, Moscow has brutally intervened by conducting actions mainly of military nature that culminated in a first stage with the annexation of Crimea. Subsequently, Moscow has focused on supporting its main political and military objectives of undermining Kyiv's (pro-Western) government and of destabilizing Ukraine's southern and eastern regions. The Russian Federation has gradually increased its military involvement in eastern Ukraine, initially by supporting pro-Russian separatists, and then by conducting direct actions both on Ukrainian territory and from abroad (air reconnaissance, artillery strikes) detrimental to Ukrainian security forces. In short time, the strong involvement of the Russian forces in the eastern Ukraine led to massive losses within the ranks of the Ukrainian security forces and lean the balance toward the separatist forces, with the latter successfully winning in their counteroffensive and taking over control over an important part of Donetsk and Lugansk. The situation created the status for a cease-fire agreement to be concluded between Kyiv representatives and separatists, in terms favourable to Moscow, meaning that another stage of Kremlin's plan has been achieved. With Kyiv accepting the conditions that Moscow imposed regarding the terms of the Agreement, the political objective of the military intervention up to now has been successfully achieved.

But which is the ultimate goal of the leader of Kremlin? Up to which point the Russian offensive may reach and which are the following stages of Russia's policy of force? These are questions that military and political analysts try yet to answer. Moscow continues to surprise

⁷ Ionuț CONSTANTIN, *RUSIA. Paradigma Euroasiatică, între teorie și realități geopolitice*, Top Form Publishing House, București 2014, p. 108.

⁸ *Idem*.

by the way it acts, permanently leaving the impression that the game will go on, and also that it has motifs and resources enough to counter any strategy that the West oppose it.

Unlike the fact that annexation of Crimea was not anticipated before it actually happened (and for which reason I consider it meets all conditions Taleb imposed in order to deem it a „Black Swan”), the scenarios that are currently under sight foresee the possibility that the Russian offensive goes on until taking over southern and south-eastern part of Ukraine, with the potential to create a corridor connecting Tran Dniester. By simultaneously utilizing political, economic and social levers, this scenario may help Moscow to enhance its control over Kyiv and Chisinau, eliminate their pro-Western options, and keeping them within the strategic sphere of influence.

I assess that by its decision to military intervene in Ukraine, President Putin aimed at demonstrating the geostrategic profile of the Russian Federation at the same time with bolstering its public image. But that is not all. After President Yanukovich left the power, the premise has been created for Moscow to be in risk of losing control over the Ukrainian evolutions and, first of all, to lose the privileged geostrategic location in Crimea. The accurate assessment that Kremlin has done over the lack of response from the West regarding fulfilment, mainly by military means, of the Russian Federation objectives, highly contributed to these developments.

On the other side, the way the Russian Federation approached the Ukrainian crisis strongly emphasizes Moscow’s denial of the principles underlying the international relations developments over the last 25 years. By its positioning toward the Ukrainian crisis, the Russian Federation brings major changes in the dynamics of the current security environment, with deep implications over the relations between states, as it constitutes the most important political and military crisis from Europe since the end of the Cold War, and points out to a significant alteration of the power balance within Europe.

The Ukraine’s events and the intervention of the Russian troops in this territory proved once again, after the Russian-Georgian War in August 2008, that despite the challenges which Russia had to face in order to rebuild its status of global power and to reform and modernize its armed forces, Moscow prepared itself to be able to conduct political, diplomatic and security actions in order to make the West understand that it has to abandon its plans to integrate the states from the so-called RUSSIA’s „close neighbourhood”, and has to promote, at the state level, the necessity to develop close relations between EU member states and RUSSIA and, at organizational level, security policies for Eastern Europe, in equal coordination, not only consultation, with Russia. At the same time, by this approach, Kremlin proved it has the political will and means to act if its vital interests are under stake.

It is highly probable that Moscow will further act in an aggressive manner with the aim to project its interests, simultaneously with protecting and strengthening its influence and control over the “close neighbourhood”, considered as traditionally and legitimately component of its influence sphere.

One of the immediate consequences, most important, of the Ukrainian crisis is the change of the security paradigm in the Black Sea, with major implications over the area’s geopolitics in the Extended Zone of Black Sea, area fraught with the pressures of frozen conflicts, likely to destabilize even more the security situation and to induce new risks and threats in the region. At the same time, the Crimea’s annexation drives to an increased Russian capability to project its military power in the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea area, which will probably lead to new serious threats, military type, against the NATO’s Eastern and South-Eastern flank.

3. NATO role in the new security context

The Russian's action in Ukraine brings the Alliance afore a new challenge which has the potential to fundamentally change the NATO's future strategic stance. The amplitude of the military component interfacing the Ukrainian crisis and the force demonstration which Moscow makes increasingly aggressive, on the Eastern and South-Eastern flank of the Alliance, generates major fears, in security terms, mainly within the states located in the near proximity of the Russian area of action. It is for the first time since the end of Cold War when Europe is in jeopardy due to the renewed Russian Army and the assertive politics promoted by Moscow.

Even if the Kremlin's leadership virulently denies its intentions of escalating the security situation from the East of Europe through the Ukraine's invasion and by maintaining its armed forces under a continuous fighting status through so-called complex exercises, with profound challenging character, conducted near the proximity of NATO members states borders, it is doing nothing else but to increase the anxiety level within these states and generate a lot of reactions and countermeasures.

Both at the level of organization's leadership, through the voice of General Secretary, and at the level of members states, the Russian Federation actions were censurable and condemned, with the Alliance disagreeing the Crimea's annexation by RUSSIA and its involvement in Ukraine. Albeit at the crisis beginning there were different approaches of the NATO members states towards the implementation of certain sanctions against Russian Federation, approaches motivated exclusively by economic interests, the decisions enacted during the recent NATO Summit from Wales (Great Britain), proved that the Alliance maintains its unity and all states agreed with the enactment of some measures to countervail the Russian Federation threats.

The Russian aggressive actions in Ukraine fundamentally altered the Alliance vision for entire Europe being, along with the increase of instability in the Southern proximity (Middle East and north of Africa) and the transnational threats, the main concerns of member states⁹.

The requirement to adapt the Alliance to the new realities of the security environment made the allied states to approve a plan (NATO Readiness Action Plan) designated to react to the challenges that Russia pose to them and their strategic implications. This plan includes measures that aim at adapting Alliance's military strategic stance. These measures have been divided into two categories¹⁰:

- *Deterrent measures* which include a permanent naval, air and land presence, and significant military activities at the Eastern zone of the Alliance, both on a rotational basis. These should provide for the basic requirement that is fundamental to assure and deter, and are flexible.

- *Adapting measures* designated to significantly strengthen the reaction capability of the NATO Response Force (NRF), by developing forces able to rapidly deploy and to react against the potential challenges and threats. According to the final Summit Declaration, a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) will be established, as a joint force able to be deployed under a few days' notice to move (NTM) in order to response to potential challenges that occur particularly at NATO borders. This structure will be constituted of a land component which include element from all services (Land, Naval, Air, and Special Forces).

⁹ Wales Summit Declaration, posted on http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm, accessed on 11.09.2014

¹⁰ *Idem*.

With a view to support allies from NATO periphery and within the framework of the collective deterrence and defence measures, the participants at the Summit agreed to establish an adequate command and control presence, and certain elements, which will participate in VJTF, at any moment, on the Eastern allies' territories, with contributions from allies on a rotational basis.

At the same time, the Alliance will militate for maintaining an adequate training status of the allied forces and for building necessary capabilities required to conduct NATO's full spectrum missions, including deterring any aggression against NATO allies and proving the level of training for NATO defence.

Conclusions

Simultaneously with the emergency of the Russia's new geopolitical claims, the international security environment has been suffering substantial changes, fact which calls for a deep and fast transformation from NATO side, in order to promote the most suitable policies needed to deal with the new challenges.

Russia continues to bring major transformations in the dynamics of the current security environment, affecting the relations between the states, which can lead to some significant changes within the ratio forces at European level. Moscow's main geopolitical aims are related to the halt of European aspirations of the countries located in its proximity (Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia), attract and maintain them under Kremlin's sphere of influence and to create a "security buffer zone" between Russia and European and euro-atlantics organizations.

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EUROPE BETWEEN STATE TERRORISM AND INDIVIDUAL TERRORISM. THE SHOOTING DOWN OF PASSENGER AIRCRAFT MH17

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Abstract: *On 17th July, 5pm, the Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 Amsterdam – Kuala Lumpur crashed in Eastern Ukraine, a pro-Russian separatist-controlled territory, 50 km from the border with Russia. Not the numerological temptation is the reason for this analysis, but substantial likelihood that the aircraft was deliberately brought down by rebels, as an action serving the “fight for freedom”, slogan that terrorists like Islamic Jihad and other radical groups often displays.*

Analysts and prestigious commentators, journalists, and politicians from Euro-Atlantic region have qualified this event as a terrorist act, whose responsibility would return to Moscow, the one that provided suitable equipments to bring the plane down, and most likely the capable specialists of such a killing performance.

Whereas these separatist actions, supported by Russia, are qualified by the Ukrainian government as terrorist acts, and are the subject of anti-terrorist operations, the current research aims to analyse this tragedy from the perspective of terrorism practiced by state and non-state actors, in the European context of security.

Keywords: *Terrorism, terrorist acts, state actors, non-state actors, separatists, Putin, Ukraine.*

Introduction: Current definitions of terrorism

The modern terrorist phenomenon knows many definitions, ranging from evolutionary and historical dimension, ascending to substantial, horizontal ultimately reflecting real and factual complexity of the issue. From the perspective of security studies, a working definition, as a guiding reference and relatively neutral doctrine, considers terrorism as “*a tactic used by different groups*”, definition “*that includes major elements*”, among which *essential is the use of violence or violence threatening, by organised groups, to achieve political goals. This violence is aimed at an audience that goes beyond the immediate victims that are usually innocent civilians*¹. In such a context, governments may sometimes be the mediated target of violence or sometimes the promoter of violence (in which case the action is a terrorist act, only if the other actor is not the government itself). It is often stated, that terrorism is the weapon of the weak, dealing with the stronger, the relativity of the terms remaining to be adjusted depending on the context and perspective. (E.g. in the case of the terrorism, promoted by the extremist-religious organisations from the Middle East, against what they call the Judeo-Christian imperialism, the weak one is presented as being the oppressed Palestinian people. In the case of the Stalin’s Great Terror, the governance – that promotes terrorist methods to liquidate the class enemy – is always strong and victorious). The group

¹ Alan Collins (ed. by), *Contemporary Security Studies*, Ch. 16, *Terrorism*, Brenda Lutz and James Lutz, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 292.

feature of the terrorism does not exclude committing of acts of this nature, by isolated individuals, without any connection involving cooperation, although in such situations a special kind of ideological adherence seems to exist almost always.

Often regarded as *a specific method of the national liberation movements*², the terrorist violence is also a form of psychological war, designed to undermine the opposition to a illegitimate political purpose, and to generate fear among large communities by attacking small groups representative for their quality (elite, supporters, activists, etc.) or through their moment situation (passengers of a train or airplane, group of tourists, shoppers in a supermarket, spectator at theatre, students in their university class-rooms, journalists, etc.). Most often, targets are civilians (because they are more vulnerable, and sacrificing them has a greater psychological impact), but also important officials, or members of the internal security forces or military.

The main techniques and terrorist methods are explosions and kidnappings (hostage-taking), attacks, killings, building, aircraft or ships captures, hijacking, ground breaking or destruction of aircraft, religious places of worship, suicide actions, etc.

According to a dictionary definition, in the European political culture, the terrorism term “*politically originates in the French Revolution, in the sense of terror feeling exercised by the state, a phenomenon later known as political terrorism*”³.

According to the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the UN in December 1999, a terrorist act constitutes “*act intended to cause death or serious bodily injuries to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or not to abstain from doing any act*”⁴.

Likewise, the International Convention for Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, explosion, adopted by the UN in 1997, defined the terrorist crime as follows: “*Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally delivers, places, discharges or detonates an explosive or other lethal device in, into or against a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure facility: a) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or b) With the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility or system, where such a destruction results in or is likely to result in major economic loss*”⁵.

Regarded as an instrument of political action, terrorism can be considered a continuation of politics by other means, being a “*practice with long tradition that probably, existed in one form or another, since the time when people were held in communities hierarchical structured*”⁶, and, although the mode of action has evolved “*from the daggers hidden in the Zealots clothes, to the airplane transformation in guided missiles, there is some continuity in the long history of terrorism*”⁷.

² Christian Walter, *Defining Terrorism in National and International Law*, (p.4). “*Există două tipuri de grupări teroriste care utilizează mijloace/metode teroriste pentru a urmări, cel puțin în viziunea lor, o formă specifică de luptă pentru libertate, cel puțin pentru o parte a populației unei țări*” (valabila pentru IRA, ETA, PKK, Hamas, etc) https://www.unodc.org/tldb/bibliography/Biblio_Terr_Def_Walter_2003.pdf.

³ Gerard Chaliand, Arnauld Blin, *Dictionnaire de Strategie Militaire*, PERRIN, 1998, p. 657.

⁴ *Convention on the Suppressions of Financing of Terrorism*, New York, 9 December 1999. Art. 2, para 1.b)

⁵ *International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings*, 1997, Article 2.1.

⁶ David Wright-Neville, *Dictionar de terorism*, Traducere de Sorina Pricop, Editura CA Publishing, 2010, Cluj-Napoca, p.10.

⁷ W. Reich, *Understanding terrorist Behavior: The Limits and Opportunities of Psychological Inquiry*” în ediția *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, State of Mind*, 1998, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, pp. 261-280.

From this perspective, terrorist violence must be understood, not as an aim itself, but a mean to achieve the aim, a way to intimidate, to punish, to humiliate or destroy. In other words, “*terrorist violence can be seen as a form of political theatre, where the violence act and the carnage that it produces, is a scenario carefully directed to communicate a certain message*”⁸.

1. Background of the event

On July 17th, 2014, at 14:15 GMT, while travelling on the flight route from Schiphol Amsterdam Airport (from which took off at 10:15), to Kuala Lumpur Airport, where it was expected to arrive at 22.00, the passenger aircraft Boeing 777-200 ER no. MH17, belonging to the Malaysia Airlines, has disappeared from radar screens at 10,000 m altitude, being in the Ukrainian airspace, at about 50 km from the border with Russian Federation.

According to the international news agencies, the remains of the aircraft that crashed near Grabovo, at 50 km away from the town Donetsk⁹ (on the controlled territory by the pro-Russian separatist militias), were spread across several miles, and the bodies of the 298 victims (of which 15 were crew members and flight attendants, and 283 were passengers, among whom were 80 children), could be seen amid the parts of the wreckage.

Even in the early hours of the tragedy, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko defined this event as being “*a terrorist act*”¹⁰, based on the event nature (the destruction of an aircraft with passengers on board) and the assumption that it was shot down by pro-Russian rebels, labelled as terrorists, being the subject of a legitimate anti-terrorist operation. According to the declarations of the Malaysian Prime Minister – declarations that haven’t been contradicted by any European or national centre for flight control – no emergency call or threatening message were sent on board, from the board of *the plane before it disappeared from the screens monitoring systems, so no alarm signal preceded the breaking down*¹¹.

2. International reactions

Shortly thereafter, controversies have arisen about the possible causes of this tragic event that shocked the international community and brought grieving to the families of the missing. There were discussed two working hypotheses:

1. A crash that could be due to technical problems of the plane, or steering problems, or weather conditions, or simply mischance, on this occasion by reference to the crash occurred in March, with a plane identical to the one in question, of the same company of aviation, the aircraft disappearing from radar while flying from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing.
2. The plane could be shot down, given that flew into an area of the fierce conflict between the pro-Russian separatist (from the self-proclaimed Republic of Donetsk and Luhansk, from Eastern Ukraine) and the Ukrainian authorities aiming to maintaining the territorial integrity of the state and its current borders.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ A Neagu, *Prăbușirea cursei MH17...* 20.07.2014, accessed online: [www.hotnews.ro http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-17712515-prabusirea-cursei-mh17-avion-pasageri-air-india-zbura-25-kilometri-aeronava-malaeziana-deasupra-ucrainei.htm](http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-17712515-prabusirea-cursei-mh17-avion-pasageri-air-india-zbura-25-kilometri-aeronava-malaeziana-deasupra-ucrainei.htm)

¹⁰ *Malaysia Airlines Crash in Ukraine Is Called 'Act of Terror'*, 17 iul. 2014; mashable.com/2014/.../malaysia-airlines-ukraine

¹¹ *MH17 Malaysia plane crash in Ukraine: What we know*- 25 July 2014, site-ul BBC-News, accessed from: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28357880>

Information issued by American officials from the United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence¹², and the Ukrainian authorities, and various recordings of the different specialised governmental bodies, national and international, have cleared in short time the first scenario, remaining to explained how it was possible for a passenger aircraft, with civilian board, citizens of several states that has absolutely no involvement in the conflicts that occurred in the eastern Ukraine, to be shot down voluntarily and deliberately.

From a technical standpoint, the opinions of the vast majority of policy-makers, experts in aviation security, and political-military analysts argue that passenger aircraft MH17 was shot down by a surface-air missile, probably launched by a self-propelled missile type BUK SA-11 (known as "Gadfly" in NATO), from the territory controlled by pro-Russian separatist rebels. However, it was argued, that such advanced equipment, existent in the Soviet air defence arsenal during the Cold War era, could be supplied only by Russia, its usage being dependent also by the presence of the Russian Army experts.

A convincing statement in this regard, given the seriousness of its possible political implications, came even in early stages of this crisis, from the American President Barack Obama, who argued that "*what happened was not an accident*"¹³, saying about the event that is "*a crime of unspeakable proportions*", and claiming that "*separatists could not act in the way they did without Russia's support*"¹⁴.

A similar assessment came from the US Vice-President Joe Biden, who, in a declaration in Delaware (after discussing with President Obama and American security services experts, and after a phone conversation with Ukrainian leader Poroshenko, said – speaking about the fallen aircraft in eastern Ukraine – "*Apparently Shot Down. Not An Accident. Blown Out Of The Sky*"¹⁵.

Department of State, both as an institution, and direct through the voice of the Secretary of State John Kerry, echoed the same firm assessment that the aircraft had been shot down by a surface-air SA-11 missile. Much more, Kerry said that is pretty clear that this is a system that was transferred from Russia into the hands of separatists. Moreover, a report released shortly after the event underlined the rapid intensification of Russian troops movements in eastern Ukraine, mentioning a convoy of 150 vehicles, including tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and self-propelled multiple rocket launchers.¹⁶

In the same context, Moscow, through President Putin's voice, directly accused Kiev, as being responsible for the tragedy occurred on the Ukrainian territory. According to the Reuter Agency, the Russian president said that "*the disaster would not have happened if Kiev had not resumed operations against rebels in eastern Ukraine*"¹⁷.

The media have also talked about the likelihood of using another type of missile or a surface-air missile launched from the territory of the Russian Federation, but has also been spoken that the missile could be launched from a Ukrainian fighter.

¹² I. Iordachescu, *SUA: Separatiștii au doborât "din greșeală" zborul MH17*, 23.07.2014 – accessed online: http://www.dcnews.ro/sua-separati-tii-au-doborat-din-gre-eala-zborul-mh17_449408.html

¹³ <http://unimedia.info/stiri/obama-aeronava-mh17-a-fost-doborata-de-o-racheta-lansata-de-separatistii-pro-rusi-79634.html>

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ Andrew Kaczynski, *Joe Biden On Airline Crash: "Apparently Shot Down. Not An Accident. Blown Out Of The Sky."* <http://www.buzzfeed.com/andrewkaczynski/joe-biden-on-airline-crash-apparently-shot-down-not-an-accid#350z2da>

¹⁶ Ishaan Tharoor, *The evidence that may prove pro-Russian separatists shot down MH17*, Washington Post, July 20, 2014. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/07/20/the-evidence-that-may-prove-pro-russian-separatists-shot-down-mh17/>

¹⁷ *Malaysia Airlines Crash in Ukraine Is Called 'Act of Terror'*, 17 iul. 2014; mashable.com/2014/.../malaysia-airlines-ukraine/

In the latter respect, General-Lieutenant Andrei Kartopolov – head of the Main Operations Department of the Russian General Staff, said, from the position of spokesperson of the Minister of Defence, that “*Russian authorities have the evidence, by the Russian Centre of monitoring of flights from Rostov, that a Ukrainian SU-25 military plane flew about five km from the Malaysian aircraft, even a few minutes before shooting down*”¹⁸, trying to give the impression that responsible for this tragedy are the Ukrainian authorities, stating that the plane could have been downed by an air-air R-60 missile, which might have been launched from this Ukrainian military plane. The statement was not supported subsequently.

The claims of the Russian general were contradicted by the authorities in Kiev, who vehemently denied the existence of any Ukrainian military aircraft flying in that area, and also by the United States Embassy in Ukraine – that issued a map containing the trajectory of a missile launched by a BUK system, from the territory controlled by the separatist insurgents.¹⁹

3. The analysis and explanations of the event

Analysing the event in terms of its politico-military nature, in some opinions, it has been considered (from the perspective of the insurgents), as an act of war, in which the perpetrator shoots in a supposed military plane. At the same time, both insurgency leaders and some perpetrators of the coup, assumed – in the early hours of the crisis – this action, reiterated warnings that the aircraft had no reason to be in the area controlled by them (and, therefore, they would have deserved it) or have put the aircraft downing due Cossack militia who appear to have no obligation to obey any kind of authority or rule.²⁰

The Euro-Atlantic Community has shown extensively in the process of supporting the idea of Moscow’s accountability in this terrorist act, pointing – on the one hand – the delay and lack of effectiveness of anti-terrorism measures and – to the other hand – the pressing need for rapid and urgent intervention and crisis solving. That is why we can see the Malaysian aircraft shooting down in eastern Ukraine as being, the most likely, a terrorist act made by insurgent forces who commit terrorist acts under the Moscow support. The strategic objective of such action may have been the try the closing down of the Ukrainian airspace, in order to prove that Ukraine is not able to behave as a sovereign state (the immediate aim being the cessation of the Ukrainian anti-terrorist military operations).

The characterisation is focused on the current state of the international relations system as well as the relatively accepted prediction according to which evolves the same paradigm, having the state actors as main protagonists. The idea must, however, be nuanced because in the last 20 years, there was an increase in the role of non-state actors, which should be discussed, especially in terms of security events such as those that now occur in eastern and southern Ukraine.

Although the list is not exhaustive, among non-state actors that manifests itself in the reconfiguration of the system of international relations, could be mentioned the following categories of actors: supranational actors (organisations such as NATO, the UN, EU, OSCE, CIS, AU, ASEAN, OPEC, etc.) sub-state actors (constituent states of classical federations,

¹⁸ <http://jurnalul.ro/stiri/externe/tragedia-mh17-oficial-rus-avion-militar-ucrainean-angajat-in-zbor-in-apropiere-a-aeronavei-de-pasageri-cu-putin-timp-inainte-de-prabusire-673486.html>

¹⁹ <http://unimedia.info/stiri/harta-sua-arata-traectoria-rachetei-care-a-doborat-aeronava-mh17-79764.html>

²⁰ *Malaysia Airlines Crash in Ukraine Is Called 'Act of Terror'*, 17 iul. 2014; mashable.com/2014/.../malaysia-airlines-ukraine/. "The beginning of the audio, Ukraine's security services say, is between Igor Bezler, a pro-Russian rebel leader, and Vasili Geranin, a man Ukraine alleges to be a Russian intelligence agent. In the first line, Bezler allegedly says "We have just shot down a plane." (This line can also be translated to "We have seen a plane shot down," but then both translations says "cossacks" – Russian volunteers – from Chernukhino road block shot it down.)" "Pro-Russian Rebel Commander: 'We Did Warn You — Do Not Fly in Our Sky' "

regions, other internal autonomies) para-state actors (entities with distinct features than states but with some parameters and some specific manifestations as states, such as groups or organisations considered by the international community as terrorist – Al-Qaeda, ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), whose members are considered themselves freedom fighters.

Unfortunately, in the case of Russian aggression against Ukraine, the reaction of the international community (including NATO, EU, and OCSE) was not sufficiently prompt and efficient. As a result, after the annexation of Crimea, things did not stop, the Russian Federation engaging in a comprehensive effort of designing, arming, and supporting for rebel separatism groups in the eastern and southern Ukraine, where ethnic Russian population or Russian-speaking population was determined – in the Kremlin view – to “*struggle for freedom and independence*”.

With this brutal geopolitical attitude, which seriously infringe the rules of international law, principles of the relationship between European states and NATO-Russia partnership agreements, regime from Kremlin returned to power and dictate politics in foreign relations, specific to the old Soviet behaviour, resumed the struggle for restoration of the old tsarist or Bolshevik empire, and of influence spheres, becoming again a turbulent and unpredictable actor.

In its current arsenal, Russia has reintroduced infiltration, invasion and armed incursion, training and support for insurgent separatist forces, ethnic cleansing and terrorism, threatening with aerial bombing and nuclear weapons, simultaneously with energy blackmail, economic warfare, informational, psychological and cyber aggression, with brutal violation of human rights and promoting nationalism, with other forms of action specific to the period of Cold War and totalitarian regimes.

Conclusions

Specialised studies reveal that state actors may engage in three types of terrorist activities: support, practice or brutal internal repression. In that studied case, we can identify a sort of state-sponsored terrorism, in supporting pro-Russians insurgents/separatist based on the idea of the “*independence movement or self-determination*” and “*human rights protection*”. Defined as a “*form of terrorism in which the government provides support to extreme groups involved in terrorist activities, regardless of whether the state considers the behaviour of the group as terrorist related or not*”²¹, state terrorism being directed from outside.

Taking into account the true nature of the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine, caused by aggression triggered by Russian Federation, the shooting down of the Malaysian passenger aircraft in Dombas separatist region represents, most probably, a terrorist act, because only terrorists kill innocent people in this way, in order to achieve political goals. And this is the case, whether it was about a deliberate act, or it was a criminal negligence, as long as those who launched the rocket aimed deliberately a civil plane, while they knew or had possibility to know this was civilian non-involved in conflict. Regardless of the legal regime applicable to this conflict – international law on armed conflict, the right of the internal armed conflict or humanitarian law – insurgents, no matter who they are, are required (to be eligible for the minimum protection enjoyed by combatants of armed conflict) to protect civilians not taking part in the conflict. Otherwise, they will be judged for specific war crimes. It is for the justice (national and international) the obligation to distinguish and judge the shooting down of the civilian aircraft, between crime against humanity and terrorist act.

²¹ Virginia Mircea, *Noua dimensiune a terorismului international*. in “Cadran politic”, Romanian Center for Education and Durable Development, accessed from <http://www.cadranpolitic.ro/?p=288>.

If the action of the Ukrainian state will end up being considered (and recognised) as an anti-terrorist operation (like had been actions of Russian Army in Chechnya) then, the event will be judged as a terrorist act. A vital evidence in this regard could be the statement of the “*Pro-Russian Rebel Commander: We did warn you - Do not Fly in our Sky*” (of course if it is true). On the other hand, if the conflict will end with a peace accord, the insurgents will benefit of combatant status, so they will be not treated as terrorists. But those who have committed the crime of shooting down the aircraft and have killed 298 civilians uninvolved in the conflict will answer for their crime.

In the light of facts, must be also discussed the responsibility of the Kremlin regime, and have to be analysed whether Russia and its separatist proxies should be treated as terrorist actors. This is because Moscow may have had a role in shooting down this passenger aircraft, and Russia should be treated as a state that gives support to international terrorism.

Finally, the logical conclusion drawn from analysing sustainable this tragedy, contains sufficient factual grounds, political and legal reasons to consider the event as a terrorist act committed by a non-state actor (Donetsk Republic) with support of a state actor (Russian Federation), support consisting in providing “*equipment and experts*”. From this perspective, according to international conventions on combating terrorism, Russia could be considered – in the current European security landscape – a terrorist state, behaviour that was a characteristic of the former Soviet Union, during the Stalinist Great Terror²² period, and in all occasions when KGB gave substantial support to the European extreme-leftist terrorism, or to the religious terrorism in the Middle East in the years of the East-West confrontation that Putin regime seems to be deciding to resuscitate.

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²² R. David Marples, *Rusia în secolul XX*, Meteor Press, 2014; Conquest, Robert, *Marea Teroare*, Editura Humanitas, 1990; Brzezinski, Zbigniew, *Marele Eșec, nașterea și moartea comunismului în Secolul XX*, Editura Dacia, Cluj Napoca, 1993; Getty, John Archibald, *Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933-1938* (Cambridge Russian, Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies) – January 30, 1987.

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THE EAST EUROPEAN INSECURITY ENVIRONMENT IMPLICATIONS OF TERRORIST GROUPS IN ETHNIC CONFLICTS

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Abstract: *The map of the world is gradually evolving and suffering important transformations. Fragmentation or annexation of territories generates events and historical processes that are quite exceptional. History has waited four decades for the Cold War to end and the Wilsonian dream to become reality. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, state actors still had the hope of solving international conflicts not through war, but through diplomacy, negotiation and democratic values.*

The end of the Cold War sent hope for an international peaceful environment, but unfortunately only for a moment. The fragmentation of Yugoslavia, modeled the architecture of ethnic conflicts over Europe. If nuclear arsenal and the communist expansion was no longer a security risk, ethnic conflicts in the proximity of Euro-Atlantic area and terrorist attacks on the USA in September 2001 changed the way in which international security was seen. History of maps was and still is a problem of great interest and importance for understanding geopolitical developments on the world stage. Russia's actions in full affirmation sanctioned with economic instruments by the Allies because of supporting secessionist terrorist groups has placed on the agenda, actual historical topics.

Keywords: *Cold War, economy, sanctions, terrorist groups, ethnic conflicts.*

Introduction

Eastern European States have fulfilled along the time, the role of meeting point regarding the interests of the Great Powers. European powers both the western and the eastern, followed their need of controlling the road to Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

East European security environment was characterized, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, by the instability of the new states, freed from the influence of the Soviet Union, culminating in some cases with civil wars. The European Union and NATO have watched over their geopolitical and geostrategic interests and bypassing the territory of the former Yugoslavia, at that time in internal crisis, mapped a new frontier of Europe.

1. Gas. Russian "Soft power"

Westerner's approaches to "anchor" within western civilization those former "satellite states" of Moscow, in conjunction with the disintegration of former Yugoslavia, led to a

geostrategic reassessment of Russia, in terms of its proximity – Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine.

Russian Federation has rethought its strategies using the concept of "energy superpower" in European and international policy making processes. Strategic resources, oil and natural gas, used by Russia on the international stage to rebuild its superpower status, has created a "soft power" by changing the brand of Moscow from a military one into an economic one.

Since January 2006, the "gas crisis" brought upfront the relationship of dependence of European countries on Russia. Moscow has pursued the development of transport corridors for sending power resources to European strategic partners like Germany and Italy, which led to the possibility of avoiding and isolating Ukraine. Moscow has created a unique diversified foreign negotiation policy and signed bilateral agreements with key countries from the EU. This strategy, by promoting national interests in detriment of community ones, pursued the weakening of European energetic security, the EU's security and EU community policies.

2. Transnistria – Ossetia. The red shield of the Black Sea

Domination and control of the Black Sea's neighbors was an historical rivalry between the Great Powers. The geostrategic importance of the area led to the creation and maintaining political and ethnic conflicts in Ukraine, Moldova and the Caucasus.

At the NATO summit held in Bucharest in 2008, using the "soft power" over economic European allies, Russia opposed to receiving Ukraine and Georgia as NATO members. Shortly thereafter, based on the non-interference of bilateral economic partners, Russia declared its territorial claims by several military interventions, aimed at creating a state shield at its border.

South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, Odessa, Donetsk and Lugansk are areas that lie on the Russian border and have become pro-Russian separatist regions. Just a few months after the NATO summit in Bucharest, an armed conflict between Russia and Georgia started.

The main reason was defending the pro-Russian regime. The Crimea crisis from February-March 2014, followed by the annexation of the area, violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, meant the continuation of efforts to expand the interests of Russia in the Black Sea region.

After months of armed conflict and several failed negotiations, on September 5, 2014, in Minsk, was signed ceasefire protocol signed by representatives of Ukraine, Russia and the separatists in this OSCE.

The Protocol states the removal of Ukrainian military control from the two regions, now autonomous, near the Russian border. By controlling these areas without enclosing them as the case of Crimea, Moscow wants to create a road that will lead to Transnistria. This will mean a total control of the northern part of the Black Sea and Odessa seaport.

Kremlin's desire to have the control over areas in Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine comes as a revenge on their relations to the EU and NATO, making it impossible for them to join these alliances.

3. Moldova on the way to EU and NATO

Given that Russia wants to create a buffer border buffer, consisting of areas controlled by pro-Russian separatist groups in eastern Ukraine and Transnistria, Moldova intended to provide a safeguard guarantee in order to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity from the North Atlantic Alliance.

In this respect, the result of the cooperation between Moldova and NATO in The Partnership for Peace, NATO members decided at the Wales summit to economically support Moldova so to develop its defense capabilities. NATO decided to also help Georgia in achieving defense and security reforms. Georgia along with Moldova is now considered heavy geostrategic regions on the geostrategic scale of Eastern Europe.

Besides military security, Moldova is trying to create a new economic security. Regarding this, it began to take measures in the approximation with European values and to withdraw from the Russian ones. On June 27, 2014 after signing the Association Agreement with the EU, Moldova established a community market oriented economy. This agreement gives Moldova the right to export domestic products within the EU countries. Following this agreement Russia imposed an embargo on Moldovan fruits, showing the desire of implementing proximity dependence.

The need for security on the eastern border of Europe is the Allies' current topic of debate and it represents the clash of geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-strategic interests of allies, separated by a border of frozen conflicts which began to be active depending on the interests of global actors.

In the final declaration of the Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit, held in Cardiff, Wales, the general opinion regarding Russia was that: *"Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally changed their view on territorial integrity, freedom and peace in Europe. Growing instability in the Southern region, from the Middle East to Northern Africa, as well as transnational and multidimensional threats, also tests the security of the Alliance."*

Recently, more and more pro-Russian secessionist groups have emerged and increased military and economic, with the support from Russia. They are used by Moscow destabilizing certain areas, blackmail other state actors and preventing the neighboring countries to join NATO or EU. The terrorist actions of separatist groups are not recognized by Russia but they are supported by it.¹

On the 23 of august 2014, an important pro-Russian separatist leader from Ukraine admitted that they are in possession of a Buk system, which is believed to have been used to knock down Malaysia Airlines plane with 298 people on board last Thursday.

Kodakovski Alexander, commander of the Vostok battalion, in an exclusive interview with Reuters, admitted for the first time since the collapse of the commercial aircraft, that separatists possess surface-to-air missile system.

Rebel leader explained that he didn't know what happened to the system but it is believed that it was returned to Russia to remove traces of its presence in Ukraine at the time of the tragedy.

Before the plane was shot down, rebels bragged that they had Buk missiles that can shoot down planes at cruising altitude. After the Donetsk disaster, the main separatist group, the self-proclaimed People's Republic of Donetsk, denied of ever being in possession of such equipment.

Kodakovski told in the interview the fact that if now they recognize they are in possession of them, it doesn't mean they admit their guilt. Kodakovski blamed the authorities of Kiev for the missile that destroyed the passenger plane and air strikes were launched deliberately, knowing that separatists have such missiles.

Furthermore, Kodakovski admitted that he knew about a Buk system from Luhansk that came under the banner of the People's Republic of Luhansk the main separatist group in the region east of Ukraine. After the tragedy occurred, the system was send back to remove evidence of its presence, as Kodakovski explained.

¹ Valentin Vidu, *Euronews: Mafia din Republica Moldova ar vinde armament rusesc separatistilor proruși din Ucraina*, available online at: <http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/euronews-mafia-din-republica-moldova-ar-vinde-armament-rusesc-separatistilor-prorusi-din-ucraina-12886577>, accessed on 22.08.2014.

Kodakovski is the former leader of the anti-terrorist unit "Alfa" of the Donetsk Security Service and one of the few major leaders of the separatists who comes from Ukraine. He said his unit has never had possession of such missile system, but could have been used by rebels in other units.

Moreover, Kodakovski remembered rebels obtained Buk systems from the Ukrainian forces in the past, including three that were found in April at a checkpoint next to the airport and one in Donetsk, but none was operational.

At the end of the interview he admitted *"I am an interested party, I am a 'terrorist', a 'separatist', a volunteer ... In any case, I need to promote what I represent, even if feel different, say different or have an alternative opinion. This makes my heart soar."*

After Malaysian Airlines Boeing 777 crashed, in the area of conflict where fights between pro-Russian separatists and the Ukrainian army took place, the insurgents, who controlled the area, did not allow international rescue and research teams.

The site of the White House published Barrack Obama's declaration concerning the plane crash, as follows: *"Evidence indicates that the plane was shot down by a surface-to-air missile that was launched from an area that is controlled by Russian-backed separatists inside of Ukraine. We also know that this is not the first time a plane has been shot down in eastern Ukraine. Over the last several weeks, Russian-backed separatists have shot down a Ukrainian transport plane and a Ukrainian helicopter, and they claimed responsibility for shooting down a Ukrainian fighter jet. Moreover, we know that these separatists have received a steady flow of support from Russia. This includes arms and training. It includes heavy weapons, and it includes anti-aircraft weapons."*²

American intelligence confirmed that type Buk surface-to-air missiles were shot, but their origin is unclear. Ukrainian president, Petro Poroshenko described it as an act of terrorism and those responsible for it are pro-Russian separatists. In turn, Russian leader Vladimir Putin has claimed that the responsibility for this tragedy falls on Kiev authorities.³

One of the most important pro-Russian separatist movements from Ukraine is the Federal State of Novorossiia – a Russian ethnic group that integrates Federation of Donetsk People's Republic and Lugansk People's Republic. Concerning its policy, there are four political parties: Donetsk Republic, Russian Block, Russian Unity, New Russia Party and the militant organization is known as Donbass People's Militia.⁴

Another separatist movement is the Republic of Crimea – Russian ethnic group, from city of Sevastopol. The militant organization is known as the Russian Armed Forces. Local corruption and ethnic war fuel separatism in the early 1990s. Between 1993 and 1995, the Russian Bloc movement was known as the most powerful political force in Crimea. The Russian Duma declared the city of Sevastopol to be a "Russian federal city" under Russian control in 1993. Separatist Yuriy Meshkov supported by the Bloc was elected president of the Crimean Republic in 1994. Because of internal divisions, marginalization of the separatist movement Meshkov was removed by the Ukrainian parliament and new leadership installed.⁵

Another ethnic group is the Crimean Tatars. Considered an autonomous area, their political organization is called the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People. On their official

² David Hudson, *The White House: President Obama Speaks on Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17, Russia and Ukraine, and the Situation in Gaza*, available online at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/07/18/president-obama-speaks-malaysia-airlines-flight-mh17-russia-and-ukraine-and-situatio>, accessed on 23.08.2014

³ Ana Ilie, *Ziare.com: Un lider separatist rupe tacerea: Au un sistem de rachete Buk. A fost probabil inapoiat Rusiei*, online at <http://www.ziare.com/international/avion-prabusit-in-ucraina/un-lider-separatist-rupe-tacerea-au-un-sistem-de-rachete-buk-a-fost-probabil-inapoiat-rusiei-1312720>, accessed on 24.08.2014.

⁴ *Global Security.org: Federal State of Novorossiia Union of People's Republics*, online at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/novorossiia.htm>, accessed on 24.08.2014.

⁵ Alex Wilson and Josh Wilson, *Sras.org: Crimea: Prosperity in Unity or Separatism?*, online at: <http://www.sras.org/crimea>, accessed on 24.08.2014.

website, *"The main goal of Mejlis is elimination of the consequences of the genocide, committed by the Soviet state against Crimean Tatars, restoration of the national and political rights of the Crimean Tatar people and implementation of its right to free national self-determination in its national territory. Mejlis in its activity is accountable to Qurultay, and is guided by its decisions, by this Provision, standards of the International law and legislative acts of Ukraine that do not contradict to these standards. Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people consists of 33 members, including the Chairman of Mejlis"* and the location is in Aqmescit (Simferopol).⁶

Nowadays, the list of nationalist groups includes:

1. The National Socialist Society (NSO)
2. Slavic Union (Slavyanski Soyuz – SS)
3. The Movement Against Illegal Immigration (Dvizhenie Protiv Nyelegalnoi Immigratsii – DPNI)
4. Russian Way (Russki Obraz).

The NSO and SS are neo-Nazi organizations and the DPNI focuses on illegal immigration, but is also a neo-Nazi group outfit (their logo includes a stylized swastika). These groups are hostile to religion and to the current Russian government, wishing to create an "ethnically pure".

The European Union, decided on Monday to delay the imposition of additional sanctions on Russia for its role in the Ukraine crisis giving them time to cease-fire. Kremlin threatened cutting oil and natural gas supplies for EU member states, which depend on Russia.⁷

In the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine, self-proclaimed separatist leaders from Donetsk and Lugansk managed to impose their authority and thus train anti-Kiev military fighters. The most respected is the head of the so-called Army of the Republic of Donetsk, Igor Ghirkin. Also known as the "rifle" he is a former FSB officer and a Russian ultranationalist that has established a harsh military regime in the region.

Separatist operations centers have become cities of Donetsk and Lugansk, near the Russian border. In May, before the presidential election in Ukraine, armed separatists from Donetsk and Lugansk proclaimed the People's Republic and in following months many people were trained and armed by Russia. This led to the outbreak of a vast "terrorist" military operation in Kiev. The result was the Kiev administration proclaiming Lugansk and Donetsk as terrorist regions. The fall of Slaviank (bastion of separatist operations) represented the biggest loss for the separatist movement. Currently, the separatists' headquarters moved to Donetsk.

In these circumstances, Colonel Igor Ghirkin, nicknamed "rifle" (Strelkov) became the military leader of the People's Republic of Donetsk and separatist commander of military operations in eastern Ukraine. Strelkov himself acknowledged that 2013 was a FSB officer and in 2014 led a unit in Crimea.

Moreover, Strelkov is not the only self-proclaimed military leader or imposed by Moscow in eastern Ukraine. His competition is another separatist leader, Alexander Hodakovsky, leading Vostok battalion, one of the most heavily armed separatist groups from Donbass.⁸

⁶ Kurtmolla Abdulganiyev, *Iccrimea.org: Institutional Development of the Crimean Tatar National Movement*, online at: <http://qtm.org/en/general-information-about-mejlis>, accessed on: 24.08.2014.

⁷ Sergei I. Loiko, Carol J. Williams, *LATimes.com: Mariupol will never be ceded to Russia, Ukraine's president says*, online at: <http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-ukraine-russia-poroshenko-mariupol-20140908-story.html>, accessed at 24.08.2014.

⁸ Andrei Luca Popescu, *Gândul.info: Ascensiunea și declinul „Pușcașului” Igor Ghirkin, liderul separatiștilor proruși din estul Ucrainei*, online at: <http://www.gandul.info/international/ascensiunea-si-declinul-puscasului-igor-ghirkin-liderul-separatistilor-prorusi-din-estul-ucrainei-12945066>, accessed at 24.08.2014.

Separatist leader Yevgeny Shevchuk signed a decree that ordered the preparation of anti-radiation bunkers and shelters until November 1. That after several Russian officials has admitted the possibility of using nuclear weapons by Russia against Ukraine.

The leader of the separatist group did not explain what led him to sign such a decree. Although he denied that Transnistria would prepare an armed conflict, he mobilized reservists for military training and accused the authorities of Ukraine and Moldavia that they are tensioning the situation around Transnistria.⁹

On the 24 June 2014, the SBU, the Ukrainian Secret Services announced that a group of people that were preparing to organize attacks and creating a "People's Republic" in the Dnepropetrovsk region of south-eastern Ukraine were detained.

According to Ukrinform agency, the group was trying to send via social networks separatist encouragements that would violate the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Also they would recruit militants from the locals, which would be sent to train in military camps and then fight against the Ukrainian army.

SBU also announced that six people were detained, people that were part of a radical criminal group. Suspects planned to establish illegal military groups to occupy the premises of local administrations and attacking Ukrainian army. The main purpose was creating popular republic of Dnepropetrovsk, for supporting Lugansk and Donetsk insurgents. After searches conducted in the homes of suspects, explosives, weapons, a terrorist plan implementation for an attack in Dnepropetrovsk and leaflets in which they urged the coup, were found.¹⁰

There is also the possibility that the Republic of Moldova will face a similar situation in Ukraine. The leader of the pro-Russian separatist region of Transnistria, Yevgeny Shevchuk mentioned he wanted a "*civilized divorce*"¹¹ with Chisinau.

Meanwhile, the information analyzed by the Ukrainian Security Service showed that violence in the Ukrainian city of Odessa were organized by paramilitary groups from Transnistria, in collaboration with Russian groups.¹²

Yevgeny Vasilyevich Shevchuk or Eugene Shevchuk is an ethnic Ukrainian politician from Transnistria, who was elected in 2011, as president of the self-proclaimed Transnistrian Republic of Moldova.

He joined politics in separatist Transnistria in 2005 after several years in Russia. He then followed postgraduate courses of compliance at the Academy of Management, Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation (1994-1996) and the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (2002-2003).

Yevgeny Shevchuk declared that if Moldova will sign the Association Agreement with the European Union, at the summit in Vilnius in 2013, then Transnistria will require recognition of its independence. Ukraine has not signed the Association Agreement with the EU at the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius.

⁹ Vitalie Călugăreanu, *DW.de: Sperietori separatiste. Transnistria se pregătește de un atac cu bombă atomică*, online at <http://www.dw.de/sperietori-separatiste-transnistria-se-preg%C4%83te%C8%99te-de-un-atac-cu-bomb%C4%83-atomic%C4%83/a-17913855>, accessed on: 24.08.2014.

¹⁰ Ana Maria Adamoae, *EVZ.ro: RĂZBOIUL DIN UCRAINA. Grupare SEPARATISTĂ reținută de SERVICIUL SECRET. Separatiștii puneau la cale ATENTATE și recrutau MILITARI*, online at: <http://www.evz.ro/serviciul-de-securitate-ucraianean-a-retinut-o-grupare-care-vroia-sa-creeze-o-republica-populara-in-sud-estul-tarii.html>, accessed on: 25.08.2014.

¹¹ Ian Willoughby, *Radio.cz: Ukraine needs strong leader not gangster, even with angelic smile and braids, says Czech president*, online at: <http://engforum.pravda.ru/index.php?/topic/252048-czech-president-called-tymoshenko-gangster/>, accessed on: 25.08.2014.

¹² *World.einnews.com: Transnistrian leader Shevchuk says he wants a "civilised divorce" with Moldova*, online at: http://world.einnews.com/article_detail/222377251?lcode=NcC9U1DejxsXKayVSIeAqJOL1eb3YFpZSNyBt0j4Mn4%3D, accessed at: 25.08.2014.

During the official ceremony from November 2014, the European Union started association agreements with Moldova and Georgia and signed the agreement on visa liberalization with Azerbaijan. At that moment, on November 21 Ukrainian government decided to suspend work on the Association Agreement with the EU and mentioned its attempts of improvement regarding trade and economic relations with Russia.¹³

After the Georgian war, Russia was accused of annexing the region of South Ossetia. Eduard Kokoity Dzhabeyevich, a former Russian official, was appointed chief of the Government. Until 1989, he was elected as the First Secretary of the Tskhinvali branch of the Komsomol, the Young Communist League. Born on the 31 of October 1964, he is the former President of South Ossetia and his term lasted just ten years, from December 2001 to December 2011.¹⁴

In April 2009, by an agreement signed between Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow will have officially hold de facto control of the borders between Georgian separatist regions – Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Georgia, for a period of five years.

In September 2009 Russia signed new agreements with Abkhazia and South Ossetia for the maintenance of large Russian military base in these areas for a period of 49 years. At that time, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that NATO will not recognize the presidential elections held on the 24 august 2014, in Abkhazia, the Georgian separatist region recognized by Russia as an independent state.

Conclusions. Defensive actions with offensive purposes

Domination, control and historical rivalry of the great powers, led to these political and ethnic conflicts in Ukraine, Moldova and the Caucasus. NATO and the European Community are trying to tip the scales in their favor by stabilizing the Eastern European region. The new security architecture can be built just by creating democratization premises and by economic liberalization in the area.

After the offensive actions of Russia, the European Union adopted a set of decisions for sanctioning Russia, thus giving a new impulse to EU's efforts in strengthening common security defense.

*"NATO remains an essential source of stability in this unpredictable world. We reaffirm our commitment to meet all three basic tasks set out in the Strategic Concept of NATO: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. In Wales, we have taken decisions to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow"*¹⁵ was the final statement of the Heads of State and Government at the NATO summit in Cardiff, Wales.

Due to the unpredictable Eastern Europe security environment, represented by Russia's hostile actions, which remain on an upward trend, within NATO summit in Cardiff, was created a common action plan of Member States to stabilize Eastern Europe and areas in its proximity.

The member countries of NATO, after closely following the evolution of Ukrainian crisis and its reflection outside its borders, decided to create a fast multinational military force, consisting of thousands of troops. Land, air and sea troops that can be deployed

¹³ Interfax-Ukraine, *Kyivpost.com: Ukraine hasn't signed association agreement with EU at Vilnius summit*, online at: <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/ukraine-hasnt-signed-association-agreement-with-eu-at-vilnius-summit-332626.html>, accessed at: 25.08.2014.

¹⁴ *Upi.com: Topic: Eduard Kokoity*, online at: http://www.upi.com/topic/Eduard_Kokoity/#ixzz3DK0uAYp4, accessed on 25.08.2014.

¹⁵ *Nato.int: Secretary General's Annual Report 2013*, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_106247.htm, accessed on 27.08.2014.

anywhere in the world, will be used by the allies for *"collective defense"* or *"crisis management."* This *"flagship"* is intended to be an eastern shield of the alliance and will be coordinated by Poland with the support of Romania and the Baltic countries. The alliance's actions are completed by other defensive approaches and initiatives.

The Aegis Ashore system, from Deveselu, functional from 2015, will give NATO a *"significant increase in NATO missile defense capability"* and will remove both the danger that comes from the Middle East and from the East region of Europe. In terms of increasingly prominent eastern threats, the military cooperation (land and sea) between the United States, Bulgaria and Romania will increase regional security.

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RECONFIGURATION OF POWER RELATIONS – – THE ISIL ISSUE

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Abstract: *The main topic of the study is the role of non-state actors on the world stage today, concentrating on a very successful terrorist group – ISIL / ISIS. We intend to analyze and interpret the actions made by ISL from the perspective of geostrategic interests of the United States. We strongly believe that the U.S. might play, with its global interests and capabilities, an essential role in preserving a stable balance of power in the areas that are now threatened by ISIL. The first part of the study will be concentrated on the situation in Iraq, including the ability of Iraq state institutions to face ISIL military actions, and accentuating consequences of the support offered to Iraq by the Unites States. The second part of the study aims present the way in which ISIL threat was coped with, using U.S. official statements and other open sources. Finally, we will address the issue of finding solutions to ISIL's threats, in terms of a possible coalition operated by the U.S. in the Middle East together with a number of different local partners.*

Keywords: *ISIL, United States, Iraq, power relations, regional coalitions.*

Introduction

Since 2010, The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)¹, led by Abu Bakr of Baghdad, proved itself to be a terrorist organization that is succeeding in bringing in deadly attacks against Iraq and Syria, aiming at creating a new caliphate, and at expanding its borders by taking over larger and larger new territories.

The non-state actors are the main topic of the study, and the influence they have on the international stage, focusing on one particular terrorist organization: ISIL/ISIS. Our goal is to analyze and interpret ISIL's actions from the perspective of global strategic interests of the United States. Having the global interests in mind and the military capacity, we believe that USA can play an essential role in balancing the situation and finally in defeating ISIL's power in the conquered and threatened areas. This study will be presenting a few decisive episodes concerning the offensive of Islamic State on the territory of the two countries, Iraq and Syria, but also watching the political and military reactions USA is having on these acts of violence.

1. The situation in Iraq

The first part of the study will be concentrated on the situation in Iraq, including the ability of Iraq state institutions to face ISIL military actions, and accentuating consequences of the support offered to Iraq by the United States.

Starting with the middle of this year, ISIL has been drawing attention of the whole

¹ „All you need to know about ISIS and what is happening in Iraq”, *RT*, 20 June 2014, at the Internet address <http://rt.com/news/166836-isis-isil-al-qaeda-iraq/>.

world by their offensive attacks in Iraq and Syria, taking over mass territories and threatening the death of the ethnic and religious minority in those areas if they would refuse converting to Islam. Unlike al-Qaeda whose main purpose is to threaten the West and America, ISIL is a terrorist organization which is seeking to strengthen its own territory in the Middle East in order to establish its own Islamic state.

Even though it is much more numerous than ISIL, with some 270.00 soldiers, plus the fighting equipment that Iraq benefits from, the Iraqi army has often found itself incapable to withstand the ISIL terrorists who are about 18.000 armed soldiers. At the same time ISIL continues to gather up more members every day as they have a big number of supporters who are joining this terrorist group them from all over the world. We can even mention the fact that Iraq has even signed contracts with USA to acquire combat helicopters and F-16 airplanes, and in 2013 Iraq's defense budget was 17 billion dollars. These are a few details that would lead us to believe that the Iraqi army could impose any time before this terrorist movement. Unlike this theory, the reality in Iraq is completely different. The Iraqi army seems to have a morale problem as well, the attacks of the jihadist army are more frequent and more powerful, therefore seriously destabilizing the Iraqi army who now faces massive desertion

To illustrate the situation in Iraq, we will focus on one major example that shows the helplessness of the Iraqi troops before the Islamic state. This is about ISIL conquering Iraq's northern city, Mosul, a city with a population of approximately 1.8 million people, the second biggest city in Iraq.

The Iraqi troops that were protecting the Mosul City were approximately 30.000 soldiers on June 10, 2014, while the terrorists of the Islamic State were only 800 in number. What seemed to be an easy prey for the Iraqi troops, trained by the American Army, turned out to be a complete failure, therefore the Iraqi soldiers withdrew without opposing, leaving the city to the ISIL troops. The withdrawing of the Iraqi soldiers left a significant amount of weapons behind, ammunition and combat vehicles that inevitably came into the possession of ISIL troops, therefore further strengthening their military power.

This episode shows how large morale deficit of Iraqi troops is, compared with the fervor of the ISIL members who were willing to fight to death, even if they were outnumbered almost 40 to one, while the Iraqi troops have abandoned the city, refusing to fight and die for the Iraqi Government.

After taking over the city the jihads have summoned the Christian minority in Mosul to convert to Islam, to pay a protection fee or to leave the city as soon as possible in order not to be killed.² Around 200.00 Christians from around the city have decided to take the Irbil and Dohuk road to escape from the jihads hands. For the first time in the history of the Mosul city the Christians have completely left because of the conditions the ISIL member have imposed, this premiere showing the determination of the jihadist groups actions.

The Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri Maliki , has requested the Parliament to declare a state of Emergency, which implicated a "general mobilization" of the citizens since the Mosul city has easily fallen into the jihads hands. Mouri Maliki then declared publicly that the Iraqi troops are under maximum alert: "The seriousness of the situation needs immediate and swift measures to preserve the national security of the people."³ As *BBC* was pointing out at the time, it was impossible for the Iraqi army to take back the city of Mosul in such a short time, despite of the prime-ministers declarations. He made similar vows when Sunni militants took over Falluja, west of Baghdad, in January, and they are still there", writes Jim Muir for *BBC News*.

² „Iraqi Christians flee Mosul after Islamic militant threats” , *Daily News*, 23 July 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/iraqi-christians-flee-mosul-militant-threats-article-1.1877215>

³ „Militants seize Iraq's second city of Mosul”, *BBC*, 10 June 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27778112>

After conquering Mosul, Iraqi Parliament speaker Osama al-Nujaifi was giving the journalists the statement that after numerous attacks in the northern and western side of Iraq, the entire Nineveh region had been taken by the jihads, and more so, they were heading towards the province of Salaheddin. In this region, in the city of Tikrit, another terrifying episode took place after this city was also taken over by the terrorists troops after Mosul assault. In this city the ISIL militants have once again, not that it was needed, shown their cruelty and brutality. June 14 is the day when new images were made public by the ISIL members.⁴ In these images, hundreds of Iraqi militants that were taken hostages were being executed after the ISIL members have taken over an old military base in Tirkrit. Some images show tens of civil dressed people that are being transported in a van, and then in other images, same people are shown with their hands tied up behind their back in a dug up hole, getting ready to be executed. Lt. Gen Quassim of Moussawi had confirmed the authenticity of the images saying that he is well aware of the fact that Iraqi militants are being executed by the terrorist troops. The Iraqi soldiers' clothes were civil ones because they were told, it seems, that they should leave their work place in this manner in order to escape the ISIL troops. But even so they were recognized by the Jihadist troops while there were hundreds trying to escape. One of the survivors of the massacre related in a Parliament session that they were all asked to turn in their weapons and retrieve to Baghdad, to be transported with some vehicles that were ready for them to be taken to the Capital city.

Iraqi Defense Minister of Dulaimi is completely denying the fact that the Iraqi troops were asked to retrieve to Baghdad. Therefore, UN envoy in Iraq has urged the government to initiate a personal and public investigation of the situation.

The superiority of the Islamic State in relation to the Iraqi Army is easy to see and in this case the ISIL army seems to be leading with a 'strong hand' the hostilities in Iraq, making this another episode in which the Iraqi army is retrieving without fighting the terrorists.

According to a subsequent report by *Human Rights Watch*⁵, 770 soldiers were executed after the assault of the city that was 190 kilometers North of Baghdad, and their number could significantly increase as the satellite imagery will advance, considering the fact that the ISIL members have claimed 1,700 killings. Previously *HRW* estimated that the number of soldiers killed oscillated between 160-190 people killed between June 11 and June 14.

We will focus now on the other city where ISIL marks significant achievements. We are speaking about the conquest of the Syrian military air base in the city Tabaqa, in the province of Al-Raqa.

ISIL took over the Syrian base after fighting for 5 days against the Syrian army. The fact that ISIL captured the military base is important, because some reports say that that position represented the last major pillar of the Assad government in that part of the country, because the ISIL militants had had already taken over two other military bases, that belonging to Brigade 93 and Division 176⁶.

Al Jazeera informs that during the fight for the air base in Raqqa, there were around 500 soldiers killed and according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, at least 346 ISIL soldiers and 170 Syrian soldiers died during the 5 days, from June 10 to June 15 in the

⁴ „ISIS 'execute' 1,700 Iraqi soldiers, post gruesome pictures (GRAPHIC)”, *Russia Today*, 16 June 2014, at the Internet address <http://rt.com/news/166092-iraq-militants-mass-executions/>

⁵ „ISIS militants executed up to 770 Iraqi troops in Tikrit – report”, *Russia Today*, 04 September 2014, at the Internet address <http://rt.com/news/184893-isis-mass-execution-iraq/>

⁶ „Islamic State jihadists capture key base from Syrian army”, *The Telegraph*, 08 Aug 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11020993/Islamic-State-jihadists-capture-key-base-from-Syrian-army.html>

afternoon, when the air base was conquered.⁷

Despite the heavy combat losses in the ranks of the ISIL soldiers, one thing the Iraqi army should worry about, is that just as in Mosul case, the jihads have got planes and combat helicopters, tanks, ammunition and weapons from conquering that military base.

Even though the number of ISIL dead soldiers was greater than the number of the dead Syrian soldiers, mainly because of stubborn way in which the Syrian troops fought back, this did not stop the jihads to claim objective.

Even more so, the Al-Raqa province became the “capital” of new Caliphate so strongly desired by jihadist extremists. Reuters reports that ISIL then began to administer the province by the rules of the “New Caliphate”, the jihadist letting any institution or public service outside their enhanced attention.

The Jihadist group “pays wages, controls the traffic and everything else from bakeries to banks and schools, land and mosques.”⁸, besides proving that extremist politics carried on the battlefield and in addition the massacres committed, they also possess a special organization within the group under the leadership of Abu Bakr al Baghdad.

Moreover, immediately after the conquest the military base, occurred in the social media images of the jihad fighters waving flags, marching victorious in Tabqa. Announcing the victory of the Islamic State and giving out money to the residents of the city.⁹ An article from *The Independent* suggestively called “Life under ISIS: For residents of Raqqa is this really a caliphate worse than death?”, presents the atmosphere from inside the region of Raqqa where Abu Bakr of Baghdad (al-Baghdadi) has imposed a set of rules, standards adapting to the Islamic State Province.¹⁰ The critics of the leader were eliminated, alcohol was completely banned.

The stores are closed at noon and the streets are empty after dark. ISIL has established services and institutions; communication with the outside world is possible only through ISIL.

Baghdadi has also separated the military actions from the civilian ones and has named the civilian deputies “walis” – an official person such as a minister- in order to manage the institutions. Military and employees receive a salary from the Muslim Financial House department- an institution that is like the Minister of Finances. From the same article we find out that the prices are maintained at a low level, the ones that are trying to put higher prices are punished, and if they are caught a second time, they are killed. At the lead of all these measures there is their leader Baghdadi- the one that has proclaimed himself “calif” in June- the leader of all Muslim world, after the breaking of the al-Qaeda terrorist group. He was involved in all the details of managing the province, a more skilled and pragmatic leader than some may have thought he would be.

On the day that followed the capture of the military base the Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem has expressed the desire if the Assad regime to collaborate with the states from the region and with the international community in order to destroy the Islamic State.¹¹

⁷ "Islamic State captures key Syrian air base", *Al Jazeera*, 25 Aug 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/islamic-state-captures-key-syrian-air-base-2014825595372569.html>

⁸ Mariam KAROUNY, In northeast Syria, Islamic State builds a government, *Reuters*, 04 September 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/04/us-syria-crisis-raqqa-insight-idUSKBN0GZ0D120140904>.

⁹ Martin Armstrong, Islamic State strengthens control in Syria, *Al Jazeera*, 27 Aug 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/islamic-state-syria-control-raqqa-20148278030456428>.

¹⁰ Mariam Karouny, "Life under Isis: For residents of Raqqa is this really a caliphate worse than death?", *The Independent*, 5 September 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/life-under-isis-for-residents-of-raqqa-is-this-really-a-caliphate-worse-than-death-9715799.html>.

¹¹ "Syria could work with West against 'terror'", *Al Jazeera*, 27 Aug 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/syria-ready-co-operate-against-terrorism-20148251196801654.html>.

On the same note, Walid al-Moallem mentioned the fact that Syria should be involved in coordinating the air raids after USA declared the intention of having operations on the Syrian territory.

Same as in the Tikrit, Salaheddin, ISIL militants have executed 250 Syrian military that were caught trying to escape from an air base toward Esrya, in the Hama province- that is under the control of Damascus. Before their execution a film was released by ISIL featuring the Syrian military men captured at the military base from the Raqqa province. The soldiers were running through the desert in their underwear, right before being executed.¹² Also, along with this video there were made public images in which the members of the Syrian army were executed, laying on the ground, for a long distance (tens of meters). Images that were extremely cruel were confirmed by an ISIL soldier via internet: “Yes we have executed them all”, he declared for Reuters.¹³ These massacres that were made public by ISIL clearly show that the terrorist group uses” these images of terror” in order to induce fear among the opponents. It seems that this tactic was successful if we were to compare the morale of the two camps.

After the retreat of the American troops in 2001, USA had to intervene in Iraq in order to stabilize the situation in the area and also to protect the regional interests.

2. U.S. reactions: political statements and military measures

The second part of the study aims present the way in which ISIL threat was coped with, using U.S. official statements and other open sources.

In order to highlight the position that the United States of America has related to the ISIL issues, we will make use of the examples we used in the previous chapter such as: victory over the Northern Iraqi city- Mosul- and victory over the military base from the city of Tabaqa, Al-Raqa province. In this chapter we will analyze the actions that the U.S.A. did relate to these two episodes.

We will start with the issue of the victory that ISIL had over the second largest city from Iraq – Mosul - on June 10 and 11, 2014. While the jihad were occupying the city of Mosul in the month of June of last year- making their way towards Baghdad- approximately 1,700 Iraqi soldiers surrendered. U.S.A. stated its availability to offer support to the government of the Iraqi premier Nouri al-Maliki facing the ISIL attacks. That determined the exodus of 500,000 civilians from the city of Mosul. In order to stop the offence of the ISIL, the officials from the Bagdad expressed their agreement on the American air raids, Wall Street Journal related. For that purpose, Washington sends drones. Also, Washington does not intend to send troops in Iraq after the retreat on December 31, 2011.

On June 18 2014 the Iraqi authorities are the ones that asked for massive air support from the Americans, as they admitted their inability to face the ISIL major offensive on their own.¹⁴ Previous to this request there takes place one of the most remarkable actions USA did - as a reaction to the alert pace of the ISIL actions. Precisely as the *NBC News* related, on the June 14, 2014 the US Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, gives an order for the USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to be brought to the Persian Gulf in

¹² Dan Bloom, „Marched to their deaths: Sickening ISIS slaughter continues as 250 soldiers captured at Syrian airbase are stripped then led to the desert for mass execution”, *Daily Mail*, 28 Aug 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2736764/Marched-deaths-Sickening-ISIS-slaughter-continues-250-soldiers-captured-Syrian-airbase-stripped-led-desert-mass-execution.html>.

¹³ SYLVIA WESTALL, Video shows Islamic State executes scores of Syrian soldiers, *Reuters*, 28 Aug 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/28/us-syria-crisis-idUSKBN0GS10020140828>.

¹⁴ Laura Smith-Spark, Ashley Fantz & Nic Robertson, „Joint Chiefs chairman: Iraq has asked for U.S. air power to counter militants”, *CNN*, 19 June 2014, at the Internet address <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/18/world/meast/iraq-crisis/>.

order to protect the American citizens that were in Iraq at the moment. This carrier was accompanied by two large combat ships that had guided missiles, the USS Philippine Sea (a heavy cruiser) and the USS Truxtun (a large destroyer belonging to the Arleigh Burke class).

Same news stated the fact that on June 13, 2014, the president of the USA, Barack Obama, declared that the American troops will not be sent to Iraq in combat missions. He had a consultation with his counselors on the national security issues and so asked for alternative solutions to the ISIL threat.

On June 19 2014 when the Iraqi situation became clearer, Obama makes a comprehensive Press statement that was meant to bring clarification on the position that the USA has on the ISIL offence. In that Press Statement the president of USA declared that the Washington closely supervises the situation from Iraq since, as Obama said “ISIL is a threat to the Iraqi people, for the region and for the interests of the USA”. The same statement informs on the fact that the help that USA gives to the Iraqi security system will include “joint operation centers at Baghdad and Northern Iraq” with the purpose of exchanging intelligence and coordinating the effort in order to block the ISIL offence. Obama made it clear that the American forces will not fight on the Iraqi territory. According to Obama’s statement regarding the ISIL issue, partnerships in which the local forces will have the leading role will be the most efficient response to the ISIL threats.¹⁵

The USA president’s statement makes reference to the Persian Gulf, emphasizing the issue of balance of power in the region. Thus Obama stresses out that USA, due to the strategic interests, desires to maintain stability in this area. *A possible victory of ISIL in Iraq meant for the USA a major geostrategic failure that implied the diminishing influence in the entire Persian Gulf area.* Thus, we see the shaping of a possible collaboration between the Shiite Iran and USA- the victory of ISIL eliminating among other issues the perspective of a Shiite hegemony in the Persian Gulf. In these lines on June 16 2014, *ABC News* declared that “we are open to discussions with Iran.” Subsequent to this statement, John Kerry declares on June 19 2014 that acting alongside with Iran is not at all one of the purposes that Washington had.¹⁶

On August 7 2014, Jihad conquers most of the Iraq barrage that is north of the Mosul city. “Kurdish fighters, having the American air support, get the control of the East part of the barrage”, declares General Abdel Rahmane Korini for the *France Press*.¹⁷ USA offered air support to the Kurdish forces in Northern Irak that succeeded after 10 days to get the control over the barrage that supplies water and electricity for most of the region. It is indispensable for irrigating large fields. On the same note, on August 18, 2014 the American Air Force launched 15 attacks over the Islamic positions on the territory of the Mosul city. Over the 11 days in which the Americans conducted air raids there were 68 bombardments over the ISIL units from Northern Iraq.

Reuters informs that as a response to the American actions ISIL launched a video message that includes threats to the USA side. This video includes the picture of a beheaded American and images of the snipers’ victims. The message to the Americans – in English - is “We will drown all of you in blood!”

On August 18 2014 during a Press Conference, Obama declared that Islamic State is a threat “for Iraqi people and for the whole region”. There should be no doubt that the American

¹⁵ Office of the Press Secretary, „Remarks by the President on the Situation in Iraq”, on the webpage of the White House, 19 June 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/19/remarks-president-situation-iraq>.

¹⁶ Ali Weinberg, „US Open To Cooperating With Iran on Iraq, Kerry Says”, *ABC News*, 16 June 2014, at the Internet address <http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/06/us-open-to-cooperating-with-iran-on-iraq-kerry-says/>.

¹⁷ *France Press*, 16 Aug 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.afp.com/fr/node/2734056>.

forces will continue to conduct limited missions to which I have approved”, Obama declared. During the same Press conference the president of the USA said: “We will not send back thousands of American soldiers to be part of the military actions. We are not the army of Iraq. We are not even the Iraqi Air Force. Ultimately it is Iraq itself that has to ensure its security”.

AFP informs that on September 1, 2014 USA conducted air raids on the ISIL positions in Northern Iraq. “The strikes destroyed three SI trucks, significantly damaged another one, and destroyed an armed vehicle and a shooting position close to the Mosul barrage” explained CENTCOM (Regional Commander Responsible for the Region). Thus the number of American raids is adding up to approximately 123 over a month time. In the beginning of September 2014 the USA air raids were over the outskirts of the city of Mosul. According to *EFE* agency on Monday, the 8th of September 2014, the American troops bombarded the Jihad positions inside Mosul.

All these elements explain why the USA chooses to offer military support to the Iraqi troops, so that the ISIL offensive in the area will be blocked. This support is limited, at least for now, to air force. *Obvious geostrategic interests determine USA to want to maintain the balance for power in Iraq Iraq, but also in the Persian Gulf.*

The conquest of the air force military base from the city of Tabaqa, Al-Raqa province is a second episode that we want to relate to, as we are trying to emphasize the availability of the USA to offer help to the local authorities. Military Air base from the city of Tabaqa could represent the means in which the ISIL could reach other cities in Syria. On August 24 2014 the Jihad entered the air force military base situated in Northern Syria and occupied a significant part of it.

According to *Le Monde*, USA started to consider the possibility of conducting raids in Syria. According to *Wall Street Journal*, the one that made this public statement is the National Security Deputy Advisor for the President of America, Ben Rhodes. Unlike the situation in Iraq, the American air raids in Syria would require a radical change of the politics of the Obama Administration until the present moment. Besides, it is worthwhile to consider the fact that the Jihad forces in Syria are better organized than the ones in Iraq.

As *New York Times* states, the White House is under a diplomatic campaign that has the purpose of drawing possible allies for the future military operations in Syria. According to the newspaper some of the possible allies are Australia, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Great Britain, Jordan, Qatar and Turkey. Out of these the USA is looking for air support from Great Britain and Australia. Turkey is an essential element to the solution for Syria, as it has a series of military bases that could be activated with the purpose of conducting operations on the territory of Syria. On the other hand, Walid Muallem- Syria’s interim External Affairs Minister- declared that any military action on the territory of Syria that is not approved by Damascus will be interpreted as an aggressive action. Walid Muallem alerted USA on the possible repercussions following the attack of the ISIL military bases on the territory of Syria, but he was also open for cooperation with USA and Great Britain.

Conclusions. Solutions for coping with ISIL: a regional coalition is needed

Finally, we will address the issue of finding solutions to ISIL’s threats, in terms of a possible coalition operated by the U.S. in the Middle East together with a number of different local partners.

Guy Zero, the Deputy Director for Training and Exercise at CENTCOM stated on July 10 2013 that the command structure we just mentioned is intensely preparing for the moment in which the presence of the United States of America in the Middle East will be less solid

than at the moment of the statement.¹⁸

The presence of USA military forces in various areas of the world is directly conditioned by the economical and budgetary problems which cause is, among others, the costs of a long time war against terrorism.

The 20 states that are under the responsibility of CENTCOM are: Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Yemen. Out of these all we can deduce that beside the fact that the geographic area in which CENTCOM operates is pretty large, it is also characterized by numerous conflicts.

As a result of analyzing the geographic situation of the area that CENTCOM is responsible for and considering the geostrategic importance of this area, General James N. Mattis concluded on the 5th of March before the US Senate Air Force Commission that “America has to stay deeply involved in the region and make full use of the tools of its national power as a force for stability and prosperity”.¹⁹ He also mentioned the fact that CENTCOM should act via local partners and reduce the presence of U.S. military troops in the area.

