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ISSN 1842-9904 (on-line); ISSN-L 1841-5784
# CONTENTS

_Editor’s Note_ .................................................................................................................................................. 5

**POLITICAL-MILITARY TOPICALITY**

_Exploring European Union Security Alternatives – Is Europe Ready to Move on?_
Valentin IACOB ................................................................................................................................................. 7

_Contemporary Crises and Conflicts Susceptible of Major Complex Effects on the European Security Environment. Ukraine Case_
Mirela ATANASIU, PhD ................................................................................................................................... 22

_Missile Defence in Romania – Implications for Security Policy_
Florentin-Gabriel GIUVARĂ
Marius ŢERBESZKI, PhD .................................................................................................................................. 38

**GEOPOLITICS AND GEOSTRATEGIES: TRENDS AND PERSPECTIVES**

_The Geopolitical and Geostrategic Environment in the Romanian Area of Interest, in the Current International Context_
Alexandru STOICA, PhD ................................................................................................................................... 51

_Political Dimension of the Art of War by Sun Tzu and its Game-Theoretical Background_
Mateusz HUDZIKOWSKI, PhD ......................................................................................................................... 64

_Analysis of the Power Factors and Their Influence on the USA, EU and Arab World_
Mihaela GHEORGHE, PhD ................................................................................................................................. 82

_Romania’s Demographic Vulnerabilities with Possible Geopolitical Impact_
Cătălina TODOR ............................................................................................................................................... 90

**SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY**

_The Decision-Making Process – from First Generation Warfare to the Post-Cold War Revolution in Military Affairs_
Niculai-Tudorel LEHACI, PhD .......................................................................................................................... 106
STRATEGIC IMPACT

Post-Cold War Evolution of the Military Organisation
Costinel NIŢU, PhD ................................................................. 113

The Influence of Unmanned Air Vehicles on the Revolution in Military Affairs
Laureniţiu-Răducu POPESCU, PhD ........................................... 120

Environmental Conflicts as Security Threats
Irina TĂTARU, PhD ................................................................. 132

THE TERRORIST THREAT

The Emergence and Activity of Tunisia’s Most Fearful Terrorist Group
János BESENYŐ, PhD Zoltán PRANTNER, PhD ....................... 137

Dynamics of Worldwide Jihad Phenomenon, from Al-Qaeda to Islamic State
Liviu IONIŢĂ Anea IONIŢĂ .................................................. 151

ANALYSES, SYNTHESIS, EVALUATIONS

The Ukrainian Euromaidan and its Effects
Cristian Leonard DORCA, PhD ............................................... 160

The Legal Status of Combatants Which Benefit from an Additional Regime of Protection
Alexandr CAUIA, PhD ............................................................ 171

Sociology, History and Conceptual Models
Mihai ZODIAN, PhD .............................................................. 178

Considerations on the Relation between Values and Security Culture
Veronica PĂSTAE, PhD ........................................................... 192

CDSSS AGENDA

Activities of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies,
January-March 2015 ............................................................... 198

Guide for Authors ................................................................. 200
Dear collaborators and readers,

The first edition of the journal this year subscribes to the usual thematic of the publication, containing a record number of articles − 17, most of all being deliverables elaborated by PhD students and post-doctoral researchers within the projects under development in our University, namely SmartSPODAS and Horizons 2020.

In the opening of the Political-Military Topicality rubric, Colonel Valentin Iacob explores European Union Security Alternatives, launching the question Is Europe Ready to Move on? The second article, signed by our colleague, Mirela Atanasiu, PhD researcher, approaches the ardent topic of Contemporary Crises and Conflicts Susceptible of Major Complex Effects on the European Security Environment, bringing into attention the Ukraine Case. Next, Commanders Florentin-Gabriel Giuvară and Marius Şerbeszki, PhD Associate Professor suggest a joint analysis of the Missile Defence in Romania – Implications for Security Policy.

The rubric Geopolitics and Geostrategies: Trends and Perspectives comprises four articles. In the first one, Colonel Alexandru Stoica, PhD explores The Geopolitical and Geostrategic Environment in the Romanian Area of Interest, in the Current International Context. The second article, signed by a familiar collaborator of our journal, Mr. Mateusz Hudzikowski, PhD, brings to our readers’ attention The Political Dimension of the Art of War by Sun Tzu and its Game-Theoretical Background. Mihaela Gheorghe, PhD proposed herself in the article she elaborated an Analysis of the Power Factors and Their Influence on the USA, European Union and Arab World. Cătălina Todor, former volunteer within CDSSS, closes the rubric with a thorough examination of Romania’s Demographic Vulnerabilities with Possible Geopolitical Impact.

In the rubric Security and Military Strategy, we included four materials approaching different, but complementary topics, specific to the field. Thus, Major Lecturer Niculai-Tudorel Lehaci, PhD, dwells on The Decision-Making Process – from First Generation Warfare to the Post-Cold War Revolution in Military Affairs. Then, Colonel Costinel Niţu, PhD Associate Professor speaks about Post-Cold War Evolution of the Military Body. Further on, Laurenţiu-Răducu Popescu, PhD Associate Professor approaches the The Influence of Unmanned Air Vehicles on the Revolution in Military Affairs and finally, our colleague, Irina Tătaru, PhD tackles the topic of Environmental Conflicts as Security Threats.

The current issue includes a new rubric, entitled The Terrorist Threat, within which our constant collaborator from Hungary, János Besenyő, PhD, together with Zoltán Prantner, PhD brings under examination The Emergence and Activity of Tunisia’s Most Fearful Terrorist Group. Next, Colonel Liviu Ioniţă and Major Anca Ioniţă analyse the Dynamics of Worldwide Jihad Phenomenon, from Al-Qaeda to Islamic State.
The rubric *Analyses, Syntheses, Evaluations* includes four articles on different topics of current interest. Thus, Colonel Cristian Leonard Dorca, PhD brings to your attention *The Ukrainian Euromaidan and its Effects*. Alexandr Cauia, PhD. Associate Professor explains which is *The Legal Status of Combatants Which Benefit from an Additional Regime of Protection*. Then follows our colleague, Mihai Zodian, PhD. Junior researcher, with a paper on *Sociology, History and Conceptual Models* and last, but not least, Veronica Păstae, PhD junior Lecturer presents her *Considerations on the Relation between Values and Security Culture*.

The traditional *Cdsss Agenda* exposes some conclusions following the *Workshop on nonproliferation and disarmament*”, organized by CDSSS on 26 March 2015, at the same time announcing the activities that the Centre is preparing for this year.

The edition closes with the *Guide for Authors*, a useful material for those who wish to publish their research results in our journal.

For those who open *Strategic Impact* for the first time, we mention that the journal is an open access publication of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies within “Carol I” National Defence University (available at http://cssas.unap.ro/en/periodicals.htm) and is a *prestigious scientific journal in the field of military science, information and public order*, according to The National Council for the Recognition of University Degrees, Diplomas and Certificates (CNATDCU).

The journal is being published in Romanian language for fifteen years, and for eleven years in English language and has been approaching a complex thematic – political-military topicality, security strategy, military strategy, NATO and EU policies, strategies and actions, the issue of peace and the war of future, informational society, elements and aspects regarding the intelligence community. The readers may find, in the published pages, analyses, syntheses and evaluations at strategic level, points of view which study the impact of national, regional and global actions dynamics.

Regarding international visibility – primary objective of the journal –, the recognition of the publication’s scientific quality is confirmed by its indexing in the international databases CEEOL (Central and Eastern European Online Library, Germany), EBSCO (USA), ProQuest (USA) and Index Copernicus International (Poland), but also by the presence in virtual catalogues of libraries in prestigious institutions abroad, such as NATO and universities with military profile in Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and so on.

*Strategic Impact* journal is issued quarterly in March, June, September and December, in two separate editions: one in Romanian and one in English. The journal is distributed free of charge in the main institutions involved in security and defence, scientific and academic environment in the country and abroad – in Europe, Asia, America.

In the end, I would like to encourage the persons interested to publish in our pages to prospect and evaluate thoroughly the dynamics of the security environment.
EXPLORING EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY ALTERNATIVES – IS EUROPE READY TO MOVE ON?

Valentin Iacob*

This article explores in depth alternative security scenarios for the EU over the next 15 years. The four scenarios are based on five drivers: economic challenges, energy security, Europe’s neighborhood security environment, the U.S. rebalancing strategy and EU cohesion. The first and last are key drivers and their combination provide the framework where the resulting uncertainties are plotted as milestones in the development of the scenarios and their possible outcomes. Each scenario highlights a theme which is reflected in the title. The strategic decisions made within the next five years will significantly influence the Common Security and Defence Policy and will ultimately determine which scenario is likely to become reality.

Keywords: European Union, security, strategic, defence, scenarios, drivers, energy, capabilities.

Introduction

The next two decades are crucial for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the future of European security. Four alternative scenarios (see Figure no. 1) depicting the outlook until 2030 were developed by combining the extremes of two main drivers: economic challenges and EU cohesion. The uncertainties generated by three additional factors are plotted in each quadrant to support the storyline: energy security, Europe’s neighborhood security environment, the U.S. rebalancing strategy. The resulting scenarios are: “Scenario I – Business as usual (progress in slow motion), Scenario II – Defence nationalization (the sum of all fears), Scenario III – Unity in scarcity (faster integration) and Scenario IV – European Army (Pleven reloaded)”.

Scenario I – Business as usual (progress in slow motion)

This scenario explores the option of an economically prosperous Europe trading short term gains for future losses and barely making any progress on CSDP. Divergence and “petty politics” prevent Europeans from capitalizing on the initial economic growth and making progress in developing the common security framework. Remaining “stuck” in the “battlegroup” concept and lacking a proper command and control structure, the EU is likely to face severe security challenges close to its borders in the very near future.

For more details, see the author’s previous related study: Valentin Iacob, „CSDP Development Dynamics: reference points and future scenarios”, in Strategic Impact no. 4/2014, Bucharest, “Carol I” National Defence University Publishinghouse, p. 45.

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The illusion of economic prosperity “tricks” Europeans into pursuing short term gains

Europe overcomes the difficulties following the crisis and resumes a modest economic growth. Over the next five years, painful economic and fiscal reforms achieve limited results at a higher than anticipated social cost. The EU succeeds in saving the euro-zone at the expense of cohesion. Perceptions of unequal burden sharing and lack of solidarity exacerbate social tensions. Having resumed a modest economic growth emboldens governments to spend more rather than invest more, giving up cohesion for more national political and social gains.

The victory of the leftist party Syriza in Greece at the beginning of 2015 created a domino effect rippling through other European countries struggling with austerity measures. In 2017, the U.K. decides to leave the Union but continuing to maintain close economic ties. In the following years, the separation “pushes” the country into a recession which changes some members’ previous mindset regarding leaving the EU, particularly at a time when the economy was steadily growing.

The illusion of economic prosperity “tricks” Europeans into not realizing the full impact of losing ground to the Asian economies and diminished global influence. As a result, emerging economies are able to more successfully penetrate new markets while EU members focus on more traditional established markets with low risk levels but also low growth potential.

The EU is not able to reach consensus on a common policy and the incoming waves of illegal immigrants deepen intra-European divisions. This paves the way for nationalism and moderate pro-European leaders have an increasingly difficult task to galvanize support for deeper cooperation.

Beyond economic prosperity, towards 2030 the EU is not able to make any progress towards more integration. Previous investments in R&D still allow some members a competitive advantage over BRIC countries but the “gap” is steadily shrinking. Social tensions constantly resurface and prevent any further progress in deeper cooperation. The fragile balance is maintained by economic prosperity which gives politicians a short-lived leeway. The demographic challenges place additional pressures on budgets, slowing economic growth. Unemployment is on the rise creating conditions for extremist attitudes directed against immigrants, with serious security implications within and outside Europe.

Gradually, emerging economies move up in the global standings at the expense of formerly strong European countries. This trend shifts the focus of global financial flows towards the Asia-Pacific region and makes the EU less attractive for strategic investors who become visibly irritated by the political disputes in Brussels.

Russia exploits lack of EU cohesion in energy security strategy implementation

The European energy security strategy is endorsed by members, but lack of cohesion in implementation limits effectiveness. By 2020, the EU is able to diversify its portfolio in terms of imports but lacks security capabilities to address threats to its partners and suppliers.

\footnote{BRIC countries are Brazil, Russia, India and China.}
The threat posed by ISIL\(^3\) to the fragile security in the Middle East benefits Russia who is able to resume its course in becoming, as earlier projected, the 5\(^{th}\) economy in the world shortly after 2020.\(^4\) Sanctions imposed in 2014 were merely a “slap on the wrist” as the EU wanted to avoid sacrificing fragile and hard gained economic prosperity for geopolitical ambitions. Moscow skillfully managed to exploit the EU lack of cohesion in foreign policy and lack of resolve on sanctions.

During the 2014 Ukraine crisis there were voices inside the EU downplaying the annexation of Crimea when faced with the prospect of sanctioning the “aggressor”. As the EU was drafting sanctions in 2014, the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was suggesting that his country was “not part of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict”\(^5\) hinting that he might not endorse any solution affecting the deal secured with Russia for building two nuclear reactors and providing financing worth €10 billion. As a result, Russia drove a wedge through European solidarity and capitalized on the conflicting attitudes of EU members towards reducing their level of dependency on fossil fuels coming through the Eastern pipelines.

Solid investment allows EU to develop alternative energy technologies. However, they are very expensive and most of the members cannot afford large scale implementation. In 2030, many European countries remain heavily dependent on imports from Russia with no alternative in sight. Lack of unity in implementing a common energy strategy with no credible security framework significantly constrains potential future options.

**European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) loses traction**

The ENP continues along the same lines but with less traction following the crisis in Ukraine. Economic prosperity brings back the tendency of the EU to rely almost completely on “soft power” in promoting its strategic interests and postponing important CSDP objectives.

As other global players also enjoy growth and expand their influence, the use of the economic instrument becomes less and less attractive due to interdependence. Therefore, ENP goals become increasingly harder to achieve with no common security architecture to support a coherent foreign policy. As a result, by 2020 the EU level of ambition is downscaled to providing only financial assistance.

European lack of resolve against Russia in 2014 was perceived as weakness and, as the situation around Europe becomes unstable, countries in the neighborhood look for other guarantees to address their security needs. In 2023, just before celebrating the 100\(^{th}\) anniversary of the Republic, Turkey joins the top 10 largest economies\(^6\) after giving up on seeking EU membership. This further contributes to a growing lack of enthusiasm regarding the ENP leading to highly challenging security environment around Europe.

**The EU lacks resolve, while the U.S. becomes more engaged in Asia-Pacific**

The U.S. rebalancing to Asia leaves Europe with a reduced American military presence, predominantly “earmarked” for NATO operations. This increases the pressure on the EU to cover the capability deficit required for a credible deterrence and to provide security in broader neighborhood area. America’s “frustration” with the lack of progress across the Atlantic becomes increasingly evident with no economic crisis to take the blame for low European investment in capabilities.

NATO remains the main pillar of European

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\(^3\) ISIL is the acronym for Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant also known as / translated as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).


security while a divided EU is only able to provide limited capabilities through “clusters of cooperation”. European interventions to address security threats in the Middle East, North Africa or the Sahel continue to rely on “coalitions of willing members” rather than on an integrated full spectrum approach. In time, the manner of addressing security concerns divides Europe in “euro willing” members and “euro non-willing” with consequences on the EU’s ability to effectively conduct crisis management operations.

**CSDP is struggling as EU governments are reluctant to “surrender” more sovereignty**

By 2020, Europe experiences difficulties in calibrating the CSDP to reflect all members’ concerns. Economic prosperity allows Europeans to symbolically increase defence budgets. Yet, lack of common view regarding threats prevents members from addressing defence issues in a cohesive manner. This leads to an “egomania” of the European governments, reluctant to surrender more sovereignty to Brussels.

Earlier in 2012, a former Chairman of the EU Military Committee captured the essence of this issue: “We have to stop pretending that we are safeguarding national sovereignty by maintaining illusory national independence. Yes, Member States will be sovereign to stay out of involvement, but will be lacking capabilities to act either alone or with others. … Doing more with less money inevitably means doing more with less people.”

Without the U.K., CSDP does not have the same traction. Anglo-French cooperation is still strong but capabilities are not “shared” with the EU while the Franco-German cooperation does not have a similar weight. Having a professional military, allows Germany to assume a more active role in EU security initiatives, but without providing a generous checkbook as it did in the economic sector. Lack of cohesion causes the EU to remain “stuck” in the battlegroup concept and maintaining a very low level of ambition.

By 2030, CSDP is only a distant memory of what it used to be in the previous decade. The European defence industry is barely surviving due to competing interests of EU members. Even with the U.K. out, there is still no political drive for creating an Operational Headquarters (OP HQ) to address the increasing concern that “the EU does not possess the proper command and control structures to assume responsibility for prolonged and potentially dangerous operations.” As a result, issues reflected in lessons learned since Operation Artemis in 2003 are not resolved and highlight shortfalls in placing “boots on the ground” with a proper command structure and sufficient enablers to accomplish the mission.

The EU battlegroups are involved in some operations but their size and capabilities allows them to achieve only limited effects. With a “dying” CSDP and no future prospects to deeper military cooperation, the EU is not able to act as an effective regional actor while threats are getting closer to its borders.

This scenario is a reflection of the “status-quo” with the EU not being able to leverage its economic prosperity due to lack of cohesion. The level of solidarity in responding to crisis in Ukraine and the way common energy security strategy is implemented could indicate that the EU is conducting “business as usual”. Initial economic growth provides Europe the opportunity to be better positioned for future challenges. However, the EU fails to capitalize on this advantage due to “petty politics” and misusing the concept of “sovereignty” for limited national social and political gains. The U.K. leaves the scene and pays the price for separation in the next few years. The European lack of resolve in security matters leads to a Transatlantic “ice age”. NATO continues to be the main pillar of security in Europe, but America’s patience is running out and the U.S. seeks new partners to assist in addressing global challenges. The CSDP becomes only a “shadow” of what it used to be as no progress is made neither to establish an EU OP HQ nor to raise the level of ambition beyond the battlegroup concept.

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Scenario II – Defence nationalization
(the sum of all fears)

This scenario covers a “reactive” EU approach to economic challenges, while a lack of unity hinders development of a common perspective on energy security and threats. Over the coming decade, EU members become increasingly more reluctant to “surrender” more sovereignty to Brussels, particularly in the security domain. This could lead to reversing most gains since the CSDP was introduced, leaving the EU struggling with the prospect of becoming an ineffective regional security actor and, potentially, an irrelevant global player by losing ground to Russia and the rising Asian powers.

Failure to make important decisions within the next 5 years would bring back recession

Europe barely made it through the Euro crisis and its scarred economies continue to struggle. The EU does not have the political will and cohesion required to complete the much needed structural economic and social reforms. Failure to make important decisions within the next five years would bring recession back to Europe.

Lack of unity causes a build-up of massive internal pressures in addition to external ones. Internally, the absence of economic growth and a struggling common currency, increase the danger of division between Euro-Zone countries and the other members. Some countries are unable to reduce their sovereign debt, which prompts further “bail-outs” and more austerity measures. Many members, particularly at the periphery of the EU, have the perception of being treated unfairly. This lead to the surprising victory of the leftist party Syriza in 2015 elections in Greece triggering a European-wide anti-austerity movement. Externally, the EU becomes less competitive in accessing new markets where emerging economies get the upper hand.

By the end of the decade, the social tensions in the EU are exacerbated to such a level that talks about leaving the union become increasingly common. A successful “secession” referendum separated U.K. from EU in 2017 encouraging other members to re-examine their status. The already challenged European cohesion is crumbling under an unprecedented wave of nationalism. Pro-European leaders like French President François Hollande and German chancellor Angela Merkel have left the scene, to be replaced by more parochial leaders who view the EU as a constraint more than an enabler.

Looking at the “what ifs” of a European failure, Thomas Wright argues that: “austerity without end leads to low to non-existent growth, exacerbated regional tensions, and an end to further integration. Most member states would gladly leave if only they could find a way to do so with acceptable economic costs.”

EU members cannot reach consensus on energy security

By 2020, the previously mentioned PricewaterhouseCoopers predictions come true and Russia becomes the number one economy in Europe. It had engulfed Crimea in March 2014 and, following the crisis in Ukraine, the weak response of the international community emboldened Moscow to incorporate the Eastern Ukraine. Exploiting the EU’s lack of unity and “thirst” for fossil fuels, enabled Russia to recover quickly, weathering sanctions and pushing its own version of “neighborhood policy”.

Increasing divisions among EU members on economic issues evolve into an inability to reach consensus on energy security and, as a result, countries pursue more nationalistic avenues towards foreign policy implementation. Russia is able to use gas exports as a political coercion tool and exploit intra-European divisions as it has successfully done in the past.

A German unilateral approach proved to be Europe’s “Achilles’ heel” during the Ukraine crisis. An historian noted that, “Germany would pursue its national interests through Europe whenever possible, but on its own when it deemed it necessary - as it did, for example, when securing its energy needs bilaterally with Russia, notably in the Nord Stream gas pipeline deal of 2005.”

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The security environment in Europe’s neighborhood becomes volatile

Towards the end of the current decade, the economic downturn and the lack of a common approach to energy security cause a plunge in EU funding for assistance and development, the main enabler of “soft power” in pursuing security interests. This leads to worsening security conditions in the neighborhood and particularly in North Africa and the Sahel region.

The migratory pressures around Europe increase and cause more divergence on the Old Continent as members are unable to reach consensus on coherent policies. Terrorist attacks in Western Europe, particularly in France and Germany, become more frequent. Large scale immigration triggers, in turn, xenophobic and extremist currents which further erode the political base of the parties supporting further EU integration.

Lack of cohesion in addressing threats further divides members

Under these dire domestic conditions, EU members find it hard to develop a common view and policy coherence in addressing newly emerging security threats. Declining defence budgets are responsible for limiting nations’ willingness to participate in operations abroad.

Moreover, towards the end of this decade, sanctions against Russia take a higher toll on some of the European economies causing further division among members. This leads to profound dissatisfaction in countries perceiving Russia as a real existential security threat, therefore, causing them to allocate their scarce resources to territorial defence assets rather than to expeditionary capabilities. As forecast by some experts, the military expenditures of EU members are now 34% lower in 2020, representing just two thirds in per-soldier allocation compared with 2011.

Some nations concentrate purely on their national defence, in part to retain public support, rather than continue to integrate capabilities within the EU framework. Pooling and sharing remains just a “paper concept” as members become increasingly reluctant to share scarce resources for protecting EU interests. Clusters of regional cooperation continue to develop, but they only serve to deepen divisions. The CSDP becomes obsolete and is abandoned in the mid-2020s due to lack of support and cohesion.

European security hinges on NATO, while the U.S. is disappointed with EU apathy

The only catalyst for Europe’s security remains NATO and the commitment to Art. 5. An increasingly threatening Russia leads the U.S. to slow down the “rebalancing” to Asia-Pacific strategy and to leave more combat forces in Europe and its proximity.

This comes at a high opportunity-cost for America, because maintaining significant presence in the Mediterranean and Middle East leaves threats elsewhere unaddressed. In time, American frustration accumulates and dissatisfaction with European’s lack of investment in robust military capabilities is openly displayed in Washington.

In 2030, ageing European countries are no match for dynamic Asian economic giants

The decade leading to 2030 looks even less promising for Europe. Asian economies continued to grow and begin dominating the global economy, as trends have shown for about 20 years. Internally, the EU faces sluggish economic growth with no prospect of improvement in sight. The economic center of gravity by then has already moved to the Asia-Pacific region, diminishing the role of Europe in global financial markets. U.S. trade and investment has likewise been rebalanced toward Asia.

From a GDP size point of view, Germany is the only EU country remaining in what was once G-7. Unable to get over their individual egos, the once large economies of France, the United Kingdom, and Italy are unable to promote their interests, when facing giants like China and India. Some economists argue that “the new economic club will produce conflict, not cooperation” and

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in “a G-Zero World” no leader is now capable of driving a “truly international agenda.”\textsuperscript{13}

Germany’s relative prosperity is not well regarded in an austerity plagued Europe and an anti-German sentiment gets traction around the continent. The demographic pressures begin to erode the union from within due to the high cost of an ageing population living longer and healthier. By 2030, a quarter of the EU population is over 65 years old causing a labor force deficit and increasing the cost of social programs to unimaginable levels\textsuperscript{14}.

Policies run by Brussels are no longer appealing to the masses who are not willing to sacrifice present for illusorily future gains. In some countries, voices calling for leaving the euro-zone and EU become stronger reviving the most pessimistic scenarios envisioned by Eurosceptics in 2013 when a research project (“Europe in 2030”) predicted that a collapse of the Euro “will trigger financial instability” and lower the EU GDP by 16\% until 2030.\textsuperscript{15} A “Grexit” was regarded as a “black swan”\textsuperscript{16} which could cause an economic tsunami with a magnitude eight times larger than the collapse of Lehman Brothers.\textsuperscript{17}

**Europe’s dependence on fossil fuel imports reaches new highs**

A decade of poor investment in R&D diminishes Europe’s competitive advantage as the technology gap between the EU and BRIC countries shrinks rapidly. A chronic lack of funding stalls research on renewable energy nouriel-roubini/a-g-zero-world, accessed March 20, 2015.\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.


16 Expression used for hard to predict events with a significant impact.


alternatives, creating more dependency on fossil fuels; in the mid-2020s, imports reach 90\% in oil and 80\% in gas.\textsuperscript{18} The diminished ability to diversify energy risk portfolio and protect new sources of energy further weakens remaining EU cohesion. Instead of competing together with the outside world, the EU members begin competing with each other. As a result, Russia is able to exercise increased leverage over Europe, as its most important energy supplier.

Russia’s rise further undermines Europe’s neighborhood policy. Towards 2030, the ENP remains only a distant memory. EU lack of unity and Russia’s boldness during the Ukraine crisis transcended into a collapse of the ENP. Countries around Europe curtailed their enthusiasm in strengthening relations with the EU and searched for better deals with rising economies dominating the global rankings.

**CSDP is distant memory and Europeans “nationalize” their defence capabilities**

The only lasting result of the former CSDP is the few EU battle groups which are unable to effectively address larger scale crises. Focused on saving the Euro-Zone and lacking unity, the EU has lost sight of its common security and has not replaced CSDP with something more relevant. Military cooperation between EU members lacks coherence and relies mostly on the NATO framework.

The U.S. still maintains presence in Europe to provide credible deterrence, but is unable to change Europeans’ mindset regarding being pro-actively engaged in regional security. Ad-hoc arrangements and coalitions of the willing that were once the exception become the rule, as more bi-lateral, interest driven relations replace long term mutual alliances. Therefore, Europe barely has a voice in international security matters where China, India and Russia are increasingly able to leverage their new-found economic might.

This is a “failure” scenario portraying an EU in disarray due to economic challenges and a lack of resiliency. The absence of unity has potentially harsher consequences than merely lack of...
economic growth. First signs of “the beginning of the end” could be seen as early as 2015 pending the solidarity of the EU in response to Ukraine crisis and the ability to implement the common energy security strategy. The next indicators are the results of the economic reforms and the referendum deciding U.K’s “divorce” from the EU in 2017. Afterwards, it is only a matter of time until the CSDP ceases to exist due to the inability of the EU to have a more “inclusive” approach towards threats and member’s lack of willingness to “surrender” more sovereignty to Brussels. The result is a fragmented cooperation with many countries “re-nationalizing” defence and reversing the progress made by European defence initiatives for over half of century.

Scenario III - Unity in scarcity (faster integration)

The main theme of this scenario is the solidarity of the EU and its ability to accelerate CSDP even in difficult economic conditions. Europeans realize that a solid security architecture is required to successfully implement a common energy strategy. Faster and deeper integration may not look appealing to social welfare adepts, but it can maximize benefits once economic growth returns. Security in the broader European neighborhood is a prerequisite to achieving economic prosperity. Good strategic communication is paramount to ensuring European governments have the strategic patience to embark upon such a path.

The EU still faces economic difficulties, but maintains focus on long term goals

The EU continues to struggle economically and fiscally over the next five years. Faced with present difficulties, Europeans rediscover strength in unity and concentrate on longer term goals. Having saved the Euro and maintaining cohesion in facing Russia during the Ukraine crisis, pro-European leaders like French President François Hollande and German chancellor Angela Merkel succeed in maintaining commitment to a deeper integration process.

However, implementation of the economic and fiscal reforms raises both social costs and Euro-skepticism. Unemployment begins to erode the fragile European solidarity and governments feel compelled to compensate by increasing the social safety net. This increases pressure on already stretched budgets, testing members’ resolve into maintaining deficits at previously agreed levels. The Greek “Trojan horse” incarnated in the Syriza leftist party does not succeed in further dividing the Europeans over the austerity approach. An effective strategic communication campaign and lack of better alternatives keep the U.K. in the EU after 2017.

Towards the end of the next decade, cohesion enables the EU to resume strong economic growth

After 2020, the shift of the global economic center of gravity towards the Asia-Pacific region and the prospect of the EU being less relevant as a global actor become powerful motivating factors sending alarm signals to the politicians in Brussels. Exports to emerging markets hit new lows, while the EU encounters fierce competition from BRIC countries.

Solidarity enables the EU to leverage competitive advantages such as technology and innovation. Scarcity of resources encourages the EU to better emphasize its strengths and focus on issues with long-term strategic impact like maintaining investment targets for R&D.

An ageing population continues to cause concern and pressure budgets while immigration increases. However, coordinated economic policies and investment in security pay off as the phenomena do not destabilize the labor market. Towards the end of the decade Europe resumes solid economic growth and remains an important actor in global markets.

The EU manages to implement the common energy security strategy and diversifies dependency portfolio

Acknowledging potential impacts of increased dependence on fossil fuel imports and Russia’s actions following the crisis in Ukraine, creates premises for the EU to implement the common energy security strategy in a cohesive manner. Lack of economic growth keeps energy demand low and allows Europe to focus on developing technologies for renewables and diversify energy source portfolio.
By 2020, sanctions and reduced European imports have had a severe impact on Russia, which adopts a more “conciliatory” attitude towards the EU on gas prices and energy exports. As the U.S. becomes less dependent on external energy sources, the EU is more actively involved in addressing security challenges in areas where its vital energy interests are threatened.

As a result, EU focuses on Africa both for fossil fuels and commodities but also for market development. Coherent strategic approaches and the ability to address security threats give Europe an edge in competing with Asian economies trying to gain access to Africa’s resources and markets. By 2030, Europe is still highly dependent on imports but is able to sustain economic growth with a balanced energy source portfolio which offers flexible options.

**Coherent foreign policy and active engagement are able to revitalize the ENP**

The ENP gets more traction by 2020 and, as a result, new venues of cooperation develop with countries around Europe. The lack of economic performance diminishes the amount of EU financial aid available with initial negative effects on ENP. In the short term, the EU does not succeed in “shielding” Ukraine from Russian interference or to make further progress in strengthening cooperation with Moldova and Georgia. To boost effectiveness of the ENP in an austere fiscal environment, European governments are willing to trade “sovereignty” for a more cohesive EU foreign policy.

Relations with Russia are “normalized” and a new framework of dialogue is created. The EU success in maintaining unity and conducting further integration in spite of social pressures is regarded as a model of governance by other countries and delivers positive results in terms of strengthening partnerships. By 2030, willingness to assume more responsibility on security issues in the broader neighborhood has positive effects on migration trends and regional stabilization.

**NATO, the EU and the U.S. succeed in better dividing security responsibilities**

The U.S. presence on the Old Continent continues to decrease in the next five years, leading Europeans to make the best use of deeper cooperation and integration to provide a credible security posture. The intra-European cohesion and the Transatlantic link worked well in deterring Russia after the annexation of Crimea and encouraged a better division of responsibilities between NATO, the EU and the U.S. Therefore, the U.S. is able to continue rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region while still supporting NATO to maintain a credible deterrence. The EU becomes more actively engaged in addressing threats in the broader European neighborhood.

**Cost effectiveness drives governments to deepen military integration**

Russia’s actions during the crisis in Ukraine prompted the EU to re-energize the CSDP. Still, over the next few years, the increase in health and social welfare costs due to an ageing population prompts further cuts in defence spending. Cost effectiveness becomes the main theme which enables political elites and strategists to advocate for “surrendering” more sovereignty to Brussels.

Declining budgets lead to further reducing military structures in an attempt to maintain expenditures per soldier at current levels. As predicted by studies on European defence trends, by 2020 the European per-soldier spending remains at 98,000 to 106,000 euros\(^\text{19}\) maintaining the 2008-2011 defence budget allocations and the same force structure downsizing ratio. Germany’s economic interests and armed forces reform contribute to changing its reluctance to participate in operations abroad. After evolving from a conscript system to a professional one, German military personnel numbers remain around 185,000 with “a pool of forces of at least 10,000 military personnel available for deployment on stabilization operations.”\(^\text{20}\)

In time, as the EU becomes more engaged in regional security, there is increased pressure for

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establishing of an operational headquarters (OP HQ) which is expected to enhance the ability of the EU to coherently and effectively lead crisis response operations. Separating the strategic policy making structures from the operational level tasks brings a fresh perspective to potential evolution of CSDP.

EU moves past the “battlegroup” concept and is willing to create more robust capabilities

Halfway into the next decade, the Anglo-French cooperation continues to get more traction and provides an off-shore projection capability built around the French carrier group. A more active German approach towards security within a deeper cooperation framework is the impulse CSDP needs to move forward. Financial resources limit the level of ambition which is unlikely to match the Helsinki Headline Goal (of 60,000 personnel), but forces Europeans to act smarter together. Deprived of strong U.S. presence, Europe takes the “battlegroup” concept a step further and looks into grouping units into “Euro-brigades” which provide more capability to operate longer and further. The ability of EU members to reach an agreement on common threats, address jointly all members’ concerns and closer cooperation with NATO are the key binding factors that carry a robust CSDP into the future.

This scenario highlights the benefits of maintaining cohesion during a period of economic difficulty. Solidarity in facing Russia and an EU-wide consensus on a common energy strategy are early signs that “unity in scarcity” is the future. The ability to focus on longer term goals helps overcome the “fallout” of harsh present decisions. Therefore, willingness to continue profound structural reforms in the next few years will show if this scenario becomes certainty. Social unrest is expected to test leadership and political will. The U.K. remaining in the EU after 2017 is likely to influence positively any future progress on CSDP. More active German involvement in security matters and reaching an early agreement to establish an operational headquarters for EU missions could offer a clearer picture of how military integration within a European framework will further develop.

Scenario IV – European Army (“Pleven reloaded”)

This scenario portrays the vision of the EU founding fathers depicting an economically prosperous and united Europe. The highlight of this scenario is the solidarity of EU translated into accelerated CSDP progress based on benefits from a positive economic development. The reforms are carried through with resilience and results are encouraging. Social turbulence remains low and allows governments to focus on long term goals. Europeans display unity and resolve in sanctioning Russia after the crisis in Ukraine and succeed in implementing a common energy strategy. The ENP gets more tractions as the EU is willing to assume a more active role in regional security. The U.S. is moving on with a new strategic posture and is able to share more of the global security burden with increasingly capable European allies.

Cohesion in implementing reforms produces results and the EU resumes economic growth

Europe is able to emerge from crisis and the reforms aimed at harmonizing fiscal policies begin to show positive results in the next five years. As a result, the prospect of deeper integration gets more traction in capitals, and countries are less reluctant to “surrender” more sovereignty to Brussels.

Coherence in decision-making and foreign policy enables the EU to look more “up and out” and compete efficiently with Asian economies. Hit by sanctions, Russia has to rely on Europe’s support to restore prosperity. Due to a substantial budget allocation, the EU achieves its goal on R&D expenditures, increasing its competitive advantage and contributing to higher economic growth.

By 2020, the prospect of prosperity and stability within European borders encourages more countries to join the “euro-zone” with positive effects for their economies. With less financial constraints and more coherence, the EU
The EU successfully implements the Common Energy Security Strategy and diversifies its reliance portfolio

Following the crisis in Ukraine, the need to implement the common energy strategy becomes a top priority for the EU. Moscow’s aggressive behavior helped members to rapidly reach an agreement. Over the next five years, Europe is able to reduce its dependency on Russia and explore new opportunities, particularly in Africa.

By 2020, the additional investment in R&D makes Europe a global leader in renewable and alternate energy technologies. The integration of national energy markets enables European economies to achieve sustainable growth levels balancing the dependency on imports from various sources.

The accelerated rhythm of economic growth in Asia leads to fierce competition for resources, mainly in the Middle East and Africa. Multiple actors in a multi-polar world try to establish spheres of influence. The situation becomes highly volatile in mid-2020s and lead the EU to establish a robust expeditionary capability to protect its interests.

As a result, CSDP is rapidly moving forward towards more military integration. Towards the end of the next decade, the EU becomes increasingly able to provide security in areas of interests and address the threats to its energy strategy.

The ENP is revived and enables the EU to conduct further enlargement

The ENP contributes to further stabilization of Europe’s wider region. The EU’s stance against Russia during the Ukraine crisis improves regional perceptions encouraging countries to seek a closer cooperation with Europe. As the EU head of foreign policy described in 2013, Europe becomes aware that “to remain true to its nature as a peace project, it needs the capabilities to protect and uphold its values in its neighborhood and beyond.”

In the following years, relations with Russia resume a degree of normality. The EU is able to leverage its economic advantages and make a smarter use of its “soft power” to prevent security threats from emerging in its neighborhood.

Cohesion and prosperity enable the EU to conduct other rounds of enlargement and, towards the end of the next decade, all countries from the former Yugoslavia become members. The ENP, supported by a revived CSDP, creates a “veil” of stability around Europe contributing to keeping threats away from its borders.

The U.S. resumes strategic rebalancing to Asia and the EU shares security burdens

As Russia increasingly “suffers” because of economic sanctions, it abandons expansionist policy and seeks cooperation with the West. In just five years, Russia changes its course and ceases to represent a serious threat to Eastern Europe enabling the U.S. to resume its intended change to its strategic posture and conduct rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region.

As a result, there is a significant decrease of U.S. presence in Europe and only the essential capabilities for a credible deterrence remain on the Old Continent. The Europeans begin looking at creating a strong expeditionary capability to address regional security threats. Enjoying a relatively long period of economic prosperity gives the EU no choice but to increase military spending and share the burden with a strategically “overstretched” America. The crisis in Ukraine proved the immense value of a strong transatlantic link and the EU seemed to have understood the expectations for preserving it.

The CSDP lays the foundation for the creation of a European Army

The Europeans develop a common understanding of threats, addressing the concerns of all members in an equal and coherent manner. The limited defence budgets and the U.S. “pivot” to Asia represent catalysts for a revitalized CSDP

which takes into account a better delineation of responsibilities between the EU and NATO, promoting deeper cooperation and synchronization of efforts.

The economic and political context generates favorable conditions for creating an autonomous EU expeditionary capability to address security challenges. The project to create a “European Army” is re-launched in 2020 and debates on size, location, procedures and control of the forces last a few years. The EU uses its notorious and cautious “small incremental steps” approach that it has been using in all sensitive integration processes.

An OP HQ is established with the purpose of providing command and control for current operations and generating a framework for a future EU force structure. The Anglo-French expeditionary capability takes part in its maiden operation under an EU banner and the OP HQ brings value added. Germany has already been taking part in a few EU-led stability operations and results generate support for further participation.

By the mid-2020s, the case for achieving a Helsinki-type level of ambition (corps-size plus) is re-opened while drafting a new EU Constitution. The “European Army” is an expeditionary force able to carry out the full range of “Petersberg” tasks in the broader neighborhood area. Being funded and equipped by the EU offsets the previous disadvantages of the Athena mechanism and slow chains of national decision making.

The European Army is placed under the control of the European Parliament which receives more powers under a new constitution. The creation of such a capability significantly increases the EU annual budget for defence and generates social turbulence which requires strong leadership. However, efficiency in spending and better return in capabilities over investment continue to drive support. The EDA procurement programs focus on equipping the force and providing deployable enablers.

The ambitious project “remains on land” as the more costly air and maritime assets are still to be provided through national channels for operations. By 2030, as the concept matures, CSDP expands the Petersberg and Lisbon tasks to address the full spectrum of regional and global threats. Therefore, the European Army is able to protect EU vital interests and promote its foreign policy objectives through a wider range of options and instruments.

This scenario describes the outlook of a truly united Europe that is able to best leverage its recent economic prosperity for reaching a better position to address future challenges. Consensus on energy security and ability to retain competitive advantages in front of emerging economies are indicators that the EU is moving towards further developing the CSDP. The U.K. remaining in the EU and an active German approach towards participating in operations are clear signs that Europe abandons its “passive” attitude and is ready to become a solid security provider. After seven decades since the initiative was first launched by Pleven, a prosperous EU creates a European Army which represents the “hard power” instrument Europe has been lacking for so long to protect its foreign policy interests.

The future of European security – which way?

Jean Monnet, one of the Founding Fathers of the EU, once said: “I have always thought that it was in crises that Europe would be made, and that it would be the sum of the solutions to these crises.” EU is at a strategic crossroads and its future depends on strategic decisions made on security in the upcoming years. Any of the scenarios can become reality pending Europe’s answer to the uncertainties originating from the two main drivers: economic challenges and cohesion.

The current low level of cohesion within EU and the economic outlook indicate that scenario I– “Business as usual,” is the most plausible. Europe has come out of the recession and has resumed a fragile economic growth hindered mostly by its rigid austerity policies. However, divergences have already surfaced in capitals because of the reforms Brussels intends to implement.

The results of the elections for the European Parliament that took place in May 2014 provided
a clearer picture of how Europeans feel about their future. Key uncertainties related to the outcome of the crisis in Ukraine, the European common energy security strategy, the follow-on actions of the Greek government, the attitude of Hungary and the U.S. forces posture will fundamentally influence which scenario is more likely to occur.

In the short term, the stance against Russia will test the cohesion of the EU. Sanctions are likely to affect the fragile economic growth of most members, leading to divergent views on how severe they should be. Nevertheless, the importance of Russia as an energy supplier cannot be underestimated because it could seriously affect Europe’s prosperity.

From a security perspective Europeans could turn away from the CSDP and rely solely on NATO. This could change the current path and place the future of EU security into scenario II - “Defence nationalization”. EU members have different views on threats and, therefore, defending territorial integrity will dominate the security debates, especially in the Eastern part of the continent which is exposed to Russia’s potential aggressive behavior. Naturally, this leads to a wide range of attitudes towards surrendering sovereignty on defence. Some countries would only regard it as a national prerogative and refuse to endorse any initiative that attempts to change this.

However, maintaining cohesion and resolve against Russia, even if faced with economic downturn, may lead Europe into scenario III - “Unity in scarcity”. A closer dialogue between NATO and the EU with deeper engagement with the U.S. regarding a common perspective on threats and interests, who and how should address them, may prove valuable in streamlining the process and alleviate some of the EU members’ concerns on sovereignty issues regarding defence.

Another important test of EU cohesion is the ability of members to strictly adhere to the European energy security strategy. The resolve in implementing a strategy that would gradually diversify the energy dependency portfolio and reduce imports from Russia is an indicator that scenario III becomes the most likely. Europeans will require expeditionary capabilities to protect interests related to energy security and this should lead to further progress on CSDP.

Pending a positive outlook regarding economic prosperity and resources allocated to defence, scenario IV – “European Army,” could become plausible by 2020. Failure to effectively implement the energy security strategy would maintain the “Business as usual” scenario as EU members would lack a powerful motivator to further progress on CSDP.

The reduction in the size of the military and changes in the strategic posture of the U.S. will soon have a serious impact on European security. Currently, the crisis in Ukraine has prompted increased U.S. presence in Europe to provide reassurance for NATO allies. However, continued reliance on the U.S. to address threats in Europe’s neighborhood could indicate that the EU remains in the “Business as usual” scenario. Scenarios III and IV become more likely in the presence of an increased EU-NATO-U.S. collaborative approach that enable better preparedness for contingencies and crises. There is currently an impression on both sides of the Atlantic that everybody does everything and everywhere, but leading nowhere and with no significant impact on anything. Therefore, lack of focus is becoming very costly both in time and resources.

Based on the most obvious indicators, the EU is currently heading towards scenario I - “Business as usual,” while a deeper cooperation and cohesion would make scenario number III - “Unity in scarcity” more likely. At the extremes, more economic prosperity and unity could “steer” Europe towards scenario number IV – “European Army,” but less prosperity and lack of cohesion would “push” Europe into scenario II – “Defence nationalization” with dire consequences for the future of CSDP.

**Conclusion**

The shifts in the global economic order will trigger significant future security challenges. Energy dependence, the U.S. “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific region and, more recently, the crisis in Ukraine are likely to have a strong catalytic effect on the EU in security decision making. Demographic challenges and strong migratory pressures in Europe’s neighborhood require a coherent collective approach.
More than a decade of participation in Afghanistan has helped Europeans to achieve combat experience and a level of interoperability never reached before. The troops forged a much deeper cooperation through real operations. However, gains in experience and interoperability are perishable if cooperation does not continue at the same level of intensity.

The idea of creating a European Army was launched over half of century ago, but there has never been such intense talk about it as in the last decade. This proves that either Europeans are ready to embrace it or that security challenges are demanding it. Both arguments are valid and some small incremental steps towards reaching this goal have already been taken. EDA has been recently coordinating more and more projects that could provide enablers for an EU deployable military capability.

Facing the threats of a multi-polar world and a rising China, the U.S. needs the support of a strong and united Europe that is able to act as a credible regional and, even global security actor. Contrary to some beliefs, there is no danger of competition in the security domain between the EU and the U.S. There may be disagreements on various issues, but when it comes to security, the strong shared values that represent the fundamentals of the transatlantic link will ultimately prevail.

Having recently emerged from the most serious crisis in its existence, the EU might have learned an important lesson based on an old and valuable principle: strength in unity. Many challenges are looming on the horizon constantly testing Europe’s unity and cohesion. CSDP and deeper military integration should be more than just policies and paper projects; they should be the living proof of a united Europe willing to back up diplomatic and economic instruments of power with credible military capabilities. Economic prosperity is important for the progress of CSDP, but is not the fundamental issue. Little can be achieved with limited resources, but almost nothing can be achieved with limited unity and lack of cohesion.

Europe is ready to move on, but the better question would be does it have the willingness to do so, and how quickly? The answer should be searched for in Brussels and the European capitals and is related to the ability to trade small gains in the present for long-term higher returns. When it comes to security, the decision makers on the “Old Continent” have to consider themselves “Europeans” first. Until they do so, changing the cultural paradigm of the average European might take much longer, placing the EU on the dangerous path of becoming less relevant in the world and significantly trimming its role as a security actor.

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CONTEMPORARY CRISES AND CONFLICTS SUSCEPTIBLE OF MAJOR COMPLEX EFFECTS ON THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT. UKRAINE CASE

Mirela ATANASIU, PhD*

The contemporary European security environment is the subject of dynamic, complex and irregular changes with consequences on regional and global plan. Europe is flawed by numerous recent and latent crises and conflicts developed in its area of interest or its close vicinity and many of these are susceptible of major complex effects.

Among these the crises lately damaging very seriously the European space produce complex effects in all the perceived security dimensions are: economic-financial crisis initiated in US but reached to exponentially harm the whole world states, including the European ones; the effervescence of new terrorist actions started to scar in an unprecedented manner the developed states in the Western Europe by inducing fear and uncertainty along the population and the Ukrainian crisis impacted by the illegitimate intervention of the Russian troops on the sovereign territory of its neighbour state, case that is the object of our present analysis.

Thus, in this material we will analyse the major complex effects of the Ukrainian crisis on the European security environment by different perspectives in its successive phases of evolvement, escalation and de-escalation. For this, we initiate the analysis by identifying and presenting the types of generator factors (political, diplomatic, economic, social, financial, military, informational, communicational, biological, psychological, ecological, etc.) from which afterward derived major complex effects on the European security field.

Keywords: Ukraine, crisis, conflict, complexity, factors, complex effects.

Factors generator of crisis on the European continent in the contemporary times

As concerns the European security there are a series of latent factors able to generate belligerency at a given moment. One of them is the process of outstanding EU harmonization and regional integration generating political frictions among the member states in each party attempt to protect its national interest, sometimes in the detriment of the organization as a whole. Eloquent examples of these situations are: the initial position stated by Germany (dependent by Russian fuel) as reaction to Russian Federation actions in Ukraine, the negotiation of bonds in the EU Bank Union and the national law related to the capital market in the United Kingdom of Great Britain.

Dynamic, complex and irregular changes suffered by the global geopolitics because of the economic development and extension of political

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influence of some Eastern states as China, India and Russia, in the detriment of US lead to the world multi-polarization and reconsideration of the balance of power. Thus, it appears a global instability phenomenon also damaging European states and concomitantly generating pressures over the national governments to reform their public systems but also other the world states to reconsider the international relations system.

The critical infrastructures represent sensitive issue in the increasingly cyber-world. Their protection is harder to provide as they grow in importance and get large ratio of interconnectivity and complexity. World Economic Forum specialists state there is needed a “new manner to think over the global government of Internet”\(^1\) aimed to avoid a “Cybergeddon”\(^2\). The informational systems used in activities to finance economies, to procure vital resources necessary for individuals and societies’ survival, to provide health for humans or to fuel with energy, as well as the systems to ease the communications and transportation, and also the ones to preserve the surrounding environment are getting more and more complex and interdependent and they must be secured in a certain manner to become global stability and security elements invulnerable to transnational risks and threats.

Among the threats against European security.

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<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>1,731,100</td>
<td>1,811,300</td>
<td>1,750,600</td>
<td>1,693,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>346,216</td>
<td>404,055</td>
<td>489,422</td>
<td>592,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>566,514</td>
<td>590,950</td>
<td>566,044</td>
<td>498,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>442,940</td>
<td>458,856</td>
<td>385,793</td>
<td>350,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>296,970</td>
<td>307,111</td>
<td>319,816</td>
<td>327,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>392,962</td>
<td>360,705</td>
<td>371,331</td>
<td>304,053</td>
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Therefore, immigration is a problem included in the European security agenda because of recent and potential consequences it has and might have over the social dimension of security nevertheless on medium and long term the migration rate as report of both its dimensions, immigration and emigration has direct impact on the decision right of population, its ethnical and racial components, public culture, social security, jobs on the labour market and public order.

On one hand, the immigration phenomenon presents factors possible to generate belligerency including military risks “irredentist activities of immigrants wishing to damage the political process in their origin countries, conflicts imported by immigrants groups leading to violence in the host-country, terrorist activities and political initiatives of the host-country to stop


\(^2\) Ibidem.

by military intervention the flow of immigrants in the provider countries.4

On the other hand, emigration presents accentuated risks in economic, demographic and social terms for the East European states that are main source of emigration to West. Among them there are: diminution or decline of economic growth rhythm as consequence of decrease of active and able to work population, aging of autochthonous population and decrease of fertility rate and birth rate and as well as particular social impact over the dismantled families of migrants.5

Another risk derived of the globalization process damaging the European continent security and inducing instability in the international plan is the organized crime. Particularly, the activity of Balkans’ criminal organizations raises worries in the international community.

For 2014, the main global risks identified and scaled in regard to the level of interest expressed by the international community, their probability of occurrence, their potential impact and their interconnection level, are represented in Table no. 2.

Table no. 2: Ten most worrying global risks in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Global risk</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fiscal crises in key economies</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>High structural unemployment/sub-occupation on labour market</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Potable water crisis</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Severe disparities in revenue matter</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Failure or non-adaptation to the need to attenuate the aftermaths of climate change</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The increased occurrence of extreme meteorological events (for example, floods, storms, fires)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>National governments failure in the global plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Global food crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>De-structuring of an important financial mechanism or institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Deep political and social instability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


For example, if we refer to some of the global risks affecting the European continent, the economic-financial crisis triggered in 2008, the economists sustain that actually it was not ended but it just pasted some phases. Moreover, the last financial information show that US, key-economy of the world, presently risks a fiscal crisis and therefore their debts will overlap their GDP in 25 years, and this can mean but the propagation of the American crisis in the global plan, implicitly in Europe. Although, the disparities registered in matter of revenues and living conditions between the rich and poor people represents potential source of conflict globally and regionally in Europe, as well as a possible failure of national government in global plan that can create chaos in all the world social systems.

Among the factors generator of indirect belligerency there is the de-structuring of an important financial mechanism or institution able to damage the European continent. For example, actually, the Eurozone crisis is the most popular topic debated by Europeans, many of the citizens accusing the European authorities of delays and deficient communication and unfortunately problems as generalized unemployment and economic recession support this perspective.

An expert of Peterson Institute for International Economy wrote in 2012 “an exist of Greece from Eurozone would not be just a devaluation for Greece, but will also trigger a domino effect over the international banks disturbing the payment mechanism in the Eurozone and the most of its effect can be its disintegration”, thus the future scenario is not very shiny as it can bring economic chaos in Europe and not only here.

2. Current complex crises and conflicts effecting over the European region

In the international environment is resented more than ever an accelerated dynamic of transforming evolutions, particularly following the multitude of non-state actors with different influences and interests appearing on the international scene and exercising their power by fuelling conflicts and tensions all over the world, including on the old continent.

Some of the crises that recently triggered conflict on the European continent there are economic-financial crisis started in 2008, recrudescence of terrorist phenomenon and the expansionist policy of Russian Federation with the infringement of Ukraine sovereignty.

The economic-financial crisis burst in 2008 and damaged all the world states generating economic recession, instability and belligerency. In January 2012, Standard and Poor’s (S&P) Agency retrograded many states of the Eurozone and the most of it suffered the ratings of France, Austria, Spain, Italy, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus and Portugal. This decision’s consequences came with shortcomings for the mentioned countries and implicitly for the Eurozone and the whole European Union. In this context, at the end of 2013, the European Union lost S&P top credit rating and that lead to the deterioration of the 28th organization’s member states reliability. The crisis effects are still going.

The present effervescence of the terrorist actions because of religious extremism in Syria and Irak already provoked direct and indirect consequences on the global level. Thus in the area there are two Jihad movements (Al-Qaida and Islamic State) born from the same ideology of Islamic religious extremism but which although have chosen different means of manifestations aim the same goal, to create an Islamic Caliphate. Far from limiting to Iraq and Syria, the global aspirations of Islamic Caliphate risk to become serious threat for all the regimes in the region but also for the occidental community. The direct effects were the attacks at the beginning of 2015, which took place in France against the employments of “Charlie Hebdo” publication and against the building of a printing house and ended with 17 dead people claimed by Al-Qaida (Yemen) as well as the potential attempts over the police forces foreclosed in Belgium by a wide antiterrorist operation, facts followed by the increase of terrorist alert level in the majority of the states on the territories where such attempts existed (France, United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, etc.), moreover when some informal sources spread the idea “there are 20 «latent» cells prepared to attack in the main European countries”.

In the same context of belligerency phases undertaken since February 2014 since present, the crisis in Ukraine under the push of Russia Federation involvement evolved dramatically. Initially, it was generated and developed by the previous discontent expressed by the popular masses regarding the political decisions and the scission of population’s political orientations. A part of the population gambles on an occidental

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future (by integration in European structures), and the other part gambles on a Russian future (by returning to the status as geopolitical pivot to support the Russia Federation). Thus, nowadays, on Ukraine territory, in the South and East regions with pro-Russian population is ongoing a hybrid war lead by traditional and also asymmetrical means and this increases each day its complexity.

In the Cold War, the Russian Federation was an insecurity factor for Europe that increased lately by its aggressive and illegitimate military actions toward the securitization of its Euro-Asian flank, to the geographical limit with the European states and former satellites, by military interventions in Georgia and Ukraine. Therefore, the Russian geopolitical actor with imperialist trends represents a hot spot on the recent occidental security agenda, by the effect it diffuses and generating instability, uncertainty and insecurity to the European and global level.

Largely, specialists said that was reach to such wide crisis following the interventionist and expansive policy promoted by the Russian Federation, therefore being generated major effects propagated in the regional and global security environment, affecting different fields of social life (economic, military, political, diplomatic, societal, etc.). Annalist Zbigniew Brzezinski affirmed in one of his most important works: “… Russia cannot be in Europe without Ukraine, while Ukraine can be in Europe without Russia”\(^{10}\). We tend to agree Brzezinski once it is obvious that the Russian president by his policies executed in all the social life fields tries to rebuild the Russian influence in the geopolitical space of the former USSR territory, to restore Russia to its statute as great global power and to promote this Russian civilization identity reaffirmed on the international agenda. For this purpose, Putin uses all the political, economic, diplomatic, imgologic and military he disposes of in order to reach his so-called “imperialist” goal.

3. Major complex effects of Ukrainian crisis

In the attempt to achieve a very comprehensive and coherent grid of qualitative and also quantitative indicators by which to present the complex dimensions of Ukrainian crisis we started from the premises this characteristic of complexity we wish to emphasize in the crises modelling is reflected in at least one of the phases of its evolvement – the crisis itself phase wherein the interactions of European security system are maximum and the separated actions have repercussions against all the security dimensions of the whole system in terms of recent registered effects.

