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Preface

We, the Heads of State and Government of the NATO nations, are determined that NATO will continue to play its unique and essential role in ensuring our common defence and security. This Strategic Concept will guide the next phase in NATO’s evolution, so that it continues to be effective in a changing world, against new threats, with new capabilities and new partners:

• It reconfirms the bond between our nations to defend one another against attack, including against new threats to the safety of our citizens.
• It commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with our international partners, most importantly the United Nations and the European Union.
• It offers our partners around the globe more political engagement with the Alliance, and a substantial role in shaping the NATO-led operations to which they contribute.
• It commits NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance.
• It restates our firm commitment to keep the door to NATO open to all European democracies that meet the standards of membership, because enlargement contributes to our goal of a Europe whole, free and at peace.
• It commits NATO to continuous reform towards a more effective, efficient and flexible Alliance, so that our taxpayers get the most security for the money they invest in defence.

The citizens of our countries rely on NATO to defend Allied nations, to deploy robust military forces where and when required for our security, and to help promote common security with our partners around the globe. While the world is changing, NATO’s essential mission will remain the same: to ensure that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values.

Core Tasks and Principles

1. NATO’s fundamental and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Today, the Alliance remains an essential source of stability in an unpredictable world.
2. NATO member states form a unique community of values, committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The Alliance is firmly committed to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and to the Washington Treaty, which affirms the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.
3. The political and military bonds between Europe and North America have been forged in
NATO since the Alliance was founded in 1949; the transatlantic link remains as strong, and as important to the preservation of Euro-Atlantic peace and security, as ever. The security of NATO members on both sides of the Atlantic is indivisible. We will continue to defend it together, on the basis of solidarity, shared purpose and fair burden-sharing.

4. The modern security environment contains a broad and evolving set of challenges to the security of NATO’s territory and populations. In order to assure their security, the Alliance must and will continue fulfilling effectively three essential core tasks, all of which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members, and always in accordance with international law:

a) Collective defence. NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.

b) Crisis management. NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security.

c) Cooperative security. The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organizations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO’s standards.

5. NATO remains the unique and essential transatlantic forum for consultations on all matters that affect the territorial integrity, political independence and security of its members, as set out in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. Any security issue of interest to any Ally can be brought to the NATO table, to share information, exchange views and, where appropriate, forge common approaches.

6. In order to carry out the full range of NATO missions as effectively and efficiently as possible, Allies will engage in a continuous process of reform, modernization and transformation.

The Security Environment

7. Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low. That is an historic success for the policies of robust defence, Euro-Atlantic integration and active partnership that have guided NATO for more than half a century.

8. However, the conventional threat cannot be ignored. Many regions and countries around the world are witnessing the acquisition of substantial, modern military capabilities with consequences for international stability and Euro-Atlantic security that are difficult to predict. This includes the proliferation of ballistic missiles, which poses a real and growing threat to the Euro-Atlantic area.

9. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, threatens incalculable consequences for global stability and prosperity. During the next decade, proliferation will be most acute in some of the world’s most volatile regions.

10. Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly. Extremist groups continue to spread to, and in, areas of strategic importance to the Alliance, and modern technology increases the threat and potential impact of terrorist attacks, in particular if terrorists were to acquire nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological capabilities.

11. Instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people.

12. Cyber attacks are becoming more frequent, more organized and more costly in the damage that they inflict on government administrations, businesses, economies and potentially also transportation and supply networks and other critical infrastructure; they can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic
prosperity, security and stability. Foreign militaries and intelligence services, organized criminals, terrorist and/or extremist groups can each be the source of such attacks.

13. All countries are increasingly reliant on the vital communication, transport and transit routes on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend. They require greater international efforts to ensure their resilience against attack or disruption. Some NATO countries will become more dependent on foreign energy suppliers and in some cases, on foreign energy supply and distribution networks for their energy needs. As a larger share of world consumption is transported across the globe, energy supplies are increasingly exposed to disruption.

14. A number of significant technology-related trends – including the development of laser weapons, electronic warfare and technologies that impede access to space – appear poised to have major global effects that will impact on NATO military planning and operations.

15. Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.

**Defence and Deterrence**

16. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The Alliance does not consider any country to be its adversary. However, no one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened.

17. Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.

18. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

19. We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations. Therefore, we will:

- maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces;
- maintain the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and several smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response, including at strategic distance;
- develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable conventional forces to carry out both our Article 5 responsibilities and the Alliance’s expeditionary operations, including with the NATO Response Force;
- carry out the necessary training, exercises, contingency planning and information exchange for assuring our defence against the full range of conventional and emerging security challenges, and provide appropriate visible assurance and reinforcement for all Allies;
- ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and consultation arrangements;
- develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance. We will actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners;
- further develop NATO’s capacity to defend against the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction;
- develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber-attacks, including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate national cyber-defence capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection, and better integrating NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with member nations;
- enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through enhanced analysis of the threat, more consultations with our partners, and the development of
appropriate military capabilities, including to help train local forces to fight terrorism themselves;
  • develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning;
  • ensure that the Alliance is at the front edge in assessing the security impact of emerging technologies, and that military planning takes the potential threats into account;
  • sustain the necessary levels of defence spending, so that our armed forces are sufficiently resourced;
  • continue to review NATO’s overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account changes to the evolving international security environment.

Security through Crisis Management

20. Crises and conflicts beyond NATO’s borders can pose a direct threat to the security of Alliance territory and populations. NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.

21. The lessons learned from NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management. The Alliance will engage actively with other international actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximize coherence and effectiveness of the overall international effort.

22. The best way to manage conflicts is to prevent them from happening. NATO will continually monitor and analyze the international environment to anticipate crises and, where appropriate, take active steps to prevent them from becoming larger conflicts.

23. Where conflict prevention proves unsuccessful, NATO will be prepared and capable to manage ongoing hostilities. NATO has unique conflict management capacities, including the unparalleled capability to deploy and sustain robust military forces in the field. NATO-led operations have demonstrated the indispensable contribution the Alliance can make to international conflict management efforts.

24. Even when conflict comes to an end, the international community must often provide continued support, to create the conditions for lasting stability. NATO will be prepared and capable to contribute to stabilization and reconstruction, in close cooperation and consultation wherever possible with other relevant international actors.

25. To be effective across the crisis management spectrum, we will:
  • enhance intelligence sharing within NATO, to better predict when crises might occur, and how they can best be prevented;
  • further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary operations, including counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction operations;
  • form an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability to interface more effectively with civilian partners, building on the lessons learned from NATO-led operations. This capability may also be used to plan, employ and coordinate civilian activities until conditions allow for the transfer of those responsibilities and tasks to other actors;
  • enhance integrated civilian-military planning throughout the crisis spectrum,
  • develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones, so that local authorities are able, as quickly as possible, to maintain security without international assistance;
  • identify and train civilian specialists from member states, made available for rapid deployment by Allies for selected missions, able to work alongside our military personnel and civilian specialists from partner countries and institutions;
  • broaden and intensify the political consultations among Allies, and with partners, both on a regular basis and in dealing with all stages of a crisis – before, during and after.

Promoting International Security through Cooperation

Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation

26. NATO seeks its security at the lowest possible level of forces. Arms control,
disarmament and non-proliferation contribute to peace, security and stability, and should ensure undiminished security for all Alliance members. We will continue to play our part in reinforcing arms control and in promoting disarmament of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, as well as non-proliferation efforts:

• We are resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all.
• With the changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, we have dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and our reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. We will seek to create the conditions for further reductions in the future.
• In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members. Any further steps must take into account the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons.
• We are committed to conventional arms control, which provides predictability, transparency and a means to keep armaments at the lowest possible level for stability. We will work to strengthen the conventional arms control regime in Europe on the basis of reciprocity, transparency and host-nation consent.
• We will explore ways for our political means and military capabilities to contribute to international efforts to fight proliferation.
• National decisions regarding arms control and disarmament may have an impact on the security of all Alliance members. We are committed to maintain, and develop as necessary, appropriate consultations among Allies on these issues.

Open Door
27. NATO’s enlargement has contributed substantially to the security of Allies; the prospect of further enlargement and the spirit of cooperative security have advanced stability in Europe more broadly. Our goal of a Europe whole and free, and sharing common values, would be best served by the eventual integration of all European countries that so desire into Euro-Atlantic structures.

• The door to NATO membership remains fully open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability.

Partnerships
28. The promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organizations around the globe. These partnerships make a concrete and valued contribution to the success of NATO’s fundamental tasks.

29. Dialogue and cooperation with partners can make a concrete contribution to enhancing international security, to defending the values on which our Alliance is based, to NATO’s operations, and to preparing interested nations for membership of NATO. These relationships will be based on reciprocity, mutual benefit and mutual respect.

30. We will enhance our partnerships through flexible formats that bring NATO and partners together – across and beyond existing frameworks:
• We are prepared to develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nations and relevant organizations across the globe that share our interest in peaceful international relations.
• We will be open to consultation with any partner country on security issues of common concern.
• We will give our operational partners a structural role in shaping strategy and decisions on NATO-led missions to which they contribute.
• We will further develop our existing partnerships while preserving their specificity.

31. Cooperation between NATO and the United Nations continues to make a substantial contribution to security in operations around the world. The Alliance aims to deepen political dialogue and practical cooperation with the UN, as set out in the UN-NATO Declaration signed in 2008, including through:
• enhanced liaison between the two Headquarters;
• more regular political consultation; and
• enhanced practical cooperation in managing crises where both organizations are engaged.

32. An active and effective European Union
contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Therefore the EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organizations share a majority of members, and all members of both organizations share common values. NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence. We welcome the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a framework for strengthening the EU’s capacities to address common security challenges. Non-EU Allies make a significant contribution to these efforts. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, their fullest involvement in these efforts is essential. NATO and the EU can and should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. We are determined to make our contribution to create more favorable circumstances through which we will:

- fully strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU, in the spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both organizations;
- enhance our practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum, from coordinated planning to mutual support in the field;
- broaden our political consultations to include all issues of common concern, in order to share assessments and perspectives;
- cooperate more fully in capability development, to minimize duplication and maximize cost-effectiveness.

33. NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security. NATO poses no threat to Russia. On the contrary: we want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia.

34. The NATO-Russia relationship is based upon the goals, principles and commitments of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration, especially regarding the respect of democratic principles and the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states in the Euro-Atlantic area. Notwithstanding differences on particular issues, we remain convinced that the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined and that a strong and constructive partnership based on mutual confidence, transparency and predictability can best serve our security. We are determined to:

- enhance the political consultations and practical cooperation with Russia in areas of shared interests, including missile defence, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-piracy and the promotion of wider international security;
- use the full potential of the NATO-Russia Council for dialogue and joint action with Russia.

35. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace are central to our vision of Europe whole, free and in peace. We are firmly committed to the development of friendly and cooperative relations with all countries of the Mediterranean, and we intend to further develop the Mediterranean Dialogue in the coming years. We attach great importance to peace and stability in the Gulf region, and we intend to strengthen our cooperation in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

We will aim to:

- enhance consultations and practical military cooperation with our partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council;
- continue and develop the partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia within the NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia Commissions, based on the NATO decision at the Bucharest summit 2008, and taking into account the Euro-Atlantic orientation or aspiration of each of the countries;
- facilitate the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans, with the aim to ensure lasting peace and stability based on democratic values, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations;
- deepen the cooperation with current members of the Mediterranean Dialogue and be open to the inclusion in the Mediterranean Dialogue of other countries of the region;
- develop a deeper security partnership with our Gulf partners and remain ready to welcome new partners in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

Reform and Transformation

36. Unique in history, NATO is a security Alliance that fields military forces able to operate together in any environment; that can control operations anywhere through its integrated military command structure; and that has at its
disposal core capabilities that few Allies could afford individually.

37. NATO must have sufficient resources – financial, military and human – to carry out its missions, which are essential to the security of Alliance populations and territory. Those resources must, however, be used in the most efficient and effective way possible. We will:

• maximize the deployability of our forces, and their capacity to sustain operations in the field, including by undertaking focused efforts to meet NATO’s usability targets;

• ensure the maximum coherence in defence planning, to reduce unnecessary duplication, and to focus our capability development on modern requirements;

• develop and operate capabilities jointly, for reasons of cost-effectiveness and as a manifestation of solidarity;

• preserve and strengthen the common capabilities, standards, structures and funding that bind us together;

• engage in a process of continual reform, to streamline structures, improve working methods and maximize efficiency.

**An Alliance for the 21st Century**

38. We, the political leaders of NATO, are determined to continue renewal of our Alliance so that it is fit for purpose in addressing the 21st Century security challenges. We are firmly committed to preserve its effectiveness as the globe’s most successful political-military Alliance. Our Alliance thrives as a source of hope because it is based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and because our common essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members. These values and objectives are universal and perpetual, and we are determined to defend them through unity, solidarity, strength and resolve.

*Source: http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf*
NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT – DETERMINATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES

Constantin MOȘTOFLEI, PhD

The adoption at the NATO’s Lisbon Summit, on 19th-20th of November 2010, of the Strategic Concept for defence and security of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization’s member states represents an exquisite event for the political-military actuality at the end of the 21st century’s first decade. In the document’s elaboration process, there were involved important human and intellectual resources of the member states and NATO leadership. The final form adopted by the heads of states and governs of the allied countries, by its generality note imposed as a consequence of its adoption on consensus principle basis and the unclassified character of the publicized content, requires profound analyses to settle the implementation solutions of its provisions. We present a first trial to emphasize the determinations which will be the object of demarches at Alliance’s level and also at national level from the member states part and, why not, from partners part. Also, we rethink a series of interrogations and considerations that preoccupied us into the pre-adoption period.

Keywords: NATO’s Strategic Concept; Euro-Atlantic security; collective defence; crisis management; partnerships.

The NATO’s Strategic Concept adopted on the occasion of Lisbon Summit which took place this year on 19th-20th of November constitutes a factor launching important transformations into security and defence approaches at Alliance’s level, taken into account as a macrostructure of the member states, independently or shared on geographic regions. Consequently, important reconsiderations are also expected from the states outside the Alliance no matter their power or their disposal to the Euro-Atlantic space. The international, global and regional security bodies (UN, EU, OSCE, etc.) will be also influenced.

The need of a strategic concept was explained by the Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Starting from the fact that the actual document dates since 1999, before 11 September 2001, before the Afghanistan conflict, before the cyber attacks and piracy acts and when NATO had only 16 members, from the fact the world has changed, the threats have changed and so did the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization, its General Secretary appreciated “we need and will have a strategic concept to take into consideration nowadays’ realities and the tomorrow’s provocations”.

For the new document elaboration was appealed to a 12 experts’ group from the Alliance led by the former American Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright. She promised from the beginning that the document’s elaboration will be worked in a transparent manner because there was needed the support of the public opinion from the Alliance’s member states and granted for the existence of very serious consultations over “the subject” among the NATO countries. Throughout the expert’s group report entitled “NATO 2020: assessed security, dynamic engagement”, there was suggested that the New Strategic Concept should have at least a 10 years applicability period, that is needed NATO’s transformation on the basis of the Afghanistan learned lessons for the Organization with enhanced powers and numerous partners.

To adopt the New Strategic Concept, there were undergone many debates, at different levels, among experts’ groups or political-military decision-makers justified by the document’s
importance and complexity but also by the fact its adoption was made on the consensus principle basis.

Romania, in its quality of NATO member state, organized many workshops to elaborate a point of view concerning the New NATO’s Strategic Concept at scientific, military and political level. These were undergone at the National Defence College (8th of October 2009), at the National Ministry of Defence headquarter (19th of October 2009), at the Foreign Affairs Minister (15th of October 2009) and, finally, at the Parliament Palace (23rd of October 2009).

Based upon the document elaborated by the collective led by Madeleine Albright, the Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen personally edited the final version of the New NATO’s Strategic Concept draft and sent it to be analysed and debated by the NATO’s 28 member states ambassadors for, further, on 14th of October 2010, being analysed by the Foreign and Defence Ministers within a reunion organized in Bruxelles. The final draft was presented to the chief of states and governments participants to the NATO Lisbon Summit, from 1st-2nd of November this year.

Into an interview of Anders Fogh Rasmussen taken meanwhile his visit to Bucharest in May 2010, the Secretary General of NATO stated “my ambition is to reform the Alliance”.

We keep in mind that, after the Lisbon moment, the Secretary General of NATO ambition was transmitted to all the people involved in the elaboration and adoption demarche of the Strategic Concept, inclusively the member states. Following the ambition to have a representative into the “wise men group”, every state acted in order to offer not only original, but also useful and viable ideas and concepts to gain all members’ interest or to grant the basis for the elements needed for compromises accomplishment before getting the consensus over the final draft. We think that the will to adopt the document as well as the consensus principle application determined the formulations characterized by a certain generality that, afterwards, should allow, by interpretations, finding and implementing the solutions for special even punctual cases. In the same ambitions’ trend, there are the expressed appreciations regarding to the New Strategic Concept value as a programmatic document where are found in the objectives and positions sustained by the member states and also for the political message clarity exposed by the allies from the both sides of the Atlantic regarding to the solidarity and common action strengthening.

The Strategic Concept, conforming to the 1999 version, should offer general instructions for the development of detailed policies and military plans, but also instructions for military allied forces’ missions and instructions concerning the Alliance’s force position and characteristics of conventional and nuclear forces. The 2010 variant has a more pronounced political component which sustains that the Organization will continue to play its “unique and essential” role by “political and military means” where prevail the non-violent actions. There is wanted for NATO to remain “the essential source of stability”, the same “unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values”, an “unique community of values, committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law”. Consequently, NATO remains the unique and essential transatlantic forum for consultations on all matters that affect the territorial integrity, political independence and security of its members, as set out in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. In the NATO’s Strategic Concept 2010 there exist elements of continuity from the previous version considered as a starting basis and, where it was necessary, there have been done corrections and explanations. Therefore, all three fundamental Alliance’s missions are maintained:

a) Collective defence being considered as the main responsibility of the Alliance supposing the protection and defence of member states territories and populations against all the dangers and threats, new type ones included. There are regarded any emergent security provocations and the new threats able to damage the basic security of individual allies or of the Alliance as a whole.

The protection is seen as a management process of all the risk factors (possible dangers) existent in the security environment and supposes the surveillance and monitoring of all the elements for Alliance’s strategic interest inclusively beyond the Euro-Atlantic space, especially from the most volatile regions. Into the Strategic Concept, there are presented some possible causes of the disorders in the international stability and in the Euro-atlantic security as follows:
- the proliferation of the ballistic missiles being able to reach the Euro-Atlantic territory;
- the proliferation of the nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction;
- the extremism and, related to it, terrorism’s exacerbation but also the growth of the transnational illegal activities and traffic of weapons, drugs and human beings;
- the facile way in modern military capabilities acquisition especially the nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological ones;
- the increase of cyber attacks number provoking considerable damages to the governmental administrations, businesses and economies;
- the increase of national and international prosperity, stability, security dependency on the critical infrastructure vulnerabilities as the vital communication, transport and transit routes and also transport and food networks;
- the dependency of some NATO’s states in assuring their energy needs on the foreign providers and, in some situations, on the foreign energy supply and distribution networks;
- the energetic reserves vulnerability confronting the provoked disruptions;
- the impact over the military planning and operations of the modern technologies as laser weapons, warfare and sophisticated means of action from space or against them;

Defence, which we understand as action (with or without destructive effect) and its results against a hostile manifestation, supposes for NATO the use of political and military means to confront any threat against the Euro-Atlantic member states territory or population wherever the place it comes from. Militarily speaking, this presumes to maintain the capacity to simultaneously deploy some major joint operations and many less ample operations, some of them expeditionary, at strategic distances, fulfilled also by the NATO Response Force.

The Secretary General of NATO underlined that, for the modern threats, there are needed modern defensive methods and in the Strategic Concept is stated that the defence of the territory and of the 900 millions of persons from the Euro-Atlantic area must be planned and fulfilled against any attack.

NATO defines the defence capacity against a missile attack as a core element of the common defence. The program of antimissile shield settlement with a special and ongoing complexity will suppose appreciable efforts in its accomplishment but it will be all the Alliance’s members’ responsibility as beneficiaries of its effects. Simultaneously, for its fulfilment, NATO will actively search the cooperation with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners.

Besides the prevention and detection of cyber attacks, NATO also regards the defence against those. There will be also regarded the enhancement of national capabilities of cyber defence and the coordination by NATO aiming the recognition of the potential cyber attack systems, the warning over the imminent production and means of accomplishment and also the response against the cyber attacks, inclusively the recovery solutions after those attacks ending.

A peculiar attention will be granted to the defence against the threat with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. In this regard, NATO reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, it will remain a nuclear Alliance. The common defence will be provided by an adequate mix of nuclear and conventional forces counting also on the United States of America nuclear forces, as well as on the ones of United Kingdom and France with discouraging role and for the others allies assuring a broader participation in the command, control and consultation arrangements to the collective defence planning with the use of nuclear weapons.

b) Crisis management. In the Strategic Concept text, there is mentioned that the crises and conflicts beyond the NATO frontiers can pose a direct threat to the security of Alliance’s countries territory and populations. Therefore, it results that the crises and conflicts being able to appear on the national territories of the member-states aren’t the object of Alliance’s missions. When approaching crises and conflicts, it must be regarded the provisions of the Article 2 of the Washington Treaty meaning the states are obliged to eliminate the conflicts from their international economic policies and to encourage the bilateral and multilateral economic collaboration. Although, in conformity to Article 4, the parties will have common consultations every time one of the parties will consider its territorial integrity, political independency or security is to be threatened.

In the acceptation of the Strategic Concept in regard to the causality principle, the crisis is related
to a conflict, with or without armed character. There is appreciated that NATO has an unique and strong set of political and military capacities to act over the entire spectre of crises: before, during and after the conflict. The Alliance’s mission is to actively engage appealing to adequate political and military tools to contribute to the management of the emergent crises susceptible of affecting the Alliance’s security before they become conflicts. When there are ongoing conflicts, NATO will act to stop and to resolve them if they compromise the Alliance’s security and, in the post-conflict period, it will support the stability consolidation as a source to accomplish the Euro-Atlantic security.

The security fulfilment by crises management and by the adoption of a proper management along their manifestation, when they reach or not the stage of conflict among the disputes’ evolution, will be based upon the experience, the lessons learned from Afghanistan and Western Balkans operations undergone with other international actors, but especially with civil partners.

NATO, an adept of conflicts’ anticipation and prevention, will be ready also for the hostilities management inclusively of the ones with insurgency/counterinsurgency characteristics wherein are found actions specific to terrorism.

c) Security by cooperation. NATO is aware of the fact that it is affected by, and it can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. Therefore, the Alliance will actively engage to enhance international stability and security and, implicitly, the Euro-Atlantic one, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organizations.

NATO will continue to act to strengthen the control and disarmament of the conventional armaments and weapon of mass destruction and their non-proliferation.

The Strategic Concept underlines that the Euro-Atlantic security promotion will be better accomplished by an extended network of partnership relations with countries and organizations from the entire world which are based upon political dialogue and practical cooperation:

- the cooperation between NATO and UN aims to deepen political dialogue and practical cooperation for crises management through operations in the entire world.
- NATO seeks to cooperate with an active and effective European Union, a cooperation where every party shall play complementary and mutual strengthening roles for international peace and security support.
- The NATO – Russia cooperation considered of strategic importance must rely on mutual trust, transparency and predictability for the both parties benefit.
- The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the NATO – Ukraine and NATO – Georgia commissions, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative are elements that contribute to the international stability and Euro-Atlantic security.
- NATO regards the evolution of a deepened security partnership with the partners from the Gulf area.
- NATO enlargement is appreciated to substantially contribute to the allies’ security and, therefore, the Alliance will maintain “the door widely opened” for the European democracies willing to become members.

The implementation of Strategic Concept provisions also supposes to regard some aspects related to the possession of sufficient financial, military and human resources. The tax payers to the Alliance’s budget will get the maximum possible security for the money invested in defence and therefore they must sustain the necessary amounts of defence spending for their own armed forces.

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In our regard, the transfer of responsibility for antimissile system fulfilment, from USA to NATO, presumes to overlap some important obstacles. The difficulties will be related to the huge costs to accomplish and maintain the antimissile system. There are appreciations that only the connection of the antimissile systems existent presently in the European countries with the American network are raising to an amount between 85 and 110 millions Euro. Also, for Romania, the cost problem is very important because the situation is different if the antimissile shield belongs to the US or to NATO.

The Alliance’s reform and transformation process regards the efficiency increase and costs’ rationalizing because it must be fulfilled without the decrease of ambition level and without the risk to generate new vulnerabilities. The reform of the NATO military structures will consist, among
others, in the personnel effectives’ reduction from 11,500 to 9,000, the diminution of headquarters’ number, and of speciality agencies from 14 to 3. We also must regard this leads to a more substantial contribution of the allies with personnel into the operation fields, to the supplementary financial resources sharing under the conditions when only 18 out of the 28 member states allots at least 2% from GDP.

Another main field refers to the cyber defence unable to be taken into account without a counteraction through offensive actions. Some themes we all are preoccupied of can be the role found for it in the collective defence ensemble or who will realize this kind of defence and also how high will be the involved costs.

Another interesting aspect, at least for Romania, we think will be the determination of the new NATO’s Strategic Concept impact over the official documents concerning the national security and defence. First, we think this is a proper occasion to eliminate the conceptual confusion inclusively from the National Defence Strategy project and, secondly, to evaluate the Defence Planning Law provisions. Maybe there’s the time for us to introduce, as many other member states, therefore for the entire official demarches basis to be done by a national security and defence Strategic Concept.

NOTES:

1 http://www.adevarul.ro/interviurile_2_plus_1/Anders_Fogh_Rasmussen-,_Invit_Rusia_sa_intre__in_lumea_reala--_0_256774807.html.
2 Manualul NATO, Office of Information and Press NATO, 1110 Brussels, Belgium, 2001, p. 43.

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The main effort of the world in the next decade of the 21st century has to be focused on creating premises for a possible management of uncertainty. There are so many determinants that the security environment is being reconfigured on coordinates which are difficult to determine. The last Europe-Asia Summit in Bruxelles, from 4th-5th of October 2010, reaffirms the strategic partnership between the two continents on the basis of an equal partnership, of mutual respect and benefits, and the current European leaders need very good relations with the Asian countries. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is reformed and it draws a new world order.

The policy of the Russian Federation towards the West represents a tactical change, with strategic value and is about to gain a significant role in the European security and the misunderstandings which followed NATO Summit in Lisbon (19th-20th of November 2010) regarding the antimissile shield may trigger a new arms race and counteractions from the Russian Federation. New risks may also emerge from the tergiversation of ratifying the New START Treaty.

The fact that the gravity center of the world policy has moved in the Pacific and Indian Oceans creates, in its turn, the premises of passing from the “single-pole moment” to a multipolar system in which there would be several great powers and numerous regional power centers.