In order to emphasize the cooperation between CENTCOM and different local partners we could consider a few examples like the Eagle Resolve- an annual multilateral military exercise that took place in different location from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, between April 21st and May 6th, 2013, but also Eager Lion that took place in Jordan in June 2013. These two examples demonstrate the fact that USA is trying to maintain stability in the Extended Middle East using less resources compared to the ones they used in other recent history moments.

Economic difficulties that USA is confronted with related to the long war against terrorism, correlated to the option of the Washington leaders to allocate more strategic resources for the Pacific area, determined USA to create and follow up with a number of local partnerships in Middle East, with the purpose of maintaining the balance of power in the area. But problems that could exist in any of the regional coalitions we can easily imagine are related to the extreme diversity of the states in the Middle East.

Thus, considering all these elements, we estimate that operating some regional partnerships in the Middle East might be the most solid solution enabling the USA to cope with the ISIL threat. Of course, it cannot precisely be said that in case of any sort of major crisis the partners of USA in the Middle East would be able to stand strong long enough until USA could send massive reinforcements. But, quite clearly, a massive regional involvement, plus some serious help coming from the U.S., plus a discreet, but vital involvement of Israel – see for example recent reports²⁰ speaking about strategic intelligence on ISIL offered by the Israelis to USA – might be enough to balance ISIL, and even to defeat ISIL in the end.

¹⁸ Donna Miles, "Centcom plans for broader regional engagement post-2014", *American Forces Press Service*, 10 Jul 2013, at the Internet address www.defense.gov/news/nesarticle.aspx?id=120434.

¹⁹ 2013 Posture Statement: Statement Of U.S. Marine Corps General James N. Mattis, Commander, U.S. Central Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 5, 2013 about the posture of U.S. Central Command, at the Internet address <http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom/posture-statement/>.

²⁰ Florin Diaconu, "Policy Brief no. 25: Israel shares intelligence data on Islamic State (ISIL), in order to help the U.S. air strikes" on the webpage of the Morgenthaucenter.org, September 10, 2014, at the Internet address <http://morgenthaucenter.org/policy-brief-no-25-israel-shares-intelligence-data-on-islamic-state-isil-in-order-to-help-the-u-s-air-strikes/>.

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THE RISE OF ISIS. THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT

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***Abstract:** ISIS or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, an extremist terrorist group with an ideology that originates from al-Qaeda's hard line, make his official announcements on the global scene in 2013. ISIS slowly emerged in the past few years and rapidly advanced in the summer of 2014. The international community was horrified and shocked when the American journalist James Foley was beheaded by an ISIS terrorist. The article try's to examine the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, his origins and ideology. We are interested to see what future has ISIS, how the international community will react in the near future and what events will follow.*

***Keywords:** Islamic State, Terrorism, Jihadist, Iraq, Regional Security, International community.*

Introduction

The Islamic State and the Levant is an extremist terrorist group that “appeared” in 2013 but existed under various names and in various shapes since the early of the 1900s.¹ His ideology originates from the al-Qaeda hard line and his goal is to create the Islamic Caliphate in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. The story of the ISIS can be an example on how modern terrorism has evolved, from religious and political ideal into a death cult.²

The author of the group is Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and after his death the group was leaded by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, he is applying the old tactics but, he supercharged them.³ The Sunni jihadist group operates in an extremely violent way, mass executions, beheadings and crucifixions.⁴

After several years of relative silence, the situation from Iraq and the civil war from Syria allowed the organization to monopolize territory and to develop an adequate financial and logistics base. After the Iraqi parliamentary elections in May 2014, ISIS launched a major offensive in Iraq well-organized and managed to capture in just a few days, a number of important objectives - the city of Mosul, second city of the country, hometown of Saddam Hussein, the former dictator of Iraq Sunni, Tikrit and Baijil, where is located the largest oil refinery in a country that has problems in the production of electricity for domestic consumption.

Iraq reaction was disappointing for the West, especially for the Americans, their troops just retreated after the prolonged occupation. ISIS established, strangely for a terrorist group a conventional force to be feared.

¹ <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/isis-a-short-history/376030/>, accessed 10.09.2014 at 09.38.

² *Ibidem.*

³ *Ibidem.*

⁴ <http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article39603.htm>, accessed 10.09.2014 at 10.09.

The international community was horrified and shocked when the American journalists were beheaded by an ISIS terrorist. Therefore, our article try's to examine the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, his origins and ideology. We are interested to see what future has ISIS, how the international community will react in the near future and what events will follow.

1. Origins

Abu Musab al Zarqawi is the founder of ISIS and the movement began to act in a violent way in 2003, after the American intervention in Iraq. A year later, the group was sanctioned, the cause was the affiliation to al-Qaeda, in consequence the group takes the name of *AQI, al-Qaeda in Iraq*- a move that allows to Zarqawi and bin Laden to maintain a position in Iraq.⁵

From 2010 Abu Bakr al Bagdadi is the leader of ISIS⁶. He was in prison from 2005 to 2009 at Camp Bucca on charges of terrorism. In 2009 after the Iraqi government takes control of the base and he is release.⁷

In 2007, the movement experienced a breakdown, due in part to the strategy applied by U.S. General Petraeus in Iraq: collaboration with key local Sunni tribes and maximum intolerance against al-Qaeda.⁸

In 2011, AQI incorporates strength and in 2013 they renamed themselves ISIS/ISIL. They saw the war in Syria like the big opportunity to expand and re-establish the Caliphate.

The Caliphate wants to erase the borders in the Middle East established after the colonial era, so is against the Iraqi government led by Nouri al-Maliki against Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad and against Syrian rebels that do not support the creation of the "Islamic State" in northern Syria.

At the same time, in the recent years through its actions the organization was a direct threat to the global leadership of al-Qaeda, which in February 2014 said that "it has nothing to do with ISIS and has no connection with this organization". Also, the actions organize by the Islamic State are a danger to the conservative Sunni regimes in the Gulf, they perceive ISIS as a security threat, although the organization has received in Iraq, according to various sources, financial support from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar.

2. Ideology

What we see now in the Middle East at the beginning of the 21th century is alarming and dramatic. After that the remaining of Christian populations in Muslim countries had gained independence in the early of 20th century they were forced to convert or have been slaughtered. The few remaining Christian communities in the Middle East are subject to a new jihad in Syria and Iraq, which is rapidly expanding in the region.

The unfortunate part is that in this new massacre many ISIS fighters are citizens of Western countries. West has a significant Muslim population in France, UK, Germany, Holland that is living peacefully and enjoying all the guarantees of civil liberty.

Opponents of the barbarism exercised by the ISIS are slaughtered, beheaded, buried alive, pushed into retreat or annihilated by various methods, which compete in barbarism and cruelty.

⁵ <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state-iraq-syria/p14811>, accessed 11.09.2014 at 12.09.

⁶ *Ibidem.*

⁷ *Ibidem.*

⁸ *Ibidem.*

The ideology of ISIS requires total war without limits or constraints. In the Arab world there were two waves of violence that have passed but the scale and brutality ISIS.

The first wave, led by Sayyid Qutb's disciples, a radical Egyptian Islamist, seen as the theorist of modern Jihadism, revolted against the secular pro-Western Arab regimes, calling them "the near enemy".⁹

Since the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1980, the Islamist insurgency has dissipated in the late of the 1990s. In the conflict 2.000 people lost their lives and a large number of militants headed to Afghanistan to fight against a new global enemy - the Soviet Union.

Afghan Jihad against the Soviets gave birth to the second wave of violence, this time targeting the "distant enemy" United States. Its leader was Osama bin Laden.¹⁰ Following the attack the United States of September 11, bin Laden justified this act to American and Muslims as an act of self-defense not aggression.

Compared to bin Laden, the leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, is not trying to justify to the world the bloodshed. In contrast to the first two waves, ISIS group emphasizes violent acts in the detriment of theology, acting as a killing machine that is fed with blood.

Muslim men in Western countries and members of other extremist groups have joined ISIS because they think they will take part in a mission which consists in reviving an idealized type of caliphate that will create a community characterized by a strong identity.

ISIS is the engine behind the group al Qaeda in Iraq, led by Abu Masab al-Zarqawi killed by Americans in 2006. Both groups rely on anti-Shia activities, developing a visceral hatred against minorities in general.

Both Al-Zarqawi and al-Baghdadi sustained that the members of the Shia are infidels, being the fifth column of the Islamic world they must by annihilated.

Taking advantage of the Sunni-Shia rupture from Iraq and from the civil war in Syria, al-Baghdadi built a base of support for rebel Sunnis.

He also restructured the military network and recruited experienced officers in the former army of Saddam Hussein; in this context the Islamic State has transformed himself into a strong fighting force.

CIA estimated that the Islamic State members are between 20,000 and 31,500 combatants in Iraq and Syria. Previously, the CIA evoked a number of 10,000 members of ISIS.¹¹

CIA attributes this growth to a vigorous recruitment of jihadists since June, after the several victories on land and after the proclamation a caliphate.¹²

In his last discourse about ISIS, Barak Obama declares: "(...) ISIL is not "Islamic". No religion condones the killing of innocents, and the vast majority of ISIL's victims have been Muslim. And ISIL is certainly not a state. It was formerly al Qaeda's affiliate in Iraq, and has taken advantage of sectarian strife and Syria's civil war to gain territory on both sides of the Iraq-Syrian border. It is recognized by no government, nor the people it subjugates. ISIL is a terrorist organization, pure and simple. And it has no vision other than the slaughter of all who stand in its way (...). Our objective is clear: we will degrade, and ultimately destroy, ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counter-terrorism strategy."¹³

⁹ Jarret M. Brachman, *Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice (Political Violence)*, Routledge, 2009, pp. 53-59.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹¹ <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/11/world/meast/isis-syria-iraq/index.html>, accessed 12.09.2014.

¹² *Ibidem*.

¹³ <http://www.vox.com/2014/9/10/6133971/obama-isis-speech-text>, accessed 12.09.2014.

¹³ *Ibidem*.

First, we will conduct a systematic campaign of airstrikes against these terrorists. Working with the Iraqi government, we will expand our efforts beyond protecting our own people and humanitarian missions, so that we're hitting ISIL targets as Iraqi forces go on offense. Moreover, I have made it clear that we will hunt down terrorists who threaten our country, wherever they are. That means I will not hesitate to take action against ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq. This is a core principle of my presidency: if you threaten America, you will find no safe haven.¹⁴

Second, we will increase our support to forces fighting these terrorists on the ground. In June, I deployed several hundred American service members to Iraq to assess how we can best support Iraqi Security Forces. Now that those teams have completed their work - and Iraq has formed a government - we will send an additional 475 service members to Iraq. As I have said before, these American forces will not have a combat mission - we will not get dragged into another ground war in Iraq. But they are needed to support Iraqi and Kurdish forces with training, intelligence and equipment. We will also support Iraq's efforts to stand up National Guard Units to help Sunni communities secure their own freedom from ISIL control.¹⁵

Third, we will continue to draw on our substantial counterterrorism capabilities to prevent ISIL attacks. Working with our partners, we will redouble our efforts to cut off its funding; improve our intelligence; strengthen our defenses; counter its warped ideology; and stem the flow of foreign fighters into - and out of - the Middle East. And in two weeks, I will chair a meeting of the UN Security Council to further mobilize the international community around this effort.¹⁶

Fourth, we will continue providing humanitarian assistance to innocent civilians who have been displaced by this terrorist organization. This includes Sunni and Shia Muslims who are at grave risk, as well as tens of thousands of Christians and other religious minorities. We cannot allow these communities to be driven from their ancient homelands.¹⁷

This is our strategy. And in each of these four parts of our strategy, America will be joined by a broad coalition of partners.”¹⁸

Conclusion

So what can be done? No matter how bitter is this finding but for the moment we dont have an option that is quick and satisfactory.

The American Defense Secretary *Chuck Hagel* said that Islamic State (ISIS): “is as sophisticated and well-funded as any group that we have seen.¹⁹ They're beyond just a terrorist group (...) the sophistication of terrorism and ideology married with resources now poses a whole new dynamic and a new paradigm of threats to this country.”²⁰

This gives us the size of the danger. ISIS has territorial ambitions aimed at the current territory of Israel, Lebanon, Iodania, Iraq, Syria and Kuwait.

Around 110 air raids against ISIS in Iraq cost about 7.5 million dollars a day. But even the Pentagon admits that the advance of ISIS, which controls about a third of Iraq and Syria, can be stopped only by air raids.

¹⁴ *Ibidem.*

¹⁵ *Ibidem.*

¹⁶ *Ibidem.*

¹⁷ *Ibidem.*

¹⁸ *Ibidem.*

¹⁹ http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/08/21/hagel_isis_is_more_dangerous_than_al_qaeda, accessed 10.09.2014 at 15.13.

²⁰ *Ibidem.*

An action in Syria is problematic, because it could essentially make the US military a de facto ally of Bashar Al-Assad who also wants to see ISIS.²¹ So far, eight countries have opted to support military the Kurds in Iraq: Albania, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy and the UK.

The Pentagon has asked the Congress for 500 million dollars to equip the moderate forces in Syria and President Obama said the goal is to destroy the Islamic State movement.

We conquire with Gen. John Allen opinion about ISIS:

“We must move quickly to pressure its entire nervous system, break it up, and destroy its pieces. As I said, the president was absolutely right to strike IS, to send advisors to Iraq, to arm the Kurds, to relieve the suffering of the poor benighted people of the region, to seek to rebuild functional and non-sectarian Iraqi Security Forces and to call for profound change in the political equation and relationships in Baghdad.”²²

The whole questionable debate on American war weariness aside, the U.S. military is not war weary and is fully capable of attacking and reducing IS throughout the depth of its holdings, and we should do it now, but supported substantially by our traditional allies and partners, especially by those in the region who have the most to give – and the most to lose – if the Islamic State’s march continues. It’s their fight as much as ours, for the effects of IS terror will certainly spread in the region with IS seeking soft spots for exploitation”²³.

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²¹ <http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid=20140906217162>, accessed 10.09.2014 at 15.14.

²² <http://dish.andrewsullivan.com/2014/08/22/is-isis-a-threat-to-us/>, accessed 10.09.2014 at 15.34.

²³ *Ibidem*.

IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT, MILITARY AND ECONOMY

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Abstract: *The proposed article is about the increasing influence of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps on the Iranian government, defense and economy in the past few years. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are one of the most powerful actors of the Iranian politics. Their influence is bigger and bigger due to military strengthening, installing their former members to highest political posts and developing their own economic activities. They have money, they have political power, and they control internal security and have better equipment than the standard Iranian army at their disposal. The IRGC are responsible only to the supreme leader of the Islamic republic and due to lack of effective external control they are practically an independent power within the Iranian power system.*

This situation and its development in recent years mean that the IRGC have become, according to many analysts, the most important and most powerful actor of the Iranian politics. Iran, which is commonly known as a theocracy ruled by Islamic clergy, can be soon known as a junta ruled country with all security impacts for the whole region and Iran itself.

Keywords: *Iran, Revolutionary Guard Corps, Junta, Regime Army, Military.*

Introduction

Sepah-e pasdaran-e enghelab-e eslami – literally The Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, often called the Revolutionary Guards, or *Sepah* or *Pasdaran* only, is also known as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). It was created shortly after the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. Their main task was the protection of newly created political system after the overthrow of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The originally spontaneously formed group of revolutionary students and religious radicals became, under Khomeini's supervision, a new armed militia protecting the newly established rule of clergy. This new authority was due to historical reasons very suspicious towards the standard army and police, because those institutions were too close to the former regime and Shah himself. Therefore, the Iranian clergy started to rely on the Revolutionary Guards that they had completely under control, trusted their ideological loyalty and could use them in any case of need against the enemy of the new Islamic republic – henchmen of the former regime or newly established opposition. The Revolutionary Guards have become the tool of Iranian domestic terror and helped to form new political system of *velayat-e faqih*¹.

In 1980, Iran was unexpectedly attacked by its neighbor Iraq and this extremely brutal and bloody conflict lasted until 1988. The Iraqi invasion necessarily increased the need for deployment of all armed forces for state defense. The Iranian defense against the modern armed and equipped Iraqi army was actually really poor due to army purges and emigration of majority of high ranked officers. Therefore, the Revolutionary Guards were moved to the war

¹ Usually translated as the guardianship of the Islamic jurists. Basically, the rule of clergy.

front. There, the Guards excelled with their combativeness, determination and fanaticism. They proved themselves competent as an effective combat force and the Iranian regime started to invest more resources and manpower in them. Gradually, during the 80s, the IRGC were split into standard three basic elements of military forces – the army (or land forces), the navy and the air forces. By this division the process of formation of the present form of the Revolutionary Guards was finished. Since then, it is possible to characterize the IRGC as a fully operational parallel army linked only to the ruling clergy and its leader.

1. Gaining of power

The contemporary Iranian regime has undergone its own power-political development with its internal dynamics since its origin in the end of the 1970s. While during its first era the power hierarchy was absolutely evident with ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini on its top along with his closest clerics, after his death in 1989, new actors started to penetrate the Iranian power system. For instance, Wilfried Buchta in his book *Who Rules Iran?* from 2000² divides the Iranian informal power structure into several levels – the patriarchs on the top, the highest ranking government officials and administrators below, and the regime power base including the revolutionary institutions, religious security forces, the Basij³ militia, media and the Revolutionary Guards. The Basij and the IRGC are fully loyal to the Iranian regime due to ideological training. The core concerns of ideological-political education in the Basij and the IRGC case are: the religion of Islam and guardianship, the importance of purification (of the soul) over training, the role of the ideological guard, and the revolutionary value and culture of martyrdom⁴. Due to this ideological indoctrination, both armed forces are more than just an army.

Nevertheless, Buchta's model is now obsolete due to the internal power dynamics of the Iranian regime. The power has been shifting toward the armed forces during the last decade. The Revolutionary Guards have become more influential due to controlling the Iranian economy, using it as a source for financing their own growth. Slater Bakhtavar⁵ offers different distribution of power within Iranian regime. On the top, there is still the authority of the Supreme Leader of Iran, but at the second place Bakhtavar places the Revolutionary Guards that increased their power by infiltration of the most influential points and posts of the Iranian economy and by strengthening their own position in the field of internal and external state security.

What happened that the IRGC got such a huge economic power which affects their importance within politics and national security system? Since the 1990s, the Iranian religious foundations, called *bonyad* in Persian, have become the most important actors of the Iranian economy. They expanded their financial resources when they took control of assets confiscated after the revolution from wealthy Iranians and the Pahlavi Foundation. During the 90s *bonyads* controlled and disbursed billions of dollars and greatly enriched those associated with them, using their own wealth to gain patronage, invest in a wide array of business interests, and generally advance their own power and influence. Moreover, the *bonyads* were

² Wilfried. BUCHTA, *Who Rules Iran?*, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington D.C., 2000, p. 9.

³ The Basij - *Sazmane Basij-e Mostaz'afin*, literally "The Organization for Mobilization of the Oppressed" is a paramilitary militia composed of volunteers and established by ayatollah Khomeini in late 1979. It is controlled by the IRGC and during the Iraq-Iran war participated in combat actions on the front. Nowadays, it is mainly used for internal security, suppressing riots and anti-regime demonstrations, and in case of foreign invasion to Iran they would serve as home-defense force and the fifth column.

⁴ Saeid GOLKAR, "The Ideological-Political Training of Iran's Basij" in *Middle East Brief*, No. 44, September 2010, p. 6. Available online at: <http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB44.pdf>.

⁵ Slater BAKHTAVAR, *Iran: The Green Movement*, Parsa Enterprises, Irving, 2009, pp. 4-10.

(and remain) unaccountable to anyone but the Supreme Leader. Nowadays they control estimated 10-20 percent of Iran's gross domestic product.⁶

Although the foundations are under control of the Supreme Leader, they have been more and more influenced by the Revolutionary Guards for the last few years. For instance, two important *bonyads*, which are not directly controlled by the IRGC but are indirectly influenced by it, are the *Bonyad Mostazafan* (Foundation of the Oppressed or The Mostazafan Foundation) and the *Bonyad Shahid va Omur-e Janbazan* (Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs). The current director of Mostazafan is Mohammad Forouzandeh, the former head of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics and a former IRGC officer. The *Bonyad Shahid* maintains a strong link to the IRGC, with former IRGC Air Force commander Hossein Dehghan acting as its president. The point is that many foundations are directly ruled by the Revolutionary Guards and many are ruled by former members of the IRGC or are somehow personally related to them.⁷

The Economic activities of the IRGC are wider than focusing on foundations. The Defense Industries Organization, an umbrella group which consisted of such companies as the Iran Electronic Industries and the Iran Advanced Technology Corporation, is under control of the Revolutionary Guards. Because of that the IRGC have supervision and direct access to Iranian arms industry and also monopolize the transfer and adaptation of high technology to civilian applications, leaving little room for private producers and service providers. Companies under the influence of the IRGC are active in petrochemical industry, too, and control production, transportation and exportation of oil and natural gas. The Revolutionary Guards have also muscled their way into the Iranian telecommunications sector, which provides not only financial gain, but also access to wiretapping and interrupting communication, if necessary. The IRGC are also heavily involved in Iran's underground economy. They leverage their control over Iran's borders and airports into financial gain. For example, Payam International Airport near Karaj, northwest of Tehran, is state-owned and IRGC-operated. In theory, it is a post airport, but there is no customs control. This means that there are no duties, no additional taxation and all profit from the smuggled goods goes to the IRGC. Because the Iranian government subsidizes fuel, the Revolutionary Guardsmen can realize a 200 to 300 percent profit by selling subsidized gasoline abroad⁸.

The IRGC are active even behind the Iranian borders, mostly in Iraq and Afghanistan. Iranian consulates and embassies worldwide are also centers of intelligence and commerce. In Afghanistan, the entire Iranian representation is determined for controlling, supervision and coordination of business activities of the Revolutionary Guards. Majority of important or lucrative dealings or government investments are (directly or indirectly) in the hands of the IRGC⁹.

⁶ David THALER; Alireza NADER, *Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2010, pp. 57-58.

⁷ Frederic WEHREY et al., *The Rise of Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2010, pp. 58-59.

⁸ Ali ALFONEH, "How Intertwined Are the Revolutionary Guards in Iran's Economy?," in *American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research*, No. 3, October 2007, pp. 2-5. Available online at: http://www.aei.org/files/2007/10/22/20071022_MEno3g.pdf.

⁹ Josef KRAUS, "Íránské aktivity v Afghánistánu: Konstruktivní nebo destruktivní přístup?," in *Obrana a strategie*, Vol. 12. No. 2. Available online at: <http://www.defenceandstrategy.eu/cs/archiv/rocnik-2012/2-2012/volna-tribuna/iranske-aktivity-v-afghanistanu.html#VAX7nObBAYk>.

2. Iranian junta?

There are plenty of such examples creating huge IRGC's economic influence. It is no surprise that the Revolutionary Guards are the best equipped and supplied part of the Iranian armed forces. It is necessary to add that the IRGC's position improved during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency, Ahmadinejad being a former member of the IRGC himself who still has strong ties to it. That is why his government allowed the Revolutionary Guards to get involved in the Iranian economy to such an extent.

The orientation of the IRGC towards the economic growth and profit means reducing the power of the most privileged group in Iran – the clergy.

With such a dynamic strengthening of the Revolutionary Guards, more and more experts start to ask the question whether they are still fully controlled by the Supreme Leader and his closest clerical followers, or whether they are more independent power aspiring to rule the country. According to Abbas Milani¹⁰, Stanford University professor, due to the increasing economic power and independence, the Revolutionary Guards are transforming the Iranian political system into a classical military junta. Ramin Ahmadi¹¹ speaks about a growing tension between the IRGC and the Shia clergy because of the strengthening of the former at the expense of the latter. If such a tension really exists, it is unlikely that the IRGC are still fully under control of the clergy, otherwise the Revolutionary Guards wouldn't be able to behave in ways the clerics would disapprove.

So who actually rules the IRGC? The highest authority for the Revolutionary Guards is *de jure* (according to Iranian constitution) and *de facto* the Supreme Leader – ayatollah Saeed Ali Khamenei. The guardians are loyal to him and he determines the main directions for political and security moves of the IRGC. On the other hand, the Revolutionary Guards, according to available information, have high autonomy in their decision making and economic activities. It is unimaginable that Khamenei knows about all actions and moves committed by the IRGC. It concerns economic activities (even those underground), external and internal politics, as well as all security matters including intelligence or supporting of terrorism worldwide.

Conclusion

The Revolutionary Guards have gone a long way from the aggressive mob of students and zealots in the streets of Iranian cities, through voluntary militia protecting the regime from the internal and external threat, to a parallel army with high level of autonomy, huge influence on the Iranian economy and their own political interests in Iran and abroad. For the last decade, their power in the mentioned fields has impressively increased, and therefore speculations about their role in the Iranian regime and their future in it are more and more frequent. Maybe it is the time to reassess the labeling of the Iranian regime as a theocracy and start to speak about it as a junta military rule under the Revolutionary Guards.

¹⁰ Carnegie Endowment, *Taking Tehran's Temperature: One Year On*, the transcription of conference, Washington D.C., 2010. Available online at: <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/0609carnegie-tehran.pdf>

¹¹ Ramin AHMADI, Iran's Mullahs vs. the Revolutionary Guards, in *World Affairs*, Vol. 176, No. 3, September-October 2013.

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IMAGOLOGICAL IMPACT OF THE MEDIATION OF THE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE PUBLIC

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Abstract: *Terrorism. Probably one of the most commonly used terms in international summits on the topic of security. Due to its evolution and diversification of modes of action, this phenomenon has evolved substantially.*

This ascension of the phenomenon is based on two stages that favor its development: the physical and the imagological effect.

If the first stage represents the engine that generates the wave of terror, the next step consists in designing the terror on global scale through the means, methods and media mechanisms.

Therefore, after a terrorists attack the victims can be divided into two categories: direct, which have been physically affected and indirect, those who have experienced psychological effect, on a mental level.

How strong can be the imagological impact through the mediation of the terrorist attacks over the public? What effects may appear above the international security due to this process? Is there a possibility through which this impact can be reduced? These are just some of the questions that we will seek to find answers.

Keywords: *terrorism, mediation of terrorists attacks, public, imagological impact.*

Introduction

Today one of the most threatening problems that the human kind is facing is shaped in a form that is well known as terrorism. This international scourge showed in the near past that even countries that have a high level of security and well prepared structures in this domain of activity whose mission is to counter such threats, for example United States of America, are caught on the wrong foot not just once.

The main key that guided this phenomenon to its success stand it two important issues. First of all, the war against terrorism is an asymmetrical one. On one hand terrorists organization can choose any mean necessary just to fulfill they mission, while the forces that counter it cannot act in such way. For example, terrorists are willing to make in a bombing civilian and military casualties. It doesn't matter for them as long if they achieve their mission. On the other hand, military forces cannot harm civilians in a mission against a terrorist organization. The second issue that grants terrorism success is bases on a very simple aspect: in the age of information and communication, we do not understand terrorism enough to stop it. And by that we refer to the causes, motivations and purpose that terrorist have on their actions.

To emphasize, the asymmetrical war against terrorism and the low level of understanding it ensures it in the near future an open path to continue to maintain its status of an international threat. Besides these, terrorist acts are becoming increasingly popular because of the mediation of terrorist attacks.

In the age of media, information and communication terrorists had found that not only the physical part of an attack may be dangerous but also the imagological effect which takes place after the attack may be as well. In fact, due to the media, the imagological impact creates much more victims on psychic scale, which is one of the terrorist main targets.

1. Media and terrorism

In present, every person depends on information and of course communication. The element that combines these two important aspects is the media. Thereby we consume media every day to keep life moving through daily activities like work, education, personal relationships, health care, entertainment, traveling, leisure activities and the other stuff with which we are involved.¹

Media tries to provide topical news that brings the present in everyone house through its means. It is all the time in rush after the first news, after exclusive and after the journalistic „bomb”.²

This usefulness of media gave terrorists a new perspective about their attacks. They use media as an ally to extend the effects of a bombing attack over the audience. This extension is the imagological impact over the public.

So, if the media is in search of fresh and exclusive news and terrorist use media as a mechanism to propagate the attack, does this thing makes media truly an ally of terrorist?

The answer to the question above is quite simple. A terrorist attack is an important event. Each major event is broadcasted by media means towards the world. By this the media is rewarded by a great size of audience, thus a great financial growth. In the same time, terrorists get what they need: a great publicity, the chance to share their message to their friends or foes and the opportunity to show their ability to strike even against to the strongest nations.³ Between terrorist and media there is one thing, a perfect symbiosis relationship, they feed off each other.

As it had been said, terrorist organizations depend on the media system in order to advance their messages, means, goals and of course to gather attention⁴. It is the most efficient way to expand their bombing all over the world.

In this simple way, terrorism found a path to link themselves to the world. That link is the media. An example is the 11 September 2001, when millions of people all over the world were able to see the two Twin Towers collapsing in the same moment as well as those who directly witnessed the catastrophe. Not only the terrorist succeeded to fulfill their mission by destroying the Two Towers, forcing the U.S.A. government to take a political action but they also showed how easily is to penetrate into a state with a high level of security, destroy its monuments, pointing out that anyone can be a potential target.

Besides these, terrorists do not wait for the traditional media to broadcast their action, even if in our days this process is extremely fast. Some of the terrorist organization use social media. The main reason is that terrorist use this type of media is because that on behalf of it they can reverse the connection between them and media.

Using social media terrorist don't have to wait for televisions, radios or newspapers to broadcast or write about their attacks. They can actually „broadcast themselves”. In other

¹<http://www2.uncp.edu/home/acurtis/Courses/ResourcesForCourses/Media&Society/MassMediaInfluenceOnSociety.html>, accessed at 16:47, 12.09.2014.

² Ana Maria Sireteanu, *Media și Imagologia*, editura Tritonic, București 2005, p. 9.

³ Brigitte L. Nachos, *Terrorism – A Global Challenge*, Columbia University, United Nations University Global Seminar Second Shimame – Yamaguchi Session, 5-6 August 2006.

⁴ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorism_and_social_media, accessed at 19:07, 12.09.2014.

words terrorists organizations have taken this relationship between themselves and mass-media to a new level.

It is actually well known that a large amount of organized terrorist groups use the internet to spread out their causes and purposes. Nearly 90% of them use the social media, such as Twitter, Facebook or YouTube and other internet forums to submit their messages to the world, recruit members or even gather intelligence. The social media is enabling the terrorists to take initiatives by making "friend" requests, uploading video clips and they no longer have to finish their goals with the passive tools available on regular websites.⁵

Terrorists use the social media for many reasons. One of them, and I think this is the most important of them all, is that through it they actually change the process between them and the media. They no longer wait after a bombing for T.V. channels to broadcast the attack. They can upload and show the world exactly what images or videos they want, express what they want and find new possible recruits. By this media tool terrorists that were a passive viewer become active, saying what they want.

Another main reason that terrorist have leaning toward social media is because it is cheap. The technological advancements helped us to access the internet by using few economical resources. It is enough to purchase a laptop, which is an extremely flexible way to access the internet, can be used in any space and most of the people can afford to buy one, and to become active on social media.

The last reason that causes the terrorist to proceed to social media is the changing audience behavior in the past decade.⁶ The interactive part of the social media, the global reach of the internet and the new technologies have transformed the social media into a „must have”. If we think about the leap that Facebook took in the last few years⁷ we might see the power that lies beneath the social media. This type of new media had changed our society, thing that didn't pass unnoticed by terrorists.

This need to act as much as possible on social networks was observed even on terrorist groups leaders behavior. For example the current leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri argues that “al-Qaeda is in a battle and more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. Al-Qaeda is in a media battle for the hearts and minds of the *ummah*⁸”.

To sum up at the ending of this chapter, between media and terrorism is a close connection. This is possible because, on each terrorist attack by broadcasting it the media channels attracts a great number of audience, exactly what terrorist wants. The difference is that for media a great number of audience means an economical growth and for terrorism this means that their bombing did not limited to the physical aspect but continued through its media coverage on psychological level and continued to create victims.

2. The imagological impact over the public

In the last chapter we discussed about few but relevant aspects about the link between media and terrorism. We pointed out how media and terrorism are helping each other, indirectly, each of them seeking their own goals on this scale.

This connection operates in favor of the terrorist organization. They know that by broadcasting a bombing they create more victims.

⁵ <http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/terrorist-groups-recruiting-through-social-media-1.1131053>, accessed at 14.09.2014.

⁶ <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/22/terrorism-and-the-media-a-dangerous-symbiosis/>, accessed at 14.09.2014.

⁷ <http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/feb/04/facebook-in-numbers-statistics>, accessed at 14.09.2014.

⁸ Nation or community.

By victims we are referring not only directly, on those who were physical involved, but emphasize, like we already said, on psychological aspects.

Most of the terrorist acts are not strictly based on a large number of deaths. Their attacks have a subliminal message. They want to force the government of the state and not only to take a political position. They want so spread out their reasons and purposes. The terrorists want the world to know about them, to fear them, to show how easily is to penetrate into a high security level state and to change the currency of normality.

But how is it possible that people who did not attended a terrorist attack are victims. How is it possible that the wave of terror affect them even if they did not assist directly on the bombing? This process is done through the media by an so called imagological impact.

To start with it is necessary to outline what imagology means. Imagology is the interdisciplinary science that studies communication through images and the way these images crystallize as part of the individual and the collective spirit depending on the dimensions of interpretation that the human groups offer during their historical development.⁹

The study object of imagology is the image itself.¹⁰ Now, by mediating a terrorist attack the images of the results of the bombing are spreading all over the world. This means that media is „promoting” terrorism through imagological efforts. What exactly this means? Because the human itself is an *image bearer*, even if he is aware or not, the images that he sees, he consume them and this will reflect in his daily routine. In other words, the images that he sees, creates mental images. This process is the same even if a person listens on a radio about a terrorist attack. The human brain will create images on mental scale, which will lead finally to the same changes on the routine.¹¹ These mental images are imagological media creations.

Seeing these images of a terrorist attack will create reactions on the individual psychic. Actually, we might say that the victims that are watching the broadcasted images are dragged closer to the event without feeling the attraction. Beside this, the continuous broadcasting of the images of the event will crystallize them on the individuals mental.

Most of the people that are watching or listening to a media mean that broadcast a terrorist attack will not recognize or feel that on mental scale they are affected. This is because people want to stay informed about important aspects or event of daily international and national level. The more media means will broadcast images about the terrorist attack the more the mental of individuals will be affected.

The repetition of the images is the key to this process. Why media continues to speak about this kind of event even after some days or even weeks? Simple, the event will continue to attract attention which will continue to create an economic growth. And by further broadcasting the message of terrorist will continue to be heard.

Interesting about this fact is that people who spend more than 6 hours informing about a terrorist attack will be more traumatized than the people who were on the scene¹². This is possible because a person who has taken part directly at a terrorist attack visualize the action once in a very powerful way, affecting its psychic in a way. But a person, even if he didn't were a direct witness of the tragic event, if he is watching or listens to information about it, his psychic will be „attacked” numerous times with the same images, like he witness did. Of course the impact will not be immediately the same on the mental scale of the person, but the constant broadcasting of the images will come close and evens surpass the effect which has been done by the live impact. Therefore the impact of media broadcasting is stronger

⁹ Luminita Mihaela Iacob, *Ethnic-psychology and imagology. Syntheses and Researches*, Iasi, Polirom, 2003, p. 27.

¹⁰ Ana Maria Sireteanu, *Media și Imagologia*, editura Tritonic, București 2005, p. 21.

¹¹ Ana Maria Sireteanu, *Media și Imagologia*, editura Tritonic, București 2005, p. 22.

¹² <http://www.pnas.org/content/111/1/93.full>, accessed at 14.09.2014.

than the direct exposure when we speak about acute stress responding to collective trauma.

The impact of continuous exposure to images that are showing the result of a terrorist attack were researched by an American research team showed that repeated exposure to violence through traditional and digital information sources can cause more stress damage than if they had directly participated at the attack.¹³

The impact that the mediated images had was outstanding. In the continued search for information people step into an outer side which affects them on a mental psychic level even if they are not aware of this. The media coverage caused more pronounced reactions of stress than the experience itself. And because of the high level of stress other symptoms are appearing such as obsessive thoughts that the person itself can be a potential target, permanent hyper state alert and flashbacks.¹⁴

Contemporary media landscape offers easier access to the images that may cause psychological distress, especially if they are viewed several times by people who are not aware of the second hidden effects due to broadcasting images.

Even if at first look broadcasting the images of a terrorist attack doesn't seem to have second symptoms by media coverage of them individuals who consume them are becoming, indirectly victims. By this, terrorist groups fulfill their mission: forcing the government of the state to take political actions, dealing a number of victims and by media means, their purposes, means and goals are made known to the world.

Conclusion

Terrorism had found in the new era of information an extension for themselves and their attack. An extension that is incredibly useful to them. The imagological impact of a terrorist attack after it has been mediated is outstanding and more impressive is that most of the people don't know that by bringing these images in their life they are becoming indirectly victims of the bombing.

The imagological impact acts on the human psyche scale. Due to the fact that the images that are being broadcasted are repeated numerous times by T.V. channels, internet websites or radio shows transforms them into a way to generate turbulence at the psyche scale.

Terrorists are aware of the indirect bounding between them and media, of the imagological impact that is created on behalf the media coverage of the images that show what a terrorist attack may be capable of. Most of this impact is the result for the desire of people to stay permanently informed. The hunger for information attracts the imagological impact towards public itself.

To sum up, between terrorism and media will always be an invisible bounding, each of them searching for its own benefits. Still, we must be aware of the symptoms of the broadcasted images and the number of hour we allocate to consume them. After all, it is true that we are what we consume, even on mental level.

¹³ <http://www.descopera.ro/dnews/11752928-imaginile-mass-media-ce-infatiseaza-incidente-violente-provoaca-traume-mai-mari-decat-trairea-acestora>, accessed at 21:29, 14.09.2014.

¹⁴ <http://www.pnas.org/content/111/1/93.abstract>, accessed at 23:55, 14.09.2014.

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THE NEGLECT OF ‘DROIT/DEVOIR D’INGÉRENCE’ BY ENGLISH LANGUAGE SCHOLARS WRITING ON THE ‘RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT’ (R2P)

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Abstract: *The doctrine of the responsibility to protect (R2P) was elaborated in 2001 in view of forging unity among the members of the international community on the issue of humanitarian intervention. A correct understanding of this new doctrine is not possible without taking into consideration the conceptualisation of humanitarian intervention as droit/devoir d’ingérence by two Frenchmen, Bernard Kouchner and Mario Bettati, and therefore the origins of both droit/devoir d’ingérence and R2P are shortly exposed and an inquiry into relevant literature devoted to R2P by English language scholars is conducted in order to identify their preoccupation for the connections between these two readings of humanitarian intervention. The paper points out that the examined authors did not refer in their analysis to the droit/devoir d’ingérence and briefly reviews the position of the French language scholars on the relationship between this concept and R2P. The conclusions of this demarche are that the neglect of droit/devoir d’ingérence by English language academics reflects an inadequate flow of information between two cultural spaces which could be partly addressed by means of rigorous research published in English that examines R2P through the lens of droit d’ingérence.*

Keywords: *droit d’ingérence, devoir d’ingérence, responsibility to protect, right of humanitarian intervention, humanitarian assistance, human rights, Bernard Kouchner, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.*

Introduction

Humanitarian intervention is usually defined as the use of force by one or more states /non-state actors against a state in order to stop or prevent death and appalling sufferance it inflicts upon a large part of its own population¹. Reflections on this topic are not confined to the post-Cold War era, as some scholars suggested², but could be traced back to the XIX-th century when the term *humanitarian intervention* appeared. According to Davide Rodogno (Rodogno 2012), phrases similar to *humanitarian intervention* first appeared in the French language and latter have been also used in the English language³. Thus, Rodogno indicates that at the beginning of the Greek War of Independence, in 1821, the Russian diplomat and famous bibliophile Dmitri Petrovitch comte de Boutourlin wrote in his pamphlet *Des Grecs, des Turcs, et de l’Esprit Public Européen* about the war in the name of humanity while the

¹ See for example the definitions of humanitarian intervention advanced by Jeff L. Holzgrefe (J. L. Holzgrefe, *The Humanitarian Intervention Debate*, p. 18), Aidan Hehir (Aidan Hehir, *Humanitarian Intervention. An Introduction*, p. 20), Jennifer Welsh (Jennifer Welsh, *Introduction*, p. 3) and Allen Buchanan (Allen Buchanan, *Reforming the International Law of Humanitarian Intervention*, p. 130).

² Michael Ignatieff, Noam Chomsky and Samantha Power are some of the scholars that in the `1990 advocated such a reading of humanitarian intervention. See on this issue Brendan Simms and D.J.B Trim, *Towards a History of Humanitarian Intervention*, pp. 8-10.

³ Davide Rodogno, *Against Massacre: Humanitarian Intervention in the Ottoman Empire 1815-1914*, p. 54.

American jurist and diplomat Henry Wheaton maintained in his celebrated treaty *Elements of International Law*, published after the end of this war, in 1836, that military operations of the European Powers on behalf of the Greek revolutionaries represented an example of an intervention “where the general interests of humanity are infringed”⁴.

The origins of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention are to be found in the French speaking world where Egide Arntz laid its foundation in a letter form 1876 published in *Revue de Droit International et de Législation Comparée*⁵ where he spelled out the conditions that give rise in international law to the right of intervention (*droit d'intervention*) and where Antoine Rougier developed this concept in his study from 1910 suggestively entitled *La théorie de l'intervention d'humanité* (The Theory of Humanitarian Intervention). Rougier's perspective on the right (and duty) of humanitarian intervention (*droit d'intervention d'humanité*) incumbent to certain states on both moral and legal grounds was well known and appreciated by prominent American international law jurists in the interwar period⁶ but also in the 1970s when the world was engaged in the Cold War⁷.

However, the international order established after the World War II and having the United Nations Charter as its cornerstone valued state sovereignty higher than the assistance of the victims and therefore humanitarian intervention soon fell into disrepute (Wheeler 2000, Ikenberry 2009, Nardin 2002) and consequently scholars paid little or no attention to it until the end of the Cold War. Despite the general lack of interest for this topic during this epoch, in both the English and French speaking world there have been some attempts to rehabilitate the humanitarian intervention, the best-known one belonging to the French physician Bernard Kouchner⁸.

1. The emergence of *droit/devoir d'ingérence*

In 1968, the refusal of the Nigerian government to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid to the people from the besieged town of Biafra who desperately needed it prompted various scholars and NGO workers from both English and French speaking world to call into question the respect of the principle of non-intervention in cases of massive loss of human life (Allen, Styan 2000, Onuf 2004, Roberts 1993, Lillich 1973).

Following these tragic events, Bernard Kouchner, who had witnessed them as a volunteer for the *International Committee of the Red Cross*, began to campaign against the reading of state sovereignty as a barrier for the distribution of emergency relief and in 1971 founded the humanitarian organization *Médecins Sans Frontières*. Further on, together with the jurist Mario Bettati, he organized in 1987 the *Première Conférence Internationale de Droit et Morale Humanitaire* (First International Conference on Humanitarian Law and Ethics) where they launched their view on *droit/devoir d'ingérence* which was subsequently strongly backed by prominent politicians from France (Kouchner, Bettati 1987, Bettati 1996, Allen, Styan 2000).

⁴ Henry Wheaton cited in Davide Rodogno, *Against Massacre: Humanitarian Intervention in the Ottoman Empire 1815-1914*, p. 54.

⁵ The latter was published by Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns, the editor of this journal, in his article *Note sur la théorie du droit d'intervention*.

⁶ One example is Ellery C. Stowel, *Intervention In International Law*, p. 55.

⁷ A relevant example is Thomas M. Franck and Nigel S. Rodley, *After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force*, note 12.

⁸ One could mention three prominent American jurists that in the 1960s and 1970s defended the humanitarian intervention: Michael Reisman, Myres S. McDougal (Michael Reisman, Myres S. McDougal, *Memorandum upon Humanitarian Intervention to protect the Ibos*) and Richard B. Lillich (Richard B. Lillich (ed.) *Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations*).

In the preface of the volume that came out of this conference, Kouchner stated that: “The ambition of this book is enormous. It is about supplementing the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* in the name of an ethics of extreme urgency (*morale de l'extrême urgence*), in the name of the duty to intervene (*devoir d'intervention*). The right of humanitarian intervention (*droit d'intervention humanitaire*) must be added to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”⁹. The resolution adopted by the participants to this conference, entitled *Résolution sur la Reconnaissance du devoir d'assistance humanitaire et du droit à cette assistance* (Resolution on the Recognition of the Duty of Humanitarian Assistance and of the Right to this Assistance), make clear that, from a moral point of view, the victims have a *right* (emphasis added) to humanitarian assistance while the states have the correlative *duty* (emphasis added) to offer this assistance which is an instance of the duty of solidarity¹⁰. It is to be mentioned that the English translation Kouchner later gave to the term *droit d'ingérence* was *right to humanitarian intervention*¹¹.

According to its French supporters, this reading of *droit/devoir d'ingérence* rapidly enjoyed widespread support in the international community that in 1988 took the form of a United Nations General Assembly resolution¹² and, after the end of the Cold War, manifested in the United Nations Security Council resolutions adopted with respect to the Kurds in Northern Iraq (1991), to the situation in Bosnia & Herzegovina (1992-1995), Somalia (1992-1993), and equally informed the broad approval for NATO's intervention in Kosovo from 1999 (Kouchner 1999, Bettati 1996, 2007). It was thus normal for the French language researchers to be seriously preoccupied with *droit/devoir d'ingérence* and to get involved in intense debates on its scope, advantages and deficiencies¹³.

2. The doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect – a project designed to rally the international community around humanitarian intervention

The concept of the *right of humanitarian intervention* gained currency among diplomats and high-level politicians after the end of the Cold War but they disagreed on its conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter regarding sovereignty as plainly proved by the intense dissensions aroused in 1999 by NATO's intervention in Kosovo when numerous non-Western states voiced concerns over a return to past colonial practices¹⁴.

Confronted with the inability of the right to humanitarian intervention to build a consensus around it within the international community, Kofi Annan in his capacity as United Nations Secretary General, urged the international community in 1999 and again in 2000 (Annan 1999, 2000) to look for an innovative way of reconciling state sovereignty with

⁹ Bernard Kouchner, *Préface. Le devoir d'ingérence*, p.10.

¹⁰ See the text of this resolution that is included in *Le devoir d'ingérence*, pp. 291-292.

¹¹ Bernard Kouchner, *The Right to Intervention: Codified in Kosovo*.

¹² United Nations General Assembly, *Humanitarian Assistance to Victims of Natural Disasters and Similar Emergency Situations*, UN document A/RES/43/131.

¹³ Relevant for the controversies among French language scholars on this issue are: Mario Bettati, *La France et le nouvel ordre humanitaire international*; Mario Bettati, *Un droit d'ingérence?*; Mario Bettati *Le droit d'ingérence. Mutation de l'ordre international*; Olivier Paye, *Du droit à l'assistance humanitaire au droit à l'ingérence humanitaire: un dérapage conceptuel dangereux*; Eric David, *Droit ou devoir d'ingérence humanitaire*; Pierre Michel Eisemann, *Devoir d'ingérence et non-intervention: de la nécessité de remettre quelques pendules à l'heure*; Xavier Emmanuelli, *Les prédateurs de l'action humanitaire*; Olivier Corten, Pierre Klein, *L'assistance humanitaire face à la souveraineté des Etats*; Marie-Christine Delpal, *Politique extérieure et diplomatie morale: le droit d'ingérence humanitaire en question*; Jean Bernard Moussavou-Moussavou, *Du devoir d'ingérence humanitaire au droit d'ingérence humanitaire*; Charles Zorgbibe, *Le Droit d'ingérence*; Alain Pellet (ed.), *Droit d'ingérence ou devoir d'assistance humanitaire?*

¹⁴ See United Nations General Assembly, Official Records of the Plenary Meetings 14 September – 02 October 1999, UN documents A/54/PV.1-22.

humanitarian intervention. In response to Annan's call, the Canadian government established in September 2000 the *International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (ICISS) and appointed Gareth Evans – former foreign minister of Australia – and Mohamed Sahnoun – a distinguished Algerian diplomat - as its co-chairs (ICISS 2001b). ICISS released its report a year later in which it developed the doctrine of the responsibility to protect¹⁵. Its findings, warmly welcomed by Kofi Annan (Annan 2002) have been largely taken over by the *United Nations High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* (HLP) in its 2004 report¹⁶ and the next year a new version of the R2P doctrine was agreed upon at the 2005 *High-Level Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly* and included in paragraphs 138-140 of the in UNGA resolution 60/1 known as *World Summit Outcome Document* (WSOD). In 2006, the United Nations Security Council equally expressed in resolution 1674 its commitment to the R2P doctrine enshrined in the WSOD. Since 2009, the incumbent United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon elaborates each year a report on the responsibility to protect (Ban 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013) which is debated by United Nations General Assembly¹⁷ in a sustained effort to advance its implementation.

It is maintained that the ultimate test for the viability of this doctrine was successfully passed on 17 March 2011 when the United Nations Security Council authorized in resolution 1973 an international military action against the Libyan government forces besieging the town of Benghazi (Bellamy & Williams 2011, Weiss 2011, Western & Goldstein 2011).

3. *Droit d'ingérence* and the reading of the R2P doctrine by the English language scholars

ICISS assumed as its primary objective the consideration of the right of humanitarian intervention as it was clearly stated in the first phrase of its report: "This report is about the so-called "right of humanitarian intervention": the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take coercive – and in particular military – action, against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other state"¹⁸. The international research team that assisted the commission as well as Gareth Evans acknowledged that this right originated in the XIX-th century and that the work of Bernard Kouchner had an impact on it¹⁹. For Evans, the contribution of Kouchner to the debate on humanitarian intervention was to advance "new twists on the old humanitarian intervention theme"²⁰. However, neither the ICISS commissioners, nor its accompanying research team or Gareth Evans as a private person engaged in a thoughtful exploration of the interplay between responsibility to protect and

¹⁵ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*.

¹⁶ High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, UN document A/59/565.

¹⁷ United Nations General Assembly, Official Records of the Plenary Meetings 21-28 July 2009, UN documents A/63/PV.96-101; United Nations General Assembly, Informal Interactive Dialogue On Early Warning, Assessment and The Responsibility To Protect, 9 August 2010, available at www.globalr2p.org; United Nations General Assembly, Informal Interactive Dialogue on *The Role of Regional and Sub-regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, 12 July 2011, available at www.globalr2p.org; United Nations General Assembly, Informal Interactive Dialogue on *Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Action*, 5 September 2012, available at www.globalr2p.org; United Nations General Assembly, Informal Interactive Dialogue on *Responsibility to protect: State responsibility and prevention*, 11 September 2013 available at www.globalr2p.org

¹⁸ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *op. cit.*, p. VII.

¹⁹ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background. Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, pp. 16-17 and 138; Gareth Evans, *The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All*, p. 32.

²⁰ Gareth Evans, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

droit d'ingérence as a distinctive approach to the issue of the right of humanitarian intervention. In the report of the HLP and in the WSOD this problem was equally ignored.

Soon after its release, the report of ICISS was carefully considered by many English language scholars such as Edward Newman (Newman 2002), Jennifer Welsh, Caroline Thielking Neil MacFarlane (Welsh, Thielking, MacFarlane 2002), Ian Williams (Williams 2002), David Ryan (Ryan 2002), Jennifer Welsh (Welsh 2002), Robert Jackson (Jackson 2003), Daniel Warner (Warner 2003) but an analysis of their work reveals that they made no reference to *droit d'ingérence*. A short reference to *droit d'ingérence* is to be found in the commentary on this report written in English and published in the United States by Joelle Tanguy (Tanguy 2003), a both French and US citizen and former Executive Director of *Médecins Sans Frontières USA*²¹, who mentioned that “The goal of the commission’s report is to shift the terms of the debate on humanitarian intervention, primarily by supplanting already existing principles such as the right to intervene, or *droit d'ingérence* (...) coined in the 1980s by French scholar Mario Bettati and humanitarian and politician Bernard Kouchner”²².

As a result of the R2P doctrine becoming more and more important in the field of international affairs, the interest for it continued to grow and, consequently, the English literature dedicated to this subject constantly multiplied. Some of the problems extensively explored are the following ones: (a) the effects of the global fight against terrorism on the international support for the R2P doctrine which was discussed among others by Thomas Weiss (Weiss 2004), Neil MacFarlane, Caroline Thielking, Thomas Weiss (MacFarlane, Thielking, Weiss, 2004), Jennifer Welsh (Welsh 2006b) and Gareth Evans (Evans 2008a); (b) the various transformations underwent by this doctrine that was approached by authors such as Alex J. Bellamy (Bellamy 2010, 2013), Gareth Evans (Evans 2008 b); (c) the way politicians and the United Nations organs made use of it, a topic that was reviewed by Gareth Evans (Evans 2008 b), Donald Steinberg (Steinberg, 2009), Weiss (Weiss, 2011), Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (Bellamy, Williams, 2011), Jon Western, Joshua S. Goldstein (Western & Goldstein, 2011), Justin Morris (Morris, 2013).

A comprehensive analysis of this diverse scientific work supports the conclusion that there are at most fugitive references to *droit d'ingérence* so that a serious analysis of the conceptual linkage between this concept and R2P is conspicuously lacking.

Based on the work of English language scholars it is possible to conclude that the R2P doctrine differs so much from *droit d'ingérence* that a comparative analysis of them could have no relevance for the understanding of the former. However, one could call into question such a reading of the R2P doctrine based on two main arguments.

The first one is that, prior to the formulation of the R2P doctrine, almost all English language scholars paid virtually no attention to *droit d'ingérence* in the debates on humanitarian intervention they engaged in during the `1990, notable exceptions being Jonathan Benthall²³, Renée Fox²⁴, David Styan²⁵, Tim Allen²⁶ and Jacinta O’Hagan²⁷ (Allen,

²¹ A short biographical notice of Joelle Tanguy is available on the website of International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies - www.ifrc.org/en/who-we-are/governance/global-senior-management-team_old/joelle-tanguy/

²² Joelle Tanguy, *Redefining Sovereignty and Intervention*, p. 142.

²³ Jonathan Benthall, *Disasters, Relief and the Media*. London, I.B. Tauris, 1993.

²⁴ Renée Fox, *Medical humanitarianism and human rights: Reflections on Doctors without Borders and Doctors of the World*, *Social Science & Medicine*, vol. 41, nr. 12, 1995, pp. 1607-1616.

²⁵ David Styan *The Origins of Le Droit D’ingérence and its Contradictory relationship with French African Policy*, Bordeaux/GRAF, mimeo, 1996.

Styan 2000). Equally, in the same period, journalists from the English-speaking world were unaware about Kouchner's work and personality as professor Tim Allen discovered in 1999 when he wanted to arrange with BBC an interview of Bernard Kouchner²⁸.

The second argument is that the French language scholars devote considerable attention to the relationship between *droit d'ingérence* and the R2P doctrine and are involved in an intense controversy on this issue. Mario Bettati (Bettati 2007) Jean-Marie Crouzatier (Crouzatier 2008), Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Luigi Condorelli (Boisson de Chazournes, Condorelli 2006) argue that R2P is nothing else but another name for *droit d'ingérence*. More exactly Bettati argues that "le droit d'ingérence was sanctioned by the World Summit of heads of states and government from 16 September 2005 under a new denomination : *the responsibility to protect*"²⁹, Crouzatier maintains that the WSOD "brings nothing new: the inspirer of the *droit* or *devoir d'ingérence* Bernard Kouchner made use of the same terms to justify it"³⁰ and Boisson de Chazournes and Condorelli express the view that "the phrase responsibility to protect is undeniably a brilliant diplomatic invention whose success (...) owes a lot to the fact that it is less difficult to "swallow" than the very mediatized ancient phrase *droit (or devoir) d'ingérence*"³¹. On the other hand, Jean-Baptiste Vilmer Jeangène considers that the two doctrines significantly differ given that "the R2P was created not only *without* the contribution of the *droit d'ingérence* but even *against* it"³². There are also authors, such as Rodim Kherad (Kherad 2008), who appreciate that the connection between the two doctrines remains unclear.

Conclusions

The fact that the English language academic community was largely unaware of the contribution brought by Kouchner and Bettati to the development of the right of humanitarian intervention is just one of the numerous cases where information fails to cross the cultural borders. One could mention that the French sociologists knew nothing about Max Weber until 1935 when Raymond Aron published a book on the German sociology as a result of his research in Germany in-between 1930-1933 (Aron, 1981). More recently, at the beginning of the '1990s, Monique Canto-Sperber invited distinguished British moral philosophers to lecture in France because she considered that "the British philosophy is poorly known in France where it is generally very badly viewed"³³.

For all these reasons one could reasonably conclude that an elaborated study published in English on the relationship between the R2P doctrine and *droit d'ingérence* will further the diffusion of the latter concept among the English language scholars while also filling a gap in the English literature on R2P, will make a contribution to the ongoing controversies among

²⁶ Tim Allen, *War Genocide and Aid* in Georg Elwert, Stephan Feuchtwang, Dieter Neubert (eds.) *Dynamics of Violence: Processes of Escalation and De-Escalation in Violent Group Conflicts*, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1999, pp. 177-201.

²⁷ Jacinta O'Hagan, *Whose humanitarianism?: Some non military alternatives?* BISA conference paper, University of Manchester, 1999.

²⁸ "When one of the authors of the present paper (Tim Allen) suggested interviewing Kouchner for a radio programme in 1999, no one in the BBC appeared to have heard of him" (Tim Allen and David, Styan, *A Right to Interfere? Bernard Kouchner and the New Humanitarianism*, p. 829)

²⁹ Mario Bettati, *Du droit d'ingérence à la responsabilité de protéger*, p. 381.

³⁰ Jean-Marie Crouzatier, *Responsabilité de protéger: avancée de la solidarité internationale ou ultime avatar de l'impérialisme?*, p. 14.

³¹ Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Luigi Condorelli, *De la "responsabilité de protéger", ou d'une nouvelle parure pour une notion déjà bien établie*, p. 12.

³² Jean-Baptiste Vilmer Jeangène, *De la mythologie française du droit d'ingérence à la responsabilité de protéger : une clarification terminologique*, p. 89.

³³ Monique Canto-Sperber, *Préface*, p. vi.

French speaking scholars on this issue and will advance the understanding of theoretical complexities of humanitarian intervention.

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THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

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Abstract: *This Paper examines the impact of international criminal law and the international bodies created under its aegis on crisis management and conflict prevention. It analyzes the on-going debates on the jurisdictional relationship between international criminal courts and national systems, by exploring a post-Westphalian legal order where the primacy/complementarity judicial doctrine overcomes states' interests and sovereignty with the object of ending impunity. This analysis comes at a decisive time in the realignment of international relations, as states begin to make common cause against external threats like terrorism and climate change, but also against unpalatable nineteenth-century norms visible in nowadays' interstate violence, internal crises and secessionist movements. Many states now have to accept their own vulnerability to international monitoring and even armed intervention to ensure that they treat their own people with a modicum of dignity.*

Keywords: *crimes against humanity, criminal courts, justice, impunity, security, crisis management, conflict prevention.*

Introduction¹

The international courts in The Hague and the "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine - the case of Libya, for example, or the recent US-led coalition's intervention in Iraq and Syria are confirmations that we have entered a the new systemic paradigm, whereas no longer can a state act exclusively on the advice of Machiavelli or Dr. Kissinger in what its government conceives to be its national interests: there are global norms to be considered. Political theory has difficulties in keeping pace with the events that over the past decades have astonished Westphalian traditionalists as they hear the daily news: General Pinochet arrested in London; Milosevic on trial; Charles Taylor sentenced to long imprisonment; indictments from the International Criminal Court (ICC) against Colonel Gaddafi and charges against the former Ivorian president Laurent Gbagbo; the ICC trial of Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta (whose trial was anticipated to begin in October 2014). More recently, the first thing Ukraine's post-revolutionary parliament did was to vote to send fugitive President Viktor Yanukovich to be tried by the ICC; and last, but not least, following Israel's *Operation Protection Edge* in Gaza, the Palestinian Authority has asked to join the ICC.

International criminal justice poses serious challenges to state sovereignty. However, its gains cannot be denied, if its final output is a constructive enrichment or empowerment of sovereignty itself. "It comes into play when a sovereign so abuses his power over his citizens as to offend our sense of what it means to be human"². International justice simply declares

¹ This paper is based on ideas initially published in the author's book *Towards Global Justice: Sovereignty in an Interdependent World*, T.M.C. Asser Press-Springer, 2013.

² Judith ARMATTA, *Twilight of impunity, The War Crimes Trial of Slobodan Milosevic*, Duke University Press, 2010, p. 9.

that *no one is above the law*. “By his criminal acts the sovereign forfeits his power”³. Being naturally linked to moral values and committed to bringing about sustainable peace and security, international justice has a deterrent effect against cruel power politics and helps to deter emerging threats globally. It is an integral relevant part of the international community’s comprehensive approach to crisis management and conflict prevention, particularly in dealing with the threats of political instability and insecurity arising from war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing and other crimes against humanity.

1. Breaking the Labyrinth of Impunity: Short History

When looking into the history of international criminal law, people usually pay special attention to the establishment of the military tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo after the Second World War. However, its early history needs a thorough reflection too, even though certain proposals to create international criminal institutions were regarded as ineffective, ambiguous, and unenforceable at the time of their submission.⁴ Among them: Gustav Moynier’s draft for a permanent international court in 1872 (his ideas found their way into the 1998 Rome Statute); articles 227-230 from the Treaty of Versailles stipulating that Germany would hand over emperor Wilhelm II to be judged by a special tribunal composed of 5 judges from the victorious countries (US, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan); and last but not least, in 1920 a consultative group of jurists from the League of Nations supported the establishment of a High Court of International Justice.⁵ Romania played an important role in the field, one of the contributors to the last mentioned project being Vespasian V. Pella, the then president of the International Association of Penal Law. Vespasian Pella’s scientific merits are recognized worldwide, as a founder of the international criminal law, promoter of the unification of the criminal law and important architect of international criminal justice.⁶

Condemnation of the Second World War crimes by the Nuremberg Tribunal and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) did not prevent other conflicts, for instance in the Balkans. In 1993, the Security Council decided “to establish an international tribunal for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia between 1 January 1991 and a date to be determined by the Security Council upon the restoration of peace and to this end to adopt the Statute of the International Tribunal”.⁷ The Great Lakes Region in the Sub-Saharan Africa was another challenging area. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established through UNSC Resolution 955 on 8 November 1994, after the bloody events that produced a death toll of 800.000 from Tutsi ethnics. The series of international tribunals also included the so-called hybrid tribunals, such as The Special Court for Sierra Leone, The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia and

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ Christopher HALL, “The first proposal for a permanent international criminal court”, in *The International Review of the Red Cross*, no. 322, 1998, pp. 57-74.

⁵ Diana-Larisa CÎNDEA, *Curtea Penală Internațională*, Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 2008, p. 132.

⁶ Mircea DUȚU, *Vespasian V. Pella (1897-1952): Fondator al dreptului internațional penal, promotor al unificării dreptului penal, artizan al justiției penale internaționale*, Universul Juridic, 2012. Also, the most famous book by the Romanian diplomat and jurist Vespasian V. PELLA: *La guerre – crime et les criminels de guerre; réflexions sur la justice pénale internationale, ce qu’elle est et ce qu’elle devrait être*, Editions de la Baconnière, Neuchatel, 1964.

⁷ Security Council Resolution 827, <http://www.cfr.org/international-criminal-courts-and-tribunals/un-security-council-resolution-827-icty/p25977> (accessed on 20 September 2014).

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, – all established by an agreement between the United Nations and the respective national governments.⁸

The *ad-hoc* international criminal courts were often accused of supporting the policy of the great powers (the so-called “*victor’s justice*”), being unfairly focused on certain areas of conflict, ignoring others⁹, and of offering an *alibi* for a permanent jurisdiction’s delay. On 17 July 1998, the international community reached an historic landmark, when 120 States adopted the Rome Statute as the legal basis for establishing the International Criminal Court. The crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court are mentioned in article 5 (1) of the Statute: „*The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes: (a) The crime of genocide; (b) Crimes against humanity; (c) War crimes; (d) The crime of aggression.*”¹⁰ So far, 122 countries are parties to the Statute (effective as of 1 May 2013). Romania signed the ICC Rome Statute on the 7th of July, 1999 and ratified it by Law no. 111 from 28th of March 2002.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the ICTR, and the aforementioned hybrid tribunals enjoyed primacy over national courts, while the ICC is complementary to the national judicial systems. Complementarity is often regarded as “one of the most opalescent notions of the Rome Statute”¹¹. As Professor Nidal Jurdi pointed out, it looks like “a pragmatic formula between realism and idealism: a realist approach favoring the conservation of states’ sovereignty and an idealist one establishing an international body that transcends state boundaries to fight impunity”¹².

2. Challenges of A Post-Westphalian Legal Order

The traditional Westphalian model of sovereignty - territorial inviolability and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states - is being increasingly challenged by pragmatic compromises to resolve violent crises and conflicts in the post-Cold War world. In reality, it has not been de-legitimized, but rather restricted by the possibility of being overridden by an appeal to the international community.¹³ New dimensions of international justice reveal post-Westphalian tendencies, such as the composition of the panels of judges who come from all over the world. Also, a new dimension of extradition is obvious, since states handover their people more easily, in the name of human rights.

An important limitation of the international criminal courts is the absence of coercive powers: they do not have police forces or ways to effect arrests and collect evidence. Strengthening the nexus between international criminal justice and national capacity to combat impunity is therefore vital. International justice mechanisms can be implemented if

⁸ Hybrid tribunals are therefore treaty-based *sui generis* courts of mixt jurisdiction and composition. Their founding agreement is incorporated in the national law. Contrary to the ICC, the jurisdiction of the *ad-hoc* courts is limited in time and place, and also retrospective.

⁹ Steven R. RATNER, Jason S. ABRAMS, *Accountability for human rights atrocities in international law. Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy*, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 220.

¹⁰ An updated analysis on the Court’s jurisdiction that extends to the four mentioned offences: Geoffrey ROBERTSON, *Crimes against humanity. The struggle for global justice*, Fourth Edition, Penguin Books, 2012, pp. 512-522.

¹¹ Markus BENZING, “The Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court: International Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and the Fight against Impunity”, in *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, Volume 7, 2003, p. 594. Available at: http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf3/mpuny_benzing_7.pdf (accessed on 15 September 2014).

¹² Nidal JURDI, *The International Criminal Court and National Courts: A Contentious Relationship*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011, p. 19.

¹³ Simona ȚUȚUIANU, *Towards Global Justice: Sovereignty in an Interdependent World*”, T.M.C. Asser Press-Springer, 2013, p. 136.

strongly supported by the national states. On the other side, if a state asks for international support, the global community can offer significant assistance at relatively low cost: “*Loans of law enforcement officials, experts and legal advisors, represent an immediate and tangible contribution to the state’s efforts*”.¹⁴ The lessons learned from *ad-hoc* tribunals on how to align international criminal justice knowledge and initiatives with efforts to strengthen domestic criminal justice capacities are most valuable. The ICTY contributed to the development of the International Criminal Court (ICC), whilst the ICTY’s work with local courts and national authorities accelerated EU accession for the countries of former Yugoslavia.

Political influence and the will of states are key challenges to international criminal law. Powerful countries like US, China and Russia still refuse to ratify the ICC Rome Statute. There is also the phenomenon of the development of regional organizations: in Europe, the European Court of Human Rights; in Latin America, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; in Africa, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The evidence shows that it is much easier for Africans to accept the jurisdiction of a tribunal composed of African judges than the ICC’s jurisdiction. Nigeria was seriously criticized for failing to refer Charles Taylor’s case to the African Union, instead taking the decision to hand over the case to a “white man’s Court” located at The Hague.¹⁵ More recently, in October 2013, in Addis Ababa, during the African Union Summit, the high officials agreed that no African head of state should be forced to face a trial during his tenure. Thus, they advocated the rejection of Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta’s case, arguing that, while the mandate of the ICC is global, only Africans have been affected so far by the Court’s proceedings. The question of a possible withdrawal of Kenya from the Rome Statute, thereby creating a worrying precedent for the future relevance of the ICC, should also be noted.¹⁶

The tradition of exile of former heads of state is still of contemporary relevance. This is the case of the former Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, whose exile has protected him from the consequences of a real trial held in Tunisia. It could also become the case of the former Ukrainian president Viktor Fedorovych Yanukovich, whose exile in Russia might obstruct his criminal prosecution (either by national courts or ICC). However, a potential ICC intervention in Ukraine would mark a significant shift in the perception that the ICC is no more than a Western tool with a bias against African states. So international criminal justice is out of Africa and now into Europe and, hopefully more visible in the Middle East in the near future if the crimes committed by the warring parties in Syria are to be referred to the ICC and if the Palestinian Authority succeeds in joining the ICC. This is an optimistic approach, since the hard lessons learned in Libya are not encouraging: within a few short months, support for the Court’s mandate vanished.

Another limiting factor is the major difficulty the prosecutors face in order to obtain the necessary evidence: they have to conduct complex investigations in regions far away from The Hague, where the security situation is unpredictable. Last but not least, since 2007 certain states have restricted their funding for the courts - an irrational move since quite often the same states make demands for more outreach and the caseload of the Court is increasing, along with expectations for it.

¹⁴ Steven R. RATNER, Jason S. ABRAMS, *Accountability for human rights atrocities in international law. Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy*, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 343.

¹⁵ See declaration by Olenka FRENKIEL, *Africa’s test for international justice*, BBC News, 26 February 2008. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/this_world/7259238.stm, accessed on 23 August 2014.

¹⁶ As for the situation in Kenya, there is a positive development in ICC functioning, namely that the Office of Prosecutor used for the very first time *propriu motu* powers to initiate the investigation, without any request made in advance by a Rome Statute member state or UNSC.

The old era of impunity is over and a new era of accountability has begun. An encouraging “justice cascade”¹⁷ has emerged as transparently conducted trials with *big men in small cells* (trials of the Arab Spring, for example) contribute to ending pervasive traditions of impunity. However, the impunity gap between what international and domestic criminal courts can achieve, and what victims expect in the way of justice, can frequently stand for a major threat to the goals of peace and stability. As Professor Jurdi has argued (see above), ending impunity follows moralist approaches of idealism and the ruthless actions of *Realpolitik* in its attempt to make the transition from turbulent crises and conflicts to lasting peace. The essential challenge ahead is how adequately to address the legitimate concerns of states without undermining the need for credible and independent international justice. In other words, it is all about “how to adequately balance idealism with *realpolitik*”.¹⁷

3. Implications for Crisis Management

A short “reality check” of the impact so far of international criminal courts shows that these institutions will always lack the power to resolve the problems of humanity, which result from failed states, terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to organized crime and regional conflicts. However, they have moral authority rather than executive capacity and their role in crisis management can be extremely important, for example in the following circumstances:

1. International criminal courts and their powers to prosecute and to jail perpetrators for long periods serve to deter those leaders who would otherwise be prepared to bring situations to a crisis point by committing international crimes. *Where deterrence works, it has a preventative effect against the excesses of ruthless power politics. International justice can also deter individual military or government officials:* some of Gaddafi’s generals defected to NATO after he had been indicted by the ICC.
2. Even in relation to those nations which are not members of the ICC, there is always a possibility that the Security Council will order its prosecutors to investigate. *This possibility can be used as a bargaining lever in negotiations towards crisis resolution.* It is instructive that the Palestinian Authority is now seeking to join the ICC in order to have a justice mechanism in place in respect of future Israeli attacks on Gaza.
3. Ending impunity for those responsible for committing these crimes can play a *significant role to strengthening a culture of the rule of law and legality, without which other phenomena such as corruption, trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking, political violence and other crimes may continue to flourish*¹⁸.
4. *Lack of international criminal accountability has led to high levels of impunity and repeated cycles of violence.* The 2011 World Development Report of the World Bank states that more than 90 per cent of civil wars in the 2000s occurred in countries that already experienced a civil war in the previous 30 years. The Report confirms that: “*A major episode of violence, unlike natural disasters or economic cycles, can wipe out an entire generation of economic progress*”¹⁹.
5. International criminal courts are effective instruments for *better understanding the roots of conflicts* and their archives can play an important role in seeking to establish a common

¹⁷ Roy S. LEE, *The international Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute*, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p. 227.

¹⁸ See the European Commission’s *Joint Staff Working Document on advancing the principle of complementarity*, Brussels, 31.01.2013, p. 8. Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/icc/docs/joint_staff_en.pdf (accessed on 18 September 2014).

¹⁹ 2011 World Development Report of the World Bank, pp. 5-6. Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Full_Text.pdf (accessed on 15 September 2014).

history of the events. Even better is a Truth and Reconciliation Commission which studies the events leading up to the crisis and makes recommendations to the government about how they can be averted in future.