In the first phase of work, we delimited the successive escalation and de-escalation periods of Ukrainian crisis following some generator factors (as will be previously presented in tables constructed inside the paper) or attenuation factors (the both agreements for ceasefire) and achieving the sinusoidal construction of Ukrainian crisis evolvement considering as main axes: violence intensity (from peacetime, to the armed conflict time) and the evolution in time (from the moment of Maidan movement initiation – February 15, 2015 – until the moment of paper’s finalization – April 15, 2015).

In the recent undergoing crisis there are ongoing a series of serious events challenging complex effects on the European security field. Under this context, in order to quantify the Ukrainian crisis complexity we consider as essential indicators: its generator types and factors from which it result combined types of generated complex effects; the intensity ratio of the process they accompany; the diversity of actors and variables of scenarios; damaged structures and systems; incompatibilities between the component elements of the crisis.

Complexity paradigm uses systemic analyses in order to build unclear, multivalent, multilevel and multidisciplinary representations of reality\(^{11}\). One of these types of analyses is specific to study

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causal complexity\textsuperscript{12} used in researches oriented on case studies.

We will also use a similar but not identical approach because this type of analysis serves to our research goal, to analyze the case study, respective the Ukrainian crisis, in the framework of complexity paradigm. The similarity of approach consist in the identification of some patterns, occurrences of the generator factors and factual evolutions until a given moment in the Ukrainian security subsystem framework comparatively with the evolutions of the tensions in the Republic of Moldavia security subsystem in order to identify the output of an possible happening crisis in it. The difference in approach consist in the settlement of a fictive but not improbable input of a similar intervention of the Russian Federation on this ex-soviet territory (as element of uncertainty specific for complexity paradigm).

Therefore, in this study case, we detailed grounded on the black box model (in terms of input – black box – output)\textsuperscript{13}, the indicator of generator factors and generated effects in the context of Ukrainian crisis undergoing and the settlement of some relations among certain predictable situations and collateral (unintentional) generated effects. Thus, we start from an analysis of linear bases in order to identify some nonlinearity situations.

Generally, the different nature misbalances and uncertainty generate crisis of different nature, intensities and length. Some crises, as they are triggered, have the potential to damage the international environment on wider or narrower areas (internal, regional – transnational or global crises), manifesting on one or many dimensions of security. Peculiarly, the factors generator of crisis and major military conflicts in their complexity and diversity can be:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Political (inadequate political decisions, extremist and radical movements, classic wars, military conflicts, civil wars, secessionist or segregationist movements, disintegration of some states, existence of some stateless nations, creation of groups hostile to the state, some states’ collapse, totalitarian political regimes, lost of
\end{itemize}

Thus, “the constitution and structure of the box are totally lacked of relevance because these are purely external or phenomenological. By all means, only system’s behavior will be counted”. See largely: Mario Bunge, „A general black-box theory”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol.30, No. 4, JSTOR, 1963, pp. 346-358.


\textsuperscript{13} Black box is an abstraction representing a class of concrete open systems which can be visualized only in terms of “its stimuli as inputs” and “its reactions as output”.

\textbf{Figure no. 1:} Ukrainian crisis evolvement
population trust in governments, fragmentation, internal and external instability, some states’ ambitions, frontiers’ permeability, etc.);  

- Diplomatic (interstate tensions, withdrawal of embassies, lack of political dialogue, infringement of international law, foreign interventions, states nonrecognition, territorial disputes in vicinity, co-sovereignty on some territories, etc.);  

- Economic (precarious conditions of living, endemic poverty, economic sanctions and embargoes imposed to some states infringing the international law, the growth of gaps between the rich and poor states, the irrational use of resources, lack or limitation of the access to vital resources – water, energy, food, monopolies on some vital resources, spread of phenomena as money laundering and corruption, etc.);  

- Social (differentiated and discriminatory policies for different categories of population, intolerance, ethnic-religious conflicts, infringements of human and citizen’s rights, networks of arms, forbidden substances or persons trafficking, illegal immigration, discontent of population, organized crime, subordination to some parties organized on ethnic criteria, etc.);  

- Financial (unemployment, lack of revenues, accentuated budgetary deficits, generalized black market, poverty, etc.):  

- Military (the use or threat to use the armed force, diversification of military means, propagation of asymmetrical actions, allocation of some large amounts of money to the military budgets, owning or producing the nuclear weapon, installation of anti-missile shield, disparities of military potential between the states, increase of the ratio of undergoing conflicts’ recrudescence, the missing from control of arm and CBRN means commerce, etc.);  

- Informational (CIS vulnerabilities of some complex systems, disinformation, informatics attacks over the critical infrastructures, social networks collecting personal data, etc.);  

- Communicational (lack of state’s communication to the public opinion, poor securitization of governmental communications, censure, manipulation, etc.);  

- Technological (excessive amounts of armament, increasingly sophisticated weapons, nuclear plants, genetic engineering applied in hostile goals, etc.);  

- Biological (degenerative and incurable diseases – AIDS, Ebola, tuberculosis, etc., natural genetic mutations and genetically modified organisms (GMO) as basis to generate food for population, etc.);  

- Psychological (uncertainty, terror, insecurity, psychosis, stress, genre, race, class enmity, etc.);  

- Ecological factor that determine the decay of surrounding environment (natural – abundant rains, cataclysms, storms and hurricanes, excessive snow, frosts, desertification, etc. -) or human – terrorism, WMD, excessive pollution, ozone layer destruction, etc.).

Internal factors generator of the Ukrainian crisis by Russian Federation and international community involvement were exacerbated afterwards and became reasons for conflict escalation, as it was previously shown in Figure no. 1, as certain events lead to the growth or diminution of violence intensity (e.g. the three agreements to cease fire in September 5, 2014 February 15, 2015 and April 13-14, 2015).

Considering the factors generator of crisis and armed conflict in their overall diversity and complexity, we have elaborated Table no 3.

From the analysis of the factors identified as generators of the crisis in Ukraine, we can conclude the nascent state of conflict reached the stage of confrontation because of factors such as heightened socio-political split amid pro-Western and pro-Russian options of the population.

Afterward, on the background of lack of firm political will to the governmental level and other factors catalystising the belligerency as: uncertain social situation of Ukrainian population following some negative phenomena as generalized corruption, presence of oligarchs involved in politics who by assigned policies aim their own interests and not the national interests, added to the increased criminality and Russian diplomatic pressures to reframe Ukraine in its area of influence, the uncertainty and insecurity state of Ukrainian nation is emphasized. Thus, we reach to a cumulus of factors generator of crisis weighing one each over and expand them and take complex forms and afterwards combined to other complexity elements (actors and interests diversity in the region, the geostrategic stake
### Table no. 3: Typology of factors generator of Ukrainian crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of factors generator of complex crises</th>
<th>Factors generator of Ukrainian crisis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Political                                  | - Generalized corruption to the Ukrainian political level;  
- Existence of great oligarchs involved in Ukrainian policy;  
- Anti-governmental protests initiated in 2013 following the abrogation of law allowing the use of some minorities languages as official languages in regional plan;  
- Populations from south and east of Ukraine split among the pro-Russian and Pro-Occidental policies;  
- Lack of trust in the government existent to the moment of crisis initiation;  
- Undertaking Crimea peninsula following the referendum organized along the majority pro-Russian population and the repeated infringements of Ukraine sovereignty by using pro-Russian military and paramilitary instruments;  
- Legitimacy crisis generated by Russian Federation actions despite the norms of international law. |
| Diplomatic                                 | - Initial failure of the Russian Federation to re-include Ukraine in its sphere of influence, against the main trend of orientating toward the EU integration (once with the subscription to the EU Agreement with the EU in 2013 and the refusal to participate in the newly created Euro-Asian Economic Union);  
- The lack of efficient reaction of the Westerners after the Crimea taking-over by the Russian Federation;  
- The lack of a “common voice” of the EU. |
| Economic                                   | - signing the EU Agreement of Association by Ukraine, Georgia and Republic of Moldavia;  
- The unpaid debt of Ukraine to the Russian Federation;  
- The Russian Federation use of energetic instrument as power lever;  
- Differences in matters of material revenues among the different social classes. |
| Social                                     | - High criminality;  
- Differences in matters of material revenues among the different social classes;  
- Repeated shut-down of gas delivery to the Ukrainian population that raised discontent of those; |
| Financial                                  | - Ukraine unpaid debt to the Russian Federation;  
- Signing by Ukraine of a concession agreement for the exploitation of a gas perimeter in NV of the Black Sea. |
| Military                                   | - The Russian military intervention with 20,000 troops in Crimea;  
- Open conflict between the pro-Russian separatist movements and the Ukrainian military forces;  
- Station of Russian troops to the border with Ukraine;  
- Continuation of bombardments in the town of Debaltsevo, by the separatists following the signing of the second agreement to cease fire. |
| Informational | - By the use of informational and media instruments was aimed the psychological coercion of the public opinion regarding the Russian Federation legitimacy*;  
- Separatists stopped Ukrainian television and radio channels in Donbas, replacing them with Russian channels. |
| Communicational | - The motivation of Ukrainian annexation by the people’s will and historical justice offered the opening of “Pandora box” for other secessionist movements in Europe;  
- Kremlin declarations to promote some laws to facilitate the obtaining of Russian citizenship by the people “speaking fluently Russian language or had lived in USSR”**. |
| Biological | - There were not identified. |
| Psychological | - The use of human shields to disguise the separatists’ military operations;  
- The use in the Russian speech of the idea of “brotherhood”, Slavic family of Russians and Ukrainians. |
| Ecological | - There were not identified. |
| Technological | - since 2010, the Ukrainian informatics systems were targeted by “Snake” malwares***;  
- Accelerated arming of the Russian Federation. |
| Geopolitical | - Ethnical, political, social, religious and linguistic dividing of population;  
- Geostrategic position held by Ukraine in its quality as “bridge-head” and “buffer zone” between Occident and Orient.  
- The imperialist wishes of the Russian Federation and the will to regain its influence in the former soviet territories. |

* The Russian justifications of psychological nature brought to support the Crimea Peninsula up-taking were multiple and the most important were as follows “Crimea reunification and the glorious Russian city of Sevastopol with the Mother Russia” or “the injustice of Crimea annexation to SSR Ukrainian in 1954”. See in details: Valery Kravchenko, Psychological aspects of “hybrid war” between Russia and Ukraine, available online at: https://www.academia.edu/7342730/Psychological_aspects_of_hybrid_war_between_Russia_and_Ukraine, accessed on 13.02.2015.
*** Sam Jones, Ukraine: Russia’s new art of war, August 28, 2014, available online at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/ea5e82fa-2e0c-11e4-b760-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3RctYxH7B, accessed on 11.02.2015.

represented by Ukraine for East and West, the threat against the international law norms, etc.) corroborated with the use of some forms and means of hybrid war, thus complex, to lead to the continue metamorphosis of the crisis and this makes it hard to manage.

Initial generator factors of the Ukrainian crisis provoked a domino effect and become their turn determinant causes for new effects. Thus, internal causes of the Ukrainian security sub-system generated a linear effect.

Afterwards, by the involvement of the Russian Federation and the occidental community, the internal factors generator of Ukrainian crisis exacerbated and suffered mutations by internationalization and this created new motivations for the both parties actions (the pro-Russian Ukrainians feel they are supported by “Mother Russia”, considering their nationality gives legitimacy to their fight, and the pro-Europeans see support in the sanctions applied to the Russian Federation and the Western community reactions and they also feel the legitimacy of their own acts) and this lead to the escalation of conflict. In Figure 1, there are shown the variations of conflict’s intensity in the temporal evolution of the crisis and are emphasized the violence de-escalation moments
(when the agreements to stop the fire were signed in September 5, 2014, February 15, 2015 and April 13-14, 2015). Thus, afterwards, by the external actions of the Russian Federation and the international community reactions, the internal crisis amplified and ramified becoming itself a dynamic system with nonlinear evolution (non-cause and effect) with interactive components connected to the external environment. These features, of nonlinearity, interactivity of the elements and connection of external environment are the preconditions of adaptive complex systems’ existence\textsuperscript{14}. Security systems are adaptive complex systems themselves (component parts of the international security system) and therefore are also called “security complexes”. The Ukrainian security subsystem is component of the European security complex (system), although Ukraine is not EU or NATO member state. Once with the illegitimate actions of the Russian Federation of international law infringement, the Ukrainian crisis got more complexity and acquired new nuances because in complex systems any minor disturbance came from exterior or from one of the actors involved can lead to major adjustments, inclusive capable to shape the system’s structure but also its external environment, characteristic so-called co-evolution. Thus, the dynamic environment of European security facilitated the acceleration of actions achieved by the actors involved who by mutual interaction influenced one each over and transformed. Nowadays, the Russian Federation sees a clear threat against its security in the actions fulfilled by NATO to install the anti-missile shield to protect the organization’s member states, the European states attitude as a whole became sceptical and cautious, and this was shown in the crescent trend of defence budget and speeches on the reintroduction of compulsory military service, particularly in the states situated in the South-Eastern flank of NATO/EU. Nevertheless, some actions initiated in the crisis framework were predictable, thus linear and with direct similar effects. An example is Russian Federation’s use of the energetic instrument as power leverage by repeatedly surcease of gas delivery to Ukraine, which triggered reaction from USA, the EU member states and Canada, that answered with sanctions against the Russia, with serious repercussions over its economy and not aply. This situation was the result of affecting the European states fuelling with energetic resources, chain in which the Ukrainian pipelines have essential role and the Russian pressures on the political decision-makers and Ukrainian population have direct effect over the European energetic policy. Unpredictability appeared as 2\textsuperscript{nd} generation and 3\textsuperscript{rd} generation (indirect) effects, one of them is the fact that the Canadian armed forces decided to send, until 2017, an echelon of soldiers in a training mission of the Ukrainian troops from West of the country\textsuperscript{15}. There appeared new geopolitical actor (new information) involving in the European security system: Canada, the 14\textsuperscript{th} military force of the globe\textsuperscript{16}, another characteristic of evolution of adaptive complex systems – feedback, as reaction to the continuation of illegitimate actions of the Russian Federation, and this fact will probably influence the behaviour of all the European subsystem supporting the pro-European orientation of Ukraine, materializing in more trust in the initiatives taken until present and more courage for future actions.

But there are also a series of different types of factors generating different series of types of effects and this gives complexity to the Ukrainian crisis. Some of the complex effects and relations of determination identified between them are included in Table no. 4.

Thus, from an intern crisis, with chances to be solved and negotiated characterized by


Table no. 4: Complex typology of effects generated by the Ukrainian crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of generated complex effects</th>
<th>Complex effects generated by the Ukrainian crisis over the European security environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>- Creation of “New Russia” movement (November 2014).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political-diplomatic</td>
<td>- Tensions in the relations between Occident and Russian Federation materialized in economic sanctions and hostile declaration by the both sides;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Triggering the East-West relational crisis;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Destabilization of regional security environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political-military</td>
<td>- Confrontation between pro-Russian and Pro-Ukrainian groups of population;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Institution of emergency situation in Donetzk and Lugansk separatist regions;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Declaration of Russian Federation as “aggressor state” by the Ukrainian parliament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political-social</td>
<td>- Diminution of Euro-Atlantic trend and Europeanism attractiveness along the Eastern European states non-integrated in EU and NATO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geopolitical</td>
<td>- Tensions in the relations between European states generated by the energetic dependence particularly of Germany in relation to Russian Federation;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Tensions between USA – EU member states;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Interdictions of visa for some Russian citizens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
<td>- Signing three agreements to cease fire, the first in Sept. 5, 2014, that was respected only 5 days, the second was acted since Feb. 15, 2015 and the third, signed on Apr. 14, 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic-economic</td>
<td>- Contradiction between the affirmation of the Russian Federation that the total debt of Ukraine is about 25 billions dollars, and of the Ukrainian minister of finance stating this is about 4.728 billions dollars*;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Elimination of the Russian Federation from G8;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Russian threat to restrict or total forbiddance of cross-country for occidental airships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>- Threat of European economies with an accentuated crisis defined by the Russian gas crisis;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Diminution of price to fuels for a brief period of time;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Renegotiation of contracts to supply the Russian gases with the European states (e.g., with Ukraine, Hungary).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic-financial</td>
<td>- Withdrawal of some important European and American companies from the Russian market;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Destabilization and then collapse of Ukraine’s economy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political-economic</td>
<td>- Sanctions imposed by EU, USA and Canada;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Necessity to find new solutions and ways of transportation for the gas necessary to the European states;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Signing some Russian-Chinese energetic agreements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political-social</td>
<td>- Requesting secession of ethnical bases by the pro-Russian population from the South and East of Ukraine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic-social</td>
<td>- Exodus of 600,000** of people from the affected areas, from which 400,000 toward the Russian Federation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>- Collapse of the social system of pensions and assurances in the areas damaged by conflict;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- damaging the living conditions of region’s population.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### POLITICAL-MILITARY TOPICALITY

| Financial          | - Freezing the fortunes of some Russians and pro-Russian Ukrainians responsible for the crisis;  
                      - Withdrawal of foreign banks and foreign investments from the Russian market;  
                      - Sanctions adopted by EU against some individuals and organizations involved in the support of Russian troops deployment in Ukraine;  
                      - Decrease of Russian gas price that drawn the collapse of the Russian economy. |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Military           | - Military conflict in its newest form – hybrid war incorporating a series of elements specific for the traditional and asymmetric military conflict (insurgent, terrorist actions, involvement of paramilitary forces, etc.);  
                      - Loosing Ukrainian control to the border with the Russian Federation;  
                      - The announcement of Russian military exercises undergoing, some with CSTO partners. |
| Informational      | - Launch of an informational and media war.                                                                                   |
| Communicational-informational | - Disinformation and mass propaganda damaging whole Europe.                                                                 |
| Socio-biological   | - More than 5,550 deaths in 10 months***;  
                      - 12,972 wounded persons*****                                                                                               |
| Psychological      | - Creation of an uncertainty, fear feeling for the East-European citizens regarding eventual infringements of their borders;  
                      - Manipulation of the public opinion.                                                                                       |
| Psychological-social | - Lowering of trust level in democracies and prosperity offered by the European states.                                      |
| Ecological-biological | - Destructions produced by bombardments.                                                                                       |
| Technological-military | - Projecting the instalment of a command centre and zone commandment of NATO on the Romanian territory;  
                        - instalment of some units to integrate NATO forces as some multinational command and control structures on the territories of Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania since 2016*****. |
| Geopolitical       | - Taking-over the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation with the use of military force;  
                      - Damaging the territorial integrity of Ukraine and threatening with the damage of territorial integrity of other European states;  
                      - Increase of regional and global belligerency;  
                      - Reconsideration of classical security paradigm;  
                      - Realignment of power relations.                                                                                         |


** STRATEGIC IMPACT No. 1/2015**
linearity in evolution, following the Russian interventionist action in Crimea (surprise element that constituted the crossing line from combined to complex of the crisis), benefiting from the referendum pro-secession organized by the majority Russian population of the peninsula and sending troops on the Ukrainian territory and such infringing the essential norms of international law related to territorial integrity and sovereignty of a state recognized by the international community, the situation got out of control and rapidly degenerated into an open conflict lead between pro-Russian and Ukrainian pro-European forces. Therefore, the situation came to an escalation of the conflict, and the specialists used the idea of civil war which forced about 600,000 citizens to desert their houses and to go in exodus.

Afterwards, the crisis got worse and took the form of an hybrid war (about that, there are voices, considering that, has as direct opponents NATO and the Russian Federation and is lead by proxies and resulted, as Washington Post stated until April 14, 2015, more than 6,000 deaths and more than 13,000 wounded Ukrainian soldiers, separatist but, utmost, civilians.

So we see this crisis is actually geopolitical, and this is emphasized by its effects: the damage of a certain status-quo and deterioration of balance state; perception of the phenomenon as simultaneous or successive ensemble of threats, dangers, risks; relative character of crisis evolution; addressability to the strategic respective geopolitical management and the need of some main decisions to stop the course of the crisis and to end its consequences. Under

17 For example, prof. David Mandel, speaking about Russia and NATO roles in the Ukrainian civil war, see: David Mandel, The Role of Russia and NATO in Ukraine’s Civil War, October 3, 2014, available online at: http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=12324, accessed on 12.02.2015.


19 Inna Varenytsia, Fighting in eastern Ukraine rages on overnight despite talks, April 14, 2015, available online at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/fighting-in-eastern-ukraine-rages-on-overnight-despite-talks/2015/04/14/0a8f6280-e319-11e4-ae0f-f8c46a8c3a4_story.html?, accessed on 14.04.2015.

this context, the geopolitical crisis represents the temporary or permanent alteration of relations between geopolitical actors, respectively Westerners and the Russian Federation, leading to the disturbance of “power balance” in the area of European security system and to the change of power relations among them. The reasons of this geopolitical crisis are found in the field of existence and manifestation of recent divergent interests of the geopolitical actors from the same security system that gets more vulnerable.

Once with the first agreement to cease fire, the changes for the security level to increase should have been growing for Ukraine and Europe. Thus, “Minsk 1” agreement was signed on September 5, 2014 but it last only 5 days because the crisis re-escalated and the violence between the Ukrainian armed forces and the pro-Russian rebels intensified. The hostilities continued because of the separatists discontented by the limited autonomy statute proposed to the negotiations for the both provinces dwelled by pro-Russian population. New economic sanctions against Russia followed and those got more fragile the European security environment.

“Minsk 2” peace negotiations marathon took place on February 12, 2015, between the leaders of Russian Federation, Ukraine, France and Germany, lead to a new agreement of cease fire for the East of Ukraine that should enter into force in February 15, 2015. The discussions were focused on the provision of a cease fire, withdrawal of the heavy armament and the creation on a demilitarized area. Although the Russian Federation was present to the negotiations, consequently, 50 Russian tanks entered the Ukrainian frontiers. One of the essential perspectives of the negotiations were the Ukraine’s constitutional reform with the adoption of a new Constitution until the end of the 2015 year to include the administrative
decentralization of Doneţk and Lugansk regions and the adoption of a special permanent statute for these. We consider that the solution found to the respective agreement of cease fire, the administrative decentralization of the conflict areas and probable the following federalization represent the exact intentions of the Russian Federation for Ukraine in the moment of it interference in Ukrainian intern policy.

The third peace agreement was signed on April 13, 2015, but even on the times of negotiations the number of victims registered was larger than the number of all period since the signing of “Minsk 2” in February until that moment. In our perspective, even in the context the Russian Federation agrees the agenda presented in the framework of fire cessation and will consequently react, at present, the Russian separatists are kind of out from Kremlin’s control and are passing through a sort of inertia of conflict fuelled by the impotence to act of the regional security organizations and this hardens the transgression from a viable phase of de-escalation of a geopolitical crisis generate and diffused from state level toward the international security environment and the creation of the pre-conditions to install a new satisfactory status-quo for all the involved parties.

At present, another very worrying element is the collapse of the Russian economy that has the potential to also bring on other states of the Eastern Europe that have close economic relation with the Russian Federation (Poland or Ukraine, for example). Other way to damage the European democracies is also the interruption of Russian gas supply used to support many European states’ economies. Also, the continuation of sanctions against Russia should be done with moderation because none European or neither continent’s state wishes for an instable and aggressive Russia to manifest in the international policy and therefore there should be looked for viable means of cooperation and dialogue to lead to the peace and stability re-instalment and the re-settlement of diplomatic relations in a proper format for all the damaged parties.

22 Inna Varenytsia, art. cit.

Conclusions

The complexity of the Ukraine crisis is given by the diversity of the involved actors, diversity of convergent and divergent interests of them, the multitude of national and international security dimensions damaged by the crisis, but also the wide range of generator factors, mutually conditioning and generating different types of combined and complex effects.

The way the component elements of the crisis relate on different phases of its belligerency evolution, correlated to the complexity paradigm principles (that presume different and more complex parts to be interconnected as a whole), which were the object of the analysis presented in Tables no. 3 and 4 included in the content of the present paper) diverse generator factors and complex effects as different generated elements are inter-conditioned) grant the complexity feature to the Ukrainian crisis. Also, generator factors of one or more types resulted in different types’ complex effects. For example, the initial general factor – the cleavage of population from South and East of Ukraine between the pro-Russian and pro-Occidental policy – is of political-social type, generating along immediate political and social effects (confrontation between pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian groups of population and request of secession of ethnical basis by the pro-Russian population in South and East of Ukraine) and economic effects (destabilizing the economy of Ukraine) and geopolitical (growth of regional and global belligerency).

Furthermore, because of the Russian Federation involvement in the intra-national conflict, the situation got more complex, as an international dimension was added to it. Thus, as a result of a cascade evolution of political factors that transformed themselves step by step from effects to causes of new effects (for example, the up-taking of Crimea Peninsula following Russian Federation actions breaching the rules of international law became a reason for generating a legitimacy crisis that ended with the triggering a East-West relational crisis (political effect) but also the apparition of an insecurity, fear feeling
for the East-European citizens regarding potential infringements of their frontiers (psychological effect). The latter generated in turn a new series of different types of complex effects: decrease of Euro-Atlantic and Europeanism trends attractiveness for the East European states non-integrated in EU or NATO (political effect); tensions among the relations between Westerners and Russian Federation materialized in economic sanctions and hostile declarations on the both sides (diplomatic effect); elimination from G8 of the Russian Federation (diplomatic and economic effect); withdrawal of some important European and American companies from the Russian market (economic effect); undergoing of a military conflict in its newest form – hybrid war incorporating a series of elements specific for the traditional military conflict as well as for asymmetric conflict (military effect), etc.

There can be seen from the drawn tables in the content of this paper that from simple factors as the cleavage of population from South and East of Ukraine between the pro-Russian and pro-West policies there resulted complex effects as direct consequence of the apparition of a factor of enhanced instability – the intricacy of the Russian Federation in the national policy of a neighbour state, infringing international laws. Moreover, factors generating crisis as biological and ecological were not identified, but there were registered effects in the biological and ecological plans.

Considering crisis on its phases of development, we can see that in successive periods of escalation and de-escalation there resulted a series of complex effects by their nature: variable intensity (to the same stimuli, there were produced different intensity reactions), the diverse number and types of the actors affected by the Ukrainian crisis. The complex nature of the registered effects of the Ukrainian crisis result from their interconnection to the European security system which they influences directly, as the Ukrainian security system is a component part interconnected to the European system.

From both drafted tables, containing some of the factors generator of crisis and the resulted effects, we can observe that from political, economic, diplomatic, social, financial, military, informational, communicational, psychological, etc. factors, which seemed very well delimited in their categories, there resulted effects with dual natures (political-diplomatic, political-military, political-social, economic-social, economic-financial, psychological-social, technological-military as well as geopolitical), which actually represent complex resultants of the generator factors combined with the individual or dual generated effects. Thus, the majority of the generated effects cannot be strictly framed in a category or their generation area for that type of effect to be very well defined, but also other effects able to derive from them and this shows the increase of uncertainty and risk ratio in relation to crisis evolution, therefore a growth of Ukrainian crisis complexity and implicitly the increase of complexity for the Ukrainian security subsystem, the European security system and the global system meta-system.

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Acknowledgement

This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/138822 with the title “Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of Military Science, Security and Intelligence, Public order and National Security – Continuous formation programme for elite researchers - “SmartSPODAS”.”
MISSILE DEFENCE IN ROMANIA – IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY POLICY

Florentin-Gabriel GIUVARĂ*
Marius ŞERBESZKI, PhD**

This article addresses both the advantages and challenges brought by the existence of BMD (US EPAA) elements on the Romania’s territory. By using the DIME model and starting the research with three pertinent questions -- What are the main security gains brought by the existence of US EPAA on Romanian territory? What are the risks and challenges that expose Romania when deciding to host US EPAA at Deveselu Air Base? Is there a favorable balance between benefits and disadvantages? -- the article proves the fact that the US EPAA in Romania represents a major development in the broader context of security policy of Romania in NATO and EU, as well as in the complex security equation of the wider Black Sea Region. Besides the political-military advantages, the article identifies several social-economic advantages considering the investments in local infrastructure and public procurement and, at a national level, a significant increment of Romania’s ratings among risk analysis agencies thus ensuring a secure environment for future foreign investments. Nonetheless, the presence of the BMD elements on Romania’s territory will likely lead to an intensification and multiplication of the risks and challenges to its security. It is therefore very important to correctly assess the impact of the US EPAA site at Deveselu Air Base on Romania’s Security Policy.

Keywords: ballistic missile defence, security policy, Black Sea Region, US-Romania Strategic Partnership.

Introduction

“To put it simply, our new missile defense architecture in Europe will provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and America’s Allies. It is more comprehensive than the previous program; it deploys capabilities that are proven and cost-effective; it sustains and builds upon our commitment to protect the U.S. homeland against long-range ballistic missile threats; and it ensures and enhances the protection of all our NATO Allies.”

US President Barack Obama, September 17, 2009

At the NATO Summit in Lisbon, in 2010, NATO’s leaders adopted the historical decision to develop a ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability able “to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles.” Most likely, the decision was encouraged by the United States’ offer to provide the lion’s share of

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capabilities – in terms of sensors and interceptors – through its European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). But the U.S. made clear that it expects the Alliance to contribute to common BMD efforts. In this respect, Romania signed on 13 September 2011 the “Agreement between Romania and the United States of America on the Deployment of the United States Ballistic Missile Defense System in Romania”. The document -- entered into force on 23 December 2011 -- has called for the establishment and operation of a U.S. land-based SM-3 BMD system (Aegis Ashore System) at Deveselu Air Base, the confirmed selection for Phase II of U.S. EPAA initiative.

With the upcoming implementation and operationalization of BMD elements in its territory, by 2015, Romania will most probably enjoy the highest degree of protection against air threats ever granted. This result of the strategic partnership with the United States of America, associated with Romania’s NATO and EU membership will offer the opportunity to enhance the role of this country as security provider in the Black Sea Region as well as its status among the member states of NATO and EU organizations. However, the presence of these BMD elements on Romania’s territory, will likely lead to an intensification and multiplication of the risk and challenges to its security. It is therefore very important to assess the impact on Romanian Security Policy of the planned U.S. EPAA site at Deveselu Air Base.

1. Importance of US EPAA site in Romania from the security perspective

Security is far from enjoying a worldwide common definition. Essentially, there are two approaches to define security. The first relates to the status of actors (individuals, organizations, nations) and defines security as representing the absence of threats to the existence of actors. The second one considers the threats and defines security as maintaining risks and vulnerabilities at an acceptable limit. 3 We will adopt the same approach.

2 There were four phases of the EPAA to be implemented: • Phase I (2011 timeframe) addresses short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats by deploying current and proven missile defense systems. It calls for the deployment of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)-capable ships equipped with proven SM-3 Block IA interceptors. In March 2011, the USS Monterey was the first in a sustained rotation of ships to deploy to the Mediterranean Sea in support of EPAA. Phase I also calls for deploying a land-based early warning radar, which Turkey recently agreed to host as part of the NATO missile defense plan. • Phase II (2015 timeframe) will expand coverage against short- and medium-range threats with the fielding of a land-based SM-3 missile defense interceptor site in Romania and the deployment of a more capable SM-3 interceptor (the Block IB). • Phase III (2018 timeframe) will improve coverage against medium- and intermediate-range missile threats with an additional land-based SM-3 site in Poland and the deployment of a more advanced SM-3 interceptor (the Block IIA). Poland agreed to host the interceptor site in October 2009, and with the Polish ratification process complete, this agreement has entered into force. • Phase IV (2020 timeframe) would have enhanced the ability to counter medium- and intermediate-range missiles and potential future inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) threats to the United States from the Middle East, through the deployment of the SM-3 Block IIB interceptor. Nevertheless, the EPAA Phase 4 experienced significant delays, in part due to the U.S. Congress underfunding of the interceptors. Therefore, the SM-3 IIB will no longer be developed or procured. Remarks by Frank A. Rose, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance on “Implementation of the European Phased Adaptive Approach,” at the Polish National Defense University, Warsaw, Poland (April 18, 2013), available from http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2013/207679.htm (accessed on October 23, 2013)

3 There is no uniform understanding of the delimitation of the Black Sea Region. From a strict geographical perspective, it defines the area’s bounding territories of the six states adjacent to the Black Sea: Russia or the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Georgia, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. A politico-economic approach also incorporates Moldova, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. In terms of practical cooperation NATO still tends to treat the wider Black Sea area as part of a broader region that includes the Caspian Sea region and Central Asia. Some also consider that a broader definition of the region should include the eastern Balkans, the Black Sea littorals, the Caucasus, and the Caspian Sea region, due to the intricate network of military, commercial, and demographic interactions and numerous other interrelationships linking this entire region. Ersan Bocutoğlu and Gökhan Koçer, “Politico-Economic Conflicts in the Black Sea Region in the Post-Cold War Era,” p.112, available from http://www.core-hamburg.de/documents/yearbook/english/06/BocutogluKocer-en.pdf (accessed on October 23, 2013)

4 For more details, see Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, “The Evolution of International Security Studies,” Cambridge
approach when analyzing Romania’s participation in the missile defense initiative. In fact, we consider that U.S. EPAA in Romania addresses two security conceptual questions: Against who (threat) and for whom (beneficiaries) it is directed? How is different the Obama’s EPAA initiative from previous approaches to BMD?

1.1. The threat

Nowadays, there is a growing threat posed by the proliferation of regional ballistic missiles in the Middle East. This threat is likely to increase both quantitatively and qualitatively in the coming years, as Iran is continuously improving its inventory with more precise and reliable ballistic missiles (Figure 1). According to the U.S. Intelligence Community, “Iran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and it is expanding the scale, reach, and sophistication of its ballistic missile forces, many of which are inherently capable of carrying a nuclear payload.” As depicted in Figure 2, Iran may already have the possibility to strike targets in Europe with medium-range ballistic missiles. Furthermore, there are various assessments stating that Iran will have ballistic missiles capable of targeting the United States in few years. In these circumstances, the NATO decision to strengthen the role of missile defense as an important deterrent, together with the U.S. EPAA initiative, represent salutary solutions to counter the ballistic missile threats, in spite of Russia’s concerns that EPAA might threaten its nuclear strategic capabilities.

1.2. The beneficiaries

The U.S. EPAA site at Deveselu Air Base is important for both the United States and Romanian security as this initiative has a dual role. Indeed, EPAA seeks to better protect both...

Figure no. 1: Iran’s Ballistic Missile Arsenal


Figure no. 2: Iran’s Medium- Range Ballistic Missile Sites and Ranges
Source: Steven A. Hildreth, “Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs,” December 6, 2012

Figure no. 3: European Phased Adaptive Approach – Phase II: Enhanced Medium-Range Missile Defense (2015 Timeframe)
American and Allied forces in Europe and in the Middle East theaters of operation as well as the U.S. and their European allies’ territories. It is a strictly defensive system, directed against no nation in particular but aiming to counter any potential attack with ballistic missiles that could be exerted to the European countries and ultimately to the U.S. homeland. When operationalized, by 2015, the U.S. EPAA site at Deveselu Air Base will enhance coverage of Southeastern NATO European territory – to include Romania – by providing an intercept capability (SM-3 block IB) against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (Figure 3). With the implementation of a more powerful and longer-range interceptor (SM-3 block IIB), by 2020, the BMD in Romania would have improved protection of the U.S. homeland against potential ICBMs launched from the Middle East (Figure 4).

Nevertheless, the EPAA Phase IV experienced significant delays, in part due to the U.S. Congress underfunding of the interceptors. Therefore, the SM-3 IIB will no longer be developed or procured.

**1.3. Obama’s European Phase Adaptive Approach**

Missile defense has always played an important role in the U.S. international security strategy and the Obama Administration made a key priority the international cooperation on missile defense. What differentiate EPAA from the initiative advanced by President Bush in early 2000s? The essential change between the two systems is that the Bush’s project was neither technically configured to meet short and medium term threats from the Middle East nor going to cover the entire NATO European territory. Instead, Obama’s approach presents some clear advantages as EPAA evolves to the extent that the threat grows and becomes operational faster than the previous version. It meets current threats and may incorporate faster and easier the new technologies as they continue to advance. It also balances the sharing of the costs of the BMD system with the European Allies and avoids a U.S. official and continuous engagement in the European defense. However, there is a question

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**Figure no. 4:** European Phased Adaptive Approach – Phase IV: Early Intercept of IRBM and ICBM (2020 Timeframe)


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whether EPAA provides little, if any, benefit to the defense of the U.S. homeland given Washington’s decision to cancel the EPAA Phase IV.\(^8\) One may say that Obama’s latest approach to missile defense has been designed to soothe Russian concerns raised by previous initiative of Bush Administration rather of real concern for ballistic missile threats from Iran.

2. Advantages for Romanian Security

From the security policy perspective, presence of U.S. EPAA in its territory will offer to Romania the opportunity to enhance its politico-military and socio-economic status in the Black Sea Region as well as among the NATO and EU member states. The Obama’s initiative will provide the military instrument to enhance Romania’s security and, from political perspective, places the country among the proactive countries on NATO missile defense policy. But, the immediate benefit will be the economic one considering the investments in local infrastructure and public procurements in the area and, at the national level, an increment of Romania’s rating among the risk analysis agencies, thus ensuring a secure environment for more foreign investments.

2.1. Providing security in the Black Sea Region and the Balkans

The implementation of U.S. EPAA on Romanian territory has both geopolitical and geostrategic regional impacts. The enlargement of NATO toward Eastern Europe has enhanced the Euro-Atlantic community on the continent and Romania has actively engaged as a promoter of security and cooperation in this region. Furthermore, Romania has assumed a proactive role for maintaining regional stability in the Black Sea Region.\(^9\) The U.S. EPAA site at Deveselu


2.2. Enhancing role in NATO and EU

Beyond fulfilling Romania’s collective defense obligations arising from its NATO membership, the implementation of U.S. EPAA will also provide opportunities to enhance the country’s access to decision-making processes on Euro-Atlantic security. As stated by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at the signing ceremony of the Agreement, the U.S. EPAA will “ensure Romania’s central role in the structure of NATO defense capabilities against ballistic missiles under development.” 10 Deveselu Air Base may illustrate the way in which Romanian and American governments implement the decision of the NATO Summit in Lisbon as well as their dedication to fulfill the fundamental commitments of NATO collective security as referred to in Article 5. Officials in Bucharest believe that participating in BMD initiative, Romania will enhance its status among the other NATO and EU member states establishing additional channels for dialogue and strengthening transatlantic cooperation, both bilaterally with the U.S. and within NATO. Will be therefore the Romanian ‘voice’ more listened in Euro-Atlantic bodies? Just simply hosting BMD elements on its territory, Romania will not get more aplomb vis-à-vis the ‘older’ and more powerful European countries like Great Britain, Germany, France and Italy, even Greece and Turkey. This, especially as some of them - like France and UK - would never be very excited about the U.S. initiative, which reduces their ability of nuclear deterrence or their European defense leading posture. However, by hosting the U.S. EPAA, Romania will gain a greater ability to implement its foreign security policy within NATO and EU. The effect is similar to that one given by the participation to NATO and EU military operations: contributing not contributing ones.

The ‘area’ where Romania could really enhance its visibility is that of ‘new comers’ in NATO and EU organization as the Romanian ‘model’ might be adopted as a ‘way to follow’ by these member states. Scarcity of national military capabilities made available for NATO and EU collective defense and operations has become in the last years a constant among European allies, especially those entering the organizations after 1999. This called the emergence of concepts such ‘smart defense’ (NATO) and ‘pooling and sharing’ (EU) which recommend, “use of military capabilities – either nationally owned or multinationally procured – on a collective basis.” 11 In this respect, Romanian participation in NATO BMD as well as in Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS) 12 and NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control (NAEW&C) 13 programs are appropriate examples of ‘pooling and sharing’ security, which might be followed by the other countries in its region, thus offering more international relevance to Romania. As observed by NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, an evidence that Romania is already enjoying a “stronger position within the Euro-Atlantic security bodies is the appointment of Romanian Ambassador Sorin Ducaru as Assistant NATO Secretory

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12 “The NATO-owned and -operated AGS core capability enables the Alliance to perform persistent surveillance over wide areas from high-altitude, long-endurance, unmanned aerial platforms operating at considerable stand-off distances and in any weather or light condition. Using advanced radar sensors, these systems continuously detects and tracks moving objects throughout observed areas and provides radar imagery of areas of interest and stationary objects.” Available from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48892.htm (accessed on November 16, 2013).

13 “The NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control (NAEW&C) Programme is often cited as one of the most successful collaborative ventures ever undertaken by the Alliance. The fleet of 17 E-3A aircraft represents the world’s first multi-national, fully integrated Air Force and is one of the few military assets that is actually owned and operated by NATO.” Available from http://www.napma.nato.int/ (accessed on November 16, 2013).
2.3. US-Romanian Strategic Partnership: reliability and commitment

The Agreement illustrates the excellence of US-Romania strategic partnership and represents a prerequisite for further development. Obviously, the Agreement is a ‘win-win’ product for both parties. Implementing the EPAA at Deveselu, Romania strengthens its national security and enhances its status of stability provider in Southeastern Europe while the U.S. continues to promote – through military instruments – its strategic interests in the Black Sea Region. Furthermore, considering the U.S. position concerning the global crisis, and its pivot from Europe toward Asia, this partnership might become to Romania more relevant than its NATO membership itself. While NATO tends to transform itself in an ‘insurance agency’ – where the Americans pay the bill and the Europeans enjoy the peace dividend – the US-Romania strategic partnership represents an additional warranty for Romania’s security.\(^{15}\)

Beyond the security aspects, however, the Agreement marks also the increment to a higher level of Romanian-American military cooperation as the US has committed to support Romania in consolidating its defense capabilities. A first step has already been done when the United States agreed to transfer technology to Romanian F-16 fighter jets, which will be procured from Portugal to replace the obsolete Romanian MiG-21s. Conversely, the Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base in Eastern Romania will serve as the main hub for the U.S. combat forces and equipment pulled out from Afghanistan.\(^{16}\) Nevertheless, the access of Romanian military to top-level military technology and scientific information represents another advantage that the existence of U.S. EPAA at Deveselu Air Base will bring.

A less evident aspect of advantages that Strategic Partnership (to include the Agreement) with the United States brings to Romania is the economic security. Security is often associated with progress as security represents a ‘shield’ behind which economy grows and social life thrives. Beyond the economic increment in the Deveselu area – new business opportunities, which will lead to new jobs and in the end will provide a certain level of prosperity – the EPAA will ensure, at the national level, a propitious environment for more foreign investments. Whether the governmental and local authorities will know how to benefit of this opportunity is another question. However, like any strategic decision, hosting the U.S. EPAA at Deveselu Air Base will not bring only benefits. In the next chapter, we will analyze the likely risks and challenges brought by the existence of BMD elements on the Romanian territory.

2.4. Risks and challenges for Romanian Security

Likely, the implementation of the U.S. EPAA elements in Romania will lead to an intensification and multiplication of risks and challenges to its security. Nobody challenges the added value that U.S. EPAA brings to Romania’s security. However, there are concerns about the fact that Romania’s participation in BMD initiative could lead to an increment of symmetric and asymmetric threats to its national security. The presence of BMD facilities on the Romania’s territory could transform the country itself into a target for state and non-state actors.

One of the diplomatic risks is the tension of relations with Russia, unhappy with this


Agreement, even if the U.S. and Romanian officials have consulted their Russian counterparts during all phases of negotiation process. As affirmed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the UN Conference on Disarmament, in 2011, the Russians “insist that there is a clear need to take into account the factors that negatively affect strategic stability […] as unilateral deployment of a global BMD system.” 17 But the ‘real’ motivation behind the Russian position is undoubtedly “long-standing opposition to the deployment of U.S. military infrastructure on the territory of countries that joined NATO in and after 1999.” 18 Moscow is unhappy about the Alliance’s enlargement. Although the infrastructure and number of U.S. military personnel to operate the SM-3 interceptors in Romania will be relatively small, the Russians simply do not ‘digest’ it. It is probably difficult for Russia to see how the U.S. increases security guarantees to a country such Romania, which was for decades in Russia’s sphere of influence.

Ukraine, the other non-NATO and non-EU major actor in the region finds itself in a very delicate situation. The Ukrainian authorities have expressed willingness to engage in the missile defense projects across Europe. Kiev was ready to contribute with existing capabilities and scientific potential for development of missile defense. The only prerequisite – caused by political circumstances – was the involvement of Russia in the initiative. Ukraine has tried to offer its services to both the U.S. and EU, while also advocating the Russian interests. Ukrainian emissary to NATO Igor Dolgov, who stated, “Ukraine will contribute to European missile defense shield if the program is developed in collaboration with Russia”, best expressed Kiev’s position. 19 Nowadays, Ukraine supports the consequences of its strategic inadequate position…

The Cold War ended but the competition between Russia and the U.S. continues, and the Black Sea region represents a starting point for the two actors to reset existing relationships. Informational, we can assess this competition as dominated by two contraire perceptions: the U.S. considers that Russia seeks to restore the former Soviet empire while the Russians claim that the Americans look for their ‘elimination’ from a space of vital interest for them. Romania is trapped in this competition, as the U.S. EPAA may be a chance for enhancing the security in the Black Sea region and, at the same time, can turn into a major destabilizing factor. Between the U.S. and Russia have held several rounds of negotiations to alleviate disagreements and various variants of cooperation were proposed to eliminate existing suspicions but positions seem immutable, at least for the near future. Although the new beginning in the relationship of the two great powers seems promising, we must not forget the Russians constantly affirm that security architecture created after the Cold War does not work because Russia does not have a significant role in making decisions regarding European security. 20

From the military perspective, the existence of BMD facilities on the Romania’s territory could lead to an increment of threats and risk of attacks from state and non-state actors to Romania. As


Romanian President Traian Băsescu mentioned at the ceremony held on 28 October 2013 at Deveselu to mark inauguration of the construction of BMD facility, “It would be wrong to say there is no risk by hosting the U.S. EPAA in Romania. Of course, Romania becomes a priority target for those planning such things against a NATO state but the risk should be outweighed by the security systems existent in such situations. The greatest risk however is to have a country that cannot defend itself against such strikes.”

The missile defense shield protects but must be in its turn protected. There must be Air Force assets able to deter any attempt to strike those facilities; there must be security equipment and personnel able to prevent such situations. Although there will be a small number of U.S. military personnel to protect the installations, the overall responsibility for defense of the infrastructure in Deveselu relies on Romanian military. Nevertheless, as long as Russians considers the BMD initiative vitiating the negotiated balance in strategic nuclear capabilities, there are possibilities that they would consider installing missiles in the Black Sea region to counter the BMD elements implemented in Eastern Europe.

Beyond the possible attacks against the military installations at Deveselu the asymmetric threats such terrorist attacks must be also considered as they may occur in any other areas. The terrorism in the Western Black Sea Region was considered more a risk than a threat until specifically manifested in 2012, when a suicide bomb attack in Burgas, Bulgaria targeted a group of Israeli tourists. The event in Bulgaria brought into focus, not only the risk for all the Black Sea countries to be targeted by terrorist organizations, but also the potential of the region to become the source or the scene of conflicts involving players from the international arena.

Finally, from the economic perspective, the risks brought by the existence of BMD facilities on the Romania’s territory refer more to the financial problems of the Alliance. Facing serious economic crises, NATO countries (to include the US) attempt to minimize their investments on collective defense. There are two aspects to be considered. One refers to a possible withdrawal of U.S. troops and equipment from Deveselu if the Iranian menace becomes irrelevant. Such a decision may lead to the economic collapse of a poor developed area like Deveselu and, at the national level, a decay of Romania’s rating among the risk analysis agencies, thus diminishing foreign investments. The second aspect refers to a possible misinterpretation of the policy makers in Bucharest on the U.S. EPPA capabilities. One may erroneously ask why Romania will need any more Air Force capabilities if it is already protected against missile attacks. Such understanding may negatively affect the Romanian military budget, which has been already drastically diminished in the last years. As described by Secretary Gates, NATO tends to look like a ‘two-tiered’ structure with member states “willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership but don’t want to share the risks and the costs.”

Without proper financial support from contributing countries, concepts such as the European ‘smart defense’ or ‘pooling and sharing’ designed to cover the existent shortfalls within the Alliance may transform from ‘doing more with less’ into ‘doing less with less.’ If Romania stops to investing seriously in military equipment able to secure its territory, then its relevance within the Euro-Atlantic organizations may become irrelevant.

2.5. Recommendations

Romania could enhance its visibility in the Black Sea region as well as in NATO and EU is region, if it carefully assesses how the other countries perceive the important change of its security status offered by the existence of BMD facilities on its territory. It may be difficult if not impossible for Romania to convince Russia that NATO BMD (to include U.S. EPAA) does


not threaten its nuclear strategic capabilities. But showing openness to more cooperation within NATO and EU organizations as well as regionally (Black Sea initiatives) may relax the (already long-time) tensioned relations between these countries.

It is incontestable the informational advantage that U.S. EPAA together with previously mentioned NAEW&C and AGS initiatives bring to Romania. However, Romania needs to improve interoperability of its assets with the NATO and the U.S. ones so the information provided could be processed and integrated into a coordinated plan.

The Black Sea Region, especially the Caucasian area, presents a major risk of instability for the regional security environment due to its frozen conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, and Nagorno-Karabakh, international terrorism, organized crime and proliferation of WMD. Both, the NATO and EU have expressed several times how important is to have strong states at their Eastern borders and U.S. EPAA comes to demonstrate this hypothesis. Romania acknowledges the importance of its security for the overall security of Euro-Atlantic organizations. There are small steps already done through the acquisition of multirole aircraft or modernization of frigates but the major improvements of its military capabilities are still blocked due to diminished budgets, which must be in the coming years at least at the level assumed by Romania to NATO.

Finally, from the economic perspective, the EPAA ensures a secure environment for economic development but alone it cannot make wonders. Without proper legal measures designed to relax the economic environment and encourage/protect the foreign investments, there may not be too many overseas companies that want to invest in Romanian economy.

**Conclusion**

Nowadays, there is a growing threat posed by the proliferation of regional ballistic missiles, which is likely to increase both quantitatively and qualitatively in the coming years. Recognizing the seriousness of the ballistic missile threat, the NATO Heads of State and Government at the Lisbon Summit, in 2010, took the historical decision to strengthen the role of missile defense as an important deterrent, by expanding the role of Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) to territorial defense. They also agreed that new gradual adaptive approach of the U.S. missile defense system in Europe would become part of the NATO missile defense architecture, in accord with the provisions for collective defense of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Committed to its assumed engagements, Romania has agreed to host BMD elements at Deveselu Air Base, the confirmed selection for Phase II of U.S. EPAA initiative. There is no doubt that from the security policy perspective, the presence of BMD elements in its territory will offer to Romania the opportunity to enhance its status in the Black Sea Region as well as among the NATO and EU member states. The U.S. EPAA initiative will provide the military instrument to enhance Romania’s security and, from political perspective, places the country among the proactive countries on NATO missile defense policy. The economic security is also to be considered as the U.S. EPAA may ensure a secure environment for more foreign investments. However, the presence of these BMD elements on Romania’s territory, will likely lead to an intensification and multiplication of the risk and challenges to its security. Beyond the Russian official rhetoric and the Iranian ballistic missile threat, Romania should also consider all the asymmetric threats to its security given the complexity and heterogeneous nature that characterize them.
1. STRATEGIC IMPACT No. 1/2015


23. SINOVETS, Polina, “The New European


THE GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT IN THE ROMANIAN AREA OF INTEREST, IN THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

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This article is an analysis of the geopolitical and geostrategic environment in the Romanian area of interest, represented by the two important areas in its close vicinity: South-Eastern Europe and the Extended Black Sea Area.

The manner in which Russia is positioned in relation with the West regarding the conflict in Ukraine, which it fuels with the purpose of regaining the influential positions that the Soviet Union had in the past, the nature and extent of its actions, the origins and their possible consequences are also subject to my personal interpretations in this article.

Keywords: geopolitics, geostrategy, security environment, the Black Sea, the U.S., European Union, Russia, the Ukraine, interests, crisis, security.

Preamble

Time seems to be getting out of its mind a Shakespearean hero would say. Not even the faithful calendar of history continues to follow the laws of time measurement, immutable until recently. There are historians who argue that the 19th century actually started in 1815, with Waterloo, and lasted until 1914, with the outbreak of World War I. Following the same “principle”, it can be sustained that the 20th century spreads between 1914 and 2014. In other words, we enter into the 21st century in 2014. Why? Because, through what it’s called the crisis in Ukraine, or the crisis around Ukraine, a new periodization of history is proposed to the world. The twentieth century would never be “finished” with the collapse of the Berlin wall or with the Romanian Revolution in late 1989, but with the troubled spring of 2014, when the fatal gears of the Cold War seemed to be reinstated in motion, gears whose disappearance had been predicted for a quarter of a century, but on which account - rightly or wrongly – a lot of what is happening in the world is still placed. The Cold War still “works” like radioactive ash.

We live in a world which seeks its ways of evolution, generated by some states’ strategies, which represent development models to something ... Something that often comes into conflict with traditions, customs, life philosophies and ideologies from different geographical areas. In this context, we seek to find solutions!

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The new security environment has also influenced the exchange of ideas and concepts, creating some new ones, different from the tradition of the 20th century. Thus, the global or regional security is approached in terms of cooperation and partnership, and the national security defence patterns emerged from the national territory, marking the active involvement in promoting the national security interests at great distances from the own borders.

After 1990, under the terms of the new security environment, Romania entered into a reform process of the state, as an entity, but also into a process of reconsideration of national security and defence. If the first process is steadily underway, the second one has led to profound transformations in the geopolitical and geostrategic profile of Romania, so that, in 2015, it is in the position to be a member of two powerful organizations in the contemporary security architecture: NATO and the European Union.

As a member of NATO and of the European Union, Romania has changed a lot compared to the Cold War period, when it was in the Soviet zone of influence. The dual position of Romania, as NATO member and an integral part of the European Union, which is on the road from political and economic to the military, also means the affirmation of a national position in the major problems of regional and global security. National security cannot be built outside the requirements and limitations of the current security environment.

**Geopolitical and geostrategic aspects on Romania’s areas of interest**

Romania’s area of interest, in terms of geopolitics and geostrategy, is represented by two major areas: South-Eastern Europe and the Extended Black Sea Area.

South-Eastern Europe constitutes a distinct security complex in the continental European space, geographically, culturally, historically, ethnically, economically and religiously individualized. Succinctly, South-Eastern Europe reveals: the direct link of the West with the Middle East through the Balkans; the strong fragmentation of the state entities, as a process outlined by the breakup of the Yugoslav State; the existence of numerous historical disputes on territorial themes, tacit, opened or conflictual ones, as required; the presence of all the Balkan States in the Council of Europe, in OSCE, as well as in the organizational coordinates of the Council of Regional Cooperation. There are also strong integration trends, with no exception, on behalf of all the states, the organizational targets obviously being the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance.

![Figure no. 1: Map of the areas of interest for Romania](image)

The European Union has drawn up a policy to gradually support the integration into the Union of the states in the Western Balkans. On July 1st 2013, Croatia became the first of the seven countries that joined the EU and Montenegro, Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania were officially accepted as candidate countries. Negotiations are under way with Montenegro and with Serbia. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are potential candidate countries.

South-Eastern Europe still bears the traces of the historic confrontation, on the one hand, of the geopolitical surpassing between the European

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The elements that give content and potentiate the geopolitical and geostrategic environment of the South-Eastern Europe, in the opinion of some specialists in the field, are: maintaining in the region of an area with a high degree of risk for European security; the existence of unresolved crises, which can degenerate into conflicts, with adverse consequences for the affirmation of the human condition; ethnic and religious disputes, with a significant conflict potential, evident in Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina; territorial claims that chronically tense the relations between the involved states, such as the relations between Greece and Turkey, between Greece and Macedonia; trends to autonomy, but also to independence of some ethnic communities; penetration and expansion of Islamic fundamentalism, especially of the radical one, in Kosovo and in Bosnia and Herzegovina; tendencies of some countries to become leaders in the area, the cases of Greece and Turkey being obvious; the actions of the Russian Federation to replenish the lost spheres of influence after the end of the Cold War; intensification of the efforts of some Balkan States for the fulfillment of the requirements of integration into European and Euro-Atlantic organizations; intensification of the non-military threats to the security of the South-East European States: corruption, organized crime, illegal trafficking in drugs and weapons, illegal immigration.

In the area of South-Eastern Europe, several aspects are to be highlighted: the development, in this region, of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); concentration of efforts of the European institutions, in the Balkan area, on strengthening statehood, and on liquidation of the destructive effects of the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia; intensifying the control over the Eastern and South-Eastern routes in Europe of drug trafficking, organized crime, and other generators of asymmetric risks; increasing the role of the military factor in managing the conflict and post-conflict situations; economic recovery after the effects of the economic and financial crisis in the years 2008-2010.