After twenty years since the Chart of Paris for a new Europe, the idea of the need for a security based on transparency and mutual trust, although was reconfirmed within the OSCE summit in Astana, continues to be an aspiration as conflict resolution cannot be made by this generation of political decision-makers. Even more, within this framework, Russia’s singularization and the contradictory declarations on the principles agreed at the NATO summit in Lisbon threat the “reset” of the relations with the West and a new period of tensions and ignoring of international rules.

Key-words: strategic horizons; uncertainty; determinants; geopolitical reconfigurations; Asian; European; transatlantic; antimissile shield; ASEM; IMF; Europe; Asia; NATO; USA; START; OSCE; Russian Federation; China; BRIC.

As the beginning of the 21st century is marked by a high level of strategic fluidity and by the reconfiguration of the power relations within the international system, the first characteristic of the strategic horizons concerning the security environment in the next decade is and will be the fluidity, which is generated by the conditioned probability of determinants, many of them being or seeming to be random. This fact has determined and determines an uncertain evolution of the G/P reconfigurations because one may wonder which the priority determinants are.

- The ones of the information globalization?
- The ones of the network economic connections and of the dysfunctions determined by the network effect?
- The current strategic armaments or the ones on the panoplies?
- The interests of the G/P great actors among which there are the great powers and the international organisms and organizations?
- The chaotic evolution of the world financial phenomenon which generates boundless crises?
GEOPOLITICS AND GEOSTRATEGIES ON THE FUTURE’S TRAJECTORY

➢ World conspiracy?
What may be the reason of asking these questions? Because the security environment is being reconfigured on coordinates which are difficult to be determined which generate such questions. The arguments for this may be the following:

1. The last Europe-Asia Summit from Bruxelles, which took place on 4th-5th of October 2010 (ASEM 8), ended without a clear conclusion, and European leaders’ intentions may have been to confront Beijing with the China’s responsibilities in the efforts to overcome the global crisis, which gave birth to another series of questions: is it a test of the determination of the two sides to coordinate their actions in the future? Is it possible, under the current circumstances, a convergence between the European continent and the Asian one? Which may be these coordinates? Are they referring to Europe’s energy and resources need? But which are Asia’s needs? Do Germany, France and Russia want to restore the heartland about which Mackinder was talking or such a reconfiguration is completely superannuated, and the European Unions’ engine (Germany and France) and one of the most powerful Asian engines (Russia, the other engine being Turkey) want to join within a common effort to generate force, prosperity and sustainable development?

2. The reaffirmation of the strategic partnership between the two continents on the basis of an equal partnership of mutual respect and benefits was emphasized by Herman Van Rompuy himself, the President of the European Council, who chaired the works of this Summit. We consider that such an approach is natural as, in the current globalized world, there can not be just the relation between Europe and America. The exit from the excessive polarization of the relations is thoroughly compulsory in an interdependent world. But, the relation between Europe and Asia becomes increasingly necessary and, similarly to the United States of America, the present European leaders need very good relations with the Asian countries.

3. The European Union needs China more and more and China seems to be prepared to support the Euro Area to overcome this difficult moment and may give a certain direction in the EU’s economic and financial evolution. But, given these vulnerabilities, China may also impose its point of view. And even more. It could use on its own benefit the divergences developed within the Union on the idea launched by the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, regarding the establishment of a “new monetary order” so as to cope with the current imbalances. The Chinese, the Indian and the Japanese engines of Asia, let alone the one of the Middle East (of the Arab and Muslim world which, for the time being, functions faulty, but it functions nevertheless!) will couple with the ones of Russia and the EU or the BRIC will tend to turn at 180 degrees towards the Pacific area and towards the South-American continent? It remains to be seen.

4. IMF is being reformed and it draws a new world order. Within a year, IMF will have other actors on the voters table. The agreement concluded at 23rd of October 2010, at the meeting of the Ministers of Finance from the G20 member states from Gyeongju (South Korea), balances the world power poles. The International Monetary Fund is being reformed and it will have a changed management structure and representation. And even more, it will draw a new world order within which a great decision power will be held by the developing countries, even more because the support given to Europe by the IMF, on the pick of the financial crisis, came in a large part from Asia. As a consequence, Europe will concede two of the twenty-four chairs composing the Executive Directorate of the IMF, which takes the decisions on the loans of millions of dollars, on the designation of the General Director and — as the Fund itself sustains — on the daily activity of the institution. But, the announced reform, which has to be approved by the European states in almost a year, will substantially modify the representation within the Directorate of the IMF and the most important power balance is given by the coming of the BRIC countries in the first ten in what concerns the representation rates. As a consequence, Brazil, Russia, India and China will have a representation rate proportional with the vote power, but also with the financial engagement too.

5. The policy of the Russian Federation towards the West also represents a tactical change, with strategic value, which offers to the European Union the opportunity to test the real will of Moscow to play a more constructive role in its neighborhood and to create together
with Europe new security structures. After the trilateral summit, Sarkozy, Merkel and Medvedev, from Deauville, from 18th-19th of October 2010, which has put on the agenda the European security and the way in which the three great European powers may revive the continent’s security institutions, but also common points such as: supporting Russia’s application for the presidency of the G20, the simplification of the Russian citizens’ access in the European Union Area and the boost of solving the frozen conflicts from the ex-soviet area (Transnistria included), Russia is on the verge of gaining a significant role in the European security and the importance of the tripartite reunion achieves an even greater interest, because, on 15th of October 2010, the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) launched the proposal to create a new security arrangement in Europe, based on a totally new vision on the realities on the continent and on the relevant powers that should participate in its construction. Additionally, ECFR introduces a new concept (concert of projects) which will constitute the mechanism laid on the basis of the so-called dialogue between the EU, Russia and Turkey.

In other words, will the EU start, in the future, from the idea of a security dialogue between the EU and Russia, advanced by the German Counselor Angela Merkel and by the Russian president Dmitri Medvedev at Meseberg, including Turkey for having at the dialogue table the three great powers of Europe? But where is Great Britain?! In the future, will we have a dichotomist game with Great Britain and USA, on the one hand, as global super-power massively and decisively involved in the post-Second World War evolution of Europe, and, on the other hand, a new trilateral (Germany, France and Russia) or is it just about the increased and special interest of the three great powers and, implicitly, of the European Union for Eurasia or Euro-Asia? We are inclined to believe such geopolitical reconfigurations with very large extents and with a very special importance need many approaches and many levels of analysis. Eurasia or Euro-Asia? Will the European and Asian countries succeed in finding a common denominator and the best and appropriate convergence ways? Maybe, for the beginning, this convergence of opinions on the perception of threats to the security of the European and Asian continents creates the opportunity of some new negotiations on the common security of the two continents which are separated only by an artificial line which may become, even if not easily, a confluence line, a sustainable construction line.

6. Under the circumstances in which “the gravity centre of the global policy has left the Atlantic and moved in the Pacific and Indian Oceans” and the world would become “more southern and more Asian”, which creates the premises of the passing from the “single-pole moment”, characterized by the USA’s status of the sole super-power from the last twenty years, towards a multipolar system, within which there shall be several great powers and numerous regional power centers, how will the transatlantic relation evolve, given the fact that the USA will play a decisive, but “less dominant” role in the international system? And how much will Europe be able to influence the relation between Russia and China, about which the American president B. Obama declared that will “shape the 21st century”?

7. What would be the consequences of the misunderstandings that emerged after NATO Summit in Lisbon on the antimissile shield? Dmitri Medvedev reiterated that any engagement of the Russia Federation within this project will be made from equal positions, any solution which is not agreed by Kremlin having the potential to lead to a new arms race.

This position was expressed by the prime-minister Vladimir Putin at Larry King Show, from 1st of December, on CNN. He asserted that, if the West rejects Moscow’s offer on sharing information and ensuring a common control on the defensive antiballistic system, and USA places missiles and radars in the proximity of its territory, Russia will proceed to counteraction reactions. There are more and more signals that Russia seems to be determined to build its own antimissile shield. Plus, according to a central moscowite publication, a new S-500 system will be operational, having the capacity to bring down enemy aircrafts, missiles, nuclear warheads and extra-atmospheric objects.

8. If the United States of America do not ratify the new Treaty for reducing the strategic armament, START, which the two countries signed this year – a crucial treaty for the national security and a turning point for the relations between the
USA and Russia – which will be the new risks triggered by the tergiversation of this treaty which has to be approved by two thirds of the senators and many republican leaders requested a delay of the vote? Will the Russian Federation strengthen its nuclear force?

9. The refusal of the political leaders to participate in the dialogue, when a favorable context is created, is increasingly evident and the impossibility to identify some measures to solve the prolonged conflicts such as Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh or Transnistria was also demonstrated at the OSCE Annual Summit, from Astana. Even if the final result of the summit was crystallized in a sole document titled “The Commemorative Declaration from Astana: towards a security community”, by which there is reaffirmed the engagement of the participant states to OSCE principles and which reconfirms the idea of the need for a security based on mutual transparency and trust, after twenty years since the Chart of Paris for a new Europe, document which was celebrated at this summit, the conclusion seems to be clear: the resolution of the conflicts cannot be achieved with this generation of political decision-makers 10. Moreover, Russia’s singularization, within this framework, singularization which made by its own withdrawal from the works and by blamable and contradictory declarations in report to the principles accepted just ten days before, at Lisbon, announces the end of the honey-moon of the reset of the relations with the West and a new period of tensions and ignoring the international rules by Moscow.

The conclusion? The determinants are so numerous that, in spite of the effort made by everybody (NATO, EU, OSCE etc.), there is no way out of the uncertainty and the main effort of the world in the next decade of the 21st century has to be focused on creating the premises for a new possible management of uncertainty.

NOTES

1 For more details, see the European Council, the President, Bruxelles, 5th of October 2010, PCE 207/10, Observations by Herman Van Rompuy at ASEM 8, press conference.

2 According to the ECFR Report, titled The Specter of a multipolar Europe, the influence areas may be avoided by a re-thinking of the security architecture to which the EU, the Russian Federation and Turkey shall participate. For more details, see http://www.ecfr.eu/.

3 The ECFR Report begins from the following definition of the actual state of fact: the order established in Europe after 1989 is over and it must be rebuilt taking into account the next four realities: (1) Russia has become a great power with interests in Europe; (2) the EU constitutes an actor which can ensure the security of its members; (3) Turkey is an essential participant in any discussion on Europe’s security and (4) the USA do not have European interests to involve them in a consistent way in the constructions meant to ensure the security in Europe.

4 The Russian president, Dmitri Medvedev, has called even since 2008 to a debate upon the new security architecture of Europe, considering the current constructions are already stale. But the European countries were terrified by such an idea and, for two years, they have been trying to postpone this discussion. With the Mesenberg meeting between the German and the Russian leaders, the situation has changed.

5 According to H. Kissinger, the USA are in a relative power decline and will have to practice the art of leadership by sharing responsibilities with other relevant actors to ensure the global security, even if the USA will remain (in the next 20-30 years) the most important actor in the International Relations (“the strongest single power in the world, H. Kissinger) and, at the same time, an indispensable component of any system of collective security. At large, Gheorghe SAVU, PhD, Relația transatlantică și provocările secolului XXI, in „Impactul evoluției relațiilor internaționale asupra mediului de securitate”: the 10th annual international scientific session, Bucharest, 18th-19th of November 2010, “Carol I” National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010, p. 23.

6 The proposal of the Kremlin leader referred to the fragmentation of the European space to be secured so that it had the responsibility to defend a certain area by possible attacks from its direction, while NATO was to be in charge of the rest of the uncovered spaces. This variant was rejected afterwards, without denying Russia’s desire on the control of the places where the elements of the shield will be placed or of a veto before using it and even its counteracting by the “attack elements” which are to be placed in the proximity of the Alliance’s frontiers, in the case it fails to respect Moscow’s wishes.

7 The Russian president reiterated the decision of investing in the Armed Forces the equivalent of 634 billion dollars until 2020, assuming the risk of resuming the arms race. He declared that he was determined to place offensive military technique on the border of the Occident if US-NATO antimissile shield project ignores Moscow wishes.
8 See the declarations of the General C. Serghei Karakaev, the Commandant in Chief of the RSVN – The Missile Forces with Strategic Destination of Russia (RVSN).

9 Barack Obama requested to the Congress to give priority to ratifying this Treaty, warning that it is crucial for the national security and a turning point for the relations between USA and Russia. But, the document has to be approved by two thirds of the senators and many republican leaders requested a postponement of the vote.

10 There is needed a longer time and a longer dialogue to end the conflicts and to find new formulas to ensure security and to satisfy the interests of all OSCE members.

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A rapidly evolving and uncertain world, entering its interpolar stage, demands a reevaluation of traditional security relationships and strategies. The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, NATO's quest for a new strategic concept and the Medvedev security proposal are all clear signs that such a reevaluation is underway. Nevertheless, a lot of controversial issues need to be addressed: reset, stalemate, reassurance, what are the concepts that best describe the security triangle that underlies EU–Russian, US–Russian and NATO–Russian relations? What role will the EU play in reshaping the existing security architecture? How does the new US administration's stance on Russia and security influence the relations with its European allies, including the special relation established by the previous US administration with the CEE countries? How great is the divide inside the EU and NATO and what role does the Russian newfound assertiveness play in fostering this divide? This paper addresses these issues, drawing attention on the security concerns informing the difficult relationship of the Western leaders with the Kremlin and analyzing the ongoing debate provoked by Russian security discourses.

Key-words: European security; Helsinki II; near abroad; common neighborhood; Eastern Partnership Initiative.

The strange spectacle of NATO troops marching on Red Square during the recent commemoration of the victory over Nazi Germany in Moscow, or that of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton actually carrying a box labeled “reset button” to her spring meeting with the Russians, the French Mistral affair as well as the friendly reassurance of Chancellor Angela Merkel during the bilateral meeting in Meseberg this June that Germany will support Moscow’s security concerns at the EU level, followed by the more recent Deauville meeting and the “historical” EU-NATO Summit at Lisbon, brings once again to the fore of the Western debate the Russian conundrum.

It’s been two years since Russian President Dimitry Medvedev signaled the need for change in the European security arena and proposed a new treaty for Europe, the so-called Helsinki II, in Berlin. Seen in the perspective of the new Russian strategy, formulated by President Putin in the famous Munich speech from 2007 and formally translated into a new concept of foreign policy by the presidential decree from the 31st of July 2008, the Medvedev proposal was met with caution by most of the EU leaders. The OSCE remained the preferred venue to discuss security issue with Moscow. Nevertheless, Kremlin made its announcement – Russia intends to return to the fore of international politics with a newfound assertiveness: “We very often – and personally, I very often – hear appeals by our partners, including our European partners, to the effect that Russia should play an increasingly active role in world affairs. In connection with this I would allow myself to make one small remark. It is hardly necessary to incite us to do so”

President Medvedev has maintained this strategic vision mainly by supporting Russia’s assertiveness and rejecting NATO’s key role in Europe. Still, his attitude has been more balanced and turned towards the modernization of the country: “Russia simply wants good relations with other countries – both large and small ones. We believe that our country is an organic part of the modern world and want to develop along with the rest of the world. The face of modern Russia is a smiling face... But other countries must smile
back at us”. He has also underlined the “balanced and multivector character of Russia’s foreign policy”, as well as the Russian overture with respect to designing a new legal framework suited for a multipolar world, where “bloc approaches to international problems are being replaced by a network diplomacy based on flexible forms of participation in international structures for the search of joint solutions to common tasks”. On many occasions, Russian officials have stressed that the Euro-Atlantic vision needs a positive agenda, towards “an integrated and solid system of comprehensive security”, “a truly open democratic system of pan-regional collective security and cooperation that will ensure the unity of the Euro-Atlantic region from Vancouver to Vladivostok and overcome the inertia of bloc approaches.”

Just like in the context of previous signs of openness on the part of the Russian partner, NATO allies and EU member states have chosen a wait-and-see attitude towards the Medvedev proposal. Nevertheless, significant changes have occurred as there seems to be an increased willingness on both parts to deal with the long-lasting and recurring disagreements that could hinder their cooperation. As far as the Russian-European relation is concerned, the Meseberg memorandum on intended establishment of a ministerial EU-Russia Committee on Security and Foreign Affairs, signed by the President of Russia and the Federal Chancellor of Germany and the Partnership for Modernization initiative readdressed by the 25th EU-Russia Summit which took place in Rostov-on-Don this summer, could be understood as the security dimension, and the economical dimension of a new strategic partnership. These new events seem to suggest a repositioning of the EU towards Russia, due to the acknowledgment that much could be gained from leaving a door open to Russia.

Still, one must acknowledge that Russia’s return to the so-called “assertive style” of its foreign and security policy could divide Europe and hinder the loose transatlantic relation. Both the EU and Moscow express divergent views on an array of security issues, ranging from the so-called ‘common neighborhood’ to NATO enlargement. Moreover there continues to be a clear division inside both the EU and NATO regarding the issue of re-engaging Russia. This introduces the need for the EU to devise a new and consistent model of cooperation with Moscow. How Western governments conduct themselves in this context will be of critical importance for gaining the much desired credibility as a global security actor. Nevertheless, the much debated US withdraw from the former Soviet space is the big opportunity for the EU to play the main part in reshaping the European security architecture and to prove to be an equal partner in the North-Atlantic alliance.

It is too early for a clear prediction on how the need to redefine the European security architecture will influence Moscow–Brussels relations. The EU has not yet taken the stand regarding this issue, at least not in a consistent manner. However, the issue of how to interpret Russia's proposals and intentions and consequently how to react, a recurrent theme in Western concerns, has certainly gained renewed importance, dividing once more both the EU and NATO.

Beware of the bear bearing gifts

News about Russia’s relations with the West gave start to a heated debate, leading to all sorts of speculation and comments. Some talk about a Russian ‘charm offensive’. Some ask whether we are dealing with ‘a new Russia’. Some observers in Europe think that the rising costs of economic and political uncertainty in Russia as well as the decision of president Medvedev to re integrate Russia into a changing world are bringing a new willingness in Moscow to engage with the West and will also make Russia more humble and appreciative of EU offers of co-operation, opening the way to a trustworthy and fruitful partnership, the underlying assumption being that a more ‘modern’ Russia would be more western-oriented, open and easier to deal with.

Nevertheless, several analysts suggested that it should have become clear that Russia’s foreign policy establishment understands the world differently than its Western counterparts. While for the EU, modernization means aligning Russia with the Union’s values and norms, for Russian officials, says Dmitri Trenin of the Carnegie Moscow Centre, modernization means “Russia using its resources to buy assets in Europe, and Europe supplying Russia with technology.” Or, as foreign policy analyst Fyodor Lukyanov pointed out, Russians see the EU as a reservoir of money, skills and technology, not as a model on which Russia will ultimately converge. As it became clear from the
many setbacks of the UE-Russia relationship, the Russian government has largely immunized itself against external value-based assaults and further attempts at blending ‘pragmatism’ in relations with a pursuit of integration are more than uninspired. Also, as Timofei Bordachev suggests, “any attempt at a neo-functionalist approach – exploring the integration phenomenon in terms of deriving new political benefits from closer cooperation in purely technological spheres – may turn out to be an exciting intellectual exercise. (...) In the short term, functional cooperation may indeed be useful to some extent at the very basic level but this cooperation will be too meager for this approach to be considered promising when it comes to the strategy of developing relations (…), even in-depth economic integration is insufficient for the purposes of diminishing the impact of nationally-specific political behavior and motivation in the decision-making process”11.

Besides the EU’s normative agenda, another big issue hampering the EU’s policy toward Russian rapprochement is EU’s inability to formulate a shared set of interests which has led to growing national egoisms and the formation of groups of countries with shared interests in domestic and foreign policies.

Serious distrust exists also when it comes to the Medvedev security proposal which is often understood as yet another divide et impera strategy – “Moscow knows that its initiative will be met with mistrust by the Baltic states, Poland, and the UK. But it intends to play a subtle game, trying to win support for its plan in the leading European capitals. Even if Medvedev’s proposal would not lead to concrete outcomes, the sole fact of proposing the plan already fulfilled one of its objectives: to divide the NATO allies”12.

There is no consensus on the nature of the dangers posed by Russia. Russia-friendly politicians in Berlin, Rome and Paris have expressed sympathy with Russian complaints that it feels sidelined, even threatened, in an EU and NATO dominated European space13. Yet, there are some Europeans more skeptical to the Kremlin reassurance that “Russia is not going to get involved in a costly confrontation”, but seeks to develop “international cooperation on the basis of equality, mutual respect for interests and mutual benefit”, “to promote good neighborly relations with bordering states, to assist in eliminating the existing hotbeds of tension and conflicts in the regions adjacent to the Russian Federation and other areas of the world and to prevent emergence of the new ones”14. Despite Kremlin’s conciliatory attitude they read the proposals put forward by Medvedev and other Russian politicians as an attempt to drive a wedge between Europe and the U.S. and to give Russia a droit de regard in its neighborhood.

By far the most contentious issue remains the fate of the countries that lie between EU and Russia, in what the EU calls the ‘common neighborhood’ and Russia the ‘near abroad’, namely the ring of countries on the EU’s east and Russia’s west. Kremlin makes no secret from the fact that Russia is concerned by the EU and NATO plans to build partnerships with its allies in the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)15. All consensus breaks down looking East. In fact, since Russia and Georgia went to war in August 2008, it has become conventional wisdom that too much Western outreach to Georgia and Ukraine is understandably provocative toward Russia. Russia has after all declared its ‘privileged interests’ in the region.16

Although Moscow realized that the “European neighborhood policy” (ENP) had little discernable impact, and that even the EU membership did not prevent Russia from doing good business and building political links in countries such as Bulgaria or Slovakia, it watched with unease as the EU launched the “Eastern partnership” (EaP) initiative, in May 2009. Russia sees the EaP with a grim eye. What made the difference was that it came at a time when Russia’s own neighborhood policy was in turmoil. In the aftermath of the Russia-Georgia, even Russia’s oldest allies began diversifying their foreign policies: Armenia started talking to Turkey; Turkmenistan reinforced its energy ties with China and even made statements about selling gas to the EU; even the last tiran, Lukashenka, did his best to be allowed to join the EaP. Also, not a single former Soviet country followed Moscow in recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moreover, now that NATO accession for Georgia and Ukraine is no longer a near term prospect and the U.S. has scrapped its missile defense plans for the Czech Republic and Poland, Russia’s zero-sum thinking about the common neighborhood seems to be increasingly focused on EU plans. The EaP could give the neighbors more options and thus make it
harder for Russia to keep them in its ‘privileged sphere of interests’.

Not surprisingly, when it comes to the common neighborhood, the relationship between the two players is most often seen in terms of geopolitics, motivated by the goal to expand their strategic influence and secure the conditions for economic presence. Despite the recent positive dialogue, most of the Western and Russian analysts are skeptical and consider that tensions and controversies will remain the key features that will frame EU-Russia relations for years to come.

While Russia and the EU have adopted a more pragmatic stance in their strategic partnership, starting to explore for new avenues of cooperation in dealing with the new threats of the 21st century, the ex-communist countries do not think that their worries about Russia are outdated. They argue that the EU should tone down its rhetoric on strategic partnership and put more effort into transmitting a clear and consistent message to Russia and should be prepared for continuing tensions over the common neighborhood and international issues.

While Brussels’ attempts at de-politicizing its relations with Moscow, some of the new EU members have grown circumspect towards the limits of the compromises the EU core is willing to make in order to keep the EU-Russian economic partnership going. They consider that the EU should not give up its normative agenda. The message should be that the EU stands ready to move forward on deeper integration and more extensive co-operation with Russia, but it wants to see progress on economic reform as well as human rights and political freedoms. Moreover, it cannot and will not accept any Russian claims to a sphere of influence. The relationship with Russia must not be developed at the expense of other partners. Moscow should not be fast-tracked at the expense of Georgia, Ukraine or Moldova, as third countries are nobody’s ‘privileged sphere of interest’. Nevertheless, fears exist that such scenarios could become reality. And such fears are not unrealistic as the St. Petersburg German-Russian Intergovernmental Consultations from the fall of 2008 had proven. Merkel made it clear at the joint press conference that Germany would oppose NATO membership for both of Georgia and Ukraine, and that it would even oppose placing the countries on the path to membership. Embracing the vague concept of a strategic and pragmatic partnership in order to surpass the Zastoi (stagnation) of its common spaces approach, the EU seems to choose interest over values, sending a wrong message to its neighbors. Some of the new EU members have grown circumspect towards the limits of the compromises the EU core is willing to make in order to keep the EU-Russian economic partnership going. Internal solidarity within the EU being undermined, some of the ‘engines’ behind European integration do not hesitate to conclude unilateral deals on the side, which also trigger indignation among the states of ‘new’ Europe. Yet, Russia’s leverage over individual member states undermines not only the EU’s common approach, but also the objectives of the ENP and EaP.

Referring to Russian trade sanctions against Poland, stoppage of oil transport to Lithuania and the Russian-Estonian conflict over a WWII monument, both the President of the Commission Jose Manuel Barroso and German Chancellor Angela Merkel have demonstrated the solidarity of the member states vis-à-vis relations with Russia: “We had an occasion to say to our Russian partners that a difficulty for a Member State is a difficulty for all of us at the European Union. We are now 27 Member-States. So, a Polish problem is a European problem. A Lithuanian, an Estonian problem is a European problem as well. And this is very important, if you want to have a real, good, close cooperation, to understand that the European Union is based on the principles of solidarity.” Yet strong messages of EU solidarity as the one sent at the EU-Russia summit in Samara on May 18, 2007 hardly ever occur.

Devoid of a coherent strategy, some of the EU policy-makers prefer to choose the bilateral solutions in areas like energy and military cooperation, but these lonely-riders break the EU solidarity and affect the image the EU was trying to build for itself ever since the Leaken Declaration. Recently, it’s the case of both France and Germany, key partners for Russia in Europe. The personal diplomacy of the former President Vladimir Putin, as during the ‘axis of peace’, the strategic partnership between him, Chirac and Schroeder, also known as the European troika, continues during the presidency of Medvedev.

While complaining about the bureaucratic sluggishness and inertia of EU’s decision making mechanism, Moscow continues with success to manage its interest vis-à-vis the EU through
developing special relations with the traditional ‘big’ European powers.

France launched its own modernization partnership with Russia in November 2009, an agreement focused on energy deals and the sale of French warships to Russia – much to the chagrin of people in the Baltic States and other East Europeans. An even more illustrative example is that of Germany, its relationship with Moscow being by far the most enduring and fruitful one. In looking at their real economic interests, the Germans were inevitably drawn to their relationship with Russia: Russia supplies Germany with nearly 40 percent of the natural gas Germany uses. At the same time, Russia needs technology and expertise to develop its economy away from being simply an exporter of primary commodities. Moreover, the Germans already have thousands of enterprises that have invested in Russia. The Greek crisis has put Germany in a difficult situation of subsidizing the rest of Europe. Due to the Euro-crisis, the European Union was becoming a trap since it was heading toward a long period of stagnation. Since a self-contained economy was impossible, Germany, heavily dependent on exports, needed to find an additional partner, which made Germany reconsider its relationship with Russia.