6. International courts *are significant tools of justice during transition* by offering assistance in processes to achieve justice, truth, reparations, and reconciliation. The survivors of atrocities in northern Uganda and eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) benefited from the international criminal court's Trust Fund for Victims (TFV)²⁰ rehabilitation programmes.

7. International criminal courts *exert strong political pressure in order for particular states to take up their responsibility and start up domestic proceedings* (when these states have the ability to do so). For instance, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor evaluates the situations in the countries such as Afghanistan, Georgia, Nigeria, Ukraine and Iraq. The final goal of the courts is to contribute to *strengthening the states' public policy framework and to fortifying their own justice sector institutions* – including by transferring the skills and methods used in their proceedings to those people working in national legal systems.

8. Crisis management frequently depends on whether the people causing the crisis can be encouraged to take their problems to a form of adjudication. *The fact that there is an international criminal justice system that could come into operation in the event that the crisis develops into war may encourage peaceful settlement of the dispute.*

9. Once activated, the ICC's *jurisdiction over the crime of aggression will serve as a deterrent against illegal war-making and other serious instances of illegal use of force.*²¹

10. *The removal of one or more leaders of a warring party to The Hague to face criminal charges may help to resolve a crisis.* There were peace dividends in Cote d'Ivoire where Laurent Gbagbo was removed to The Hague, and similarly the removal of Milosevic from Serbia took a lot of tension out of the conflict in that state;

11. The doctrine of command responsibility imputes guilt of war crimes and crimes against humanity to military and political leaders who turn a blind eye to savagery perpetrated by their troops or by associated paramilitaries. This important development in international law *serves to deter the escalation of certain crises and requires leaders to moderate the behavior of their followers.*

Conclusions

International criminal courts will continue to face difficult challenges. Hopefully, in a few decades, they will be more recognized and respected and will be more firmly supported by the Security Council and the Human Rights Council. At present they face “the dynamic development and continuing uncertainty that together characterize the present state of international criminal law”.²² The huge task ahead for national states, NGOs and individuals is the shaping of a better international order “consistent not only with the requirements of criminal justice, but also with agreed limits on international authority”.²³

International criminal justice assisted crisis management quite effectively in Sierra Leone, where the leaders of the main warring parties were brought to trial, as was Charles

²⁰ The Rome Statute created the Trust Fund for Victims having two mandates: (i) to implement Court-ordered reparations; and (ii) to provide physical and psychosocial rehabilitation or material support to victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Read more about Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) activities in its Programme Progress Reports available at: <http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/> (accessed on 19 September 2014).

²¹ Following the consensus decision on the crime of aggression amendments adopted in Kampala (Uganda) in 2010, ICC might have, after 2017, jurisdiction with regard to this crime.

²² Bartram S. BROWN (ed.), *Research Handbook on International Criminal Law*, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2011, p. 13.

²³ *Ibidem*.

Taylor, and victims were given a sense that their sorrows had been required. Justice was necessary in that country to ensure its peaceful future. The management of other serious crises can be brought within an accepted paradigm by concentrating on the apprehension and punishment of those primarily responsible for perpetrating war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. The very fact that these are international crimes which may be punished by an international court or even under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, by national courts, gives crisis managers and negotiators an important new lever to encourage peace negotiations and to discourage leaders from directing violence. It can be explained to them that if they refuse to de-escalate hostilities, they may end up for the rest of their lives in The Hague with only lawyers for company!

International justice has given rise to many expectations on which it cannot deliver because it is frequently hamstrung by power politics in the Security Council. In 2011 protesters in Damascus carried banners reading “Al Assad to The Hague”, but the Security Council refused to act even after he had killed tens of thousands of them. However action by the Security Council or by NATO or by “coalitions of the willing” is always possible and it is essential for crisis managers and negotiators to understand international justice mechanisms and doctrines in order to deploy them, where appropriate, especially to discourage political and military leaders from escalating violence and permitting war crimes.

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EUROPOL. EUROPEAN JUDICIAL INVESTIGATIONS

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Abstract: *Europol was established according to the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union of 7 February 1992. Having its headquarters in The Hague, the Netherlands, this organization takes over the tasks of the national police forces in every state in Europe, whenever the criminal activity goes beyond national borders. On the 1st of January 2002, Europol's mandate was expanded in order to be able to deal with all serious forms of international crime as listed in the Annex to the Europol Convention. Europol Convention was ratified by all Member States and entered into force on the 1st of October 1998. After the finalisation of a number of legal acts relating to the Convention, Europol commenced its full activities on the 1st of July 1999. Europol is the European Law Enforcement Organisation which aims at improving the effectiveness and co-operation of the Member States' competent authorities in preventing and combating terrorism, illegal drug trafficking and other serious forms of international organized crime.*

Keywords: *human security, Europol, judicial investigations, joint investigation teams, Eurojust.*

Introduction

States that joined the European Union wanted to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice. Preventing and combating crime through closer cooperation between police forces, customs authorities and other Member States' competent authorities were developed along with the principle of the free movement of persons, in order to guarantee that the abolition of border controls will not lead to an increase in organized crime.

Joint efforts aim at protecting the international security environment, human security, transcultural security (the relations East-West and North-South), energy security, food security, global climate changes and the impact on the international security, European business environment, legal migration, as well as some demographic factors.

Efforts of authorities in charge of judicial decisions focus on identifying and eliminating vulnerabilities, risks, dangers and threats that may lead to the above mentioned situations.

This scientific approach started from a reality : the rapid development of technologies and the freedom of movement have favored the emergence and development of new types of crime both in Romania and in other European countries. Moreover, a number of vulnerabilities related to justice-making have been identified.

Faced with an unprecedented growth in the crime rate, police cooperation becomes particularly important. It contributes to the maintenance of an area of freedom, security and justice, it defends the fundamental rights involving all competent authorities of the Member States, including the police, the customs and other law enforcement services, specialized in the prevention or detection and the investigation of criminal offences. In practice, it concerns mainly serious crimes (organized crime, drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings), as well as terrorist activities.

In the light of the above mentioned, the European Council gathered at Tampere on the 15th and 16th of October 1999 required that at first, in order to increase the efficiency of European security, joint investigation teams under the Treaty of the European Union be created without delay in order to fight drug trafficking, human trafficking, as well as terrorism.

In order to fulfil the desired goals, the 6th April 2009 Decision 2009/371 / JHA of the Council of Europe was adopted. The Decision, published in the Official Journal of the European Union, L series, no. 121 of 15 May 2009, establishes the European Police Office (Europol).

On the 22nd of March 2012, the Romanian Parliament passed Act no 55/2012 on the cooperation between Romania and the European Police Office (Europol). It was republished in the Official Gazette No. 206 of 24 March 2014.

Faced with an already established fact, Romania could not afford to require a period of adaptation to the emerging situation, but it has made utmost efforts towards promptly addressing the concerns of the European partners.

One of the work procedures that the judiciary in Romania had to enforce is the joint investigation teams method, a method that allows the judicial bodies and the specialized services to exchange intelligence without a bureaucratic system and conduct joint investigations throughout by coordinating the investigation of criminal offence, in the two countries. The purpose of establishing these investigative teams is to gather information and evidence in specific situations.

To accomplish successful missions, the Member States which set up an investigation team shall establish its objective, structure and the term of office. It is also necessary that the Member States that establish a team be able to decide, as far as possible and in accordance with the applicable law, that persons who do not represent the competent authorities of the Member States, - in particular representatives for example, of the European Union's Judicial Cooperation Unit- Eurojust, the European Police Office- Europol¹, the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF) or representatives of third countries and, in particular, representatives of law enforcement services from the United States- participate in the activities of the team. In such cases, the agreement setting up the team has to specify matters of responsibility for such representatives.

Compared to the classical legal assistance long used between countries, joint investigation teams mark significant progress because they do not only provide targeted assistance when requested through international letters rogatory in order to obtain information from abroad, but they are a real cooperation tool between judicial authorities of the countries that agree on the objectives to be achieved in a criminal case².

1. The initiation of joint criminal investigations

In order to implement European norms, Romanian law provides that in order to facilitate the handling of a request for letters rogatory, joint investigation teams can be created having a specific purpose and a limited duration which may be extended by the mutual consent of the states concerned.

Competent Romanian authorities analyze on a priority basis Europol requests on the initiation, performance and coordination of criminal investigations and such authorities respond to them, indicating whether the requested investigations will be initiated or not.

¹ Eurojust and Europol, in accordance with their powers, play an important role in the establishment of joint investigation teams.

² Cristian-Eduard ȘTEFAN, "Joint investigation teams, effective instrument for combating organized crime and terrorism", Journal Dreptul no. 2/2009.

The law also indicates the situation in which the Romanian competent authorities decide not to act on a Europol request. In this situation the response needs to include the reasons for this decision, unless those reasons can not be disclosed under art. 7 par. (3) of the Europol Decision.

Responses to Europol's requests provided in par. (1) and Europol information on the investigation results are disseminated through Europol National Unit.

2. The investigation team structure

The structure of the investigation team is decided through mutual agreement and it can be especially created, when³:

- the ongoing proceedings of some difficult investigations in the requesting State involve significant human resources and other resources concerning both countries,
- more states conduct investigations that need coordinated and concerted action in the countries concerned.

The request to form a joint investigation team can be made by any State concerned and it shall include proposals for the composition of the team⁴.

The activity of the joint investigation team on Romanian territory is subject to the following general rules:

- the team leader must be a representative of the competent Romanian judicial authority (prosecutor), who acts within his/her powers under the national law;
- team activities are performed according to Romanian law; team members and seconded members of the team perform their tasks supervised by the team leader, given the conditions established by their own authorities in the agreement which sets up the team.

The Framework Decision on joint investigation teams also provides a third rule, namely that the Member State in which the team operates shall ensure the organizational conditions necessary to enable its operation.

Members of the joint investigation team from other Member States than that in which the team operates are referred to as seconded members in the team. As far as the seconded members to the joint investigation team are concerned, they are entitled to take part in all procedural acts, unless the team leader decides otherwise.

When the joint investigation team members need procedural documents in the requesting State, seconded members may request their competent authorities to issue those documents, as they are allowed to provide the team with information that is made available to the state that appointed the seconded member for the purpose of handling ongoing criminal investigations.

In accordance with the legislation of the Member State in which the investigation is conducted, the team leader can entrust seconded members of the joint investigation team the task to perform some investigation activities with the consent of the competent authorities of the Member State in which the investigation takes place and the Member State that authorized the secondment.

If allowed by the legislation of the parties concerned or the provisions of any legal instrument applicable between them, arrangements may be concluded that persons, other than the representatives of the competent authorities of the parties forming the joint investigation team take part in the activities of the team.

³ Art.169, para.2 Act no.302/2004 on the international judicial cooperation in criminal matters, amended and supplemented by Law no.224/2006.

⁴ Art. 169, para.5 Act no.302/2004 on the international judicial cooperation in criminal matters, amended and supplemented by Act no.224/2006: „The participants in the joint investigation team designated by the Romanian authorities are appointed members, while those designated by a foreign country are seconded members”.

When the joint investigation team needs the assistance from a Member State, other than that which set it up or from a third state, the request for assistance may be made by the competent authorities of the State in which the investigation of their counterparts from the other State concerned is carried out in accordance with the relevant instruments or arrangements.

All the information lawfully obtained by a member or a seconded member while being part in a joint investigation team, information that can not be obtained otherwise by the competent authorities of the States concerned, may be used according to the purpose for which the joint investigation team was created for the discovery, investigation or prosecution of other offenses, with the consent of the State in which the information was obtained or in order to prevent an immediate and serious threat to public safety.

In 2008, during the seminar "Eurojust, joint investigation teams and the pooling of procedures," held in Toulouse (France), joint investigation teams were given new impetus by the representatives of judicial authorities involved in international judicial cooperation in criminal matters.

During discussions, a number of best practices were proposed and embodied in the following conclusions:

- the need to adopt a European model;
- the need to select and specialize investigations;
- the need to set the goals of the investigation or of the criminal proceedings in an early stage of the investigation.

3. Domestic regulation

Act no. 55/2012 on the cooperation between Romania and the European Police Office establishes the obligation that judicial authorities belonging to joint investigation teams in terms of the art. 182 of Act no. 302/2004 on international judicial cooperation in criminal matters, republished, suggest as a follow-up to their own analysis or at Europol's request, to the authorities of other countries that the teams include Europol staff, to the extent that the investigations cover crimes dealt with by Europol⁵.

All requests to participate in joint investigation teams are sent to Europol only through the Europol National Unit after the prior consent of the authorities of other participating countries.

Europol staff participating in the joint investigation teams operating in Romania are seconded members.

At Europol's request, Romanian public authorities express their consent to include information supplied to the joint investigation team in Europol's information processing system.

Conclusions

Based on the common activities undertaken, a number of failures to obtain positive results have been identified. They are due to the procedures, the legislative gaps, the language barriers and the specialized terms used by the representatives of each state involved.

As far as Romania's situation is concerned, the legal gaps are the main cause of risks, threats or vulnerabilities. A good example in this respect is the mismatch of the legislation on judicial police powers and the legislation on its establishment, operation and prerogatives.

⁵ 55/2012 on Romania's cooperation with the European Police Office.

Thus, the ten articles of Act no.364 of 15 September 2004 on the organization and functioning of the judicial police, do not clearly stipulate the functional competences of the judicial police officers, the institutional relationship with the prosecution bodies or their managers' actual role in the activity that their subordinates perform.

In conclusion, it is imperative that failures identified in the missions performed by the judicial bodies in Romania be eliminated and that Romanian procedures be aligned with the European judicial authorities' procedures in order to reach results consistent with their objectives.

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ANALYSIS OF ARMS TRANSFER NETWORKS

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Abstract: *Arms transfer includes all the international flows of major conventional arms between international actors (state or non-state organised group).*

This paper presents the study of arms transfer involving social network analysis as a research tool. Analysis of global arms transfer networks is focused on network visualisation and measurement of topological features (e.g. network diameter, nodes centrality, clustering coefficient) and correlations between measurements.

Arms transfer networks are build based on cumulative open source data covering large periods of time. Nodes represent state actors, and edges reflects all the international flow of major conventional arms between suppliers and recipients weighted by the number of items delivered or produced and the financial value.

Modelling and analysis of conflict networks involve Gephi, an open source interactive visualization and exploration platform for all types of networks.

Keywords: *Arms transfer, Actors, Social network analysis.*

Introduction

Arms transfer includes all the international flows of major conventional arms between international actors (state or non-state organised group).

For the purpose of this paper the study is limited only to the transfer of arms to state actors (government of the state) with a focus on actors involved in international armed conflicts during the last years.

A state actor could play two different roles, specifically supplier (exports arms to other state actor) or recipient (imports arms from other state actor).

Measurement of the volume of the international transfers of major conventional weapons is based on SIPRI trend-indicator value (TIV) which does not represent the sales price for arms transfers. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament¹. Trend-indicator value (TIV) “is based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons and is intended to represent the transfer of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer”².

SIPRI Arms Transfers Database provides statistical date on arms transfers for major conventional weapons. According to SIPRI, major weapons include: aircraft, air defence systems, anti-submarine warfare weapons, armoured vehicles, artillery, engines, missiles, sensors, satellites, ships and other. Detailed definitions of each class are provided by SIPRI together with a list of military equipment which is excluded from the database (e.g. small arms and light weapons/SALW, trucks, artillery under 100-mm calibre, ammunition)³.

The science of networks emerged from various disciplines and research fields as graph theory in mathematics, social network analysis in sociology, statistical mechanics and computer science. In this view a system (politic, socio-economic, market etc.) is considered as a set of networked entities.

¹ <http://www.sipri.org/>.

² http://www.sipri.org/databases/yy_armstransfers/background.

³ http://www.sipri.org/databases/yy_armstransfers/background.

According to Estrada (2012), a network (graph) is a diagrammatic representation of a system. It consists of nodes (vertices), which represents the entities of the system. Pairs of nodes are joined by links (edges), which represent a particular kind of interconnections between those entities⁴. Weighted or valued networks have strength, weight or values attached to edges.

Social network analysis is multilevel being focused on network formation and structures (network level of analysis), network positions (node level of analysis).

At network level proprieties as density, path length, and fragmentation defines cohesion of the network and degree-distribution is in direct correlation with the shape of the network. Density is defined as the number of existing connections divided by the number of potential connections. In a network a path is any structure of nodes such that every consecutive pair of nodes in the structure is connected by an edge and the path length is the number of edges traversed along the path.

Centrality is the most important propriety at the node level. Newman (2011), considers that the simplest centrality measure in a network is just de degree of a vertex, respectively the number of edges connected to it⁵.

1. Construction of Arms Transfer Networks

The structure of an Arms Transfer Network includes both parties involved in an international flow of major conventional arms (suppliers and recipients) as actors (nodes) and cumulative transfer of arms between parties as edges.

Actors include only state actors (government of the state) and edges reflects all international sales and gifts of weapons, including manufacturing licences. Also, The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database includes weapons on loan or lease if both are for at least three months.

Arms transfer networks are build based on cumulative open source data covering large periods of time. Data are extracted from the most recent version of the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, which include “all international transfers in seven categories of major conventional arms since 1950” and is considered “the most comprehensive publicly available source of information on international arms transfers.”⁶

Different structures of Arms Transfer Networks are created considering relationship between suppliers and recipients or affiliations networks by observing actors and connected events.

Examination of Arms Transfer Networks includes network construction, network visualisation and measurement of topological features (e.g. Average Degree, Average Weighted Degree, Network Diameter, Graph Density, and Average Path Length) and correlations between measurements.

Modelling and analysis of armed conflict networks involve Gephi, an open source “interactive visualization and exploration platform for all kinds of networks and complex systems, dynamic and hierarchical graphs”⁷.

2. Annually Arms Transfer Affiliation Network

In general terms an affiliation network called also two-mode network or a bi-partite graph is a network with two type of nodes representing actors and events, with edges connecting actors to events.

Specifically for arms transfer I constructed an affiliation network linking suppliers and recipients to each year of transfer. Edges are weighted by the value of each arms transfer.

⁴ Estrada, E., *The structure of complex networks. Theory and applications*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2012, p. 4.

⁵ Newman, M.E.J., *Networks. An introduction*, Oxford University Press Inc., New York, 2011, pp. 169.

⁶ <http://www.sipri.org/databases>.

⁷ <https://gephi.github.io/>.




Figure no. 1: Generic Affiliation Network: A1, A2...A5 – actors, Y1, Y2...Y10 - Years

Structure of the Annually Arms Transfer Affiliation Network includes suppliers and recipients (actors) and years of arms transfer (events) starting with 1950 and ending with 2013 as nodes. In addition, arms export are represented by edges which are weighted by SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) expressed in US\$ m. at constant (1990) prices.

Annually Supplier Network for five top suppliers includes two types of nodes: 5 state actors and 64 years from 1950 to 2013.





Figure no. 2: Visualisation of Annually Supplier Network for five top suppliers (Gephi - layout Fruchterman Reingold, cumulative data: 1950 – 2013)

The size of the nodes is proportional to the SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) and indicates the size of the annual arms transfers for suppliers.

Network visualisation (Figure 2) illustrates the years between 1974 and 1987 as very active for transfer of major conventional arms and years around 1960 similar with years around 2000 from arms transfer volume perspective.

The United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France and Russia were the major five supplier during the period of 1950-2013, covering 74.5% of the entire volume of the international arms transfer.

Annually Recipient Network for five top recipients includes two types of nodes: 5 state actors and 64 years from 1950 to 2013.



Network Overview: Nodes: 69, Edges: 320, Average Degree: 4.638, Average Weighted Degree: 5159.101, Network Diameter: 1, Graph Density: 0.068, Average Path Length: 1.

Figure no. 3: Visualisation of Annually Recipient Network for five top recipients (Gephi - layout Fruchterman Reingold, cumulative data: 1950 – 2013)

The size of the nodes is proportional to the SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) and indicates the size of the annual arms transfers for recipients.

Network visualisation (Figure 3) proves similarities with the previous network of suppliers (the same values for number of Nodes, Edges, Average Degree, Network Diameter, Graph Density and Average Path Length). Also illustrates the years 1958, 1964, 1965, 1986, 1988, 1987, 1990, 1991, 2012 and 2013 as very active for transfer of major conventional arms.

India, China, Japan, Egypt and Germany were the major five recipients during the period of 1950-2013, covering the large part of the entire volume of the international transfer of major conventional weapons.

3. Arms Transfer to States involved in Armed Conflict

International Humanitarian Law distinguishes three types of conflicts: international armed conflict, internationalized armed conflict, and non-international armed conflict. Geneva Convention, 1949, defines the manifestation of an international armed conflict or an inter-state conflict by a confrontation between the legal armed forces of two different states. Non-international armed conflicts are “armed conflicts that are non-international in nature occurring in one of the High contracting parties”⁸. When hostilities appear between two different factions fighting internally but supported by two different states, an internationalized armed conflict take place.

I represented the arms transfer to states involved in armed conflicts as a directed graph comprising suppliers and recipients as nodes and edges reflecting the export of major conventional weapons weighted by SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) expressed in US\$ m. at constant (1990) prices.

A directed graph is a network with edges having directions, pointing from one edge to another and represented as arrows. Specifically, edges reflecting suppliers point edges replicating recipients. The dot size is proportional to the number of arms transfer an actor is involved. The edge size is proportional to the value of SIPRI TIVs.




Figure no. 4: Visualisation of network representing the arms transfer to states involved in armed conflicts (Gephi, layout Fruchterman Reingold), Weighted Degree ranking – cumulative data: 1950 – 2013

As depicted in Figure 4, the main suppliers of countries involved in conflicts are Soviet Union, United States, United Kingdom, Russia and France and the major recipients of arms transfer are India, Iraq, Israel, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

⁸ Geneva Convention, common article 3, 1949.

Network density is relatively high which means that actual connections represents approximately 25.8% of possible connections among suppliers and recipients. Kadushin, 2012, considers that “density is at the heart of community, social support, and high visibility” and “other things being equal, the greater the density, the more likely is a network to be considered a cohesive community, a source of social support, and an effective transmitter”⁹.

Arms transfer networks has a positive impact on receiving actors by facilitating transmission, manipulation, integration and sharing of knowledge from suppliers to recipients. Exporters of major conventional arms are important sources of knowledge and best practices related to research, design, development, manufacture and acceptance of new equipment. Knowledge flows contribute to improvement of individual and organisational performances, enhancement of organisational innovative capabilities, and development of political, economic and social relationship among state actors.

On the other side, arms transfer is the main factor contributing to initiation and development of conflicts around the world. Also arms transfer may facilitate transmission of ideologies and extremist ideas.

The state actor which occupies a privileged node in the network as supplier has social power to influence the receiving actors of arms transfer.

Conclusion

In this paper I proposed a new approach to study of arms transfer using methods and tools developed by social network analysis. Analysis is focused on relationship between actors playing the role of suppliers and recipients of major conventional weapons. Also I developed an affiliation network linking suppliers and recipients to each year of arms transfer.

Network formation, measurement of topological features (e.g. network diameter, nodes centrality) and network visualisation allows observation and understanding of arms transfer networks shape and cohesion, degree of connectivity and behaviour of actors involved in sending and receiving arms in international market.

Application of network science on arms transfer studies offer new opportunities for further research to explore dynamics of arms transfer networks and dyadic properties such dyadic cohesion and equivalence.

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⁹ Kadushin, C., *Understanding social networks. Theories, Concepts and Findings*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2012, p. 29.

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SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS AND ARMED CONFLICTS

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Abstract: *Armed conflicts represents direct negative relations between two actors (state or non-state organised group) activated by a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory, including the use of armed forces that conducts to a number of battle-related deaths in a certain period of time.*

This paper presents the study of armed conflicts involving network analysis. Investigation of Global Armed Conflict Networks includes network formation, network visualisation and measurement of topological features (e.g. network diameter, nodes centrality).

Conflict networks are built based on cumulative open source data covering large periods of time. Nodes represent state and non-state actors, and edges reflects all the particular negative relations among them, respectively conflicts (e.g. All Armed Conflict, Intrastate Armed Conflict) weighted by conflict intensity.

Modelling and analysis of conflict networks involve Gephi, an open source interactive visualization and exploration platform for all types of networks.

Keywords: *Armed conflicts, Actors, Social network analysis.*

Introduction

Although International Humanitarian Law distinguishes three types of conflicts (international armed conflict, internationalized armed conflict, and non-international armed conflict), clear definitions are not provided by the commonly named law of armed conflict or law of war.

However, Geneva Convention, 1949, defines the manifestation of an international armed conflict or an inter-state conflict by a confrontation between the legal armed forces of two different states, respectively as “all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.”¹

Non-international armed conflicts are “armed conflicts that are non-international in nature occurring in one of the High contracting parties”². From legal perspectives a non-international armed conflict is similar to an inter-state conflict but occur within the boundaries of a single country and involves organized non-state armed groups carrying out extended hostilities. When hostilities appear between two different factions fighting internally but supported by two different states, an internationalized armed conflict take place.

According to Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)³, an armed conflict is a “contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year”. Incompatibility refers to the issue of the

¹ Geneva Convention, common art.2, 1949.

² Geneva Convention, common article 3, 1949.

³ <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/>.

conflict: government (e.g. type of political system, the replacement of the central government or the change of its composition), territory (e.g. change of the state in control of a certain territory, secession or autonomy) or both.

A party is considered “a government of a state or any opposition organisation or alliance of opposition organisations”⁴. Also, regarding to the conflict dynamics, “a conflict, both state-based and non-state, is deemed to be active if there are at least 25 battle-related deaths per calendar year in one of the conflict’s dyads”⁵.




Figure no. 1: Classification of armed conflicts

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) defines four types of conflict⁶ as depicted in Figure 1.

The science of networks emerged from various disciplines and research fields as graph theory in mathematics, social network analysis in sociology, statistical mechanics and computer science.

According to the concepts and methodologies developed by network science, a system (politic, socio-economic, market etc.) is considered as a set of networked structures or entities. Estrada (2012), defines a network (graph) as a diagrammatic representation of a system. It consists of nodes (vertices), which represents the entities of the system. Pairs of nodes are joined by links (edges), which represent a particular kind of interconnections between those entities⁷. A particular type of networks called weighted or valued networks has strength, weight or values attached to edges.

Social network analysis is focused on entire network (network level of analysis), studying network formation and structures and on nodes (node level of analysis) observing network positions.

At network level, cohesion of the network is defined by proprieties as density, path length, and fragmentation and shape of the network is reflected by degree-distribution.

⁴ http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/definition_of_armed_conflict/.

⁵ <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/>.

⁶ http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/124/124920_1codebook_ucdp_prio-armed-conflict-dataset-v4_2014.pdf.

⁷ Estrada, E., *The structure of complex networks. Theory and applications*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2012, p. 4.

Density is measured as the number of existing connections divided by the number of potential connections. In a network a path is any structure of nodes such that every consecutive pair of nodes in the structure is connected by an edge and the path length is the number of edges traversed along the path.

At the node level, centrality is considered the most important propriety. Newman (2011), expressed that the simplest centrality measure in a network is just de degree of a vertex, respectively the number of edges connected to it⁸.

1. Construction of armed conflict networks

The structure of a global network includes all the parties involved in an armed conflict as actors (nodes) and cumulative negative relations among parties as edges.




Figure no. 2: Representations of a generic armed conflict network using Gephi –layout Yifan Hu, b) – layout FruchtermanReingold

Actors include state actors (government of the state) and non-state actors (formally organised or organised groups). An edge reflects a conflict between two actors and is weighted by the intensity of the conflict.

Visualisations of a generic armed conflict network are presented in Figure 2, where A1, A2... A10 are state actors and nA1, nA2... nA5 are non-state actors. The dot size is proportional to the number of conflicts an actor was involved. The edge dimension is proportional to the intensity of conflicts.

Armed conflict networks are build based on cumulative open source data covering large periods of time. Data are extracted from the most recent version of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2014, 1946 – 2013, which is “a conflict-year dataset with information on armed conflict where at least one party is the government of a state in the time period 1946-2013”⁹.

There are several options cu build armed conflict networks based on conflict classification, time periods, global or regional approaches. In this paper are analysed only

⁸ Newman, M.E.J., *Networks. An introduction*, Oxford University Press Inc., New York, 2011, p. 169.

⁹ http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/.

global armed conflict networks considering all armed conflicts, respectively extra-systemic, interstate, internal and internationalised internal armed conflicts.


Modelling and analysis of armed conflict networks involve Gephi, an open source “interactive visualization and exploration platform for all kinds of networks and complex systems, dynamic and hierarchical graphs”¹⁰.

2. Analysis of Global Armed Conflict Networks

Investigation of global and regional conflict networks includes network formation, network visualisation and measurement of topological features (e.g. Average Degree, Average Weighted Degree, Network Diameter, Graph Density, and Average Path Length) and correlations between measurements.

Node-specific network statistics or centrality measures provide information regarding the position of each actor in the Armed Conflict Network. For instance, node degree or degree centrality is used to observe the number of negative connections between actors and the network density to quantify the proportion of actual links with respect to the all possible connections. The network density takes values between 0 and 1, the closest the values are to 1 the denser is the network.

2.1. Global all armed conflict network– nodes includes all actors respectively state actors (government of the state) and non-state actors (formally organised or organised groups) and edges refers to any kind of conflict between them.



Undirected Graph; Network Overview: Nodes: 636, Edges: 576, Average Degree: 1.811, Average Weighted Degree: 8.528, Network Diameter: 14, Graph Density: 0.003, Average Path Length: 5.815.

Figure no. 3: Visualisation of Global All Armed Conflict Network (Gephi - layout FruchtermanReingold, cumulative data: 1946 –2013)

¹⁰ <https://gephi.github.io/>

All Armed Conflict Network is very large containing 636 nodes and 576 edges but not very dense. Top highly connected nodes based on node degree are presented on the graph (Figure 3) and reflects the actors highly involved in armed conflicts during the period of 1946-2013 (e.g. Myanmar/Burma – Node Degree: 41, Node Weighted Degree: 308; India – Node Degree: 32, Node Weighted Degree: 218; Ethiopia – Node Degree: 26, Node Weighted Degree: 155).




Figure no. 4: Degree distribution of All Armed Conflict Network

Degree distribution of All Armed Conflict Network is presented in Figure 4 and the shape suggests a power-law degree distribution. A simple visual analysis recommends All Armed Conflict Network as a graph displaying scale-free proprieties. According to Estrada, 2012, in networks with power-law degree distribution “probability of finding a high-degree node is relatively small in comparison with the high probability of finding low-degree nodes”¹¹.

2.2. Extra-systemic armed conflict network – nodes include all actors and edges refer to conflicts between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory.

Extra-systemic conflicts or colonial conflicts are territorial by nature and were active until 1974.




Figure no. 5: Visualisation of Extra-systemic Armed Conflict Network (Gephi - layout Fruchterman Reingold, Cumulative data: 1946 –2013)

¹¹ Estrada, E., *The structure of complex networks. Theory and applications*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2012, p. 29.

Extra-systemic armed conflict network is very small with 30 nodes and 25 edges but relatively dense. We can observe three nodes which are highly connected (Figure 5), representing the most active actors involved in conflicts abroad during the period of 1946-1974, respectively France (Node Degree: 10, Node Weighted Degree: 65), Portugal (Node Degree: 6, Node Weighted Degree: 40) and UK (Node Degree: 6, Node Weighted Degree: 34).

2.3. Interstate Armed Conflict Network – nodes include all actors and edges refer to conflicts between two or more states.





Figure no. 6: Visualisation of Interstate Armed Conflict Network (Gephi - layout FruchtermanReingold, cumulative data: 1946 –2013)
a) Degree Ranking, b) Weighted Degree Ranking

Relatively small, with 61 nodes and 49 edges, visualisation of Interstate Armed Conflict Network (Figure 6) depicts state actors involved in armed conflicts during the period of 1946-2013. Some nodes are highly connected (China, Israel, Iraq Egypt, Thailand etc.) reflecting the state actors very active considering the number of conflicts involved. Also we can observe other nodes (Iraq – Iran, India – Pakistan) strongly connected representing the number and the intensity of the armed conflict between state actors. Network density is relatively small which means that actual connections represents approximately 2.4% of possible connections among state actors, indicating the low number of interstate conflicts during the analysed period.

2.4. Internal Armed Conflict Network – nodes include all actors and edges refer to conflicts between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states.



Undirected Graph; Network Overview: Nodes: 532, Edges: 445, Average Degree: 1.673, Average Weighted Degree: 7.635, Network Diameter: 6, Graph Density: 0.003, Average Path Length: 2.101.

Figure no. 7: Visualisation of Internal Armed Conflict Network (Gephi - layout FruchtermanReingold, cumulative data: 1946 –2013)

Internal Armed Conflict Network is very large with 532 nodes and 445 edges. Network visualisation (Figure 7) indicates a number of actors highly involved in internal armed conflicts, such as Myanmar, India, Ethiopia and Mali.

2.5. Internationalised Internal Armed Conflict Network – nodes includes all actors and edges refers to conflicts between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides.




Figure no. 8: Visualisation of Internationalised Internal Armed Conflict Network (Gephi - layout Fruchterman Reingold, cumulative data: 1946 –2013)

Internationalised Internal Armed Conflict Network is relatively large, but not dense. Visualisation of the network (Figure 8) emphasise a number of actors highly connected (Chad, Afghanistan, Congo, Iraq, Cambodia) indicating the countries where the intervention from other states were very active.

Conclusion

In this paper we proposed a new approach to study of armed conflicts using methods and tools developed by social network analysis. In this view the analysis is focused rather on relations between actors (state actors or non-state actors) than on the actors.

Network visualisation and investigation of network formation, and measurement of topological features (e.g. network diameter, nodes centrality) allows observation and understanding of conflict network shape and cohesion, degree of connectivity and behaviour of actors involved in armed conflicts.

Application of network science on conflict studies offer new opportunities for further research to explore dynamics of conflict networks and dyadic properties such dyadic cohesion and equivalence.

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ON THE MEANING OF VICTORY: SOME COMMENTS ON THE GEOSTRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE OPERATION ‘PROTECTIVE EDGE’ (2014)

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Abstract: *Along several weeks, mainly in July and August, 2014, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and some radical Palestinian organizations in the Gaza Strip (mainly Hamas, but also the Islamic Jihad) have fought an extensive set of military operations of all sorts. It is the third major violent confrontation of the IDF and Hamas in less than 10 years, a fact that proves how large is the conflict potential in the entire Greater Middle East. When a quite stable cease-fire was internationally brokered, both sides claimed that victory is theirs. The text makes some comments on the meaning of strategic victory in contemporary military confrontations, extensively using both open (media) sources, and authors with capital contributions to the field of military science and strategic studies (Clausewitz, Luttwak, etc.)*

Keywords: *Israel, Hamas, Greater Middle East, power, war, victory, strategy, grand strategy.*

Short introduction

Military confrontations of all sorts dominated¹ – and are still dominating (even if Liberal Idealists have neither the necessary desire, nor the minimal intellectual will for accepting this) – the international arena. Power status(es) of many actors on the global arena are boosted (or, on the contrary, are severely diminished) as a direct result of the outcome of military confrontations².

1. Briefly exploring the Clausewitzian way of defining victory

The notoriously influential Carl von Clausewitz offered several direct or indirect definitions of victory in his capital work *On War*, which was published after his death. In the opening stages of the first chapter, for example, the German 19th century general (whose vision on military issues of all sorts and at all levels – starting with almost minor tactical topics, and reaching in so many occasions *strategy* and the ultimate level of *grand strategy* or *superior strategy*³ – has been generated and ‘upgraded’ by the so long era of the Napoleonic Wars) stated that *war is the deliberate use of large scale violence, aiming at forcing the*

¹ Along 700 years, starting with the 13th century, for example, peace had been present in Europe only in a very few occasions – see Michael HOWARD, *Războiul în istoria Europei* [*War in European history* – original title in English], Ed. Sedona, Timișoara, 1997, p. 9.

² For the fact that winning wars is a significant booster for the power status of the victorious actor see, for example, Robert GILPIN, *Război și schimbare în politica mondială* [*War and Change in World Politics* – original title, in English], translator Florentina Anghel, Editura Scrisul Românesc, Craiova, 2000, pp. 240-269.

³ For the definitions of strategy and grand or superior strategy see B.H. LIDDELL HART, *Strategia: Acțiunile indirecte* [*Strategy: The Indirect Approach* – the original title in English], translators I. Cojoc, S. Pitea, foreword I. Cupșa, Editura Militară, București, 1973, pp. 334-335.

enemy to completely accept “our will”⁴. For Clausewitz, violence is only the tool to be used at war, and imposing our own will is the goal. In more operational terms, *we have to make the enemy not capable to fight any more*, and badly crippling the military capabilities of the opponent is, according to Clausewitz, the direct and immediate goal of military actions we call war⁵ (and a major ‘ingredient’ of victory).

In order to make the enemy accept our will, we have to push him into a situation clearly more difficult than the ‘sacrifice’ we are going to ask him for. And, Clausewitz also wrote, the worst situation we can imagine is ‘totally disarming’ the enemy, simply making him completely unable to fight any more⁶. The same author also said that defeat is nothing else but a ‘passing harm’, indicating that *the consequences of victory are not at all perennial*: anytime in the future, the opponent we have managed to defeat today might be victorious⁷, simply nullifying the positive results of our present victory. This idea of the extreme vulnerability and reversibility of both victory and defeat is a major contribution of the Clausewitzian thought to properly understanding the nature and consequences of warfare.

2. Exploring other definitions of victory: F. Foch, B.H. Liddell Hart, A/ Beaufre, and Edward N. Luttwak

Clausewitz is not at all the only capital author we can use to better understand the geo-strategic significance of event in our time, including the results of the Operation *Protective Edge*. More recently, other authors – some of them with direct experience in very high military command jobs, others with a brilliant civilian academic career – offer interesting extra elements allowing a better understanding of the meaning of victory. In the opening stages of the 20th century, both before and after the First World War, strategic thinking and strategic practice were influenced a lot by F. Foch, who became in the final stages of the Great War the commanding general of *all* the military forces of the Entente (in this capacity he obviously was directly responsible for stopping the last major German offensives, and for making the Germans to actively search for a ceasefire, and – at least militarily – for the very fragile, non-perennial nature of the peace settlement reached in the early 1920s). Foch wrote that many authors and practitioners think that victory and defeat are influenced by only ‘material factors’, while a careful effort to explore strategic reality shows that victory and defeat are, both of them, ‘purely and entirely moral results’⁸. He did not deny the serious impact of material factors on the final result of military confrontations. On the contrary, he strongly underlined that modern war means larger and larger amounts of manpower simply dwarfing even the largest armies in the era of Napoleon, plus immense amounts of modern hardware of all sorts – railways fit for large strategic transports, airships, and modern communication means⁹. But, in the end, not the weapons (material superiority and / or excellent logistics) are responsible for victory. *The most important ingredient of victory is, anytime and anywhere, says Foch, human will, accompanied by a strong ‘intellectual discipline’*. Foch also stated that modern war is not any more limited. Unlimited violence is used to completely defeat the enemy forces, to ‘exterminate’ the units abandoning the

⁴ Carl von CLAUSEWITZ, *Despre război [On War, in English]*, edited by Corneliu Soare, Editura Militară, București, 1982, p. 53.

⁵ Carl von CLAUSEWITZ, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-54.

⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 55-56.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 59.

⁸ F. FOCH, *Principiile războiului. Conducerea războiului [Des principes de la guerre. De la conduite de la guerre – original French titles]*, translation by Nicolae T. Popescu, foreword dr. I. Cupșa, Editura Militară, București, 1975, pp. 28-29.

⁹ F. FOCH, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

battlefield. Only after such military goals are accomplished, ‘we can talk to’ the enemy¹⁰. And, as we will see later on, Hamas forces have been badly mauled along the Operation Protective Edge, but not at all *completely* destroyed,

Another important author in the field of military science and military history, B.H. Liddell Hart, also had some remarkable remarks on the meaning of victory. He wrote, for example, that the very logic of *military* strategy is, for any gifted commanding general, to accomplish the goals listed and asked for by the government, by means of skilfully using all available resources¹¹. *In such a situation, victory does not mean to completely defeat and / destroy the enemy, but simply to do what central authorities regard as being politically useful and feasible*. If we take into account this opinion, we might speak about an Israeli victory, as long as the IDF has clearly accomplished most of the goals listed by the Netanyahu government

Even more recently, in the early 1970s, the French General A. Beaufre indicated that victory means to accomplish the political goals of war, which can be vastly different, in different circumstances¹². Speaking about “the victorious battle”, he strongly supported the idea that strictly military victories, not necessarily accompanied (or followed) by political positive result, are clearly possible¹³. He also listed a set of “missions” which, if and when are accomplished, the final result might be what we usually call victory: to capture a territory or to deny the enemy the possession of that area; to destroy enemy forces or at least to tear them down (making them lose men and equipment); acting really quickly, or gaining time¹⁴. Hamas lost a lot of manpower and equipment, so that we can speak again about an Israeli victory,

And even more recently, in the final stages of the 1980s, Edward N. Luttwak wrote in one of his notorious books that success means in many occasions to skilfully implement technical innovations, but he also warned that there is also “the likelihood of a counteraction to any technical innovation”, and that we have to pay a lot of attention to the “much less obvious but significant connection between the technical efficiency of new warlike devices and their vulnerability to countermeasures of all kinds”¹⁵ (as far as we can understand, such counteractions can simply ‘dissolve’ situations we legitimately can call victories).

In another book also published in the late 1980s, the same Edward N. Luttwak wrote a lot about different ways in which we can explore ‘the meaning of victory’; for example, he stated that, in spite of major geographic vulnerabilities and high costs for maintaining such a large bridgehead, the Roman control of Dacia clearly has been a major strategic feat with huge positive consequences: for example, it “provided the necessary conditions for a restoration of Roman diplomatic control over the Germans and Sarmatians of the entire region”, and it “provided security for Dobruja and all the Danube lands up to Vienna (and this regional security generated both “agricultural prosperity” and intense “urbanization”)¹⁶. According to this part of Luttwak’s text, *victory simply is a matter of strategy mixed with economics: victory is ours if the total results we get are clearly more important than the aggregated costs of the efforts we had to do in order to achieve those results*. And, as we will

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 173.

¹¹ B.H. LIDDELL HART, *op.cit.*, p. 332.

¹² A. BEAUFRE, *Introducere în strategie. Strategia acțiunii* [Introduction a la stratégie. Stratégie de l’action – original French title], translation and edited by Corneliu Soare, Editura Militară, București, 1974, pp. 13-15.

¹³ General A. BEAUFRE, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-35.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 45.

¹⁵ Edward N. LUTTWAK, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London, 1987, p. 32.

¹⁶ Edward N. LUTTWAK, “A historical precedent: The Romans in Dacia”, in 8. LUTTWAK, Edward N., *On the Meaning of Victory: Essays on Strategy*, Touchstone Books / Simon Schster, Inc., New York, 1987, pp. 217-218.

see along the next pages, damages in Gaza are clearly larger than the costs of the Israeli war effort.

3. Some comments on Operation *Protective Edge*, based on open sources

Up to a certain point, Operation Protective Edge generates a very intense feeling of *déjà vu*: it is the third large scale military confrontation fought by the IDF, in the Gaza Strip, against Hamas, in less than a decade¹⁷. Anyhow, several important elements are shaping vast differences separating Operation Protective Edge from previous military operations launched against radical Palestinian organizations (and, in more general terms, from previous wars, campaigns and battles fought by Israel against Arab foes of all sorts). First of all, *social media has been a really major theatre of operations* (TO), as important as the regions near or in the Gaza Strip. Secondly, the *'technological gap' separating the Israelis and Hamas was larger than ever before*. Thirdly, *the Israeli efforts to limit as much as possible both the 'collateral casualties' and 'collateral damages' have been intense* (please do compare, for example, the 10 to 20 thousand civilian casualties of the massive strategic raid across Lebanon, in 1982, which reached Beirut in the end, with the 2,000 to 3,000 Palestinian deaths in Operation Protective Edge – and we emphasize the fact that a large part of those killed clearly were Hamas militants). A fourth major difference is that *domestic political debates and conflicts directly connected to the military operations have been more overheated than ever before in Israel*¹⁸.

The military might of Israel is clearly many times larger than that of Hamas, and its military arsenal is very sophisticated and very modern. According to a quite recent (2013) study of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London (IISS), Israel's armed forces "remain the most capable in the region" – 176,500 active military personnel, plus 465,000 reserve soldiers, more than 30 antiballistic batteries of different types, 480 very modern main battle tanks (plus more than 2,000 in store), 1,265 armoured personnel carriers (APC), 530 artillery pieces (250 of these are self-propelled 155 mm *M109A5*), several hundred mortars (81 mm and 120 mm), three large corvettes (and other 56 lighter combat and support surface ships), several conventional submarines, 441 "combat capable" aircraft (including 143 very modern fighters and 252 fighter & ground attack airplanes, and 77 attack helicopters)¹⁹.

The armed forces Hamas can use are smaller and their arsenal is less modern and less effective, in conventional operations. IISS estimated in 2013 that "Hamas groupings include internal-security groupings such as the Executive Force (est. strength: 10–12,000; major equipment include: artillery rockets, mortars, SALW) and the al-Qassam Brigades (est. strength: 10,000; major equipment include: mines and IEDs, artillery rockets, mortars, SALW)"²⁰. More recent media sources offer different figures: In July, NBC estimated, quoting different specialists, that "in Gaza, Hamas has a direct fighting capability estimated at

¹⁷ For a chronological presentation of the conflicts in (and for) Gaza Strip, after 2005, see the text "Gaza under attack: A chronology of disproportionate attacks on Gaza", *Aljazeera*, accessed in late August 2014 at the Internet address <http://webapps.aljazeera.net/aje/custom/2014/gazaunderattack/index.html>.

¹⁸ For these intense domestic political debates in Israel see, for example, Herb KEINON, „Sparks fly in cabinet meeting between Netanyahu, Liberman”, *Jerusalem Post*, July 7, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/Sparks-fly-in-cabinet-meeting-between-Netanyahu-Liberman-361710>, and Gil HOFFMAN, „Netanyahu fires Deputy Defense Minister Danon for attacking him”, *Jerusalem Post*, July 15, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/Netanyahu-fires-Deputy-Defense-Minister-Danon-who-was-highly-critical-of-Gaza-strategy-362930>.

¹⁹ *The Military Balance 2013: The annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics*, IISS, London, .pdf text, pp. 382-385.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 398.

about 20,000 personnel, including members of its military wing, the al-Qassam Brigades”, and that “outside of that are other militant groups including Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which has several thousand members”²¹. In spite of these massive differences, the fact that Gaza Strip is practically one of most densely populated areas in the world helped Hamas a lot, both in concealing attack installations and positions, and in organizing a strong and surprisingly effective defence.

The costs of the conflict have been immense for both the Israelis and for Hamas (and, more generally, for all inhabitants in the Gaza strip). On July 10, a study indicated that “Operation Protective Edge could cost Israel NIS 8.5 billion”²². In early August, *The Algemeiner* reported that “Operation Protective Edge’s overall cost for Israel was estimated... to be \$4.3 billion”. The same source said that “the Israeli economy had lost 0.5 percent in projected gross domestic product growth, estimated at \$1.3 billion, during the month-long Gaza campaign”, and that “the Tax Authority estimates that more than \$14.6 million worth of property damage has been caused by rocket fire, and further predicted a drop of \$438 million in tax revenue in 2014 because of the operation”²³.

At the end of August, the Israeli media offered a set of almost complete data about the magnitude of Israeli military efforts, and about both military and civilian casualties along the Operation *Protective Edge*. According to these open sources, “82,201 IDF reservists were called up during the war”. And “for 50 days of war, the home front and soldiers on the front lines were battered by thousands of rockets and mortar shells, as armed groups in Gaza fired 4,564 projectiles at Israel”. The same source stated that “according to the army, 3,659 rocket and mortar impact sites were found – counting those fired on IDF soldiers in Gaza. Of those that struck in Israel, 224 hit built-up areas. A further 735 were shot down by the Iron Dome missile defence system. Also, the IDF said that there were 197 ‘failed launchings’ – projectiles that never left the Gaza Strip or that did not launch at all”. The text also says that “during the war 70 people were killed on the Israeli side, including 64 soldiers... 469 [Israeli soldiers] were wounded”. Official Israeli sources say that “there were 842 Israeli [civilian] casualties during the fighting. Six civilians were killed by rocket or mortar strikes and 36 were wounded by shrapnel, including 10 who were seriously injured, 6 who were moderately injured, and 20 who sustained light injuries”. The same official sources say that “33 people were hurt by flying glass, and that 18 people were hurt in traffic accidents that occurred when rocket warning sirens sounded, including one person who was seriously injured. Also, 159 people were injured while running for bomb shelters, and 581 were treated for shock. In addition, nine people were killed in three terrorist attacks in Israel”. The total number of Palestinian casualties was significantly larger: “Gaza health officials said more than 2,100 people were killed in Strip in the fighting and many thousands more were wounded”. The Israeli military effort had been *very* important (and *very* expensive): “During the operation, the IDF struck some 5,226 targets in Gaza, including 1,814 targets linked to rocket firing, 109 weapons depots, and 85 weapon-making facilities. The army also attacked 312 houses belonging to people who were involved in terrorism, according to the IDF. The air force also carried out 840 strikes to support ground forces, and 192 attacks on Hamas military or

²¹ Alastair JAMIESON, “Israel’s Military Might Is Tested by Hamas’ Stamina: Experts”, *NBC News*, July 22, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/middle-east-unrest/israels-military-might-tested-hamas-stamina-experts-n161881>.

²² Niv ELIS, „Study: Protective Edge could cost NIS 8.5 billion”, *Jerusalem Post*, July 10, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.jpost.com/Operation-Protective-Edge/Study-Protective-Edge-could-cost-NIS-85-billion-362286>.

²³ JNS.org, “Operation Protective Edge Cost Israel \$4.3 Billion”, in *The Algemeiner*, August 6, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.algemeiner.com/2014/08/06/operation-protective-edge-cost-israel-4-3-billion/>

training sites. The destruction of Hamas attack tunnels was a central goal of the operation, and the IDF said that 32, everyone it identified, were eliminated”²⁴.

In the end, for Israel the most worrying result of the conflict with Hamas is neither the magnitude of human casualties, nor the total amount of costs, but the problems at the *national morale* level. Some senior regional authorities say that they feel themselves defeated (Alon Shuster, the Sha'ar Hanegev regional council chief, says that “the discovery of the tunnels this past summer during Operation Protective Edge, when we saw 13 Hamas men coming out from underground, created a crack in the mental fortitude of the residents”, and that “the terrorist groups have succeeded in their mission of threatening [us] and sowing fear and terror”²⁵), and almost one third of the Israelis declare that they might want to emigrate, if possible (“some 30 percent of Israelis would seriously consider leaving if they could, according to a poll commissioned by Israel's Channel 2”²⁶).

On September 4, *Reuters* published a piece of news estimating that the reconstruction in Gaza might cost up to 7.8 billion U.S. dollars. Only the “Strip’s education sector would need around \$143 million to get back on its feet. About half a million children have been unable to return to their schools due to damage or because the buildings are being used to house refugees”, and “over 106,000 of Gaza’s 1.8 million residents have been displaced to U.N. shelters and host families, the U.N. says”. The same text says that “the cost of rebuilding 17,000 Gazan homes razed by Israeli bombings would be \$2.5 billion..., and the energy sector needed \$250 million after the Strip’s only power plant was destroyed by two Israeli missiles”²⁷.

A few days later, on September 12, *Reuters* published another large and well documented text dealing with the economic consequences in Gaza Strip of the long and intense Operation *Protective Edge*. The text says that “fifty days of war in one of the most densely populated parts of the world have left swathes of Gaza in ruins. With the economy reeling under an Israeli-Egyptian blockade, the enclave now faces an almost impossible task of rebuilding”. The authors also say, quoting an economist in Gaza, that “one fact stands out: before the war, an average of 30 tonnes of cement crossed into Gaza each week. Now, an estimated 10,000 tonnes will be needed every day for the next six months”, and are also quoting Borge Brende, the foreign minister of Norway, who visited the area this week to try to assess the humanitarian and reconstruction needs. Brende said: “Some of the areas here in Gaza, unbelievably enough, look as if they were hit by an earthquake”. *Reuters* also wrote that “the Palestinian Authority said in a study the work would cost \$7.8 billion, two and a half times Gaza’s gross domestic product, including \$2.5 billion for the reconstruction of homes and \$250 million for energy”, and that “Gaza economist Maher al-Tabbaa puts rebuilding costs at a lower \$5 billion”. The reconstruction effort will be a huge one, because “an estimated 18,000 homes, at least three 14-storey apartment buildings, roads, schools, bridges, clinics need to be rebuilt but perhaps the most important job is fixing the power plant.

²⁴ For all these data see Ben HARTMAN, „50 days of Israel's Gaza operation, Protective Edge – by the numbers”, *Jerusalem Post*, August 28, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.jpost.com/Operation-Protective-Edge/50-days-of-Israelis-Gaza-operation-Protective-Edge-by-the-numbers-372574>.

²⁵ „Israeli regional council chief says Hamas 'succeeded in its mission' of terrorizing residents”, *Jerusalem Post*, September 13, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Israeli-regional-council-chief-says-Hamas-succeeded-in-its-mission-of-terrorizing-residents-375239>.

²⁶ *Haaretz* and Lior DATTEL, “Poll: One-third of Israelis think about leaving”, *Haaretz*, September 7, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/1.614514>.

²⁷ Noah BROWNING, “Palestinians put Gaza reconstruction cost at \$7.8 bln”, *Reuters*, September 4, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/04/mideast-gaza-reconstruction-idUSL5N0R537W20140904>.

Running at less than 50 percent of capacity before the war, it is now at just 6 percent of its potential output²⁸.

Some very brief (and grim) conclusions

The Israeli Defence Forces have been, strictly militarily speaking, victorious again, at least partially (not at all a surprising outcome for any really keen observer – in the end, *all* major wars and combat operations which the IDF had fought along its long and distinguished history are *major* – or *at least* significant – military victories). The IDF's combat casualties were significantly lower, according to all open sources we could use, than those of the radical Palestinian organizations (Hamas and the Islamic Jihad), and a very large share of the Palestinian military arsenal threatening the Israeli state was destroyed. Concomitantly, a large share of the vital infrastructure in the Gaza Strip (infrastructure used by Hamas to prepare and launch attacks of all sorts against mainly civilian targets in Israel) has been either annihilated, or at least badly damaged by the Israeli airstrikes, intense naval or ground bombardment, and by the direct fire of the massive Israeli ground forces which advanced very deep inside the Palestinian territory on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. *But a decisive and really stable positive political result is still lacking.* According to open sources, the Hamas leaders simply decided 'to take a break', to say so, in order to get new weapons, to train and integrate new recruits, to replace the leaders eliminated by the Israeli 'surgical strikes'. *But no major sign occurred to indicate that the political will of Hamas has been completely broken.* In such a situation, conventional / traditional definition(s) of victory cannot be used for an accurate evaluation of the results Israel has obtained at the end of Operation Protective Edge. *More than this, stubborn military resistance generated an important increase of the popularity of Hamas.* A recent media report indicates that "militant group Hamas would sweep Palestinian elections if they were held today after its support soared during seven weeks of war with Israel in Gaza, an opinion poll published on Tuesday [September 2] found", and that "most Palestinians surveyed said they preferred Hamas's strategy of armed struggle against Israel rather than peace negotiations, which are favoured by Fatah, once the dominant Palestinian political movement and one backed by the West"²⁹.

We estimate that the most probable outcome of all these is going to be a sharp decline, but only for a while, of the pace and magnitude of Hamas violent actions, and a new quick escalation of the conflict along the next few years. Decisive and stable (or perennial) strategic results have been simply postponed, and the Israeli victory, an obvious one at tactical and operational levels, has not at all been the complete one Clausewitz so strongly recommended almost two hundred years ago: *the military might of Hamas has been diminished and badly crippled, but the ugly political will of the Iranian-backed Hamas is still operational.* More than this, we know that Hamas is quickly rearming, preparing for a new future confrontation: "Two weeks after Operation Protective Edge ended..., Hamas is readying itself for the next

²⁸ Nidal AL-MUGHRABI and Maayan LUBELL, "Blockaded Gaza faces huge challenges to rebuild after war", *Reuters*, September 12, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/12/us-mideast-gaza-reconstruction-idUSKBN0H70DX20140912>.

²⁹ "Hamas popularity surges as Palestinian rivalry flares", *Reuters*, September 2, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/02/us-mideast-gaza-poll-idUSKBN0GX14820140902>.

round of fighting with Israel, a senior diplomatic source said Sunday.[September]. ‘They are already preparing themselves’, the source said, adding that Israel has detected Hamas smuggling weapons into the Gaza Strip.

Likewise, he said, Hamas is working to restore the terrorist tunnels in Gaza, as well as to build up its rocket manufacturing capabilities³⁰.

So that the final result of the recent Operation *Protective Edge* was simply perpetuating a very high level of lack of stability and lack of security in that part of the Greater Middle East. The general situation there is still extremely volatile and not at all predictable. *At geo-strategic level, the clearly incomplete nature of the Israeli victory, coupled with the almost complete collapse of the Iraqi state confronted with the Islamic State (ISIL), with the massive civil war in Syria, and with a more discrete than before – but still obvious and very powerful – Iranian bid for regional hegemony make the entire region we usually call the Greater Middle East a very dangerous place, more dangerous than a few years ago.* Greater Middle East is now a region generating a lot of very serious and long-term worries even for actors of the global arena with geographic position which make them immune, up to a certain point, to immediate consequences of the unfolding dramas in the Middle East.

In terms of power³¹, the final results of Operation Protective Edge can be summarized in two different ways: either Israel lacks the amount of power necessary to gain complete and stable victory; or (more probably), because of both domestic and international factors of all sorts, Israel is simply unable to use its so vast power potential in the most effective way. In such a situation, complete victory for Israel, and a quick and lasting stabilization of the region are clearly possible, but these geo-strategically significant goals have not been accomplished.

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³⁰ Herb KEINON, “Hamas already rearming, preparing for next round of fighting with Israel”, *Jerusalem Post*, September 7, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Hamas-already-rearming-preparing-for-next-round-of-fighting-with-Israel-374674>.

³¹ Defined as “man’s control over the minds and actions of other men”, power is the most important concept in the works of authors belonging to the Realist school of International Relations. See for the definition quoted here Hans J. MORGENTHAU, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, third edition, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1964, p. 28.

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THE CHINESE NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

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Abstract: *Since the end of the Cold War, the global nuclear environment has known significant changes. The spread of nuclear knowledge, materials and expertise from the former Soviet space has offered the premises for new actors to have the possibility to gain access to nuclear weapons. In our opinion, from many points of view, the nuclear environment today is more challenging than it was 20 or 30 years ago. In this given situation, China, one of the 8 declared state actors that possess nuclear weapons, had to take certain measures in order to be adequately prepared to face the challenges of the post-Cold War nuclear environment. This paper aims to present and analyze the evolution of the Chinese nuclear program and policy since 2001.*

Keywords: *China, deterrent, no first use, Second Artillery Corps, ballistic missile, nuclear arsenal.*

Introduction

The Cold War was a period of intense competition and antagonism between the Western Bloc (the United States and its allies) and the Eastern Bloc (the Soviet Union and its allies). For nearly half a century, in a bipolar world, the two superpowers were engaged in a struggle for supremacy. A fierce social, economic, political, diplomatic and military competition pitted Moscow and Washington against one another. One of the key components of the Cold War was the *nuclear* arms race. Spending huge amounts of money, both states tried to gain the upper hand by increasing the quality and quantity of their nuclear arsenals. Shortly, both superpowers had enough warheads to obliterate each other and most of the world. Although there were some tense moments that could have escalated to a nuclear confrontation (the Cuban missile crisis being the most obvious one), neither side was ready to take such a step, because it would have also led to its own destruction. During the Cold War, several other countries besides the two superpowers joined the nuclear club: the United Kingdom, France, India and China (to which we add Pakistan, in 1998 and, more recently, North Korea, in 2006; although undeclared, Israel is also thought to possess nuclear weapons).

Initially, Beijing benefited from substantial Soviet aid (advisers and equipment) in developing its nuclear technology and arsenal, almost to the point in which it received blueprints¹. Of course, after the Sino-Soviet split, Moscow withdrew its support. However, this aspect did not stop the Chinese nuclear program from knowing remarkable progress in the sixties²: on October 16, 1964, China joined the nuclear club, in the aftermath of the nuclear test that took place at the Lop Nur site; in 1966, on October 25, Beijing successfully test-launched its first nuclear missile. Shortly after, on June 14, 1967, the Chinese tested their first thermonuclear bomb. The very quick evolution from the atomic to the thermonuclear bomb might suggest that Beijing made use of nuclear espionage. The exact number of nuclear

¹ Stephen M. YOUNGER, *The Bomb: A New History*, New York, Harper Collins Publishers Inc, 2009, p. 43

² *Nuclear Weapons*, <http://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/nuke/index.html>.

warheads produced by the Chinese during the Cold War is unknown³: in the late eighties, it was thought that the People's Republic of China was the world's third nuclear power, with a number of 225 to 300 nuclear warheads (significantly inferior to the Soviet and American arsenals). During the second half of the last century, China also built a comprehensive nuclear infrastructure, including facilities capable of uranium enrichment and reprocessing⁴.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international nuclear environment has become more challenging. It is true that during the bipolar confrontation Moscow and Washington had sufficient nuclear weapons to destroy the entire planet, but both sides played by a certain, rational, set of rules that prevented an atomic confrontation. However, after the disintegration of Soviet Union, the risk of unpredictable or even irrational actors (like North Korea or terrorist cells) gaining and actually using nuclear weapons has risen. The present nuclear environment presents multiple (although smaller) and more volatile threats than it did during the Cold War.

Beijing was quick to notice these changes. In 1992, the Chinese joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty⁵ (NPT), an international written understanding that dates back from 1970, according to which "Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer" or receive "nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices". The NPT is the most important pillar of the international nuclear non-proliferation effort, having been joined by 189 countries up to this moment. It is also believed that Beijing has stopped its highly-enriched uranium (HEU) production in 1987 and its plutonium production in 1991⁶.

1. Nuclear capabilities and the Second Artillery Corps

The Beijing officials have generally kept a veil of secrecy regarding their country's nuclear capabilities. We do know that China has been (and still is) in the process of modernizing its strategic arsenal for quite some time. According to a nuclear notebook⁷ released by the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, China has an estimated number of 250 nuclear warheads, spread in 12 sites across the country. The central warhead storage silo is situated at Base 22. The missiles intended to deliver the said warheads are dispersed at approximately 25 different bases; probably each base has a number of nuclear warheads in regional storage sites. The navy also has two bases with submarines capable of launching nuclear missiles (SLBM), while the Air Force "has a couple of intermediate-range bomber bases that might have a secondary nuclear mission".

According to an American source⁸, China is actively researching and developing a wide range of potential nuclear delivery vehicles: "China has the most active land-based ballistic and cruise missile program in the world. It is developing and testing several new

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ *Facilities*, <http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/china/facilities/>

⁵ The full text of the treaty can be viewed at <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf>.

⁶ *Reducing and Eliminating Nuclear Weapons: Country Perspectives on the Challenges to Nuclear Disarmament*, The International Panel of Fissile Materials, 2010, p. 12, <http://fissilematerials.org/library/gfmr09cv.pdf>.

⁷ Hans M. KRISTENSEN, Robert S. NORRIS, *Worldwide Deployments of Nuclear Weapons, 2014*, *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, Sage, pp. 97, 98, 104, <http://bos.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/08/26/0096340214547619.full.pdf+html>.

⁸ *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, 2010*, U.S. Department of Defense, pp. 1-2, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_cmpr_final.pdf

classes and variants of offensive missiles”, while also “qualitatively upgrading certain missile systems”. In addition, China is also “modernizing its nuclear forces by adding more survivable delivery systems”, with the “DF-31 and DF-31A intercontinental range ballistic missiles” having entered service. The DF-31A missile has a range of over 11.000 km. Another DOD report⁹ offers more information on the matter: “China [...] is developing a new road-mobile ICBM known as the Dong Feng-41 (DF-41), possibly capable of carrying multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV)”. Beijing is also interested in developing a nuclear-capable submarine force: “The JIN-class and the JL-2 will give the PLA Navy its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent”.

Beijing has placed its nuclear ballistic (as well as conventional) missiles in firing units, under the command of the Second Artillery Corps (SAC)¹⁰, a distinct structure within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The stacking together of conventional as well as unconventional missiles seems to be a risky decision, because it can enhance the risk of an accidental nuclear conflict¹¹: if a targeted state with offensive nuclear capabilities detects the launching of a missile by the SAC, it does not know if the respective missile has a nuclear payload or not; as a consequence, the said state can wait and absorb the strike, then retaliate in kind; or it can launch an immediate retaliatory nuclear strike.

Larry Wortzel, a leading authority on China and military strategy, presents the SAC’s objectives, responsibilities and classes of readiness¹²: providing nuclear deterrence, supporting conventional war through ballistic missiles attacks and, in the event China was subjected to a nuclear aggression, retaliate through a nuclear counter-attack. In the case of the latter, the SAC’s retaliatory strike aims to break the will of the enemy, destroy the enemy’s command and control system, delay the enemy’s operations, reduce its war waging potential and degrade its capability of winning a nuclear war. The Second Artillery Corps has three classes of readiness. In normal conditions, the SAC is in the Third Class – low or no alert status. If China is confronted with the possibility of being subjected to nuclear aggression, the Second Artillery Corps enters Second Class – it starts moving or deploying missiles with nuclear payloads into launching positions. When it has entered First Class Warning, the SAC is completely ready to fire nuclear missiles, waiting for an order to do so.

In the so-called *White Paper*¹³ on China’s armed forces of 2013, Beijing states that “the PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) is a core force for China’s strategic deterrence. It is mainly composed of nuclear and conventional missile forces and operational support units, primarily responsible for deterring other countries from using nuclear weapons against China, and carrying out nuclear counterattacks”, also adding that “the PLASAF capabilities of strategic deterrence, nuclear counterattack and conventional precision strike are being steadily elevated”, another proof that the Chinese are undergoing a process of nuclear modernization. It is obvious that Beijing is interested in updating some of its older nuclear capabilities, in order to be capable to successfully deal with the present nuclear environment. However, China seems more preoccupied with perfecting and diversifying its means of nuclear delivery rather than numerically expanding its limited nuclear warhead stockpile.

⁹ *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2014*, U.S. Department of Defense, pp. 7-8, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf

¹⁰ Larry M. WORTZEL, *China’s Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control, and Campaign Planning*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007, p. 31, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub776.pdf>.

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

¹² *Ibidem*, pp. ix, 16, 20.

¹³ *The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces*, The People’s Republic of China, Beijing, April 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/16/c_132312681_2.htm.

2. No first use

Ever since it joined the nuclear club, back in 1964, Beijing has adhered to a nuclear policy of *no first use* (NFU), according to which “China will never use nuclear weapons first against any nuclear-weapon state and China will never use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state or nuclear-weapon-free zone”¹⁴. Basically, China only regards nuclear weapons as a deterrent, but one that is essential to national security. Washington policy makers believe that for Beijing, this deterrent is focused on “maintaining a nuclear force structure able to survive enemy attack and respond with sufficient strength to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy”¹⁵. We believe that China’s current nuclear forces provide such a deterrent. According to a 2006 report¹⁶, in the aftermath of a U.S. nuclear strike against China’s strategic forces, between 1.5 and 26 million people would die. Due to the fact that the Chinese nuclear stockpile is not large enough to be successfully targeted against similar U.S. forces, Beijing would have to attack counter-value targets, namely civilian centers in order to execute a massive retaliatory strike. If the Chinese strategic forces were to attack 20 major American cities, between 15 and 40 million people would perish.

China is the most important power player in the Asia-Pacific region. The impressive rate at which its economy is growing can only make us wonder how long it will take until it surpasses the American one. Some believe it can be a future opponent for the U.S., especially given their divergent positions regarding Taiwan. Other sources of tension between Beijing and Washington could be related to the China-Japan-South Korea competition for resources in the East China Sea, or the Chinese claims in the South China Sea. In the event of war, it is safe to assume that no one could muster a bigger conventional army or take more punishment than China. The United States has two big advantages: the yet to be equaled mobility of its forces and its undoubtedly superior strategic forces. However, we believe that for the time being, China’s current nuclear forces, although limited, are sufficient enough to act as an insurance policy against any major strategic aggression. Of course, the American pursuit of ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems can alter the present state of affairs. Many among the People’s Liberation army believe that the American military power and its potential to coerce or dominate China is a latent threat¹⁷.

Over the past few years, among Chinese military men and experts, a difference of opinion has risen, on whether or not the nuclear no first use policy is still an adequate strategy¹⁸. As a testimony to this debate, the previously mentioned *White Paper* on China’s armed forces of 2013 is the first official document which does not explicitly mention the fact that Beijing is not willing to be the first one that uses nuclear weapons in the event of a nuclear conflict. We believe that this aspect, alongside with Beijing’s secrecy regarding its nuclear capabilities further strengthens China’s strategic deterrent.

When it comes to nuclear disarmament, the statement¹⁹ made by the Chinese delegation during a U.N. session is relevant: “first, all nuclear-weapon states should fulfill in good faith nuclear disarmament obligations under the NPT, and publicly undertake not to seek permanent possession of nuclear weapons”. Furthermore, China’s point of view is that the

¹⁴ *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2010*, U.S. Department of Defense, pp. 34-45, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_cmpr_final.pdf

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 34.

¹⁶ Hans M. KRISTENSEN, Robert S. NORRIS, Matthew G. MCKINZIE, *Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning*, The Federation of American Scientists & The Natural Resources Defense Council, November 2006, p.10, <http://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/Book2006.pdf>.

¹⁷ Larry M. WORTZEL, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p.27.

¹⁹ *Statement by the Chinese Delegation on Nuclear Disarmament at the Thematic Debate at the First Committee of the 67th Session of UNGA*, October 19, 2012, <http://www.chinesemission-vienna.at/eng/hyyfy/t980680.htm>

Russian Federation and the U.S. should spearhead the disarmament movement: “countries with the largest nuclear arsenals should continue to take the lead in making drastic reductions in their nuclear weapons in a verifiable and irreversible manner so as to create conditions for comprehensive and thorough nuclear disarmament”. The Chinese delegation also expressed its belief that “all nuclear-weapon states should abandon the nuclear deterrence policy based on first use of nuclear weapons and unequivocally undertake no-first-use of nuclear weapons and negotiate and conclude a treaty on no-first-use of nuclear weapons against one another. Nuclear-weapon states should also unequivocally undertake not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and conclude a legally-binding international instrument in this regard at an early date”.

We shall now briefly present China’s position in regard to the nuclear programs developed by Iran and North Korea. The international community has yet to establish if the Tehran government is actually pursuing nuclear weapons. However, it has concluded that Iran’s nuclear infrastructure could harbor possible military applications. This has convinced part of the international community to impose sanctions on Tehran. This is not the case with China. In an article²⁰ written in November 2013, we find out that “when Western countries imposed sanctions against Iran due to concerns over its nuclear program, Chinese oil companies were able to win bids for developing large oil fields in Iran”. More interested in following its economic interests than debating whether or not a country that “has never been considered as one of the top three targets of diplomacy by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs” is pursuing nuclear weapons, China believes that “Iran may carry out limited uranium enrichment activities” and that “the Iranian nuclear issue should not lead to war”. In the case of North Korea, Beijing abandoned its relatively indifferent attitude. From another article²¹, we find out that earlier in 2014, “China has used diplomatic channels to warn North Korea against conducting a fourth nuclear test”, despite the fact that the Beijing government is “North Korea’s most important diplomatic and economic ally”. It is obvious that allies or not, China does not want North Korea’s nuclear program to be the cause of war or instability in the region.

Conclusions

Half a century has passed since China has successfully tested its first atomic bomb. Initially, Beijing benefited from Soviet nuclear expertise. After the Sino-Soviet split, however, the Chinese had to undertake this process without any known (or willing) foreign help. They progressed quickly, and were able to test their first thermonuclear bomb in 1967. An interesting aspect is to be noted about the successful pursuit of nuclear offensive capabilities by Beijing: by joining the nuclear club, China could no longer be subjected to potential nuclear blackmail. Unlike the two superpowers, who engaged in a nuclear arms race – both Washington and Moscow dedicated vast amounts of resources in order to gain the quantitative or qualitative upper hand – from the very beginning, Beijing only produced a limited stockpile of nuclear warheads.

During the Cold War (as well as after), basically each Soviet and American leader had a different view regarding the way the strategic forces could (or should) be used. Periodical changes in nuclear policy and strategy (not necessarily important ones) were a rather common occurrence for Washington and Moscow. Unlike the U.S. and the Soviet Union (or the

²⁰ Mu CHUNSHAN, *The Iranian Nuclear Question: China’s Perspective*, *The Diplomat*, November 27, 2013, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/the-iranian-nuclear-question-chinas-perspective/>.