The South-Eastern European space experienced an acute resuscitation of the interests of the three main actors to fully establish and develop the influences in the region: the Russian Federation, the European Union and the United States, each of them acting in their own interests. The three great actors of international relations scene know best that rule of the international policy, according to which “The states have neither friends, nor enemies, only interests”.

The Yugoslav area remains problematic for nearby states, but it is under control, through the establishment of a safety belt, within NATO, consisting of Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovenia.

Regarding the situation in the Extended Black Sea Area, Romania is located in two situations: as part of this area, but also as state in the immediate vicinity of the Eastern hemisphere, a powerful generator of multiple sources of insecurity, especially since the Crimean Peninsula was included as part of the Russian Federation through a fast move, without any possibility of opposition from the great actors of the world with interests in this area.

At the same time, by its position at the eastern border of the European Union and, thereby at the linchpin of the East cross-border crime, Romania assumes the tasks arising from the risk generated by the direct contact with the active sources of major insecurity; largely absorbs the dangers, risks and threats that jeopardize the security of the European Union from the East; has the responsibility of securing the eastern border of the Union; intervenes directly in combating and countering some of these risks, dangers and threats.

Located at the intersection of three major geostrategic axes – Europe, Middle East and Central Asia – the geopolitical region of the Black Sea is one of the most significant areas of transit of the energy resources and it is the space where there are major risks and conflicts of interests, with a strong impact on Euroatlantic security.

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The most important security issue in the Extended Black Sea Area is, however, the increased tension between democratization and consolidation of some modern independent and sovereign states, and Russia’s strategy of maintaining and expanding its sphere of influence in the former Soviet space and at an international level. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia has crossed over an identity crisis. Permanently regarded as a great power, at the end of the Soviet era it was unable to resolve the violent conflicts within the country, without any blame on some external actor. Since then, Russia has struggled to regain the status of world power, or at least the one of regional power, making use of political power-sharing strategies, particularly in the former Soviet space, in order to regain its sphere of influence5.

Its actions in Ukraine constitute an unprecedented act of violation of the principles of international law, which have generated the complete control of Crimea, which became an intermediate platform for Russia in order to project its means of force towards the Southern Caucasus and the Balkans, where, using its good relations with Serbia, it also tries to extend its influence and control. More recently, Russia is trying to expand its influence in the Balkans and, by attracting Greece into a trap laid for the European Union, taking advantage of the economic impasse in this country and by the existing misunderstandings between the leaders of the major European powers and those in Athens. Numerous separatist trends, backed by Moscow in varying degrees, are permanent hotbeds of regional and national instability.

In this context, we are witnessing with concern the increase of military threats in this area of the world. We already are in a period of repositioning of means and forces of action in the military area, the period of more or less threatening statements being exceeded. Basically, the Cold War is rapidly transforming into an increasingly hot conflict, which may potentiate, by interests or strategies, the upsurge of frozen conflicts at Romania’s eastern border. Basically, Romania is in a paradoxical situation: we have the most powerful security guarantees, but the dangers that surround us are becoming more and more numerous.

On the other hand, there are obvious manifestations of military globalization in this increasingly hotter area of the globe, considering the following indicators: the degree of imperial or neo-imperial expansion; increased foreign military presence; military diplomatic representation; the market of lethal and non-lethal weapons and equipment, which, it seems, will be in a strong expansion; defence expenditure, which will increase significantly in the coming years; membership in alliances and military cooperation agreements; consequences of the defence industry; the incidence of military interventions and premeditated military conflicts; repositioning of forces and military assets; the use of means and rules of hybrid type warfare.

The Extended Black Sea Area faces a variety of risks and problems, but also opportunities for resolving them. The OSCE, the Council of Europe, EU, NATO and the UN are present in the area through different mechanisms and programmes. However, towards a policy still hesitant of the West and the aggressiveness of an extensive policy of Moscow willing to rebuild and maintain “its space of influence”, the countries in the area are marked by concern regarding their role and place in the future evolution of the world order. Therefore, more synergy is necessary between the international organizations and more energy to focus the whole region on a solid path of stability, democracy and economic development6.

At the same time, it is obvious that the US and the European Union have a major interest in diversifying their sources of energy supplies, and the Black Sea is an ideal route through which oil and natural gas from sources other than the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Persian Gulf area can reach European markets. The potential of these sources is considerable. The Extended Black Sea Area is a traditional area of transit and an important energy provider. Energy resources and the potential of

5 Ibidem.

6 Ibidem.
energy transport from the Southern Caucasus is an important guarantor of energy security for Europe in the coming years.\(^7\)

Also, the Extended Black Sea Area is the space where the interests of four global actors, Russian Federation, USA, EU and NATO face each other directly, Romania being a member of both organizations, a European and Euroatlantic one, but its interests having, in this context, a strong national character.

Along with the radical political and economic transformations, the states in the area faced risks and threats to their security and national and regional stability, including events in Georgia, the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, the fleet problem and of the Crimea Peninsula in Russian-Ukrainian relations, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, the separatist movements in the Republic of Moldavia (Transnistria), existing or potential ethnic and territorial conflicts, chronic underdevelopment and poverty. To these some “old” problems that are still present in the relations between the states of the region are added, such as the dispute between Greece and Turkey concerning territorial waters and the islands of the Aegean Sea, the situation of minorities and others. A generator of an unprecedented international crisis in the postwar period, as we have shown, is the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the extremely tensed situation in Ukraine, a country which has lost “de facto” its eastern part, controlled by the pro-Russian militias.

The stability, security and peace in this region are threatened, as well, by new risks, which include manifestations of extremism, separatism or terrorism, and by land disputes, regional arms race, environmental problems and the rise of transnational organized crime.

Unresolved conflicts on the territory of some states or among the states of the Southern Caucasus bear the potential risk of hostilities being resumed thus resulting in new waves of immigrants, constituting a major obstacle to the development of the entire region.

The self-proclaimed Transnistrian republic remains an important lever by which Moscow acts to keep the Russian troops and promote its interests in the area. Any possible solution in solving this conflict should include Russia’s compliance with its Istanbul commitments, namely the withdrawal of its troops from the territory of Moldova.

In addition, geopolitical and geostrategic changes in the Extended Black Sea Area highlight the disappearance of national military sufficiency and interconnecting military trends and of applicative safety and dilution of the intensity of national military expenditure, mainly driven by a certain rationalization industrial potential of defence and the outstanding increase of diplomatic efforts for conflict disengaging.

Until February 2014 we could talk about a sensitive diminish of the possibility of a major conflict, along with the real affirmation of the probability of management of the local conflicts and emphasizing the essential traits of globalization, a process that determines the evolutionary qualities of the phenomenon. However, since then, Russia has decided to show its supremacy in the ex-Soviet area and, under the pretext that it comes to the aid of ethnic Russians in Crimea who were aggrieved by the regime in Kiev, occupied this Ukrainian territory, with the help of the army. Then, through an undemocratic referendum, which was not recognized neither by Ukraine nor by the EU and US, it has annexed this territory.

On March 1st 2014, the Russian president Vladimir Putin, has sought and unanimously obtained the permission of the upper House of the Russian Federation Parliament to make use of the armed forces of the country on the territory of Ukraine. NATO officials have prompted Russia to cease all military operations, warning that the peace of Europe and of the Extended Black Sea Area is threatened and that he will incur sanctions imposed by international forums. But president Vladimir Putin has not taken into account these requests, on the contrary.

The crisis in Ukraine, the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation, in March 2014, and serious destabilization of the country’s Southeast have a strong impact on the strategic situation in the region of the Black Sea. In justification of its actions in Ukraine, Russia

\(^7\) Ibidem p. 56.
has used the same reasons as in the case of the invasion of Georgia in 2008 – the defence of the Russians ethnics.

The annexation of this peninsula in the Black Sea, a vital strategic point, has brought to the Russian Federation the expansion of its territorial presence in the Extended Black Sea Area, including the most important port to the Black Sea - Sevastopol, and the proximity of the south-eastern flank of NATO. Basically, Kremlin has now the ability to project its military force to southern Ukraine and the Balkans, including Turkey, which constitutes a real threat that NATO and its member countries in the region cannot ignore. It should be noted that the distance between Romania and Russia, in a straight line, after the annexation of the Crimea Peninsula, is about 220 nautical miles (400 km). In the port of Sevastopol, the Russian Federation has an important operational naval base. On the other hand, the Crimean Peninsula has become a strong “military fortress”, from where air strikes can be launched, and not only air strikes.

The importance of the Russian-Turkish relationship gains more substance with the changes of the balance of forces in the Black Sea, these two states being regional powers which will have an even bigger influence in the architecture of the so fragile security of the Black Sea. Ankara is quite reserved towards the new strategic changes in a region it dominated through a special partnership with the Russian Federation meant to promote their geostrategic interests, to consecrate their status of regional powers and to prevent the presence of NATO or American naval forces by invoking the subjective Montreux Convention regarding the regime of warships from states not bordering the Black Sea.

The new situation will have significant long-term implications, and cause the Euroatlantic community to rethink the nature of its relationship with Moscow, especially of NATO and of the United States. The states in the Extended Black Sea Area, which have frozen conflicts on their territories or in regions with separatist tendencies, can now no longer ignore the possibility of a Russian armed intervention, and important regional actors, such as Romania and Turkey,
will have to consider the strengthening of their military capacities and, in the case of Romania, the increased NATO presence in the region\(^\text{11}\). We must not forget that, politically, diplomatically, economically and militarily, Turkey is the most important partner for Romania in this region of the world. At the moment, Europe is outside this conflict, and the United States do not want a direct

Black Sea and the Baltic Sea, which was intended to be performed during the interwar period, Intermarium, for its own and Europe’s safety. The present conditions are favourable for extending the belt to the Caspian Sea, in order to link the three seas: the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, and to form a stable and secure region of Europe, including Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania

### Table No. 1: Elements of the military potential of some states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population (millions)</td>
<td>142.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active military</td>
<td>766.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired soldiers (millions)</td>
<td>2,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence budget ($ Bil.)-2014</td>
<td>60.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Land forces

| Tanks                       | 15.398 | 8.848 | 2.809 | 875 | 3.778 |
| Armoured vehicles           | 31.298 | 41.062 | 8.217 | 1.456 | 7.550 |
| Self-propelled guns         | 5.972  | 1.934 | 1.302 | 2   | 1.013 |
| Towed artillery pieces      | 4.625  | 1.299 | 1.669 | 413 | 697   |
| Rocket launchers            | 3.793  | 1.331 | 625   | 188 | 811   |

#### Air forces

| Airplanes                   | 3.429  | 13.892 | 222   | 111 | 1.020 |
| Helicopters                 | 1.120  | 6.196  | 90    | 81  | 443   |

#### Naval forces

| Aircraft carriers           | 1      | 20     | -     | -   | -     |
| Frigate                     | 4      | 10     | 1     | 3   | 16    |
| Destroyers                  | 12     | 62     | 3     | 7   | 8     |
| Corvettes                   | 74     | -      | 62    | -   | -     |
| Submarines                  | 55     | 72     | -     | -   | 13    |


As the second largest military power in the world, Russian Federation got involved in force, in the conflict in Ukraine, by massively supporting the pro-Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine with modern warfare equipment, ammunition and weapons, which generated the biggest rift between the West and Moscow following the break-up of the Soviet Union. Since the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine and up to date over 6,000 people have lost their lives and other thousands have been injured, many of them civilians, not militarily involved persons. The destructions have not yet been calculated, but estimations can be easily made, reaching tens of

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billions of dollars. Basically, Ukraine is on the threshold of disaster and of the loss of statehood, despite the agreement in Minsk concluded earlier this year, with which the parties in conflict do not comply. Although a military conflict between the US and Russian Federation is unlikely, in Table no. 1 we presented, for example, some elements of the military potential of the two countries, and to have a relatively complete picture of the military point of view, I have inserted some data on Romania, Ukraine and Turkey. With a military budget of 577 billion dollars last year, the United States dominates Russia in terms of air and naval forces, Russia having an advantage in terms of ground forces. If the US and Russia occupy the top two positions in the standings of military forces worldwide, Romania is on position 51, Ukraine on 25, and Turkey’s position is 10, this representing an element of balance in the Black Sea area. It must not be forgotten that Turkey is the third country, as military significance, in NATO, having the second largest army in NATO among the North Atlantic countries.

In this context, the Extended Black Sea Area is, in geopolitics and geostrategic terms, an example that reveals the increasing role of NATO, and not its decrease, as anticipated immediately after the end of the Cold War.

Regarding the European Union’s role in the Extended Black Sea Area, we’re witnessing a relative failure rather than encouraging results, as the action of the Union’s instruments are limited, both in terms of action coherence and of the effective means.

Regarding the problems in the field of security and defence, the European Union, through the Treaty of Lisbon, has created and offered opportunities for advancement. It has become obvious that this is not enough. Despite the numerous operations in which the Union participates, there is still a significant rift between military instruments it has at its disposal (battle groups) and makeshift collection of national instruments they use, in fact, when it is called upon to intervene.

To better understand what is happening with the European Union’s contribution to resolving the crisis in Ukraine, one can appeal to the example given of the events in Libya, which preceded the fall from power of Muammar al-Gaddafi. Therefore, in the Libyan case, due to the absence of political consensus and of the appropriate military means, the formation of a coalition of will was necessary, and, subsequently, the North-Atlantic Alliance was asked to take command. It is obvious that with the onset of the military operation against the regime in Tripoli, the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU has been sidelined, exactly at the time when it was necessary and, therefore, it had a chance to demonstrate its viability in practice.

So, to truly become a functional concept both politically and military, the Common Security and Defence Policy should be reviewed and substantiated, so that the military capabilities be put in line with the objectives of the Union. Only under these circumstances the European Union can become a global actor, even a superpower, but only if it manifests itself with a single voice and if it develops, at the same time, its own military capabilities.

In fact, at present, the US and the Russian Federation have the key to resolve the Ukrainian problem and to achieve the stability in the Extended Black Sea Area.

**Implications for national security following the installation of anti-missile shield elements and the establishment of two NATO commands in Romania**

For conceptualizing and operationalizing integrated efforts to defend the national territory through ground antimissile systems on the platforms of naval and air combat, it is appropriate to present some elements concerning the participation of Romania in the American anti-missile defence system in Europe, taking into account the recent developments in this area, which led to virulent reactions by Moscow officials.

Thus, in order to better understand the context, a few highlights of the antimissile shield here in our country need to be presented, elements which can be seen in Figure no. 313.

The protection of the United States against a possible ballistic missile attack is an essential national security priority. We have to deal with a growing threat to the troops, to our allies and partners\(^\text{14}\), says the former US Defence Secretary, Robert Gates, in the short preface, of his 60-pages report, where a wealth of information about the missile shield can be found.

The Pentagon Report points out that at the present, only Russia and China have the capacity to launch a major attack with ballistic missiles on the American territory, but this is unlikely and it is not an issue for the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD). The US Administration intends to reach a military status with Russia, in accordance to their relationship after the Cold War\(^\text{15}\). In this report it is highlighted that local powers, such as North Korea, in the North-East Asia, or Iran and Syria in the Middle East, hold short range ballistic missiles, intermediate and medium action, which represent threats to American forces, to our allies and partners in the areas where the United States have sent troops and maintain security relations\(^\text{16}\) ... and the American missile defence systems are essential for strengthening the area intimidation\(^\text{17}\) ... based on principles of the zonal approach: the U.S. will strengthen the architecture area of intimidation. It must be based on solid relations of cooperation and of burden-sharing the tasks between the US and its allies; The US will follow a gradual adaptive approach in each zone, which will fold on the threats specific to that area, taking into account the scale, scope and pace and their capacities appropriate for the deployment of forces. This goal does not require a global missile defence architecture to integrate the allies. Instead of this, the US will create local structures that take advantage of the powerful military facilities, tailored to the needs and opportunities in each area; because, in the next decade, the supply of missile systems in each area will not cope with the demand, the US will build mobile devices that will be able to be moved from one area to another in times of crisis\(^\text{18}\).

On February 4th 2010, the Supreme Council of National Defence took the decision to accept the invitation made by the US president, Barack Obama, regarding the involvement of Romania in the development of the American missile defence system in Europe. This decision was an


\(^\text{15}\) Ibidem.

\(^\text{16}\) Ibidem.

\(^\text{17}\) Ibidem.

\(^\text{18}\) Ibidem.
important step towards increasing the national security level, contributing at the same time, to the strengthening of the Romanian-American strategic partnership and to the strengthening of Romania’s profile as a reliable partner and supplier of safety for the member states of the European Union and NATO.

The decision of the Supreme Council of National Defence on Romania’s involvement in the US system of adaptive approach, in stages, of the missile defence in Europe is in full agreement with what was established at NATO level. This approach has spurred the concerns of NATO anti-missile defence, based on the principles of indivisibility of allied security and collective solidarity.

On September 13th 2011, in Washington D.C., the Agreement between Romania and the United States of America was signed concerning the location of some elements of the system of ballistic missile defence of the United States in Romania¹⁹.

The development of the missile defence system in Europe, with the establishment of interceptors in Romania, will be done in four stages. Romania’s involvement will take place in the second stage of the American program, when the base at Deveselu will become operational, starting at the end of 2015. Interceptors to be placed in this military base have an important role in the defence of the national territory, in destroying enemy hits which would take place through kinetic energy effect. The missile shield ensures full coverage of the Romanian territory and it will cover the territory of all the Alliance states at its completion. In its essence, it is no more than a defensive feature.

In terms of costs for the installation of the Deveselu base, it is pointed out that these will be borne entirely by the American side.

The anti-missile shield strategy of the US will change in the sense of encouraging immediate reaction. In the next decade, as it results from the Ballistic Missile Defence Review Report in February 2010, land-based interceptor bases will be placed that will be movable at any time and which, together with the naval based systems, will permanently adapt to various specific threat. But the real confrontation is a psychological one, where the key concept becomes intimidation. For this reason, it seems natural to amend the military doctrine of the Russian Federation, since any anti-missile system weakens the potential force of intimidation in the use of missiles by another state.

In the opinion of many security experts, the installation of some elements of the anti-missile American shield on Romanian territory is beneficial for defending the country, but significantly increases the risk of an attack on the national territory, targeting especially the missile shield elements.

The second item, that caused virulent reactions from Kremlin, is the immediate formation on the eastern allied territories - Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – of some NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU), with multinational command and control structures, which will ensure a visible and continuous presence of NATO on the eastern allied states territories. This decision was taken at the meeting of the defence ministers of the NATO member states, in February 5th 2014, and was based on the decisions taken at the Summit of Wales in 2014.

Also, in addition to this integration center, Romania will host a Multinational Division Command which will function as a command-control center in the eventuality of the deployment of forces on the eastern flank of NATO. Basically, Romania will have, starting with 2016 when the Bucharest headquarters will be 80% operational, and entirely operational starting with 2018, permanent NATO troops on the national territory²⁰.

Divisional headquarters in Bucharest, about 300 officers, half of them from other member states than Romania, will be supported by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Moreover, the United Kingdom could take a more active military presence in Romania and in the Black Sea area. Facing the present threats, Germany will take charge of the northern zone of Europe, France remaining grounded on


the problems in Africa\textsuperscript{21}.

After our acceptance in NATO, in 2004, the measures approved for Romania today are very important, even historical we may say, concerning the eastern flank of NATO and the EU reassurance. These multinational NATO command and control structures represent the decision adopted at the Summit in 2014, concerning the assurance of a visible and persistent presence of NATO on the allied territory. These units will have a key role for the bound between the national and NATO forces, providing the command and control element in situations in which the new NATO reaction force of the Alliance, the one with a high level of efficiency, will be deployed\textsuperscript{22}.

The installation of some elements of the American anti-missile shield and the creation of the NATO headquarters on the territory of Romania have triggered a series of provocative, inappropriate and pointless statements by some officials in Moscow, which shows that our country has turned into a “platform to support US and NATO nearby the Russian border, and the Romanian Government is sacrificing the security in the Black Sea area by accepting NATO to deploy, from tactical reasons, troops on its territory”. “Romania must be conscious of the responsibility and of the consequences of supplementing NATO’S herds on its territory”, and “NATO plans are confrontational”\textsuperscript{23}.

As a result of what I presented above regarding the installation of some elements of the anti-missile shield and the establishment of two NATO headquarters in Romania, I believe we are facing a paradox: Romania is subject to multiple threats and dangers, but it also has the most important and powerful security guarantees in its history.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibidem.

\textsuperscript{22} The statement of the defence minister, Mircea Duşa, after the meeting of the ministers of defence of the NATO member states, in Brussels, February 5th, 2015, http://www.mediafax.ro/social/duşa-cele-doua-comandamente-nato-din-rmania-vor-functiona-in-bucuresti-13960263, accessed at 01.03.2015.


\textbf{Conclusions}

In the context of the affirmation of geostrategic interests by global actors in the Extended Black Sea Area, at present, a large-scale aggression of the classic type, by using conventional armed forces against Romania, but also against any other member state of the European Union or the North Atlantic Alliance, is unlikely and geopolitical obsolescent. Romania, as a member state of the European Union and of NATO, faces new threats, much more diverse, less visible and less predictable. Romania is, equally, the potential target of all threats to NATO and EU, noting that the ones generated geostrategically and geopolitically close to our country have a direct effect.

The main threats that may endanger the fundamental values of the democratic architecture of the Romanian state, as well as its national interests, but also those arising from its membership in the European and Euroatlantic community are: the escalation of regional conflicts, increased aggressiveness by the Russian Federation, international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction under non-state control, organized crime, failed states, environmental degradation, pandemics, corruption. Threats to national security do not manifest solely by themselves, but also in correlation with those it enhances or by which they are augmented.

Currently, in our country area of interest, a highly dangerous reality takes shape, which may trigger an uncontrolled and real arms race.

Also, the strategic area to which Romania belongs is rich in local conflicts, some open and wide-ranging, others dormant or potential, with significant determinations for the peace, stability and security of the region and of Europe. Their interstate, intra-state, religious or ethnic character has, in fact, an unequivocal political genesis, mainly an effect of the dismantling of the USSR and of the ambitions and beliefs of the Kremlin leaders that it was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century”.

\textbf{Conclusions}

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The main threats that may endanger the fundamental values of the democratic architecture of the Romanian state, as well as its national interests, but also those arising from its membership in the European and Euroatlantic community are: the escalation of regional conflicts, increased aggressiveness by the Russian Federation, international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction under non-state control, organized crime, failed states, environmental degradation, pandemics, corruption. Threats to national security do not manifest solely by themselves, but also in correlation with those it enhances or by which they are augmented.

Currently, in our country area of interest, a highly dangerous reality takes shape, which may trigger an uncontrolled and real arms race.

Also, the strategic area to which Romania belongs is rich in local conflicts, some open and wide-ranging, others dormant or potential, with significant determinations for the peace, stability and security of the region and of Europe. Their interstate, intra-state, religious or ethnic character has, in fact, an unequivocal political genesis, mainly an effect of the dismantling of the USSR and of the ambitions and beliefs of the Kremlin leaders that it was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century”.
Is it only ideal or it can be a reality for Romania to manifest and to make viable its security interests in its geopolitical proximity or to expand beyond its national borders, environment of interest to NATO, to the US, to the Russian Federation, to the European Union, to Turkey and to China? The answer to this may be affirmative, but for this, what we call the national will must manifest itself so as to be able to build an area of stability, peace and prosperity, Intermarium, where Romania could become an important actor.

Romania has at its disposal a number of strategic opportunities in order to make viable its geopolitical interests which can be: promoting and fostering of regional cooperation; updating of the dialogue on NATO/EU strategy for the Extended Black Sea Area to promote the country’s interests in the decision-making processes of the North-Atlantic Alliance on the current challenges of the regional security environment; participation to the conceptual and operational development of the common security and defence policy of the EU; development of strategic partnerships; involvement in the implementation and development of the EU and NATO policies in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia and in the Middle East; the development of energy projects of European and even global interest in the Extended Black Sea Area; involvement in the strengthening of the interests of the states in the Black Sea region for the achievement of regional security mechanisms and assistance in the field of security sector reform; defining and explicit undertaking of national security strategic goals, on its military performance.

In my opinion, an in-depth analysis upon these strategic opportunities is absolutely required, as the security environment requires the obligation of drawing up a new National Defence Strategy of the country, defining, among other things, the national interests, the resources and the way of action by which they would become viable.

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**Acknowledgement**

This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/138822 with the title “Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of Military Science, Security and Intelligence, Public order and National Security – Continuous formation programme for elite researchers - “SmartSPODAS”.”
The starting point of this research is the well-known methodological question about the mutual relations between human activity spheres. These domains are politics, war and economy. In particular, in this paper, politics and war are examined. Various academic sources show different standing points of researchers focused on this abstract and methodological issue. “The Art of War” by Sun Tzu, as one of the most ancient and most popular books on strategy, has been put into the central point of this paper as a case study. The Chinese classical text is often perceived as an universal handbook of efficient human acting (in terms of praxiology). Therefore, it is applied not only to military issues but – in the contemporary world - to the business and social relations. The main problem analysed in this research is the potential application of Sun Tzu strategic principles into politics and its implications. The political dimensions of “The Art of War” are examined through three perspectives. Direct references to politics have been shortly depicted at first, then praxiological core of Sun Tzu’s principles, and then some game-theoretical aspects that were developed into more complex problems.

The Art of War by Sun Tzu refers directly to politics in a few cases only and his remarks are clearly too limited to consider him as a political thinker. However, a wider praxiological aspect of Sun Tzu’s ideas makes them suitable to be applied to other domains of social life. The main thesis of this article is that the meaning and the value of Sun Tzu’s book is far less important than its possible interpretation (or misinterpretation) by political and military actors.

Keywords: Sun Tzu, The Art of War, praxiology, game theory, strategy, politics, war.

Introductory landmarks

At the very beginning, I should explain the inspiration that has led me to writing this article. In the year 2008 a paper concerning, inter alia, the application of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War strategy principles into business domain has been published (unfortunately, solely in Polish language). The article entitled (in translation) Three Sections of Praxiology was written by professor Mirosław Sulek from University of Warsaw who then used several arguments against using Sun Tzu’s thought in order to understanding the world of economy¹. The author stated that the text of the Chinese scholar concerns only the

military strategy. He argued as follows:

“(...) praxiology is divided into three sections distinguished in accordance with the systems of human relations. These are: cooperation, struggle and rivalry. (...) Cooperation is a positive sum game and struggle is a negative sum game, while rivalry is a zero sum game (or constant sum game). The economics is a theory of cooperation - the art of war is a theory of struggle, however the theory of policy is the theory of rivalry. The cooperation and struggle are different systems of human relations, therefore it is not possible to apply the principles, worked out in theory of struggle to descript the economics of business, and inversely.”

2

No matter whether we agree or not on this issue with M. Sułek, another question arises: What about politics, characterised in the quoted paper as “rivalry” and “zero sum game” or “constant sum game”? Can the principles of The Art of War, which is an example of “the art of war” in general, be applied to the politics (or – at least – to the political strategy or political conflicts)?

1. Theoretical background

1.1. Research methodology

A part of the problem underlined by M. Sułek, shortly explained in the beginning, is the starting point of my further research.

In the summary of his article, the Polish author gives a partial and non-exhaustive answer to the question presented above. He describes the politics, especially the international relations, as rivalry which is the synthesis of struggle and cooperation. Depending on the range and weight of contradictive interests, the rivalry may contain more “struggle element” or more “cooperation element”. Accordingly to this reasoning, the rivalry seems to mean the struggle plus the cooperation. Should we then treat politics as the simple union of the military conflict and the economy? The politics is rather something more that the two domains characterised by struggle and cooperation taken together, although this problem has not been yet explained in the paper of the Polish researcher.

Probably the politics has predominant character with regard to the other two areas. That means that the politics controls both the military and the economy domains. On the other hand, it is also possible that they both somehow more or less influence the politics. Also from the perspective of the three systems of human relations (mentioned by M. Sułek), the politics seems to be placed “above” the two other systems, i.e. its role is predominant over the struggle (including its most typical example: armed struggle) and over the cooperation (i.e. economy). M. Sułek referred the politics as “the regulation sphere” (I presume that the term is a counterpart of “regulatory economics”), in contradiction to both military...
actions domain and economy domain, perceived as “the real sphere of human activity” (I presume that this term is an obvious counterpart of “real economics sphere”).

This is a rather methodological issue worth to be examined in another research. From the point of view of the topic of this paper, the most important conclusion is that the rivalry sphere refers sometimes to the struggle, so the struggle is from time to time present in the politics. As a result, the politics is not only based on cooperative (peaceful) behaviour but also turns into a “hard rivalry”, including armed struggle, violence and mortal combat. In this manner, every “art of war” (as theory of struggle) could have its political dimension and its rules may concern – to some extent – the universe of politics.

Getting back to the point, the subject of this article is to try to answer the question whether Sun Tzi’s *The Art of War* principles can be applied to politics. One has to research whether there are any premises for “building bridge” between these ancient Chinese strategy concepts and political relations. The thesis of this text is that such premises could be found (1) in direct references to the politics, (2) in more abstract rules which might be adapted to the world of politics and (3) in some game theory problems that may reveal similarities in cooperation, rivalry and struggle mechanisms in the military strategy and in the political strategy. As a result, there are three stages of analysis in this paper:

a.) Political: Does Sun Tzu clearly say something on politics?

b.) Praxiological: Can his military advice, in abstract terms, be related with politics as such? and, last but not least,

c.) Game-theoretical: Is game theory giving any explanation regarding this matter?

Thus, this case study of *The Art of War* can be an introduction to the wider problem of mutual relations between politics, economy and war (and their core characters).

### 1.2. What is *The Art of War* and why it is so popular among Western non-military experts?

The Art of War is the title of an ancient Chinese military strategy manual. Various sources indicate, on average, the year 500 BC as the date of its creation. Its author, one of the most known Oriental thinkers, was probably a scholar, military commander and political advisor. One has to admit, however, that studies on *The Art of War*, as well as contemporary commentaries to the book, attached forewords and dictionary entries, very often give diverse and contradictory information. The genesis of the text, which is unclear, and its further popularity seems to have more common with some kind of a legend that with a confirmed fact1. E.g. English Wikipedia suggests (after S. Griffith) that one of the daimyo of Sengoku Jidai period in Japan, Takeda Shingen, said that the reading of Sun Tzu was more meaningful to his military victories than having guns4. According to the same source, surprisingly many of the XXth century military and political commanders are now suspected to read and apply *The Art of War*5. Such theses have to be treated with caution. Nevertheless, one fact is that the Chinese text spread during centuries to large part of Asia and to the Western world.

I have decided to treat the Chinese strategic text as an exemplification of mutual relations between military strategy and political strategy mostly because of its tremendous popularity. Certainly, the book of Sun Tzu has become a contemporary bestseller and an element of popular culture. There are plenty of modern editions of *The Art of War*. Other books, more or less grounded in it, are interpretation of this classical strategic thought and frequently concern domains that are rather far from its typical, military application. Business area or social relations are the most obvious examples. The politics is a separated problem. There

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3 Ibidem.
exists, however, far less texts than links The Art of War and the politics. The simplest answer is than political handbooks are less popular and attractive for an average reader than business books. Or maybe the linkage between The Art of War and the politics is so obvious that there is no need for any further transposition?

Nevertheless, Sun Tzu’s thoughts are common research topic among academic staff and other experts in the fields like security, strategy, military studies, geopolitics and so on. What is more important, political researchers sometimes also focus on this issue.

For sure, one important thing is that The Art of War is constantly treated as a classical book on strategy, and not only on military strategy, but also on business and political way of acting. And even if such wide application is not well grounded methodologically, common opinions on the usability of this book remaining a hard fact. Besides, not only Westerners are under charismatic influence of Sun Tzu. “His classical thoughts are immensely popular in modern China”, confirms one of his Polish translators, expert on Chinese culture, J. Zawadzki. Thus, it is also an important element of Chinese culture (and maybe also a part of its political culture but this should be confirmed in another research). K. Gawlikowski claims that – in contemporary China – Sun Tzu’s principles are applied to other than military domains as well, even to everyday life’s issues or interpersonal relations.

So where lies the origins of The Art of War’s fame in the West? Firstly, when the Western world was gradually discovering Oriental culture, its elements seemed to be exotic titbits. But during the dynamic political and economic progress of East Asia countries (Japan was first, then so-called “Asian tigers”, like South Korea, and finally China), some Eastern solutions, e.g. in strategic management, became to be esteemed by Westerners as highly effective ones. And because their fundamentals were often built on Oriental traditions and philosophy, the attention of observers has been focused on such roots – and among them on The Art of War, which is the main ancestor of Eastern strategic thinking. Among political researchers the reason was similar: the rising power of modern China is a certain argument for reading Sun Tzu.

Secondly, some psychological aspects also were important. Every manual make a promise of teaching something useful. Strategy handbook in particular offers an opportunity of learning about achieving goals, acting efficiently and taking advantage of a situation. To put it mildly, in consciousness of an average human being such books give an important possibility of gaining victory and defeating opponent, no matter what domain is exactly concerned. The efficiency of this kind of books is tempting, however it is not always true. That notwithstanding, this is the logic of the free market. That is why the business, theoretically a domain of economic cooperation, is sometimes perceived as a battlefield and various strategic handbooks appropriate to the military affairs, are used as they could served to the businessmen. Regarding politics, every way to impose one’s will and to realize a political interest is good, so if there exists even a slight possibility of increasing chances to political success, such like gaining power and influence or simply overthrowing competitors, a skilful politician must use it.

1.3. What translation has been used and why the translation has so important meaning in this case?

A French Jesuit missionary in China, Joseph Marie Amiot, made in the 18th century the first European translation of The Art of War (into
Currently the research on the reception of Sun Tzu thought (and Chinese military strategy in extenso) in France is conducted by Yann Couderc.10

There are much more English translations of Sun Tzu. One of most known is the one of Lionel Giles (1910)11 which was used for the quotations in this paper.

Translation is one of the most important factors when a research based on a foreign source is being conducted. The difficulty is doubled in this case because (1) the Chinese languages are difficult for a Western user and (2) there are doubts when and how *The Art of War* was created and who exactly was the author. As a result, some methodological complications are present.

In addition, when considering books loosely based on Sun Tzu’s text, such as *The Art of War for Executives*13 and its foreign language versions, the situation gets really difficult. First, we do not know, whether the author of *The Art of War for Executives* used original Chinese text or rather took advantage of any existing translation. Secondly, whether and to what extent a subjective interpretation process took place when the author applies *The Art of War*’s fragments to some decision-making problems (in this case into business management). Finally, his book has been translated into another language (in this case: Polish).14 Such multi-stage operation increases the risk of an error or misinterpretation if we treat the output book as an academic or specialist reference.

Certainly, some risk exist even when using English translation of the original text or the original text itself. Nonetheless, the latter seems to be far less problematic.

Some other translation issues are presented by J. Zawadzki. Confusion about the name of the author of *The Art of War* (Sun Tzu, Sun Zi or Sun Wu?) is first of all caused by different transcriptions systems. The name Sun Tzu is written in Wade-Giles system, while Sun Zi is the same name depicted by *hanyu pinyin* transcription. Both means “Master Sun” (Sun as a last name). Tzu or Zi means “Master”; this was a title given to philosophers and thinkers. The first name of Sun Tzu was Wu, so Sun Tzu, Sun Zi and Sun Wu was (probably) the same person.16

Another important issue is that some strategic texts, authored by Sun Pin (Wade-Giles, Sun Bin in *hanyu pinyin*) are sometimes mistakenly assigned to Sun Tzu’s authorship. Works of both of them are frequently treated altogether and printed as one book. From time to time another Chinese strategic texts are included in one publication commonly known as *The Art of War*. This was even the case of Father Amiot’s translation.

2. Direct references to politics

At the beginning of the crucial part of this research, let us start with the basic inquiry: Does Sun Tzu say something directly related to politics? Are there any fragments in his text that support the thesis that his book should be treated not only as a classical military manual but also as a set of rules concerning political issues?

If the answer is positive, it would be a reason confirming the thesis of political applications of the Chinese strategic text. The remaining problems will be: How much Sun Tzu says on politics and whether his conclusions (made

12 There exists plenty of Chinese languages: Mandarin, Cantonese and so on.
15 Wade-Giles transcription of his name is more common.
around 500 B.C.) are still useful in the 21st century. However, if the answer is negative or if it is not quite convincing, we should lead further research to the next point.

First and direct narration about politics can be found at the very beginning of the book:

“Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.”

This classic and well-known paragraph requires no further explication apart from some conclusions. The State can be interpreted as a symbol of politics. The war, because of its “vital importance”, is an element of the State’s policy. As a result, if something concerns war, it concerns the State’s policy at the same time. This resembles the thesis of Clausewitz that “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means”. On the other hand, maybe more appropriate to quote would be the following concept of Mao Zedong: “War is the continuation of politics.” In this sense, war is politics and war itself is a political action; since ancient times there has never been a war that did not have a political character… However, war has its own particular characteristics and in this sense, it cannot be equated with politics in general. “War is the continuation of politics by other… means.” When politics develops to a certain stage beyond which it cannot proceed by the usual means, war breaks out to sweep the obstacles from the way… When the obstacle is removed and our political aim attained the war will stop. Nevertheless, if the obstacle is not completely swept away, the war will have to continue until the aim is fully accomplished… It can therefore be said that politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed.”

Nota bene, Mao was highly interested in classical Chinese strategic thought.

Another quote related to the State can be read when Sun Tzu analyses the costs of protracted war:

“Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain.”

and

“Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished.”

In the following verses of this chapter, Sun Tzu advises to pay attention to the costs of military actions. The State and its citizens are bearing most of the war expenses. The war has obvious implications on political sphere and economy. Other interesting remarks that can be referred as economic thinking are clearly visible in the chapter four (Attack by Stratagem):

“Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them.”

This resembles a little the point of view of geo-economics. Takeovers of territories that pay dividends and control over infrastructure (especially transport corridors and power plants) are perceived as far better way to gain the domination than overt military struggle (on certain conditions). According to Sun Tzu, the


18 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, New Jersey 1984, p. 87.

19 Zedong Mao, On Protracted War, Peking, 1966, Online Version: Mao Tse Tung Internet Archive (marxists.org)
army has undeniable role in the State, though:

“Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.” 24

Further paragraphs develop this idea, saying that the army should be properly managed in order to be an effective instrument in the hand of a political ruler. Sun Tzu does not criticise civilian control of the military. Instead, he suggests to let the experts lead the army and he rejects the ruler’s interference on military issues:

“There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army.

(…) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army.” 25

The role of a ruler should be restricted to hiring competent army staff. The autonomy of military actions has been underlined by strict statement:

“There are commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed.” 26

Sun Tzu, who probably was a military commander, presents opinions that are similar to realism paradigm in contemporary international relations theory:

“The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy’s not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.” 27

As a political realist, the Chinese thinker is conscious of constant danger that is present in international environment (although it is deniable whether one may refer to this term when thinking of ancient China):

“We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbours.” 28

Another important point concerns the intelligence that allows the State to react according to changing situation and realize its strategy through political or military means. Hence, a crucial information factor appears in Sun Tzu reasoning. As we will see in next paragraphs, information plays critical role in game-theoretical aspects. The meaning of information is significant in game-theoretical perspective. The following verses can also be interpreted as an emphasis on the effective foresight and political analysis:

“Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. (...) Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from other men. Hence the use of spies (...) Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying and thereby they achieve great results.” 29

These fragments are certainly an interesting example what the Chinese writer thinks of the State and war issues. As we can see, there are several quotations from Sun Tzu that refer directly to politics, although some of them need further interpretation. Thus, the purists of political science and international relations can argue that The Art of War is solely a military handbook and it cannot be applied to political thinking because these are different spheres and of distinctive nature. On the contrary, if we assume that politicians use war as a political instrument or war itself is the extension of policy but by different means, everything that concerns military subjects has also some political significance and might be treated as politics sensu largo.

To conclude, it is necessary to verify whether other premises in Sun Tzu’s texts suggest it could be applied to politics.

3. Praxiological rules

According to M. Sulek and several other authors, any art of war (in general), or theory of struggle, is all about several principles that can be boiled down to following issues: goals / assets parity, economy of forces, surprising, initiative,
manoeuvre, synergy, sustainability\textsuperscript{30}. Indeed, similar rules called “principles of war” (such as concentration of force, economy of effort, flexibility) are explained in defence doctrine documents of many countries, for instance: United Kingdom\textsuperscript{31} (some of these rules were introduced by Clausewitz in Principles of War\textsuperscript{22}).

The Art of War is mirroring and extending principles of war. To some extent, it contains also more abstract praxiological rules that appear as capable of being assimilated by other domains of human activity. The concept of Chinese praxiology (xingweixue 行為學 in the mainland) or xingdongxue 行動學 in Taiwan) and its roots has been invented by Krzysztof Gawlikowski in 1990\textsuperscript{33}. Multiple paragraphs of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War can be analyzed from the praxiological point of view and, in this way, one can extract principles which will be applied to politics.

The next quote is about making material gains and using as little force as possible:

“In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. (...) supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.”

“Therefore the skilful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.”\textsuperscript{34}

Many other advices are emanation of the most important praxiological terms: economization (actions that decrease costs or increase productivity) and efficiency (achieve objectives with a minimum investment of resources)\textsuperscript{35}. Hence, Sun Tzu advises to think economically, not to waste assets and energy. Simply said: maximum benefits, minimum work.

“Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy’s plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces, the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities”\textsuperscript{36}.

Some other verses say:

“Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed in his attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the result is waste of time and general stagnation. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; the good general cultivates his resources. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical”\textsuperscript{37}.

Here we can find the concepts that concern initiative and planning – central praxiological element – and saving resources The realization of a strategy transposes into advantageous strategic position which may prevent from enhancing unnecessary efforts. These principles introduced by Tadeusz Kotarbiński have been presented in praxiological publications\textsuperscript{38}. And finally:

“Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight;”

\textsuperscript{30} Mirosław Sulek, Trzy działy prakseologii, “Rocznik naukowy Wydziału Zarządzania w Ciechanowie Wyższej Szkoły Menedżerskiej w Warszawie”, z. 1-2, t. II, Ciechanów 2008, s. 51-70.


\textsuperscript{34} Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 4: Attack by stratagem, p. 39.


\textsuperscript{36} Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 4: Attack by stratagem, pp. 37-38.

\textsuperscript{37} Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 13: The Attack by Fire, pp. 119.

whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive exhausted”39.

This quotation from The Art of War is almost identical in meaning with another one from a contemporary book on praxiology40: “Position. It is easier to keep one’s position than to seize it. First come, first served. To defence is much easier than to attack”41.

The thesis on the existence of universal praxiological principles behind the words of Sun Tzu must be confirmed then. Would these rules be useful for a conscious political decision-maker or at least for an academician seeking to describe and to explain politicians’ behaviour? If we agree than political activity is a particular example of human activity, and that efficiency in politics has the same praxiological dimension as efficiency in human acting, then the core sense of quoted advices may be applied to politics and there is no contradiction here. It is obvious as far as focusing on priorities, economy of force, good planning and similar issues are concerned.

The problem appears at the more complex level of analysis. In the case of a hypothetical situation where for example a cooperative behaviour is required as a good solution of a problem, antagonistic attitude would be counter-effective (or unfavourable) for at least one of agents, and sometimes even for all participants. And such attitude may have its sources in treating political interactions like war manoeuvres, when some kind of “theory of struggle” is adapted to where it should not be used. Even simple misinterpretation of a text like The Art of War can imply: ineffective strategy, wrong decisions, losses of potential benefits for one or all sides, escalation of conflict and so on. For example, although Sun Tzu does not teach to make total war and to destroy the enemy completely, a reader can understand him conversely and then perceive his political opponent as a foe, not as a rival in the political game or e.g. negotiations partner. That is why the interpretation matters. Perception seems to be a decisive factor from the game-theoretical point of view and this problem will be handled in next paragraphs.

4. Selected Game-Theoretical Aspects

4.1. Fundamentals

The military applications of game theory are almost as old as the game theory itself. Usefulness of this method in military studies (at least in some cases) has been proved since the beginning of the Cold War42. Currently game theory is one of the dominant paradigms in political science and international relations43. Nonetheless, “core theoretical principles of game theory are limited, both in terms of the domains where it is applicable and in terms of its explanatory power in those domains”, assessed G. L. Munck regarding comparative politics44. In my opinion, the same remark might refer to international relations and any related field.

The Art of War and similar texts have been already examined through the lens of the game theory45. Some games (in terms of game theory) can be easily built basing on the text of Sun Tzu. It is not surprising, considering the fact that game theory is concerned with mathematical models of conflicts. The question still is: Are there any more

39 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 7: Weak Points and Strong, p. 53.
40 A.N.: that has nothing to do with Sun Tzu, it refers only to T. Kotarbiński.
Table no. 1: Examples of various types of strategic games in war and in politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRITERIUM</th>
<th>TYPE OF GAME</th>
<th>WAR</th>
<th>POLITICS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sequential-move</td>
<td>Response to border attack</td>
<td>Bilateral negotiation: rejecting / accepting offer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Simultaneous-move</td>
<td>Any example of Prisoner’s Dilemma</td>
<td>Any example of Prisoner’s Dilemma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict of interest</td>
<td>Zero-sum (constant-sum)</td>
<td>Maintaining power and secure existence owing to constant struggle (case of continuous clashes between armed groups in Iraq after 2004 not interested in peaceful cooperation)</td>
<td>Presidential election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not zero-sum (positive-sum)</td>
<td></td>
<td>International alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non zero-sum (negative-sum)</td>
<td>Nuclear conflict where both sides suffers heavy damages or total destruction</td>
<td>Breaking a coalition and losing power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of plays</td>
<td>Played once</td>
<td>Global nuclear war</td>
<td>Election race</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Repeated*</td>
<td>Smaller armed conflicts repeated within an area</td>
<td>Multilateral continuous international talks, e.g. over Iran nuclear programme or North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Probably there is no practical example, such situation occurs in strategic games, like chess</td>
<td>Probably there is no practical example, such situation occurs in strategic games, like chess</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other**</td>
<td>Common in reality, e.g. intelligence</td>
<td>Common in reality, e.g. hidden goals of foreign policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
<td>May be fixed if there are objective conditions of winning for each side of conflict (e.g. reaching strategic sites, occupation of an important territory, destruction of enemy forces etc.)</td>
<td>Legislative process (but one can try to manipulate where possible)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manipulable</td>
<td>Information warfare</td>
<td>Political discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreements</td>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td>Possible, e.g. multi-side armed conflict with switching alliances, cease-fire agreements</td>
<td>System of international relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-cooperative</td>
<td>Exist, e.g. two-side armed conflict, such as total war, classic war</td>
<td>the lack of formal diplomatic relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In addition, they can be repeated with the same player or with others.
** Although A. Dixit and S. Skeath do not handle with this issue, there are games of complete, perfect, certain and symmetric information: Eric Rasmusen, Games and information, An Introduction to Game Theory, 4th Edition, Wiley-Blackwell, 2006. The information problem in game theory makes analysis more complex. On the other hand, it is an interesting point of view to what players know about each other and their movements, how it influences their choices and how psychology factors affect the game.

Source: Author’s own source based on Dixit and Skeath’s classification.
reasons for connecting *The Art of War* and politics than simple textual interpretation or extracting more general rules of acting? On the other hand, maybe the game theory denies that they should be connected?

It seems obvious that some game-theoretical problems may become common factors when comparing *The Art of War* principles and political issues. As Avinash Dixit and Susan Skeath stated: “Similar games (similar to social interactions - M. H.) are played in business, politics, diplomacy, wars – in fact, whenever people interact to strike mutually agreeable deals or to resolve conflicts. Being able to recognize such games will enrich your understanding of the world around you, and will make you a better participant in all its affairs. (...) Political science is rapidly catching up. (...) Psychology and philosophy also interact with the study of games of strategy. Game theory has become a provider of concepts and techniques of analysis for many disciplines, one might say all disciplines except those dealing with completely inanimate objects”46.

Based on strategic games classification suggested by A. Dixit and S. Skeath I try to compare various types of games and their examples characteristic to war and politics. The authors quoted above suggest to ask the following questions in order to classify a game: (1) Are the game moves sequential or simultaneous? (2) Are the players' interests in total conflict, or there is some commonality? (3) Is the game played once or repeatedly, and with the same or changing opponents? (4) Do the players have full or equal information? (5) Are the rules of the game fixed or manipulable flexible? (6) Are agreements to cooperate enforceable?47

As we can see, various types of strategic games are noticed both in war and in politics. Therefore, it is not tenable to assume that war (including military actions,) can be described as only one type of game in terms of game theory, such as struggle, rivalry or cooperation. Considering that politics is the only field where game theory is applied is misleading. Thus, we shall consider that war covers some game-theoretic mechanisms and they can be of a various nature. War is not the only game – it can reveal some games. *Per analogiam*, various games can also be found in politics. But also politics is not a single field where game theory applies.

### 4.2. The most important problem: zero-sum games or non zero-sum games?

Starting from the statement given in previous paragraph, we are able to settle the dilemma whether Sun Tzu’s book as an example of “theory of struggle” can be applied to politics which is a phenomenon of a different nature than war.

In his paper, M. Sulek indicates three types of games (in terms of game theory). This is background to the further division between economics, politics and war and their different characters as they represent different types of games. Unfortunately, the idea has not been developed in the referred article, so we can only take it as a point of reference, not as a complete theory. According to the Polish researcher, economic (cooperation) is a positive-sum game where each participant wins, although different sides of this relation may get different payoffs (always greater than zero). Neither one nor the other loses (in mathematical terms, see a paragraph below).

Secondly, war (struggle) should be considered as a negative-sum game. It means that each side of the game characterised by struggle gets a negative payoff. Here, neither one nor the other is able to achieve a result greater than zero. Everyone loses in mathematical terms.

Finally, the politics (rivalry) is a zero-sum game (or constant-sum game) because a victory of one player is at the same time a defeat of his counter-part. What one gains, the other loses. Nevertheless, “though similar, these terms (zero-sum, positive-sum, negative-sum – M.H.) differ from the terms “win-win, win-lose, and lose-lose” which refer to wins or loses relative to expectations”, says Brad Spangler48. In fact, this is rather a material perspective that lacks deeper

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47 Ibidem, pp. 18-23.

analysis of psychological dimension. A simply conclusion is that every side of a conflict loses when making war. Such reasoning is attractive but doubtful. We could easily find examples of different games within the phenomenon called war, as presented in the table above. Furthermore, wars are equally characterized by game theory researchers as zero-sum game, not a negative-sum game\(^49\).

There is also a problem of demarcation line between politics and war (see Table no. 1). Such system allows playing “multi-level games”. It is possible to imagine a situation when a political leader agrees to begin a war that will be certainly lost and he knows that. At the same time, his other goals (and other payoffs) equalize the military defeat. From this perspective, a war is not confined to military actions only but it is a part of a larger phenomenon (politics). For this player, the loss in a negative sum game is compensated by a positive payoff in another game (which is likely to be of a different type). In such case, defeat here, victory there, the combination is a kind of strategic sacrifice, like in the game of chess or Go, and both played games – won and lost – are at the same time a part of another “greater game”. But are we able to conclude where the struggle ends and the rivalry starts and vice versa?

This problem shows how complicated is analysis of the nature of strategic thinking when comparing political, war and economy fields altogether. Alternative conclusions may appear when we change the model depicted on Fig. no 1. Any initial assumption of this kind: politics equals war, politics is only a part of war, war is only a part of politics, influences immediately the considerations of game-theoretic character of both phenomena. Restricted, technical perspective is certainly perceived as a way to simplifying scientific problems, making soluble “models of reality” as game theory wants it. An \textit{a priori} assumption that politics is always a zero-sum game and so forth eliminates wider discussion. On the other hand, however, this methodological approach can easily disregard important factors and ignore more complex relations.

There is a case of a lose-lose game in \textit{The Art of War}: prolonged wars that are certainly presented as some kind of a negative-sum game. Sun Tzu says:

“There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.”\(^50\)

In such case is imaginable that financial expenditures, human and material casualties are so considerable than any benefit from even victorious war cannot counter-balance them. A. Dixit and S. Skeath highlight the same problem\(^51\). On the other hand, however, we find in \textit{The Art of War} such advice:

“When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard. \textit{Such is the art of warfare}.”\(^52\)

Do not push too hard. Should not the enemy be destroyed? Again, interpretation can vary. Some readers will claim that it is an example that “win-win” situation at war are possible and maybe that it is easier to defeat an opponent when his loss is not total. Clearly, at least one side is victorious in quoted paragraph, so it is not an example of a negative-sum game. Sun Tzu does not appear as an aggressive warrior trying to crush enemy forces at any expense. He does not seem to perceive military actions as zero-sum game. While sometimes he is conscious that both opponents can suffer unnecessary casualties, he also suggests “softer” tactics in some cases:

“\textit{Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting}.”\(^53\)

Every generalization on the nature of war and politics would be vicious. The understanding of players’ payoffs, and, as a result, the indication of a proper game-theory model is crucial when searching for an effective strategy. Therefore, there are examples of various game models in the text of the Chinese commander. If such model

\(^49\) For example: Ziemowit M. Pietraś, \textit{Teoria gier jako sposób analizy procesów podejmowania decyzji politycznych}, Lublin 1997, s. 51.
\(^50\) Sun Tzu, \textit{The Art of War}, Chapter 3: Waging War, p. 34.
\(^51\) Avinash Dixit, Susan Skeath, op. cit. p. 19.
\(^52\) Sun Tzu, \textit{The Art of War}, Chapter 8: Maneuvering, pp. 67-68
\(^53\) Sun Tzu, \textit{The Art of War}, Chapter 4: Attack by Stratagem, p. 37.
is properly referred to any similar issue in the warfare, or even in politics, it can be useful. To conclude, some Sun Tzu’s methods seem to be effective under given conditions. As a result, several The Art of War case studies appear as able to be interpreted in terms of politics.

4.3. Further game-theoretical issues

From game-theory perspective, there are many interesting points in The Art of War which refer to well-known aspects of game theory. The most obvious seems to be the case of information and psychological warfare. Sun Tzu advises to mislead the opponent by disinformation, deception and surprise:

“All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.”

There are several important conclusions here: (1) deception is a part of play (2) disinformation is a mandatory element which prevents from having proper information on the game (3) psychological warfare is superior than overt clash, because gives higher payoffs at lower cost (4) the opponent must be made to act irrationally and (5) the optimal strategy must be chosen. As we can see, games with full information are rather impossible to find in reality and they are only theoretical models. Examples of the complete or perfect information games, however, are more likely to be found in armed struggle or political conflicts. Either way, it looks like turning a game with more pieces of information into “the fog of war” game, to refer to Clausewitz. Although politics seems to be a domain where it is not so hard to find information (although it is still not an example of a game with full information), the remarks of Sun Tzu could be applied in this field. It is good to be better informed than a political opponent; it is good to mislead him in case of conflict or rivalry.

The question of mutual knowledge and information has been also depicted in one of the most famous verses of The Art of War:

“This saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”

“Know yourself” might be understood as call to rational thinking: assessing owns position, desired goals, possible strategy and choosing optimal solution in both military and political domain.

A counterpart of the information warfare in politics is public relations, political propaganda and political discourse (fighting by words, not by violence). In addition, politicians very often try to irritate their antagonists, to provoke them in order to make them act as they want it. The similarity is obvious.

There is also another paragraph where Chinese thinker refers to emotions and irrationality:

“No ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own spleen; no general should fight a battle simply out of pique. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where you are. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by content. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again into being; Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full of caution. This is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact.”

in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty.

55 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 4: Attack by Stratagem, p. 42.
56 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 13: the Attack by Fire, pp. 119-120.
The conclusion is simple: Control your emotions, otherwise your damage will be considerable. Is it a call for the rational choice? Here we come to weak points of game theory: the assumption of rationality of players and the problem of quantification. Both of them are frequently highlighted in discussions on game theory application in social sciences. The main problem is that emotions, perception and cognitive biases are important issues to deal with in decision-making process in general. These factors influence any decision-maker. As far as military or political leaders are concerned, their importance cannot be excluded. Similarly, the political or intelligence analysis does not remain untouched. Simple human mistakes can have huge impact on the perception of international environment and, as a result, wider political or military implications.

So Sun Tzu advises to calculate. Is everything quantifiable as game theorists want it? As we know, normal-form games are represented by a payoffs matrix. The payoffs value is crucial because, from the mathematical perspective it allows to asset properly the choice of strategy. The main problem remains the value of payoffs. How it can be measured in all cases? Even if we assume that Sun Tzu thought about planning rather than quantification, another question is revealed: forecasting and foresight. Same planning is not enough in certain conditions; the planner has also to try to predict some factors, including players' movements and behaviour. That concerns both military and political affairs. Although future studies have been developed for many years, with the use of supercomputers and artificial intelligence software, they still have some methodological limitations.

