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Contact address:

Șoseaua Panduri, nr. 68-72, Sector 5, București, România
Telephone: +4021-319.56.49, Fax: 4021-319.57.80
E-mail: impactstrategic@unap.ro
Websites: http://cssas.unap.ro/index_en.htm, <http://cssas.unap.ro/en/periodicals.htm>

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EDITOR'S NOTE

Edition no. 57 of *Strategic Impact* scientific quarterly, the last in 2015, includes in its pages, besides articles approaching topical subjects of interest, other rubrics which I hope will gain your attention. I refer, for instance, to the **Strategic Dialogue** on EU Global Strategy 2016 with Mr. Daniel Fiott, PhD Fellow/ Institute for European Studies, Free University of Brussels (VUB). Also, having in mind that in 2015 we commemorated 70 years from the end of World War II, Mr. Mihai Zodian, PhD Researcher chose for the rubric **Book Review**, three books on the subject, namely Ian Buruma, *Year Zero. A History of 1945*, Victor Sebestyen, *1946. The Making of the Modern World* and Andrew J. Rotter, *Hiroshima: the world's bomb*. In addition, our colleague Irina Tătaru presents, at the rubric **Scientific Event**, main conclusions following the International Scientific Symposium “*Atypical Conflicts of the 21st Century*”, organized by the CDSSS on December 8, 2015 and, last but not least, the **CDSSS Agenda**, from which you can find out the scientific events we planned for 2016.

As for the articles, they were grouped in three rubrics, as follows. To begin with, in the **Political-Military Topicality** rubric, I bring to your attention *A Comparative Analysis of Mutual Defence and Collective Defence Clauses*, realised jointly with Cristina Bogzeanu, PhD Researcher. Further on, Mirela Atanasiu, PhD Researcher brings forward *Developments in the Turkish Security Agenda*.

In the rubric **Security and Military Strategy**, Mrs. Ecaterina Mațoi, PhD Fellow Professor/“Carol I” NDU launches the question *are Private Military Security Companies the Missing Link in the New Iraqi Security Paradigm?*, while Colonel Ion Puricel, PhD. Associate Professor offers the readers *Enduring Lessons of Military Art* starting from *the German Decision to Focus on Stalingrad in 1942*.

The rubric **Analyses, Syntheses, Evaluations** comprises four materials, in a logical connexion and consecutiveness, considered in tandem: Mr. Haliru Dogondaji Bello approached the subject of *The Islamic Cultural Factor in Relation with Globalisation*, while Mrs. OR-9 Rita Palaghia dwells on *Interculturality in Afghanistan Theater of Operations*. There follows Lieutenant-colonel Daniel Roman, presenting *Aspects on Critical Infrastructures from a Systemic Perspective* and Irina Tătaru debating on *The Impact of Extreme Events and Phenomena on Critical Infrastructure*.

Last, but not least, there is the *Guide for authors*, useful to those who wish to disseminate the results of their research in our journal.

For those who open *Strategic Impact* for the first time, we mention that the journal is an open access publication of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies within “Carol I” National Defence University (available at <http://cssas.unap.ro/en/periodicals.htm>) and is a *prestigious scientific journal in the field of military science, information and public order*, according to National Council for the Recognition of University Degrees, Diplomas and Certificates (CNATDCU).

The journal is being published in Romanian for fifteen years, and for eleven years in English and approaches a complex thematic: security and defence related issues; security and military strategies; NATO and EU policies, strategies and actions; political-military topicality; geopolitics and international relations; future of conflict; peace and war; information society, intelligence community. Readers may find, in the published pages, analyses, syntheses and evaluations of strategic level,



points of view which study the impact of national, regional and global actions dynamics.

Regarding international visibility – primary objective of the journal –, the recognition of the publication's scientific quality is confirmed by its indexing in the international databases CEEOL (Central and Eastern European Online Library, Germany), EBSCO (USA), ProQuest (USA) and Index Copernicus International (Poland), but also by the presence in WorldCat, in virtual catalogues of libraries of prestigious institutions abroad such as NATO and of universities with military profile from Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and so on.

Strategic Impact journal is issued quarterly in March, June, September and December, in two separate editions: one in Romanian and one in English. The journal is distributed free of charge in main security and defence institutions, as well as in national and international academia in Europe, Asia and America.

In the following edition of *Strategic Impact*, you shall read about the March Workshop and a *Strategic Dialogue* with a representative of UNHCR (TBD) on the topical issue of migration.

In the end, I would like to encourage the persons interested to publish in our pages in 2016 to prospect and evaluate thoroughly the dynamics of the security environment.

Colonel Stan ANTON, PhD.

Editor in Chief

Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies



A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MUTUAL DEFENCE AND COLLECTIVE DEFENCE CLAUSES

*Stan ANTON, PhD**

*Cristina BOGZEANU, PhD***

The present paper constitutes a comparative analysis of Article 42(7) of Treaty of Lisbon (mutual defence clause) and of Article 5 of the North-Atlantic Treaty (common defence), from the perspective of the consequences their invocation triggers. It approaches the implications entailed by the above mentioned articles concerning the type of measures they can determine, taking into account the nature of the organisations within which they were designed, the decision-making procedure, the operational planning and the use of force. The present demarche was motivated by the necessity of identifying the possible repercussions of France's invocation of mutual defence clause in the context of the terrorist attacks of November, 13th, 2015.

The hypothesis of this study is that the respective articles are substantially different as far as their force and effects are concerned, the gap between them emerging from the nature of the organisations having developed and adopted them, from the institutional framework characteristic to NATO and EU, from the decision-making process, from the available

forces, as well as from the significance of the security concepts they enshrine.

***Keywords:** mutual defence clause, collective defence, solidarity clause, bilateral agreement, operational capacity.*

1. Context

After being heavily affected by the world economic and financial crisis, at a short while since its economy had begun to redress, the European Union entered another period of security crises, inclusively in the military area, paralleled by a crisis of European institutions' credibility.

At the end of 2013, the Ukrainian crisis began – a range of events, including a territorial annexation in the Union's close vicinity, which escalated at a rapid pace to a war in Eastern Ukraine. Furthermore, relations between the West and the Russian Federation entered the gravest crisis since the end of the Cold War, the speeches, the actions and the visions shaped by the two parties resembling at a great extent the years preceding USSR implosion. Under these

** Colonel Stan ANTON, PhD in Military Sciences, is the Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies within "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: anton.stan@unap.ro*

*** Cristina BOGZEANU, PhD in Military Sciences, is Researcher at the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies within "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: bogzeanu.cristina@unap.ro*



circumstances, it was recognized the failure of the European Neighbourhood Policy, especially of its Eastern partnership component, as well as of other approaches initiated by the EU in this respect, such as Black Sea Synergy¹.

At the peak of the Ukrainian crisis, in 2014, another phenomenon with serious implications brought new security challenges for the European Union – the amplification of the migration fluxes from the Middle East to the European states.

In 2015, Europe was under the necessity of managing an extremely wide wave of refugees, which polarized European states in two categories – the ones supporting their receiving and the ones assuming their limits in receiving a large number of refugees.

On November, 13th, 2015 France was the scene of several coordinated terrorist attacks claimed by Islamic State (IS) terrorist organisation, which resulted in hundreds of dead and injured among French citizens. International press reported

that, among those having perpetrated the attack, there were also Syrian citizens who entered the European territory along with the refugee wave.

François Hollande addressed to the Parliament on November, 16th, opening his speech asserting that “France is at war” and ending it with “Terrorism will not destroy France because France will destroy it”. In this context, the French president invoked the article 42(7) of the Lisbon Treaty. On November, 17th, the French Minister of Defence, Jean-Yves Le Drian, called on the same article within the Foreign Affairs Council meeting. This is the first time the article is invoked in the European Union’s history, an article whose content is equivalent to the article 5 of the North-Atlantic Treaty.

**2. Content elements
of article 42(7)/Treaty of Lisbon
and of article 5/North-Atlantic Treaty**

Article 42(7)/ Treaty of Lisbon and Article 5/North-Atlantic Treaty. Comparative table

	Article 42(7)/Lisbon Treaty	Article 5/North-Atlantic Treaty
Content	If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation ² .	The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security ³ .

¹ European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Ioan Mircea Paşcu (Rapporteur), Report on the strategic military situation in the Black Sea Basin following the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia (2015/2036(INI)), 21 May 2015, URL: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A8-2015-0171+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>, accessed on 5 October 2015.

² Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2010, p. 39.

³ The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., 4 April 1949, URL: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm, accessed on 25 November 2015.



POLITICAL-MILITARY TOPICALITY

Type of organisation	A political-economic union with supra-national and intergovernmental character (a <i>sui-generis</i> organisation).	Political-military alliance
Principle	Mutual assistance	Collective defence
Significance	Reminiscence of Western European Union (Article 4 of Brussels Treaty – 1948 ⁴). Its inclusion within the Title approaching the Common Security and Defence Policy has an exceptional character.	Contains the rationale of the Alliance. Substantiates the collective defence principle
Context of invocation	Terrorist attacks in Paris, November, 13 th , 2015	World Trade Center terrorist attacks, September, 11 th , 2001
Level of coordination	There is no contingency planning at EU's level. Bilaterally (the state invoking the clause negotiates with each Member State of the Union and concludes agreements accordingly). It doesn't imply an EU formal decision or an EU Council conclusion.	There are contingency plans meant to anticipate such situations. Implementation of these plans and the subsequent planning for crisis response through operational plans is executed by the Allied Command Operations (ACO). Plans are approved by the North-Atlantic Council.
Result	Each EU Member State decides the manner in which can offer support to the state invoking the clause (supposes bilateral negotiations)	Action (operations, missions) coordinated and carried out at NATO level.
Type of support	Non-military and military	Non-military and military
Available forces	NATO and EU Member states can assign the same package of forces for the missions carried out under the aegis of these organisations. However, as far as the EU is concerned, these forces, inclusively the EU Battlegroups, can be operationalised, first and foremost, for crisis management operations. Through its contingency plans, NATO has pre-identified the necessary packages of forces for Article 5 operations, namely for collective defence. By contrast, the EU has no provisions in this respect.	
	EU Operation Headquarters EU Force Headquarters	National and multinational headquarters assigned to NATO on a permanent or temporary basis, in compliance with specific training criteria.
	*EU Battlegroups: CSDP forces, composed on the basis of Member States contribution, rotational so that two of them are always ready to deploy. * Even if they became operational on January, 1 st , 2007, EU Battlegroups have never been operationalized.	NATO Response Force (NRF): joint high preparedness and high technology force, composed of land, air, sea and special troops, rapidly deployable, being meant for rapid demonstration of force and to rapidly ensure NATO military presence in an Article 5 or crisis management operation.
Implications on Member States' defence policies	Has no implication on states' security and defence policy	Supposes transformations of Member States' defence policies
Value	Political and symbolic	Political and military

⁴ Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration March 1948, URL: <http://www.weu.int/>, accessed on 10 and Collective Self-Defence Signed at Brussels on 17 December 2015.



Article 42(7)/ Treaty of Lisbon introduces the mutual assistance clause and, at a first view, could be assimilated in terms of effects and relevance to article 5/Washington Treaty, the one enshrining the fundament of the entire Alliance and containing the idea of collective security.

However, the force and effect of the above mentioned articles are not similar, and the reasons for this state of facts lay in the type of the organisations having issued them, in NATO and EU specific institutional framework, in the specific decision-making process, in the available forces, as well as in the significance of the security concepts they enshrined (see the comparative table).

3. Differences streaming from the typology of the organisations

The force of Article 5 of Washington Treaty emanates, firstly, from the nature of the organisation within which it functions – a political-military alliance. Article 5 underlies NATO's *raison d'être* and the main reason for which the states composing it chose to become its members. Article 5 enshrines the principle of collective security and defence, namely the core of the Alliance.

At the same time, Article 42(7) is included in the Treaty on European Union, a sui-generis (intergovernmental and supranational) integration organisation. Initially created as an economic and political integration organisation, EU's security and defence dimension appeared only later in its history. Actually, neither these days could we speak about the full development of this dimension. Treaty of Lisbon stipulates that "the common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides"⁵. Thus, as far as security and defence is concerned, EU's objective is to develop a common defence, but this aspect

⁵ Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2010, p. 38.

remains a desideratum to be reached.

If collective defence constitutes the basis of NATO creation and existence, in EU's case, it is noteworthy that its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is focused on crisis management missions outside the Union's territory. Article 42(1) mentions that CSDP "provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security". Article 43(1) details these missions as follows: "The tasks (...) in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories"⁶.

Additionally, after the European Security Strategy (2003) was issued, a process of developing EU's military capabilities (Headline Goal 2010) was initiated, also including five major scenarios in which the use of armed force was considered possible: a) Separation of Parties by Force; b) Stabilisation, Reconstruction and Military Advice to third countries; c) Conflict Prevention; d) Evacuation Operations; e) Assistance to Humanitarian Operations⁷.

Analysing CSDP missions' specifics, evolution and efficiency within a study published under the aegis of the European Union Institute for Security Studies⁸, T. Tardy concluded that

⁶ Ibidem, p. 39.

⁷ ***, Development of European Military Capabilities, July 2009, URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090720%20Factsheet%20capacites%20militaires%20EN.pdf>, accessed on 16 December 2015.

⁸ In order to emphasize the relevance of the analyses elaborated within this framework, we consider necessary a brief presentation of its specific. European Union Institute for Security Studies defines itself as the EU agency, whose mission is to study foreign policy, security and defence issues. It was established in 2002, as an autonomous agency within the Common Foreign and Security Policy,



“essentially, CSDP is about responding to threats that are not direct or immediate. It is about projecting security outside of the EU area so as to contribute to the stabilisation of states or regions that may potentially be the source of further destabilisation or threaten EU societies more directly”⁹.

CSDP range of actions, including rapid action through EU Battlegroups, comprises crisis management actions, the equivalent of what is known, at NATO’s level, as “non-Article 5 operations”. This type of actions doesn’t enter the scope of Article 51 of UN Chart, enshrining the principle of states’ self-defence right.

Nevertheless, Treaty of Lisbon includes Article 42(7), laying the basis of mutual assistance clause. Article 42(7) is introduced in Title V of the Treaty: *General provisions on the Union’s external action and specific provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy*. Therefore, this provision is part of an area where decisions are made on intergovernmental basis, adopted unanimously within the European Council, composed of Member States’ heads of state and government.

Thus, the 7th paragraph of Article 42 has an exceptional condition: the decision of invoking the mutual assistance clause doesn’t follow the provisions regarding decision-making procedures under CSDP, Member States’ obligations and roles deriving from bilateral negotiations and agreements. In other words, the invocation of Article 42(7) is a basis for consultations, implies neither a formal decision made by the European Council, nor a CSDP mission or operation. Concomitantly, the text of Article 42(7) doesn’t contain any provision excluding explicitly the participation of EU institutions, which can still facilitate and coordinate the actions undertaken in this respect.

Consequently, mutual assistance clause

by a decision of the European Council. For details, see URL: <http://www.iss.europa.eu/about-us/>, accessed on 3 December 2015.

⁹ Thierry Tardy, *CSDP in Action. What contribution to international security*, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper no. 134, Paris, May 2015, p. 33.

doesn’t create or describe a responsibility for the Union, but for the Member States. It is a provision tangential to CSDP, not a specific one. The exceptional nature of the mutual assistance clause within Title V of the Treaty is determined by its origin. The inclusion of this clause is related to the cease of the activity of another institution of the European security architecture: Western European Union (WEU), an international organisation and alliance, whose attributions were transferred to Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP). The process ended once the Treaty of Lisbon came into force in its present form comprehending the mutual assistance clause.

The fact that mutual assistance clause is the result of an effort to transfer WEU attributions towards the EU gives it an interpretable character, insufficiently supported by EU’s institutional framework. The description of the clause is extremely similar to the engagement states assume within an alliance. The support in case of attack is an obligation and consists in “all the means in their power”, but, unlike NATO, it doesn’t suppose any coordination at EU’s level, through its institutions of political decision or through strategic or operation coordination.

A major significance is attached to the fact that France called on Article 42(7) of Lisbon Treaty, although it also provides for another basis on which EU Member States can support each other in such crises.

Solidarity clause – Article 222(1) – also falls into EU’s effort to develop a common defence system. According to this provision, Member States and EU will offer each other mutual assistance, at authorities’ request, in case a Member State is the victim of a terrorist attack or of a natural or man-made disaster. The clause has security and defence implications, but it mainly refers to internal security, thus creating a connection with operational implications between the internal dimension and the external, CSDP related one, between the diplomatic dimension and the CFSP crisis management one, as well as between the various means available for the EU.

Although Article 222(1) has a similar phrasing, it is extensively different from Article



42(7) from the perspective of the manner in which they are put into practice. Paragraph (3) of Article 222 mentions that “the arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause shall be defined by a decision adopted by the Council acting on a joint proposal by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”¹⁰, a decision adopted subsequently, in 2014¹¹. Article 42(7) is not followed by such a provision and its wording avoids the clear reference to the Union. Solidarity clause supposes that “the Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal”, as opposed to the mutual assistance clause mentioning that “the other Member States *shall have* towards it *an obligation* of aid and assistance”.

The major difference between the two articles consists in the fact that Article 222(1) – solidarity clause – would involve the Union altogether, the organisation and operation of actions within Brussels institutional framework, while Article 42(7) implies an obligation of Member States, therefore conducted from the capital of each EU member nation.

Furthermore, Council Decision on the arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause stipulates that it shall be invoked when the concerned state “considers that the crisis clearly *overwhelms* the response capabilities available to it” (Article 42(1))¹². By choosing the mutual assistance clause against the solidarity clause, Paris conveys the crisis doesn’t overcome France’s capacity of approaching it.

At the same time, the lines regarding NATO’s role as the fundament of collective defence, within an article enshrining a principle similar to the one laying at the basis of the Alliance itself confirms

¹⁰ Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2010, p. 148.

¹¹ Council Decision of 24 June 2014 on the arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause (2014/415/EU), URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/sede/dv/sede160615councildecision_/sede160615councildecision_en.pdf, accessed on 15 December 2015.

¹² *Ibidem*.

not only that it is the framework within which the collective defence principle is objectified, but also the rather political and symbolic value of introducing a similar principle within EU legal framework. Additionally, the reference to NATO is also a reiteration by certain Member States of the “red lines” concerning the need to prevent the duplication of the two organisations’ efforts, the avoidance of creating new command structures concurring NATO’s ones and consuming additional resources, as well as the preservation of US interests in Europe, through UK.

4. Coordination and action

Thus, one could assert in all reason that Article 42(7) has political and symbolic implications, but doesn’t suppose the creation of a defence system for the EU, as it only bolsters solidarity between Member States. This is the conclusion towards which verges not only the analysis of the fundamental documents, but also the declarations made in Paris and Brussels in the context of the invocation of Article 42(7) and the positive response unanimously agreed at EU’s level: “first and foremost, this is a political act” (Jean-Yves Le Drian, French Minister of Defence); “political act and a political message” (Federica Mogherini, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security policy)¹³.

As far as the Alliance is concerned, at political level, decisions are made within the North-Atlantic Council, on the basis of the consensus achieved after consultations. The planning and execution of operations is coordinated through ACO, which is meant to maintain the Alliance’s territorial integrity, the preservation and/or restoring its Members’ security. ACO is made up of a series of permanent headquarters, acting at strategic, operational, and tactical level. The mission of NATO’s command structure is to ensure the Alliance’s capacity of approaching

¹³ Federica Mogherini quoted by Matthew TEMPEST, “EU unanimous in agreeing French treaty-call for help after attacks”, *Euractiv.com*, 17 November 2015, URL: <http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/eu-unanimous-agreeing-help-french-319555>, accessed on 26 November 2015.



threats in case deterrence fails or in case there would be an attack on the territory of one of the European Allies. In other words, the invocation of Article 5 results in an action coordinated at the Alliance level, by specially designed structures.

Moreover, ACO is directly connected to NATO's Force Structure, composed of deployable national and multinational forces and headquarters put at NATO's disposal by its Member States on a permanent or temporary basis.

Similar structures can be found within EU's institutional structure. The Political and Security Committee (COPS) has a central role in this context as it is meant to define and follow EU's response in a crisis situation¹⁴. EU Military Committee provides COPS military counselling and recommendations. EU Military Staff is defined as the source of military expertise within the European External Action Service (EEAS), the latter having the role of ensuring early warning, situational assessments, strategic planning, information and communication systems, concept development, training and education and partnership support. In spite of all this, the EU doesn't have a permanent military command structure comparable with NATO. Also, if, as far as military capabilities are concerned, Member States can engage the same package of forces at NATO and EU levels, the major difference between them resides in the degree in which they developed their command and planning structures.

The two organisations make efforts to compensate for EU's insufficient development in this area by resorting to various command and control options:

- some states voluntarily made available their national headquarters for activating some EU Headquarters of strategic level (OHQ) or operational level (FHQ);
- "Berlin +" agreements, allowing EU to carry out crisis management missions, resorting to NATO's capacities and means (inclusively to

the planning capacities of the Alliance), to NATO European command options (including the role of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe – DSACEUR);

- the possibility to operationalize EU Operations Centre (OPSCEN) for smaller scale operations.

Nevertheless, these options are created for operating in the context of crisis management measures undertaken at EU's level and as steps towards the definition of a common security policy.

Thus, despite the fact that Article 42(7) of the Treaty of Lisbon doesn't imply an action coordinated and directed from Brussels, the EU has neither the institutional, nor the operational capacity to translate into reality, in measures and actions a principle such as "an attack against one is an attack against all".

As far as coordination and action in the context of mutual defence invocation are concerned, there are two aspects of major importance for delineating the implications and actions resulting from the measures adopted by France in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of November, 13th, 2015. Firstly, it is about the incomplete development of EU's legal, institutional and structural framework for coordinating an eventual intervention based on collective defence principle. In this regard, the comparative analysis of NATO and EU capacity of action is eloquent.

Secondly, Paris option to request support from EU's Member States, turning to advantage EU's legal basis and not NATO's, is illustrative for the type of the assistance expected, as well as for the role the Élysée Palace wants and can assume in the given context. In this line of thought, it is useful to recall that France deployed considerable troops and capabilities in missions in Sub-Saharan Africa and Middle East. According to the data published by the European Parliament, on November, 13th, France had 3,500 troops in Sahel, 35 in Mali, 930 in Central African Republic, 900 in Lebanon and 3,500 in Syria and Iraq¹⁵.

¹⁴ Council Decision 2001/78/CFSP of 22 January 2001 setting up the Political and Security Committee (PSC), URL: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Ar00005>, accessed on 26 November 2015.

¹⁵ Mutual defence clause: what the requirement to help out other member states means, 20.01.2016, URL: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20160119STO10518/Mutual-defence-clause-what>



Article 42(7) of Lisbon Treaty doesn't suppose the European states would launch an operation against the organisation having claimed the terrorist attacks. The assistance expected by France in this situation consists in pooling capabilities and support of French operations in Syria and Iraq, as well as in supporting French operations in other regions of the world, so that would allow France to deploy troops where necessary.

As a matter of fact, two of the states whose contribution was most eagerly awaited – the United Kingdom and Germany – responded promptly to France's request, with a consistent contribution: the former initiated air strikes against ISIL in Syria and the latter deployed a frigate¹⁶.

Placing reaction in this legal framework made it impossible for the European states to ignore France's call and, simultaneously, conferred Paris a central role in coordinating the support given, additionally offering flexibility and the possibility of making rapid decisions, given the fact that the implementation of the measures doesn't imply a formal European Council decision.

5. The actors

Although NATO and EU share 22 common Member States, out of the 29 of NATO's and 28 of the EU, there is another aspect fundamentally differentiating the implications of Article 42(7) of Lisbon Treaty from the ones of Article 5 of Washington Treaty – the actors regarded, the actors which are to offer assistance to the one invoking the respective legal framework. The provision of the Treaty of Lisbon regarding CSDP-NATO relation enhance the idea that the North-Atlantic Alliance maintains its central role for the security and defence of the states composing it. One of the most relevant paragraphs in this respect is the one referring to the mutual defence clause.

the-requirement-to-help-other-member-states-means, accessed on 20 January 2016.

¹⁶ Thierry Tardy, "Mutual Defence – One Month On", EU Institute for Security Studies Alert, no. 55/2015, URL: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_55_Article_42.7.pdf, accessed on 15 December 2015.

The last part of Article 42, paragraph 7, asserting that NATO remains for the states composing it "the foundation of their collective defence", underlines and reconfirms NATO's role and importance for its Member States, even if they are also EU members. Thus, mutual assistance clause doesn't overlap and doesn't have a bearing on NATO's collective defence clause, a fact transpiring from the article's content in itself. Even more, this part of the text can also be interpreted as an acknowledgement of NATO's primacy in such situations.

It is also relevant the historical background of the mutual assistance clause within the text of Lisbon Treaty, its introduction being made at Greece's request. The Hellenic Republic wanted such security guarantees not only in NATO's framework, but also within the EU, because Turkey, which has NATO but no EU membership, had been long considered by Athens a potential source of tension and even a potential adversary¹⁷. Additionally, those states which are EU, but not NATO members, surely attach a great importance the inclusion of the mutual assistance clause within the Treaty of Lisbon.

The mention regarding NATO's fundamental role in the European security included among the lines of the article enshrining mutual defence clause corroborates the idea that an eventual action carried out in the name of the principle "an attack on one of us is an attack on all of us" would be coordinated at the Alliance's level and not by the EU.

On the other hand, invoking Article 42(7) and not Article 5 also implies an effort to address a security challenge without directly involving NATO and, implicitly, the US. The foregoing analyses elaborated within the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies have demonstrated, in the recent years, US tendency and effort to determine its European Allies to assume more

¹⁷ Jérôme Legrande, "Will CSDP Enjoy 'Collateral Gains' from France's Invocation of the EU's 'Mutual Defence Clause'?" In-Depth Analysis, European Parliament, Policy Department, December 2015, URL: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/570452/EXPO_IDA\(2015\)570452_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/570452/EXPO_IDA(2015)570452_EN.pdf), accessed on 20 December 2015.



responsibility for their own security¹⁸. The respective argumentations were included in studies of world economic and financial crisis' consequences, of "smart defence" and "pooling and sharing" concepts' implications and even in the ones approaching the dynamic of international system's polarity. And the occasions for the European Allies to demonstrate they assumed this role were neither few, nor lacked of relevance. The range of popular revolts in North Africa and Middle East, generally known as "the Arab Spring", which culminated with the intervention of two European powers under NATO aegis in Libya, as well as the Ukraine crisis constituted contexts in which European states gave proof of the limits of action under the Union's umbrella.

Subsequently, invoking Article 42(7) of Lisbon Treaty represents a message of assuming this responsibility and, equally, an effort to build a favourable context for confirming EU's relevance in security and defence terms. The above mentioned aspects confirm the rather symbolic and political value of the invocation of this provision of the Treaty of Lisbon against the much more famous Article 5 of the North-Atlantic Treaty.

In the same line of thought, Paris decision also infers France takes upon itself the role of EU leader. The choice to not make an appeal to Article 5, but to the clause of mutual defence referring to the European states, can exert a higher moral and political pressure on the latter. Le Drian speech confirms this argumentation: "France cannot do everything, in the Sahel, in the Central African Republic, in the Levant and

then secure its national territory"¹⁹; European partners can contribute "either by taking part in France's operations in Syria or Iraq, or by easing the load or providing support for France in other operations"²⁰. This phrasing doesn't reveal only the acknowledgement of some limits of France's capacity of acting in various theatres of operations, but also lays a stress on the extent to which Paris involved in these operations, and henceforth the lever of moral and political pressure.

Appealing to Article 5 of the North-Atlantic Council would have equalled to act within a framework where US has the primacy and Turkey plays a major role, which would have had Paris to hold fewer levers of control on the actions undertaken in this respect as compared with the similar process at EU's level²¹.

From another perspective, the fact that France chose EU framework to respond to the terrorist attacks of November, 13th, can be considered natural, considering the long history of its plead for the development of an European defence, autonomous from Washington. France's withdrawal from NATO's military command structures for almost three decades, French leaders' propositions for the development of an European defence community (René Pleven, 1950), the disagreements with US, in 2003, regarding the launch of the operation in Iraq are just a few meaningful examples in this respect.

Conclusions

The comparative analysis of the two articles from the perspective of their force given by the nature of the organisations to which they are specific, of the operational capacity, and by the specific of the actions they trigger reflect aspects relevant for the present state of the European security environment, for the transatlantic trends, as well as for the dynamic of the relations

¹⁸ Such examples can be considered the following: Petre Duțu, Alexandra Sarcinschi, Cristina Bogzeanu, *Apărarea națională, între viziune și realitate la început de mileniu*, "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, 2013; Stan Anton, "European Union Strategic Vision. Between Tradition and the Imperative Need of Change", in *Strategic Impact*, no. 2[47]/2013, pp. 50-58; Cristian Băhnăreanu, "The Impact of Economic and Financial Crisis of Euroatlantic Security", in *Strategic Impact*, no. 4[49]/2013, pp. 26-34, Mirela Atanasiu, "Contemporary Crises and Conflicts Susceptible of Major Complex Effects on the European Security Environment. Ukraine Case", in *Strategic Impact*, no. 1 [54]/2015, pp. 24-39.

¹⁹ ***, "Le Drian Tells EU Defense Ministers: 'France Cannot Do Everything'", *Atlantic Council*, 18 November 2015, URL: <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/le-drian-tells-eu-defense-ministers-france-cannot-do-everything>, accessed on 4 December 2015.

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

²¹ Jérôme Legrande, *op. cit.*



between the European security actors. Mutual assistance clause invocation by France following the terrorist attacks at the end of 2015 illustrates its capacity to turn to advantage a crisis situation, turning it into an impetus for the development of CSDP.

On the other hand, the same deed is representative for the need to reassess EU's toolbox in the area of security because, even if France opted for this framework, in our opinion, this decision was substantially determined by the flexibility typical for the action under the mutual assistance clause, as a result of the possibility of rapid action, under the circumstances of a minimum involvement of EU institutions.

Although similar from the perspective of the principle laying at their basis and of their phrasing, mutual assistance clause (EU) and collective defence (NATO) differ at a great extent when it comes about the measures they trigger. As far as NATO is concerned, collective defence supposes actual actions (missions, operations) led at the Alliance's level. For the EU, Article 42(7) invocation is a political basis for bilateral agreements between the state making the appeal, on the one hand, and each one of EU Member States, on the other.

At a first glance, considering lack of experience at the European level, resorting to mutual assistance clause for getting support in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in November, 13th, could seem a chanceful decision made by Paris. Nevertheless, this decision is solidly substantiated as it supposes a series of undoubted benefits, both for France and the Union.

Bearing in mind the identification of the main coordinates of the European security environment and given consideration to the political and symbolic value of France's invocation of Article 42(7), there can be three major significances attached to the respective decision: a) European effort to address a security problem without appealing and involving the US through NATO; b) France's assertion as an European leader; c) effort to give a new impetus to CSDP development.