But most importantly, German-Russian alignment is a security issue as well as an economic issue. As Stratfor founder Dr. George Friedman pointed out, Germany was faced with an important strategic decision that has decisive influence on the security of the European space as well as on the future of NATO. Trying to avoid the perils of the shifting alliances between the three main players – France, Germany and Russia, which decided the security of continental Europe between 1871 and 1941, Germany looked for ways to integrate Russia into the European security system, or at least give it a sufficient stake in the European economic system that Russia does not seek to challenge the European security system. But, as Friedman pointed out, and his words were confirmed by the Deauville summit, “this immediately affects French relations with Russia. For Paris, the partnership with Germany is the foundation of France’s security policy and economy. If Germany moves into a closer security and economic relationship with Russia, France must calculate the effect this will have on itself. Yet, since there has never been a time when a tripartite alliance of France, Germany and Russia has worked because it has always left France as the junior partner, it was vital for the Germans to present this not as a three-way relationship but as the inclusion of Russia into Europe.”

The Berlin-Moscow Axis appears to be sowing discord not only within NATO, but within EU itself. The frustrations of the newcomers resurface as, once again, the core of the EU, namely the French-British duo seem to maintain monopoly over the decision-making process in the Union when it comes to fundamental issues. It should be noticed that the Germans are proposing a Russian security relationship with Europe, not a Russian security relationship with Germany alone. At the same time, it should be remembered that it is the Germans taking the initiative to open the talks by unilaterally negotiating with the Russians and taking their agreements to other European countries. It is also important to note that they have not taken this to all the European countries but to France and Poland first.

As Friedman points out, “it’s becoming clear that the Germans do not want to lose the European concept, but at the same time, they are trying...
to redefine it more to their advantage. From the German point of view, bringing Russia into the relationship would help achieve this. Nevertheless, they still have to explain what their relationship is with the rest of Europe, particularly their financial obligation to troubled economies in the euro-zone and also define their relationship to NATO, and more important, to the United States.”

Barack Obama – the least or the last Atlanticist president

In the wake of the U.S. presidential elections a heated debate was going on between two possible scenarios of foreign policy. Showing distrust in the EU’s newly ambition to play an important role on the international stage, in the ESDP and the Lisbon Treaty, many analysts predicted that America may have no choice but to turn to Asia for support if it wishes to remain an international arbiter; a different kind of relationship with a more activist China and India will be needed to manage global instability. If so, the Euro-American age will have come to a close. On the other hand, it was said that in the face of economic and military difficulties, the next U.S. administration will likely return to a more multilateral foreign policy; it will look favorably on working with international organizations; it will focus on greater cooperation with allies and above all, it will turn to Europe. Portraying Europe as the main partner of the new Obama-Clinton duo was the main statement of the U.S. discourse.

Yet, lately, this attitude has changed due to the different threat perceptions and strategic interests of the two transatlantic allies. Although the U.S. administration pointed out that Europe’s security interests are at least as threatened by the situation in Afghanistan as are the United States, Europe has been reluctant on Afghanistan, concentrating instead on relations with Russia, whose policy towards EU member states has to date prevented consensus to emerge, and Turkey, which forms the gateway between the European and Islamic worlds and whose succession to EU member status generates hostility in much of Europe. This has been seen by many analysts as a incentive for the U.S. to regard the relationship with China as its most important bilateral tie. As a contributor to the Washington Note put it, the situation is rather ironic: “the President whose election was so lauded throughout Europe may therefore turn out to be the President under whose tenure neorealist predictions of the demise of the North-Atlantic Alliance come to pass”. Either way, one thing seems to be clear: “If Obama really is the United States’ first Pacific President, he will surely be its last Transatlantic President,” transitioning the United States to the post-Western world, which is another way of saying he is adapting America to a world in which its relative power is eroding.

Some analysts link the rather shaky state of Obama’s relation to the Europeans to his pure pragmatic fashion of conducting foreign policy, the president being characterized as member of the post-Western world, with no misty-eyed vision of Atlanticism. The President instinctively recognized that he would need all the support he could get on tough questions like Afghanistan, Iran’s drive towards nuclear weapons, or global climate change. He would need a strong, united Europe as a partner and he would have to convince Russia not to play the role of “spoiler”. But EU’s disunity, especially its bureaucratic structure and division over Russia made him move the transatlantic relation at the bottom of the agenda, and give priority to the relations with China, India, the Middle East and Russia.

As Jeremy Shapiro and Nick Witney formulated it in a report for the European Council on Foreign Relations, Obama was dissatisfied with the “basically infantile and fetishistic” European attitude to the United States. “America wants to be Europe’s partner, not its patron; but it cannot be responsible from without for weaning Europe off its client status. (…) An incoherent and ineffective assemblage of European states will be increasingly marginalized” they wrote, re-launching the endless debate over the inefficiency of EU’s new foreign policy apparatus.

As one by one European leaders become disappointed by the president’s cool remoteness, Obama's ratings are slowly falling on the continent and one place where they are already low – certainly lower than those of his predecessor – is in the countries that former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld dubbed “New Europe.” While Bush made Eastern and Central Europe a top priority – as evidenced by the missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic and the push for NATO expansion for Georgia and Ukraine – his successor is clearly more concerned about relations with Russia, the very country whose influence New Europe is trying
to avoid. His whole reset policy rhetoric made the countries of Central and Eastern Europe fear their strong ties with Washington would be downgraded in favor of closer U.S.-Russian relations, that the Obama administration will sell out Georgia and Moldova by dropping insistence on Russian withdrawal from those two countries.

Once again, the Europeans’ fears turned to be right, as Russia has become more accommodating on the question of Iran sanctions. The shift in Russia’s position turned to be a result of the fact that some of the critical irritants in the U.S.-Russia relationship have diminished, in part due to circumstantial events as in the case of Ukraine, but mostly due to the compromises made by the Western capitals and the US.

Obama and other senior U.S. officials have repeatedly said they do not recognize a Russian “sphere of influence”. But actions or non-actions speak louder than those words. Through its neglect, the administration is ceding to Moscow exactly such a sphere. Also, Moscow made sure to broadcast its opinion that America had conceded to its demands. As Sergei Karaganov, the chairman of the Presidium of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy of Russia, a state-funded advisory group, stated, “Russia will never spoil its relations with Iran” unless “America agrees to serious compromises and stops enlarging NATO to the east, stops the Cold War in Europe, and accepts a Russian sphere of influence”.

While the Obama administration continues to support Georgia’s westward aspirations, President Mikhail Saakashvili is viewed by the current team with a far more critical eye than its predecessors, and they have made clear that Tbilisi does not have a blank check from the United States. The U.S. insists that it still supports Georgia’s territorial integrity. But Washington also says that Russia’s ongoing occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia “need no longer be considered an obstacle” to ratifying an agreement on joint civilian nuclear cooperation originally mooted after Russia’s 2008 invasion. As Owen Matthews from Newsweek puts it: “old friends who once saw Georgia as a strategic bridgehead now see it as more of a liability – in the process sending a signal to Moscow that the West prefers to strike diplomatic deals rather than get tangled in conflicts in Russia’s backyard”.

After a series of mutual missteps, America’s relation with Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) seemed to be in need of a ‘reset button’ of its own. In this context, the decision to abandon the missile defense systems – the original Bush plan to counter Iranian missiles by installing a sophisticated radar facility in the Czech Republic and 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland, has created a firestorm of controversy, being seen by the CEE countries as one too many compromises. Moreover, a series of poor diplomatic work by the administration further offended the countries of the region. The Obama administration’s handling of U.S. missile defense plans for the CEE region illustrated a serious lack of attention for, and sensitivity to, CEE allies. When the administration announced the modifications to European missile defense, Poland and the Czech Republic were both surprised, which says much about the level of U.S. consultations with its allies. Apparently, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk was so angry at first hearing about U.S. policy changes from the news media that he refused to speak to President Obama when he called.

According to Kurt Volker, former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, this marks the beginning of a ‘strategic drift’ of the U.S. and CEE away from each other: “There is widespread concern in CEE that U.S. attention and priorities under the Obama Administration have shifted away from Central Europe to such a degree that the region is no longer an important piece to the United States on the strategic chessboard”.

If at first the main concern was that the administration would pursue a “Russia first” policy at the expense of Russia's neighbors, now, the situation turned out to be worse, as the administration seems to have moved toward a ‘Russia only’ approach, giving rise to feelings of bitterness and betrayal, neglect and abandonment among Atlanticist in Central and Eastern Europe.

Yet, President Obama doesn't seem eager to trade the CEE for the Russian smile, as he wants it both ways in Europe: NATO solidarity, and re-engagement with Russia, which needs a very delicate balancing act, as reset with the Russians (recognizing that they have ‘spheres of influence’ in Eastern Europe) and strategic reassurance for the CEE (deploying American capabilities to defend this region) seem to be incompatible. Nevertheless, Joe Biden, the US vice-president, appears to be handling quite good his new role of perestroakhovshchik (‘the re-insurer’), as he’s spreading from Tbilisi to Bucharest words of...
comfort and reassurance: “I think that America has not forgotten us. (...) I have not yet observed that America is losing interest in us as allies. If she has decided that she will replace one anti-ballistic missile system with another, that is her expert decision and should not be seen as American lack of interest in the region – that would be a somewhat rash and sentimental way of thinking”.

Conclusion
(Not at) all quiet on the Eastern front

Putin and Medvedev announced on different occasions Russia’s resurgence, its frustration with the further expansion of the North Atlantic alliance, with being sidelined, even threatened, in an EU and NATO dominated European space. While the West, mostly interested in strengthening the economic cooperation and also neglecting that implicit understanding which existed in the ‘90s of where Europe ends, seemed deaf to the message, many Central and East European states have experienced intense Russian pressure across the diplomatic, informational, and economic spheres.

The tensions around the Russian proposal split once more the EU: while CEE countries want protection from Russia, those in the West want ‘strategic engagement’ with Russia for reassurance. Many Western Europeans and U.S. officials underestimated the deep fear of Russia imbedded in the minds of East Europeans. From the Baltic to the Black Sea the CEE states view the Russian threat in a completely different way than many long-time NATO allies, including the U.S., for which Russia is a potential partner in solving the new issues of the 21st Century – cyber threats, nuclear proliferation, organized crime etc.

Rather than pulling together, states within Europe, and the wider transatlantic community, are showing greater divisions. While the lack of Western European political support makes the CEE countries feel insecure, the lack of NATO contingency planning and scarcity of response forces in the face of a resurgent Russia also contributes to these perceptions of vulnerability. Their anxieties are eroding solidarity in NATO pushing them to pursue separate bilateral security arrangements with the United States. Yet, while Russia has benefited from an Obama ‘reset’ and the Chinese already have a strategic and economic dialogue, a new U.S. strategy towards the EU is hard to discern. While Kennedy called for a ‘Declaration of Interdependence’ with Europe, the Bush administration produced the ‘Transatlantic Declaration’, President Bill Clinton launched the ‘New Transatlantic Agenda’ and ‘Joint US-EU Action Plan’, no such vision has yet emerged from the Obama administration.

As far as the North-Atlantic alliance is concerned, the German shift represented a dramatic blow for the Western alliance. Nevertheless, it remains, at least for the near future, the main security provider in the European space. At 61, NATO is trying to reinvent itself through a new security concept which could be instrumental in unifying the allies' views on Russia, and in clarifying NATO’s intentions towards Moscow. Nevertheless, one must acknowledge the difficulties facing the Alliance. NATO, as well as the Obama administration, has the tough mission of giving reassurance to its CEE allies while pressing the reset button in its relations to Moscow. Reassurance measures should calm the relationship by increasing solidarity among the allies, thus taking away the opportunities for Moscow to practice its divide et impera strategy, pitting one NATO member against another. Moreover, reassurance measures would make the new allies feel more secure and therefore more willing to support a bold new outreach to Russia. After all, the stability of Europe depends on Russia’s amiability, on its political evolution and consequently on its behavior toward its neighbors. Yet, as reassurance is the precondition of reset, so is compromise. After all, politics means making compromises, but Western leaders should keep in mind that “sometimes, some of these compromises could be very dangerous because it could be the beginning of the road of making a lot of other compromises, which are results of the first one, and there are very dangerous compromises”.

Despite recent positive outcomes, the EU needs to be prepared to deal with a Russia that is often stubborn, defensive and unpredictable. Most importantly, it should speak with one voice, it should seek an all-encompassing platform of cooperation with Russia, with everybody subscribing to a common list of EU interests, and it should send Russia a clear message about what the EU wants. What’s at stake are the rules by which our relationship with Moscow will be governed.

Until now, the EU proved to be a rather fragile structure that can easily be ignored and divided
amongst it. From Berlin to Paris, and from Paris to Rome, European leaders may ultimately be doing the same thing, but they are all doing it separately, as competitors, rather than partners, united under a common vision, within a tight-knit Union. Double-hatted or not, it has been said that the European Union has one too many heads. In spite of Lady Ashton taking her mission seriously, the EU remains a multiheaded hydra, still not being able to deliver a straightforward answer to Henry Kissinger’s famous question. But, to effectively deal with the ongoing fallout from the global financial crisis and in order to use every window of opportunity that may arise to play a leading role in building a new European security architecture, an ever closer European solidarity will be vital. While the stones of the Berlin Wall have long been distributed as souvenirs, to use Putin’s expression from his Munich speech, throughout wider Europe other walls remain. Festering tensions can explode, as in the Balkans or Caucasus. The EU external ambitions as well as its internal solidarity will be put to ever more serious tests in the years to come.

The present circumstances are particularly prone to novelty and change as the faith of the Medvedev proposal is to be decided this December at the OSCE Summit in Astana, one month after the long awaited Lisbon Summit. Moreover, next year is set to be the year of Central Eastern Europe on the continent. Hungary and Poland will each have six months in the EU’s rotating presidency. Also, Lithuania will be the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and is already coordinating with Poland to present a coherent EU-OSCE agenda in 2011. Hungary and Poland will each have six months in the EU’s rotating presidency. Also, Lithuania will be the OSCE Chairwoman-in-Office and is already coordinating with Poland to present a coherent EU-OSCE agenda in 2011. Hungary is already talking about a ‘Danube strategy’, while Poland intends to push for more EU aid to countries such as Georgia, Moldova and Belarus and EU rules on mutual help in energy crises.

In the meantime, “Europe whole, free and at peace” remains a valid vision and policy…but still only a vision…

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NOTES:

1. The authors wish to thank for the financial support provided from the program co-financed by The Sectoral Operational Program for Human Resources Development, Contract POSDRU 6/1.5/S/3 – “Doctoral studies, a major factor in the development of socio-economic and humanistic studies”.


3. Medvedev says Russia is interested in NATO proposals on anti-missile defense, RIA Novosti, April 27, 2010.


7. An interesting point is made by Stephen WALT, a leading international relations scholar: “a large U.S. presence isn't central to European security any longer. There's little danger of serious conflict in Europe these days (and certainly no potential threat that the European states can't handle), and all that's needed from the United States is a mostly symbolic presence to help hold NATO together and remind Europeans not to let security competition reignite on the continent. And please don’t try to tell me that Putin's Russia poses a resurgent threat to the rest of Europe (...) if our European allies can't handle Russia's not-very-impressive military, then they don't deserve U.S. help.” Apud: Stephen WALT, *Indispensable or insolvent?*, Foreign Policy, Monday, June 21, 2010.
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The author submit this article as the first part of an ample analysis on the dynamics of regional security in Caucasus and Central Asia, with a focus on the historical issues of these regions. Internal struggles for powers and territorial border issues added to those of ethnic diversity and the Islamic militancy constituted significant motives to analyze these regions security developments on the background of the natural resources competition involving not only regional but also international dominant actors.

Keywords: Caucasus, conflict, ethnic, religious, USSR, separatism

Placed on the southern border of the Russian Federation, at the junction point of Eastern Europe with Central and Eastern Asia regions, the Caucasus recently reasserted as a real insecurity complex involving the historical, cultural and political contradictions, tensions, crisis and conflicts of that shaped the regional security environment (as a boomerang effect of the historical memories that lead to unresolved present issues). To this complicated situation it were added actions and dominating tendencies of some major international actors in the regional general obscure geopolitical and geo-economics mutations intervening after the end of the Cold War.

The dominant characteristic of the region, a geographical area in which are localized diverse ethnic groups (Figure nr. 1), emphasize in a bolder manner than in the Balkan region, the religious dimension of the recent history region conflicts.

It is imperative to note that development of every conflict from the region must be necessarily linked by the asymmetrical hierarchic structure of the territorial ethnic based Soviet Union whose leaders, in spite of the communist ideology, directed a lot of their efforts towards ethnic issues. Although the soviet leadership allowed the right of self-governing of its ethnic based territorial units, in parallel there was promoted the creation of ethnic-political elites in its autonomous units, either provinces or republics, limiting in some measure the ethnic segregation of the population and the projection of the ethnic issues on the socio-politic life of the Union.

After the dissolution of USSR, the projection of ethnic identity in the public life was more pronounced in the Caucasus, compared with other ex-soviet regions. The frequent usage of the native languages, high level of resistance to the russification of the local cultures and the low level of mobility of the region’s populations contributed to this state of fact. Moreover, the region’s history recorded unresolved ethnic conflicts in the pre-soviet era, before and after the First World War. As parts involved in these conflicts respective ethnic groups kept in their collective memory all those records so that every one of them developed a specific interpretation of the history. On the background of the disorganization of the soviet army in the 90’s, appeared also the perspective of acquiring significant amount of weapons to arm the separatist paramilitary movements, facilitating this way the emergence or re-emergence of ethnic or religious conflicts. Hereby, we identified three major conflicts in the Caucasus region: inter-state conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh province and conflicts on the
Georgian territory in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the South Caucasus; the conflict initially generated by the Chechen separatist movement and further developed on the Dagestan territory under the influence of Islamist militants. Hereinafter these conflicts were analyzed in order to identify the causes, and dynamics factors to support the assessment of the ethnic and religious context in the 1990-2002 period.

**South Caucasus – separatist movements and inter-state conflict in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia**

South Caucasus region represents the geographic area of three states: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Placed at the junction of two continents Europe and Asia, these states are in the immediate vicinity and influence of three major powers: Iran, Russia and Turkey. The geopolitical dynamics and the presence of an important amount of natural gas and oil reserves in the Caspian Sea area (most of them localized on the Azerbaijan territory), complicated the already turmoil (by the separatist crises in Azerbaijan and Georgia) regional competition game, increasing the level of instability in the region.

As mentioned before, the Caucasus region is one of the most ethnically diverse on the globe, the dominant ethnic groups being the national groups of the three independent states of the regions: Armenians, Azeri and Georgians. Armenians speak an indo-european language and religion of the majority is monophisite Christianity; Azeri speak a Turkic language, with shiia muslim majority in their religious profile; regarding the Georgians, their language is a Caucasian language and 5% of the population is affiliated as orthodox Christians.

The geographical localization of minority groups in the three mentioned could be mapped as follows: in Javakheti region (Southern Georgia)
there is an important Armenian minority as well as in the neighboring Kveno-Kartili province can be found a large Azeri population. In the southwestern part of Georgia, in the Autonomous Republic of Adjaria there is a large population of Muslim Georgians and on the Azerbaijan territory Armenians, Lezgins (North) and Talysh (South).

From all three states Armenia only can be described as an ethnically homogenous³ state, aside of Armenian majority only a small yezdiz Kurds⁴ community residing on its territory. There also can be found, disparate on the three states territories, small Russian communities.

As mentioned before, previous to the USSR collapse, an important factor in the region was the policy of the central government in Moscow that wanted to maintain its influence in the Caucasus and to prevent separation of the republics in the region.

This attitude continued even after the dissolution of the USSR, Moscow trying to prevent their independence and further alignment to pro-Western policies that would removed them from the Russian sphere of influence. In this respect, as a successor state of the former USSR, Russia supported the separatist movement in Georgia as well as the both parts of the azeri-armenian conflict in order to weaken their independence and increase their dependence from Moscow. Thus, in early 90’s Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have been affected by ethnic conflict, economic collapse and political instability. Resulting devastating effects on the region lead to tens of thousands dead and a million and a half refugees. In human and material casualties terms the Armenian-Azeri conflict has caused the largest damages, closely followed by the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, while the conflict in South Ossetia, comparably, could be characterized as one of lower intensity. Internal power struggles degenerated into large scale conflicts close to civil war intensity, as in the years 1991 and 1993.

To better understand the evolution of security in the region, and its ethnic-religious determinations, we will further examine how the region's states have been torn by separatist ethnic movements. On this background, local elements, away from international community's influence have transformed the whole area into a space of organized crime, kidnapping, weapons trafficking or shelter for terrorist groups.

As previously noted, among the three South Caucasus countries, Armenia is the only state that can be considered ethnically homogeneous. This situation was quite different before the outbreak of war in Karabakh, when Armenia hosted a minority of approximately 200,000 Azeri. Their expulsion between the years 1987-1989 lead to the existence of no dominant minority group in the country, with the exception of some Kurdish communities. Religiously, majority of the population (95%) is of Armenian Apostolic faith, the national laws restricting and prohibiting religious proselytizing activities of any other religions than the one of Armenian Apostolic Church.

Most of Armenia's foreign relations were dominated by attempts towards convincing the international community by legitimacy of its claims on Nagorno-Karabakh province. As mentioned, Turkey was perceived as the main threat to the Armenia national security. Turkey's support for Azerbaijan during the azeri-armenian conflict when publicly condemned the Armenian occupation in the Azerbaijan territories and imposed a partial trade embargo on Armenia has sharpened the accusatory attitude of Armenia on Turkey's responsibility for the massacres⁵ of Armenians population in the First World War. Turkey has rejected, however, these accusations and continues its policy of restrictions on the background of the unofficial Armenia's territorial claims on Kars and Erzurum Turkish regions.

With the ongoing war with Azerbaijan and Turkish restrictions, Armenia has relied on Russia as a guarantor of security, becoming an active participant of the CIS Collective Security Treaty. Self-isolation policy of Armenia, with pro-Russian tendencies seemed had been the price paid for its independence. On the other hand Russia perceived Armenia as an important ally in the Caucasus, maintaining the 102 Russian military base on its territory (in Gyumri), S-300 missile complexes, and an air squadron of MIG-29 (in Yerevan)⁶.

However, Russia was not the only ally of Armenia, but also Greece and Iran, both with a long history of tense relations with Turkey. Greece supported Armenia both by delivering military and economic assistance and diplomatic representation by promoting the Armenia's interests in the EU and NATO. Iran provided trade opportunities and an opening to the maritime space. In terms of religious issues, despite the fact that it is Shiite
Muslim country, Iran has adopted a neutral attitude toward Christian Armenia in the conflict with the Muslim Azerbaijan. However, after September 11, 2001, Armenia's ties with Iran were sanctioned by the U.S. that imposed economic sanctions on the Armenian private companies that were trading nuclear materials with Iranian companies. On the other hand, due to the strong Armenian lobby in the U.S., the Armenian government succeeded to obtain a $90,000,000 annual support.

Member of the Partnership for Peace program, Armenia remained in tense relations with Georgia over the status of Jarakheti province (an ethnically Armenian province of Georgia), and participation of ethnic Armenian guerilla forces in the Georgian-Abkhazian war, on the Abkhaz side. Despite all these facts, Armenia maintains a relatively calm relation with Georgia, avoiding the escalation of the conflict, mainly due to the trade and communication routes that were subject of a strong dependence of Georgia infrastructure.

The conflict with Armenia on the Nagorno-Karabakh was not the only one that newly independent Azerbaijani had to manage on its territory that hosted no more than 15 minority groups. With a 82.7%, Azeri population (according to the 1989 census population) plus Lezgins-2.2%, Russians-1.8%, Armenians-1.5%, talysh-1%, Avars, Georgians, Kurds with percentages ranging from 0.6% to 0.2% from 7,790,200 total population. Largest Armenian communities (about 250,000) lived in Sumgait, a city near Baku, and in Karabakh Autonomous Province. Religiously the Azerbaijani population is predominantly Sunni Muslim (95% of total population). Most part of the 90’s the activity of religious groups were peaceful, not threatening in any way the authority and stability of the Azeri state, but the emergence of the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, founded by groups from Iran, and religious group „Jeyshullah (responsible for the assassination of Ziya Bunyatov, significant political figure of Azerbaijan) have led to inconvenience when those organizations began to constitute a threat to country’ stability, especially since Islamic Wahhabi activists were also active on its territory. In these circumstances, President Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev on 21 June 2001 created a state committee on religious issues and organizations in charge with monitoring religious activities, publication of religious materials and reporting of subversive religious activities within the Ministry of Interior. The committee had the right to restrict proselytizing actions of foreign nationals and to recommend judicial exclusion of religious groups and activities that would threaten the central government.

Ensuring the security and human rights for these groups was a challenge for the newly independent Azerbaijan. On the background of separatist movements emergence within legions and talysh communities as well as among the Armenians in Karabakh there has been fears of the political elite on the issue of territorial integrity of state. These fears were well founded, ethnic tensions and escalating conflict standing as evidence, regarding both lezgins and talysh but also the Armenians in Karabakh. The letter turned from an intra-state into an inter-state conflict. The dynamics of those conflicts will be further discussed.

Lezgins are a North Caucasian group, with origins in Dagestan, and Islam (Sunni) religion. Their separation tendency was manifested in the early 90s as a reaction to the nationalist ideology promoted by the president Abulfaz Elchibay. In 1992, when he came to power one of his first decisions was to declare Turkish language as national language and to adopt the Latin alphabet instead of Cyrillic one. Reacting, the non Turkic lezgin population had began to fear about the increasing domination of azeri ethnic group, and on the ground of difficult socio-economic conditions the lezgins representatives began to state separatist ideas. The Sadval organization associated with these separatist demands in order to create Lezghistan Republic which would have added in the southern Dagestan and northern Azerbaijan. In the year 1995 the Sadval organization was accused of planning an explosion in the Baku subway system, explosion resulted in 12 casualties. It was also assumed that Sadval cooperated with the Armenian secret services and Azeri government acted accordingly and arrested several members of the group for treason and terrorism acts. Separatist lezgin movement reached its utmost in 1993, during the civil war, when, when after the independence of southern Azerbaijan Republic Talysh Mugan, lezgin politicians have advocated the creation of ethnic Republic of Lazghistan. After the President Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev elections, the separatist movement decreased as the president allowed access and participation in governance for representatives of lezgin minority. In this respect,
General Safar Abiyev was appointed Minister of Defence and Asga Manafova elected President of the parliamentary committee on natural resources. These changes have been part of a vast program of Baku government which had established an special office of the Presidential Adviser on the problems of minorities to monitor the situation of all minorities, provide resources, but limited to magazines and books publishing and producing television programs in minority languages.

Talysh minority, one of the largest ethnic groups in Azerbaijan, after Russians and Armenians were, according to official figures from the Council of State Statistics of Azerbaijan, about 21,200 people, located near the border with Iran. Belonging to the Shi’a branch of Islam, they speak a western Iranian dialect, the attitude towards the participation to political scene being generally characterized by passivity.

The major political event of talysh minority can be related to the year 1993, when retired Colonel Aliakram Humbatov, of talysh origin, declared independence of so-called Talysh-Mugan Republic and taken appropriate military measures to strengthen its border. The idea of unilateral declaration of independence had not been shared by the majority of the population, that rather perceived it as a maneuver of the political games originating from Azerbaijan’s capital being known that Aliakram Humbatov is a political ally of the Prime Minister Suret Husseynov, in the latter’s attempt to weaken the position of President Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev. President Alyev sent military forces to Lankaran, where concentrated forces of Humbatov had been defeated. The coup attempt was quickly defeated and Humbatov fled to Iran. Later, he was extradited to Azerbaijan being accused by high treason.