Finally, no matter whether the use of The Art of War is well founded from the perspective of methodology, and no matter to which domain it is applied, another questions of rather psychological and cognitive character appear on the horizon. What if this text is applied (even improperly) to the domains different from military matter? What problems it may cause? Assuming that the ways

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**Figure no. 2:** The Chicken game matrix presenting Cuban Missile Crisis (1962). Payoffs values are easier to be assessed in case of military conflicts models (or models of political conflicts likely to be turned out into military conflicts) where potential casualties are quantifiable. In case of purely political decisions payoffs seem to be incalculable; as a result, they are often presented in arbitrary way.

Source: Blake Kaplan, Creating and Solving the Cuban Missile Crisis, Math 89S: Game Theory and Democracy, Duke University, 2014. About abuses of theory of moves in international realations see also: Randall W. STONE, The Use and Abuse of Game Theory in International Relations. Theory of moves, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, April 2001 vol. 45 no. 2 216-244.

The conclusion is simple: Control your emotions, otherwise your damage will be considerable. Is it a call for the rational choice? Here we come to weak points of game theory: the assumption of rationality of players and the problem of quantification. Both of them are frequently highlighted in discussions on game theory application in social sciences. The main problem is that emotions, perception and cognitive biases are important issues to deal with in decision-making process in general. These factors influence any decision-maker. As far as military or political leaders are concerned, their importance cannot be excluded. Similarly, the political or intelligence analysis does not remain untouched. Simple human mistakes can have huge impact on the perception of international environment and, as a result, wider political or military implications. Thus, the words of Sun Tzu remain merely a good advice. The problem of rationality is even much more complicated: what does it mean to be rational? It is a good question. To choose the best possible strategy (objectively) or rather the strategy considered as an optimum (from the point of view of a player)?

Another big issue of game theory which appears in Sun Tzu’s book is quantification.

“Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.”

So Sun Tzu advises to calculate. Is everything quantifiable as game theorists want it? As we know, normal-form games are represented by a payoffs matrix. The payoffs value is crucial because, from the mathematical perspective it allows to asset properly the choice of strategy. The main problem remains the value of payoffs. How it can be measured in all cases? Even if we assume that Sun Tzu thought about planning rather than quantification, another question is revealed: forecasting and foresight. Same planning is not enough in certain conditions; the planner has also to try to predict some factors, including players' movements and behaviour. That concerns both military and political affairs. Although future studies have been developed for many years, with the use of supercomputers and artificial intelligence software, they still have some methodological limitations.

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57 Wojciech zajęczkowski, Zrozumieć innych. Metoda analityczna w polityce zagranicznej, Warszawa 2011, pp. 75-82, 102-111.

58 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 2: Laying Plans, p. 32.

of acting described by Sun Tzu are effective, they are likely to give a kind of “praxiological advantage” to one of the actors. If they are ineffective, it should not have influence to the positions of actors (or players, in terms of game strategy). In a worse case scenario, it can worsen the situation of the unfortunate user.

As we can see in the Figure no. 3, inefficient use of these praxiological rules does not influence the game and it has results equal to not using at all. Aside from self-harming by improper use (e.g. when applying to domains where it would be counter-productive), it is always better to apply The Art of War in case where the antagonist takes advantage of the book. This conclusion has been illustrated by a non zero-sum game model, built with the help of the table above, which is shown in Fig. no. 4.

According to the assumption that the efficient use of The Art of War is profitable for a user (gives him advantage = one point) and that the inefficient use harms nobody. There is no prisoner’s dilemma here (cooperation/rivalry alternative). In addition, the payoffs are kept as simply as possible (advantage is one point, harm is minus one point, the rest is null). Obviously, any change of arithmetical values of payoffs may have impact of game results. The Nash equilibrium shown above is at once its Pareto optimality, which means that “an outcome of a game is Pareto optimal if there is no other outcome that makes every player at least as well off and at least one player strictly better off. That is, a Pareto optimal outcome cannot be improved upon without hurting at least one player”\(^60\). Therefore common applying of The Art of War under given conditions is not only justified but also is the most stable position in such game. This simple model might explain in terms of game theory the popularity of this core book of Chinese strategic thought?

The model gets more complicated if the information factors are introduced. The mutual thinking: “He knows that I know that we both read Sun Tzu” is an example of “he-thinks-that-I-think” regresses, to quote Peter Ordeshook\(^61\). In the model seen in Fig. no. 5, having information that the other side read this book gives us advantage only when we assume that the reader use it efficiently at the same time and we also decide to use it in order to counter-balance his

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WHOSE ADVANTAGE?</th>
<th>A uses it</th>
<th>A uses inefficiently</th>
<th>A uses self-harming</th>
<th>A doesn’t use it</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B uses it</td>
<td>even</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B uses inefficiently</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>even</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>even</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B uses self-harming</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>even</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B doesn’t use it</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>even</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>even</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure no. 3: A simple game matrix showing the confrontation of two players (A and B) using or not using Sun Tzu’s principles. For each of them, there are four possible cases: 1) a player uses Sun Tzu’s principles, 2) he uses them but either they are ineffective or a player is not skilful enough to use them efficiently, 3) he uses them but he damages his own strategy (the worst case) or 4) a player simply does not use it.

\(^{60}\) http://www.gametheory.net/dictionary/ParetoOptimal.html.

payoffs, random factors and so forth. Certainly, our reasoning can be even far more complex. Another complication we can add is the question: “He read Sun Tzu. He uses it always, sometimes, seldom or never?” with a proper model describing this “battle of wits” which turns armed struggle or political conflict into psychological game.

To conclude, what if someone follows *The Art of War* principles when making politics? What impact it may have, even if we assume the rules are ineffective or inappropriate for politics? A good deal of implications depends on the external perception of such strategy. If it is aggressive (by the reason of behaviour of an warlike player) or if it is perceived as an aggression (because some of players considers *The Art of War* as a hostile strategy adapted to war conditions and not to political relations), an escalation of a conflict may occur. Cooperative attitudes are likely to give place to non-cooperative ones.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who's Advantage? (Limited Information Factor)</th>
<th>A read and uses</th>
<th>A read but does not use it</th>
<th>A did not read and does not use it</th>
<th>A read but we don't know whether he uses it (not using using alternative)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B read and use</td>
<td>even</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B / even</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B read and do not use</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>even</td>
<td>even</td>
<td>even / A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B didn't read and don't use</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>even</td>
<td>even</td>
<td>even / A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B read but we don't know whether he uses it</td>
<td>A / even</td>
<td>even</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A / B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure no. 4:** A non zero-sum game model explains why it is always better efficiently use the methods of Sun Tzu in the areas where it is methodologically justified. The Gambit software indicates that the strategy (B uses it, A uses it) (marked in grey) is the Nash equilibrium for this game (no player has anything to gain by changing his own strategy only).

**Conclusions**

The Art of War by Sun Tzu refers directly to politics in a few cases only. It presents an interesting point of view of classical Chinese thought on the role of the State and war. This could be also an element of wider discussion on the three spheres of human activity: mutual relations between political sphere, war sphere and economy sphere, their features and principles of acting within these domains. Still, the Sun Tzu’s references to politics are too limited to conclude that he was a political thinker, although his ideas are crucial as far as strategic thinking.
is concerned. A political leader and a political researcher should, however, know this book for war “is of a vital importance to the State”.

The sense of several further fragments is related with the core of abstract praxiological rules of efficient acting. Thus, the principles of The Art of War contain, in some cases, a meaning that allows to apply them to other domains. Politics is just one example. Of course, such interpretation and transfer are not always methodologically correct, considering strict, almost technical character of many passages in The Art of War that concerns mostly military issues. Nevertheless, we observe a great popularity of this book among non-military readers (and users).

As a result, cognitive side of the phenomenon seems to be a key to understanding what impact may have following The Art of War principles when making politics. The question whether it is justified to follow the theory of struggle contained there, even when somebody’s strategy of acting does not concern armed struggle or any aspect of military conflict, is rather theoretical. The fact is that the Sun Tzu’s book is often used in other domains. Therefore, we should rather ask what is happening when a fascinated fan of The Art of War makes use of it when he should not (from the methodological point of view). Is it efficient for his strategy or have it any influence of possible conflict escalation?

Game theory appears as fundamental background for this kind of problems. Here, the interpretation of a situation, conducted by players, seems to be the one of the most crucial factors, along with such elements as information, perception, players’ rationality and so on. Psychological game that takes place in opponent’s minds is as important as the material side of conflict. Eventually, in many cases, the players decide what game they play: subtle non-zero-sum rivalry or just brutal zero-sum conflict.

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The article in question hints at identifying and analyzing the power factors belonging to the power centres at the global level, just like those belonging to the Arab World. The multitude and variety of the power factors, the efficiency in using them, the adaptation at the existent conditions in order to fulfil the objectives proposed, all these mean a priority within a continuous-changing environment. The influence the states have at the global level is laid, on the one hand, on the natural and human resources, and, on the other hand, on the ability in using these resources and in directing to assure a stable security environment.

**Keywords:** natural resources, crises, challenges and threats, popular movements, social, economic and financial policies.

1. The manifestation of the power factors at the USA level

The power factors give a certain attitude at the global level and determine the relations between the state actors. The geographical, economic, social, demographic, military nature factors contribute to establishing the level of influence on the international scene and to limiting the opportunities of acting at the global level and of having as a primordial objective the fulfilment of the power interests. The appearance of the crisis at the global level meant a challenge, the crisis acting not only at the economic, or social or financial level, but also at the level of reorganizing the government, through the appearance of the political parties and – extremely important – the intention of observing the democratic principles (Arab World)\(^1\).

Analysing the aspects that contribute to establishing a certain statute at the global level, the territorial factor shows, as well, a peculiar importance. On this ground, the USA is situated on the third place, after the Russian Federation and Canada. The geographical position and the afferent resources turned out to be an advantage for the USA, encouraging the appearance of a world power position and having a great influence at all levels, the position at the global level being the premise for the super-power statute belonging to the USA. Canada and Mexico – the countries in the neighbourhood of the USA – do not represent a threat for this, and the oceans that border the USA are like a separation from the rival states, discouraging these states from the possible attempts. This aspect is supported by the impressive quantity of operational nuclear armament, as well, that the USA has, this aspect being a supplementary element for the global

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position of the USA.

The geographical position has also supported the development of the USA as a significant continental power.2

We have presented some favourable elements for a state actor, elements given by the geographical position and the influences a good geographical position could have. The resources, together with the geographical position, are a real advantage for the USA. Having a climate pre-eminently temperate, arctic and semi-arid (the areas with semi-arid climate being favourable for agriculture), the USA has important food resources. The energetic resources – which mean another strong point for the USA – are, also, owed to the geographical particularities of this. Oil – another extremely important resource – places the USA on the third place at the global level regarding oil production (10.7 % out of the total production)3. The production of natural gases is, also, very important, the USA being on the first place at the global level, surpassing the Russian Federation.

North America stood out not only as one of the main producers of oil products, but also as an actor who has identified and turned to good account new energetic sources, for example oil sands in Canada, oil resources in the USA and Mexico waters, shale gas, biofuels, etc.

The analysis of the trends regarding the use of the resources, trends that meant a study theme in different works4, justifies us to say that North America will become the new Middle East. Identifying and turning to good account the resources the demographical changes, the methods to reduce the fuel consumption, all these have brought their contribution to obtaining some good results, some advantages economically speaking, meaning a strong point to get a certain position in the power relations. To use the energetic resources efficiently means an energetic independence, this aspect being almost fulfilled by the USA and, from here, a certain position in the power reports with other strong states, for example China, the country that is getting more and more dependent on the energetic resources. The positive influence of the energetic security development on the economic and financial crisis will influence, as well, the unemployment. The level of the unemployment isn’t a difficult problem for the USA (6.1%), not having the same influence it has within the member states of the European Union (10.0%)5, where the unemployment could be a weak point, this aspect leading to the decreasing of the European Union cohesion. A high unemployment in the European area will lead to a movement of the working force towards the USA and towards the Western countries6. The revolution in the energetic plan, the banking system, the strengthening of the property system, the decrease of the budget deficit in 2013, the political stability – all these elements have brought their contribution to the USA strengthening at the economic level and, not only economically speaking, but also, their contribution to neutralizing the economic and financial crisis effects in 2007.

Another factor that shows importance in analyzing the influence of the power factors is the demographical factor, from this point of view the USA being on the third place in the world, overtaken by China and India7. A certain part of

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the active population of other states directs to the USA, so the aging process of the population has a less effect at the demographical level. The USA accepted the population came from other states, being eager about integrating the new-come people into the American Society.

The military factor was influenced by the economic and financial crisis, but the budget funds allocated weren’t reduced significantly, the USA still investing, at the greatest extent, into the military plan or part. Although the budget allocated to the defence was diminished, Washington wasn’t less disposed to invest into defence, not being very much affected by the economic and financial crisis, according to a statistics of the Office of Management and Budget of the US Government, the conception regarding the funds allocation being maintained in 2015, as well, the amount allocated this year being of about 577 milliards of dollars.\(^8\)

The USA army is based on voluntaries, this aspect demanding important funds, enough for assuring a viable motivation to those acting inside different operation theatres. The USA military power consists in investing funds in defence materials, equipments, armament, etc., in the number of well-trained troops, but also in specific technologic and nuclear development.

The power sources specific to the unipolarity epoch are still present, conferring to the USA the statute of major actor on the international scene, though the context at the global level has been changed, from a unipolar world to a multipolar one.

But the power and its approach are relative at the present moment, the existence of a state actor having a power comparable with the USA power being out of question, the USA proving political, social, economic and military stability. The relative character of the power is obvious and, owing to the changes at the internal and external level, the USA have adopted a policy of reconsidering the strategic priorities on the ground of the existent power sources and on the changes appeared in the security international environment.

Relevant, taking into account the influence of the power factors, are the relations between the USA and the European Union, relations that have been developed from simple diplomatic relations in the 90’s to collaboration relations based on principles and values accepted: “democracy, fundamental rights, state law, human dignity, solidarity”, the two giving importance to the transatlantic community not only geographically speaking, but also in accordance to some commune rules. As the international society has begun to face more and more complex threats, more and more difficult to approach threats, the European Union and the USA had to strengthen periodically their partnership and to elaborate new action plans.

2. European Union – the influence of the power factors

European Union faces different challenges and threats at the internal and external level. The economic and financial crisis, a keen necessity to reorganize the institutions, to adapt to more and more complex international competition, these are elements that need some policies, able to counteract the negative effects generated by the crisis and able to assure an efficient utilization of the economic, financial, of natural and human resources, to assure a favourable position at the international level. The economic and financial policy has as an objective the adhesion of the states to Euro. The unique coin is managed by the European Central Bank. The member states must align their economic policies, emphasizing the increase of the work places and the economic development. By searching, innovating and promoting high accuracy techniques, a durable economy will be grounded, an economy based on knowledge, an economy that must pay deep attention to the climate, the energetic resources, education, social problems, the changes manifested, etc.

The social and workforce policy aims at reducing the unemployment and at obtaining a 75% of the employed population, at diminishing the number of students that resort to abandoning school and at reducing the number of persons

facing the extreme poverty. Common measures and rules have been adopted, these regulate the collective dismissals, the duration of work, the remunerations, the labour contracts timeshare, the part-time working etc., these being measures that take into consideration the efficient utilization of the existent human resource and the best conditions to turn to good account the intellectual potential and to improve the living conditions.

Energetic resources policy and environmental policy are based on a climate-energy Plan, which is aimed at reducing green house gas emissions by the end of 2020 year, at reducing energy consumption by 20% and at using the renewable energy to support energy needs. Regional, agricultural and maritime policies have been developed, aiming at controlling the prices at the international markets (agricultural policy), at reducing the pollution practices of the oceans and seas, at protecting the environment, at increasing the supervision measures, the measures of developing the coastal regions, the areas at the borders, as well.

The alignment and the linking of the legislative provisions specific to the European Union countries is another objective aimed at, taking into account the guarantee of freedom, security, right to reply, to work, to education and to social protection.

As a result of the European Research Council establishment, about 7.5 billion Euros have been allocated for research and innovation, but it is a modest percent allocated GDP (1.8%), comparing to the USA that allocates 2.5% from GDP.

CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) is the base of the states initiatives in the security area, having as an objective to maintain a climate of security, of freedom and of a higher standard of living. The military aspects are coordinated by the European Defence Agency. The collaboration of the European Union bodies with those belonging to USA, Canada, Africa, Latin America is based on different strategic partnerships, agreements that reflect the collaborations relations with the states, relations established to defend their own interests and the interests at the global level. The collaboration relations have been developed, also, with the Russian Federation, China, Ukraine, Asia, India, etc.

The European Union has a GDP of about 17 billion dollars, 25.8% of the global GDP being considered the most important economic area in the world. Commercially speaking, the European Union is the most important commercial partner of the USA, China, Russian Federation and India.

The European Union has important quantities of coal, but depends on the import of hydrocarbons from Iran, North Africa and Russian Federation. European Union imports cobalt (Russian Federation – 96%), magnesium (91% from China), germanium (47% from China), graphite (57% from China) etc., having remarkable industrial capacity. Regarding the civil aircraft production, the European Union is situated among the positions of top, at the global level, the military aviation being placed after the USA army. The European Union has an important position in mobile telephony, being, also, the second internet user at the international level. In what concern the production of the hydrocarbons, three of the five places at the global level belong to the states that have their centre in the European Union. About 30% of nuclear power plants can be found in the European Union. The turning into a good account of the natural resources, the traditions and customs, the maintenance of the natural beauty, mean a viable reason for the development of the tourism, the European Union attracting more than 50% of the total number of tourists at the global level.

The crisis manifested at the global level influenced the European Union, as well, this one facing important debts at alarming shares (Germany, Greece, France, Italy, Belgium, etc.), the increase of the unemployment, the decrease of the living standards and the appearance of

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austerity conditions. The consequences of this situation imposed a certain budgetary discipline, a control of the wages growth, a promotion of competitiveness and efficiency in creating new workplaces, a control of the financial system and a plan established to restructure or to reorganize the insolvent states. The implementation of some strategies for convergence and at the regional level (European strategies for convergence), the attempt to have a common market – without a federal state – the problems of financial, political, social and economic nature, corruption and tax evasion are some elements that determined the crisis in the European Union. Without tackling the problems of the Eastern states, without establishing the important part that transnational corporations have, without annihilating corruption, the European Union could have an uncertain future.

Regarding Romania, the fiscal consolidation must influence the public investment, the reform of the state sector, the budget programming, etc. In the European Union (including Romania), the setting-up of a budget discipline, of a control regarding the internal imbalances, the control of the internal markets, all these are measures needed to adapt to the new challenges manifested at the economic level. At the European Union level there appeared not only a reduction in the economic growth, the fragile environment at the structural work market, the economic discrepancies between the countries in the West, Central, South and South-East parts, a fragmented internal market, a crisis in the Euro area, a high level of the unemployment, but also the settlement of the new partnerships with the Russian Federation, the USA, the Mediterranean partnerships, etc. Romania, as well, being a member of the European Union, aimed at promoting a policy of Euro-Atlantic directions, by becoming a member of NATO and EU structures. Romania has adopted reforms to integrate banking, fiscal and budgetary discipline.

Militarily, Romania’s contribution with military forces is notable, participating in various NATO and other international missions.

The changes appeared at the global and regional levels influenced Romania’s position, as well, this one being situated in the neighbourhood of the Russian Federation. As a result, in Romania were brought an American military basis at the Black Sea and a missile defence system at Deveselu, a defensive project that will be integrated into the NATO missile defence system. The European Union has many weak points, capable of producing destabilization and fragmentation and, only through a permanent collaboration between the member states, through policy for supporting the economic initiatives, the fiscal policy, by eradicating the corruption and tax evasion, by promoting the interest in education, by adopting policies to raise living standards, by using the natural resources in an efficient manner, by developing some durable structures, based on cooperation, on the development of the tourism, of the industry and agriculture, on the reduction of unemployment, the adoption of a budget discipline, by having an objective analysis and by adopting to the present conditions, specific to each state, one can achieve optimal results at the regional and global level, and one can have a stable security environment.

3. Arab World and its specific power factors

In the context of the manifestation of crisis at the global level, Arab countries, as well, faced crises, revolts among the masses, conditions that imposed the formation of the political parties and the setting-up of the democratic elections principle, rules that should be observed by all Arab states, but Saudi Arabia and the countries belonging to the Gulf area, don’t comply with this rules. On this ground appeared Al-Quaeda organization, a fundamentalist organization, focusing on armed struggle.

Ennahda Movement (Tunis), after having obtained a considerable number of votes (37%) in October 2011, did the government formation (Islamist) and a constitution. It is interesting, however, a change in thinking and acting among the Islamists, being interested in occupying some moral conservative and economically liberal positions. Saudi Arabia, however, is governed
by a religious police. In Egypt, Islam is the state religion, and the Muslim Brotherhood, that is the oldest politic organization, must take into account army and other internal forces. The popular movements, the multitude of the religious organizations, the multitude of parties and political groups, have an influence, also, on the relations between the Arab states and the powerful states of the world. The phenomenon of globalization and regionalization is manifested in the Near and Middle East, as well. The Arab states are members of the UNO, IMF, have partnerships with the EU, USA, China, etc., and the great companies in the USA, EU, Japan, Asia have collaboration relations with the Arab states in different fields. Overall, during the last decade, a revival of the Arab world has been obvious, not only economically speaking, but also regarding the politic, collaboration and transparency aspects. However, the army struggles have always been between Arab countries, perhaps the most fearing fight being between Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries.

Apparently, the conflict between Arab countries and Israel seems to be a competition of forces between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, but, at a closer analysis, the regional and global dimensions of this conflict are obvious. The turning of Israel into the first political and military power in the area (1948-1967), the manifestation of the different conflicts at the local level, the interests of the Western countries in the natural resources in the area (oil), were factors that determined many conflicts and, no doubt, the involvement of the great powers in carrying out the conflicts. The military disputes between the Arab countries and Israel became the baseline for the security environment in the Near and Middle East for the power relations between states at the regional and global level. The American and European influence in the Arab world, the economic and democratic globalization have changed the coordinates of the conflict base, leading to the restriction of action freedom for the regional Muslim actors. The Palestinian territories have became an independent state, at the beginning of 2005, democratic elections were organized, the radical organization Hamas having prevailed politically. The conditions of proclamation of the Palestinian state and the setting-up of the peace in the area consist in giving up terrorist policies, maintaining the Israel troops in the area, these objectives being on the spot of achievement. The end of 2010 and the beginning of 2011 brought many economic and social conflicts in the Arab world.

Arab revolts were stimulated by the radical Islamic organizations, this aspect influencing the initiative of establishing a strategy to democratize the Arab world, this being able to be democratized but for the benefit of the Islamists\textsuperscript{11}. The democratization of the Arab world is considered differently by the members of the Arab world, the young Islamists being tempted to accept democracy and transparency and openness at the economic and political level, and the conservative members remain loyal to the religious principles, specific to their religion, as said Ashraf El Sherif, an expert from the American University in Cairo\textsuperscript{12}.

In the autumn of 2011, the leadership of the governments in Tunis and Morocco took over the Islamist moderate parties, but they were unable to carry out the social and economic problems in these countries. The Arab revolutions seem to have influenced the most the European countries, these having many relations with the Arab states. The rivalry between Morocco and Algeria, between Egypt and Syria, between Egypt and Saudi Arabia is outdated by the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, being a rivalry of confessional nature, but also of economic and political nature, Iran extending its activity in the area.

In the newspaper “Le Monde Diplomatique”\textsuperscript{13}, the conflict Iran – Saudi Arabia is seen as a clash between the Islam of the left side and the pro-American conservative powers. In the period 2011-2012, Turkey experienced major foreign policy problems, Ankara being surprised by the Arab revolts. In 2011, Turkey adhered to the

\textsuperscript{13} In the category of A. Gresh from Le Monde Diplomatique, December 2011.
position of the Saudi Arabia, the USA and NATO regarding Libya problem, being interested in this problem owing to the Turkish companies that were developing in the territory of Libya. The Arab revolts led to the failure of some Arab governments to change the Arab society, these governments being still influenced by the policy of the clan, by bureaucracy and corruption, but the tribal relations, especially in Syria, Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, etc. are very strong. In Egypt, also, the period 2011-2012 brought change, the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power, establishing a complex relation with the armed forces, with the radical groups, with the unreligious parties and the Christian minority.

Conclusions

This article analyses and identifies the power factors manifested in the present context in the USA, European Union and the Arab World, seeking to emphasize the influence these factors have on the political, economic and social environment, an environment characterized by a constant capacity of changing, depending on multiple factors. Whether it was about the crises, the revolts, the mutual dependence on natural resources, on material and human resources, on the establishment of political parties based on religious interests or of other nature, on the support of the external interests on certain considerations, on maintaining rivalries, the manifestation of the power factors was obvious and influenced the global security environment. The efficient use of the natural resources is of great importance on the ground of the resources reduction and on the increasing degree of dependence on these resources.

At the political, economic, cultural, educational, etc. level, the power factors have a weaker or deeper manifestation, leading to the interdependence relations between different state actors. The influence of the power factors determines the evolution of the relations in the global security environment.

Depending on the interests and the objectives established, on the existent natural resources, on the determination in overtaking the crises of any nature, one could outline the profile of every state actor and could establish the place of the actor within the global environment.

Using the available power factors, turning to good account the existent resources and identifying the clear objectives, all these are defining elements in having a favourable position within the international environment.

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Acknowledgement

This paper has been financially supported within the project entitled “Horizon 2020 - Doctoral and Postdoctoral Studies: Promoting the National Interest through Excellence, Competitiveness and Responsibility in the Field of Romanian Fundamental and Applied Scientific Research”, contract number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/140106. This project is co-financed by European Social Fund through Sectorial Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013. Investing in people!
Demography is one of the very important power factors in geopolitics, fact confirmed by the geopolitical literature ever since its classical period until present days. The current global demographic transformation emphasizes even more the necessity of this specific analysis in the field. Regarding the case of Romania, to study these dimension is crucial because of the acute negative demographic evolution. Basically it follows some of the regional trends characteristics specific to European Union (from the perspective of the demographic decline, aging perspectives), but also the one specific for Central and Eastern Europe (the emigration issue, abortion, etc). These evolution stay under the signs of an acute demographic crisis, with possible repercussions on the long term, not only at societal level, but even at the geopolitical one. In this context, the present research aims to offer; in a very well articulated frame, a complex analysis of the main demographic vulnerabilities for Romania, that can emphasis its main societal and geopolitical threats on the long term.

Keywords: demography, geopolitics, demographic decline, population aging, migration, vulnerabilities, risks.

Introduction

Ever since the classical period, of first emergence of theoretical and academic approaches in the direction of geopolitics, demography has been constantly considered as one of the most important power factors in the geopolitical equation. In the first phase this was of a deterministic manner (specific to the German school), then transformed into the one of possible (the French school and to a certain extent the American one), alongside with factors of other nature such as the economical ones, military one, etc. Analysing the classical literature, we can assert that the most relevant demographic aspects for geopolitics specific to these approaches are the numerical dimension of population and the structural one – related to the ethnic and confessional structure, but also the elements related to its distribution and organisation.

Coming back in present days, the importance and relevance of demography presence as an integrated part of the geopolitical analysis is highlighted also by unprecedented demographic transformations (the regional differentiated evolution of the population number: growth, stagnation, decline; the new phenomenon of demographic aging; the unprecedented flow of migration), which generate the specific oriented research need over this niche:

1. Regarding our own position, today we dissociate our approach of any approach that would include deterministic and aggression justifying elements specific to German classical scholars, opting for a non-partisan geopolitics. We acknowledge though its contribution in structuring one of the concepts wherewith operates even today, though their sense has new valences nowadays.

2. We have focused our research toward these starting with 2011 until present days.

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demography-geopolitics. Therefore, heavy names in the field of current international geopolitics such as: Yves Lacoste, Frédéric Encel, Gyula Csurgai, Nayef Al-Rodhan, Alexandr Dughin, Francis P. Sempa, Samuel Phillips Huntington, George Friedman, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Francis Fukuyama, Colin Flint, Bert Champman, etc, but also Romanian academia’s personalities

also the qualitative one of population. Related to this is the assertion made by Ramesh Dutta Dikshit back in 2000: “Aspects that regard the population impact the political side; the direct concern of political geographers is the size of the population, it’s distribution, it’s quality and it’s structure.”

2. We consider as a starting point the fact that demography can generate both power and vulnerability, in accordance with the nature of its evolutions.

3. The most important aspects to be considered from the perspective of the demography-geopolitics nexus are, broadly, those structured in 2013 by Gyula Csurgai: “The main factors that can impact the demographic evolution of population are the following: 1. Death and Birth Rates: Differences between these factors in the case of a given population (birth rate of 2.1 is necessary for a continuous population renewal); 2. Age and Generational factor: Composition of the population according to age and distribution of generations; 3. Gender ratio: Male-Female Distribution; 4. Population density; 5. Geographic Distribution of Population; 6. Migration Dynamics: These processes can be internal (within a country) and or external (taking place between countries). Different «push» and «pull» factors can play a role in these processes; 7. Colonization of a given territory; 8. Population movements influenced by state policy to alter the ethno-demographic structure of a given territory; 9. Population change caused by armed conflicts (for instance ethnic cleansing, civil war, and genocide, among others); 10. Population change caused by natural disasters and/or epidemics; 11. Constitution of a Diaspora Population: These groups can exercise

4. Even though the objectives of this research focus only on the quantitative (demographic) dimension of the analysis.


influence on a given geopolitical configuration.”97 Besides, in 2010, Vasile Simileanu presented, from a theoretical perspective, the aggregate of relevant demographic aspects for geopolitics under the following structure: 1. The characteristics of population: the size of population, its density, age structure (population pyramid and the meaning of its patterns), the gender distribution, spatial distribution; 2. Population-related processes of a people: fertility, natality (the determinant factors of natality), mortality, density and 3. The elements related to the ethnic structure of a state, presented under the arch of minority concerns, here being included also the migration dynamics, since those can generate changes in the ethnic structure.

4. The demographic data have a geopolitical valence only analyzed in their evolution/progressive dynamic and of a comparative manner. Namely, from the perspective of a considered territorial unit/state/region, the demographical data must be analyzed, on the first hand, according to their evolution in time for that specific unit/state/region, only so being possible to determine those changes that can generate either opportunities, or vulnerabilities and, on the other hand, data must be the object of a comparative analysis, either of internal nature for the different ethnocultural groups within the unit/state/region, or of external nature for the specific state/territorial unit/region related to other geopolitical relevant units/states/regions.

Thereby the following considerations of the national and international academia are essential as a starting point for any analysis toward the demography-politics research niche:

S. Tămaș, 1995: “Population is an essential variable for the equation of power. Population is a resource of power, but also a subject to actions of power... that is why all the states inventory the population stock and monitor the demographic flows (births, deaths, etc) which modify this stock... from a quantitative point of view, population is relevant for various aspects: ethnicity, culture, religion, degree of professional training, etc.”98

Francis P. Sempa, 2012: “the relative demographic analysis gain strategic relevance only in the moment there are considered in their geographical, economical, industrialization (or the lack of it), globalization context and in the context of information revolution, culture, the nature of governance and other geopolitical factors.”10

Gyula Csurgai, 2013: “The demographic evolution of population can considerably impact geopolitical configurations as it can affect power relation between states. The demographic decline of a country may impact its power position on a regional or global level. … Within states, demographic factors can impact inter-ethnic relations between the majority group and the minorities. In this context, the problem of power-sharing in multi-ethnic states could be mentioned.”11

George Friedman, 2009: the critical number = 2.1. In the context of uneven numerical evolution of population, he draws the attention towards the importance this number has at state level: a total fertility rate12 of minimum 2.1 is a “critical number”. Therefore he asserts: “this is the number of children that every woman must have, on the average, for maintaining a global stable population. Anything under this number means the decrease of population, anything else does not matter any more.”13

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98 Vasile Simileanu, Geopolitica - Centre de putere, Bucharest, TopForm Printing House, 2010.


10 Ibidem.

11 Gyula Csurgai (Ed), 2013, op. cit., p. 11.

12 Total fertility rate (TFR): “This entry gives a figure for the average number of children that would be born per woman if all women lived to the end of their childbearing years and bore children according to a given fertility rate at each age. ... This indicator shows the potential for population change in the country.”, according to in CIA Factbook data, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/notesanddefs.html?fieldkey=2127&alphabet=ter=T&term=Total%20fertility%20rate, Accessed at 2.12.2014; According to The National Institute of Statistics, total fertility rate, named also as “the conjunctural fertility indicator”, “represents the average number of children born alive by a woman during her entire fertile period. For calculating the rate specific fertility rates are summed by years of ages, obtaining therefore a synthetic image of fertility intensity”, data available at http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/Web_IDD_BD_ro /O1/O1_11-Rata total de fertilitate. doc, Accessed at 2.12.2014.

P. Dobrescu, 2008: “Not a single significant element of today’s world can be understood without a direct or mediate reporting to population, its growth rate, its level of education, its degree of health.” Population represents the main «material of construction» out of which the geopolitical influences emerge and anchor. Today’s demographic configuration draw with clarity the geopolitical relations of tomorrow. And no geopolitical analysis can ignore the evolution of population.”

“Population is not the explanatory factor of the nations power. By itself, population can not explain the rise of a state. But its presence in mandatory in the equation of starting, ascension and consecrating a national community. It is not about a simple presence, but about a sustained one of the number and the power that the number gives.”

A final consideration from the specific literature is related to the relevance of demographic analysis especially for the case of Romania. Here we adhere to the position sustained by P. Dobrescu regarding the “population obsession” in the history of the Romanian people. Basing its analysis on S. Mehedinți’s specific argument he asserts the following: “the pursuits of the Romanian specialists in the field of population growth are not at all uncommon in this space. «The population obsession» represents the expression of discovering an essential truth. … In this region it represents the key of the geopolitical equation.”

Those kind of reflections could only appear in a space in which the history has warned that the main support of a people is its number, and the main fulcrum of a state, is its population. This means a narrow geographic space, a space wished-for along history, a space as subjected to various pressures, including of demographic nature. This is why the primary mean of survival would be population increase, the increase of the autochthonous element. Internal density appears as the most proper form of countering the external demographic pressure, of preventing various dangers with which a small state, placed in a space of demographic interferences, would always be confronted with.”

Hence, for a people whom, historically, have based some of its most important geopolitical objectives (the one of surviving in a space of intersection of the international interest and even the one of national union) on factors of demographic nature, the analysis of this type are even more relevant. We conclude by stating that if the demographic analysis must be a part in each complete and complex geopolitical analysis, even more for the case of Romania these are essential due to historical considerations (as we could previously see: “the population obsession”), but even more because of the dramatic demographic evolutions of the last decades, those being the main motivation underlying this research.

2. The numerical dimension of Romania’s population. The progressive comparative perspective of the decline

Especially starting with 2013, a series of personal researches have had the purpose to identify and analyze the core demographic vulnerabilities of Romania. As a result of those procedures we can assert with certainty that our country is facing some very delicate evolution from demographic perspective, which can bring vulnerabilities on the medium and long term for it. These can even have a potential to generate national security threats, but also challenge its geopolitical situation.

The magnitude of this sort of transformation is put under the arch of the term “latent demographic crisis”, as V. Ghețău has caution ever since 2007 (especially regarding the numerical evolution of the population). The main demographic vulnerabilities will be analyzed both from the national progressive perspective (meaning in its temporal dynamics) and from the comparative internal one (intrastate ethnic groups) and external one of Romania as a member of European Union.
(EU), but also as a NATO state from the former Eastern Bloc region (FEB)\textsuperscript{21}, as a state of The Black Sea Zone (BSZ)\textsuperscript{22} and even more as an actor of the neighborhood realities.

From the internal progressive perspective, our country is facing negative shifts of the population size, installed immediately after 1989. We can state that the manner of applying the demographic policies specific to the communist period, by imposing, especially the 770 decree from 1966, and then the uncertain evolutions that marked the period started after 1989, to which are added the socio-economical state of the post Decembrist Romania and the subsequent demographic policies characterized rather by non-intervention, as well observed even since 2000 by Ioan Mărginean\textsuperscript{23}, have lead to the imminent decline of our country’s population, starting with the first years after the revolution. The population of Romania is decreasing continuously for about 25 years and according to UN estimates it is expected to drop even after 2100. Our country’s population has already declined with almost a quarter of its total in only 20 years\textsuperscript{24}, and the UN 2013\textsuperscript{25} estimates show it is likely to lose another 18.53\% of its population until 2050, and 42.34\% by 2100. By 2050, the situation could be even more dramatic if we consider the national estimates, based on last census data: according to V. Ghețău, Romania is expected to lose another quarter of its population by 2050, reaching about 14 mil inh. in 2050.\textsuperscript{26}

From the interstate progressive and comparative perspective, in a previous study we appealed to 2009 US Census Bureau data, according to which Romania within the top states with the biggest population decline globally, estimated between 2008-2040, among states as Russia, Japan, Ukraine, Germany, Italy, Spain (K. Kinsella, Wan He 2009, p. 23).\textsuperscript{27} Updating, in 2013 UN estimated that Romania will be one of those countries in which its population will record a decline of over 15\% of its total population by 2050, alongside with other states as: Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cuba, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine.\textsuperscript{28} Therefore it remains in the top countries with the most consistent population decline estimated at global level.

Regarding its place within the relevant regional dimensions for a geopolitical analysis, Romania not only that at global level is among the states with the most critical position, but also related to the regional dimension one can observe the same position.

- Romania as an European Union member state is surpassed in the top of declining populations only by Bulgaria, this being the most dramatic ones within EU. In this region (EU) we can identify three types of states: the ones that will record some degree of population growth both for 2050 and 2100\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{21} Eastern Bloc = buffer states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia) + former satellite state of USSR (Poland, Germany - considering only East Germany, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria) + Albania + former Yugoslavia states (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia)

\textsuperscript{22} Black Sea Zone = space circumscribed to the territories of those states with opening at The Black Sea: Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine (Cristina Bogzeanu, Evoluția mediului de securitate în Zona Extinsă a Mării Negre și influența acesteia asupra configurării forțelor navale ale României pe termen mediu și lung, Bucharest, “Carol I” National Defence University Publishing House, 2012, p. 8.)


\textsuperscript{25} Based on 2010 estimates, not on the recent data of the last, 2011, census.

\textsuperscript{26} Vasile Ghețău, 2012, op. cit., p. 47. V. Ghețău has questioned some UN Census trends, even since 2007 (V. Ghețău, 2007, p. vii.), and taking into consideration the 2011 census data and their associate trends, he estimates that Romania will count about 14 mil. inhabitants. However, according to UN, the population will register around 17-18 mil. inhabitants, in its medium variant (Romania’s country profile, 2013, volume 2), but we must take into account again these trends are based on 2002 census data.

\textsuperscript{27} Date used in a previous research; Cătălina TODOR, “O altfel de criză: criza demografică românească, simptome, evoluție și consecințe”, Revista de Antropologie Urbană, no.2/2013, Bucharest, Oscar Print Printing House, p. 63.

\textsuperscript{28} ***World Population Prospects The 2012 Revision - Volume II: Demographic Profiles, New York, United Nations, 2013.

\textsuperscript{29} We utilize UN 2013 data, with trends according to 2010 estimates, even if more recent data are available for our country and other states, this because of the universal base of reporting and methodology utilized for prediction, which is extremely relevant for interstate comparison.

\textsuperscript{30} If we relate this growth to the growth of the states that
(Luxembourg: +38.97% for 2050 and +40.94% for 2010; Ireland: +34.15%, 47.62; Sweden: +27.20%, +54.21%; UK: +17.82%, +24.34%; Denmark: +14.59%, +25.95%; France: +15.78%, +25.03%; Austria: +11.33%, +14.10% Belgium: +10.18%, +15.10%, Cyprus: +22.82%, +4.71%; Finland: +6.05%, +7.33%; Czech: 6.29%, +5.04%)

states with insignificant changes (Netherlands: +1.82%, -3.91%), which we can consider stagnant, and the declining states, some of which experiencing a deep decline, as it is also the case of Romania, with a decrease of -18.53%, between 2015 - 2050 and of -42.34% between 2015-2100, alongside with states as: Bulgaria (-31.28%, -52.18%), Croatia (-16.87%, -36.19%), Latvia (-19.94%, -30.22%), Poland (-10%, -31.71%), Estonia (-13.70%, -26.17%), Germany (-12.58%, -31.45%), Lithuania (-16.65%, -31.38%), Slovakia (-8.15%, -28.36%), Hungary (-10.59%, -23.50%), Greece (-3.97%, -15.70%), Malta (-1.88%, -20.94%), Slovenia (1.50%, -12.22%), Italy (-0.81%, -9.76%), Spain (4, 42%, -9.78%).

From the perspective of the former Eastern Bloc, excepting Czech (the only country that will record population growth), all the states are demographic declining (and besides Slovenia, which will lose only 12% of its population by 2100) are expected to lose at least a quarter of their population until 2100. The most dramatic cases are the ones of: Belarus (-22.46%, -40.98%), Romania (-18.53%, -42.34%), Bulgaria (-31.28%, -52.18%) and Serbia22 (-26.67%, -57.97%). Of these states, the NATO non-members have a more unfavorable situation than the majority of the members one (the majority of them have an estimated decline of over 35%), which will record a decline around 30% of their population. Nevertheless Romania alongside with Bulgaria are estimated to have similar percentages of decline as the non-NATO states, being also the most acute ones within the NATO states.33

- Black Sea Zone: the only state in which the growth is present is Turkey (+31.14%, +19.86%). For the remaining states the ranking is as follows: Bulgaria (-31.28%, -52.18%), Ukraine (-26.90%, -46.51%), Romania (-18.53%, -42.34%) Georgia (-18.81%, -31.05%), Russia (-15.82%, -29.06%). Again, our country has a leading position in matter of population decline for this region considered.

Neighbor states. All this states face decline, but Hungary has an advantage compared to Romania and its neighbors. The sequence is: Serbia34 (-26.67%, -57.97%), Moldova (-30.47%, -52.36%), Bulgaria (-31.28%, -52.18%), Ukraine (-26, 90%, -46.51%), Romania (-18.53%, -42.34%), Hungary (-10.59%, -23.50%).

Figure no. 1 and Figure no.2 emphasize very clearly the previous analyzed situation.

In conclusion, from a comparative perspective, relating our country to the states of regions of geopolitical interest, Romania has one of the most delicate situation in European Union and also

Figure no. 1: The comparative perspective towards Romania’s population decline related to the average decline of the geopolitical regions of interest for it35

31 Data obtained by calculating the percentage change of population comparing 2050 with 2010 and 2100 with 2010, according to UN 2013 data.

32 Here UN included also the population of Kosovo.

33 Other states that do not appear previous to the analysis: Albania (-1,77%, -29,61%), Montenegro (-10,16%, -31,9%), Macedaonia (-10,51%, -36,86%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (-13,36%, -38,27%), Georgia (-18,81%, -31,05%)

34 For Serbia remains the previous statement remains valid (UN including Kosovo`s population into the Serbian case)

35 Where FEB= The Former Eastern Bloc.
between the former Ester Bloc and actual NATO member states, the states of Black Sea Zone and even among its direct neighbors.

Demographically, three major types of evolution are at the base of this decline: the rate of natural increase (the difference between natality and mortality; for estimates the index total fertility rate - TFR is essential) – extremely negative for our country, because of a very low natality-, massive emigration and the extremely high number of abortions.

• TFR. This indicators started to record dramatic values for Romania, remaining at an almost constant value of 1.3, from 1995 until 2010, as Vasile Ghețău remarks.\(^{36}\) Updating those with the CIA estimates for 2014, Romania remains approximate at the same value, with a TFR estimated at 1.32. Related to the regional situations of interest, within EU our country places among the lowest positions, being well below the UE average of 1.6 and being among the states with values lower than 1.4 as: Lithuania (1.29), Poland (1.33), Slovenia (1.33), Latvia (1.35), Slovakia (1.39). An opposite situation within EU is the one of the states with the most favourable values of TRF, such as: France (2.08), Ireland (2), UK (1.9), Sweden (1.88), Netherlands (1.78), Luxemburg (1.77), Denmark (1.73), Finland (1.73), and even Belgium (1.65),\(^{37}\) but even so they are under the level of stability, respectively 2.1. Regarding the former Eastern Bloc states, neither of these exceeds the value of 1.77, the average of the region being of 1.41. Georgia (1.77), Macedonia (1.59), Moldova (1.56) and Albania (1.5), have the highest values here. Romania (1.32) is on the fourth last position, only Bosnia-Herzegovina (1.26), Lithuania (1.29) and Ukraine (1.3) recording lower values.\(^{38}\) Among these states, the NATO\(^ {39}\) ones do not have the most favorable situation in the region: Romania (1.32) is on the penultimate place, being surpassed only by Lithuania (1.29). It is followed by Poland (1.33), Slovenia (1.33), Latvia (1.35), Slovakia (1.39), Hungary (1.42), Germany (1.43), Czech (1.43), Bulgaria (1.44), Croatia (1.45) Estonia (1.46) and Albania (1.5).\(^ {40}\) In the Black Sea Zone, Turkey (2.08) is the only state with a positive demographic situation and Romania (1.32), Ukraine (1.3) and Bulgaria (1.44) have the lowest values, the remaining states recording: Russia (1.61), Georgia (1.77).\(^ {41}\) Interesting is the fact that Russia, as a global and regional very important actor, with a rate significantly higher than Romania’s, considers its demographic evolution very dramatic, this being one of the thesis of great interest also for the Russian geopolitician Alexandr Dughin.\(^ {42}\) Meanwhile


\(^{38}\) Idem.


\(^{41}\) Idem.

\(^{42}\) Alexandr Dughin, Bazele geopoliticii, First Volume:
our country does not seem to be preoccupied in this direction. Related the neighbour countries, Romania and these ones record the lowest values globally. In this region only Moldova has slightly higher values, but not sufficient ones for the stability level. From this perspective the ranking is: Ukraine (1.3), Romania (1.32), Hungary (1.42), Serbia (1.42), Bulgaria (1.44), Moldova (1.56). Figure no. 3 emphases the findings.

• Massive emigration. The estimated decrease of population does not take into account the emigration, but as we can observe by statistical data and the academia interpretation this comes with a substantial contribution to the decline of population, at least on medium term. V. Ghețău asserted that emigration “would erode the number of population resulted from projection, at least for the next 10-15 years, if we take into consideration the social and economic discrepancy between our country and the developed ones, and the intention of leaving confirmed by recent selective researches.”

Internally it is estimated that after 1989 “between 10 and 15% of this population has participated to the flow of migration, especially towards the Western countries of the continent, after, in the first years have been exhausted as destinations, for the intentions and plans of migration, USA and Canada.” The country’s population, which has decreased between the last two censuses with 12%, owes this negative evolution in proportion of 83.92% to emigration, meanwhile the natural movement has contributed to this with only 16.07%. At European level, in a precedent study we used Eurostat data to assert: “in 2007 Romanians accounted for 19% of the total intracommunity migrants, and in 2011, according to Eurostat, they formed the most significant group of European emigrants, surpassing Turkey and Morocco at this chapter, their main destination being Italy, Spain, Germany and Hungary,

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Figure no. 3: The comparative perspective towards Romania’s total fertility rate related to the states of the geopolitical regions of interest for it


emigrants (with 42% in Italy and 36% in Spain).549 Passing on the comparative dimension, we can affirm that within The European Union there are two main trends: 1. European states as important destination for immigrants and 2. source countries, where emigration, especially for work purposes one, is at high rates. Romania places in the last category. Here it is to emphasises the fact that Romania is a great human resource exporter even though it exports a resource it shouldn’t be allow to export, taking into consideration its significant population decline. If we analyse the indicator net migration, for 2010–201450 from World Bank, we can observe very clear that, within European Union, while countries as UK (900.000), France (649.998), Germany (549.998), Italy (900.00), Spain (599.997), but also Sweden (200.000), Austria (150.001) or Belgium (150.007) are leading in terms of immigrants import, states as Romania (-44.999), Bulgaria (-50.000), Poland (-38.090), Croatia (-20.000), Lithuania (-28.394) or Latvia (-10.000) are leading in exporting human resources, even though non of these states are facing a superfluity of population, but a declining one.51 Regarding the Eastern Bloc, Romania is among the countries with significant emigration. The only states with positive values are: Germany, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia. Besides Romania is among these NATO members with significantly negative values. Within The Black Sea Zone, the only countries with significantly positive values are Turkey (350.000) and Russia (1.100.002). Romania is among those ones with significantly negative values. From the perspective of the neighbours, the situation is favourable for Hungary (75.000), meanwhile Romania (-44.999) has a similar position to its remaining neighbours: Moldova (-103.050), Ukraine (-40.006), Serbia (-99.999), Bulgaria (-50.000). The issue of emigration is not a strict numerical one. In a previous study52 we have shown that besides the contribution that emigration has on the decline of population, both directly and also indirectly through the cases of abroad family reunification, it alters also the structural dimension. In this respect it contributes to the population aging process, by the fact that the majority of emigrants are belonging to the active segment of age and the emergence of brain–drain phenomenon has potential to affect the quality of the future active population of the country, to these being added the issue of the children implicated in this phenomenon (the children left at home, the children born outside the national borders and the children being part in family reunification process across national borders) with repercussions towards the numerical and qualitative dimensions of population.

• The number of abortions. From an internal progressive perspective, after a long period in which the abortions were forbidden (The Decree 770 from 1966, until 1989), now their number is of 50 to 100 born alive. In a previous study we remarked: “this procedure not only prevent the birth of about 50% more children, but is likely to jeopardize the future health and even the ability to give birth of the women that appeal to such procedures.”53 Referring to the interstate comparative perspective, we find that Romania’s position within EU is one of the most critical ones, both legislative (through the fact that the law allows free abortion on request, being non-restrictive)54 – in the majority of the European states the law allows not restricted abortion, existing only few countries which prohibit it with the exception of endangering the mother’s life (Ireland) – and from the perspective of its rate, being the second in this top, after Estonia (25.5), with a value much higher than the average (11.96), respectively of 21.3. Other states in this top are: Sweden (20.8), Bulgaria (19.7) and Hungary (19.4). By contrast, one can see the cases of: Austria (1.4), Croatia (4.7), Ireland (4.5), Poland (0.1). The Eastern Bloc has a higher average

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50 “Net migration” indicator refers to the net total number of migrants during a period of time, meaning the total number of immigrants minus the one of emigrants, including both the citizens and the non-citizens. Data represent estimates for five years: 2010–2014. (World Bank)


52 Cătălina Todor, 2014 (B), op. cit.


54 In Romania this is legal in the following situations: 1. to save a woman’s life, 2. to preserve a woman’s physical health, 3. to preserve a woman’s mental health, 4. in case of rape or incest, 5. because of fetal impairment, 6. for economic or social reasons, 7. on request, basically being non-restricted. (UN, World Abortion Policies 2013).
(12.97) than the EU one, Romania being again in the top along with: Georgia (26.5), Estonia (25.5), Ukraine (21.2), Bulgaria (19.7), Hungary (19.4). An opposite situation is the one of: Croatia (4.7), Germany (6.1), Poland (0.1), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1.4). As a NATO state within this region, Romania has the first position in this top, followed by Bulgaria and Hungary. In The Black Sea Zone all the states have high rates, but Romania is surpassed only by Russia (37.4) and Georgia (26.5), Turkey having the lowest value of this region (15.1). The ranking among the neighbors is: Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Hungary, Serbia (10.7). 55 The situation of our country is best indicated by figure no. 4, in which Romania is compared with the averages of the relevant geopolitical regions.

3. The structural dimension – population aging. Romania’s case in the geopolitical relevant regional context

From an internal progressive perspective, in a previous study we stress that Romania subscribes to the European trend: according to Eurostat, in 2011 EU-27 had 17.5% of its population of 65 years and over and in 2060 this segment of population is estimated to record 29.5% out of total; for Romania the elderly population is likely to rise from 16% (2011) to 28%. 56 Updating and completing these studies with the regional dimension of analysis, we rely on two types of extremely relevant statistical data: the median age and the old-age dependency ratio. 57 The median age of EU is estimated to be of 41.1 years (2015), of 44.75 (2050) and of 47.58 (2100). Romania is little under the European average for 2015 with a median age of 40, and on the long term very close to the EU trends: 48.8 (2050) and 47.4 (2100). Regarding the Eastern Bloc, we can observe that, in general, the European Union’s states tend to have higher values than the former USSR and former Yugoslavia states. The average of this Bloc is lower than the EU one, respectively of 40.22 years (2015), but the trends are more acute than the EU ones for the dawn of 2050 with a median age of 48.61, here contributing the more acute decline of population, the emigration, etc. For 2100 the median age will return under the EU values, with a median age of 46.91. Regarding the NATO members states of this Bloc, they register slightly favourable situation for example Lithuania (39.7; 44.2; 44.5), Latvia (41.7; 42.7; 43.4), Estonia (41.3; 44.4; 45.1). Generally, NATO states have a higher average age than the remaining states. As far as the Black Sea area is concerned, Romania places somewhere at the middle of the ranking, from the perspective of the numbers estimated for 2015, as well as those estimated for 2050 and 2100. The rankings: Bulgaria (43.4; 48.0; 45.3), Romania (40; 48.8; 47.4), Turkey (30.1; 42.4; 49.4), Georgia (38.1; 43.4; 46.4), Ukraine (39.9; 43.4; 42.7), Russia (38.5; 41.7; 42.4). From the perspective of the neighbouring states, Romania has one of the most acute situations, alongside with Bulgaria and, on the long term, with Serbia, the ranking being: Romania (40; 48.8; 47.4),


57 This Old-age dependency ratio represents the number of dependent aged persons (65 years and over) per 100 persons of working age (15-64 years).
Hungary (41.0; 46.1; 46.5), Bulgaria (43.4; 48.0; 45.3), Ukraine (39.9; 43.4; 42.7), Moldavia (36.3; 45.8; 44.7), Serbia (39.3; 50.6; 49.3).

From the perspective of the old-age dependency ratio, Romania (2015: 22.3, 2050: 48.8; 2100: 51.0) places below the E.U. average for 2015 (26.95) and gets closer to it for 2050 (48.27), only to place again below the average by 2100 (54.48). Nevertheless the situation is not one with a more favorable potential to the E.U., because actually, without an imbalance from this point of view, our country is facing difficulties regarding the financial support of the dependent categories and is not appearing to be proactive towards some long term prevention measures against economic risks which would certainly follow the imbalance generated by the doubling of the old-age dependency ratio and the decrease of active population. Compared to the situation of the Eastern Block, the one of Romania places above the average (2015: 23.75; 2050: 44.97; 2100: 50.46), yet still aligned to the values of the NATO members among the Eastern Block and below the average of the Black Sea Area (2015: 20.96; 2050: 40.58; 2100: 45.5) and, among its neighbors, one of the highest dependence rates along with Serbia, the ranking being: Romania, Moldavia (2015: 16.4, 2050: 31.5; 2100:39.5), Ukraine (2015: 21.2, 2050: 36.3; 2100: 34.5), Hungary (2015: 26.1, 2050: 43.8; 2100: 48.5), Serbia (2015: 21.7, 2050: 48.1; 2100: 57.5), Bulgaria (2015: 31.1, 2050: 50.5; 2100: 45.3).