²¹ Megha RAJAGOPALAN, *China “uses channels” to warn North Korea against nuclear test: sources*, *Reuters*, May 19, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/19/us-china-northkorea-nuclear-idUSBREA4I08W20140519>.

Russian Federation), since 1964, China has adopted a long-lasting policy of no first use, according to which Beijing will not be the first to use nuclear weapons against other nuclear-capable states; furthermore, for the Chinese, the option of using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states is off the table. However, some questions remain unanswered regarding this no first use policy; for example, if the Chinese strategic forces are threatened in the context of a conventional conflict, is Beijing prepared to lose its nuclear deterrent? Or will it make use of it?

As we mentioned before, the international nuclear climate has changed after the Cold War; this became even more obvious especially after 9/11, because we can only ask ourselves, what would have happened if instead of planes, the terrorists would have used weapons of mass destruction? The international community is now generally interested in not allowing potential unstable or irrational actors from acquiring such capabilities. In this context, for example, American strategic forces have undergone significant changes (in posture and capability), especially under the George W. Bush administration. Beijing is also preoccupied with the spread of nuclear weapons, but only to a certain extent (as we have noticed in the cases of Iran and North Korea). We believe that, most of all, China is more interested in maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent. Thus, the ongoing process of modernizing its strategic capabilities is a rather reactionary one. It is also limited, because Beijing seems to be more interested in developing new and perfecting older means of delivery than in expanding its limited nuclear stockpile.

In regard to disarmament, China believes that the main responsibility lies on the shoulders of the countries with the most significant nuclear capabilities: the U.S. and the Russian Federation. We believe that the prospect of world-wide nuclear disarmament is distant, in the best case scenario, if not impossible. It is hard to believe that all international actors are willing to abandon a technology which offers the ultimate strategic advantage and go back to more conventional ways of waging war. And even if they were, there is still the question of trust. Agreements focused on limiting or reducing nuclear capabilities are more likely to happen (as was the case in the past). For the time being, if nothing else, a credible nuclear deterrent is a necessary evil for China, especially if we take into the account that 4 of its neighbors (the Russian Federation, Pakistan, India and North Korea) possess atomic weapons.

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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FALKLAND: FROM 1982 TO PRESENT

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Abstract: *The paper is a comparative analysis of the conflicts between Argentine and the United Kingdom, both countries being presented before the Falklands War in 1982 and at the present moment, from a diplomatic, economic and military perspective. Is it possible a quick escalation of the present conflict between the UK and Argentine, or can diplomacy prevent that? Did the discovery of huge amounts of oil and gas in the islands' area change the position of the state actors on the international arena? If a new violent conflict starts, will the two countries be ready for war, from military point of view? Do they have adequate strategic capabilities? What is the position of other major players on the international arena regarding the implication of the UK and Argentine in this matter? The study will try to find an answer to these questions, and to present, using open sources, a broader picture of a very complex situation.*

Keywords: *Falklands Islands, Malvinas, Falkland War, Argentine, Great Britain.*

Introduction

The Falkland Islands, known also as Islas Malvinas are located in South Atlantic, at a distance of 435 km east of Patagonian southern coast of South America and 450 km NE from the southern extremity of Tierra del Fuego. The archipelago consists of two principal islands, East Falkland, West Falkland and other 776 smaller islands. In 1980 the islands population was about 1813 people, from which about 1000 lived in Port Stanley, the capital. In 2012, the population of archipelago was about 2932 people including the native population of British ancestry but also French, Gibraltarian and Scandinavian.

From economical point of view, in 1980, the exports of wool and leather towards Great Britain were in value of 2.8 millions of British pounds and the imports (mostly food, lumber, manufactured goods and machinery) were in value of app. 2 million pounds. From 1995 until today, the islands exports grew from 20 million dollars up to 180 million at present. Today, the discovery of a big oil reserve, uncovers a new economic potential of the islands.

Regarding the history of the islands, the first documented data are from 1690 and are linked to the English captain John Strong, who in his journey to the shore of Peru and Chile noted the discovery of the islands. It seems that two other earlier maps, one of the Portuguese cartographer Pedro Reinel in 1522 and another, a French copy of this map made in Lisbon by André Thevet (1516-1592), a French franciscan priest, explorer, cosmographer and writer, who travelled to Brazil in the 16th century, (this map can be find in the National Library of France in Paris) contain these islands.¹ The islands were inhabited from 1764 when the French

¹ Eugeniu NISTOR, "Aspecte ale crizei de comunicare și relaționare în conflictul din Arhipelagul Malvine/Falkland (1982)", *International Conference European Integration - Between Tradition and Modernity*, Targu Mures, 2013, at the Internet address http://www.upm.ro/facultati_departamente/stiinte_litere/conferinte/situl_integrare_europeana/Lucrari4/NISTOR.pdf.

captain Louis Antoine de Bougainville founded Port Louis in East Falkland and in 1776 when the commander of the British ship HMS Jason, John MacBride, founded Port Egmont in Saunders Island, near the coast of West Falkland. In 1770, the Spanish discovered Port Egmont and captured it. Both settlements existed until 1774 when the British retreated voluntarily from economical reasons. Spain will abandon the settlement in 1811, the island remaining uninhabited with the exception of the temporary visits of the Spanish and Americans fishing ships. In 1820, Argentine proclaimed the sovereignty over the territories and in 1833 Great Britain reestablished the control over the territories expelling the Argentines and setting the bases for the first stable population.

Argentine continued to issue territorial claims over the islands and in 1965 UN stated that the territory is “a problematic territory” and asked the presence of both countries in order to negotiate a solution. For 17 years, until the outbreak of the conflict in 1982, these negotiations have not led to any results. The Argentinean army invaded the islands on April the 2, 1982. The United Kingdom responded and the command of Port Stanley garrison was surrendered on June the 14. 655 Argentinean and 255 British soldiers have died during the fight.

The diplomatic relations were resumed in 1990 but the island status remains an important topic with misunderstandings regarding the flight over the islands and the fishing rights.

1. The diplomatic situation

In 1965, the dispute between United Kingdom and Argentine got into ONU attention through the approving of the Resolution 2065 in the General Assembly of UN, inviting both parts to find a peaceful solution. Unfortunately it has not led to any result regarding the problem of the islands' belonging. United Kingdom considered that it was an issue of a great importance for Argentina to offer citizenship to the islands citizens in order to reduce the level of isolation and after 3 decades they should be invited to choose between the British and Argentinean citizenship, but in order to accomplish this, time and patient were needed from Argentine, which rejected the proposal.

In December 1973 it was adopted a UN resolution, 3160, that encouraged the two parts to start the negotiations in the interest of islands inhabitants and expressed the gratitude for "the continuous efforts made by the Government of Argentina, in accordance with the relevant decisions of the General Assembly, to facilitate the process of decolonization and to promote the well-being of the population of the Islands. It was adopted with 99 in favor, zero against and, as in 1968, 14 abstentions."²

The new Junta ruled by the General Leopoldo Galtieri, who took the power on December the 8, 1981, ended the negotiations that last over a decade.

The situation in Crimea brought again into attention the Falkland Islands issue, when the president of Argentina, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner accused the United States of America and United Kingdom of double standards “for criticizing a pro-Russian secession vote held in Crimea, while backing a status referendum in the Falkland Islands claimed by Argentina. Critics say her campaign is simply a cynical attempt to divert attention from Argentina's patchy economic performance.”³

² Lawrence FREEDMAN, *Official History of the Falklands, Volume 1: The Origins of the Falklands War*, London, Routledge, 2005, p. 25.

³ Colin FREEMAN, “Britain should open talks with Argentina over the Falklands, says Vladimir Putin”, *The Telegraph*, September 8, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/argentina/10965578/Britain-should-open-talks-with-Argentina-over-the-Falklands-says-Vladimir-Putin.html>.

A major change in the force equilibrium compared to the previous situation is the involvement of Russia. Vladimir Putin supports Argentina in opening the negotiations over the future of Falkland Islands. On July the 14, 2014, in a six day visit in Argentine, Vladimir Putin declared that Russia sustain “the need to find a solution in the Malvinas Islas dispute between Argentine and the United Kingdom through direct negotiations between the two states.”, despite the fact that Great Britain clarified its position and doesn’t intend to reopen the negotiations regarding the future of the islands. Russia’s interests, besides the possible economical benefits in the oil field of the Islands and contracts with Argentina, are related to the strategically position that can be obtain in the Atlantic Ocean. Russia, a BRICS member, with Brazil, India, China and South Africa, seeks to impose o stronger position after the latest events in Ukraine and the sanctions that were imposed on Russia. The orientation toward South America comes from the need to exploit a new market, both in investment and imports, to assure a higher level of independence toward the European markets. In this line, the security of the area is very important.

This year, in July, Argentina succeeded to persuade the Special committee of decolonization of the UN and to start new negotiations with the United Kingdom regarding the islands and ignoring the referendum in Great Britain from 2013 to which 99.8% voted that the situation should remain unchanged.

Another situation that seems to repeat itself for the United Kingdom is the one related to Gibraltar, a dispute with a history of 300 years. In the last three years, The Popular Party that governs in Spain has adopted a rough approach toward the dispute. This situation increased the pressure on Gibraltar and its inhabitants. The Gibraltarian suffered customs delay, aggressive maritime intrusions and provocative speeches related to sovereignty and economy from the Spanish ministers.

Spain’s actions put the government of Great Britain in a difficult position. The bilateral relations with Spain are in the interest of all the British citizens including those one million English that live in Spain. But the Government has responsibilities also towards the Gibraltar and can’t ignore the Spain’s actions that try to create difficulties for the inhabitants of the island.⁴

We can detect the similitude between the position of Spain and Argentina both of them playing the nationalism card in an international issue. Also, “from the perspective of realignment of the power relations on the international arena, that what Spain is undertaking now, resembles up to a point with the manner in which, in various occasions, Argentina raises the issue of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)”⁵. The difference between the two situations is substantial: if in the case of Gibraltar, the United Kingdom and Spain are limited at the membership of European Union, in the case of Falkland Islands the possibility of degeneration of the situation is much bigger in the absence of such an organization.

2. Economic aspects

Between 1978 and 1979 the real exchange rate in Argentina was appreciated because the inflation consistently exceeded the rate of depreciation. The overvaluation finally led to

⁴“The UK government must “get off the fence” over Gibraltar, says Foreign Affairs Committee”, *New Statesman*, September 8, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.newstatesman.com/gibraltar/newstatesman-gibraltar/2014/07/uk-government-must-get-fence-over-gibraltar-says-foreign>.

⁵Florin DIACONU, “Chestiunea Gibraltarului: în interiorul UE nu curg numai lapte și miere”, *LaPunkt*, September 8, 2014, at <http://www.lapunkt.ro/2013/09/20/chestiunea-gibraltarului-in-interiorul-ue-nu-curg-numai-lapte-si-miere/>.

capital flight and collapse of the financial system.⁶ In the “80s, after high expenses, because of the massive wage increases and ineffective production, Argentina was in a rather problematic situation with a chronic inflation that exceeded the annual rate of 1,000%.

General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri, whose popularity was eroded by the effects of economic collapse and repeated financial crises, choose to pursue a policy relying on dangerous exacerbation of nationalism and decide to take the Falkland Islands.

If during that time, the Falklands War was seen as a possibility to save the political power, today, the newly discovered resources can be targeted in terms of economic rescue for the economical situation in Argentina. In 1982, Argentina's actions have distracted attention from the disastrous economic situation of the country. This proves that then, and even today, these actions can be a tool to promote nationalism and we can't exclude that in a similar situation they will not try this again, especially since this time, the existence of resources presents an additional motivation.

Argentina is in continuous decline since the beginning of the twentieth century, the causes being subject of more analysis. Di Tella and Zymelman argue that Argentina have never found alternative to compensate the end of its territorial expansion, at the final closing of the border. Duncan and Fogarty put this on account of unstable governments and Alan M. Taylor pointed that the relatively high dependency ratio and the slow demographic transition in Argentina led to a reliance on the foreign capital to compensate for the resulting low savings rate. The ultimate cause of Argentina's historical backwardness appears to be its institutional framework.⁷ In macroeconomic terms, Argentina was one of the most stable and conservative countries until the Great Depression, after which it turned into one of the most unstable.⁸

In May 2011, studies in the area led to the discovery of approximately 943 million barrels of oil in Lion Sea⁹, close to the Falkland Islands which made the stakes increase. In July 2012, Premier Oil PLc (PMO) farmed in for 60% of Rockhopper Exploration's license interests in the North Falklands Basin, including the Sea Lion discovery. The transaction was completed in October 2012 and Premier assumed operatorship of the Sea Lion area development in November 2012. Premier paid an initial payment of \$231 million plus an exploration and development carry of up to \$48 million and \$722 million, respectively.¹⁰ Premier Oil has delayed plans to extract the first oil off the Falklands until 2018 amid uncertainty over how best to develop the oil extraction in the disputed waters.

In the same year, in Argentina was discovered Vaca Muerta oil field with 927 million barrels and 308 trillion cubic feet of gas which allows negotiations with major oil companies in the world and also offers the opportunity to put conditions in terms of the resources of the islands. Daniel Filmus, a one-time Argentina senator who recently became head of a new “Malvinas Secretariat”, has warned firms drilling off the islands' coasts that they will be ineligible to exploit shale-oil and gas in Patagonia's vast Vaca Muerte field. “In November

⁶Rudiger DORNBUSCH, Juan Carlos de PABLO, *Argentina: Debt and Macroeconomic Instability*, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 1987, p. 13, at the Internet address <http://www.webcitation.org/63vtJrm5Q>.

⁷Leandro Prados de la ESCOSURA and Isabel SANZ-VILLARROYA, “Institutional Instability and Growth in Argentina: a Long-Run View”, *Economic History and Institutions Series*, Madrid, 2004, p. 5, September 8, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.webcitation.org/68RdgJNR9>.

⁸Gerardo della PAOLERA, Alan M. TAYLOR, *A New Economic History of Argentina*, Volume 1, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 87.

⁹“Sea Lion Oil Field, Falkland Islands (Malvinas)”, *Offshore Technology*, September 8, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.offshore-technology.com/projects/sealionfield/>.

¹⁰Emily GOSDEN, “First Falklands Islands oil production delayed to 2018”, *The Telegraph*, September 8, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/10269301/First-Falklands-Islands-oil-production-delayed-to-2018.html>

the Argentine congress passed a law to impose hefty fines and prison sentences of up to 15 years for anyone involved in exploring the Falklands' continental shelf without its permission."¹¹ The big oil companies with an eye on Argentina are not expected to do any drill in the Falklands in the near future. That leaves the field free for smaller, mainly UK-based companies to prospect under the waves.

In February 2014 during his visit to the Falkland Islands, Hugo Swire, a British foreign-office minister, rebuffed suggestions that firms would be put off by the Argentine threats. "No, we very much hope that people won't be scared off," he said, before putting his finger on the real problem. "I think once we know there is oil and gas here, it is just a question of making it happen." The islanders are confident that oil riches lie in their future.¹²

3. Military aspects

3.1. On the Islands

According to Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman, official historian of the Falklands War, "on the eve of the invasion, there were about 70 Royal Marines stationed on the islands - twice the usual number due to a changeover. They were, in theory, backed up by about 120 local reservists, although only a small proportion reported for duty. HMS Endurance, an Antarctic ice patrol vessel, was the only ship based in the South Atlantic at the time. And there were no fighter jets - none of the island's airstrips were long enough. The only planes that could land before the war came from Argentina. Supplying the Falklands by sea from Britain took two weeks."¹³ Argentine Marines were ordered to capture the islands without killing any British soldiers, a maneuver that they accomplished. The Argentine navy was well equipped with Dassault-Breguet Super Etendard strike fighters, which destroyed several British ships with Exocet missiles. Other planes used by the Argentine military included Aermacchi MB-339s as well as Skyhawks and Mirages.

In 2014, Great Britain has in Falkland Islands, one infantry company of 1500 men, one air defense detachment with Rapier, one fighter flight with 4 Typhoon FGR4, one Search and Rescue squadron with Sea King humanitarian assistance HAR-3/3A, one tanker/transport flight with C-130J Hercules.

United Kingdom has on patrol since August 2007 in waters around Falkland Islands, HMS Clyde, the first ship build in the last 40 years in the naval base Portsmouth, the fourth ship from River class, and the first of a lengthened variety with a larger displacement of 2,000 tones and a 30 mm Oerlikon KCB gun in place of the 20 mm gun fitted to other River-class ships. The ship will be sailing around the Falkland Islands until 2018. In the last years there were few incidents related to the ship: in 2011, Brazilian government denied the access of the ship in Rio de Janeiro out of solidarity with Argentina. It is not the only incident, on the 20th of September 2010 the government of Uruguay denied the access of Gloucester Ship in Montevideo as a consequence of the Falkland Islands sovereignty dispute. The Ship HMS Gloucester D-96 requested to enter in Montevideo and was stopped by the Uruguayan National Army, at the order of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Defense Ministry.

¹¹J. B. STANLEY, "Oil and gas in the Falklands Treasure islands?", *The Economist*, September 8, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2014/02/oil-and-gas-falklands>

¹²J. B. STANLEY, "Oil and gas in the Falklands Treasure islands?", *The Economist*, September 8, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2014/02/oil-and-gas-falklands>

¹³"Could the UK still defend the Falklands?", *BBC*, September 8, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-17157373>

According to sources, “authorities banned the vessel from entering for the Foreign Minister did not consider it correct to do so.”¹⁴

3.2. Military spending

“The Global Firepower website ranks Argentina in lowly 55th place, behind the likes of the Netherlands, Belarus and Ukraine. And despite its ongoing economic travails, the UK remains among the world’s leading military powers thanks to the \$53.6 billion it spends on defense, compared to Argentina’s \$4.3 billion. Moreover, the UK’s helicopters, aircraft and submarine capabilities significantly outnumber and outclass their Argentine equivalents. To further compound matters, Argentina’s armed forces are still equipped with outdated technology from the 1970s and 80s, whereas the UK has significantly improved its quality and capabilities since 1982. UK forces are also significantly battle-hardened from recent conflicts in the Middle East and Asia.”¹⁵

According to the latest Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Military Expenditure Database¹⁶, during the era which included the Falklands conflict, Britain's military budget represented around four percent of GDP - something which the conflict itself helped to increase. The UK's spending had been the subject of major cuts during the late 1970s, which, ironically, would have meant that a number of the vessels involved in the war would not have been in service if Argentina's military junta had delayed the decision to invade with a few months.

Today, cuts are once again on the agenda, with defense spending now accounting 2.7% of GDP and, in the wake of the Strategic Defense and Security Review, they are to face a five percent reduction - £1.72 billion in real terms – for 2013/14. Nonetheless, Britain's military budget still ranks fourth in the world.

In case of Argentina, while the SIPRI figures show the proportion of GDP spent on defense “has fallen slightly - from 1.4% then to one percent today - that masks the increase in actual cash terms driven by the growth in the country's economy.”¹⁷

Argentine military expenditure in 2009, at constant 2009 prices and exchange rates, was \$2.7 billion USD and in 2010, it reached up to \$3.3 billion. A recent report from Strategic Defense Intelligence predicted that Argentina's defense budget will have an annual growth rate (CAGR) of 15.87% from 2011 to 2015, reaching a final total of \$5.5bn. “In respect of the Argentine Naval allocation, the authors forecast it will increase from the average of 25.3% of the country's total defense budget between 2006 and 2010, to 25.5% over the years to 2015.”¹⁸

¹⁴ “Uruguayan gov’t bans British heading-to-Malvinas vessel from entering Montevideo’s port”, *Buenos Aires Herald*, September 8, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.buenosairesherald.com/BreakingNews/View/45724>

¹⁵ Neil THOMPSON, “What Threat does Argentina Currently Pose to the Falklands?”, *The International Relations and Security Network (ISN)*, September 8, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail?id=181854>

¹⁶ *SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public. Based in Stockholm, SIPRI also has presences in Beijing and Washington, DC and is regularly ranked among the most respected think tanks worldwide*, at the internet address <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/measuring-military-expenditures>

¹⁷ Gareth EVANS, "Falklands War – UK and Argentine naval power then and now", *Naval Technology*, September 8, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.naval-technology.com/features/featurefalklands-war-uk-navy-argentina/>.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

3.3. British and Argentine naval fleets

In the late 80s, the Royal Navy had two aircraft carriers, seven amphibious ships, 13 destroyers and 35 frigates. Nowadays Britain has 18 active major combatants, 6 destroyers and 13 frigates. More than that, seven vessels are currently under development- the two Queen Elizabeth-Class aircraft carriers, the last of the Type 45 destroyers and four Astute-Class submarines. In addition, there are two landing platform docks and a total of 11 nuclear powered submarines, of which four are ballistic missile submarines and the remaining seven are conventionally-armed, fleet submarines.

Argentina's core fleet, in 1982, at the beginning of the Falklands conflict was comprised of six destroyers (two of them Type 42s), three corvettes, one cruiser, one ex-Royal Navy Colossus-Class carrier (the former HMS Venerable) and a submarine Type 209 and, a submarine from WWII, vintage Guppy-type. Argentinean maritime lost in the conflict one cruiser, one submarine, four cargo vessels, two patrol vessels and a spy trawler. After the war, the main fleet was transformed, with modern Meko 360 and 140 type vessels replacing the antiquated Fletcher and Gearing Class destroyers, and two Thyssen TR-1700 Class vessels being acquired in the place of the single Guppy submarine.

Today's Argentine Navy boast two amphibious vessels (one command ship, one cargo ship), four destroyers, nine corvettes and three submarines, but like the UK, no carrier. The Falklands-era ARA Veinticinco de Mayo was decommissioned in 2000.

A curious fact that can clearly be seen from a simple comparison of both nations is that, both have turned their backs to naval air support, for the time being.

The BBC Horizon programme in 1986 underlined the vulnerability of surface ships to anti-ship missiles and submarines, the challenges of co-coordinating logistical support for a long-distance projection of power, and confirm the role of tactical air power and the use of helicopters.

Much has also changed in strategic terms. Professor Michael Clarke, director of the Royal United Services Institute says that in case of an attack the islands can be won back through long-range air power. The lack of carrier aircraft is an impediment for the United Kingdom.

Conclusions

Many analysts hold Argentina's special-forces in high-regard and believe that they are capable of launching covert strikes against the Islands. Yet, even if such strikes were to succeed, it would still be extremely difficult for Argentina's armed forces to hold the Islands and, indeed, reinforce and resupply them. Given the parlous state of Argentina's navy especially, this idea makes no military sense. But as a public relations gesture to rally regional support for itself against Britain, a clash could easily be presented as a moral victory.¹⁹ Regarding a covert strike, Professor Michael Clarke, director of the Royal United Services Institute, stress out another important element: the evolution of intelligence. If in 1982 this area was poorly handled, the presence of Mount Pleasant base and the electronic monitoring that now takes place from there changed the situation. Also, there is the ability to response quickly.²⁰

¹⁹Neil THOMPSON, "What Threat Does Argentina Currently Pose to the Falklands? – Analysis", *Eurasia Review*, September 8, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.eurasiareview.com/22072014-threat-argentina-currently-pose-falklands-analysis/>

²⁰ Michael CLARKE, "The Falklands: The Security Equation in 2012", Royal United Services Institute, September 8, 2014, at the Internet address <https://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4F632444BE2E/#.VBE7yPmSwtQ>.

According to Gareth Jennings, head of the air desk at IHS: while, numerically speaking, the Argentines would be able to take in battle field a larger number of aircraft than the UK in any future war, the important thing to remember is that Argentina has not purchased a single new combat aircraft since before the war in 1982. Essentially, it has the same air power it had back in 1982 minus the aircrafts that were shot down. They didn't manage too well against the Sea Harriers then and they'd be torn apart by the Typhoons today.²¹

We also have to keep in mind that United Kingdom has fought in since 1982 in eight wars and Argentina in one. The experience gathered on combat field by United Kingdom army can make a big difference in the outcome of a potential conflict.

The situation may increase in tension because of the economical position of Argentine and the possible interest of other countries in this issue. It's interesting how an event in one place of the world can reactivate tensions in another place: the crisis in Ukraine stimulated a statement from the president of Argentina and the involvement of Russia in reopening the discussion. Also, the new oil discovery in the area may transform Falkland in "the islands of treasure" from an economical point of view. The evolution of the situation is strongly linked to the dynamic of the international scene and the position of various state actors regarding the matter in discussion.

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²¹ Tim RAYMENT, "Can we still defend the Falklands?", *The Sunday Times*, September 8, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/focus/article860698.ece>.

THE ROLE OF GERMANY IN EURASIA IN 21ST CENTURY – EFFECTS OF CONSOLIDATING EUROPEAN UNION

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Abstract: *Throughout the history of postwar Germany attempted to define national and geopolitical interests within a united Europe, so called European Union and also within Eurasia, through the relationship with the former Soviet states in Eastern Europe and Russia. Eurasian geopolitics as described, according to Mackinder's theory as the "heart of the world". Germany, through its constant active role in Europe, manages to strengthen the frontiers of the European Union, due to its special relation with Russia. The premises of the European Neighbourhood Policy brought a fruitful administration security dialogue to European Union, which does not want its borders to be vulnerable; conflicts might endanger the European unity. The recent conflicts in Eastern Europe, located mainly in Ukraine, causing Germany to increase its interests in Eurasia to ameliorate the conflict near the European Union borders.*

Keywords: *Germany, Eurasian geopolitical interests, the security of the European Union, the European Neighbourhood Policy.*

Introduction

Germany today tends to raise its power and influence in Europe again, but this time through a young regional organization so called European Union. Through the development inside the European Union, Germany had the chance to raise its economic power and had a complete unity within the Eastern part of Germany, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. To strengthen its role in Europe, Germany, engaged itself in economic, social and energetic relations with Russia.

At the end of the 90es, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote in his book “The Grand Chessboard” that Ukraine is a geopolitical pivot in the struggle for the world primacy. The struggle for global primacy would be played along the Eurasia region, if Russia would regain the power over Ukraine than the course of history tells us that it would become an imperial and powerful state in Europe and Asia.

We are watching a raise of a new geopolitical actor on the Grand Chessboard; the Sino-Russian strategic alliance tends to threaten the Mackinder heartland and its inner rim. The raise of economic power of China in world trade put in danger the security of the international relations system.

Today a multipolar system is running the world order. It is hard to let go slowly to the hegemonic power of one state and facing the new powers that are born. This is the case of United States, whose had the missionary duty to help other state to democratize and develop to the nowadays standards, but with the new world order the old hegemonic power try to find its place in the world system.

Germany is a regional and economic power in Eurasia, due to its inner power in European Union securitization its eastern European borders. Germany has the power to stabilise the increasing need of Russian power in Europe and Asia throughout the special

relation, that was consolidate in time, although the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, criticised the constantly the human rights issue within the Eurasia region.

Germany is a balance power between the Russian empire struggle and the raise of the Eurasian Union. Germany along with France and United States can secure the peace in Europe. Perhaps Obama administration along with the German influence in Eurasia may actually lead a containment policy to limit the ongoing hegemonic power of Russia in the world.

The purpose of this paper is to make a clear and comprehensive presentation of the Germany role in Eurasia in the 21st century, in consolidating the European Union. Moreover, the article aim to fill a gap in the scientific research derived from the lack of interest to cover the analytic topic to this specific issue. Therefore, the methodology used here to build the argumentation has a qualitative perspective rather than a quantitative approach. By a close examination of the accessible literature, different books and articles that touched, in a particular way, the hypothesis of specific regarding the relations of Germany with the former soviet states from the Russian sphere of influences, the German – Russian relation and the significant role of the German – France partnership inner the European Union. Different expert researchers had the opportunity to access the primary sources or expert analyst, that knew the topics from the interests and history of Germany, wrote the studies.

1. Eurasia and the Mackinder Theory

The geopolitical circumstances of the 21st century gave the indicators and a new perspective to studies of the regional structure regarding the application of the geopolitical space of Eurasia. The principles of the Mackinder theory revives through the transformation and evolution of the nowadays-international relations environment.

According to Mackinder, the European civilization was a result of the outside pressure, due to the struggle of many centuries against the invasion of the Asian population.¹ He asserted that evolution and expansion of Europe consists in the reaction against the pressure coming from the Asian invasion.

Mackinder named Heartland the continental part of Eurasia were everything was concentrated and served as the pivot of the geopolitical changes within the World Island. He underlined that Heartland was thy advantageous and central location from geopolitical reasons and not only. Eurasia is in the centre of the World Island where the global geopolitical interests are concentrated. His doctrine pointed out that the actor who dominates the Heartland would possess the main geopolitical, economical and geostrategic control over the World Island (the planet).

Mackinder geopolitical pivot concept was concentrated and turn into form along the river basins Volga, Yenisey, Amu Darya, Syr Darya, Caspian Sea Aral Sea and the Black and Baltic basins. Through this delimitation Eurasia, possess sustainable conditions to develop the necessary military power for the actor who would dominate the pivot area. There existed of course an “inner crescent”, which included the intensive civilization evolution, situated along the coastal Eurasia and the “outer crescent” that included the geographical and cultural area around Eurasia, the rest of the continents.²

The Pivot Area, in Mackinder conception, controlled from the Eastern Europe, represents the key to possess the Heartland. If Eastern Europe remains united than the geopolitical unity of the functionality of the Pivot validates Eurasia. His famous geopolitical

¹ Halford J. MACKINDER, *The Geographical Pivot of History*, in "Democratic Ideals and Reality", Washington, D.C., Ed. National Defence University Press, 1996, p. 177.

² *Idem.*, pp. 180 – 183.

formula is “Whoever rules the Heartland commands the World Island; whoever rules the World island rules the World.”³

To understand the role of Germany in Eurasia in nowadays century and its significant impact in consolidating the unity of European Union, the Pivot Area, must be seen as a geopolitical evolution cycle. The Heartland can be seen as a pupil eye that shrinks, dilates continuously depending on the circumstances.

From historically point of view, the Pivot Area was formed mainly of ethnic empires, such as Hun Empire, Ottoman Empire, and Russian Empire, religious and ideological reason. The evolution of the Heartland was flourish, each geopolitical actor tended during the history to dominate over this area.

In the beginning of the 20th century, the Russian Empire suffered a radical transformation into the Soviet Union. This new political and ideological construction inherited the geopolitical potential over the Pivot Area. As previous underlined, the evolution cycle made a new step into the future of the Heartland through the disintegration of the superpower, the Soviet Union. The new segments appeared after the collapse of the Soviets ideology, the regional power – European Union, Germany, France, Russian Federation and other actors from Central Caucasian and Central Asia. Each of these powers tended to emerge in Heartland and dominate it.

According to Mackinder theory, Heartland is the central part of the World Island, so it has the dynamic and sustainable part of Eurasia. The main function of the Pivot Area consists in ensuring sustainable land to geopolitical and economic integration in a relatively isolated Eurasia.

The history revealed that the conquer principles to dominate Heartland such as ethnical or ideological principle led Eurasian empires to fall apart. The main principle that should sustain the Pivot Area under the rule of a single power should use the self-regulation criteria, which means mutual complementarity through the segments of the area.

2. The German – Russian Relation and the security of the European Union

The 21st century began with a reshaping of the Eurasian continent. Russia and the former soviet states tried to redefine their role in the region.

Once with the Vladimir Putin’s presidency, the rhetoric in Russia became more nationalist and that complicated the relations of Russia with the European Union member states. The crisis appeared in the inner of the West European states and especially in the European Union and NATO institutions, gave Moscow an advantage to explore the weaknesses of the West using methods such as launching bilateral relations within the West countries and keep influence the former soviet regions.

For Russia, Germany represent a viable and reliable partner between the other European member states. Due to the current crisis in the Eurozone, Germany, increased its role in the European Union Common Security Policy. Germany is the key actor in the Russian game with European Union and the raise of the Eurasian Union. History taught European countries that Germany had a special role in Europe regarding the need to unity, because of its tradition in Ostpolitik.⁴

The actual German foreign policy consists in three important key elements. First of all, Germany must contra balance the lack of great military force with economic and

³ *Ibidem.*, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, Washington, D.C., Ed. National Defense University Press, 1996, p. 113.

⁴ Andrey, MAKARYCHEV, *Eastern Partnerships: Is Germany Driving or Riding?*, Berlin, in “PONARS Eurasia Policy”, March 2013, <http://www.ponarseurasia.org/ru/node/6485>, accessed to 7.09.2014.

technological development and the use of soft power in foreign affairs. Second of all, Germans tend to promote and defend human rights and democratic values and issues. The final key element, Germany upholds for a supranational integration within the European Union.

On the other part of the Europe, the Russian political premises derives from the believes that Russia has the military potential and energetic capabilities that put itself in the centre of the international relations.

It is interesting that both Russia and Germany support the European Union-Russian partnership for modernization. It is unlikely to think that through this partnership Russian issues, corruption, inefficient state instructions and increased deficit of human rights implementation, would be solved. Russian diplomacy thinking remains undoubtable unbreakable. When it came the West to have a humanitarian intervention in Syria, Russia opposed, because the West interfered with the military campaign in Libya to ameliorate the conflict. From a German point a view those countries should follow the Western institution integration, Germans strategy flooded between soft and hard power, the so called *smart power*.

Germany and Russia want to be the European powers that are having individual strategy and do not depend on some coalition of thoughts. Germany role in Eurasia depends on its role in European order, and reverse; while for Russia its role consists in being a greater power in the consensus with other major power.

The revival of a new leadership between the inner European Union member states, such as the “Weimar Triangle”, which means for Germany a wider Europe. The German – Polish nexus consists in an important part of the German Eastern policy. On the other hand, Russia cooperation with Poland is much softer.⁵

After the third election of Putin as a president, this fact became challenging for Germany, because Russian key economic partner, remains Berlin and Germany energetic imports are mainly from Russia. The conflicts near the proximity of the European Union borders, such as Syria, Transdnistria, Ukraine and the controversial approach of Russian (re)action to this conflicts raise security concerns in Europe. The German Foreign Politics underlined that a reproach of Germany whit the states from Eastern Partnership will threaten Russian ambition of legitimacy in its *near abroad* sphere of influence region. The German engagement in the Eastern Europe should provoke Moscow to rethink the political influence in the region and find a flexible way of interaction with the European Union.⁶

The recent year events from the proximity of the European Union border, the conflict from Ukraine, reveal that Russia wants to regain the major influence in its near abroad region and also to strengthen its position in Europe. Applying Mackinder theory, a domination of Russia in Ukraine, determinate its position in the World Order.

Eurasia is seen as the historical region from where all the global power pretenders originated and represents also the decisive geopolitical chessboard for the new regional power, such as China and India;⁷ therefore Russia tends to keep its sphere of influence and dominate in Eastern Europe and Central Caucasus to redefines itself as a post-imperial state.⁸

⁵ *Ibidem.*, *Russia and Germany in wider Europe dynamics of rapprochement and alienation*, Berlin, in “PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo”, No. 206, June 2012, p. 2.

⁶ Rolf, SHUETTE, *EU.–Russia relations: interests and values— a European perspective*, Washington D.C, Ed. Carnegie Endowment, 2004, p. 26.

⁷ Zbigniew, BRZEZINSKI, *A Geostategy for Eurasia*, Washington, Ed. Council of Foreign Relations, in “Foreign Affairs”, September/October 1997 Issue, p. 1.

⁸ Ilie, BĂDESCU, Ioan, MIHĂILESCU, *Geopolitică, Integrare, Globalizare*, București, Ed. Mica Valahie, 2011, p. 261.

Europe's aspirations for unity will be met if Europe Union member states are encouraged, to have a strong voice regarding the issues raised upon its borders.

3. Germany Eastern Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy

The debate over the Eastern Europe concerns both European Union and Russian policy, those policy must face the obstacle that of different state with different institutional issues. Germany conducts almost the same interest regarding the Eastern Partnership as European Union, but unlikely to others Berlin wants to bring the partner countries more close economically and not politically as those wish. Using soft power instruments in Eastern Partnership such as an economic cooperation, by signing deals concerning the free trade with the partner countries. Germany does not want to initiate actions in Eastern Europe that are against the Partnership Relation with Russia. Engaging in bilateral joint projects with the partner states from the Eastern Partnership should bring economic and political benefits to Germany and strengthen the European Union.

Germany's position towards the Eastern Partnership consist in three factors: the priority of economic cooperation with the partner countries, avoiding becoming an pre-accession instrument of fuel expectation of European Union membership for the partner states and building a "trust diplomacy" of cooperation and reconciliation with Russia. Those three factors are the German principles of having a strong Eastern Partnership.⁹

Although Eastern Europe countries, such as Ukraine engaged itself in the Eastern Partnership with the consideration of becoming in time a member with fuel membership in the European Union, but Germany and not only itself, underlined that a further enlargement would provoke significant change in the nowadays arrangements inner the European Union and international relations. Germany strengthened the *common neighbourhood policy* by declaring that the Eastern Partnership is designed as a project to intensify the relations with the neighbourhood countries of European Union borders, and not as a rival project against Russia.

The European Neighbourhood Policy represents the European Union key foreign policy towards the coastal neighbour countries situated at the boarder of Europe and Mackinder Eurasia concept. Zbigniew Brzezinski pointed that Eurasia key players will continue to be France and Germany;¹⁰ with this statement in mind towards the European Neighbourhood Policy, Germany relies on bilateral Action Plan with the countries on the European Agenda, such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine. The each bilateral relation of Germany with the above mentioned countries from the European Neighbourhood Policy raise awareness about the main obstacle to the region's integration in a *normal path to self-determination* of the former soviet states in the region of Eurasia.

The German bilateral reiterated relations with Azerbaijan represents a vital role played in the Eurasian great chessboard, due to the "enormous potential, as an oil and gas producer, but also as a transit country".¹¹ The stability of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine represents a strategic interest in the Caspian region and also in the nearby of Europe and Mackinder's Eurasia, therefore Germany considers that it is a need for the neighbour countries from the European Neighbourhood Policy to consolidate their territorial integrity.

Germany role in the Eurasia is to offer a support and balance between the Russian ambitions towards a Eurasian unity under its sphere of influence and moreover an economic

⁹ Dimitri, TRENIN, *The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization*, Washington, Ed. Carnegie Endowment, 2002, p. 216.

¹⁰ Zbigniew, BRZEZINSKI, *A Geostrategy for Eurasia*, Washington, Ed. Council of Foreign Relations, in "Foreign Affairs", September/October 1997 Issue, p. 2.

¹¹ *Ibidem.*, p. 5.

and common value union.¹² Germany through its bilateral relations and through the European Union Neighbourhood Policy tends to achieve the role of consolidate Europe unity, under the use of a soft and smart power at the periphery of Eurasia, through its economic, technologic and technic-administrative know-how support relations.

The German – Russian energetic relation makes part of the so called “modernisation partnership” with Russia, by seeking a key element to activate the democratisation process through economic strains. This relation thus not chance because of the recent events happened in Ukraine lately. The Ukraine issues consists in the deficit of the government functionality and furthermore in the incapacity of the state to face the bankruptcy. This conflict raise when Russia interfered in Ukraine and co-opted Crimea under the Russian regime.¹³

The recent Ukraine fiasco alert European Union to reconsider the Eastern Partnership, because of the enormous consequences for Europe unity.

Russian ambitions came out earlier, due to the eve of the November 2013, when the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius took place and Germany was supposed to link more energetically with Moldova and Ukraine against Russia's expectations.¹⁴

Germany must be seen as a mediator in the complex Russian-European Union and other neighbour countries relations. There are a few key elements that gave Germany this important role in the region; first, the German-Russian management project for the Nord Stream gas pipeline, second, the implication of Germany in the reconciliation relation of Russia with Poland and the free-visa for the Kaliningrad exclave¹⁵, third, the consolidate European Union-Russia Partnership through the cultural and technologic innovation relation. If Germany would play its card wisely to moderate the Russian ambitions to become a more powerful actor in the region and in the world, by ruling the strategic part of Ukraine, that can give Russia the spark to rule Eurasia and as a result the World Island.

The key is that Germany shall chose to call for mutual readjustment and accommodation in the region, by practicing an open regionalism with Russia on the each other's neighbourhood policy. European Union shall motivate the neighbour countries between itself and Russia to have a common integrate neighbour policy, by not dealing with selective regional integration, that can, like today, chose being closer either to European Union or to Russia.¹⁶

Europe states have the possibility to facilitate the current situation by appealing on the concept of *Europe of different speeds*, which means that the regional integration is flexible and incorporates different neighbourhood approaches individual for the each member.

The German role in Eurasia is translated also through its leader position and driving force as a European member state in European Union. Germany new geopolitical position in the world consists in raising progressive as a security actor with a moderated military power. The United States profile in the Eastern Europe and part of Eurasia lowered lately, therefore Germany took surely but constantly the role to secure the borders of the united Europe by using soft and sometimes smart power.

¹²Janusz, BUGAJSKI, *Expanding Eurasia: Russia's European Ambitions*, Washington D.C., Ed. Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2008, p. 2.

¹³ Andrey, MAKARYCHEV, *Euro-Expert Insight: No Change in Germany's Russia Policy; But New Nuances toward Ukraine*, Berlin, in “PONARS Eurasia Policy”, September 2013, <http://www.ponarseurasia.org/article/euro-expert-insight-no-change-germany%E2%80%99s-russia-policy-new-nuances-toward-ukraine>, accessed to 7.09.2014.

¹⁴ Natalia, MEDEN, *The Integration of Eurasia and Berlin*, Berlin, <http://orientalreview.org/2012/05/12/the-integration-of-eurasia-and-berlin/>, 2012, accessed at 8.09.2014.

¹⁵ Ludger, KÜHNHARDT, *The Lakes of Europe*, Bonn, Ed. Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung Center for European Integration Studies, 2002, p. 34.

¹⁶ Michael, LEIGH, *A New Strategy for Europe's Neighbourhood*, Washington, Ed. The German Marshall Fund of the United States, September 2014, p. 6.

Germany suggests through its Eastern Policy that a strength European Union must be centred on a vertical instructional function and not on enlargement, due to the confrontation of the neighbour countries difficulties. The regional tensions in Ukraine case contribute to the fundamental rethinking of the overall approach, by promoting a clear *wider Europe* concept. The former soviet states shall generate a consensus regarding the favour of the European values and be more flexible upon the Russian pretensions in the region.

Conclusions

Germany political elite enhance a new geopolitical role in the new world order, by promoting and associate Germany with its brands in the global affairs, and not with the old image of Nazis propaganda. Therefore Germany through its unification process became at the beginning of the 90es a champion regarding the use of soft power.

Although Germany hoped that Eastern Europe would become *a zone of comfort* between the Russia and European Union, the region transformed itself into a turmoil. Russia struggle by forcing a part of the former soviet states to integrate in the Great Eurasian Custom Union. Germany hoped that Russia would become an extension of the joint European Union, but with the recent events, it turned out that Russia become a greater competitor in Eurasia.

The more Russian ambitions continue to shake Eastern Europe the more Germany emerges as a great power in Eurasia. The role of NATO in Eurasia, especially in Eastern Europe is to provide transatlantic security, but Germany with the common front on security with France and Poland would face the new challenges at the European Union borders. A safer, peaceful and democratic Eurasian periphery retain Russian to fulfil Alexander Dughin geopolitical premises on an imperial power in Eurasia and in the world.

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CZECH REPUBLIC IN NATO - FROM ADMIRATION TO RELIANCE

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***Abstract:** When Czech Republic finally became member of NATO in March 1999, it marked the end of transitional period following fall of communism. For a large portion of population as well as of political elites, NATO membership was also expression of new identity embedded in the Western civilization.*

However abolition of conscript military in 2005 and the so called “War on terror” distanced the population from the armed forces and NATO membership started to be seen largely only through the lenses of Afghanistan mission. This caused lack of interest among political elites hindering any serious debate about the NATO’s future. Mainly because of political disinterest in military matters, the financial crisis after 2009 hit defence sector in Czech Republic severely. This period was dominated by budget cuts and army has been frequently seen as a source of money which led to one of the sharpest drops in defence spending in the whole Alliance. As a result, until 2013, there were very few shared ideas about the future role of the Armed Forces among the political representation - with reliance on NATO deepening. As a result, clear division between reliance on NATO on the military level coupled with unwillingness to endorse political ideals promoted by the Alliance is symptomatic for Czech membership in this political-military organization.

Year 2014 however may symbolize new era. With crisis on Ukraine, NATO membership finally seems to be no longer understood as an excuse for defence cuts and our obligations are getting more attention.

Keywords: Czech Republic, NATO, Defence planning, NDPP, Very High Readiness Joint Task Force.

Introduction

This year in Czech Republic was marked by the celebration of 15 years in NATO. That is quite a long time during which we had three presidents and nine prime ministers and of course shifting attitude towards our defence policy and the membership in the Alliance in particular.

Czech road to NATO began probably during the dissolution of Warsaw pact and withdrawal of Soviet forces from Czechoslovak territory. However year 1994, when we became member of Partnership for Peace is seen as true start of Czech road to the Alliance but, even before, our soldiers met their future Allies in the first Gulf war and later on in Balkans.

Group of politicians around President Václav Havel represented for example by the first Minister of Defence after the fall of communism Luboš Dobrovský seen participation on

missions with NATO countries as vital to our approach. This group also considered fast access to NATO as a sign of our identity embedded in Western civilization. As another member of this group – later minister of defence Alexander Vondra put it in his speech in 2010 – “it was retrieval of Yalta conference and division of Europe. The alliance has always symbolized both «the return to Europe» and the transatlantic bond which we see as the foundation of our security policy”¹. However transatlantic bond rather than European integration was stressed as much more important.

1 Admission in the Shade of Halfway Admiration

Czech president Václav Havel always considered the Czech Republic’s joining NATO a top priority. In 1999 on the occasion of our admission to NATO he said: “After many centuries of the ‘dramatic’ existence of our state, its security is at last strongly guaranteed and we become an integral part of the Euro-American world”. Saying this at the time, when only a little more than half of Czechs backed NATO membership, clearly illustrates problematic position of Czech society towards Alliance. It is true, that large proportion of population (15-20% according to 1999 results from public opinion polls²) was rather indifferent, but some, not least members of the Communist Party were coming out strongly against our membership. In contrast to Hungary and to Slovakia in particular, the Czech Republic did not have a substantial nationalist-oriented resistance towards NATO. Nevertheless, part of the nationalist-oriented resistance towards NATO was adopted by the discourse of the Czech left. On the other hand NATO has been always seen especially by right wing of Czech political elites as victor of the Cold War. Thus support for and opposition to NATO entry closely corresponded to the political orientation of respondents, dividing right from left. This distinguishes the Czech Republic from for example Romania and Poland, where support for the country’s application for NATO membership also issues from a substantial part of left oriented voters or cuts across the entire social and political spectrum.

While the support and opposition towards NATO was around even among Czech population, media coverage for the opposition was very weak. Critical discussion was almost non-existent³. There were frequent accusation of pro-NATO propaganda, but despite that, the whole debate was eagerly followed by the majority of population. Supporters or not, people in the Czech Republic understood the question of NATO membership as fundamental.

2. First steps in NATO

When the Czech Republic joined the Alliance on 15 March 1999, it was seen by large portion of political elites as being primarily a military defensive organization that would help us ensure stability and territorial integrity. However three days later came NATO operation against Yugoslavia and Czech representatives were the last to approve it. And “while Poland and Hungary offered geopolitical position (towards Russia in case of Poland and near Balkan peninsula for Hungary), Czech Republic offered just Václav Havel”⁴. His famous quote “Humanitarian bombardment” used to justify aerial attacks on Yugoslavia can be translated both as a pure cynicism and as a sign of our stress on ideals. These were however not shared

¹ Alexandr Vondra, *Havel varoval Obamu před Rusy včas*, 23 čec 2014, available online at: <http://www.ods.cz/clanek/7641-havel-varoval-obamu-pred-rusy-vcas>.

² Mareš, Petr, *Public Opinion Research Data on the Entry of the Czech Republic into NATO*, 1998.

³ *Czech mark 15 years in NATO*, 12 March 2014, available online at: <http://www.czech.cz/cz/Aktuality/Current-Affairs/Czechs-mark-15-years-in-NATO>.

⁴ Alexandr Vondra, *Havel varoval Obamu před Rusy včas*, 23 čec 2014, available online at: <http://www.ods.cz/clanek/7641-havel-varoval-obamu-pred-rusy-vcas>.

by the general public where pro-Serbian sentiment was very strong. This can be one of the problematic points of Czech relationship with NATO. Political elites of the Czech Republic were supposed to help enforce ideals which large portion of population did not deem so important. Thus varying stress on human rights often cited today by the US partners in talks with our diplomatic staff remains important dividing line in the Czech society. And there is no surprise, that it is also reflected in our relationship with NATO.

However two other factors in ensuing period formed Czech popular stance towards NATO. Firstly, it was abolition of conscript military service in 2005 and then also the so called “War on terror” both of which distanced the population from the armed forces. Henceforward NATO membership started to be seen largely only through the lenses of Afghanistan mission. This caused lack of interest among political elites hindering any serious debate about the NATO’s future - and consequently about the security environment and its military implications for the Czech Republic. As these debates were usually left just for the experts, they very rarely elevated higher to the political level and thus usually did not transform themselves into political guidance. And the causal link does not end here. Mainly because of political disinterest in military matters, the financial crisis after 2009 hit Defense sector in Czech Republic severely. This period was dominated by budget cuts and army has been frequently seen as a source of money which led to one of the sharpest drops in Defence spending in the whole Alliance. As a result, until Ukraine crisis, there were very few shared ideas about the future role of the Armed Forces among the political representation - with confidence in NATO cover having almost the character of resignation into reliable hands.

3. “Double Trouble” of Reliance and Discrepancy – Current issues

The Czech Republic's role in world affairs and security challenges around the globe in the beginning of the second decade of this century has been largely dictated by downwards creeping military budget. Until last year, it was only slightly over 1 percent of GDP. In the recent past, the defence budget has not been a priority for many European countries. The protracted economic crisis has perhaps done the worst damage as it forced governments to channel scarce funds to other areas. This applies not only the Czech Republic but to most NATO members who have slashed defence spending and seen the public's interest in defence issues all but disappear.

Even in such situation political elites in Czech Republic continued to applaud role of the military as “professional, well prepared partner for our Allies”⁵. According to current Chief of General Staff general Petr Pavel, NATO membership has had a huge impact on the transformation of our armed forces. The aim was to develop a modern, mobile, and small-sized force, and to achieve an adequate level of interoperability with new allies and partners. But generally membership in NATO and political guarantees we received from Alliance were overly admired and taken for granted so that they overshadowed true capabilities of our own armed forces - yet the ideals represented by the Alliance were still not universally accepted. This clear and deepening division between reliance on NATO on the military level coupled with unwillingness to endorse political ideals promoted by the Alliance is symptomatic for Czech membership in this political-military organization.

To illustrate the “Crisis of Identity” within Czech political elites towards NATO membership, words of current Minister of Defence Martin Stropnický can be used. In May 2014 Stropnický said, that the Czech Republic does not favour hosting foreign NATO troops as part of the alliance's plans to boost its eastern wing over the Ukraine crisis. Let’s leave aside, that there is of course no real need for NATO to deploy its forces in Czech Republic

⁵ *Czech mark 15 years in NATO*, 12 March 2014, available online at: <http://www.czech.cz/cz/ Aktuality/Current-Affairs/Czechs-mark-15-years-in-NATO>.

since there is no shared border with Ukraine or Russia, but lack of identification with NATO membership is more than clear. It can be seen from Stropnický's reasoning which was in sharp contrast to some of our regional peers such as Poland. He explained his position by saying, that „Czechs remained wary of any foreign troop presence as a hangover from the 1968 Soviet invasion of the former Czechoslovakia, thus raising the alliance's presence on our territory in various modifications may be possible, but when it comes to actual units, I am rather sceptical”⁶.

But this “Identity Crisis” is also evident within the society where again foreign missions are problematic. After the start of Afghan mission, NATO simply became synonymous for very distant “Out-of-Area Operations”. On one side people widely see missions as a sign of fulfilling our commitments to NATO. On the other hand majority of people disagree that by deploying forces abroad, we strengthen our security⁷. Therefore the easiest conclusion we can draw from this results is that fighting abroad under NATO banner is not strengthening our security. For illustration and in stark comparison to lack of support for foreign deployment, soldiers participating in those missions are highly valued by our population. They are almost universally described as brave, courageous and admirable⁸.

With no doubt “Afghanisation” of the armed forces brought with it number of positive results which should not be overlooked. The equipment was modernized on pace not seen for the past 20 years and soldiers were systematically prepared and trained for their deployment abroad. However stress on qualities of our soldiers was not always the most important argument in domestic politics a focus on NATO operations abroad caused several negative factors. Further distancing Armed forces from the population may be the most severe one of them.

Another discrepancy between positions of NATO and the Czech Republic has been noticed on Wales Summit in September 2014. The Wales Summit Pledge on Defence Investment stipulates commitment of member states to finally increase defence spending targeting 2% GDP level. There indeed is a consensus among the coalition parties in the Czech government signed in August 2014 to gradually increase our defence budget – but only to 1.4 % of the GDP by 2020⁹. This timeframe is not only quite distant, but it is after next elections which may result in completely different ruling coalition without any need to honour even the agreed level of 1,4 % of GDP on defence.

While on the level of ideas, Czech Republic sometimes fails to accept NATO direction, there are completely different issues on practical level. Here our armed forces rely on NATO heavily.

It starts with analysis of security environment, where the influence of NATO's assessment of future threats (which is described in classified document MC 161) is paradoxically more accessible to conceptual bodies of the Czech Ministry of Defence (MoD), than our own national assessment from Czech intelligence agencies. Thus the process of “*transplanting*” every finding about every possible threat from NATO perspective on Czech Republic has grown enormous proportions. Needless to say, that some of those „transplants” – however important for the whole Alliance - were rather distant for Czech Republic and our Armed forces. Usefulness of MC 161 is also doubtful since it is “Agreed” document and thus any finding must be agreed upon by all 28 members of NATO – which naturally leaves many important issues omitted.

⁶ Robert Muller, *Czech Defense Minister sees no NATO troops stationed on Czech soil*, May 12, 2004, available online at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/12/us-ukraine-crisis-czech-nato-idUSBREA4B09820140512>.

⁷ „Armáda a Věřejnost“.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *The NATO Summit in Wales: Czech Republic's Perspective*, 10 September 2014, available online at: http://www.mzv.cz/nato.brussels/en/news_articles_speeches/the_nato_summit_in_wales_czech_republic.html.

Another issue of rather specific nature, where Czech Republic relies on NATO almost completely, is defence planning process. Unlike some “bigger” allies, the Czech Republic does not have a proper nationally codified defence planning system enabling an assessment of capabilities identified for accomplishing politico-military ambitions. It is sometimes said, that national defence planning is fully compatible with NATO. However, in reality the national defence planning often processes findings derived from the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) on capability assessment, including identified capability shortfalls and their prioritization. There is only rudimentary harmonization with NDPP, and capability tasks from NDPP cycle are accepted very selectively.

This rather poorly functioning defence planning partially resulted in a Czech commitment made on Wales Summit in September 2014 to contribute to the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). VJTF is supposed to be a tool to help meet shared goals in both collective defence and crisis management¹⁰. At this moment Czech republic envisage providing a special operations unit and an airborne unit (roughly 150 personnel in total) with two days “Notice To Move“. Further contributions will be considered once the VJTF concept is specified in NATO. 150 soldiers may not seem as a lot until we calculate 3:1 necessary rotation which suddenly increases the number to 450 soldiers – at least part of them on 24 hour alert. With chronic shortage of manpower, this would constitute heavy burden for the Czech Republic and may hinder training of these troops – not to mention their private lives. Not knowing their exact mission, it might be waste of their potential to use these highly specialized units as an ordinary infantry. There is also unanswered question of how this will impact on our already existing commitments to NATO and EU. However political representation pledged support in this matter with no regard to these issues so that it seems that there was lack of deeper coordination between civilian and military part of the MoD.

And then there is the most important strategic question of them all – “whether we are still capable of independent defence”? Article 5 of The North Atlantic Treaty does not absolutely stipulate, that help from other member states of NATO is automatically granted. For sure we do not expect attack on Czech territory, but we also did not expect current crisis on Ukraine few years ago. Thus it is perhaps time to rethink our blunt reliance on NATO even in this matter.

Conclusion

Some of our aforementioned experiences with reliance on NATO are wholly specific for the Czech Republic; however the others may be symptomatic for many new members of NATO including Romania. Discrepancy on “ideological level” – the so called “crisis of identity” is observable both on political and on societal level. With many sentiments towards the past in the Czech society and with integral “left to right” divide which is influencing relationship with NATO, our position is quite difficult. Thus what is surprising is heavy reliance on NATO membership on practical (military) level which raises questions into what extend we take our own defence seriously.

Year 2014 however may symbolize new era. With crisis on Ukraine, NATO membership finally seems to be no longer understood as an excuse for Defence cuts and our obligations are getting more attention. But simply increasing Defence budget is far from enough. Stability and long term predictability in expenditures are even more important – and that needs public consensus. However this may be hard to get for various reasons – “invisibility” of the armed forces being one of them. Since the end of conscription, Armed forces lost touch with the population – and vice versa. I believe that it is no coincidence, that

¹⁰ *Idem.*

sharp drop in Defence spending in Czech Republic came precisely at the time when last conscripts left the barracks. And while professional army is with no doubt the absolute necessity, we must not forget Clausewitzian notion, that only trinity of State, Population and Army ensures successful defence. “Making Armed Forces visible” is a Motto of the Day. Let us do that by stressing role of Territorial Integrity and State Sovereignty of NATO members and our Allies. It is important not only in the light of Ukrainian crisis, but also because it may generate far greater Public Support than distant “Out-of-area” Operations. And last but not least – society will support what it can see. Make our people proud by military parade once in a while – and you get all the money you need.

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HUNGARY'S 15 YEARS WITHIN NATO: LESSONS LEARNT AND UNLEARNT

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***Abstract:** The 15th anniversary of Hungary's accession to NATO offers us the opportunity to summarize achievements and draw some conclusions, identifying the most important lessons learnt for the country's security and defense policy, as well as for the armed forces. However, it is also important to pay attention to deficiencies – or lessons unlearned – that still pose unresolved problems and shortcomings for Hungary despite 15 years of transformation. The article provides a strategic-level analytical summary of the key lessons learnt and unlearned for the period 1999-2014 from a critical but understanding point of view.*

***Keywords:** Hungary, NATO, security, defense policy, lessons learnt, armed forces.*

Introduction

Hungarian security and defense policy has experienced a fundamental transformation in the past two decades leading towards and following the country's accession to NATO in 1999. This transformation meant more than a shift, much more a fundamental change right from its founding values and core aims. During the 1990s, leading to Hungary's NATO membership the country – its political and economic systems, as well as its society – strived to leave behind the legacy of the Soviet Eastern Block and the Warsaw Pact. Three parallel processes have been going on in this regard: Hungarian security and threat perception, the scope and characteristics of the international role Hungary desires to play, and the corresponding institutional framework have been transformed. Thus, 15 years of NATO membership has had an all-encompassing effect on Hungary's security, including the country's defense policy and its institutions, the country's involvement in international crisis management efforts, the development of national defense capabilities and Hungarian society's relation to the armed forces. In spite of this, relevant literature in English on the country's lessons learnt in these fields is rather limited, not to mention the practical lack of analyses on 'lessons unlearned', some deficiencies that might serve as guidelines for prospective members of NATO on what to do differently. The aim of this brief study is to draw the most significant conclusions of Hungary's 15 years within NATO from a critical but understanding point of view.

1. The direct effects of Hungary's accession to NATO and the lessons learnt

Hungarian security and foreign policy has followed a relatively consistent Euro-Atlantic path since soon after the change of regime period. Not only internal political and institutional transitions, but the favorable transformation of the international security environment and the open approach of Euro-Atlantic organizations have significantly contributed to this process. As a result, the country's foreign and security policy can be described as oriented towards the Euro-Atlantic community, within the wider value-based

framework of international institutions (Council of Europe, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, United Nations Organization).

However, it is important to note that Hungary has experienced two decades of continuous transformation and it was due to these simultaneous and parallel favorable processes that the country gradually moved towards Euro-Atlantic integration. NATO's Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation (1991) and the launch of Partnership for Peace (1994) meant significant positive drivers in this process and opened up the way for Euro-Atlantic integration – and along with the Balkan Wars resulting from the dissolution of Yugoslavia this external transition was the key strategic issue addressed in Hungary throughout the decade. The adoption of new Defense Policy Guidelines in 1998 reflected this shift in priorities, clearly targeting accession to NATO and the European Union after fulfilling the respective political, economic and military accession criteria. Meanwhile, internal transition continued and the democratic control of the armed forces had been completed, also facing the double challenge of continuously cutting down on defense expenditures both in terms of resources and manpower, and the urgent need to adopt the new institutional culture of NATO for the military in terms of interoperability.

The role the North Atlantic Alliance played in Hungary's foreign and security policy agenda has then become and remained fundamental since these years. The threatening military conflict in the Balkans and the crisis management role NATO decided to undertake drove Hungary faster and closer to the Alliance than many would have expected even in 1994. The first major foreign deployment of Hungarian armed forces (military engineers) took place within the framework of the Implementation Force (IFOR) in 1996 also providing host nation support for NATO forces in Hungary, and continued within the Stabilization Force (SFOR) since 1997 (later under EUFOR Althea since 2004). These engagements already paved the way for the interoperable development of the national armed forces. Following Hungary's NATO-accession, further engagement followed in the Alliance's Kosovo (KFOR) and Afghanistan (ISAF) operations showing allied solidarity and commitment to international peace. (Törő – Wagner, 2014)

Interestingly, the first fully developed National Military Strategy was adopted in 2009 only, showing the secondary role military strategy had played for the political elite on the one hand, and a somewhat belated adoption of the practice of drafting long-term strategic documents for the Hungarian Defense Forces on the other. Even in 2012 when the effects of the financial crisis forced the adoption of both a new National Security Strategy and a National Military Strategy, these documents showed to some extent the lack of executable long-term planning, providing mostly a 'global vision' and not for the functional realization as the resources and modernization schedule had not been identified. (Csiki – Tálas, 2014) As repeatedly mentioned, the Hungarian military has continuously been underfinanced since the change of regime and after an initial increase around NATO-accession it has shown a mostly decreasing trend in the past 10 years. (See Table 1.)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Hungarian GDP (billion HUF)	20665.0	22018.3	23675.0	24989.9	25643.3
Defense budget (billion HUF)	346.9	288.1	283.1	278.2	319.7
Defense budget as share of GDP (%)	1.68	1.31	1.20	1.11	1.25

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Hungarian GDP (billion HUF)	25626.5	26.513.0	27635.4	28048.0	29144*
Defense budget (billion HUF)	320.6	308.2	248.9	234.8	241.4
Defense budget as share of GDP (%)	1.25	1.16	0.90	0.83	0.83

Table no. 1. The Hungarian defense budget, 2004-2013 (*: Estimated)¹

Despite some obvious shortcomings, NATO has clearly been identified in these strategic documents as the cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security, stability and prosperity whose international agenda means primary commitments for Hungary. Still, we can see two opposing trends: on the one hand the ‘strategic vocabulary’ of the transatlantic community has been adopted successfully and Hungarian defense policy has deeply been embedded in NATO’s security agenda, while on the other hand serious deficiencies have prevailed regarding funding and modernization (see the next subchapter as a determining lesson unlearned).

As for the military tools of foreign and security policy and possible military action, decision making has been brought under strict civilian control during the 1990s in accordance with democratic requirements also formulated by NATO. (Molnár, 2007) Command structures evolved further by 1996 when the Joint Forces Command of the Hungarian Defense Forces had been created in order to meet NATO requirements, and in 2001 when the Joint Forces Command was integrated into the Ministry of Defense, accomplishing fully transparent civilian command and control in this field.

The strict authorization rule of foreign deployment of the armed forces also became somewhat looser as a consequence of the decision to create the NATO Response Forces at the 2002 Prague Summit, because potential deployment required rapid decision making schemes. Previously, 21 days of foreign deployment for a maximum of 100 troops could be authorized by the Ministry of Defense, while after the December 2003 modification of the Constitution and the Homeland Defense Act, any international engagement invoked upon the consensus of NATO member states became possible based on government decision while also informing the Parliament.

The direct effects of NATO membership can be identified in three areas: in the transformed Hungarian security and defense policy that can be traced in strategic documents; in terms of compatibility with NATO institutional structures and systems and interoperability with other NATO members’ armed forces; and the contribution of the Hungarian Defense Forces to the alliance’s collective defense tasks and crisis management operations. Lessons learnt in these respects include learning the institutional culture of NATO and participating fully in decision making, also ensuring the democratic control of the defense sector as well as effectively contributing to allied defense and operations through NATO structures.²

¹ Source: Respective annual Budget Acts’ provision for defense (without implemented sequestrations), Central Statistics Agency statistics for Gross National Product.

² For an insight of what results are identified by current political and military leaders, defense policy experts and diplomats with regard to Hungary’s NATO membership, see the interview series ‘15 Years – 15 Voices. Lessons Learnt from Hungary’s 15 Years within NATO’ compiled throughout 2014. NUPS CSDS, 2014

2. Lessons unlearnt

Regarding lessons unlearnt, there are three broad topics in which Hungary needs to draw the conclusions of the past 15 years: the underdeveloped security culture of Hungarian society and the political elite; unfinished and fragmented attempts at ‘reform and modernization’; and lacks in understanding the true potential of deep and intense multinational defense cooperation.

The broadest set of problems is that both Hungarian society and the political elite have an underdeveloped security culture that is based on their primarily non-military security perception briefly discussed earlier. This in practice means that issues beyond economic and societal security rarely become subjects of interest or concern for Hungarian people. Unfortunately subsequent governments have also been following a very limited, self-constrained information policy, providing only superficial information on Hungarian security and defense policy or the Hungarian Defense Forces.³ Critically speaking, one might also raise questions about transparency and accountability issues taking into account that no detailed information is being dispersed in public about specificities of the budgetary resources used for defense. The negative effects of this restrained stand have been reinforced by the vanishing representation of foreign and security policy issues both in public and commercial media – TV, radio and internet news portal – in recent years, causing a general disinterest and indifference through wide strata of Hungarian society. Thus, besides being uninterested, people have to a significant extent become uninformed of defense issues, as well as institutions such as NATO.

Thus, 15 years after NATO-accession we can conclude that Hungarian people in general have very limited contact to defense issues and this trend has been reinforced by the suspension of conscription in 2004, effectively abolishing this direct, practical tie between society and the Hungarian Armed Forces. Since then, HDF has remained visible in everyday life only through their crisis management role in natural disaster relief (floods) and through HDF bomb squads tasked with ordnance disposal that is still a frequent issue due to the large number of ammunitions left behind from World War II. Meanwhile, civic (NGO), governmental (MoD, MoFA) and media activities that could improve the situation have also largely been lacking or have remained ineffective. Public engagement is very weak and only a surprisingly low number of actors carry out activities – such as information campaigns, public outreach programs – with limited visibility and practical effect. This is particularly true for NATO.⁴

These, coupled with the perception of the population that peace and security can be taken for granted without further effort, resulted in a lack of ownership and a lack of the feeling of responsibility for their own defense. Similar problems have recently been studied

³ If we want to contrast this policy approach, we can easily point out German and British examples where both the Bundeswehr and the British Armed Forces provide detailed and up-to-date, easily accessible online information on their international engagement, missions and presence, including force levels and mission tasks, while the Hungarian Ministry of Defense rarely provides such information directly, while the HDF mostly distributes promotional material via online and social media. For MoD-related information see: “Honvédelmi Minisztérium” [<http://www.kormany.hu/hu/honvedelmi-miniszterium> Accessed on 15 10 2014], for information released for the wider public see: “Honvedelem.hu” [<http://www.honvedelem.hu/> Accessed on 15 10 2014] and related social media sites.

⁴ In principle NGOs with a strong focus on Euro-Atlantic policy agenda do function in NATO member and partner countries, such as national chapters of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) or its youth organization (YATA). In contrast, very few organizations are active in this field in Hungary: the Hungarian Atlantic Council and its youth organization are hardly functioning and currently no other NGO has tried to fill this ‘gap’ in the NGO sector. With regard to think tanks, only two institutions can be found active in the foreign, security and defense policy field: the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs and the MoD-affiliated think tank, the Center for Strategic and Defense Studies.

by NATO through think tanks in a number of member states with the aim of finding out how much defense in fact ‘matters’.⁵ Even though Hungary was not included in the project, and no thorough studies have been carried out in this respect, similarities can be observed in this respect highlighting a general, abstract support to the armed forces and defense, but coupled with disinterest in particular single issues. The following conclusions identified in eight member states by the Defense Matters Project also stand for Hungary: ‘Defense spending has some general support, but other (social) issues are seen as more pressing. But there is also a lack of interest in the specifics and details of defense among the wider public.’ ‘There is a lack of strategic debate.’ ‘The strategic community is often detached from the general public.’ (Carnegie Europe, 2014)

The lesson identified and so far unlearned in this regard in Hungary is that there is a sustained need of continually keeping society engaged and informed. Besides, it is also advisable to keep members of the political elite aware of their role and duty to address defense issues effectively and manage them responsibly.⁶ In order to achieve this developing permanent contacts and regular meetings of relevant parties – members of the political and military elite, think tanks, media representatives and various groups within society, especially the young – would be necessary, triggering their active participation and deepening their involvement.

The second set of lessons unlearned can be identified regarding ‘reform and transformation’ of the armed forces. As mentioned before, the most fundamental challenges to the Hungarian Defense Forces have been being underfinanced and being in a constant process of unfinished and incomplete waves of reform, transformation or attempts of modernization.

The fluid conditions and unaccomplished targets have resulted in various problems already before NATO accession but even more since 1999. The Hungarian Ministry of Defense had to carry out two strategic and defense reviews within a couple of years (1999 and 2003) in an attempt to set policy and planning mechanisms aligned and fully interoperable with NATO standards and processes. Recommendations drafted in 1999, first and foremost about streamlining Hungarian command and control processes with those of NATO, have been realized by 2001. As a next step, the recommendations drafted in 2003 on a NATO-compatible defense planning system were fulfilled in the following years, and eventually a new system of evaluation and assessment of the external and internal security environment and resulting military tasks has also been developed and introduced based on the strategic foresight analysis methodology applied by NATO. (Németh, 2014)

However, most conclusions of these strategic reviews regarding military capabilities (or their shortcomings) and the repeated calls for technological modernization have been neglected and no other strategic review has been carried out since 2003 despite the adoption of new National Military Strategies in 2009 and 2012. The negative consequences of this ‘modernization gap’ have been summarized by the current Minister of Defense, Csaba Hende in June 2013 as the following: ‘The Hungarian Defense Forces have not procured any major

⁵ See the Defense Matters project’s concluding conference and related reports at Carnegie Europe, 2014

⁶ Unlike in Poland, for example, members of the Hungarian Parliament – even of the Committee on Defense and Law Enforcement – in Hungary receive no formal in-advance education, training or briefing on national and international security and defense policy or foreign policy issues before they take their offices. This might backfire in various respects when informed decision-making and well-established professional debates would be necessary regarding the budget, modernization or deployment of the Hungarian Defense Forces. Instead, discussion and debates – if taking place at all – mainly follow the dynamics of party politics even in defense issues.

equipment since the change of regime period with the sole exception of the Gripen program.⁷ The equipment that is still in service has mostly been manufactured in the Warsaw Pact era, 30-40 years ago. Within ten years time all of these will have to be scrapped and we need to carry out the full rearmament of the HDF.’ (Vg.hu, 2013) By 2014 the unsustainable situation regarding the financial and modernization gap has been acknowledged at the top political level as well. (Hirado.hu, 2014) Going beyond the 2012 government decision to maintain the nominal level of the Hungarian defense budget at the 2012 level until 2016 and then to increase it by an annual 0.1% until 2022 – thus reaching 1.39% of the GDP –, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán declared at the 2014 Wales Summit that the increase in defense spending will be brought forward to 2015 in accordance with the growing demand on behalf of NATO. However, no specificities have been announced and the concrete measures to be undertaken will be decided by the Hungarian Parliament, most likely during the debate of the 2015 fiscal budget in late 2014. (Csiki, 2014)

Without elaborating upon the current defense capabilities and readiness of the Hungarian Defense Forces, it is indicative in this respect that the general level of technological modernization regarding major equipment is still at the level of the 1970s-1980s (T-72 tanks, BTR-80A armored personnel carriers, An-26 transport aircraft, Mi-8 transport helicopter etc.) or with modernizations the 1990s at best, with the exceptions of the Gripen multirole aircraft and some equipment provided for the land forces deployed in peace operations in Afghanistan and the Balkans. As Tamás Kern has pointed out, subsequent Hungarian governments have tended to design and launch ‘military reforms’ and ‘modernization programs’ in such a way that cost saving and cutback measures were realized under their election period while increased investment and procurement measures were always scheduled or postponed to the next or later election periods. (Kern, 2009) Unfortunately incoming governments again tended to redesign or simply further postpone modernization, thus by 2013 the Hungarian Defense Forces came to the brink of their operational capability. Besides procrastinating modernization, the alarming amount and sustained trend of cuts of the operation & maintenance budget within the Hungarian defense expenditure have caused considerable capability losses and a decrease in operational readiness. Even though the HDF has remained capable to fulfill its duties and commitments within NATO crisis management operations, the general operability and spectrum of capabilities can be questioned in various fields and these shortcomings require urgent action.