Subsequently, in the case of a positive evolution of the relations between the European states, the

consequences of Article 42(7) activation, despite triggering, in the first instance, only political and symbolic effects, could also consist in an enhancement of European solidarity in a time when the unity between EU's Member States is seriously questioned by the crisis of Middle East refugee wave.

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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TURKISH SECURITY AGENDA

*Mirela ATANASIU, PhD**

Turkey's geopolitical importance cannot be challenged. It primarily derives from its geographical position at the intertwinement of Europe and Asia, but also from its culture – which is at the confluence of the Western world and Islam – and from its role in world economy, as an emerging state and a hub of energy – between hydrocarbon resources of the East and the consumption needs of the West – and essential commercial transport route for both parts of the world. So, all these factors put Turkey in a double geopolitical posture as Eurasian security pivot and East-West interference state.

Lately, security policy agenda of Turkey took a turn – not necessarily unexpected as controversial –, which directly affects the Western world and even beyond. Considering this aspect, in the present paper there are analysed some geopolitical and security aspects of the Turkish state designed to increase the predictability of Ankara's administration actions by presenting some estimated directions of evolution of its security and foreign policy.

Keywords: geopolitics, Turkey, security, Eurasia, crisis, war, emerging power.

Foreword

In two thousand years, Turkic peoples migrated and expanded from a small group of nomads in western China and formed one of the most durable empires, further resulting in

six Turkic modern nation-states and minorities expanded throughout Eurasia.

Turkish language used by Turkic peoples was the core element of their unity, although they were composed by diverse cultures. Since the beginning of the eighth century, the Turks came into contact with Muslims as, and up to present, the vast majority adopted Islam, which contributed to their political unity.

Turkish people cohabited with other peoples for centuries, the Ottoman Empire's multi-ethnic character making it more tolerant in domestic and foreign relations. Thus, the Turkish state was shaped as a dichotomous political entity, embracing at the same time several identities – *Altai and Levantine, Arab and Persian, Greek and Roman, Balkan and Anatolian*¹. Also, its geographical connection with Europe gave the possibility to the Turkish people to come into contact with Western civilization, modern Turkey being created by importing Western progressive ideas.

1. Geography

Most of Turkey's territory is in Asia Minor, but a small area is in the south-east of the Balkan Peninsula. Turkey's borders were established by

¹ Come Carpentier de Gourdon, "Turkey: Nation or Empire", in *Turcia de la Kemal Atatürk la U.E.* volume, coordinators: Güven Güngör and Vasile Simileanu, Editura Topform, București, 2014, p. 69.

** Mirela ATANASIU, PhD in Military Sciences, is Researcher within the Centre for Defense and Security Strategic Studies, "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania. Email: atanasiu.mirela@unap.ro*



the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) with Bulgaria, Greece, Syria, Iraq² and the former Soviet republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia). Turkey has 4,454 miles of coastal border³ to the Black Sea, the Mediterranean Sea and Aegean Sea. In the northwest there is an internal sea, Marmara, between Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits.

Turkey is a country with unique position, being a geographical bridge between Europe and Asia, its territory linking Southeast Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. This position explains the interest of the world's great powers for the Turkish state. Thus, Brzezinski considers it "a geopolitical pivot"⁴, and Samuel Huntington sees it as "a power of the future, a bridge state linking European civilization to Asian civilization"⁵.

What cannot be neglected in terms of Turkey's importance, there are the approximately 77 million inhabitants with a significant Kurdish minority, which is one of the defining geopolitical element for this state. Besides, the main domestic problem is related to the Kurdish minority, which is manifested by actions taken by Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), considered by Turkey, the US and the European Union to be a terrorist organization⁶. Other minorities are underrepresented: Armenians, Greeks or Arabs.

The Gross domestic product (GDP) of Turkey for 2014 was 793.43 billion dollars, down 1.4% from 2013⁷. However, for 2015 it was estimated a GDP growth of about 4% compared to 2014.

² *Lausanne Peace Treaty*, 1923, available online at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/lausanne-peace-treaty-part-i_-_political-clauses.en.mfa, accessed on 12.12.2015.

³ *Turkey*, available online at: <http://www.everyculture.com/To-Z/Turkey.html>, accessed on 25.11.2015.

⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard*, Basic Books, New York, 1997, p. 47.

⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2003, p. 141.

⁶ *Over 2,000 acts of violence by PKK in Turkey in 2015*, July 25, 2015, available online at: <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/europe/20029-over-2000-acts-of-violence-by-pkk-in-turkey-in-2015>, accessed on 09.11.2015.

⁷ *Turkey GDP 1960-2016*, available online at: <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/turkey/gdp>, accessed on 16.11.2015.

The Turkish economy is in a period of transition, relying pretty heavily on agriculture. By all means, the contribution of agriculture to GDP has increased on average from TL 2,408,411.20 in 1998, reaching a record of TL 5,288,949 in the third quarter of 2015⁸.

Due to the geographical location of Turkey which transits about 70% of oil and gas reserves of the world, namely from the Middle East and the Caspian basin⁹, the Turkish state has a clear chance to play the role of a key-route of the energy transit. Moreover, its role as a Eurasian energy hub was reminded by US Vice-President Joe Biden in November 2014 in the context of the Ukrainian crisis starting with the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. On this occasion, the US official underscored in Istanbul "the importance of Turkey in the context of East-West energy corridor"¹⁰, referring to the energy transport route connecting Caspian resources to Western Europe's energy market. Also, there are allegations that Turkey has the potential to transit almost a third of the energy demand of the EU in the medium term and help, in the long term, the incorporation of Middle East and the Caspian region into a more extensive energy transport network connected in turn, to the vast global community¹¹.

Turkey, along with Romania and Bulgaria, provides a NATO strategic platform in the Black Sea, South Caucasus and Middle East regions.

⁸ *Turkey GDP from Agriculture 1998-2016*, available online at: <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/turkey/gdp-from-agriculture>, accessed on 15.12.2015.

⁹ Katinka Barysch, *Turkey's Role in European Energy Security*, Centre for European Reform Essays, 2007, p. 1 (apud: Göktuğ Sönmez, *Turkey's Renewed Ambitions on the Eurasian Energy Chessboard*, University of London, August 2015, p. 1).

¹⁰ *Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden on European Energy Security to the Atlantic Council Energy and Economic Summit*, November 22, 2014, available online at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/22/remarks-vice-president-joe-biden-european-energy-security-atlantic-counc>, accessed on 05.12.2015.

¹¹ Göktuğ Sönmez, *Revisiting Turkey's Potential as the "Eurasian Energy Hub" with a Holistic Energy Policy*, December 17, 2014, available online at: <http://www.sde.org.tr/en/newsdetail/revisiting-turkeys-potential-as-the-eurasian-energy-hub-with-a-holistic-energy-policy/4116>, accessed on 19.11.2015.



Precisely because of Turkey's geographical location, NATO has installed a military headquarters in Izmir and a Rapid Deployable Corps in Istanbul, on the territory of the allied state, which allows monitoring the states in the area of the Middle East and the Caucasus, and US access to military base at Incirlik, currently used in air operations undertaken on strategic positions of the terrorist organization 'Islamic State in Syria and Iraq'.

An important geopolitical advantage is the sovereignty right of Turkey over the Ponto-Mediterranean Straits established by the Montreux Convention (1936), which stipulates the principles of free passage and navigation through the Straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles, and attributing Turkey's right to block traffic to ships of a state where they would feel threatened by it to any armed conflict¹². Thus, Turkey controls the access by sea route between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea basin. The mechanism has already been applied in 2008 in the Georgian crisis context, when the US and NATO allies have sent humanitarian aid ships in the Black Sea¹³, and the Russian Federation has accused US ships have violated the Convention.

Geopolitically, Turkey is today an interference state, a hinge between east and west from geographical, cultural, political and ideological perspectives, where there is a fervent secessionist Kurdish trend emphasized in the context of systemic crises in Syria and Iraq.

2. Culture – political ideology

The Ottoman territory was, for a long period of time, transit area for many migratory peoples and tribes and, at the same time, was the cradle of many nations: Hittites, Greeks, Lycians, Assyrians, Romans, Persians, Mongols

and Seljuks¹⁴. Part of the European system of alliances, the Ottoman Empire was an important military power in Europe and spiritual in the Muslim world. Although the majority of Turkish population declare themselves Muslim, we cannot frame the Turkish culture in a pure Islamic identity because until now the Republic of Turkey imported specifically Western items as: democratic system, secularism, Latin alphabet, educational system, justice system, legal system¹⁵, etc. In addition, since the period of Kemalist modernization in the 20s, Turkey also adopted Western music, clothes and other artistic elements of Western culture which of course altered Turkey's prominent Islamic culture.

The official language, Turkish, is spoken by 90% of the population. The minority languages include Kurdish, spoken by 6% of the population. Arabic is spoken by 1.2% of the Turkish population, who are actually bilingual Arabic and Turkish speakers. Other minority languages are Circassian spoken by more than 0.09% population across the country, Greek, Armenian and Judezmo, a Romance language spoken by Hebrews¹⁶. About 99% of the country's population is declared adherent of Islam. Most Turks are Sunni (80%), while Kurds and Azeri are Alawis.

Turkey appeared in 1923 and was developed as a headlight of secular modernity in a traditional Muslim region¹⁷. Ambitions for modernity of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk led him to turn to the

¹⁴ *Turcia, creuzetul culturilor*, available online at: <http://www.filmdocumentare.com/turcia-creuzetul-culturilor/>, accessed on 11.11.2015.

¹⁵ For example, the Turkish legal system has taken over the Swiss Civil Code, Criminal Code and German commercial law. See: Talat S. Halman, *A Millenium of Turkish Literature*, Kalkan Printing and Pinding Co., Ankara, 2013, p. 122.

¹⁶ *Turkey - Turkish Language, Culture, Customs and Etiquette*, available online at: <http://www.kwintessential.co.uk/resources/global-etiquette/turkey-country-profile.html>, accessed on 15.12.2015.

¹⁷ Joanna Andrusko, *The Crossroads of Turkey's Relationship with The West*, The Washington Review of Turkish and Eurasian Affairs, January 2011, available online at: <http://www.thewashingtonreview.org/articles/the-crossroads-of-turkeys-relationship-with-the-west.html>, accessed on 15.12.2015.

¹² Zachary Karabell, *Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa*, The Gale Group Inc., 2004, available online at: http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Montreux_Convention.aspx (apud: *Montreux Convention*, 1936).

¹³ David Morrison, *Turkey restricts US access to the Black Sea*, October 18, 2008, available online at: <http://www.david-morrison.org.uk/us/turkey-restricts-us-access.htm>, accessed on 01.10.2015.



Western model, an idea that clearly contrasted with theocratic tendencies manifested in the former Ottoman Empire.

Once with Kemalism, Turkish nationalism has been declared for the first time in history¹⁸, Atatürk's coming to power started an era of reforms carried out primarily in the cultural, scientific and military fields, but not only. Although these reforms did not have a huge impact in rural areas until the second half of the twentieth century, urban centres have undergone radical transformations in the political system, religious belief, national ideology, institutions and methods of education, intellectual orientation, everyday life, etc.¹⁹ Now, Turkey has a homogeneous population with diverse political and administrative structure, characterized by internal tensions (traditionalists versus revolutionaries or fundamentalist versus secularists). Turkish culture, although largely influenced by the European ways, has not become a Western culture. It is no longer predominantly Muslim, but has few ties with the Western world, despite the values and standards taken from its cultural representative bodies (Jewish, Greek and Christian). As a result, Turkish culture was transformed "into an amalgam of traditions – Turkic, Anatolian, Ottoman, Islamic, Arab, Iranian, European and American – creating a bridge between two continents"²⁰. However, in history, Turkey stands as the dominant power of the Muslim world.

One of the basic pan ideas of Turks appeared around 1900, being promoted by the Turkish Defence Minister at the time, Ismail Enver Pasha. Thus, pan-Turkism campaigns for the unity of all Turkish speaking peoples (Turks, Turkmens, Uzbeks, Tatars, Azerbaijanis, Kazakhs, Uighurs, etc.) under a single state entity called Turkestan. Subsequently, there appeared neo-Ottomanism, which has its origins in pan-Turkism, but expressed differently in the sense that Turkey wants to become a power base of the Islamic

world, without limiting its influence only on this, and for this goal it will use all the tools available to create vectors in directions that are interested in its geopolitical perspective –Balkan, Caucasus and Middle East.

3. Economy

Turkey has a strong economy and an ideal geographical position for trade. According to World Bank, in 2015, Turkey ranked 17th among the largest economies in the world, registering a GDP of \$ 799.54 billion. In addition, in less than a decade, per capita income in Turkey nearly tripled, exceeding \$ 10,500²¹. Turkey is a member of the OECD and the G20, one of the major donors for Official Development Assistance (ODA), and a recipient of external funding provided by the EU through the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) for the period 2014-2020 worth 11.7 billion Euros (for the Balkans and Turkey)²².

European Union countries are major trading partners of Turkey, 40% of Turkish trade is dependent on them and since 1996 a Turkey-EU customs union was created. Also, Turkey has a very important economic role in supplying the EU's energy resources. Thus, through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, there passes Russian and Caspian oil, Turkey also representing the meeting place for sources of gas and oil coming from Northern Iraq, Iran or the Caspian Sea. In contrast, its trade ties with the US represent approximately 10% of exports and 6% of imports.

Energy corridors – the East-West corridor supplying Europe with Caspian and Iranian resources and the North-South corridor supplying Europe with Russian sources – represent a true energy bridge to the EU. Turkey is the one that ended the isolation of Caspian resources by opening the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline,

¹⁸ Kubilay Arin, "Turkish Think Tanks, the AKP's Policy Network from Neo-Gramscian and Neoottoman Angles" in *Occasional Paper Series* vol. 4 - no. 1, Center for Turkish Studies Portland State University, June 2015, p. 2.

¹⁹ Talat S. Halman, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 124.

²¹ *Overview*, the World Bank, available online at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/turkey/overview>, accessed on 26.10.2015.

²² EU Parliament, *A general survey of development policy*, p. 3, available online at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_6.3.1.html, accessed on 10.02.2016.



facilitating the transport of energy from Sangachal terminal on the Caspian Sea shore to Ceyhan marine terminal on the Turkish Mediterranean coast. In addition, the oil from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, since 2013 are supplied in the same way²³. Ceyhan port has global importance in the transit of more raw and is arrival point of gas and oil pipelines²⁴. Moreover, a pipeline transporting natural gas supplies Erzerum town to the rest of Turkey.

As regards the economic relationship with the Russian Federation, Turkey is the second biggest buyer of Russian gas after Germany, while Russia is the largest gas supplier for Turkey, Ankara acquiring from Russia 28-30 billion cubic meters of the 50 billion cubic meters of natural gas it needs²⁵. In 2014, Turkey's total volume of trade with Russia amounted to 31 billion \$, while its exports to Russia amounted to 5.94 billion \$, Russia holding the 7th place among export markets of Turkey²⁶.

After shooting down a Russian plane on November 24, 2015, the economic relations between Turkey and Russia were negatively impacted, Russia imposing economic sanctions against Turkey, including a ban on imports of Turkish products and a ban on charter flights between the two countries. Moreover, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced that Russia would suspend visa-free travel for Turkish citizens visiting Russia from January 1, 2016²⁷. However, Turkey has not announced a change in the visa regime applicable to Russian citizens.

²³ *BTC Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline*, available online at: http://www.bp.com/en_az/caspian/operations/projects/pipelines/BTC.html, accessed on 24.01.2016.

²⁴ Susanne Nies, "Gaz și petrol către Europa. Perspective pentru infrastructuri", in *Guvernarea Europeană și geopolitica energiei*, vol. 4, IFRI, Paris, 2008, p. 119.

²⁵ *Factbox: Russia-Turkey economic and trade relations*, November 24, 2015, available online at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-russia-turkey-ties-fac-idUSKBN0TD26K20151124>, accessed on 26.11.2015.

²⁶ *Turkey-Russia economic relations after the plane downing*, December 9, 2015, available online at: <http://www.turkishweekly.net/2015/12/09/news/turkey-russia-economic-relations-after-the-plane-downing/>, accessed on 15.12.2015.

²⁷ *Idem*.

4. Turkey's defence policy

Currently, Turkey is a booming power, being the sixth largest economic power of Europe, the seventeenth in the world and the second military power in NATO, after US Armed Forces. Turkey's military personnel capacity is impressive²⁸: 41.64 million eligible population, of which a total of 35.01 million fit for military service. Turkey's land forces are modern and comprise 3,778 tanks, 7,557 armoured vehicles and 811 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). Moreover, Turkish naval power includes 115 ships and the air forces, more than 1,000 aircrafts²⁹. Turkey is also one of five NATO countries in which the Alliance has deployed tactical nuclear arsenal³⁰, hosting about 90 nuclear bombs³¹. For 2016, it is expected that Turkey will hold the tenth place in the world between conventional military forces³². Turkey also joined China and India in an attempt to become a large-scale military supplier, triggering a series of high profile development programs.

Turkish directions of defence policy are regulated by the Defence White Paper, in force since 2007. Thus, the document states that "global problems are solvable regardless of their complexity, as long as mutual understanding and cooperation is governing relations between states"³³. The main threat to global security was

²⁸ *Turkey ranked as 10 of 126 with a GFP Power Index rating of 0.4339*, available online at: http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=Turkey, accessed on 15.12.2015.

²⁹ *Idem*.

³⁰ In fact, for 40 years, Turkey was silent custodian of nuclear weapons belonging to the US and NATO. See detail: Alexandra Bell, Benjamin Loehrke, *The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey*, available online at: <http://thebulletin.org/status-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey>, accessed on 19.11.2015.

³¹ *Forța Militară a Turciei*, July 29, 2015, available online at: <http://www.digi24.ro/Stiri/Digi24/Extern/International/Fora+militara+a+Turciei>, accessed on 12.11.2015.

³² *Turkey ranked as 10 of 126 with a GFP Power Index rating of 0.4339*, available online at: http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=Turkey, accessed on 25.11.2015.

³³ *Defense White Paper of Turkey for 2007*, p. 1, available online at: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e->



considered to be international terrorism, but there are also identified political, social and economic instability diffused in the region by the failed states, regional and ethnic conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and religious fundamentalism.

Turkish military doctrine emphasizes the sufficiency of troops, defending by own forces, territorial defence and the primacy of the interests and needs of defence in relation to other types of interests. Turkey's military strategy regards the following aspects: deterring potential enemies through its own capabilities, collective security (NATO and CSDP/EU), advanced defence, active military participation in the administration and crisis management in the area. Turkey's military budget is estimated at over 12 billion dollars³⁴, at the disposal of a numerous, well-equipped, armed forces, which enjoys respect among the population.

Moreover, its military power is seen as a guarantor of national security, as demonstrated throughout history, by the crucial role played by the Turkish Armed Forces in implementing the state's national security strategy. Even in the Constitution, the focus is on military power³⁵, which distinguishes it from European constitutions, while its Kemalist tendencies and lack of a state religion separates it from the majority Muslim constitutions of other nations. This approach gives unique character among other countries, including from those that have compatibility or affinity, but also shows the Turkish state willingness to adapt to western modernity.

Although it has a doctrine centred on maintaining the integrity and sovereignty of its territory, Turkey has had a consistent contribution to collective security by participating in NATO

2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=154908, accessed on 10.12.2015.

³⁴ *Duplex turco-sirian (1)*, available online at: <http://www.rumaniamilitary.ro/duplex-turco-sirian-1>, accessed on 28.11.2015.

³⁵ Joanna Andrusko, *The Crossroads of Turkey's Relationship with The West*, The Washington Review of Turkish and Eurasian Affairs, January 2011, available online at: <http://www.thewashingtonreview.org/articles/the-crossroads-of-turkeys-relationship-with-the-west.html>, accessed on 14.10.2015.

and EU operations, in the framework of the Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE), contributing to peace and stability in the area. Such activities were conducted in the context of the Defence Ministerial Process in South East Europe (SEDM)³⁶ launched in 1996 with the aim of improving cooperation between countries in the region. Among SEDM activities are included³⁷: the formation of Simulation Network for Southeast Europe, satellite interconnection of military hospitals, cooperation on natural disasters, border security, combating terrorism and cooperation in defence industry and research fields. Another important initiative was the creation of Southeast Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) in order to support peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations carried out by NATO or the EU in the UN framework or under the OSCE auspices' context in which Turkey constituted, in-between 2007-2011, the Kabul Multinational Brigade Headquarters, organized under the leadership of ISAF. Also during 2016, the Turkish Armed Forces will participate in *Resolute Support* Operation, with significant responsibilities to the "Hamid Karzai" international airport in Kabul³⁸.

In 2001, another initiative was the establishment of the Turkish Group at the Black Sea Naval Cooperation (BLACKSEAFOR), involving all riparian countries (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russian Federation, Ukraine and Turkey). Subsequently, on March 1, 2004, the Turkish Naval Forces launched Operation *Black Sea Harmony*, in order to deter terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other possible illegal activities in the Black Sea.

³⁶ Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine and the USA are members of SEDM, and Georgia and Moldova have observer status.

³⁷ *Turkey's International Security Initiatives and Contributions to NATO and EU Operations*, 2011, available online at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/iv_-european-security-and-defence-identity_policy-_esdi_p_.en.mfa, accessed on 10.12.2015.

³⁸ *DSACEUR Visits NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Turkey*, April 24, 2015, available online at: <http://shape.nato.int/dsaceur-visits-nato-rapid-deployable-corps-turkey>, accessed on 19.10.2015.



5. Evolution of foreign and security policy in contemporary Turkey

Historically, Turkey had a policy of neutrality and understanding with all countries of the region, signing even the Balkan Pact with Romania, Greece and the former Yugoslavia. After the World War II, it is included in the Western European alliance system, in 1952 becoming NATO member and in 1963 an associate member of the European Economic Community (EEC).

For nearly two centuries, the Turkish state (be it Ottoman or modern Turkey) was faced with three major security issues. The first was related to the permanent threat felt towards its Russian neighbour (empire, union or federation, according to the historical moment), the second was represented by the emergence of nationalist ideas and movements, and the third refers to its condition and economic dependence towards the West.

The basic principles that have guided Turkish foreign policy since the founding of the Republic in 1923 were prudence and pragmatism. In the first 10-15 years from the creation of the Turkish state, its foreign policy has been particularly cautious, without very intense reactions to the events that took place in its close vicinity.

Later, after World War II, Turkey has strictly followed the directions set by the US and NATO. This was until the Turkish foreign policy began to undergo a major conversion, which aims to place Turkey among influential actors on the world map.

From an official point of view, the Republic of Turkey has a parliamentary democracy structure. Currently, the political regime led by R. T. Erdogan – although recently re-elected – is challenged by a series of radical and terrorist groups, particularly the Islamic organizations and parties of the Kurdish minority (e.g. PKK). The opposition in Turkey consists of centre-left Kemalist Republican People's Party (CHP), the centre-right Party of Nationalist Movement (MHP) and the leftist Kurdish-nationalist Peace and Democracy Party (BDP)³⁹. Political

³⁹ Andrea Binder, *The Shape and Sustainability of Turkey's*

differences between these three parties diminish the influence of the opposition in the legislative system dominated by the government.

Turkey's national security policy is determined by the National Security Council, which is composed of the President of the Republic, the Government and the Turkish Armed Forces' commanders⁴⁰. This composition reveals the role of the military in politics and security policy development in Turkey.

Turkey is an emerging power that is rising economically, commercially, diplomatically and militarily⁴¹, thus a developing state⁴² which is taken into consideration in the current international disputes. Thus, at political-military level, Turkey has been a permanent ally of the US, more so given that Turkey is a NATO member state. However, recent history has shown that this relationship between Turkey and the West was the result of a community of interest, not of shared values.

Despite efforts to integrate into the EU, Turkey has remained independent of both the West and the Muslim world. Motivations for which Turkey has not achieved membership in the European Union are diverse but mostly used in political discourse were: the respect for human rights in the issue of the Kurdish minority, ethnicity distribution of its population – concerns of some nations like France and Germany on integrating in the EU a Muslim-majority state, which would constitute the largest population of the organization – and its unstable economy due to its unstable currency and high inflation.

In the post-Cold War period, Turkey transformed its foreign policy and international

Booming Humanitarian Assistance, available online at: <https://poldev.revues.org/1741#tocto2n1>, accessed on 12.12.2015.

⁴⁰ *About the National Security Council*, 2013, available online at: <http://www.mgk.gov.tr/en/index.php/about-the-national-security-council>, accessed on 19.11.2015.

⁴¹ J. Deas, Y. Schemel, *Un des modes de puissance chez les émergents*, available online at: www.puissance.emergents.des.nouvelles.puissances, accessed on 24.11.2015.

⁴² Barry M. Rubin, Kemal Kirişç, *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*, Lynne Reiner Publishers, Boulder, London, 2001.



image more than all former communist states⁴³. This constant effort has been directed to gain acceptance of the West and to be considered part of Europe. Amid this effort, its role in the international plan increased by the involvement policy pursued in solving problems arising between different regions and topics of interest to European and Euro-Atlantic communities. We can say that this involvement was needed from Turkey because of its location in the epicentre of Eurasia and the heart of Rimland.

Since 2002, under the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkish politics has undergone a rapid transformation. Ideological orientation of PKK is significantly different from the Kemalist (pro-Western), for which it led a foreign policy based on the so-called neo-Ottomanism, a trend that began building a new type of nationalism and a new conception of the nation⁴⁴. Thus, the nation's identity is constructed with reference to its Ottoman past, and the national interest is to define a "great nation"⁴⁵, or to create a state as big and powerful as the former Ottoman Empire.

The main problem of Turkey's domestic security is the presence on its territory of a Kurdish ethnic community of approximately 20 million people, concentrated mostly in eleven provinces in the southeast⁴⁶, which represents 25% of the state population. The situation has sparked a series of bloody conflicts.

Historically, Turkish foreign policy is encumbered by at least three elements: the proclamation in 1975 of the "Autonomous Turkish Federated State of Cyprus"⁴⁷; its strained relationship with Greece, which is based on differences over the issue of delimitation of

the continental plateau and the airspace of the Aegean Sea; the regional revisionist tendencies generated by the Kurdish community, which aims to exploit regional instability for achieving the goal of ultimate purpose – to shape their own state Kurdistan by the fragmentation of states such as Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Armenia, containing territories inhabited by Kurdish minorities.

Moreover, as regards its security policy, currently, besides domestic issues related to how to ensure democracy and the Kurdish minority and historical foreign issues listed, Turkey is at the centre of the main crises affecting the conjunction among European and Asian continents: European crisis generated by the influx of migrants from problematic states of the Middle East, especially Syria, given that about 3 million refugees – of which more than 2.5 million registered⁴⁸ exist only in Turkey; the crisis in Syria, with the Russian Federation military involvement in support of the Alawite regime of Bashar al Assad, contrary to the wishes of the Turkish authorities; the Middle East crisis generated by separatist and radical tendencies fuelled by terrorist groups acting regionally, as Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State.

Turkey's attitude on the developments in the Middle East countries affected by the "Arab Spring" has varied depending on the approach of the Justice and Development Party and the perceptions of the concerned countries. For example, Turkey has hesitated to get involved in Yemen, since it did not consider to be an important state for his geopolitical agenda, the same hesitation has manifested in the case of Libya, at least in the initial phase of the crisis in 2011, after which came to participate in operations conducted under the "coalition of the willing" consisting of NATO members and partners.

A more enthusiastic involvement of Turkey was done in Egypt for the removal of President Mubarak, hoping that the "Muslim Brotherhood" will take power. In the Syrian crisis, although before its outbreak, in March 2011, the two

⁴³ Barry M. Rubin, Kemal Kirişç, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

⁴⁴ Cenk Saracoglu, Ozhan Demirkol, "Nationalism and Foreign Policy Discourse in Turkey under the AKP Rule: Geography, History and National Identity" in *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Routledge, 2014, p. 302.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 315.

⁴⁶ *Kurds*, available online at: <http://countrystudies.us/turkey/28.htm>, accessed on 19.11.2015.

⁴⁷ Horia C. Matei, Silviu Neaguț, Ion Nicolae, Nicolae Șteflea, *Statele lumii. Mică enciclopedie*, ediția a VI-a, Editura Meronia, București, 1995, p. 344.

⁴⁸ *Syria Regional Refugee Response Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal*, available online at: <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224>, accessed on 26.11.2015.



countries were having excellent political relations, Turkey's action has reached its peak, claiming expulsion from power of the Assad regime and offering direct support to streamline the opposition by setting in Istanbul on August 23, 2011, of an umbrella organization called the Syrian National Council, actually a coalition made up of anti-governmental groups. After the "Arab Spring", Turkey seems to rely again on close cooperation with the US, NATO and the European Union.

Currently, through its involvement in Syria, providing support to forces fighting to remove the regime of Bashar al-Assad, along with other countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and, to a lesser extent, the US and some European countries, Turkey is in opposition to Russia and Iran, which support the Syrian regime still in power. The fact is that due to different stakes pursued in Syria by the major powers, the US and NATO allies' entry into Syria presents the risk of a direct confrontation with Russia, and even a world war.

However, besides its problems, Turkey takes an active humanitarian foreign policy by engaging in some humanitarian crises, such as those in Somalia and Syria. Aware of its demographic, economic, cultural and geopolitical advantages, Turkey "does not perceive itself as a state at the edge of Europe, assigned with defending the interests of the West in one of the most disordered regions of the world", instead it considers itself "a central country able to define its own vision and interests"⁴⁹. So, Turkey's interests have been announced for a long time and are not limited to being a regional power, but a world power. Turkey presents itself as a geopolitical actor able to play the role as a major broker of security in the region at a time when events in the Middle East take on increasing importance in the system of international relations. However, although in the first instance, the international community seemed to begin to grant credit in its self-assumed role, the issues raised by the pursuit

of democratization of the Turkish state and the management of the Syrian crisis in progress have diminished its status.

Conclusions

Inheritor of huge traditions and of an eclectic culture, Turkey is the gateway between East and West, for which, in geopolitical terms, it can be considered a bridge between East and West and an interference state. Turkey is, at the same time, the link between cultures, religions, mentalities, ideologies and multiple, if not antagonistic, spheres of influence.

For decades, the security and defence policy of Turkey massed around continue technological innovation in the military field and maintaining a well-calibrated network of relations with NATO and its neighbours. From the moment Turkey began to face a series of increasingly diverse security threats, ranging from domestic issues posed by terrorism manifested by the PKK to foreign issues, including Iran opposition to the agreement of the Turkish state to host NATO facilities, active instability in the Caucasus and political turmoil in Iraq and Syria, the defence and security policymakers in Ankara began to formulate goals embodied in long-term plans.

Today, Turkey faces serious threats to its national security, due to factors such as the emergence and evolution of the Islamic State, the existence of failed states in its immediate vicinity, mass emigration and/or refuge in Turkey and toward European states, the escalation of proxy wars and tensed geopolitical situations, created as a result of reorganization trend in the pattern of global power.