4. The structural-ethnic dimension. Homogeneity of population and conflict potential

In a previous study, we were conducting a relevance analysis of the internal evolution dimension of population homogeneity; we found that no significant differences had been registered between the last two censuses (2002: 89.5% Romanians, 2011: 88.9%) and that Romania continued to place among the states with a high
degree of homogeneity, despite its historical position at the crossroads of civilizations and despite having been constantly invaded by other populations and considering the intense migration flow of this century which, as we can observe, considerably affects the situation of the Western European states.\textsuperscript{58}

Based on the CIA FactBook data, we may establish the following, at regional level: Romania places among the E.U. states with a high degree of homogeneity, given the fact that states with a very high degree of homogeneity also exist: Austria (91.1% Austrians), Germany (91.5% Germans), Finland (93.4% Finns), Hungary (92.3% Hungarians) or Poland (96.9% Poles), but also states with a lower degree of homogeneity, such as Belgium (58% Flemish, 31% Walloons), Estonia (68% Estonians), Latvia (61.1% Latvians, 26.2% Russians), Czech Republic (64.3% Czechs). The Eastern Block tends to display lower percentages of homogeneity than the E.U. average; the NATO members from this block tend to have various situations, from states with a very high degree of homogeneity (Hungary, Poland, Germany, Croatia), to states with a high degree (Romania, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, Bulgaria) and states with a rather low degree of homogeneity (Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia). In the Black Sea Area, the states tend to have a rather high degree of homogeneity, Romania placing among the highest: Bulgaria (76.9%), Romania (88.9%), Turkey (70-75%), Georgia (83.8%), Ukraine (77.8%), Russia (77.7%). Among the neighboring states, Romania is exceeded only by Hungary, the remaining states displaying values between 75.8% (Moldavia) and 83.2% (Serbia).\textsuperscript{59} Still, the conflict potential tends to appear even in the states with a high homogeneity degree, especially when they deal with minorities of significant percentage (usually over 5%) concentrated in special areas, minorities with irredentist intentions; in this regard, we can appeal to the Conflict Barometer data for 2013. At E.U. level, Romania places among the states with an ethnic conflict on their territory, alongside Belgium (Walloon fractions, autonomy; intensity degree: 1\textsuperscript{60}); Croatia (Serbs, autonomy, intensity degree 1); Cyprus (Turks, secession; intensity degree: 2); Estonia (Russian minority, autonomy, intensity degree 1); Latvia (Russian minority, autonomy,

\textsuperscript{58} Cătălina Todor, 2013, op. cit., p. 66.


intensity degree: 1); Romania (Hungarian minority, autonomy, intensity degree: 1); Slovakia (Hungarian minority, autonomy, intensity degree: 1); Spain (Catalan nationalists, secession; intensity degree: 1); Basks, secession; intensity degree: 1); U.K. (Scotts, secession; intensity degree: 1 and Northern Ireland, secession; intensity degree: 3). At the level of the Eastern Block, we may observe that most of its states face conflicts to whose cause the ethnic-demographic factor also has a contribution; among the states belonging to the E.U., we may also mention: Belarus (Croatian fractions, autonomy; intensity degree: 1), Georgia (Aphasia and Ossetia, secession; intensity degree: 2; Armenians and Azerbaijanis, autonomy; intensity degree: 1), Ukraine (the conflicts have a demographic factor, being encouraged by a significant Russian minority), Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croatians; autonomy and secession; intensity degree: 1), Serbia (Albanian minority , autonomy; intensity degree: 2; Bosnian minority, autonomy; intensity degree: 1; Serbian minority versus Kosovo Government: 2013, intensity degree: 3). As far as the Black Sea Area is concerned, Romania – even though registering low intensity conflicts (disputes) – places among the countries with a rather good situation from this point of view, if compared to that of Georgia, Ukraine or even Russia (Ingush minority , sub-national supremacy, intensity grade: 1; militant Islamic groups, secession, intensity grade: 4; or as part of the conflict with Estonia, Georgia, Latvia and Ukraine, intensity grade: 1). From the perspective of the neighboring states, Romania’s position is more fragile than those of Hungary and Bulgaria, but way more stable than the one of Moldavia (Transnistria: Russian population, secession, intensity grade: 3), Serbia or the Ukraine.

Also from the perspective of homogeneity, another possible issue could be the evolution of the Roma people. In a previous study, we appealed to the following data: the existence of a TRF 3 times higher in case of the Roma people than in case of Romanians, for which even if their actual number represents 3% of the country’s population (real estimation: cca. 1.5 mil. inhabitants), it is possible that by 2050 their number becomes geopolitical significant. The organization Roma Party (Partida Rromilor) estimates somewhere close to 40% of Romania’s population by 2050, but V. Ghețău claims that it is still to be seen how their massive migration towards the western states will influence the demographic behavior, including birth rates. From a comparison point of view, we may observe that Romania has the biggest Roma community within the E.U., the Eastern Block, the Black Sea Zone, but also among its neighboring states, followed closely by Bulgaria. Basically, this ethnicity is mainly concentrated in former states of the Eastern Block: Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland, but also countries of great interest, such as Turkey.

Immigrants: Romania is not yet aligned to the Western European trend, which registers internal security vulnerabilities, especially at the urban environment level – as a result of emerging of minority population concentrations, with a cultural background which differs greatly from the one of the host population (ex. the Muslim population of the great European metropolis). But there are opinions in the academia according to which the long term trends could enroll the country among the Western European trends, even if not at the same scale; as a consequence, the aspect of immigration is one which should be intensely monitored, as it may bring changes within the ethnic structure. By 2011, in Romania, the immigrants formed a 0.75% of the country’s population, while the E.U. average was of 10%. S. Neguț, L. Comite, M.C. Neacșu consider the following arguments for which the immigration in Romania could turn from a transit one to one of destination: the strong decrease of migration rates from 1990 until present; the demographic crisis, the imbalance of the workforce market, the E.U. member status and the economic growth tendency.

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61  Cătălina Todor, 2013, op. cit., p. 70.
5. Instead of conclusions: Romania’s demographic evolutions, a factor generating vulnerability

By correlating the theoretical frame to the results of the indicators’ analysis, we may certainly assert that Romania’s demographic evolutions do not create a potential of power, but rather one of vulnerability, which adds to those of the population’s education and health, as well as its government.

Following the previous analysis, the main demographic vulnerabilities can be systematized as below:

- **Demographic decline**: Romania would most likely lose a half of its population by 2100, facing one of the most serious situations at E.U. level by placing among the states with the most dramatic evolutions within the Eastern Block, but also within NATO and the Black Sea Zone; compared to its neighboring countries, Romania’s situation is slightly more favorable, with only Hungary registering a lower decline.

- **The issue of massive emigration has to be linked to the decline of population.** Romania places among the highest at European level as “exporting country” for migrants, while we cannot speak of a population surplus, which deepens the population decline and contributes to its aging (by emigration of the active population), thus generating a vulnerability potential also as far as the quality direction of the human resource is concerned. Here we may mention two phenomena: the brain-drain and the issue of the emigrants’ children (those left behind at home, those facing the process of family reunion outside the country and those born abroad). The brain-drain, in its main two coordinates - the emigration of highly qualified youth and the emigration of doctors - has the potential of dispossessing Romania of a human resource which is crucial to its sustainable development. As for the issue of the emigrants’ children, this may lead to vulnerabilities regarding the molding of the future active human resource (c.f. the results of the previous research regarding consequences brought by massive emigration upon family and the children involved in this phenomenon). At regional level, we could observe that Romania is by far facing the most serious evolution among the E.U. states; if the Western European countries are destinations - even if registering a slight increase, stagnation or slight decrease of their population - the Eastern members share a common ground in terms of emigration and population decline. Among these states, Romania places highest. At the level of other regions of interest, we may mention that Turkey shows a similar trend regarding emigration towards the E.U., but it also has a population surplus which allows it to do so; as far as the neighboring countries are concerned, Hungary has a positive evolution: with a population deficit estimated only slightly lower than that of Romania, Hungary manages to place among the countries of destination for migrants, whereas the Romanian dynamic is the exact opposite and in the most acute way.

- **The number of abortions is another coordinate which deepens the demographic decline**, with great possibility to also generate vulnerabilities regarding the health of the women who undergo these procedures, thus bringing possible repercussions at the level of future human resources. From this perspective also, Romania displays some of the most dramatic numbers both at E.U level and among the countries of the former Eastern Block; it also has the least favorable situation among NATO and the Black Sea Zone states, placing highest among its neighbors as far as the number of abortions is concerned.

- **Aging of population.** From this perspective, Romania follows the European trend, though placing slightly below the average. As a NATO member from the Eastern Block, Romania places among the states with slightly more favorable values. As far as the Black Sea Zone is concerned, Romania places at the middle of the ranking. Among its neighbors, it registers the most negative evolution, alongside Bulgaria. Even if Romania, from this point of view, places below the European average and follows the regional trend, this does not mean that Romania will have to face fewer difficulties generated by this evolution, because Romania, unlike the Western states, is even now dealing with the issue of supporting the dependent categories (elderly and children). As a result of the economic evolution and of a less efficient governance, with a dependence rate which would double by 2050 as compared to the actual one, Romania will certainly
face not only difficulties, but also, we may say, economic risks and implications, and then complex societal implications.

• **Issues of ethnic structure.** Even if for now we do not observe significant changes as far as the ethnic structure of the population is concerned, we do identify two minorities (the Hungarian and the Rroma one) which may cause vulnerability for Romania. Though placing among the states with a high degree of population homogeneity at the level of the E.U., the Black Sea Zone and among its neighboring countries (here being only exceeded by Hungary), our country also places among those states in E.U. which are dealing with ethnic conflicts within their territory, even if this conflict is of low intensity (dispute). At the level of the Eastern Block, Romania’s dynamics are slightly more favorable, as some of the countries in this region are facing conflicts of a higher degree of intensity: the Ukraine, Georgia, Serbia. As for the comparison with its neighboring states, Romania’s situation is slightly less favorable than Hungary’s or Bulgaria’s, but compared to the rest of the countries its situation is stable. As far as the Rroma minority is concerned, our country possesses the biggest community as compared to all the regional dimensions analyzed and it could significantly grow to the point where it could bring considerable societal vulnerabilities, given the fact that Romania is already facing difficulties regarding the integration of this minority, though the percentage is below the level estimated for 2050. Also from the perspective of ethnic structure, the immigration dynamics are to be monitored, although their present evolution does not yet shape a transformation of the ethnic structure.

All these aspects contribute to Romania facing one of the most disadvantaged demographic positions among the realities which are relevant from a geopolitical perspective to our country: the E.U., the former Eastern Block, the Eastern part of NATO, the Black Sea Zone and the neighboring countries. Some of these evolutions are certified as vulnerabilities at state level by means of their presence under this category within the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy.

Thus, within Romania’s National Security Strategy we can find that: “following phenomena are generating concerns or threats: some persisting negative trends at demographic level, as well as massive migration; the increased level of social insecurity, the persistence of chronic poverty and the deepening of social discrepancies; decreased proportion, fragmentation and insufficient involvement of the middle class in organizing the economic-social life; frailty of the civic spirit and civic solidarity; weakly developed and insufficiently protected infrastructure; precarious state and low effectiveness of population’s health insurance system; organizational deficiencies, insufficient resources and difficulties in adapting the educational system to society’s needs; inadequate organization and precarious of resources assigned for crisis management; insufficient involvement of the civic society in debating and solving security issues.”

Also, within the National Defense Strategy 2010, among other vulnerabilities, together with legislative, administrative, financial, institutional, media, regional development, critical infrastructure, organized crime vulnerabilities, we may also find the demographic ones and those with demographic substrate, such as “negative demographic trends and the population aging process”, as well as “degradation of family cohesion as a result of the migration phenomenon, with powerful negative impact on children and youth.”

Thus, the niche of geopolitical, security and demography research should place among the main areas of national interest, in order to serve as a frame for correct measures. Without the state’s active participation in order to diminish these vulnerabilities, they might turn into real risks for Romania’s societal and even geopolitical evolution on a long term.

We conclude by asserting that demography remains a very important element for Romania within the geopolitical and security analyses, an element which requires very careful monitoring and even interventions in order to alleviate some evolution with destabilizing potential.

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Acknowledgment

This paper has been financially supported within the project entitled „SOCERT. Knowledge society, dynamism through research”, contract number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/132406. This project is co-financed by European Social Fund through Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013. Investing in people!”
THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS – FROM FIRST GENERATION WARFARE TO THE POST-COLD WAR REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

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Among the large number of transformations undertaken by military action throughout history, there were a few elements that stood out and became emphasized, finally turning out to be a dominant feature of every generation of conflict. Without attempting to exhaust the topic, the present article is a review, we could even say an analysis, of the main wars of the modern age, sorted out by specialists in "generations", from the point of view of the decision-making act.

Keywords: decision, warfare, forces, process, conflict.

Introduction

Planning military actions is presented in most publications in the field as being a process. Although we could not deny the usefulness of a process in the manner of planning military actions, especially when it comes to putting them in a certain order and providing them with the necessary explanations, we could deem it as much more relevant that it offers the decision-making factors a logical model of solving complex issues. Making a timely and efficient decision is a significant prerequisite of military structure command on all levels. The most artful element of command consists in acknowledging in due time the circumstances and the moment when a new decision has to be made. This depends on the existence of good judgment and initiative. The most favorable case is the one in which a commandant makes the decision right on time, so as to be ahead of the enemy. Obviously, in order to do that, he needs to posses the ability to know if he needs to make a decision and, if so, when is the right time to make it. A possible answer could be offered by identifying the changes encountered in the military decision-making process throughout history, and especially in the modern generation of conflicts.

Decision and warfare

The junction between the cognitive domain (specific to mankind) and the information domain, as well as the physical domain of the infrastructure of the environment in which we observe, understand, decide and act was transposed synthetically by Colonel Boyd in the OODA Loop of decision-making cycle: Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action. Through its nature, including its fundament of development, this cycle is a process of making military decisions, whose stages are closely connected to the permanent process of checking

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and exchanging information between the reality of the battle space and the measures comprised in the plans made at command level.\(^1\) The changes made throughout time in this domain brought multiple alterations in the manner of approach, with direct influences upon the way of conducting various actions, alterations felt even more intensely due to the challenges imposed by the information age.

If we resort to a familiar military interpretation, by which we consider the amplification of the four stages of the decision-making process, we notice that in order to be successful, the key imperative is to gain superiority by achieving the following:

- To be the first to see and also to see more than the potential enemy so as to gain information superiority;
- To understand better and quicker the enemy’s intentions and own situation, so as to gain knowledge superiority;
- To make faster and better decisions, so as to gain decision superiority;
- To act decisively so as to gain superior effects.

Understanding the manner of waging war and determining the direction we are heading with respect to the future of warfare could be achieved by explaining the actions and interventions made throughout time upon each stage of the decision-making cycle presented above. Researchers of the American Institute of Strategic Studies within the War College consider modern warfare as being separated into four generations\(^2\):

- The first generation warfare.
  - example: Napoleonic wars;
  - features: large armies;
  - combat method: man against man.
- The second generation warfare.
  - example: 1st World War;
  - features: large armies;
  - combat method: fixed artillery against man.
- The third generation warfare.
  - example: 2nd World War;
  - features: rapid transition from one maneuver to the next one; lightening war (blitzkrieg);
  - combat method: tanks/bombers against cities/armies.
- The fourth generation warfare.
  - example: the Vietnam war;
  - features: deterring the enemy;
  - combat method: propaganda oriented against population.

Beside the four generations determined and analyzed by the institute mentioned above, Mark Safranski, in his article *Unto the Fifth Generation of War*, tries to bring to the forefront a projection of the fifth generation warfare\(^3\), which, in my opinion, may be based on the transformations in doctrines, technologies, and organizations occurring in the post Cold War period, transformations synthesized by military experts through the concept of “post Cold War revolution in military affairs”. Mark Safranski states that the warfare of the future will mean a systematic annihilation of enemy networks, which may lead to the supposition that actions will be directed especially towards the first stages of the decision-making cycle. Considering that the previous generations of warfare are characterized by the tendency to get as deeply as possible in the enemy territory, the fifth generation warfare is waged in a common space, going evermore deeply, but not in the enemy territory, but rather in the metaphysical domain, in other, more concrete terms, penetrating the enemy mind. Essentially, this will result in a sort of total warfare, waged against a society on the whole, or only one part of it, and it is very likely that at this moment there is no such thing as “more deeply” for this generation of warfare.

Any analysis of the domain of military leadership and the relationships between this domain and the transformations in the ways of waging war, conflict alterations and so on reveal a link of causality between these elements. Referring to the fluidity of the security environment, the American Secretary of Defense

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Donald Rumsfeld said that “the new threats occur and evolve unexpectedly, very often without warning, in order to surprise us. We cannot afford not to change, and even very rapidly, if we hope to live in this world”.

Moreover, when analyzing wars from the perspective of the moments of entering and leaving each phase of the decision-making process, we notice that the general tendency of each generation of warfare was to act and get as deeply as possible in the phases of the enemy’s decision-making cycle manifesting a tendency which is exactly contrary to the process. Its graphic representation can be seen in the figure below.

In the first generation warfare, such as the Napoleonic wars – characterized by specialists as being representative for this generation, campaigns were directed mainly upon the action phase of the OODA cycle. The armies, which were extremely fluid, marched everywhere where the “boots” of the soldiers could take them. We wonder why the commandants chose to intervene in this phase only. A possible explanation is the fact that the means available at the moment offered relatively symmetrical information to both belligerent parties, the terrain conditions were the only ones known, whereas the precise location of each army was most of the time unavailable to commandants. Therefore, the first generation warfare can be defined as a conflict influenced by the abilities of the commandants to act so as to destroy the enemy forces.

The basic characteristic feature of the second generation warfare is the “direct bayonet attack”, the action being relatively simple. The relevant conflict of this generation can be considered the 1st World War, characterized by long marches of the armies, pack saddled deployments or transportation by train towards the front line where both parties stopped and confronted each other. The exact position of the own troops, where the enemy was, was well known, and the fighter, the soldier knew where it was very likely to find his death (in the fields covered with barbed wire and mines, caught in the enemy crossfire). How did these facts change the decision-making cycle? Relatively simply, by the invention of the telegraph and the beginning of modern communications which manage to provide commandants with evermore information, even though they are at the same time assaulted by a multitude of data and facts without importance.

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This translated in the fact that the peak of war moved deeper in the OODA cycle, the conflict being centered on the capacity of the enemy to orient himself and to make a decision. This type of actions is considered by most military analysts as being the defining elements of the second generation warfare.

The third generation warfare continued to advance even more deeply in the decision-making cycle and to manifest a tendency of breaking away from the action. For instance, the 2nd World War was also fluid; comparable to the campaign led by Lawrence of Arabia in the 1st World War, but the purpose of the war was to paralyze the enemy through uncertainty. The actions of the third generation warfare are centered mainly on the enemy’s capacity of getting oriented. The impossibility or, in many cases, the incapacity of clearly distinguishing between the concentration and dispersion of forces, distraction or drawing attention denied many times the enemy the possibility of creating a complete, whole-picture image of what is going on the battlefield, something which we call today a common operational image. Thus, from the point of view of the decision-making process, the orientation phase “received” the imperative characteristic features of this generation of warfare.

While the wars of the old generations were characterized by fluidity, the fourth generation warfare can be assimilated to a “gas”. This spreads everywhere, most of times in an uncontrolled manner and in most cases the usual, conventional armies find it difficult to determine the profile of the combat. To a certain extent, the fourth generation warfare is concentrated in the image in the enemy’s mind, in a manner similar to the third generation warfare. Still, while the third generation warfare only tries to destroy the overall picture, the fourth generation aims at building a new one. This new image is largely built by or within the decision-making process between the phases of “Observation” and “Orientation”, when people “wait and see”, action represented graphically in the figure above according to the arrows pointing both ways between the two phases. By creating the operational and technical conditions of adopting and implementing a decision through which they are transposed into practice with a higher speed than the enemy’s capacity of reaction, the commandant of the forces has the possibility to modify the environment so as to use it according to his needs and goals. Thus, superiority in making a decision depends largely on establishing and maintaining a dominant position in collecting and processing information and, moreover, in parting knowledge during all the stages of an operation.

If in the third generation warfare the enemy could be “paralyzed” by making use of the doubt, the fourth generation warfare tried and we can notice that in most cases it could succeed in neutralizing the enemy by depriving him of willpower. Thus, in most analyses, this generation is regarded as a conflict based on observation and orientation. The fourth generation warfare allows the enemy to see, to wait, at the same time inhibiting his desire to do something, depriving him of the ability to “wish” to do something. Furthermore, in reality, the fourth generation warfare tries to act upon the civil society of the enemy, to “destroy” it by turning it in an easily maneuverable mob, often incapable of organizing itself, some authors being even more radical in naming it “herds of brainless cowards”. So, the fourth generation warfare is based on uncertainty in the proximity of observation and orientation stages, by creating, exploiting and not lastly increasing them. This uncertainty is further helped by a general chaotic atmosphere created by events that seem ambiguous, even contradictory. Being based on the desire to undermine the essential values the enemy relies upon and, obviously, to maximize internal frictions at his level, this generation of conflict brings out and disclosed fear, anxiety and weaknesses.

Keeping the same analysis model, from the point of view of the decision-making

process, the fifth generation warfare goes even more profoundly in the OODA cycle turning mainly towards the observation phase. The fifth generation warfare is concentrated especially on the enemy’s intellectual power, unlike the previous generations that were directed either towards the enemy’s intellectual power – as the case was with the first generations – or towards the enemy’s morale as it happened with the fourth generation. Due to the remarkable transformations undergone throughout time by the nature of warfare itself and the transitions from the economies based on physical power to the economies based on the power of the brains, warfare had to change too. The war, which used to be so devastating in the past because of its major implications generated by raw and mechanical power, then became the war based on the force of the brains. Acting in a relatively abstract environment, we could say that in certain circumstances war could be waged without the other party knowing whom they are fighting against, while through an exemplary manner of execution premises could be creates so as one of the parties may not even be aware that they have been at war. The actors, the belligerents of the fifth generation could probably be even the intelligence agencies that, specializing in raising and changing impressions, may generate misinterpretations, spread false information, and create deception, building a framework of false reality which may affect even from the initial stage the enemy’s decision-making process.

Thus, a possible conclusion is that the evolution towards the fifth generation warfare occurred naturally, on the background of the post Cold War revolution in military affairs, which is indeed what happened, but, in my opinion, with a certain delay. To be more precise, if the main alterations in the domain of military affairs originated or happened in the '90s, the first years after the end of the Cold War, the alterations in the manners of waging war were felt only after 2000, together with the actions in Afghanistan and even the second conflict in Iraq. Rapid, many times even exponential, evolutions in the fields of science and technology produced a special effect upon the military domain and imposed reorientations, different perspectives and even reorganizations in military actions in general. We notice major changes at the levels of force organization and command systems by using automatic means and automatic data processing, changes in combat technique and ammunition and, why not, in the doctrine area of the system of principles of armed combat. For instance, while classical actions ensured a freedom of action of at least 50 % of the 24 hours of the day, nowadays, the technologies implemented ensure the capacity of the forces to deploy and conduct combat actions in any conditions of time or weather, practically 24/7. In other words, the revolution in military affairs, that is, the transformations related to the organization and doctrine are based on another domain of the RMA concept: technology. To support this idea, we could also resort to James Adams’s statement who, when talking about the art of war, said that nowadays it needs new tactics which might take advantage of the information age. Technology increases the role of high precision armies and determines strategy, while armies show their tendency to change their main orientation from space to time. We notice how the domains defining the concept mentioned above affect and develop each other functioning according to the snowball principle. Nowadays, the warfare of the future is a materialization of the future of warfare and nobody could doubt the metamorphoses that have taken place, are taking place, and will take place in military art and, implicitly, in the military decision-making process.

If we take into consideration all the elements described above, we could agree with the French

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theorist F. Foch, who said that “at war, there are only particular cases; everything is special, nothing ever repeats itself. On the same field, in the same circumstances of time and place, different actions will have to be taken.” To act differently means, actually, to make a different decision. Thus, this statement could be translated through different decisions in similar situations. But what makes us make different decisions? Quite probably, the external factors. Even if the place, the battle space is the same, each confrontation is unique through technique, through the moment of engagement, through the manner of executing fire, through the way of conceiving, maneuvering, and using a lot of other elements, and even through the results expected. Therefore these factors could lead towards making different decisions. The planners of military actions need to take into account elements that until recently were quite irrelevant or utterly ignored due to reasons of efficiency.  

Conclusions

The fundamental restructurings undergone by the world throughout history, the changes in technology and the appetite for the rapid assimilation of the new technologies led to major changes in products, services, organizations. Technology rapidly diffuses its power both towards the individuals and the organizations and nations prepared and capable of using it. In most cases, the military itself becomes the trigger of change, of development, having as a fundamental element the need of security in all its forms. This change, besides being an opportunity, may also be regarded as a challenge for structures generally speaking and decision-makers especially.

The OODA loop model can be considered as generally applicable. From the point of view of warfare, the essential factor in understanding the Boyd cycle is the speed at which a commandant is able to completely cover this decision-making model in order to obtain success. Taking into consideration that the command and control process is aimed at adapting the military structure to the reality of the situation in the battlefield, it becomes obvious that the rapidity of going through stages significantly influences the adaptation to the real situation. At the same time, it is necessary to identify and acknowledge only probable situations when this process becomes vulnerable, as planning does not have as a purpose only solving a situation in the near future, but rather creating the necessary conditions for obtaining long-term successes.

In conclusion, the large number of attempts, searches, and transformations of military action throughout time, by using at maximum level the technological facilities available at a certain moment, leads us towards the definite idea that warfare has been and will always be a mirror of its age.

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**Acknowledgement**

This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number **POSDRU/159/1.5/S/138822** with the title **“Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of Military Science, Security and Intelligence, Public order and National Security – Continuous formation programme for elite researchers - “SmartSPODAS”**.
The End of the Cold War surprised and generated confusion within the international public opinion and security organizations. Mankind was facing a new global architecture in which democracy spread rapidly, requiring a reconsideration of the role of international institutions in providing global security. The events that followed influenced and even led to the transformation of the military in order to adapt it so as to fulfill its fundamental mission – military security. The disappearance of the main global security axis meant a challenge, but also an opportunity for the key actors on the global stage. The most urgent issues at that time regarding global security were who would have the capacity to provide, manage, and supervise it and how they would do that. Following the aftermath limitations of the large-scale intensity military threats, many states analyzed and planned the implementation of changes in the defense strategies segment, and also doctrinal changes in support of military actions. Military structures, as key elements involved in war and crisis response situations, changed their physiognomy, so they gradually became smaller, flexible, mobile, modular, self-sustainable, with highly combative capacity, suitable to conduct military actions away from the home-base, in diverse geophysical and psychosocial environments. The place of mass armies was taken by professionalized structures involved in solving various tasks within political and military alliances/coalitions. The broad and complex modernization process of the military was supported and shaped by technologies specific to the information age.

**Keywords:** action, fight, environment, military organisation, war, security.

**Introduction**

The twentieth century, the century of the two world wars, of regional conflicts and tensions generated by the Cold War, was marked by an impressive and steady arms race. The end of the Second World War represented the hope that peace and harmony among peoples of the world would prevail, diplomacy would replace the power of weapons and democracy would govern the nations. It was not that way. The postwar period turned into a mad race to arms and a prolonged struggle. Old allies (US and USSR) became adversaries; the “hot” war became “cold” and turned into a non-military confrontation, open though limited. The Cold War, phenomenon that influenced the international relations for over four decades (1947-1991), produced major changes at planetary level, in the security environment, as well as in the economic, political, cultural environments.

The collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 represented the end of the Cold War when, at least in theory, a relaxation in international relations occurred, but this moment practically
triggered the process of request and enunciation of a series of theories concerning the new world order, a search for adapting the systems to the new existing situation. It was the moment when, spontaneously, in terms of power, the world shifted from bipolarity to uni-polarity and subsequently to a multi-polarity with asymmetric poles. The unilateralism spontaneously imposed by the fall of one of the opposite poles, put into question all the law principles of the bipolar order: sovereign equality, non-intervention, non-aggression and the non-use of the force or the threat by force, etc. Humanity faced a new global architecture, democracy spread quickly, and the role of international institutions was reconsidered. These events influenced the transformation of the military (military reform), so as to adapt it in order to meet its fundamental goal – the military security of the state. The study of the military from a dialectical perspective answers to some current necessities, which can be considered from quite different angles. First, I should mention a need that is not purely military in nature, but refers to the knowledge of the security environment and its governing laws. This allows a better understanding of the military phenomenon throughout society and also its opportunities, trends and consequences. Such knowledge can be considered very useful for the scientific and realistic validation of the concept concerning what all mankind wants – peace.

Another approach useful in the study of the military evolution is the approach of the military domain itself, the design and organization of military structures, the conducting and management of military actions throughout the international community’s efforts for peace keeping. Accordingly, the study of armed warfare as a specific object of military science, may, like any other social phenomenon, be an object for scientific knowledge, with its objective law and its own dialectics, methodology, research tools and adequate conceptualization.

In these circumstances, in order to meet the new challenges, the military organisation has adapted continuously, both in point of concept as well as in point of doctrine, endowment and structural perspective.

The armed forces, as a system, along with the police and the intelligence services, the judiciary system and other agencies, represent the main pillar of the international security sector.

However, even in the post-Cold War timeframe reality has shown us that, despite the diplomatic efforts aimed at maintaining the world’s peace, the use of force, particularly the armed force, remained, in some cases, the only efficient solution for solving conflict situations.

1. The post-Cold War security environment

At least in terms of statements, along with the collapse of the USSR, the military clashes between the two groups with different political systems and ideologies were rejected. This point is particularly important, being practically the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a new era in the inter-state relations. There has been a systemic change in the international environment affecting all activity fields, particularly the military, which made specialists search for new solutions to adapt the new political objectives for the development and cooperation between states and alliances. Basically, mankind has entered an era where visions (in all activity fields) proved to be very different compared to those who governed the Cold War period. The end of any order announced a new era of uncertainty and even disorder. The disappearance of the main global security axis represented a challenge and an opportunity for the actors still on the stage. The unusual way in which this war ended, the lack of a peace treaty between the former combatants, generated confusion and even overwhelmed the public opinion and the international security organizations. The most urgent problem at that time was global security: who would have the

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2 Ibidem.
capacity to provide, manage, and supervise it and how they are going to do that. In solving this problem a special role was played by the public opinion. This was searching for a new sense of human identity, ruling against any dictatorial tendencies and for the application of norms, principles and values of a real democracy aimed at consolidating the observance of human rights. It was the moment when the process of designing a new model of power began.

The bipolar system, along with its disappearance, imposed the need to define a new system of international relations and a new systemic order largely influenced the evolution of military reform. The public opinion has intensified its pressure on the political factors, determining the revision of the old concepts of security environment and the beginning of a long process of adaptation and reduction of the armed forces. The next period required extensive discussions at expert level, on establishing the new paradigms of world order, from revitalizing the “concert of power” formula to tri-polarity or multi-polarity.3

The period that followed the Cold War can be analyzed as a whole or having as a main landmark the events on September 11th, 2001. Between 1991 and 2001, the Cold War meant setting up a new strategic concept, a suspension (at least temporarily) of the conflict between the two poles of power and the occupation of the central position by asymmetric threats, escalation of terrorism and religious divergences. After September 11th, 2001, global security gained new values, being influenced mainly by the American official position that “America is a nation at war” (Rumsfeld, 2005, p.1).4 An America that proved vulnerable to the vicious blows of the menace called terrorism which was spreading rapidly without any respect for moral values or democratic norms.

The June 1991 Summit, when Presidents Gorbachev and George H.W. Bush founded the Soviet-American partnership, certified the establishment of the United States as the sole global superpower. Basically this partnership contributed to the first American triumph (Gulf War) in his new quality. The Gulf War, where the US led a coalition of 35 states, demonstrated the possibility and capacity of a constructive dialogue between the two poles of power and the direct non-involvement of Russia in solving these problems.

The tension generated by the existence of two political and military blocks finally stopped but peace was not installed in the world. There were numerous centers which emanated violence and produced armed confrontations within the various states. But these secessionist actions had no global implications and, in particular, did not affect the US interests to manifest its global leadership position.

Although the major military powers were not directly involved, the ‘90s hostilities were particularly bloody. Russia on the brink of the collapse, unable to exert influence beyond its borders and concerned with serious internal problems (failure of Chechnya and CIS), did not get involved in anything outside the former USSR borders. On the other hand, if Russia was unable, the United States was not prepared to militarily intervene to restore the order in a unilaterally way.

The multinational experiences for restoration /enforcement of peace by the United Nations in Somalia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were not favorable to the US and showed the world the limitations in terms of collective security, the lack of preparation and organization of states for such missions. If in the Gulf War, a war specific to the industrial era, in which the precision firepower (especially using aerial bombing) was used, the US forces achieved military and diplomatic triumph, conditioned by the favorable context, not the same thing can be said about the wars that followed in which that unusually favorable

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situation and outcome did not happen again\(^5\).

The post-Cold War period has not been quiet at all. In every part of the globe, whether we look at Asia, Africa or Europe, there have been local interstate wars (sometimes just fights) without strategic or political significance.

Analyzing the strategic power of the post-Cold War moment one can easily see that on all standard scales US superiority was so great compared to other countries, that the emergence of a “competitor of the same rank” has not been officially anticipated. However, the outstanding competitor, whose threat has to be taken into account, was not expected long. Just as abruptly as the Soviet threat vanished, threat which for over four decades had given coherence and meaning to the US policy and strategy, the terrorism threat emerged.

Terrorism replaced the Soviet threat and, guided by religious motivations, the phenomenon claimed itself the enemy of all “Zionists and Crusaders”, thus opening the “terror era”.

The dominant nation, competing again, has declared war on terror and terrorists, taking the lead at global level against this insidious enemy.

Classical warfare, mainly interstate and regular, was replaced by an atypical one, of an irregular type, in which the enemy is unstable and difficult to locate. The attacks of September 11\(^{th}\) 2001 had the immediate effect of triggering changes in US policy and strategy. The American reaction influenced and dominated politics at global scale. Al Qaeda and its “hosts” have become the main threat to democratic states, with respect to national and global security. Afghanistan and then Iraq were targets in the fight against international terrorism. Fight against them revealed several inconsistencies in adapting the armed forces, classically organized and equipped, to achieve and consolidate the victory.

At the beginning of the millennium reality shows a world that apparently tends to restore its multipolar feature. The global Hegemon, the US, seconded by actors of regional importance, is engaged in the fight against the Islamic international terrorism, considered the bipolar opponent missing from the equation of the ’90s.

China has begun to abandon its regional power status and is determined to take external responsibilities so as to become accepted as an actor with equal rights among the other global actors\(^6\), practically aspiring to the position of major world power. Japan has agreed to participate in the peacekeeping mission in Iraq; however, India remains latent and cautious.

In Europe, Germany, through its prudent and balanced politics, has stepped away from historical memory, following economic profitability and success, in terms of political fairness towards partners, as compared to France and Italy which seem more economically and politically aggressive, displaying a colonial and corporate behavior. Great Britain seems to have lost his identity as a European state entity and is rather behaving as an “American federal state”.

The fight against terrorism has highlighted the need for high and nuanced protection. A nuclear attack on the US, coming from countries such as Iran or North Korea, is now being considered very seriously along with the possibility of using chemical or biological weapons in various attacks. Ensuring the protection of national territory and the access to vital natural resources is the primary objective of US foreign policy. Virtually the entire international policy meant to ensure global security revolves around the American hegemon. To balance the forces and to avoid the rapid rise of a hostile state, it does not neglect the supporting role of allied states, through setting up a rapid intervention force to be used in decisive moments.

US hegemony may have a somewhat temporary nature, as far as the international politics is currently influenced by state actors and it cannot be dissociated from the non-state actors/ (organizations, corporations, individuals). In the absence of a significant multi-polarity, the USA relies on a clear technological and information superiority, being tempted to indulge in a sort of temporary uni-polarity.

\(^5\) Ibidem, p.167.

\(^6\) Adrian Severin, op. cit.
The events mentioned above and the post-Cold War period analysis revealed that in order to establish security in the current security environment, it is not sufficient to take into consideration only military threats, but also the economic, financial, information, terrorist and all other such threats.

International policies that governed the post-Cold War era, have sought new coordinates by increasing political and economic interdependencies. Economy has become regional through its dimension and monetary circulation with perspectives for globalization.

2. The military after the end of Cold War

After the end of the Cold War, the need for changes in the military domain at political-strategic level gained important implications. It became necessary to achieve political goals that needed to cope with the needs of the new security environment and with the increasingly diverse threats. The need for such changes produced a revolution in military affairs, which transformed the society and the military fundamentally changed the structure and the way of waging war. The new concept of security in the age of globalization is all-encompassing, transcending the narrow scope of the military and referring to economic, political, cultural, demographic aspects and so on.\textsuperscript{7}

The revolution in military affairs, attributed to the Americans, both as an ideology and as a domain of study and research, is a paradigm shift in the field of war and may be generated by new technology, new operational concepts and new types and structures of forces. It seeks to use new technologies to transform the way military units may conduct and execute warfare.\textsuperscript{8} As they are not limited to simple upgrades, revitalization or adaptations, and being confined to a lengthy process, revolutions in military affairs comprise major advances in military capacities and capabilities. They aim at creating profound, fundamental changes, giving absolute preference to technology, affecting the entire “system of systems” among the categories of armaments, ammunition and combat platforms.

Due to the impact produced after the end of Cold War and characteristic to the political, economic, social, cultural and military, internal and external phenomena and processes on the one hand, and regional integration and globalization, on the other hand, the armed forces are facing changes in all aspects and on all levels.\textsuperscript{9}

Regarding the military, along with the limitation of military large-scale and intensity threats, in the aftermath of the Cold War, many states have analyzed and planned the implementation of several changes in the segment of defense strategies and doctrinal changes to support military actions. Thus it was found necessary to change the concepts of combat actions, to adapt doctrines to the new situations, as well as to achieve flexible and modular structures endowed/equipped appropriately for the situations in which they are employed.

The best trained and equipped armies, prepared for a major confrontation during the Cold War, were found unaware, less competent, and we could even say unsuited for opposing irregular structures that do not respect the principles of war.

Under these circumstances, a new kind of warfare has emerged as being very probable for the military, characterized by increasing clashes in civilian domains and by a more efficient use of armed combat, through the use of task forces less in number but highly specialized, relying heavily on a complex protection system, recognition sensors and smart weapons.

Military structures, as the main elements involved in the response to situations of war and crisis, changed gradually their features becoming smaller, more flexible and mobile, modular, self-sustainable, with a greater combat capacity, capable of conducting military actions far from home-base, in very diverse geophysical and psychosocial environments.

The post-Cold War began with the signing, on November 19\textsuperscript{th}, 1990, in Paris, by a number of 22 countries (from Europe plus the US) of

\textsuperscript{7} Mihail E. Ionescu, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 112.


the Treaty on Armed Forces in Europe (TCFE). Although initiated during the Cold War and focused on achieving a balance between the East and the West through reduction, the CFE Treaty has achieved a major contribution to the reduction of armed forces. This reduction of forces, warfare equipment and armaments, was supplemented by the implementation of the most developed technologies.

The extremely spectacular contemporary scientific and technical development is reflected, in all respects, both by the evolution of society and the development of the military. The emerging Information Society influences the military domain too, by improving and becoming integrated within the current military doctrines of modernization plans necessary to win the war in the modern battle space.\(^{10}\) The technical and technological research domains have seen an increasing number of actions meant to design and produce highly performing equipment and armaments that would have to replace the mass type armies which began to dissolve.

If in the interwar period the weapons were made in an ad-hoc manner, in response to the war demand and were limited mainly to the portable armaments, the Second World War changed the concept of endowment opting for combat platforms with long-range and increased efficiency weapons. These were deployed by different means of transport (on land, air and water) with armored protection. Subsequently, the deterrence strategies developed by the US and USSR created armaments industries with continuous operation in order to remove the previous “just in time” approach. These industries in many countries gave rise to private military corporations, thus joining outsourced services and activities and developing the phenomenon of security privatization. Currently, the battle platforms have integrated information systems, active and passive protection, as well as kinetic means.

Military art had to be adapted to the new reality generated by the proliferation of unconventional threats and actions, by the growth and diversification of the missions of armed forces. The end of the Cold War was the mark when the way was opened to revolutionizing the military art by triggering the transition from military power, perceived as brute force (which destroys) to the military power that influences, deters armed combat and participates in building security.\(^{11}\)

The stages produced so far, through the restructuring and transformation of the military process, the new horizons and progress demonstrates its magnitude, complexity and depth and, why not, the interest triggered among the military specialists to meet the new requirements.

Conclusions

Under the current and probably the future conditions, the military actions development will be marked, in particular, by technological developments, with essential implications on the need and possibility of adapting the military organisation, to protect the forces participating in armed actions, in order to survive and fulfill the missions received.\(^{12}\)

I believe that the military has evolved to meet the essential changes, mainly determined by the movement of the military conflicts pretexts from ideological area to the economic, psychological, cultural, ethnic and religious, but also information areas, mixing the classic aggression with new types of aggression imposed especially by technology; renouncing at the use of brute force and adoption of more subtle, surgical ways; increasing the role of last resort solutions of international security organizations resolutions, for preserving security/peace-building in conflict areas, but keeping the

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military option in the role of the best solution by which a political-military superpower can impose its interests; asymmetrical actions which will dictate new features of warfare and which relate mainly to mobility, flexibility, decentralization, maneuverability, adaptability, continuity, high speed action, digitization, amplification of the striking force; vastness of operations in all temporary dimensions and in a multidimensional space etc.

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Acknowledgment

This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/138822 with the title “Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of Military Science, Security and Intelligence, Public order and National Security – Continuous formation programme for elite researchers - “SmartSPODAS”.”
THE INFLUENCE OF UNMANNED AIR VEHICLES ON THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Laurenţiu-Răducu POPESCU, PhD*

The revolution in military affairs and the place of aerospace means without human pilot on board constitute a matter of topicality which raises numerous issues to military analysts. Due to these developments, I will seek to emphasize in the current analysis exactly these innovative solutions provided by the new technologies and the transformations that this category of equipment will generate in the current concepts. I will also present the most recent novelties regarding the integration of remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) in the controlled European air space.

**Keywords:** revolution in military affairs, unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), unmanned aerial systems (UASs), remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPASs), air robots.

**Introduction**

Beginning with the 90s the concept of revolution in military affairs (RMA) emerges in the military thinking. This concept has an American origin, although its defining elements can also be found in other parts of the world. Qualitative leaps are based on quantitative accumulations and nothing really important happens in isolation.

The defining of the revolution in military affairs began at the beginning of the 90s with Andrew Marshall, director of the Office for Evaluation within the American State Department: “A revolution in military affairs (RMA) is a profound change in the nature of war determined by the innovative application of new technologies which, combined with profound changes in military doctrine and operational and organizational concepts, radically modifies the character and waging of military operations.”

I will emphasize below these very innovative solutions of the new technologies (unmanned air vehicles) and the transformations that this category of equipment will generate in the field of military doctrine and strategies and especially in the combat tactics, techniques and procedures. I will begin by approaching the new possible domains of confrontation of the Revolution in Military Affairs and the involvement of unmanned air vehicles in them.

**1. Domains of confrontation**

A domain of confrontation is a form of warfare with unique military objectives.

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characterized by the association with particular forces or systems. For example, we can mention a couple of domains of confrontation from the interwar period that captured the attention of military analysts such as: “armoured vehicle warfare”, “aircraft carrier warfare”, “amphibious warfare” and “strategic air bombing”. In comparison with these, four possible domains of confrontation have been identified lately: surgical strike, informational warfare, dominant manoeuvre and space warfare. As it can be observed, this process is permanently changing firstly due to the technological component of the period of time under analysis. Coming back to the recent times, we can assert that the surgical strike is the most developed one, conceptually speaking, while it remains for the other ones to go the long road towards certification. This does not require that they be developed simultaneously and completely in the near future. It is rather possible that these domains of confrontation of the current Revolution in Military Affairs intersect within the future changes of the way in which warfare is waged. This process requires great imaginative thinking from the part of military planners, without which the advantage of the own forces over the adversary would be lost. The best example in this regard is represented by the two wars in Iraq.

I will continue by briefly describing the four possible domains, namely the surgical strike, the informational warfare, the dominant manoeuvre and the space warfare.

The surgical strike – represents the ability to locate enemy targets, be they fixed or mobile, and to destroy/annihilate them in the shortest time possible and with minimum collateral damage.

This thing must be possible in the first stage of the military action, keeping the forces of the enemy at a distance and pinning them down in all their actions. The effect of the surgical strike must be similar to that of nuclear ones, only without the destructive effects of the latter. When the surgical strike is aimed at the enemy centres of operational and strategic level, the strike itself has a decisive effect. For the first time in the history of military actions we can observe that, within the strike force, the time of reaction of these forces in annihilating the objectives is much more important than the manoeuvre of forces (which is carried out over long distances), allowing the direct and simultaneous attack of several command centres.

In order to achieve this, the enemy operational conception and strategic plan must be recognized in accordance with the selection and prioritization of attacks on its vital targets and objectives. For a maximum efficiency of the surgical strikes, they must be synchronized in time and space through the elimination of one or more command levels and the acceleration of the decision making process, in other words, through an efficient decision making cycle.

At the same time, measures of improvement are required with regard to: extending the reconnaissance and striking area; mission planning; force protection; processing and transmission of data (by diversifying the ways of transmission, by permanently knowing the current situation and by ensuring a continuous flow of data); accuracy and efficiency of munitions (by using last generation GPS tracking and positioning devices and explosive materials); loss/damage evaluation.

All these aspects are also achieved through the use of unmanned air vehicles. On board these vehicles there is electronic-optic equipment in infrared and SAR\(^3\) for enhancement and permanent surveillance of an action area, the mission planning being carried out in real time. Knowing the position of the enemy, the most effective force protection measures can be taken through NBC sensors. Through the onboard ELINT\(^4\), COMINT\(^5\) type equipment the electromagnetic space can be monitored and through the retransmission equipment temporary loss/damage evaluation.

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\(^3\) SAR, Synthetic Aperture Radar.

\(^4\) ELINT (Electronic Intelligence) “information derived from foreign electromagnetic radiations, other than atomic detonations or radioactive sources”, Mihai Axante, Cercetare, informaţii, spionaj, Editura Niculescu 2005, pp. 193-194).

\(^5\) COMINT (Communications Intelligence) “information obtained by intercepting enemy communications” (ex. morse, radio, fax etc.), Mihai Axante, Cercetare, informaţii, spionaj, Editura Niculescu, 2005 pp. 193-194.
connection nodes can be provided. Also, the loss and damage evaluation can be done in real time and permanently. Until 2020 real time sensor and striking systems must become a reality of the modern combat field. These systems for the first time proved their effectiveness during “Desert Storm” operation.

The informational warfare is defined as the combat between two or more adversaries for the control of the informational combat space.

The great dilemma within this combat is that one must act in order to attack the enemy informational systems concomitantly with the protection of the own informational systems. We must admit the fact that it is not an easy problem to solve. Almost any combatant will first try to damage the enemy informational system, especially due to the existence of more and more sophisticated, complex and difficult to protect informational systems. Protection can not be achieved by creating new military organizational structures. The issue exceeds the military field, being rather a problem for the entire national security infrastructure, having numerous access points for those who want to break into the system. Scenarios have been elaborated about potential dangers to informational systems, even though these threats are very subtle. One example of a scenario would be the penetration of the transmission connection of the logistic structures, which would significantly undermine military operations or the introduction on a growing scale of automatic and robotic systems into the battle field. We currently observe this thing as well, but it is certain that more and more such systems will exist in the next 20-25 years. Among these, unmanned air systems have quite a significant projection, together with intelligent mines and cruise missiles of various forms. The decision factors who do not correctly appreciate the vulnerability of the own information system and the manner of programming of unmanned systems will find themselves in great danger. The informational warfare must no longer be considered as a support function or element for the current functions of war: manoeuvre, fire, strike etc.

In the following decades the concept of informational warfare will adapt to the more and more complex equipment with which the force structures will be endowed. These pieces of equipment will affect both the manner of thinking and the manner of decision making. Even at present, decision makers of modern armed forces think a lot about the decentralization of the act of command. This way, even in the case of an enemy infiltration of any kind in the network, the network as a whole will continue to function with other connections.

A major conclusion is derived from the recent “informational bombardment” and concentrated psychological strikes, mainly from the fact that we are growingly dependent on technology. Adapting the concept of the use of UAVs to the new types of systems, threats and conflicts will represent one of the priorities of the near future. It is known that in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, simply when seeing UAVs or hearing their engine, some enemy troops would fly the white flag or would temporarily cease any activity in the respective area”.

The dominant manoeuvre – is defined as the positioning of forces at global scale or in the theatre of military actions, in close correlation with the surgical strike, the informational warfare and the space warfare, aiming to hit the decisive locations and to destroy the weight point of the enemy.

This dominant manoeuvre is important precisely because by deploying forces at the right time and location, through the effects produced, the enemy may collapse psychologically and surrender. The dominant manoeuvre will be concentrated on the enemy weight centre, leaving him without any chance and in the impossibility to continue the fight. As Clausewitz stated at the beginning of the XIX century, victory can not be obtained exclusively through battles of attrition, but through attacking the enemy weight centre

which, depending on the situation, could be its army, its leaders or its main allies. The dominant manoeuvre seeks to benefit from the growing complexity and non-linearity of warfare. It is not solely limited to a combination between movement, supported by fire on the enemy or not, but it rather refers to a positioning of forces on an advantageous alignment that will implicitly lead to the accomplishment of the mission (namely to provoke lack of cohesion of enemy actions and its automatic swift collapse precisely by directly hitting its weight centre). The manoeuvre requires the movement and positioning of forces and not necessarily their engagement and it also does not absolutely requires the existence of superiority in all the areas of the theatre of operations or the supremacy of the manoeuvre in general. Of course, the dominant manoeuvre is the appanage of the armed forces of states with global interests.

Thus, the dominant manoeuvre is and will be important in the military conflicts of the future where other strikes delivered to the enemy are not sufficient to force him to capitulate. Here as well the unmanned air means can have a significant contribution to the monitoring of deployments through UAVs, through strikes delivered by UCAV's if necessary, through support transportation means of combat and logistic materials by UGVs\(^8\), through force protection in littoral areas carried out by USVs\(^9\) and UUVs\(^10\).

The warfare in the cosmic space – represents the exploitation of the cosmic dimension in waging global level and real time military operations. This offers military powers the possibility to project their force at incredible speeds and in unforeseen situations. From a qualitative perspective, it has every chance of becoming a distinct domain.

Satellites, space unmanned means, are support capacities (and rarely combat ones) made up of a space component represented by satellite platforms equipped with multispectral sensors (for example the research and surveillance space platforms, placed on geostationary orbits and/or low polar orbits), a land component and a users component. These mini-systems are connected with each other, being subjected to real threats and vulnerabilities. All the enemy has to do is to exploit these vulnerabilities by interfering with or breaking the connections between these segments which are very sensitive to jamming.

The space component includes the propulsion rocket for launching into space, the satellite itself where the mission load is located (transponders, sensors etc.). Thus we have: the mechanic subsystem; the propulsion; the thermal control subsystem; the supplementary energy system; the orbit control and correction subsystem; the surveillance, telemetry and command-control subsystem; useful loads (specific embarked equipment).

The land component – comprises the totality of satellite and rocket production and storage facilities (industrial areas). Also, it includes command and control networks (antennas, computer networks), launching facilities and centres of information processing and dissemination.

The user component – comprises the totality of receptors of satellite signals. The main beneficiaries are information systems, as well as private customers, who, after paying for monitoring services, benefit from permanent or temporary surveillance of certain objectives of interest.

The missions of C2ISR\(^12\) systems based on the circumterrestrial space are\(^13\):
- reconnaissance, surveillance and early warning against attacks with ballistic vectors;
- tracing ballistic or air targets during their flight to their objectives;
- providing guiding data for cosmic interception systems;
- providing data for air and sea navigation activities;

\(^8\) UCAV- Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle.
\(^9\) UGV - Unmanned Ground Vehicle.
\(^10\) USV - Unmanned Surface Vehicle.
\(^11\) UUV - Unmanned Underwater Vehicle.
\(^12\) C2ISR - Command, Control, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.
- providing large distance communication links for own forces;
- implementation of extended control measures of air and cosmic space, corresponding to all the areas of operational interest for the own forces;

The aerospace forces execute:
- permanent surveillance of possibly hostile states and especially of those which possess strategic forces;
- early discovery and warning of a possible nuclear strike (SAMOS\textsuperscript{14} type satellites, Big Bird) through the detection of the rocket launch due to the heat of the engines (Programme 647 of the US Air Force – DSP\textsuperscript{15} which mainly uses GSO\textsuperscript{16} orbit satellites);
- the testing of new equipment for cosmic objects with military destination (self-propelled satellites carrying sub-satellites with classic combat components or nuclear combat components – currently forbidden);
- the close examination (from 10-15 metres) of cosmic objects on low orbits in order to establish their owner and their destination (USAF military projects – SAINT\textsuperscript{17}, FAST – produced by General Electric and RMU\textsuperscript{18} for the use of automatic satellites for the discovery, interception and destruction of cosmic objects identified as suspect or potentially dangerous);
- the discovery of strategic objectives in the theatres of military operations and the determination of their coordinates in view of their destruction;
- the detection of nuclear explosions occurring in the atmosphere, on the surface of the ground, underground and in the cosmic space;
- conducting topographical research in order to draft or update digital maps;
- conducting of meteorological research for the use of all services;
- conducting radio-electronic research in order to establish the parameters of the communication and radio systems, as well as their coordinates (goniometry);
- conducting research through photographing the main directions of action for the use of the operative-strategic echelons;
- joint and interagency cooperation and coordination, control of the own forces;
- evaluation of the results of combat actions.

The operational advantages of the circumterrestrial based systems are the following:

- free flight access at global scale – The countries with this capacity can obtain information with a single satellite from any location on the planet. Depending on the orbit chosen for the satellite, the overflight of a certain location can vary from a couple of minutes to a couple of tens of hours. At the same time, the technological characteristics of the onboard sensors influence the quality of the information obtained;
- continuity of the surveillance and observation/reconnaissance actions – due to the environment in which the movement takes place (the circumterrestrial space) the satellites/space systems are neither influenced by the geomorphologic characteristics of the surface of the planet nor by weather conditions. Due to these, the long time of functioning, measured in years, without human intervention;
- enhanced manoeuvrability – the systems based in the circumterrestrial space are equipped with propulsion which gives them, depending on operational necessities, the possibility to change their orbit, although these manoeuvres are important energy consumers;
- reduced vulnerability to anti-satellite means (the case of low orbit satellites with a speed of 28.000km/h);
- multiplication of civilian and military missions through: the global positioning system (GPS), the early warning system (weather, anti-missile etc.), higher quality transmissions and telecommunications directly to users (or to other areas situated outside the circumterrestrial space) without amplifiers located on the ground or in space.

\textsuperscript{14} SAMOS - Satellite and Missile Observation System.
\textsuperscript{15} DSP - Defence Support Program.
\textsuperscript{16} GSO - Geosynchronous orbit - geostationary orbit - the orbit of a satellite around the Earth with and orbiting period of approximately 23 hours 56 minutes and 4 seconds.
\textsuperscript{17} SAINT - Satellite Inspector.
\textsuperscript{18} RMU - Remote Maneuvering Unit.
The disadvantages of the circumterrestrial based systems are:
- the maintenance of these systems is difficult to execute and it is often impossible to achieve. The lack of human personnel requires the automatization of commands.
- equipment with increased sensitivity to aerial remote sensing, given the height where it operates;
- the existence of atmospheric turbulences which produce electromagnetic turbulences;
- repeated conversions of emission-reception signals which require major corrections of the images and information coming from the satellite;
- big production and launching costs;
- complicated and risky orbit placement manoeuvres;
- limited payload (radar with limited functioning);
- difficult and costly recovery operations;
- reduced protection to impacts with meteoritic particles.

In spite of all the current limitations, the future capabilities in space transport will make possible the manoeuvre of forces and equipment to operations theatres in a shorter time than via the current air and naval means. The new extrastratospheric Unmanned Transfer Vehicles (UTV) or the Automated Transfer Vehicles (ATV) are notable technological achievements which significantly improved the logistic support of the International Space Station.

Thus, space operations can provide numerous advantages in critical periods of time and situations. The advantages offered by altitude contribute to the improvement of land surveillance and reconnaissance. Space operations are different from air operations because of the environment that is unsuitable for life and for the functioning of electronic equipment, limiting its military use. However, compared to ground command systems, where the distances and the terrain negatively influence the effective achievement of command and control, the cosmic command-control systems can represent viable alternatives. The limitation of the human presence in future space military operations will more and more determine the introduction of technologies that do not require human presence (unmanned space vehicles). Also, the very large sources of energy and quantities of fuel necessary for manoeuvring on circumterrestrial orbits significantly limit its execution. At the same time, orbital mechanics require operation speeds a lot higher than atmospheric ones, covering areas at global level. Thus, the time required for carrying out missions is a lot shorter than in the case of aircraft.

The satellite based space striking systems or other types of trans-atmospheric vehicles can influence the significant increase of the efficiency of surgical strikes. We can currently anticipate the future systems that will be used in space operations such as: orbit based launching installations, directed energy beam weapons or kinetic energy weapons, ballistic missile with cosmic launching bases, defence satellite systems etc. These capabilities will become more and more present in space as the states with space capabilities will have access to unique economic resources (such as He3 from the Moon or from other celestial bodies). From here it comes the interest for holding the supremacy over this environment. There will inevitably be conflicts and implicitly the need to wage military operations exclusively related with objectives of a space nature. At that moment, space operations will no longer have any common element with traditional air operations and will become a distinct domain of confrontation.
In conclusion, the *surgical strike*, *informational warfare*, *dominant manoeuvre* and *space warfare* can constitute genuine components of the revolution in military affairs and in which the unmanned means will have a significant contribution.