Situated in the Western Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh province hosts Armenian Christians (80%) and Azeri Muslims (20%) population. The disputes over the province emerged at the beginning of XX century, from the first independence period of Armenia and Azerbaijan (1918-1920), and continued during the soviet era. First signs of conflict escalation appeared in the period of 1988-1989 when anti-Armenian revolt outbreaks in Sumgait, Baku and Gonja. The revolts were followed by ethnic cleansing resulting in 300,000 Armenians leaving Azerbaijan and 200,000 Azeri fled from Armenia, as the central Soviet government failed to stop the riots and control the further developments of the conflict.

The 1991 declarations of independence for the two countries led to a new development of the conflict, turning it into an inter-state conflict. In early 1992 Armenian forces together with Karabakh defence forces obtained the control of the province and managed to create a corridor to Armenia. Next year the Armenian forces succed to control of other six districts with major Azeri population outside Karabakh province. The war continued until 1994 when a cease fire agreement is reached by the involved parties of the conflict, with OSCE’s Minsk Group supervision. In 1997 OSCE had advanced a progressive settlement: retreat of the Armenian forces from the occupied territories and the return of the exiled population, followed by the economic exchanges. The proposal failed in being implemented as well as any further proposals.

The conflict was devastating for Azerbaijan, more than one million Azeri ethnics being forced to leave Nagorno-Karabakh and neighboring districts. The self declared independence of the province was not internationally recognized, the UN Security Council resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884 stating the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and considering as inadmissible the obtaining of territories by force.

Located north of the position of the Armenian-Azeri conflict, with southern border neighboring the two states involved in the conflict, Georgia was confronting with its own ethnic issues, especially after the 1991 independence. The presence of the Armenian, Chechen, Ossetian, Abkhaz Dagestan minorities along with the neighborhood of North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya, Republic of Karaciai-Cerchessia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Dagestan intensified the already tense relations with Russia and Azerbaijan. The main ethnic minorities were the Armenians, Azeri, Abkhaz and Ossetians. With 9% of the total population, Armenians were concentrated in three different areas of Georgia: in the capital, Tbilisi (100,000 inhabitants estimated) in Samtskhe-Javakheti province in the South (approximately 150,000 inhabitants) and Abkhazia (approximately 75% of the total population of the region).

Samtskhe - Javakheti province is located in the southern part of Georgia, bordering Turkey. Over 90% of the population consists of Armenians...
The region has a high separatist potential involving several factors among which are: the presence of Russian military bases Ahalkalki, a high concentration of Armenians ethnic along the border with Armenia, their isolationist attitude towards the Georgian language and culture. The region's separatist ambitions have been manifested in 1998 when an armed protest prevented the inhabitants of Georgian troops into the region to perform military exercises. Autonomy claims have been supported by nationalist groups (Kavakhh, Virk) and the Armenian diasporas groups, especially Dashnaktsutiun, resident in the U.S.

A compact Azeri minority was located in south-eastern province of Kvemo Kartili with a dynamic growth, which has made its number reach to 400,000. Areas inhabited by this community include one of the best agricultural lands in Georgia. Since gaining independence there were few moments of tension with the central government, most of which are related to grievances of poor political representation and difficult access in politics. Despite of these issues there have been no major tensions, this being possible also due to good relations between Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Abkhaz population is located in the north part of the country in the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, the ancestral cradle of this ethnic group, numbering about 100,000. Ossetians inhabiting the territory of South Ossetia autonomous province located in northern Georgia, but only an estimated 66,000 Ossetians live here, others being located in neighboring regions: Kaheti, Kartli and Mesheti.

On the background of this mosaic of populations, in the late '80s, ethnic tensions are increasingly visible manifested in Abkhazia. Insistent requests of the leaders of the region to lead Georgia out of the jurisdiction of Abkhazia declared independence in 1992, resulting in an attack by Georgian paramilitary forces in mid-August of that year. Abkhaz counter attack, equipped with Russian weapons and Chechen volunteers, and managed to repel Georgian forces and gain control of most of the territory of Abkhazia in late 1993. These actions were followed by acts of ethnic cleansing which led to some 24,000 displaced Georgians in Gali district in southern province. Power structures of the region were undertaken by the Abkhaz President Vladislav Ardzinba. Un-established buffer zone along the river Ingur river was extremely unstable, UNOMIG, the UN mission monitoring the situation in the region and the demilitarization of the border, having practically no influence on Russian peacekeeping troops. The latter, together with the Abkhaz forces and Georgian paramilitary forces being involved in organized crime activities throughout Abkhazia. Economic actions illegal / underground spread in the state hierarchy, no limits imposed by ethnicity, proving to be one of the few rapid enrichment activities and, ironically interethnic cooperation. Therefore, neither party had an economic interest to seek resolution of the conflict, although none of them wanted to resume hostilities.

In May 1998, approximately 40,000 displaced persons return to the Gali region. Russian peacekeeping forces deployed along the river Ingur River Abkhaz authorities have provided assistance to establish state border with Georgia and to progress towards Kadori Valley in eastern Abkhazia, which had a strong position to volunteer Chechen and Georgian guerrillas, who have launched attacks on the Abkhaz capital Sukhumi in October 2001.

The peace process long stalled, Abkhaz side refused the province’s final status talks and insisting on independence. It also proposed that the return of displaced persons to be accompanied by economic rehabilitation of the zone of conflict and a final peace agreement. Without being fully satisfied with the document, the signing of the agreement and asked the Georgian accept international peacekeeping forces at that time which is exclusively of Russian troops.

The status of the province remained unclear, not recognized by the international community, except Russia, remaining a territory that de jure was a part of Georgia but de facto out of control the government in Tbilisi.

Secessionist movement in Abkhazia and calls for autonomy for the Armenians in Samtskhe-Javakheti region, are added to the conflict in South Ossetia, the armed conflict between Georgians and Ossetians were during the years 1989-1992. Its evolution has led to numerous casualties and thousands of refugees on both sides. Negotiations on the conflict resolution were initiated in 1995 under the aegis of OSCE with Russia as a mediator. While discussions have brought the two sides agree on many issues, the main problem, represented by the political status of South
Ossetia remained unresolved. Georgia has offered limited autonomy to South Ossetia and support in rebuilding the region’s infrastructure, while South Ossetia was not willing to give up the idea of independence.

A new element comes in 2001, when President Ludwig Chibirov moderate, lost elections in favor of South Ossetia Eduard Kokoev, a Russian citizen with business conducted in Moscow. It proposes union of South Ossetia with North Ossetia and joining the Russian Federation. Initiative fails to settle the conflict; the parties nevertheless agree falling to facilitate return of refugees and displaced persons. In reality, this agreement did not work, therefore, not only that there were very few Georgians have returned, but those have left the region again in the same year. In turn, the Georgian authorities have not implemented the necessary measures to support ethnic Ossetians return to their homes in various locations in Georgia.

CIS summit in late 2001, Moscow has failed to harmonize the divergent views of the Russian Federation and Georgia on Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Chechen guerrillas’ refugee problem from mountainous areas of the border between Georgia and Chechnya. The clashes have amplified in Abkhazia (Gali area) in December 2001, with the attacks carried out by militia groups Georgian and Chechen guerrillas led by Ruslan Ghelayev.

In Tbilisi and Zugdidi were held street demonstrations, the population expressing support sending troops against separatist authorities in Abkhazia. Consequently, units of the Georgian army and volunteers were concentrated in the Kodori Valley, where Abkhaz forces backed by helicopters operated by the Russian base at Gudauta.

The presence of Russian troops was not a surprise, the CIS peacekeeping forces, Russia managed to maintain a strong military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Although at that time not yet recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Russian government’s policy was to provide them with their political and economic support and, indirectly, military support. In this sense, Russia applied visas exempt to nationals from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, requiring it for Georgians beginning with the year 2000. The government in Moscow has continued this policy and, in 2002, the Abkhazians and Ossetians granted Russian citizenship, which mean, in fact, the annexation of the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

This kind of attitude and how to get involved in conflicts in the region lead us to conclude that the situation was one which suited the Russian region. This was evident in the case of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, conflict termination and peace which would lead to a lower level of Armenia’s dependence on Russia.

North Caucasus – from secessionism to religious extremism in Chechnya and Dagestan

Chechen Republic is located in a region of diverse ethnic and linguistic point of view. Located on the northern slopes of the Caucasus mountain chain, is flanked territorial republics of the Russian Federation, Ingushetia and North Ossetia to the west, east and north Dagestan and Stavropol in the Russian province of Northwest and South Georgia. With the exception of Georgia and North Ossetia, these republics are predominantly Muslim; their population belonging to the Sunni branch of Islam. Originated initially in Dagestan, Islam is experiencing a massive spread in the region until the nineteenth century, mainly through Sufi communities, adherents of Sufism, the mystical form with pre-Islamic pagan influences of Sunni Islam.

With a major geopolitical value, over history, the region has experienced waves of invading tribes and expansion of empires. Tsarist Russia meant the annexation of this region in terms of geopolitical space to ports in south unfrozen. Tsarist colonization in the region was completed during the Caucasian wars of the nineteenth century characterized by an angry Islamic resistance to the occupying Russian forces. Chechen society is characterized by strong loyalty relationships between the rival clans 150 (teips) is organized. Even during the Russian expansion in the eighteenth century in the North Caucasus, the population of this region showed strong resistance to the Russian occupation. The nearly 50 ethnic and linguistic groups in the area led by Sheikh Mansur and Imam Shamil, along with neighbors Circasians and Dagestan were engaged in a prolonged and violent conflict in order to preserve their cultural identity and to prevent annexation the Tsarist Empire.
In 1858, despite fierce resistance of the population, most of the North Caucasus falls under Russian control by establishing military garrisons in the region and Russian population. It was a series of concessions made by the authorities of the empire in the sense that the local population was exempted from compulsory military service and granted the right to practice Islam and live according to Islamic law šarī'ā community. However, there were periods of crisis across the region over the last decades of Tsarist control.

In 1936, under Soviet rule, Chechnya and Ingushetia were united as the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Chechen-Ingush (ASSR Chechen-Ingush). In 1944, on Stalin's orders, the Republic was abolished, and its population deported to Central Asia and Siberia, with Karachai and Balkaria, on charges of collaborating with Nazi forces. It is estimated that of the 70,000 people deported, about 25% perish within 5 years. In fact this dark period of Chechen history is known as the "genocide in Chechnya". In 1957 is reestablished the ASSR Chechen-Ingush.

In 1990, shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union, is separated from the Chechnya Ingushetia, a former Soviet army general Dzokhar anul1991 Dudayev was elected president. It refuses to sign the Treaty with the Russian Federation and supported by parliament, declare the independence of the republic. The new independent country was not recognized by the international community.

Under these circumstances, the Russian army withdraws from the republic, Moscow trying to resolve the situation through a referendum and federal elections. Boycott of the Chechen population has increased tensions, which led to the Russian invasion.

The Russian President of that time, Boris Yeltsin, sent troops in 1991 and again in 1994 in order to prevent separation of Chechnya and, thereby, losing still a part of Russian territory. Thus, Russian federal troops invaded Chechnya to restore Russian authority in the breakaway republic of North Caucasus. Expectations about the Kremlin's control over the timely resumption of capital Grozny had no support but in reality, everything turning into a conflict of time and a defeat for the Russian army. The Russians have committed a disproportionate level of force, being greeted by fierce guerrilla resistance, which led to numerous casualties and human rights violations by both sides. One of the first consequences of the conflict was demographic, Chechnya's neighboring republics received a significant number of refugees, both Chechen and Russian ethnics.

The armed conflict between Russian troops and Chechen rebels turned into a real war that lasted until 1996, when Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev was killed by a missile attack from Russia, on 21 April 1996. Zelimkahn Yandarbiyev, vice-prime minister of the Chechen government, considered a supporter of complete independence from the Russian Federation, followed the leadership of Dudayev. Although after Dudayev's death, over 6,000 Russian troops were withdrawn from Chechnya, the attacks by both sides continued.

Finally, in 1996 the signing of an agreement is reached, followed in 1997 by a treaty of peace. He stated that the republic's borders will be guarded by both Chechen and Russian soldiers; Russian troops will withdraw from rebel strongholds in the mountains of southern rebels who had occupied Chechen capital Grozny to teach their weapons and will establish a committee that will ensure any non-compliance of understanding.

In the same year the presidential elections in Chechnya were held, competitors being former Soviet officer separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov and Shamil Basayev.

After validating the election results - which, according to the 1997 annual report of the OSCE, "reflected the free choice of those who voted" - newly elected President, Aslan Maskhadov had to rebuild the country after the conflict. However, instead of uniting all political forces to rebuild the country, which caused a split in the former separatist movements in the country, that further complicated the Chechen-Russian relations. Consensus between domestic political forces, so necessary to define its relationship with Russia - in order to determine their level of autonomy of the republic and to obtain facilities from the Russian central government - has not been possible, Samil Basaiev leader, organizing, in 1998, "extra-parliamentary opposition."

Meanwhile, the Russian Federation refused to meet commitments and in 1996 Chechnya has entered a severe economic crisis. Many former "war lords" in the years 1994-1996 have been re-profiled in cross-border activities of
international crime category. Thus, in early 1999 over 1300 figures indicated that the Russian Dagestan and Ingush were kidnapped, tortured or killed in the Chechen republic. Efforts to promote a strong Muslim identity continued in Chechnya, but causing divisions in the Chechen leadership. Wahhabism is preached, (originally from Saudi Arabia) in a country dominated by Sufism (Islamic teaching with strong pre-Islamic pagan reminiscences). Aslan Maskhadov, former chief of staff, and one of the architects to restore peace in the republic, tried to prohibit the Wahhabi movement in the position of president, but his initiative was hampered by the alliance of Shamil Basaev (rival in presidential elections) and Wahhabi fighters led by Commander Khattab (Saudi Islamist, a veteran of the first Chechen war and civil war in Tajikistan, whose real name is thought to be Omar Ibn al Khattab). It created, as the premises for fundamentalist elements in Chechnya to promote the formation of a pan-Caucasian Islamic state, while at the removal of any elements of the Russian North Caucasus.

Despite official statements of President Maskhadov, who condemned the newly formed alliance plan, Wahhabi fighters began a series of attacks on police and military locations in neighboring Dagestan, the Russian Federation. These attacks carried into Wahhabi jihad against Russian forces in Dagestan have caused, as expected, a new military intervention by the Russian Federation, and led to the outbreak of conflict known as “The Second Chechen War”.

Autonomous Republic of Dagestan is part of Russian Federation and occupies a strategic position between Georgia, Chechnya, Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea. Population of about 1.9 million people is predominantly Muslim, with close cultural ties with Chechnya, which binds the past and a history of struggle against Russian imperialism in the nineteenth century the territory of the republic passed a part of the strategic pipeline Baku-Grozny-Novorossiysk.

As provinces united under the banner of Islamic Sufi religious teaching, Dagestan and Chechnya have been fighting for an independent North Caucasian Republic immediately after the Bolshevik takeover in Russia. During the Soviet leadership, daghestani more easily accepted the leadership of Moscow, compared with their Chechen neighbors, which would explain the lack of a massive movement in support of independence after the collapse of the USSR. We believe that this attitude differs from that adopted by the Chechens, was possible because of the highly fragmented ethnic mosaic in a total population numbering less than two million inhabitants there are about 34 distinct ethnic groups. Their organization is the traditional type, form djamaats, representing djamaat village or group of villages, which are “like the ancient city-states.”

The high degree of ethnic fragmentation made in conjunction with this form of organization is from our point of view dual role factors in relations between the groups: on the one hand, acted as factors inhibit the emergence of the idea of nationalism, and secondly that factors favoring the emergence of intercommunity animosity. The emergence of foreign missionaries, Wahhabi, an overwhelming share of late, has highlighted the exploitation of these factors by the Wahhabi fundamentalist elements. This process of exploitation of local ethnic traits has led, over 90s, the emergence of a powerful Wahhabi movement that has managed to finance the construction of mosques, while the population level there is a generalized state of poverty. Speculating low living standards, this movement has managed numerous conversions among youth, in addition to teaching philosophy radical Wahhabi imams new followers by giving them large sums of money. Obviously, had a quick success, given that unemployment among men aged between 18 and 28 years amounted to 60% of the total workforce of this population segment. Activity fundamentalist elements soon exceeded the boundaries of religion and spiritual beginning to affect the state, the enclave of villages or groups of villages where the presence of central authorities were poorly represented, djamaat leaders are also convinced by significant material gain. Although the population has largely remained true to local Sufi traditions, cities and Karamakhi, and Kadar remained Chabaumakhi recognized for the influence they exercised Wahhabi elements. The particular interpretation of Islam given by the Wahhabi doctrine in these villages was banned music and introduced compulsory wearing of the nighab (full veil) for women. This last point is surprising, since usually it was not part of the tradition of the area until then.

Social prohibitions are added to military issues in the localities mentioned are digging trenches,
setting up checkpoints and pseudo-boundary points, both to delineate the other religious communities and to declare their independence from Dagestan that was perceived as a secular state. Therefore, in the year 1998, local police had lost complete control of these areas where Wahhabis imposed its own initiative. Wahhabi fundamentalists, Dagestan or Arabs, most trained in Khattab’s camps in Chechnya, launched a series of attacks on state institutions, stormed the police station and kidnapped officials. Eyewitness process of taking control of the fundamentalist imam of Karamakhi, Magomed Makhdiyev, testified that if at first the approach was non-threatening Wahhabi missionaries, based on material rewards for those willing to convert, over time, while increasing the number of followers, the formula approach had become “join us or we will cut off heads.” Considered in the same series of violent actions taken by Wahhabi, the assassination of Dagestan Mufti Hajji Said Mukhammad Abubakarov had further deepened the split between the two current Islamic countries: Sufi and Wahhabism.

The threat to regional security was becoming increasingly visible, and Moscow, through the voice of Russian Interior Minister, believed that “the biggest threat comes from Islamic fundamentalism, especially Wahhabism,” which he considered a form of extremism, similar to terrorism.

Wahhabi leaders have established important Dagestan to Chechnya, where radical leaders like Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev Samil Basayev and welcomed them with open arms. Thus, in April 1998, Congress formed the people of Chechnya and Dagestan, whose main objective was to create a unified theocratic state. While holding the office of prime minister in the government Maskhadov, Shamil Basayev was elected president of the People’s Congress. Hundreds of Wahhabi fighters who were joined Chechens and Arabs have crossed the border into Dagestan and participated in attacks on police and Russian patrols in the neighboring country. Responsibility for these actions was undertaken by the “Central Front for the release of the Caucasus and Dagestan” group known for promoting the call for jihad in Dagestan.

The Wahhabi ideology increased spreading from Chechnya and Dagestan in Wahhabism leading to its recognition as a major threat to the federation, meaning that the Russian authorities cannot continue to allow this movement spread on a territory where they lived about 15 million Muslims. Despite Khattab’s deportation order issued by President Makhadov it receives from Congress to the people of Chechnya and Dagestan the command of 700 Arab and Chechen fighters. It was created this way a parallel military force called “peacekeeping brigade” and designated to act in case of an attack on Russian troops in Dagestan Wahhabi villages. Fearing the consequences of an attack in Dagestan Maskhadov Basayev removes the deputy commander of the Chechen army, but fails to stop on Basayev and Khattab.

In August 1999 the so-called “peacekeeping brigade” crossed the border into Dagestan with the aim of defending the Wahhabi villages that were surrounded by federal troops intervened to restore the Russian Federation’s sovereignty in the area.

Stated purpose of the actions initiated by the fundamentalists were also adds that Shamil Basayev and Khattab, displaced labor leaders in neighboring Chechnya, had received the fatwa from Saudi and Pakistani clerics, which had legitimized the act of wearing a holy war. The important aspect is that data fatwa fundamentalist Chechen leaders in Dagestan it legitimate for the removal of the Zionist elements, which contrasted sharply with the initial objective set in 1994 when the Chechens started their struggle for independence.

On the first day of conflict the Wahhabi forces had taken control of 36 villages and announced the creation of Dagestan Islamic State, independent state. As a governmental body was established Islamic Dagestan Shura that established šarī'ā as supreme law in the occupied territory, appointed Shamil Basayev as commander and declared war on Russia. Russia’s response was prompt, federal forces are joining thousands of police officers and residents who did not like Dagestan wahhabi presence. Following attacks by federal forces and pro-Russian Dagestan, Wahhabi enclaves were issued in less than a month, many fundamentalist fighters in Chechnya is returning. It should be noted that most of Dagestan residents, mostly farmers and followers of the ancient Sufi tradition, were placed on the side of Moscow, declaring his desire for democracy and maintaining a peaceful coexistence with Russia.

With popular support, Prime Minister at that time Vladimir Putin ordered the continuation
of attacks in Chechnya, to annihilate the fundamentalist elements. There have been bombed in their resistance points Vedono, Urus-Martana and Gudermes. Therefore, the Russian-Chechen armed conflict resumed in September 1999 (end NATO campaign against Yugoslavia). Although they have installed a local administration (in 2000), Russian troops were still faced with Chechen guerrillas (fighting the Taliban in their turn, members of Al-Qaeda, Saudi fundamentalists commander Khattab, Iranians, Palestinians, etc.). At the end of 2001, Chechen separatist leaders (Aslan Maskhadov) have asked Eduard Shevardnadze to mediate an agreement with Moscow. In September 2002, Moscow has threatened with military intervention in Georgia in order to capture Chechen guerrillas. However, U.S. opposed to any military action in the area, although the reality was that many Chechen fighters had taken refuge in Georgia, particularly in the Pankisi Valley.

Terrorist attack resulted in the taking of hostages at a Moscow theater in October 2002, complicated Russo-Chechen relations, and the horizons of a rapid and peaceful settlement of the conflict remained very distant.

In conclusion, in terms of our analysis on religious determinations of the internal security situation in the two republics, with negative influence on the entire regional security, we can delineate some ideas about the causes of its degradation:

• personal ambitions of some Chechen leaders;
• the emergence and spread of extremist Islamic movement of Wahhabism in both Dagestan and Chechnya;
• gain access to Caspian Sea in order to take advantage of the location of oil transportation pipeline on the Dagestan territory;
• Dagestan Wahhabi villages intention to defend against attacks from Russia, on the one hand and the establishing of a unified Islamic state between Chechnya and Dagestan, on the other side;
• The tensions between the Wahhabi and Sufi presence have emphasized not only local problems - skillfully exploited by opportunistic leaders - but also a specific regional situation, namely the fight for supremacy of the various existing types of Islam in the Caucasus, the supremacy of one from the two Islamic confessions would had influenced how political future would had been shaped in the region. A Wahhabi-dominated region would had been equivalent to a fragile region, ideological opposite to democratic values, which would have led to serious problems of security of the Caucasus and neighboring regions of Central Asia and the Middle East.

However, we must note that the emergence of Wahhabi missionaries was not followed by the general spreading at the population level, of this preached radical form of Islam but was rather adopt by some Chechen leaders as it provide them with an instrument for either secessionist goals or to consolidate personal power.

We must not omit to remark that a major role in the spreading process of the Wahhabi fundamentalism - in addition to domestic factors, economic and social policies of the two republics – was that of the brutal military actions conducted by the Russian federal forces. It was possible, this way, for the extremist leaders to add a sacred dimension to the conflict. In support of this idea, noting Dzokhar Dudayev’s statement saying that „Russia has forced us to go the way of Islam.”

These conclusions lead us to the opinion that, in time, the initial causes of the conflict (an ethnic insurgency and organized crime composite) became more complex, adding ideological tendencies of religious nature and loosing the secular dimension. In other words, the triggering nationalist energies gathered in order to obtain the independence in the early 90’s were transformed in religious extremist manifestations.

Similarly, these conclusions may be applied to the general picture of the Caucasus region (both Nord and South Caucasus), considering the fact that the regional security environment is the interactions resultant of various factors; the undeveloped state structures lead to deep socio-economic problems generating social reactions against the bad management of the region’s governments. Political culture of the region was therefore impregnated by the nationalist ideologies, leading to the fragmentation of the population on the ethnic and gradually in time, religious basis, and impairing the civic conception of the respective nations. This way the peaceful cohabitation of the numerous ethnic groups was inhibited and encouraged the territorial autonomy claims on the background of major ethnic group’s domination. Also supported by the week
development of the national identity in the states of the region, the exacerbation of ethnic identity importance added to the local rivalries and the interests of the major international powers in the region determined the increased fragility of the region’s security environment. On these bases, the region had become a source of insecurity in the European Union proximity, complicating the obscure rivalry games involving the energetic resources from Caucasus and Central Asia.

NOTES:
1 http://www.grid.unep.ch/product/publication/CEO-for-Internet/CEO/images
14 Ion Giurcă, op. cit., 2003, p. 182.
16 Ibidem, p. 182.
17 Ibidem, p. 183.
21 Ibidem
23 Ariel Cohen, op.cit., 2005, p. 56
24 The chechen war in the 90s was strongly supported by the tribe from the mountains. See: Carlotta Gall, T. De Waal, Chechnya: A Small Victorious War, Pan, London, 1997, p. 24-36.
26 Ibidem.
37 Paul J. Murphy,op. cit, 2004, p. 45.
40 Dimitri V. Trenin, Alecksei V. Malashenko, Anatol Lieven, Rusia’s Restless Frontier. The Chechenya
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Adapting to the new security threats in the environment through the transition from military extended structures characteristic of the Cold War, to smaller systems and more efficient forces with strategic mobility and with a higher reaction speed is the essence of the ongoing process of transformation, wherein are involved military dimensions of the main political-military organizations in the world.

Key-words: NATO Response Force; missions; EU Battle-groups; political control.

In recent years concern, has been noted both NATO and the EU to be well prepared to face the challenges of current operations or future participation in the stated goal to help in strengthening local, regional or global security. The manner how the both organizations have decided to do this was by creating and developing new military concepts and capabilities: for NATO - NATO Response Force, and for the EU - the EU's Anti-Tactical Group.

For both organizations, the 1990 year marked a turning point: their approach to the changed strategic environment and their awareness regarding new types of conflict has increased. Both strategic and military organizations have learned the lessons from the Balkan wars and from the sources of global crisis: first, an intervention at an advanced stage of the crisis is often more prone to loss and more expensive than early involvement, secondly, beyond lack of political will, the Western states had the ability to deploy large amounts of existing forces quickly and efficiently. Thus, rapid response capability has become a strategic necessity.

Contrary to the principle of using military force as a last resort, the rapid reaction involves early or even preventive deployment. The aim is to avoid further escalation of the conflict by using timely and resolute the military means. Therefore, both organizations aim to achieve two interacting objectives: the readiness to create capacity to meet future security challenges and the support of those forces as necessary means to process their own armed forces. Despite the close partnership between the organizations, there are regular discussions about their roles in the security zone. Many times, the exposures include concerns regarding duplication and non-NATO members' status in EU activities. Another constant concern is improving relations between the EU Battle groups (BG EU) and NATO Response Force (NRF). It is a case of doubling or complementarity? In this case, which is where in the current security environment?!