This way of conduct in defense planning and capability development has become a tendency in several NATO member countries that had joined the alliance in 1999 and in 2004 from the East Central European region and the Balkans, thus it is imperative to point out this ‘lesson unlearned’ for prospective members as well.

The third set of lessons unlearned is related to regional multinational defense cooperation (MDC), more precisely the lack of understanding how to utilize the full benefits these can bring possibly without engaging in unnecessary pilot projects or developing less functional capability packages only for their political gains, sacrificing scarce resources without practical long-lasting effects. Hungary has in the past 15 years participated in various forms of multinational defense cooperation with varying practical results. However, these have mostly been developed outside NATO’s capability development framework or the

⁷ Based on repeatedly altered negotiation targets and contractual commitments, Hungary has been leasing 14 JAS-39A/B Gripen planes, in service since 2008. Even though exact costs of fulfilling the leasing contract have not been disclosed, it is estimated to go beyond 10% of the total annual defence budget.

NATO Defense Planning Process with the outstanding examples of two European Union Battlegroups⁸ and other cooperative projects within the Central European Defense Cooperation (CEDC).⁹

While following the broader international trend of developing ‘clusters of capabilities’ within regional frameworks (see the examples of the BENELUX and NORDEFECO co-operations, as well as the French-British bilateral cooperation), what we can see by the end of 2014 in Hungary is that the practical usability of some of the developed high-profile frameworks can hardly be judged. Either driven by the lack of political will, the necessary financial resources or the lack of military capabilities some of these have not fully been developed or if developed, never used (EU BGs for example.) On the one hand it is positive that the high-level political will to support and participate in such multinational defense co-operations has been strengthening in Hungary as well, as these are often seen as a possible solution to the identified capability shortages in Europe. (Csiki – Németh, 2012) While on the other hand delivered results, real capability development that would go beyond the pooling of existing capabilities and generate new ones in missing fields through joint procurement and sharing mechanisms are missing so far. The only exception is a NATO-branded project also included among the role models of Smart Defense: Strategic Airlift Capability, where 17 nations procured and have been operating three C-17 Globemaster strategic transport aircraft from Pápa Airbase in Hungary. This signals a strong contrast in favor of well-functioning large capability development projects within NATO and smaller, practical cooperative programs within CEDC. While the use of developing another EU Battlegroup that rather provides answers to the capability needs of the 2000s and not the post-ISAF and post-Crimea security environment can be questioned, while it also distracts resources from existing and functioning frameworks for the sake of harvesting the political gains within the Visegrad Group for developing a capability package that may never even be used as experience with EU Battlegroups has demonstrated so far. (Csiki – Németh, 2013)

Thus, in sum, the significance of multinational defense co-operations has been realized, its short-term political yield has been harvested, while the real value delivered in terms of usability can be questioned for example in the case of the current flagship project of the V4.¹⁰ For the coming years it would be of utmost importance for Hungary to align the current parallel processes of MDCs with the limited financial resources available and to opt for operable, deployable capabilities also within the framework of NATO that is achievable in the mid-term and sustainable in the long term.

⁸ The first EU BG Hungary has become part of is the Italian-led Battlegroup that had been developed on the basis of the basis of the Italian – Hungarian – Slovenian Multinational Land Force (operable since 2002) on standby in 2007 and in 2012 as the crisis management entry force of the European Union. The second Battlegroup is to be developed with the participation of the Visegrad Countries by 2016, comprising of Czech, Hungarian, Slovak and Polish troops, the latter taking the role of lead nation as well. However,

⁹ Within CEDC (formerly also known as the Roundtable on Central European Multinational Defense Cooperation, or Central European Defense Initiative) 6 Central European nations – Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia – began to intensify their defense cooperation in 2011 and various programs have been realized since: a multinational CBRN defense battalion was established, joint Special Operations Forces training, C-IED training and Air Mentor Team training for Afghanistan had been initiated and a Multinational Logistic Coordination Center was also established. (Csiki – Németh, 2013)

¹⁰ We have seen other examples of this kind as well in the past: the Hungarian – Romanian Joint Peacekeeping Battalion was established in 1998 incorporating 500 troops from both parties, while the Multinational Engineer Battalion ‘Tisza’ incorporating troops from Ukraine, Romania and Hungary, each providing a company for the battalion was established in 1998 and became operation in 2002. Despite of various occasions when these units could have been used, none of them has ever been deployed – still, they are kept alive, for which building confidence, trust and enhancing interoperability can only mean a partial explanation. (Németh, 2014)

Conclusions

Several controversial characteristics of Hungary's NATO membership as well as the broader Hungarian security and defense policy have been examined throughout this brief study, resulting from the continuous, unbalanced and in certain areas unfinished transformation the country has experienced in the past two decades.

The direct effects of NATO membership can be identified in three areas: in the transformed Hungarian security and defense policy that can be traced in strategic documents; in terms of compatibility with NATO institutional structures and systems and interoperability with other NATO members' armed forces; and the contribution of the Hungarian Defense Forces to the alliance's collective defense tasks and crisis management operations. Lessons learnt in these respects include learning the institutional culture of NATO and participating fully in decision making, also ensuring the democratic control of the defense sector as well as effectively contributing to allied defense and operations through NATO structures.

Regarding lessons unlearned, there are three broad topics in which Hungary needs to draw the conclusions of the past 15 years: the underdeveloped security culture of Hungarian society and the political elite that puts restraints on the defense sector, ranking security and defense policy as only one of many tasks and needs; the unfinished and fragmented attempts at 'reform and modernization' leaving the Hungarian Defense Forces with mostly outdated military equipment even 15 years after accession; and lacks in understanding the true potential of multinational defense cooperation with some positive signs and the need to prioritize and align efforts effectively in accordance with the country's resources.

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REGIONAL SECURITY AT A CROSSROADS: VISEGRAD GROUP AND THE CHALLENGES OF UKRAINIAN CRISIS

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Abstract: *The objective of this study is to examine in what extent the on-going security developments in Ukraine and Russia's assertive geopolitical actions would shape the future regional strategic posture of the Visegrad Group. There will be explored in some depth the impact of the emerging systemic dynamics on Central European regional landscape and the rationales behind V4's positioning towards the crisis. The final part of the study discusses how the V4 might evolve and what role it might further play as a regional security actor. It can be argued that the major risk facing the regional grouping is to see its role and status downgraded to a more formal posture focused on a limited agenda of actions (low politics). In such a way, V4's ability to shape its own regional strategic environment will be dramatically weakened, as well as its role in the overall geopolitical game played in Central and Eastern Europe.*

Keywords: *Visegrad Group, Central Europe, Ukraine, Russia, NATO, region, security, cooperation.*

Introduction

The crisis that erupted in Ukraine and Russia's assertive political return to old-fashioned power plays had deeply shaken the European wisdom that military conflict in Europe is no longer possible or desirable. Whatever the outcome, mostly of the scholars and security experts agree that the very nature of security in Europe has been profoundly changed by the revival of geopolitical competition, the security rivalries and the emergence of power politics.¹

Within this complex picture, the countries from Central and Eastern Europe are left with a deep sense of vulnerability and imminent danger against their security. The countries that stand at the Eastern border of the EU/NATO, stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, are warning against a return of history nurtured around Russia's new revisionist geopolitical agenda. Therefore, with a major crisis next door and facing a resurgent Russia, many expected that the countries from the most vulnerable area of Central and Eastern Europe will find common grounds to formulate a joint agenda of actions and to coordinate more closely their positions in relation to Russia and within the EU/NATO framework as well. However, despite the initial expectations, the region is struggling to keep its unity of purpose balancing between resistance, compromise and accommodation facing increasing difficulties to maintain a sense of regional solidarity.

The Visegrad Group (V4), as the most vibrant regional grouping of the Central and Eastern Europe, bringing together Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, is at the

¹ Walter Russell Mead, "The Return of Geopolitics, The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers", *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2014, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141211/walter-russell-mead/the-return-of-geopolitics>

forefront of a deep systemic crisis. Since its establishment in February 1991, the V Four developed itself as solid security community grounded on a sense of common identity and interests, shared values, norms and expectations. They together provided useful frameworks for facilitating engagement and coordinating policies at regional level and for advancing the EU agenda by building cooperative networks with neighbouring states. Against this background, and based on its shared security geography and common strategic culture, the V Four settled an ambitious agenda targeting a greater harmonization even partial integration in the realm of security and defence so that to become a model of what Tomas Valasek called “island of cooperation”². These prospects of evolution seem fading away under the impact of the security developments in their neighbourhood, significant enough that some observers questioned the future relevance of the grouping as a credible regional actor. This is why the way in which the Visegrad Group will answer to the critical events in Ukraine will highly shape its future course of development as well as the region’s overall strategic posture.

1. Facing the Ukrainian crisis: towards a common agenda

With the destabilization of Ukraine and the growing turbulences on the European Eastern frontier, V4 was facing direct security risks particularly concerning military security, the potential interruption of energy supply transit, border instability, and the possible influx of refugees.³ These potential challenges coupled with the strategic interests shared by the V Four concerning Ukraine explained and motivated a specific pattern of behaviour in the early stages of the crisis. It’s worth mentioning that given the geographical location (three of the Visegrad countries border Ukraine), strategic imperatives (the need to extend the Western security system towards East), and economic considerations (energy security) Ukraine has played a distinct role in the V4 geopolitical calculus. As a result, the V4 states actively engaged in supporting Ukraine at regional level and within the EU through the Eastern Partnership, by providing extensive assistance, expertise and significant funds allocations via the International Visegrad Fund.

Looking at the initial positions agreed by the V4, the priority was to influence the events on a more moderate path and avoid a deterioration of the internal situation in Ukraine. The efforts made in the early days of the crisis by the Polish foreign minister, Radoslaw Sikorski, together with his counterparts from Germany and France, to reach a negotiating solution among the parts involved in the crisis, was particularly welcomed by the remaining Visegrad states⁴. The level and the frequency of the V4 reunions and meetings held to discuss the Ukrainian situation is particularly revealing. In the first five months of the crisis, between January and April 2014, the Visegrad representatives met six times⁵. All the official

² Tomas Valasek, *Surviving austerity. The case for a new approach to EU military collaboration*, Center for European Reform, April 2011, http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/rp_981-141.pdf, accessed 5 June 2014.

³ András Rácz, *Divided stands the Visegrad?*, FIIA Briefing paper no.158, June 2014, pp. 1-8.

⁴ The political truce between Yanukovic and the opposition forces was signed in Kiev on February 21, 2014. *Joint Statement of V4 Foreign Ministers on Ukraine*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/joint-statement-of-v4>, accessed 3 June 2014.

⁵ *Joint Statement of the Prime Ministers of the Visegrad Countries on Ukraine*, Budapest, 29 January 2014, <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/joint-statement-of-the>; *Joint Statement of V4 Foreign Ministers on Ukraine*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, 24 February 2014, <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/joint-statement-of-v4>; *V4 Interior Ministers' Joint Statement on Ukraine*, Budapest, 25 February 2014, <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/official-statements/v4-interior-ministers>;

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communiqués and statements issued by V4 during this period highlighted a common vision and a joint agenda of actions having as the main directions: strong interest in maintaining the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine; firm support for Ukraine's European perspective; readiness to provide expertise and assistance to the new Ukrainian government. As regards Crimea referendum, all the V4 countries supported the EU position and refused to recognize its outcome. Important also to mention the V4 joint initiative of 5th of March to send a letter to EU foreign Policy chief, Catherine Ashton, and Stefan Füle, the EU Commissioner for enlargement, asking the EU to start preparations for signing the AA/DCFTA with Ukraine, "without any undue delay".⁶

However, the annexation of Crimea fuelled a series of differences inside the group since it faced a more challenging demand to address Russia as a potential threat, something that V4 found not easily to manage. This became obvious in the Joint Statement of foreign ministers of the V4 and Eastern Partnership countries following their meeting in Budapest (28-29 April 2014)⁷. The document voiced concerns about the "recent violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity" and condemned all actions threatening the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine including the annexation of Crimea, but avoided to name Russia as the potential target of the punitive measures that they were calling for. The general line followed inside the Group was in fact a compromise between Poland's approach, asking for tough measures against Russia, and the other three countries that rather preferred a more ambivalent way of conduct. Nevertheless, this remained so far the only official document adopted at V4 level which openly condemned Russia for its aggressive actions in Ukraine and for its involvement in destabilizing Eastern Ukraine. However, one can notice that the critical issues connected to the military and strategic needs, especially those regarding the need to strengthen the military build-up and to enforce NATO military presence on the Eastern flank remained largely untouched within the Visegrad common discourse.

2. The V4 alignment: between cooperation and free-riding

The general theoretical assumption is that the geographic proximity grounds common security perceptions among the countries that share common borders and related neighborhood and, therefore, they have more incentives to act together⁸. In the case of Visegrad Group, the theory did not match the practical reality. The gap emerged among the V4 countries was not necessary generated by a lack of common security perception, since all of them acknowledged that the Russia's belligerence is dramatically changing the regional security geography. The explanation lies in the level of urgency that each of the four countries was willing to disperse to tackle the emerging threat coming from East based on each specific national reading of the regional developments and their own national interests.

Statement of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the V4 Countries on the Occasion of the V4+EaP Informal Ministerial Meeting, Budapest, 28-29 April 2014, <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2014/statement-of-the>.

⁶ *Letter sent to Baroness Catherine Ashton, and Stefan Füle by the minister of Foreign Affairs of the Visegrad Group*, 5 March 2014.

⁷ *Statement of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the V4 Countries on the Occasion of the V4+EaP Informal Ministerial Meeting*, Budapest, 28-29 April 2014, <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2014/statement-of-the>, accessed 5 June 2014.

⁸ Joseph Nye Jr, *Descifrarea Conflictelor Internationale, Teorie si Istorie*, Editura Antet, Prahova, 2005, p. 69; Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, *Securitatea: un nou cadru de analiza*, CA Publishing, Cluj Napoca, 2011, pp. 282-283.

2.1 Poland playing alone

It is obvious that Poland is the dominant actor of the Visegrad Group, given its size, demography, economic and military potential. However, as the only V4 country that shares direct borders with both Russia and Ukraine, it is also the most vulnerable to the security turbulences coming from the East and highly exposed to Russia's unpredictable moves. By orienting its strategic focus on Ukraine, Warsaw could reach a double goal: to increase its international profile by forging an ambitious agenda on a crucially important EU dossier and to overcome the insecurity of its Eastern border by extending the Euro-Atlantic structures deep into the former Soviet space. The EU Eastern Partnership was to become the cornerstone of Poland Eastern agenda and highly defined its diplomatic actions towards the region.

Accordingly, Viktor Yanukovich's decision not to sign the EU's AA/DCFRA in November 2013⁹ sent a shock wave in Warsaw. The impact was higher than we could see in the other Visegrad capitals because the stake was different. It meant not only a direct blow to the Eastern agenda pursued energetically by Poland within the EU, but the likelihood of Ukraine's removal from the European integrationist project was to shape a new regional security configuration.¹⁰ This is why Poland opted for a more robust involvement within the Ukrainian dynamics and adopted a hard stance on Russia.

Several developments are especially important. On March 4th, Poland requested, with the support of the Baltic States, an emergency reunion of the North Atlantic Council, by invoking the Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. Simultaneously, Poland pressed the EU countries to adopt tough measures against Russia and to implement extensive sanctions something to force Kremlin to push back from its revisionist and aggressive behavior. On April 2, Poland asked NATO and USA to consolidate the defense on the Eastern flank and deploy credible forces and capabilities on the Polish territory.¹¹ Warsaw went even further and asked the Alliance to consider the possibility to redesign the force allocation in Europe by settling permanent bases on the Eastern frontiers. Warsaw required NATO to deploy two brigades, meaning 10,000 military on the Polish soil, sending a clear message to Russia regarding NATO commitment to defend its allies even by changing the rules of the game as settled in 1997.¹²

The radical position adopted towards Russia and the maximalist agenda pushed within NATO and EU, made Poland something of an outlier within the V4. Moreover, the Western hesitation to effectively respond to Russian threat and the deep divisions emerged among the Western allies raised serious concerns in Warsaw regarding the allies' willingness to provide for its defense. These dynamics have bolstered country's commitment to its territorial defense leading to the government's decision to speed up the massive military modernization and acquisition program already started back in 2013¹³. The advantages to this approach are

⁹ AA/DCFRA-Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement.

¹⁰ Tomasz Szatkowski, *After Ukraine: Developing Central European defense capabilities*, 10 June 2014, <http://www.cepa.org/content/after-ukraine-developing-central-european-defense-capabilities>.

¹¹ *Ukraine Crisis: Poland Calls for 10,000 NATO Troops on its Territory*, April 02, 2014, <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/ukraine-crisis-poland-calls-for-10-000-nato-troops-on-its-territory>, accessed 5 April 2014.

¹² According to the Russia-NATO Treaty signed in 1997, NATO will not deploy any military bases in the former Eastern Bloc countries once they will become members of the Alliance.

¹³ In 2012, Poland announced 10 years defense modernization program worth 44 billion dollars focused on its territorial defense. According to its tout-azimuth military assumed doctrine, Poland need to be able to conduct classical warfare against any type of aggression. Dominik P. Jankowski, *Beyond Air and Missile Defense: Modernization of the Polish Armed Forces*, Issue Brief No. 132, September 5, 2013, Center for European Policy Analysis,

http://www.cepa.org/sites/default/files/documents/CEPA%20Issue%20Brief%20No.%20132_Beyond%20air%20and%20missile%20defense.pdf, accessed 3 October 2013; Andrew A. Michta, *Polish hard power: Investing in the military as Europe cuts back*, American Enterprise Institute, December 19, 2013,

twofold. First, Poland would be able to contribute more efficiently to the defense burden-sharing within NATO and keep the American attention focused on the region. Secondly, it would give Warsaw the ability to successfully manage and address the country's strategic and military needs. This trend comes to also reveal that a great deal of trust has been lost as regards the viability of the current V4 regional defense and security formula.

2.2. Rationales behind a more balanced approach

Unlike Poland, the other remaining Visegrad countries opted for a more balanced approach towards Russia but, however, they do not form a monolithic block either. Czech Republic was among the countries that joined Poland in condemning firmly Russia's moves in Ukraine. President Milos Zeman, was even harsher comparing the situation in Ukraine with the Soviet invasion against Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Nevertheless, on March 3rd, the Czech Prime minister, Bohuslav Sobotka, warned against a policy of burning bridges saying that Czech Republic was not going to halt all economic ties with one of its biggest trade partners. Slovakia rather preferred an ambivalent posture, keeping silently in line with its V4 partners but seeking to avoid being in the frontline against Russia. Hungary is a special case since its position became a matter of real concern. The Hungarian government, which since 2010 started to reorient its foreign policy towards the East, was slow, even reluctant, in criticizing Russian moves. The climax was reached on March 3rd, when the Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orban said that "Hungary is not part of the conflict" and stated the 'neutrality of Hungary' on the Ukrainian-Russian conflict. His statement next day, on March 4th, ahead of the 6 March EU summit in Brussels, contained no reference to Russia at all, position that generated a wave of criticism inside and outside the country.

In a broader perspective, this is the result of cumulative factors ranging from economic considerations, domestic political ambitions, and geostrategic imperatives that in fact came to decisively define the typology of the alignment in case of each of the Visegrad country.

Firstly, it is about the economic considerations given that all four V4 countries are heavily dependent on Russian gas supplies and some of them have been developing extensive networks of relations, investments and business ties with Russia. As the general figures show us about 59% of the natural gas consumed in Poland, 80% in Hungary, 84% in Slovakia, and 57% in the Czech Republic comes from Russia¹⁴. This is why the general discourse adopted by the three Visegrad countries aimed at avoiding troubles in relations with Moscow and protecting their economic advantages. In the words of Slovak Prime Minister, Roberto Fico, "his role is not to make vain gestures for the sake of gestures".¹⁵ Slovakia's ambiguous position concerning the issue of gas reversal towards Ukraine was especially revealing.¹⁶ The same goes with Hungary whose business ties with Russia are even more worrisome. Having signed a 10 billion dollars nuclear energy agreement with Russia's state nuclear company

<http://www.aei.org/outlook/polish-hard-power-investing-in-the-military-as-europe-cuts-back>, accessed 10 January 2014; Marek Swierczynski, *Poland Speeds Up Deterrence Weapons Procurement*, July 14, 2014, <http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/poland-speeds-up-deterrence-weapons-procurement>, accessed 20 August 2014.

¹⁴ Paul Belkin (coordinator), *NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine and Security Concerns in Central and Eastern Europe*, CRS Report, Congressional Research Service, April 16, 2014, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43478.pdf>, pp. 7-8.

¹⁵ *Czech and Slovak views on Ukraine*, 6 March 2014, <http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2014/03/czech-and-slovak-views-ukraine#sthash.Wp2QlJsN.siDFcWtN.dpbs>, accessed 7 March 2014.

¹⁶ On April 16, the Slovak prime minister Robert Fico suggested that Russia should join the talks on the reversal to be held between Slovakia, Ukraine and the European Commission. In the end, Slovakia accepted the EU's initiative but with an obvious lack of enthusiasm.

Rosatom in January 14, 2014 for upgrading its nuclear power plant in Paks, and due to negotiate a new gas contract with Russia, as this existing one will expire in 2015, Hungary was definitely more constrained to be rather cautious in the general course to be adopted towards Russia.¹⁷ If Poland decided to put ahead the security considerations at the expense of its economic benefits, the other remaining V4 countries chose to prioritize their economic policies and business relations with Moscow. The result was a lack of unity in forging a common agenda of action as regards the level and scale of the sanctions (especially as regards the implementation of the 3rd level of sanctions) to be imposed against Moscow and, therefore a weak voice in shaping EU policies on the matter.¹⁸

Secondly, there were domestic rationales that highly impacted upon the attitude adopted by some of the V4, especially important being the minorities' issue. It was the decision of the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) to abolish the 2012 law "On State Language Policy" in February 2013 that sparked a "mini-crisis" between the new Ukrainian government and the neighboring states. Having the largest minority living in Ukraine, out of the four Visegrad countries, (around 165.000 people located in Ukrainian Zakarpattia region), Hungary sharply condemned Kiev decision that was to justify even further its general alignment towards the Ukrainian crisis. The discourse of the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in supporting the Hungarian minority rights, took even a radical character when on May 12 he demanded autonomy for the Hungarians living in Trans-Carpathian region of Ukraine. In fact, Hungary's new rhetoric- either from pragmatism, opportunism or domestic consideration- broke one of the basic principles assumed jointly by the V4 states to respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine.¹⁹ The Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, was quick to call Orbán's statements as "unfortunate and disturbing"²⁰, but, however, the other Visegrad countries fall short to answer.

Thirdly, strategic imperatives need to be taken into consideration. At this level, the V4's security dilemma developed around a key question: what measure to be taken to increase its countries' security and defense without increasing the regional insecurity by fueling Russia's further hostility? The answer led to centrifugal tendencies that split the Visegrad group between Poland's maximal agenda and the other three member countries that opted for a more cautious path. Unlike Poland, Prague, Bratislava and Budapest showed reluctance to consider Russia as an existential threat. The rationales are twofold. On one hand, it is about geography, since none of them share direct borders with Russia. On the other hand, the protection provided by NATO Art 5 was considered the most credible deterrent and security guarantee against any potential threat. Based on these assumptions, a Russian military attack

¹⁷ Hungary is also one of the participating countries in the South Stream gas pipeline project (and there is no sign what so ever to change the course), and, important to notice, it was among the first who withdrew their support for the construction of the rival Nabucco gas pipeline. More about Hungary's new discovered 'Eastern orientation', see Dariusz Kałan, 'They Who Sow the Wind... Hungary's Opening to the East', *PISM Bulletin*, No. 37 (632), 19 March 2014, pp. 1-2; Andrzej Sadecki, 'In a state of necessity. How has Orbán changed Hungary', *Point of View*, No. 41/April 2014, Central for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, pp. 36-38.

¹⁸ The only visible initiative put forward by all V4 countries in a more articulated manner was the appeal addressed to the US Congress on March 10, 2014 calling the US to ease natural gas exports to the region by removing the existing legislative regulations that limit the export of American shale gas to countries which do not enjoy free-trade agreements with the USA. "Ukraine crisis: Visegrad Group in gas import appeal to US", 10 March 2014, <http://www.thenews.pl/1/12/Artykul/164630,Ukraine-crisis-Visegrad-Group-in-gas-import-appeal-to-US>, accessed 13 March 2014.

¹⁹ Fareed Zakaria, "The rise of Putinism", *Washington Post*, 31 July 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fareed-zakaria-the-rise-of-putinism/2014/07/31/2c9711d6-18e7-11e4-9e3b-7f2f110c6265_story.html, accessed 1 August 2014; András Rácz, *Divided stands the Visegrad?*, FIIA Briefing paper no.158, June 2014, p. 7.

²⁰ 'Tusk about Orbán's statement: unfortunate and disturbing', *The Warsaw Voice*, 14 May 2014, available at: <http://www.warsawvoice.pl/WVpage/pages/article.php/28248/news>, accessed 15 May 2014.

against their territories was seen as highly unlikely. The result was a lack of enthusiasm as regards the need to increase the defense budgets, and reluctance towards an enhanced NATO infrastructure on their territories. The last point, in fact a request forwarded by Poland, highlighted even further the division lines among the V4 countries. Indeed, Prague aligned closer to Poland's position, and acknowledged the need to increase NATO military presence in Poland and Baltic States, as well as measures to increase defense spending and to enhance Visegrad military cooperation. However, both Prague and Bratislava turn off the option of hosting foreign NATO troops on their territory drawing comparison with the August 1968 Soviet occupation. Therefore, the presence of foreign bases on the Czech and Slovak territories was seen as "a psychological problem". As Robert Fico, the Slovak Prime Minister, spoke "*Slovakia has its historical experience with participation of foreign troops. Let us remember the 1968 invasion. Therefore this topic is extraordinarily sensitive to us*", adding that he can't imagine foreign troops being deployed on Slovak territory in the form of some bases²¹

The positions adopted by Czech Republic and Slovakia, alongside Hungary ambivalent posture, were to complicate even more the overall strategic equation in Central and Eastern Europe.

3. Visegrad Group as a strategic player: prospects for new regional dynamics

It is obvious that the Ukrainian crisis represents a break in the patterns of past years cooperation in the field of foreign, security and defense policies. Until recently, the V4 was seen as the most suitable candidate to play as a role-model for the implementation of a credible and lasting regional defense partnership, even by taking the form of a sub-military alliance in line with the emerging trends within NATO and EU voicing for increased security regionalization. The concept developed as a complementary formula for framing the new Euro-Atlantic security geography aiming at bringing the regional players to work closely together. In fact, this was to allow them to enhance their defense potential, overcome their military weakness and increase their contribution to the overall Euro-Atlantic security efforts. This was the rationale behind important initiatives developed by EU ("pooling and sharing") and NATO ("smart defense") urging the member countries to adopt a formula of military cooperation focused on specialization, prioritization and integration of parts of their militaries. As frontier states, sharing similar geographic vulnerabilities and strategic imperatives, the V4 states were considered in general "well positioned to become a hub for military cooperation".²² The 2011 initiative to create a common Visegrad Battlegroup answered to these specific considerations and grounded an optimistic view regarding the V4's future perspective as a credible security and military actor²³. The Ukrainian conflict has significantly changed this narrative as the ambitious V4 defense project is now highly questioning. Facing a real crisis situation, the V4 states found that the strategic assumption that motivated their previous solidarity, namely common shared threat perceptions and security concerns, carries

²¹ *NATO troops and bases not welcome in Slovakia and Czech Republic*, <http://rt.com/news/163784-slovakia-no-nato-troops/>.

²² Tomáš Valášek (ed), Milan Šuplata (co-ed), *Towards a deeper Visegrad Defense Partnership*, DAV4 Full Report, Central European Policy Institute, 2012, p. 5.

²³ In fact, it was for the first time since the establishment of this regional group when the participating countries committed themselves to assume the responsibility for their own security and complement NATO efforts in the area of defense. In an interesting analysis published by Stratfor Global Intelligence, George Friedman points out that this initiative "represents a sense of how these countries evaluate the status of NATO, the U.S. attention span, European coherence and Russian power". George Friedman, *Visegrad: A New European Military Force*, Stratfor Global Intelligence, 17 May 2011, <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110516-visegrad-new-european-military-force>, accessed 22 May 2014.

potentially sources of tensions. The strategic equation inside the V4 starting to alter since the member countries could not agree on how to confront the Russian threat and what measures are needed to manage the growing regional security vulnerabilities. In other words, V4 proved to be a cohesive and efficient platform for action towards the crisis in Ukraine, but failed to generate a similar level of solidarity in handling the Russian threat. According to Poland's perspective, Russia turned into an existential threat reality that completely changed the geostrategic regional game. Against this background, a consolidated forward-presence of NATO in Central Europe, with military bases and troops deployed on a permanent basis, was considered as the ultimate deterrent to change Russian assertive calculus. In Budapest, Prague and Bratislava the general assumption was shaped mostly by their less vulnerable geography, business interests and their fears that a tougher answer would only give Moscow an incentive to cause more troubles in Central and Eastern Europe. NATO fragmentation and EU weakness to generate a united and robust position against the Russian threat is another key variable which highly marked the political thinking in different Visegrad capitals. Despite various statements and declarations issued by the V4 countries in the last months calling for enhancing defense cooperation and fostering common initiatives on capabilities development among the member states²⁴, the group internal dynamics seems to follow a different logic. There is no more telling evidence than the deepening gap in the military capabilities and the defense budgets among the V4 countries. Except Poland, the other remaining V4 countries lie far below the assumed NATO threshold of 2% of GDP spending on defense and there are gloomy prospects of any significant change in the future²⁵. This is all the more striking since Poland is engaged in a far-reaching military modernization program that is going to transform it in a significant European military power. The immediate question going forward will be whether this in-looking defense focus signaled the beginning of a defense re-nationalization process so that Poland would be able to become more self-reliant in security matters. Nevertheless, if the defense disparity among the V4 countries would continue to grow, maintaining a functional cooperative military balance among the member countries will be difficult to sustain on long term.

Given the new internal architecture of interests and strategic priorities, a possible scenario for some V4 countries would be to diversify their regional strategic options and to look for additional regional partners besides the V4 framework as to strengthen the regional security front. There are already several developments showing an increased political coordination between Poland and the Baltic States, countries that share the same understating regarding the changing security environment and the need for a consolidated NATO military presence on their territories. Recently, they jointly asked NATO to consider at the forthcoming Wales NATO summit expanding the long-planned missile defense system to be

²⁴ *Long Term Vision of the Visegrad countries on deepening their defense cooperation*, Visegrad, 14 March 2014, <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/official-statements>; *Framework for an Enhanced Visegrad Defense planning Cooperation*, Visegrad, 14 March 2014, <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/official-statements>; *Declaration of the Visegrad Group Heads of Government on the New Opening in V4 Defence Cooperation*, Budapest, June 24, 2014, <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2014/budapest-declaration-of>.

²⁵ If Poland initiated an ample program of defense modernization worth 40 billions until 2022, the defense budget of the three countries remained below NATO threshold of 2% of GDP. Hungary plans to increase its defence budget (currently 0.8% of GDP) by only 0.1% of GDP annually from 2016, Czech Republic (currently 1,08% of GDP) intends to reduce its spending next year and then to gradually raise expenditures in order to reach 1.4% of GDP in the medium-term, while Slovakia (currently 1% of GDP) stated that it would not boost its defence budget in the near future. See Artur Kacprzyk, *Deterring Russia after Ukraine: CEE Divided on the Future of NATO Policy*, PISM, Policy Paper, No. 13 (96), July 2014, http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=17873, accessed 2 August 2014.

deployed in Eastern and Central Europe as to cover Russia as well²⁶ and urged their NATO allies to mention Moscow as a potential aggressor in its September summit communiqué²⁷. This new regional axis might develop as to include the Nordic States, especially Sweden and Finland, that also showed signs of willingness to recalibrate their relations with NATO as to counter the Russian moves. Such a regional formula comprising the European Northern Tier might act as a catalyst for a new regional configuration. Its alignment to the Weimer Triangle, that also includes France and Germany, is another strategic vector that highly strengthens Poland's central role in shaping the on-going regional game. There is also the southern axis that Poland could follow as to complement its Northern layer. In this regard, the Polish-Romanian bilateral partnership might be the key in advancing a revisited regional agenda settling the grounds for a viable security and military cooperation. The two countries share similar regional approaches and threats assessments as regards the Ukrainian crisis, and both are leading voices in urging for tougher measures against Russia and an upgraded NATO presence on the Eastern-Nordic flank. However, given their geostrategic location and geopolitical exposure to possible Russian moves, Bucharest and Warsaw struggled to influence the Alliance's strategic calculus on the potential redeployments of forces on the Eastern theater leading to a kind of "competition" between the Northern and Eastern flank of the Alliance. It's to be seen if the forthcoming NATO summit in Cardiff (4-5 September) will find the right balance between the two most vulnerable fronts by deploying robust military reinforcements as to cover broadly the Northern-Eastern border. The regional game is in the making and it is difficult to predict how the strategic equation between the regional players will unfold. Recently, Stratfor analyst, George Friedman, advanced a possible scenario rebranding the old concept of the Intermarium that would connect Baltic Sea to Black Sea and Caspian Sea²⁸. The strategic relations between Romania and Poland represent key part in the overall geopolitical geography envisaged by the new concept.

In the same time, the forthcoming Wales NATO summit might help fostering a new regional security constellation of strategic goals and priorities within the V4. A decision, albeit unlikely at this point, to deploy permanent troops on the territories of the most vulnerable frontier states might give new incentives to the Visegrad countries to regain the confidence and security trust. This could also encourage Poland to continue to play its traditional leading role by investing more energetically in the defense cooperation alongside its Visegrad partners. The Visegrad Battlegroup remains an important asset to help member countries to regain the previous level of ambition in the field of military cooperation. A possible enlargement of the V4 format by including other regional actors is likely to forge a new regional dynamism and increase the relevance and internal potential of the group as a whole. Such a structural shift, that some of the member countries, Hungary in particular, showed some resistance, could generate a new regional geography articulated around a robust Eastern security agenda. In the emerging regional strategic puzzle, a coherent and powerful strategic line between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea- with an enlarged V4 at its core- looks as practical option as to cope with the new Eastern threats and to bring a valuable contribution to both NATO and EU.

²⁶ "Baltic Fears: NATO Debates Directing Missile Shield against Russia", *Der Spiegel International*, 25 August 2014, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/nato-considers-missile-shield-directed-against-russia-a-987899.html>, accessed 26 August 2014.

²⁷ *NATO Forces in Eastern Europe May Lead to Endless War, Hostilities – Expert*, 28 August 2014, http://world.einnews.com/article/220791843/_0FgB6fDO3M3XbkR?continued=1, accessed 28 August 2014

²⁸ George Friedman, "Ukraine, Iraq and a Black Sea Strategy", *Geopolitical Weekly, Stratfor Global Intelligence*, 2 September 2014, <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/ukraine-iraq-and-black-sea-strategy#axzz3CAst14tb>, accessed 2 September 2014.

Conclusions

In the last months, the main narrative regarding the V4's role focused on the growing divisions and divergences among the four countries which rather preferred to follow national agendas than to forge a common unitary front of action. As a consequence, the V4 missed the opportunity to secure its relevance as a strong voice within the European affairs and to become a credible actor on the European arena²⁹. Against such pessimistic views, the V4 role within the Ukrainian crisis needs to be considered in a more comprehensive perspective that should not ignore the serious potential that this regional grouping still has and might use to secure the Western security interests in an extremely turbulent area. Leaving aside the obvious shortfalls inside the group, one can notice the interest that all four member countries shared to keep the relevance of the group. Looking at the meetings and reunions held between the V4 leaders since the beginning of the crisis and the statements/communiqués issued during this period, one cannot miss the serious endeavor pursued to soften up the divergences and to find a compromise between different domestic agendas and strategic imperatives.

This comes to prove two important features. On one hand, all the four countries acknowledged the benefits of being identified with a regional grouping that enjoys a high rating of confidence and important voice in the European affairs. On the other hand, the V4 states are well aware of the strong potential of their group in fostering regional cooperation in the field of energy, social development, modernization, infrastructure (the so-called *low-level policies*).

However, as security and defense ambitions are concerned, the Ukrainian crisis and the on-going Ukrainian-Russian conflict demonstrated that V4 shares neither a sufficiency of strategic ambition nor critical strategic culture. The danger is to have V4 split in two groups. One, centered on Poland, will continue to seek an American-led defense via NATO "umbrella" while simultaneously trying to diversify its regional strategic choices and increase its own defense potential. The other group, comprising the other three Visegrad countries, will choose a middle way, calling for Atlantic solidarity but avoiding significant defense commitments and actions that might put their economic and business interest in jeopardy. The Visegrad Group is at a crossroads. The way in which the member countries will answer to the geostrategic challenges coming from the East will define the role and level of ambition of this sub-regional grouping.

It is still difficult to predict how the Central European playground will be shaped, but, however, the V4 potential to become a genuine regional actor, a credible military force and a model for new Euro-Atlantic security geography needs to be reconsidered and upgraded in line with fast-emerging geostrategic realities.

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²⁹ Edward Lucas, *Edward Lucas on V4: Grappling with irrelevance?*, 30 June 2014, <http://www.cepolicy.org/publications/grappling-irrelevance-v4-after-its-split-ukraine>.

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PARALLEL BETWEEN THE HUMAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURES OF AFRICA AND SOUTH ASIA

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Abstract: *Human security aims to provide the necessary means for humans to live in dignity as response to more diversified threats against human being. Essentially, human security underlies the universality and interdependence of a set of fundamental liberties for human life: liberty from fear, free of will and liberty to live in dignity. Therefore, human security recognizes the connections between security, development and human rights and considers these are the milestones of national security and human security.*

Africa and South Asia are confronted to a series of threats related to human security. Prevention, diminution and even elimination of these threats need transnational cooperation and solutions.

By this parallel between the human security architecture of Africa and South Asia we intend to emphasize the complexity of human security issues in these regions, to identify common elements, and measures and actions meant to contribute to the development and safety of persons from the states of these regions.

Keywords: *human security, security, Africa, South Asia, security environment, threats, parallel.*

1. Aspects of human security in Africa

Along the speech held in front of African chiefs of states and governs in Lusaka in July 2001, The Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan when referring to human security in Africa mentioned the following: “Conflict in Africa, as everywhere, is caused by human action, and can be ended by human action”¹.

Traditionally, Africa aimed an expansive approach of human security concept. Thus, the text of the African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact adopted to the defence ministers' meeting in July 2004 mentions: “human security means the security of the individual with respect to the satisfaction of the basic needs of life; it also encompasses the creation of the social, political, economic, military, environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the survival, livelihood, and dignity of the individual, including the protection of fundamental freedoms, the respect for human rights, good governance, access to education, healthcare, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his/her own potential”².

Greatly, insecurity and instability in Africa became complex and interdependent issue. Threats against human security are diverse and interdependent.

Jakkie Cilliers considers that the civil society has an important role for solving the human security issues in Africa; it is not a substitute of the state but it is well positioned to

¹ Jakkie Cilliers, *Human Security in Africa. A conceptual framework for review*, publicat de African Human Security Initiative, 2004, p.1, available online at: <http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/AHSIMONO1.PDF>, accessed on August 13, 2014.

² *Ibidem*, p. 8.

fulfil two important roles: the first is to increase the capacity of development and security and the second is to put pressure on the decision-making factors from the economic developed countries in order to answer to the human security needs of the poor developed states.³

Among the threats against human security on the African continent, terrorism is very spread, damaging great part of the population. In-between 1991-1996, Sudan was the headquarter of Osama bin Laden; terrorist groups found in the Northern of Africa a rich region in oil, gases and uranium, an environment suitable to undergo their activities. In 2013, USA offered a 7 million dollars reward for the information offered about Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram Jihadist movement, considered to be responsible for the organization of many assaults in the Northern Nigeria, resulted in more than 2,000 dead persons⁴.

Other threat against human security in the Sub-Saharan Africa is famish that in regard to Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nation has a high level, about 21%, therefore one of five persons suffers of malnutrition.

Water deprivation (about 400 million persons are deprived of potable water access in Africa) is serious threat as the previously presented threat. Infrastructure issues and poor management of potable water are two reasons blocking the access to this vital resource although it has enough amount in Africa (5,400 billions of cube meters of water are present in its undergrounds⁵).

Domino effect of water deprivation is very serious: conflicts, pandemics, displacements, etc., under the circumstances when, in regard to the forecasts, the African continent will host 25% of the world population in 2050, meaning 2.4 billion inhabitants.

Epidemics are serious threat against human security and for now it does not have resolution. As concerns the World Health Organization publicized on July 27, 2014 in Africa were about 1,300 cases and 729 deaths⁶. Ebola that burst at the beginning of the year in Guinea and then spread in Sierra Leone ravishes in Africa and scares the other states in the world. AIDS also harmed Africa. The news on statistics are ravishing: in 2000, 24.5 millions of Africans of Sub-Sahara (meaning 71% of seropositive population in the world) was infected with HIV⁷, and in 2012, there were infected about 25 million persons, representing almost 70% from the total worldwide⁸; the people affected by this disease are mainly persons with ages between 15-49 years and new born of seropositive mothers; many girls do not know the risks of AIDS; the lack of knowledge as regards the sexual transmitted disease; a low percentage of treated persons (in Nigeria, for example, the percentage of untreated persons is about 80%⁹). Therefore, the epidemics generated a series of negative social and economic consequences widely in education, health, industry, economic development.

Women are under-privileged in Africa because of their economic and social statute and usually they depend by their husbands and have restricted rights. UNICEF statistics show 2/5 of the young women in Africa are married before the age of 18 and in Chad and Niger 1/3

³ *Ibidem*, p.48.

⁴ *Americanii pun recompense de milioane pe capetele teroristilor din Africa*, available online at: <http://www.ziare.com/international/terorism/americanii-pun-recompense-de-milioane-pe-capetele-teroristilor-din-africa-1239080>, accessed on August 12, 2014.

⁵ *Circa 400 de milioane de africani nu au acces la apă potabilă*, available online at: <http://www.agerpres.ro/externe/2014/02/17/circa-400-de-milioane-de-africani-nu-au-acces-la-apa-potabila-21-32-43>, accessed on August 12, 2014.

⁶ *Virusul EBOLA. Totul despre VIRUSUL EBOLA. Ce este virusul Ebola și cum se transmite*, available online at: <http://www.voceatransilvaniei.ro/virusul-ebola-totul-despre-virusul-ebola-ce-este-virusul-ebola-si-cum-se-transmite/>, accessed on August 12, 2014.

⁷ *Statisticile funeste ale SIDA în Africa*, available online at: <http://dezvaluiribiz.ro/statisticile-funeste-ale-sidei-in-africa/>, accessed on August 12, 2014.

⁸ <http://www.avert.org/hiv-aids-sub-saharan-africa.htm>, accessed on August 12, 2014.

⁹ <http://www.paginadepolitica.ro/onu-sida-ar-putea-fi-eradicata-in-2030/>, accessed on August 12, 2014.

of the young women are married before the age of 15.¹⁰ The report called "African Women Lag Men in Activism, Fear Campaign Violence" emphasize a series of aspects as: genre discrimination is widely present in many African states, particularly in the northern part; great part of people interviewed in Egypt and Nigeria consider governments applied efforts in fighting for women emancipation; each African state has particular solution to solve its issues related to women rights, but an regional agreement in this concerns will improve the situation; in Tunisia majority of women strongly believe they must fully enjoy the citizenship and political rights but the country is still shared between two parties - liberal and conservator, etc.¹¹.

Africa, a diverse continent from ethnical, religious and social-cultural perspective, it is not avoided by conflicts with diverse causes, from military, ethnical, economic to the artificial nature of borders between states, and political corruption. In many African states, conflicts are regional and irregular¹².

Eritrea and Ethiopia, two of the poorest countries in the world, were in armed conflict in-between May 1998 and June 2000, spending hundreds of millions dollars and losing millions of human lives.

The Conflicts Barometer for 2013, achieved by Heidelberg Institute for international conflicts research, 11 of the 20 recorded conflicts were in Sub-Saharan Africa and here are top leaders Sudan and South Sudan with 5 conflicts categorized by the institute as wars.¹³

In July 2014, conflict trends on the African continent were as it shown in Figure no. 1:




Figure no.1. Conflict trends in Africa – July 2014¹⁴

¹⁰ <http://www.our-africa.org/women>, accessed on August 13, 2014.

¹¹ *African women making progress in battle for equal rights*, available online at: <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2014/mar/28/african-women-progress-equality-afrobarometer-report-2014>, accessed on August 13, 2014.

¹² *Ibidem*, p.20.

¹³ *În 2013 au fost cele mai multe conflicte armate de după al Doilea Război Mondial*, available online at: http://stiri.tvr.ro/in-2013-au-fost-cele-mai-multe-conflicte-armate-de-dupa-al-doilea-razboi-mondial_40951.html, accessed on August 13, 2014.

¹⁴ *Conflict trends (no. 29) real-time analysis of African political violence, august 2014*, available online at: <http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/ACLED-Conflict-Trends-Report-No.-29-August-2014.pdf>, accessed on August 13, 2014.

The map shows an escalation of conflicts in South Sudan and Uganda and the undergoing crisis in Somalia; Mozambique recorded a decrease of hostility intensity and Cameroon is lower in violence on short time, respectively for July 2014; in Libya the level of violence dramatically intensified while the violence decreased in Central African Republic. In Nigeria the conflict continues; more than 4,000 persons were killed this year in the conflict between the Nigerian Armed Forces and the Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram; in the late months, the conflict intensified in the North-Eastern part of the country particularly in cities and villages close to the frontline. This terrorist group introduced new techniques of war: kidnapping adolescent female and rape¹⁵.

The effects of conflicts on human security are negative and numerous (diseases, deaths, material losses, migration, etc.).

There were also focused positive aspects as regards the resolution of problems of human security. For example, in order to solve their conflicts, Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad announced their decision to create a regional force formed by 700 militaries from each country with support promise from United Kingdom and France; African Centre for peace and human security by its designed and developed courses aims to improve human security in the African states.

2. Human security aspects in Southern Asia

South Asia is the most vulnerable region in the world because of natural and human made disasters and it is possible to affirm this region will become the second volatile region in the world, along with the Middle East.¹⁶

By geographical perspective, South Asia includes the region situated in the south of Himalaya - Hindukush mountain system and comprises the following states: *India* (has the widest part of the territory and population), *Pakistan*, *Afghanistan*, *Bangladesh*, *Sri Lanka*, *Nepal*, *Bhutan* and *Maldives*. Some sources, as UN Statistics Division include in this region also Iran.¹⁷

The political systems of these states from South Asia materialized in different forms of governing: democracy: India, Pakistan, Maldives, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal; monarchy: Bhutan.

By religious perspective, Pakistan is declared Islamic republic, Nepal is Hindu state and India is the birthplace of two great religions of the world - Hinduism and Buddhism.

Before their independence, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka were British colonies. After their independence, the focus was on security then human development. South Asia expended in 2009 about 15 billion dollars each year for the army and this determined the cut of the budget designed for development.¹⁸

Owed to its great cultural, religious and civilization diversity, South Asia is the most populated regions in the world.

Three of the countries of this region are situated in the top ten of populated states of the world, in 2013 and 2050 (Table no.1).

¹⁵ *Nigeria: Gruesome footage implicates military in war crimes*, available online at: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/nigeria-gruesome-footage-implicates-military-war-crimes-2014-08-05>, accessed on August 13, 2014.

¹⁶ Maneesha S. Wanasinghe – Pasqual, *Seen and Heard: Human Security of Youth of South Asia and Potential as Catalyst for Building Peace*, available online at: <http://home.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/heiwa/Pub/E25/e25-4.pdf>, accessed on August 13, 2014.

¹⁷ Vasile Popa, *Geografia statelor Asiei*, Editura Universitară, București, 2012, p.10.

¹⁸ Arshi Saleem Hashmi, *Internal conflicts and regional security in south asia*, p.2, article available online at: http://www.academia.edu/2508567/INTERNAL_CONFLICTS_AND_REGIONAL_SECURITY_IN_SOUTH_ASIA, accessed on August 13, 2014.

Country	2013/inhabitants	Forecast 2050/loc
India	1.277 millions / 2	1.652 millions / 1
Pakistan	191 millions / 6	363 millions / 6
Bangladesh	157 millions / 8	202 millions / 8

Table no. 1. South Asia countries are the most populated in 2013 and 2050¹⁹

Human security in the South Asia states encounters a series of threats. Corruption, inefficient and disorganized state institutions, increasing militarization, conflicts, etc. are some examples affecting the development of region's states and people wellbeing.

In Afghanistan, people confront since over 20 years with corruption, violence, murderers, smuggling, expulsion, etc.; the damages are greater than in the other transnational wars in the present.²⁰

Also it recorded meaningful economic development (2012 – 5.5%; 2011 – 6.9%; 2011 – 9.6%)²¹, statistics show India confronts to a series of problems against human security as the access to sanitary appliances: 31 million households in the urban environment (including poor districts) have inadequate sanitary appliances; over 130 million households in India do not have toilets, or even a whole, and they do their biological necessities in open space near their own houses.²² In order to solve this serious issue, the Indian Minister of Finance, Arun Jaitley required for the budget of July 2014 to be used to initiate a program to clean the biological dirt from the streets of great Indian cities. Building toilets is not the final option (until September 2014, the Indian government ordered the building in India of over 5.2 million toilets) but because many Hindus as their religion require prefer to make their biological needs in open space, many times in public spaces and they also consider the lack of hygiene as socially welcomed and healthy.

Other threat against human security is violence particularly domestic violence. Statistics show in India a woman is raped each 20 minutes²³, and New Delhi gained, in 2013, the title of „*Indian capital of rape*“²⁴. In this country, when verbal or physical harassment takes place in public areas, the passengers choose to look the other way instead intervene in order to avoid conflict and because in a certain measure they blame the victim. Under these circumstances, the male politicians also contribute because they calumniate the supporters of rape victims.

¹⁹ *Most Populous Countries, 2013 and 2050*, available online at: http://www.prb.org/pdf13/2013-population-data-sheet_eng.pdf, accessed on August 13, 2014.

²⁰ Barnett Rubin, *Afghanistan and Threats to Human Security*, article available online at: <http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/rubin.htm>, accessed on August 21, 2014.

²¹ Iulia Monica Oehler Sincai, *India: usoara accelerare a cresterii în 2013-2014*, article available online at: <http://tribunaeconomica.ro/blog/?p=1073>, accessed on August 13, 2014.

²² *Cea mai veche democratie capitalista a lumii - India - ingropata in fecale. Sistemul sanitar primitiv si mizeria groaznica dictata de religie si "convingeri" capitaliste*, available online at: http://www.alternativaromaniei.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1389:cea-mai-veche-democratie-capitalista-a-lumii-india-ingropata-in-fecale-sistemul-sanitar-primitiv-si-mizeria-groaznica-dictata-de-religie-si-qconvingeriq-capitaliste-&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=50, accessed on August 13, 2014.

²³ *Iadul femeilor pe pământ. În India, drepturile omului sunt o glumă sinistră*, available online at: <http://m.ziuanews.ro/dezvaluiri-investigatii/iadul-femeilor-pe-pamant-in-india-drepturile-omului-sunt-o-gluma-sinistra-91346>, accessed on August 14, 2014.

²⁴ *Zece motive pentru care India are probleme cu violența sexuală*, available online at: http://adevarul.ro/international/asia/zece-motive-india-probleme-violenta-sexuala-1_50e44ded596d72009162eb87/index.html, accessed on August 14, 2014.

In India and Bangladesh there is great number of poor people; for example, in 2010, in top achieved with the first five countries with the biggest number of poor people, India took the first place with 32.9%, and Bangladesh 4th place with 12,8%²⁵.

Violence is serious threat against the individual and knows diverse forms in Pakistan. For example, in 2011, the tensions between the local communities Muttahida Qawmi Movement (MQM) and Awami National Party (ANP) generated a series of human casualties and material losses. The data offered by the Institute for Peace Studies in Pakistan are explanatory: in 2010 - 2,113 and in 2009 - 2,586 violent actions – consisting in inter-confessional assaults, offensives of the army against the Islamist militants or attempts committed by the insurgents. Other statistics show in-between 1989-2014 took place 2,927 cases of sectarian violence, recording 4,864 deaths and 9,389 injured persons.²⁶

Other known aspect with bad effects on individual security is the conflicts. Because of the inter- and intra-state conflicts in Southern Asia, the flow of refugees is large, particularly between India and Bangladesh and Pakistan and Afghanistan. Although India, Nepal and Sri Lanka have not signed the Convention on refugees' statute in 1951, they offer asylum for great number of refugees. For example, India grants asylum and offers direct assistance for about 200,000 refugees from the neighbouring countries.²⁷

There are also other factors determining the growth of refugees number as the high poverty, the impact of climate changes, persecution, terrorist actions. Terrorist attacks from Sri Lanka generating serious effects against persons' security determined the diminution to the maximum amount of the movements, the travels to be done by individual means of transportation and not the common ones, the avoidance of areas where official convoys are not present. We cannot omit in our presentation that the civil war undergone in this country in-between 1983-2009 among the government in Sri Lanka dominated by the Buddhist majority and Tamil Tigers Freedom Movement - separatist organization fighting for the establishment of Tamil Eelam, an independent state in the Eastern and Northern parties of the country represented serious threat against human security scoring as a whole about 80,000 and 100,000 victims and 265,000 persons recorded in the fields²⁸).

The access to potable water - the source of life -, it is a threat against human security with serious consequences against individual health. In Nepal, the potable water crisis determined as great part of this country's population to lack the access to potable water and therefore, the country confronts with great deal of diseases caused by the lack of water as the diarrhoea, dysentery, enteric fever, cholera, and gastroenteritis.²⁹

As for the African continent there were set in the South Africa states a series of measures and actions to diminish the threats against human security. An example is the activity of Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies with a wide range of thematic areas: political violence and terrorism, conflict and development, regional strategic problems, international relations and foreign policy. The Regional Strategy for Asia 2007-2013 stipulates the states

²⁵<http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2014%20MDG%20report/MDG%202014%20English%20web.pdf>, accessed on August 14, 2014.

²⁶*Sectarian Violence in Pakistan*, available online at: <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/sect-killing.htm>, accessed on August 14, 2014.

²⁷ 2014 UNHCR regional operations profile - South Asia, available online at: <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45b156.html>, accessed on August 14, 2014.

²⁸*Sri Lanka STUDIU DE CERCETARE / EVALUARE iunie 2012*, available online at: http://www.jrsromania.org/DOCUMENTE/Sri_Lanka.pdf, accessed on August 17, 2014.

²⁹*Water In Crisis - Nepal*, available online at: <http://thewaterproject.org/water-in-crisis-nepal>, accessed on August 17, 2014.

from South Asia forwarded to the fulfilment of Millennium Development Goals differently from the Eastern Asia with slower development.³⁰

Conclusions

The human security concept focuses on humans' security but also recognizing the security of states and governments. Human security is an universal issue, it is relevant for all people indifferently they are rich or poor and shapes as objective conditions wherein each individual undergoes his/her living and the subjective manner each of us assess his/her own living.

Poor civilians-militaries relations, policy of exclusion, poor civil society, failed states problem, etc. are few of the present challenges against human security in Africa and Southern Asia. For example, in Africa the civil society proves furthermore to be uncoordinated and excessively dependent by donor communities and the competition for finances and diverse group interests hinders coordination. A civil society can become "an early warning device"³¹ by the support given to the governments to provide humans safety. Failed states represent considerable challenges for human security as shows the previous experience recorded in Somalia, Liberia or Sierra Leone, states unable to guarantee human security and to control their territories counting on protection groups and bodies. Human security in Africa can be qualified as being in "precarious situation"³², the challenges against human security are multiple and diversified.

Former American President Bill Clinton described South Asia as the most dangerous place on the Earth.³³ It is true is we think about the great number and nature of threats against human security, the security environment of the region is characterized by the combination of old with the new security risks and we remember in 1998 India provoked controlled nuclear explosions and Pakistan is the single Muslim country with atomic weapons.

There are opinions the security of South Asia states is tried by the interaction of many factors operating on three different levels: domestic, regional or bilateral and global.³⁴ The analysis on human security in Africa and South Asia is complex and in order to show the most reality of the places it must be done on certain period of time, on each of the seventh components of human security (political, economic, social, personal, of group or collective, health and food) grounded on some pre-set items.

Based on the presented aspects on the parallel between human security in Africa and South Asia there can be identified a series of common elements. Threats against human security in the both regions are assembling as nature but different as shaping, number and period of time. The resolution of human security problems in Asia and South Africa greatly depends by a stable and progressive internal environment of states for them to be able to cooperate but also to provide the conditions for regional and international cooperation, by the will of decision-makers to solve the security issues and to attenuate and prevent the challenges against human security. Of course, the number of threats against human security in Africa and South Asia are many than we presented but we hope these lines to be taken as another signal of alarm for the world.

³⁰ *Strategia regională pentru Asia 2007-2013*, available online at: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/asia/r15016_ro.htm, accessed on August 13, 2014 .

³¹ Abdul Omar, *Challenges of Human Security in Africa*, available online at: <http://peacemagazine.org/archive/v16n3p09.htm>, accessed on August 13, 2014.

³² *Ibidem*.

³³ Malleha Lodhi, *Security challenges in South Africa*, p.118, available online at:

<http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/Secrete%20Ch%20Pak%20Perspectivei.pdf>, accessed on August 14, 2014.

³⁴ *Ibidem*.

Human being needs safety and stability to develop as person wherever lives in the world, he/she also needs respect of his/her fundamental rights. Lately, on internal and regional plan, there are seen more fruitful preoccupations to diminish the threats against human security but also higher interest shown by some economic developed states (for example: the requirement of budget of Obama Administration for 2010 emphasized the focus on non-military support for Pakistan, the most noticeable was the very growth of funds assigned for economic development³⁵ or for the National Development Plan launched in 2012 in South Africa - a framework starting to communicate the needed actions of society to occupy by the omnipresent famish³⁶) and of the governmental and non-governmental organizations to solve the human security issues. The growth of influence of a state from South Asia - India - in Africa materialized in supply of automobiles, communications and energy is other common element coming from the used bibliography.

For Africa and South Asia there is still hope the things regarding human security can be solved. It is well-known that each successful security project must emphasize more than anything the human being safety and development.

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³⁵ Paul Duță, Constantin Stanciu, *Avatarurile imperiilor și expedițiilor în Asia Centrală iilor în Asia Centrală*, p.26, Policy Paper no. 1/2012, available online at: <http://www.idr.ro/publicatii/Policy%20Paper%201.pdf>, accessed on August 14, 2014.

³⁶ S. Drimie & M. McLachlan, *Food security in South Africa—first steps toward a transdisciplinary approach*, available online at: http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/428/art%253A10.1007%252Fs12571-013-0241-4.pdf?auth66=1408183563_91d0ffa7b6df88c29c885bce3f53eaf&ext=.pdf, accessed on August 14, 2014.

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LATIN AMERICA HUMAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AT THE BEGINNING OF XXI CENTURY

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Abstract: *Latin America is a fascinating and complicated space situated between two oceans (Atlantic and Pacific) being focused by analysts and specialists from the whole world. It occupies important role on the international scene mainly owed to its richness. For example, in July 2014, Beijing expressed the intention on the occasion of Chinese President in Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina and Cuba to sign many economic and commercial bilateral cooperation agreements in order to amplify developing relations between China and Latin America.*

Latin America states are subjected to different threats against human security. Organized crime actions, traffic of women and children, money laundering, smuggling, drugs' traffic, etc. are only few of the threats against human security. For example, organized crime has trans-nationalized, structured in networks and groups and got uncontrollable.

The scientific goal of our paper is to present recent human security aspects in Latin America states and national, regional and international efforts shaped in actions and measures taken for the diminution and elimination of threats against human security.

Keywords: *Latin America, human security, conflicts, crises, threats, security environment.*

"America, widely, and Latin America, particularly, if it were not to be revealed, it would have to be invented because Latin America entered the consciousness and everyday life of Europe long before its becoming, more than the vast territories ruled by the Spanish and Portuguese".

Constantin Bușe

1. Latin America – some aspects

Geographically, Latin America occupies large surface between Rio Grande and Land of Fire also including areas from Caribbean Sea. It is the territory *"wherein each country has its own specificity, special attraction and even certain mystery which together create this American "continent" or "subcontinent" with its peculiar, diverse and the same "unitary" and identity problems and great likelihood to freedom"*¹.

The first Latin America inhabitants were the Amerindians as Maya, Inca and Aztec who lived in extremely remarkable civilizations with recorded progresses in Mathematics and Astronomy. The first Europeans arrived in XV century started a 300 years of colonialism and brought the first African black peoples as slaves in the region particularly in Caribbean Islands. As a result, most contemporaries Latin American inherited a mixture of European,

¹ Gheorghe Lencan Stoica, *Dezvoltare și tranziție democratică în America Latină de astăzi*, publicat în *Tendențe actuale în politica latino-americană*, coordonatori Răzvan Victor Pantelimon și Gheoghe Stoica, Institutul de Științe Politice și Relații Internaționale, Academia Română, București, 2008, p. 74.

Indian and African residents. The most Latin Americans speak Spanish, Portuguese and French and share the same traditions and values being part of the common colonial heritage.

The differences between the Latin America states are many and grounded on their regional identity, geographical aspects and economic development.

Many of the Latin America countries gain their independence at the middle of 1800s (for example, Mexico, the most northern country in Latin America and also the most popular speaking Spanish country in the world got its independence in 1810). The gained political independence did not lead to economic progress but "*a change of masters ... economic development of Latin American countries based on the interest manifested from abroad for its products, following the trend towards monoculture phenomenon and leaving old forms of agriculture used for local consumption*"². An essential reason of underdevelopment of Latin America in the XIX century was the policy of foreign investors interested only to rob the richness, Latin Americans work and to keep the population in poverty, ignorance and inferiority.³

By Latin Americans and their historical roles, Simon Bolivar (1783-1830) understood the following issues: "*we are not Indians neither Europeans but an intermediary specie among legitimate owners of this country and Spanish usurpers ... we are Americans by birth and our rights from Europe we must impose also in our country and we must preserve here against the invaders' invasion*"⁴.

One of remarkable personalities of Latin America, José Martí (1853-1895) said the importance of Latin American culture and art in the politics and in finding indigenous solutions to solve different political problems. Martí sustained "*the need of transformation*" was felt more acutely and "*became a need because the Latin Americans could not continue to be a short-pants mask of England, wearing Parisian waist coat, North American jacket and Spanish beret*"⁵.

Latin America is wide territory comprising countries with specificities as regards the economic, social and political development and an increasing numerous populations as the World Bank forecasts.⁶

In the last century, Latin America had spectacular transformations. Peoples travelling around the Latin American states discover a ravishing region with contrasts and curiosities and pass through an unique itinerary of humankind history from the primitive tribes of Amazon jungle to the modern cities as Valparaiso, so-called "Pacific Jewel", declared monument of UNESCO patrimony owed to its architecture and urban aspect uniqueness.⁷

Other cities with quick development and in the "Top 10 of the cities in Latin America" are in descending order: Caracas, in Venezuela, 4.47 million inhabitants; Guadalajara, in Mexico, 4.8 million inhabitants; Belo Horizonte, in Brasilia, 5.8 million inhabitants; Santiago, in Chile, 6.1 million inhabitants; Bogota, in Columbia, 8.9 million inhabitants; Lima, in Peru, 9.35 million inhabitants; Rio de Janeiro, in Brasilia, 12.7 million inhabitants; Buenos Aires, in

² Constantin Bușe, *Între Panama și San Francisco. America Latină în lume*, Editura Științifică, București, 1991, p.45 and p.47.

³ *Ibidem*, p.377.

⁴ Simon Bolivar, *Ideas Fundamentales*, Academia Nacional de la Historia, Caracas, 1980, p.53, apud. Constantin Bușe, *op.cit.*, p.374.

⁵ Constantin Bușe, *op.cit.*, p.378.

⁶ În anul 2011, populația Americii Latine și Caraibe a fost de 574.751.070, iar în anul 2013 de 588.000.000 - *Population - total in Latin America and Caribbean*, available online at: <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/latin-america-and-caribbean/population-total-wb-data.html>, accessed on August 23, 2014 and <http://data.worldbank.org/region/LAC>.

⁷ *Prin America Latină*, article available online at: <http://www.mixdecultura.ro/2013/04/prin-america-latina/>, accessed on August 23, 2014.

Argentina, 14.2 million inhabitants; Sao Paulo, in Brasilia, 21 million inhabitants; Mexico City, in Mexico, 23.1 million inhabitants.⁸

The agenda of Economic Forum in Latin America organized in Panama in-between April 1-3, 2014, Latin America became important player in this globalized world and its potential is unlimited. The focus on education, innovation and productivity will contribute to the economic growth and to future achievements in this region.⁹

By economic perspective, Latin America was in August 2014 in a time of slowdown because of two factors: the decrease of world request with impact on sectors dependent of export of goods and the increase of soft investments in other countries.¹⁰

2. Latin America perspective on human security

To present this subject we considered useful to bring to reader's attention how human security concept is understood by Latin American specialist, Professor Bernardo Sorj¹¹.

Professor Sorj considers in Latin America the most of the NGOs and academic communities focused on human rights tended to be critic as regards human security concept.¹²

In order to understand this critic professor Sorj says it is important to think to the continent's history when the military dictatorship used "all-inclusive" doctrine of national security in the fight against communism. The doctrine states the public security forces including police were under the control of armed forces. The armed forces governing were the major goal aimed by democratization. The new constitutions limited the armed forces attributions tasked to defend the national territory against the external enemies by eliminating the attributes on internal security.

In this context, Professor Bernardo Sorj says human security perspective was seen as a trial to "re-secure" the social life by placing social problems in the security field of application. When the human security concept was introduced, the intention was exactly opposite: to extend the considerations related to security issues in order to bring to the attention the inter-relation between wider spectrum social problems. Moreover, human security concept generated certain anxieties in the intellectual circles and in the armed forces when the concept developed opposite to the International Relations specialists visions based upon national sovereignty. Foreign policies of Latin America states in XX century focused on the national sovereignty value and this was understandable given the latent fear of an United States invasion.

Bernardo Sorj thinks despite the critics it is possible and recommendable to keep working on human security concept in the region as the single conceptual framework wherein to develop a multilateral vision and respect for human rights and social development in the International Relations. Also it is necessary to be defined more precise focus in the human security analysis.

⁸ *Top 10 – Cele mai mari orașe din America Latină*, available online at: <http://media.imopedia.ro/stiri-imobiliare/top-10-cele-mai-mari-orase-din-america-latina-22127.html>, accessed on August 22, 2014.

⁹ *World Economic Forum on Latin America Meeting Overview, Regional Agenda*, Panama City, Panama 1-3 April, available online at: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/LA14/WEF_LA14_MeetingOverview.pdf, accessed on August 23, 2014.

¹⁰ *Economic Snapshot for Latin America*, available online at: <http://www.focus-economics.com/regions/latin-america>, accessed on August 23, 2014.

¹¹ Born on September 1949; Sociology Professor, Rio de Janeiro University and director of Edelstein Centre for Social Researches.

¹² Presenting the perspective on human security in Latin America is grounded on the article of Professor Bernardo Sorj j, *Security, human security and Latin America*, article available online at: http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S1806-64452005000200004&script=sci_arttext&tlng=en#nt, accessed on August 23, 2014 and August 24, 2014.

Human security concept can be seen in different ways even it is not in contradictory senses. Professor Sorj opinion is the different social actors can define and put this concept into practise by three means.

The first mean is basically normative and helps to define a moral horizon for international relations and societies wherein human rights are fully guaranteed.

The second mean is to see human security by semantic perspective rather than a set of normative principles or conceptual instrument; in this vision, human security is understood as wide conceptual framework creating a common base for the dialogue among different actors looking for an international security agenda prioritizing development and human rights application problems.

The third mean refers to the transformation of human security concept into a relevant and useful operational concept by analytical perspective for researchers in the social sciences field. As relevant analytical and operational concept, human security should:

- Produce a narrower focus on insecurity. In this situation, the difficulty presented by the human security concept is represented by the protection against organized or uncontrolled armed violence able to endanger stability of local democratic institutions, physical security of population or international community reaction (for example, for genocides or terrorists formation). Therefore, humanitarian crises as the ones related to famish, epidemics damaging health of populations, natural disasters are not included in a more human security focused concept. By moral and political perspectives, it is important to argument the difference between these two types of humanitarian crisis and intended humanitarian violence crisis;

- Involves an analysis of the institutional and social framework wherein it is or it is not provided human security. The institutional framework is in the focus of political differences oriented toward the human security analysis. In the great majority of international interventions or humanitarian cases the analysis refers to failed states or states passing through humanitarian crises. In the both situations, the main problem is constituted by the institutions in bankruptcy. Unjustified accent on NGOs and civil society capacity to solve security issues is unrealistic, ineffective and escapist because there is no individual security outside a state with political and administrative structure able to provide it;

- Correlates security and development agendas with subordinate one to the other. A security agenda without sensitiveness to problems related to global and national inequity - as epidemics, surrounding environment decay, etc. will be condemned to permanently fight against symptoms.

By Latin America perspective, Professor Bernardo Sorj agrees human security should:

- Not combine diverse social problems. The argument is the following: social problems are inter-related and each presents specific dynamics and needs specific policies and institutions. By recognizing the inter-relationship between social problems as violence and poverty this does not necessary lead to a reductionist vision over them. Sociological researches shown it is not compulsory needed the involvement of sectors of poor urban population in crimes and armed conflict and once those ideas are consolidated they became automatic until certain point. Nevertheless many of the problems found on the multidimensional agenda refer to basic problems associated with internal policies. For example, poverty in Latin America is the most supported by the social inequity, corruption and ineffective social policies;

- Aim the development of an operational vision focused on state institutions construction and involves the participation of civil society but with ultimate goal to provide the functioning of state of law. Research and actions oriented to human security should focus on insecurity resulted from armed violence in the framework of a perspective taking into consideration the respect for human rights and understands the social context generating violence. In this way, the prevention and repression of violence should act over immediate

causes and over the social context - particularly over the social groups most probable to become victims of armed violence and murder or to be involved in those;

- Provide the development of a multilateral international approach and a national approach of security issues when different parties involved (public institutions, NGOs, entrepreneurship and community associations) to discuss and promote new approaches and policies;

- Recognize in concrete situations there can be tensions between the universal vision of human rights or ecological defence and to recognize the sovereignty as one of the pillars of the international system. While the extreme cases can be managed by international courts, many situations have ambiguity that needs openness and dialogue. On local level it is important to grow the interaction between the institutions responsible for national defence and NGOs with goal to defend and promote human rights. Nevertheless, mistrust and mutual accusations will generate obstacles in the development of a more democratic agenda;

- Provide the connection with global debates referring to security in the framework of variable geometry perspective. By this, the global agendas and concepts are significant only they recognize the specificity of local conditions and are relevant only when they are useful for comparative analyses. Moreover, the global agendas and concepts should include different variations and typologies and should not promote comprehensive simplifications of the style promoted by the international agencies and the American government. More precisely, in the Latin America wherein the states are not major actors in terms of military and humanitarian aid but are neither failed states - focus of human security should be oriented on the internal problems of public order able to have international consequences. The same approach of variable geometry should be applied on the internal and regional level of Latin America where looking for a common agreement tends to generate very general and non-operational proposals. By the sub-regional and bilateral agreements are created more realistic bases to develop an agenda of common security. Human security agenda should be built from local to global replacing the actual trend to produce global concepts and to apply to the national situations.

3. Recent aspects of human security in Latin America

Challenges against human security vary from region to region, from individual to individual and manifests in different manners related to culture, sex, generations, etc. This is also available for the Latin American countries.

Threats against human security in this region's states are different. Famish, violence, corruption, smuggling, and organized crime, etc. are just some of those.

In the late two decades, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela, Cuba, Dominica, Barbados and Mexico succeeded to eradicate famish. Situation is more serious in Haiti (where half of the population is affected by famish), Guatemala and other countries from Central America. Another problem of the region is obesity and overweight that affects nowadays 23% of the adults and 3.8 million children aging less than five years. Anaemia and malnutrition also create problems; in regard to specialists in nutrition, a poor fed and anaemic child loses 15% of his/her intellectual coefficient, cannot learn and gets sick and furthermore becomes worker without possibilities of development and low productivity.