Today, the Turkish foreign policy agenda is very comprehensive. Priorities are related to its stringent security interests, such as the Kurdish issue and terrorism. In this context, its partnership with the US and NATO membership will be exploited in the future directions of its foreign policy, though at first glance it seems that the relationship is something colder. West needs Turkey in at least two issues pressing for its security community: the support for the

⁴⁹ Ionuț Constantin, "Criza economică și evoluțiile internaționale contemporane. Cine are de câștigat?", in *GeoPolitica* nr. 43/2011, Editura TopForm, București, p. 168.



intervention in Syria, at least by the air base offered to NATO forces to launch attacks on the positions of the Islamic State and the management of the influx of migrants from Syria and Iraq. In this context, Turkey is the state which has the potential to alleviate or to intensify geopolitical tensions between Europe, Levant and the space of Euxinus Pontus, having a key-position in drawing the map of the New Middle East. Also, at present, it can heavily weigh to compensate the global balance of power through its influence in geopolitical relationship between the two, Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian centres.

Because of the new regional geopolitical situation created as a result of the civil war in Syria, Turkey's national stability and security have become highly interdependent with the states in the region, this feeling threatened its national security by the Kurdish community, which wants to create Kurdistan. From this perspective, Turkey's involvement in Syria and Iraq is justified.

Its settlement in opposition to the Russian Federation in the context of the Syrian crisis, which culminated with Turkey's quite recent action of shooting down a Russian plane, did nothing but to weaken the already globally tense situation. Given its NATO membership and a possible direct military response from the Russian Federation, Turkey could invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which could, in turn, lead to a global war.

In the current geopolitical context, the immediate priorities of Turkey should be focused towards normalizing diplomatic relations with its neighbouring countries and the Russian Federation in particular, reintroducing flexibility in foreign policy narratives for establishing a proper framework to change strategy approach externally, on the purpose of restoring its power regionally, improving its relations with the West and generating initiatives to revive the EU accession process.

If Turkey does not calibrate its foreign policy in line with the new realities, its future role in the region is likely to face many external but also internal constraints.

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PRIVATE MILITARY SECURITY COMPANIES – MISSING LINK IN THE NEW IRAQI SECURITY PARADIGM?

*Ecaterina MAȚOI**

At the end of May 2015, U.S. government announced its intention to boost the number of Private Military Contractors in Iraq, according to the Professional Overseas Contractors website, as part of the White House's growing effort to drive away the Islamic State that is threatening the Iraqi capital.

Paradoxically, this decision has been made at a moment when Iraq has 600'000 security forces, is spending every year approximately 7 billion dollars on defense and there is an international Coalition that is supporting the security forces to counter ISIS, even though mainly aerial.

While the literature of last 12 years on Iraq has paid a lot of attention on the legal or ethical use of Private Military Contractors in this country, this paper attempts to identify if the presence of PMSCs in post-Saddam Iraq has affected the reconstruction of the Iraqi Army, by looking at the role they played starting with the very moment when former Iraqi Army had been dismantled, until Mosul moment, in June 2014.

Keywords: *PMSCs; the Iraqi Army, state reconstruction, Security Sector Reform, Mosul, ISIS.*

1. The framework of Iraqi security vacuum

“It’s absolutely essential to convince Iraqis that we’re not going to permit the return of Saddam’s instruments of repression – the Ba’ath Party, the Mukhabarat security services, or Saddam’s army. We didn’t send our troops halfway round the world to overthrow Saddam only to find another dictator taking his place”. The decision made by Paul Bremer, head of Coalition Provisional

Authority in May 2003, through the Coalition Provisional Authority(CPA) Order 2, to dissolve the Iraqi army, was one of the most controversial and criticized decisions in the history of post-Saddam Iraq; it was in direct contradiction with the previous recommendation of Ray Garner, head of ORHA (Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance), who viewed the military as a fundamental element in the stability and especially in the process of rebuilding a new Iraq¹.

Through this decision, one of the most important institutions in the history of contemporary Iraq, a symbol of national unity and stability, was dismantled; it was taken in accordance with the US strategy of eliminating anything connected to the Ba’ath Party, thus to establish the foundation of a new nation-building process, even though there were only 75’000 Ba’athists and 400’000 security military personnel². Moreover, it was in accordance with wishes of the new political elites returning from exile, the Shiites and Kurds, for whom the military represented an instrument of repression employed by former regime. In reality however, a large part of the Iraqi population was attached to the symbol of military and to the role

¹ Ray Garner qtd. in James Dobbins & all., *Occupying Iraq - a history of the coalition provisional Authority*. National Security Research Division, p. 52, accessed online on the 10th of October, 2015, at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG847.pdf

² James Fellows, “Why Iraq Has No Army”, *The Atlantic Online*, December 2005, accessed online on the 10th of October, 2015, at <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/12/why-iraq-has-no-army/304428/>

** Ecaterina MAȚOI is PhD Student, Near and Middle Eastern Studies, Basel University, Switzerland. E-mail: ecaterina.matoi@unibas.ch*



it had played throughout Iraqi history³.

2. Building the new Iraqi Army

According to a document issued in February 2006 by the US Department of State and released in January 2009, the US Congress authorized USD 20,9 billion in civilian funds to help reconstruct Iraq in three and a half years, following the Operation Iraqi Freedom in April 2003⁴.

The Security Track (ST) meant to support the national strategy for victory in Iraq, as it is stipulated in the above mentioned document, involved three integrated directions: security, economic and political. Also, it is mentioned that progress along each direction reinforces the other two, whereas the objective of ST is to develop capacity of the Iraqi security forces to secure their country “while carrying out a campaign to neutralize the insurgency”⁵. In achieving the stated objective, the US helped Iraqi government to clear areas of enemy control, to build the capacity of Iraqi security institutions and to train forces. Through the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), there were spent most of the funds for the initial training of 80’000 Iraqi Police, specialized training for hundreds of police staff and construction of police academies and stations. The IRRF, the Iraqi budget as well as United States Grants (USG) funds were used in these directions. As a result, in December 2005, over 226’000 Iraqi security force personnel were trained and equipped.

As it can be observed in the document released by the Bureau Of Near Eastern Affairs And The Bureau of Public Affairs, building the Iraqi Army was important, but not as relevant as the Iraqi Police, since it is underlined that in *less than two years*, the Ministry of Defense has been established, and staffed with civilian and

military personnel and “it is more to do to build the sustaining institutions and infrastructure of the Iraqi Army”, while just a third of army units have been developed until 2005. Moreover, when it was about building a security institution, priority had the Iraqi Police, not the Army⁶.

Eventually, the Iraqi Army has been reinstated with difficulty, initially conceived as a structure tasked with maintaining internal security, and not the external security, and helping the allied forces in the offensive against Sunni and Shi’a insurgency. Managed by a foreign power which was barely accepted by the new military elites, the new Iraqi army was marked in its turn, in the first years after 2003, by institutional chaos and multiple fractures, which existed within the Iraqi state and society. Recruitment for the military and security structures was often made following the patronage criteria, according to the new influence networks built by the Shi’a and Kurdish elites, but the chaos at grassroots level inclusively facilitates the reintegration of Saddam regime’s former adepts or even that of insurgency’s sympathizers⁷.

The persistence of ethno-confessional militias and paramilitary groups, such as the Shia Mahdi Army, Badr Brigade of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) or the predominantly Arab Sunni forces such as the Islamic Army in Iraq, often interfered with the process of building military and security forces. They infiltrated into various branches of Iraq’s military with the aim of advancing their sectarian agenda, by sharing intelligence with the insurgents, as it was the case of General Amir Bakr al-Hashimi, the first Chief of Staff in the New Iraqi Army from 2004. He passed information to insurgents, which lead to the assassination of another army officer⁸. In Kurdistan, the official size of the army was integrally attributed to the *Peshmerga* forces, which now manifest their devotion mainly towards Erbil government⁹.

³ Kendall D. Gott, Michael G. Brooks, *Warfare in the Age of Non-State Actors: Implications for the U.S. Army?* Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2007, p. 116.

⁴ Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Achievements Through the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. U.S. State Archives. Accessed online on the 12th of October, 2015 at <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/60857.htm>

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁷ Ibrahim Al-Marshi, Sammy Salama, *Iraq’s Armed Forces: An Analytical History*, Routledge, 2008, pp. 209-211.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 216.

⁹ James Dobbins & all., *Occupying Iraq-a history of the coalition provisional Authority*. National Security Re-




Figure 1: Annual costs of war (in billion dollars) between 2003-2015 for the US citizens¹¹

Problems within the New Iraqi Army were noticed especially during the moments of sectarian conflict, between 2005 and 2007, when it was proved that most of the Army forces were faithful rather to their Shi'a identity than to their institutional role, and that there was no national unity feeling among the Army units.

Despite the fact that Iraqi Army was once a formidable military and US spent during last decade over USD 20 billion to train and equip the Iraqi security forces¹⁰, and that it has more than 200'000 active personnel, starting with Mosul moment on June, 2014, the same Army is proving on a daily basis that is not able to fulfill its main goal: protecting Iraq as a state, from internal, as well external threats, even it is backed by more than 400'000 security forces and also by International Coalition, mainly aerial. The figure below shows only a part from the amount of money that were spent in Iraq in post-Saddam era. According with these data, exactly

during the period in which the Iraqi Army was under reconstruction, only the U.S citizens spent for Iraq, hundred of billion of dollars.

3. "Iraqi Army no longer exists"¹²? What about before June, 2014?

Dissolution of the army in May 2003 left soldiers and officers without perspective; in an Iraq that went through more than a decade of long social and economical crisis, which now becomes paroxysmal, loss of professional status and lack of financial perspective made their situation a dramatic one. Except the financial problem, a much more important issue has to be connected with increasing insecurity level after Saddam: it has to do with the feeling that affected a significant part of the military, especially the Sunni officers, i.e. the humiliation; in a country in which honor (*sharaf*) is a supreme virtue, army dismantling by a foreign power was felt like an insult towards high rank officers, as well as most of the Iraqis; this sentiment was deepened by

search Division, accessed online on the 10th of October, 2015, at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG847.pdf

¹⁰ *Iraqi Army*, accessed online on the 10th of October, 2015, a <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/nia.htm>

¹¹ *National Priorities Project*, <https://www.nationalpriorities.org/cost-of/resources/notes-and-sources/>, accessed online on the 12th of October, 2015.

¹² Barry R. Posen, "Iraqi Army No Longer Exists", *Defence One*, June, 7th, 2015, accessed online at <http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/06/iraqi-army-no-longer-exists/114607/>




Figure 2: Documented civilian deaths from violence in Iraq between 2003-2015¹⁶

Iraqi Army's lack of sovereignty, which determined in 2007 the staff Brigadier General Khalil Nabil to make a historical analogy in an interview "Are we going to revert to the disastrous formula of the British Mandate, when there were two chains of command – an Iraqi one that served merely as a go-between and a foreign one that made all the decisions?"¹³. As a consequence, many of the ex-military, especially from Sunni areas, will contribute to the insurgency against new Iraqi elites and foreign forces. Therefore, from May 2003, Iraq's security situation will get worse during the following years, until 2007-2008¹⁴, and then again after 2011, as it can be observed in the table below¹⁵. According to the Iraqi Body Count, number of civilian casualties starting with the moment of May 2003 till present (October, 2015) is between 144'250 and 165'926. This data is relevant because the Iraqi Army during 2006 and 2007 was responsible with Iraqi citizens' protection from internal threats as well from the external threats, after 2010.

¹³ Quoted in Ibrahim Al-Marshi, Sammy Salama, *Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History*, Routledge, 2008, p. 214.

¹⁴ Ibrahim Al-Marshi, "Disbanding and Rebuilding The Iraqi Army: The Historical Perspective", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, vol. 11, no. 3, September 2007, pp. 42-53.

¹⁵ *Iraq Body Count Data*, accessed online on the 10th of October, 2015, at <https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/>

The dissolution of any formal state security structure in Iraq and especially the widespread violence, directed par excellence against any foreign structure and also against the new political, administrative Iraqi authorities imposed soon, in the aftermath of Saddam removal, a need for massive use of private security companies, at a magnitude that was never achieved elsewhere so far. The necessity for post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq and existence of numerous and different military, political, economic, foreign entities involved in the management of post-Saddam state, imposed this phenomenon, especially because the new Iraqi military forces had no capacity and no specialized training to ensure the diversified protection and safety services.

4. Private Military Security Companies – a short history

Private military and security companies' (PMSCs) history has to be traced back to Antiquity. However, especially in recent decades, the distinction between the two becomes obvious, as the PMSCs have been transformed into a legal and formal entity. Thus, in terms of the mercenary status, according with the Additional Protocol I/1977, brought to the Geneva Convention/1949, it is defined as "a person who takes part in an

¹⁶ *Iraqi Body Count*.



armed conflict, who is not a national or a party to the conflict, and is motivated to take part in hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain”¹⁷.

Taken in this sense, the term *mercenary* had constantly a negative connotation, the financial motivations being widely discredited in comparison to those of participants in national armies or volunteer corps, such as, fidelity, nationalism or political, ideological attachment. In the twentieth century, the phenomenon of mercenaries has experienced a large scale in the context of the decolonization of Africa, when they were part of the structures that opposed the liberation movements, or when they were used in various clashes between factions that were disputing power in post-independence African states. In this context, the United Nations Organization decided to condemn mercenary activities but still, only in situations when recruitment was made to overthrow a legitimate government of a state, member of United Nations, or to fight against national liberation movements. Furthermore, Additional Protocol I, without explicitly prohibiting the phenomenon, states that mercenaries are deprived of the protection enjoyed by legitimate combatants, such as the war prisoners’ rights.

International Convention against the mercenaries from 1989 could not eliminate this phenomenon but, after the end of the Cold War, it has undergone major transformations towards a growing institutionalization and formalization aspects of new private structures, but closely related to those of the states structures. As a result, it is mentioned in the specific literature that today there are considered four categories of actors to be designated in the broadest sense of the term, as mercenaries¹⁸.

- *The first category* is that of the classic

¹⁷ Additional Protocol I of 1977, Geneva Conventions, 1949, article 47, <https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/f6c8b9fee14a77fdc125641e0052b079>

¹⁸ David Isenberg, *Soldier of Fortune, Ltd.: A Profile of Today's Private Sector Corporate Mercenary Firms*, Center for Defense Information Monograph, November, 1997, <http://www.aloha.net/~stroble/mercs.html>

mercenary – that is composed by those individuals or groups who are motivated purely by financial gain, and are recruited by various forces to fight in operation theaters.

- *A second category* is that of mercenaries motivated rather by ideological or religious considerations-is the case of Islamist militants who went to fight in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kashmir, or the Orthodox ones from Russia or other countries in Eastern Europe who backed Serbian forces in former Yugoslavia.

- *The third category* is made up of groups that can not be designated as mercenaries in the classical sense, due to the fact that is combining both financial and ideological motivations or different collective interests. Here could be considered as an example, private militias and military groups attached to the parties, drug cartels, who defend the communities from which they come -such as, Iraq.

- *The fourth category* is a recent phenomenon emerged after the Cold War, that of corporations responsible for providing security, in a legal manner, a series of military and security services, based on contract. Initially, called “private security companies” they offer military assistance, participation in combat operations, the use of complex weaponry systems, training of local police or army forces, intelligence and security services, risk consultancy issues, etc.

Today, designated under the term “private military and security companies” (PMSC) are hybrid structures that combine financial interest in providing specialized services that transcend the formal authority of the states and take a private dimension. Differences from mercenary phenomenon are quite important. Firstly, if mercenary phenomenon had essentially an individual dimension or contained small groups, often criminal, PMSC instead are official entities registered in some countries, with a perfect public visibility, a legal and commercial status, which is regulated under the laws of the state where it has HQ. Then, regarding the use of personnel, it comprises much more professional categories than the mercenaries. PMSCs may have a staff, whose members to be from the country where



Figure 3: Number of military contractors vs. number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq between December 2008 to June, 2009. Source : DoD quoted in Wall Street Journal²¹

the company is based, with members from the host country where it is acting and performing operations, or members from other countries¹⁹.

What can be highlighted as a general perception is massive scale taken by PMSC phenomenon during the last 20 years, when there have been developed numerous private security structures in the United States and Western Europe. This it is accompanied, obviously, by a growing substitution of the classic military personnel with PMSC employees, especially in conflict and prolonged post-conflict cases such as those of Afghanistan and Iraq. If the case of Iraq is taken, it can be seen that in 2003, the ratio between Iraqi troops and contractors was 10 to 1, to become in 2007 as low as 2 to 1. During 2007, the number of employees in the various PMSCs financially supported by the United States was about 190'000 and in 2009 the total number of contractors working in the area of responsibility of the US Central Command to be counted over 240'000 personnel²⁰.

There are several reasons for developing this sector; they take, first, an objective dimension,

¹⁹ Christopher Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies*, Routledge, 2006.

²⁰ David Isenberg, *Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq*, Praeger, 2009, p. 9.

the search for alternative sources to ensure security in an international system where the sources of risk multiply and segments that are requiring security services increase. Thus, once with the relaxation that occurred after the Cold War, simultaneously with the reducing costs in weapons, a surplus of military personnel has also occurred, often highly trained and specialized, whose expertise and skills have no longer found a place within traditional structures.

Also, to this already available military trained forces were added even more, in parallel to the cuts in military personnel, and to the elimination of conscription, which, combined with budget cuts, has motivated the emergence of specialized private structures, to take over the tasks of training and security, both within the official structures of states, especially in the US, and also for customers from private economic sector, since the globalization caused relocation, often to regions with problematic security environment²².

²¹ August Cole, *Afghanistan Contractors Outnumber Troops: Despite Surge in U.S. Deployments, More Civilians Are Posted in War Zone; Reliance Echoes the Controversy in Iraq*, August 2009, accessed online on the 11th of October, 2015, at <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125089638739950599>

²² Peter Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, Cornell University Press, 2003.




Figure 4: Number of contractors vs. number of U.S. troops- deaths Iraq between 2003 to 2007.
 Source:US department of Labor. DoD quoted on a specialized PMSCs website²⁴

Thus, Blackwater at the time of its formation, was par excellence designed to provide high-level expertise and training for preparing US military forces and units of Special Operations.

All of these came in a general context of growing, dynamic war privatization, in various areas of conflict, reconstruction and post-conflict management, when skilled and efficient staff from the operations and activities perspectives is required. Therefore, PMSCs is a product of a growing globalization, of a growing liberalization of private services, which transfers including in the field of what was, par excellence, the authority of states, i.e. management of security. It is an industry that has taken multiple forms, from companies that operate internationally, contracted by major powers like the United States to various structures acting in different states as such, military forces, local police, as well as security companies providing and fulfilling more and more tasks at the domestic level²³.

Finally, using PMSCs, might be an answer to a political need of states to spare as much

as possible the public negative perceptions on involvement in various areas of conflict, particularly when it comes to situations where the direct national or security interest of the state – like the US or European powers, are not very obvious. Therefore, substitution of national military forces with those of PMSCs, make the issue of human losses have a reduced negative collective impact, as was the case of Iraq, where casualties figures was higher among the regular US forces (an issue that triggered many protests within the American society), than, among the PMSCs, as it may be observed from the figure below. Similarly, from the administrative and logistics point of view, it is easier for national authorities to hire private contractors than to use the institutional complex of military and security structures especially when it requires internal political decisions and discussions within civil society.

5. Private Military Security Companies in Iraq

To understand the explosion of PMSC phenomenon in Iraq after 2003, it is necessary to place it in the context of Iraqi internal realities

²³ Carlos Ortiz, “The Private Military Company: An Entity at the Centre of Overlapping Spheres of Commercial Activity and Responsibility,” in ed. Thomas Jäger, Gerhard Kümmel (eds.), *Private Military and Security Companies: Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects*, VS Verlag, 2007, pp. 55-68.

²⁴ Acc. to <http://gahep.com/security-contractors-iraq-jobs/>, accessed on the 11th of October, 2015.



– marked by the generalization of a violent climate, and in that of foreign powers' security and economic policies; first of all, the United States assume the role of managing the political transition in Iraq and particularly its economic and institutional reconstruction. In this respect, after 2003, the US authorities (and adjacent, its allies who took part in anti-Saddam coalition, primarily Great Britain) tried to place the reconstruction process of Iraq within the logic of a liberal and capitalist dynamics, inviting many companies – especially those that were in different clientelistic relations with US power structures, to invest and participate in the reconstruction and development programs. This is because neither US forces nor those of other countries participating in the coalition have undertaken the role to provide public security for foreign civilian personnel, administrative or business, who came to Iraq. Likewise, the dissolution, by the Coalition Provisional Authority, of all military, civil, and security structures, of the old regime, left a vacuum of authority within all the Iraqi territory – with the relative exception of Kurdish autonomous region, which neither the Coalition nor the new Iraqi authorities have been able to fill, quickly. Moreover, granting foreign contractors immunity from Iraqi law by Paul Bremer just before he left Iraq in 2004, contributed to the increasing number of crimes, abuses and participation in torture activities of the PMSCs, especially at Abu Ghraib prison, under an umbrella of a translation services company.²⁵

As a result, since 2003, the large number of outside contractors entering Iraq and that of the various organizations and international bodies entrusted with the transition and reconstruction, necessitated an increasing amount of effective security structures, especially in the context of increasing violence. Their number has grown steadily over the years, but there was a constant lack of transparency regarding the real number, figures provided by US Department of Defense (DoD), the State Department, or by the Iraqi Ministry of Interior were always

²⁵ Thomas Jäger, Gerhard Kümmel, *Private Military and Security Companies: Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects*. Springer Science & Business Media, 2009, p. 384.

approximated. Legally, the Memorandum No. 17 of the Coalition Provisional Authority stated that all PMSCs must register with the Interior Ministry of Iraq until 1 June 2005, which happened only partially, many continued to operate and especially to enter Iraq without officially notifying the Iraqi authorities²⁶.

Even if a license would be revoked (which was the case for approximately 30 PMSCs) they were creating a collage composed of foreign subsidiaries, parent corporations and associate entities, each of them – as separate legal entities, impossible for the Iraqi officials to outlaw the whole entities that were composing a single US or British PMSC. In 2006 several reports emphasize some top companies which operated in Iraq had not officially registered with the Baghdad or Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Ministry of Interior, including *BH Defense*, *CACI*, *DynCorp International* and *G4S*, holders of lucrative contracts with the U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State.

Thus, in 2004 and 2005, it is believed that more than 60 companies were present in Iraq with a staff between 20'000 and 25'000 employees²⁷. In 2006, the number was estimated at 181 companies, with over 48'000 employees. In 2008, the Private Security Company Association leadership of Iraq considered that there were over 60 private security companies within which, between 25'000 and 30'000 employees had the task of ensuring security for the staff of US government agencies as such, the State Department or Defense Department, while 48'000 employees worked for guarding other contractors present in Iraq (state or private companies), international organizations, NGOs, media, private individuals etc.²⁸.

²⁶ The Memorandum no. 17, accessed online on the 11th of October, at http://www.trade.gov/static/iraq_memo17.pdf

²⁷ David Isenberg, *A Fistful of Contractors: The Case for a Pragmatic Assessment of Private Military Companies in Iraq*, British American Security Information Council, Research Report, September 2004, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/attach/23/23108_Fistful%20of%20contractors.pdf

²⁸ Leticia Armendariz, Jordi Palou-Loverdos, *The Privatization of Warfare, Violence and Private Military & Security Companies: A factual and legal approach to human rights abuses by PMSC in Iraq*, Creative Commons Print, 2011, p. 34.



In 2010, only Iraqi employees who were working for the State Department were guarded by 27'000 members of PMSCs, considering that the real need in the future to be of about 7'000 security contractors. This in the context of the US troops withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, when the American Embassy and administrative staff who were working for various US official state structures have doubled the number of those in charge with their security. In 2011, the official number of registered PMSCs in Iraq, according to the Ministry of Interior, was 129, not all of them active. It was also noted that during recent years there was an increase of Iraqi PMSCs in comparison to the foreign ones: in 2010, there were 72 PMSCs, and only 28 Iraqi were foreign. However, when it comes to Iraqi PMSCs the situation becomes complicated again.

Over the years, when considering country of origin for the foreign PMSCs in Iraq, majority were recorded in the United States (45), followed by the UK (18), UAE (6), France, Canada, South Africa. A key point to note is that some companies have maintained very close links and later merged among them, former high-level officers or military, political, or intelligence officials facilitating very often contacts with state institutions. It was especially the case of Blackwater, Global Risk Strategies, and Steel Foundation in Iraq²⁹.

Their policies weren't effective only in Washington, but also in the *Sandbox*³⁰ from a certain perspective. They were experienced professionals, better equipped, better coordinated and with the support of extremely influential individuals with whom they created emotional connections as they seen them putting their lives in danger for their protection. At the same time, they had a very different approach on tackling some immediate needs as intelligence gathering and a certain degree of understanding

²⁹ David Isenberg, *The Good, the Bad, and the Unknown: PMCs in Iraq*, paper at "Guns'n gates: The role of private security actors in armed violence", Cost Action 25 Working Group 3, Bonn, Germany, February 9-10, 2006.

³⁰ *Outlaws PSG PMC Sandbox is a multiplayer mode designed to simulate working as a Private Military Contractor in a conflict zone*, accessed online on the 11th of October, 2015 at :<http://www.armaholic.com/page.php?id=26423>

local culture, often using local employees to be able to operate. Predictably, they benefited from the major government contracts, primarily those who integrated into Worldwide Personal Protective Integrated Services program of the US Department of State, in charge of personnel protection and of the fixed American high risks objectives. In Iraq, three security companies had the right to provide services in this program: Blackwater, Triple Canopy, Dyncorp International; in this regard, they received contracts also in the former Yugoslavia, the Palestinian territories, Israel and Afghanistan. Defense Department used, in its turn, PMSCs services in Iraq, first for the security of its senior military staff, with public visibility, including US Diplomatic Personnel – contracts that were attributed to Blackwater. This massive call of US and foreign government agencies present in Iraq for the services provided by private security companies legitimized their status and facilitated better their massive use in the years after 2003³¹. Moreover, widespread development and valuing their potential, especially in conflict or post-conflict, was largely placed in the new post-2001 security strategy "War on terror". Moreover, in February 2006, the Pentagon magazine, officially came to recognize that PMSCs are an integral part of American force, broadly.

Taking as a pretext high risks and generalized climate of violence, companies have charged the services they offered at fabulous prices. The salary of an employee, especially in the US or British PMSCs was between 300 and 1'500 dollars a day. The highest paid were members of Blackwater. Immediate consequence was an increase in the number of those who left the military and security of different state official structures, primarily those with high expertise, to integrate in private corporations due to financial reasons. On the other hand, foreign civilian companies present in Iraq to participate in the reconstruction process, primarily those working for the US government, had the willingness to pay huge sums required for the services of

³¹ CRS Report for Congress, *Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues*, Congressional Research Service, August 25, 2008, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32419.pdf>



PMSCs precisely because funds were paid by the American Federal structures³².

In 2008 for example, it was estimated that 25% of the total budget for payment of contractors in Iraq was dedicated to the security services. This meant that the amounts of money for reconstruction was significantly reduced at the expense of Iraqi society as such because often, services were offered at much higher prices than would have normally been. These salaries were paid but preferential. The Iraqi security services have recruited staff from over 30 countries, including Iraq. But, depending on their origin – and not necessarily the qualification and the type of work done, payments are privileged, clearly, for those coming from western states, primarily American and British³³. Furthermore, PMSCs neglected to provide their personnel access to medical services if injured, obligation to work under-equipped (non-armored vehicles), deceptive recruitment, contractual irregularities, and refusal of payment or complete non-payment of salaries and in some cases, illegal detention if they expressed the will for leaving the country. Iraqi guards working for PMSCs earned about 4 dollars a day, they being good employees to invest in because they did not require long distances transportation and/or accommodation.

The corporate thinking of Bush administration, by far the most influential state actor in the Multinational Force – Iraq (MNF–I), had assessed the situation from an extremely narrow perspective: effectiveness of a specific echelon within the complex apparatus and multilevel operations that combined a military approach, humanitarian aid and heavy private investments for the reconstruction of Iraq. But in reality, as they secure one issue, misread the main frame. A report form 2007 by a House oversight committee is accusing Blackwater of aggressive tactics – the company which get

the most media coverage providing diplomatic security, has been involved in at least 195 shootings since 2005, with its guards firing first in most instances³⁴. If adding the numbers, it was the case of the most companies with diplomatic and facility security responsibilities; especially after the Nisour Square incident in 2007, reports such as this surfaced an intricate issue. Although from the viewpoint of success rate in their mission was 100%, the damage was far more unacceptable. Nouri al-Maliki, the former Prime Minister, has described it as an attempt to erode the sovereignty of the Iraqi government.³⁵

Under the protection of immunity from criminal prosecution in Iraq (June 27th, 2004 in Order Number 17.18)³⁶ which has ended in the lasts months of 2008 (Status of Forces Agreement – SOFA)³⁷ the private security guards were actually encouraged by their status to apply the same tactics and techniques as the high-value military transports, allowing to use lethal force if their directions are not followed without a previous warning shot. By doing so, they were creating a buffer zone around the VIP, actions that explain most of the incidents such as Nisour Square.³⁸ At the same time, the Iraqi security forces couldn't apply the same tactical approach. Not only that they couldn't acts like this because of law restrains, but they would lose their authority in the eye of public opinion also and would be seen as representatives of the occupation force. The incident that targeted

³⁴ Jeremy Scahill, *Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army*, Nation Book, 2007.

³⁵ John Daniszewski, Tarek El-Tablawy, "Iraqi PM Fears for Nation's Sovereignty", *Washington Post Online*, September 24, 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/23/AR2007092300304.html>

³⁶ Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 (Revised): Status of the Coalitional Provisional Authority, MNF - Iraq, Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq (The order, revised June 27, 2004, provided that "[c]ontractors shall be immune from Iraqi legal process with respect to acts performed by them pursuant to the terms and conditions of a Contract or any sub-contract thereto.").

³⁷ Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities During Their Temporary Presence in Iraq, Art. 12.

³⁸ *Ibidem* no. 1.

³² Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, April 30, 2007.

³³ Congressional Budget Office, *Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq*, Congress of the United States, August 2008, <https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/110th-congress-2007-2008/reports/08-12-iraqcontractors.pdf>



Iraq's interim Prime Minister, Ayad Allawi, in April 2005 is most relevant.³⁹ Even a high official convoy is not regarded as hard to intercept by the insurgent elements if it is protected by Iraqi security forces. But the far extent of this so-called immunity has a long reach as contracts continue to be awarded by the US government, despite well-documented reports of human rights abuses, from torture and killings to trafficking by employees of these companies or other tertiary involved in the process. On the Iraqi's national territory where regulatory bodies or coercive apparatus lack the strength, the knowledge or will to enforce the law will create antagonistic views regarding the role of PMSCs in the reconstruction of the country⁴⁰. As the evidences are piling up, it seems that ill treatment of non-western employees, mismanagement and certain acts and conducts that demonstrate impunity can make a case against the PMSCs as having a vital role in the reconstruction of post-conflict countries. In the last years some concrete steps have been made to regulate their activities, from setting up the Joint Contracting Command to provide a more centralized contracting support and management system and other regulatory and policy changes. The *International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers* signed during 2010 in Geneva, Switzerland, by 58 private security companies, including industry leaders such as DynCorp, Triple Canopy, and Xe Services (formerly Blackwater, former Academi, now part of a merged company) with the declared intention to improve the industry's human rights impacts⁴¹. Although, sustained efforts are being made to change the tides, a healthy skepticism is the only way to tackle the problem.