1. Comparative study between the basic features of European Battle Groups and NATO Response Force

The disappearance of traditional threat against the Alliance has led to a fundamental and appropriate adaptation of NATO. The Alliance has evolved from static defensive concepts of the prior period to a new strategic concept in which the emphasis is over security missions outside NATO's traditional areas and over the importance of developing new capabilities to combat new threats. Moreover, operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan have reinforced the concept that NATO military relevance doesn’t stand in its ability to provide land and air forces to defend the defensive nature of NATO territory, but rather the ability to act quickly to stabilize conflict, to prevent their escalation and to remove their possibility to extend. In this context, NATO countries agreed...
at the Prague Summit in 2002 to establish the NRF as a key element of NATO’s transformation agenda. It includes land, sea, air elements and acts as a multinational force without geographical limits. Generally, modular composition of up to 25,000 troops to the NRF should allow selection of specific mission capabilities of the various elements of this force.

Since late 2006, NATO has always had an NRF unit in standby mode. Original units can be deployed within five days and sustained for 30 days. NRF was activated in 2005 to provide humanitarian aid and to manage disaster’s consequence.

As an equivalent, the EU has identified the relative impasse reached in their rapid reaction force developed under the Headline Goal 2003. In June 2004, the EU Council agreed to establish the elements of the EU BG rapid reaction. These units are intended to enable the EU to react quickly and flexibly in a wide range of crisis scenarios. The main element of the EU BG is a battalion-sized military force with combined arms, combat support elements and elements of logistics support. While the basic units are pre-defined, EU BG can still be adapted to specific mission requirements. Thus, support elements may be attached to the maritime, aviation, logistics, and Special Forces. These forms a package of EU BG force. Depending on the mission, a BG can comprise approximately 1,500-2,200 soldiers. Since January 2007, the EU has two BG structures ready for action at its disposal at any time. EU's ambition is to be able to decide on the deployment within five days. In ten days after the decision to launch an EU BG operation which should be able to begin action on the ground. Every EU BG should be able to stay on mission for at least 30 days. By strengthening measures and exchange of troops, this period may be extended up to 120 days.

One of the main differences between the NRF and the EU BG is the strategic framework in which NATO and the EU can act. NATO was initially established for the military defense of Western Europe. Now, its goal has expanded geographically and defined a clear functional action. Crisis management and stabilization operations outside NATO territory became the main task of the Alliance. However, NATO remains primarily a military organization. No consensus has been reached so far on the development of civilian capabilities.

EU includes in its main global strategic approach, the integration of civilian and military elements. Initially, the EU has focused on civil instruments to promote peace and democracy. The EU has recognized that the ability to maneuver has been shortened to a lack of military dimensions. This shortcoming was addressed in 1999 with the ESDP. Under this framework, the Member States agreed to provide military forces for crisis management operations.

NATO Response Force and EU Battle groups reflect different approaches and levels of ambition of their organizations. BG added an important tool for the EU’s comprehensive set of resources, while the NRF is more appropriate in situations where major conflicts will require the mobilization of military forces on a larger scale. EU BGs are based on the overwhelming proportion of ground forces, while the NRF is a joint force structure, more robust and with greater operational capacity.

The both rapid reaction forces range similar missions - European Battle groups can be employed in a full range of tasks so-called Petersberg tasks. These include assistance in humanitarian aid, evacuation operations, peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations. Moreover, they can be deployed on missions of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and missions of the broader spectrum of security sector reform. In addition to EU BG missions’ portfolio, the range of missions including NRF deployment for collective defense (NATO Article 5) or surgical Non-Article 5 crisis response, for managing the consequences of disasters and for demonstration of force in the context of crisis diplomacy or deterrence.

Both structures can be deployed either as an independent force for independent operations or as an initial entry force facilitating the arrival of other higher powers. EU BGs are especially designed as a transitional capacity for other organizations (especially UN). They should allow the generation of forces to carry out a further operation more than having the first initiative.

While both parties have a series of missions, their sizes considerably varies. NRF will be able to manage tasks in a more comprehensive level of intensity, greater than of the EU BG one. In turn, EU BG is subjected to limited risks owed to the limitation of troops and capabilities. This can be best used for prevention tasks in a limited geographical area. However, BG can have a
strategic impact. It is expected that both forces to be capable of deployment in a very short time. NRF is guided by the principle that its main elements are able to deploy after five days notice - similar to the EU target BG. In terms of capacity support, the NRF should be able to claim for 30 days and alike the BG. Horizon can be extended if both forces are adequately replenished. Furthermore, both forces are based on a rotation system within six months.

Maintaining and developing EU BGs as a viable military concept is endangered by two aspects that can be considered as bottlenecks. It is about political will and structure / size of these tactical battle groups.

There are two important operations carried out in recent years where the EU BGs were not involved in because it wasn’t a political consensus in terms of their deployment, although it is considered that it was a good opportunity for them to be shown their usefulness and efficiency. One of these is the operation launched by the EU to support UN mission in Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) in order to ensure safety in the process of free elections. EU military operation was conducted with full acceptance of the Congolese authorities and in close coordination with MONUC, ending successfully in November 2006. Although this EU-led operation was carried out also under the auspices of ESDP, the EU BGs were not involved in any way. One of the reasons was that Germany, which had the status of the framework-nation at that time, made public its intention to provide a third of EUFOR troops needed and these groups have no longer been used for tactical combat. It was also considered that the operation it isn’t a response to the crisis, but a planned operation, subject to a different regime of force’s use and generation.

Another example is the EU initiative to undertake a peacekeeping operation in eastern Chad and northern Central African Republic. The operation was originally scheduled to begin in mid-December 2007 but was postponed for the first quarter of 2008. The framework-nation role for the operation was declared to be assured by France that also assured half of the approximately 4,300 troops required for the smooth running of the operation. Reasons for delay may not necessarily be considered inconsistent supply of personnel, but both technical and specialized equipment means inconsistency in the process of planning the forces deployment in theater, and the reluctance of nations to provide material resources without a clear guide arrangement and reimbursement for their expenses incurred by it. And this time we used force generated specifically for the operation, without any BGs to be involved in.

It appears that there will be honest for BGs to be engaged in operations such as those for which they were created, although they are considered a political instrument of intervention. No matter these military structures are considered, if they will not be used in near future operations, with engaging in specific missions of peacekeeping and crisis management, it is expected that the interest of Member States to support and to develop the concept to decrease significantly. Also, there is a risk that these military structures to be deployed to participate in operations just for the sake of credibility need but will not be consistent with the needs for which they were created or for which they are prepared.

Since its inception, NRF has not been engaged in military operations with traditional character, but was activated and deployed to achieve the safe conduct of the Olympic Games in Athens in 2004, to support the presidential elections in Afghanistan in 2004, to remove the aftermaths of Hurricane Katrina in the United States in 2005 and of the earthquake in Pakistan in 2005.

2. Political control and military command and control aspects of NRF and the EU Battle group

Both structures of NATO and EU decision-making are politically and militarily similar. In both organizations, the principle of unanimous decisions ensures the sovereignty of Member States. Transactions can be launched only if all members agree. While this may be in itself a reason for delay in the context of rapid response, those countries which need parliamentary approval for deployment are under additional pressure.

During operations management, strategic political control is exercised by an intergovernmental body. In the EU, this is the Political and Security Council (PSC) and in NATO, the North Atlantic Council (NAC). However, even at this stage, national contributions ultimately remain under the control of the Member States. NATO has a unique structure of military command. NRF is under
permanent command of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Operational headquarters are generated from one of NATO JOINT orders. This structure not only provides a pretty good campaign management from initial planning its management but it also allows the introduction of systematic military aspects of political decision making. The commander of a given mission has the ability to influence from the before planning stage and to ensure its consistency.

EU operations may be lead from the operation headquarters commandment provided by the National Command Structure assessed by EU Member States (France CPCO - Center for Planning and Management Operations; PJHQ United Kingdom – Joint Permanent Commandment; EFK Germany - Führungs Einsatz Kommando; IOC Italy - Commando Operativo di Vertic Interforze OHQ and OHQ Greece from Larissa). Alternatively, the EU can have access to NATO’s SHAPE capabilities through Berlin Plus arrangements. In certain circumstances, the Ops Center in the EU military staff can also be activated. However, options such as a commander of the operation can be chosen only after the EU formally decision to launch an operation. Initial planning can be done by the EU Military Staff.

3. Structural transformations and action required by the Rapid Reaction Force for the both NATO and EU organizations’ security

EU BG and NRF forces have a significant contribution in transforming and modernizing their forces. As part of the transformation leading national armies, the NRF has introduced changes in particular countries larger forces. Many small states have no major capabilities (aircraft carriers, strategic air transport and shipping, media satellite modern means of individual protection, adequate logistical support, etc.) in the quantities needed to complete the necessary registry. Therefore, participation in the NRF has become quite unattractive. Because of the flexibility in terms of contributions and their smaller size, EU BG became very attractive for small and medium enterprises.

European Battle group concept offers the possibility of the explicit, niche forces. Thus, the concept allows states to fly their flag with a limited effort. In addition, participation in EU BG allows them to keep pace with the transformation of Western forces. Therefore, the effects of transformation are applied mainly to Central and Eastern European countries, but also for non-NATO members such as Ireland, Finland and Austria. Sweden is a special case. Here, BG was used to initiate a quite comprehensive transformation of national defense posture, territorial, to a flexible crisis response.

Generally, the transformation involves not so much the modernization of weapons systems, but rather the introduction and application of concepts and standards, and cooperation within multinational forces. It interacts with a successive conversion of structures into smaller units and more mobile forces. Their capacities are based less on weapons platforms, but increasingly on their integration into a network structure.

NATO Response Force and EU Battle group strengthened defense cooperation between troop-contributors. Adaptations to the challenges of rapid response were needed not only in terms of technical standards, but also in political decision-making concerns. Also at the conceptual level, these changes have led to a rethinking of the role and conception of territorial defense scenarios for the deployment of multinational expeditionary operations. However, still, there is an East-West difference in Europe. While Western European states have changed their attention to crisis management operations within the EU, NATO or UN, territorial defense concept remains central to the security of the states of Central and Eastern Europe.

As most nations of the EU BG framework are also NATO members, they can use their special position to serve with NATO standards and concepts, thus ensuring a mutually reinforcing initiative. This is also necessary because the EU BG is certified under the same criteria as the NRF.

4. Compatibility between EU Rapid Reaction Force (FRRE) and NATO Response Force (NRF)

Generally, the European countries allocate the same set of forces and capabilities for the both military rapid reaction forces and this may create some problems of compatibility between the NRF and BG and the possibility of duplication and waste.
of scarce resources for defense. The allocation of the same forces can lead to a dual subordination, which is intended to be bypassed by NATO, while the EU considers it an effective way to flexibility. Although the phrase „separable but not separate” translates into the same package that national forces and capabilities will form the basis both for NATO operations and for EU operations. Thus, there are tools that promote this kind of action, the first being the Berlin Plus agreement stating that NATO’s capabilities can be made available to the EU if NATO decides not to participate in an operation. But the danger remains that a certain set of forces or capabilities to be applied simultaneously by several organizations, or be required to state whether it has to offer. In this regard, while the nation remains sovereign in its decisions on EU contributions to the NRF and BG, the two organizations have played an important role in identifying and proposing solutions to improve coordination and harmonization of their rapid reaction forces. It is therefore stressed the need to strengthen cooperation and intensify the exchange of information between the EU and NATO in terms of both operational rapid reaction force, including the technical procedures by which Member States shall provide the NRF and the EU BGs forces and military capabilities.

**Generation of forces for RRF.** NATO Response Force and EU Battle group formations is not permanent (?). They form a cycle of waiting for six months (the waiting phase) with national contributions. Forces are generated by different procedures. For NRF, the Supreme Allied Command defines the necessary capabilities and facilities that match those capabilities. This top-down approach turns into a very detailed record, which must be supplemented by national contributions. Regarding the EU BG necessary force characteristics are defined by a catalog of capabilities comparable to that of NATO. However, unlike the procedure for NATO forces they are generated through a bottom-up process. An EU BG is based on the initiative of the Member States. They agree with each other, their contributions and then provide EU BG package. It is therefore up to Member States how they will generate the necessary capacities defined by catalog. The main responsibility vis-à-vis the EU is to the nation framework. It must ensure the overall effectiveness of the BG package, command and control arrangements and capacity development.

NRF training-oriented approach should provide a fairly consistent supply of capabilities and forces for each NRF structure. However, the quality and quantity require national contributions, which are difficult to fulfill.

The Battle group, the European much smaller approach on the power of action, constitutes a very heterogeneous body, thus, were expressed doubts about their effectiveness. The context of the EU approach is that countries contributing with troops have a desire to remain flexible in order to use force, taking into account commitments, for example, NATO or national tasks.

Finally, both parties face the same problems: their forces are increasingly engaged in ongoing operations, in Afghanistan, the Balkans and other areas, the Member States are reluctant to provide capacity for higher value tasks crisis management potential. This is the background to the recent decision to reform the NRF size. The first challenges related to the numbers of soldiers have arisen when the United States decided to reduce its contribution of troops to the NRF as a result of insufficient troop contributions of the European partners. The both parties have invoked as a reason their participation to the long-term operations such those from Afghanistan, Kosovo and Iraq. As, in real terms, only in Afghanistan are deployed about 40,000 NATO troops and 18,000 U.S. military has become a problem for states and nations contributing with troops to the theaters of operations to meet its commitments to the NRF.

Recent plans may lead to the generation of NRF EU-BG style: main units plus ad-hoc facilitators². In addition, the NRF concept envisages a gradual intervention capacity. The both are expected to be valid only as long as NATO is involved in long-term operations. The challenge offered by the availability of effective methods of troops for the NRF and the development of the concept addresses the understanding and mutual solidarity of NATO member states. It outlines more seriously the possibility that the desired robust force with high education and intervention to achieve a package of 5,000 to 10,000 troops to act as a nucleus around which to structure a future force, according to the needs.

Is there competition between EU Tactical groups (EU BG) and NATO Response Force
For determining relations between the both rapid reaction forces are arguments about the general division of responsibilities between the EU and NATO in international security and evidence aimed at complementing, developing Member States' military capabilities, including contributions to the Alliance and Union (avoiding duplication and wastage of scarce resources allocated to defense).

In discussions with reference to the Battle groups concept is always the question if there is competition between NATO and the EU (ESDP). The greater role of Europe in the world and the development of Security and Defence Policy since the Council of Europe debate in Cologne, in 1999, provoked questions and concerns across the Atlantic but also in some parts of Europe. Madeleine Albright, U.S. Secretary of State at the time, pointed the “i” in regard to these questions by launching the three „D” now became famous. According to them, the ESDP should consider the following assumptions: no Decoupling: no separation of the European security system from NATO, no Duplication: no doubling of EU and NATO capabilities, no Discrimination: none discrimination against non-members of EU and NATO.

Therefore, ESDP must not diminish NATO's role, should not duplicate NATO's capabilities and must not discriminate against non-EU NATO members. ESDP should allow to EU the development of autonomous military operations in response to international crises. This is true for the whole range of Petersberg tasks, extending from humanitarian and relief assistance to military intervention to settle the crisis outbreaks, including the use of peacekeeping measures. The EU will undertake autonomous operations only in cases where NATO as a whole is not involved. This limiting expression is crucial since from the start avoids conflicts and mutual suppression effect between NATO and the EU in international crisis management.

A doubling of the capacity of the EU and NATO is not, nor financially or politically possible, nor is it intended by Member States of EU and NATO. In this case, it applies the principle of a single set of forces, after which the members belong to the same time EU and NATO forces can use those in both organizations. Moreover, the long termed agreements fixed into Berlin Plus forum facilitate synergetic intervention of limited military resources, without being duplicated. Most member countries of NATO and the EU understand the process of developing EU military capabilities as complementary and not competitive to NATO structures and capabilities.

Discrimination against non-EU but NATO members is excluded under the ESDP. At the Summit of Nice and into the Berlin Plus package frameworks were established comprehensive procedures for consultation and cooperation of these states in the ESDP.

Important issues of relations’ development between NATO and the ESDP, which the Secretary of State, Madeleine Allbright, surprised very relevant the three „D” were achieved without restrictions. Former Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson then spoke about three „I” in the relationship between NATO and the ESDP:

- Indivisibility: the indivisibility of transatlantic relations;
- Improvement: improving European capabilities for ESDP and NATO;
- Inclusiveness: the ESDP include all NATO members.

Such data are prerequisites for a genuine synergy between NATO and ESDP. Strengthening ESDP also means a strengthening of NATO. What is true for the general relationship between NATO and ESDP goes for the relationship between the EU BGs and NRF. Both are required to provide a military capability for intervention in crisis management operations and contribute to establishing credible security and defense. Also is true principle that while executing a military operation, will predominate NATO’s will, and then Battle groups will come into action only when NATO is not involved, in whole, in the operation. At one hand, both rapid intervention forces are characterized by their immediate availability of rapid deployment and the capacity to deploy well trained and equipped forces. On the other hand, the two forces lack important capabilities in areas such as strategic transport, research, logistics and transmissions.

It’s Rob’s vision of Wijk, Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies Director of the Netherlands, that transatlantic security cooperation should be based on “a clear division of labor whereby the U.S. return to the main responsibility for military combat operations, while Europe has
to cover in first, post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction”. Furthermore, this partnership would involve the recognition for each party to develop specific skills to manage new types of risks and security threats by achieving a balance between soft and hard means of intervention.

For the success of this strategy is necessary that the both complementary parties may not be limited to investing in its own direction, but to also develop complementary approaches - Europe to build the actual capabilities of asymmetrical warfare to reduce the gap separating it from the U.S., and Americans to recognize the importance of post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization, by making their own capabilities in this area.

Finally also NRF and EU BG goals differ from one another: NRF will be able to intervene anywhere in the world, while the EU BGs are initially planned for a radius of 6,000 km intervention. They should be used with a mandate of the United Nations in particular (but not exclusively) in the vicinity of Europe, especially in Africa. During the discussion of whether there is competition between the two forms of means was outlined very clearly the limited autonomy of action of Europeans in the upper range of missions. This raises the question whether the European Security and Defence Policy should / must concentrate for a long time in an international sharing of work and responsibility, on the assumption of missions beneath the beach of high-intensity conflict or if preferred a geographical division of tasks between NATO and the EU.

After each conflict, the U.S. is interested to bring combat troops as quickly as possible, at their core task. This means they are not interested to commit their combat troops, in duly and long times to rebuild civil society structures, infrastructure reconstruction, de-mining operations, military police services, etc. Many politicians and military translate this attitude and the relationship between the NRF and the EU BGs, defining Petersberg tasks as some peacekeeping and perceiving the role of the two bands as a complementary intervention.

The Petersberg tasks as the NRF missions include peace enforcement tasks. Long term orientation of combat forces for peacekeeping missions lead to reduced capacity for action within their core functions. However, the combat forces ready for war can be much easier trained for peacekeeping operations. It is obvious that the reverse can not be due to the requirements much higher. Because of this equipment and training intervention forces must follow a scenario very well done.

Security Strategy of the European Union (Solana Strategy) highlights the need to develop policies based on credible military capability to protect European interests in the world and to counter new security risks, primarily international terrorism. Headline Goal 2010 and the initiative on the development of BG are directly responsible for this new orientation. In these circumstances, before launching a military crisis management operations, the Europeans have four options to consider: a NATO operation, an EU mission with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities within the framework of the Berlin Plus arrangements, a EU mission using one of the five national headquarters made available to the EU for this purpose by France, Britain, Germany, Italy and Greece, or through the Operational Centre made operational within the EU Military Staff earlier this year.

The catalysts function designed for NRF combat forces transformation could be deployed in full force only when all types of subjects undergo long-term cycle NRF. Therefore, it makes no sense to limit European units to peacekeeping missions. By eliminating many unneeded capacity in peacekeeping missions is sharply reduced military autonomy units, which contradicts the EU’s decision to provide troops to intervene for their own tasks arising from the Petersberg Agreement. In this way Europe's capacity to act would always remain dependent on U.S. military power and their availability for commitment. At the same time, European military incapacity to contribute substantially to lead a coalition war with the U.S., would force the U.S. to act unilaterally.

Therefore, in many scenarios, from the theoretical point of view, it is conceivable EU troops’ intervention, respectively Battle groups, as a force for employment later (follow-on force) at the NRF, which should be properly used as the intervention doctrine states “first force in, first force out” (the first force that kicks in, first out). In this regard, the NRF should be structured to establish standards as more experienced band interference. In this way, the Europeans will try to be autonomous and capable to interfere with a single set of forces, in a longer time - according to the original intent of the ESDP - if NATO won’t like to act as a whole.
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Complementarity of actions. The both concepts of NATO Response Force and EU Battle group can be considered complementary rather than duplicative. Initially there were views that the different missions of the two forces led to differences in the level of military efficiency and effectiveness. Later, after BG concept crystallization, it was concluded that both forces require the same high level of military effectiveness and combat capability.

As rapid response force packages (ready-to-fight), they are appealing to the same general package of capabilities, particularly strategic transport and logistic support. In this regard, NATO can assist EU BG by providing facilitators rather operational and strategic, than by providing forces. At the same time, European states capacity allocated for EU BG initiative can be considered to cover the deficient elements of the force generation process for NRF or to strengthen already carried out NRF components. The Alliance can also appeal to niche capabilities available from EU BG and the EU coordination cell centers and air (Eindhoven) and sea (Athens) transport.

The recent years’ reality has shown that given to the current global security environment, the traditional way to intervene with military force - from peacekeeping operations to the unilateral use of military force - is not enough anymore. Military forces have proven they lack the necessary capacity to perform very good job in removing natural disasters, humanitarian assistance and post-conflict reconstruction operations. It is increasingly clear that military and civilian organizations have become dependent on each other in finding viable solutions to solve the above types of operations. This reality should be, still, transposed in practice by a wise manner and avoiding duplication.

It is estimated that currently the European Union holds, by the EU BGs, needed capabilities to respond properly to civilian crisis management. This capability is below the European member countries can offer, but now is a solution in terms of operation for a rapid response to potential civil crisis. The basis for this kind of action is the civil dimension of ESDP, which was discussed and agreed, in 2000, to the European Council held in Feira, Portugal. The civil dimension may be used in EU-led operations or as part of a larger UN mission and can cover five areas: police, law enforcement, civil administration, civil protection and monitoring. These areas of interest can be enlarged by multifunctional organizing of civil crisis management capabilities in order to set up expert groups on different required areas of intervention. The European Council confirmed that civilian response teams and police elements of the civilian crisis management capabilities can be quickly deployed when the situation requires it.

The optimistic scenario of relations’ development between the both rapid reaction force is to maintain and develop complementarities, which would lead to the possibility of joint intervention in crisis management operations and the potentiation of this intervention outcome by using NRF in situations of high conflict spectrum and EU BG involvement in peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction missions (where the EU expertise and capabilities are higher than those of the Alliance). Can be also envisaged situations wherein EU BGs version to be more appropriate than the NRF to intervene, given the very focus of the EU on post-conflict reconstruction situations. All these require further investigation and identification of opportunities for joint use of the NRF and the EU BG in the same operational theater, to achieve a common goal. The main element for complementarities’ support comes from the political decision area to intervene in some crisis. In this respect, it is assumed that interventions into missions planned by the EU Security Strategy to involve BG into a series of peacekeeping, humanitarian and crisis management operations, on which the Union decides to intervene in the situations when NATO, as a whole, decides not to participate.

Conclusions

From a military perspective, the apparent interactions between the NRF and BG do not necessarily lead to contradictions. NATO and the EU have tried to create these configurations which are mutually reinforcing, as we have exemplified the problem of common standards for assessment and certification.

Both parties depend on contributions from Member States. In fact, the NRF and the EU BG are constituted by almost the same forces that bear different hats every six months. This also reflects the potential divergences between the organizations: the competition for scarce
capacities (including Special Forces and strategic assets such as transport and communications’ infrastructure which are available only in limited quantities). With only one set of forces at the EU level, there exist double competitions which can be mitigated only by a good coordination. Therefore, NATO and the EU are striving to provide rotation of national capacities for EU BG and NRF allocation. However, the nature of interaction is ultimately decided on political level and its usefulness into real operations. While, because of historical and political sensitivities, it is difficult to imagine NATO operations in certain regions, the scope for EU BG is much broader. Their use is still limited in terms of intensity.

Important instruments of cooperation such as EU-NATO joint battle group or EU-NATO exercises MILEX-type are crucial in order to reinforce links and increase mutual trust. At operational level, the EU and NATO have the opportunity to conduct exercises in the CME / CMX (crisis management exercise) context. They are conducted at an interval of about three years to test the unused procedures. Theoretically, these exercises could be used to test the operational links between the EU BG and NRF components. The first EU/NATO crisis management exercise of political-military strategic level was held in November 2003.

In time, parties should consider whether and how EU BG and NRF can help each other in quick response situations. To synchronize the both organizations, is needed close cooperation between the OHQ (including SHAPE), FHQ, EU Military Staff, NATO International Staff, PSC and the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Then, must be accomplished the following issues: early coordination, including the schedule of deployment and the impact over strategic (air) transport, the changing rules alignment of forces from theater, the communications systems’ interoperability and timely exchange of information between the forces, the rotational use of infrastructure (ex. operational headquarters). It is also necessary to increase the pace of PSC and the NAC consultations to discuss security and political relations strengthening issues.

Despite the slogan often heard that NATO and EU troops are separable but not separate, economic and operational solution for the future would be wise to address the full spectrum of crisis management, with two separate sets of capabilities: one military and one civilian with a clear division of tasks and an effective relationship between the institutions responsible for each. The EU is traditionally specialized in resolving crises in the civil sector and NATO in the military one, with existing capacity.

NOTES:

3 George TIBIL, Relations between NATO’s rapid reaction force (NRF) and the European Union (BG) at the maturity of the two initiatives, the International Scientific Session: Dynamics of European security environment, NDU Publishing House, Bucharest, 2007.
The objective of the contribution is to present, in a simple way, the impact of the project of the US Antiballistic Missile Defence on the political situation in the Czech Republic, public opinion, and the relations between the Czech Republic and the U.S. The presentation consists of several parts and it is focused mainly on explaining the reasons for U.S. engagement in the Czech Republic, it shortly describes the basic facts concerning antiballistic missile shield in Central Europe, highlight the timeline of US - Czech negotiations and its most interesting or crucial points. The attention is paid to the cancellation of the project, its reasons and outcomes and an important part of the contribution is dedicated to the presentation of public attitudes and political consequences in the Czech Republic and abroad. The contribution is finished by a short summary of the project impacts.

Key-words: antiballistic missile defence; U.S.; NATO; the Czech Republic; public opinion; political parties.