2. Conceptual components

The current revolution in military affairs has three components: *technological*, *doctrinal* and *organizational*. The revolutions in military affairs also require conceptual changes beside the technological ones. Of the multitude of concepts introduced by the literature of this domain, as well as from the point of view of the evolution tendencies of military strategy, I will focus only on the three most significant ones, without however minimizing the importance of the remaining ones, namely: *effect based operations*, *network centric warfare*, *parallel warfare* or *hyper-warfare*. We will thus notice that the presence of UAVs on the battlefield becomes a necessity.

2.1. Effect based operations

Effect based operations (EBO\(^\text{19}\)) are defined as a conceptual process “aimed at obtaining the desired strategic result or effect over the enemy, through the synergic, multiplicative and cumulative use of an entire array of military and non-military capabilities”\(^\text{20}\). Another definition, provided by the United States Air Force Doctrine, states that this type of operations represents “…a methodology of planning, execution and evaluation of the results of a military action destined to obtain the result necessary to achieve the desired national security objectives”\(^\text{21}\).

Generally speaking, armed conflict is evaluated through the point of view of results obtained and not of scale of destruction. The concept unfolds across all three levels of confrontation, strategic, operative and tactical, but planning is situated at the operative level. It is well known that to military planners destruction is just one of the ways towards obtaining more complex results, such as interdiction, paralysis or shock. In this case, the preoccupation of planners must focus on quality, on dynamic planning and evaluation, on force conservation and on the best succession of combat actions on the whole.

At the basis of this concept lies the effect based selection of targets, using lethal or non-lethal capabilities, in order to change the behaviour of the enemy and his manner of thinking in the direction desired for the benefit of the own forces.

The last generation sensors and the high precision weapons onboard RAPS allow for the planning and execution of major impact operations at all levels, but the difficulty is to find a way in which the products of the action turn into facts, in focal points for the military action. Thus, effect based operations envisage the relations between actions and effects, being focused both on the physical and behavioural desired effects, taking into account the direct, indirect, complex, cumulative and cascade effects.

The objective based approach is focused on achieving the objectives at one level in order to satisfy the requirements of the next level up. It is a completely different approach than the one practised along the history of military actions, when the objective based approach was focusing on their destruction, on quantity rather than on quality.

The concept of effect based operations provides a dynamic evaluation of the effectiveness of combat actions permanently monitored by unmanned systems.

2.2. Network Centric Warfare

This concept originates in the USA, being studied in detail after 1998, after the publication of the article *Network Centric Warfare (NCW): Its Origin and Future* in the *Naval Institute Proceedings* magazine. The concept of Network Centric Warfare allows for a more rapid and efficient execution of military actions, being

\(^{19}\) EBO means Effects Based Operations.  
\(^{21}\) Air Force Doctrine Document 1, “Air Force Doctrine, AFDD/1.”
Manuel W. Wik defined *Network Centric Warfare* (NCW) in the paper “Network-Based Defence for Sweden - Latest Fashion or a Strategic Step Into the Future?”: “... a group of interconnected people, so that they can transmit and receive the same information if they so wish”. These pieces of information create virtual organizations for accomplishing specific missions. The organization ceases to exist once these missions are accomplished. In fact, this network is formed of a group of interconnected people with access to a certain quantity of information and with a certain level of classification, according to the node of the network that they have access to. In other words, each user transmits and receives only the necessary information. The complexity of the phenomenon is in how developed the network is and who administers it, so that it offers rights of access on levels of classification. Also, *auto-synchronization* in action of the members of the network is very important. The decision making process is carried out in a consultative manner by creating consensus. For this, the intention of the commander and the rules of engagement must be very clearly defined, who is responsible for the accomplishment of the mission as well as the unity of the effort of the members in view of accomplishing the purpose for which the network was created and developed. These aspects definitely require certain categories of sensors and an automatized command-control system on certain levels. In practice, of the multitude of sensors and weapon platforms, unmanned systems are already used. By providing real time information over a long period of time (I refer here to the RPAS autonomy) and striking where the situation becomes critical, these highly automatized systems revolutionized the decision making and acting act. Furthermore, the integration of weapon systems with onboard reconnaissance sensors was achieved, the gain being a shorter reaction time.

Due to the architecture of the network, the combat forces and means have a relative independence (with several leaders). I say this because they nevertheless act within a unifying vision. The advantage can be found in the fact that such a structure is a lot more flexible and adaptable to newly created situations than one based on a hierarchical chain. The existence of multiple lines of communication reduces the vulnerabilities of a network based organization compared to one based on a hierarchical chain, where the enemy has a greater chance of interrupting the decision making chain.

In order to attain these operational advantages a very well organized and secured technological and logistic infrastructure is needed, within which the members of the network can make exchanges of information on action levels, so that they do not become suffocated by residual information or by information without strict operational value. The question is how many analysts will be used so that the users may access only the information with action value. It is a problem to which the network administrators will have to find a solution, especially in the conditions of the current development of transmission / storage capacity. For example, let us remember the year 1991, when the operative structures had a transfer capacity of 100 Megabytes / second, while in 2003 the transmission rate reached 3 Gigabytes / second (30 times more) and it continues to grow exponentially.

The fusion of bits of information represents one aspect, while the distribution of useful information to the operational structures represents a totally different one, with quite complex implications. The functioning of the network requires the obtaining of operational advantages by combat units that should not be neglected, units which could be more mobile / flexible and, of course, leaner, with implications on the allocated logistic resources. Consequently, concomitantly with the increase of the pace of operations, the command-control systems must be reconsidered as well. It is not an easy process but one which requires a developed infrastructure and well trained commanders, both professionally and psychologically. Taking into account that the operative situation changes at a speed unimagined in the past, the notion of decision
taken in consensus by several commanders is too optimistic, seeming even utopian. Furthermore, the commanders positioned on different nodes of the network require a sum of qualities for the act of command, such as: courage, wisdom, swift perception of reality, adaptability to change, improvisation, morality, high degree of understanding of humanity, and all these are in contrast with rigid planning, linear working procedures and blind obedience to orders. We must admit that not everybody has such qualities, which implies a developed selection infrastructure.

In conclusion, the concept of network centric warfare within which force structures have and use unmanned systems is and will be applicable due to the recent digital revolution in it represents in itself the Revolution in Military Affairs.

2.3. Parallel warfare

One of the theoreticians of this concept is colonel (ret.) John Warden (USA) who places value on the air power which reached a very advanced level. According to him, advanced air forces have simultaneous target hitting capacity in any geographical location on the planet. This aspect is known by any military theoretician, as today’s aircraft have and use precision munitions as well as onboard capacities (radars, navigation equipment, air fuelling systems, STEALTH capabilities, supersonic speeds etc.). The simultaneous strikes within the concept of parallel warfare gain a new meaning not necessarily by paralyzing the enemy action system which, according to theoreticians, is formed of several “concentric rings” or the “five rings”, as follows: the armed forces, at the periphery of the system; the population, unengaged in combat; the transport infrastructure; the organic elements essential to the system and the leadership, at the centre. The purpose of the military action is not to destroy all five circles, but to paralyze the enemy system (to break his will to fight) through the destruction / annihilation of the targets with strategic value. Only the air force is able to reach these objectives/targets located in the interior rings of the enemy system. Destruction is viewed only from the perspective of obtaining certain effects.

The central element that runs through all the rings and keeps them together is information. The air forces act informatively (through discouraging information) targeting the enemy leadership. This aspect requires updated intelligence about the enemy, about the location of its vulnerable points, intelligence which can be permanently obtained also through operative-strategic level unmanned air systems (for example, Predator, Global-Hawk, satellites). The best example regarding the manner of functioning of this concept is the air attack on Iraq during operation “Desert Storm”. The current technology allows for the transmission of this type of information.

This concept can theoretically reach its objectives but, in reality, a series of drawbacks have been identified. More precisely, the concept does not have the same meaning in the case of asymmetrical military actions, such as against a weakly industrialized enemy, non-state enemies, terrorist or guerrilla organizations, where the five concentrical circles are not clearly contoured. Let us presume theoretically, they could somehow be identified by the use of RPAS, but the practical problem remains, at least from the perspective of the application of air power in its ensemble.

Another vulnerability of this concept is in miniaturization and demassification, phenomena that are characteristic to the information age. Due to the computer networks and use of satellites for the transmission of information – satellites with dual civil-military missions – the identification of the parts making up a terrorist or insurgent system becomes extremely complicated. In these circumstances, putting parallel warfare into practice is hard to achieve, as the concept does not take into account the possibilities of evolution of the enemy system, which is in continuous transformation.

Beside the fact that it requires the allocation of considerable air force and logistic means, the parallel warfare does not make reference to the joint operations, leaving completely aside the enemy NBC capabilities. At the same time, the concept does not pay increased attention to the
aspects related to the end of the conflict, to political restraints. The concept tries to demonstrate the independent winning of the war through the perspective of air power. The realities in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the contrary.

In conclusion, this concept can be improved and updated in the future through the large scale use of unmanned aircraft. Consequently, I believe that it becomes essential to fully integrate UAVs in the joint environment together with the manned aviation.

3. Important events regarding RPAS in Europe

On 2-4 December 2014 the third international conference on unmanned air vehicles and their use in the controlled air space “Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems Civil Operations Conference” (RPAS CivOps) was organized in Brussels (Belgium) by the Belgian Royal Military Academy and UVS International. It is to be noticed that Romania attended this event through its “UVS Romania” Association.

I will continue by briefly presenting the conclusions accepted by the participants, followed by a few comments at the end, which could be synthesized as follows:

1. The RPAS domain has potential for development and it might at a given moment even revolutionize human society, due to its applications as generator of jobs, but also as platforms for the testing of new technologies, in spite of the negative image of “killing machines” generated by the military applications;

2. It is required, at least at European level, to harmonize the legislation, to standardize specific practices and procedures and to integrate unmanned air vehicles in the controlled air space, so that it might be comparable with the evolution of the internet;

3. Unless the required measures are taken, RPASs represent vulnerabilities to national security, to the safety of the citizens, taking mainly into account their current, but especially their future, performances;

4. The JARUS group will address the RPAS issue if a more active participation of its members occurs. I can mention here that Romania, through its Romanian Civil Aeronautical Authority, was accepted in this international working group;

5. The European Commission presented its point of view with regard to this aeronautical domain in the paper “Roadmap for the Integration of Civil Remotely-Piloted Aircraft Systems Into the European Aviation System”, issue of June 2013.

The Strategy of the European Union in the RPAS Domain has a recent history, beginning with 2009, when the European Commission identified the integration of RPAS in the European controlled air space as its main priority in view of the development of this aeronautical domain in Europe. The activity continued in July 2012 within the “European RPAS Steering Group” (ERSG) – a working group constituted by the main organizations and experts in the European integration of RPAS (AESA, EUROCONTROL, EUROCAE, SESAR JU, JARUS, ECAC, EDA, ESA, ASD, UVS International, EREA, and ECA).

Conclusions and proposals

The conclusions resulting from the Strategy underline the fact that RPASs can be integrated in the controlled air space with the observance of the requirements imposed to manned aircraft and with the observance of the safety standards specific to air operations, which must be in both cases the same. RPASs must not determine the reduction of the safety level, the disturbance of air operations, the change of ATC procedures or the introduction of supplementary equipment.

At the same time, air operations in which RPASs are involved must remain the same as those of manned aircraft and they must follow the requirements regarding air communications and navigation in conformity with the class of air space where the respective flight is carried out. The planning of RPAS flights, as well as flights

\[\text{Prezentată de dl. Remus Dogaru (membru al Asociației “UVS România” și Șef Birou Certificări Naționale/ Serviciul Navigabilitate/Direcția Supervizare/AACR).}\]

\[\text{JARUS — Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems.}\]
in the controlled air space, will be made with the observance of the requirements regarding the management of air routes and the application of procedures/rules regarding the control of air traffic.

Flying will be possible only after RPASs are certified by a national aeronautical authority, mainly envisaging the aircraft type certificate, the navigation certificate within the system, including the command-control system and the satellite communication equipment. The operating personnel must be authorized, especially the operator of the flying vector. The operator must hold an air operator authorization or a certificate and a valid licence.

What is fundamentally important is the fact that solutions are sought for the integration of RPASs in the European air space, as they represent the main priority for supporting the development of this aeronautical domain in Europe. The flight of unmanned aircraft in the controlled air space, without restrictions or limitations, is planned for 2028 (adding that in 2016 a limited integration of RPASs in the controlled air space would be possible).

“In the military activity it is also a pressing necessity to integrate and fuse the C4ISR data (Command, Control Communications Computers Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance) coming from UAVs with those collected by other existing and future C4ISR systems for the creation of a unique data fusing centre. As it has been demonstrated, the engagement of UAVs becomes an integral part in the whole spectrum of military actions. Thus, the presence on the battlefield must be taken into consideration in the process of development and modification of operation concepts, doctrines, standards, tactics, operational techniques and procedures. And not lastly, we must also have in mind the aspects related to the training of commanders and operators within the cycle of education of military and civilian command personnel, within training sessions, exercises and evaluations. The operational procedures must establish a number of principles of engagement which can be elaborated both at the level of the services (for example, the engagement of UAVs belonging to the Land Forces, Air Forces, Naval Forces or Special Operations Forces) or which can be standardized at NATO level.”

I would also like to draw an alarm signal to the political-military decision makers in our country with regard to the threat to national security generated by the enemy unmanned vehicles. Being difficult or too late to detect, they can affect and paralyze the action of the air forces as a whole. Furthermore, being used by guerrilla or terrorist forces, they can create great problems to the structures of the own security structures. The lack of unmanned air vehicles at all echelons beginning with the company level will gravely impact on the real-time information support, as well as on the training that is so needed by military commanders at different hierarchical levels. In order to combat, one must first know how the system functions, while the growing diversity of these systems complicates the issue even more.

For this reason, these systems constitute a challenge that we will have to face in the near future, even if the road will not be easy. As Albert Einstein said “A person who never failed is a person who never tried anything new”, we must act even if the road ahead is not that easy. Without a pragmatic and responsible approach we will not be able to make a step forward in order to demonstrate that in our country as well RPASs can represent a Revolution in Military Affairs.

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This paper was possible thanks to the financial support offered by the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed through the European Social Fund within the project SOPHRD/159/1.5/S/138822, with the title “Transnational Network of Integrated Management of Intelligent Doctoral and Postdoctoral Research in the Domains “Military Sciences”, “Security and Intelligence” and “Public Order and National Security” – Programme of Continuous Training of Elite Researchers – SmartSPODAS”.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS
AS SECURITY THREATS

Irina TĂTARU, PhD*

From climate change, depletion of natural resources and higher numbers of endangered species to industrialization development and implicitly pollution, all of these factors increase the conflictual setting in more and more areas. Given the fact that a discussion regarding the environment is never limited by any borders, arising issues generated by these conflicts occur on both national and international level.

Keywords: environmental conflict, natural resources, sustainable development, security.

Introduction

The environment is represented by a blend of natural and anthropogenic elements, events and energies that are constantly active and which determine the ecological balance of the planet. The environment comprises of “all natural elements of Earth: air, water, soil and subsoil, all layers of the atmosphere, all organic and inorganic matter as well as living beings, interacting natural systems, material and spiritual values.”

The environment is increasingly threatened by human activity triggered by the excessive need to use natural resources which is more widely embodied in the extreme air and water pollution. Environmental security concerns focus in particular on preserving local planetary biosphere as an essential support system which all other human activities depend on.

The need for recognising a balance between human and nature appeared due to the rise of environmental problems, mainly an effect of the industrialization and uncontrolled human intervention in nature and overall this created the concept of sustainable development.

For the first time, the issues affecting the relationships between humankind and environment came to the attention of the international community at the first United Nations Conference on Environment (Stockholm, 1972) and translated into the work of the World Commission for Environment and Development in 1985. In 1987, GH Brundtland presented to the Commission the report called “Our Common Future”, defining for the first time the idea of sustainable development as “a type of development that meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. This concept is the result of an integrated approach to policy makers and policies, in which economic growth and long-term environmental protection are seen as complementary and interdependent.

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1. Environmental conflicts

The environmental conflict term first started to be used after 1960. Nowadays, it is commonly used to refer to conflicts affecting natural resources, pollution control and land use.

Environmental conflict, as defined by researcher Stephan Libiszewski is “the conflict in which the scarcity of non-renewable natural resources—induced by environmental degradation plays an important role.”

In addition to its benefits, economic development also carries negative consequences, such as, among others, political differences on some environmental issues and environmental conflicts. These consequences are amended by environmental organizations which, together with disadvantaged populations belonging to the affected areas, engage in conflicts against the parties responsible for disasters and the destruction of the environment with economic and social consequences arising therefrom.

In Romania, the most publicized conflict environment is the one from Roșia Montana. The mining project was proposed by Gold Corporation (RMGC) in Apuseni Mountains 17 years ago, when the Canadian company Gabriel Resources Ltd. belonging to the Romanian businessman Frank Timis, starts listing mining exploitation licenses on the Vancouver Stock Exchange (17.1 million ounces of gold and 81.1 million ounces of silver) at Roșia Montana. This precious metal deposit is considered among the largest in the world and the largest in Europe. The company plans to open the largest operating mine for gold and silver in Europe, wanting to put into operation four pits of surface and to use the gold cyanidation mining technique. Local organizations together with the overall public opinion have opposed this project. Issues arose due to the fact that Roșia Montana belongs to the Romanian cultural heritage, being a mine founded by the Romans in the time of Trajan and the oldest mining town in Romania.  

The impact of human activity on the environment is a consequence of the normal functioning of the economy. The costs and environmental consequences caused by natural resource extraction, uncontrolled use of agricultural lands and chaotically built infrastructure are supported by the vast majority of the poor population in those areas. Many countries are affected by environmental conflicts generally caused by the growing demand for energy and natural resources. To spatially illustrate these global ecological conflicts, Environmental Justice Organisations, Liabilities and Trade (EJOLT) created the Atlas of Environmental Justice, which is an interactive online platform were approximately 1,000 worldwide environmental conflicts are mapped in detail. Although not many of these environmental conflicts are publicized and well known worldwide, environmental conflicts are currently increasing worldwide and are being highlighted in this map.

The map is broken down by various factors: country, company that caused environmental damages, exploited resource type but also by the type of environmental degradation. India is the country with the highest number of conflicts in the world, 112, followed by Colombia and Nigeria. Leading companies that have produced the strongest natural disasters are Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation with 33 cases, followed by Chevron Company with 12 cases (operating in Romania too). The latter is known for producing the largest ecological disaster in the world in Ecuador, 2011. In terms of which is the most damaged resource, that is the earth (affected in 223 cases, with the most violent conflict being in Darfur), followed by conflicts over water (167 cases). The biggest environmental destruction is caused by mining (212 cases) and gold mining is the most commonly destructive process known the world.

The environmental conflicts classification is performed based on several factors:

- By location: inter-state and intra-state;
- After the driving factors and those involved in their deployment: direct (the actors involved in
the conflict want to access and control the natural resources) and indirect (other factors besides environmental elements are involved);
- By natural resources type: due to their scarcity or abundance.

2. Environmental conflict management

Environmental conflict management covers all conflict intervention types aimed at using natural resources with no regards to environmental degradation, in order to settle and resolve a conflict. Hostile relationships between conflict actors must be transformed into cooperation to better consolidate environmental sustainability. For efficient conflict management the focus should be on identifying the causes which have generated the conflict.

Environmental conflict management is still in its early times and is often characterized by applying general conflict management principles. However, there are some important differences between general and environmental conflicts. Environmental conflicts occur due to an overlap of human and environmental systems, while general conflicts only occur within human systems (society). It takes a minimum of two parties to create a normal conflict. An environmental conflict, however, always has three actors, with the environment (often overlooked) being the third party. To enable a better understanding of nature versus man relationship and as a result of numerous studies, the researcher Simon A. Mason of the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, ETH) has developed the “Human Environment Interaction Triangle” (HEIT). The model is demonstrated by a triangle between human actors (or groups of actors) in conflict and the specific environmental system involved in the conflict.

The HEIT model is created in accordance with the sustainable environment principle which promotes natural resource conservation to future generations. They cannot just simply be transformed into economic goods. Actors A and B symbolize groups of actors such as two countries sharing an international river basin. A and B try to manage the conflict directly in the human environment (upper chart) through coercive means, acting within the legal and institutional framework or through cooperative negotiations.

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9 Simon A. Mason, Kurt R. Spillmann, Environmental conflicts and regional conflict management, Centre for Security Studies and Conflict Research, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich, p. 12.
The actors’ interaction is influenced by their position, their interests and needs as well as their economic, political, geographical and military power available. Actors A and B, are also bound indirectly via their common environment. For example, actor A may consume more water, leaving an insufficient amount to B.

Conflict management is a success when actors focus on interests and needs and the resources cost and benefits are shared equitably; when institutional negotiations are used before coercive means; when the power difference between actors A and B is not too high; when actors perceptions (subjective in reality) are taken into account, and when environmental systems (the objective reality) are managed with a long term time horizon, within the appropriate spatial units.

3. Threats to security

Threats to national and international security are numerous but in the following we will refer only to environmental conflicts, which, as underlined above, are vastly increasing. Although in most of the cases the conflict reasons invoked are ethical, religious or ideological, their true nature is environmental. The need for water, natural resources, fertile soil, etc., is growing, especially since the demographic pressure has started increasing. Most often conflicts are triggered under ideological or legal claims but in fact their purpose is plundering resources (oil, metals, minerals, wood, gems, water etc). Some opinions sustain that these conflicts are financed by major industrial powers or international companies that depend on resources from generally underdeveloped areas. Another dimension of the relationship between resources and conflict is given by the consequences of uncontrolled exploitation of natural resources. In most cases, these operations are for the benefit of a small influential group but the inconveniences caused to local populations are numerous, including forced expropriation, lifestyle degradation, environmental devastation and even social ills. All this leads to violent conflicts, even though affecting only at a small scale (few examples: Niger River delta in Nigeria, Darfur, Sudan etc.)

Material and social impact of environmental degradation may be grouped into threats to human health, economic and demographic constraints. Overall, these elements are an important influencing factor to national security.
Conclusion

Lack of international cooperation on common environmental resources does not usually lead to a military conflict but rather to a lack of sustainable development. This, in turn, can lead to poverty, migration and violent conflicts worldwide. Although environmental issues do not seem to greatly influence political and economic contexts and their specific management effectiveness, they do have a crucial impact on society, particularly in the case of poor countries given their lower resistance to emergency situations.

International organizations have an important role to play as third parties in the management of international environmental conflicts and, most often, they are more efficient than local governments. International organizations should therefore expand their capacity to manage conflicts. This includes tactics such as efficient support, the use of interest-based negotiations and costs and benefits proposals for the use of resources.

The main features of an environmental conflict include a predominantly interstate nature, driven by multiple causes, often locating in developing countries and relatively low intensity.

As we live in an environment which becomes increasingly artificial, environmental security should be highly considered in urban planning, industrial development, international trade, agricultural practices and consumption models.

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Acknowledgement

This paper has been financially supported within the project entitled “Horizon 2020 - Doctoral and Postdoctoral Studies: Promoting the National Interest through Excellence, Competitiveness and Responsibility in the Field of Romanian Fundamental and Applied Scientific Research”, contract number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/140106. This project is co-financed by European Social Fund through Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013. Investing in people!
THE EMERGENCE AND ACTIVITY OF TUNISIA’S MOST FEARFUL TERRORIST GROUP

János BESENYŐ, PhD*
Zoltán PRANTNER, PhD**

Ansar al-Sharia is the most prominent Salafist jihadist organization in Tunisia which was established in April 2011. In the beginning, the movement, which sympathizes with the ideology of al-Qaeda, focused its attention on humanitarian and missionary works. Later it did not balk using violence to enforce the religious norms. The conflict between the Ennahda Government and the organization culminated between May and July, 2013. In the end, the Government designated Ansar al-Sharia as terrorist-organization at the end of August 2013. According to the official reports, the organization is responsible for planning several unsuccessful attempts during the intervening months. Therewith Okba bin Nafaa, the military wing of Ansar al-Sharia, has been fighting an open war with Tunisian Army near the Algerian border region since December 2012.

Keywords: terrorism, Salafi, jihad, Tunisia, Ansar al-Sharia, Okba ibn Nafaa Brigade.

Introduction

The Salafist jihadist movements have strengthened significantly in Tunisia after the 2011 Arab Spring. The Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST), the most prominent local organization, came into existence three months after the collapse of Ben Ali’s regime. The movement, which unreservedly sympathized with the ideology of the international al-Qaeda terrorist-organization, laid emphasis on works of mercy and the dawa, which meant missionary activity in the beginning. After months, it has been took full advantage of the critical economic conditions of the country and the social tensions that originated from the previous situation. It did not flinch away from using the hisba, the enforcement of Islamic doctrines with violence, to achieve its purpose. The conflict between the Ennahda majority government and the organization culminated in May-July, 2013. Finally, the cabinet declared the Ansar al-Sharia a terrorist organization at the end of August. According to governmental sources, the organization tried to make attempts on several occasions during the elapsed time. The Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade, the military wing of the organization, nowadays is fighting an open war with the Tunisian Armed Forces alongside the Algerian border region.

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1. The establishment of Ansar al-Sharia

The Salafist Ansar al-Sharia (Partisans of Islamic Law) was set up by Abu Iyad al-Tunisi (or Seifallah Ben Hassine) in Soukra, one of the suburbs of Tunis, at the end of April, 2011. From the beginning its openly declared aim was to provide services that according to his point of view, the government was incapable to provide. The precise structure of the organization has been unknown until now. We only know that it was built up by a network. The latter consisted of smaller local groups and its structure was like a pyramid.¹

There was not any reliable information about the exact size of the organization, because membership was regularly undervalued by the governmental authorities and overestimated by the supporters. The first adherents came mainly from the working-class in Bab al-Khadra as well as al-Kambes and Malik bin Anas Mosques. The popularity of the AST grew dynamically in a short time due to its intensive campaign and religious activities in the local mosques. In a little while, the base of the AST attracted mainly desperate youths who were disappointed in the revolution and the regime.²

From the beginning the organization emphasized the importance of propaganda to pass its message to a wide mass of people. It established the al-Qayrawan Media Foundation (QMF) on April 27, 2011 to popularize its ideology and work. It ran its own blog and created Facebook pages as well as it regularly published different presses.³

Officially it covered its expenses from donations that mainly Tunisian locals offered in the mosques during the Friday preaching. The works of mercy were also sponsored by prominent foreign – mainly Saudi and Kuwaiti – foundations.

Besides the activity on behalf of the community, it made an intensive campaign to demand the release of well-known Islamist prisoners. In addition, it held peaceful sit-ins on several occasions outside the Iraqi embassy in Tunis and in front of the Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on behalf of Tunisian activist of al-Qaeda, who were imprisoned in Iraq during 2005–2007.⁴

The name of the organization also shows that the main objective of the Ansar al-Sharia is to appear the sharia strongly in everyday life. The ideas of AST about the new Tunisia were manifested at a nation-wide conference in Kairouan on May 20, 2012.⁵

Ansar al-Sharia supported unreservedly the ideology of international al-Qaeda network about global jihad. Despite the ideological identification, in the beginning, the group concentrated vitally on recruiting local volunteers and providing missionary activities (dawa). AST considered its main duty to return to the right way and to strongly enforce Islamic values in everyday life. The long-term aim of the organization was the re-establishment of the Islamic Caliphate.

The Ansar al-Sharia emphasized several times that its aim is not to acquire power. It did not want to accede in internal politics so it did not set up an own legal party. It condemned the state and

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⁵ This occasion Abu Iyad urged the reform of the media, tourism and commercial sectors in accordance with Islamic principles. He also felt necessary to create an Islamic trade union to counteract the powerful and secularist Tunisian General Labour Union. (Lin Noueihed, “Radical Islamists urge bigger role for Islam in Tunisia” in Reuters, May 21, 2012, available online at: http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/05/21/tunisia-salafis-idINDEE84K03420120521, accessed on July 29, 2014.)
democracy and in the distributed pamphlets it pronounced the participation in political life as a polytheist act. In addition, AST regularly posted fatwas and videos from popular Salafi jihadist sheiks arguing against democracy in order to deter potential voters from the poll.\footnote{Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Salafi Challenge to Tunisia’s Nascent Democracy” in The Washington Institute, Improving the Quality of U.S. Middle East Policy, December 8, 2011, available online at: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-salafi-challenge-to-tunisias-nascent-democracy, accessed on July 28, 2014.}

Another important aspect was the rejection of violent jihad in Tunisia besides the radical interpretation of Islam. This statement was not the result of the weakness of Salafi jihadist tendency that could not previously strengthen in Tunisia. At the same time we also have to add to the non-violent-statement that in this case Ansar al-Sharia only rejected the open fight with external enemies of the Islam religion in Tunisia. We have to emphasize this, because the main aims of the organization were the missionary activities and the so-called hisba, which meant an avoidance of forthcoming wrong.\footnote{In practice this means making observations of religious norms in the Muslim community. According to their interpretation this entitled them to attack and assault persons and institutions in necessity that violated regulations. (Daveed Gartenstein-Ross – Bridget Moreng – Kathleen Soucy, “Raising the Stakes: Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia’s Shift to Jihad” ICCT Research Paper, February 2014. p. 4; Sarah Leah Whitson, “Letter to Tunisian Minister of Interior and Minister of Justice” in Human Rights Watch, 14 October 14, 2012, available online at: http://www.hrw.org/es/node/110818, accessed on August 05, 2014.).}

The homemade dawa did not prevent Abu Iyad from supporting violent jihad in foreign countries. This is why he created a dual strategy in the interest of keeping on non-violence and alleviating tensions in Tunisia. He offered an opportunity of choice for his fellows to decide who wanted to do peaceful missionary works at home. The others, who wanted to fight, were sent to Syria, Libya or Mali.\footnote{Aaron Y. Zelin, “Meeting Tunisia’s Ansar al-Saria” in The Middle East Channel, March 08, 2013, available online at: http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/08/meeting_tunisia_s_ansar_al_saria, accessed on July 23, 2014.} In his country he endeavored consistently to make real Islamic moral mainly with verbal persuasion and exemplary behavior in the population.

Influential theorists of the movement are Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the Palestinian writer with Jordanian citizenship, Sheikh al-Khatib al-Idrissi, who is one of the most prominent Salafi clerics in Tunisia, the imprisoned Abu Qatada al-Filistini, the Syrian Abu Basir al-Tartusi, Anwar al-Awlaki, who were killed in the end of September, 2011, or Hani Sabahi.\footnote{Fabio Merone, “Salafism in Tunisia: An Interview with a Member of Ansar al-Sharia” in Jadaliyya, April 11, 2013, available online at: http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/11166/salafism-in-tunisia_an-interview-with-a-member-of-, accessed on August 01, 2014.}

In practice, the organization’s aim was to offer concrete choices for daily challenges and tribulations in accordance with Islam. For example, AST often organized presentations for gaining minds and hearts. On these performances notable Tunisian scholars popularized the thought of returning to Islamic values. In addition, it regularly distributed the works of the Salafist literature among the people on the weekly market, the activist cleaned the streets in public works, they nursed elder locals in their homes, they carried out many humanitarian actions in the refugee camps as well as in the region afflicted by natural disaster, and the organization helped those in need with donations of food, medicine and clothes in the backward countryside areas, which were previously neglected by the government. AST took maximally the advantages of the opportunities of modern age to form a wide supporting base. This is why AST continuously reported its activity on the internet which was illustrated by photos.\footnote{Aaron Y. Zelin, “Meeting Tunisia’s Ansar al-Saria” in The Middle East Channel, March 08, 2013, available online at: http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/08/meeting_tunisia_s_ansar_al_saria, accessed on July 23, 2014.}

2. Warning signs

There were many warning signs from 2011 referring to the will of the Salafists to enforce their Islamist minds and rebuild the state to their own face as soon as possible despite several occasions
of non-violent declarations. The first serious conflict between the government and Ansar al-Sharia occurred on June 26, 2011. Several dozens of AST activists demonstrated on Habib Bourguiba Avenue against the Tunisian film “No God, No Master” that outspokenly criticized political Islam. The demonstrators broke into a movie hall where they crushed the equipment. The police arrested seven people, but about 100 Salafist activists had been demanding the release of their detained fellows two days later in front of the Justice Ministry. The protesters attacked five lawyers and one of the latter ones was taken to hospital. After the incident, the interim government determined to crush the Islamists and arrested 26 people, among them several Ansar al-Sharia’s members.\footnote{Andrew Hammond; Tarek Amara, “Tunisia Islamists Arrested After Clashes in Capital” in 
Reuters, June 28, 2011, available online at: http://af.reuters.com/article/algeriaNews/idAFLE75R14C20110628?pageNumber=1\&virtualBrandChannel=0, accessed on July 31, 2014; Adrew Hammond, “No God” film angers Tunisian Islamist” in 

Three months later the tempers got out of control again due to another film, Persepolis, the Oscar-nominated film. Abu Iyad encouraged his fellows against Nessma private television channel after it had broadcasted the film on October 7, 2011. The next day the Islamists tried to set fire to the TV station and the channel owner’s home was raided.\footnote{Ben Child, “Islamist protesters attack Tunisian TV station over animated film Persepolis” in The Guardian, October 10, 2011, available online at: http://www.theguardian.com/film/2011/oct/10/islamist-protesters-attack-tunisian-persepolis, accessed on July 28, 2014.}

By this time, the demonstrations in the capital happened ordinarily on behalf of women in universities wearing niqab, which covers their whole body. The protesters attacked the riot policemen who tried to dissolve them with tear gas with sticks, stones and knives. Shortly, the street disturbances also spread to the universities. The Salafist activists attacked secular minded students and a little group of undergraduates led by Mohamed Bakti practically kept Habib Kazdaghi, the dean of University Manouba as hostage in his office for weeks in order to force him to give permission to wear niqab in classrooms and on exams.\footnote{Rob Prince, “Tunisian culture wars: the case of Habib Kazdaghi, Dean of the University of Tunis-Manouba” in 

In La Marsa, one of Tunis’s suburbs, other disturbances broke out on account of an art exhibition on June 12, 2012. The temper got out of control after the assault of the gallery. Thousands

of religious extremism was clearly and alarmingly manifested on March 16, 2012. Thousands of Islamist protesters demonstrated in front of the building of Constituent National Assembly in Tunis under al-Qaeda’s typical black banner where they demanded the acknowledgement of sharia as the fundamental source of law in the future constitution.\footnote{John Rosenthal, “Tunisian Salafists Demonstrate for Sharia under Al Qaeda Banner” in 

Nine days later, the flag appeared again in the downtown of Tunis where an originally peaceful demonstration started organized by Ansar al-Sharia for glorifying Koran. The demonstrators took one with them to the top of the clock tower near one of the busiest crossroad of the capital where they demanded the establishment of a new caliphate. Unfortunately the violence did not fail on this occasion either. This time the participants interrupted a performance in front of a theater of the capital when they attacked and maltreated the members of the company.\footnote{Ahmed Ellali, “Several Thousand Salafists Demonstrate for Islamic Law, Attack Dramatists in Tunis” in 
of protesters set fire to the offices of the country’s main labour union in Jendouba, burned a local court in west Tunis and threw rocks and Molotov cocktails at several police stations. At the end of the riots, 65 members of the security forces were wounded and 162 people were detained.\textsuperscript{16}

The turning-point with long-term consequences occurred on September 14. The demonstrations began after Friday prayers on account of a film which portrayed the Prophet Mohammad engaged in vulgar and offensive behavior. The disturbances quickly spread in the capital when Ansar al-Sharia endorsed the rallying call on Facebook by Islamist activists. The protesters marched in front of the U.S. embassy in Tunis with sticks, stones and petrol bombs where they forced their way into the building and started to plunder it systematically. Certain persons hauled down the U.S. flag from the embassy, burned it, and replaced it with the black flag of Islam while others carried off the values. Luckily, no one from the American embassy’s staff was hurt due to the quick arrival of the riot police though the aggressors resolutely stood on the defensive in the beginning. Their resistance ended when the police used live cartridge. During this time, their fellows broke into a nearby American School. They set aflame the building after they took away laptops and computers. On this occasion the clashes required serious casualties: minimum 29 persons got injured and two others lost their lives.\textsuperscript{17}

The assassination of the well-known left-wing secular minded Chokri Belaid on February 6, 2013 was another example of declining public security throughout the country. Disturbances broke out after the opposition leader’s death which someone used to plunder. However the police arrested the majority of these persons in a short time, Ansar al-Sharia found that the time had come to set in its private army, called Neighborhood Committees. The activists, as self-appointed vigilantes, patrolled on streets in 10–50 member groups waving al-Qaeda black flag to provide justice arbitrarily against anyone whose behavior they regarded substandard. Although the crisis-situation passed with few scuffles and the arrestment of a thief, the patrols’ presence made a big impression on locals who were disappointed with the cabinet’s policy. This and the social activity for public welfare together showed explicitly that AST would soon form a separate state inside the Tunisian state. Ennahda had to do something, because the co-operation grew larger between the party’s hard-line elements and AST due to the concessions made to the secularists in the writing of the constitution.\textsuperscript{18}

3. The proscription of the Movement

In the beginning, the moderate Islamist Ennahda adopted an extremely tolerant policy towards Ansar al-Sharia after winning the National Assembly elections on October 23, 2011. It took the initiative and suggested a national dialogue with Salafist. With this step it trusted in preventing the radicalization of fundamentalists who meant a dangerous threat with their illegality and commitment to terror-acts in the long run. However, the positive proposal affected inconsiderably the Jihadist movement, because several members approached Ennahda with some skepticism from the beginning. In spite of positive efforts the first conflicts had been already occured in 2011 when Ennahda made a non-Islamist parties’ coalition. The situation became more and more critical in 2012. The number of Salafist demonstrations increased on the streets where the marchers protested against


governmental policy with violent acts. At the end of December the cabinet offered a new dialogue for those Salafist groups which rejected violence. At the same time for emphasizing the importance of gesture it stressed that it was not willing to negotiate with those ones who disturb public order and promised serious sanctions against them. The relation between Ennahda and Ansar al-Sharia worsened; because the same ideological aspects of the movement with al-Qaeda and its wide missionary activities soon became suspicious. In governmental circles it caused growing anxiety how AST could recruit adherents in such extremely respectable numbers during a short period. The Abna’kum fi Khidmatikum’s (Your Sons Are at Your Service) activity mainly impressed those people who became disillusioned by the government’s policy. These people more and more saw the care they previously expected from government in AST.

As the charity works of the organization became known throughout the country, in the beginning, the government targeted its propaganda. Their Facebook-profile was banned 12 occasions between September 2012 and March 2013, with no effect. The movement emerged again and again to inform its fellows continuously. After the attack on the US embassy, the cabinet was forced to accept the demand of the political opposition and numerous Jihadist persons, among them several Ansar al-Sharia members, were detained to restrain extremists. However, many imprisoned Salafists began hunger-strikes as a protest against the considered unjust procedure. Two of them died in prison in November. So the cabinet did not succeed in shattering Islamists, but gave martyrs to their movement unwittingly.

Despite the growing danger, the government still bewareed of openly confronting with Ansar al-Sharia whereas several members of the organization evidently participated regularly in demonstrations against blasphemous issues and acts. According to the authorities’ suspicions, others did more and they were related with many violent incidents and weapon smuggling in March 2013. However, they could not prove the charges for a long time, so the organization could work further. Then the security forces bore down on members of the organization without any kind of warning on 10-11 May, who distributed their books and pamphlets on the streets. In response, Abu Iyad threatened the government to give up his peaceful standpoint and broke out an open violent jihad against it. In its reaction, the cabinet banned Ansar al-Sharia’s imminent annual congress. The membership of the organization was infinitely indignant at decision and its motive. The disaffected persons already crashed openly with security forces in Tunis and Kairouan on May 19. The protesters threw stones and Molotov cocktails to the policemen, set fire to an armored vehicle, attacked one of the posts of National Guard, closed roads, burned a national flag and plundered. The government gave up its tolerant rhetoric once and for all after the clashes that caused at least one protester’s death and 15 policemen’ injury. Prime Minister Ali Larayedh openly declared Ansar al-Sharia an

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19 “Two years on since revolution, Tunisia struggles with new political realities” in Al Ahram Online, January 14, 2013, available online at: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/62468/World/Region/Two-years-on-since-revolution-Tunisia-struggles-w.aspx, accessed on July 31, 2014.

20 It was a clear indication of the organization’s considerably increasing popularity that only a few hundred people attended the 2011 conference whereas the participants’ number reached 10 000 people one year later. (Mohammad Abu RUMMAN – Hassan Abu Haniya, “Ansar al-Sharia: Al-Qaeda’s Response to Arab Spring” in Al-Monitor, January 07, 2013, available online at: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/policy/2013/01/history-ansar-al-sharia-arab-spring.html, accessed on July 31, 2014.


illegal organization and for first time he spoke about AST’s alleged terrorist ties and activities when he commented on the events.24

The oppositionist Mohamed Brahmi’s death on July 25, 2013 and the following mass-demonstrations this time meant turning-point. On 27 August, Prime Minister Ali Larayedh announced at a press conference that Ansar al-Sharia was provably the mastermind behind killing Brahmi and Chokri Belaid and held them responsible for the internal crisis.25 To the murder of the two politicians he added that the murderers were senior leaders of AST who committed their act with Abu Iyad’s knowledge and approval. So he justified the terrorist designation of the organization as part of the international al-Qaeda network which trained its volunteers in Libya and Syria as well as got its financial support from Arabic countries, like Yemen, Libya or Mali.26

He charged them with supporting the armed jihadist cell which was active in the Algerian–Tunisian border region and was the target of the army for a month around Mount Chaambi. Next day, the Director of Public Security supplied the information that the secret military wing of the organization provably planned assassinations against 19 public figures.27

In its response, announced on September 3, the organization denied the charges and stressed its independence and innocence. It found the terrorist designation as “honor” and threatened the “tyrants”, who ruled Tunisia, to start a war.28 Abu Iyad was accused of instigating the besieging mass over the U.S. embassy and a warrant of arrest was issued against him; therefore he fled to illegality after the embassy’s attack. Nowadays, he is supposedly staying in Libya where he enjoys the protection of Abdelhakim Belhadj, a former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) commander.29

The United States of America also accepted the standpoint of the Tunisian cabinet in relation to Ansar al-Sharia in the beginning of 2014. According to their judgment, the organization became the most dangerous threat against American interests in Tunisia. This is why they designated the group and its leader as terrorist on January 10.30


25 According to police sources, both assassinations were provably carried out with the same gun that they seized during a raid. (“Ansar al-Sharia blamed for Tunisia killings” in Al-Jazeera, August 27, 2013, available online at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/08/2013827131811488516.html, accessed on August 01, 2014).


4. The end of non-violent policy

The jihadist cell, hiding in the Mount Chaambi region, identified by the Tunisian authorities as Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade and AST were accused of co-operation. The exact structure and the size of the terrorist-group are unknown as well as its leadership. Nowadays, it seems that it is composed at least of two serrya (company) that are built up rather flexibly. The crackdown on the group is very probable, because injured militants were taken away immediately by their companions during clashes. If the latter was impossible, they decapitated the bodies to avoid identification. They also hid booby-traps under the abandoned bodies to cause further damages to security forces.³¹

The cell, which numbered about 20 jihadist fighters in May 2013, was composed mainly of foreign volunteers from the neighboring countries – primarily Algerians and Libyans – in the beginning. The situation worsened when Ennahda increasingly turned against Salafist groups and reached out to secular opposition parties as a compensation of extremists. In its response, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb issued a statement on March 17, 2013 urging Tunisian volunteers in foreign countries to return home and turn back unfavorable processions against religion. Many Tunisian veterans, who fought earlier in Iraq and/or Syria, traveled back to their country where they joined Okba Ibn Nafaa as well as set up another group, estimated of 12–15 persons, in the area of el-Kef 160 kilometers to the north.³²

According to the signs, from the beginning the group was closely linked to terrorist-organization al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. According to Interior Minister Ali Larayedh’s announcement in December 2012, the cell was under the leadership of three Algerians, who were in close relationship with Abdelmalek Droukdel, leader of al-Qaeda’s North-African wing. He said that in the beginning their main goal was to set up camps in the Kasserine region, where recruits could get initial training before sending them to one of al-Qaeda’s base in Algeria or Libya.³³ Later, his notification was justified by the terrorists, who were equipped with Kalashnikovs, heavy weapons and sniper rifles. They used – and are using nowadays too – the same tactic in their raids around Mount Chaambi that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb practiced in the Kabylie mountains against the Algerian army: raiding by surprise against mountainous hardly approachable military posts, then torturing the bodies of the soldiers and finally looting their weapons and military dress.³⁴

The terrorist-group, which was named after the Umayyad general, first appeared in the horizon of the authorities at the end of 2012. In December, four armed men killed adjutant Anis Jelassi in shoot-out in Kasserine Governorate. The Tunisian authorities began a wide-scope investigation and arrested seven people. On the basis of their confession, Interior Minister Ali Rayadh delineated for first time the exact name of the cell, its contact with al-Qaeda as well as its smuggling and secret military training activity on December 21.³⁵

³³ He also stated that the members of the group were inhabitants of Kasserine region and Ansar al-Sharia volunteers. His statement, which meant an open charge against a legally working organization, was lacked any kind of proof. That is why many people questioned the authenticity and precision of the notification (Andrew Lebovich, “Confronting Tunisia’s jihadists” in The Middle East Channel, May 16, 2013, available online at: http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/16/confronting_tunisias_jihadists, accessed on August 01, 2014).
Following the case when a road-sided bomb shattered one patrolling soldier’s leg in the National Park, the Tunisian Army launched a military offensive to eliminate them. Practically, there was no direct armed contact with the group in the first half of the two-month action. The terrorists always escaped after they undermined the place. The Army’s only solution against this was using mortar fire against dangerous areas. During the operation, which was executed by several hundred soldiers, three persons died and 27 were injured due to the 10 explosions against them.36

Certainly the armed forces caused serious damages to the terrorists, but they did not succeed to eliminate them completely. The cell struck again in Mount Chaambii in July 2013. They killed eight soldiers and cut the throats of five of them. The armed forces launched a new wide-range offensive against them as revenge, but the offenders managed to escape also on this occasion.37

5. Open jihad against security forces

After the proscription of the organization, the Tunisian authorities started an intensive hunt for Ansar al-Sharia and Islamist militants. During 2013 alone, 1,347 persons were brought to justice in connection with terrorist-related charges, and more than 8,000 young men and women were prevented from going to Syria to fight.38

a police raid in the Raoued area outside Tunis, Kamel Gadhgadhi, the main suspect of Chokri Belaid’s assassination, was killed along with six other terrorists. It was thought-provoking that the security forces found a large quantity of weapons during the rummage of the building. It indicated that the terrorists probably planned to carry out an attack.39 Another six members of the banned organization were detained by the anti-terrorist unit in the centre of Sidi Bouzid on July 10. Two weeks later, they arrested Mohamed Anis, “the Princes of Ansar al-Sharia”, who possessed considerable cash and documents containing terrorist plans.40

According to the reports, the security forces killed several other members of the organization in October. Due to their intervention, the suicide attempt against French and American embassies also failed at the end of the month, which was ordered by Abdelmalek Droukdel to sleeping cells of Ansar al-Sharia as a revenge for French military action in Mali and the liquidation of al-Qaeda leaders. They also managed to disarm the suicide bomber who wanted to blow up the mausoleum of Habib Bourguiba in Monastir with considerable quantity of explosives in his rucksack on October 30. Unfortunately, they could not prevent his companion from committing action. His bomb, which was hidden in a suitcase, was activated by a mobile phone on the beach outside the Riad Palm Hotel in Sousse on the same day.41

36 At the same time it was thoughtful that none of the detained dozens of suspects almost certainly belonged to the hiding jihadists. (Paul Schemm, “Jihadis threaten Tunisia’s Arab Spring transition” in AP, July 31, 2013, available online at: http://bigstory.ap.org/article/jihadis-threaten-tunisia-arab-spring-transition, accessed on July 31, 2014; “Tunisia links two wanted jihadist groups to al-Qaeda” in AFP, May 7, 2013, available online at: http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/Africa/2013/05/07/Tunisia-links-two-wanted-jihadist-groups-to-al-Qaeda-.html, accessed on July 29, 2014.)


38 Yasmin Najjar, “Tunisia takes out top terrorists” in Magharebia, February 05, 2014, available online at: http://magharebia.com/en_GB/articles/awi/features/2014/02/05/

39 Ibid.


suicide assailant did not hurt anybody else.

Soon after these events, the Tunisian authorities began a wide-range investigation. Shortly, they arrested five persons and confiscated a considerable quantity of explosives in Monastir. The suspects told during their interrogation that they planned an attempt according Abu Iyad’s order against the center of the security services, police stations as well as four supermarkets, where alcohol could be bought. The security services managed to discover another attempt when they arrested a terrorist cell. Supposedly, the six terrorists wanted to target hotels or bars on the popular tourist site Djerba Island during New Year’s Eve celebrations.

At the same time, despite the unquestionable significant results, the struggle against terrorism proved to be a remarkable challenge for the Tunisian armed forces. The low experience meant a serious problem as well as the lack of sufficient equipment. Their position worsened when they had to divide their small strength and regroup forces to the Libyan border region that became dangerous after the turn in the country. What is more, the militants slew at least 15 soldiers or policemen until October 2013 and killed two policemen in Beja about 160 km north of the Chaambi region on October 15, 2013. The security forces lost their confidence in the cabinet due to growing casualties. Their unions organized several demonstrations where they demanded to make the needed resources available to combat jihadist elements as well as laws to protect policemen.

The danger of terrorism increased on January 14, 2014 when Okba Ibn Nafaa merged with Ansar al-Sharia whereby it was non-officially transformed to al-Qaeda’s Tunisian wing. Abdelmalek Droukdel, the Algerian chief of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, appointed Khaled Chaieb (aka Lokman Abou Sakhr) as the leader of the new organization that was very soon referred to in the press as al-Qaeda in Tunisia. From the experience of the past half a year, it seems that Chaieb managed to recruit and train new volunteers meanwhile he managed all the time to avoid capture. The militants, equipped with rocket-propelled grenades and rifles, raided again and made an assault on two military checkpoints near Mount Chaambi on July 17, 2014. The casualties – 15 soldiers lost their lives and at least 20 other wounded in the attack – were the heaviest death toll registered by the armed forces since independence in 1956. After the events, the government set up a crisis group and closed the unlicensed Al-Ensan television and Nour Radio stations, as well as certain mosques, which they claimed that they had promoted violence and jihad. Above all, the Tunisian cabinet intensified its cooperation with neighboring Algeria and they launched a joint operation to catch Islamists. Despite the preventive measures, another raid occurred on July 26, when some 40 Islamists ambushed two vehicles of the armed forces near Djebel Urgha, in Kef Governorate. In response to the attack, which caused two soldiers’ death and four others injured, two days later, the armed forces reacted quickly and arrested more than 10 persons of perpetrators.

44 The growing disaffection of policemen was exceedingly exemplified on October 18, 2013, when they did not allow President Moncef Marzouki, Prime Minister Ali Larayedh and parliamentary speaker Mustapha Ben Jaafar to attend the funeral ceremony for the two comrades, who were killed three days earlier by extremists. (“Tunisia leaders evicted from police memorial” in Al-Jazeera, October 18, 2013, available online at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/10/tunisia-leaders-evicted-from-police-memorial-20131018135840923875.html, accessed on July 29, 2014).
Conclusion

We can see in the study how the relations between Ansar al-Sharia and the Tunisian government worsened step-by-step. The main reasons were many successive incidents as well as mutual responses and reactions. We can consider Anis Jelassi’s killing in December 2012 as the beginning of the war against the state. The raids against soldiers together with the set-back of public order caused a considerable pressure to the cabinet until the politician Mohamed Brahmi’s death in July 2013 as well as the killing of eight members of security forces some days later. The Tunisian cabinet got into a tight corner and without any kind of a choice it had to designate Ansar al-Sharia as terrorist-organization and declared an open struggle against it.

Today, there are many factors that spelt difficulties in the fight against terrorists. The jihadists look like normal inhabitants with their appearance and clothes and enjoy the local’s maximum support. They build up close cooperation with local smugglers in hardly controlled mountainous regions so there is no special problem for them in gaining reserves. The police lost its prestige after the fall of Ben Ali’s regime so now the armed forces’ main task is to eliminate them. At the same time, we can not wonder that this proved to be an enormous challenge for them with securing public institutions and keeping public order as well as controlling several hundred kilometers borderline and fighting against terrorists. The problem is heightened by the lack of such technological resources (e.g. enough airplanes and helicopters or suitable bugs for reconnaissance) that could compensate for the disadvantages in their number. It looks like that without effective measures, all of the risk that jihadist activists can set up their own basis in the region, where they can train their common ideological volunteers in untroubled conditions who will be deployed later against the institutions and representatives of Tunisian state seems to transform into a real threat.

The failed attempts in the second half of 2013 also resulted in misgivings. Namely, the selection of targets implies that the terrorist-organization accepted Jamal al-Islamiyya’s previous tactic when it wanted to force its conception upon state by attacking tourism. Using this strategy practically means the loss of the main public revenue needed as soon as possible for the state to stabilize the critical economic conditions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:


THE TERRORIST THREAT


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Thus far, Al Qaeda has been perceived as the indisputable banner of the contemporary religious extremism and modern terrorism. The annihilation of its leader, Osama bin Laden, seemed to have marked the commencement of this organization’s setback but the effects of the Arab Spring offered the premises of a dramatic revival.

The recent turmoil in the security environment in the Middle East favored the occurrence of a strong organization bearing extremist connotations, the Islamic State, a group with a fast and startling regional ascent in Syria and Iraq that brings new territorial (state) and military dimensions to the Islamic extremism.

As a result, the ascent of the Islamic State represents a significant change at the tier of the Jihadist phenomenon, having geopolitical consequences that do not send Al Qaeda into oblivion but, on the contrary, have an increasing effect as the peril of the worldwide Jihadist extremism diversifies and upsurges.

Keywords: Islam, extremism, terrorism, Jihad, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Middle East.

1. Premises related to the changes in the contemporary Jihadist phenomenon

The unstable and tumultuous situation following the Arab Spring in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) established the prerequisites essential to transform the regional security environment into one marked by changes in the regional power and thus opening great opportunity windows to the extremist-terrorist entities. The region armed conflict zones (Syria, Iraq), the post-conflict vacillation in certain states (Libya, Yemen), the security vacuum especially in the desert border areas in Northern Africa as well as the presence of some important non-state actors in the region (Hamas, Hezbollah) augmented the regional asymmetric risk level. The Jihadist militant groups ideologically or functionally linked to Al Qaeda obtained significant advantages as a result of the regional instability and proved a remarkable ability to recover.

The post-revolutionary geopolitical weaknesses offered Al Qaeda the encouraging context to come back to the regional stage after the organization had lost influence in the Gulf region (following the reiteration of the Shiite interests and their offensive) and experienced the waning of the franchise „Al Qaeda in Iraq”.

Al Qaeda envisioned the enhancement of its presence in the corridor Yemen – Saudi Arabia – Iraq – Syria, in its attempt to achieve regional coordination through the two main force components: „Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula”
and „Al Qaeda in Iraq”, changed afterwards into the „Islamic State in Iraq and Levant/DAISH” (April 2013) and self-proclaimed the „Islamic State” (IS), on July 2014.

At the regional tier, many factors made their contribution to the success of the „Al Qaeda in Iraq” (IS) vector. Among these factors are: the civil war in Syria, persistence of the political crises in Iraq and Egypt, inflation in the nationalist feelings among the Kurdish community and the ambitions to establish a state (with direct consequences upon the increasing autonomy actions exerted by the authorities of the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan - ARK), protracted instability in Lebanon, pensive attitude of Saudi Arabia – a neutral actor when it came about the continuous destabilization in the situation in the Middle East and whose efforts were mainly focused on the confrontation with Iran, with the purpose to assert its regional leader quality.

The year 2013 marked the commencement of the struggle for the global Jihad leader position between the mother - organization - al Qaeda (the hard core in Afghanistan and Pakistan) and the IS (still named ISIL), and the civil war in Syria was the triggering factor of this struggle as well as the area where the vanities of the two entities clashed.

Thus, the official branch of Al Qaeda in Syria (the Al Nusrah Front) began a direct confrontation with the ISIL (IS) and the conflict between the Al Nusrah’s leader, Abu Mohammed Al Golani and the ISIL’s leader, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, led to the dissolution of the alliance.

„The great Jihadist rift” (al Qaeda versus ISIL) was formalized in February 2014 when Al Qaeda decided to cut the links with the dissidents and labelled the actions of the group as being too ruthless and its leaders as too difficult. Since this moment, it can be assessed that the movement assumed the independence from the al Qaeda and declined its loyalty towards Ayman Al-Zawahiri and thus the actions in Syria and Iraq were conducted independently, with no coordination with other groups.