A *Financial Time* analysis, worth mentioning, states that US spend with both the military and reconstruction effort at least \$138 billion on

³⁹ Rory Carroll, "Iraq prime minister escapes assassination bid", *The Guardian Online Edition*, April 21, 2005, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/apr/21/iraq.rorycarroll>.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem* no. 1.

⁴¹ Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, *International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers*, Bern, October 8, 2010, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/150711.pdf>

private security, logistics and reconstruction contractors⁴². A good example that reveals political connections and influence that these organizations have is Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR), a Halliburton subsidiary, with Dick Cheney as a former CEO and vice-president in the George Bush administration, was able to secure federal contracts within Iraq with a total worth of \$39.5 billion⁴³.

6. Towards a Second Contractors' War in Iraq?

The retreat of American forces from Iraq in 2011 and relative security stability in following years have questioned again the status and role of foreign private security companies in the new context. Both Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior have conducted a massive recruiting policy, as per 2014 the total number of employees exceeded 600'000. From another perspective, the American Department of State – that still used more than 5'000 private contractors for security services and other American or foreign civil companies, especially in oil industry, continued to utilize PMSC⁴⁴.

CENTCOM AOR (Central Command's Area of Responsibility) have continued to work with companies like DynCorp International, Vectrus Systems Corp, Constellis Group and so on, contracts ranging often up to hundreds of millions of dollars, for different specific operations: technical and logistical support, training, maintenance, security. However, Iraqi government's policy after 2011 was to try exerting effectively its security attributions; the negative image attached to PMSC in previous

⁴² Anna Fifield, "Contractors reap \$138bn from Iraq war", *Financial Time*, March 18, 2013, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7f435f04-8c05-11e2-b001-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3oF6DsLpQ>

⁴³ Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, *Cost, Outcome, and Oversight of Iraq Oil Reconstruction Contract with Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc*, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, January 13, 2009.

⁴⁴ Micah Zenko, "It's Hard to Say Goodbye to Iraq", *Foreign Affairs*, July 28, 2011, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2011-07-28/its-hard-say-goodbye-iraq>



years imposed less visibility and activity (of PMSC) outside highly specialised domains of action⁴⁵.

However, as tragically proved in June 2014 by Mosul's fall, real Iraqi military potential was not only exaggerated but disastrous. Lack of experience and motivation concerning both troops and officers, cumulative to recent discoveries of massive funds defalcation within military and security institutions, largely spread corruption, have all resulted in a catastrophic situation regarding real capability of Iraqi military structures, despite training programs carried out by the United States, NATO or different European states, before and after 2011. The fall of Iraqi military and security forces after 2014, in terms of image and efficacy, the necessity to block Islamic State's offensive towards main city and other regions, as well as the project meant to regain territories occupied by militant jihadi structures, have determined the apparition of parallel structures that would assume the tasks of defense and protection. Firstly, there are Shi'a militias created by Shi'a political forces, that recruit massively and are supported by Iran. They have supported official Iraqi troops and sometimes have conducted operations exclusively/with Peshmerga troops, in order to repel the Islamic State or even retake territories like Tikrit.

The reticence of United States and European powers to directly involve, on the field, against Daesh, has reopened the discussion on using PMSC as alternative option to support Iraqi forces on the ground, since operations against Daesh require experience and equipment that the Iraqi army does not possess. Consequently, DoD and other American officials have considered the idea of an increased re-implication in Iraq, not directly but through a relaunch of PMSCs system. Without the ability to mobilize like in previous decade, "America's Second Contractors' War" Iraq is discussed intensively. If American participation in the form of financed PMSCs is privileged, it is this time integrated in a larger

⁴⁵ Anthony Cordesman, Sam Khazai, *Iraq After US Withdrawal: US Policy and the Iraqi Search for Security and Stability*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 3, 2012.

frame, i.e. the "private Muslim Expeditionary Force", comprising former members of military and security services from Arab and Muslim states, instrumentalized as ground force against the Islamic State⁴⁶.

Until now, such an organized structure has not been implemented, due to both Iraqi opposition and the difficulty in overcoming numerous rivalries and particular policies of the Arab states. Furthermore, as legitimacy and authority of the Iraqi state was fragile during previous decade, the massive reactivation of PMSCs raises a series of practical and juridical problems. Which authority should assume decisions and attribution of actions? The Iraqi one, leadership of the company, United States, another foreign state authority or a unified command center? Then, taking into consideration recent history marked by abuses, excesses, breach of national Iraqi jurisdiction, etc., the issue of legality regarding contractor's status and responsibility is raised. Finally, what should be the role of regular military forces in the context of reactivated military operations carried out by PMSCs? How compatible are the two types of structure, is it possible to conduct joint missions and especially, what is the financial status of regular troops when compared to contractors, whose resources are far superior? Motivation is strictly dependent on received retribution especially in nowadays Iraq, as fidelity to nation and state becomes relatively fragile. Perpetuation and accentuation of ethnical, sectarian, tribal fidelity, encouraged by the fact that even the Islamic State claims to be the protector of Sunnis and forces a sectarian narrative on the Iraqi society, limits the authority of Iraqi state. A military and security support granted through reactivation of PMSCs could be efficient on short term in countering the Sunni insurrection, but it contains implicitly the seeds of pronounced political instability. A foreign intervention would certify security limits and incapacity of the Iraqi state and would force it to manage the complex situation of foreign troops on its soil, financial consequences it involves and

⁴⁶ Ann Hagedorn, "Is America's Second Contractors' War Draughting Near?", *Time*, August 29, 2014, <http://time.com/3222342/invisible-soldiers-iraqi-contractor-war/>



the possible reactivation of armed confrontation between population and contractors.

As new threats arise and the PMSCs are already in place in the Middle East, despite their documented abuse on human rights and the negative stress on the local judiciary in the countries they operate, their role as private security providers will be preserved. On a larger scale, from corporate perspective, the continuous presence in hostile environments of the PMSCs grant them an undisputed role in military and reconstruction operations and now they are part of the extremely influential military-industrial complex with tight connections to some of the highest senior army officers and intelligence directors on the globe. Their methods are adapting very quickly to the new threats and vulnerabilities of the new way of waging war. Nonetheless, in the endeavor to rebuild a country and create a climate of sustainability in the strategic sectors, their approach is inflicting harm and loss. This also had an effect on the task of reestablishing from scratch the Iraqi army, the funds designated for training new security forces that should have been absorbed by the Iraqi government were regurgitated by the PMSCs back into the US economy or in off-shore private accounts. The immense impact that these organizations had on foreign policy of powerful countries in the last decade will not fade off. Their know-how is spreading and the modus operandi is getting better as they also invest in their image as lawful actors in the security industry.

Conclusions

The special situation of post-Saddam Iraq, with no political, military or administrative authority, leaving a power vacuum and especially a very broad generalization of violence, motivated in an objective way the US and its allies project to find their own fast and efficient formulas for supplying security primarily to their own and then to international political and administrative structures, who undertook the reconstruction and process management. PMSCs were the most pragmatic and effective solutions, whereas

Multinational Force forces from Iraq had no potential, or any preparation whatsoever for such specialized actions. As a result, the particular situation of Iraq has facilitated the development of a huge industry for private military and security services, which gradually came to exceed its initial objectives and operating in a logic of devouring by maximizing its financial opportunities offered to public or various private contractors present in Iraq.

Furthermore, PMSCs in Iraq between 2003 and 2011 became a phenomenon on a scale never seen before. If it has generated visible profits for companies, in a mutually beneficial complicity with many decision makers from the American and other European or Arab government structures, instead, it had negative consequences on the development of Iraq. First, from a financial standpoint, the important part of international funds for reconstruction as well those from the Iraqi government, were directed towards PMSCs, in cases when the new Iraqi authorities had to use services of external contractors. Later, massive numbers of external security contractors have further complicated the status of military, political, and foreign administration in Iraq, inducing the perception among population of an occupation of the country. In addition, excesses and abuses made by some companies, provided a constant motivation of militant, political forces or Iraqi population to oppose the existent order, and to take violent action against foreign presence and against the new Iraqi authorities regarded as being an accomplice, including the Iraqi Army. It is true that precisely this climate of instability and communitarian, social, ethnic fracture have limited the quick and efficient reconstruction of new Iraqi military and police forces. But this process has largely been placed under the responsibility of the Coalition, who preferred to facilitate the building of security and military structures highly specialized to serve mainly as auxiliary multinational forces in the operations' field. The long persistence of three major security structures on Iraqi territory, one composed of regular troops of the coalition, the staff of PMSCs – which in 2009 exceeded the



first, and the Iraqi forces, has complicated also the recovery of security and administrative process of the country. Iraqi Army was not regarded as an absolute priority, and its reconstruction process, financing, training were too long-lasting and constantly conditioned by external interests. Its professionalism has been limited by financial constraints, and the fact that its staff was too less valued for tasks where external contractors were privileged, even in cases where local resources were equally effective.

Basically, in the years that followed 2003, all foreign entities that were present in Iraq, political (governmental institutions of different countries, international organizations), economical (firms, companies, etc.) or media, used and are still using private security companies for protection and for various specific activities on Iraqi territory. This very situation gives Iraq a unique position, where countless consequences on the development of its post-Saddam period and on the Private Military Security Companies (PMSCs) industry as a whole generate many reflections and critical analysis. In the case of Iraq, the main problem was that the massive use of PMSCs, beyond pragmatic and necessary reasons, has become an end in itself and has diverted a significant part of financial resources and logistics, that would have been more useful for reconstruction, an efficient military and Iraqi security structures as such.

Regarding the image of the PMSCs, important differences in payment between those from Western countries and staff from Iraq or from third world countries were revealed, things that also affected the status and image of PMSCs. In a general manner, the perception and reality of this phenomenon were that the situation in Iraq offered, in a cynical manner the possibility of a very profitable business, from which benefited almost exclusively foreign companies and various civil contractors within the Washington's field of power, such as James Steel, George Bush junior, etc. as well as its allies, while Iraqi society had to suffer the dramatic consequences of an economic, humanitarian and social crisis. Lack of motivation and professionalism that characterized largely the Iraqi military forces

during the Islamic State offensive after 2014 can be traced beyond the multiple endogenous reasons and long-term consequences of this phenomenon of PMSCs and associated effects. Recent scenarios that are mentioning the idea of using again the external contractors to fill in the drifting and ineffective Iraqi Army against the Islamic State, raise again questions on the whole complex of related factors, especially on the negative consequences that can result from an Iraqi state seeking with difficulty a balance based on its own resources to implement a legitimate authority at national level.

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ENDURING LESSONS OF MILITARY ART: THE GERMAN DECISION TO FOCUS ON STALINGRAD IN 1942

*Ion PURICEL, PhD**

War principles' correct use foster victory both on the battle and in war. Conversely, their ignoring or misusing paves the way to defeat. If total misunderstanding of the environment is added to these, a catastrophic defeat can occur, as it was the case of Germans at Stalingrad and, after that, on the entire Eastern Front. Why is it important to study the "old Stalingrad case" today? The simplest answer is that war has always been a permanent reality in the world, its nature has remained unchanged even though its character has changed and that is why military art has always been studied in all military high education institutions. Moreover, in the last period, due to the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, the specter of war has strongly approached our borders, so the critical analysis through the lens of military art's teachings, with its enduring and nourishing lessons, is no futile endeavor, but a mandatory one, helping military leaders to make important decisions, to know and be able to apply them differentially according to new specific war circumstances.

Keywords: *principles of war, Military Art, bad assumptions, The Battle of Stalingrad, Germans, Soviets, Communism, Absolute War, Total War.*

Introduction

“War is a matter of vital importance to the State; it is a subject of life and death, the road to safety or to destruction. Hence, it is a subject of inquiry which can, on no account, be neglected”¹, stressed Sun Tzu in his *Art of War*. At the same time, War is a complex social and political phenomenon, which is largely recognized to have changed its character over time (who, why and how they fight?), but which remains constant in its very nature (the violent essence of the confrontation together with chance and uncertainty). Finding natural born great leaders is difficult in peace time, not to speak about war time. So, in order to flexibly apply the resources of success or avoid the past tragic mistakes, the training of leaders in all military art domains is a mandatory and continuous endeavor in all institutions of higher military education.

The Battle of Stalingrad, in my opinion, remains, after 72 years from its end – in a dangerous current international environment –, not only one of the biggest battles in modern human history, but also a continuous *reservoir*

¹ Corneliu Soare, *Gândirea Militară*, Editura Antet, 1999, p. 10.

*** Colonel Ion PURICEL, PhD is Associate Professor at the Air Force Department from Command and Staff Faculty within “Carol I” National Defence University in Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: ipuricel@yahoo.com**



for apprehending the essence of military art and science.

This analysis, made from the “German perspective”, from strict military point of view, does not attempt to point out what was good in the German way of waging war, but to underline what was wrong in German’s decisions regarding the ignorance or wrong application of the principles of war and the blatant misunderstanding of the environment, all these leading to a disastrous defeat at Stalingrad, which would constitute the turning point on the German – Soviet Front.

1. War, much more than battle

WWII, the most terrifying war in the history of human kind, was a *total war* for the majority of nations participating in it due to the scale of all kinds of resources implied and losses in the war: vast economic and technological resources, huge human resources and amount of casualties (dead, injured, disappeared), the incredible range and magnitude of the destructions and, of course, the first and unique use of nuclear bomb in combat.

In comparison with an *absolute war*, the *total war* is not only the mechanical confrontation between two armies looking for a decisive battle, but much more than that, it is a social and political phenomenon that involves the multidimensional confrontation between adversaries (nations, states) with the presence of all factors of power, each having at its disposal armed forces – quantity and quality of each Branch /Service and the Armed Forces, as a whole: size, equipment; preparedness (operational readiness), morale, logistics, joint operation effectiveness; population – quantity and quality (education and skills), support for war, sacrifices endured; natural resources of any kind; economy and technology; allies and friends and their support; state and military leadership, viable standing plans for war, etc.

As we have seen, the elements of power mentioned above, even taken separately, matter in any war, but they are far more important taken separately or in their interdependence as a whole, when it comes to a *total war*. This was true not only in WWII, where both sides waged a *total war*, but also more recently in Vietnam (1958 –

1975) or Afghanistan (1979 – 1988), where it did not matter whether one side waged a *limited war* while the other one had a *total war*; no one has ever contested American /Soviet Air Superiority throughout the entire periods of time, however, both undoubtedly lost their wars.

Regarding the confusion occurred on American camp between “*winning a battle*” and “*winning a war*” pointed out by the famous dialogue between Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr. and his North Vietnamese counterpart, Colonel Tu: “You know, you never beat us on the battlefield; That may be so, but it is also irrelevant”², that was acknowledged years after the war while the pain for all sacrifices endured for nothing still reverberated in the American conscience. As Senator John McCain more recently pointed out in a newspaper: “The US never lost a battle against North Vietnam, but it lost the war. Countries, not just their armies, win wars. Giap³ understood that. We didn’t. Americans tired of the dying and the killing before the Vietnamese did. It’s hard to defend the morality of the strategy. But you can’t deny its success”⁴.

2. Poor understanding and assessment of war

Before going on to Stalingrad’s issues, it is worth pointing out, at political-military level, the bad strategic assumptions made by German leadership at the beginning of the War and after it had started and the huge strategic mistakes they had made until the Soviet’s victory at Stalingrad which ultimately led them, two and a half years later, to total defeat and unconditional surrender.

The poor assumptions, in my view, are generally coming from the distorted understanding of the environment – enemy, terrain, and climate – overconfidence in its own forces, and the unrealistic calculus of the balance of power between adversaries.

² www.answers.com /Q/Why_couldn't_the_US_win_the_Vietnam_War

³ Vo Nguyen Giap, Chief Military Commander of Vietnamese Army during Vietnam War.

⁴ John McCain, “He beat us in War but never in Battle”, *The Wall Street Journal*, October 6, 2013, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304626104579119221395534220>, accessed on 21.10.2015.



By focusing on bad assumptions in understanding the environment, the necessary question to answer is why these happened then and why they still happen nowadays?

In my approach, the reasons for bad assumptions on the enemy strengths, basically, are lying in the overconfidence in own forces, from some biases on the enemy coming from past experience, individual /collective perception or hatred and also poor intelligence.

The German overconfidence in its own forces could have come, particularly, from the roots of the Nazi ideology regarding the Supremacy of Nordic (German) – Aryan people (*Mein Kampf*) and, also, from their extraordinary successes in all battles throughout the entire Europe, from the outset of the war in September 1st, 1939.

The biases the Germans had on the Soviet Union could have come from Hitler's lessons learned from the Winter War when Soviets fought poorly against Finland and, also, from his perception of communism and deep disdain for Slavic people. Hitler considered them inferior as the Bolshevik Revolution had put the Jews in power over the mass of Slavs, who were, by his own definition, "incapable of ruling themselves but instead being ruled by Jewish masters"⁵.

Regarding the German intelligence, in fact the lack of intelligence, it has to be said that it had embraced many forms of shortages regarding the understanding of the real Soviet Union's strength. That lack of intelligence referred both to the estimation of the Soviet forces ready to fight at the beginning of the war, to the overall real force of the Soviet industrial potential, and to the unity of people around Stalin and the communist ideology.

If someone could explain these serious errors of estimating the enemy's power through the difficulty of gathering information from a country where the secrecy was the norm as the communist archenemy, Churchill, said in his unique manner – "*Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma*", there is still no excuse for not understanding reality. At that time,

⁵ Geoffrey P. Megargee, *War of Annihilation: Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front, 1941*, Rowman & Littlefield, 2007, p. 4.

in the Soviet Union, communism meant that a new society was built for gaining victory in the Armageddon with the capitalism and a New Man – *the Communist*, was born ready to work, fight, and sacrifice himself for that mission. Behind the official communist propaganda, there were still too many things worth focusing on (by Germans) in the Soviet country – leadership, economy, military, science, culture, etc., which should have warned about the immense reservoir of power built in the Soviet Union at that time.

Regarding the assessment of the Soviet economic potential, the Germans missed to correctly evaluate what the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union meant in terms of real power in the 3rd five years economic plans cycle (which had started in 1928) and, much worse, to see that, beside the plants for producing military hardware, any other civilian industrial factories, being part of the gigantic communist country, were primarily designed to easily fulfill the military mission to produce, on a large scale, different military equipment.

In fact, from the very moment Stalin had prevailed in his domestic struggle with Trotsky on how Communism would be built and spread across the world, the Soviet Union started to prepare for the future war with Capitalism in all domains of the state power, especially ideology, economy and military.

Despite the fact that Germans, following the *Rapallo Treaty* stipulations (1922), had close connections with the Soviets, including common military drills in the Soviet Union till 1936, they missed to have a good perception of the Soviet reality. For instance, they missed to correctly evaluate and take the necessary preventive measures regarding the impact of the existence of the Soviet railway network's large track gauges or the lack of modern, accessible routes toward Soviets inland; in reality, all these were built, but not on purpose, out of the rationales of war, as a means to delay the enemy's offensive. Ironically, more than 130 years after Napoleon's bad experience, his words were still true in 1941: *In Russia there are no routes, only directions.*



Behind the lack of routes, the Germans should have known the effects of bad weather, especially rain, on Russian soil in forming the so called “rasputitsa” – the semiannual mud seasons, when the mass of mud makes the troops movement almost impossible.

More than that, in a tragic irony, as Napoleon’s experience clearly showed, the Russian winter should have never been forgotten and the necessary measures to have warm clothes, food and fuel depots at hand should have never been neglected.

All those realities taken separately and together had represented much more than Clausewitz put on his term – “*Friction*”; they had represented deadly traps which, together with the mistakes made by Germans, would affect, in a decisive manner, the overall result on the Eastern European Front.

Before going further in my analysis, it would be also useful to say that, while there was a common understanding of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of military art (military decision), there was no a common point of view regarding the principles of war.

The classic military thinkers and practitioners who approached war issues, had different approaches to military science and art and, consequently, to principles of war. The approaches had, at one end, the words expressed, for instance, by Prince of Ligny “my first principle at war is not to have any principle”⁶ and, at the other, the ones of Jomini “...Only Strategy will remain with its principles, which had been the same under Scipio and Cesar, and also under Frederic, Peter the Great and Napoleon, because they are independent of the nature and the ways troops are organized”⁷.

The debate continues today when each nation, according with its tradition and particularities, has adopted its own set of principles of war.

A strict selection of these different approaches, as referred in *The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide*⁸,

⁶ Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, *Tratat de Strategie*, “Carol I” National Defence University Publishinghouse, Bucuresti, 2006, p. 253.

⁷ Idem, p. 254.

⁸ *The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide* 1997, AFSC PUB 1,

retains those found in the majority of approaches: *selection and maintenance of aim, concentration of force, flexibility, security, and preservation of combat effectiveness*. It is worth mentioning that under certain circumstances, one could not apply all principles simultaneously because it is not possible. Selecting one (some) principle(s) and neglecting other(s) is the commander’s choice and decision in gaining victory; the preference for one (some) principle(s) by neglecting other(s) as basis for achieving the success in battle or war is the unique attribute of superior spirits in interpreting and applying the teachings of military art.

It seems to me that the great Napoleon himself offered the most realistic and standing approach to this issue: “The Genius acts through inspiration. What is good in a certain circumstance is bad in another, but the principles should be considered as axis a curve is related to. It is an important achievement that in one or another circumstance you realize that you are away of principles”⁹.

Due to particularities of dictatorial leadership in both countries – Germany and the Soviet Union, augmented by the requirements of a *total War*, both rulers, Hitler and Stalin, beside the decision at political and military level, retained for themselves the real military decision, not only at strategic level, but also at operational one and, even worse in the case of Hitler, after losing the trust in his commanders towards the end of the war, at tactical level, till the level of battalion and company¹⁰.

Having all these specifications made, we will now go further, “towards Stalingrad”, starting with the *bad assumptions* Hitler and his staff had made before and after the start of the WWII until Stalingrad:

- *France and Britain will not get into war with Germany for Poland.*

In reality, they did by Declaring War against Germany on 3rd September, 1939.

National Defense University, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia, pp. 1-4.

⁹ Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, *Tratat de Strategie*, Editura UNAp “Carol I”, Bucuresti, 2006, p. 255.

¹⁰ Victor Suvorov, *Epurarea. De ce a decapitat Stalin armata?*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2000, p. 8.



- *Britain, alone, will surrender sooner or later.*

That was not the case; under Churchill leadership, his memorable words “...we shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be. We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender”¹¹, became the great catalyst of the British constant, admirable behavior as a nation throughout the entire war.

- *Germany needs aircraft fleets (Luftwaffe), mainly for tactical objectives, near the frontline.*

That was also a bad lesson taken from the Spanish Civil War; even if it was independent as Service, the Luftwaffe acted only in support of the Wehrmacht – CAS, Air Interdiction, not acting independently in the depth of the enemy, for destroying its centers of gravity and decisive points related with them, as the theorists of the modern air warfare, Douhet and Mitchell, stated even in 20’s and how the enemies – the Americans and British, successfully, did.

- *Britain, isolated, will not constitute a strategic threat for Germany.*

That was totally wrong, proving, if needed, that one should never let an enemy able to fight, turn his back on him and start to fight another enemy; as we saw, the island became a huge airfield for American - Britain Air Fleets which aimed to destroy the German cities and economy and, further on, it housed and offered the necessary conditions for launching the Allied invasion on June, 6th, 1944.

- *Proven Superiority of the German Army together with its leadership will be sufficient to win the war against any other nation.*

Even if the initial victories could have led to this idea, it shouldn’t been forgotten that any particular war or battle is different in many aspects so, definitely, one should not come to conclusions based only on some victories when wanting to attack an enemy of unknown resources in a total war.

- *Soviets will fight poorly as they fought in*

the Winter War, against Finland.

As stressed before, neither wars nor battles are identical to previous ones and the image of the Soviets fighting poorly in Finland should not have been taken as a rule. Moreover, one had to think that Soviets, for sure, draw their own conclusions in order to correct the situation.

- *In a war, all is reduced to “will to fight”, to morale where Germans are, naturally, superior; so they will finally win.*

This assumption was made through the lens of the so called the “Aryan Race’s superiority” where the German’s high spirit of fighting was supposed to be common. Through Hitler’s mobilizing speeches, this potential characteristic of the German people was so much exaggerated till the point of losing contact with reality. Later one, this exaggeration was made, on purpose, by Joseph Goebbels’ propaganda in order to balance something impossible to be balanced – *the overall ratio of forces (power) in the favor of the Germany’s adversaries and, also, the enemy’s high morale.*

- *The Soviets will not be able to transfer over the Ural Mountains all their War industry in due time.*

That was also wrong; due to the viable Standing War plans I mentioned before, the vast majority of Soviet industry, both military and civilian (producing for Soviet War machine) were transferred, at proper time, over the Ural Mountains.

Political – Military and Strategic mistakes

While the wrong estimates, as I’ve already stressed, could, arguably, be justified till one point, nothing could diminish, in my view, the responsibility of Nazi leaders, personally of Hitler, regarding the bad political-military and strategic mistakes made, as follows:

- *Not crushing the French-British armies at Dunkirk.*

It is hard to understand why Hitler lost momentum near Dunkirk by stopping von Rundstedt’ tanks and waiting for infantry, when the defeated Britain – French Armies waited desperately either to be crushed or for something

¹¹ Winston Churchill, Speech to the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, June 4th, 1940.



miraculous to happen and it happened: tanks stopped; so, by not following the Clausewitz's guidance to *take the full advantage of the victory by pursuing and destroying the enemy*, the German's indecision led to a successful British naval rescue operation – nearly 340,000 soldiers saved. In the general equation of the war, this huge mistake would be painfully paid by Germans in four years' time when these forces, together with the Americans, would come back and defeat the Germans on the Western European Front, because, as Clausewitz said, *"the war never ends"*.

- *Starting another big war in Eastern Europe without finishing the war in Western Europe.*

Even if, in the line of the old *Schlieffen Plan*, Germany easily crushed France but, by not defeating Britain and starting the war against Soviet Union, against the most valued *principle of concentration of force* (effort), Hitler freely made the same mistake Napoleon made 130 years before – *fighting on two fronts, in a total War* with the full use of powerful and deadly military technologies. It is hard to justify why Hitler, by not finishing the war in the West, "threw himself in the Unknown, in East" making the same mistake as Napoleon's; the most probable answer could be his overconfidence in his soldiers due to the great successes the German Army had obtained till June, 22, 1941.

- *Postponing the Barbarossa Plan for 5 weeks.*

The invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece/Crete was justified for military security reasons by eliminating the threat from inside camp due to the "Yugoslav defection", the Italian failure, and the landing of British troops in Greece. Also, the invasion of Crete was necessary for the same military reasons, so that they would prevent the British from using the island's airfields to bombard the Romanian Ally refineries. All these unexpected, but necessary movements led to a 5 week anti-Soviet campaign delay¹² (according to the Directive No.21, the initial date for launching

¹² Liddell Hart, *Istoria celui de-al Doilea Razboi Mondial* (in original: History of the Second World War), vol. I, Traducere: Irina Negrea, Editura Orizonturi, Bucuresti, 2006, p. 207.

the War against Soviet Union was May 15th, 1941¹³) and so shortening the favorable time necessary to capture Moscow and Leningrad with bad consequences in the first East War year's outcome.

- *Declaring War to the US while not convincing the Empire of Japan to attack the Soviet Union.*

Even if the US started to play British cards by helping them, Germany should have refrained to Declare War against the US; by doing that, after the Pearl Harbor's attack, Germany showed its support to Japan after the Pearl Harbor attack, but also gained another very important adversary – the US. Moreover, Germany did not convince the Japanese to attack the Soviet Union when they needed that in their Offensive peak, near Moscow, allowing the well trained Extreme Orient's Soviet troops to come and save their capital.

However, with all these bad assumptions and serious mistakes, due to the excellent German soldiers' skills together with good Military leadership, starting with September, 1st 1939, the German Army crashed all Military Forces opposing to them in the whole Europe.

Moreover, at the beginning of the German-Soviet War, the number of victories with associated casualties & damages produced by Germans to Soviets were incredible large, so, their deep advance into Soviet land was seen as unstoppable.

3. Poor understanding and assessment Stalingrad battle

Following the frequent change of the invasion's main objective – Leningrad, Moscow and, later on, Stalingrad – with all costly maneuvers and resources implied, including time, against the principle of establishing a clear objective, after a relative small roll-back, which occurred in December 1941, in the spring of 1942, the Germans retook the general Offensive on Eastern Front on three directions – Leningrad, Moscow and, finally, Stalingrad.

¹³ Patrick Shrier, *Operation Barbarossa: The Ultimate Strategic Miscalculation*, www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/barbarossa/articles/barbarossashrier.asp, accessed on 21.10.2015.



Due to the 1941 /1942 wet winter conditions, the Germans started the Offensive, relatively late in May, 1st, 1942, putting the maximum thrust on the South Offensive Strategic Direction. The German's main objective – the conquer of the *Caucasus oil fields*, was correctly identified, as being *Soviets COG*; by doing so, the Germans would have cut off the oil flow feeding the Soviets War machine and fully use it for their own War effort.

For reaching the main objective, Hitler made another big mistake by ignoring one fundamental principle of war – *the concentration of efforts*, by deciding to split the strong Army Group South in two less strong Army Groups: Army Group South A having as direct objective the conquer of the Caucasus oil fields (Stavropol, Maykop, Krasnodar, Mozdok, Novorossiysk, Ordjunikidze, Baku) and Army Group South B having a more diffuse, hard to reach objective – to throw the Red Army to a huge area behind the Volga River. The huge distance between the Army Group South A and the Army Group South B, rendered ineffective any mutual support in case of emergency.

The Army Group South B, under General Maximilian von Weichs - 2 German Armies (6, 4 Panzer), 2 Romanian Armies (3, 4), one Italian Army (8), one Hungarian Army (2), not having set by Hitler an achievable objective according to the principle of *establishing a reachable objective in correspondence with the forces allocated*, were condemned to failure; by flagrantly ignoring this principle, due to *a blatant disproportion between the generous ends and poor available means*, the Army Group's missions were also extremely difficult to accomplish: *to drive the Soviets to East, initially toward Don river and later on, towards Volga river, to conquer Stalingrad, to clear the west bank of Volga and, after that, to go up to the river towards North and finally, to attack Moscow from the East.*

Initially, the offensive of both Army Groups was successful and, by the end of July, the Germans pushed the Soviets across the Don River. At this point, the Don and Volga Rivers were only 40 mi (65 km) apart, and the Germans made one of the biggest mistakes in the entire war by leaving their main supply depots west of Don

River. In doing so, they neglected *the mandatory principle of preservation of combat effectiveness* by having necessary logistics available all the time, in any conditions. As we know, this decision would have very bad consequences on the course of Stalingrad battle.