Roots of the Current U.S. Antiballistic Missile System

During the Cold War, in 1983, Ronald Reagan announced the plan for developing the so-called SDI (“Strategic Defence Initiative”). Its foundation should have consisted in lasers located in orbit and the objective of the SDI was to defend the territory of the U.S.A. against a nuclear attack from the USSR. After the USSR fell apart, the interest in the project decreased. But, in 1993, Bill Clinton comes with the improved project (NMD – “National Missile Defence”) and his successor, George W. Bush, acknowledged the plan. In summer 2006, the system was activated and, according to the original plans, it should be fully operational in 2012. The system was focusing on the threat of an attack by a ballistic missile delivering weapons of mass destruction, either from international terrorist groups, or from rogue states. In the 90's, Iran started an ambitious program of developing missile carriers and the research in the field of nuclear technologies, which raised concerns in the U.S. as well as other countries. Iran's hostile attitude towards the U.S. and Israel and some statements made by the country's leadership have led to concerns that Iran attempts to gain nuclear weapons that would endanger the U.S.A. and its allies. In response and in order to secure protection against such threat, the building of the anti-missile system was speeded up.

The Ballistic Missile Defence (BDM) system, which would be effective against the threat from Iran, presumed the location of the so-called midcourse defense components (radar and interceptor silo) in a specific geographical area. The Brdy military area, located just a few tens of kilometers southwest of Prague, was identified as a suitable place for building the radar station. Therefore, the Czech Republic (together with Poland, which was identified as a suitable location for the interceptors) began to come into the forefront of an American interest.

Timeline of Radar Events

The first informal contacts between the American and Czech sides probing the possibility of placing a BMD component in the Czech Republic took place at the turn of 2000 and 2001. In June 2006, U.S. experts identified suitable locations and, on 20th January 2007, Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek officially announced that the U.S. wanted to build a radar base in the Czech Repub-
lic, the interceptors being situated in Poland. Five days later, the U.S.A. made a request to locate the radar in the Brdy region. On 28th March 2007, the Czech Republic officially launched negotiations on the radar station. This step, however, met with very fierce opposition of the Czech public and opposition parties in the Parliament, which was accompanied by the extensive media interest, loud activities of civic associations and a number of protest actions. Political negotiations proceeded, however, regardless of public opinion and parliamentary opposition to attempt their cancellation, and, in September 2008, it got to the stage of signing Czech-American Declaration on strategic cooperation and of signing the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The fragile government coalition at the time, however, did not find enough parliamentary support for the ratification of these key documents. In March 2009, the government withdrew the documents from the Parliament agenda. A week later, the weak government did not survive a confidence vote in the Parliament and resigned. At the same time, shortly thereafter, on 5th March 2009, president Obama, during his visit to Prague, announced the intention to review the BMD project, provided Iran would stop its nuclear military program. In the Czech Republic, a caretaker government led by Jan Fischer was appointed; it did not continue with further ratification of the already signed agreements, and waited for further development, which culminated in September 2009, when the United States officially abandoned the original project envisaging the radar base in the Czech Republic (CR).

The development of the situation is illustrated by the following timeline:

- **March 28, 2007** – CR officially started negotiations about the radar station.
- **April 28, 2008** – Greenpeace members occupied the location of the planned radar station in the Brdy; the spot was evacuated by soldiers on the June 9.
- **May 7, 2008** – The Parliament opposition did not succeed with its demand for terminating the government's negotiation about the radar in the CR.
- **July 8, 2008** – Karel Schwarzenberg and Condoleezza Rice signed the treaty of radar in Prague.
- **September 19, 2008** – Minister of Defence Vlasta Parkanová with Robert Gates signed the Declaration on Strategic Cooperation, along with the SOFA treaty.
- **March 17, 2009** – The government withdrew the radar treaties from the Parliament; it lacked the necessary majority for their ratification. A week later, the government fell.
- **April 5, 2009** – President Obama said in Prague that if Iran stopped its nuclear military program, it would not be necessary to build the anti-missile shield.
- **May 8, 2009** – The government led by Mirek Topolánek was replaced by a caretaker government with Prime Minister Jan Fischer.
- **May 20, 2009** – The new foreign minister Jan Kohout announced that the government would not send the radar related treaties to the Parliament.
- **September 17, 2009** – U.S.A. abandoned the idea of building a part of the anti-missile system in the CR and Poland. The U.S. considers installing the system on Aegis ships (and bases in Romania, Turkey).

**Possible Reasons for the Change**

Why did the United States finally withdraw from the original project, which had been so strongly advocated by the administration of George W. Bush? The reason is, of course, not only the changing the administration, but also taking into account some new factors. The project met with only lukewarm support both at home and abroad and caused many controversies in relations with the U.S. partners. Retreat from the original concept of a missile defense system can also be seen as an informal concession to Moscow in order to improve relations. Undoubtedly, there were also such factors as reviewing the Iranian nuclear threat, the demanding financial requirements at time of impending recession, and the Alliance’s decision to build its own missile defense system.

**Czech Public Opinion and the Radar Project**

In the Czech Republic, the radar project was strongly opposed by the opposition leftist parties (social democrats, communists) and a number of civic initiatives came to being, mobilizing the public opinion against the building of the radar station. Building the radar in the Czech Republic has become a strongly perceived and sensitive
political issue. The government was unable to adequately and clearly explain the reasons for building a radar station to citizens and respond to the arguments of those political and public initiatives which mobilized the public opinion. In the public debate, particularly the following arguments against the radar were prominent:

- The American radar is not necessary or its purposes are different, such as monitoring missile tests in Russia. The campaign led by the government and the American party did not persuade the public of the threat from Iran.
- The radar represents a security risk. It would become the first target in the case of attack.
- The presence of American soldiers (radar service) is too much sensitive and unacceptable. 15 years ago, the same area was the location of Soviet occupational army.
- The American presence expresses expansive and imperialist policy of the U.S.A., represented by the largely unpopular G. W. Bush.
- The radar represents a health risk for citizens and can interfere with air traffic, telecommunication etc.
- Rejecting the radar at a local level is a means to negotiating financial support for regional development (transport, infrastructure, employment etc.).
- Ideological reasons (The traditionally anti-American communist party has a strong position in the Brdy region that should host the radar station).

Figure no. 1 Chart of Radar Support/Rejection

Figure no. 2 Agreement/disagreement with the radar based on political preferences

Note: Blue represents government parties, red represents opposition parties.
Despite a government-led explanatory campaign, the public opposition to the location of the radar station remained very strong and stable, as documented by the radar support/rejection chart (Figure no. 1).

The topic of radar was also reflected in the level of support for political parties. The public was sensitive to the opinion of political groups, while political parties, on the contrary, sought to reflect the prevailing public opposition and mobilized the public to gain more political support. The only exception was the Civic Democratic Party, the main part of the government coalition, which was perceived as a major supporter of the radar in the Czech Republic, as well as its voters being the only ones among whom the support for the project prevailed. The agreement/disagreement with the placement of the radar according to voting preferences is illustrated by the graphic (Figure no. 2).

Czech public, therefore, welcomed the U.S. decision to revise the original plan of BMD, which had in fact abandoned the plan to build the radar in the Czech Republic:

Q: American president Barack Obama announced that the United States had abandoned the plan for building an anti-missile defense system radar station in the Czech Republic. Are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>III/03</th>
<th>V/04</th>
<th>II/05</th>
<th>IX/06</th>
<th>X/09</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US struggling for stability and peaceful arrangement of the world.</td>
<td>44/49</td>
<td>47/44</td>
<td>47/44</td>
<td>47/43</td>
<td>56/35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US behavior does not respect the opinion of international community.</td>
<td>73/21</td>
<td>64/26</td>
<td>64/24</td>
<td>64/24</td>
<td>51/38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. in its foreign policy defends freedom, democracy and human rights.</td>
<td>48/42</td>
<td>51/38</td>
<td>48/40</td>
<td>51/38</td>
<td>57/34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. in its foreign policy favors its own power and economic interests.</td>
<td>82/13</td>
<td>76/15</td>
<td>76/14</td>
<td>78/14</td>
<td>72/20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. has a right to intervene against non-democratic regimes, even if it means use of military force.</td>
<td>20/71</td>
<td>22/64</td>
<td>18/70</td>
<td>22/66</td>
<td>22/66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current U.S. foreign policy is a threat for contemporary world.</td>
<td>57/31</td>
<td>42/41</td>
<td>43/40</td>
<td>44/39</td>
<td>30/55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
you satisfied or unsatisfied with the decision? (Figure no. 3)

Summary of the Project Impact

The project of the radar in the Czech Republic and its cancellation had significantly affected the Czech internal political scene. Governmental support for the unpopular and publicly refused project undermined its weak support in the Parliament, promoting the radar by the government parties (especially civic democrats - ODS) led to loss in electoral preferences and together with other factors, such as economic situation, it led to the fall of the government in April 2009. It was followed by a period of a caretaker government, internal political turmoil and a weakening of the international image of the Czech Republic. From the viewpoint of the Czech-American relations, the abolition of the project, or its enforcement despite the opposition of the public and majority of the political spectra, respectively, had several consequences:

• There is no strictly pro-American partner on Czech internal political scene. The experience of political support for the American project will have a negative impact on prospective other political requests made by the U.S.A. (such as increasing the number of soldiers abroad etc.).
• The interest of the U.S.A. in the Czech Republic has decreased. President Obama’s visit in Prague in April 2010 was the last political event of higher importance in mutual relationships.
• The loss of American interest in the Czech Republic is also evidenced by the fact that no American ambassador to the Czech Republic has been appointed for more than two years.
• There was a decline in prestige of the U.S.A. in the Czech public and the U.S. foreign policy is now viewed much more critically than at the beginning of the decade.

Note at the End

Currently, the Czech Republic is working on its ways of involvement in the planned NATO missile defense, which should be built on the alliance base in 2020 and will be aimed against the threat of short and medium range missiles. Unlike previously expected U.S. only project (not a NATO one), this considers building only a so-called early-warning center. According to sources from the Czech MFA, this should have the form of two offices with computer and other technical equipment, which would gather data on enemy missiles. Operators, who should be Czech soldiers, would analyze missile targets, and possibly the geographical area affected by the debris after downing the missile by an allied defense missile.

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The Iraq and Afghanistan experience have proven the post-war phases, not the war itself, involves the biggest costs, as materials and human lives. The Insurgency/Counterinsurgency is, by definition, long-term conflicts affecting directly and gravely the lives of many people in these countries, the human casualties being perhaps the biggest challenge for the international communities’ legitimacy and authority to act in the future conflicts.

Key-words: insurgency; counterinsurgency; human security; war; strategy; Afghanistan.

1. Insurgency – a challenge to human security

Today, the world faces a new challenge, the insurgency, which utilizes asymmetrical tactics to confront the overwhelming conventional power of developed countries, especially that of the USA. However, military operations have been pretty much the same since the beginning of the wars. Only the forces, means and actions within these operations have changed. These changes are caused, on the one hand, by the almost continuous revolution of battle techniques and hence, of the strategic concepts of warfare as means of politics and, on the other hand, by the metamorphosis of political interests and hence of warfare political motivation.

Military operations specific to warfare are big action systems in theatres, that is in combat, which mean violent confrontation, army against army, their purpose being derived from Clausewitzian warfare, meaning destroying the enemy or forcing it to surrender.

The military operations in recent conflicts and wars (the wars in Western Balkans, Angola, Somalia, Afghanistan, the one between Iran and Iraq, between Israel and a part of the Arab countries etc., even though they had different forms, from offensive or defensive great operations to guerilla-like actions (the actions of the Liberation Army in Kosovo in 1998), from special operations to psychological operations, didn’t invalidate the operation pattern created by the First and Second World Wars.

The strategy books in the United States, France, Russia and also the numerous lessons learnt haven’t invalidated the concept of operations consolidated throughout history, but they have only stressed the new tendencies. The notions of disproportionate warfare, low, medium and great intensity warfare, insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare impose a certain reconfiguration of military operations and, by endowing them with a very clear civil component, they became civil-military operations.

Insurgency, by its effects on the population, gravely affects its human security. In turn, counterinsurgency can have unwanted consequences on the inhabitants of the country affected by the armed conflict. From this perspective, we can say that both insurgency and counterinsurgency are serious challenges to human security of individuals and human communities.

2. The evolution of insurgency

There have been many forms of insurgency throughout history, from the battle for independence against colonial powers to the rebellion of the groups ethnically and religiously discriminated against their rivals and the resistance against foreign invaders.

The insurgencies and counterinsurgencies have been a common form of warfare, particularly at the
beginning of the 20th century. Before World War I, the insurgencies had a conservative character and were generally aimed on defending the country, traditional monarchies or religious traditions. For instance, in the 19th century in Spain, the rebellion against Napoleon undermined France’s power and attracted the attention of military theorists such as Clausewitz. The disturbances during World War I and afterwards, caused numerous internal wars. Trotsky and Lenin took over the power in Russia and defended the new regime against the revolutionaries afterwards. Taking over the power by the Bolsheviks in Russia, demonstrated a conspiratorial approach in overturning the government and spreading the communist move which supported other “wars of national liberation”.

The disturbances during World War II launched the modern age of insurgencies and internal wars. A lot of resistance moves against Germany and Japan generated a series of insurgencies which continued after the defeat of the Axis powers. Thus, while the nationalism was developing, the imperial powers were declining. Together with the supranational philosophies of communism, nationalism became an important motivational factor for people to form governments responding better to their needs. The ongoing development of effective technologies dramatically increased the fire power of insurgent groups. Also, the increased media mobility permitted to broadcast more easily images of the events both to local population and to public throughout the world.

Although pure insurgencies are civil wars, the situation becomes less clear when foreign powers intervene. Often, such interventions materialized in material support or revolutionaries (such as the Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara in Bolivia) which organized and disciplined what otherwise could have been easily destroyed by the government. The intervention of great powers became a common ground, in the hope for local or regional advantages, so that the insurgency could play the role of indirect confrontation between them. In the 20th century, the insurgent conflicts fully marked the third world countries and were the result of political and economic inequities combined with the perception of minimum opportunity for economic and political reforms.

Typical for the developing nations of the third world is that they manifest an acute discrepancy between the deep poverty of most of the people and the fabulous wealth of the ruling elite. Moreover, a middle class, which may be a factor of stability, is practically inexistent. Often, these areas exposed to insurgency moves were in the way or near several important commercial routes or have important resources vital for the economies of industrialized countries attracting thus their interest.

The end of the Cold War brought about a new wave of insurgencies, most of them fueled by ethnic and religious motives. Once the empires and the decolonization wave collapsed in the 20th century, the weak states proliferated, not being supported anymore by the rivalries during the Cold War. These power vacuums fed the insurgencies.

The interconnection and information technology are new aspects of this contemporary wave of insurgencies. Now, the insurgents can associate with other ally groups, including criminal and terrorist organizations, becoming horizontal organizations with common purposes but different motives.

The contemporary environment presents a new type of insurgency globally represented by Al Qaeda which seeks to transform the Islamic world and reorganize its relations with the entire world. Such groups feed with local grievances, integrate it in a wider ideology and connect separate conflicts through global communications, finances and technology. While the effort scale is new, the grievances and their supporting methods are not.

As in other insurgencies, terrorism, propaganda and open warfare are its tools. But defeating such an enemy requires a global response to counteract the interconnected resource network and conflicts supporting them. Furthermore, the efforts of the international community against such form of insurgency must be joint and systematical.

### 3. Theoretical considerations on insurgency and counterinsurgency

Some authors state that, in fact, insurgency and counterinsurgency, both asymmetrical wars, are nothing more than primitive confrontations (most of the times unjustified) of the weak against the strong where due to the fact that the strong always respects the rules and principles of warfare, legal norms and the entire international legislation, the weak has the strategic initiative and all the means to put the strong in a difficult situation as they respect nothing. In other words, the victims of asymmetrical warfare would be: the great
technological and informational powers; the great armies (which can’t condescend to terrorist attacks, ambush etc); the civilized world and democracy; people’s environment and normal life. On the other hand, it is said that the insurgents are not the ones creating sophisticated weapons that can destroy human civilization completely and even the biosphere, but the great dominant powers, the technological and informational civilization which has always been aggressive and monopolizing.

In contemporary literature, there are many definitions of the term insurgency, such as revolution, guerilla, terrorism and battle for freedom, often utilizing these terms in a wrong way. One of the most widely accepted definitions describes the insurgency as being “an organized action aiming to overthrow a government formed by using subversion or armed conflict” (Joint Publication 1-02). Bard O’Neill defines the insurgency as “a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g. organizational expertise, propaganda and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.”

**Counterinsurgency** is the political, economic, military, paramilitary, psychological and civic action of the government in order to defeat an insurgency.

These definitions are a good starting point but they don’t emphasize the paradox that insurgency and counterinsurgency are different types of operations. In any case, they are connected and are the two sides of the same phenomenon which, sometimes, has been called *revolutionary warfare* or *internal warfare*.

In our opinion, the insurgency is an organized and lasting political and military battle meant to weaken the government control, change the social order and redistribute the power in the country or break from the state’s control and form an autonomous area. The insurgency is always a form of internal war, while the coups d’état and revolutions can become such a war if a quick agreement isn’t reached. As the name of internal warfare denotes, these are firstly conflicts within a state and not conflicts between states and all of them have at least one element of civil war.

The only possible exception is the fact that it can be called liberation insurgency when indigenous elements seek to expel or overthrow

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of insurgency</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anarchist</td>
<td><strong>To eliminate</strong> all institutionalized political arrangements; they consider authority relationships as unnecessary and illegitimate.</td>
<td>Black Cells in Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarian (communist and socialist)</td>
<td><strong>To impose</strong> a new system based on distribution equality and centrally controlled structures to mobilize the people and radically transform the social structure within an existing political community.</td>
<td>Shining Path in Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditionalist</td>
<td><strong>To displace</strong> the political system; the values they articulate are primordial and sacred ones rooted in ancestral ties and religion.</td>
<td>Hezbollah in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralist</td>
<td><strong>To displace</strong> the political system in favor of individual freedom and liberty.</td>
<td>UNITA in Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secessionist</td>
<td><strong>To withdraw from</strong> the present political community and constitute a new and independent political community.</td>
<td>Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td><strong>To gain autonomy</strong> and reallocate political and material resources within the present political system.</td>
<td>Kurds in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preservationist</td>
<td><strong>To maintain the existing</strong> political system by engaging in illegal acts against non ruling groups/the authorities who want to change.</td>
<td>Ulster Defense Association in Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table no. 1 - Types of Insurgencies (O’Neill)*
what they perceive to be a foreign occupation or an occupation government. Such a resistance move can be initiated by a legitimate government in exile or elements assuming such a role. Despite this, foreign actors were often involved in this. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States played a major role in such conflicts and today the insurgency has a pregnant global aspect resulting in extremist transnational organizations trying to exploit the internal conditions of many states with serious problems.

However, in all cases, the long term objective for all the parties involved, is accepting the legitimacy of a political power which is the central point of an insurgency. If the insurgents try to overthrow or undermine a government or a constituted authority, the counterinsurgents use all the tools of the national power to support the government and restore the rule of laws thus involving the controlled application of national power in politics, information, economy, society, army and diplomacy.

O’Neill structured seven types of insurgencies according to their final objective and the political aspects the insurgents consider (Table no. 1).

All these types of insurgencies can, depending on the environment and the insurgent force, choose some types of strategic approaches in order to reach their political objectives. Although some types of insurgencies generally prefer a particular strategic approach, all can be useful. All of them have been used by different types of insurgencies throughout history.

O’Neill defines the following strategic approaches:

- **The Conspiratorial Strategy.** In this strategy a small and well disciplined conspiratorial group forms a party to exploit grievances that have largely alienated elements of the population from the government. The insurgent does not seek to bring the general population against the government but it will mobilize segments for mass support in riots and demonstrations. When the government is no longer sure of the loyalty of the military and police, it can collapse as a result of mass demonstrations.

- **Protracted Popular War Strategy.** This strategy is the most successful as it assumes that the government is in a superior position of power and is unlikely to fall without a protracted and significant effort. Victory can be obtained only through a multi-phased battle, where the government will be attacked in its weakest points. In the first stage, it is used the political terrorism and the insurgents’ infrastructure is organized. The primary objective of the first phase is to build a structure and to isolate the government from the people. In the second phase, the one of guerrilla warfare, there are undertaken violent military actions against the government in order to coerce it to protect itself and to militarize the country. The last phase, mobile conventional war, is started when the balance of power is in the favor of the insurgent and the government can be defeated by overt military actions.

- **Military Focus Strategy.** This strategy is a variation of the protracted popular war strategy and was introduced by Che Guevara and Fidel Castro in Cuba. Instead of relying on a revolutionary condition to arise, this strategy is based on accelerating this political process by

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non Violence/Political activities</th>
<th>Propaganda</th>
<th>To influence national and international opinion and gain national and international support. Pamphlets, media broadcasts.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>To influence regional/national government. Media broadcasts, meetings, protest demonstrations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td></td>
<td>Recruiting cadres, training, raising money, creating groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>Bombing randomly or aimed, kidnapping, hijacking and sabotage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guerrilla warfare</td>
<td>Terrorism, small scale hit and run attacks, ambushes on military targets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conventional warfare</td>
<td>All military operations, excluding NBC.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table no. 2 – Insurgent means (O’Neill)*
an armed revolt by a group of guerrillas. This strategy is easier to initiate and requires not only less organizational work, less popular support at the beginning but also less time.

- **Urban strategy.** This strategy uses terrorism within urban areas of a society to destabilize it and its government. The objective is to decrease government’s credibility either by triggering a crisis generated by government’s inactivity or by government’s exaggerated response. The strategy uses the complexity, freedom of movement and anonymity of urban areas. The growing world population and urbanization makes the urban strategy the strategy of the future.

These different strategic approaches can be implemented using violent or non-violent means or a combination of them. The insurgent will choose an approach depending on its own strength and the other players in the environment. Although some strategies focus more on violent means and others on nonviolent/political means, they all have been used throughout history. The following means are defined by O’Neill in the Table

Stating that the use of terrorist or guerilla tactics is unconventional can sometimes be tricky because these have been the common approaches throughout history. Any combatant prefers a rapid, easy and clear victory compared to a long and bloody battle, as is the case of insurgencies. The type of insurgent warfare is in antithesis with the conventional warfare. For the last two centuries, the conventional military forces have been constantly seeking ways to concentrate their forces in time and space in order to ensure rapid and decisive victories. The insurgent military forces follow an opposed approach by dispersing into space and stalling for time to avoid a decisive defeat.

While the conventional forces try to win by acting more rapidly than the enemy, the insurgent guerilla forces seek victory by acting for a longer time than the enemy can react. While the conventional forces try not to give the enemy enough time, the guerilla forces try the enemy’s patience, so that time becomes a weapon.

The recent overwhelming victories of the American military forces in great battle operations have determined many opponents to adopt the asymmetrical approach, the USA holding the supremacy in firepower and surveillance. Those who tried an overt conflict, as was the case in Panama in 1989 or Iraq in 1991 and 2003, were destroyed in hours or days. Conversely, the opponents avoiding direct fire and the US surveillance, operating from the middle of civilians and around the news agencies (for instance the Somalı clans in 1993 and Iraqi insurgents in 2005) were more successful in achieving their objectives. The insurgents, too, use conventional military operations very often.

The competition in an internal warfare isn’t a fair one most of the times and many rules favor the insurgents; that’s why the insurgency has been and continues to be the common approach of the weak in their battle with the strong. At the beginning of a conflict, the insurgents have the strategic initiative. While the government prepares its response, the insurgency becomes stronger and creates more and more problems in the country. Normally, the existent government has the initial advantage provided by the resources but this is counterbalanced by the necessity of maintaining the order. Where the insurgents succeed by creating chaos and disorder everywhere, the government fails unless it maintains order everywhere.

The expenses to maintain the security are considerable, this being a major reason for which long lasting wars are so difficult to be supported by counterinsurgent forces; this effort requires a firm political will and extreme patience from the government, people and countries providing assistance.

Also, the insurgents have an additional advantage, that of having a wider maneuver space in managing the information environment. While the counterinsurgents seek to keep their legitimacy by providing real information and their statements must be supported by facts, the insurgents can make exaggerated promises and show the government’s defects, many caused by them. Ironically, as the insurgents succeed in controlling larger parts of the population, many of these asymmetries fade, an adaptive counterinsurgency fully exploiting these new vulnerabilities.

Counterinsurgency is not a warfare approach that can be easily classified as internal defense; it represents a complete specter of operations including stability operations as any other campaign. The course of an insurgency implies significant variations in the proportion of the effort for different types of operations because they cannot be limited only to killing insurgents.
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Given the fact that the insurgents have the strategic initiative, at the beginning, counterinsurgency is involved in defensive operations rather than offensive ones, and regaining the initiative implies not only stability operations, solving the causes of the society’s grievances through real reforms or reconstruction projects or by taking different measures to influence in a positive way the population’s support but also operations against the insurgent forces.

As counterinsurgency gains more ground, offensive and defensive operations become more balanced and, in the end, they reduce their importance as compared to stability operations, the final objective being accepting the government legitimacy by the population and ending the passive and active support to the insurgents.

If the vital popular support or, at least, popular neutrality were absent, the underground infrastructure would be rapidly destroyed and exposed because it would lack its political arm and its information apparatus and it would be stripped of its main military human power source and of its logistical support.

On the other hand, the power of the besieged government depends ultimately on the population’s support and loyalty because, on long term, no government can survive without the population’s approval and much less a government attacked by an active and aggressive insurgency move.

4. Insurgency, counterinsurgency and human security in the context of the war in Afghanistan

In the social, political and military context of Afghanistan, the insurgency is an organized and lasting political and military battle of the anti-coalition militants in order to weaken the control and legitimacy of the Afghan government while they try to increase their own control. The political power is the core of any insurgency move and thus it must be the core of the counterinsurgency strategy. The gravity central point for the counterinsurgency is the Afghan people, its support and acceptance determining ultimately who will have the political power and who will control the country. Both the insurgents and the counterinsurgents are in a competition for the population’s support. Thus, gaining the support of the Afghan people is the strategic objective of the counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan.

For counterinsurgency, population’s support doesn’t mean only sympathy and approval but also the active participation in the fight against the insurgents. David Galula divides the population into three categories: active minority supporting the cause, neuter majority and active minority against the cause. His second counterinsurgency law is that it shall be supported by the active minority in favor of the counterinsurgents and which will influence the neuter majority to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Insurgent means</th>
<th>Counter insurgent means</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Propaganda, winning popular</td>
<td>Public relations, CIMIC, Psy-ops, population control, political/social reforms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support</td>
<td>Destroy insurgent organization and arrest cadres and replace with own organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Antiterrorism: defensive measures to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Counterterrorism: offensive measures to prevent, deter and respond to terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>Defeat insurgent forces, undermine morale, deny/destroy his bases and resources, counterintelligence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla warfare</td>
<td>Conventional warfare based on movement and superior firepower.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional warfare</td>
<td>Cut foreign assistance, isolation.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Foreign assistance</td>
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*Table no. 3 – Comparison between insurgent and counterinsurgent means (O’Neill)*
rule out and neutralize the minority in favor of the insurgents. The objective is separating the insurgents from the population. Isolating them means making them inefficient and exposed. All the efforts of the counterinsurgency must bear this objective in mind.

The collateral damages, human lives losses represent the first cause of friction in this cooperation between the population and counterinsurgents. Any operation or action affecting this relationship with the favorable minority and the neuter majority will have negative effects on the strategic objective.