On February 2014, the Al Qaeda leadership refuted any connection with ISIL. Ayman al-Zawahiri condemned the movement for its ambitions related to autonomy, averring that the exponent of the fight in Syria is the Al Nusrah Front, exclusively. Another reason of discontent for al Qaeda leadership was the change in the movement’s name into the „Islamic State” a gesture that gave the signal that its leaders aim at the territorial gaining and were no longer satisfied with the fact that the movement was assimilated to an entity whose area of influence is contained to some territories that were precisely delineated. The ISIL leaders replied that they did represent the Al Qaeda – bin Laden and not Al Qaeda – Zawahiri.

The IS’s regional drives were underscored in the summer of 2014 when the movement commenced an ample offensive in Iraq with a rapid development and succeeded in controlling extended areas in northern country. The IS motivated its actions through the intents to establish an Islamic Caliphate in the entire region of the Middle East, proving a remarkable ability to make use of the vulnerabilities of Syria and Iraq and gaining notable successes both tactically and ideologically.

The IS’s thinking, in a nutshell, resembles that of the classical terrorist organizations: „puritanism” in implementing the Islamic Law of Sharia and spreading of the Islamist message through extremely violent means. What makes it different from other terrorist organizations is its ability to entice followers and especially the way it acts to achieve its own interests – the

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1 DAISH is the acronym for the organization in Arab language (Dawla Al-Islamiya fi Al-Iraq wa Al-Sham) whose translation is the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant/ISIL. In English are also used the acronyms affiliated to the name „The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant”/ISIL and “The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria”/ISIS. Since July 2014, the organization proclaimed itself the Islamic State/IS.


prestige of „statehood” – by attempts to establish institutions specific to a state – doubled by military actions that remind more the pattern of some conventional armed forces.

They are in fact two Jihadist movements stemming from the same ideology of the Islamic religious extremism, with different ways of manifestation even if both have a common end-state – the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate⁴.

2. Al Qaeda versus IS. Similarities and dissimilarities

The dissimilarities between Al Qaeda and IS, the radical son of the organization, are more numerous and significant than the similarities and the latter become insipid as IS achieves more regional importance and adjusts its modus operandi according to the tangible developments in the field.

Although Al Qaeda remains an ideological symbol for the global Jihadist trend, currently it is lapsing, following the death of Osama bin Laden. In the work Jihad or the way to Djinna, Dumitru CHICAN catches very well the genuineness within the network led by Ayman Al – Zawahiri, saying that its planning and top decision-making core is weakening, being a phenomenon accompanied by a certain autonomy of the organizations and local and regional groups, and the core turned somewhat into a slogan-producing one rather than into an effective and decisive center for leadership, management and decision at the level of the global Jihadist front⁵.

Al Qaeda’s main goals, as stated by Osama bin Laden, were to cast the Americans and their influence out of the Muslim nations, especially out of Saudi Arabia, to destroy the state of Israel and to oust the pro-Western dictatorships from the Middle East. Moreover, the supreme leader of the organization wanted to gather the entire Muslim origin population and to establish, by force, if necessary, an Islamic nation that might join the rules of the first Caliphate⁶.

Currently, although Al Qaeda keeps its transnational, anti-Western and anti-Zionist agenda, the organization lost its power over other groups, given the geographic isolation (the core is focused in Afghanistan and Pakistan). Ayman Al – Zawahiri’s authoritarian leadership and his lack of charisma, as well as the difficulties in adjusting his propaganda to the new realities of the Middle East after the Arab Spring events triggered a withdrawal of the former affiliates and some connected Jihadist groups blueprinted their own agendas, with local relevance and gave up the organization’s umbrella. At the moment, the various affiliated groups seem to pursue first of all their own interests and goals and then Al Qaeda’s worldwide ones. Furthermore, the resources are not allotted in a centralized manner as each entity set up its own particular financing mechanisms.

As to the IS, this is a local focus entity (Syria and Iraq) with regional ambitions and global objectives (to justify the role of an organization that act on for the restauration of the Islamic Caliphate). It focuses on the Iraqi-Syrian fief, including by encouraging the followers to migrate towards this region with the purpose to support the establishment of the Caliphate.

On the other hand, unlike Al Qaeda, the IS has peculiarities that put it beyond the classical terrorist group, given the territorial ambitions and control maintenance. It does not threat the West directly, despite the fact that it has volunteers from the Western states. Theoretically, volunteers’ coming back to their origin countries is a major risk. Al Qaeda focuses on targets represented by the US and its European allies and the Arab fronts are seen as secondary and rather as havens and training and logistic camps where they can gain expertise to conduct strikes against the West.

Both entities act to achieve their ultimate goal – the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate by promoting the philosophy of the radical Islam. Here there are notable dissimilarities, mainly ideological.

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⁴ Catherine Shakdam, quoted work.
⁵ Dumitru Chican, Jihad or the way to Djanna, Corint Publishing House, Bucharest, 2011, p. 148.
The utopian state of Al Qaeda is envisioned within the entire Arab-Muslim space, as well as in the „stolen” territories - Spain, Portugal and a part of Eastern Europe. The establishment of the Caliphate would be the next step, but the concrete path to achieve this goal has not been decided, yet.

According to the draft of the Salafist Mohammed Adnan, there are two types of Emirates /Caliphates in the Salafist doctrine – an overall Islamic Emirate, namely a Muslim state under the authority of a Caliph, similar to the times of Prophet Mohamed, and a special Islamic Emirate, established either for Jihad and proselytism, or for governance. According to the draft of the Salafist Mohammed Adnan, there are two types of Emirates /Caliphates in the Salafist doctrine – an overall Islamic Emirate, namely a Muslim state under the authority of a Caliph, similar to the times of Prophet Mohamed, and a special Islamic Emirate, established either for Jihad and proselytism, or for governance. Nonetheless, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi does not see himself as the emir of a group, but of a state. While Al Qaeda promotes primarily the liberation of the Muslim territories from the conquerors and then the establishment of a state within the territories purified of the pagan presence, Al Baghdadi wants primarily the state as a center from which to start the liberation campaigns.

Al Baghdadi’s caliphate is intended to manage the Muslim affairs in its territories, while the Al Qaeda’s caliphate focuses on the fight until the complete annihilation of the enemy but attaching no importance to the population’s problems.

Contrariwise, major dissimilarities are present in terms of the areas of action of both organizations. While the IS is the most significant threat to the stability in the Middle East, Al Qaeda remains the most significant non-conventional threat to the Western states. The IS registered important successes on the fronts in Syria and Iraq, while Al Qaeda (lower number of people) is present and active especially in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Moreover, the IS is more popular than Al Qaeda in the Middle East.

As to the African region, this has become the competing area for both entities. Also, the IS tends to augment its influence in the states in Northern Africa by creating some organizational bodies, especially with the purpose to extend the recruiting pool and by making use of the region Jihadist tradition. The movement is interested in developing cooperation with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a group that possesses the most important operational capabilities at the level of the region despite of the fact that this is still subordinated to Al Qaeda. In this context, we assess that it is less likely for the radical groups in Northern Africa to aver openly their support to IS. A balanced approach is more likely and thus they may obtain financial and logistic support from both organizations.

Major dissimilarities between the two entities are present in terms of modi operandi. The IS that has a cohesive, well equipped, trained and financed force turned into an army of terror, with a military force able to confront with a sovereign state (Iraq). The movement seems to favor the complex, long-term, conventional actions (military campaigns, besieges etc.). As to Al Qaeda, the organization focuses on punctual and spectacular actions (hit and run) with dramatic psychological impact, and this offered wide media coverage – assassinations, terrorist attacks (suicide attacks, bombs etc.).

When it comes about similarities, one of them is that both entities are organized as networks; make use of information technology to enhance the organizational structures; the IS displays a more aggressive propaganda by using the social networks intensively, while Al Qaeda uses this kind of technology to plan, coordinate and conduct terrorist activities.

The social-political dimension of the two movements indicates that whereas Al Qaeda remains a tribal structure, having the support of the ethnic lords when it exerts power (delegating responsibilities) and relies on the existing local institutions rather than on new, own ones, the IS has institutionalized its ideology and ambitions by establishing some state structures.

### 3. The IS dominants

#### 3.1. The organization’s state dimension

In November, the Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s self-proclaimed “Caliphate”, also known as the

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7 Catherine Shakdam, quoted work.
8 Ibidem.
9 Ibidem.
Islamic State controlled a part of the territory that lies from north of Aleppo to south of Bagdad and that includes the towns of Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq (Figure 1). Approximately six million people live in this area and obey the rules established by the IS\(^\text{10}\).

In the occupied territories, the organization positioned itself as the manager of a rudimentary form of state and a series of institutions was established – police, justice, education, health. On the other hand, following the pattern of the Muslim Brotherhood, the IS promotes some charity activities intended to develop and enhance the popular support especially among the poverty-stricken population and thus gaining the role of an important social benefactor.

The institutional and social dimension of the organization is kept through the implementation of a firm intimidating policy. The Sunni tribal leaders are given a special attention taking into account that, especially in the rural area, that the tribal bonds and the tribal authority are of paramount importance compared with the power of the central authorities. The elimination of the influence poles represented by the tribal heads is one of the methods used by the IS to control efficiently the local population.

Both in Syria and Iraq, a series of Sunni tribes stated their allegiance to the IS for various reasons but mainly related to the fact that they fear repressions and they are outnumbered. In Syria, these developments allow this movement to enhance control over the region of the Euphrates, while in Iraq its capability to keep domination relies on the stability of the alliances with the tribal components.

\subsection*{3.2. The organization's military dimension}

The organization’s tactical success and capabilities to conduct large scale military operations stem from the strict hierarchical structure and from the way the various entities relate to each other. Moreover, the network organization is difficult to be penetrated as this group merges with other movements or tribes in the territories it controls through accords that are more or less formalized.

The organization’s military core consists of a series of elite units manned by the most well trained members of the group as some of them fought together even since the structure was headed by Abu Musab Al Zarkawi. Among them are foreign fighters with a rich expertise and a

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{10} Richard Barrett, quoted work, p. 39.}
high level of training, both achieved during their participation in combat actions in various theatres of operations.

Around the core of the elite units there is a structure consisting of units whose members rallied the IS gradually and many of them are local militants from Syria and Iraq. The fact that most of them are former Iraqi or Syrian military is extremely important for the organization because they have the tactical and practical knowledge of the combat field and are accustomed with the peculiarity of the terrain. The support of these members is significant for the reestablishment of the bonds with the important tribal leaders, for tactical alliances with other insurgent groups as well as for the support either formal or informal of the Arab Sunni communities that live in the area controlled by the organization, in case these communities do not state from the beginning that they adhere to the ideals of the organization. Despite the recent affiliations, the members of this segment must be seen as an inherent part of the organization that joined the IS, assuming completely the message and the goals of the organization or as a result of a lack of more facile alternatives.

The external circle of the group consists of the new members, especially belonging to the groups that took allegiance to the organization with the purpose to be laid beneath its umbrella.

In terms of the military size of the group, a special importance is attached to the recruiting pool. This keeps being large as long as poverty, social inequity, ignorance and lack of prospects especially among the young people will persist, altering the individual identity and thus, the marginalized people become open to the religious message (from promises of a better life to the ultimate „martyrdom mirage”). As a result, the collective force of the group stems from the common wish and will of numerous persons who failed socially in various states and who assume any risks in order to feel themselves fulfilled (experience the victory feeling).

Since its occurrence, the military success and its capability to provide the financing of the operations enlarged the prestige and recruiting pool of the organization and triggered a fast development and extension of its influence sphere.

The conventional weapons (coming especially from seizures, similar to the Libyan and Syrian pattern) and the progress achieved in operating these weapons triggered a visible transfer in the behavior of the organization towards the conventional dimension.

Along this transfer, the financial sector keeps bearing a significant importance and the organization succeeded in becoming independent. The financing sources are provided from oil, donations, fees, rewards from abductions and various goods/funds captured during the attacks on banks. Mostly, the funds come from oil exploitations with the support of the installations captured in Iraq and Syria. The resources and the major energy infrastructure are needed to control the population and to ensure the money to equip and pay the fighters.

Although since its inception and until now the pattern of manifestation in IS was that of the asymmetric operations, the pattern with the most prolific expertise, since the commencement of the offensive in Iraq, the conventional-like military operations, that are not specific to the terrorist entities, won more relevance.

Lauren SQUIRES, an analyst within „The Institute for war studies” and a former analyst within the US armed forces, says that the IS’s success can be attributed to „the ability of the group to conduct a hybrid war — half conventional war and half terrorist guerilla campaign”. L.SQUIRES assesses that the air power might diminish the IS’s determination but „this will be in the short term and the group will adjust itself to the use of the guerilla elements”11.

The religious factor which dominates the Arab-Muslim society facilitates the recruiting activities of the IS as these communities depend mostly on the foreign aids. The openness manifested by various donors with an uncertain background and in some cases with obscure

intents prepares the ground for the Islamic radical tendencies. The volatile situation following the Arab Spring offered a significant maneuver space to the Islamic organizations that, under the screen of the humanitarian activities, promoted their own agenda.

In the attempt to foresee a course of action related to the political and military goals of the IS in the short and midterm, we quote Richard Barrett who says that the military ambitions of this organization remain the conquering of Iraq and Syria and the enhancement of what it possesses so far. At the proper time, the IS may try to make progress in Jordan and Lebanon where it has already supporters and then in Saudi Arabia as no other plans exist for a further development\(^\text{12}\).

3.3. Challenges to the IS

The influence that Sheik Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi and the IS’s leadership have over territories they currently control is far from being absolute and depends upon the support provided by a large number of tribal actors and insurgents whose agenda on long term may significantly change.

Alongside the international consensus towards the necessity to annihilate the organization (the anti-IS Coalition), the general regional situation itself seems to present challenges for the IS, as Iran has intensified its efforts to secure Iraq by providing direct support to Iraqi governmental authorities and the main Shia paramilitary formations, and Turkey seems to be increasingly available to act against the IS. The Gulf States adopted a strong enough position against the movement, even if donations from some private individuals for IS activities continue to be provided.

The significant costs needed for the IS to maintain control over conquered areas is a key vulnerability of the movement. The strategy that IS uses for activities’ management in controlled territories requires a focused effort that involves significant human, material, and financial resources. Providing of these resources is not an issue for the time being, but it may become one on mid and long term, given the counteractions from Iraqi, Kurdish, Syrian and international community. Since the movement should cease material and financial aids it currently provides to the population, as it needs to focus on military actions, grievance reactions are likely to occur which may decrease the support it benefits at present.

On the other hand, the expansion of the IS’s influence will be significantly burden by local traditions and beliefs specific to the targeted areas, but especially by local population’s perception toward central authorities. The IS’s mission will be difficult in the regions where population is not hostile toward the authorities, as it will face a strong opposition for locals part, these being ready to fight for their homes and families, as the situation presents in the northern Kobane region of Syria.

The deepening of the conflict between Al Qaeda and IS may be another factor which may cause problems for the latter. The IS’s proclamation is a significant challenge that Sheik Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi launched against the supreme leader of Al Qaeda, Ayman al Zawahiri, and all Islamic radical groups from the Middle East and the whole of the world. While no direct confrontation between the two terrorist entities is foreseen in short time, Al-Baghdadi’s ambitions and the pressures he makes mainly within the ranks of young fighters of other nationalities may persuade Ayman al Zawahiri to adopt a more strong approach toward his rival. In the context, the IS’s agenda may be compromised beyond local tier, in Syria and Iraq, and in other states from the region, as both groups compete for recruiting new supporters and members from Islamic communities around the world.

The criticism that some religious leaders of the Islamic world aver against the IS sparked no reaction from the latter, and had no effect on its actions, but in the long run this will likely affect IS’s ability to entice followers, especially if the movement continues with its criminal and extremist methods. The IS implements a policy based on fear, but this is a two-edged weapon which may amplify feelings of rejection and

\(^{12}\) Richard Barrett, quoted work, p. 39.
accelerate entity’s disintegration. The stances that Sunni religious leaders take against the organization are backed by leaders of the Gulf States who previously manifested without reserve in favor of extremist groups operating in areas from Iraq and Syria. Far from being limited to Iraq and Syria, the global aspirations of the Islamic Caliphate envisioned by Al Baghdadi may evolve into a serious threat against all regimes from the region which directly or indirectly contributed to its ascension, and whose legitimacy may be challenged by the same fighters they initially backed.

The game of alliances seems to go beyond the tier of the Middle East and Northern Africa, which emphasize that the movement is an increasingly important actor in the terrorist elite “club”. A sign to this effect is the call that Omar Khalid al Khorasani, senior leader of Jammat-ul Ahrat (a breakaway offspring of the Taliban Movement of Pakistan), conveyed to IS and Al Nusrah Front, to leave dissensions away and fight together against the USA and their allies that launched attacks against jihadists in Iraq and Syria. He offered to use its influence to mediate between rival entities and urged Muslims around the world to join efforts in the fight against non-believers and apostates. Nevertheless, the unification of global jihadist efforts is not foreseeable since the divergences between them are more numerous and significant than the common elements. However, this state of the fact seems to favor the IS, since it is just the divisions within the rank of Jihadi community that favor the organization which benefits of the tactical and ideological dissensions to unimpededly promoting its agenda.

Conclusions

As to the IS’s fast regional ascent, it should be underlined that the organization appeared and developed in an extremely unstable regional context characterized by numerous favoring factors: cultural-religious peculiarities, ethnic and confessional milieu with direct consequences over the national identity fragmentation, severe and excessively centralized regimes and thus impeding the opposition poles with a strong secular and coherent message, different agendas of the regional and international relevant actors and their interests in the region. The organization succeeded in exploiting rapidly and successfully the political and security opportunity window after the Arab Spring events and speculated the regional chaos that followed the revolutionary euphoria and it assumed the role of the alternative to the existing systems, especially through the use of Islamic traditional messages that were very enticing for the disfavored categories of population with a precarious or even lacking level of education.

In this context, not only the success but also the survival of the organization in front of the international offensive offers additional value to the group among the people who are sympathizers of the Islamic radical ideology (the previous Hamas and Hezbollah that survived the conflicts with Israel). The politicization of the file concerning the combat against the IS, the disregarding of some resolutions of the UN Security Council on this issue (2170,2178) may generate new opportunity windows for proselytism, enhancement and spreading of its regional and international presence.

On the other hand, the IS’s ambition to establish a state engaged the organization into an open conflict with the regional and international community. The group would have survived as a terrorist organization or local insurgency movement as it did many years, but it had risked to establish a Caliphate. This decision offered increased authority and enticed new recruits and seemed to be beneficent in the short term. Nevertheless, the development of the group remains uncertain in the mid and long run.

The IS offers increased relevance to the concept of multinational terrorism, given the fact that its militant forces come from various states, governments, habits and social environments positioned at contrasting poles. The organization seems to take over successfully the traditional pattern of Al Qaeda, positioning itself as the umbrella of various movements but with similar
ambitions. The fact that some Western citizens took over the thesis of the movement makes the peril represented by the organization even greater and nowadays we can talk about a globalization of the threat represented by the IS „trademark”.

Al Qaeda remains the major non-conventional threat to the Western countries. Similarly, in case the capabilities of the organization are diminished, following the anti-IS international coalition offensive, the group remains able to conduct terrorist attacks with strong conventional features (war of attrition with the purpose to fulfil the end-state goal – the Islamic Caliphate). The organization’s action propagation vector to the West is represented by the European fighters once they come back to their origin countries. The terrorist attacks they conduct are likely but they are not necessarily orchestrated by the IS.

In order to diminish the terrorist threats coming from the Middle East, the West must focus the humanitarian, military and intelligence support not only on the actions intended to combat the IS, but also on the actions against the groups affiliated to the Al Qaeda in Syria. The air strikes, although ineffective in this regard, may cause the radicalization of the Syrian Sunnis who are not affiliated to the IS for the moment. The international coalition’s current preponderantly military approach towards the IS will have little chance of success given the fact that extremism in general can be rather limited than annihilated. The extremism, as an ideology, can be combated through another ideology and not through military means. Thus, moderation and support granted to the moderate groups might be a way to peacefully eradicate this threat.

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**Acknowledgement**

This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/138822 with the title “Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of Military Science, Security and Intelligence, Public order and National Security – Continuous formation programme for elite researchers - “SmartSPODAS”.”
THE UKRAINIAN EUROMAIDAN AND ITS EFFECTS

Cristian Leonard DORCA, PhD*

The events in Maidan – the Independence Square in downtown Kiev – marked the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, which we can place either on November 21st, 2013 – the start of the pro-European popular reaction (known as the Euromaidan) to the President Yanukovych’s gesture of suddenly suspending the preparations for the signing of the political and economic Association Agreement between Kiev and the EU, either on February 22nd, 2014 – Yanukovych’s flight from Kiev and the seizing of power by the pro-Western political forces supported by the Maidan.

This paper proposes a close analysis of the events that triggered the most important international crisis in the post-Cold War era, the implications of the key international players and the reaction of the Russian Federation.

**Keywords:** Maidan, Euromaidan, Russia, NATO, crisis.

**Introduction**

The protests in the Independence Square in Kiev began on November 21st, 2013, when several thousands of students gathered there to demand the signing by the Ukraine of the Association Agreement with the European Union, after the government had announced the suspending of the negotiations. It is obvious that the Ukrainians, at least those living in the Western and Central regions of the country, traditionally pro-Western, saw this potential move toward Europe as an opportunity to separate themselves, once and for all, from Russian influence. But as it turned out, Russia had a different opinion.

George Friedman believes that Russian interests in Ukraine are not confined only to the energy pipelines – the traditional method used by Moscow to influence decisions in peninsular Europe – but they are connected to the “long-term physical security” of Russia. The author explains: “The Ukrainian border with Russia is over seven hundred miles long. It is five hundred miles from Moscow over flat, open terrain. Odessa and Sevastopol, both in Ukraine, provide Russia with commercial and military access to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. If Ukraine were to be integrated into NATO and the European Union, Russia would face a threat not only in the Baltics, but one from Ukraine. Loss of access to Ukrainian territory would be a blow to Russian economic strategy. A Ukrainian alliance with NATO would pose an unmistakable threat to Russian national security.” From this perspective, an agreement between Ukraine and the EU could only be interpreted by Russia as a direct threat by the West to its security.

Of course, the current situation can not be explained without making a reference to history and its defining role in the more or less frozen

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conflicts in this ethnically and religiously split region. The Western part of Ukraine – mostly fertile areas suitable for agriculture – is largely composed of the lands on the right bank of the Dnieper (after a old division, dating back to ancient Cossack Hetmanate), which has long been under Polish rule and was only included in the Russian Empire at the end of the eighteenth century, and the adjacent territories in the Southwest, Ruthenia and Bukovina, which were integrated as the “Austro-Hungarian branch” after the Second World War; this area has long been under Western influence and marked the eastern borders of Catholicism. The Eastern Ukraine – largely, the region on the left bank of the Dnieper, with its coal deposits in Donbas – became part of the Tsars’ Russia at the end of the seventeenth century and was almost exclusively Orthodox.

For Ukraine, Stalin and Hitler were both executioners and unifiers: executioners, because Stalin exercised power through the Holodomor, and Hitler in 1941-1944, through the Holocaust; and unifiers, because following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 23rd, 1939, Ukraine has gained much of its current territory, later confirmed by the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947. Finally, in 1954, 300 years after the conclusion of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, by which the Cossacks of hetman Khmelnytsky recognized the protectorate of the Russian Tsar, Khrushchev offered Ukraine the “poisoned” gift: Crimea.

All these developments marked the striving journey of the post-Soviet Ukraine and were mirrored by the actions of the two Ukrainian presidents following the Orange Revolution. If Viktor Yushchenko favored a pro-Western policy, Viktor Yanukovych, a native of the eastern region of Donbas, had an attitude contrary to that of his predecessor.

After two years of negotiations with Ukraine on the Association Agreement as part of the Eastern Partnership, one can assume that the EU officials have interpreted the Kiev’s intentions as sincere. It seemed that the summit in Vilnius, 28-29 November 2013, would mark a truly historical moment, one that would represent a tangible rapprochement between East and West. Instead, Yanukovych would announce a surprising “U” turn, motivated by financial difficulties which could only be solved through further negotiations with Moscow.

The student movement that began on November 21st 2013, following Yanukovych’ change of attitude, as a support movement for the pro-Western orientation of Ukraine, would later transform into one of the opposition to the country’s political leadership. This was not the first time the Independence Square in Kiev had been occupied by mass protests. In 1990, after the events that shook the eastern part of Europe (as divided by the Iron Curtain), the Lenin Square – as it was then called – was occupied by students on hunger strike and dozens of tents were erected. The students were joined by thousands of Ukrainians on the streets, in an unprecedented demonstration of support for the Ukrainian sovereignty against the USSR. A year later, the referendum that would decide the independence of Ukraine was attended by more than 80% of the citizens entitled to vote, 90% of whom voting “in favor of the independence”. Students and young people were also at the forefront of protests in the winter of 2004-2005, when Kiev would be home of the Orange Revolution.

The Euromaidan – as an expression of pro-EU orientation of the Ukrainian nation

At least initially, the Euromaidan in 2013 appeared to be nothing like the Orange Revolution. The participants refused the association of any political symbols to their movement. After the bitter experience in 2004-2005, this new generation of young Ukrainians seemed to know what they wanted or rather what they didn’t want: the political confiscation of their civic and
popular movement, the denying by force of their deeply democratic rights to freedom of speech and to choosing their future.

Because even if Euromaidan began on November 21st, 2013, with peaceful protests against Yanukovych’s anti-European decision, the critical moment that transformed the movement into a mass revolution was the intervention of the Berkut special forces, on November 30th, at 4am, against the several hundreds of young people who were gathered in the Independence Square. Armed with rubber batons, non-lethal and tear gas grenades, the police forces attacked and dispersed the crowd, after having interrupted all telephone communications in the area. The intervention was caught on several cameras and transmitted live, so that the whole world could see how the police acted: it was for the first time that this kind of brutal force was used against demonstrators in Ukraine. In an official statement, Anatoly Prishko, Deputy General Prosecutor of Ukraine, confirmed 79 people injured during the intervention, which included six students, four reporters and two foreign citizens. Ten of these victims had to be hospitalized. The police had seven injured.

The violence with which the protesters were attacked in the Independence Square generated a state of rebellion in the population, which built upon the quasi-general feelings of anger – at least in the western and central Ukraine – determined by the summary way in which Viktor Yanukovych had sacrificed the pro-European future of Ukraine and, on December 1st, brought to the streets a huge number of people (it is estimated that 500,000 to 700,000 Ukrainians gathered in Kiev). During the protest, more clashes with the police followed, and the demonstrators occupied the Kiev City Hall. According to the local Health Department, during the two days of clashes, 109 protesters were hospitalized, out of a total of 165 wounded – about 40 media representatives among them.

In the following days, the protests continued. Tens of thousands of Ukrainians gathered daily in Euromaidan, while thousands others blocked the main buildings of the ministries. Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk (towns in western Ukraine) announced general strikes of solidarity with the protesters. The political leaders of the opposition – who had missed the start of Euromaidan – found themselves in the extremely difficult position of having to manage the rising expectations of the protesters for a better future and their negative feelings against the regime in power. At the same time, and perhaps the most difficult, they had to find, in the shortest of time, a political formula to end the crisis, one that could be also accepted by the voice of the street. Thus came on the scene the main figures of the opposition, Arseniy Yatsenyuk (Fatherland Party) – replacing the former prime-minister Yulia Tymoshenko, in prison – Vitali Klitschko (Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform), Oleh Tyahnybok (Svoboda Party), the former Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko – sentenced to four years in prison in the Yanukovych regime – or the businessman Petro Poroshenko, who would later become the next elected president of Ukraine.

The demands set forth by the opposition – which, beginning with November 30th, set up the “National Resistance” – included, on the short term, the resignation of the Interior Minister and the disbanding of the special forces, and, on the long-term, Yanukovych’s departure from power, the dissolution of Parliament, early

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elections\(^9\) and the returning to the Constitution of 2004 – according to which the president had diminished powers. However, the main demands of the Ukrainians gathered in Euromaidan, through the voices of the opposition leaders and others, were the immediate signing of the Association Agreement with the EU and the implementation of a visa-free regime for Europe as soon as possible. While both sides defended their positions strongly, a rapid resolution of the conflict seemed quite unlikely.

Seemingly, up to this point, the events in the Independence Square in Kiev were not much different than other popular protests around the world. However, the developments that followed – or some of them – bore their specific fingerprint. For over three months, thousands of people remained in the square, against the bitter cold. The weekends, their number would grow to tens or even hundreds of thousands, making Euromaidan a city within a city. People came early in the day and remained in the Square until late at night, as part of a movement which, by the means of social media, reached worldwide attention. The protesters organized barricades at the access points in the Square, strictly controlling access to identify the agents provocateurs, who, by initiating violence, would justify a brutal intervention of special troops. For the hard core of protesters, those who actually began living in the Square, tents were erected and mobile kitchens were brought. A scene was mounted where the activists, the civic leaders, or the prominent cultural figures could have their speeches or where popular rock bands could perform live shows. Newspapers were printed for those with no access to the internet so they could keep up with the international developments. Even a Free University was set up and an ambitious program of cultural activities was started. The national anthem of Ukraine could be heard in the speakers, and each morning began with a religious service. The Square was divided into several sectors, for political parties, for students, for the politically uninvolved or for the “civil society”. The tents bore the names of the Ukrainian cities and regions from which came their occupants and campfires were burning everywhere for the protesters to stay warm or have a cup of hot tea.

The Anti-Maidan Ukrainian forces: Yanukovych and the Party of Regions

During the first phase of the protests – from the announcement of the blocking of the negotiations until the intervention of the Berkut special forces –, the political leaders in Kiev almost ignored the Maidan events, but once the riots began to intensify and extend, they were forced to seek solutions. As it turned out, trying to resume talks with Brussels failed, especially after the summit in Vilnius, when Yanukovych proposed Russia’s involvement in the negotiations. José Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Commission, declared after the failure in the Lithuanian capital, that “What we cannot accept is a condition on a bilateral agreement to have a kind of a possible veto of a third country. This is contrary to all principles of international law”\(^10\).

In these circumstances, the rhetoric and the actions of political leaders in Kiev grew more similar to those of the Kremlin. Prime Minister Mykola Azarov accused the opposition that, with the help of the street, was trying to give a coup and remove the Party of Regions from power and that it was under the “illusion” that it could overthrow the existing order\(^11\). In the early days of December, police raids were organized at the headquarters of opposition parties and the media outlets critical of the government.

The same month, there were several counter-demonstrations organized by the government, meant to discourage the protesters in Maidan. On December 3\(^{rd}\), the Party of Regions initiated a rally in support of Yanukovych in Mariinsky Park.


near the Parliament building, which, according to organizers, was attended by 10,000 to 15,000 people. The media and the police representatives estimated their numbers between 2,000 and 3,000 people. On 14-15 December, the Party of Regions organized another pro-government rally, this time in the European Square in Kiev, under the slogan “Let’s save Ukraine!” At the time, the press commented on the fact that most of those who were to take part in the protest were from the Russian-speaking regions of the country, they were transported by trains or buses provided by the party, many of them were state employees brought to the capital against their will or for various amounts of money, and that the army was involved in organizing the demonstration – this information was denied by the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, although several photos appeared on the Internet showing mobile military kitchens used for feeding the pro-government militants or tents installed on land owned by the army.

In this state of high tension, the biggest fear was that the pro-government militants and the Euromaidan protesters would initiate a conflict that could escalate into some violent clashes, difficult to manage. The opposition leaders have stated that the government would even try to infiltrate their agents in the Euromaidan, in order to provoke quarrels that would escalate into violence.

In his speech in front of the government supporters, the Prime Minister Azarov stated that Ukraine has not given up its goal to join the EU, but insisted on the unacceptable conditions imposed by Brussels for signing the Association Agreement: “The opposition leaders are telling fables when they say that we only have to sign the [Association] Agreement [with the EU] to start traveling to Europe visa-free the next day. Nothing of the sort. We have yet to comply with a whole set of preconditions: we have to legalize same-sex marriages, we have to adopt legislation on equality of sexual minorities, and so on. Is our society ready for this?” Of course, such a rhetorical appeal to a religious traditionalist society could have had a chance to achieve its goal, but only in different circumstances. In this case, it did not address an audience that needed convincing or the issues that, meanwhile, had become acute for the majority of the Ukrainian society.

After a meeting in Moscow on December 17th between Viktor Yanukovych and Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister Azarov again refused signing the Association Agreement, although several EU officials declared that it was “still on the table”. Meanwhile, the protests continued. On December 27th, the Ukrainian government imposed criminal liability for occupying government buildings and a few days later, 200,000 Ukrainians celebrated the New Year in the Independence Square.

On January 10th the Berkut special forces again collided with protesters; one of the opposition leaders, Yury Lutsenko, was wounded in the clashes. On January 16th, the Party of Regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine passed a group of anti-protest laws that punished the methods used by demonstrators; Yanukovych signed it into law the next day. On January 19th, 200,000 people gathered in Kiev to protest against it. From 21 to 22 January, three demonstrators were killed. Yuriy Lutsenko and his friend Yuri Verbitsky, were abducted from the hospital by unknown persons. Lutsenko was found beaten and abandoned in a forest and Verbitsky was found dead.

In response to the escalating violence, the special troops were given permission to

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intensify their measures against protesters. From that moment on, they would be able to restrict access to the city and use water cannons, even if temperatures remained consistently negative. President Yanukovych awarded medals to several representatives of police and military forces for their conduct in the conflict. Several thousand pro-government provocateurs (titushky) picketed the US Embassy. Members of police stormed and destroyed a medical center in Euromaidan. Several social media channels and Internet websites that were publishing information on the events were blocked. After a period of relative calm, in which more than 200 protesters were released from custody after negotiations between the opposition and the government, demonstrators responded to the government’s requests, left the occupied buildings and reduced the number of barricades.

However, on February 18th, the bloodiest events to date occurred, resulting in dozens of deaths. A group of demonstrators occupied the headquarters of the Party of Regions, which was later freed by Berkut special forces, and the Kiev City Hall, which the protesters had evacuated two days earlier. The next day, the government troops attacked the Square. War ammunition was used. Following a recrudescence of violence, attributed to “extremist” groups, the Ukrainian Security Service announced the launch of an “anti-terrorist” operation. On February 20th, both sides used firearms. The Berkut snipers and unidentified forces were aiming at the head and neck area. By the end of the day dozens of deaths were confirmed. With the sharp deterioration of the situation in Kiev, the authorities decided to evacuate the presidential administration, the government and parliament buildings and the offices of the official press agency Ukrinform.

On February 21st, in the presence of European mediators, President Yanukovych and opposition leaders signed an agreement stipulating major concessions to the opposition, including early elections, a coalition government and a constitutional reform. On February 22nd, the Ukrainian Parliament Speaker Volodymyr Rybak, one of the trusted men of the head of state, resigned. In his place, The Parliament elected Oleksandr Turchynov, a close associate of former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, who also would occupy the position of interim head of state, after the Parliament would declare Viktor Yanukovych constitutionally unable to fulfill his duties. Yanukovych fled the capital to participate in a pro-Russian congress in Kharkiv. In a prerecorded speech aired in the media, he claimed he had no intention to step down. However, Yanukovych did not make it to the Kharkiv Congress, and the media released several options regarding his whereabouts, most likely in Russia, Belarus or the United Arab Emirates.17

**Foreign forces in favor of Euromaidan:**
EU, NATO, USA and their actions

As expected, the protests in the Independence Square in Kiev and the events that had led to them generated many international reactions.

On November 21st 2013, the European Union took note of the Ukraine’s decision to suspend the preparations for signing the Association Agreement and expressed its “disappointment” regarding Ukraine’s decision to renounce the document. At the same time, the EU reaffirmed that the future of this country should be based on a close relationship with the Union: “This is a disappointment not just for the EU but, we believe, for the people of Ukraine”18, said the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton.

On November 26th, right before the start of the Vilnius Summit and the President Yanukovych’s steadfast refusal to sign the Association Agreement, Elmar Brok and Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, MEPs responsible for the Eastern Partnership policy, have issued a statement in which they expressed their “strongest support” to the “many thousands of Ukrainians who are

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gathering at Euromaidan Square in Kiev and in other cities across Ukraine in the freezing cold” to protest against the government’s decision of “depriving them of their European future”

The statement ended on a serious tone: “We strongly warn the Ukrainian authorities to refrain from using force against peaceful protestors. Otherwise, serious consequences will have to be drawn.”

After the intervention of Berkut special forces the night of November 30th, Štefan Füle, the European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy, and Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, issued a joint statement condemning “the excessive use of force last night by the police in Kyiv to disperse peaceful protestors, who over the last days, in a strong and unprecedented manner, have expressed their support for Ukraine’s political association and economic integration with the EU.”

On December 3rd, the foreign ministers of NATO member states issued a press release condemning the use of force against peaceful protestors and demanded that both parties involved should refrain from provocations and violence. In addition, the partnership between NATO and Ukraine “will continue on the basis of the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. NATO remains committed to supporting the reform process in Ukraine.”

On November 23rd, in a phone conversation with Viktor Yanukovych, US Vice President Joseph Biden expressed Washington’s “disappointment in the Ukrainian government’s decision to delay preparations for signature of an Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the EU.” According to the communiqué issued by the White House, “it is our strong conviction that closer integration with Europe offers Ukraine a strategic opportunity to strengthen its democracy and return its economy to prosperity. The Vice President underscored the continued support of the United States for the Ukrainian people and their aspirations for European integration.”

After November 30th, the United States joined their European allies and condemned the violence against demonstrators as “unacceptable”. White House Press Secretary stated that “violence and intimidation should have no place in today’s Ukraine”, and that “we certainly don’t consider peaceful demonstrations coup attempts”, in response to the allegations of Prime Minister Azarov, who appreciated that the events in Maidan have all the signs of a coup. On December 11th, during the violent clashes between protestors and police forces, the Secretary of State John Kerry issued a statement expressing the United States’ “disgust with the decision of Ukrainian authorities to meet the peaceful protest in Kyiv’s Maidan Square with riot police, bulldozers, and batons, rather than with respect for democratic rights and human dignity. This response is neither acceptable nor does it befit a democracy.”

The events were in development even while Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, was in Ukraine to attempt a democratic end to the crisis, and Prime Minister Azarov required 20 billion Euros from the European Union as financial aid, as part of the Association Agreement. As

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20 Ibidem.
26 Ukraine requests EUR 20 bln from EU as financial aid
the European officials’ answer was negative, the Moscow Agreement of December 17th, between Viktor Yanukovych and Vladimir Putin, could not have come as a big surprise.

**Russia’s reaction**

For historical reasons (the Kievan Russia, the “hearth” of the original Russian State), for geopolitical reasons (the siding with the EU and NATO of the countries in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus is seen as an outright threat for the Russian “Heartland” – the geographical pivot of history, as defined by Halford Mackinder) and for military-strategic reasons (Ukraine, like other post-Soviet states bordering the Black Sea, is an extremely important buffer zone for the Russian defense planning), the Russian Federation could not – and still can not – accept Ukraine exiting its sphere of influence or, rather, its entering into the Western sphere of influence. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski’s assessment, an independent Ukraine is a geopolitical pivot in the sense that, without it, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire; its aspirations would be reduced to the status of a – large or regional – Asian power.\(^{27}\) In this case, the loss of Ukraine is equivalent with an expulsion from Europe, which also reveals the interests pursued by Russia by promoting the idea of a united Europe, by its attempted rapprochement to the European states, as a counterweight to the American influence, but also by the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union.

For all these reasons, the Ukraine’s rapprochement attempts to the West, which culminated with those of former President Viktor Yushchenko, following the Orange Revolution, were blocked by Moscow every time.

The 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest proved that, after a time of domestic deadlock, which generated the weakening of its position abroad, Russia is trying to recover, seeking its former glory. In Bucharest, Ukraine and Georgia were denied the NATO Membership Action Plan – with the help of some other member states, notably France and Germany. In these circumstances, the pro-Western intentions of the Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and of the Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili could not be materialized. Then followed the war in Georgia, in which Russia played a risky but winning card, correctly assessing the incoherent reaction of the West. From this point of view, one could argue that the annexation of Crimea in 2014 was encouraged by the developments in Georgia: Russia “took the pulse” of the West and drew the appropriate conclusions.

Yanukovych’s return to power in 2010, after his victory over Yulia Tymoshenko, was implicitly accompanied by a rapprochement (to a point, skillfully disguised) of Ukraine towards Moscow. With a pro-Russian President, is hardly conceivable that Ukraine could play a role of an unbiased mediator in the region, particularly with regard to the frozen conflicts in Transnistria and the Caucasus. Against this background, stands out Putin’s primordial intention to strengthen the economic and military position of Russia against NATO and the EU, embodied by his project to create the Eurasian Economic Union (officially effective on 1 January 2015), accompanied by a customs union, which includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Armenia. It is obvious that, without the participation of Ukraine, this project does not hold the same force. This was the general background on November 22nd, 2013, when Viktor Yanukovych announced the blocking of the Association Agreement with the EU.

As early as December 6th, the Ukrainian President had talked to Vladimir Putin about the conclusion of a “strategic agreement” between Russia and Ukraine aimed at eliminating the differences in the exchange and trade policies between the two countries and the problems relating to the supply of Russian gas. On December 17th, the two presidents signed a Russian-Ukrainian Action Plan, which provided for the acquisition by Russia of bonds issued by the Finance Ministry in Kiev, worth $ 15 billion.

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In addition, Russia agreed to give Ukraine a discount of almost a third on Russian export gas to Ukraine.  

These developments complied with the view expressed by Moscow since the beginning of the conflict. On November 22nd, President Putin accused the European Union of blackmailing Ukraine in signing the Association Agreement: “We have heard threats from our European partners towards Ukraine, up to and including promoting the holding of mass protests,” Putin said. After protesters occupied several government buildings in Kiev in response to the brutal intervention of Berkut forces on November 30th, Vladimir Putin has described the events of Maidan as being “more like a pogrom than a revolution [...] It has little to do with Ukraine’s relations with the European Union”.

On December 10th, the Russian Duma expressed “concern” for “the overt interference of foreign officials in the affairs of the sovereign Ukraine that stands at variance with any international norms causes particular concern”, adding that “unauthorized meetings, the siege of agencies of state power, seizures of administrative buildings, rampages, and destruction of the monuments of history lead up to a destabilization in the country and are fraught with ominous economic and political consequences for the people of Ukraine” (on December 8th, demonstrators in Kiev destroyed Lenin’s statue and hoisted in its place the EU flag along with the Ukrainian flag).

On December 12th, in his annual speech before the Federal Assembly, Vladimir Putin was courting Ukraine, noting Russia’s readiness to collaborate with it in Customs Union affairs on expert level. “Our integration project is based on equality and genuine economic interests. We will be consistent in the promotion of the Eurasian process without opposing it to other integration projects, among them, naturally, such a mature integration project as the European one,” he said.

The Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had an even more decisive stance than President Putin had, rhetorically asking in an interview with Rossiya 24 channel: “What did the government of (President Viktor) Yanukovych do? Did it quit the non-proliferation treaty? Did it announce that it is creating a nuclear bomb? Or maybe it executed somebody? [...] There is a street protest on such a scale and with such harsh slogans, as if the country has declared war on some peaceful state against the wishes of the Ukrainian people.” A few days later, he described as “indecent” the decision of “members of several European governments” to “rush to the Maidan without any invitation and take part in anti-government demonstrations”.

Although he did not mention any names, those targeted were Catherine Ashton and German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, who had met with the protesters in December. In addition, Lavrov added that “we have information that much of this is being stimulated from abroad”.

At the 50th Munich Security Conference held from 31 January to 2 February, the West and the East went against one another again on the issue of Ukraine, this time face to face. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov criticized those who “have occupied and still hold administrative buildings, attack policemen, set them on fire, use racist, anti-Semitic and Nazi slogans”, accusing the West of supporting the violence and terrorist

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32 Ibidem.


34 West has ‘lost sense of reality’ over Ukraine: Russia, http://en.tengrinews.kz/politics_sub/West-has-lost-sense-of-reality-over-Ukraine-Russia-24729/, accessed 14.03.2015.


actions of the protesters. The Secretary of State John Kerry reiterated that “the United States and the EU stand with the people of Ukraine in that fight.”

It was a dialogue of the deaf on many voices, and nobody seemed to want to take responsibility for an actual, practical decision. The only notable action seemed to have been the financial assistance proposed by the United States and the European Union in order to prevent Ukraine from collapsing if Russian financing would be stopped, to encourage reforms and a peaceful resolution of the conflict. However, nothing official was discussed about the possibility that Moscow would make an aggressive move in Ukraine. The conclusion seems to be that the West has not yet decided what strategy to adopt about the situation in Kiev, continuing to “play it safe” against a Russian leadership that, in more than one occasion, proved to be willing to take major international risks; the closest example, at the time, was the intervention in Georgia in 2008.

Conclusions

A major factor in the Ukrainian crisis is the insecurity which affected the international system of states following some major events of momentous and unusual impact on the international scene, such as: the prolonged insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan; the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008; the financial crisis of 2008. During this period of systemic uncertainty, as it was called in the media and by various experts, there have been significant events, like the “Arab spring” (2010), the US beginning to withdraw its troops from Iraq (2013) and Afghanistan (2014), the deteriorating security situation in the South China Sea between China and Japan, especially around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the Euro zone sovereign debt crisis or the emergence of the Islamic Caliphate. Thus, we are compelled to assert that the Ukrainian crisis is part of these events of major systemic impact, which demonstrate the state of uncertainty in which lingers the current international system of states.

We must conclude that the events of Maidan marked the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine, the most important one after the 90s, with deeply unstable and dangerous effects in the region (at this stage), with a major impact on international relations, causing surprise among states and the international public opinion, especially in Ukraine but equally in Russia, EU and USA.

The occurring of such dramatic events in Europe seems to harm the political values of the EU such as self determination, rule of law and peaceful resolution of conflicts. Although the situation in Ukraine has deteriorated since, Europe largely remains only a passive observer and, in good right, we can ask ourselves whether we should expect the EU to stand aside in future crises too.

Russia’s involvement in blocking Ukraine’s accession to NATO and the EU, as well as its intention to militarily intervene in Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea are clear indications that Russia seeks to strengthen its geopolitical position. The resolution of this regional crisis and, for that matter, of that of the entire international system will depend, undoubtedly, on the will of the Ukrainian people and of the Ukrainian state, but also on the cooperation of all actors involved, mainly Russia, US, NATO and the EU.

Since the early 90s, Russia either supported, either directly contributed to the emergence of four ethnic separatist regions in Eurasia: Transnistria, a self proclaimed region of Moldova; Abkhazia, located on the Georgian Black Sea coast; South Ossetia in northern Georgia; and, to a lesser extent, Nagorno-Karabakh, a mountainous region located in southwestern Azerbaijan. Moscow’s involvement led to the so-called frozen conflicts in those countries where separatist territories remained outside the control of central government and the local authorities enjoy the de facto protection and influence of Russia.


Regardless of the answer to the Ukrainian crisis, President Putin will be hard to counter. His foreign policy asserts a profound rejection of modern Western values and an attempt to draw a clear line between the world of Russia and the world of Europe. For Putin, Crimea is probably just the beginning.

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**Acknowledgement**

This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/138822 with the title “Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of Military Science, Security and Intelligence, Public order and National Security – Continuous formation programme for elite researchers – “SmartSPODAS”.”
THE LEGAL STATUS
OF COMBATANTS WHO BENEFIT
FROM AN ADDITIONAL REGIME
OF PROTECTION

Alexandr CAUIA, PhD*

In contemporary international armed conflicts, military forces composed of children (persons below 18), are widely used. Conventional rules of international humanitarian law allow the use of minors in the hostilities, provided that such a person is over 15 years. The representatives of this group of participants in a conflict are considered combatants if they are qualified to the conditions of this status and benefit from a supplementary protection regime, which also applies to women participating directly in military operations in a modern armed conflict. The essence and content of supplementary protection regime established for these categories of participants is the subject of research of this article.

Keywords: international humanitarian law, international armed conflicts, combatants, supplementary protection regime, children, women.

Introduction

Before World War II, armed conflicts supposed, in the majority of cases, confrontation between the regular armed forces of the states, which required massive and organized involvement of children in the course of military operations. The massive participation of children can be noticed in the resistant movement, which led to mass arrests and deportations. Later, in the second half of the twentieth century, within the armed conflict, the participation of combatant children in a larger scale becomes a rule, especially for conflicts between regular armed forces of the state and guerrillas or national liberation movements.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), while acknowledging the need to adopt an international legal act to prohibit the active participation of children in hostilities, contributed effectively in the development and adoption of the Geneva Declaration in 1924 regarding children protection, and in collaboration with the International Union for Child Welfare, ICRC drafted in 1939 a Convention regarding the child protection in armed conflicts.1

Unfortunately, the outbreak of World War II hostilities did not allow its adoption, but the protection of this category of “privileged combatants” is provided by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocols of 1977.2 In modern armed conflicts, there are two categories of combatants who benefit from a better protection, enjoying a privileged


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status owing their susceptibility to be attacked and become victims of the generated atrocities resulting from the hostilities – women and children combatants.

Both conventional rules and those customary of the humanitarian international law establish a special protection of this category besides general protection. In international armed conflicts, children who do not participate directly in hostilities are protected by the Fourth Convention from Geneva regarding the protection of civil persons and the First Additional Protocol. They have the guarantee of the right to life, the prohibition of torture and corporal punishments, collective punishments and reprisals and also international legal rules regarding the hostilities and principle of distinction between the civil and combatant population and the prohibition of transformation of the civil population in legal object of attack are applied.4

1. The legal regime of protection for children during armed conflicts

The Fourth Geneva Convention guarantees special protection for children during the armed conflict, but the principle of special protection is expressly foreseen in the Protocol Additional I (1978) text: “Children shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected against any form of indecent assault. The Parties to the conflict shall provide them with the care and aid they require, whether because of their age or for any other reason.” Also, this principle will be respected during a non-international armed conflict.6

The provisions regarding the special protection of children in modern armed conflicts stipulated by the texts of humanitarian international law can be classified into the following six categories:

1. Evacuation and special areas

Newborns and recently given birth mothers are treated according to the status of injured, and

the children under 15 years old and mothers of children under seven are in the category of civil persons that may be placed in a hospitals or safety zones established by the Parties involved in the conflict according to Article 14 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The children also fall into the category of civilian persons which have to be evacuated from a besieged or encircled area, but AP I, expressly foresees obligatory temporary evacuation of the children if this may indeed help to ensure their security. During a non-international armed conflict, is recommended the evacuation of children from a dangerous region for the safety of their lives and physical integrity.8

2. Assistance and care

Assistance and care is done by requiring the Parties involved in a conflict to ensure the areas of traveling for children ensure the proper functioning of the institutions charged with the protection and child care, etc.

3. Determining the identity, restoration of family relationships

Persons deprived of liberty because of the situation resulting from the armed conflict, determining the identity and family unity is the priority reflected by the obligation to put the family in a separate place during the hospitalization in order not to destroy it. The security and integrity of the family is the basic objective of the provisions of humanitarian international law in this regard.

4. Education and cultural environment

If the child remains within his family, then he/she benefits from all the conditions in order to receive the necessary education, and if the family cannot be restored at that moment, the child must benefit from a school education relative to his age, provided by a person of the same nationality and religion.

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3 CG IV art. 27-34 and AP I, art. 75.
4 AP I, art. 48 and 51.
6 AP II, art. 4 (3).
7 CG IV, art. 14, 17, 24 (2), 49(3), 132 (2); AP I art. 78; AP II art. 4 (3) (e).
9 CG IV art. 23, 24 (1), 38 (5), 50, 89 (5); AP I art. 70 (1), 77(1); AP II art. 4(3).
10 CG IV art. 24-26, 49 (3), 50, 82, AP I art. 74, 75 (5), 76 (3), 78; AP II 4 (3)(b), 6 (4).
11 CG IV art. 24 (1), 50, 94; AP I art. 78 (2); AP II art. 4 (3) (a).
5. **Arrest, detention and internment of children**

In cases of internment, the detention force is to take all measures to ensure the reunification of the family relationships, and for that, children will be placed with their parents. However, with the commission of ordinary crimes, which are under national law of the detention force, these children can be detained and arrested, if the age stipulated by the applicable law allows to qualify them as subjects of infringements of the imputed law.

6. **Prohibition to apply the death penalty**

Death penalty is prohibited for combatant children, even if the actions committed would expect such a type of punishment.

The cases of combatant children that participate in hostilities are too frequent, participation that may be embodied in various forms – from helping combatants through the provisions of arms and ammunitions, the enforcement of the intelligence actions, etc. up to the recruitment of children into regular armies of some countries or some groups of conflict.

Additional Protocols of 8 July, 1977 to the Four Geneva Conventions are the first international legal acts of the humanitarian international law which govern expressly this phenomenon. Thus, AP I provisions require the Parties involved in a conflict to take all possible measures to prevent direct participation of children in hostilities who have not reached the age of 15 and prohibit their recruitment in regular armies of the states, and in case when the state is being forced by the circumstances to recruit people aged 15-18 years old, the priority should be given to those elder. The PA II prohibits, without exception, the recruitment and the participation of the children below 15 years old in military operations during the modern armed conflicts.

However, children who participate directly in hostilities, within an international armed conflict receive the status of combatant and the corollary of a prisoner of war and combatant children who have not reached the age of 15 also benefit from the special protection provided by the normative documents applicable to such situations.

Even if the participation in hostilities of persons below 15 is strictly prohibited, in the case of their capture on a battlefield, the protection under humanitarian international law standards for prisoner of war cannot be limited in their regard. Thus, there is no age limit to be benefited from the prisoner of war status, which is a single factor that can generate a more favorable treatment. The captured persons who have not reached the age of 15 cannot be held liable simply for wearing a gun and participating in hostilities because the prohibition stipulated in the Article 77 (2) of AP I refers to the parties involved in the conflict, and not to the combatant children.

An international legal act that is primarily regulating the protection and safeguarding the children’s rights is the Convention on the Child Rights of 20 November 1989, which provides the safeguards stipulated in the Article 77 of AP I and the non-international armed conflicts, obliging the signer countries not to recruit the children aged under 15, but it does not prohibit or exclude the direct participation of the children aged between 15 and 18 in modern armed conflicts. This act is the product of the initiative launched by the Polish government in 1978 and aims principally at civil, cultural, economic and political, social rights of the child. In the discussions regarding the adoption of this Convention, Austria and Germany have pledged to increase the amount of age from 15 to 18, which in their view, would be in accordance with the major interests of the child. This position was supported by Spain, Colombia and Uruguay, but was not reflected in

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12 CG IV art. 51 (2), 76 (5), 82, 85 (2), 89, 94, 119 (2), 132; AP I art. 77 (3) şi (4); AP II art. 4 (3)(d).
13 CG IV art. 68 (4); AP I art. 77 (5); AP II art. 6 (4).
15 Maria-Tereza Dutli, op.cit.
18 Customary Norms, p. 624.
the final text of the Convention.

The optional Protocol of the Convention from 1989 governing the participation of the children in modern armed conflicts, adopted on May 25, 2000, fulfills their existing protection until that moment through the following provisions:

1. Signatory States will take all measures to prevent the direct participation in hostilities of persons with the age under 18, in their regular armed forces.

2. It prohibits the compulsory recruitment within the regular armed forces of the persons who have not reached the age of 18.

3. Signatory States determine the minimum age for voluntary enrollment as more than 15 years, except the military – profile educational institutions.

4. Military groups, other than the regular armies of states cannot recruit, neither forced nor voluntary people who have not attained the age of 18, and the states are required expressly to provide this within the national legislation and to criminalize this fact in order to provide a clear criminal penalty for these actions.

The recruitment and enrollment of children in facilitating their direct participation in the hostilities is prohibited both by the rules of humanitarian international law by the 1977 Additional Protocol, and through normative acts of public international law. International Criminal Court Statute establishes jurisdiction of the Court to criminalize and recruit or enroll in the regular armed forces of the states of people who have not attained the age of 15 and using them to participate actively in hostilities during the international armed conflict or national recruitment into armed forces or other military groups involved in non-international armed conflicts. This infringement is also stipulated in the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra-Leone text and the UN General Secretary noted in its report on the work of the court that the rule laid down in Article 4, AP II is being treated for some time as a customary rule. The specialized international organizations have not remained indifferent to this phenomenon: the UN Security Council through the resolution regarding the problem of the children in armed conflicts has strongly condemned the recruitment and enrolment of children within military forces under any form, and the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity has called upon all Member States, especially to those involved in the conflict not to recruit the children for achieving military objectives.

In accordance with the complementary character of the International Criminal Court jurisdiction, this mechanism can be implemented only in case when the state is unable or unwilling to punish those who committed these crimes, and signatory States are obliged to provide national criminal punishment to those committing these actions. This prohibition is stipulated in the military orders and guides of a large number of states.