In order to solve these problems, the Initiative for Latin America and Caribbean Area without Famish is a pattern for other regions as Africa and intends the famish obliteration in the following eleven years. Simultaneously, at the VIII Reunion of Workgroup 2025 of Initiative for Latin America and Caribbean Area in July 2014 it was stated the Latin America has the necessary food, financial resources and technical knowledge to contribute to famish

obliteration and was proceeded to the revision of Plan for food security, nutrition and famish eradication of Community of Latin America and Caribbean Area States.¹³

Violence is the threat against human security occupying special place because of its diversified causes, produced human casualties, material or other damages. The report achieved by the Mexican research team, Seguridad, Justicia y Paz (Security, Justice and Peace) in 2011, underlines 40 of the most dangerous 50 cities in the world are in Latin America, San Pedro Sula in Honduras, New York City, Ciudad Juarez or Acapulco, Turreon, Chihuahua and Durango are cities wherein violence materializes particularly in murders and gets top positions.¹⁴

Studies of World Bank show Latin America although has only 8% of world's population is the most dangerous region in the world with 40% of the homicides recorded in the world and 60% of the kidnappings.¹⁵ Generally, violence is considered in these studies to have a series of causes as: drugs trafficking, availability for fire weapons, violence around teenagers etc.

Violence against women generates a series of negative consequences over their health including unwanted pregnancy, abortions, sexual transmitted infections, physical prejudices, depressions, suicides, etc. The traumatizing experience of women subjected to violence effects also over children who can develop in time a high risk to become aggressors or victims in their adult age. There are also negative economic and social consequences for the civil society.

The Corruption Perceptions Index for 2013 achieved by Transparency International shows in Latin America the overall trend to transparency is low; among Latin American countries, just Uruguay recorded the best score occupying the 19th place and being the leader of the region in transparency matters; it is followed by Chile on 22 place, while Venezuela takes the lowest place of the region.¹⁶ In order to combat this threat, anticorruption summits are taking place where reunite experts and lawyers from the region's states and look for solutions to combat and diminish this scourge.

UNICEF appreciates Latin America and Caribbean Islands to be the most inequitable region in the world. Although all Latin American and Caribbean countries ratified the Convention on children rights (adopted by the UN General Assembly on November 20, 1989), there are still many things to do in order to apply the activities for achieving the eighth core objectives of Millennium Development Goals. In September 2008, it was created the Regional Network of Adolescent Communicators – LACVOX, used to identify the opportunities for adolescents to exchange ideas. The support granted by the Telefónica and Sony Inter-America Foundations, in 2009 and 2010, contributed to the organizations of some contests on different themes in order to encourage the participation and promotion in the network.¹⁷

WE cannot skip in presenting actual aspects of threats against human security the fact that Latin America is crucial geographical area for drugs traffic and production. Columbia,

¹³ *FAO: America Latină poate eradica foametea până în 2025*, available online at: http://www.economica.net/fao-america-latina-poate-eradica-foametea-pana-in-2025_85081.html, accessed on August 23, 2014.

¹⁴ *În America Latină se află 40 din cele mai violente 50 de orașe, potrivit unui raport*, available online at: <http://epochtimes-romania.com/news/in-america-latina-se-afla-40-din-cele-mai-violente-50-de-oras-potrivit-unui-raport---138072>, accessed on August 24, 2014.

¹⁵ *Violence in Mexico and Latin America*, available online at: <http://www.coha.org/violence-in-mexico-and-latin-america/>, accessed on August 23, 2014.

¹⁶ *Transparency International: Corruption Remains Prevalent in Latin America*, available online at: <http://panampost.com/ana-lia-turi/2013/12/04/transparency-international-corruption-remains-prevalent-in-latin-america/>, accessed on August 23, 2014.

¹⁷ *LACVOX, Latin America and the Caribbean Voice of Children – UNICEF*, available online at: http://www.unicef.org/lac/english_19843.htm, accessed on August 24, 2014.

Peru and Bolivia are main producers of cocaine in the world while Central America, Mexico and Caribbean are core corridors for drugs' transportation to the United States and Europe. Therefore, many persons' security suffered and the efforts to eradicate and interdict are far from the total victory. Uruguay became the first country legalizing marijuana in 2013 and the Uruguayans are allowed to cultivate, buy and smoke marijuana (the intended goal was of this normative act was for the drugs' traffickers to remain without an important source of profit). The war to dismantle the Columbian cartels lead from USA destroyed many lives, many innocent and for this reason, in-between 2000-2010, USA spent 7.3 billion dollars for military and economic aid, the so-called Columbia Plan.¹⁸

The human security problems existence was underlined also by the Human Development Report in Latin America for 2013-2014 emphasizing the following issues: the region records more than 100,000 homicides per year; five of ten Latin Americans perceive the security in their country decayed; in all the analyzed countries, more than 80% of the detainees have not ended 12 years of school; in 2012, one of three Latin Americans reported they were victims of violent acts.¹⁹

In order to diminish the threats and to solve different negative aspects related to human security, UNTFHS (United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security) increasingly involves in Latin American states. For example, in Nicaragua, UNTFHS applies multi-sector approach of human security in order to satisfy human security needs; in Brasilia it financed a project to improve human security of neglected communities in Sao Paolo; in Bolivia financed two projects to strengthen human security against indigenous communities' vulnerabilities and to approach health needs of adolescents, in Ecuador it supported the approach integrated system on vulnerable population affected by the conflict undergoing to the Northern border, etc.²⁰

Conclusions

Human security means protection because the concept is derived from the recognition of the fact that humans and communities can be threatened by events out of their control. The Human security subject gained more importance in the regional, sub-regional and national agendas of Latin America states.

By presenting the approach of Professor Bernardo Sorj on human security and some actual aspects regarding the threats against human security in the region, we wanted to underline that this trend became priority. Regional initiatives as "Promoting and Developing the Concept of Human Security in Latin America" have as main goal to promote a common approach on human security in the region in order to understand the development challenges in Latin America or "*Extreme Occident*", as calls it the political scientist Alain Rouquié.

The common regional and international effort, mutual cooperation and trust are some of means which applied permanently can contribute to the diminution and limitation of threats against human security in Latin America and promotion of multiple opportunities offered by this region for personal development of communities.

¹⁸ *The US war on drugs and its legacy in Latin America*, available online at: <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2014/feb/03/us-war-on-drugs-impact-in-latin-american>, accessed on August 24, 2014.

¹⁹ *Human Development Report for Latin America 2013-2014*, available online at: <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/hdr/human-development-report-for-latin-america-2013-2014/>, accessed on August 24, 2014.

²⁰ *UNTFHS around the world*, available online at: <http://www.unocha.org/humansecurity/trust-fund/un-trust-fund-human-security>, accessed on August 24, 2014.

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GEOPOLITICAL AND SECURITY ASPECTS OF IMMIGRATION. A DEMOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE. STUDY CASE ROMANIA.

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Abstract: *The migration dynamics are an important component in the geopolitical equation of power. They were present in the classical period of geopolitics and are nowadays even more relevant and important due to the current worldwide intense migration flows. The major European demographic transformation will most likely generate geopolitical and security repercussions. Migration along with declining and aging population are the most important European demographic challenges. Romania's case subsumes to the regional realities, and is now dealing with declining population and which is expected also to age. Therefore, this paper aims to analyze whether we can find similarities in immigration trends to the actual situation of Europe. Most of the Western states are countries of destination for immigrants and Romania is currently not among the favourite destination countries. Some argue that it can become one in the long term future; therefore, it is essential to study how migration evolution can pose geopolitical and security challenges. This study aims to emphasize the main demographic coordinates and tendencies of immigration and to structure some possible security and geopolitical consequences of these evolutions.*

Keywords: *geopolitics, security, national security, immigration, diaspora.*

1. Geopolitics, security and immigration. A theoretical perspective.

1.1 Migration and geopolitics

The migration dynamics of population have always been relevant from geopolitical perspective, even since the first conceptualization efforts on geopolitics appeared. This assertion is supported by using the presence of migration as a power factor as an argument, starting with the classic geopolitics and continuing with the current geopolitical approaches.

In the classical period, examples of migration dynamics presence in geopolitical analyses are revealed by the works of F. Ratzel, A. Demangeon, H. Mackinder, etc. In F. Ratzel's work, the precursor of geopolitics, known for being the first to use the term "living space", the migration dynamics involving the inflow of Chinese into California¹ are of interest. Albert Demangeon, the initiator of regional geography, even though opposed to the geopolitics "term", did formulate specific to geopolitics trends, including the possible decline of Europe. From the perspective of migration, the case of European emigrants is especially relevant – the strong colonies which they formed and the possible important cultural contribution they could have upon their return to Europe.² Mackinder, best known for his theory of the Heartland, takes also interest in migration dynamics, such as the Eurasian ones

¹ <http://biography.yourdictionary.com/friedrich-ratzel>, accessed at 8th of August 2014.

² Albert DEMANGEON, *America and the race for world domination*, Former published in France under the title "Le declin de l'Europe" Translated by Arthur Bartlett Maurice, Doubleday, Page & Company, Garden City, N.Y and Toronto, 1921, p. 20.

and their effect on power over Eurasia, mostly from a historical perspective.³ These are just a few examples which argue the presence of migration dynamics in classic geopolitical approaches.

Currently, taking into account the major demographic transformations worldwide, which include migration, both the theoretical perspective and the case study based geopolitical approaches, tend to comprise more and more the migration dynamics into the geopolitical equation. In this respect, we can refer to two very actual and relevant geopolitical approaches: the one of Gyula Csurgay – 2013 (who has one of the few works dedicated particularly to the nexus between geopolitics and demography) and Nayef Al-Rodhan's one-2009 (who introduced a new geopolitical concept: “meta-geopolitics”).

Gyula Csurgay considers geopolitics to be “*the analysis of the interaction between socio-political situations and their territorial dimensions, taking into consideration their historic, geographic, strategic, political identity, demographic and economic factors, both the internal and external levels of states*”.⁴ He identifies eleven most important demographical factors relevant in geopolitics: death and birth rates, age and generational factor, gender ratio, population density, geographic distribution of population, migration dynamics (internal and external ones), colonization of a given territory, population movements influenced by state policy to alter the ethno-demographic structure of a given territory, population changes caused by armed conflicts (eg.: ethnic cleansing, civil war, genocide), diaspora population (these groups can exercise influence on a given geopolitical configuration).⁵ It can be clearly observed that migration dynamics are identified as an important geopolitical factor by Gyula Csurgay. These can also affect the ethno-demographical structure of a territory and can increase the role of diaspora over the geopolitical configurations.⁶

Nayef al-Rodhan develops the concept of “meta-geopolitics” which refers to a multidimensional vision over the concept of state power, taking into account seven state capacities: 1. social and health issues, 2. domestic politics, 3. economics, 4. environment, 5. science and human potential, 6. military and security issues and 7. international diplomacy.⁷ Migration can have repercussions on the first capacity of a state, which “assesses the state of society in each country, including demographic factors, ethnic make-up, the degree of social peace and cohesion and health issues affecting the population.”⁸ Regarding security, al-Rodhan asserts that “threats to international peace and security can emanate from seven different areas of state power and are often interrelated and mutually reinforced.”⁹ In this context of security and migration dynamics, he draws the attention to the fact that “Population pressure can also lead to large migratory movements. The influx of large numbers of migrants can put pressure on the resources and the economy of destination countries, which can have political implications. Migrants can also change the ethnic balance of a state Europe, for instance, will have to deal with an increasing number of migrants in search of employment. This will have security implications when it comes to illegal migration, and it will have social implications in those European states which have so far had difficulties integrating people of different faiths and ethnicities into the mainstream society.”¹⁰ We can assert that the most

³ Susan YOSHIKARA et al, *Population Decline and the Remaking of Great Power Politics*, Potomac Books, Washington D.C, 2012 p. 62. and Paul Dobrescu, Alina Bârgăoanu, 2001, *Geopolitica*, Ed. Comunicare, Bucharest, 2001, p. 49.

⁴ ***, *Geopolitics and Demography*, International Centre for Geopolitical Studies, Geneva, 2013, p. 11.

⁵ *Idem*, p. 12.

⁶ *Idem* p. 13.

⁷ Nayef AL-RODHAN , *Neo-statecraft and Meta-Geopolitics: Reconciliation of Power, Interests and Justice in the 21st Century* , LIT Verlag, Berlin, 2009, p. 51.

⁸ *Idem*, p. 56.

⁹ *Idem*, p. 51.

¹⁰ *Idem*, p. 87.

important European migration trends generated the need of research on specific topics, as one can observe also in al-Rodhan's work.

1.2 The migration-security nexus

Regarding the security-migration nexus, there are at least three major approaches: the state-centred ones, globalist ones and the “conjoined” ones –which take into account the complexity of system integrating both specific and global perspectives–. In this respect, Elspeth Guild makes a very complex literature review, which analyzes the approach of migration in each international relations paradigm as follows: the realistic tradition, in which “the state's duty to control both security and migration” prevails¹¹ –Weiner: “the capacity of individuals to move without state authorization represents a fundamental challenge and threat”¹²–, the liberalism: “Approaches migration regimes in liberal democracies through the contradictions - On one hand they acknowledge the public speech of some actors which is virulently anti-migrant, on the other they examine the generally liberal outcomes in democratic states' migration regimes (Cornellius, Martin & Hollifield, 1994)”¹³, the Marxist tradition: “the way in which states treat migration as part of their economic strategies and the struggles around the exploitation of migrant workers”¹⁴, the era of migration approaches: Stephen Castles and Miller: “the relationship of migration with capitalism and the organization of labour”: “the consequential decline of working class parties and trade unions and the erosion of local communicative networks” resulting from migration create conditions for virulent racism (Castles & Millers 2003), and Robin Choen: “ how the preferences, interests and actions of global capital intersect with global migration (R. Cohen 2006)”¹⁵; the Communitarian approach: “migration as a threat to social cohesion and the right of communities to determine their membership ... –the sub-state level of the community and the relationship of the community with the state – how do a state's activities in allowing migration flows affect community coherence (Kymlicka 1995; Etzioni 2004)”¹⁶; the constructivist theorist: “the identities and interests of international actors become central in international relations. They examine the ways in which social construction of interests transforms individuals into foreigners who are perceived as threat, as opposed to citizens (Waever, Buzan, Kelstrup & Lemaitre 1993).”¹⁷ Also she brings an innovative approach over the security- migration nexus, which includes both state-centred and global positions, but also the individual level. This comprise four dimensions: 1. Sovereign, state or national security – the state's right to determine its borders, who crosses them and what the consequences of crossing a border are; 2. Security, policing and crime – what a crime is and how it relates to the foreigner; 3. Security categorization and identity – the state's power to define the identity of its citizens and thereby exclude others who are not accepted as such; Welfare and social security – the allocation of resources to protect the individual.¹⁸

The national approaches see this nexus in its complexity and in its ambivalent direction nature. For example Ina Raluca Tomescu asserts: “The relationship between security and migration is indisputable. On one hand, migration may be the result of the manifestation of certain threats on human individuals' security, such as human rights violations, ethnic conflicts, civil wars, etc. On the other hand, migration itself can be a source of risks, dangers and threats, when not controlled, causing emphasizing of the organized crime, xenophobia and racial violence, etc.

¹¹ Elspeth Guild, *Security and Migration in the 21st Century*, Ed. Policy Press, Cambridge, UK, 2013, p. 6.

¹² *Ibidem.* apud (Weiner 1997).

¹³ *Ibidem.*

¹⁴ *Idem*, p. 7.

¹⁵ *Ibidem.*

¹⁶ *Ibidem.*

¹⁷ *Ibidem.*

¹⁸ *Idem*, pp. 10-11.

The complexity of these relationships is extremely high, as they are correlated with almost all security dimensions.”¹⁹ In the same direction go the approaches of Alexandra Sarcinschi, Corneliu Preja and Vasile Cerbu. Alexandra Sarcinschi argues: “The traditional approach of the relation between migration and security emphasizes the economical and social dimension of the last one. But a deeper field analysis reveals its connection with the other. Therefore, we consider the following dimensions as important for the analysis: the political, economical, social, military, environmental and psychosocial ones.”²⁰ Corneliu Preja and Vasile Cerbu emphasize the same main effect of migration on security as Irina Tomescu does, asserting that: “there are inter causal relationships between migration and security. Migration can be seen both as a cause and a consequence of security problems. Migration can appear as the result of different threats to the security of the human race, such as human rights’ violations, interethnic conflicts, civil wars, etc. When it’s uncontrolled, migration itself can represent a source of risks, dangers and threats, having as a result the increase of organized crime, xenophobia and racial violence, etc. At the same time, migration has an impact over all the state’s dimensions; security: politics, economics, social, military, and environmental issues.”²¹

Hence, this work will approach the relation between geopolitics, security and immigration in the following directions: regarding the host state – to what extent migration can destabilise the host country (terrorism, relevant changes in the ethnic and religious structure) – regarding the state of origin and the relation with the host one – to what extent can diaspora contribute achieving of the geopolitical objectives of the origin state, objectives that can be in contradiction with the ones of the host state. Therefore, from the demographical perspective, the most relevant aspect for the analysis are: the size and structural aspects of immigration (mostly the ethnical and religious structure and the age one), but also aspects related to its legal and illegal characteristics (illegal migration dimension).

2. The demographical aspects of the Romanian immigration

Firstly, it is important to emphasize the fact that demographic data has its limitations, most of all when we are discussing about migration statistics. In this respect we must mention both the lack of data and the difference that might occur between official data and the real situation. Comparing emigration to the object of this study, respectively the immigration, we can certainly assert that the data are much less for immigration than for emigration. In the case of emigration, substantial differences between official data and the real situation may exist, but both among sources. This fact can be extrapolated also to immigration.

2.1 The numerical dimension

The Romanian immigration does not subscribe, yet, to the Western trend, where countries are mostly of destination for migrants than origin or transit ones. Our country is a country of origin (a source country²²) as also reported by IOM²³, due to its massive

¹⁹ Ina Raluca TOMESCU, 2013, *op.cit.*, p. 65.

²⁰ Alexandra SARCINSCHI, *Migrație și securitate*, “Carol I” National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2008, p. 11.

²¹ Corneliu PREJA, Vasile CERBU, “Aspects of the migration impact on security dimensions”, *Research and Science Today Supplement 2/2014*, The Conference “Migration Dynamics And New Trends In European (In)Security”, pp 73-80, p.73.

²² Alin CHINDEA et al, *Migration in Romania: A Country Profile 2008*, International Organisation for Migration, Geneva, 2008, p. 12.

²³ International Organisation for Migration.

emigration rate (as we argued in a previous study²⁴), but in terms of vulnerabilities, one must not ignore the possible concerns regarding immigration. The most recent Eurostat data shows that foreign-born residents as share of population in Romania, in 2011, are at the level of 0.75%, whereas the EU average is 10%.²⁵ We can observe that, from this point of view, Romania is not dealing yet with the same degree of immigration challenges as other EU countries do.



Figure no. 1. International migrant stock (% of population), Source United Nations Population Division²⁶

In an IOM official report, *Migration in Romania: A Country Profile 2008*, it is asserted that “Romania is to a lesser extent a destination country. Immigration was modest before 2000 and only the prospects of European Union (EU) accession and an economic revival, accompanied by labour shortages, have led to the entrepreneurs considering employing more foreign workers.”²⁷

From the perspective of immigration, Romania is more of a transit country than a destination one. Yet, academics do consider in the future a possible shift of situation, in which Romania could become from a country of transit a country of destination. In this respect, we can use the assertions of Silviu Neaguț and Marius Cristian Neacșu as arguments: “Tendencies are obvious, even in Romania, which has known a considerable decrease of migration rate’s value, from strongly negative values in 1990 (- 4,04 %) ²⁸ to balanced values nowadays, with small oscillations around the 0 value, both in the negative and positive spectrum, in 2008 the net migration rate reaching the value of - 0,13 %.”²⁹ We can update the analysis of S. Neaguț, L. Comite, M.C. Neacșu with the most recent data (2014 est.) provided by CIA – The World

²⁴ Cătălina TODOR, “The post-communism Romanian emigration. An analysis of its characteristics and its effects on security”, in the 10th International Conference Strategies XXI - Strategic Challenges in Security and International Relations- volume, 10th –11th April 2014.

²⁵ The Migration Observatory – Oxford University available at <http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/data-and-resources/maps/census-map-migrant-population-eu-countries-2011>, accessed at 1st September 2014.

²⁶ Index Mundi Official Site <http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/SM.POP.TOTL.ZS>, accessed at 2nd August 2014. The source Index Mundi shows a value of 0.62% /2010 for Romania, which places her on the 166 out of 194 position at global level.

²⁷ Alin CHINDEA et all, *Migration in Romania: A Country Profile 2008*, International Organisation for Migration, Geneva, 2008, p. 12.

²⁸ Silviu NEGUȚ, Luigi di COMITE, Marius-Cristian NEACȘU, “Immigration – socio-economical implications. the case of Romania”, *Amfiteatru Economic Journal*, Vol XII, No. 28, June 2010, p. 577, apud *The Statistical Yearbook of Romania*, 2008.

²⁹ Silviu NEGUȚ, Luigi di COMITE, Marius-Cristian NEACȘU, 2010, *op. cit.*, p. 577.

FactBook: net migration rate: -0.24 migrant(s)/1,000 population.³⁰ Three main causes are to be seen by the authors to support this trend: "...immigration started to become a reality shown in full, reflecting a demographic phenomenon which is deployed in view of at least three realities: the obvious tendencies towards a demographic crisis; the unbalance of the labour market; the quality of member of the European Union and the tendencies of economic growth."³¹ The precedents are also used as arguments, in order to enforce the logic behind the asserted trends: "All this are reinforced by the experience of ex-communist countries as well, countries from the East of Central Europe that have composed the first "wave" of adhesion (May 2004), among which some countries have already known the change of the migration sense, from source countries to destination countries, the examples of Czech Republic (0,97 ‰), Hungary (0,87 ‰), Slovenia (0,52 ‰), Slovakia (0,30 ‰), and Poland already signing, in 2007, a bilateral agreement with India in order to bring in foreign workers (Voicu & all, 2008. p. 9). Examples of older members of the European Union are also known, such as Spain and Italy, which have passed from negative values of the migration rate to positive ones, thus currently forming receiving labour pools."³² The argument of Maria Stoicovici and Daniela Cervinschi goes in the same direction. Maria Stoicovici asserts: "Once the EU accession, Romania has become from a transit country, a more attractive country of destination for the Eastern European and the South Asia economic migrants."³³ "The last hypostasis of Romania, the one of destination country for migrants, is a new one, if we relate it to the current situation. With a growing number of immigrants, Romania is seen as a country which, in a near future, will have to accept them in order to fill its labour market vacancies, with the condition to decide, according to its interests, what category of migrants are needed, in full agreement with EU policies and rules."³⁴ Daniela Cerveschi remarks the following: "before Romania`s accession to the European Union, a small number of immigrants from third world countries were applying for visa or residence, but over the last years, mostly after Romania`s entrance in the EU, the number of applicants and the number of those who are given residence permit increased constantly every year."³⁵ These statements seem to be confirmed by the recent data (the evolution of immigrants number after 1990 – Fig. no. 2) and estimates: an IOM report states: "assuming a sustained trend of economic growth, a deepening of labour shortages, and an expanding aging population, the National Commission of Forecast estimates that by 2013-2015, approximately 200,000–300,000 foreign workers will enter the Romanian labour market. ...with the country`s EU accession and its position at the crossroads of East and West Europe and linking South Asia with North and West Europe (Romania is thus included on the Balkan route of irregular migration), it is expected that the flows of irregular migrants transiting and settling in the country will intensify."³⁶

³⁰ The Official Site of Central Intelligence Agency – The World FactBook- People and Society –Net migration rate available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ro.html>, accessed at 2nd September 2014.

³¹ Silviu NEGUȚ, Luigi di COMITE, Marius-Cristian NEACȘU, 2010, *op. cit.*, p. 577.

³² *Ibidem*.

³³ Maria STOICOVICI, "România ca țară de origine, de tranzit și de destinație a migranților", *The Romanian Journal of Sociology*, new series, anul XXIII, nr. 5–6, p. 429–443, Bucharest, 2012, p. 439/ p. 11 din 15.

³⁴ Idem, pp. 441-442/ pp. 13 - 14 din 15.

³⁵ Daniela CERVINSCHI, "Migrație și Integrare. Fenomenul imigraționist și impactul programelor de integrare asupra resortisanților țărilor terțe în România", *The Sphere of Politics*, issue: 166 / 2011, pp.: 45-55, on www.cceol.com, p.45.

³⁶ Alin CHINDEA et all, IOM, *op. cit.*, p. 12.




Figure no. 2. The evolution of immigrants number in Romania: 1991-2011.
Source: The author using INSSE Tempo- Onine 2014 data.³⁷

On the other hand, the Pardee Centre forecast does not indicate such long-term tendencies. This can be seen in Fig. no. 3.




Figure no. 3. Migration rate (Percent) in Romania. History plus Forecast.
Source: Pardee Centre, IFS³⁸

Maria Stoicovici estimated in 2012, that Romania has over 65 000. The author appeals also to a study of Iris Alexe and Bogdan Pădureanu which asserts in 2010, in Romania were 59 358 foreigners residing legally out of which 10 076 had permanent residence.³⁹

The statistic data can be completed with the assertion of Daniela Cervinschi, which draws the attention to the fact that, after Romania's EU entry, the number of applicants and of those who receive the right to reside increased constantly every year.⁴⁰

Therefore, it is difficult to predict with accuracy demographic matters such as migration ones, because they depend on complex social and societal evolutions both in the countries of origin and destination, but also on mentality changes which can occur within immigrants - which in turn are difficult to predict accurately. But in major lines, regarding the

³⁷ The Romanian National Institute of Statistics, Tempo-Online data base <https://statistici.insse.ro/shop/index.jsp?page=tempo3&lang=en&ind=POP310D>, accessed at 15th August 2014.

³⁸ Pardee Centre Official Site, IFS application , [http://www.ifs.du.edu/ifs/frm_GraphicalDisplay.aspx?ListNames=%22Migrants,%20Net%20\(Million\)%22&HistFor=False&GrpOp=0&Dim1=135&File=0&DisplayLastYear=2050](http://www.ifs.du.edu/ifs/frm_GraphicalDisplay.aspx?ListNames=%22Migrants,%20Net%20(Million)%22&HistFor=False&GrpOp=0&Dim1=135&File=0&DisplayLastYear=2050), accessed at 15th August 2014.

³⁹ Maria STOICOVICI, 2010, *op. cit.*, p. 429–443, Buchares, 2012, P. 438/ pag 10 din 15.

⁴⁰ DANIELA CERVINSCHI, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

immigration issue in Romania, one must not ignore that such trends, anticipated by academics and confirmed by current data can become, on the middle and long term, a reality - case in which this kind of matters will be an extremely attractive research topic in geopolitical and security fields.

It is relevant to mention that, for Romania's case, one can find all forms of international migration. Corneliu Preja and Vasile Cerbu assert that currently these are: “minorities’ migration towards the host countries, labour force migration, family migration (previous workers migrant families’ migration), and migration forced by natural disasters, politic or religious persecutions, wars, etc”⁴¹ and according to IOM⁴², three types of immigration statuses can be seen: refugees, asylum seekers, labour migrants.⁴³

Therefore, along with the numerical perspective, one must analyze also the structural perspective regarding the type of migration, but also the ethical and age structure. Basically, we argue that in terms of immigration, the most important aspect to be pursued in observing the future dynamics which might have geopolitical and security repercussions are: the numerical evolution, the structure by ethnicity/country of origin, but also the age structure and its legal/illegal character.

2.2. The structural dimension. Immigrants by origin and age

From the perspective of the immigrants origin, one can observe the proportion of EU born residents out of the total population compared to the non –EU born ones: in Romania, it is lower, respectively 0.36% (the average position within the EU is of 4.2% residents born in other EU countries) compared to 0.39%. Basically, out of the total share of foreign born population in Romania, 45.92% are EU-members, hereby exceeding the European average. Therefore, according to official data, Romania, again, does not subscribe to the general EU trend, having most of the foreign born population belonging to EU countries, compared to the invert situation of the EU countries, where most of them are born outside its borders.⁴⁴ The numerical evolution of immigrants after their country of origin can be seen in Fig. no 4., Fig. no 5. and Fig. no. 6.




Figure no. 4. The numerical evolution of immigrants in Romania after their country of origin. (number of persons) Source: The author, after INSSE data, 2014⁴⁵

⁴¹ Alexandra SARCINSCHI, *Migration and security*, Bucharest, “Carol I” National Defence University, 2008, apud Corneliu PREJA, Vasile CERBU, 2014, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

⁴² International Organisation for Migration.

⁴³ Alin CHINDEA et al, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

⁴⁴ Alin CHINDEA et al, IOM, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

⁴⁵ National Institute of Statistics, TEMPO-Online, *Social Statistics– Immigrants by country of origin*, <https://statistici.insse.ro/shop/index.jsp?page=tempo3&lang=en&ind=POP310D>, accessed at 15th August 2014.




Figure. no. 5. Numerical evolution of Immigrants by country of origin in Romania: 1994-2011, Source: The author using INSSE Temo-Online 2014 data.⁴⁶




Figure no. 6. Comparative numerical evolution of immigrants in Romania after their country of origin (number of persons): 1994/2011 Source: The author, after INSSE data, 2014⁴⁷

From the INSSE data, one can very clearly observe that tendencies support a shift in immigration countries of origin; the only constant are the immigrants from Moldova Republic. Previous studies show, in detail, the main origin countries of immigrants as follows:

- The stock of foreign citizens with temporary residence permit out of the total of 48,177 in 2006 were from: Moldova (11,284 – 23.42%), Turkey (5,730 -11.89%), China (4,258 - 8.84%), Italy (3,526 - 7.32%), Germany (2,180 -4.52%), United States (1,925 -4.00%), Syria (1,201 -2.49%), France (1,571 -3.26%), Lebanon (921 -1.91%), Ukraine (1,139 -2.36%), Other countries (14,451 -30.00%)⁴⁸

- The stock of foreign citizens with permanent residence permit in 2006 were from: other countries (1,258), Turkey (607), stateless (264), Lebanon (409), Iraq (470), China (716).

- Top 10 countries of origin for the work permit issued in 2006: Turkey (2,147), Moldova (1,272), China (1,268), France (443), Germany (409), Italy (239), Greece (155), Austria (148), Lebanon (134), United Kingdom (112), with main sectors of activity as following: production (2,230), trade (2,192), service (1,606), banking (920), Construction (568), Gambling (180), culture/sport (176), transportation/telecommunications (120).

⁴⁶Ididem.

⁴⁷National Institute of Statistics, TEMPO-Online, *Social Statistics– Immigrants by country of origin*, <https://statistici.insse.ro/shop/index.jsp?page=tempo3&lang=en&ind=POP310D>, accessed at 15th August 2014.

⁴⁸The percentage value is calculated using IOM numerical data.

- Temporary foreign workers: top 10 sources countries of temporary foreign workers in Romania/2006: Turkey (1,721), China (1,129), France (310), Germany (200), Italy (126), Greece (121), Lebanon (111), Russian Federation (73), Serbia (63), India (60).

- The top five source countries of irregular aliens apprehended from 2004 through 2006 are Turkey (3,196), Moldova (2,886), China (799), Syria (419), and Ukraine (372).

- Removed persons by main countries of origin: Moldova (370 – 54,33%), Turkey (93 - 13.66%), China (58-8.52%), Pakistan (7 -1.03%), Ukraine (20-2.94%), Syria (15 - 2.20%), Serbia (12 -0.44%), Lebanon (3 -0.44%), Iran (3 -0.44%), India (4 -0.59%), Total (681).

- Number of illegal border crossing/attempts of foreign nationals by citizenship 2006: Moldova (1,008 -70.89%), Turkey (68 -4.78%), Russia (42 -2.95%), China (35 -2.46%), Somalia (33-2.32%), Georgia (28 -1.97%), Ukraine (25 -1.76%), Bangladesh (13 -0.91%), Nigeria (11 -0.77%), Liberia (11 -0.77%), Others (148 -10.41%), Total (1,422)⁴⁹

We can also add to these data the number of asylum applicants by their country of origin.

Therefore, we can observe that, apart from the Moldavian citizens, the immigrants in Romania have a very different identity background. Most immigrants with the right to residence in Romania are from: Moldova (28%), Turkey (17%), China (15%) and Syria (4%).⁵⁰ The "Asylum Trends 2013" report, mention also in the research of C. Preja and V. Cerbu, shows that the top -10 countries of origin of asylum applicants in Romania, in 2013, were: Syria (1,016), Iraq (45), Pakistan (40), Afghanistan (39), Egypt (29), Palestinian (28), Iran (26), Georgia (25), Turkey (25), China (18).⁵¹ C. Preja and V Cerbu assert that: “in Romania, the number of people who submitted asylum requests in 2013 was 1.499 (mostly from Syria) representing 60% of all applications registered in 2012 (2.511).”⁵²

From the perspective of the age structure, Fig. no. 7, using the most recent data provided by INSSE, shows most of the immigrants in Romania are from the working age segment.




Figure. no. 7. Numerical evolution of Immigrants by age group in Romania: 1991-2011, Source: The author using INSSE Tempo-Online 2014 data.⁵³

2.3 Illegal immigration

Another very important aspect is the legal and illegal characteristic of migration, which is very difficult to be accurately analyzed from the demographic point of view. As we

⁴⁹ Alin CHINDEA et all, IOM, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-17, 30.

⁵⁰ Maria STOICOVICI, 2012, *op. cit.*, p. 439/ pag 11 din 15.

⁵¹ Corneliu PREJA, Vasile CERBU, 2014, *op. cit.*, p. 76-77.

⁵² *Idem*, p. 75.

⁵³ National Institute of Statistics, TEMPO-Online, *Social Statistics– Immigrants by age group*, <https://statistici.insse.ro/shop/index.jsp?page=tempo3&lang=en&ind=POP310D>, accessed at 15th August 2014.

previously shown through data, Romania is confronting with a challenge consisting of illegal immigration. Romania, by its geographical location is “strongly influenced by and endures the direct consequences of the conflictual and post conflictual situations from the former Soviet space, the extending of the criminal phenomenon from the former Soviet space, the situations of political, social and other natures, influences from Central Asia, Middle East, North Africa countries, especially by the groups of migrants which use it as a country of transit to reach the West. This is the reason why Romania has drawn the attention of The European Parliament, ever since 2009, that the country could become a “targeted” country for illegal immigration ... our country has transformed from a source of “illegal workforce” into a “consumer”, causing mutations in volume, direction and destination of the illegal migration.⁵⁴ Codruț Olaru, the Chief Prosecutor of DIICOT⁵⁵ in 2009, asserted the following: “if in the past years Romania was a source and transit country for the human trafficking and illegal migration, now it is a country of destination.”⁵⁶ Even though there is a tendency of decrease in human trafficking as a general phenomena, due to measures regarding the frontier security and border surveillance, Maria Stoicovici sees an increase of immigrants smuggling for the purpose of exploiting them for labour.⁵⁷ According to the General Inspectorate for Immigration, in 2013, “the main countries of origin were: Turkey (– 353 illegal migrants), Moldova (– 267 illegal aliens), Syria (– 167 illegals), China (– 140 illegal migrants), Serbia (– 143 illegal aliens).”⁵⁸

If the forecast meets the long-term realities, this is likely to generate geopolitical and security challenges, taking into consideration the Western pattern, and the actual and estimated demographic challenges of Romania (the most important ones being the demographic decline and the forecasted population ageing).

3. Geopolitical and security aspects of immigration in Romania

Two main dimensions are to be considered in this subchapter: 1. the effects of the current situation; 2. the possible repercussions of the forecasted immigration trends.

3.1 The current position and possible effects

The current immigration demographic position does not present the elements of a major challenge or vulnerability in terms of security and geopolitics for Romania. In order for that to happen demographic figures should emphasise growing immigrant communities which to be capable to constitute numerically relevant ethnical groups, because as C. Preja and V. Cerbu argues that: “security challenges are rooted especially in the ethnic and religious differences between the population of the destination country and immigrant population, but also in the low living standards of the latter, caused by the difficult access to jobs in the country.”⁵⁹

But one must not ignore the fact that, in terms of security and vulnerabilities, Romania is facing some risks to a certain extent, such as the ones generated by illegal immigration. Even in 2007 one can observe the focus in this direction. In The National Strategy of Security there are several mentions regarding immigration and security especially in what concerns

⁵⁴ Maria STOICOVICI, 2012, *op. cit.*, p. 431/ pag 3 din 15.

⁵⁵ Directorate for Investigating Organized Crime and Terrorism

⁵⁶ <http://www.frontnews.ro/social-si-economic/juridic/diicot-romania-devine-o-destinatie-pentru-imigranti-ilegali-21266>, accessed at 20th August 2014.

⁵⁷ Maria STOICOVICI, 2012, *op. cit.*, p. 438/ pag 10 din 15.

⁵⁸ Mihai SOFONEA, “The Impact of growing immigration flows on the Romania’s societal security issues” , *Research and Science Today Supplement 2/2014* available at <http://www.rstjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Supplement-No.-2-2014.pdf#page=22>, p.25-26.

⁵⁹ Julia TALLMEISTER, *Is Immigration a Threat to Security?*, immigration-a-threat-to-security/, apud Corneliu PREJA, Vasile CERBU, 2014, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

cross-border organized crime: “Romania has transformed into a real source, transit and destination area for some serious forms of criminal activity, consisting especially of: illegal trafficking of weapons, munitions and explosives; narcotics trafficking; illegal migration and human trafficking; trafficking of counterfeit goods; money laundering activities; other forms of economic and financial crime...by their scale and nature, they can foster terrorism and proliferation of mass destruction weapons and contribute to the perpetuation of separatist regimes”⁶⁰; “From the perspective of security challenges, the region is a true mirror of the new risks and threats and a virtually dangerous polygon for their experimentation. Among them, one must mention: international terrorism; proliferation of mass destruction weapons and means of delivery; local conflicts; illegal weapons, ammunitions and explosives trafficking; drug trafficking; illegal migration and human trafficking; inefficient governance; endemic corruption and organized crime.”⁶¹ From the geopolitical perspective, the following assertion is a very relevant one: “cross-border organized crime: represents a severe form of crime, which gained the capacity to influence the policy of states and the activity of democratic institutions.”⁶²

In the 2010 Strategy, the risk-immigration nexus is approached in the context of reducing the impact of cross-border organised crime and of the terrorism, where the Strategy emphasis the necessity of ensuring a coherent and efficient policy of combat illegal migration.⁶³

Hence, for the current situation, the issue of illegal migration is one of the key aspects, and as Romania might become a destination more and more attractive for labour migration, the illicit labour market might be an encouragement for illegal migration and for criminal activities. In this direction go the assertions and arguments of Maria Staicovic: “Romania as a country located at the junction of roads linking East and West of the continent and the Asian South of the Northern and Western Europe, is included in the "route Balkan " of illegal migration. This position can affect vital areas of society, including the safety of the state and its citizens. Illegal migration is today first step towards organized crime. Moreover, the UN Information Centre for Romania drew attention in 2009 over organized crime and its transformation into a “global security threat.”⁶⁴

Regarding illegal migration we can mention also the studies of Ionel Stoica in which he concludes that: “a phenomenon with deep negative consequences on national security is illegal migration and human trafficking.”, where he also invokes Romania's “geostrategic position”: “at the European Union’s border, and at the crossroads of three continents (Europe, Asia and Africa), Romania is facing an increasing pressure from its national security threats, because, among others, of the intensification, especially in the region, of the illegal migration phenomenon, human trafficking and organized criminality, in general.”⁶⁵ I. Stoica remarks a paradoxical situation: “on the one hand, the intensity of trafficking in persons on the national territory was reduced; on the other hand, it is registering an increase in the smuggling with labour force inside the country, a situation showing that, in Romania there is an increasing

⁶⁰***, *Strategia Națională de Securitate a României*, Buchares, 2007, p. 17 <http://presidency.ro/static/ordine/SSNR/SSNR.pdf>, accesat la 20th de August 2014.

⁶¹ *Idem*, p. 35.

⁶²***, *Strategia Națională de Securitate a României*, Buchares, 2007, p. 17 <http://presidency.ro/static/ordine/SSNR/SSNR.pdf>, accesat la 20th de August 2014.

⁶³ ***, *Strategia Națională de Apărare – Pentru o Românie care garantează securitatea și prosperitatea generațiilor următoare*, Bucharest, 2010, p 21. <http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/SNAp/SNAp.pdf>, accesat la 20th de August 2014.

⁶⁴ Maria STOICOVICI, 2012, *op. cit.*, p. 438/ pag 10 din 15.

⁶⁵ Ionel STOICA, “Implications of the migration phenomenon on Romania’s national security, section- analysis. synthesis.evaluations”, *Strategic Impact No. 3/2011*, p. 93-94.

demand for foreign labour force, but also an interest of the foreigners for Romania.”⁶⁶ Besides encouraging the illegal labour market, illegal migration can also have an effect on national security by rising the risk of emergence of terrorist movements. In this respect Cristian Barna asserts: “In the past two years, Romania has become one of their entrance doors to the West” (their – referring at the terrorist organisations). He points out that in this migration flows are included: “people from Middle East, Asia and Africa, some of which are known for terrorist activities in their areas of origin.”⁶⁷ “According to Silviu Turza from the Inspectorate General for Immigration, if in 2012 Romania had only 269 asylum applications from Syrian refugees, in 2013 there was a dramatic increase in asylum applications to 1018 by this national group. Most claims are made by Syrians who have legally entered Romania. There are also refugees who risk their lives turning to illegal migration networks. The smuggling problem has gained a special scale.”⁶⁸ Recently, prosecutors from the Combating and Investigation Terrorism Directorate removed a network of smugglers specializing in illegal shipments of Syrian refugees.”⁶⁹

Security issues which can emerge from illegal migration can affect to some extent the geopolitical situation, if these kind of illegal activities are not properly managed. Basically, there are two main relevant aspects: 1. the effect of illegal migration on the internal stability and future economic evolution of Romania; 2. the possible emergence of terrorist organisations developed and encouraged by illegal migration, the geostrategic position of Romania and the lack of adequate response of the state to these type of illicit activities .

3.2. The possible repercussions of the immigration forecasted trends

Regarding the possible trends, if they transform into reality, the most important element for geopolitics and security will be the cultural and identity security one. In this respect, one can observe the current case of Western European countries. G. Elspeth assertion summarizes this fact: “Key concepts such as ‘nation’, ‘sovereignty’ and ‘identity’ are ... changing in their meanings and the balance of the three is changing in political, legal and cultural aspects of interaction, particularly in Europe. In the European context, as a new EU citizenship is forged, diversity is maintained through national citizenships. Yet diversity, in the form of non-integration of migrants, can be seen as much of a challenge as it is an opportunity.”⁷⁰

S. Neaguț, L. Di Comite and M. C. Neacșu draw attention to the “extremely important consequences that the new-comers have in modifying the population structure, in general, and the quantitative and qualitative modifications as far as autochthonous labour force goes, in particular, to which one can add other social, economic, cultural, effects and soon.”⁷¹

Corneliu Preja and Vasile Cerbu identify the complex possible security repercussions that migration can have. Basically they argue that migration can affect security in many of its dimensions: political, economical social, psychological, military, and environmental.⁷²

⁶⁶ *Idem*, pp. 94-95.

⁶⁷ Cristian BARNA, George PIȘLEAG, “Syrian Refugees In Romania: Hospitality Versus National (In) Security”, *Research and Science Today Supplement 2/2014*, The Conference “Migration Dynamics And New Trends In European (In)Security”, pp.48-54, p.50

⁶⁸ *Idem*, p. 53, Apud *** Din interior. Război, traficantși, durere. Povestile refugiaților sirieni din Romania, <http://www.digi24.ro/Stiri/Digi24/Special/Reportaj>, accesat la 17.06.2014

⁶⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁷⁰ Elspeth Guild et all, *International Migration and Security: Immigrants as an Asset or Threat? (Transnationalism)*, Routledge, 2005, p.5

⁷¹ Siviu NEGUȚ, Luigi di COMITE, Marius-Cristian NEACȘU, 2010, *op. cit.*, p. 578.

⁷² Corneliu PREJA, Vasile CERBU, “Aspects of the migration impact on security dimensions”, *Research and Science Today Supplement 2/2014*, The Conference “Migration Dynamics And New Trends In European (In)Security”, pp 73-80, p.74.

Analyzing their perspective, one can find that the most relevant aspects of migration effects toward security for geopolitics are mainly in the political, social and military dimensions. The authors draw the attention of the necessity to approach migration and different security dimension in conjunction, as the last ones are interrelated.⁷³

For Romania's case the following dimension can be of real interest on the long term (mostly if immigration in our country is going to follow the trends provisioned by the academic environment):

- *The political dimension:* “from the inside and from the outside” threats. “From the inside, the state may be threatened by the actions of groups who feel disadvantaged by government policy. From the outside, the state may be threatened by the ideology of another state, nationalism, chauvinism, fundamentalism, liberal democracy or communism.”⁷⁴ (mostly when differences between the host and origin countries do exist in terms of ideology and where there exist geopolitical rivalry) ... when immigrants have a different ideology than the host country, they can represent a threat to that state (if they are involved in anti-regime activities in the host country). ... In response to the actions of immigrants against the political regime of the country of origin, the latter can track the activities of immigrants in the country of residence. The authorities in the country of origin of immigrants can seek to attract diaspora elements to cooperate in support of their policies. This equals with the internationalization of the conflict, meaning that a conflict between political groups belonging to the same state that would normally be performed in that state, is taken in another state.⁷⁵

- *The social dimension:* “migration can be seen throughout the fact that immigrants are perceived as a threat to cultural, religious or national identity of the society.”⁷⁶ ... “On the long term, the most obvious effect of migration is the creation of the ethnic minorities that can turn a homogeneous society into a multiethnic and multicultural one. Migration is an important challenge to the traditional values of nationality and citizenship. Immigrants could constitute a threat to the social, cultural and religious norms and values of the host society. In their attempt to defend these values, the host societies may be tempted to emphasize the differences between the dominant culture and the minority cultures existing within the host society.”⁷⁷

Irina Tomescu emphasizes that the “most exposed” security dimension to migration effects are the social one, the economical one, the political one:

- *The social dimension:* “immigration flows may affect social stability, cultural identity, demographic characteristics, living standards, human rights and enhance the level of organized crime in the country of destination.”⁷⁸

- *The economic dimension:* “The work of illegal immigrants affects the economic component of the national security. Through this way, practically the state loses money from the employer and the employee, and the illegal worker does not benefit from a number of social measures.”⁷⁹

⁷³ Corneliu PREJA, Vasile CERBU, 2014, *op. cit.*, p.79.

⁷⁴ *Idem.*, pp. 76-77.

⁷⁵ *Ibidem.*

⁷⁶ *Idem.*, p. 77.

⁷⁷ *Ibidem.*

Weaver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup; Pierre Lemaitre (eds.), *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1993.

⁷⁸ Ina Raluca TOMESCU, “International migration. Security implications” , *Research and Science Today*, University “Constantin Brâncuși”, No. 2(6)/2013, November 2013, ISSN-p: 2247 – 4455, ISSN-e: 2285 – 9632, ISSN-L: 2247 – 4455, Târgu-Jiu 2013,p.65 Apud Elena-Giorgiana Simionescu, *Recidivismul și recidiva legală*, (Buchares:Ed. Universul Juridic, 2012), 8 -9.

⁷⁹ Ina Raluca TOMESCU, 2013, *op.cit.*, p. 65 Apud Barry Buzan, *People State and Fears*, (Brighton:Harvester Press, 1983).

▪ *The political dimension:* “In this sense, immigration is seen as a political problem appreciated by the security agencies as a significant danger. Both these ones and the politicians analyse security as a sphere of politics, a sphere revealing the military and the strategist or the presence of an existential threat that menaces survival, but varies according to different sectors.”⁸⁰

▪ *The psychosocial level:* “On a psychosocial level it is likely that a large number of immigrants to a country under the rule of law and democracy, to have less desirable effects on social cohesion, the national consensus, the interpersonal relationships and on the climate of groups and local communities.”⁸¹

We can certainly assert that if the academic estimated trends become a reality, the risks and vulnerabilities of security may transform into geopolitical relevant ones for Romania. The most important aspects emerge from the possible increase of the immigrant communities in Romania, being very important also elements such as the age structure, the origin and the legal/illegal aspects.

The risks and vulnerabilities can amplify in the host society is confronting with other type of vulnerabilities and negative evolution in key dimension such its governance, economic, political, demographical, societal dimensions. In this respect one can see as an extremely relevance the assertion of C. Preja and V. Cerbu: The states that are vulnerable due to some related situations such as underperforming economy, weak social cohesion, dysfunctional/ ineffective public institutions, or immature political system are more exposed to security risks related to migration than the strong ones, economically and politically well-organized.⁸² Romania identify itself with this type of situations and vulnerabilities. Therefore risks are more likely to manifest if they are supported by a demographical significant evolution.

To all these we must emphasise the specific of our geostrategic position, which can lead to some predilections in term of immigration. It can not be ignored the fact that Romania is located at the cross-road of three main geopolitical and cultural zones: the West, The East and The Middle East and migration routes.

The intensity of migration dynamics of the 21st century, its geostrategic position and the fact that Romania is a European Union member have lead to some good results in mitigating mostly illegal immigration. In this respect Ionel Stoica remarks: “of all The intensity of the phenomenon and the geostrategic position of Romania have led to pressure from the international organizations on the Romanian authorities for implementing effective policies in order to solve these issues.17. Starting with 2001, Romanian authorities have taken some measures aimed at preventing and combating human trafficking, especially that of minors. In 2004, the government presented the project of the National Plan for Preventing and Combating Minors’ Trafficking; institutions were also established for assisting victims. Despite these efforts, an agency within The State Department (United States), which carries out its activity inside a larger framework of The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and that is specialized in the assessment of the effectiveness of anti-traffic policies, was maintaining Romania on the list of countries having serious problems in this sense.”⁸³ Therefore in the context of some existent security challenges related to immigration

⁸⁰ Barry BUZAN, *People State and Fears*, (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1983) apud Ina Raluca TOMESCU, 2013, *op.cit.*, p. 65.

⁸¹ Petre DUȚU, *Provocări actuale pentru securitatea europeană*, București, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, 2010, apud *Ibidem*, p. 48.

⁸² Corneliu PREJA, Vasile CERBU, 2014, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

⁸³ Ionel STOICA, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

in Romania, and taking into account possible future shifts in immigration flows, proactive measures must be supported and promoted in order to counter them.

The current immigration situation in Romania poses some security risks related mostly to illegal immigration with effect on organised crime actions and illegal labour market. On the long term, if Romania will become a country of destination, following the European trend, it will be very important to monitoring the numerical and structural (age, ethnicity) evolution of migrants communities in Romania in order to anticipate the possibility of risk occurrence which can be generated by a growing foreign population.

Conclusions

The migration dynamics are an important component in the geopolitical equation of power and most of all nowadays when flows have raised at levels without precedent.

The research aimed to address the complexity of the relationships between security, geopolitics and immigration, firstly starting with a theoretical approach, and than continuing with a demographical perspective and concluding with the academic position on the subject.

From the demographical perspective, the most relevant aspect for the analysis were: the size and structural elements of immigration (origin and age structure), but also aspects related to its legal and illegal characteristics (illegal migration dimension). As we could observe from the statistical data used, from the perspective of immigration, Romania is more of a transit country than a destination one. Yet, academics do consider in the future a possible shift of situation, in which Romania could become from a country of transit a country of destination.

The current immigration demographic position does not present the elements of a major challenge or vulnerability in terms of security and geopolitics for Romania. In order for that to happen demographic figures should emphasise growing immigrant communities which to be capable to constitute numerically relevant ethnical groups. If the trends transform into reality, the most important element for geopolitics and security will be the cultural and identity security one, which can have security effects in the political, economical, social dimension of security.

But one must not ignore the fact that, in terms of security and vulnerabilities, Romania is facing some risks to a certain extent, such as the ones generated by illegal immigration.

The intensity of migration dynamics of the 21st century, its geostrategic position and the fact that Romania is an European Union member impose a permanent observation of trends and proactive measures.

Therefore, in major lines, regarding the immigration issue in Romania, one must not ignore that such trends, anticipated by academics and confirmed by current data can become, on the middle and long term, a reality - case in which this kind of matters will be an extremely attractive research topic in geopolitical and security fields.

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SOCIETAL SECURITY AND THE MIGRATION PHENOMENON. RISKS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

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Abstract: *Migration is one of the oldest social phenomena and an important security issue. It is essential in the concept of societal security, defending the moral elements of the state and nation.*

Also, on long-term, migration affects decision on racial and ethnic composition of individuals in society, employment, social security, culture and public policy. This has led the European Union to adopt a number of measures to limit the negative effects of migration.

Along with the social risks to security, also military risks are involved, such as: terrorism, irredentism or conflicts of immigrants.

Keywords: *migration, societal security, risks, national security*

Motto: *„Societal security refers to the preservation, under acceptable evolution conditions, of traditional language, culture, association and national, religious and customs identity patterns.” (Ole Waever, “Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe”, 1993).*

Introduction

It is known that nowadays migration represents a very important aspect for national security. That is happening through the process that migration requires and the involved effects. The most known effects that migration has on the national security are reflected in autonomy, state capacity, the nature of conflicts and the power of balance. The main challenge remains especially for the security of small and weak states to manage the migration. In the actual globalized security environment, a state has to be able to develop strong migration policies.

As Charles Hirschman said,¹ migration is “primarily a product of economic and political crises that push people to leave their homelands, usually involuntarily. This effect is also available when people voluntarily leave”. This can be the answer to the question “Why do people migrate?”, because the main reason for why people migrate is to improve their socioeconomic life or their families well being.

Taking into account that national security has to avoid any kind of risk or vulnerability, migration plays an important role in this equation. Migration produces many transformations, both for those who are directly involved and for those who are indirectly involved.

When the stability of a state is affected, a series of risks that can threaten identity arise: states reduce their traditional functions, even without them being taken over by new political structures. Community structures are usually created in order to promote the new identity and, as a result, traditional structures are no longer the focus of interest. This is where societal security comes in, giving a warning as to the possibility of identity loss. Migration

¹ Charles HIRSCHMAN, *Migration and national security*, 18 July 2004, accessed 15 October 2014 at <http://faculty.washington.edu/charles/new%20PUBS/Unpublished%20Papers/U2.pdf>.

has only recently started to be analysed from the point of view of security. It wasn't discussed from this standpoint from the beginning, even though migration is one of the oldest social phenomena.

The concept of societal security was internationally recognized as a fundamental human right in 1948, with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. According to the article number 22 of it, "every individual, as a member of society has the right to societal security".

The connection between migration and societal security is represented by the fact that migration is a source of insecurity for societies. Also, the security societal is used sometimes to explain why European societies tend to repel the state migration policies and the integration into the European Union. Referring to this aspect, authors Iulian Chifu, Oazu Nantoi and Oleksandr Sushko explained² that "in such cases, societies closely mirror the state in which they are found, thus obfuscating the distinction between societal actors and state actors. Applying the concept to non-state societies will not only test its usefulness, but should also help elucidate the process by which societies act, which remains unclear due to the fact that societies, unlike states, lack a clear definable securitizing actor".

There is a constant debate referring to migration like a national security problem. A lot of people may consider that migration is not a real challenge to national security if this is realized respecting the law. However, migration remains a matter of national security. This owes to a main aspects: social redefinition from Western Union, after the second world war.

1. Historical observations and representatives

The term 'societal security' dates back to the 70s, when it was used by the European schools of security studies 'Copenhagen Peace Research Institute' and 'Stockholm International Peace Research Institute'. However, the concept did not spread to the academic environment until the mid 90s, through the studies under the aegis of the Copenhagen School. Researchers there emphasized the idea that different aspects of real life that are often contradictory are included into the concept of national security.

Societal security theoretically and methodically interweaves realist currents and liberal and idealist currents. This concept results from European integration and the perspective of organizing a singular political entity in Western Europe.

Amongst the most well known representatives of societal security are: Morten Kelstrup, Ole Waever, Barry Buzan (who is also one of the founders of the concept of societal security). It was the belief of the first mentioned theorists that security also requires society to be able to maintain its fundamental character under possible or changing threat conditions. They named the security of organic communities the societal security.

The largest contribution to the configuration of a research area of societal security came from specialists in the field of strategic studies that built the base for a research project, defined the basic concepts and ideas and identified the public and institutional need for the results of the entire procedure. Very many security studies specialists believed that the evolution of the term of 'society' occurred at the same time as the introduction of the concepts of 'positive peace' and 'stable peace' into professional literature. The two concepts were promoted by Johan Galtung, and Kenneth Boulding, respectively. Stable peace determines the existence of a political climate within a society. This requires a very low possibility of war breaking out, so low, that it's not even worth mentioning. More often than not, the contemporary reality of politics is home to the so called 'negative peace', which means that authentic, security generating peace is missing. Negative peace merely rules out war; it does

² Iulian CHIFU, Oazu NANTOI and Oleksandr SUSHKO, *Societal Security in the Trilateral Region of Romania-Ukraine-Republic of Moldova*, accessed 16 October 2014 at http://www.cpc-ew.ro/pdfs/carte_201.pdf.

not eliminate structural violence at the level of social or political systems.

2. Concept definition

The security can usually define security into five large fields, that is: political, military, economic, environmental and societal. Societal security is included in national security, but maintains its independence from it since, by weakening societal or identity cohesion, states can be separated by their own societies. Security does not only designate a social fact, that of being safe, covered, but also the feeling of trust and quietude, generated by peace and, implicitly, by lack of danger. The concept of security acquires meaning in the presence of the notion of value, because it's necessary to relate security to something important that we are aware we could lose. The feeling of losing or the possibility of losing something such as the fundamental value of human existence brings people together more than any other feeling generated by other losses; „(...) security is not a value in itself, it fulfils more of an instrumental role, that of a condition that is absolutely necessary in order for us to have access to other values, such as freedom, serenity, justice, etc.”³

Starting from the state - nation – society relation, the following observations are necessary, such as:

- society does not coincide with the state, the state is a part of society;
- states aren't always formed after the model of nations;
- the social aspect is not under the complete control of the state;
- societal security can be defined outside of the state, but not outside of the nation.

Therefore, state security is not necessarily the same thing as societal security. Societal security refers first of all to „threats to the foundations of the state, especially moral ones, because society represents the moral bases of the state”⁴. Societal security refers to the rest of the security not covering the state, also called moral security that refers to threats to social identity. This calls our attention to the devastating effect that can be the result of loss of identity.

Sava Ionel Nicu defines the main essential components of societal security as follows⁵:

- Nation – population with a historical territory, memories, mass culture, economy, collective duties and rights;
- Nationalism – political action meant to create or protect a nation;
- National political identity – natural or civic;
- Cultural identity – organic or ethnic;
- Ethnicity – subcategory of the nation;
- Ethnic minority – the relationship between ethnic minority and majority is important due to the conflicts between them or identity.

As stated by Adela Șerban (2008), societal security is a new concept, but one that defines an old reality. Human communities have always felt the need to protect their existence. They've always felt the need for security and been concerned with regard to their safety. This concern manifested itself in an interiorised fashion, taking the form of a silent collective agreement. All human communities formed their own institutions in order to ensure societal security. The concern for this need has always existed, as shown by research.⁶

The reference subject of societal security is the human community that manages to

³ Adela ȘERBAN, *Securitate societală*, Bucharest, Valahia Publishing House, 2008, p. 55.

⁴ Ionel Nicu SAVA, *The theory and practice of security*, Course materials, Bucharest, 2007.

⁵ Ionel Nicu SAVA, *The theory and practice of security*, Course materials, Bucharest, 2007.

⁶ Adela ȘERBAN, *Securitate societală*, Bucharest, Valahia Publishing House, 2008, p. 55.

preserve its identity when confronted with threats, especially nations. Being the reference objects in the political, military, economic and environmental sector, state security can be influenced by societal security that it is based on. Also within these four sectors, the state is the main supplier of security. In some cases, the state is replaced by political bodies of the same rank. Societal security is heavily influenced by the possibility of societies to maintain traditional culture, identity, language and customs structures, so the threats to these values mostly come from inside the state. Peoples without a state benefit from the same protection of their basic values as those with a state. Therefore, it appears that the state has the indirect role of correctly recognizing the parties which exercise security functions at a collective level and being sure that they work under favourable conditions, so that they can play an active role in societal security.

According to Sava Ionel Nicu, some of the advantages of the analytic use of societal security are:⁷

- It places the focus of security on the issue of migration, terrorism, identity and also explains the processes in the field of integration and disintegration;
- It illustrates the issue of a lack of a reference with regard to aspects of identity in new Europe. The delegation of authority from the national state to European institutions represents a problem, as well as societal insecurity, noticeable in the difference of perception between nations and Eurobureaucrats;
- With regard to security, societal security proposes an extension of the theory. Collective security can have another reference besides the state: society. Society could take over more and more of the state's attributions if it gets weaker.

According to Ionel Nicu Sava (2008), for the protection of societal security it's necessary to strengthen social cohesion and increase the structures of civil society (cultural, professional, intellectual, religious). Majorities generally adopt defensive positions, unlike minorities, who occupy offensive positions, as a result of the processes of social and national dislocation. This is due to the European integration process that can sometimes demobilise majorities, encouraging ethnic minorities. Therefore majorities turn to societal security, in search of means of strengthening the majority identity, unlike minorities, who usually opt for more extremist positions (that can lead to the formation of new states, terrorism or secessionism)⁸.

3. Migration – a security issue

Societal security includes the problem of migration as its main component.

By definition, migration is a „phenomenon that consists in the movement of a large group of people from one territory to another, followed by a change of residence and/or integration into a form of activity in the destination area”⁹. Being a collective phenomenon, migration emphasizes the imbalance and instability of social relations between the more developed and the poorest areas in the world. People generally migrate from poorer areas to areas that are more developed in search of higher living standards. The reasons why people usually migrate are financial ones, as they want to have a better job or better living conditions, a better quality of life.

Through his thesis, „Our demographic drama. Romania's population at the October 2011 census. The reprofessionalization of Romania IV”, sociologist Vasile Ghețau analyses

⁷ Ionel Nicu SAVA, *The theory and practice of security*, Course materials, Bucharest, 2007.

⁸ Ionel Nicu SAVA, *The theory and practice of security*, Course materials, Bucharest, 2007.

⁹ Online sociology dictionary, coordinators Lazăr Vlăsceanu and Cătălin Zamfir, accessed 15 October 2014 at <https://www.scribd.com/doc/58414549/Catalin-Zamfir-Lazar-Vlasceanu-Dictionar-de-Sociologie>.

***<http://www.dictsociologie.netfirms.com/M/Termeni/migratie.htm>.

the main results of the 2011 census, compared to the 2002 one – at a national and county level – and makes some essential critical observations with regard to the organisation and execution of this action that is of fundamental importance for the knowledge of the current situation and strategic orientation of Romania's development over the following decades. The analysis also refers to the number of the population and contains an estimate as to the contribution of natural movement and migration (internal and external) to these changes. According to him, Romania's current population is 19 million and shall probably reach 14 million (2050). Compared to 1990, Romania's current population has dropped by 4.2 million (18%), and compared to the previous census in 2002 it has dropped by 2.6 million.

Why is migration so tightly connected to security? After World War II, the social redefining process of Western Europe included the creation of the "welfare state". The foundation of this welfare state, along with military security formed the development basis for public policies to be oriented towards societal and economic security, as well as the development of political assistance.

Due to the fact that more and more people have emigrated, a series of negative processes have been triggered (street violence, crime, unemployment, the housing problem, filthy streets), which were blamed on immigrants, thus attracting the contempt of those who were, in fact, natives. The issue of identity was later raised, because you couldn't be considered German, French, English, even through birth. This was possible from a legal point of view, but it was absolutely necessary to have something else connecting you to the national community, such as: religion, culture, language, ethnical identity, which were all considered much more important.

The European Union is one of the international forums that tried to take measures against the harmful effects of the migration phenomenon, having analysed the consequences of the high number of immigrants on societal security. Migration infringes the right to decide on social security and public order, as well as states' power to dominate their frontiers, thus becoming a security phenomenon. The main aspect due to this fact is the social adaptation of immigrants: immigrant camps can be formed, local bureaucracy for the immigrants' personal information. At the same time, in addition to the societal risks to a country's security, military risks can also arise: terrorism, group conflicts, and irredentist actions.

4. The current situation and conclusions

Public order can be affected by many causes. A series of 'minor', smaller, but not at all unimportant reasons, combined with 'bigger' reasons that are more well known by most states are constituted by minority groups who react violently to certain political ideas, alienated military groups, ethnic groups hired at the request of the origin state or immigrants.

A societal security problem must be on the priority list of the political administration in order to be a part of the societal security policy of a state. Moreover, a more extensive mobilization is necessary, formed both of simple citizens and members of civil society, as well as specialized organizations, in order for it to remain visible. This entire process bears the name of securitization and implies that political forums present an aspect as a grave threat to the state and society with the purpose of justifying unusual interventions or allocating more funds than normal political procedures would allow.

„Terrorism networks, organised crime, generalised traffic and illegal migration that form the current puzzle of insecurity must be combated through agency networks and multi-institutional cooperation”.¹⁰ These are the main elements that can affect societal security,

¹⁰ Callaghan, Jean and Franz Kernic (coord). 2004. Securitatea internațională și forțele armate. Bucharest: Tritonic, in Introduction by George Cristian Maior.

requiring increased attention and the attempt to control them as efficiently as possible, for the good of the nation and the safety of all people. Multi-institutional cooperation can increase the success of the combating or elimination to the greatest extent possible of these negative elements that humanity is confronted with.

In contemporary society, there have been two major significant transformations important from the standpoint of social security. The first refers to the modern socio-political system that has adopted new ways of monitoring societal security based on the implication of decision forums and finding solutions, giving up the traditional ones. The second refers to an increase in structural societal collapse risks, because the developed societal threats have generated modifications.

Societal security means that people are fighting for their values, wishing to eliminate threats to them as much as possible. All human communities feel the real need for security and for their healthy development need to have it, and need to receive support in this regard.

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DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENT AS SECURITY FACTOR: THE CASE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC

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Abstract: *The Czech Republic, as well as a number of European countries, has been faced with unfavorable demographic developments. However in comparison with other states, this development is more dynamic and dramatic. The demographic trends have not only many serious social and economic consequences, but also their security implications should be considered. For example, the state prioritization of social agenda before defense spending, deteriorating position of the armed forces in the labor market, etc., are just some of such aspects. On the other hand, the CR is a target country for relatively massive immigration. Although immigration is not met with a very positive acceptance by the public and mutual conflict could be a real problem, immigration can be also seen at least as a partial solution for demographic problems. The contribution is therefore devoted to the question whether immigration to the CR is a security threat, opportunity or even inevitable necessity.*

Keywords: *security, demographics, ageing, migration.*

Introduction

The European Union is a very safe and, despite the existing troubles of the Eurozone, still extremely rich region, which is very attractive for immigrants from around the world. Migration is a phenomenon to which the European Union pays a great attention, not only in connection with the necessity of its regulation and coping with immigration flows, but also due to demographic developments of the EU. The Czech Republic is on the one hand a country that is struggling with an extremely dynamic aging of population, and on the other hand, it is a state, which is a target country for immigration. In light of these two facts, the perception of this phenomenon has been dramatically changing, which is evident also from the official strategic documents of the Czech Republic. While in the 90's migration was perceived as a threat significant for the security system of the state, now the approach to immigration is not so black and white anymore. The immigration is rather seen as an opportunity or even as a factor that should be encouraged in order to sustain national economy's performance and social state function. In my contribution, I will outline the current state of immigration in the European Union and the experience of a particular member state. It will address the issue of securitization and changing of apprehension tied with immigration, its reflection in the security strategic documents, approaches to the management of immigration and contemporary experience.

1. Ageing: Europe's growing problem

The European Union represents a unique integration group of 28 states. It is also the largest economy in the world. It almost generates over 13 trillion euros and represents one quarter of the global GDP. Its population is more than 500 million people and the EU as the safe and rich region is an attractive target for immigration from less fortunate areas.

However, the fundamental problem of the EU and its member states is demographic development, particularly aging of population. The EU's current population structure is characterized by a particularly high number of people who were born in the two decades following the end of the Second World War, although when this increase in births took place varies greatly between Member States; this generation is often referred to as the baby-boom generation and comprises the population cohorts that were born between the mid-late 1940s and the late 1960s. The first of the baby-boom cohorts have now entered retirement. According to the Eurostat population projections, the number of people aged over 60 years will increase by about two million persons yearly in the coming decades, while the working age population will start to shrink (as a result of lower fertility rates among post baby-boom generations).¹ This will result in an increasing number of very old persons (aged 80 or over) and fewer young persons to care for them or to contribute to the social systems.

2. EU: Basic Demographics

The current EU 28 median age is more than 41 years and will further grow to 50 years in 2030. The EU's population started to age at a relatively rapid pace. In Europe 2.1 children per woman is considered to be the population replacement level, however the average total fertility rate in the European Union (EU-28) has been calculated at 1.59. Europe is not able to replace the loss of an aging population from its own resources, and therefore the importance of migration to the EU increases. It could slow down the negative demographic trends. In addition, we can assume that towards 2030, population growth will be significantly higher in countries neighboring Europe to the South, which may sustain a particular migratory pressure on Europe.²

Currently more than 33 million people who are not nationals of the EU member states live in the Union territory. This amount represents 7% of the whole EU's population. Most of foreigners come from Turkey, Albania and Ukraine (together 37%), African countries (25%, mostly from Algeria and Morocco), Asia (21%), North and South America (16%), etc.³

Despite the recent weakening of immigration stream caused by stricter border controls and positive political and economic developments in migration source countries more than 3 million immigrants get into Europe every year.

In connection with mentioned facts, a question should come to our minds: What does the immigration mean for the European Union and its member states? Is it a threat, challenge, opportunity or necessity? In attempt to find the answer on this questions I will try to interpret data and experience of the Czech Republic, which is the EU member state since 2004 as well as a unique state from a demographic point of view.

¹ EUROSTAT. 2014. *Population*. Available online at: <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/introduction>.

² *Ibid.*

³ Migration Policy Institute. 2014. *International Migration Statistics*. Available online at: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/international-migration-statistics>.

3. CR: Basic Demographics

Firstly, the Czech Republic is a country with more than 10.5 million inhabitants. In this number, Czech citizens as well as other residents are included. For historical reasons, the Czech Republic is a very ethnically homogeneous state, where about 94% of the population declared the Czech or Moravian nationality and only 6% represents the other ethnic groups.⁴

Secondly, during the Communist regime between years 1948-1989 and the period of existence of the Iron Curtain, the Czech society was more or less isolated from contact with neighboring nations and other ethnic groups. At least two generations of today's Czech population grew up in a kind of "ethnic and demographic greenhouse".

Thirdly, inability to engage into free political, economic and social life at the time of the communist regime especially after 1968 had led the young generation of that time to escape into privacy and family life orientation, which, together with generous state social support led to the baby-boom in the early 70's. It is by the way a historical paradox that the most significant population growth of the Czech nation are concentrated in time of Nazi and Soviet occupations. All these factors play an important role in understanding the situation in the Czech Republic and its relationship to immigration.

3.1. Population of the CR (1989-2014)

The sharp and rapid change came after 1989. The fall of the regime, limitations of state support of families and motherhood, new opportunities for young people, but also the economic problems of the part of population have led to the postponement of parenthood, a drastic decline in fertility and the establishment of a negative trend, with whose consequences we will face in the next decades. Especially after 1993 there are clear signs of aging, there is a real decrease of population (-20,000 annually) and the total fertility rate in the Czech Republic is among the lowest in the world (at 1.22).

If in the 90's these trends were not recognized as the serious issue or they were considered as a temporary phenomenon, at present, aging appears to be a fundamental problem for the Czech Republic and thanks to ongoing reform of the pension system their impacts affect all citizens. Is there any solution to declining and ageing population? It seems that the only hope to mitigate the impacts of unfavorable demographic development remains immigration from abroad.

As I mentioned before, according to the latest census from 2011, the Czech Republic has more than 10.5 million inhabitants, which is, an now please pay attention to the next number, more than 330,000 people more than was counted in 2001. How is it possible? Thanks to immigration. The number of foreigners increased over the past decade more than 3.5 times and reached the number of 450,000 people. The largest group (more than a quarter of all foreign residents) is represented by citizens of Ukraine in the absolute number of nearly 120,000 persons. Other major groups of residents are people with citizenship of Slovakia (84,000), Vietnam (60,000), Russia (36,000), Germany (21,000) and Poland (18,000). These figures show not only the growing popularity of the Czech Republic as a final destination of migration, but also its exploitable potential.⁵

However, a simple increase in population due to the immigration does not necessarily mean automatic benefits for the target state and it is not an obvious remedy for every demographic problem. Except the simple increasing of the number of immigrants there must be also helpful system, wide political will and permanent social consensus to integrate

⁴ Czech Statistical Office. *Public database*. 2014. Available online at: <http://vdb.czso.cz/vdbvo/en/uvod.jsp>.