The insurgents have the great asymmetrical advantage over the counterinsurgents in the struggle for popular support because the insurgents live and move much more freely amidst the population, their separation from the population being very difficult. In order to separate the insurgents from the population, the counterinsurgents must focus their operations and efforts on four key directions: security, governance, services and legitimacy. The government must exercise its will and power in politics, army, economy, society, information and infrastructure in order to be the dominant power in these key domains. Solving the grievances and ensuring the basic needs of the population represent the first steps to separate and isolate the insurgents from the population.

Ensuring security is the milestone of counterinsurgency operations because the population’s fundamental concern is the physical security against crime and insurgency. In Afghanistan, this objective is firstly a function of the coalition of forces coordinated with Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). For the USA, the three pillars of their security strategy in Afghanistan are the continuation of military operations, local teams engaged in reconstruction and involving ANA and ANP. The objective of their security strategy is not only eliminating the insurgents from amidst the population but also providing an environment where the government can ensure the basic services like electricity, water, roads, medical assistance etc. When an area is physically secured, the Afghan government can solve people’s problems and institute positive and permanent reforms in their advantage. As the government goes farther in these areas, its legitimacy grows and the insurgents become isolated.

Unfortunately, the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan proved inefficient in at least two fundamental aspects:
- it didn’t succeed in preventing the acts of violence against the civilian population by the Taliban and other insurgent elements;
- the large number of Afghan victims undermined the population’s support in favor of the foreign military presence in their country.

It’s more and more obvious that the international forces haven’t succeeded yet in adequately protecting the Afghan civilians against the threat of the Taliban and terrorist groups. The security situation in Afghanistan has been constantly degrading since the invasion in 2001 led by the USA to the point where the Afghans have become less secure than they were under the Taliban regime. It’s clear that this increase of insecurity is a result of the intensification of Taliban insurgency which uses suicide bomb attacks and other terrorist tactics.

The second way the US counterinsurgency doctrine has failed and even proved counterproductive is the large number of victims as a direct result of the American military tactics. In 2009, the number of civilians killed by the international forces increased to 2412 victims, a 14 percent growth compared to 2008. The number of killed civilians has seriously decreased the support to the foreign military presence and simultaneously eroded the success registered in governance and economy, increasing the support for the Taliban.

One of the greatest advantages of the international coalition in Afghanistan after the overthrow of the Taliban government in 2001 was the fact that most of the Afghans accepted the necessity of the foreign military presence expressing their optimism concerning an improvement in their life. The tactics used by the international military forces, particularly by the USA, have resulted in incidents with human losses, first of all, because of the bombing raids which have proved to be counterproductive in gaining the support and trust of the Afghan population.

The high level of civilian victims is not only a direct proof of the human insecurity in Afghanistan but also a disturbing factor of future possible violence. The greatest impact of the victims produced by the USA and NATO reflects in the larger number of insurgent recruits against whom they fight. The death of one civilian will determine others to join the insurgent cause and these new recruits will contribute to even more attacks against civilian and military targets, determining the USA and NATO to respond, thus contributing to a terrible spiral of violent attacks. Ignoring human security by the allies in Afghanistan generates a conflict where the counterinsurgents cannot be successful. The importance of human security to the future of the international mission in Afghanistan is demonstrated by the fact that the new doctrine of the US counterinsurgency considers that protecting the civilians is crucial for the success of the mission.

Conclusions

Insurgency and counterinsurgency are perfect types of asymmetrical warfare which today affect the entire planet. Both of them – if we accept to consider them wars and not something else, for instance confrontations in the realm of criminality, revenge, battles for power and influence etc. – are ongoing wars with unpredictable developments, from large actions such as Afghanistan bombing, considered to be a terrorist base, to the Iraqi guerilla or the suicide actions of the Palestinians and Islamic fundamentalists, with multiple effects on space and all its dimensions (geophysics, climate, land, maritime, aerial, cosmic, virtual and cognitive).

Insurgency and counterinsurgency will require new forces, means and types of actions, new spaces and new engagement systems. Some will inevitably lead to the fragmentation of the great entities and of great strategic actions; others, on the contrary, will amplify and maybe unify them. All of them will act on the environment fragmentary, mosaic-like and extremely diversified. Hence, a very important question today: will the world be able to protect the environment against attrition warfare of the insurgency type?

Ensuring human security and its main dimensions – social, economic, political, military, and environmental – for the entire population of the insurgent country represents the guarantee of gaining its support by the counterinsurgent forces. In fact, the success of the struggle against insurgency is ensured only if all the population or most of it supports the counterinsurgent forces.

NOTES:

3 Idem, pp. 17.
4 Idem, pp. 31-53.
5 Idem, pp. 126-132.
7 Idem.
REFLECTIONS ON THE EVOLUTION AND THE USE OF EUROPEAN BATTLE GROUPS IN MILITARY ACTIONS

Valentin DRAGOMIRESCU, PhD

In the coming years it is likely to witness changes in the evolution of battle groups, in terms of their organization, equipment and actions, due to the following transformation processes through which the army and society as a whole pass: general transformations on military line; applying new EU Concept for rapid response in the three environment (air, land and sea); coordination with civil society and international organizations; external factors and so on.

1. Military transformation process at European level

As noted in the European Security Strategy, there is a need to transform the armed forces of Member States in more flexible, mobile units to be able to respond to new types of threats. The European Defence Agency shall create conditions to improve the equipment of the armies of European states in poor areas such as strategic transport, communications means, C-2 means, intelligence, surveillance, personal protection and means of recognition. The investment in engineering and technology, the incorporation of these and other new technologies will affect European battle groups in different ways.

Firstly, the military operational effectiveness will increase as communications' systems are improved and they become interoperable across the EU. This avalanche effect should make it easier to EU battle groups engaging in the Petersberg tasks full spectrum, when needed.

Secondly, as new technologies are introduced, it should be easier to extend support for deployed ground forces for more than 120 days if needed. This will give the EU battle groups greater operational flexibility because it minimizes the limitations of supply chains. The constraints related to sustainability are more likely to appear related to the staff rotation limitations and staff’s selection base.

Thirdly, the European battle groups would be able to change their basic configuration as a result of military transformation - especially as new technology is adopted. Unmanned platforms, whether air, land or sea, are likely to be part of future combat equipment in groups, having an impact on their operational capacity. Such changes may have implications for the types of missions, rules of engagement and the number of troops in a battle group composition. For example, they could increase their sphere of activity, as new types of technology would allow. However, negative consequences may occur. Greater specialization may hinder policy makers to select a group fighting for a mission with a broad spectrum of operational requirements. It may also be affected interoperability with other units that are not part of the battle, as UN troops, hindering the execution of certain types of transactions. As a result, the EU could be forced to issue a set of minimum interoperability requirements for operations conducted jointly with other forces.

Fourthly, the introduction of the new concept of security areas - like outer space – on long term could affect how battle group operates. A variety of security services based in space may occur in the near future, facilitating their applicability to the EU battle groups level. The emergence of Earth observation systems and positioning, navigation and timing systems, could serve as a strategic platform for future EU battle
Global positioning systems could be used to monitor the location of humanitarian aid, thus ensuring their arrival in time and adequate.

The comparative advantage of advanced military technologies could become less pronounced as the duration of an operation grows and becomes a stabilizing operation. Recent studies suggest that future operations will be less focused on achieving victory on the battlefield and more on stabilizing conflict zones, focusing on a mixture of the military and civilian actions that together will lead to achieving the goal. On the other hand, the relations between the EU battle groups and armies’ transformation also operates in reverse.

EU battle groups are interconnected with the process of military transformation. They facilitate military transformation line, given their rapidly deployable forces that can fulfill a variety of missions. One can even say that the main purpose of the European battle groups is to be a catalyst vector for the military transformation processes in Europe. This effect is most noticeable in certain EU countries.

In Sweden, the associated preparatory process for Nordic Battle Group formation has emphasized the transformations of static forces, concentrated on defending its own territorial in deployable forces capable of participating in international missions. Given the applicability of the concept of European Combat Group, these changes will continue to expand to other armies in EU member states. Although the Nordic Battle Group was ready for rapid action in 2008 and spent six months in continuously standby mode, this force was not used and the troops remain in barracks owed to the lack of political unity within the EU when it comes to be sent into action. The truth is that no EU Battle group has been used yet. It is regrettable from many points of view because the units are built very well but then are not used. The problems are: the transaction cost, taxpayers’ money and the impossibility to intervene where are needed with battle groups.

2. Changes due to new Concept of European Union rapid reaction

EU tactical battle group concept (EU BGC) from 2003 was subsequently completed with the Maritime Rapid Response Concept - MarRRC and Air Rapid Response Concept - AirRRC. Together, these three subordinated concepts generated a series of requirements and principles involved a review of the EU Military Rapid Response Concept – MRRRC, in 2009.

To obtain a comprehensive rapid response, the EU must have a quick and efficient political response and a possible response of the military needs. Preparation and planning can help in reducing the political response time.

On long term, the joint forces problem will become more prominent. As the concept of air and water rapid response will grow, it will be easier to decide whether transportation facilities will be part of the concept of battle groups, and how to achieve it. The decision will thus be more relevant once the battle groups will have a history. At that point, policymakers will have a basis to determine whether or not justified the existence of a group of combined forces in Europe. To illustrate this point, if BG are involved with some frequency and need for strategic resources, the transition to the type of combined forces will be a natural step. Conversely, if BG isn’t frequently employed and policy makers will choose to support on coalitions, perhaps a more obvious choice would be to keep separate air and naval facilities to ensure greater flexibility.

Adding naval and air forces will have the effect of creating a substantially increased force. This may require an increase in ground forces to validate the addition naval and air components, such as Brigadier-level employment. Moreover, depending on level of usage at that point, policymakers could consider ways to reduce costs associated with maintaining the awaiting battle groups. For example, policymakers might decide to maintain only a single BG in waiting and not two. Any other additional forces could be used to form the strategic reserve for rotating staff assignments.

3. Coordination of battle groups with international and civil organizations

For the battle groups could be need to adjusted certification and training processes to improve capacity to work with civilian personnel. Different requirements may be necessary for cases involving different civil parties, such as civilian response teams or multinational teams as the European Gendarmerie Force.
The battle groups must also take into account how they fit into the cycle of crisis management, especially when both are present during both military and civilian phases. Recent operations indicate that it is likely a civil-military alternation. Increasingly, there is more awareness among the policy makers that a mixture of military and civilian approaches is often the key to crisis management operations.

The extern factors influence can be felt on medium and long term to EU BG level. The most important external factories are:

- **Size of the army’s budgets** - from the Cold War end, most EU member states have low defense budgets. Only in recent years, some EU countries have increased investment in defense to adjust to the situation after the events of 11 September 2001. Discussion groups for allocation of important resources to fight the conditions under which they are intended for foreign missions, may have implications on long-term viability of the concept of battle groups.

- **Interaction with other element specified in the Headline Goals** - battle groups are not exclusive evidence of a rapid reaction. There are other rapid reaction elements specified in Headline Goal 2003. If the battle groups will soon be used in crisis management actions, it is difficult to conclude how they will cooperate with other elements of EU rapid response. The learned lessons are based on these common shares.

- **Type and frequency of conducting crisis management operations around the world will reduce or will emphasize the importance of the military battle groups.**

- **Influence of private military companies** - they can assume a variety of tasks, from support services (vehicle maintenance, feeding, handling hazardous materials, fuel supply) to perimeter security missions. Given this trend, it is possible that some private military companies to be employed to ensure that support functions currently performed by the staff of the battle groups. Over time, the tasks area assigned to private military companies could expand. The impact of this trend would be major over the battle groups, leading to diminishing roles of battle groups or to their structural transformation.

4. **Ways in which the EU can use the battle groups in military action**

EU Member States are responsible for training and preparation of EU BG making them available for action in six-month periods rotation. There are always two EU BGs simultaneously on standby, giving the EU a quick crisis management tool. Rapid suppression of a developing crisis or conflict, to prevent further escalation, is an important task for the EU BG. When a Battle group fulfilled its mission, several long-term measures can be implemented.

So far no EU battle group has been used yet in crisis management actions in the world. Why are not used the battle groups? The reason is simple because the European Union Council, which decides on the mission, should take a unanimous decision. So far, it proved impossible to reach such unanimity. When the EU has approved a military operation in Chad in 2008, it took six months to put together units that were ready to be deployed. Meanwhile, we had two battle groups available, which were ready for action, but could not be sent because they were reserved for rapid response situations.

Forces have never been used, but expectations are rising. This raises the question whether the EU should have a more flexible vision of the battle groups when is to be put into action. It was noted recently that the problems with the EU’s rapid reaction forces have contributed to the reform of the armed forces of European countries. However, it is noteworthy that the increased flexibility in the use of battle groups would enhance the credibility of EU crisis management.

One problem is that the exchange of information between countries or between civilian and military actors does not always work as it should. Defense Ministers of the Member States have therefore agreed that it should be improved cooperation in this field. An example of cooperation was maritime surveillance operation in the Baltic Sea region (SUCBAS). The results show that there are discussions with a broad consensus about the importance of effective cooperation between countries, civilians and soldiers involved when it comes to maritime surveillance. Experience with the system used by the Baltic Sea countries, can be used in EU maritime operations in Somalia.

It is possible that a battle group to be undertaken in close cooperation with the UN,
either as an initial force before another UN force, or a temporary strengthening of existing UN. All international transactions involve risk. Battle group was first introduced in an action area, it can be said that the military will act in dangerous situations. To cope with high risk pregnancies, the staff will be well prepared and provided with necessary equipment.

Employing rapid reaction force can be made in an autonomous operation, usually with an identifiable purpose and / or final expected. It is possible to use a fast effect of rapid reaction forces (such as EU BG), as a precursor to a higher deliberate operation (a standard military response operation), which may require the complete period of 60 days planning and force generation. In this case, the main planning and force generation must take place simultaneously with the initial rapid reaction military force because the resistance forces for rapid response may be limited.

For perspective, consider that the armed forces of the EU rapid reaction can be used, especially in situations of crisis that requires more action and less peace in warfare by appealing to their fighting skills.

A key aspect is the deployment of the available EU BG. In this case, Member States are responsible for providing a Battle group and its deployment, including appropriate strategic airlift. They must ensure that, after receipt of the deployment, battle group will move in the strict orders given to the location. Battle groups must be prepared to intervene in 5 to 10 days from the decision of the European Union. Neither EU decision making should last more than five days.

What is really important is the logistics’ autonomy of these units. BG must be able to intervene until the end of their mission, i.e. by the end of the operation or until the time of the change of its troops. The support from the host nation will be possible only in exceptional cases. The intervention of a battle group requires a full command structure, including an operational headquarters (OHQ) which remains stationary in one of the Member States. The existing multinational units, as the German-French brigade, are mainly offered. But these possibilities should not be viewed from an exclusive perspective.

Smaller nations are also able to participate in the Battle groups concept, for example in the specializations. But should be considered the military policy needs, so that military effectiveness do not suffer due to multi-nationalization. NATO and the EU Member States put a special emphasis on the fact that these structures should be analyzed in conjunction with NATO’s rapid intervention forces (NATO Response Force - NRF).

Education and training of battle groups is the responsibility of the concerned Member States. Battlegroup forces package hasn’t fixed structure and thus allows to the Member States the flexibility to shape their own battle group package. EU facilitates the coordination between the Member States. The certification of war remains a national responsibility of participating Member States. EU Military Committee, assisted by the EU Military Staff, monitors the battlegroups certification process which should be undertaken in accordance with procedures established and agreed by the EU.

Training is a key requirement for the battle group. The concerned Member States conduct a series of exercises in this context, before entering the battle group in a stand-by period. The battlegroup package certification by the Member States will allow EU to have the necessary assurance that it is prepared for a possible mission. Operation’s Commander, who shall be appointed by the Council for each case, has the authority to adjust the command and control structure, battlegroup’s package, means and capacities to the specific requirements of the job.

If the EU decided that a rapid military response is necessary, the deadline for response is a combination of forces readiness, willingness of Member States to commit forces, plus the force generation. This is also derived from the operational requirements of advance planning and crisis response. These should include deployment’s pre-planning and its implementation to ensure timeliness of response.

The most effective solution to achieve a balanced and coherent Battle group force would be, therefore, to develop a centralized certification process endorsed by the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff and the responsibility assumption to declare every Battle group ready for action.

Battle group concept is the cornerstone of the current EU action plan to improve European military capabilities. EU rapid reaction capability will save many of the national military forces from security, stabilization and reconstruction.
missions, which currently require much of their training time and for which are poorly trained and equipped.

**Conclusions**

The future engagement of the EU BGs is unavoidable. Despite this pressure, the diplomats still seeks to ensure favorable conditions for the activation of an EU BG and the establishment of back-up field forces (BG) in case of long-lasting warfare. Besides the employment of EU BG is important to recognize that cooperating states will register a number of benefits from involvement in the EU BG, as much higher levels of interoperability between BG and EU partners and the ability to engage in military transformation because BGs allow wider „sharing of responsibilities” between European countries. Simultaneously, the question of EU relations with other similar BG structures outside the EU (egg NRF) appears, especially in the planning, management and conduct of operations.

Military forces in actions of peace restoration or crisis resolution can not by themselves establish function of the governments, the internal security forces and the prosper economies; they need assistance from civilian agencies. The involvement of civilian agencies will help in freeing military personnel from the mentioned tasks and hence their participation in high intensity military operations.

**NOTES:**

1 Julian LINDLEY-FRENCH, Headline Goal 2010 and The concept of the EU battle groups: an Assessment of the build-up of a European defense capability, Cicero Foundation, Paris, 2005.

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The world’s welfare depends on ecosystems but mankind still considers them only public goods with no market and no price. Mankind pays an exorbitant price for biodiversity’s destruction: we lose about 1,350-3,100 billion Euros globally¹. United Nations Organization warns that the future of mankind could be in danger if the environment security, especially climate change, species extinction and population growth worldwide, were not be properly managed. At a UN conference on biodiversity held in Bonn in 2008, there was presented the study: “Ecosystems and biodiversity economy”. The author, Pavan Suchdev, said in this study that „we are trying to navigate on murky waters, with no map and a faulty compass”². The study sustains that some ecosystems may not be restored, as they have been irremediably destroyed, and others will disappear if there isn’t taken any responsible action until 2050. It warns that 11% of natural areas (from the year 2000) will disappear; being converted to agricultural land or destroyed by climate change, 40% of traditionally cultivated land will become intensive exploitations and 60% of coral reefs may disappear, with consequences difficult to predict. Pavan Suchdev claims that 150 species of flora/fauna disappear every day! The rate of this dynamic is 100-1,000 times higher than natural extinction rate.

Key-words: ecosystems; sustainable development; resource security.

Introduction

Bruce Babbit, former U.S. Secretary for Home Affairs (1993-2001) and current Chairman of the Board of Directors of World Wildlife Fund, said that „if you want to send a country on the way to disaster, the main resource you need is not oil, gold or diamonds, but something more prosaic than this – trees” and „the World Bank considers that the income and the lost resources cost, each year, about ten billion dollars - eight times the amount of the aid provided to the sustainable management of forests”³.

Policy makers and experts have concluded that world peace, development, nature conservation and respect for fundamental human rights are indivisible libertarian, interconnected and interdependent, forming the foundation for a sustainable world⁴.

The UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 acknowledged that legislation constitutes an essential component of environmental development policy implementation processes at global, regional and national levels. The conference stressed the urgent need to integrate environment and development issues at all levels including: a) developing a natural balance between environmental concerns and development ones; b) clarifying the relationships between the various existing treaties; c) ensuring the involvement of states both in the elaboration and implementing these legal measures, focusing on developing states.

The report „Ecosystems and human well-being – Biodiversity Synthesis” elaborated by the Millennium Assessment Report⁵ states that „Biodiversity contributes to security, resiliency, social relations, health and freedom of choices and actions”. The areas with a fundamental impact on in biodiversity are habitat loss (such as changing land use, physical changes of rivers, the reduction of coral reefs and the damages to the ocean environment due to fisheries), climate change, invasion of alien species, overexploitation and pollution.

The report draws attention to the need to increase the capability to anticipate the consequences of developments in biodiversity, ecosystem functioning and ecosystem services,
which, together with the potential to quantify biodiversity, will enable the elaboration of the best decisions at all levels.

In Belgium (Mechelen, on the 25th-27th of October 2010), took place the Global Forum of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development having the theme of sustainable materials management (SMM - Sustainable Materials Management). The Forum pointed out that in the last 100 years there has been an unprecedented increase in the use of materials. If in 2050 the population will reach 9 billion people, then the question of resources becomes a vital one. The problem has direct consequences such as: the biodiversity loss and climate change, the reduction of the natural potential, the overexploitation of land and water resources.

The Forum’s participants agreed that we must shift from visionary projections to solidary actions. OECD policy in sustainable management of materials must be based on four fundamental elements, as follows:

1. preservation of natural capital which human civilization is depending on through monitoring materials’ flux and its impact on the natural environment, increase resources’ productivity, reduce material consumption and the growth of the quantity of reused and recycled materials;
2. design and materials management from the perspective of life cycle;
3. “Sustainable Management” of materials must be boosted by policy instruments such as regulations, taxes, research and development, innovation, purchasing policies, disseminating information and education;
4. sustainable management of materials has to engage and empower the whole society in a collaborative effort.

Forum participants agreed that there is needed a closer cooperation between OECD work and sustainable management of material, which, above all, must be included in a more explicit strategy of “green growth” of the OECD.

**Conceptual framework**

**Natural environment** refers to natural resources, both the biotic and the a-biotic ones, such as air, water, soil, fauna and flora as well as the interactions between the components and the characteristics of the environment to which they belong.

Hillary M. Masundire defines the **ecosystem services** as the benefits obtained as a result of humanity’s interaction with ecosystems. They include **supply services** such as food and water; **regulation services** such as flood adjustment, drought, soil degradation and illnesses; **support services** such as soil formation and nutrient elements’ cycle, and **cultural services** such as the recreational, spiritual, religious or other non-material benefits.

The European Commission supports the view expressed in the synthesis report on biodiversity of “The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment” (2005), conducted under UN auspices, by which ecosystem services are grouped as follows:

- **support services** – all services necessary for the production of other ecosystem services: soil formation, pollination, nutrient cycle and primary production;
- **supply services** – products obtained from ecosystems: food, fresh water, firewood, fiber, bio-chemicals and genetic resources;
- **regulating services** – benefits obtained as an effect of ecosystem processes: clime, disease regulation, water regulation, water purification, floods control and CO₂ absorption;
- **cultural services** - non-material benefits provided by ecosystems: relaxation and eco-tourism; aesthetic benefits for inspiration and spiritual, educational, cultural heritage and sense of place.

Ecosystem services include, among others, the following areas:

- **forests** as natural erosion and flood control services and their role in climate systems;
- **fresh water** of wetlands and floodplains as habitat, groundwater recharge area, aquatic areas, flood buffer zones, and areas of oxygen filter for contamination;
- **marine ecosystems** as essential habitat for fish, natural defense against coastal erosion, as reservoirs for biological diversity and its role in maintaining global geochemical cycles, including global climate system, and
- **the polar regions** as the fundamental values of the global natural environment and global climate system.

Natural systems include major ecosystems and individual components such as physical, chemical and biological weapons. In accordance with Section 2 of the World Conservation Strategy
(1980), there were identified three existential support vital systems: agriculture, forests and fresh water along with the coasts.

If we analyze the situation in Romania from this perspective, we will conclude – on the basis of official information – that both agriculture and illegal deforestation have brought the Romanian state in a serious state of insecurity. The vitality of “natural support systems” has reached critical thresholds, significantly affecting (the case of deforestation) the potential of national security resources too.

From a conceptual point of view, biological diversity should not be confused with the diversity of planetary life because “biological diversity” is an attribute of life, a qualitative concept that refers to elements of natural systems, available in a sufficient quantity to allow their continuity. Besides the role of including human existence and health, biological diversity concerns, among others, and producing sufficient quantities of food, fiber and wood and to the potentiality/capability of sustainable ecosystems to produce renewable natural resources such as fish and timber.

We may conclude that four major types of natural systems shall be in our attention: forests, wetlands producing fresh water, ecosystems, marine/coastal ecosystems and Polar Regions.

Ecosystems must be understood as a complex of relations between all life forms and their surrounding environment (non-living). Focusing on ecosystems is the result of recognizing the inter-determination of these natural environment components and of the fact that their functioning determines the whole system to avoid collapsing. The components can be protected only by protecting the natural environment that encompasses all of them.

Hillary M. Masundire believes that ecosystems are a dynamic complex composed of plants, animals, communities of microorganisms and non-living environment interacting in a functional unit. People are an integral part of ecosystems, whose sizes vary.

Recent studies have highlighted the necessity to conceptualize the problem of resilience of natural systems by which we mean the ability of natural systems and human communities to withstand and recover from disturbances/turbulence of the natural environment and the processes by which they may be limited and the way in which can sustain their rapid recovery with a minimal cost can be realized.

The role of ecosystem services in a sustainable development

If we accept that the purpose of a nation securing processes is to preserve the fundamental elements of national identity and generate favorable prerequisites for sustainable development then we must consider the role of ecosystem services.

Costs led to switching from the collaboration/cooperation with the natural environment to dealing with it. Current rates of biodiversity loss are estimated at 100 times higher than similar natural processes. Human activity has caused the degradation of ecosystem services by almost 60% and the increased pressure of the planetary civilization on natural processuality determined to reach the critical thresholds of ecosystem vitality, jeopardizing the existence of future generations.

Deforestation contributes with 20% to carbon dioxide emissions, as every minute, 20 hectares of forest disappear, and at least 4.4 million trees are cut daily. More than 80% of biodiversity is in tropical forests and more than 30% of all known species will disappear before the end of this century because of climate change. In Latin America and the Caribbean, between 1990 and 2005, there have been cut 64 million hectares of forest!

Involvement of the relationship between nature and civilization determined the UN to organize the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (2000) and to promote the concept of “ecosystemic approach” as a component of integrated land water and living resources (ecosystems) management strategy. This approach supports the processes aimed at conservation, sustainable use and equitable sharing of benefits.

Given the relationship between the evolution of civilization – from a socio-economic point of view – and ecosystems and in response to the proposals of G8+5 Environment Ministers (Potsdam, Germany, 2007), there was elaborated a comprehensive study under the tutelage of the European Commission and Germany with the title “The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity”. An independent similar study was funded by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), Germany and Great Britain who were later joined by Norway, Netherlands and Sweden.
From these documents, we will refer to “TEEB D1 – The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity for national and international policy makers” posted online in November 2009.

We appreciate that some conclusions can be also useful to strategic decision makers of the Romanian nation today, this being the reason for which we will make a comprehensive assessment. Undoubtedly, the economic solution for the relationship economic environment-natural environment-national security should be based on the awareness of decision-makers of the involution of this triangle relation which is fundamental to the development of any nation.

The failure to properly understand the value of ecosystem services is worrisome not only to the ministers of environment, development and climate change, but also to officials in the field of finance, economic or business environment.