As a result of hostilities termination, the prisoners of war shall be repatriated. This fact can take place during the armed conflict. The combatant children detained by the opposing Party, if returned early, are to give consent, which would be according to the rule stipulated in the Article 109 (2) of the Third Geneva Convention, which requires detainers to obtain the approval part for the repatriation of prisoners of war during the hostilities. This may prove to be beneficial only in cases when a detainer shall ensure that these children will not be involved again in hostilities by the Power of origin. There lacks well established rules in such a situation, but in accordance with Article 117 of the Third Geneva Convention: “No repatriated person may be employed on active military service.”

In the case of non-international armed conflict,

20 Statute of ICC art 8 (2) (b) (xxvi).
21 Statute of ICC art 8 (2) (e) (vii).
24 OAU, Council of Ministers. Res. no. 1659 (LXIV) din 1996.
25 Customary norms, pp. 617-618.
upon the children apply general guarantees in the favor of the persons who do not participate directly in the hostilities and the principle that: “The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.” The provisions of AP II are more severe regarding the protection of the child in comparison with the stipulations in AP I because they expressly prohibit to the Member States the recruitment, enrolment and direct involvement in hostilities of the children below 15 years old. Also, the ICRC can intervene to remind the parties in conflict that have quotas of combatant children of the prohibition of using of the children aged below 15 to increase its military potential. Thus, the bodies of UN: Security Council, General Assembly and Commission on Human Rights have repeatedly insisted on the rehabilitation and reintegration of the children who participated directly in armed conflicts.

The combatant children shall be repatriated at the end of active military operations, except when they are prosecuted for breaches of the humanitarian international law. If the ICRC actively participates in the process of repatriation, its representatives will insist on the priority of combatant children to be repatriated on the basis of their consent.

2. Legal status of combatant women

The humanitarian law contains special provisions to protect women’s rights in armed conflicts. Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, or any form of indecent assault. The special obligations are imposed to the warring parties, especially in the case of women hospitalization when they should be kept in separate places and supervised by guardian women. Also, a special attention should be given to pregnant women, women who have recently given birth, mothers with children under seven years old.

Even if Article 3 that is common to the Fourth Convention from Geneva and Additional Protocol II does not contain a special rule regarding the status of privileged protection or treatment of the women in non-international armed conflicts, these international legal acts contain provisions of a such rule as the damaging the life of somebody, especially murder of all types, particularly humiliating and degrading treatment, requiring women to provide sexual services and the obligation to place the women separately in the case of detention. The obligation to respect some of the needs of the women during a non-international armed conflict is stated in the text of military orders or guidance, and violating these rules one may be accused under the criminal law in the legislation of some states and some international documents that are applicable to situations of non-international armed conflict.

By the rules of Additional Protocol I, one insists to do everything possible to prevent the death penalty for crimes committed in armed conflict to pregnant and recently given birth women and mothers with infants, the application of punishment being prohibited in this period and Additional Protocol II expressly prohibits the application of this punishment and confinement for pregnant women.

The customary norm of the humanitarian international law that requires parties to armed conflicts to respect the special needs today, provides special protection to women affected by the military operations can be found in the text of Convention from Geneva and Additional

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26 Art 3 common to CG I-IV and art. 4 AP II.
27 AP II art. 13 (2).
28 Maria-Tereza Dutli, op.cit.
30 AP I, art. 76.
31 Argentina, Azerbaijan, Venezuela.
32 Customary norms, p. 609.
33 AP I, art. 76 (3).
34 AP II, 6 (4).
35 AP I, art. 12, par. 4, CG II, art. 12, par. 4, CG III, art. 14, par. 2, CG IV, art. 27, par. 2.
Protocol II requires a special attitude towards the situation of women involved or affected by the armed conflict.\(^{38}\)

A large number of orders, regulations and guidance of some states\(^{39}\) require strict observance of the special protection of women in the armed conflicts.\(^{40}\) Under the influence of the terminology used in the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol I, the practice shows that acts of domestic use of the vast majority of world states use the concepts of “special protection” and “special respect” that affected women will benefit.

Women combatants, just as men, have the right to all the judicial guarantees required by the international legislation and awareness of rights and guarantees enjoyed by the general provisions of public international law and humanitarian international law in particular. Poor educational background of women prisoners prevents judicial involvement in the settlement of the process where they appear as a suspect, accused or defendant.\(^{41}\)

In their approaches and attitudes taken on special protection status of women in the hostilities, the UN Security Council, Economic and Social Council and the Commission for Human Rights do not distinguish between international and non-international armed conflicts. UN Security Council\(^{42}\) has repeatedly called on parties to the conflict to respect the special needs and special protection enjoyed by the women under the rules in general and conflicts in some part, like the one of Afghanistan, for example.\(^{43}\) By resolution adopted in 2000, the UN Security Council has expressed concern over the situation of women affected by armed conflicts and reiterated its position according to the special needs and comprehensive ensuring of a special regime of protection that is an obligation for the parties involved in conflict,\(^{44}\) and the Bulletin of the UN Secretary General regarding the international law by UN provides that women shall benefit from special protection.\(^{45}\)

**Conclusion**

Because of the special status of combatant children and combatant women, during the course of legal regulations on the protection of individuals involved or affected in hostilities, a series of additional protection mechanisms were set. Following the analysis of these mechanisms, we have found out the following:

a) the urgent need to reconsider the legal instruments that would guarantee the absence of children in hostilities;

b) if they are still used, the normative provisions ensuring additional protection shall be fully respected by the warring parties;

c) respecting and ensuring a supplementary protection regime should be generated by the moral attitude to the two categories of combatants, which would enforce consistent respect for the rules under analysis;

d) respecting and ensuring a supplementary protection regime should be provided equally in both international and non-international armed conflicts.

Finally, we conclude that despite international efforts to adopt and implement international humanitarian law norms, the realities in hostilities do not always respect the rules that establish a supplementary protection regime for women in armed conflict, and the achievement of such norms is directly proportional to the moral-psychological and regulatory training of the combatants of warring parties.

\(^{38}\) AP I, art. 76 (1).

\(^{39}\) Austria, Argentina, UK, Canada, Switzerland, France, India, Indonesia, Spain, Madagascar, Marco, Nigeria, New Zealand, Holland, USA, etc.

\(^{40}\) Customary norms, p. 608

\(^{41}\) Шарлотта Линдсей. Женщины и война содержание под стражей во время войны. МККК, Сборник статей. Москва 2000. с. 269, с.255-273.


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This paper aims towards reviewing the main contributions brought by social history and historical sociology and evaluating the reception which these two intellectual approaches received in the International Relations discipline (IR). They were involved in the theoretical disputes regarding structuralism’s destiny as a research approach, being often viewed as both alternatives and failed hopes. The debates are still important for understanding actor’s policies, because they identify and select the factors which are considered as significant for an academic domain and can influence decision-makers reactions.

**Keywords:** security, policies, structure, change, neorealism, sociology, history.

**Foreword**

One of the most important questions for the social sciences is about how to relate general theories with contextual research, which is dependent on space and time. Can we explain our world by a mental framework which identifies recurrences and laws, or all depends on accidents and circumstances? Positivist believed in the first idea and, this way, they made valuable contribution to research traditions consolidation and systematization, by often were stuck at the same obstacles: predictions too vague: counterexamples which invalidated some pretty refined theories or a certain pragmatic skepticism. Repeatedly, they were criticized for ignoring the concrete, the social representations or ideas, the uniqueness of certain phenomena or the history.

Why should researchers focus usually on practical issues like resource allocation or procurement be interested in this type of subject? Any explanation appeals to certain ontological and epistemological premises which should draw our attention. Their underestimation may offer a distorted view of an academic domain and may weaken our critical capacity. The policies which these premises may inspire can fail or can’t be well understood without knowing the interpretations which supports them.

To these general issues, one can add some practical concerns. The contemporary debates related to nation-state’s fate are raising some interesting conceptual issues. How do we look at a subject: we take a model and we look at him as such, with a risk that the correlations involved can be soon obsolete, or we problematise it? By looking at the changes which are influencing the public institutions, one can elaborate more nuanced interpretations, including on distributive policies. As an example, for European Union’s members, this type of decisions must take account on, not only security problems, but also on the agreements related to public debts limits, budgetary deficit or inflation rate.

This article aims, as stated above, towards investigating the characteristics of social history and historical sociology and their receptions in the IR discipline and in the strategic and security
studies, with the general purpose of developing ideas regarding the study of decision regarding resource allocation. Social history and historical sociology are important because they go beyond the level of public institutions towards a broader area of phenomena and relationships, including the modern economy, social stratification and the role played by beliefs and social representations. The main hypothesis is that, as argued by Abbot regarding sociology, the effect of intellectual influences is filtered by academic traditions, when ideas travel across disciplinary boundaries. The main consequence is a partial understanding and sometimes, a distortion of these conceptual debs. Even if authors like John M. Hobson were looking for an alternative to neorealism, a new research tradition has failed to develop, neither is it certain that one can see it in the near future. The most ambitious attempt, the one undertaken by Buzan and Little, looks more like an attempt to refute neorealism using history, than a standalone attempt to understand the events. At the same time, though, social history and historical sociology can offer important contribution to IR, by their accent on change, processuality and their care for details.

This article is divided in three parts. The first one is about the research undertaken mostly by the Annales School, less known in IR and strategic and security studies, in part also as a result of the cultural prestige of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ academic environment. Two significant authors were selected, Fernand Braudel and Jacques le Goff, which aimed to reconcile theory and history. The second part describes the historical sociology approach, which is better known, but which is sometimes seen as a single intellectual approach, a view which understates its complexity, having to deal, thus with an research tradition more than a single worldview. The last chapter reviews the parallelisms and the reception which the ideas developed in social history and historical sociology got in IR, strategic and security studies.

1. Social history and structural diversity

In the beginning, social history started as an attempt to reconcile the study of the past with the rising discipline of sociology, which ended with more general issues like the distinction between structure and process, the assumed relationships of agent and structure or between politics, economics, the social domain or culture, which mixing theory and the study of primary sources. Its importance for IR, strategic and security studies can be shown in two ways. First, it reveals the complexity of the dimensions involved in decisions regarding public policies, not only the security aspect, but also the social, economical and cultural factors which help to configure the power relations and political judgment’s manifestations in a society but also on the world stage. Second, it can change the perspective on the actors, which can be seen not only as immovable objects, but as parts of long-term processes. For example, a battle can reflect a struggle between two competing forces, and a whole social mechanism, with cultural, political or social elements, as Braudel argued, as we will see below.

1.1. Annales School complexity

The biggest problem with contemporary theories from IR, strategic and security studies is that they try to simplify in excess the phenomena which they try to understand, and then they adapt their statements to avoid or to solve on a short-term basis the evolutions which may contradict them. Of course, there are exceptions to this
tendency. For this reason, one must take into consideration the intellectual approaches which are revealing the theoretical ambiguities and correlation’s multiplicity inherent in the process of explanation. Here, an important standpoint is represented by Fernand Braudel’s work, one of the Annales school most valued members, especially The Mediterranean and The Material Civilization, accompanied by a set of methodological articles6. He had an indirect influence on IR by the theory of Immanuel Wallerstein7.

Braudel’s main idea is that of a ‘longue durée’, that one must study social phenomena and interaction between structures on the long run, gaining, this way, a new perspective on history and society8. Political system are, according to this worldview, undergoing constant changes, not simply atemporal mechanism, they way neorealism tends to see them. Social structure, thus, has a dual nature, as positioned units, but also as a process, as transformation. Also, it can’t be reduced just to one of its component, be they political, economical or social9.

From these considerations, it follows that, when we are researching states and systems, we must, at least, be aware that these institutions are, in reality, dynamic equilibrium between competing and moving forces, and are the objects of a variety of influences. If in one stage of modernity, for example, production is dominating, one can simply over-generalize, being necessary further case studies. Also, one can still identify a few main tendencies, like the development of economic structures, state’s centralization or cultural trends, but without seeing them in an inflexibly way.

A second author from the Annales School important for these issues is Jacques le Goff. Two works are worth mentioning in this context: The Middle Age Civilization and the Medieval Imaginary10, where the historian has general, theoretical interests, besides describing and explaining some old time phenomena and contexts. Thus, he offers us the image of a world in which one can find multiple linkages between social sectors, where mentalities play a significant role, conditioning and motivating actors’ behavior.

According to le Goff, the political, religious and social structures are mutual conditioning, being difficult to speak of one determining cause11. For example, the uncertainty of live during the medieval ages was linked with a feeling of uneasiness which defined the imaginary of that era12. At the same time, the mentalities can’t be easy reduced to material factors and can cause, on their own, changes of dominant institutions13. Here we are speaking mostly about how social reality is interpreted, about concepts and theories, more than only concrete facts. Especially this nuanced correlation between social structures and representations, with a durkheimian mark, may offer a solution to the IR disputes; too often prey to facile oppositions, like then one between idealism and materialism14.

Annales school works deserve the attentions of IR’s researchers for at least two reasons. The first one is the need to study in a multidisciplinary and contextualized way the phenomena, not only from a political perspective. Secondly, the accent on the relationship between power and ideas draws the attention on the risk of overlooking the role played by ideas, a risk which

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10 Jacques le Goff, Civilizația Occidentului medieval, Editura Științifică, București, 1970.


12 Ibidem.


can be endangered by a reductionist explanation, either structuralist or institutionalist. The social structures are results and models of actor’s behavior, not blind forces. Moreover, one can find not only one type of interaction, but multiple forms, which can reflect upon each other.

1.2. The value of actors and experiences

If the Annales School highlighted structural diversity, a series of historical studies from the British and American academia put under question the limits of structural determinism. These tendencies influenced IR after 1990, but were anticipated in the previous years\(^\text{15}\). They were concerned with the value of actors’ subjective knowledge, of the ways they see the world, of organizational development and of consequences.

An important contribution was brought by E. P. Thompson, in a classical work in the relationship between social groups and institutions, in *The Making of the English Working Class*\(^\text{16}\). The fundamental idea was that the positions held in a system are insufficient as explanations for understanding the results of social interactions. His significance resides in proving that an actor-centered research is not necessary chaotic, but can lead to the identification of important trends and recurrences which can lead to change in or of the system.

The presence of self-conscious groups is not simply a reflection of structure, but it can be understood as actor-based behavior too\(^\text{17}\). Thus, for Thompson, one must study the development of collective identities, autonomous from institutions and organizational forms. Any social system has, in consequence, a history, being influence by the context and by traditions, which makes difficult to sustain the radical separation undertaken by Waltz or Wallerstein, between structure and process\(^\text{18}\).

The implication for this study is that one can understand the resources allocation process not only by investigating the security environment, of threats and of power balance. It is important to understand the social representations held by actors and of internal characteristics. If social structures are not analogous to the ones from architecture, but they consist of processes, with various speeds, then one must research longer-term tendencies, the context, besides the structural aspects.

1.3. Social history’s contributions

Authors like Fernand Braudel argued that a strictly political explanation can be insufficient even for understanding security phenomena. Le Goff underlined the diversity of structures and the processual nature of institutions, besides pointing towards the role played by culture and economy. Thompson brought maybe the most incisive explanation of actor’s origins and, as Ashley argued, we drew the attention of structuralist explanation’s vulnerability in understanding change\(^\text{19}\).

The first conclusion is about a way to see the various social interactions, more than one regarding specific causal relationships, a view which contradicts simplistic arguments which tend to reduce everything to a few numbers of causes\(^\text{20}\). Structures are diverse in nature; determinations can be complex, either bottom-up or the opposite. Secondly, it is important to keep in mind the processual aspects of society, including here also the international system, actors, power manifestations or security threats. One of the most important critiques raised by researchers such as Buzan and Little to Waltzian structuralism was exactly this tendency to ignore the temporal aspects of phenomena under investigation\(^\text{21}\).


\(^\text{17}\) Ibidem, pp. 9-10.

\(^\text{18}\) Ibidem, p. 9.

\(^\text{19}\) Richard Ashley, *op. cit.*

\(^\text{20}\) Ibidem.

2. Historical sociology: structuralism’s rise and fall

For a long time, historical and systemic, or diachronic and systemic explanations according to one’s use of jargon, were seen as contradictory, some interested in unique cases, the others on general questions. The result was a not very surprising contrast between monographies dedicated to subjects considered impossible to replicate and the often static theories aspiring to universality. This divorce which traces the origins in the deep structures of Western culture still is influencing many disciplines and intellectual debates.

Historical sociology attempted to overcome these types of oppositions, though with an accent on wide scale recurrences, even in particular contexts. One can grasp this by considering that positivism – that idea that social sciences must imitate the natural one's – was influential after 1945 by the means of many schools of thought like functionalism and structuralism. This part of the article will review the main contributions bought by historical sociology, like the one authored by Barrington Moore, Charles Tilly, Theda Skocpol, Anthony Giddens and Michael Mann. The goal, like above, is to point out the advantages and disadvantages which these views can bring to IR, specially on issues like the value of structure, of states and cultures.

2.1. In-between society and state

Structuralist approaches hoped to explain general phenomena like wars and revolutions as a result of the configuration of power relationships or of positioning. They have a universalistic nature and are in trouble while trying to explain particular phenomena, besides their obvious advantages in underlining continuities. Thus, it is not surprising that this worldview was very popular inside historical sociology, since it offered a way to integrate systems and change. Here the main structuralist explanation from historical sociology will be analyzed.

One of their forerunners was Norbert Elias, which attempted to reconcile weberian approaches, which stressed the growing rationalization and state centralization processes; durkheimian, pointing to the linkages between society and ideas and, last, freudian, regarding personality’s development, in his classical work, *The Civilizing Process*. His main argument concerned the impact of international competition and of internal group interactions on culture and individual personality, and vice-versa. His logic anticipated much of what later was called structuration theory, which will be approached later in this article.

Engage in rivalries, the states engaged into processes of political development, aiming towards fighting external threats and gaining internal control of groups like aristocracy. This lead to authority’s centralization, a tendency which pressed towards greater individual self-control, by adopting the new norms and practices. Here, Elias was speaking about manners, polite behavior or eating rules.

These historical processes didn’t lead though to identical results, because internal power relationships were different. Elias was explaining, for example, the differences between French and German cultures, by using the specific positioning of elites and the state/monarchy in the 18th century. These characteristics started new identity configurations which lead in time, linked with power structures, to 20th century nationalism.

Elias conceived an interesting explanation, which relies on social groups, states and identities. Even if it came with a materialistic nuance, his theory offered a panoramic view of the changes which affected the international system in the

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26 Ibidem, pp. 49-69.
last three centuries. The resource allocation and procurement policies are, here, the result of three interlocking processes: state centralization, the competitive nature of international relations and the new identities which appeared, marked by the opposition between the internal domain (peaceful) and the external one (conflictual), one of the foundational metaphors of IR, strategic and security studies, as Guzzini has pointed out\(^\text{27}\).

A second important contribution was brought by Barrington Moore, especially in *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, where he offered a more flexible view of social stratification’s effect on politics than the typical positivist ones\(^\text{28}\). He tried to explain political regimes linking internal structures and different categories or revolutionary change, using path-dependency as a causal principle. This way, events, decisions and constraints from the past stimulated or limited processes of change which is influencing the environment and options available to contemporary generations. It influenced many domains, including the main theory of distribution and social policies, authored by Gösta Esping-Andersen\(^\text{29}\).

Barrington Moore identified three causal pathways which played a dominant role in modernity. According to the first one, a social structure with an influential commercial or bourgeois class leads a social coalition, on the long run, to democracy and capitalism, one a revolutionary change succeeds. The second one, where aristocracy keeps an important standing, explains how traditions of change from above are followed by fascist regimes and capitalist economies. The third causal trend is about a strong peasantry, which stimulated revolutions and radical politics, explaining why communist movements were successful\(^\text{30}\).

According to this view, one can understand the types of resource allocation and procurement for defense as distributive politics, the result of linkages between social structure, political regime and the economic order. The main sources of change are the dominant social coalition and the path-dependency. These structures must be seen as influenced by context and they can help us grasping not a particular decision, but the general forms and linkages.

Moore’s approach encounters two difficulties. Firstly, public institutions play no role, becoming only the result of social coalition changes, according to which public policies are designed and pursued. Secondly, the cultural and ideological aspects are ignored, especially since they can’t be simply explained as the result of class positions\(^\text{31}\). Even so, the accent he put upon power relations and the extension of analysis beyond strictly static and formal point of views can be useful in understanding how decisions are make and implemented.

The third important theory, after the ones of Elias and Moore, belongs to Charles Tilly, in works such as *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990*\(^\text{32}\). He studied the linkages between the international system and domestic politics, and became famous with the dictum „war makes the state”, or, put it otherwise, that the latter’s institutional machine developed as a result of military necessities and that his advantages in this area explain why it was the central actor of world politics\(^\text{33}\).

Tilly’s main objective was to understand state’s success, by comparison with other types on political communities, such as city states

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\(^{30}\) Barrington Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. XII-XIV, 4-14; 162-164; 228-256.


or Papacy. Thus, the conflictual potential of international security environment stimulates actors to develop military capabilities, which required a resource extraction ability to assure their survival and power. Unit’s behavior dependent also on the type of domestic order, especially on the relations developed between political and economic groups.

Like Moore, Tilly projected three models of political development, but with a different intent and causation, linking force and economy. The first one is about capital-intensive communities, city-states like Venice or Genoa, lead by traders; the second, capitalized coercion, the future nation states like France or Britain; and the third, coercion-intensive, referring to authoritarian regimes. The second and third one gained success in the European security system, due to their governing capacity, ability to extract and allocate resources, which allowed them to remain competitive in organizing and engaging in warfare, during modernity.

Similar to realist structuralist arguments, the characteristics of the international system is stimulating units to distribute resources for the defense sector, but here a special access is put on domestic structures and on path dependency. The external gains are also encouraging a tendency towards convergence of political and social rules. The dimensions and the goals of resource allocation policies are the result, thus, of security threats, of internal institutions and of negotiation between political and economic elites.

This explanation is focused on military pressures and on leadership, which leads to the development of modern states, but they only offer us a sketch, being indeterminate. It also understates maybe one of the most important changes in state’s goals and organization, unrelated to war, which is about social policies, an argument for broadening the social context beyond the roles played by elites. The advantages which Tilly views brought are the simplification of causality, the impact of political arrangements on economy, and a processual view of society. Thus, the state can be seen not only as an unchanging object, but also as a chain of phenomena, a reunion of different tendencies, which allows us to better understand contemporary trends.

The third structuralist theory discusses here was elaborated by Theda Skocpol, by connecting the domestic and international levels, including on issues regarding resource allocation. In States and Social Revolutions, she argued that motives and identity are insufficient for understanding political phenomena, offering instead a positional approach, applied to the study of revolutions. She appealed to explanatory factors such as social stratification, organization, and resources owned by different groups.

To the internal traits, Skocpol added the impact of external trends. Thus, revolutions are the result of a conjunction between international crisis, which are pressing the political system, especially on its extractive/taxation side, and domestic features, like the presence of extended discontent. The allocation policies, transposing this view, depend, in consequence on at least three factors: the external political order; the degree of economic development and state’s ability to draw resources for its goals.

Typical for a structuralist approach, here actors and ideas are not very important, one of the main reasons for which Skocpol’s approach was intensively criticized. The author distinguished, though, between culture, more diffuse and standing, and ideologies, which are seems as directly related to capabilities and power struggles. This way, one can have a better understanding for this very complicated issue.

Also, it was underlined the case selection potential weakness, since the theory was focused on cases from the western European context. This focus, however, is not an inherent drawback of the approach, as Skocpol’s work demonstrates. The approach can be applied to other contexts and periods, as long as the analysis is grounded in a rich historical and comparative perspective.

Theoretical and methodological issues are also relevant in this context. For example, the role of ideas and culture in shaping social and political dynamics is often overlooked in structuralist approaches. This is a limitation, as cultural and ideological factors can play a significant role in the emergence and development of revolutions. Similarly, the impact of external factors on domestic processes is sometimes underemphasized, as it is assumed that state actors are autonomous and independent units.

In conclusion, Tilly’s and Skocpol’s structuralist approaches offer valuable insights into the dynamics of political and social systems. They emphasize the importance of power, resources, and institutional structures in shaping political outcomes. However, they also have limitations and can be complemented by other perspectives and methodologies to provide a more comprehensive understanding of historical and contemporary phenomena.
on societies defined by states under challenge by modernity and with a big rural population. Many invoked here cultural traits, not ideology, such as the presence of milenaristic traditions, with origin in religious beliefs. It is interesting to compare the reactions to Skocpol work with the replies Kenneth Waltz received for his Theory of International Politics.

2.2. Moving away from structure

Anthony Giddens offered a way out of the dilemmas created by structuralism, more precisely, the choice between form or actors and between ideal and material factors, exercising, thus, an important influence of approaches such as constructivism, but not only. His structure is dualistic, defining the actors, but also created by them; following that one can’t simply draw a line between them, but one must see both sides. Moreover, the structure has also an ideational aspect, related to power.

Based on this premises, Giddens elaborated a reinterpretation of modern history. For him, the main trend was a change from class divided societies (or societies based on orders) towards class ones. This transition lead to two structures, market economy and the state, linked in many different ways. The political institutions can also be separated in authoritarian and national, according to the influence played by finance, production and trade.

From the 19th century, these two phenomena were closely related, the economy being protected by armed force, while its resources became an element of military power, which allowed the international security environment to play a significant role. One side, capitalism developed in tandem, the economical elite being in control of wealth, but on the other side, political leaders were depending on entrepreneurs for collecting the needed resources to implement various security policies.

Giddens was criticized for its overvaluation of ideas and underestimation of power, though this reproach can be a little overstated. More likely, the cultural element in his theory was highlighted by his followers, reacting to the intellectual dominance enjoyed by structuralism. More important, is his attempt to underline the value of change and of its necessary conditions.

A second distancing from structuralism, more radical than the one discussed above belongs to Michael Mann, who attempted a monumental sociological synthesis in The Sources of Social Power. He offered there a model with four causal factors, related to power resources: ideological, economical, military and political. These capabilities define or stimulate various types of social interactions. The author identified a series of attributes for these relationships: according to comparative positions, centralization, range and the way they are used.

His main idea was that no single factor can help us understand the way societies changed in history. The communities are a result of these four capabilities and of the interactions which they allow, but with not fixed form for the long term, while the changes are difficult to predict and understand. Modernity is dominated by states, capitalism and nationalism, a not very different theory from the previously discussed ones.

Here, how we see resource allocation policies depends on the theory about the state. For Mann, the defense is one of the four main sources of power which helps define a society and it explains the success enjoyed by Western societies. The generation of capabilities depends upon the autonomy enjoyed by public institution, their

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46 Giddens, op. cit, pp. 7-8, pp. 182-185.
administrative abilities and by the overall pattern produced by the four power sources.

2.3. Evaluating historical sociology

Historical sociology can bring important contributions to understand how resources are generated and distributed. This discipline sends three messages: path dependency; the fundamental role played by social stratification and the impact of states processes and policies. At the same time, it underestimates sometimes ideas, culture and it bears the risks of simplification, even in Mann’s formulation.53

The structuralist theories from this domain, especially the ones of Moore, Tilly and Skocpol refused to limit themselves to banalities. The authors tried to prove the existence of multiple linkages between different social sectors, like the international system, economy, public institutions or stratification. Even if they understated ideas, the value of structure as part of a broader explanation still stands, as Sewell has argued54.

The distancing from structuralism which Giddens and Mann elaborated put a significative accent upon the meaning of change. Even so, the conditions in which transformation occur are still underspecified, including in Sewell reformulation, which highlighted the possibility of choosing between multiple structures and of transforming them55. Especially at Mann, one can notice a reversed exaggeration, since the interaction between his four fundamental powers sources seem to be chaotically.

3. Parallelisms and reception in international studies

The debates regarding structure, actors, change, ideas and capabilities are common themes to social history, historical sociology and the related disciplines of IR, strategic and security studies. It follows that the presence of theoretical parallelism between these apparently different domains is not a big surprise, the differences between them being cause by, not only the issues researched, but also by different traditions and forms of institutionalization. For example, structuralism and the critics it received one can find them in almost all intellectual debates since 1945, in social science.

The problem of mutual influences is raising some question marks, having to choose between the classical explanations according to which the receiver follows blindly a model, or the opposite one, in which one chooses according to some predetermined mental framework. The disciplinary borrowing can go from total integration to the search for help in defending favorite theories. This section is organized in two parts, once dedicated to general theories of world politics and economics, like the one attempted by Kenneth Waltz, Immanuel Wallerstein and Alexander Wendt. The second part will look upon the work of researchers which consciously tried to use social history and historical sociology to improve IR, strategic and security studies.

3.1. Between structuralism and constructivism

The conceptual approaches discusses in this section are influenced by wider philosophical and theoretical issues. They put under question how should we think about laws, concepts, and explanations, how they relate to reality, or the meaning of terms such as structure, actors, continuity, and change. They are dedicate not only to concrete events, but more to the framework in which one can understand a specific policy, a war, the development of a certain weapon system and the rise of new international actors.

Once the dominant view inside IR, Kenneth Waltz’s theory is closest to the one elaborated by Charles Tilly, on which he exerted an influence. Resuming his argument, the anarchical structure of international politics, along with the assumption of survival lead to the recurrence of power equilibrium; the international actors are forced, under these conditions to choose between following the system by balancing behavior and playing to price57. This is a partial determinism,

54 William Sewell, op. cit., p. 126.
aimed towards explaining only some aspects of world politics: conflictuality, alliances or arms races\textsuperscript{58}. One can notice here not only the similarity with Tilly, but also with Skocpol, regarding the epistemological view on society. Even so, historical sociology is not identical to neorealism, being more critical towards the concept of structure and having a more processual perspective\textsuperscript{59}.

Immanuel Wallerstein could be treated in any section of this article, but in IR’s institutional memory, he is almost adopted, especially his ideas regarding political economy, hegemonic cycles or the importance of holism. It is probably the clearest example of a successful outside influence on this academic domain until constructivism’s development; part of which can be ascribed to the author’s ability to connect very different societal sectors, but also to his writing style. For him, the economy defines international system’s deep structure, formed by a center, a periphery and an intermediary social space\textsuperscript{60}. The great power is also the most developed societies, but their ranking can be contested during economical crises and hegemonic conflicts. Wallerstein enjoyed an influence not only on radical theories, but also on realist authors like Robert Gilpin, being seen sometimes as a lefty version of Kenneth Waltz\textsuperscript{61}.

The third approach discussed here is the one belonging to Alexander Wendt, who is somehow in between structuralism and constructivism, and who imported much of Giddens structuration theory into IR, in two valuable articles\textsuperscript{62}. The popularity which constructivism enjoyed owes much to the latter, even though Wendt went further than the theories from historical sociology, coming closed to some of Waltz’s much criticized ideas like conceptual schematism and a rigid view of change\textsuperscript{63}. In essence, he argues that structure is not only a constraint upon, but also a product of unit’s behavior, being reproduced by their interaction only and that the international system has a predominantly ideational nature, of a social representation, which defines interests and identities\textsuperscript{64}.

These three interpretations can be called theories cu a big \( T \), being ambitious abstractions of international relations, wild scale concepts and law which frequently are drawing researcher’s attention, even if they end up criticized and rejected. They point towards three flashlights which reveal standpoints of world politics, including how resources are allocated for defense. Wendt is exemplary for the way in which a seemingly radical contestation can become pretty closer to its former opponent, structuralism.

3.2. Specific theories

Besides the large scale views of international relations reviewed above, a group of researchers attempted to adapt ideas from social history and historical sociology in a more contextual way or their ideas paralleled the ones from these two disciplines. They can be distinguished by a constant reference to the Wendt, Wallerstein and especially Waltz, a reference so important that they helped structural realism to have even today a strong influence over IR\textsuperscript{65}. Is not overblown to argue that the attraction of social history and historical sociology comes mostly from this tendency.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibidem. Pentru o critică a neorealismului, Andrei Miroiu, Balașă și hegemonie, Tritonic, București, 2005.
\textsuperscript{63} Radu-Sebastian Ungureanu, Securitate, suveranitate și instituții internaționale, Polirom, Iași, 2010.
\textsuperscript{64} Alexander Wendt, Teoria socială a politicii internaționale, pp. 132-200.
One of the researchers which influenced the reception of these ideas, John Hobson, followed an approach which distinguished between state’s power/capabilities and their ability to modify the international structures, or in Susan Strange’s wording, between relational and structural power. He adapted also Giddens structuration concept, but with less accent put upon the ideational part and in a less holistic way than Wendt. His main idea was that a state can produce radical change if is more strongly linked to the domestic society, an argument which goes against many realists views.

Thus, Hobson moderates some theories which reify the state, and which have problems explaining phenomena like United States success in winning the Cold War. His theory identifies three factors: domestic relations between various groups, external behavior and state’s competence regarding both the international and the internal domains. The causal linkages must combine all these features, but, contrary to Waltz, Hobson doesn’t ignore the unit level of analysis.

According to this view, state’s decision-making capacity is also the result of a series of factors, such as fiscal ones, autonomy and coercion. Hobson applied his theory to the change form free change to protectionism in the second half of 19th century, arguing that the differences between Great Britain and Germany were the product of specific domestic configurations. The first one, being better integrated, could hold on the liberty of exchange, and while the second was forced to rely on protection to compensate for reduces revenue from taxation.

Here, two different structures are intersecting, while keeping their relative specifics. Even so, the idea of an integrated domestic realm is difficult sometimes to encounter in reality, for example in captive and vulnerable states. A clearer view of power’s relational aspect could reduce the difference between capabilities and the ability for external change. Hobson’s contribution remains important for nuancing IR theories, opening interesting perspectives.

Alongside Hobson, interdisciplinary was also strongly promoted by Barry Buzan and Richard Little. Influence by many historical schools and by IR theory, they underlined the role played by interaction capacity (features like technology or common languages) and of different types of units upon the international system. Thus, they accomplished a broader historical and conceptual framework, which distinguished itself by comparison with other works from IR, strategic and security studies.

Using a comparative historical method, Buzan and Little pointed that international system changes are depending on various interaction traits such as its intensity, space, dimension, type and upon actors. The last two characteristics are more interesting, going beyond structural realism. Buzan and Little used also the older idea of differencing security across sectors (political, economical, social), promoting a pluralism of interpretation analogous to the multiple structures invoked by Sewell.

More interesting is their view on actors, where the causal linkage established in Waltzian theory is reversed. The changes of system are the result of unit’s transformation, while anarchy seems to be an exception than a rule of history. Thus, is more important to study the nation-state, than polarity or balancing behavior. Similar to Hobson, domestic politics are connected to international ones, while the structure is both a product and a constraint upon actors.

Buzan and Little avoided the attempt to draw a general theory and maybe this is one of the vulnerabilities. For a more convincing critique of neorealism, one needs also to show more

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68 John M. Hobson, The State and International Relations, p. 204.
70 Samuel P. Huntington, op. cit.
73 Ibidem, pp. 385, 388, 396-397.
precisely how structure and agents are related in concrete historical circumstances. An analogue argument can be made also about how sectors related to each other across time and space. But, with all the potential weak points, Buzan and Little’s work stands out by the originality of its intention and by its range.

The peak of historical sociology and social history reception was a special conference which leads to an interesting collective volume, coordinated by Hobson and Hobden. The main problem here was that the authors were too much interested in distancing from neorealism and in intellectual positioning. Thus, as Abbot has argued, the academic discipline traditions can distort the way ideas are seen and used across institutional boundaries.

For example, here Hobson argued in favor of historical sociology potential to offer a more nuanced perspective compared to neorealism; while pointing out the complexity’s value, even if his argument only multiplies the structures, while keeping the same logic of causality. Hobden promoted multidisciplinarity as a necessity, and more studies on the role played by units; other contributors bring more skeptical, though. Steve Smith even questioned the whole enterprise, because it was leading to a consolidation of dominant theories.

Maybe IR is too self-centered, which leads to a pretty modified view of other disciplines. Is not always true that the whole historical sociology is or must be structuralist. Even for these theories, is not a necessity to reify structures, to treat them as unmovable essences, one example being here state’s theory presented by Tilly, which, even it may be simplistic, has a prosesual nature.

### 3.3. Multidisciplinary or parallel trajectories?

Sociology, history and IR were sometimes influenced by common cultural trends, going beyond their specific domain, method or intellectual traditions. Structuralism and the wave which comprises postmodernism and critical approaches are the easiest examples. The issue they raised, of connecting general theories with contextual studies are more interested and valuable than it is usually thought. For now, it is difficult to answer to the question raised by Abbot.

Generally speaking, the reception has proven to be very selective and was determined by the parallels with IR evolutions, especially with Waltz’s theory. Outside theories had the strongest influence when there wasn’t a local equivalent like it happened to Wallenstein’s approach. But for the rest, internal concerns and debates were dominating. This can be explained by institutional reasons, but it also reflects a few common interests, related to states, power, international system, which are defining at least the issues in dispute, lacking a minimal consensus. This, a multidisciplinary research program is not very probable in the near future. More likely is the continuation of this selective borrowing.

### Conclusions

Structuralist theories shown an important factor which explains resource allocation and procurement policies, but they can’t explain their motives and manifestations. They can’t fully grasp the interaction between system and units, except by vague expressions. Thus, they need at least to identify the steps by which actors are integrated and use their knowledge to define policies, more precisely, of unit-based explanations.

Even so, the existing actor-based explanations are mostly statist, structuralist and underestimate the role played by ideas. The attempts made by neoclassical realism are still in infancy, and they risks becoming just another version of rational-actor model. Is not mandatory to view states and other actors in this excessive way, without taking into consideration domestic traits, at least.

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77 Stephen Hobden, “Historical sociology: back to the future of international relations”, in Hobden and Hobson (eds), op. cit., pp. 42-43.
78 Steve Smith, op. cit., p. 223.
Historical sociology the our attention on the value of part dependencies and traditions, gave a processual view of the state, but also has not taken much into consideration the ideas, at least the structuralist version. On the contrary, Annales School and similar approaches underlined the imaginary/identity dimension of society and its impact on politics, but the linkages between ideas and power remained ambiguous. Also, the idea of a structural time alludes to the need for contextualization and attention for long term trends. One can look at the resource allocation and procurement domain in an alike processual way, but this attempt is raising the multiplicity of causes question. How can we do this without adding another positivist theory to an already filled warehouse? One reply comes from Weberian ideal-type methodology, which offered a compromise between universal and interpretative conceptualizations. Out of the diversity of social reality, it is possible to construct abstract models, which highlight some traits and linkages and are used to underline how the meaning of social action was produced, like with Max Weber distinction of patrimonial and administrative forms of state power, to which one can, adds the often discussed postmodern political communities. These type may be build by combining capabilities and culture, linking resources and goals to politics adopted and implemented. This way, one can skip some of the ever lasting IR debates, the recurring and millennial one about matter and spirit.

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Acknowledgement

This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/138822 with the title “Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of Military Science, Security and Intelligence, Public order and National Security – Continuous formation programme for elite researchers - “SmartSPODAS”.”
CONSIDERATIONS ON THE RELATION BETWEEN VALUES AND SECURITY CULTURE

Veronica PĂSTAE, PhD*

This article investigates the relationship between values and security culture, therefore we shall analyse the manner in which social values such as equality, liberty, solidarity, tolerance, difference, diversity or justice are reflected by the concept of security culture. Additionally, we shall approach some controversial aspects, like the overlap between diplomatic culture, political culture, strategic culture and security culture, in an attempt to highlight the fine distinctions among them. Our final purpose is to draw attention to the deeply ingrained national perceptions which exert a powerful influence on the way regional security strategies are designed. We shall argue that leaders and policy-makers must be aware of cultural differences and take them into account if they aim at building a realistic and viable security culture that could ensure better safety for all citizens.

Keywords: security, value, security culture, strategic culture, security discourse, national stereotypes, policy-making

Introduction

Reflecting on the content of security culture inevitably leads a researcher to the thorny questions “what is to be understood by this concept?” and “is it actually of any use to promote it?”

Although the focus on cultural aspects of security policies and practices could be characterized as relatively new, concerns and debates around the importance of culture in the context of international encounters can be traced back historically as far as centuries ago. In this respect, Keith Krause1 mentions François de Callières’ diplomatic handbook which looked at national differences distinguishable among negotiators in the eighteenth century2. The point made in this work (and in other similar ones) is that there are cross-cultural differences which both common people and, more significantly, decision-makers are subconsciously influenced by.

However, mention must be made, that it would be a gross overstatement to claim that cultural influences are everything in the security arena, since there are other critical factors at stake such as economy or geography, which may well prevail in transactions and military/political alliances. Yet, at a closer look, there remains a subtle and open to question area of the security domain, where culture and (national) values fit in, and discreetly shape the dynamics of security architecture. We may not witness a huntingtonian clash of civilizations in the development of the security agenda, but there are important cultural aspects worth reflecting upon as analysts consider them to have the potential of a snowball effect if neglected. All these influences and mingling taken into account, we arrive at what has generally been labelled in the domain as security culture.

1. Troublesome overlaps: strategic or security culture?

The first and most delicate problem encountered by a researcher in approaching the field of security culture is providing a proper definition of the concept, against which things could be subsequently put into perspective.

What should be underlined from the very beginning is that in many works under our investigation, there is a large degree of concept overlap, namely, what some authors call security culture is called strategic culture in other works.

J. Howorth speculates that one possible reason for this outcome could be the fact that strategic culture sounds more proactive, heroic and martial, as compared to its neutral competitor, security culture. 3

What adds to the confusion is the fact that security culture, as it is largely understood today, heavily draws upon strategic culture studies. Actually, the first conspicuous association between strategy and culture was introduced by Jack Snyder in the 1970s, in a study dealing with Soviet and US approaches to nuclear strategy. Thus, the author defined strategic culture as “the sum of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired… with regard to nuclear strategy”. 4

This definition is rather significant in the course of security studies since it introduces the cultural perspective to the discussion. Heiko Biehl et al. reinforce the weightiness of Snyder’s contribution, claiming that this focus on culture “was intended to challenge the dominant theories of that time, which largely rested on the assumption that actors behave rational and act in pursuit of preferences largely determined by material factors”. 5 Moreover, these authors expand on the interplay between cultural backgrounds and the decision-making process: “Cultural approaches emphasize that national preferences and interests are not always objectively determined, but are created in a multifaceted way and complex environment. The sensitivity a cultural approach brings to historical experiences of societies and the ability of strategic culture research to connect domestic and international politics are important advantages for analyzing security and defense policies”. 6

These observations are quite pertinent, but it is obvious that authors often use the term strategic culture with reference to the collective mindset of a society/nation that could well fall into the category of security culture.

One of the scholars interested in the differences between these two terms is Keith R. Krause 7 who elaborated minute distinctions between “different cultures of international relations”. Thus he expanded on the nature of diplomatic culture, political culture, strategic culture and security culture and managed to draw several dividing lines among them. Summing up his observations, the researcher devised a diagram according to which the four categories of culture mentioned above displayed the following characteristics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diplomatic culture includes</th>
<th>Political culture includes</th>
<th>Strategic culture includes</th>
<th>Security culture consists of those</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- negotiating strategies</td>
<td>- institutions and traditions</td>
<td>- experiences of war and peace</td>
<td>- enduring and widely-shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes, and symbols that inform the ways in which a state’s/society’s interests and values with respect to security, stability and peace are perceived, articulated and advanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- international standing</td>
<td>- colonial or historical legacies</td>
<td>- role of armed forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- the acceptance of the rules of the game</td>
<td>- attitudes towards violence, dispute resolution</td>
<td>- threat perceptions, security doctrines</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- enemy images</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- unilateral or mutual security posture</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. Schema of variance among diplomatic, political, strategic and security cultures

6 Ibidem, p. 10.
As one can very easily notice, the distinctions made above are relative and there are numerous blurred borderlines. But, in accordance with Krause’s arguments, **strategic culture** is more concerned with power and war (cf. experiences of war and peace, role of armed forces, threat perceptions, enemy images, etc., as constituents of strategic culture), whereas **security culture** draws upon beliefs, traditions, attitudes, etc. Thus, by comparison with strategic culture, security culture is more inclusive, more far-reaching, since it refers both to values (with respect to security and peace) and to the ways these values are perceived, articulated and advanced.

This brings us to our next point of discussion, namely the relationship between values and security culture.

### 2. Values and security culture

In what follows we would like to focus on the changes undergone by the social representation of security, in general, and on the importance lately attached to values and culture in the context of security studies. Due to the fact that numerous authors use the term **strategic culture** instead of **security culture**, we have decided to analyze the selected definitions and viewpoints by setting aside this overlap, since the main goal of the present section is to focus on the reflection of social values in these key concepts.

To start our survey, we have considered it useful to explore the concept of **value** before analyzing its manifestation in the way security culture is envisioned.

For instance, in Steven Connor’s opinion, values, as a universal category, have stemmed from a basic human tendency, that of evaluation, or, in other words, they stemmed from our fundamental “orientation towards the better and revulsion from the worse”\(^8\). Briefly put, values have emerged as an answer to cardinal questions such as “what is good/ bad?” and “what is better/ worse?” Thus, as stated by Chris Barker, (an item of) value is essentially “something to which we ascribe worth and significance relative to other phenomena”\(^9\).

Expanding upon the topic, the same author makes several clarifications, as follows: “Cultural studies has been concerned with questions of value in relation to (a) aesthetics, (b) political and cultural objectives and (c) the justification of action”\(^10\). Consequently, as specified in (b) and (c) values are strongly associated with human activity and desirable behavior. Chris Barker also touches upon the connection between values and the structure and functioning of democratic societies, in which he observed that a mix of values like equality, liberty, solidarity, tolerance, difference, diversity and justice are held in high esteem as contemporary goods. In practice, however, things are a bit more complicated, since many times there are significant differences among ways in which values are perceived by various societies. Indeed, there are similarities: generally speaking, all people cherish life, love and the pursuit of happiness, but when getting to the ground, we are faced with a huge amount of diversity which sometimes seems impossible to overcome. Barker justly asserts that though the appeal to values is inevitable and inescapable, “…values do require justification. Such reason-giving is a social practice, so that to justify a value is to give reasons in the context of a tradition and a community. Here, the acceptability of reasons has an intersubjective base in the community norms for reason-giving”\(^11\). In conclusion, we are forewarned about what many researchers have argued: when cultures come into contact differences may cause a powerful clash. This is an issue of particular interest to the community of security studies and policy making, since security strategies, however grand and ambitious, are doomed to failure if they neglect the inherent features of the peoples and regions they are dealing with.

Obviously, scholars argue in favour of mutual respect among representatives of differing cultures, and treasure diversity as a source of development. Chris Barker, a representative of the Western culture, cherishes the values of democratic tradition mentioned above - equality, liberty, solidarity, tolerance, difference, diversity and justice, which, as we shall see below, are also present in the approaches to security culture.

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\(^10\) Ibidem, p. 206.

The author gives the reasons why such values are revered: “These values suggest support for cultural pluralism and the representation of the full range of public opinions, cultural practices and social-geographical conditions. They suggest a respect for individual difference along with forms of sharing and cooperation that are genuine and not enforced. Indeed, our best chance of maintaining difference and pursuing a private identity project is to live in a culture that values heterogeneity”.  

Consequently, security researchers nowadays start from these basic assumptions in their theoretical approaches. For instance, when referring to the security policies in the European Union, Nicole Gnesotto defined security culture from a similar perspective, as “the aim and the means to incite common thinking, compatible reactions, coherent analysis – in short, a strategic culture that is increasingly European, one that transcends the different national security cultures and interests”. But things have not always been assessed within this framework. Mention must be made that the nature of “security culture” has evolved in line with the inherent social and political changes. To give but an example, during the Cold War and before it, the state of affairs was considerably different - security was conceived in terms of us against them. Referring to this past period, J. Howorth comments that such phenomena were culturally-bound: “the requirements of national defence against invading foreign armies dictated national conscription, mass mobilization, the construction of national stereotypes about the other and the forging of a heroic national consciousness geared to collective survival – in short a national strategic culture”.

But what has happened since the 1990s in the Western world, at least, changed dramatically because policies shifted. In accordance with J. Howorth’s observations, nowadays other values are emphasised and viewed as desirable: tolerance, human rights, and multiculturalism – in other words, inclusiveness is cultivated rather than exclusion. 

In an attempt to define security, Arnold Wolfers exclusively refers to values, highlighting their importance in human existence: “Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.”

Along the same lines, John C. Garnett makes another interesting point in his article “European Security after the Cold War”, by arguing that security is an important value in itself, but in order to be achieved sometimes other values have to be sacrificed to it - values which enable people to enjoy a better quality of life: freedom, justice and prosperity.

Garnett goes deeper into the difference between how principles sound like in theory and how they are actually put into practice. In a fragment which is worth quoting at length, he underlines that quite often security, as a social value, is sacrificed to other values, owing to the fact that things are more complex in reality: “Of course, in an ideal world there would be no conflict between the pursuit of security and the pursuit of all the other values which contribute to the sum total of human happiness. But in the flawed reality of politics it is often necessary to make choices which trade one value against another. In democratic societies, for example, people may have to choose between tolerating terrorist activity or losing democratic rights. Or they may have to accept higher taxes (greater poverty) or suffer inadequate defences (less security)…In other words, colloquially speaking, nothing is for free and you cannot have your cake and eat it. Security is a scarce commodity, and like all scarce commodities, it has to be paid for by sacrificing other values”.

This state of affairs requires high responsibility on behalf of decision-makers, as well as cultural awareness. Concerns of how to build a common European security culture, for instance, should take into consideration the values treasured by

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14 J. Howorth, op.cit., p. 185.
15 Ibidem, p. 185.
18 Ibidem, p.24
each member state and the willingness to trade them for something else.

### 3. Workable solutions

As we have proven above, the issue of security culture is difficult to fully capture since it overlaps to some extent with what other authors called strategic culture. But one must take into consideration that security culture should be closely associated to plausible human action. Actually, culture itself is related to ways of behavior, as W.H. Goodenough suggested: “culture consists of whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members”. Thus, culture, as an attribute of human race, is based on acceptableness, on shared, reasonable norms within cohesive groups of individuals. In fact, the essence of social constructions is agreement: people consent to act in a certain manner because they share the same values and tend to preserve them for community’s well being. H. Plotkin reinforces this aspect very strongly: “That human culture exists at all is proof of the existence of agreement”.

In the debates over collective security, several scholars have underlined the importance of culture and attitude towards particular values. Therefore, in order to reach a common security goal, leaders should concentrate on creating a specific mindset, in which partner countries to be aware of each other’s perceptions of security needs. J. Howorth further stresses the weightiness of language and discourse adjustment in this undertaking; regarding the attempt to build a European strategic culture, he advocates for the recourse to shared beliefs, values and traditions: “Any putative EU strategic culture will need to develop a coherent security discourse...Discourse has thus been allocated both an ideational dimension, with cognitive and normative functions, and an interactive dimension with coordinative and communicative functions. At the ideational level, it is important for policy-makers and leaders, especially those who are launching new policy programs and projects, to construct a discourse which explains, not only cognitively, why the new approach is necessary, but also, normatively, how it fits with traditional norms and values. To date, there has been precious little effort to present these cognitive and normative adjustments to security policy in convincing ways. At the interactive level, the discourse has to be coordinated between policy elites and decision-makers in such a way as to ensure that everybody is singing from the same hymn-sheet, but above all, it has to be communicated to a range of publics coming from different politico-cultural traditions in such a way as to command their electoral support.”

What is worth bearing in mind from these remarks is the fact that the general public should also be enlightened with regard to security policies, since common people have only the faintest idea of this matter in question. In our opinion, embarking on the task of making security issues known to non-specialists is the only way of building a proper security culture.

### Conclusion

As we have argued above, capturing the distinctive features of security culture is not an easy undertaking, especially because it overlaps with another concept, namely strategic culture. Nonetheless, we have examined several definitions given by different scholars in order to comment on what lies at the core of such a slippery concept.

In our opinion, security culture is a more neutral term, a kind of junction where other “related” cultures (such as diplomatic, political and even strategic culture) meet, and therefore it should be used in a more abstract manner, with reference to a collective security mindset, since it heavily relies on perceptions and values. On the other hand, we view strategic culture as more specific and action-oriented, a kind of hyponym in relation to security culture.

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21 J. Howorth, op.cit., p.197.
Our focus has been to explore the links between values and security culture, to emphasize the importance of cultural awareness in designing strategies. Though security needs are often perceived through a subjective, national lens of deeply rooted cultural narratives, which are difficult to leave behind, it is also important to understand that respect for partners’ values is crucial in common ventures. Therefore, we have underlined that leaders should pay special attention to the ideational level, which includes the beliefs and attitudes of citizens in the street, who are both affected and affecting the process of policy building.

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This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/138822 with the title “Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of Military Science, Security and Intelligence, Public order and National Security – Continuous formation programme for elite researchers - “SmartSPODAS”.”
THE CDSSS AGENDA

The series of workshops started in 2014 by the Center for Defence and Security Strategic Studies (CDSSS) from the National Defence University “Carol I” is a way for researchers, teachers, and PhD and master level students to gain access to the experience and opinion of notable personalities from the academia, governmental institutions or civil society.

The first of such events in 2015 was the second edition of The workshop for young strategists, with the topic of “Nonproliferation and disarmament”, which took part in 26 March.

The future of nuclear weapons, proliferation dilemmas and the challenges to disarmament and arms control processes were among the subjects approached with this occasion. Other issues included the role played by international rivalries, military power, great power strategies and long term perspectives for nuclear proliferation.

In the event there took part Daniela Bleoancă, from OSCE, Asymetric Risks and Nonproliferation Directorate of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, colonel Radu Stănicel, expert at National Administration for States Reserve and Special Problems, beside experts from CDSSS, the academia, master and PhD students.

Daniela Bleoancă approached the nuclear disarmament negotiations related to international regimes such as the Nonproliferation Treaty and other institutions from international relations. Radu Stănicel pointed out the main traits of arms control treaties, especially on the European region. Both speakers highlighted Romania’s activities, in meetings such as NPT Review Conference, but also in OSCE missions or other types of cooperation.

During the debates, the ambiguities of security policies followed by international actors in this domain. Thus, were discusses issues such as crises and conflicts, the relationship between interests and results or theoretical interrogations about the future of various proposals. Also, there were revealed the strong points but also the weaknesses of the regimes which are governing the processes related to proliferation and arms races.

This workshop is one of the ways in which the CDSSS aims to stimulate the interaction between experts and practitioners in areas like security studies, academia, or civil society.
Another important point on CDSSS agenda is about the monthly public lectures organized at the National Military Center. Researchers from the Center popularize here the results of their scientific activities and are opening debates on topic of interest, being based on opinion exchanges between anyone interested in this domain. Thus, in this period, three lectures were organized: “Analizând securitatea națională: de la marea strategie la obiective” (Analyzing national security: from great strategy to objectives), presented by Alexandra Sarcinschi, PhD, senior researcher; “Puterea militară și finanțarea ei în condiții de criză economică”, of Cristian Băhnăreanu, PhD, senior researcher and „Neorealismul și optimismul relațiilor internaționale” (Neorealism and IR’s optimism), by Mihai Zodian, PhD, junior researcher.

The next point in CDSSS agenda, the international scientific conference STRATEGIES XXI on The Complexity and dynamism of the security environment will take place this year in 11-12 June, due to its inclusion under the aegis of the project financed by Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/138822 with the title “Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of Military Science, Security and Intelligence, Public order and National Security – Continuous formation programme for elite researchers - “SmartSPODAS”. “ For more details, check the conference’s web address (http://www.strategii21.ro/index.php/ro/conferinte-strategii-xxi/centrul-de-studii-strategie-de-aparare-si-securitate).

In the second half of this year, CDSSS with organize a second workshop, with the theme Modernizarea Armatei României. Capabilități, tactici, strategie (Romanian’s Army Modernization: Capabilities, tactics, strategy, 8 October 2015) and the symposium on Conflictele atipice ale secolului XXI (Atypical conflicts of 21th century, 8 December 2015).

Mihai ZODIAN, PhD
Irina TĂTARU, PhD
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**ARTICLE LENGTH** may vary between 6-12 pages (including bibliography and notes, tables and figures, if any). Page settings: margins - 2 cm, A4 format. The article shall be written in Times New Roman font, size 12, one line spacing. The document shall be saved as Word 2003 (.doc). The name of the document shall contain the author’s name.

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- A relevant abstract, which is not to exceed 150 words (italic characters)
- 5-8 relevant key-words (italic characters)
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- 2 - 4 chapters (subchapters if applicable)
- Conclusions.
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In the case of tables, please mention above “**Table no. X**: Title”, while in the case of figures there shall be mentioned below (eg. maps etc.), “**Figure no. X**: Title” and mention the source in a footnote.

- **REFERENCES** shall be made according to academic regulations, in the form of footnotes. All quoted works shall be mentioned in the references, as seen below. Titles of works shall be written in the language in which they were consulted.


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