The objective for the 6th German Army, under General von Paulus' leadership, as it was personally rewritten by Hitler, was to conquer and destroy Stalingrad – on the basis that this industrial city had a very important contribution to the Soviet War machine.

In the meantime, as the fight was prolonging, the importance of Stalingrad grew sharply in the eyes of both enemies, becoming the true symbol of this huge fight between titans. The symbolism of the city, coming from Stalin's name, was so challenging and alluring that the German leadership lost the cool judgment, proving total blindness regarding the application of principles of war they had magnificently used till then. Here, it is worth saying that, generally, when it comes to symbolic logics, there is not enough room for cool, rational thinking, as Clausewitz urged. The Germans, who “blinked irrationally” at Stalingrad by making a chain of bad assumptions and mistakes in applying or even ignoring the principles of war, made decisions which finally led them to catastrophic defeat which will constitute the “turning point” on the Eastern Front.

Poor assumptions

Self-intoxicated by the huge German's military successes of the 1941's campaign and the Sevastopol's garrison surrender, the German leaders, Hitler, personally, continued to take into consideration totally wrong assumptions they made at the level of War (political – military level) further on, at operational and tactical levels, as follows:

- *The Red Army suffered huge losses and, in the view of Kurt Zeitzler, the new chief of the General Staff, the Soviets were “in no position to mount a major offensive with any far-reaching objective”¹⁴.*

As it was to be seen later on in the Stalingrad Counteroffensive, the Stalin's inexhaustible

¹⁴ Laurence Rees, *Hitler's charisma – leading millions into the abyss*, Vintage Books, a division of Random House LLC, New York, 2014, p. 270.



reservoir put on the battlefield more than 1,000,000 soldiers and around 900 tanks¹⁵;

- *The unshaken German will prevail, despite any difficulties.*

As we have seen, the superior German skills in a battle could not match the bad consequences of the great mistakes made by its leadership in ignoring the environment and the principles of war.

- *Soviets will not be able to fight till the end for the city.*

This assumption proved to be false; the sacrifice of the Soviet soldiers, together with the unshaken Chuikov's will and leadership, Khrushchev's apparatchiks, and NKVD's vigilance were decisive factors in bolstering the Soviet soldiers morale and matching the much trumpeted German superiority in battle.

- *The German Air Force (Luftwaffe) will neutralize any attempt of the Soviets to provide reinforcements over the Volga River.*

In reality, the Luftwaffe only hindered the flow of reinforcements from the eastern Volga River bank, but never stopped it.

- *The Reserve of the Army Group South B will be sufficient to solve any dangerous situation.*

As it was seen, against the principle of security, the decision not to keep, as Reserve, strong mobile forces to bolster the Romanian allies, on the 6th Army flanks -- only the 48 Panzer Corps (having the strength of a single Panzer division) and the 29th Panzergrenadier Division¹⁶, had proven to be very bad, because, pure and simple, it was too small to be effective against the mighty Soviets forces once they had started their Counteroffensive.

Moreover, at Stalingrad, Hitler and his Staff had flagrantly ignored the teachings of military art at operational and tactical levels, by making many *Operational - Tactical mistakes*, each of them being capitalized and exploited by Soviets, such as:

- *The decision to destroy Stalingrad.*

That destruction helped Soviets to transform the city's ruins in a formidable obstacles against

¹⁵ Gordon Corrigan, *The Second World War: A Military History*, Thomas Dunne Books, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2011, p. 344.

¹⁶ www.stalingrad.net/russian-hq/operation-uranus/rusopuranus.html, consulted at 22.10.2015.

German advance.

- *The decision to send tanks inside the city in the street fights.*

By doing this, the Germans prevented their tanks from taking advantage of their tactical superior characteristics – speed and maneuver, and made them extremely vulnerable to the enemy's fire by getting stuck in the street obstacles – situation of which the Soviets would take advantage;

- *The decision to conquer the city rather than focusing on ensuring a continuous frontline on the Volga River bank.*

By not eliminating the Soviets strong bridgeheads on the west bank of the Volga River – like Serafimovich¹⁷, the Germans would deadly endanger themselves, allowing the Soviets to fully use these during their Counteroffensive;

- *The decision to place two Romanian Armies (3rd and 4th) on the flanks of the 6th German Army, without equipping them with the necessary antitank effective weapons.*

Despite the numerous signals received from the Romanian Army commanders in the field – Gl. Petre Dumitrescu, Gl. Constantin Constantinescu-Klaps¹⁸ –, asking for redressing the dangerous situation, the German leadership ignored that, situation which would be fully exploited by Soviets in November 19th and 20th, when they pierced deeply both sectors kept by the Romanians 3rd Army, respectively, 4th Army. Due to the lack of heavy artillery and antitank equipment, the Romanian armies were unable to stop the Soviet's *Operation Uranus* on both flanks leaving the entire 6th German Army encircled at Stalingrad. Unfortunately, the Romanian Armies were nearly obliterated, the military personnel who escaped being demobilized once they reached their homeland.

- *The decision to leave the 6th Army logistics far behind, on the western bank of Don River would ban the elementary supply ratios of any kind for this Army, when Soviet encirclement occurred.*

- *The decision that the 6th Army should hold the city and the front line despite the Soviets'*

¹⁷ Adrian Pandeia, Ion Pavelescu, Eftimie Ardeleanu, *Romanii la Stalingrad*, Editura Militară 1992, p. 170.

¹⁸ Idem, p. 211.



clear intentions of encirclement.

Hitler's inflexibility in his interdiction of any withdrawing, possible only until November 23rd when the last Romanian nest of resistance collapsed¹⁹ and Soviets had realized the encirclement at West Kalach (65 kilometers West of Stalingrad) was, in my vision, by far, the worst strategic - operational decision he had made till then, and, probably, in the entire WWII, so condemning nearly 300,000 mainly Germans and Romanians to death mainly by starvation and freezing or going to the Soviet captivity – 90,000²⁰, from where very few had survived – only some 5,000 – 6,000 ever returned to their homelands²¹.

These were, in my view, the bad and very bad assumptions and mistakes Hitler and his staff made at Stalingrad of which the Soviets took the fully operational and strategic advantage by gaining the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front for the last two and a half years and culminating with the Berlin's conquest on May 1945.

The very short well known story of the catastrophic defeat tells that after the German Offensive at Stalingrad in August, 23rd, 1942 and the conquest of the 90 % of the city, the Soviets launched their Counteroffensive – the *Operation Uranus*, in November 19th and 20th with over a million men, 900 tanks, 12,000 artillery pieces and 100 multiple rocket launcher batteries, supported by 1,200 aircraft²², succeeding in encircling the entire 6th German Army and parts of Romanian Armies by realizing the junction /encirclement at West Kalach, after 5 days, in November 23rd, 1942.

By blindly obeying Hitler's orders, against the *principle of flexibility (maneuver)*, General Paulus lost the favorable moment to withdraw

¹⁹ Anthony Beevor, *Stalingrad*, translation: Delia Razdolescu, RAO International Publishing Company, p. 356.

²⁰ Gordon Corrigan, *The Second World War. A Military History*, Thomas Dunne Books, St.Martin's Press, New York, 2011, p. 353.

²¹ Raymond Limbach, *Battle of Stalingrad (World War II)*, www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Stalingrad, consulted at 22.10.2015.

²² Gordon Corrigan, *The Second World War. A Military History*, Thomas Dunne Books, St.Martin's Press, New York, 2011, p. 344.

and redress the situation, making impossible, despite Goering's and Manstein's late efforts, any chance of his Army's escape and, finally, in February 2nd 1943, the remnants of the entire 6th German Army surrendered.

Conclusions

War remains a constant element in human history and evolves together with it. The vast array of War typology has preserved its nature while its character has changed constantly – who, how and why they fight?

After the end of WWII until present, there are only few wars which have been fought based on the “conventional approach” while “symmetry” is almost impossible to be found.

Despite these, the new contemporary wars dominated by “asymmetry” have not excluded the military confrontations in “conventional logic”, performed with a maximum intensity and violence.

This aspect has become even more relevant today when the post-Cold War's International Order is strongly perturbed by the more frequent and deep clashes of the World Power's interests, which also possess a strong war potential with pronounced symmetry, thus, causing an increase in the risk of the conventional war, profoundly marked by technology.

Without denying any of the war features, one should value the constant efforts to formalize at the theoretical & conceptual level the Laws and Principles of War meant to give rationality to any type of War, as a complex social – political phenomenon and a political tool of international actors.

Naturally, in any war, the adversaries are reciprocally preventing each other from doing what they want. As a result, they succeed, as Foch stressed in his pledge for the seriousness of studying War and Military Art, in doing “simply what one can in order to apply what one knows”²³, resulting, further, in *the necessity to know a lot in order to make only a little from what it is intended to do.*

²³ Corneliu Soare, *Gândirea Militară*, Editura Antet, 1999, p. 119.



Moreover, as any conflict is a dangerous undertaking – especially, knowing when and how one should enter the War, but not knowing when and how it will finish – the War and its painful lessons should be taken into consideration very seriously today and in the future, as it should have been taken by Nazi German leadership in the fact that *never should one ignore the principles of war and the battlefield's characteristics, overestimate one's forces and underestimate the enemy*; the lessons of the Stalingrad Battle and the WWII, as a whole, are the utmost example of what could happen if all these are to be ignored.

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THE ISLAMIC CULTURAL FACTOR IN RELATION WITH GLOBALISATION

*Haliru Dogondaji BELLO**

Continuous and persistent assorted forms of terror unleashed on innocent civilians pose the greatest challenge to global peace and security today. Perhaps the Islamist terrorist is not understood correctly. Perhaps a true understanding of the Islamist terrorist lies in a thorough knowledge of their cultural background.

In the era of interdependence, daily interchanges and globalization, where issues of cultural difference have become proximate, understanding the numerous actors through their way of life and integrating their concerns in world affairs is crucial for world peace and security.

In this article, I am to reveal in short the study made upon the core values that dictate to culture and its unity in Islam, thus exposing the convictions that shape the laws, regulations and the distinct human characteristics of the 1.6 billion Muslims around the globe. The study also gives a highlight on the inner consciousness of Islamist terrorists and shows how the defence and protection of certain absolute values in the Islamic culture drive their evaluation and calculated response to arising circumstances in the course of daily life.

Keywords: *Islamist, terrorism, clash, civilization, culture, moral, religion, secular.*

1. Understanding Islamic culture

Broadly speaking, culture means a people's complete way of life. It is the general pattern of behaviour and way of thinking created, learned and shared within a social group. What a people believe, what they value the most, their rules of behaviour, language, religion, rituals, art, technology, mode of dressing, foods, political and economic systems are elements determined by their culture; it distinguishes one human group from another.¹

Islamic culture, therefore, refers to those practices developed around the religion, which determine Muslims' way of life. It encompasses, among others, those practices defined by core values legally sanctioned within Islamic societies, whose protection becomes mandatory in order to maintain the very nature of an Islamic society.

At this point, let us try to understand Islam and the fundamental values that shape the way of life of its followers and distinguish Islamic communities from other communities.

What is Islam?

Islam is a belief in the idea that God (Allah) exists, that He (Allah) is the only true God, and that Muhammad is His messenger and servant. It is

¹ Edward B. Taylor, *Primitive Culture* 1, 3d edition, 1889.

*** Haliru Dogondaji BELLO is PhD Student in Information and National Security with "Carol I" National Defence University in Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: halibello@yahoo.co.uk**



believed by Muslims (those who believe in Islam) to be a summary and concluding chapter of God's revelations to mankind, through a final message delivered through Prophet Muhammad; the final of Judeo-Christian prophets, the conclusions on the equality of prophets of Monotheism being Messengers of Allah are based on this premise. For this reason, Muslims see Christ as *Isah* and Moses as *Musa*, being Allah's messengers to deliver the divine guidance and not Christian or Jew respectively.² It is therefore believed to embody elements found in the Bible and other Judeo-Christian scriptures. Muhammad began to receive the message of Islam through Angel Gabriel in 610 AD. Islam is theocentric and strictly monotheistic, as it does not encourage the association of the oneness of Allah to any deity. The term *islām* comes from fourth form of the Arab verb, *aslama-yuslimu*, with the main meaning of "obedience" or "surrender", but also peace as a radiation of faith. *Al-Islam* is the total submission to the will of Allah through worship and obedience to the One and only true God³.

In *Islam*, there are certain things that are forbidden (*Haram*) and those that are allowed (*Halal*). Seeking the necessary knowledge, understanding it and incorporating it in one's life through abstinence from forbidden things and devotion to the recommended things reflects a Muslim's commitment and level of conviction to the faith (*Taqwa*). Before all, Islam is a history of the Revelation. Preceding it, the Revelation finds in Islam its supreme form: the most complete, the most clear and thorough, therefore, the last.⁴

Muslims of all centuries, irrespective of nationality, individuality or geographical space, consider their doctrines to be the historical

embodiment of the "Divine revelations from the beginning until the end of time". *Islam* permanently offers the amazing example of crossing centuries and societies carrying on the immutable principles of the faith, through which it is defined and recognized.

Islam is built upon five pillars over which all other rules of conduct and fundamental practices constant in Muslim societies around the globe are built.

First and foremost is the belief that there is no God worthy of worship than Allah, the belief in His Angels, prophets, life after death and the day of Judgment. Following the belief that Allah is the sole creator of all things, living and non-living, the whole variety of being in existence is understood not as a happenstance but for the benefit of mankind. Within this notion, a Muslim apprehends the variety of peoples, languages, and races. However, within this diversity of beings, the truth remains one, emanating from the only true one – Allah.⁵

The next pillar is prayer (*Salat*), which is mandatory for all Muslims five times in a day at specified periods of time. It involves periodic isolation from temporal matters and communication to God in obedience to his instruction. *Salat* also marks the difference between a believer and non-believer in Islam.

The third pillar is fasting (*Sawmn*) which is the act of abstaining from food, drinks, carnal knowledge and other forms of physical nourishment from dawn to dusk, also mandatory on all healthy matured Muslims during the month of *Ramadan* (*the 9th month of the Islamic calendar*).

The fourth pillar is *Zakat* (payment of alms tax), every Muslim is enjoined to give a certain percentage of his annual income to the needy.

Finally, *Hajj* (pilgrimage to the mecca) during the month of *Zhul Hijja* (*the 12th month of the Islamic calendar*) is mandatory on only those who can afford it, at least once in a life time.⁶

² *Ibidem*, p. 38.

³ Maitham Al-Janabi, Islam, "Islamic civilization: an empire of culture" - Chapter III in Kirabaev, Nur; Pochta, Yuriy (editors), *Values in Islamic Culture and the Experience of History*, Russian philosophical studies, vol. I, Washington D.C, 2002, available at http://www.crvp.org/book/Series04/IVA-13/chapter_iii.htm, p. 37- accessed on 6th October 2015.

⁴ ***, Sahih Bukhari, <http://www.sahih-bukhari.com/Pages/results.php>, accessed on 6th October 2015.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 37.

⁶ Sahih Bukhari, Book 2, Vol 1, Number 7, available at <http://www.sahih-bukhari.com/Pages/results.php>.



Core values in Islam

Upon these five pillars mentioned earlier, all other fundamental principles guiding the conduct of those who believe in Islam as their way of life are built. Further, we mention the core values.

Universal human brotherhood

All Muslims are brothers and sisters to one another and enjoy universal fraternity. Therefore, irrespective of language, race, gender, tribe, nationality etc., in Islam, superiority of one human being over another can only be on account of one's goodness and piety in answering the divine call; the call to humble oneself and unite all in the name of a transcendent attitude towards perfection and restoration. In this regard, peoples, nationalities, tribes are recognized but subordinated to the monolithic outlook inherent in Islamic tenets. The core of Islamic culture is therefore devoid of nationalist, chauvinist, fascist or racial tendencies or ideologies. According to a *Hadith*⁷, appearing for the last time in front of the believers, Muhammad (the Messenger of God) reminded the main lines of his teachings, mainly insisting over a Muslim's double duty which is never going to end: practising brotherhood within the community and strictly following the laws enshrined in the Qur'an.

The words spoken on this occasion, considered the end of his preaching, represent, without doubt, the most vivid essence of the masterpiece he tried to fulfil in his lifetime and which was going to be placed beyond the primitive Arabism in the middle of which it was born⁸: "... People, listen to my words and weigh them, because I have fulfilled my duty on to you. I am leaving in you a clear and simple thing, which, if you are faithful to it, you will be protected forever from being lost: Al - Qur'an (The Book of God) and Sunna of His Prophet. Listen to my words and weigh them. You must know that every Muslim is a brother to every other Muslim; it is not allowed for a man to take his brothers belonging unless it is willingly given to him. Don't hurt one another. Have I fulfilled my

mission?" to these words, the crowd answered in the affirmative.

Moral dignity in Islam

Islam pays attention to good moral conduct. It emphasizes on honor and personal dignity through modesty and simplicity in all aspects of life. "Based on this, a diverse system of privileges and obligations for moral conduct are generated, giving a basis for the Islamic version of human rights. These may be summarized as: right to life, honour and personal dignity and the inviolability of personal property". From the *Hadiths*⁹ also, it is taught in Islam that a truly pious person should do unto others as he wished others do unto him and should refrain from causing any harm, be it physical or emotional to another human brother. Forgiveness, generosity, modesty, giving to charity, regard for elders, kindness to the older and to the younger, treating others with a honourable attitude, prohibition of profiteering, regard for private life of persons, safe guarding of the chastity, livelihood, belongings of a Muslim from violation by others, care, assistance, etc. are mandatory for the success of a true Muslim. It is therefore common in Islam to find actions categorized as ambiguous, recommended, permitted and compulsory depending on how they conform to Islamic moral standards. The totality of perceptions of this *hadith*¹⁰ adopted in the various schools of thought lingers around the protection of Moral justice. For example, anyone whose words are not reflected in his actions or who claims to have faith but acts contrary is shunned with regard to moral considerations in Islam.

Islam in relation to other cultures

Emanating from the belief that all knowledge comes from God, it is the duty of Muslim faithful's to search for knowledge and wisdom and accept it on its own merit. Islam makes no distinction between secular and religious education. All knowledge is important in Islam as knowledge further aids the understanding of right from wrong so as to enforce reason. While recognizing diversity in creation, incorporating

⁷ ***, Sahih Bukhari, <http://www.sahih-bukhari.com/Pages/results.php>, accessed on 6th October 2015.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 40.

⁹ Sahih Bukhari, Volume 1 Book 2 Number 12, <http://www.sahih-bukhari.com/Pages/results.php>.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.



the good experience of other cultures is sanctioned in Islam for the purpose of the believer is equated to search for wisdom, with wisdom defined as true creativity and at the same time the basis of creativity”¹¹ The wisdom of America, Europe, China, India and other great civilizations remain in Islamic literature, in its philosophy, science, and polity, being recognized as cogent realities. Experiences and achievements of other civilizations of the past and present are learned, acknowledged and accepted into Islamic culture provided that those considerations do not contradict the fundamental teachings of Islam. Hence, objective achievements are evaluated on Islamic standards. Modernization of the methods of doing and producing things as provided by modern science and technology are therefore treated in the same manner in Islam.”¹² Modern methods of research, architecture, communication, arts etc. may therefore find a place in Islamic culture and form a part of it as long as they do not contradict the oneness of God and other fundamental values like moral dignity. The diversity both within and outside of Islam is recognized as a benefit for all mankind and thus encouraged towards a universal civilization with different cultures according to Islamic paradigms. The deep religious tolerance in Islam is therefore founded on this openness according to the system of monolithic paradigms.

Society and the rights of the Muslim

Islam elevates the importance of society beyond the whims of the individual. It sanctions relations between individuals among themselves and individual to community. In essence, the moral vision for mankind in Islam regulates the practical forms of interaction within societies. The association of public interest and mutual benefit outlines the scope of freedom, human rights, obligations and several other aspects of human endeavour in the pursuit of universal human brotherhood¹³. Considerations of the common good for all therefore forms the basis for the rules, laws and guiding principles in all

levels of life of a Muslim from global outlook to intimate relationships. In this view, the situation of community is believed to depend on the conduct of the whole, which is invariably a balance between material and spiritual issues of life intelligently processed and substantiated in decision-making.

Freedom in the Islamic sense, just like working for personal needs, is conditioned to obey the commandments and regard the needs of other members of the community. The right of the community to be without social ills like adultery, fornication, homosexuality, gambling, use of intoxicants etc., are rights beyond the freedom of any single individual and are sanctioned and protected by law in Islamic societies. Therefore, individual rights are not elevated beyond the framework of the moral dignity in Islam.

2. Cultural unity

Cultural unity refers to those universally accepted fundamental practices – presented above – developed around Islam that remain constant in Muslim societies around the globe. Cultural unity does not mean a standard form of culture for all Muslims; it refers to the very basic and constant features and characteristics of Islamic culture found in every such society. These values and ideological trends play the role of structural elements in defining the character of understanding, interpretation and application in response to real life circumstances.

The diversity tolerated in Islamic culture is limited to those specific environmental, customary and traditional practices that do not fall within the fundamental doctrines and are as such practiced differently by Muslims around the globe. Worth noting is the fact that irrespective of the ideological and political differentiations or focal points in interpretation and application of the divine revelations enshrined in the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah*, the fundamental doctrines shape the mind-set of believers in a particular manner around the globe. For example, life on Earth is believed to be a short passing stage, the purpose of which is to serve Allah as taught by his prophets, any

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 53.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 53.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 40.



man made law elevating the individual beyond the collective will is rejected in same manner by Muslims all over the world.

Islamic culture found in any society is united in a conscious and continuous search for order within the confines of justice and freedom within the framework of order. Islamic culture, before anything, reports to the same unit of linguistic unity, Arab language, which going by the *Qur'an* becomes the revealed language and element of unity of Islam itself. In Islam, the language becomes a keeper of values, the common reference point that transcends the ethnic and linguistic diversity of those who take part in the community. Besides the language, cultural unity is also a unit, which refers to the affiliation to a larger Muslim community.

All ancient and present experiences are harmonized in terms of Islamic principles and evaluation. This embodiment of authenticated history enables the Muslim community capable of reproducing itself, preserving its common knowledge and permissible action as dictated in its monotheistic vision for universal order and global justice. Order, in this sense, refers to the practice of a proportional combination of the revelation and reasonable interpretation of immediate circumstances accumulated over time in different forms of experiences in the Muslim community, and justice being impartial dispensation of arising issues.

The unity of these core values in the culture of Islam makes it possible for any Islamic society within any century capable of founding a similar order and consolidating it to entrench justice and fairness within it. The understanding and application of basic Islamic standards and methods resulted in the establishment of a cultural whole categorized by a liberty of diversity in creative endeavours. Similarities found in Islamic societies from Eastern Europe to Western Africa and other parts of the globe stem from this creative cultural spirit.

In Islamic societies, justice is the yardstick for the measurement of all values, be they social, economic, ethical or political. It also remains the yardstick for evaluating the conduct of all

communities. Common to Muslim culture are the developed dualistic relations of both the religious and secular, supporting the unique system of education for a proper way of living for human survival on the planet.¹⁴ It is worth noting here that there is no place for extremism in the interplay of personal and communal, material and spiritual in relation to justice and to God.

Looking back in history, the first century of the Islamic faith witnessed a series of social, political and military upheavals. Turbulent period in the formation of Islamic civilisation began with migration of the prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina (*Hijra*). These trends developed to protest against any deviation from principle of justice in Islam and to ensure that rulers lived modest lives alongside the people they led¹⁵.

Unity of religion and state is predicated on the understanding that Islam is the custodian of justice and should apply it in all socio-political and economic relations. In Islamic culture therefore, the state is only a mode through which the principles of *Shari'ah* are dispensed. Taking into account the great role of the *Shari'ah* in temporal affairs and the occurrence of earthly purposes in human behaviour and thinking, Islamic culture retains a link between the universe and humanity. Thus, the Islamic law cannot in any manner be dissociated from affairs of the state and public matters because the *Qur'an* and the *Sunnah* remain the main legitimate sources of legal proceedings, and *Shari'ah*, the instrument through which activities of state are dispensed. Who is the real custodian of political power, and how are power and legitimacy to be understood in civil Islamic societies, raise issues of great concern to global peace and security. One may ask, to what extent then, do secular states support the course of the fundamental values in Islam and human salvation?

United in the aforementioned values, all Islamic societies analyse the components of order, organization or rebellion, revolt or retention, constraint or freedom and define them

¹⁴ Nur Kirabaev and Yuriy Pocht (editors), *Russian philosophical studies* vol. 1, 2002, p. 47.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 44.



as faithfulness or blasphemy, good or evil, sin or worship.

3. Globalization and the matrix of interdependence

We have seen the fundamental values in the Muslims way of life that create the context in which laws, regulations, politics, principles, science, philosophy, economy, order, religion and all other aspects of human life are perceived, integrated and assimilated in an Islamic society, and at the same time, determine the Muslims socio-political and economical and cultural affinity or otherwise to other cultures in a fast globalizing world. With the above background, it would be easy to note and understand that the life style of Muslims and way of life within Islamic societies find their essence and meaning in the fundamental teachings of Islam.

Today however, the world is characterized by evolving trends of the Westphalia arrangement of 1648 which saw the formation of a system of independent states¹⁶ and bestowed on them sovereign statehood, national independence, territorial integrity and guaranteed non-interference from other states. With the institution of these elements, the modern states were born while the reign of religion as the ultimate source of legitimacy was abolished thereby transferring absolute sovereignty to state.¹⁷ The new system developed extensive network of International, legal and organizational structures with the main purpose of promoting open trade and a stable international financial system. From the mid 20th century, it has remained the scaffolding of the international world order as we know it today.¹⁸

One of the structures necessary for the separation of religion from state affairs in the new state system is secularism. This a principle that postulates strict separation of religion from state affairs and equality of all people before the law irrespective of religious orientation,

¹⁶ Henry Kissinger, *World Order: Reflections on the character of nations and the course of History*, Penguin Group, p. 6.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 27.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p.23.

also considered by the west as a movement toward modernization and disconnection from traditional and religious values.¹⁹ Secularism provides the principles and rules forming an outline for a democratic society. It lays down the framework for equality in socio-politico-economic aspects of the society as they bear on all citizens.

In modern democracies therefore, religious beliefs are not legally or socially sanctioned by the state, while the religious and spiritual leaders do not have authority over political decisions. Simply put, secularism replaces laws based on scripture (such as the *Torah* and *Sharia* law) with civil laws,²⁰ leaving policy issues of morality such as abortion, dress code, contraception, homosexuality, same-sex marriage, gambling and usury to secular and ecumenical considerations.²¹

With interdependence fostering multi-directional interaction among all peoples in the world and the need for Islamic societies to adopt Western patterns in their interrelation with other societies, the entrenchment of structures such as secularism, democracy and the elevation of individual rights beyond societal rights etc., around the globe, and their dominance in the existing world order, the remote cause of the complex balance between legitimate authority and power within modern states, especially those with high populations of Muslims is to be found in the exclusion of some fundamental concerns of Islam and consequently its followers in world affairs. Noting that from inception, secularism, democracy, state sovereignty and other such new concepts had never been without opposition and condemnation from both Christian and Muslim fundamentalists, who argue that the ideology is a threat to religious rights²² and

¹⁹ Noah Feldman, *Divided by God*, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005, p. 25.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 14.

²¹ Marc Kaufman, "Think Tank Will Promote Thinking", *Washington Post*, November 15, 2006.

²² Rev. Jerry Falwell, *Quotations*, Seventh quotation, 2001-09-15, <http://www.positiveatheism.org/hist/quotes/foulwell.htm>.



national security.²³ Now, as societies continue to become more secular as a result of dynamic social processes, the elevation of the individual beyond community in an attempt to allow each one realise their particular excellence in secular states²⁴, and the lack of authority by spiritual/religious leaders has been a major source of friction between legitimacy and power in modern states as affirmed by Max Weber.²⁵

It must be noted, at this point, that the common aims of every society determine the levels of permissible action and established methods of problem solving through a common framework of law. In the northern part of Nigeria for example, with majority Muslim population, where Islam predates the colonial invasion of the territory, spiritual/religious authorities with hitherto absolute powers were downgraded and separated from governance in 1979. By implication, the fundamental values upon which they lived and on which they survived as a civilization, were no longer sanctioned by the state, while the religious and spiritual leaders lost authority over political decisions. To what then would such societies aim?

Within this quagmire, the gap created by leaving religious issues in disarray constituted a great concern for the Islamists who perpetually attempt to reap the states based on fundamentalist vision of Islam.

The rising internal dissatisfaction within modern states with large(r) Muslim populations (especially after the cold war era) in respect of ideology and economic well-being left the elites to contend with developing trends of domestic discontentment and tremendous challenge to the legitimacy of their governments and leaders.²⁶

²³ Bob Lewis, "Jerry's Kids' Urged to Challenge 'Radical Secularism'", *The Christian Post*, 2007-05-19, archived from the original on 2008-03-05.

²⁴ D. L. Munby, *The Idea of a Secular Society*, London, Oxford University Press, 1963, pp. 14–32.

²⁵ Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, London, Routledge Classics, 2001, pp. 123-125.

²⁶ Henry Kissinger, *World Order; Reflections on the character of nations and the course of History*, Penguin Group 2014, p. 117.

The radical groups from both Shia and Sunni gained prominence (as the Mosque was left as the only avenue for the Muslims to find a solution to their daily problems). They claim to protect Islam and vowed to replace the imposed state system with a religiously based system. The result is the emergence of strong holds for the Shia: Khomeini and the Iranian revolution, Hezbollah in Lebanon and for the Sunni, Al-Qaida - 1988, Hamas - 2007, the Muslim Brotherhood - 1928 and also Jamaat Ah l as sunna lid Da'awah wa'l Jihad (known as Boko Haram) in Nigeria. Both branches though under violent confrontation with one another, remain committed to replacing the existing order with a divinely inspired one. Both branches dreaded the degrading effects of foreign influence and secular ways of life because they share a common culture in which all Muslims are united.

With promises of protection and economic support, secular states of modern times are continuously mandated to entrench in their societies, elements beyond the levels of permissible action especially in the Muslim world. The crisis in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Mali and other hot spots of Islamist terrorism remain a practical manifestation of the inability of secular states to create a balance between legitimacy and power under prevailing conditions of world order.

Conclusions

The meaning, relevance and application of some concepts in the Western oriented existing social world order – prosperity, human rights, freedom, morality, role of religion in state affairs and many other vital concepts – are repugnant to Islamic ethics and it seems that they will never be willingly adopted and assimilated in Islamic societies, as long as they are looking to remain Islamic.