⁵ *Ibid.*

newcomers into the existing society, to avoid their isolation and take advantage of the opportunities which the arrival of new citizens and their descendants brings.

As the example of successful integration into the Czech society may serve an example of the Vietnamese minority. Vietnamese began to move to the former Czechoslovakia in 60's and particularly in 80's. Their stay was the result of intergovernmental agreements aimed at promoting of the economic development in Vietnam. Vietnamese acquired education at Czechoslovak universities and expert skills in selected industrial enterprises. After the fall of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia, most of Vietnamese students remained in the country permanently and later their family members and others persons also came.

These Vietnamese, which can be described as the first generation of immigrants, were trying to maximize the opportunities offered by the Czech state and society in that time in both negative and positive sense. They dominated the trade in imported consumer goods, built large market areas, but they have been also heavily involved in criminal activities of an economic nature, such as smuggling, sale of counterfeit goods, etc. In recent years attracted the attention a number of cases of illegal industrial production and sales of marijuana. These first-generation immigrants created a closed Vietnamese community, which was almost outside the state security control and tax law.

The change has come with the second generation, it means children of Vietnamese street marketers, and this is an example of positive use of the offered opportunities by this community. Today Vietnamese teenagers, who were born in the Czech Republic, are unlike their parents fully socialized. They are fluent in Czech, they are Czech citizens, they are significantly more motivated to achieve the social success. They are the best high school students and in the coming years we can expect a shift of their generation to Czech universities.

I think that in the very near future members of the major society will meet employees of Vietnamese origin in surgeries, schools, and perhaps serving in the police or armed forces. Moreover, hopefully, unlike their parents, also at the tax offices. Currently about 60,000 Vietnamese have lived in the Czech Republic and after Germany and France they represents the third largest minority in Europe. Surname Nguyen is the ninth most common surname present in the Czech Republic.

Of course, there is the question whether the third generation, that will follow, will not be returning to the roots and this return will not be accompanied by rejection of a new homeland and similar events that we are witnessing today in France, Norway, Sweden or Belgium.

However, the current trend tied with the second generation of Vietnamese residents gives hope that there is the option to fully integrate these hardworking, highly motivated and educated people into an existing Czech society. It is also questionable whether this experience is permanent and transferable to other immigrant groups.

3.2 Security implications

Finally what is the linkage between previously summarized demographic and migration trends and security?

Let me a four comments and explanations based on the experience of my country:

Firstly - there is a rapid increase of aging people who are depending on the shrinking number of working age population. This leads to social and political pressure on reallocation of available financial resources to the social system as well as transfers within the state budget. Moreover, this trend has become stronger in connection with the current stagnation of the Czech economy. Despite governmental efforts to reform the pension and welfare system, it is more politically feasible and less unpopular to make cuts in homeland security and defence budgets and these obtained funds spend for the state social agenda.

For example, the Czech state has increased social spending since 2000 by more than 50%. In the same period of time, budget of the Ministry of Interior started to be strongly constrained as well as the defence spending that fell during the decade over the half. Due to financial constraints more than 4,000 police officers were dismissed in last two years (from 39,000 in 2012 to current 34,300).⁶ Also, the military strongly reduced their numbers. In 1993, the defence budget spent 2.61% of the GDP, but since the mentioned year continuously decreased to the contemporary 1.08% of the GDP. In 1993 we had in service more than 38,000 professionals and almost 69,000 conscripts. Today the Czech Armed Forces represent a little bit more than 21,000 professionals.⁷ These cuts are undermining the self-defence abilities of the state and the level of internal security. The reduction of the Czech participation in foreign military missions and redefinition of foreign policy goals will inevitably follow.

Secondly, with the loss of young, healthy and skilled people capable for the military service, their price on the labor market will increase. According to the recent public surveys, the army is perceived as a good employer by around 75% of the entire population. However keeping of this reputation will be very demanding. Taking into account demographics, the professional armed forces will soon have to offer more attractive employment conditions and pay extra money if they want to succeed. Unfortunately, their financial options are often limited. Impending shortage of personnel for the Czech Armed Forces also could to initiate the discussion about the possibilities of recruiting foreigners into the military.

Thirdly, the immigration itself, respectively its some specific negative impacts, may be perceived as the threat or security problem. Differences between the values and customs of domestic and incoming populations, mutual distrust and fears can lead to clashes with majority. Friendly or neutral attitude towards immigration could change rapidly in times of austerity and economic problems of the country, in case of emphasizing the negative criminal activities of some foreigners, underlining differences and creating of a negative stereotype of immigrants. All these factors can lead to revival of xenophobia and extreme nationalism, and in exceptional cases, to the violent conflict.

Fortunately, in the Czech Republic the similar development has not been recorded yet, even there is no significant political party or movement enforcing the immigration and its restrictions as the main political issue. However, taking into account the increasing number of immigrants and the experience of other European countries, the rise of such political force is probably just a matter of time. For example, according to a one recent public survey, the entire half of respondents believes that there are too many foreigners in the Czech Republic.

Finally, there is a change of attitudes towards immigration from the state's point of view. For instance, the shift is very visible in strategic security documents. In 1999 the government approved the first-ever Security Strategy of the Czech Republic. It also included a list of the nine most serious threats for the country. On the fourth place you could find the threat of massive migration waves connected with violent behavior of migrants. This simplified black and white understanding of immigration as a security threat has slowly changed in the next decade. The latest version of the Security Strategy of the Czech Republic issued in September 2011, apprehends the immigration more as an opportunity ("One particularly negative phenomenon is illegal migration, together with its possible consequences, such as links to organized crime. The inadequate integration of immigrants

⁶ Police of the Czech Republic. 2014. *Number of police officers 2014*. Available online at: <http://www.policie.cz/clanek/pocet-policistu-a-sluzebnich-vozidel-v-jednotlivych-krajich-a-mnozstvi-vynalozenyh-financnich-prostredku-na-jednotliva-krajaska-reditelstvi-policie-cr-k-aktualnimu-datu.aspx>.

⁷ Ministry of Defence & Armed Forces of the Czech Republic. 2014. *Fact file*. Available online at: <http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=5769>.

could weaken the positive benefits of legal migration for the cultural, political and economic development of society. This can be a source of social tension, resulting, for example, in the unwanted radicalization of members of immigrant communities.”).⁸

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to state, that the Czech Republic perhaps represents the extreme case of demographic development and a specific approach towards immigration. Nevertheless, many problems that my country must solve in this issue are very common in other EU member states. The immigration to Europe is the fact. The aging of European population is the fact. Economic difficulties and pressure on social systems in Europe is the fact. Moreover, the only and real additional and available source of population is immigration, this is the fact too.

If I have therefore concluded my contribution and answer the question mentioned in the title of my speech, I believe that immigration is unquestioned necessity, a great opportunity and a permanent challenge. Only if we perceive immigration in this framework, there is a chance that it will not become a threat.

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⁸ Ministry of Defence & Armed Forces of the Czech Republic. 2011. *Security Strategy of the Czech Republic*. Available online at: http://www.army.cz/images/id_8001_9000/8503/Czech_Security_Strategy_2011.pdf.

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS AS EU POST-COLD WAR SECURITY ISSUES

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Abstract: *Migration is a two faced issue: it is about both security and insecurity and has an important impact on each dimension of security, especially on the psychosocial one. The entire world is confronting the problem of emigrants who weaken the human resource of their states of origin. Moreover, immigration is about discrimination, marginalization and cheap labor force, but concomitant with rising productivity and living conditions for a certain part of the migrant population. This paper analyses those issues focusing on EU as a form of regional integration that preserve the borders of the states but offer the chance for a post-national European citizenship and, in the same time, applies the rules of the Schengen Area for some of the Member States.*

Keywords: *international migration, social representations, national security, European Union*

Introduction

There are a considerable number of papers dedicated to the post-Cold War migration phenomenon at least from two main reasons. One argument may consist in the positive trend of immigration that was identified after the fall of the Berlin Wall and another in the fact that the second important component of demographic dynamics is the international migration. As Romanian demographer, Vladimir Trebici, argued in 1991, immigration has the same meaning with the birth for the destination country and emigration represents the losses¹.

In this framework, European Union is the best case to study - a form of regional integration that preserve the borders of the states but offer the chance for a post-national European citizenship and, in the same time, applies the rules of the Schengen Area for some of the Member States². Even if one could ask himself/herself if this migration inside EU can be “international”, the existence of an European citizenship does not affect this issue due to the fact that migration is defined in correlation with national borders. Thus, this paper brings into attention the articles 13-15 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* that state that: everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state and to leave any country and to return³; everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution⁴, and, the most important, everyone has the right to a nationality⁵. These articles should be the corner-stone for the entire process of managing

¹ For more details, see Vladimir TREBICI, *Populația Terrei: demografie mondială*, Editura Științifică, București, 1991.

² From 28 EU Member States, 22 are Schengen States. URL: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/index_en.htm.

³ Article 13 of the *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, United Nations, 1948, URL: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#atop>.

⁴ Article 14 of the same document.

⁵ Article 15 of the same document.

migration, but, unfortunately, it is difficult to achieve as a result of migration being both a challenge and an opportunity for development and security. Approaching migration as a security issue means to analyze a large area of subjects varying from objective reality to the subjective one.

1. The place of migration in the social construction of reality

Since the revealing work of Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (1966) – who take over and develop ideas from other scientists such as Durkheim, Mead, Sartre, Marx – the issue of *homo sapiens* always being a *homo socius*⁶ was debated in many analysis that underline the existence of three dialectic but interrelated moments in the process of constructing reality: society is a human product, but society is an objective reality and, still, human being is a social product⁷. In other words, society must be understood as a dialectical process in continuous motion that comprises three stages – externalization, objectivation and internalization⁸. There must be underlined the fact that these stages are not presented in a temporal sequence. The individual is able to confront the social world as being outside himself/herself and undeniable by the processes of externalization and objectivation. The attainment of individual subjectivity is made through internalization that is defined as the immediate apprehension or interpretation of an objective event as expressing meaning⁹. Internalization is both the starting point and the end of this three stages process and it allows us to understand our fellowmen and to apprehend the world as a meaningful and a social reality.

Therefore, the society is staged and reproduced through practice by human behavior. Anthony Giddens is more explicit: the individual behavior results from the societal structure and the human action reproduces the structure. Saadi Lahlou connects the reproduction process with Serge Moscovici's social representations: "new social objects emerge by anchoring their representation into previous cultural notions, through debates between stakeholders, until they become reified social representations which in turn may serve as anchors for future cultural innovations"¹⁰. Lahlou argues that human behavior is determined at three levels that are provisions of the environment, representations and practice embodied in actors and rules enforced by institutions.

A clear and concise definition of *social representations* is not easy to identify.

The starting point of this process is 1908 Emile Durkheim's *collective representations* concept that addresses the issue of collective meaning in society, asserting that social life is essentially a product of collective representations. In social life, everything consists of representations, ideas and sentiments, and only collective representations are much more powerful than individual ones: they have a power of their own and without concepts to represent thought, humans would cease to communicate as social beings¹¹.

The papers that followed Durkheim criticized or complemented his work, but nobody to Serge Moscovici managed to develop fully his theory of collective representations. In 1961, in the paper *La psychanalyse, son image et son public* (*Psychoanalysis, its image and its*

⁶ Peter L. BERGER and Thomas LUCKMANN, *Construirea socială a realității*, Ed, ART, București, 2008, p. 77.

⁷ *Idem*, p. 89.

⁸ *Idem*, p. 177.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ Saadi LAHLOU, "Social Representations and Social Construction: the Evolutionary Perspective of Installation Theory" in Gordon Sammut, Eleni Andreouli, George Gaskell, and Jaan Valsiner (eds.) *Handbook of Social Representations*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, in press, URL: <http://nickenfield.org/files/2014-SRT-textbook-Lahlou-final.pdf>.

¹¹ Alex LAW, *Key Concepts in Classical Social Theory*, SAGE Publications, 2011, extract.

public), Moscovici introduces the concept of *social representations* but he do not offer a clear definition of it. He states that social representations are almost tangible entities that circulate, intersect and crystallize constantly in our everyday world through a word, a gesture, an encounter.¹² There is very difficult to identify a clear and concise scientific definition of social representations (SR), but a series of characteristics as follows:

- SR are a transformation process of a social reality into a mental object – this process requires a selection to be done based on individual's position, social status;
- SR are a relational process due to the fact that the mental elaboration is dependent on the situation of the person, group, institution or social category in relation with other person, group, institution or social category. RS play the role of social communication mediator and they are an exchange instrument;
- SR facilitate the process of reshaping the reality, producing information that are significant for beneficiaries, recreating reality, and facilitating the internalization of cultural and ideological models;
- the transformation made by SR is translated into an effort of naturalization of social reality and appears as an inventory of an assembly of evidences.¹³

Overall, the RS fulfill two main roles: on the one hand, they conventionalize objects, people and events that come into contact, and on the other hand, they are prescriptive, imposing upon us with an irresistible force. This means that SR offer objects, people and events a precise form, place them in a given category and impose them gradually as a model of a certain type that is shared by a certain group of persons.¹⁴

In this theoretical framework, migration appears as a phenomenon that is influenced by and influences the SR, especially the immigration component. Papers on this issue argue that from the perspective of the individual, immigration causes a shift of the representational fields in terms of change in the shared understandings on groups and their position in the society¹⁵. In the same time, the existent SR are affected by immigration due to the fact that government policy, demographic realities and SR are interdependent and create a new social context that influences both immigrants and the citizens of destination country¹⁶.

Considering the theoretical framework with the issue of migration, can be identified some important aspects to be analyzed beyond the demographic, economic and military ones, such as: the intention to migrate; the construction of immigrants' self-identity; the impact of migrants on both origin and destination countries, and the correlations between mental representations of receiving communities on immigrants and the way of dealing with this phenomenon.

2. Migration in EU – between facts, intention and social representations

Migration in EU is a complex issue: firstly, there are the very consistent migration flows between EU Member States but in the context of an existing *European citizenship*, and secondly, there is an important immigration flow from the non-EU countries. This translates in two migration pathways: from North to North and from South to North. North and South

¹² Serge MOSCOVICI, *Psihologia socială sau mașina de fabricat zei*, POLIROM Editura Universității “Al. I. Cuza”, Iași, 1997, p. 27. This book contains a chapter on social representations taken from the book published in 1961, *La psychanalyse, son image et son public*, P.U.F., Paris.

¹³ Adrian NECULAU, “Reprezentările sociale – dezvoltări actuale”, in Adrian Neculau (coord.), *Psihologie socială. Aspecte contemporane*, Ed. POLIROM, Iași, 1996, pp. 34-51.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ Kay DEAUX, Shaun WILEY, “Moving People and Shifting Representations Making Immigrant Identities”, p. 10, in Gail MOLONEY and Ian WALKER (eds.), *Social Representations and Identity. Context, Process and Power*, Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pp. 9-27.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

are defined here not in geographical terms, but development ones. According to UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, this classification is about developed and developing regions: North comprises North America, Europe, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, and South includes Africa, the Americas (without USA and Canada), the Caribbean, Asia (except Japan) and Oceania (except Australia and New Zealand)¹⁷. Still, UN Development Programme offers a slightly different classification on this issue: North is composed of countries ranking very high on Human Development Index (HDI)¹⁸, and South includes countries ranking low, medium and high on the same index.




Figure no. 1. Crude rate of net migration (per 1,000 inhabitants) since 1990 until 2013 according to EUROSTAT, 2014¹⁹

As the chart shows, the economic and financial crisis that started in 2007 produced a rapid decrease in the crude rate of net migration that recovered only in 2013. In times of economic crisis, migrants are one of the most affected social groups. The problems they face are diverse: from mistreatment in the workplace and its loss in the country of destination to unemployment in the country of origin, for those who did not yet emigrated or for those who decide to return. The last years were abundant in official and unofficial calls to reduce immigrants' access in the countries of destination based on the false idea that immigrants

¹⁷ International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2013. Migrant Well-being and Development*, Geneva, 2013, p. 43.

¹⁸ According to IOM, the territories ranking very high on the HDI are: Andorra; Australia; Austria; Bahrain; Barbados; Belgium; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Cyprus; Czech Rep.; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hong Kong, China; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Japan; Liechtenstein; Luxembourg; Malta; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Rep. of Korea; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; United States of America (IOM, *Cit. Op.*, 2013, p. 44).

¹⁹ EUROSTAT 2014, URL: <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=0&language=en&pcode=tsdde230>

occupy jobs of those country citizens and compete "unlawful" for benefits, even accepting poorly paid jobs. The reality is different: most migrants create economic activity and jobs²⁰. Reactions of decision makers confronted with this situation are diverse: some governments enhance border control, while others lead a policy of attracting and integrating immigrants into society.

In the current geo-economical context, EU attracts non-EU nationals mainly from China (including Hong Kong), India, Morocco, Pakistan, USA, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Nigeria, Australia, Brazil, Albania, Philippines, Turkey, Bangladesh and Afghanistan²¹. Still, the number of non-EU European residents is more than one third of the total number of non-EU residents as the following chart shows:




Figure no. 2. Origin by continent of non-EU nationals residing in EU (2012) according to EUROSTAT, 2014²²

The American Psychological Association identified the main factors that drive the migration trends: family reunification, search for work, and humanitarian refuge²³. In our opinion, each of these factors include one motivation – *a better quality of living* even if for one person that means reuniting the family or a better work place or seeking shelter from violence, war or environmental catastrophes. Translating those factors in the Maslow's contested but still actual pyramid of needs, the level of safety is the one consistent with them: security of body, of employment, of resources, of morality, of the family, of health, of property²⁴. The European case includes also the case of migration for education. For instance, in 2012, almost one fourth of the total residence permits were issued to non-EU nationals for

²⁰ IOM Policy Brief, *The Impact of the Economic Global Crisis*, March 2009, p 1.

²¹ According to *Immigration in the EU* (EU, 2014) for the year 2012 and EU-27.

²² European Commission, *EUROSTAT 2014*, URL: <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=0&language=en&pcode=tsdde230>

²³ Report of the APA Presidential Task Force on Immigration, *Crossroads. The Psychology of Immigration in the New Century*, American Psychological Association, 2012, URL: <http://www.apa.org/topics/immigration/executive-summary.pdf>.

²⁴ Abraham H. MASLOW, *Motivație și personalitate*, Editura TREI, București, 2013, p. 167.

education purposes (22%), and the rest as follows: for family reasons – 32%; for work – 23%, and for other reasons – 23%²⁵. There must be underlined the fact that this statistics do not include the irregular migration which is difficult to record. According to European Commission in 2009, the number of irregularly staying non-EU nationals apprehended in the EU was about 570 000 (7 % less than in 2008)²⁶.

2.1. Intention to migrate in EU

In this context, the issue of *intention to migrate* might be considered as indicator of migration trends. Gallup conducts each year the World Poll survey that includes questions about migration, especially the desire, the plans and the preparation for migrate. The Potential Net Migration Index (PNMI) is the estimated number of adults who would like to move permanently out of a country subtracted from the estimated number who would like to move into it, as a proportion of the total adult population²⁷. According to Gallup's PNMI, the intention to emigrate is lower in the period of 2010-2012 than the period of 2007-2009, when it was considered that the potential net migration could change nations²⁸. Comparing the earlier PNMI with the last one published by Gallup, the authors of the survey conclude that the Southern Europe's economic distress made it less attractive although the population would still potentially shrink in Eastern and Southeast Europe²⁹.

For the accuracy of the analysis, it is important to compare the PNMI with the crude rate of net migration³⁰. The conclusions confirm or not the people's intention towards migration (Figure no. 3).

²⁵ According to *Immigration in the EU* (EU, 2014) for the year 2012 and EU-27.

²⁶ European Commission, *Irregular Immigration*, URL: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/immigration/irregular-immigration/index_en.htm.

²⁷ Neli ESIPOVA; Rajesh SRINIVASAN; Julie RAY, *Potential Net Migration Could Change Nations*, Gallup, 2009, URL: <http://www.gallup.com/poll/124193/potential-net-migration-change-developed-nations.aspx>.

²⁸ Ibidem and Neli ESIPOVA; Rajesh SRINIVASAN; Julie RAY, *Potential Net Migration Index Declines in Many Countries*, Gallup, 2014, URL: <http://www.gallup.com/poll/166796/potential-net-migration-index-declines-countries.aspx>.

²⁹ *Ibidem*.

³⁰ The crude rate of net migration is the ratio of the net migration during the year to the average population in that year.; the value is expressed per 1,000 inhabitants.

	PNMI 2007-2009 (%)	PNMI 2010-2012 (%)	Crude rate of net migration 2013
Austria	33	35	6.6
Belgium	9	13	2.3
Bulgaria	1	-13	-0.2
Croatia	-2	-11	-1.2
Cyprus	NA	91	-13.9
Czech Rep.	-4	-4	-0.1
Denmark	28	32	3.8
Estonia	-13	-19	-2
Finland	29	24	3.3
France	60	38	0.6
Germany	14	23	5.8
Greece	11	-8	-4.7
Hungary	-15	-20	0.6
Ireland	66	33	-5.6
Italy	23	8	19.7
Latvia	-22	-20	-7.1
Lithuania	-17	-23	-5.7
Luxembourg	NA	86	19
Malta	NA	17	7.6
Netherlands	17	17	1.2
Poland	-15	-14	-0.5
Portugal	23	1	-3.5
Romania	-21	-27	-0.3
Slovakia	NA	-14	0.4
Slovenia	NA	-15	0.2
Spain	74	43	-5.5
Sweden	78	68	6.9
United Kingdom	62	53	3.1

Figure no. 3. Comparison between intention to migrate (PNMI) in the years 2007-2009 and 2010-2012 and the 2013 crude rate of net migration³¹

For instance, even if in some states the PNMI is positive, meaning a gain the potential net adult population, the crude rate of net migration is negative: Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. In addition, there are some cases where crude rate of net migration shows that the

³¹ Data selected from Neli ESIPOVA; Rajesh SRINIVASAN; Julie RAY, *Potential Net Migration Could Change Nations*, Gallup, 2009, URL: <http://www.gallup.com/poll/124193/potential-net-migration-change-developed-nations.aspx>; Neli ESIPOVA; Rajesh SRINIVASAN; Julie RAY, *Potential Net Migration Index Declines in Many Countries*, Gallup, 2014, URL: <http://www.gallup.com/poll/166796/potential-net-migration-index-declines-countries.aspx> and EUROSTAT 2014, URL: <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=0&language=en&pcode=tsdde230>.

country receives immigrants, but the PNMI indicates a potential loss of population that desire to migrate: Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

One of the most interesting cases is the one of Greece where the PNMI decreased from a positive 11% in 2007-2009 to -8% in 2010-2012 completed with a negative crude rate of net migration (-4.7). Greece is one of the most affected countries by the economic and financial crisis and this is the main reason for decreasing the intention to migrate and the negative rate of net migration.

The Gallup index provide useful information about potential change of population not only in number, but, most important, in human capital, in the ability of a certain society to perform labor to produce economic value. Declining PNMI in many countries, even those perceived as highly desired countries of destination, reflects the decrease in worldwide desire to migrate as result of the global economic crisis, but one can argue that this is not a permanent trend, but a juncture one.

2.2. Some aspects concerning the social representation of migration in EU

International migration has an impact on the social identity of individuals, even if they are citizens of the country of destination or immigrants. Social identity is the individual's own conception of himself/herself in terms of features of the social category of belonging, that makes his/her ego interchangeably with the one of other members of the in-group's and distinct in terms of stereotypes from the ego of out-group members³². The group behavior has specific aspects that distinguish it from interpersonal behavior. These aspects include: ethnocentrism; bias favoring the in-group; intergroup competition; discrimination; stereotyping; prejudice; behavioral uniformity; in-group cohesion; conformity, etc. These elements exist even in the case of relations between one country's residents and immigrants in that country. Thus, in recent years, immigration has made national identities be viewed from the perspective of security. On one hand, this is where migration and refugee flows are generated by ethnic conflict and ethnic cleansing policies that aim to achieve cultural homogeneity or the domination of a given territory by a certain ethnic minority. On the other hand, a flow of immigrants is often represented as a potential threat to the culture of the country of destination and a challenge to the basic values and its cultural and linguistic habits.

Still, as UN experts argue, public perceptions of migration vary with time and place and are often shaped by contextual factors³³. There is both positive and negative perception on migration. The positive perceptions about migration are especially in countries of origin and they can also influence the decisions of potential youth migrants to venture abroad, especially when they are given the opportunity to interact with successful youth migrants and returnees. Unfavourable and often biased media content can reinforce negative perceptions about migration and can lead to harmful stereotyping, anti-immigrant discrimination, xenophobia, social exclusion, the abuse of migrants' rights, and social unrest.³⁴

According to EU Standard Eurobarometer 81, there is an increasing concern about immigration³⁵. The immigration issue is the fourth national cause of concern of the EU population, in the EURO area and outside it (Figure no. 4).

³² Ștefan BONCU, *Curs de psihologie socială*, Facultatea de Psihologie și Științe ale Educației, Universitatea „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Iași, 2004, Cursul nr. 31, p. 1.

³³ UN, *UN World Youth Report. Youth and Migration*, 2013, URL: http://www.unworldyouthreport.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=101&Itemid=245.

³⁴ *Ibidem*.

³⁵ European Commission, *Standard Eurobarometer 81. Spring 2014. Public Opinion in the European Union*, 2014, URL: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb81/eb81_publ_en.pdf, p. 38.

Eurobarometer	EURO Area		NON-EURO Area	
	EB80/2013	EB81/2014	EB80/2013	EB81/2014
Unemployment	50%	51%	46%	42%
Economic situation	35%	32%	29%	25%
Government debt	15%	15%	NA	NA
Rising prices/inflation	18%	14%	23%	19%
Immigration	10%	13%	15%	19%
Taxation	13%	13%	NA	NA
Health and social security	NA	NA	17%	19%

Figure no. 4. Comparison between five most mentioned items as “the two most important issues facing (our country) at the moment” in the EURO Area and NON-EURO Area and their trend in the last two years according to EB80 (2013) and EB81 (2014)³⁶

Immigrants are seen as the main potential "illegal workers" in all European countries where their number is high, but in countries of origin is a more relaxed attitude regarding the image of illegal immigrant worker. Instead, it outlines a radical position towards human resource depletion phenomena, such as "brain drain" phenomenon.

It is obvious that the relationship between international migration and national security (its psychosocial dimension) can be analyzed by the social representation of the Other (meaning different). These social representations determines attitudes that, in turn, sets not only the states' policies and strategies regarding migration, but also the events that trigger tensions, crises and conflicts, affecting all dimensions of security and thus all fields of social life.

Conclusions

International migration has become in the recent years a priority for the domestic and foreign agendas of most countries of the world and international organizations. This is because migration is at the same time a source of insecurity and security for both countries of origin and their citizens and for destination countries and their residents.

International migration affects and is influenced by all dimensions of security, in particular the psychosocial one. The social representations of the citizens of the destination country regarding the immigrants, asylum seekers or refugees largely determine the measures to be taken for or against them. It also determines attitudes that may create tensions, crises and even conflicts between both parties.

For Europe, the migration issue has become more complex especially because of EU enlargement. The accession of countries with large numbers of immigrants targeting the developed European countries questioned both their status in relation to the territory concerned and the regulation and counteract of the its negative effects of migration. Thus, even if the movement of migrants takes place within the same community, the European one, the phenomenon cannot be considered as internal migration because crossing national borders remains a feature of international migration. The EU needs to regulate this situation taking

³⁶ *Idem*, p. 39.

into account both the rights and European status of immigrants and the citizens' rights in the countries of destination. Moreover, it is mandatory that all actions taken must comply with Universal Human Rights.

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ANTICIPATORY METHODS AND TECHNIQUES APPLIED IN SECURITY STUDIES

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Abstract: *This paper concentrates on describing the main types of anticipatory methods applied in security studies. One tried to shape and to propose a basic taxonomy of nowadays methods of foresight starting from the products of future studies research (the estimations, the predictions and the scenarios). The necessity of a taxonomy is given by the enormous number of the research methods which are employed by the international think-tanks and research organizations. One outlined which are the best methods a researcher could use for anticipating some variables characterizing the national security. The paper mainly refers to T. J. Gordon, J.C. Glenn and P. Schwartz analysis in this field. Finally, the paper tries to emphasize the importance of implementing future studies methodology in the field of security, as a new way of protecting us in front of the unknown.*

Keywords: *foresight methods, security, anticipation, future studies, scenario.*

Introduction

In 1964 Bertrand de Jouvenel published *L' Art de la conjecture* in which he described a philosophical rationality for the field of future studies. By sketching “a good day”¹ the author bound freedom with future, sustaining that if we do not try to find out the consequences of our facts, our freedom of choosing is an illusion. In 1965, as a response to his book, *The American Academy of Arts and Sciences* created the *Commission on the Year 2000* in order to “anticipate social patterns, to design new institutions, and to propose alternative programs”². Today after half of century, the world is a melting pot of networks and reciprocal influences which constrain the future. From its magma, decision makers must identify disruptive elements acting on the functionality of their organization and pursue in order to eliminate or diminish the negative effects. This also applies to the field of national security. Building foresights’ products (estimations, predictions or scenarios) means not knowing the future, but calculating a range of possible futures through some research tools. These tools have to be properly structured in order to obtain predictions for the described organization. In security, the overall purpose of foresight is to provide to key-people decision-making guidelines and characterizations on general move or particular situations of the future³. Thus, the political and the military leadership can take appropriate decisions, given the existence of accurate information. In this field, the things gather also a valence that intrigues and complicates the research: the subordination of the decision to the will of man - which is difficult to control or define. This subordination pushes the methodology to search and apply techniques of different types, gathering researchers form different areas. In this

¹ Bertrand de JOUVENEL, *L'art de la conjecture, Futuribles*, Éditions du Rocher, Monaco, 1964.

² Britannica Enciclopedy, www.britannica.com, site consulted on 05.09.2014.

³ The problem of foresight was first applied in security studies by H. Kahn. In the article *Simulating the Unthinkable: Gaming Future War in the 1950s and 1960s* published in *Social Studies of Science* the author tried “sinking the probability of catastrophe and smoothing the consequences by obtaining predictions”.

context appears the problem to establish certain strategic directions that will guideline the future of a state towards an increasingly act of security. The modelling process used for generating some strategic directions of national security becomes one of the most determining hypothesis for appending anticipatory and foresight techniques.

1. Scanning taxonomies

As described in the abstract, the main objective of this research is to analyse the ways of organising methods and techniques from future studies and to identify the basics of a taxonomy specific to the applied techniques in security studies and international reations. This necessity appeared after an initial study of the main types of methods and techniques offered by the scientific community, the current approaches not satisfying our fields of interest⁴. Counting the enourmous number of techniques one needs synthetising and rank them depending on their comun elements, their differences, their purposes and their areas of interest.

The first two taxonomies that arrouse one's interest are Kleiner's (1996) and Dunn's (2003)⁵. The provided taxonomies of the foresight techniques and anticipatory methods pass into a milestone for this research, their approach shaping a cross-road between statistics and qualitative thinking. The researchers found usefull grouping the methods in two main categories:

- Methods and techniques based on extrapolation (e.g.: the estimation of linear trends and the nonlinear time series analysis);
- Methods and techniques based on theoretical prospecting (e.g.: Delphi technique, cross-impact analysis and technical feasibility).

Some specific methods used in anticipating national security policy and its products are described by Sam Tangredi. S. Tangredi makes an import step forward, by identifying the main products of the prospective studies. The author notes that the most important foresight products are the estimates, the forecasts/the predictions and the scenarios⁶. We believe that this is a decisive point in structuring the methodology, as it describes the particularities of what the methods should do.

One of the most complete papers systematizing foresight techniques and methods is the Futures Research Methodology Version 3.0 – published by the Millennium Project in 2014. Jerome C. Glenn and Theodore J. Gordon analyse over 20 specific techniques and methods applied in the prospective studies. According to them, the methods in this series could be classified after 4 main characteristics⁷ (see figure 1):

- Quantitative – reffering to statistical, mathematical or numerical data or computational techniques;
- Qualitative – trying to answer why and how;
- Normative – based on norms or values is trying to answer to the question what future do we want? What do we want to become?;
- Exploratory – tries to find out what is possible regardless of what is desirable.

⁴ The characteristics and the methodology of future studies are generally described by Mircea MALIȚA (1969), Eleonora BARBIERI MASINI (1993), Roy AMARA (1991), Jerome C. GLENN (2014).

⁵ Irmak RENDA-TANALI, An Assessment of the Benefits of Online Scenario Simulation Tools in Homeland Security and Emergency Management Education, *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management*, vol. 8, 2011,pp.1-18.

⁶ Sam TANGREDI, *All Possible Wars? Toward a Consensus View of the Future Security Environment, 2001–2025*. Washington DC, NDU Publishing House, 2000.

⁷ Jerome C. GLENN, Theodore J. GORDON, Elizabeth FLORESCU, *Futures Research Methodology Version 3.0*, Millennium Project, Washington D.C., 2014.

The taxonomy becomes important as it completes the organizational field with two important characteristics, making differences between desirable and wanted. As much as helpful as it seems, the prospection in security studies finds itself at the intersection of four roads: past, present, possible futures and desirable futures. Generally, the taxonomy helps us to understand the variety and the complexity of the existing techniques.

No.	Name	Quantitative	Qualitative	Normative	Exploratory
1.	Agent Modeling		X		X
2.	Causal Layered Analysis		X		X
3.	Cross-Impact Analysis	X			X
4.	Decision Modeling	X			X
5.	Delphi Techniques		X	X	X
6.	Econometrics and Statistical Modeling	X			X
7.	Environmental Scanning		X		X
8.	Field Anomaly Relaxation		X		X
9.	Futures Wheel		X	X	X
10.	Genius Forecasting, Vision and Intuition				X
11.	Interactive Scenarios				X
12.	Multiple Perspective				X
13.	Participatory Methods		X	X	
14.	Relevance Trees and Morphological Analysis		X	X	
15.	Road Mapping		X	X	X
16.	Scenarios	X	X	X	X
17.	Simulation-Gaming		X		X
18.	State of the Future Index	X	X	X	X
19.	Structural Analysis	X	X		X
20.	Systems Modeling	X			X
21.	Technological Sequence Analysis		X	X	
22.	Text Mining		X	X	X
23.	Trend Impact Analysis	X			X

Figure no. 1: Foresight methods, Source: Jerome C. Glenn, Theodore J. Gordon, Elizabeth Florescu, Futures Research Methodology Version 3.0, Millennium Project, Washington, 2014.

Michael Marien describes a different taxonomy depending on seven P⁸:

- Probable;
- Possible;
- Preferable;
- Present (referring to trends);
- Past (referring to retrospective);
- Panoramic (referring to systems);
- Participatory.

⁸ *Ibidem*, pp.10-20.

This taxonomy presents an interesting perspective regarding the use of methods, as it completes the upper taxonomy with the security's four road intersection, but has a major disadvantage because the best part of the methods can be used in most of these categories. So, instead of simplifying understanding, it could be tricky and create wrong assumption.

Today, one witness an increasing usage of decision support systems. Regarding the developed methodology of the computer based techniques, Zinnes Dina and John Gillespie proposes us the following taxonomy⁹:

- Dynamic simulations based models – building a mathematical model as a representation of the real world (McPhee, 1963; Guetzkow, 1963; Forrester, 1969; Meadows, 1972);
- Knowledge based models – like semantic networks, frame based systems, rules based systems and natural processing systems (Allen Newell, 1956; Herbert Simon, 1997; Brian Smith, 1999);
- Learning models – like neural networks (Bauer, 1994; Schrodt, 2000).

This taxonomy becomes a central point of understanding computer based techniques, as it shapes the temporal development of the methods. It also shows us the dependent cohesion established between systems (*based on some rules*), learning models (*based on finding similarities with the human processing information*) and with the representation of the real world (*based on the implementation over time of a simplified model of the world*).

2. The Estimation, Predictions, Scenarios (EPS) taxonomy

One agrees that besides the upper taxonomies, there are a variety of ways of organizing methods and techniques. None of them are completely satisfactory for us. So, in order to cut down the time for finding the most suitable method or technique, we want to propose a particular way of organizing methods for a researcher from the field of security studies and international relations evolutions. One of the most developed methods of organizing prospective studies elements is developed by Katherine Bertolucci¹⁰. She argues that the best way of organizing methods and future studies materials must be built on a hierarchical structure inspired by Carol Linnaeus' *Sistema Naturae*¹¹. One doesn't find this choice productive for organizing methods for the security field. Indeed such a hierarchical topology is suitable for operating data with a much bigger heterogeneity. The need to find a suitable taxonomy pushed us to develop some principles for our approach.

The four main principles that have shaped our approach are described below:

- A researcher from security is more interested in what a foresight method does (*its purpose*) and not of how could it be described through design characteristics; one doesn't find it relevant if a method is normative or exploratory – in the represented sense from figure 1 – because he wants to know the outcome of the method;
- A taxonomy for future studies techniques applied in security studies should start from the products one wants to obtain and from the time horizon one wants to create – for estimations (*2-5 years*), for predictions (*5-10 years*) and finally for scenarios (*10-25 years*);
- As the time horizon progressively grows, the qualitative methods should be used – especially for predictions and scenarios;

⁹ Dina ZINNES, John GILLESPIE, *Mathematical Models in International Relations*. New York, Praeger, 1976

¹⁰ Katherine Bertolucci, *Taxonomy for the future: Organizing Futures Information into a New Hierarchical Structure*, *Future Research Quarterly*, pp. 29-60, 2004.

¹¹ A full description of the topology is available into *Facsimil of the First Edition of the Sistema Naturae* edited by M. S. J. ENGEL and Ledebor ENGEL in 1964.

- No single method should be used – as shown before, the prospective studies methodology makes sense combining different types of methods.

The mix of those three main principles lead us to the following taxonomy: *The Estimation, Predictions, Scenarios (EPS) taxonomy*, as shown in figure 2.




Figure no. 2: The EPS Taxonomy

2.1 The estimations

The estimations are based on analyzing current conditions in order to sketch future events. In the field of security and information a numerous estimations are provided by the intelligence agencies and information services (e.g.: *National Intelligence Estimates* in USA¹²). Their purpose is to summarize important assessments for the intelligence community. These estimations usually try to merge a variety of components (starting from technology achievements to industrial production) in a decision-making comprehensive way. Estimations are used to identify the achievement of the near-term policies.

Taking into account our *EPS taxonomy*, if a researcher wants to develop estimations on how some variables of security or of international relations would evolve on short-time range he must use Decision Modelling and Statistical Modelling or other type of mathematical modelling. If he wants to see how future events may change extrapolations, he has to apply the *Trend Impact Analysis (TIA)*¹³ and to create a data base of potential key events, their probabilities and their impact. Least but not last, if a researcher wants to show the directions and intensity of change in international relations and to identify the factors responsible through an index, he should apply *The State of the Future Index (SOFI)* produced by The Millennium Project¹⁴. The SOFI could be extended to a 10-year outlook for the future

¹² These estimates are provided by Central Intelligence Agency.

¹³ Some extensive description of the method is made by John STOVER (1975), Joseph COATES and Jennifer JARRATT (1992). Frontiers of the method and samples of applications are delivered by Jerome C. GLENN (2014)

¹⁴ SOFI represents a quantitative time series which could indicate the changing points of the future and could show us the probability of getting better or getting worse. The method was refined in 2001-2003 State of the Future. A full description of the method is now provided by Theodore J. GORDON, Peter P. YIM and Jonathan M. CHEYER (2012).

based on historical data for the last 20 years. It could be used not only for estimations but also for predictions.

2.2 The predictions

The predictions gather a group of longer-range assessments. The specific thing of creating predictions in the field of security and information is that they are directly based on using trends. The predictions are created starting from the assumption that a specialized expert is best qualified for developing a product concerning the continuity or modification of security. The predictions enlighten us how trends may combine in international relations in order to produce significant changes in the evolution of the system. If the political leadership wants to evaluate the validity of any new policy recommendation, he has to determine the assumptions and the possible directions about the future. This is feasible through creating and analyzing predictions on the fields involved.

Applying the *EPS taxonomy*, if a researcher wants to develop predictions he has a lot of options. That happens because the predictions represent the field of intersection between quantitative and qualitative methods, between estimations and scenarios. The researcher could extrapolate some of the results obtained through estimations' modelling (TIA, SOFI), but also apply new methods and techniques. But the most used tools in future studies applied in security and international relations are the impact matrices¹⁵. If a researcher proposes to investigate some systems from international relations and their dynamics he must use impact matrices which are divided into three categories: structural analysis, actors' strategies and probabilistic cross impact matrix.

If one wants to find out the importance that a predecessor of an event had or will have in obtaining another event in international relations he must apply the interrelationship called *Cross Impact Analysis* (CIA) which completes TIA. (e.g.: If the probability of dividing Ukraine rises to 50% how this influences the probability of a military intervention of NATO forces in the area?). However, if one must describe the whole system and the relation between its subsystems, in order to underline the variables that influence the system's evolution has to deal with structural analysis. (e.g.: Kane's KSIM¹⁶ or Godet's MICMAC¹⁷). If one deals with shaping objectives and strategies he must use the actors' strategies analysis. (e.g.: Teniere-Buchot's CHART OF POWERS¹⁸, Battelle's EXPLOR-SIM, Godet's SMIC-PROB-EXPERT¹⁹, and Enzer's INTERAX²⁰).

2.3 Scenarios

Scenarios can be sketch like a range of predictions and estimations, with a more complex and well balanced construct and intent. In the field of security and information,

¹⁵ Impact matrices calculate the impact that a series of factors have over the development of the future. A full description of the methods are made by Keijiro HAYASHI and Kaya YOICHI (1973), Alan PORTER (1991), Theodore J. GORDON (2014).

¹⁶ The Cross Impact Language (KSIM) is a simulation technique which was first developed by Julius KANE in 1972, being blueprinted on the expected interactions among some time-series variables rather than the rare events.

¹⁷ Impact Matrix Cross- Reference Multiplication Applied to a Classification (MICMAC) represents a simulation tool which allows us to shape the evolution of the system. The method has three phases in Julius KANE's opinion: listing the variables, describing the relationship between variables and identifying the key variables

¹⁸ A suitable description for the *chart of power* was made by TENIERE-BUCHOT in the book *L'ABC du Pouvoir*, published in 1991.

¹⁹ The Cross-Impact Matrices and Systems (named SMIC-PROB-EXPERT) serves, as the author argues "to outline the most probable futures; this probable future will serve as a basis for scenario building techniques" (Teniere BUCHOT, 1980).

²⁰ An Interactive Model for Studying Future Business Environments (INTERAX) was developed in 1979 as a new techniques of showing variables' interactions.

scenarios were used for the first time by Herman Kahn through his approach related to analyzing potential nuclear wars that might occur²¹. A key moment in wide spreading the scenarios is related with Pierre Wack and Shell. Pierre Wack predicted the rise of OPEC and of the appearance of the 1970's oil crisis. However, scenarios have the purpose to help decision-makers to take into account all the possible futures. Peter Schwartz argues that "The result of the scenario is not a frame of tomorrow, but a tool which could give better decisions for the future."²²

Scenarios mean thinking big. Based upon this affirmation one must understand that if he wants to shape scenarios he must obtain first of all estimations and predictions which could be integrated in a bigger frame with other methods. *Scenario modelling* should be an efficient and sufficiently vivid technique for a security planner to see clearly and understand the problems, the challenges and the opportunities that the analyzed system would present. A scenario is a plausible description of what might occur. If a researcher must describe events and trends as they could evolve then he must use scenario modelling or interactive scenarios. These scenarios could be sustained by a qualitative and participatory approach through *Delphi Methods*²³.

Depending on the product one tries to shape, the researcher could combine the upper methods in order to obtain the wanted result in three main categories: estimation methods, predictions methods and scenarios methods. He also has to take into consideration the time horizon of the product. That means that as long the time period is as diverse the mix of methods will be.

Conclusions

The nowadays foresight methods are widely developed and spread. One argues that their application in the field of security studies could help decision makers from national security to better understand the consequences of their actions. In this article one tried to shape a simple understanding way of using prospective studies' methodology in security studies. Because there is no satisfactory taxonomy of those methods which could help the researchers anticipating the international system's movements, one proposed to deliver such a taxonomy. Starting from the possible products, one shaped a new taxonomy of future studies methods specific to the field of security studies: *the EPS taxonomy*. By applying this personal schema, a researcher becomes the guardian of some principles of future studies. First of all, no matter of the technique one uses, he cannot find out for sure the future; but he can make some foreknowledge and probabilities. Second of all, no single method should be applied; being given the nature of the factors implied in defining the future, cross referencing methods have a higher accuracy rate. Finally, one cannot control the future, but he can influence it. The purpose of anticipating the security is to explore and of course to test both – *possible* and *desirable* – futures in order to improve security related decisions.

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²¹ Herman KAHN Simulating the Unthinkable: Gaming Future War in the 1950s and 1960s, *Social Studies of Science*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2000.

²² Peter SCHWARTZ, *The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World* third edition, Doubleday, 2003.

²³ GLENN C., *op. cit.*, pp. 1-19.

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CULTURAL GLOBALISATION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21st CENTURY

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Abstract: *The global world at the beginning of 21st century is marked by different phenomena of cosmopolitanism, pluri-culturalism, internationalism, reflecting different kinds of relations between cultures. They represent various trends of interconnecting the global world and, moreover, they can be considered to establish different types of relations between the cultures of the globe, which can be analysed as linked to a specific process called “cultural globalisation”.*

Keywords: *trans-culturalism, cosmopolitanism, inter-culturalism, meta-culturalism, cultural globalisation.*

Introduction

Despite the global context at the beginning of the 21st century, characterised by cosmopolitan, multicultural or internationalist *tendencies and trends*, but also despite the proliferation of *new technologies used for the diffusion of cultural elements*¹ at global level, some authors believe that, over the last two hundred years, *the balance of cultural power* could not escape the dominant position (in the international cultural context) that nation states and national cultures have had. Moreover, they believe the balance has tilted in their favour².

In this article we seek to identify the elements that can shape *different forms of global cultures*, some of which have old historical roots, before the Modern Age (for instance, *the culture of imperial elites*³). These forms of global cultures fall within the scope of a wider concept, called “*cultural globalisation*”, that we also seek to define in the following pages.

1. Cultural globalisation: concept, general characteristics

The beginning of the 21st century is characterised, *among other things*, by the proliferation of *global cultural trends* which, *due to their variety, intensity and degree of dissemination* in the most diverse societies across the globe, cannot be compared to older forms of globalisation. Global cultural flows at the beginning of the 21st century are

¹ Cinema, telegraphy, radio, television, long-distance transport, air transport, the Internet and, more recently, the proliferation of virtual social networks - important including for the political relation governors-governed, for the political and civic debate, the creation of a civil society at all levels (infra-national, national, transnational) with consequences such as the involvement of citizens in the act of political governance, the development of a virtual agora, of public initiatives in the civic and political field of a country or region or at global level (Earth – an enormous online agora of people with “a planetary civic identity”).

² David HELD; Anthony McGREW; David GOLDBLATT; Jonathan PERRATON, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (Transformări globale. Politică, economie, cultură)*, translated by Ramona-Elena LUPAȘCU, Adriana ȘTRAUB, Mihaela BORDEA, Alina-Maria TURCU, Polirom, Iași, 2004, p. 373.

³ David Held *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 375-376.

generated by *the advent and continuous development of telecommunication technologies, but also by the emergence of new and very powerful non-state actors* (multinational corporations, mass media, international non-governmental organisations, international intergovernmental organisations⁴).

As most theoreticians of culture and civilisation notice, there is “a kind of great cultural entity, of cultural system or civilisation, which lives and acts as a genuine unit”⁵. This unitary reality “leads to the elaboration of cultural systems or super-systems with variable limits”, according to George Uscătescu, quoting Sorokin, systems which have different names in the literature: “great cultures” (Berdiaev), “universal cultures” (Northrop), “models of high cultural value” (Kroeber), “intelligible fields of historical study” (Toynbee), “high cultures which, in their last stage, become civilisations” (Spengler) or “historical-cultural types or civilisations” (Danilewski)⁶.

1.1. The relation between culture, civilisation and value

In the analysis of the content of cultural globalisation, we should also mention the incidence of *philosophy of values* on the scope of the definition of culture and civilisation, making a distinction between “value-relation” (phrase used by Max Weber) and “value in itself” or between “personal values”, “impersonal values” and “values of efficiency”. Culture was intrinsically associated with the term “value”, being understood as “*the essence of the goods we appreciate for their value*” (H. Rickert, *Kant als Philosoph der modernen Kultur*, 1924). According to the literature, only cultural values “are eternal, make possible the existence of history as a science and historical development, emphasise cultural goods related to cultural values, forming the basic model of the Rickertian philosophy (History-Culture-Nature-Value)”⁷.

The notion of “value” is central to any definition of culture, all these definitions (around 300, identified up to 1952 by Kroeber and Kluckhohn, in their paper *Culture, a Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions* and subsequently reduced to 160 definitions by Pucelle) being based on the following *trichotomy*: the relation between man and nature, between man and the man enjoying a high-profile or not, between man and the idea of value⁸. For others, the trichotomous relation, resulting from the application of the system of values to the notion of culture, includes: the subject-object relation, the relation between subjects and the relation through objects⁹.

Pucelle believes that the entire human civilisation, including the field of culture which represents its accomplishment, is the development of the last two types of relations and that it begins with the first type of relation¹⁰. *Thus, the essence of civilisation is man as subject and not the multitude of interposed objects*, Pucelle appreciates. This essence *is invariable*¹¹, despite the numerous and diverse forms of civilisations and cultures, which do not have an incidence on the basic relationship.

According to other authors, civilisation cannot be reduced to its urban aspects, since it represents “the single largest unit of human organisation, higher though more amorphous

⁴ Jean-Jacques ROCHE, *Relations internationales*, LGDJ, Paris, 2005, pp. 296-299. Frédéric TEULON, *Comerțul internațional (Le commerce international)*, translated by Anca-Andreea PAVEL, Ed. Institutul European, Iași, 1997, pp. 58-59.

⁵ Sorokin, quoted in George USCĂTESCU, *Ontologia culturii (The ontology of culture)*, Ed. Științifică și Enciclopedică, București, 1987, p. 79.

⁶ *Idem*, p. 79.

⁷ According to George USCĂTESCU, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

⁸ *Idem*, p. 58.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 58.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 58.

than even an empire”. But civilisations can also be regarded as forms of “a practical response by human populations to the environments – the challenges of feeding, watering, sheltering and defend themselves”, without ignoring the cultural and religious aspect of their substance, or the linguistic component¹². An interesting phenomenon noticed in the literature regarding the evolution of civilisations over time is that genuine civilisational spaces “seem to remain consistent with themselves for long periods of time, despite external influences”.

“Civilisation”, a French term used for the first time in 1752 by the economist Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, later printed by Victor Riqueti, Marquis de Mirabeau, goes beyond aesthetic aspects, being “a highly complex human organization”, according to the literature in the field¹³.

In an encyclopaedia entry written in 1959, Fernand Braudel said that “civilisation” is “first of all a space, a cultural area ... a locus. With this locus ... you must picture a great variety of «goods», of cultural characteristics, ranging from the form of its houses, the material of which they are built, their roofing, to skills like feathering arrows, to a dialect or group of dialects, to tastes in cooking [...] and even to the compass, paper, the printing press. It is the regular grouping, the frequency with which particular characteristics recur, their ubiquity within a precise area”¹⁴.

The representatives of the behaviourist approach¹⁵ appreciate and assess culture depending on the psychological interpretation of human behaviour. A. White (in the paper *Human Behavior*) appreciates that culture is “an organisation of phenomena (acts), patterns of behaviour (objects, i.e. tools, things made with tools); ideas (i.e. belief, knowledge) and sentiments (i.e. attitudes, values) that is dependent upon the use of symbols.”¹⁶. This behaviourist believes that culture began to exist when man developed an articulated language, in which symbols are used¹⁷ and thus can be passed on from one person to another.

The phenomenological school of culture interpretation defines culture as “a set of meanings, values, non-objectified or objectified immaterial rules, together with all vehicles ensuring its dynamism, but also with all conscious individuals and groups making up the social and cultural world¹⁸”. According to this school of thought, *meaning* is essential for the cultural fact going beyond the state of natural fact, *becoming an interpreted and symbolic fact*, illustrating *man’s creative action* on nature, on himself, on the surrounding world and on others¹⁹. *Through behaviour and meaning, culture leads to the concept of personality*, according to Sorokin (in the paper *Social and Dynamics. Society, Culture, Personality*) and Talcott Parsons (who develops the theory of personality and cultural vocation), the latter regarding culture as “a product of the mutual interaction between society and personality (the latter being the result of culture)”²⁰. Moreover, the literature mentions that any cultural system is based on a social system, the two systems being interconnected. Parsons believes that the cultural system includes *a symbolic apparatus* that

¹² Coulborn, *Origins of Civilized Societies* or Fernandez-Armesto, *Civilizations*, quoted in Niall FERGUSON, *Civilization, The West and the Rest (Civilizația. Vestul și restul)*, translated by Doris Mironescu, Andreea Mironescu, Polirom, Iași, 2011, p. 24.

¹³ Niall FERGUSON, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

¹⁴ *Idem*, p. 18.

¹⁵ Sergiu TAMAȘ, *Dicționar politic. Instituțiile democrației și cultură civică (Dictionary of politics. The institutions of democracy and the civic culture)*, Ed. Academiei Române, București, 1993, p. 29.

¹⁶ According to George USCĂTESCU, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

¹⁷ *Idem*, p. 65.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 64-66.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

²⁰ George USCĂTESCU, *op. cit.*, p. 68-69.

guides and fuels all social action (in the analysis of the notion of culture, Parsons also introduces the concepts of “system” and “systems analysis”)²¹.

1.2. *Cosmopolitanism and meta-culturalism*

The word *cosmopolitanism*, which derives from the Greek *Kosmopolites* (citizen of the world) is a generic term used to describe a wide variety of views in moral and socio-political²² philosophy. But despite its ambiguity, this term can be defined as the *idea that all human beings belong to a single community, regardless of their political affiliation* (this being *defined differently* over time, some people envision a political community, while others thought that it referred to a moral community or to inter-human relations and others considered it to be the division of global markets or forms of cultural expression)²³.

In the 18th century, this term was used either to indicate “an open-minded and impartial person”, or someone who “did not define himself through his affiliation to a certain religion or a determining political authority, namely a person who did not have particular loyalties or cultural prejudice”; but the term also referred to “persons living an urban lifestyle or travelling around the world, having an international network of contacts, the ones who feel at home anywhere in the world”²⁴.

According to Kant, a *cosmopolitan* is any person who has the characteristics of freedom, equality, independence, *humankind forming a unique moral community*, governed by self-imposed moral laws, based on reason. According to Jeremy Bentham, *moral cosmopolitanism* regards humans as brothers, by virtue of morality, lawfulness, human reason, aesthetic imagination. According to another meaning, *political cosmopolitanism* is a concept referring to a type of world where all existing nations and states have been abolished, in which there is only one state, one universal republic establishing a direct relation with individuals. Kant is the author of the concept of *cosmopolitan law*²⁵, which he considers to be a body of distinct legal rules, in addition to the constitutional law and international law, referring to states and individuals (as “citizens of the earth”, here) as being the main subjects of the law²⁶.

Lastly, according to certain opinions, regarding the term “metacultural”, *metacultural* approaches reflect a type of unitary, overall approach, of all human cultures, by using the philosophical concept of “culture”²⁷. *Pluriculturalism* or *multiculturalism* is a perspective of cultural studies reflecting quantitative distinctions between cultural units, by means of a simultaneous approach of several cultures²⁸.

²¹ *Idem*, p. 69.

²² www.wikipedia.ro

²³ *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, first published in Feb.23, 2002, revision in Nov. 28, 2006, <http://plato.standord.edu/entries/cosmopolitanism>, accessed on 15.05.2013.

²⁴ See Mary KALDOR, *New and Old Wars. Organised Violence in a Global Era (Războaie vechi și noi. Violența organizată în epoca globală)*, translated by Mihnea COLUMBEANU, Ed. Antet, Oradea, 1999, pp. 101-103, who considers cosmopolitism not as a denial of identity, but rather a celebration of the diversity of global identities, acceptance and enthusiasm for multiple overlapping identities and, at the same time, a commitment to the equality of all human beings and to respect for human dignity. The cosmopolitan is someone who takes pleasure from the presence of other different people, respects their diversity and identity and the fact that people are different (while humanism corresponds to a desire of global homogeneity).

²⁵ Understood in the wider sense by Mary KALDOR, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-132. Thus, cosmopolitanism implies “a positive political vision, embracing tolerance, multiculturalism, civility and a more legalistic respect for certain overriding universal principles which should guide political communities at various levels, including the global level”.

²⁶ *Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, first published in Feb.23, 2002, revision in Nov.28, 2006, <http://plato.standord.edu/entries/cosmopolitanism>, accessed on 15.05.2013

²⁷ Dumitru ZAIȚ, coord., *Management intercultural. Valorizarea diferențelor culturale (Intercultural management. Capitalising on cultural differences)*, Ed. Economică, București, 2002, p. 81.

²⁸ *Idem*, pp. 80-81.

1.3. *Intercultural, intracultural, transcultural*

According to authors like Hudson, Baokat and Laforge, *intercultural* relations are relatively easy to define, since they provide information on the specific variations of rules, depending on the cultural differences between two or more cultural areas (unlike the *intracultural approach*)²⁹. Intercultural studies focus on the analysis of cultural units without powerful historical connections between them, which are located either on different continents, or in different regions. The comparison between these cultural units according to the specificities of each one of them results in the identification of different types and forms of relations between them³⁰.

Unlike the *intracultural* approach (marked by the thorough study of a cultural entity considered separately), *intercultural* studies focus on interactive processes, different combinations resulted from the meeting of two or more cultures³¹; therefore, intercultural approach concerns a dynamic process of interaction between cultures regarded as “entities capable of evolution, adaptation and mutual cultural influence³², according to the literature in the field.

Regarding the *transcultural* dimension of the studies on cultures and civilisations, it is generally considered to be a vague term, used either to substitute the term “intercultural”, or to distinguish itself from it³³. Despite its ambiguity (according to some authors), the word *transcultural* has features common to several cultures or common characteristics that do not derive from the nature of cultural systems, but are revealed by the biological level, the human species (transcultural and intercultural), or are the result of the great religious revelations (transcultural and supra-cultural)³⁴.

While *transcultural* studies approach the relations between cultures in the strict sense, studies that focus on the *intercultural* perspective envisage the interaction between cultural units from a synergetic perspective, of their mutual influence³⁵. But it seems that this is not an explicit enough distinction between the terms “intercultural” and “transcultural”. In our opinion, the term *transcultural* rather reflects a transcendence of mutual interactions between cultures, emphasising a new cultural phenomenon, born from these various interactions, but observed in its ways of manifestation and in the forms it takes, at regional, international or even global level. The term *transcultural* uses a dimension of analysis and synthesis of the results of various interactions between cultural units, *being similar*, in our opinion, *rather to metacultural or supracultural studies*, to those cultural processes and phenomena which can have a regional or even a global dimension, born from the various interactions of cultural units (rejection, dialogue, borrowing, openness, response, withdrawal, etc.) seen as dynamic, reactive units, generating and disseminating cultural elements.

A characteristic of the global order at the beginning of the 21st century is *the complexity of the actors that can influence it*³⁶ (especially the prominence of those actors or informal groups, such as G8, that can, at some point, develop forms of economic

²⁹ Authors quoted in Dumitru ZAIȚ, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

³⁰ *Idem*, pp. 80-81.

³¹ Dumitru ZAIȚ, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

³² *Idem*, p. 80.

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 81.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 81.

³⁵ According to Jürgen Bolten, quoted in Dumitru ZAIȚ, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-81.

³⁶ Alvin TOFFLER, *op. cit.*, pp. 193-204.

imperialism, political imperialism or, on a more elaborate level, cultural imperialism³⁷ - although, in the case of informal groups such as G8, where participants come from or represent entirely different civilisational areas or cultures, exercising a *cultural collective imperialism is more difficult*, being possible only if it refers to the *implementation of global regimes of rules, norms, practices, symbols, values, general recommendations in the cultural field* -).

Conclusions

In conclusion, cultural globalisation is not a process dating back to the end of the 20th century, but, on the contrary, it is based on successive and distinct historical stages, as we can talk about *cultural interferences* between distinct civilisational areas, *civilisational borrowings* since ancient times (the age of city-states, the age of empires).

Elements of cultural proto-globalisation, understood as the basis for the creation of social, cultural, political and religious identities of people, can be identified ever since the Antiquity, *through world religions* and what experts have defined as “*the culture of imperial elites*” (closed mini-systems of political, religious and military governance of imperial conglomerates).

With the emergence of *nation-states and an international political order, focusing on the nation-state* as the main actor of the international political arena, but also with the emergence and dissemination at international level of *certain ideologies*, such as capitalism, communism or political, administrative and rationalist ways of thinking on the organisation of the systems of human communities (technocratism, bureaucracy, scientism, technicism), we can speak about a *new phase of evolution* in the history of globalisation as a process of generating and disseminating cultural flows between different civilisational areas, but also as an active factor influencing and changing the type and degree of civilisation within human communities, going up to defining a new supra-civilisation (moment when *the globalisation itself is changing into a form of global civilisation*, through a change in the *essence* of the great civilisational areas of the globe).

It should be noted that, although today's world is composite (the Westphalian world *continuing to resist* the pressures from global actors and globalisation processes – certain authors of the literature in the field even speak about a resistance of the nation-states to a new type of cultural imperialism, which would be the essence of the globalisation at the beginning of the 21st century), *a world marked by the increasing influence of global actors* (especially multinational corporations, which, in our opinion, are active factors in the process of destructuring of the Westphalian world and creating a private global empire, outside the scope of the democratic political control of citizens and states themselves), *we cannot speak about a disappearance of national identities and national cultures*. Although they are *strongly affected* by forms of cosmopolitanism, by the increasing interferences between civilisations, as a result of the activities carried out by global actors (especially the creation of a global mass culture, through the activity of press organisations with global dissemination), as an effect of the globalisation of markets, but also of the globalisation of dangers, threats and violence,

³⁷ Marie-Claude SMOUTS, Dario BATTISTELLA, Pascal VENESSION, *Dictionnaire de relations internationales*, Dalloz, Paris, 2006, pp. 506-508. Sterian DUMITRESCU, Ana BAL, *Economie mondială (World Economy)*, ed. a II-a, Ed. Economică, București, 2002, pp. 53-62.

nation-states, national cultures and national identities *remain the benchmarks* of human communities in their definition as communities of the 21st century world”.

The intensity, diversity and rapidity of today’s global dissemination of cultural flows, due to the emergence and continuous development of communication technologies, of the globalisation of markets (under the pressure of corporations), significantly challenge the world of nation-states, which focuses on the promotion of national culture and national identity. The new technologies generated and promoted by corporations as a lifestyle and as a way to relate to the new values of this type of cultural globalisation (the consumer society, materialism as a lifestyle, hedonism, the revaluation of the symbols of popular cultures, which are now bearing the meanings of the market culture, hence the specific phrases used, such as “McDonaldisation” or “the Coca-Cola culture”) are trying to transform the Westphalian world into a “global village”.

In our opinion, this tremendous impact of the new global actors on the world of nation-states (we can even speak about the creation of a “*global cultural market*”, where cultural values become mere “cultural products” intended for consumption and subsequent disposal – a manner of thinking which is harmful to national identities and cultures based on the idea of nation) cannot be denied. Nevertheless, we believe that the argument concerning the standardisation of national cultures cannot be considered to explain an unshakeable reality.

On the contrary, it is difficult to assess the impact of the global production and distribution of popular cultural products (entertainment, mass cultural consumption) on national cultures and on local and national identities. *Alternative cultural forms have already emerged at local and national level, as a reaction to the global culture* (in this case, as a reaction to the form of Western culture distributed globally through corporations and other global actors, especially in the field of the mass media and mass entertainment).

Moreover, it is difficult to estimate whether cultural globalisation (here, regarded as cultural standardisation in specific fields, such as the global production and distribution of films, music) also leads automatically to a standardisation of other local and national traditions and customs. It is also difficult to assess the actual manner in which global cultural products are consumed at local and national level, as well as the way in which they are viewed by local populations (which do not merely play a passive role, as cultural marketing strategists of the great corporations or great powers would expect, and which can interpret and transform the meanings of the globally dominating culture in original and surprising ways).

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FORMS OF GLOBAL CULTURES AT THE BEGINNING OF 21st CENTURY

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Abstract: *This paper seeks to analyse a few types of global cultures (mass-media culture, the corporatist culture), formed as a result of globalised cultural phenomena, and also the concepts and processes of cultural imperialism, soft power as cultural power, which are particularly important in the current framework of international relations.*

Keywords: *global cultures, soft power, post-industrial societies, global village, mass-media cultures, corporatist cultures*

1. A short typology of the forms of global cultures at the beginning of the 21st century

This communication seeks to briefly analyse some of what we consider to be forms of global cultures at the beginning of the 21st century, without claiming to offer an exhaustive presentation or analysis. Some of them can be understood as forms of *soft power* (or cultural imperialism, which, in the context of the phenomena of cultural globalisation, gains a special meaning and a significant importance concerning the redistribution of power relations – here being interpreted as including cultural power-), while others are born as a direct effect of the intensification, diversification and dissemination of the flows of ideas, information and information technology at global level.

1.1. The global communication society

We believe that the forms of global culture at the beginning of the 21st century also include the one stemming from the phenomena of intensification, dissemination and technological advance in the field of mass-media.

According to Marshall McLuhan¹, the cultural universe, the mindset and life forms in the globalist society undergo a fundamental restructuring, due to the predominant role played by the means of communication in the Third Wave societies (based on information and knowledge, post-industrial societies)². Thus, *the new information technologies and audio-visual communication, considered in relation to the phenomenon of cultural globalisation (including the mass media culture)*³ have changed fundamentally and irreversibly the way of thinking and the structure of culture, in a different way than the culture stemming from the large-scale development of the printing technology did.

¹ In his works *The Gutenberg Galaxy* (1962), *Understanding Media: The Extension of Man* (1964), *The Medium is the Message* (1967), see Grigore GEORGIU, *Filosofia culturii. Cultură și comunicare (The philosophy of culture. Culture and communication)*, ed. a II-a, SNSPA, Ed. Comunicare.ro, București, 2004, p. 204.

² Alvin TOFFLER, *Power shift [Power shift. Puterea în mișcare]*, translated by Mihnea COLUMBEANU, Ed. Antet, s.a., s.l., pp. 22-24 (knowledge being defined here as the “highest quality power”).

³ David HELD, Anthony McGREW; David GOLDBLATT; Jonathan PERRATON, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture (Transformări globale. Politică, economie, cultură)*, translated by Ramona-Elena LUPAȘCU, Adriana ȘTRAUB, Mihaela BORDEA, Alina-Maria TURCU, Polirom, Iași, 2004, p. 373).

At the beginning of the 21st century, we witness *a type of post-modern culture, specific to post-industrial societies, a mosaic-world* producing a mass culture, specific to a global mass society, a network-world, a simultaneous world, where everything happens at the same time and is in tune⁴. Some authors speak about *the emergence of a “global village”*⁵, due to the new technological means of communication, which connect people to them (television, Internet, online social networks). There is a shift from the culture of words to a *predominantly visual culture*, but also to *the dynamic interference between all means of communication which contain one another*⁶ (the film, for example).

If modernity meant fragmentation, empowerment, specialisation, individualisation, *post-modern culture is based on cultural globalisation, on interaction, on the simulacrum world, but also on the simultaneous world*⁷. The simultaneous broadcasting of images to the people connected to these new means of communication with global or regional coverage, the continuous shaping of culture, through the action of communications via the Internet and online social networks, progressively create a new vision of the world, therefore *a new type of culture* (called by some “*the media culture*”). Far from being a simple “means of providing people with unbiased, objective information”, the mass-media currently represents “a means of educating people in the spirit of post-modern culture”, changing their way of relating to the world, their way of representing the world⁸.

Thus, a media culture is created, produced and controlled by an organised system of people in the field of information technologies (in the wider sense), which can be accessed by anyone who owns or knows how to use the appropriate technological tools (Internet, TV).

The global culture at the beginning of the 21st century is an essentially audio-visual one, based on television and the Internet as means of communication significantly increasing the degree of inter-connectivity between individuals, until the creation of this concept of “global village”. That is why it is very important to mention that *the mass media do not represent, for this type of culture, simply an instrument for conveying information, but also a means to influence society as a whole, but also each individual, regarding the mental organisation of representations and man’s inner image of the world*⁹.

According to the literature, *the primary universe of life* (the immediate reality) is coupled with the *virtual universe* (the reality reshaped by the media), through the use of the technological infrastructure of social communication (allowing *a global dissemination* of information and messages), *and the audio-visual universe*. A mass public also emerges (due to the phenomenon of cultural globalisation, to the emergence of a new mass culture, distinct from the culture of elites, from the specialised culture) at global level, *educated and manipulated by the mass media, according to the new ideas on value, globally disseminated by them*. We no longer talk about “simple channels for communicating information”, in its raw, unprocessed state, but about the interposition and over sizing of intermediate links which are making their way *through this global communication system*, dominated by media corporations and their own interests: the dimension of political, economic, cultural *analyses*, by which these corporations, via the programmes they propose to the post-modern

⁴ Ori BRAFMAN, Reod A. BECKSTROM, *The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations (Steaua de mare și păianjenul. Puterea de neoprit a organizațiilor fără lider*, translated by Iuliana Raluca Hiliuță, Ed. All, București, 2011, pp. 34-39).

⁵ McLuhan, quoted in Grigore GEORGIU, *Filosofia, op. cit.*, p. 210.

⁶ *Idem*, p. 210.

⁷ Also see Viorica RAMBA, *Ecologii culturale vechi și noi în pragul mileniului III. Repere sintetice din istoria culturii umane (Old and new forms of cultural ecology on the threshold of the third millennium. Synthetic landmarks in the history of human culture)*, Ed. All Educational, București, 1999, p. 463-464.

⁸ McLuhan, citat în Grigore GEORGIU, *Filosofia, op. cit.*, pp. 210-212.

⁹ *Idem*, p. 211.

audience, *create a uniform level of cultural expectations, of cultural representation, a post-modern symbolism, a means through which post-modern people perceive the surrounding world and themselves*¹⁰.

The mass media launch cultural trends, post-modern lifestyles, values of mass culture, continuously educating their audience (with the consciousness of its globality, its affiliation to the global culture of communication) through the manipulation of the media reality (manufactured, different from the primary reality). This is the image of reality built by the mass media through their messages, the global universe of communication, in which the mass media become an active agent and more than that they have gained a position of control and manipulation of the messages communicated by them.

The global mass media (the corporations of the written or online press, television channels, companies owning online social networks, etc, which are “global” in as much as they can be accessed by any user of this means of communication, addressing a global audience, formed according to a global mass media culture, having certain expectations and preferences) *have the ability to define and interpret social reality*, therefore becoming *an active agent* (that can exercise a *strict control*, depending on the relevant society to which we relate) *guiding* people’s behaviour, but also the behaviour of public authorities¹¹.

The mass culture is also called *technoculture*, given its dependence on the new technologies (according to René Berger) and its emergence is due to the extension at global level of the new communication technologies (Internet, television), generating a fundamental change of paradigms in the fields of the philosophy of art and culture in general¹². In this culture, specific to post-industrial societies, based on a knowledge and information society, a prominent role is played by *the cognitariat* (defined as “the elite processing information, carrying out knowledge-based and management activities, producing scientific expertise and ensuring the functioning of the gigantic media machine”¹³).

According to the above-mentioned opinion, the mass media underlie the mass culture in the globalist age, generating another vision of the world and therefore *a fundamental change in the cultural paradigm*. Due to its global scope of social influence (on the global village and its mentality), *the power of communication changes into a political power*¹⁴. Thus, it influences the political world, political decisions, due to its high degree of social concentration. Therefore, in the new global village, *information warfare* emerges as a new way of understanding and waging conflicts between political actors, changing the global village into a *strategic place*, with winners and losers¹⁵.

1.2. The corporate and consumerist culture – connection with global economy

As a result of the ever-growing role played by non-state actors in the post-modern world at the beginning of the 21st century (especially multinational companies), in the analysis of the content of cultural globalisation we must refer shortly to a form of global culture conventionally called here “the corporate culture” (generated and influenced by the great corporations, which have an effect on the large socio-cultural units in the framework of which these actors carry out their economic activities, also having an impact on the social, political and cultural field).

¹⁰ Radu M. OLINESCU, *Biologia și psihologia artei (The biology and the psychology of art)*, ed. Cernaprint, s.l., 2008, pp. 186-187, 305-308.