Since politics in Islamic World is basically for the control of the established framework of order and for its defence against adulteration, and restoration to original uncorrupted values, therefore, the legitimacy of any government will be vindicated only as long as it does not infringe on the commonly accepted values in Islam which



define the level of permissible action.

The mission statement of *Al-Qaida*, *Daesh*, *Boko Haram* and other Islamist terrorist networks around the globe suggest their extreme constraint in abiding by Western norms, which, in their view, are laws made by man and inferior to those made by God. Islamist terrorist action against civil governments and its spread to the “self-acclaimed natural defenders” of the new concepts of political legitimacy in the international system are motivated and driven on this premise.

The concerns of the Muslim relating to some core values of Islam highlighted throughout the article should therefore be recognised as issues of absolute importance to the Muslims around the world. The acceptance of these values as such into the prevailing social order demanded by globalisation should be taken into considerations when security strategies are drawn up around the globe.

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INTERCULTURALITY IN AFGHANISTAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Rita PALAGHIA*

The purpose of the article is to present and understand the cultural values of different groups of countries and organizations participating in International Assistance Force for Afghanistan (ISAF) and its successor, “Resolute Support Mission”. Taking into consideration the number of countries and organizations participating in this mission, I am going to shortly refer to the way in which the American, German, Dutch and Afghan cultures are interacting and develop efficient functional mechanisms, in a multinational environment, specific to a coalition of forces.

The article also takes into consideration some elements influencing interrelationship in between Coalition’ members and its level of interoperability, with effects on the mission’ accomplishment, in connection with operational requirements and with the existing conditions within Afghanistan Theater of Operations.

Keywords: *culture, multiculturalism, interculturality, interoperability, ISAF, Resolute Support, professional ethos, cohesion and Esprit de Corps.*

1. Conceptual delineation

The concepts *multiculturalism* and *interculturality* are very often mistaken and/or used with a similar meaning by nonexperts.

The term *multiculturalism* is a descriptive

one, referring to the existence of some ethnic groups or cultures within the same society or organization having distinctive identities and traditions¹.

According to this definition, “Resolute Support” Multinational Mission in Afghanistan can be considered a multinational multi-cultural organization. Multiculturalism is a term used very often within public policies, with the aim to manage cultural diversity inside multi/ethnic societies and organizations, having as central element the mutual respect and tolerance inside those societies and organizations².

Interculturality, on the contrary, is more focused on small groups of individuals than collectivities, but also has a major influence on achieving a certain level of interoperability, so as to be able to accomplish the end-state – that is to accomplish the mission.

2. General framework

International Assistance Force for Afghanistan (ISAF) was one of the biggest multinational coalition of forces in History, having, at its peak, more than 130,000 soldiers, from over fifty

¹ Romanian Academy, *Dicționarul explicativ al limbii române* (ediție revăzută și adăugită), Institutul de lingvistică “Iorgu Iordan”, Univers Enciclopedic Gold, 2009.

² Thomas J. La Belle and Christopher R. Ward, *Multiculturalism and Education*, Work Press, 1994, p. 15.

* OR-9 Rita PALAGHIA, PhD Student in Military Science at “Carol Ist National Defence University in Bucharest, Romania, is NATO International Civilian Consultant (ICC) in “Resolute Support” HQs Kabul, Afghanistan Theater of Operations. E-mail: rpalaghia@yahoo.com



NATO and partner countries. Starting with 2015, as a result of the Allied decision, based on the operational requirements and the evolution of the situation on the ground, NATO moved on to the execution of the Mission „Resolute Support”, determining that all contingents in Afghanistan to be reduced drastically up to 14,700 military and civilian personnel from over forty countries.

Each national contingent participating in the Coalition Forces, be it bigger or smaller, has its own culture, a certain level of training and endowment and is inter-relating differently with the military and civilian personnel from other countries, and also with the Afghan population in accomplishing the established tasks, in the common effort to counter terrorism and in offering assistance, advise and training for the local administration and local forces.

Taking into consideration this context, the aim of my research was to analyze *if the premises are created in order for the existent multiculturalism within the multinational coalition to be transformed into interculturality.*

In my opinion, cultures should be in interaction a sufficient period of time in order for cultural exchanges to take place, to become permanent and to gain a unique form, different from the initial one. I consider that this period should be of at least one year, for the same contingent, without any rotation, being influenced by the level of their training (including their understanding of the history, the language and the culture of the local population), the way they perceive the attitudes, values, loyalty, skills and competencies of the other participants in the mission. I also consider that heterogeneity of the mission, the training for risk situations and the open attitude towards the others are factors that implicitly contribute to achieve a higher degree of interoperability that allows a successful accomplishment of a mission.

3. Cultural analysis models

Starting from the premise of the respect and tolerance existent in the Coalition in Afghanistan, as positive elements of the mission, I'll concentrate the attention to the study and

analysis of the some specific elements such as cultural dimensions, using certain instruments to quantify them, known as *cultural values and norms* that I'll take into consideration.

There has been written a lot about dimensions, norms, analysis factors and the way cultures can be differentiated. That is why, with the aim to identify some specific features of interculturality, I shall analyze only the most important cultural norms and attitudes of the personnel taking part in the Coalition, with reference to the conclusions resulted from two studies concerning the cultural dimensions and their influence over the Multinational Environment specific to the Coalition in Afghanistan Theater of Operations, namely the studies of Geert Hofstede and James Burke.

I shall start my démarche from one of the most well known studies related to the analysis of national cultures and the creation of a quantification instrument of those features – that of Geert Hofstede. He identified the following cultural dimensions: *individualism versus collectivism, power distance, masculinity versus femininity, long term orientation versus short term orientation, uncertainty avoidance*³. The quantum/index given to every cultural dimension is very important when we intent to analyze different interaction existing within the Coalition.

For example, US participation is a major one and the first observations that we can make related to the American Culture are the following: “*individualism*” index is very high (91) in comparison with the global average value (60), being the highest of all the 76 countries studied by Hofstede. On the other hand, US have an index of (40), below the average (60) for “*power distance*”, highlighting a less formal culture in social relations and in which the power is homogenously distributed.

The relevance of these items' quantum is that Coalition members can adjust their approach and behavior only by knowing them. Regarding the specific scores of “*individualism*” at global

³ For details, see the site Hofstede Centre, <http://geert-hofstede.com/national-culture.html>, accessed on November 15, 2015.



scale, we observe a certain similarity within some European countries such as Great Britain, Belgium, Denmark or Netherlands. The value of this index is an important factor in the analysis of the leadership of an organization, for example, especially when the leadership is formed of individuals belonging to some cultures with high values of this cultural dimension.

Another point of view from which different cultures have been analyzed is that of cultural norms. I consider that it is necessary to take them into consideration in analyzing a culture, having in mind the specificity, complexity and scale of this theater of operations (it is the largest operation conducted by NATO), and also the specificity of the interactions, in order to accomplish the mission given according to the operational needs.

4. Cultural differences of the nations participating in Afghanistan Theater of Operations

In order to stress the cultural differences existing inside the Multinational Coalition, I'll analyze some of the most important norms and/or cultural attitudes of the military and civilian personnel that participated in ISAF mission and of those taking part within the Resolute Support mission, as following: place and role of the man/woman in the society, age, attitude towards time, short term versus long term orientation, logic and emotions and also style and body language.

Man/woman's role in the society

The Constitution of the Afghan Islamic Republic⁴ establishes equal rights for men and women. But Afghanistan is an Islamic country, so the same document is saying that "no law can be against sacred religious believes of Islam⁵". The provision allows anyone, from the Supreme Court to father and man to interpret it at convenience. That is why, in comparison with the Western societies, where man is considered equal with woman, from the point of view of his place

and role in the society, in Afghanistan, his role is extremely important – that of taking care of the entire family, the same as in the West but, at the same time, to fight in order to defend the territory of the tribe he belongs to, to preserve and pass on family traditions and, last but not least, the person who has exclusive right and decision for the future of his family members. Thus, woman is in a particular position, somehow in inferiority, regarding her role and place in the society, being limited to be only a careful mother and a good wife.

In Western countries, woman is considered equal to man, an equal part of the labor force and is expected to be as competent as man, adding to the role of mother and wife, in which she also has to be very competent.

In contrast, in the Islamic societies, woman does not have a similar role on the labor market, being subordinated to the husband in particular, and to man, in general, fulfilling different tasks, especially inside the family. The diverted way in which woman is seen in the Afghan society can create frictions when the Coalition Forces, that include women, intends to act in a society that does not grant the same rights to both genders.

Within the Coalition, women, irrespective of their military or civilian status, are seen as equal partners, according to their rank. However, in the Afghanistan mission, a major problem is finding a way to interact, in specific actions of counterinsurgency, with Afghan women, who represent approximately half of the population.

Thus, the best initiative of the coalition was training and including military teams made up of women (Female Engagement Teams - FET) in the patrol units, with the aim for them to interact with Afghan women, having in mind that the interaction of male soldiers with Afghan women is not socially acceptable. "History has taught us that most insurgent fighters are men. But, in traditional societies, women are extremely influential in forming the social networks that insurgents use for support. Co-opting neutral or friendly women, through targeted social and economic programs, builds networks of enlightened self interest that eventually

⁴ Adopted in 2004.

⁵ Constitution of the Afghan Islamic Republic, 2004 Edition.



undermines insurgents. To do this effectively requires your own female counterinsurgents”⁶. The increase of women’s role in the Afghan society has to be understood more as something imposed from the International Community, for instance the percentage of female participation to the social and political life. Nevertheless, it is a promising start, especially when the First Lady, Mrs. Rula Ghani, is actively involved in programs promoting women in all spheres of the social-political life of the country.

Age

Seniority does not get the same level of respect and consideration within the Western Cultures, as does in Islamic ones. From the point of view of Hofstede’s cultural dimension “power distance”, American culture and West-European culture praise abilities more than seniority. In Islamic cultures, this dynamics is reversed, senior members of the society being granted the highest degree of deference. The effect of those differences manifests itself through difficulties of interrelationship, especially at the level of Forward Operating Bases, where young officers have the duty to control and coordinate, in different projects, the local population led by the elder of the community. At the Coalition level, especially within the HQS of the Mission, age is associated with experience and with the highest ranks in the military hierarchy, facilitating interaction with the Afghan society.

Attitude towards time

The majority of Western countries, perhaps with the exception of Greeks and Italians, are very aware of the notion of “time”, having a specialized language for this notion. Islamic cultures generally have a more relaxed attitude towards time, paying greater importance to inter-personal relationship and etiquette. If a Westerner does not know the Islamic approach towards “time”, (s)he may feel offended and draw negative conclusions, without a real foundation. It is a frequent practice during official meetings

between the Coalition and the Afghan side, that arrival and beginning of activities to take place later than established.

Short time orientation

Within the same framework of „time” is included the way cultures treat the notion of “future”. Westerners have, in general, the following approaches: „Everything is going to be better in the future” and “individuals can control the environment in which they live”. Both approaches are in profound contradiction with the culture of Muslim societies, who believe that everything is in the hands of Allah. If something will happen or not, it is just because Allah wants to. In fact, the attempt to control their own future is considered to be a great sin. There is also another reason for this behavior. Because of extended wars, corrupted political class and lack of hope, Afghan people have developed a survival behavior oriented only on the notion of „today” and „tomorrow”.

Logic and Emotions

Each culture has its own balance between logic and emotion. Some cultures act more logically, being aware of the reasons for their actions. In other cultures, emotions and traditions play the main role in taking decisions. Understanding of the logic versus emotions in a different culture can be as hard as learning a foreign language. It is proven that Latin and South-European nations, as well as Afghans, are emotional people, quite easy-influenced, reactive, while North-West Europeans and Americans use to dissimulate feelings and immediate reactions.

Styles of communication and Body language

Some of the military and civilians within the Coalition (for example Americans) are rather reserved in relation to the body language and of the communication style, preferring a personal space and feeling uncomfortable when this personal space is invaded. For example, the majority of South-East Europeans, just like Afghans, prefer a more reduced personal space for interaction. To the verbal interaction, are added gestures, mimics, the tendency to strengthen an idea by touching

⁶ Erwin, S. K., *The Veil of Kevlar: An Analysis of the Female Engagement Teams in Afghanistan*, Naval Postgraduate School, 1 Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner, Baltimore: Penguin Books, 2012, p. 81.



the counterpart. Military from Western Armies prefer a larger personal space whose invasion is felt as an aggression or discomfort.

5. Other elements that influence the relation among Coalition members and the interoperability level

Other elements that influence the relationship among Coalition members and can impact on the level of interoperability and, implicitly, on the fulfillment of the mission are: discipline and the professional Ethos, ceremony and etiquette, cohesion and esprit de corps and valorizing military attitudes⁷, that are common to all military organizations, but their significance and the way to adapt to the reality of the Afghanistan theater of operations is sometimes difficult.

Discipline and professional ethos

Discipline is a need at all levels of military structures. Orders and regulations are respected and miss-subordination is punished gradually, following legal means or according to the regulations and procedures, based on the commander's decision.

Regarding professional ethos, the report showed that this is centered on the combatant actions⁸, having as the foundation the traditional Western approach, to immediately and decisively solve a conflict.

Professional ethos demonstrates availability to fight and die for the cause of the nation and for the unit to which the soldier belongs. It includes the courage, respect and loyalty towards comrades. A great part of this ethos is based on the values of equality and sacrifice⁹. All participants in fight are expecting the others to equally share the privation and the danger of war. This thing is demonstrated symbolically by commanders who eat only after they are sure that all subordinates have eaten. Those traditions help maintaining the value of equality in sacrifice.

⁷ J. Burke, Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Annual Report*, Washington DC, 2000, p. 8; J. Burk & E. Espinoza, "Race relations in US military", *Annual Review of Sociology*, No. 38, 2012, pp. 401-422.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

The professional ethos of the American soldiers is based on meritocracy. Soldiers are promoted based on impartial standards of potential and performance¹⁰. Officers and sergeants are promoted by a Board that analyses and divides them based on clearly established criteria. Nepotism, privileges for the family and bribing are criteria for invalidating promotion. This system demonstrates that professional competencies are highly valued.

Another important element that has a major impact over the relationship between Coalition members is related to *ceremony and etiquette*. Generally speaking, soldiers celebrate together both individual and group events, with the aim to create a common identity and to develop a group cohesion, medals they receive being symbols of personal or group achievements and sacrifice. Cohesion and esprit de corps are the measure of loyalty and of belonging to the group, of being proud to identify with the unit considered to be the higher echelon.

The way discipline is applied among Afghan fighters is either very flexible, or very rigid, based on where they were trained – with the Mujahedins or with the Afghan Army. The majority of the Afghans are fighting for personal reasons, so that religion, profit and revenge are more attractive causes than the stability of the Government. Discipline inside the groups is normally controlled or imposed by the leader. Another defining feature of the Afghan history is the will to fight for the place where they were born and live, having as main aim to protect their family, territory and tribe. In these conditions, we are witnessing a dual, concurrent action. On the one hand, Afghans take part in the military action, be it a traditional or a counter-insurgency one and, on the other hand, they have to take care, at the same time, of their families that live in the same area. In the case of the military employed within the Afghan National Army, or those working for the Coalition Forces, even if they are paid, they are obliged to go from the deployment areas to their own resident places – as there are no mail services – in order to bring the money

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.



to their families, this being a cause for some of the military' (approximately 30 %) absence from work some times.

Afghan tribes are different from the classical, traditional way of organization of other states/ethnicities. The traditional relationship system and social organization are based on group solidarity, acting in a homogenous way when needed. Fighters' role inside the tribe (*qwam*) is to ensure with courage and dignity the identity and internal security of the group, protecting it against any threat and external aggression.

Ceremony and etiquette

Traditionally, Afghans and Lashkar Units very seldom organize military ceremonies, having a reduced interest towards them. What is important for them is the etiquette and public piousness that are appreciated at their right value, as long as they are not transformed in a show. Praying is a form of manifestation of belief and it is done in small organized groups, like in the case of the Mujahedins, or in large groups, as a form of rhythmical simultaneous behavior, like in the case of the Taliban.

Cohesion and Esprit de Corps

Qwams are groups with a normal specific cohesion, tightly linked to the leader's experience and capacity to motivate and to lead the subordinates. These can execute small scale insurgency and counter-insurgency military actions and rarely, if any, military operations, because coordination, synchronization, command and control are rather in deficit, mainly because of the poor endowment with communication and information means, of the operational procedures and discipline.

Afghans, in comparison with Americans, understand differently some values, such as loyalty, skills and competencies, the attitude towards the organization and the motivation to fight. However, they have some common values, such as courage in fight, the sacrifice spirit, camaraderie and the respect towards military knowledge and skills.

For Afghans, loyalty is manifested based on the status of a person, his leading and fighting skills, and also based on the place, role and status

according to the tribe to which he belongs, thus loyalty being developed in different directions, according to relationships with the others. On one hand, Afghans, living in an anarchic environment, believe less (when they have personal interests or a relationship), if at all, in their former or current Government. They believe, on the other hand, in the persons they know for a long time, for example their leader or a person from their tribe, the same as Mujahedins or those from Qwams. Those from Lashkar units are more or less attached to their birthplace the place they live in. Because of that, sometime alliances change when the war calculus is modifying, without any influence to the local community, family or tribe. On the other hand, US soldiers have the reason to believe in and be loyal to the State, the American Government and their leaders, because they appreciate, respect and support them in everything they do with respect to the mission and the given tasks.

This difference in attitude towards the respect, loyalty and motivation to fight can influence the training process of the Afghan National Army, questioning Afghans' acceptance of the way everything is organized and of the military procedures taught by the coalition advisers and instructors.

Appreciation of military skills

Rank and fighting skills are essential elements of personal power, determining some Afghan leaders and fighters to refrain from teaching and passing all of the best knowledge and skills during the training period. This is caused by the apprehension that subordinates can become better trained and better fighters, capable of replacing them, thus considering the situation/opportunity as an attack to their authority.

In comparison, American commanders and instructors are educated to execute training as good as possible, so that when the situation requires, any of their subordinates to be able to replace them, being very proud of their success, with huge benefits within the respective organization or unit. Those things are supported by a pragmatic and efficient promotion system, by clear, well known procedures and mechanisms for training and education that are strictly respected.



Afghan leaders' attitude towards organization and discipline is given by the relative trust in their subordinates, military actions' leading being done with enthusiasm and experience. This attitude can be observed inside small units/groups, because it is not stipulated as a standardization of the tactics, techniques and procedures, this being one of the main reasons for which Afghans can not plan and execute joint operations, each group/unit acting and fighting differently.

In contradiction with the Afghan side, the American leader is not the executing person, he delegates this authority, but he is the principle factor responsible for the planning, preparing and conducting military actions, the responsibilities being clearly defined. The commander trusts his subordinates and offers them freedom of movement, based on the principle of centralized planning and decentralized execution of military actions.

On the other hand, Afghan Fighters' motivation to fight has no tactical relevance, in general, but traditional and credibility roots, that can go up to the supreme sacrifice in the name of faith, an aspect that has its roots during the liberation from the Soviet Regime. Another motivation, extremely important, is the fight with a rival, for recognition and supremacy inside a group, or even a revenge (*badal*), especially in the case of an affront that, according to the tradition, must be vindicated in order to maintain the same level of honor to the family and the tribe, with all derived rights upon resources possessed.

In contrast with Afghan soldiers, American soldiers, according to the mission and the tasks they got, are motivated first of all to accomplish the strategic, operational or tactical objectives, as they did in Iraq and partially in Afghanistan, in order to achieve the end-state and to accomplish the mission, without trying to get any personal benefits or advantages. According to their culture and tradition, defending the Community can be a high motivation, but the idea to fight for reputation or personal benefits is definitively rejected.

Within NATO, the Anglo-Saxon "cultural complex" specific to the ABCA Countries (America, Great Britain, Canada and Australia)

is relevant, as these countries have a common history and a similar way to implement common practices and defense related policies. Regarding discipline, hierarchy and punishment, these countries act in a very similar way, but different from the working style of many Continental European Armies that look easier to be led, more relaxed and even less ambitious when it comes to participating in military operational-military actions.

*The Air Forces, especially those operating in NATO are exposed to isomorphism, a technology which is based on impulses*¹¹. The homogeneity of Air Forces regarding technology (for example Blackhawks, F-16) reduces the variation represented by the human behavior and, as a result, the impact of the human factor decreases.

6. Harmonizing and cooperation efforts among Coalition members

After fourteen years of mission in Afghanistan, there are sufficient elements to confirm the following idea: *local culture is known and actively promoted in the Coalition bases*. Periodically, meetings, conferences and seminars are organized, where historians, politicians, cultural experts and Afghan militaries are invited in order to make local history and culture understood and known.

The dimensions, elements and cultural norms presented are truly relevant because they offer a general image on different cultures and represent a starting point in the attempt to build a cultural harmonizing strategy within the Coalition.

The strategists of the multinational coalition took into consideration the impact of multiculturalism, maybe not so serious and timely as they should and decided to allocate materiel and human resources in a common training before the mission (pre-deployment training).

Thus, there was created, in 1995, the first bi-national contingent (German-Dutch) that trained and formed in common during a period of seven years, outside the theatres of operations. The aim

¹¹ P. J. DiMaggio, W.W. Powell, *The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields*, in Powell/ DiMaggio (eds.), 1991, pp. 63-82.



of the training was to analyze, on the one hand, the level of interoperability of the soldiers belonging to two different sub-military cultures, but not too different and, on the other hand, if cultural interoperability is feasible, what conditions will support it and under what conditions it shall develop.

Multiculturalism and the German-Dutch cultural interoperability within the corps has been studied outside the Theater of Operations from Afghanistan, Kabul¹², with the following results and conclusions: the first is that the images and values that are part of the cultural nucleus of a nation remain stable, being extremely resistant to change, that is evolving step by step, and the second conclusion is that attitudes towards other cultures are subject to change, attitudes being influenced by organizational policies.

German-Dutch cooperation within the theater of operations began in 2002, when the first (GE/NL) Corps got the mission to contribute with troops to ISAF Mission. The Dutch did not feel comfortable with the German control with respect to the personnel, materiel and resources, and also with respect to the style of command. This was a clear bi-national cooperation example, in a multinational mission, but the contribution of the two countries was clearly unbalanced¹³. The camp was densely populated and the tents of the Dutch soldiers were clearly isolated from German ones.

Conclusions

Within the article, I presented different norms and cultural dimensions with the aim to create an idea that is closely related to the reality that multiculturalism within the Afghanistan mission is so complex, that it is less probably to function in ideal terms.

¹² Ulrich von Hagen, René Moelker & Joseph Soeters, *Cultural Interoperability. Ten Years of Research into Co-operation in the First German-Netherlands Corps*, Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, Forum International, Volume 27, Breda & Strausberg, May 2006, pp. 15–51.

¹³ U. Hagen, P. von/Klein, R. Moelker, J. Soeters, *True Love. A Study in Integrated Multinationality within 1 (GE/NL) Corps*, SOWIFORUM International No. 25, Strausberg, 2003, p. 78.

I consider that the difference in terms of cultural distance existent in between the coalition partners can generate frictions related to the situations that currently take place and can produce exaggerated reactions. The successful results of the operations within KAIA Military Camp in Kabul can be seen as the result of technology and of the professional isomorphism norms. In the studies related to military cooperation in Afghanistan, different operational tasks were divided in between the participating units, with the aim to control the situation, to protect the area against any hostile action and to develop projects together with civilians.

As a result of the study, I identified a series of factors that influence military cooperation, as follows:

- under stress conditions, cooperation becomes difficult and cultural differences generate effects;

- the strategy to separate national contingents is preferable if another way is difficult to implement, taking into consideration the short period of time in between the preparation time and the mission, in order to change the attitude of the soldiers of a particular contingent and to make other cultures more attractive for them;

- the heterogeneity (or homogeneity) of the mission from the nationality point of view;

- finding an agreement with respect to a solution for the operational problems and for the uniformity of the technologies used;

- stressing the need for an open spirit status in relation to the other participants in the multinational mission, especially among the “elite units”;

- an organizational structure in which all nationalities are contributing to the success of the mission and a system of comprehensive training of the soldiers with respect to the risk situations for the mission.

If all these conditions are fulfilled, international military cooperation is more probable to be smooth, as it was in the case of KAIA.

The impact of national composition is obviously playing an important role. We do not have to forget, thus, that when we have an interaction between two partners having nearly



similar power and a common history, this kind of environment is generating frequent frictions and misunderstandings.

The images and values that are part of the cultural nucleus of a nation remain stable, changes occurring step by step, while attitude towards other cultures is subject to change, being influenced, among other factors, by organizational policies.

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ASPECTS ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES FROM A SYSTEMIC PERSPECTIVE

*Daniel ROMAN**

The unprecedented international technological development of certain political-economic sectors has generated significant changes in the security of the contemporary societies. Mainly, the regional economic gap, the need for direct access to certain resources, the combination of several military-political influential factors and not only, have radically transformed the field of the currently known critical infrastructures. Therefore, it is required to rethink the ways of approaching the identification, the protection and the optimization of securing those vital infrastructures which may become critical on the impact of the unpredictable actions both from the outside or from within. We consider that a simple change of viewpoint on the conceptualization and identification of the critical infrastructures, by excluding ones and including others, can significantly alter the impact of certain destructive factors on them. The systemic approach does not only provide a dynamic perspective of the causes and the effects on a structure's situation, but even more so, it can put us in the position of managing them according to predictive algorithms and processes.

Keywords: *security, critical infrastructure, operational environment, system architecture, risk, danger, threat.*

Defining critical infrastructure issues

The economic field, from a historical and conceptual perspective, can be characterized as being, by excellence, one of the most successful and realistic spaces of confrontation. Quite often, political-military analysts were inspired by economic and technical conceptual models and developed viable solutions to problems in the areas related to economics. The need for security, now, more than ever, has become one of the hottest issues following the impact of the terrorist actions on September 11, 2001. Reviewing the defence plans against threats and identifying vulnerabilities of the structures directly related to the stability, safety and security of the economic, political, informational or military processes, led to the formation of new concepts and attitudes towards identifying and nominating infrastructures as critical. Basically, we can speak about a new trend, a new philosophy concerning the functioning of the contemporary society based on several infrastructures, some of which are regarded as critical.

By analyzing any structure to which we could refer in terms of its safety and security through a systemic approach¹, we can develop cause and effect scenarios, namely identify the relations with

¹ Gheorghe Boaru et al, "Aspecte ale conducerii sistemelor militare", Bucharest, Military Publishing House, 1999, pp. 41-47.

** Lieutenant-colonel Daniel ROMAN is Superior Instructor in the Land Forces Department of the Command and Staff Faculty, "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: danutroman2@yahoo.com*



its internal and external natural environment. We can write and describe the characteristics of such a structure, by its very destination, we can clarify the dimensions and the implications of stability, of causal chains that can generate or influence by their dynamics other important or less important structures. The degree of importance and involvement of a structure in the community life leads to their selection and their identification as being critical.

Depending on the place, role and importance of a certain infrastructure, related to the stability and the functionality of the reference society, infrastructures can be classified in three main categories: *common infrastructures*, *special infrastructures* or *critical infrastructures*². The individual approach from the perspective of the three categories can place an infrastructure on a certain scale of values, but it may not cover the nature of the intercausality relations which it can generate under certain circumstances, such as the occurrence of unforeseen events that can change such a structure.

*Common infrastructures*³ are those structures that do not possess special traits through their nature, other than those justifying their existence within their operational environment⁴. For the proper functioning of an economy, a state must benefit from an adequate network of roads, industrialized centers, areas for agriculture, etc. In their dynamics, some of them may become special or even critical, depending on the modification of the environment conditions or under the impact of internal and external factors in specific circumstances, such as certain mandatory crossing points, the acute lack of manufacturing or agriculture products, the effects of a nuclear power plant, etc.

Special infrastructures are characterized by their particular role in the stability and

functionality of the societies they are part of, providing them with a certain efficiency, quality, performance and well-being. These infrastructures, through their design, play an important role on the achievement of performance, which, by amplifying the effects achieved by upgrading or affecting them, can be classified as critical.

Critical infrastructures can be those infrastructures on which directly depend the safety, the stability and the security of the societies as a whole. They can be selected from the common and the special infrastructures, under certain conditions and circumstances. For example, certain roads or electricity, gas, water, etc. distribution networks may be critical at a certain time for a specific purpose or for a period of time. For this reason, we consider that all infrastructures known to have a criticality potential from a certain point of view of the conceptual flexibility and of the unpredictability of materializing negative effect and disastrous outcome events.

In support of identifying the level of criticality of some structures, we can refer to a number of factors and conditions involving the infrastructure in question. The uniqueness condition is one of the strongest arguments that can raise the level of criticality. Associated to the uniqueness condition is the vital importance of the infrastructure within a society or within the systems specialized in conducting the social, economic, political, informational, military or other processes. The increased vulnerability to certain direct or indirect threats can turn certain common or special infrastructures into critical ones. Together with this vulnerability, the sensitivity of the infrastructures to the changes in the normal environmental conditions can be one of the factors for classifying the infrastructures critical. In other words, the classification of infrastructures based on the criticality criterion is given both by their design and by the circumstances in which they may find themselves at a certain moment in time.

I have identified a number of criteria, which can be helpful in the approach of including an infrastructure in the critical category.

² Grigore Alexandrescu, Gheorghe Văduva, *Infrastructuri critice. Pericole, amenințări la adresa acestora. Sisteme de protecție*, Bucharest, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, 2006, pp. 6-9.

³ *Ibidem*, pp. 6-9.

⁴ Iulian Martin, *Raționament și argumentare în planificarea operațiilor*, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2015, pp.18-23.



- the *physical* criterion or that of belonging to another infrastructure: size, scope, importance, reliability, etc.

- the *functional* criterion is given by the role of the infrastructure within the society or by what exactly it “does” and which are the implications on other infrastructures.

- the *security* criterion shows how much the society is dependent on the proper functioning of the respective infrastructure and the envisaged impact achieved following direct or indirect affecting of the infrastructure.

- the *unpredictability* criterion is connected to the infrastructure’s environmental conditions and follows its reactions to sudden changes in situation when a common infrastructure can suddenly become critical.

- the *flexibility* criterion can lead an infrastructure from the common or special area to the criticality area and vice versa.

Many other criteria can further be determined, which can help classifying the infrastructures, such as their sensitivity and vulnerability to hazards and threats, the ability of resilience and readjustment to the new environmental conditions required by the transformation of the internal or external factors.

The motivation of the systemic approach to infrastructures, from our point of view, is strongly supported by the dual operation of any structure, from within and from the outside. The need to classify infrastructures as being critical officially emerged in July 1996, with the “Executive Order for Critical Infrastructure Protection”⁵ issued by the US president. The first definition expressed in the preamble to this regulation defined the term as being “part of the national infrastructure that is so vital that its destruction or incapacitation may seriously decrease the US defence or economy”⁶. At that time, among critical infrastructures were considered electricity and water supply systems, gas and oil storage, telecommunications, banks and finance, emergency services (medical, police and fire) and the continuity of the government. Subsequently, following the development of

the subject on the protection of the critical infrastructures, a multitude of documents have been promoted, directly referring to our topic of interest.

In 2003, a wording of the definition of the critical infrastructures has been achieved which was much more comprehensive and included in this category “the public and private institutions in the sectors of agriculture, food, water supply, public health, emergency services, government, defense industry, information and telecommunications, energy, transport, banking and finance, chemical and hazardous materials, and post and navigation”⁷. Of course, many more definitions have been developed, depending on the authors’ background, essentially having the same meaning.

In parallel with the concept of critical infrastructure was developed the need to protect critical infrastructures, mainly focused on the overall measures identified and established in order to reduce and annihilate the risks of blocking the operation or destroying an infrastructure designated as critical. Specialists in the field have invented and perfected a number of preventive and urgent implementation measures to protect the vital elements of a structure at the society level. The issue of how exactly to build the means of protecting and preventing a potential danger of a critical infrastructure was left to the experts in the respective fields – economic, social, political, administrative, informational, military, etc.

The systemic approach to critical infrastructures

After analyzing how a critical infrastructure is classified and developed, we followed several conceptual references, without going in the depth of the problems. Due to acceptance of mainly two of the most important axioms on establishing critical infrastructures – 1. the impossibility to entirely ensure the protection of an infrastructure deemed to be critical and 2. the fact that there

⁵ *Executive Order Critical Infrastructure Protection*, USA, 1996, <http://www.fas.org.irdp/offdocs/eo1301htm>, accessed on 20.11.2015.

⁶ *Ibidem*, own translation.

⁷ *The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace*, USA, February 2003, p.7, http://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cyberspace_strategy.pdf, accessed on 20.11.2015.



can be no unique universally valid solution to solve the problem of protecting the designated critical infrastructure – we initiated our approach for identifying a working algorithm on the study of the critical infrastructure protection from a systemic perspective.

Political and social concerns⁸, especially regarding identification and protection of critical infrastructures have highlighted many aspects of the environment where this infrastructure exists and functions. Economic and technical issues related to direct operation, as well as those related to security of the operation can be perceived by regulations that govern them, namely that a particular service is required or not, a particular behavior is appropriate or not, a certain set of security measures is complete, necessary and sufficient or not. Therefore, it should be noted that an infrastructure, irrespective of its nature, cannot be studied independently outside its existential environment. We need to acknowledge that interaction with the environment to which the infrastructure belongs is the core element around which we can identify potential problem situations. Subsequently, we can predict certain types of risks to which the infrastructure may be subjected and, finally, the most optimal protection measures can be implemented.

Regarding the interactions of an infrastructure with its existential environment, it is necessary for the problems to be expressed and the most convenient solutions to be found in order to ensure the continuity of its operation at the designed parameters by removing the causes leading to destructive effects. The systemic approach in studying infrastructures, regardless of their nature, opens at least two perspectives.

The first perspective is related to the external environment of the infrastructure and the second, to its internal one. We conclude that an infrastructure must be protected at least from two directions: from the outside and from the inside. This, as a means of dually approaching the interactions, helps us understand how a structured entity functions and which the types of association

with other structured entities are. Here we refer not only to the characteristics of the group, the association of certain infrastructures, but also to the effects of their actions on how they individually or jointly respond to disturbances especially from the outside. The degree of impairment of certain structured entities is obvious when they are dependent on other structured entities, which in turn are also affected. We can assimilate this aspect to the so-called concept of *cascading effects*.

The systemic approach of a structured entity shows us the connection and the nature of the relationships established both within the respective entity and with its outside⁹. The structured entity schematically represents a multitude of elements among which there are non-accidental relationships or connections which interact in order to achieve certain common objectives. Thus, depending on the area of interest, infrastructures can be defined as systems consisting of a multitude of items (people, machines, installations, raw materials, information, energy, etc.) among which there are a series of economic, technological, social, informational and decision-making, etc. relations, that have predetermined objectives to achieve certain products and services designed for a very well defined target group. The complexity of relationships between the established infrastructures is given by the number of the interconnection elements, communications between them, through which they act and influence each other in terms of the behavior of the elements of the analyzed system.

The links (connections) between several structured entities engender the interaction between at least two of them, where the progress of one is directly dependent on the other's conditions. Observing these connections is often subject to the uncertainty principle, directly influenced by the level and the type of expertise of the observer. Thus, we can achieve the first conceptual model from a systemic perspective concerning the classification of the infrastructures as common, special or critical. Depending on the

⁸ Tudorel Lehaci, Marian Stancu, *Gestionarea crizelor din perspectiva nivelului operativ de comandă și control*, National Defence University Publishing House, 2010, pp. 12-18.

⁹ Ludwig von Bertalanffy apud P. Robbins Stephen, *Organizational Theory: Structure, Design, and Applications*, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1990, p.18.

positioning of the infrastructure within the system of values in relation to other infrastructures, we can identify several situations. The distinction between the analyzed system and its operational environment is achieved by the concept of boundary/border determined both by the objectives of the system and by the behavior of certain neighboring elements in its environment of interest. While a system boundary can be physical, we suggest an analysis based on the *border cause-effect* typology. In the systemic terminology, everything outside the boundaries of the system, but that can influence it, is the *environment of the system* in question. It should be noted that the border of a system can have a relative nature, as it may be defined according to the objectives of the system analysis, and a subjective nature because it reflects the analyst's point of view.

Figure no. 1: Scheme of the impact relations of two infrastructures related to the environment

The other inherent elements located along the border of the designated infrastructure, having




Figure no. 1: Scheme of the impact relations of two infrastructures related to the environment¹⁰

their own memory and intelligence, will leave a mark on the entire system to which they belong. Therefore, we can refer to at least two aspects concerning the infrastructures and their existential environment. The first issue is related to the

¹⁰ Scheme developed in own conception after the cybernetic model, Eugen Țigănescu, Dorin Mitruț, *Bazele cercetării operaționale*, p.8, http://www.asecib.ase.ro/cursuri_online.htm; Mihai Păun, Carmen Hartulari, *Analiza, diagnoza și evaluarea sistemelor din economie*, <http://www.asecib.ase.ro/Mitruț%20Dorin/Curs/bazeCO/Cuprins.htm>, accesat la 22.11.2015.

position of the infrastructure in its environment and the second aspect is related to its components situated on its border. The relationships between the various elements of the infrastructure are given by the nature of the interactions between the components, where the ones on the border will be more likely influenced by the environment, while the other elements remain more or less unaffected in terms of the impact of a hostile action from the outside. Therefore, most often the elements on the border of the infrastructure are those that help the system that includes them to easily bear the influences of its environment predominantly occurring at its border.

An infrastructure may be ranked as common, special or critical, depending on the degree of connection of its elements to the environment to which it belongs. Thus, we distinguish between several types of components of the analyzed infrastructure: isolated elements, connected elements and strongly connected elements, as shown in Figure no. 2.

The means of communicating to the environment¹¹ which includes the analyzed infrastructure and, furthermore, the nature of the influence relations with this environment, makes us rethink the classification procedure and categorize the infrastructures as simple, special or critical. The impact caused by the environment on the infrastructure can be felt on many levels, according to the number of damaged elements or depending on the nature of the damaged elements

¹¹ Iulian Martin, *op.cit.*, pp. 18-23.




Figure no. 2: Scheme of positioning the infrastructure's elements in interaction relation¹²

(importance and degree of connection between elements).

The environment's ability to influence the infrastructure in question and, conversely, the ability of the infrastructure to produce significant changes to the environment it is a part of, are two essential elements that differentiate infrastructures from each other. Such simple or special infrastructures may belong, depending on their importance, to another category identified as vital/indispensable to a particular field of activity. Depending on the relations with the environment, vital infrastructures require a high or special level of protection, which, by its nature, can be affected and implicitly transforms the vital infrastructure into a critical one. However, not all vital infrastructures are also critical infrastructures and not all critical infrastructures are necessarily conditioned by vital infrastructures. Depending on circumstances, we may identify critical infrastructures from among simple or special infrastructures, depending on the degree of impairment of the elements of the respective infrastructure (border, connected or strongly connected).

The biunique relationship of actions between the designated infrastructure and its environment involves several connections of different nature. These connections are made by the infrastructure through its elements, which, depending on their level of expertise, may rank the infrastructure on different levels of its importance. Within the systemic approach, it is interesting to analyze the

behavior of a structured entity depending on the degree of adaptability to the environment. We can distinguish between two types of infrastructures: *maladaptive* and *adaptive*.

Maladaptive infrastructures are generally those infrastructures designed to act in isolated environments and are characterized by total or partial absence of the communication with the outside. Due to lack of communication, they do not produce actions on the environment or if they produce them, these actions are insignificant in scope and intensity, they are unimportant. Maladaptive infrastructures from the planning stage do not require protection measures or they are adequately protected without the need for additional measures, when they are affected, the purpose of the hostile action being to completely annihilate them. Thus, we can say that maladaptive infrastructures can be assimilated to the category of disposable infrastructures.

The adaptive infrastructures are the most numerous, widely spread in all areas of the economic, social, political-administrative, military etc. life. The fundamental characteristic of adaptive infrastructures is that they interact with the environment, they have their own actions and respond to environmental factors. The typology of actions of an adaptive infrastructure is given by its complexity, internal and external functionality of all its components, regardless of their degree of connection.

Studying the behavior of an infrastructure can be successfully analyzed in terms of its operational environment. The operational environment

¹² *Ibidem* Figure 1.

describes the actions' scope, their importance and their impact on the target group. The acting potential of a structured entity is given by the ratio of force that can be generated at a time and by the degree of vulnerability confronted with a danger or a threat. Therefore, we can talk about adaptability from at least two points of view. External threats or internal resource depletion can place the infrastructure in a state of danger, when the value of the disturbance vector is greater than the value of the adaptive vector. Thus, we can analyze the state of danger from both the outside and the inside of the relevant infrastructure. We can mathematically express the following causality formula¹³:

$$S_i = f_a(V_i * V_a) * V_p \quad (01)$$

where S_i is the state of the infrastructure, f_a is the adaptability function, V_i – the input vector (specific to the entity performing the action), V_a – the adaptive vector (specific to the entity subjected to the action), V_p – the disturbance vector (it may have negative values, as well as positive values, depending on the nature of the action).

An adaptive infrastructure contains at least one main element (nucleus) that can generate/order a reaction (counter-reaction) to another element with the role of adapting/adjusting the status parameters of that infrastructure. Basically, at a certain size of the input vector, the central element sends a command to the adjustment element in order to compensate for the imbalance caused on the infrastructure, either as a positive or a negative value, relative to the size and the direction of the disturbance vector. The internal operations to compensate the imbalance or to return to its initial state will be resumed until the disturbance vector reaches zero ($V_p = 0$).

We shall refer next to the means in which an adaptive infrastructure can compensate for the exposure to danger by the action of its elements towards reducing the impact of the already produced or likely to produce negative action/

an action aimed against the identified risks. Both variants of getting the infrastructure out of the state of danger are based on an extensive process of planning the actions, both present and especially future ones.

Due to the development and implementation of the defense plans – the plans of achieving immediate security of the critical infrastructures, it could be possible to declassify them from the critical category to other categories ranging from simple to special infrastructures. We note that passing from one classification to another does not change the importance of that infrastructure nor its degree of vitality, but rather shows the level of coverage of the risks to which it may be exposed.

The level of infrastructure interconnections can be one of the parameters that can raise or lower the classification level of the infrastructure in terms of danger analysis. The systemic approach requires a substantial analysis of the infrastructure's level of connection according to the principle of cause-effect interaction. In this sense, we can distinguish between several types of connections, based on which infrastructures with different decision-making elements can be distinguished: hierarchical, non-hierarchical and mixed infrastructures.

Infrastructures based on hierarchical decision-making elements have a clear and unambiguous scheme concerning the responsibility of providing security and protection against threats, while the non-hierarchical decision-making elements are based on a distribution of the responsibilities and, therefore, may be more vulnerable to actions of destabilizing vectors.

Regarding the classification of infrastructures in terms of connections, several inter-infrastructure relationships can be identified:

- *interaction connections* are the most commonly encountered types of connections which have the ability to remain relatively stable for a longer period of time, noting that on the occurrence or the disappearance of the border elements, the interaction relations are maintained between the other components. These connections can be different in nature: economic, material, energetic, information, etc.

- *generation connections* have a temporary

¹³ Eugen Țigănescu, Dorin Mitruț, *Modelarea matematică. Rolul ei în cercetarea operațională*, course paper - Bazele cercetării operaționale, p. 2, Academy of Economic Studies, Department of Economic Cybernetics, <http://www.asecib.ase.ro/Mitruț%20Dorin/Curs/bazeCO/Cuprins.htm>, accessed on 22.11.2015.



character and occur when two or more infrastructures interact to achieve a common goal¹⁴.

- *development connections* are a particular case of the generation connections and involve essential qualitative exchanges, they are more stable and last for longer periods of time than generation ones; this is why they require prospective investigation methods and techniques from a systemic point of view.

- *functional connections* are informational and reflect characteristics of the infrastructures that fulfil their functions, but which, in turn, are also the terms of achieving the functions of the system they belong to, or could belong to at a certain time (in temporary subordinate relations).

- *transformation connections* are a particular case of the functional ones and consider bringing some of the infrastructures composing a system (social, economic, military, etc.) from an initial state to a specific final state, previously described or initially unpredictable. In this case, infrastructures in question no longer have different functions, they pursue the same objective.

In the process of transformation, this type of connections does not have a stable character; they depend on the stages of the transformation process and show some restrictions specific for the system, which transform them.

- *decision-making connections* are the most complex connections, being a combination of the development connections with the functional ones and are materialized on the basis of principles, methods and models of leadership. These connections are characterized by stability while pursuing the fulfilment of the objectives, and their study is essential for defining the decision-making-information structure of the system.

Tackling critical infrastructures from a systemic perspective involves, in our view, being aware that any infrastructure cannot exist and function in isolation, but in relation with other infrastructures, regardless of their classification category, be them simple, special or critical. As discussed in the first part of this article,

infrastructures “are not born critical”, they become critical after an evaluation process, after placing them in a certain context of circumstances which must be defined, analyzed and identified, a danger, namely an analysis of the risks that these vital infrastructures are subjected to – threats and/or vulnerabilities.

Forming a “systems thinking” is fundamental to the critical infrastructure analyst and understanding the phenomena and explaining the causes in the context of several types of connections, and describing how these infrastructures interact with the environment is an important step on the achievement of resilience and security of these infrastructures.

Conclusions and recommendations

Throughout this article, we expressed a number of views on how to classify infrastructures, where we highlighted the importance of the interactions, of the connections that the infrastructures make through its elements, and we developed the conceptual model of “the infrastructure border”. Also, we observed a number of issues directly related to how to classify the infrastructures, their typology from the perspective of the role they perform: simple infrastructures, special infrastructures and critical infrastructures. We showed how to express the types of infrastructure and how they “migrate” from one category to another.

Another issue relates to infrastructures’ protection and security, seen in relations of interaction with the external, but also the internal environment. We have shown the components of the infrastructure, the role of each component and their relation according to the border of the infrastructure to its environment. Defining the operational environment of an infrastructure can help our systemic analysis in terms of determining the influence vectors in defining the state of the infrastructure. Disturbances may be present at all times, but it is important to identify which factors cause the disturbance, their values and their nature. A negative disturbance can be a threat materialized into action. If the threat is identified and the action associated to the threat is described, then we talk about expressing a risk.

¹⁴ Mihai Păun, Carmen Hartulari, *Analiza, diagnoza și evaluarea sistemelor din economie*, [http://www.asecib.ase.ro/Mitrut%20Dorin/Curs/bazeCO /Cuprins.htm](http://www.asecib.ase.ro/Mitrut%20Dorin/Curs/bazeCO/Cuprins.htm), accessed on 22.11.2015.



Once we have expressed the risk and we have analyzed the situation of that infrastructure, we can move on to achieving the security plan.

Another conclusion refers to the aspect of relating the infrastructure to its environment. In this sense, we have identified two types of infrastructure: *maladaptive* and *adaptive*. It is important to correctly determine the typology of the infrastructure that is under consideration by judging it according to its environment. Subsequently, we can compile a plan to compensate for the shortcomings concerning the security of the infrastructure. Regardless of the nature of the analyzed infrastructure and of its complexity, the systemic analysis will always help us understand the relationships between the components (the internal nature) and between these elements and the exterior of the infrastructure.

Keeping in mind all of the above, it would be desired that the critical infrastructure analysts should focus more on the systemic approach, an explanation of the phenomena based on the interactions and then, after identifying the circumstances of a possible event, the risks should be expressed and thus the security plan for the protection of the infrastructures in question should be developed.

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THE IMPACT OF EXTREME EVENTS AND PHENOMENA ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

*Irina TĂTARU, PhD**

Extreme meteorological and geophysical phenomena which occurred in Europe and around the world in recent years have raised extremely complex issues related to the organization and management of critical infrastructures – already subjected to increasing level of risk. Conversely, there are numerous uncertainties and an acute lack of information on how critical infrastructure should be managed when confronted with such events. The chaos and uncertainty in this regard may lead to disruptions in transport, energy distribution and, in the most severe cases, to live losses. This paper seeks to highlight the importance of environmental protection towards the critical infrastructure system function.

Keywords: *critical infrastructures, environment security, environment protection.*

Introduction

Recently, a number of very complex phenomena have generated extreme environmental effects (including prolonged drought, heavy rainfall, landslides, fires, floods, storms and hurricanes, etc.) that have threatened and severely damaged sizeable areas in Europe and the world.

Most of the events have had a devastating impact on critical infrastructure systems, raising issues within the system's organisational process and management. Both the cause and effect of these phenomena is represented by uncertainty and lack of information regarding the behavior of

critical infrastructure under extreme situations. Generally, these environmental phenomena are characterized by high intensity, amplexness, often unpredictability, having a complex development and gradual course. Therefore, careful monitoring and high insights are essential in identifying, assessing and effectively managing environmental risks.

It's well known that the smooth operation of a socioeconomic system depends on the existence and viability of its infrastructure, most specifically, its critical infrastructure. The character of the infrastructure – regular, special or critical, is given, on the one hand, by the configuration of interdependencies of societal systems and processes and, on the other hand, by the interest of those who analyze the situation and expertise political and strategic decisions.

Such management is not an end in itself but is one of the essential conditions – a vital condition – for environmental security, for achieving and maintaining optimum parameters of a security framework without which any activity becomes practically impossible. The security of systems and processes is one of the basic pillars in a society's integrated system – this permanently ensuring an optimal state of living and safety for both productivity and all other activities oriented towards prosperity, freedom and high economic, social and cognitive performance achievement.

** Irina TĂTARU, PhD in Military Science, is Expert with Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: tataru.irina@unap.ro*



1. Environmental security

If, in the distant past, man was subjected to nature and lived almost exclusively according to its determinations – through the power of knowledge, intelligence and creation – man has transformed himself, using nature according to his needs, creating what is called human nature. This concept is, in some aspects, opposed to the biological nature of the Earth, generating a conflict that has some of the worst effects. Progressively, man brought severe imbalances in defining processes for the environment. These imbalances accentuate the degree of endogenous and exogenous threat on human society (but also on nature) and generate catastrophic effects, many of them with unpredictable effects.

The whole relationship between man and nature has suffered profound changes due to the fact that, following their particular interests, but also out of greed, negligence or ignorance or sometimes in bad faith, through reckless actions against nature, man has managed to become the author of the crisis facing the environment that calls into question its very survival. In other words, man succeeded, only in a few hundred years, to bring major and mostly irreversible damage to the environment.

Interestingly, in most cases, both reckless and irrational actions of man have generated serious threats, which surpass military damages. Natural environment, as support of life, has been increasingly suffering more pressures generated by the intra and inter-human conflicts at all levels: economic, social, political, military, informational, cultural, etc. In every level, for centuries, people have not helped at all natural environment but rather created an environment of their own, with anti-nature infrastructures. These have led to nature hostility on one hand and increased vulnerability on the other, which is very serious, given that man himself is a product of nature.

Therefore, this complicated *modus vivendi* man-nature has been instilling numerous characteristics to all human actions, including the military. However lately, man became more alarmed and increasingly aware of his assault on nature and tried to improve it.

The topic of the relationship between the environment, people security and nature was lately included on the agenda of high politics, creating a necessary international environment policy.

If humanity continues to highly neglect the preservation of ecosystems sustaining life on earth and those generating water and other vital resources, such as, for example, breathable air or food, current and future generations will face severe situations and environmental changes.

If man will not understand and will not assume the role of protecting the ecosystems and create structures and infrastructure to generate and continuously update the environment security, it might be possible for humanity to pass through dramatic experiences, accelerating its destruction. It seems that, finally, people and authorities have deeply understood the situation, on whose appropriate management depend human and environmental security.

Environmental security can be defined as the threat to public security caused by environmental hazards driven by either natural processes or human accidents (triggered by ignorance, accidents, mismanagement) and which originate within or across national borders.¹

Another definition states that environmental security is the condition of dynamic environment that includes restoration of the environment affected by human actions and improving resource scarcity, environmental degradation, as well as biological threats that could lead to social unrest and conflict.²

The term *environmental security* is used to emphasize the link between environmental conditions and security interests of people. There are numerous definitions given to environmental security and its problems. But environment security management domain generally includes three categories³:

- one related to the role and obligation

¹ *Environmental Security Study*, in <http://www.millennium-project.org/millennium/es-2def.html>, accessed on 01.12.2015.

² *Ibidem*.

³ Norman Myers, *What is Environmental Security?* in: http://www.envirosecurity.org/activities/What_is_Environmental_Security.pdf, accessed on 01.12.2015.



of states and non-state actors to act in favor of ecosystem protection and against environmental degradation, organized violence on the environment, because both types of threats can severely affect all the planet's resources;

- one related to managing the effects of local and regional environmental degradation and/ or deficiency of resources (exacerbated by population growth, unequal distribution of wealth and global changes in the environment) which is an important factor contributing to political instability and even the recrudescence of violent conflict (e.g. hybridization of the water war);

- those related to the role of security and military institutions (including intelligence agencies) for environmental protection and security.

One of the most important resources is water. Although, apparently, water resources are considerable, it is equally true that the needs are becoming bigger. Drinking water is not evenly distributed on the planet. There are areas without potable water or very poor resources and areas where it is found in abundance. Access to water is limited in some regions due to the geographical position, given living standards, quality of infrastructure in the area and the existing water distribution facilities. For example, while Turkey has over 120,000 lakes with drinking water, a large portion of Middle East countries do not have sufficient water resources. Similarly, the fertility of Mesopotamian low lands and the reduced water supply for the populations in the area has been affected by the Construction of Ataturk dam, one of the 22 dams built by Turkey on rivers Tigris and Euphrates. These severe situations are found in China, and in India, and especially Africa's dry territory. We can now discuss about a real water crisis triggered by the diversification of human needs activities and which, through its implications, frequently becomes an element of geopolitical or geostrategic interest.

I strongly believe that the trends that will increase water crisis in the future are: disrupting the ecological dynamics of streams and rivers through irrational architecture (dams, embankments, drainage of land, deforestation), industrial pollution coming from performing services (street cleaning, transportation),

agriculture pollution (use of chemical fertilizers, manure) and the pollution produced by the planet's inhabitants (consumers). Many analysts believe that the real cause of the Middle East' crisis is in fact water.⁴

2. Conceptual delimitations on critical infrastructures

Infrastructures are the framework of a socioeconomic system, the necessary support for it to become individualized, to function and to stabilize itself as well as to interact with other systems.⁵

Critical infrastructures are those infrastructures that have an important role both in providing security and in the functioning of the systems and implementation of the social, economic, political, military and informational processes. Critical infrastructures are an essential commodity for the functioning of the economy and of society in general.⁶

For the first time, the term "critical infrastructure" was used officially in July 1996, when was developed the "Executive Order for Critical Infrastructure Protection" by the US president. From the document preamble results that critical infrastructures are that part of "national infrastructures ... so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on ... defense or economic security"⁷. These critical infrastructures include telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil storage and transportation, banking and finance, transportation, water supply systems, emergency services (including medical, police, fire, and rescue), and continuity of government. In

⁴ Claire König, *La guerre de l'eau*, http://www.futura-sciences.com/fr/doc/t/developpement-durable/d/geopolitique-et-guerre-de-leau_622/c3/221/p1/, accessed on 02.12.2015.

⁵ Hociung Cristian, Hociung Tudor, *Captivi între infrastructuri critice*, Editura Lidana, Suceava, 2014, p. 24 (author's translation).

⁶ Gheorghe Văduva, Grigore Alexandrescu, *Infrastructuri critice. Pericole, amenințări la adresa acestora. Sisteme de protecție*, Editura UNAp "Carol I", București, 2007, p. 21.

⁷ US President, Executive order EO 13010 on Critical Infrastructure Protection, July 15, 1996, <http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo13010.htm>.



the NATO view, critical infrastructures are facilities, services and information systems so vital for nations that their removal from service or destruction can have damaging effects on national security, national economy, population health, environment or the full functioning of government⁸.

Also, the European Union 2008 Directive addresses identification, definition and preparation of necessary support materials for the development and implementation of effective policies and strategies for the management of critical infrastructure.⁹ In the last two decades, EU Member States have carried out important actions in order to establish a common language and a way of action, primarily aimed to protect targets with strategic value. EU States have established that critical objectives are: telecommunications, energy and water sources, distribution networks, health institutions, production of food, transport systems, institutions of defense and public order (army, police and gendarmerie) and the financial and banking services. Some countries (France, Austria, United Kingdom, Germany and Spain) have constituted specific bodies that have developed methodologies and have allocated significant funds for infrastructure protection considered as critical.¹⁰

Critical infrastructure vulnerabilities result from the ratio of the probability of a real threat against the proper functioning and the system's ability to cope with it.¹¹

3. The influence of environment on Critical Infrastructure

Transportation disruptions, power failures and, in extreme cases, loss of lives are just a few examples of the environment's impact on critical infrastructure. For example, in 2002, a flood caused by continuous rain over a week led to dozens of deaths and billions of euro damage in Germany, Czech Republic, Austria and Slovakia. Effects on critical infrastructure consisted of: disruptions of electricity and telecommunications, damage to about 250 roads and 256 bridges¹², changes in natural gas distribution and deterioration of transport links and polluted drinking water in fountains from flooding's contaminated waters.

In order to ensure the security of vital utilities, the following can be done: reducing uncertainty by monitoring phenomena that generate risk events, increasing level of knowledge and a better understanding of how critical infrastructures and their operators must adapt their behavior to new events and manifestations of environment. In the context of an extreme event, it is always necessary to have good interaction between the involved entities, such as emergency services, utilities operators and, most importantly, the inhabitants of the affected area. The population must have a culture of extreme risk events, to understand what is happening and to act so as to prevent surprise and panic and disaster amplification.

Therefore, ways to improve the results of such an interactive security system in the event of extreme risk (seriously affecting primarily critical infrastructure) can be neither designed nor implemented in isolation or, worse, randomly.

An interdisciplinary approach is crucial for a risk analysis of the infrastructure networks and the extreme weather phenomena (rain, thunderstorms, hail and extreme temperatures). This can be organized by bringing together within the same concept and the same strategy (extreme

⁸ Adapted after NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2007, <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=1165> and NATO, Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, 2013 apud Gheorghe Văduva, Grigore Alexandrescu, *Idem*. p. 11, http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_studii/infrastructuri_critice.pdf, apud George Dediu, Protecți infrastructurilor critice – o nouă provocare, <http://documents.tips/documents/protectia-infrastructurilor-critice.html>, p. 2, accessed on 02.12.2015.

⁹ Apud Ministerul Afacerilor Interne, Centrul de Coordonare a Protecției Infrastructurilor Critice, *Protecția infrastructurilor critice*; in <http://ccpic.mai.gov.ro/pic.html>, accessed on 04.12.2015

¹⁰ Gheorghe Văduva, Grigore Alexandrescu, *Idem*. p. 12.

¹¹ Hociung Cristian, Hociung Tudor, *Idem*, p. 25.

¹² Eugene J. Obrien, Donya Hajjalizadeh, Richard T. Power, *Quantifying the Impact of Critical Infrastructure Failure due to Extreme Weather Events*, in https://www.researchgate.net/publication/292158946_Quantifying_the_Impact_of_Critical_Infrastructure_Failure_due_to_Extreme_Weather_Events, accessed on 02.12.2015.

risk Strategy) experts from transport, energy, meteorology, social sciences, civil engineering and telecommunications, in order to predict how extreme weather will impact on critical infrastructure networks and to monitor relevant indicators – which allow for a more realistic assessment of the situation and appropriate estimation of insecurity environment risk levels.

Among projects approaching transportation systems sensitivity and vulnerability to extreme weather events are the ones called EWENT (Extreme Weather Impacts on European Networks

existing infrastructures network and to evaluate the sensitivity of such components to extreme weather. The European infrastructure sensitivity (vulnerability) to widespread disruption under extreme weather events can be evaluated (obviously using a system of appropriate indicators and instruments) in order to reduce the impact of insecurity of possible future events. On this basis, for example, the complex infrastructure systems' interaction can be quantified as well as the potential damage in the case of extreme weather events.




Figure no. 1: Work Plan Strategy & Methodological Diagram¹⁵

of Transport) and WEATHER (Weather Extremes: Impacts on Transport Systems and Hazards for European Regions)¹³, which identified hazards that have occurred, primarily, because of climate change. Within these, an operational risk analysis was realised in order to minimize the impact of major weather phenomena in the EU.¹⁴

This analysis, mainly aimed at ensuring accurate knowledge of the situation, can be used to determine the key components of critical

In this regard, an advanced risk assessment procedure is necessary to obtain a measurable indicator of risk. In general, the risk as an intersection between threats and system vulnerabilities is defined as a set of scenarios, each having an occurrence probability and a consequence¹⁶. Critical infrastructure system operation may be affected by different extreme

¹³ Fraunhofer-Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (ISI), *WEATHER Project*, in: <http://www.weather-project.eu/weather/inhalte/research-network/ewent.php>, accessed on 02.12.2015.

¹⁴ Eugene J. Obrien, Donya Hajjalizadeh, Richard T. Power, Idem.

¹⁵ Eugene J. Obrien, Donya Hajjalizadeh, Richard T. Power, *Work Plan Strategy & Methodological Diagram*, https://www.researchgate.net/figure/292158946_fig3_Figure-3-Work-Plan-Strategy-Methodological-Diagram, accessed on 03.12.2015.

¹⁶ Stanley Kaplan, B. John Garrick, *On The Quantitative Definition of Risk*, in <http://josiah.berkeley.edu/2007Fall/NE275/CourseReader/3.pdf>, accessed on 03.12.2015.

weather events such as storms, heavy rains or river floods and landslides. These influences could lead to a change in the system condition from normal functionality to disrupting performance.