¹¹ Grigore GEORGIU, *Filosofia*, p. 212.

¹² Ibidem, pp. 212-213. David HELD *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 392-408.

¹³ Grigore GEORGIU, *Filosofia*, p. 213.

¹⁴ Alvin TOFFLER, *op. cit.*, pp. 331-365.

¹⁵ Grigore GEORGIU, *Filosofia*, p. 229.

Certain authors use the concept of “*enterprise culture*” (which they use to refer not only to the culture developed by corporations, but also to the culture generated by any enterprise or company and which represents a way of manifestation of a greater culture – which can be even a national, regional or ethnic culture¹⁶ – used by a company in order to mark its identity more profoundly, constitute and strengthen, protect and disseminate its system of values, representations and symbols that are shared and promoted by all its members.

According to this culture, each member of the respective company or corporation adopts a common vision of what that enterprise is, of its objectives, role and position it occupies in relation to its competitors, of its constitutive goal in relation to its clients, staff and shareholders. The authors of intercultural management studies (some of which also analyse the enterprise culture¹⁷ provide a wide definition of the concept of enterprise, considering it to be “culture in general, based on beliefs, values and rules, on a set of symbols that can be found in the language, myths, histories, rites and rituals (...), an attempt of enterprises to adapt by diversification, by forming their own cultural characteristics, not necessarily to mark their particularities and oppose other enterprises, but especially to resist competition and to evolve in a positive way”.

By the proliferation of companies, small and medium enterprises, especially of great non-state actors, without a national, clearly shaped identity¹⁸ (which translates into an “affiliation to a specific national culture”), namely multinational corporations, *the enterprise culture becomes one of the forms of global cultures*¹⁹ that need to be analysed as a factor influencing the wider phenomenon of cultural globalisation (regarding its emergence in the world at the beginning of the 21st century, its strengthening and development).

When non-state actors, such as corporations (but only the ones with a strong connection between the parent company, the centre making the main strategic decisions or most decisions and the national culture of the state of origin or the principle place of business), emerge on the global stage (of decisions, influences and actions, not only political, but also economic, cultural, military, social), the culture of the respective corporation is no longer transnational; on the contrary, it represents the national culture of the state of origin, of decision-making headquarters or of the main shareholders) asserted at global level²⁰. At global level, this corporation changes into an agent *representing* the national culture of the state of origin/state of decision-making headquarters/the state where the main shareholders are located or where its assets are²¹; moreover, it can become an agent *promoting*, at global level, the national culture of the state with whom it established the strongest connection or an exclusive connection²², with a view to create a global society *educated in the spirit of a certain form* of cultural globalisation.

¹⁶ Dumitru ZAIȚ, coord., *Management intercultural. Valorizarea diferențelor culturale (Cultural Management. Capitalising on cultural differences)*, Ed. Economică, București, 2002, pp. 82-83.

¹⁷ *Idem*, pp. 83-85.

¹⁸ According to a dissenting opinion (namely that multinational companies appear as agents of economic imperialism exercised by the great powers in the international economic order, see Cynthia GHORRA-GOBIN, *Dictionnaire des mondialisations*, Ed. Armand Colin, Paris, 2006, pp. 165-166).

¹⁹ David HELD *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 275-277, 282-289.

²⁰ On the contrary, the gradual disappearance of national economies as a result of international financial pressure, in parallel with the global economic domination of transnational corporations without a national affiliation, the location where they are set up having only an economic incidence, see Paul HIRST, *War and Power in the Twenty-first Century (Război și putere în secolul 21)*, translated by Nicolae NĂSTASE, Ed. Antet, 2001, p. 94).

²¹ In that connection, also see Jean-Francois GUILHAUDIS, *Relations Internationales Contemporaines*, Lexis Nexis, Litec Paris, 2005, pg. 298. Concerning economic imperialism, see Peter MARSHALL, *Imperialism*, published by Sempringham in The New Perspective Journal, vol. 2, no. 2, <http://www.history-ontheweb.co.uk/concepts/imperialism22.htm>.

²² In this sense, authors like Hirst and Thompson/1996, quoted by David HELD *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

Consumerism is also a form of global culture, at the beginning of the 21st century, originating in the rise and proliferation of the great non-state actors (transnational or international corporations, with their global or regional strategies for conquering markets), liberalism (here, as economic ideology, promoted by democratic governments within the scope of Western civilisation and eventually integrated in their policies by economic or political-economic institutions and international organisations of the most various kinds – ranging from the ones of cooperation to the ones of integration or informal and composite groups for international consultation and economic decision-making with global impact).

In this paper, we refer to the consumerism related to a certain social behavioural and self-referential profile of a community (whether or not politically organised) at the beginning of the 21st century, under the circumstances of the domination of national, regional markets and even of the creation of a global market by transnational corporations. In this sense, we understand consumerism as an *exaggerated interest*, specific to contemporary societies, in acquiring and consuming goods and services which are not all essential for survival or for the traditional lifestyle and that are used *without* a complementary, systematised, conscious, coordinated *action*, based on a public-private partnership of *reducing the impact on the environment of the enormous quantity of waste* resulting from this social use of the most diverse goods and services (affecting people's lives, ultimately consumers' lives).

The contemporary consumerist society continues to *emphasise the irrational, irresponsible use* (from the perspective of the need to respect, protect and preserve the quality of the environment, its integrity and purity) of *great quantities of goods and services producing toxins or transforming into toxic, non-degradable waste, spread throughout the Earth's ecosystem*, increasing the level of pollution, together with industrial activities and other types of activities (cultures of genetically modified organisms, chemical agriculture)²³. This dimension of consumerism (together with the influence exercised on society – especially through the aggressive policy of commercial advertising carried out especially in the mass media, by companies in the name of trade freedom and the market law) *certainly has a negative, destructive impact on human civilisation and on local, regional and traditional cultures, based on the respect for nature and the preservation of the purity and integrity of the environment*²⁴.

Having become a form of contemporary global culture, by an unfortunate association between the secular transnational ideology of liberalism (translated by corporations into market domination and weakening of the levers of control of nation-states on their policies and actions)²⁵) and corporatism (market liberalisation, that is the free

²³ But other authors notice that, in the framework of the consumerist culture developed by the global society profoundly influenced by capitalism, *an experience of volatility*, the cultivation of a lifestyle (under the influence of the mass media, via advertising) based on the idea of superficiality, boredom, disposability, novelty and instantaneous outdating. Thus, a real dynamics of a "throw-away" society emerges, in which the *mass media and the images promoted by them end up playing an essential role in the manufacturing of a global consumerist culture*, to the extent that the *images themselves have become a merchandise*, since they can be sold instantaneously (hence *the role of the simulacrum*, of mass production, of the repetitive, the substitution of value with the notion of product, particularly important in the post-modern culture, *the simulacrum replacing the original*, changing the entire lifestyle of a society and therefore *discrediting the very idea of value*): see Mihaela CONSTANTINESCU, *Forme în mișcare. Postmodernismul (Changing forms. Postmodernism)*, Ed. Univers Enciclopedic, București, 1999, pp 95-96.

²⁴ Alvin Toffler speaks about the trend of the so-called "eco-theocracy", by propelling ecology on the world political agenda, as a direct result of the series of catastrophes produced by the declining industrial society. According to Alvin TOFFLER, op. cit., pp. 375-380.

²⁵ Also understood as economic imperialism. See the post-modern definition of the phrase in Maurice VAÏSSE, coord., (*Dicționar de relații internaționale. Secolul XX*, translated by Marius Roman, Ed. Polirom, Iași, 2008, p. 165-166).

movement of goods and services, including the ones having a toxic effect on human bodies or on the environment), consumerism implies a social dimension of temporary possession, destined strictly for use and disposal²⁶. Goods and services are meant to be used and disposed of, since they are out of fashion and must be replaced with better others (according to the consumerist ideology).

The aspect of *recycling the waste* resulted from the actions of using and disposing of products and the aspect of actions taken in order to *protect the environment and consumers, to inform consumers* on the quality and the substance of the goods and services they use are dimensions recently added to the irrational, irresponsible culture of consumerism. Morally, consumerism leads to superficiality, and greed, acquiring and using commodities becoming the main purpose of life and even creating a false identity of consumers (human transformation, under the permanent stimulation of advertisements, into a perpetual consumer). This form of global culture (consumerism) has its own institutions and actors: it is promoted especially through non-state actors (the international mass media, international financial institutions or economic international organisations, transnational corporations and their lobbying the governments – since we are talking about a global dimension of this post-modernist culture). The role of these institutions in the global consumerist society, as noticed in the specialised literature, is to encourage and serve to the promotion of consumerism as a lifestyle and to organise society (until the state eventually ends up functioning *according to consumerist principles*, under the action of non-state actors).

Sociologists and other authors who studied the phenomenon of consumerism at global scale believe that *the definition of the consumerist process must take into account several dimensions*: the development of new goods and needs of the consumer, in parallel with the development of a real *consumerist apparatus* (from producers, distributors, intermediaries, sellers, to the phenomenon of the emergence and proliferation of large chains of stores, to the inclusive pseudo-social-consumerist concept of “malls”, which combines shopping with other activities considered to be entertaining or relaxing: cinema, restaurants, playgrounds for children, reading spaces). As noticed in the literature of intercultural management, we are evolving towards a computerised world culture²⁷, complemented by a *cultural heterochrony* (concept used by J. Demorgon)²⁸, that is a phenomenon of diversification of national cultures and *building complex and diversified cultural micro-environments*. Corporations create their *specific cultures* (called by authors either “enterprise cultures” or “organisational cultures” or “professional cultures”) in order to single them out in relation to the national, regional and local cultures of non-corporate communities. In as much as these cultures are able (from the point of view of their intensity, global degree of dissemination and influence on national/regional and local cultures) to generate *effects on most or on all* regional and local national cultures, we can talk about *the exercise of private global forms of cultural power*²⁹, under certain circumstances, becoming what can be called “*private cultural imperialism*”.

Contemporary cultural globalisation is marked by what the authors of studies dedicated to the phenomenon of globalisation called “the domination of multinational

²⁶ In another sense, consumerism is regarded as a movement for consumers’ rights, an economic expression of the American revolution (Jim Turner, *The Chemical Feast: the Nader Report on the FDA*). See John NAISBITT, *Megatrends (Megatendințe)*, translated by Constantin COȘMAN, Ed. Politică, București, 1989, pp. 257-260).

²⁷ Also see Alvin TOFFLER, *op. cit.*, pp. 279-295.

²⁸ Dumitru ZAIȚ, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

²⁹ Here we must also take into account the definition of the concept “*transcendent cultural power*” by which he refers to a “movement of people and texts which contributes to establishing a pattern of cultural beliefs shared on a large scale and, thus, the creation of patterns of mutual interaction between different locations, in which cultural ideas from a certain place influence the ones from another place” (Michael Mann, 1986, in David HELD *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 375).

corporations in the industry of culture” concerning the creation, possession of infrastructures and organisations for the production and distribution of cultural commodities and for conquering/maintaining a *global market of cultural goods and services*³⁰.

2. Global cultural power: soft imperialism?

In as much as we can distinguish a relation of power between the centre and its (global) peripheries, a *cultural power exercised at global level through one or more agents* (various non-state actors, such as the corporations maintaining a close/exclusive relation with the respective state³¹; international NGOs, groups of states, more or less formal, institutionalised, such as G7, G8, G20³²; the international mass media or international organisations whose founders are certain states) and by which the state in question ends up in a position of cultural domination in relation to the remaining actors, at global level, we are dealing with a *soft imperialism*³³.

Also called *cultural imperialism*, it is a form of exercising an imperial relation by using a subtle form of power (cultural power) in the framework of an international system dominated by a state/group of states (often being part of the same civilisational area). This too can be regarded as a *form of global culture* that can define the international society between the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, in as much as the existence of *subtle* forms of imperialism (non-violent, non-military³⁴) is acknowledged – for instance, according to the realist paradigm for the study of international relations.

Corporations can exercise, just like states, *direct or subtle forms of imperialism*, whether or not they are acknowledged as such and sanctioned by the international community³⁵ (there is also an international legal regime prohibiting all forms of imperialism in the contemporary international legal order).

In as much as this type of imperialism (here, a subtle and cultural one) is distinguished by a *global scope of action* (dissemination), transforming into a *substitute/competitor for national, regional or local cultures, but also into an instrument ensuring the superiority of the national culture of the state with which it identifies itself* (at the level of enterprise culture), *eventually up to domination*³⁶, a point when there takes place a *practical shift* from elements of local/regional/national cultures to elements of the global cultural form (the culture of the *hegemon*³⁷ of the international political system, at a given

³⁰ David HELD *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 387, 392-394.

³¹ Ilie ȘERBĂNESCU, *Corporațiile transnaționale (Transnational corporations)*, Ed. Politică, București, 1978, pp. 83-124. Walter C. OPELLO Jr., Stephen J. ROSOW, *The Nation-State and Global Order. A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics*, Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, London, 2004, pp. 254-256. David H. BLAKE, Robert S. WALTERS, *The Politics of Global Economic Relations*, Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1997, pp. 90-115. Jean-Louis REIFFERS (coord.), *Sociétés transnationales et développement endogène. Effets sur la culture, la communication, l'éducation, la science et la technologie*, Les Preses de l'UNESCO, Paris, 1981, pp. 121-163.

³² Jan WOUTERS, Thomas RAMOPOULOS, *The G20 and Global Economic Governance: Lessons from multi-level European Governance?*, *Journal of International Economic Law* 15(3), 751-775, 2012, Published by Oxford University Press, <http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org>, accessed on 13 March 2013.

³³ Stéphane ROSIÈRE, *Géographie politique & Géopolitique. Une grammaire de l'espace politique*, Ellipses, Paris, 2003, 291-292.

³⁴ Robert COOPER, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (Destrămarea națiunilor. Ordine și haos în secolul XXI)*, translated by Sebastian HULUBAN, Ed. Univers Enciclopedic, București, 2007, pp. 96-99).

³⁵ Walter C. OPELLO, Jr., Stephen J. ROSOW, *The Nation-State and Global Order. A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 2004, p. 254.

³⁶ Jean-Louis REIFFERS (coord.), *Sociétés transnationales, op. cit.*, pp. 181-270.

³⁷ Leadership exercised in an international system by a leader, seen in the classical (state-centric) interpretation of most authors as a “state” (while the globalist order implies *types of non-conventional hegemonies, exercised*

point, for instance), it turns into a *form of global culture, falling within the scope of the phenomenon of “cultural globalisation”*.

Likewise, forms of *private* soft imperialism (and not as representatives of a state) can be exercised at global level *by multinational corporations*³⁸, *as non-state actors acting on their own account*, behaving *in fact* as hegemons³⁹ in relation to national/local/regional cultures (extension of the concept of “hegemon” from the field of political and state affairs proper, specific to the international political order, dominated by nation states or empires, to the cultural field), *on the basis of unbeneficial and unequal relations*, typical to the phenomena of imperialism, *through which cultural power is held exclusively by these corporations*. This way, their soft imperialism (here, a cultural, not an economic one) is the *enterprise culture itself* of those corporations (the specific culture oriented towards the identification of specific rules and behaviours by which the corporation can obtain advantages in its competition with other corporations⁴⁰). Here, we are practically talking about a form of global culture *different from the soft imperialism, exercised by nation states or by federations through corporations*⁴¹. This form of imperialism *is mostly or even entirely private*, having no connection with the state of origin of the corporation, of the international NGO, of an international organisation/integration entity.

That is why it is natural to take into account, in the global order at the beginning of the 21st century, *different forms of global cultures*, including *the enterprise culture (or the culture of transnational corporations)*⁴² developed in the framework of a private soft imperialism, through which these private actors *have become detached from the connections with national/regional culture and are promoting, like real private hegemons, their own type of culture* (this is a type of private soft imperialism that can *be, at some point, taken up and annexed by a state actor* – for instance, *by the state hegemon* of the classic international political system, which is *at the centre* of the complex global system, oriented precisely towards *ensuring/gaining a position of soft cultural domination* in the relations with other states⁴³.

Conclusions

Although certain authors of the literature on globalisation believe that it is difficult to assess the actual impact of global flows of ideas, of transnational and supranational institutions, of regional (transnational) cultural identities, of technological products (in particular telecommunication products which enable the creation and dissemination of a global mass culture at transnational level, especially through films, information, music) on

by several types of non-state actors, sometimes together with state actors, individually or organised in informal groups or groups institutionalised to a lesser degree, such as G7, G8, G20 or a myriad of actors of all kinds, gathered in forums – for instance, the Davos or Evian Forums). See Graham EVANS, Jeffrey NEWNHAM, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations (Dicționar de relații internaționale*, translated by Anca Irina Ionescu, Ed. Universal Dalsi, București, 2001, pp. 231-232).

³⁸ Ilie ȘERBĂNESCU, *op. cit.*, pp. 34, 44-53.

³⁹ David H. BLAKE, Robert S. WALTERS, *The Politics of Global Economic Relations*, Prentice Hall, INC., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, USA, 1997, pp. 76-77.

⁴⁰ Dumitru ZAIȚ, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

⁴¹ Ilie ȘERBĂNESCU, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-166.

⁴² Dumitru ZAIȚ, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-83. Florin BONCIU, *Economie mondială (Global Economy)*, Univ. Româno-Americană, Ed. Lumina Lex, București, 2004, pp. 69-78.

⁴³ The literature in the field admits that, when we talk about the relation globalisation-transnational corporations, direct foreign investments at global level are made mainly by corporations from developed countries. Globalisation *favours the phenomenon of concentration of capital*, since, in order to use the advantages of a *global market*, corporations need *superior resources* compared to the ones available to many states. According to Florin BONCIU, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

national cultures and national identities, we cannot ignore that, at the beginning of the 21st century, we are facing a *period when cultural globalisation has reached its peak*.

It is true that national identities and national cultures cannot remain pure, unaltered by the action of global actors (especially global media corporations) and that they are subject to *considerable pressure in order to dissipate in favour of local, regional, continental identities and cultures or of global culture* (considered by certain authors to be *the cultural imperialism at its peak*, exercised by the great powers of this age, in a rather soft manner, through global actors such as corporations or global NGOs or other formal or informal decision-making groups with a global reach, which fall into the category of “*global imperial elites*” – if we take into account the monopoly on decisions concerning issues of global interest in their framework). But there are also *forces contrary* to the process of cultural globalisation, which must be taken into consideration in any relevant analysis on this topic (for instance, separatist, regionalist, independence movements and tendencies within states or, on the contrary, nationalist movements, meant to strengthen nation states). These movements of *fragmentation of global culture* reposition the *de facto* centre of power once again in favour of *units other than the centres of global cultural imperialism* (the latter being either centres of *formal* power – represented through great state powers or association of states with supranational governance – or centres of *informal* power – the most various types of non-state actors, with a global level of decision-making influence. Whether we talk about infra-national, local or national units, these identities continue to *represent alternatives to the forms of official global cultures*, which tend to standardise civilisational areas of contemporary world, setting them to observe and acknowledge common standards or pseudo-values.

As regards national cultures and national identities, they are facing, at the beginning of the 21st century, a *double challenge*: the first is posed by *infra-national and local cultures which tend to relate to the state as a rival or oppressor, seeking to reach the maximum level of autonomy*, and the second is posed by *cultural imperialisms developed at global level* (in complex relations, from civilisational alliances to wars for global cultural hegemony) between the great actors of the beginning of the 21st century (great state powers, international integration organisations, informal, non-institutionalised or quasi-transparent groups of global decision-making).

Although cultural globalisation cannot be denied, since it develops *complex mixtures of elements belonging to different cultural areas* (hybrid cultures), the world at the beginning of the 21st century *cannot be imagined without national cultural areas and national identities*. Despite the fact that they are subject to considerable pressure from global cultural flows, but also from cultures defining themselves in opposition to everything that is national (infra-national, local cultures), they remain important and irreplaceable for most members of the world’s population.

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CULTURE AND SECURITY IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

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Abstract: *The present paper draws upon the fact that the term security, as well as the phenomenon it covers, have undergone deep changes, especially in the post-Cold War era. Therefore, we intend to analyse the way the concept of security has been reconfigured over the last decades, in connection with the latest practices in the field. Consequently, we shall approach the subtle links between culture (in its widest sense) and the phenomenon of security in present-time society, by demonstrating that there is a complex relationship between the two. Along the same lines, we intend to argue that the ending of the Cold War triggered the redefining of identities among Western states, establishing new forms of (cultural and symbolic) power within politico-military alliances.*

Keywords: *security, culture, identity, security and defence policies, reconfiguration, cultural power, symbolic power.*

Introduction

The undertaking of joining two concepts such as *culture* and *security* is particularly challenging due to the multifaceted nature of the two, as they have been subject to countless definitions and differentiations. Our intention, however, is to emphasize the subtle connections between these two concepts, and since there are neither exhaustive, nor agreed definitions of *culture* or *security*, we shall rely in the present approach on fairly wide-ranging meanings of these multidimensional, inclusive terms. One fundamental assumption of our argument is the fact that the phenomena of culture and security display both stability and changeability, that they are evolving and undergoing various transformations. But the most important claim we want to make and support is that culture has a profound impact on security practices, no matter if the actors involved are aware of the respective influence or not. Therefore, in what follows we shall investigate the nature of the two concepts under analysis and we shall examine several consequences of their overlap.

1. General remarks on culture

To begin with, *culture* is one vast concept, notoriously difficult to pin down, that has, according to Brooker, “a complex and still open history, which in itself expresses the complexity of general human history”.¹ Different theorists have tried to offer more or less convoluted definitions of the term, out of which we shall select several in keeping with our scientific purpose.

Samovar and Porter, for instance, argue that culture is “ubiquitous, multidimensional, complex and all pervasive”², therefore it should be analysed in the context of multiple

¹ Brooker, P., *A Glossary of Cultural Theory*, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, p.58.

² Samovar, L.A.&Porter, R.E., *An Introduction to Intercultural Communication*, in *Intercultural Communication: A Reader*, Wadsworth Publishing Company, 7th edition, Belmont, California, 1994, p.11.

disciplines and perspectives as it represents a “matrix of interacting elements”.³ Expanding on the topic, the two scholars also put forward the essential constituents of culture, defining it as: “the deposit of knowledge, experience, beliefs, values, attitudes, meanings, hierarchies, religion, notions of time, roles, spatial relations, concepts of the universe, and material objects and possessions acquired by a group of people in the course of generations through individual and group striving”.⁴

What is worth bearing in mind from this definition is its emphasis on attitudes/values and the underlying assumption that culture is both stable and dynamic, preserving universal categories, but evolving under the influence of individual and collective experiences.

In a similar manner, Salzmann claims that the term culture designates a “total pattern of human learned behaviour transmitted from generation to generation”⁵, whereas Hofstede⁶ defines culture as the “collective programming of the mind”, through which members pertaining to one group or category distinguish themselves from others. The researcher further uses the metaphor of *mental software*⁷ to refer to culture as a subtle unconscious conditioning. Along the same lines, Robbins lays stress on the often imperceptible influence culture has on human behaviour: “Most people are unaware of just how their culture will affect them. Culture is like a fish to water. It is there all the time but the fish are oblivious to it”.⁸

Though expressed slightly differently, all the above definitions bring to the fore the shaping influence culture has upon human attitudes and conduct. Obviously, values and actions are at the core of such scientific endeavours.

Brooker, too, highlights the interconnection between culture, value and activity: “the study of culture can never be free of assumptions of VALUE or an involvement in meaningful, value-making activity on the part of the researcher or the works or social actors being studied”.⁹

Thus, bearing in mind the above argued relationship between culture and its influence on *meaningful, value-making activity*, as well as Raymond Williams’ influential definition of culture as “a whole way of life of a social group or whole society”¹⁰, we shall move forward to the next issue we want to address in this paper, namely the phenomenon of security and its overlapping with culture.

2. General remarks on security

At present, *security* in itself is another comprehensive, all-round term, with a tortuous history as a concept, enlarging or shrinking in line with varying societal events and schools of thoughts.

There has been a great amount of dispute over the meaning of security. Among other notions, such as freedom, justice, power, peace, etc., security has always been ambiguous, an “essentially contested concept”¹¹, giving rise to endless debates over what should be included or excluded from its scope. Back in the 1980s, for instance, when Barry Buzan first published his influential study, *People, States, and Fear (The National Security Problem in*

³ *Idem*, p.11.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p.11.

⁵ Salzmann, Z., *Language, Culture and Society – An Introduction to Linguistic Anthropology*, Westview Press, Oxford, 1993, p.156.

⁶ Hofstede, G., *Culture’s Consequences*, Sage, 1980.

⁷ Hofstede, G., *Cultures and Organisations: Software of the Mind*, McGraw-Hill, London, 1991.

⁸ Robbins, S., *Essentials of Organizational Behaviour*, 3rd edition, Prentice Hall, 1992, p.14.

⁹ Brooker, P., *op.cit.*, p.60.

¹⁰ Williams, R., *Culture*, London: Collins, 1981.

¹¹ Gallie, W.B., Essentially Contested Concepts, in Max Black (ed.), *The Importance of Language*, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1962, pp.121-146.

International Relations)¹², he did not hesitate to assert that security was an “underdeveloped concept”. This state of affairs, Buzan argued, was attributable to five reasons:

- 1) The concept had an essentially contested nature and proved too complex to attract analysts
- 2) The overlap between security and the concept of *power* during the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War
- 3) The various revolts against the Realist model which despite circulating the idea of collective security was considered too war-prone by those of an idealist bent, who therefore turned to the concept of *peace*
- 4) The influence of Strategic Studies (mostly an offspring of Anglo-American defence policy needs), which due to the fact that constituted a field rooted in military strategy and defence studies was policy-oriented and confined to the Realist model of the struggle for power
- 5) The interest in maintaining the symbolic ambiguity of the term *security*, so that more sinister affairs (such as power – maximizing strategies for political and military elites) could be pursued within its protean scope without the necessity of providing uneasy explanations.¹³

Nonetheless there were several academic voices which, though isolated, attempted to raise social awareness about the necessity of expanding the security investigation through the addition of new dimensions. L.B. Krause and Joseph Nye, for instance, made the remark that “neither economists, nor political scientists have paid enough attention to the complexity of the concept of security including its *instrumental role* in the enhancement of other values”.¹⁴

And it was not until the end of the Cold War that security studies would really embrace the cultural side associated with the concept. Mention must be made that there is an impressive amount of literature devoted to the evolution of the concept (see Walt 1991, Katzenstein 1996, Krause and Williams 1996, Buzan *et al.* 1998, to give just a few examples), but it is beyond the scope of the present article to offer a thorough account of these innumerable debates.

Instead we shall keep in mind for our objective a definition of security offered by A. Sarcinschi, a Romanian researcher concerned with the non-military dimensions of this phenomenon, who stresses the importance of values and perception in the security domain: “security, human security, in particular, is a condition whose salient feature is the perception of the absence of risks, dangers, and threats to human existence, values and interests, while it concomitantly includes the processes of forming and managing this perception”.¹⁵ We consider this definition relevant for the purpose of our study, since it emphasizes the role values play in approaching the security field.

Consequently, as specified in the title of the paper, we intend to focus our analysis on this relatively new issue incorporated in the security studies agenda, namely the relationship between culture and the security phenomenon.

3. The cultural influence on security

The connection between culture and security may be considered a relatively new concern in the field, since no sooner than the 1990s could we speak about a significant reconfiguration of the security domain. The boom of globalization, the enlargement of international organizations such as NATO and UE, the terrorist threat, the environmental and

¹² Buzan, B., *People, States, and Fear (The National Security Problem in International Relations)*, Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., 1983.

¹³ *Idem*, pp.6-9.

¹⁴ Krause, L.B.& Nye, J.S., Reflections on the Economics and Politics of International Economic Organisations, in C.F. Bergsten& L.B. Krause (eds.), *World Politics and International Economics*, Washington DC, Brookings Institution, 1975, p.329.

¹⁵ Sarcinschi, A., *Dimensiunile nonmilitare ale securității*, CSSAS, Universitatea Națională de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2005, p.7 (*our own Romanian-English translation*).

religious issues, all triggered a shift in the way security was viewed and approached. M.C. Williams asserts that the events occurring in the international arena at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, clearly proved “the insufficiency of narrow rationalist and materialist understandings of state action, and the need to develop more sociologically sophisticated theories of security that place questions of culture and identity at the centre of their analyses”.¹⁶

In spite of this unquestionable prominence of cultural aspects over the past years, it would be a reductionist claim to say that the military aspects of security have turned obsolete; on the contrary, they are as weighty as ever, but gained new dimensions from a contemporary, broader perspective. Williams further argues in favour of this adjustment in the security sector: “military and material powers, while remaining significant, were repositioned within what might be called the ‘cultural field of security’ that privileged cultural and symbolic forms of power”.¹⁷

The researcher, however, forewarns us against the temptation to disregard the importance of the military aspect. Despite claiming that, lately, “particular articulations of the relationship between culture and security have been and continue to be crucial forms of power in the production of security practices”¹⁸, Williams underlines that this does not entail the retreat or absence of power.

Highly probable, the origin of this particular interest in cultural aspects stems from the changes stirred up at international level in the aftermath of the Cold War. Once the superpower rivalry was (at least formally) over, the question *Who are we?* required additional attention and refinement.

Consequently, a lot of researchers approached the issue of identity in the newly formed context, in which military security is accompanied by environmental, economic, human or other types of securities, and in which various schools of thought manifest themselves (*i.e.* the traditional Realist trend co-existing with Feminism, Post-colonialism, Poststructuralism, Constructivism, etc.)

Another interesting aspect brought about by this shift in the security approach was the fact that more civilian expertise was needed in the field since new dimensions were added to the original concept. As Barry Buzan points out, experts such as physicists, economists, sociologists, psychologists *et al.* stepped in the security sector because

“From the 1970s onwards, as the nuclear relationship between the superpowers matured, the original breadth carried by the term security began to re-emerge, opening up pressure to widen the international security agenda away from the military–political focus. Economic and environmental security became established, if controversial, parts of the agenda during the later years of the Cold War, and were joined during the 1990s by societal (or identity) security, human security, food security and others”.¹⁹

Given this different perspective, researchers noticed that security studies must necessarily look into issues such as religion, values, norms, attitudes, education.

In his weighty study dealing with the cultural impact on security, M.C. Williams²⁰ made a remarkable observation. He argued at length that security practices, no matter if they favour military or non-military dimensions, are all rooted in the culture of the time and place of their emergence. Commenting on the historical periods when individual security and liberty

¹⁶ Williams, M. C., *Culture and Security (Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security)*, Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, London & New York, 2007, p.1.

¹⁷ *Idem*, p.2.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p.2.

¹⁹ Buzan, B. & Hansen, L., *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009, p.2.

²⁰ Williams, M. C., *op.cit.*, p.15 ff.

were neglected, the researcher stresses the fact that such attitudes reflected the mental frameworks of their corresponding times. He demonstrates that the unwillingness to address the question of identity has often been a conscious choice inspired by wicked interests (*i.e.* maintaining social class division or/ and enhancing the power of few).

This observation goes along nicely with Barry Buzan's remark cited above, that security used to be "an underdeveloped concept" owing to the political and military interests which benefited from the ambiguity of the term. But the changes occurring in the aftermath of the Cold War imposed a new security agenda where questions of identity or value ranked very high.

Culture problems were addressed from many perspectives: is there an insurmountable European-US divide?; will international organizations and alliances overcome state differences and arrive at a common security view?; what is the impact of ideational factors (beliefs, norms, religion) on national and international security?; is globalization beneficial or are we facing "a clash of civilizations"? (see Huntington 1996).

Terrorist attacks, which reached climax on 11th September 2001, raised further, unprecedented questions to security policy makers. Barry Buzan offers a thorough account of the challenges posed by the terrorist threat, as follows:

"The elevation of terrorism from the marginal position it had occupied during the Cold War and the 1990s to being the central issue, triggered a wide-ranging debate aimed at relating this new challenge to many of the main aspects of the traditional security agenda. Opinions varied as to whether the GWoT²¹ marked an epochal change or something less dramatic in the landscape of international security (...). Could it be understood as a dark side of globalisation, where liberalisation opened opportunities not just for civil society but also for uncivil transnational actors, or was a more Huntingtonian 'clash of civilizations' perspective more appropriate (...)? What kind of war was this given that one side was a non-state actor (...), and was it a good idea to frame it as a 'war' at all (...)? Who was the enemy, what kinds of strengths and weaknesses did 'terrorism' have, and how was it to be understood (...)? Perhaps of most concern was how to devise appropriate alliances, tactics and strategies for fighting such a strange type of war".²²

These worries evolved into a deeper dilemma: whether mankind is facing a 'new' type of war (intra-state, many-sided, including motley entities such as private military companies, militias, warlord gangs and 'government' armies, pursuing economic and criminal rather than political interests) as opposed to 'old wars' (mainly interstate, generally fought by formal armies under central political control for political objectives) (for additional details see Buzan 2009) Such warfare changes further raised the issue that this new state affairs might be rooted in the cultural difference between 'the West and the rest'.

Inspired by these culturally-laden debates and starting from Bourdieu's theory of practice (which addresses the relationship between culture, power and strategies)²³, M.C. Williams develops the "theory of cultural strategies"²⁴, where he argues that culture can be viewed as a "strategic resource", as "a form of power". Williams claims, and we are of the same opinion, that international institutions (such as NATO or EU) cannot be viewed as merely sites for the synchronization of interests, be they political or financial. More than that, such institutions are sites for the production of identity, for the exercise of cultural and symbolic power. In the same context, Williams maintains that "having cultural power (arising from

²¹ Global War on Terrorism.

²² Buzan, B. & Hansen, L., *op.cit.*, p.231.

²³ Bourdieu, P., *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. R. Nice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977

²⁴ Williams, M. C., *op.cit.*, p.22 ff.

related claims to expertise or knowledge) and symbolic power (recognized position and authority) is a particularly powerful combination”.²⁵

What is of paramount importance here is the fact that these Western security organizations cherish (obviously, but not inconsequentially!) Western societies’ values. This entails a very interesting end result: that those credited with cultural and symbolic power can play a “security game” of inclusion or exclusion with the outsiders. Here is how Williams comments upon this aspect: “This process of self-constitution, of ‘we-ness’ and the construction of ‘likes’ within the liberal community, provides a mechanism whereby the liberal security community is able to exercise a subtle yet potentially extremely powerful influence upon those who stand outside the community”.²⁶

This ideational polarity, between *us* and *them* has more far reaching implications that it might appear at first sight: in contemporaneity it had serious, practical consequences as it became the narrative justifying Western military interventions in various parts of the world such as Afghanistan or Iraq, which were portrayed as deviant from the values of liberal democracy.

To some extent, this attitude resembles the one existing during the Cold War when the opposition between us and the *Other* constituted a source of building identity and conducting security policies and practice.

In our opinion, this is further proof of the importance of cultural dimensions within the security field, because (as argued above) they contain experiences, beliefs, values, overall conceptions of the world, therefore they constitute a powerful mental software which generates courses of action. In this context serious concerns with religious differences have emerged as it became obvious that they can have political and security implications by governing people’s views of life and death.

Another highly influential cultural aspect we would like to touch upon is technology with its astonishing advancements. The existence of smart weapons, robotic aircraft, networked communication, global surveillance, all changed dramatically the nature of warfare. Though targeted by government surveillance, the Internet, for instance, has turned into a site for antiwar/peace movements²⁷.

To further complicate the overall picture, terrorist suicidal attacks, together with the hazard of spreading infectious diseases worldwide have presently transformed the human body into a “potential carrier of insecurity”²⁸.

Global warming, the increasing level of pollution, concerns about food supplies, are other factors which greatly impacted on the way security is seen nowadays, thus shaping world politics.

Conclusion

To conclude, culture, in its widest sense, plays a crucial role in the way people conduct their existence and structure their lifestyles. At macro-level this impacts on the way societies function and organize their practice.

As a consequence, we considered it useful to first expand on the meaning of culture, highlighting its influence on human behavior and, secondly, to deal with the essential features of security so that we could go into detail about the connection between the two. Thus we

²⁵ *Idem*, p.40.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p.58.

²⁷ Buzan, B. & Hansen, L., *op.cit.*, p.248.

²⁸ *Idem*, p.248.

have approached some important shifts occurring in the perception of security, focusing on manifest differences before and after the Cold War era.

Additionally, we have devoted particular interest to the reconfigurations which became obvious in the 1990s, when the security agenda widened by including cultural and identity issues, as well as elements pertaining to symbolic forms of power.

By no means do we consider that military power is less important or less present in international relations. What we maintain, however, is the fact that the answers to the questions “who are we?” and “who owns the future?” are being shaped by issues such as the technological development, the terrorist threat, the possibility of biological and cyber attacks, or global warming. Inevitably, these concerns include cultural considerations which have led to the rethinking of the security agenda.

Nevertheless, the final conclusion derived from the above discussed aspects is the fact that both culture and security are living phenomena, subject to transformations of various kinds and in subtle relation to one another.

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THE RISE OF DEVELOPMENTAL NATIONALISM: REFLECTION OVER THE ELECTION OF NARENDRA MODI AND THE INDO-JAPANESE ENTENTE

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***Abstract:** In recent years, as the unipolar moment is slowly dwindling, soon to be replaced by different regional settings, Asia Pacific experiences a dual process of ideological and diplomatic arrangement with significant consequences that will mature their shape in years to come. One of them is the rise of what some might call <developmental nationalism> wrapped around authoritarian leaders with impressive economic achievements that boast their countries identity and envisage greater roles in an international environment not necessarily American friendly. The election of Shinzo Abe 2006/2007 in Japan- the nation's most militaristic postwar Prime-Minister was followed in May 2014 by Narendra Modi in India. Former chief-minister of Gujarat, Modi was groomed in the bosom of BJP, the far-right party and owes much of his electoral triumph due to his administrative talents displayed at local level for more than a decade. The change of guard in New Delhi coincides with a fast paced rapprochement towards Abe's Japan, both nations discovering their affinities while trying to forge an entente against what seems to be a looming sino-centric Asia.*

***Keywords:** India, Japan, Narendra Modi, Shinzo Abe, liberal order, nationalism.*

Introduction

The multipolarisation of the international system coincides with America's devolution in world affairs and the reopening of regional powers' bid for altering the status quo. Ukrainian crisis in Eastern Europe, the jihadist spillover in Syria and Iraq or the Oriental triptic made of East and South China Sea along with Malacca Strait hail the dawn of a new world disorder. After a decade of staunch happy trigger interventionism during the Bush II years, Obama crisis management administration turned to prudence. Instead of boots of the ground, White House seems to prefer selective military engagements, drone manhunt, off shore balancing as to shape an international environment with minimal costs. However, burdensharing is a sword with two sides: while it saves American money and alleviates fears of unending hemorrhages of soldierly lives, it also obliges Washington to give its allies more freedom and to hope their actions should not slide on a geopolitical roller-coaster with dramatic consequences. Shorter, American strategists have to grapple with the fact that close allies no longer feel secured under the blanket of Pentagon's manner of offering protection and begin to consider alternative security arrangements (new allies, expanded imports of arms, even flirting with the idea of nuclear weapons). Such is the case of Japan, former US enemy during 1930s and 1940s, afterwards turned into a civilian power and an economic giant. Since 2007/2007, with the advent of Shinzo Abe as prime-minister <-most revisionist postwar Japanese statesman-> Tokyo gradually rolled over a process of rearmament exhibiting fears from a Sino-centric Asia. Apart from growing defence expenditure, Abe defence diplomacy aims to carve alliances with pro-American democratic emerging powers such as India and

South Korea. A few seas apart, the election of Narendra Modi, a controversial local administrative figure backed by extreme right wingers, brings Abe a like minded ally.

On a more profound level, all those events tossed on the map beg the question whereas Western styled liberal values should still linger or be replaced by 1930s like nationalism moulded according to early XXI Asian landscape.

First part of the article dwells upon Indian fascination with European National-Socialism in order to understand Narendra Modi's political family background. The second part summarises Indo-Japanese historical ties so as the third part can walk into the present and ask what are going to be the prospects of Delhi-Tokyo handshake.

1. The demise of European extrem right and the world-wide spread of its symbolism

One can assert without the fear of much exaggeration that all postwar Western political culture has defined itself against totalitarian experiments unfolded in the first half of the XX century. The construction of a united Europe above the ashes that severely ruined its nations both domestically and on the world stage meant tossing aside all the material and ideological factors that boosted the rise of populist dictatorship. Moreso, as fire begins in the minds in the minds of men, a reborn Europe and an unified West faithfully devoted to the *never again mantra* had to discard the totalitarian iconography embodied first of all by the Nazi paraphernalia.¹ In this regard the figure of Adolf Hitler and his acolytes would serve the purpose to create a *bête noire*. Especially for postwar Germany, an entire cultural and educational apparatus had been put into motion to instill the guilt, lucidly reflect on the nation past and, most of all, prevent any repetition in kind due to psychological predispositions of *furor teutonicum*.² Hollywood assumed its office and expanded all over the world the tenets of Western political corectness, historical experiences, consumerist tastes and so on. American globalised symbolism made any reference to Hitler and Nazism part of political battles. Being assimilated to the German dictator can tarnish someone's career and imagistically exile him (or her) in the bestiarium of human condition.

However European experience does not bear the same meaning to other parts of the world.

The affair of Indian public space with National-Socialism bounced between terribilisme and national mythology. It also tells us that we are Indo-European in geopolitical and geoeconomical terms, not only due to an immemorial shared past.

1.1 German fascination with Indian world and the dialectics of civilisations

Probably, if not certainly, Asian subcontinent caught the imagination of Europeans more than other place in the world and became the main character for a complex collective psyche searching for new frontiers to discover, new Jerusalems to conquer, gods to worship or simply the matrix upon which to mould the alterscape, the Non-Western other. India was the endpoint for Alexander's macedonians, the target of Columbus expedition when he discovered America or held the promise of fabulous wealth under the veil of torrid pleasures for baroque adventurers. As Hindu sacred texts became open to Western philosophers through the toil of ilks like Abraham Anquetil Dupperon or William Jones, Bharat/Hindustan rose

1 Eugene Davidson, *The Unmaking of Adolf Hitler*, University of Missouri Press, 2004.

Diksha Sahn, Should the Swastika Be Banned?, *The Wall Street Journal*, Jan 13, 2012.

2 Stephen Brockmann, "German Culture at the "Zero Hour"" (1996). *Department of Modern Languages*. Paper 7. http://repository.cmu.edu/modern_languages/7

Europe's reluctant hegemon, *The Economist*, Jun 15th 2013.

high on the canopy of Romantic imagination. German thinkers, from Schlegel and Arthur Schopenhauer to Paul Deussen, Fr.Nietzsche and Max Muller exhibited their fascination for the Indian world as they were trying to find the cradle of civilisation inhabited by Ūrvolk- the living first humans unblemished by the dawn of industrial civilisation. In time, as early enthusiasm gave weight to disappointment, the same Indian cosmos served as burden of choice for the white Christian modernisers, how the excellent study of Robert Cowan demonstrates.³ Was this Orientalistic frenzy a compensation for German inability to acquire an imperial domain in its own right, just like French and British had previously succeeded?!

During WWI German military establishment tried to circumvent the geostrategic pincer movement by capacitating different nationalistic movements or discontent communities in order to weaken the internal front of the Allies. The Zimmerman telegram, the mission of Wilhelm Wasmuss towards Persia in order to stir anti-British feelings or the help given to Sikh-based Ghadar party translated earlier Pangermanistic fantasies into tactical solutions.⁴

The Weimerian chaos to follow the üntergang of the Wilhelmine Reich hosted an entire plethora of mystic and political organisations nurtured by the mass depression in search for a way out, either political or religious- something to mend the earthly kingdom of their country or at least balm wounded pride. It is not here the place to recapitulate how emerging National-Socialism made from ancient Indo-European swastika an indelibly icon of its own or hotchpotched all sort of religious ingredients into their propaganda soon to become embroiled into the very functioning of state-apparatus. What is still poorly known to the Western public is Indian flirt with Berlin - taken by Gandhian memories and Nehruvian grandeur few care to remember the saga of Subhas Chandra Bose (Jan.1897- Aug.1945). Preeminent thinker and national revolutionary, Bose was at first part of the Congress and an associate of Gandhi. Growing discontent by the praxis of non-violence, Bose parted ways with Ghandi and set to fight British in a military manner. During WWII his relentless quest for allies against the Raj took him from Soviet Russia via Afghanistan to embattled Nazi Germany and in the end to Japan. His last flight over Formosa Strait (now Taiwan) when the plane crashed in flames.⁵

Overshadowed by the course of events but not entirely forgotten, Bose's legend would survive in the ideology of Hindu far-right. For organisations like RSS-Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (engl: National Volunteer Organization), Indian exceptionalism stems from being the oldest and richest civilisation. For their followers Hitler became nothing less than the architect of Indian independence. If not directly than surely by default, as his efforts hammered tirelessly the British Isles. Event though defeated, the Wermacht succeeded in wearing down an already ailing colonial empire and speeded up its dissolution.⁶

1.2 Inclusive versus exclusive nationalism

PostIndependent India was crafted as a cvasi-socialist, secularist regime. Gandhi-Nehru founding fatherly binome synthesised a compromise between Westminster parliamentarism, American federalism and Soviet style economic dirijisme (albeit without

3 Robert Cowan, *The Indo-German Identification: Reconciling South Asian Origins and European Destinies, 1765-1885*, Camden House, 2010.

4 Hugh Tinker, India in the First World War and after 1918-19: From War to Peace, *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 3, No. 4, (Oct.,1968), pp. 89-107.

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Bill Price, *Spies of the First World War*, RW Press, 2013, p.1916.

5 See the documentary film 'Between Gandhi and Hitler', (<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xyhmI6a2qsA>)

6 Shubham Ghosh, RSS leader compares Narendra Modi to Subhash Chandra Bose, *One India*, May 2, 2014.

Stalinism). Gandhian romantic ruralism and critique against Western-inspired-industrialism found an ironic embodiment within the Nehruvian anti-business socialism (which hampered the country's economic growth for three decades// It is fair to say though that Indira was more socialist than her father who had manifested a certain tolerance towards private initiative and foreign investments). Otherwise put, what came out was a democracy without capitalism, strange creature between the ideological blocs of the Cold War.

Beside this political will there were always ideological alternatives, some further to the left, some further to the right. Amongst them Hindu nationalism would become the real alternative and contender of Congress. As Nathuram Godse plunged his knife into Ghandiji in 1948, it highlighted how India's tryst with destiny was to be realised to the extent that economic success was there to back up an inclusive secular policy. While the star of the Congress Party was heading for decline in late 1980s (due to dynastic rule, scandals of corruption, instrumentalisation of extremist organisation not to mention the overall failure of dirigiste mechanisms) BJP-Bharata Jainata Party/People's Party came to take up the mantle. Emerged from the bosom of RSS, militant cell, it has gain legitimacy by offering social services at the grass root level.⁷ Soon it peaked to the have its day(s) in 1990s. If August 1947 saw the colonial chains lifted, post1991 reforms got rid of socialism and unleashed the entrepreneurial energies of the nation. At the same time the implosion of USSR brought also a darker side to the same world Francis Fukuyama or Paul Johnson sang optimistic chants: namely the rebirth of religious fundamentalism. In Kashmir a homegrown insurgency blended with flows of jobless mujaheddins coming from Afghanistan after the Soviets walked away. In Ayodhya, early December 1992, Hindu fundamentalism destroyed the Babri Masjid mosque to clear the place where the god Rama supposedly had been born thousand and thousand years before. *Toyota nationalism*- how would soon be known due to religious procession in which statues of Rama along with other Hindu deities were carried by the famous Japanese cars- invaded public space to accompany BJP march towards power. Dressed in black and saffron-orange clothes, Hindu nationalists proudly displayed their political creed based on a culturally homogeneous society from which Muslim and other religious minorities must not be allowed to express themselves.⁸ Estranged sons of the great Bharat tree, non-Hindu were meant to be fetched back to the fold, one way or the other. 1930s European fascism was taken out of the closet to inspire and charter a coherent direction but with Southasian stint. When BJP finally arrived to Rashina Hill through the person of Atal Biharee Vajpaee, *saffronisation* emerged as a verb in itself, depicting the whole gamut of politics destined to homogenise and rewrite national history. Serious efforts were made to retextualise Indian history as an irreducible fight between Hinduism and Islam whereas many historians such as P.N.Oak spent hundred of pages to demonstrate how Muslim places of worship starting with Taj Mahal are nothing more than previous Hindu temples.⁹ But Indians' crave for Hitler goes beyond BJP sponsored identitarian nationalism. Copies of Mein Kampf in open street, name of persons, comedies or restaurants underline a phenomenon which is half political and half a matter of joke.¹⁰ The lexicon of anglobalization did not escape the cosmopolitan Indians and here, as in other places around the world semantic checks and balances need no other introduction in electoral debates. During Indian general elections Rahul Gandhi branded his rival Narendra Modi in

7 Yogendra K. Malik and Dharendra K. Vajpeyi, The Rise of Hindu Militancy: India's Secular Democracy at Risk, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Mar., 1989), pp. 308-325.

8 David Ludden (ed), *Making India Hindu*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1996.

9 P.N.Oak, The Tajmahal is Tejomahalay A Hindu Temple, http://www.hindunet.org/hindu_history/modern/taj_oak.html.

10 David Shaftel, Hitler Has a Following in India, *Businessweek*, December 06, 2012
Hitler's Hot In India, NPR, December 23, 2012.

the mould of the German Reichchancellor: “Hitler was the biggest arrogant who thought people had no wisdom and there was no need to listen to them,”[...] “He thought he had all the knowledge himself. Similarly, there is a leader today in India who says ‘I have done this, I have done that’ and behaves arrogantly. A leader should not be arrogant.” In the same veneer, Sitaram Yechury, Communist politician thought that Modi represents a: “chillingly reminiscent of the appeal that Hitler had among the German youth.”¹¹

1.3 From text to pretext

If culture can be broadly defined as a set of metaphysical solutions to the ever changing historical and material conditions of life, political culture is the subspecies of the former which orients and channels the act of governing. Political culture transforms the text (everyday norms and predispositions) into context (public policies) and links elites with society they rule over.

At the time of our writing, with Narendra Modi assumes the highest political office, many pundits ask themselves if India’s recent past will be also her future. Beset with a controversial past, the Janus faced public figure of Modi is credited to have been responsible for communal massacres in Gujarat (2002) but also to efficient management and developing the state he was in charge for the last twelve years.¹² His strong personality and administrative records gained the upper hand over a much younger but seemingly wanting rival and, let’ not forget, in front of an even much younger population (27 year old median age).




Figure. 1. Compared GDP increase of India and Gujarat
(Source: A useful campaign, *The Economist*, March 1st, 2014)

If we climb the ladder and ascent from national to international environment, we are presented to a panorama where Narendra Modi is not at all a singular case, but only another example of a trend in double aspect: a) the multipolarisation of the world and b) the emerging of authoritarian sponsored economic growth. In this regard Modi only adds up to a chorus of

11 Victor Mallet, India election: the return of Hitler, *Financial Times*, March 14, 2014.

See also: Rahul Gandhi raises electoral pitch, comparing Narendra Modi with Adolf Hitler, Times now March 11, 2014:

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mh1YFeKCgGg>.

12 A useful campaign, *The Economist*, Mar 1st 2014.

leaders in the shades of Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Shinzo Abe.¹³ They are not Kim Jong-Un nor Adolf Hitler, one may say, and their style or the domestic features of their homerule is not the same. But all of them play their part in the political economy of postWestern turn.¹⁴ Below them an international society of discontent echoes Weimarian overtones. From Nigel Farage in Britain, to Front National across the Canal, and German National-Democrats to Central and South Asia, calls for Blut und Boden/ Blood and soil rally new members and gain the tacit approval of many more others.¹⁵

2. Indo-Japanese confluence: from cultural via economic towards political great games

First tangible Indo-Japanese encounters happened in early sixth century with the advent of Buddhism, world religion born in nowadays Nepal which irradiated all across the continent towards Tibet, China, down to Southeast Asia only to be spread beyond.¹⁶ If that was more of a subpolitical phenomenon, both cultures grew important to each other's strategic attention in the early XX century. Fast pacing reforms of the Meiji Era (roughly 1868-1911) overthrew many of the feudal shackles and transformed the Empire of Japan into a full fledged industrial nation on parity with any European power, also animated by an equivalent appetite for altering the status quo. For its Asian peers, Tokyo's successful synthesis between old and new was seen with looming fear but more so with admiration. At the same time with the American Progressivist Era and the European Belle Époque, Pacific Rim matured what is known as Pan-Asianism, a loosely defined philosophy craving for solidarity among colonial Eastern people.¹⁷ In this regard preWWI Japan stood central to this movement and welcomed many Indian intellectuals such as Rabindranath Tagore along with many anarchists bent on overthrowing British rule by violent means.¹⁸ Twenty years later, the seemingly unstoppable Japanese war machine expanded bit by bit at the expense of the British Empire only to find itself halted in Northeastern India, in the battle of Kohima (April-June 1944).¹⁹

13 Dileep Padgaonkar, In the footsteps of Putin, Abe, Erdogan, *Times of India*, April 4, 2014.

William Dalrymple, Is India New Prime-Minister a Neo-fascist or a reformer, *New Republic*, 16 May 2014.

Ishaan Tarora, Narendra Modi: India's Reagan, Putin or Hitler, depending on whom you ask, *The Washington Post*, 19 May 2014.

Samar Halarnkar, Globally Narendra Modi's rise is hardly unique, *Hindustan Times*, May 21, 2014.

14 Zachary Keck, Turkey Renews Plea to Join Shanghai Cooperation Organization, *The Diplomat*, December 01, 2013.

15 Damian Thompson, Nazi chic: from Mongolia to Tel Aviv, angry teenagers think Hitler is cool, *The Telegraph*, August 3rd, 2010.

Daphne Halikiopoulou, Sofia Vasilopoulou, Greece: Economic crisis and the rise of extremism, *Queris*, 27 February 2014.

Andrew Foxall, Putin has far-right admirers all over Europe and they are for election this month, *New Republic*, 20 May 2014.

Sam Sokol, Far-right's election success worries European Jewry, *Jerusalem Post*, 27 May 2014.

16 Radhey Shyam Chaurasia, *History of Ancient India: Earliest Times to 1000 A. D.*, Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, New Delhi, Chennai, 2008, pp.265-266. Hermann Kulke, Dietmar Rothermund, *O istorie a Indiei*, traducere de Loredana Tiron, Artemis, București, 2008, pp.134-135.

17 Pankaj Mishra, *From the Ruins of Empire. The Revolt Against the West and the Remaking of Asia*, Penguin Books, New York, 2012, pp.122-124 and *passim*.

18 For more on this topic read Maia Ramnath, *Decolonising Anarchism: An Antiauthoritarian History of India's Liberation Struggle*, AK Press and Institute for Anarchist Studies, Washington D.C., 2011.

19 Robert Lyman, *Kohima 1944. The battle that saved India*, Osprey Publishing Ltd, New York, 2010.

Gardiner Harris, A Largely Indian Victory in World War II, Mostly Forgotten in India, *The New York Times*, 21 June 2014.

From 1945 till today, Indo-Japanese diplomatic dialogue entertained itself in predominantly cordial terms, filled by economic exchange. India post1991 liberal turned tossed away much of the socialist dirigiste economy thus nurturing its own miracle at a time when Japan along with other Asian tigers started to experience structural malaise. In 2000, Japan' Prime Minister, YoshiroMori visited India and monickered it a Startegic Partner for XXI century. His visit was returned one year later by then chief of executive, Atal Bihari Vajpaae. Since 2005 on, India is targeted by the most generous Japanese international financial aid. In 2006 both countries signed a Global Strategic Partnership followed in 2011 by an Economic Comprehensive Partnership. In December 2013 the symbolism of all the previous steps has been elevated with the visit of the Japanese Emperor – first of its kind ever.²⁰

Tokyo's accelerated allurement towards the Asian subcontinent has been strongly personalized with Shinzo Abe's coming to office seven years ago. Abe, country's most militaristic statesman in ages, and a thinker in its own right just like Turkish Ahmet Davutoglu, envisaged a <diamond of democracies> compound of USA, Japan, South Korea and Australia, all of them maritime neighbours of China and simultaneously worried by Beijing's revisionist rhetoric.²¹ Using the beef with the Popular Republic over Senkaku Islands, Abe's administration pulled the strings to reverse a decade of dwindling defence bugets an upgrade national military paraphernalia.

In January 2013 Japanese Minister of Defence announced that the budget of his ministry was poised to rise 0.8 percent to 4,68/ 4,7 trillion yen (\$51,7 billion).²² For 2014 defence budget added another 2,8% to reach 4.884,8 billion yen with the manifest goal to reinforce national defence systems in the next 5 years, task towards which government pledges to improve „airborne warning and control system, enhancement of patrol and monitoring ability through acquisition of fixed wing patrol aircrafts, and reinforcement of defense for islands through strengthening amphibiousness and acquisition of next-generation fighter aircrafts.”²³

However, even though declining during the 2000 years, Japanese defence budget reigned amongst top ten in the world:




Figure 2. Military spending

20 India | Japan : From economic ties to strategic partnership, *The Hindu*, 27 November 2013.

21 Shinzo Abe, Asia's Democratic Security Diamond, *Project Syndicate*, 27 December 2012.

22 Isabel Reynolds, Japan Defense Budget to Increase for First Time in 11 Years, *Bloomberg*, Jan 30, 2013 .

23 Highlights of the Budget for FY2014, p.8, <http://www.mof.go.jp/english/budget/budget/fy2014/01.pdf>.

Source: (from left to right): Mure Dickie, Japan to shift military towards China threat, FT, 13 December 2010; The dragon's new teeth. A rare look inside the world's biggest military expansion, *The Economist*, Apr 7th 2012

Material capabilities do not suffice to bolster Tokyo's power projection. Japan's reinvention as largely civilian actor was strictly guarded by Article 9 of the Constitution which states that: „*Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.*

To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”²⁴

To mark a turning point and provide a normative lustre to such newly discovered assertive nationalism, a Prime-ministerial committee was set-up in June 2014 to broaden the acceptance of self-defence without changing the text of the Article 9 per se. Reactions did not need too much waiting. While critics deplore lack of transparency and forcing democratic framework, Abe himself assured his respect for peaceful values but highlighted the need to complete them with a pro-active attitude which would enable Japan to take part in collective defence along with allies. He flung the possibility of North Korea launching a rocket towards the United States, case when Japanese forces might be obliged to thwart it.²⁵

Given the above, India thus justifies Japanese security by detour stance. Under the matrix of common threat and interests, Tokyo and New Delhi geared up to boost their defence cooperation. For that matter, in early 2014 the coastal guards of both countries trained together in the Arabian Sea improving their tactics against terrorism related activities. In the same veneer, Japanese ministry of defence, Itsunori Onodera met his Southasian counterpart, K. Antony to express his interest in selling India US-2 reconnaissance planes.²⁶ If perfected, the contract loosens the arms embargo imposed by Japanese industry towards exports, and also reinvigorates struggling defence contracts like Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. and Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd.²⁷

Concluding remarks

Near the time of our writing (late summer- early fall 2014) Narendra Modi, the freshly appointed Indian Prime-minister has completed a five day visit in Japan where he indulged in lengthy discussions with his counterpart, Shinzo Abe with whom he enjoys warm relations even before assuming the office, and with numerous other Japanese politicians, high-ranking officers and businessmen. Scheduled between 30 August and 2 September, the bilateral meeting allowed both statesmen to deepen their knowledge of each other and each other's domestic achievements thus cementing an already growing entente that will surely define Pacific XXI century. Amongst results, Tokyo pledged a package of more than 30 billion \$ to

24 The Constitution of Japan. Prime Minister and His Cabinet, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html.

25 Jeremy A. Yellen, Shinzo Abe's Constitutional Ambitions, *The Diplomat*, June 12, 2014.

Craig Martin, 'Reinterpreting' Article 9 endangers Japan's rule of law, *The Japan Times*, 27 June 2014 .

Sheila Smith, Reinterpreting Japan's Constitution, *Forbes*, 3 July 2014.

Petitioning Shinzo Abe. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe: Save Japan's Peace Constitution, Change.org, 4 September 2014, <http://www.change.org/p/prime-minister-shinzo-abe-save-japan-s-peace-constitution>.

26 Ankit Panda, India-Japan Defense Ministers Agree To Expand Strategic Cooperation, *The Diplomat*, January 08, 2014.

27 Sanjeev Miglani, India close to buying Japan-made military aircraft, *Reuters*, 28 January 2014.

be delivered in the next five years supplemented by the signing of a Global and Strategic Partnership India-Japan.²⁸ However it remains to be seen if such axis would remain embedded within American liberal values or one shall witness in the region a new concert of nationalistic revanchist powers poised to contain China's expansion but at the same time borrowing from Chinese style authoritarianism.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMY AND ENVIRONMENT IN ENSURING NATIONAL SECURITY

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Abstract: *Given the fact that the environment has no borders and we can not just pollute here and there, that pollution produced in one country can effect even more the neighbours, it is necessary to take into consideration the importance of this area. And even more, as between economy, environment and national security there is an interdependent relationship. In this article we want to emphasize the importance of these areas in national security.*

Key words: *security, environment, sustainable development, economy, natural resources.*

"Everything is out of the hand of the Creator, everything degrades human hands" Jean Jacques Rousseau

Introduction

The main risks and vulnerabilities, which affects the security of a specific nation on current stage, worldwide level, are generated or could be influence by the following aspects: political instability, competition for control of strategic resources, corruption and organized internal and international crime, ethnic and religious politicization, legal and illegal migration, environmental degradation.

National security can be achieved only in a well-defined economic support, with sufficient material, human, financial, scientific, etc. premises. "To discuss national security or to project it without regard to its economic component is like a sand castle rises near sea waves."¹

The concept of security must be seen in correlations with its associated concepts, and we consider national interests, national security systems and institutions, national security strategy, resources and security policies, policy objectives of national security, national security principles.² Based on these correlations, security must be addressed as a system, as the concept involves several dimensions: political, social, military, economic, informational.

We stand today on the threshold of a new industrial revolution, a fundamental structural change in the global economy. The traditional model of economic development - the GDP growth parallels the energy consumption and carbon emissions growing - is no longer viable. It is unsustainable in terms of energy and climate security. As the carbon is pumped into the atmosphere, accelerate climate change occurs.

This is not an environmental problem that would concern only the skilled artisan. Climate change track relates to human existence itself. Consequences such as floods, famine

¹ Marin Dumitru, The economic component of security, UNAP Publisher, Bucharest, 2004

* PhD in Military Sciences and information, expert at the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University "Carol I"

² D. Dumitraş, I. Giurcă, Politico-military alliances and coalitions, UNAp Publisher, Bucharest, 2004, p. 29.

and diseases lead to migration, widespread in areas where there are already tensions. In turn, drought and changes in agricultural crops generate more competition for food, water and energy in regions where resources are already low. Economic destabilization, as forecast and Stern report, it is possible to achieve a level not seen since the Second World War.³

The importance of the economy in safety security

In recent decades, due to mutations produced, world reached a new security hierarchy thus passed first component followed by the economic and environmental policy. In this context, achieving security and national defence in the event of a war depends primarily on the economic resources at their disposal.⁴

Underdevelopment, food crisis (and future water crisis), environmental degradation, faster population growth (particularly in underdeveloped areas), restrictions on energy and main materials, the battle to maintain control in space and planetary, crisis triggering generating mechanisms economic, inflation and uncontrolled development of urbanization are the main security challenges for the XXI century.

As the economic development of countries (China, India, enlarged EU) has greatly increased demand for energy, many countries are dependent on energy and foreign policy of neighboring countries. Given this growing demand, we need to seek and develop national, regional and global energy policies and strategies; international planning is needed to solve these problems. So far, the world economy has not been driven by a superpower unilaterally, but by the interests of the states participating in international life⁵. This demonstrates, once again, the need for economic alliances, both at regional and at global, but also the importance of diplomacy.

Achieving the importance of the economy for national security environment, each EU Member State has developed a strategy for sustainable development and tried to move towards clean technologies, to care for the environment, to develop communities according to their needs and priorities depending on governments.

And National Security Strategy outlined role in achieving national security economy is "A strong economy, performance and competitive, macrostabilă, dynamic in terms of growth and adaptable to the requirements of integration and globalization, is an important pillar of national security, ensuring the conditions for economic and social security, the interest of the majority population to support democratic institutions and the basis for initiatives to promote the prosperity and security of the nation."⁶

The importance of the environment in protecting the society

Nature has always been seen as an infinite supply of resources and an ideal place for waste disposal. Natural resources have become the main pillar for the security resources.

The environment is increasingly threatened by human activities, more widely this can be translated into pollution of air and water caused by the excessive use of natural resources. In the last thirty years the European Union has been increasingly active in this area through proposing programs and approving policies to protect the natural environment. It has also stimulated investments in new manufacturing facilities while drawing people's attention on

³ <http://www.green-report.ro/romania-nu-are-nevoie-de-masuri-suplimentare-pentru-reducerea-emisiilor/>

⁴ Manafu Alexandru, National security and economic wars, URL: <http://www.art-emis.ro/analize/1880-securitatea-nationala-si-razboaiele-economice.html>

⁵ Darius Stan, Economic policy - the main generators of world conflicts, in GeoPolitics no. 23, Top Forum Publisher, Bucharest, 2007, p.115.

⁶ The National Security Strategy of Romania, URL: <http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/SSNR/SSNR.pdf>

the serious issues with pollution. The European Union also implemented a series of measures to combat pollution and climate change. This should be an initiative followed by states around the world but countries will have to work together to protect the natural environment because pollution cannot be limited within states borders.

The relationship among states are affected by resource deficits or limited access to resources that often leads to devastating consequences. Natural disasters have increased in frequency and intensity, energy resources are low and we are witnessing high population growth in areas with low food and water resources. This, together with recent climate changes, are continuously influencing countries' stability and security but at the same time affecting the economic development of a country.

Unfortunately, the effects of climate change were visible to everyone in Romania through the floods and drought from the recent years. In addition to the empirical evidence gathered, the Stern report, published in late 2006 presents the consequences of not taking any action against the environmental challenges. This study had a crucial role to make both developed and developing countries aware of the important climate change issue and the economic and environmental risks it drives. It also emphasises that while we could afford the costs related to diminishing climate change, the economic consequences of non-action would be almost catastrophic. As such, we need to establish a new economic model, one that uses energy and resources more efficiently and also separates economic growth from carbon emissions.

Romania has expressed support for strengthening the EU's role as a world leader in combating climate change through supporting the 20% carbon emissions reduction commitment by 2020.

The environment provides the perfect living and economic development conditions for humans. As long as we protect the environment we have economic development and good quality living conditions.

The National Strategy for Sustainable Development of Romania for 2013-2020-2030 proposes the use of the best available technologies from an economical and environmental point of view when making investment decisions of public funds at national, regional and local level and to stimulate such decisions by private capital; It also discusses the entrenchment of eco-efficiency criteria in all activities of production or service delivery. The overall objective of the SDS / EU is to ensure that transport systems meet the economic, social and environmental needs of society, while at the same time minimizing their undesirable impacts on the economy, society and environment.

The development, specialization and improved quality of services is not a final objective in itself but a specific tool of modern economies to increase efficiency and competitiveness in all other economic and social sectors. Contributions brought by R & D department, innovation, science, transport and communications, training and continuous improvement of workforce do not directly inhibit the development of productive sectors (industry, construction, agriculture, forestry, fishing), but they highlight the potential for modernization and improved resource efficiency.

Economic crises have proved that planned developments enabling immediate profits have affected species resilience (animal or vegetable) to new economic developments. Natural negative effects evidenced by global warming, lack of significant rainfall, disappearance of certain species are all due to ecosystem disruption caused by economic impact.

The effects of such crises can expand globally and significantly impacting the environment. The crisis effect can be paradoxical for diverse ecological niche environments, one example being the disappearance of the human species as it happened before with other species.

Ecosystems destruction acts as a puzzle game. Even if only a small area seems to be affected, given the physical evidence, the damages can expand to a much larger area although with a small force.

Unfortunately, some processes are irreversible and nature's whole resources are hard to predict and imagine. Hence, the only component that may slow its confrontation with the environment dynamics is the man, as a significant part of the global ecosystem. The god of living and natural balance must dethrone the god of profit. The purpose of this process is, again, realising the existing balance between the ecosystem components.

Environmental Economy

Environmental Economics refers to the responsible use of natural resources with maximum efficiency of their applicability so that the impact on the environment is least destructive and could be neutralized as much as possible in as short a period of time, both naturally and artificially. Environmental Economics involves two major problems: exploitation of the environment and environmental protection.

Over time, complex relationships were established between economic activities run by people and the environment supporting them. They led, in most cases, not only to the progress of humanity and enabling humans to differentiate them from the other species, but also to the emergence of environmental problems which currently threaten the very continuity of life on earth. From an economic sector perspective, the environment is a supplier of raw materials; a landfill; an agricultural space but also an enabler of industrial and services manifestations.

Environmental Economics is concerned with the relationship between ecosystem and resource management, trying to identify the causes and characteristics of environmental problems and their solutions. For the economy, the environment is an economic asset. This resource provides the necessary raw materials economy needs to transform into goods and services that are returning back into the environment as waste.

Building an eco-economy is a goal that cannot be compromised. Untimely restructuring of the economy will lead to other branches being affected. The choice must be made by our generation as it will affect life on earth for all generations to come.

Economic security is associated with the reconstruction of the power of a state. Affected by cumulative consequences of economic security, states are undergoing a profound transformation as powers, roles and functions are redefined and reframed at the intersection between environment and economy.

Current and future developments of economic security are, to a large extent, dependent to changes in the design and development of the economic stability of countries. They are based on measures of environmental protection and social protection.

In conclusion, the environmental economy study makes it possible to: understand the genesis and complexity of the concepts and strategies that explain, protect and drive economies; understand the importance of fully addressing environment security through blending multiple perspectives; understand the structure and components of security, of the environment and the inter-relationships between the state, business organizations and the external environment.

Conclusion

One of the extremely hard to answer questions is whether security is part of the economy or the economy is part of the security. As argued in this paper, the two are interrelated. Economists regard security as a subsystem of the economy, while military regards the economy as a security subsystem.

As outlined above, the basic problem for both sides is represented by resources of any kind and these resources are taken only from the nature. Economists see global economy growth based, particularly on trade and international investment.

A common task for all governments is to send appropriate political signals to motivate the business sector to invest in the global transition to a cleaner, low carbon economy. The European Union has already made the first steps in the field when Member States have established a mandatory target for the whole Union at the Spring European Council - a 20% reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases by 2020 compared to 1990. Another objective was also targeted: a 20% contribution of renewable energy in the total consumption of the European Union by 2020.

Simultaneously, governments and managers in the business world should start discussions on this issue and establish a true public-private partnership to drive some impact in this area. All EU governments and companies have a common interest, and can also promote change to eliminate economic and environmental risks.

The "rush for profit" has disastrous consequences on the environment. All this has implications on social and international security, starting from the individual and expanding nationally and then globally. The crises caused by local disasters which lack vital resources, can transform into regional conflicts and much more.

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INDEX

- ANDREI Elena Adelina, 315
ANICA (CÎRNICI) Luminița
Ludmila, 138
ANTON Stan, 97
ANTONESCU Mădălina
Virginia, 346, 354
ATANASIU Mirela, 30
BADIU Marius-Iulian, 7, 13
BĂHNĂREANU Cristian, 39
BOGZEANU Cristina, 72
COȘEA Raluca, 147
COSTEA (GHIMIS) Ana Maria, 123
CSIKI Tamás, 259
CUTURELA Cristian Sandu, 22
DIACONU Alexandru-Tudor, 230
DIACONU Florin, 221
DUCU Diana Stefania, 116
DYČKA Lukáš, 253
FRANK Libor, 322
GORGOS Iulian-Liviu, 64
GRIGORAS Răzvan, 338
GRIGORE Gabriela Amalia, 156
IONIȚĂ Liviu, 130
IRIMIE Petre Vlad, 156
JULAN Ioana Corina, 237
KRAUS Josef, 171
LUCINESCU Alexandru, 182
LUNGU Ciprian, 205, 212
MIČÁNEK František, 253
NEAGOE Visarion, 48
PĂSTAE Veronica, 364
PETRE Silviu, 372
PÎSLARIU Daniel, 176
POPESCU Alba Iulia Catrinel, 106
RÂNCEANU Dorin, 147
RĂPAN Daniela, 48
RĂPAN Daniela, 57
REPEZ Filofteia, 280, 289
RÎJNOVEANU Carmen, 268
SARCINSCHI Alexandra, 328
SECĂREANU Marian, 200
STÂNCILĂ Lucian, 7, 13
TÁLAS Péter, 84
TĂTARU Irina, 382
TODOR Cătălina, 297
TUTUIANU Iuliana Simona, 192
URSA Maria Ruxanda, 245
VISOIANU Corneliu, 166

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