Figure no. 2 shows all necessary steps for risk management. The analysis objective is to evaluate




Figure no. 2: Risk Management Procedure¹⁷

a range of possible event scenarios. This allows accurate estimation and representation of the risk level, depending on statistical information availability.

4. Effects of climate change on infrastructures

Effective measures to minimize the negative effects of climate change are based on cognitive support generated from the understanding of the very complex impact that climate change has on the economic welfare. As it is well known, one of the worst consequences of human activity is pollution - increasing gas emissions that amplify the greenhouse effect. Reducing emissions of greenhouse effect gases helps to slow down or even eliminate most of climate change problems.

¹⁷ Eugene J. Obrien, Donya Hajializadeh, Richard T. Power, Idem.

For example, massive and unselective cutting of forests - happening today in Romania - lead to change of precipitation regime and to the occurrence of extreme weather events. The effects are well known. There are numerous international documents which seek to impose a set of rules absolutely necessary for environmental security, among which there is the Kyoto Protocol. But even this Protocol (still unsigned by a number of major countries) can only delay but not stop climate change with a few years (from 15 to 20 years). Therefore, with climate change already underway, other measures are needed, especially strategic adaptation of society - and particularly critical infrastructure. "Climate change endangers the environment in which people live and increases vulnerabilities. Natural disasters are becoming more frequent and more extreme"¹⁸, warned Elhadj As Sy, General Secretary of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent.

Some of the effects of climate change on infrastructures are shown in Figures 3-5.



Figure no. 3. Natural disasters in 2012, United States of America, including Hurricane Sandy, which caused total damage of about 160 billion dollars¹⁹

¹⁸ Interview with Elhadj As Sy, Secretary General, IFRC, in <http://www.ifrc.org/en/news-and-media/news-stories/international/interview-with-secretary-general-mr-elhadj-amadou-as-sy-66559/#sthash.s0tkmpP1.dpuf>, accessed on 03.12.2015.

¹⁹ *Pagubele produse de catastrofele naturale din 2012*, în <http://www.ziare.com/bani/asigurari/pagubele-produse-de-catastrofele-naturale-din-2012-1210334>, accessed on 03.12.2015.



Figure no. 4. After floods in Arges County, the railway between Arges and Pitesti was destroyed²⁰



Figure no. 5. Landslides in Prahova County²¹

Conclusions

The human desire to create the perfect system, with “zero” risks and disturbing factors leads not only to increased efforts to achieve new technical performance, but also to the interconnection and integrated operation of more and more systems, aiming to achieve full system protection. Unfortunately, this is still impossible to fully achieve in practice. There is no perfect system;

²⁰ Patru persoane au ajuns la spital după ce un tren a deraiat în Argeș. Cum arată calea ferată măcinată de viitură, in <http://stirileprotv.ro/stiri/actualitate/patru-persoane-au-ajuns-la-spital-dupa-ce-un-tren-a-deraiat-in-arges-cum-arata-calea-ferata-macinata-de-viitura.html>, accessed on 03.12.2015.

²¹ Alunecări de teren în Prahova, in <http://primarph.ro/content/alunec%C4%83ri-de-teren-%C3%AEn-prahova>, accessed on 03.12.2015.

vulnerabilities of any system and process will always represent sensitivities and risk factors.

In the context of global changes taking place in the last period, risks and environmental crises have become a fundamental problem. The main challenge is increasing human security, creating and developing those conditions absolutely necessary for survival, even in high-risk environments or in situations of extreme risk.

Research on social vulnerability with regard to natural hazards and environmental issues was always centered on specific objects and the results take time. Environmental risk management and particularly extreme risk management is still very difficult.

Therefore, I consider it is necessary to better understand the risks related to climate change in Europe and around the world, which can only be achieved by concentrating the effort of scientific research and knowledge in general. Effort is needed given this areas are absolutely vital for the security of the Earth and human beings.

This effort will certainly bring, besides an additional level of cognition, better arguments for generating modern management of different components of environmental security (insecurity) risk: threats to the environment and, at the same time, sensitivity, vulnerability and potential risks of climate change.

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15. *Alunecări de teren în Prahova*, in <http://primarph.ro/content/alunec%C4%83ri-de-teren-%C3%AEn-prahova>.

Translation from Romanian: Iulia Andreea Bolea.

STRATEGIC DIALOGUE

with Daniel FIOTT

on EU Global Strategy 2016

Mr. Daniel Fiott is a Doctoral Researcher at the Institute for European Studies, *Free University of Brussels (VUB)*, a *Fellow of the Research Foundation–Flanders (FWO)* and a Senior Editor of the online magazine *European Geostrategy*. He formerly served as an Associate Analyst at the *EU Institute for Security Studies*. While Fiott’s research primarily focuses on European defence-industrial politics, he regularly lectures on European security and defence. He has lectured to students of the Baltic Defence College, the British Joint Services Command and Staff College, the European Security and Defence College, the EU Military Staff, the German Federal Academy for Security Policy, the Institut des hautes études de défense nationale, the Royal College of Defence Studies (UK) and the University of Cambridge. His numerous academic articles are published in leading international journals. He studied at the Open University and the University of Cambridge and is a dual-national of the UK and Malta.

In what follows, we are going to present Mr. Fiott’s answers to the questions drafted by Cristina Bogzeanu, PhD Researcher within The Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies.

1. “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure and so free.” This is how the 2003 European Security Strategy begins. In your opinion, how will the 2016 European Global Strategy begin?

The EU’s High Representative, Federica Mogherini, has already given us an insight into how she and her colleagues are thinking about the world. Indeed, the Strategic Review Mrs Mogherini undertook in June of this year sees the

world as being more “connected, contested and complex”. I am sure that the June 2016 Strategy will not depart from this understanding. It is only natural that the updated security strategy should see the world in these terms. Not only is Europe facing security and defence crises on all of its borders, but internally there are major questions about its security and unity, and the structure of the world is changing: China is rising and the US is rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific. I expect the 2016 Strategy to give a rather candid assessment of Europe’s place in the world, but we should be realistic about what the Strategy will achieve overall. No EU Strategy will work unless it gets buy-in from the Member States, for they are the actors with the capabilities needed to ensure the Strategy is a success. One should also note one important aspect of the strategic environment in which Europe finds itself. Sure, the world does look bad for Europe right now, and the original Strategy was drafted when Europe was optimistic about the world – Europeans were also much richer then. So, while Europeans may not be as prosperous, secure or free as in 2003 these are still the objectives to which Europe should strive. In 2003 we took these principles as a given, but today we must work to re-capture them.

2. With regard to foreign policy and security and defence, one of the fundamental characteristics of the EU is the intergovernmental nature of the decision-making process. Do you consider that the current regional and international context is favourable to reaching consensus?

The truth of the matter is that political power still overwhelmingly resides with the



Member States, and more particularly, at least in the field of international relations, only a handful of European states have the power to act seriously and decisively. For better or worse intergovernmentalism is here to stay. Of course, intergovernmentalism is a problematic form of governance when its members take radically different opinions about the security threats at hand. However, what I detect is that when member states do use intergovernmental processes they can increasingly agree on common positions. Let me give you a short example of what I mean. Following the seizure of the Crimea crisis and the natural “strategic turn” of the Baltic and Eastern states, I was quite taken with how these states still stressed the importance of Mediterranean security even though their main concern is the threat from Russia. Yet the idea of taking a broad, full-spectrum, strategic approach to European security is logical – can you make other European states interested in your security, if you show no interest in theirs? Now, this is not to say that everything works perfectly – far from it. We still see many Member States doing things on their own. Yet, this is not the intergovernmental spirit – states should talk to each other first before making unilateral statements that impact all of Europe. Sometimes, however, it is better that states act alone rather than not at all.

3. What are the issues on which you think the EU Member States will best manage to shape a common position? What are the matters in which they will find it most difficult or even impossible to reach a consensus?

I think all of the Member States agree with the strategic issues facing Europe today: Russia, ISIS, Syria, surges in immigration, energy security, food security, the global economy, the rise of Asia, etc. However, agreeing on the important strategic issues at hand is the easy part – to be a bit factious, even a teenager knows Europe’s strategic issues because they read the news and in some cases they now feel security/insecurity on their streets. Identifying strategic issues is the easy part, acting on them is another matter completely.

I think the EU Member States showed great unity in agreeing to impose sanctions on Russia, and so far these sanctions have remained in place. I also think that through NATO they have stepped up their efforts in defence and deterrence in the East, although in my opinion much more can be done to reassure Europe’s eastern partners. Deploying EUNAVFOR Mediterranean also shows a level of decisiveness not normally associated with the Common Security and Defence Policy. There is also increasing awareness of the need for better-managed external borders, even if there are differences over the migration quota system proposed by the European Commission. Nevertheless, there remain important differences between the Member States related to the use of force, intelligence sharing, the question of EU-owned defence capabilities, the transatlantic relationship, a permanent NATO force in the Baltic and Eastern States, etc.

4. Within academia there are many arguments for the existence of a reactive nature of the development of EU security and defence policy, having in mind that, throughout the entire history of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), most progress has been made in a context of crisis, under the influence of external pressures. How do you think this reactive nature of the development of EU security and defence policy dimension could be exceeded?

I’m not too sure that this “reactive nature” can or should be exceeded or overcome. It seems to me that while states can make a number of mistakes when reacting hastily to events, in the realm of security and defence being reactive is indeed the only real way to proceed and evolve. States don’t really have an incentive to seriously cooperate if they are not under pressure to act. Now, should having a reactive nature imply that there is lack of overall strategic foresight or planning then I agree that being reactive can be problematic. One doesn’t want complete strategic anarchy. Yet the history of the CSDP has always been about reaction and today’s security developments do



not show any change to this. Indeed, while a number of analysts had called for a sizeable EU naval presence in the Mediterranean before the deployment of Operation Sophia, it took a real tragedy to stir the Member States into action. Likewise, only after the recent Paris Attacks do we see some potentially radical steps in external border protection, mutual defence, intelligence sharing and airstrikes on ISIS in Syria even though analysts have been speaking about these issues for some time now. In Europe, as indeed in most places of the world, states only really seem to act when their backs are against the wall.

5. In view of recent events in the security of the European continent, do you consider it necessary for the incoming strategic document to present a new hierarchy of the range of risks and threats facing the EU?

My guess is that the word “hierarchy” would be too divisive for the Member States, because the challenges facing Europe differ in scope, intensity and geography – each state would rank threats differently. For political reasons, therefore, the new Strategy will have to talk-up the comprehensive approach and the shared threats Europe is facing. There is also the fact that many of the challenges facing Europe today are multifarious and intertwined. For example, the Russian threat is not just about potential conventional warfare but cyber threats, energy security and the whole gamut of hybrid warfare. ISIS is also a problem linked to the Syrian regime and broader geopolitics in the Middle East (especially with Saudi Arabia and Iran), plus it relies on global criminal networks to sell oil and to procure weapons. As is normally the case, the crisis reported in the media sits on top of a web of problems that reach far beyond the epicentre of insecurity. What I do think the Strategy could do is talk about short, medium and long-term priorities. Indeed, it is clear that climate change and ISIS are threats to European security but the time and resources needed to deal with each crisis are different. It would be quite illuminating for the new strategy to show how Europe will, step-by-step, return to a state of “prosperity, security and freedom”.

6. The massive amplification of the wave of migrants from 2014 brought a new and serious security challenge on the European agenda. What are, in your opinion, the areas that require a new approach to the prevention and countering of the new risks and threats?

Immigration is an issue for all of Europe, yet I must remind you that for some Member States such as Greece, Italy, Malta and Spain having hundreds and thousands of people turn up on their shores is not news. Only now, following the Syria crisis, refugee flows and the extensive media coverage, have more European states been moved to act. It is clear that the combination of wanting to leave horrid parts of the world and Europe’s relative economic health are drawing desperate people to Europe’s shores. For me, the migration crisis is the perfect example of an issue that needs a comprehensive approach but the politics involved means that Member States are unlikely to come to some lasting agreement soon. There are two interrelated elements to the debate: should Europe deal with the refugee problem in the region itself or open its borders to growing numbers of refugees? And, if we do open our borders, how will Europe deal with the issue of fair allocation and burden-sharing? These questions are made all the harder to answer because not only are we talking about desperate human beings, but the flows of people can be instrumentalized for political purposes. While we cannot compare the refugee flows with terrorist flows – indeed, it is reported that some of the terrorists involved in the Paris attacks used refugee flows as a way to communicate with Syria via Brussels and Paris –, it is clear that Europe needs a more integrated and comprehensive system for dealing with external border and internal security. Frontex has a role to play here and the EU will have to find a way to combine police work, humanitarian assistance, intelligence, etc. They will have to do so by providing humane conditions for refugees when they do arrive in Europe, all while fending off criticism from extremist elements in Europe’s political landscape.



7. One of the strategic objectives of the 2003 document consisted of “building security in our neighbourhood”, but the Ukrainian crisis has demonstrated the failure of EU action in this regard. The influence of security developments in the vicinity of the EU fully justifies maintaining this objective. What improvements do you think a new European security strategy could bring in terms of formulating the objective, identifying resources and means available to avoid similar situations in the medium and long term?

Europe’s neighbourhood policy has not been effective. I think Brussels was for a long time drunk on the positive process of EU enlargement, which culminated in the euphoria of the “Big Bang” explosion in 2004. This had engendered the belief that the EU could have a workable and effective neighbourhood policy based on the ambiguous promise of potential EU membership/closer EU ties. This has been exposed as a flawed policy because the EU has never defined where its borders end. The key question for the EU now is how it can instigate positive change in its neighbourhood without the promise of EU membership. This task is made harder in the East because of Russia, and in the South the ‘Arab Spring’ has turned into a long, hot, crisis-ridden summer. The top priority of the new security strategy has to be the neighbourhood, but it will have to do more than state Europe’s principles if it is to deal with the crises head-on. The EU is very quick to throw money at crisis situations, but the crises Europe faces need more intelligent tools. The military has a role to play, but a very specific one. Development aid plays an important part of the package too. One area where the EU is lacking perhaps is intelligence. Here I don’t just mean “James Bond-style” reconnaissance, but the intelligence gathering ability of EU delegations and EU Member State missions in important countries in the neighbourhood. I’m not talking here about inventing an EU “spy agency” because I think government-to-government intelligence exchanges can already be enhanced. Overall, it seems to me that better understanding the neighbourhood is a prerequisite to acting there.

8. In a quite difficult international security context, do you think the transatlantic partnership will have a role and place in European security?

Whatever might be said about the United States it still has a fundamental security role and interest in Europe. Indeed, I think Washington understands that without security in Europe and the broader Middle East it will find it difficult to fully ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalance’ to the Asia-Pacific region. America’s role in Europe continues and the role NATO is playing in Eastern Europe and the Baltic States is largely built on US military assets. Even though the US are aiming for a flexible posture in Europe based on rotational forces, I’m not too sure how credible NATO’s response to Russia’s aggression would be without Washington. Sure, key states such as the UK and Germany are playing a role in the NATO response but the US still has much of the muscle needed. There is also the fact that one of Europe’s leading military powers, Britain, still values the transatlantic partnership and it regards NATO as the cornerstone of its security. Yet it is not just the UK. Countries such as Poland and many other Eastern countries have faith in the transatlantic relationship. Even France, which is traditionally perceived as hostile or suspicious of the transatlantic partnership, today recognises the limits of the EU as a defence provider and has taken steps to become Washington’s preferred military partner in Europe. It doesn’t matter whether one speaks of the EU or NATO, European states understand that their security is indivisible and more needs to be done to boost defence. So yes, the transatlantic partnership still has an important role to play in European security.

9. Given that in recent years relations between European countries / EU and the Russian Federation have become tense, and European states have often had clearly distinct visions on security issues of common interest, do you think effective multilateralism would still constitute a viable and feasible solution to achieve EU targets?

“Effective multilateralism” is a specific concept that was born out of the need for the EU to defend its values and distinctiveness in the wake of US unilateral military action in Iraq. The fact that Washington and London decided to



disregard the United Nations, plus the grievances this caused with key European allies such as France, meant that the EU felt it necessary to show its support for a key institution of global governance. The concept is not without its difficulties, however, and in many ways it is a confusing term. “Multilateralism” is a form of governance and it is unclear how you really make this effective, or indeed how you even define “effectiveness”. I suppose the overall message was that the UN is still important and should be supported, even by a power the size of the US. In a way it was natural for the EU to propose this concept because it is itself a continuous exercise in multilateralism, although whether or not it is effective is a different question altogether. I do not expect the EU to drop the concept completely but I think it will become less of a buzzword(s) as time goes by. The US seems less likely to undertake unilateral military action and France and the UK also engage in military action – sometimes multilateralism does not work, especially if it means vetoes in the Security Council will block action for political reasons. Where the concept of “effective multilateralism” does become important is when we talk about the “West”. Indeed, supporting institutions such as the UN is to also support the post-World War II institutions that have undergirded Western power. It may be a mistake to disregard institutions such as the UN precisely because this institution was a European creation. However, one must keep in mind that multilateralism has its limits.

10. The 2003 European Security Strategy was developed in a period previous to the Lisbon Treaty, the creation of the European External Action Service and even major developments in crisis and conflict management. To what extent has the structures and capabilities of CFSP/CSDP, the stage reached in their development to date, been a powerful tool in the current regional and international context to ensure the EU’s role as a relevant international actor, capable of contributing effectively to maintaining of regional and international security?

This is a good question because Europe is living in a completely different institutional

milieu than 2003, and the Lisbon Treaty did bring about some important developments for EU foreign policy. As a general comment, I would say that it is too early to judge the “power” of these institutional tools – if indeed power is the right word to use here. Institutions need time to take root, even if they need to constantly display their added-value to the EU Member States and European citizens. Overall, I think it is difficult to really measure the role CFSP/CSDP have played in maintaining regional and international security. There have certainly been some success stories: the military missions to Chad/RCA in 2008 and EUNAVFOR Atlanta have and do certainly add to security and European development aid has led to progress on many fronts too. Even in terms of diplomacy, where the EU has played a diplomatic role in Ukraine, Egypt and Iran, the presence of the CFSP can be seen. Yet one always has to be modest about the overall effectiveness of the CFSP and CSDP. Simply put, in the EU it is not easy to always agree on common positions and without them no consensus on crisis management capability generation can be achieved. One also has to remember that, in certain cases, the EU Member States can work to undermine a common EU position, or, at the very least, certain Member States might be better placed to deal with crises than the EU institutions.

11. Through Article 42, paragraph 7, the Treaty of Lisbon introduces the “mutual assistance clause”. In the context of an intergovernmental decision-making procedure in the CFSP, the obligation to provide assistance clearly falls to the Member States and not the Union, this term having rather political and symbolic meanings. What are the reasons that you consider appropriate or not for introducing this clause in a future European security strategy?

Having in place Article 42 is wise as it allows the EU Member States to ensure their own burden-sharing without having to always rely on Washington and NATO. Furthermore, NATO is a military alliance and Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is mainly about responding to military aggression on the territory of a NATO



member. Article 42 is useful because it is not just about military assistance and indeed any response to the recent Paris attacks will demand that Europe moves beyond just military action against Islamic State. In this respect, I think that reference to Article 42 in the new security strategy should be expected and this is a good thing for the EU to do. France was calling for other EU Member States to take up their responsibilities on defence, and invoking Article 42 is a way for

France to ask its EU partners to commit more to existing CSDP missions. In order to take the fight to Islamic State, France will need to be relieved from its duties on many CSDP missions and other Member States should rightfully step-up to the task. France has now thrown down the gauntlet to its partners because apart from a few of them, a lot of EU states have been free-riders on the security that France provides through its contributions to CSDP missions.

WORLD WAR TWO, STILL A TOPICAL CONFLICT


Mihai ZODIAN, PhD



Ian Buruma, *Year Zero: A history of 1945* (in Romanian *Anul zero. 1945, o istorie*), Humanitas, București, 2015, 422 p.



Victor Sebestyen, 1946. *The Making of the Modern World*, MacMillan, Falkirk, 2014, 440 p.



Andrew J. Rotter, *Hiroshima: the world's bomb*, Oxford University Press, 2008, 374 p.

70 years after the end of the Second World War, the conflict still raises intense feelings from the public opinion, experts and decision-makers. Often, we find references and various comparisons with current events, in important political debates, such as those regarding armed intervention and best policy to use against potential aggressors. These books suggest various ways in which the contemporary world was defined by and reflects upon this major event.

In *1945. Year Zero*, Ian Buruma attempts, in a personalized and pessimistic approach, to show us the dualism of the Second World War¹. His father's destiny serves as a model for the tragedy which fell upon many people, caught into situations which they could not control. The attempts to establish a better world, the hopes brought by the peace, once the war was over, were to cause further disappointments.

In 1945, Europe was in ruins. The human drama is almost impossible to imagine by someone living in our time. Societies ravaged by the war, tens of millions of dead, while many others tried to survive in a world completely different from the one which they knew before.

In this context, Buruma describes the policies pursued by the United States, United Kingdom, France and Soviet Union and the attempts to establish a new international order designed to prevent the reemergence of traditional power relationships, based on rivalries between major actors. But the results were meager for the author: even though a new war was avoided, the Cold War was to bring

¹ Ian Buruma, *Anul Zero. 1945, o istorie*, Humanitas, București, 2015.



the threat and use of force again on the main stage. An emotional book, *1945. Year Zero* manages to offer to the reader a different perspective of this important era and of its main tendencies.

More optimistic than Buruma, Victor Sebestyen approaches the same issues, in his *1946. The Making of the Modern World*, but from a different point of view². First, he shows that many of our valued institutions and processes, such as democratization or European integration stem from the experiences of that age. The author tries, in this way, to avoid an overly deterministic interpretation of historical change.

Second, he doesn't consider that the Cold War was unavoidable, but is pointing towards the freedom of action on the part of decision makers, once the Second World War ended. An important part of his argument regards the role played by elite misperceptions and by current events in the dismantlement of the winning WWII coalition. Also, Sebestyen thinks that the personality and the regime lead by I. V. Stalin is one of the main causes of the post-war bipolar competition.

International relations are influenced not only by political conflict, but also by the context which are influencing it. Hiroshima and Nagasaki signalled the entry in the Nuclear Age, in which a „hot“ great war is becoming irrational, even if politics still goes on, but with different forms. This is the message of Andrew J. Rotter, in his *Hiroshima: the world's bomb*, a somehow older book, but relevant here³.

Here, we find out that nuclear military technology was the result of three intersecting causes: the international system's competitiveness, which included the use of science; the internal structures which may have helped or blocked the research advances and the new discoveries, especially fission⁴. Rotter points out that almost all Great Powers engaged in exploratory approaches, testing or development in this area. For the United States, not only the available resources helped, but also the relatively tolerant political regime and the work style adopted in the Manhattan Project, which lead to the bomb⁵.

A dramatic composition, *Hiroshima: the world's bomb* tends towards a certain pessimism regarding the long term efficiency of nuclear proliferation. If social systems contributed decisively to produce the weapons, is not easy to imagine a change so radical as to bring about the abolishment of the arsenals, but also of the knowledge and technology on which is based? Meanwhile, Rotter is cautious as to bet on human moral capacity to control their policies and tools⁶.

Historical metaphors can influence contemporary events, especially if these references become a custom in a society. The end of the Second World War raises contradictory feelings and interpretations, which points to the importance of representations for defining identities and decisions. The books reviewed here offer interesting contributions to an ongoing debate.

² Victor Sebestyen, *1946. The Making of the Modern World*, MacMillan, Falkirk, 2014.

³ Andrew J. Rotter, *Hiroshima: the world's bomb*, Oxford University Press, 2008.

⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 3-6.

⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 22-27.

⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 302-303.

INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC SYMPOSIUM

“Atypical Conflicts of the 21st Century”, December 8, 2015

International Scientific Symposium organized annually by CDSSS is a traditional activity that has become known in the academic environment, at national and international level. In the 15 years since this activity is organized (initially as an International Seminar) the value of the works presented and the number of people interested in participating has grown steadily.

This year, the Symposium was organized on 8th December. The activity was attended by representatives from national and international academic environment and researchers from the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies of the Military Academy of the Armed Forces “Alexandru cel Bun” from Chisinau (Republic of Moldova).



This activity was attended by a representative of the Presidential Administration, Major General PhD. Mihai Șomordolea, State Councilor and Secretary of the Supreme Council of National Defence, with a presentation that addressed the *Adequacy of the National Defense Strategy to contemporary challenges of the security environment*. The Chief of the General Staff was represented by Mr. Brigadier General Florinel Damian, who presented his work *Alternative Process Analysis (ALTA) - fundamental element for improving decision making in the context of asymmetric threats*.



SCIENTIFIC EVENT

In the Symposium, 11 academics and researchers presented their findings on various topics related to conflict. *Strategic Impact* quarterly no 1/2015 shall include some of the papers presented. The contributors represented the following institutions: “Carol I” National Defence University; National Intelligence Academy “Mihai Viteazul (Michael the Brave)”; University of Bucharest; Bucharest University of Economic Studies; Ministry of National Defence; National Anti-Drug Agency; Ministry of Internal Affairs. The event enjoyed the participation of 60 specialists from the Ministry of National Defence, Presidential Administration, Ministry of Interior, National Intelligence Academy, civilian universities (University of Bucharest, Bucharest University of Economic Studies, The University of South-East Europe, “Dimitrie Cantemir” Christian University).

Main issues that were discussed are those related to new elements in the evolution of atypical conflicts. Thereby, it was pointed out that hybrid threats and conflicts manifestation in the form of hybrid war requires adaptation at action level, conceptually and in terms of capabilities of military organization, as well as all other actors in the field of manifestation of security.



We consider that this event has enjoyed a high level of participation and specialization, and participants understood the importance of adapting the political-military structures of our country to the Euro-Atlantic framework under the new asymmetric threats of the 21st Century. The activity reached its main objectives, namely to disseminate the latest research results in the field of security, national and international defence and to facilitate the dialogue between scientific communities participating in the activity.

Irina TĂTARU

Translation from Romanian: Andreea Simona Cucu.



CDSSS AGENDA

OCTOBER - DECEMBER 2015

The end of 2015, like the rest of the year, was marked by scientific events organized by CDSSS, such as the Workshop in which the subject debated was *Romanian Army Modernization. Capabilities, tactics, strategy*, held on October 10 and the Symposium with the theme *Atypical Conflicts of the 21st Century*, which took place on December 8, during which there were exposed interesting papers by researchers, professors and top representatives of institutions with attribution in the field of security and defense.

The monthly lectures organized by CDSSS at the National Military Palace were resumed. Thus, on October 14, 2015 Mirela Atanasiu, PhD Researcher, presented *The implications of extending the NATO system of antimissile defense*, and on November 11, 2015 Alexandra Sarcinschi, PhD Senior Researcher, addressed the aspect of *International migration, between opportunities and challenges*.

Regarding the studies of scientific research made in this period, we recall the works *The Relation between the West and the Russian Federation in the new global context*, by Mirela Atanasiu, PhD Researcher and Cristina Bogzeanu, PhD Researcher and *Risks and threats to non-NATO European states*, by Mirela Atanasiu.

For 2016 we have planned numerous scientific events, which we present below. Monthly, there shall be held the already well known Lectures at the National Military Palace, events in which CDSSS researchers will expose papers on various current topics specific to their area of interest, followed by questions and discussion. The series will be opened by the Director of CDSSS, Colonel Stan Anton, PhD. who will hold on January 13, 2016, a presentation on *Asymmetry and the hybrid character of contemporary wars*.

The first Workshop to be organized by CDSSS is on 24 March, following *The correlation military geography - geostrategic - geopolitics in Security Studies*, and the second workshop, which will take place in October, will address the issue *Cross-border threats and political risk*.

In June, the International Scientific Symposium will analyze *Major challenges for the security of the Euroatlantic area*.

The Annual International Scientific Conference STRATEGIES XXI on *The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment*, will take place in November.

Details of all the events of the Centre will be announced on the website at: <http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/manifestari.htm>.

Irina TĂȚARU

Translation from Romanian: Andreea Simona Cucu.



GUIDE FOR AUTHORS

We welcome those interested in publishing articles in the bilingual academic journal *Strategic Impact*, while subjecting their attention towards aspects to consider upon drafting their articles.

ARTICLE LENGTH may vary between 6-12 pages (including bibliography and notes, tables and figures, if any). Page settings: margins - 2 cm, A 4 format. The article shall be written in Times New Roman font, size 12, one line spacing. The document shall be saved as Word 2003 (.doc). The name of the document shall contain the author's name.

ARTICLE STRUCTURE

- Title (centred, capital, bold characters, font 24).
- A short presentation of the author, comprising the following elements: given name, last name (the latter shall be written in capital letters, to avoid confusion), main institutional affiliation and position held, military rank, academic title, scientific title (PhD. title or PhD. candidate – domain and university), city and country of residence, e-mail address.
 - A relevant abstract, which is not to exceed 150 words (italic characters)
 - 5-8 relevant key-words (italic characters)
 - Introduction / preliminary considerations
 - 2 - 4 chapters (subchapters if applicable)
 - Conclusions.
 - Tables / graphics / figures shall be sent in .jpeg / .png. / .tiff. format as well.

In the case of tables, please mention above “**Table no. X:** Title”, while in the case of figures there shall be mentioned below (eg. maps etc.), “**Figure no. X:** Title” and the source, if applicable, shall be mentioned in a footnote.

- REFERENCES shall be made according to academic regulations, in the form of footnotes. All quoted works shall be mentioned in the references, as seen below. Titles of works shall be written in the language in which they were consulted.

Example of book: Joshua S. Goldstein; Jon C. Pevehouse, *International Relations*, Longman Publishinghouse, 2010, pp. 356-382.

Example of article: Gheorghe Calopăreanu, “Providing Security through Education and Training in the European Union” in *Strategic Impact* no. 2 /2013, Bucharest, “Carol I” National Defence University.

Electronic sources shall be indicated in full, at the same time mentioning what the source represents (in the case of endnotes, the following mention shall be made: accessed on month, day, year). *Example of article:* John N. Nielsen, “Strategic Shock in North Africa”, in *Grand strategy: the View from Oregon*, available at <http://geopoliticraticus.wordpress.com/2011/03/03/strategic-shock-in-north-africa/>, accessed on 10.03.2014.

- BIBLIOGRAPHY shall contain all studied works, numbered, in alphabetical order, as seen below. Titles of works shall be written in the language in which they were consulted.

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SELECTION CRITERIA are the following: the theme of the article must be in line with the subjects dealt by the journal: up-to-date topics related to political-military aspects, security, defence, geopolitics and geostrategies, international relations, intelligence; the quality of the scientific content; originality of the paper; novelty character – it should not have been priorly published; a relevant bibliography comprising recent and prestigious specialized works; English language has to correspond to academic standards; adequacy to the editorial standards adopted by the journal. Editors reserve the right to request authors or to make any changes considered necessary.

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