The correct evaluation of biodiversity need to determine national policy reconsideration as investment in natural capital may be more cost-effective and the conservation process offer a wider range of economic benefits. Currently, companies do not have or use appropriate tools for evaluating welfare, whose growth would take place only in terms of natural limits of ecosystems, on the one hand, or, on the other, they don’t know the needs of the future generations.

Natural capital – ecosystems, biodiversity and natural resources – lay at the basis of the economies, societies and each individual. Its value is often neglected or partially taken into account and we waste the „natural heritage” without understanding its value or what we lose in reality.

The solutions can be identified through cooperation between business and scientific environment, where there have been identified four strategic priorities, as follows:

1. stopping deforestation or forest degradation;
2. tropical coral reef protection;
3. save and restore the overall potential of fisheries;
4. recognition of strong links between ecosystem degradation and maintaining rural poverty.

Unlike the human and economic capital, natural capital does not have an adequate/special evaluation, monitoring and reporting system. The thorough understanding and the quantitative assessment of biodiversity and ecosystem values to support integrated policy assessment is the fundamental premise of long-term solutions. There should be identified and implemented indicators of ecosystem services and indicators relating to biodiversity. New approaches to macroeconomic assessment must include the value of ecosystem services.

The global network of protected areas includes about 13.9% of the world's land, 5.9% of the oceans and only 0.5% of the Seas. Almost a sixth of the daily life existence of the world population depends on these protected areas.

Each country has a specific „natural heritage” to be identified, which is the reason to identify the most favorable solutions. Romania, not only for security reasons (security resources issue is not addressed in any policy document), must reconsider how it can manage its natural resources orienting itself to the efficient use of ecosystem services. The diversity of landforms which determines the diversity of ecosystems, having one of the most fertile soils in Europe (even if the owners are not Romanian) and an eco-tourism potential, has to consider them both as resources for sustainable development and vital resources to preserve national security.

Future conflicts, as many analysts agree, will be generated by the access to resources from the natural environment. The role of government’s institutions is to promote the processes for assessing the potential ecosystem services and to maximize their recovery for the benefit of the entire nation. Constitutional right to property must be balanced by the strategic decision makers with the right of each Romanian to a healthy environment and a decent level of welfare.

Conclusions

The approach on ecosystem services, as security resources, requires integrated policies to promote poverty eradication, sustainable consumption and production and encouraging conservation of biological diversity and natural resources. The purpose of these policies must generate the sufficient and necessary conditions for sustainable development.

The development of integrated policies should be based on sustainability science that highlights that the substitution of natural resources, social capital and economic potential can be eco-effective only beyond the constraints under
which the entire socio-economic system will collapse. Interdependencies and conditionalities of production variables, natural environment, labor and capital do not require replacement of ecosystem services (such as ozone depletion), depletion of natural and human resources than to assume linear catastrophic consequences. Based on these facts, the science of sustainability draws attention to the proper functioning of vital natural capital and irreversible nature of the social and economic capital.

Holistic approach requires states – strategic and policy makers – to integrate environmental conservation into the planning processes and the implementation of policies, giving equal importance to the natural environment, economic, social and cultural factors.

In order to realize such an approach, states have to: a) monitor and adjust policies and plans on natural environment and societal development; b) periodically reconsider the legal framework; c) establish/strengthen the institutional architecture and procedures to allow the integration of environment and development problems in all the phases of the decision making process.

An integrated approach allows a better identification of priorities for environmental and ecosystem services generated by them and a better alignment between environmental policies and other sector policies offering both the maximization of the use of institutional resources and ecosystem services.

The concept of „ecosystem services” is perhaps one of the most interesting and challenging for human existence today. It requires the rethinking of the civilization’s existence from the perspective of the ways in which we manage and invest in sustainability and development. It is challenging because they force us to reconsider our relationship with natural systems by looking at them as a vital element of sustainable support processes. A responsible approach and a good management of social and economic activities will permit us, within the natural environment, to develop the civilization and to avoid confrontation with the problems that mankind has no solutions and no resources.

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THE STRUCTURE, THE MISSIONS, THE TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION STANDARDS OF EUROPEAN BATTLE GROUPS

Iulian MARTIN, PhD

One of the main deficiencies recorded in the process of achieving the Headline Goal 2003 was the lack of specialized and highly mobile forces with high mobility and able to take action under difficult conditions. Among the tasks set for this purpose is specified that EU Member States should be able to provide rapid response units capable of deployment and ready for action within a very short time1. Later political decisions have led to the EU battle groups formation and the realization of that rapid response capability was seen as a European priority and an essential part of rapid response between the elements described in the Headline Goal 2010 document.

Key-words: battle groups; operations; missions; rapid reaction.

1. Premises of the European Battle groups occurrence

Practical approach to sustainability of rapid reaction forces was not taken into account until the execution of ARTEMIS military operation (Democratic Republic of Congo - the first autonomous EU-led military operation, launched in June 2003 at the request of the UN Security Council). Artemis Operation has provided to European policy makers and strategists a real and practical model applicable for future deployments and rapid reaction forces.

The purpose of this operation was to restore the security in the region of Ituri in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Deployment of European forces, numbering about 2,000 troops, was achieved by giving time to the UN to reinforce their presence on the ground formations and then to pass toward a Chapter VII mandate’s type. EU staff was quickly established with the intention to remain deployed for a period of about three months. In many respects, was copied the model offered by UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) in the former Yugoslavia in 1992. This showed the EU’s ability to operate with a relatively small force at a significant distance from Brussels, in this case more than 6,000 km. In addition, it demonstrated the need to develop further the capacity for rapid response.

The positive impact of Artemis Operation is reflected in the final declaration of the French-British meeting in London on 24 November 2003. The statement, which describes ways to strengthen European cooperation in security and defence issues, notes that “the EU must be able and motivated to deploy an autonomous operation within 15 days to respond to a crisis”2. Moreover, in line with experience gained from Artemis Operation, the forces would be „deployed in response to a UN request to stabilize the situation in the short term, until the arrival of peacekeeping forces operating under UN mandate”3. The declaration also requires the existence of battle groups consisting of approximately 1,500 land forces troops, provided by a single nation or multinational, in a framework agreement.

At February 10, 2004, France, Germany, and UK have released a document outlining Battle Group Concept. This was presented to the Political and Security Committee, which, in turn, asked the opinion of the Military Committee on technical aspects of the concept (February 18, 2004). Later, it won support from Brussels, the defence ministers and chiefs of staff.
The document proposed a number of battle groups based on the results of Artemis Operation, stated in November 2003. Battle group would focus on deck operations, preparing the actions prior to the intervention of higher powers, for example, UN peacekeeping forces and regional forces under a UN mandate. The plan was approved by all countries in 2004 and, in November, the same year the first thirteen BG were employed with associated niche capabilities.

In terms of sustainability of these forces, they should be focusing on transitional operations - for example to support the operation until its acquisition by peacekeeping forces under UN mandate. So they will have to be sustainable for the „initial operation period of 30 days, with possibility of extension for at least 120 days”. At the meeting on General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) on 17 May 2004, the representatives approved the Headline Goal 2010”, wherein the battle groups will be the key. Battle groups concept was approved by the EU defence on June 14, 2004. Finally, to the Military Capability Commitment conference in November 2004, the Member States made the first bid for establishing battle groups. In this context, the EU Military Staff (EUMS) developed the battle group concept, which was agreed by the EU Military Committee (EUMC) in June 2004. The process continued and was completed in October 2006 a document called “Concept Battle group” being prepared.

Battle group basic features - the BG concept is based on multinational principle and BG package could be formed by a framework nation or by a multinational coalition of Member States. The key criteria are military interoperability and effectiveness. A battle group is associated with deployable forces’ military headquarters, an operational command and pre-identified facilities for operational and strategic support such as strategic lift and logistics. The Member States can also contribute, with other capabilities, providing specific BG elements, struggling to improve value. Battle groups are waiting for a period of six months and should be initially sustainable for 30 days, with expansion up to 120 days if the necessary resources are secured properly.

In principle, the Combat Tactical groups have a similar configuration, even if there are peculiar features (egg battle group or amphibious Mountain). The structure of a battle group is based on a mechanized infantry battalion, composed of three or four companies, a Force HQ (FHQ) and a logistics subunit. Specific types of units may include mechanized infantry, fire support units (egg artillery) and logistical support items (egg medical formation). The Battalion has attached to it various specialized sub-units (engineering, research, CBRN) which will be able to provide combat support in case of need, and logistical support units (medical, maintenance, and transportation). The combination of these staff allows to EU battle groups to act independently and perform a variety of missions. Note, however, that it is up to each member country to determine their exact composition of the EU battle groups, both in terms of personnel and equipment. Since there is no fixed structure of a grouping of combat, participating countries have great flexibility to create and equip such a force. EU battle groups accounted for a total of about 1,500 soldiers, consisting of a joint structure. Taking into account the operational and strategic decision-structures, the total number may exceed 1,500 participants.

Combat Tactical Group must have a rapid deployment capacity, be capable of independent action or be a driving force in the initial phase of a pre-military operation. The formation may participate in the acceding countries, candidate countries or third countries. Given the decision making process, the EU wants to be able to take the decision to launch an operation within 5 days from the crisis management concept approval by the Council. Regarding to deployment, the participating forces will be deployed in the area of interest within 10 days from the decision to launch the operation.

Applying the principle of formation of BG, the Nordic Battle Group, which has been pending for six months period from January 2008 and includes contributions from Norway, a NATO member, but non-EU member According to the Nice European Council conclusions, “EU Member States are encouraged to include in the battle groups formed and NATO member states, non-EU or EU candidate countries. In such cases, it will be without prejudice to the rights of any EU member state”. Operating, certification and training processes are national responsibility, but it runs in conformity with the standards and criteria formulated by the European Union.
Initial steps to form EU BG were held in the military capabilities conference in November 2004 and at conferences of battle groups coordination (BGCC), the Member States contributions are announced twice a year, usually in May and November. BGCC was first held in May 2005. During the conference, EU member states presented composition of potential contributions and when they can be placed in the stand-by position. Into the full operational capability, there are deals that exceed 2010 year. BGCC has a five-year business plan, the development of approaches depending on the details of the waiting period.

Battle groups status and missions - European Union based on the Headline Goal 2010, emphasizing on rapid reaction and deployment capability, progressed in developing its military capacity. Battle groups will be engaged in a full range of transactions listed in Article 43 (1) of the Treaty on European Union and those identified in the European Security Strategy (ESS). These forces are trained for combat and their full potential would be best achieved in combat missions for crisis management, taking into account their limited size. BG warfare operations could be implemented, usually after the UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), but could be also considered when a UNSCR is not necessary.

EU Battle Group must be able to act quickly and decisively on the basis of provisions stipulated in Article 17 (2) of the Treaty on European Union (often known as the Petersberg tasks). The types of missions are in line with the objectives identified in the GAERC meeting of 17 May 2004. Petersberg tasks are: humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping, shares of combat forces in crisis management, including peace enforcement, and the tasks of the European Security Strategy: disarmament joint operations, support to other countries in combating terrorism, reforming security sector institutions operations as part of reconstruction in the conflict zone.

From 1 January 2007, the EU has full operational capability on this dimension, implying the simultaneous performance of two military operations using combat groups when the EU Council decides, on the entire range of the following scenarios: 1) humanitarian assistance; 2) evacuation; 3) conflict prevention; 4) stabilization and reconstruction (including military advice to third countries and security sector reform), 5) separation of parties by force (high-intensity combat missions). In this sense, was conceived a mechanism by which such two structures to be, always, in stand-by for a period of six months. These scenarios don’t mutually exclude.

There are no limits on the area outside of Europe where the EU could activate Battle group. However, there is reference to an area within a radius of 6,000 kilometres from Brussels as part of planning. This assumption is consistent with the Toquet Declaration provisions from 2003 and focuses on operations in the African continent strengthening the planning horizon 6,000 km term, representing the approximate distance from Brussels to the Great Lakes Region of Africa.

In fact, the list of military tasks has been extended in accordance with the common security and defence policy, from humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacekeeping to include also disarmament joint operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention, post-conflict stabilization, and supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories6.

Another way to measure the potential Battle group EU missions is to consider the conditions under which they may be employed. From this point of view can be:
- **buffer operations (deck)** - an EU battle group could be employed as a buffer force in support of ground troops, under the condition to be deployed into an EU operation. Examples of specific objectives may be to reinforce the existing troops or to take over operational responsibility for a specific geographical area, while other forces are regrouping. In both scenarios BG could be employed for a period of time. If it is already engaged in supporting ground forces, BG could remain under the EU’s political and strategic control. The use of an EU battle group as buffer force was successful among the mission in support of Artemis Operation;

- **rapid response operations (forces precursor)** - BG could be employed as the original force preceding the main forces involvement because of its rapid reaction capability;

- **Stand-alone operations** – small scale operations that require quick response.

From the perspective of force generating packages are organized yearly conferences on coordination (coordination conferences Battle group - chaired by EUMS BGCC) in which tenders shall be made on a planning horizon of five years. Up to date, the contributions were announced from 25 states, of which a candidate country (Turkey) and a third country (Norway), setting up 15 battle groups in the period 2007-2010.

It is up to Member States how they form a battle group package and when will be offered. The BGCC, held in October 2009 confirmed that waiting periods are fully subscribed in 2011. The Member States putting together a standby BG, or waiting for the next 18 months, provides also a command of the operation. Member States have a number of other packages to confirm battle group for the time ahead.

While the numerical ability of troops has been met, a question remains vis-à-vis the functionality and interoperability. Battle groups have not yet been used and the limited degree of interoperability (although a certain extent has been reached) between the European forces raises the question of efficiency to deal with BG in high risk situations.

Since battle group concept was agreed in June 2004, a large part of the provisions have been met. With the full commitment of Member States, the concept has already shown the potential value of increased cooperation in developing the military capabilities of Member States. This has helped to increase the EU’s ability to intervene with rapid reaction forces and will continue to do so. In November 2009, the Council approved guidelines for improving the flexibility and the use of BG.

### 2. The leadership of European battle groups’ actions

The European generic concept of command and control (C2) states that the military chain of command has three levels of commands: Command operation - (Level Military / strategic), Force Headquarters - (operational level) and force component commander - (tactical level).

Operation Headquarters (OHQ) directs the execution of strategic ESDP operations. It worked on a case by case basis by a decision taken by the Council and receives strategic direction from the Committee for Security and Policy. OHQ should be ready for planning within five days. Most European battle groups preferred an OHQ. Up to date, five national OHQ were considered potentially available to the European Union.

At the operational level, Forces Command (FHQ), typically serving as a base of operations, provide command and control of troops in the field. In accordance with the Battle group concept, a battle group requires association with a FHQ, which size will vary in accordance with EU BG needs. Depending on the nature of the operation, command structures can be air, Special Forces, sea and more.

**BG action’s planning process** - the decision making process for crisis management operations represents the conduct basis of EU BG. Several elements are needed to be accomplished before forces deployment.

First is the need for a Crisis Management Concept (CMC) detailing the general objectives of EU operations. Council General Secretariat prepares CMC data coming from the General Secretariat / High Level Representative and EU Presidency, among others. This process is coordinated with the European Commission. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) assesses CMC on the basis of the requests from the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management before being submitted to the Council for approval. After approval is the base for CMC joint EU action.

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**SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY**

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Secondly, a set of military strategic options (MSOs) are designed to highlight different military issues, including risks, forces’ requirements, command and control structures associated with each option. PSC asks to EUMC to instruct the Staff to develop MSO. If a transaction involves civil matters, the competent structures in the field submit Civil Strategic Options or Strategic Policy Options for civil-type missions. PSC evaluates all strategic options and recommends the preferred course to the Council. PSC also suggests, potentially Operations’ Commands and Commanders on the basis of the military planners’ suggestions.

Once the Council selects a specific MSO, PSC asks to EUMC to formulate a Initiation Military Directive (IMD) to guide the operation commander. EU Military Committee instructs Staff to draft directives. Before EUMC to be able to submit it to the Commander, IMD is approved by the PSC. At this point begins the process of operational planning. Due to time constraints, all these steps can be shortened.[9]

Operational planning phase, as well as CMC process contains a variety of steps involving various stakeholders. The process begins with the outlining by Operation Commander in cooperation with the EU Military Staff, of a Concept of Operations (CONOPS). Once completed, the EUMC offers its own suggestions before the PSC documentation to be evaluated and submitted to the Council for approval. Meanwhile, the PSC requests to EUMC to instruct the Operation Commander to execute the generation of forces process.

Then, Force Commander develops an operations plan (OPLAN) and Rules of Engagement (ROE). EU Military Staff shall provide military disposals in accordance with the demands of EU member states. EU Military Committee must approve these recommendations before being submitted for consideration to the Council. After the PSC expressed its view, the documents are submitted to Council for approval. Once the Council approves the operation plan and authorizes the rules of engagement, the operation can be launched. Certain steps in the planning phase of the operation can be skipped or shortened, possibly in regard to EUMC suggestions and where is appropriate. For EU BG operations, certain phases may not be needed, or would not require consolidation. For example, since the EU battle groups are on hold is not necessarily a process of generation. MSO can not be developed separately if the decision process is accelerated and defining elements of MSO already appear in CMC. Accelerate decision making process to facilitate rapid response is a prior asset to the approval of the CMC.

3. Training and certification standards of EU battle groups

Each BG is unique, just like the conditions of education in Member States are different. It is therefore a challenge in describing the training course, sufficient to apply in different Member States and various BG, but quite effective in providing guidance. However, preparations for any multinational BG match; the main difference is the sequence and timing of activities in the real case. In principle a BG follow these steps to conduct an operation: planning, preparation, waiting for deployment.

EU Military Committee (EUMC) recognized the usefulness of standardizing training for BGs to obtain homogeneous structure and to facilitate Member States’ procedures, planning, generating and preparing for their future contribution. In this context, the EU Military Staff (EUMS) developed in 2008 an EU BG preparedness guide in order to develop standardized training guidelines for general BGs. They can be used on a voluntary basis by Member States in accordance with the concept of BG. The preparation period begins with the design of a possible BG (about 2-3 years before the waiting period) and ends with the withdrawal period.

EU Member States participating in the BG are responsible for training and preparation of forces and means in the respect of those standards and criteria for BG. Contact Points (Point of contact - POC) are responsible for coordination of the BG training and preparation package. The detailed structure of all agreements between participants in the creation of a BG remains the responsibility of participating Member States.

The decision to offer BG packages to the European Union is a political decision. Where several Member States and/or third countries are involved in creating a BG, this should be ideally preceded by a Memorandum of Understanding between the participants, signed at the political
level. With this document representing the BG setting basis, the military level participants could sign in different technical agreement / understanding on the establishment of tactical battle group. There aren’t established standard documents to be used between the participants in the formation of a BG. This will be agreed by the concerned countries. Generally speaking, there can be taken into account the following types of documents: technical agreement on the allocation of staff to BG structures based on a framework nation, technical arrangements regarding training and exercises for BG, technical arrangements regarding BG’s employment action.

When are considered the BG logistics there must be regarded the following areas: air/sea transport, integrated medical support, life support, host nation support - HNS, memoranda of understanding between participating countries and technical arrangements/agreements, generic conduct/redeployment and support plans.

**BG’s command and control planning.** EU BG are specific operations, therefore should be taken regarded the adaptation of the existing SOPs to the Force Headquarters (FHQ) and Operation Headquarters (OHQ) of the EU. Specific SOPs development should begin during the planning phase, to be able to properly train BG.

The (F) HQ establishment and location may be different for each EU BG. Some countries will determine (F) HQ from existing national staffs. Still, other BGs might use tactical-level commands, such as the nucleus for the Brigade (F) HQ. EU BG contact points should start planning as soon as possible in order to identify teams and requirements.

In terms of command staff chain, commander of the operation (OpCdr) and Force Commander (FCdr) will be suggested by the countries contributing with troops (Troop Contributing Nation - TCNs) and approved by Council. All positions of senior officials will be designated by TCNs, in accordance with the guidelines for EU legislation. Assigning people in positions of responsibility will be a national responsibility. Staff training planning will be decided by TCNs and could be mentioned in technical arrangements (Technical Arrangements - TAs).

The training will aim to undertake the tasks of the ESDP, as stated in the Treaty of European Union-Article 17/2 and the European Security Strategy (ESS). In planning the training process should be taken into account the fact that if BG is trained for the most demanding tasks, it will be able to adapt to the less demanding. The EU Battle group concept training should be consistent with the procedures of the NATO Rapid Reaction Force (NRF). At all (national/multinational) levels, the BG headquarters, components and package, the training is closely linked to the certification process. Certification activities and exercises are part of the training program.

The European Union has no intention to carry out exercises involving military forces under the FHQ level. Thus, national and multinational forces exercises, below this level will remain a responsibility of Member States (MS). Member States are responsible for ensuring that the forces offered meet all applicable standards and requirements a month before the waiting period. Therefore, BG training and training structure will be based on MS contribution. Being their responsibility; Member States may freely form any long process as it would be if it leads to successful certification and meets the standards set and EU criteria. Member States should, where possible, to coordinate their contributions on BG formation with other similar events of national and multinational companies.

**BG Point of Contact (POC)** is designated to be responsible for the coordination of training and preparation of BG structure along a coordinated training program. The flow of information between BG and MS is a key element in order to ensure coordination and timely certification. It is therefore advisable to establish an adequate system of reporting on the state of preparedness. The training of BG. The purpose of this process is of compliance with established standards and criteria to provide a rapid reaction force ready to fight the full spectrum of EU BG Operations. Personnel, equipment and organization are converted into a deployable output (force) through training and preparation. As the struggle is complex, so are the skills necessary to achieve it. These skills are disappearing over time, both for individuals and units, so individual and collective training and preparation should be progressive and frequent.

Training forms a capacity of reference and generates common understanding. Forms of collective training involve individuals in a
coherent and consistent form. The usual training lasts from individual instruction to joint combined exercises. BG training program should include three elements: (F)HQ, BG and support elements. Each element should follow its own training program that must be coordinated and may contain simultaneous and competing activities. BG must perform regular realistic training, including multinational exercises. BG package must be trained by running command exercises and also national and multinational exercises, organized by Member States. In order to adapt units to the specific of ESDP are required to be implemented during training and formation activities: EU military concepts, commandment SOPs and standard way of reporting.

BG Training. Items and levels of training - battle group is a battalion-sized combined structure reinforced with Combat Support - CS and Combat Service Support - CSS, therefore the training runs on different levels. The forces provided by states participating in the BGs program must have a level of proper initial training and formation so that the subjects covered, are not to be included in the training program of BG. Within this structure, there are different elements of training that require different approaches during the training process: command-force (F) HQ; battle groups (including CS and CSS); support elements (facilitators); other elements (policy-makers’, civilian actors, etc.). Also, these elements are created at different levels need of training as follows: individual instruction, collective Subunit and Unit level instruction (including CS and CSS elements); BG basic element training (Infantry Battalion); BG structure integrator training (power pack).

Communication and reporting in the BG may require language training for some individuals. Adapting to EU BG standards may require some special activities aimed to familiarize the key-leaders with the EU military concepts and procedures. The battalion commanders, the personnel staff of the BG, the commanders of combat support subunits (CS) may require some preparatory work that can be organized with the EUMS support. To obtain maximum efficiency, the subordinated and BG structures commands should be addressed at the same time in different activities and joint exercises.

Force Training Command (F) HQ can be made taking into account the EU BG training activities provided in the training - formation policy being included in the preparation program of ESDP. Some items such as CIMIC personnel, PsyOps or Info OPS may require more attention, in order to make them available to address to the EU civil-military coordination.

Some necessary elements for the command of the operation and/or support of EUMS can be used in (F)HQ training, participating as the OHQ cell response. Interoperability testing of Communications and Information System (CIS) and exercises between the OHQ, between (F)Q and subordinated subunits should be undertaken in order to ensure interoperability between different CIS systems and provide alternatives to ensure adequate C2 support, if necessary. To have certainty about BG coaching is advisable to conduct during training a planning exercise of force deployment.

The collective preparation at subunit and unit level is a responsibility of Member States and is essential to the operation of BG. Regular combat training system of the Member States provides an adequate set of activities and exercises to prepare forces each is contributing to this level. For evaluation and certification should be granted time in advance to obtain success for the whole process. In the field are recommended exercises for the following levels of structures: small subunits (up to company level), battalion-type unit.

BG basic element training (Infantry Battalion) is based on exercises all LIVEX-type involving its forces and can also be used for evaluation purposes. This will not only prove the troops competence to work together and to ensure interoperability, but it also gives confidence to its commander. Since it is not always possible to provide multinational participation in all scheduled training activities, it is recommended that such participation should take place during an exercise. To ensure proper integration of all tactical level units, when structure’s participation is not possible, it is advisable to ensure participation at least as EXCON cell response.

Preparing facilitators (support elements, collaborators) consists in individual and collective training. Facilitators should, where possible, participate in the integration of BG package in order to ensure full cohesion and BG’s interoperability as a whole package. At least, the participation as cell response should be guaranteed to the final certification of the BG.
BG forces Package Highlights should be achieved through training and CPX-type exercises involving both the (F)HQ and subordinate commands structures. To ensure interoperability and operational efficiency of the BG entire package, training should culminate in a common and combined joint exercise.

The training order (sequence of). Training activities should be undertaken during the planning, preparation and waiting phases. By the end of the planning phase, planning drills and exercises should be solved. Arguably, the tactical training of the forces contributed by Member States up to the company should be finalized by the end of the planning phase. To achieve this, the following are to be carried out: training field, educational courses and lectures of ESDP, foreign language courses.

During the preparation phase of the employment, runs (F) HQ training. The individual preparation at the tactical level will continue until the battalion level. The focusing will be progressively transferred to integration in order to obtain full certification of the BG package by a final exercise.

The order of activities may be: exercises in the Operational Planning Process (OPP) designed to make the progress of a (F)HQ based on a tactical level command; exercise such CFX/Mapex to test (F)HQ development and SOP’s procedures; exercises/tests for data communications system (CIS OHQ) - (F)HQ and BG(F)HQ; Command Training, coordination meetings OHQ-(F)HQ, training key leaders; training basic element of BG (Infantry Battalion); complete BG package certification exercise.

The tasks and responsibilities during the training are specific for every participating structure into the Battle group concept. Member States contributing with forces and means must: develop education and training program for their contribution to the BG package so that they meet the BG standards and criteria; coordinate its forces training with important national and multinational events in the preparation of BG, maintain BG point of contact informed of the status of forces preparedness; maintain the liaison with the organizers for BG’s staff participation in courses and lectures in educational ESDP Training Foundation - ETF and the Operational Planning Course - OPC.

BG Point of Contact (BG POC) ensures BG coordination conference (BGCC) with training programs and information on BG’s main training events and exercises, coordinates the training of BG as a whole package to meet the BG standards and criteria; draw support from EUMS applications, if necessary, to increase knowledge/training in specific areas, can produce invitations for MS, EUMC and EUMS to observe certain training activities/ exercises.

EU Military Staff provides the following tasks: facilitates the exchange of information on training activities by collecting information on training events through Battle Group Coordination Conference (BGCC) and maintaining a central register of all major events related to the BG preparation and supports the MS, if necessary, in educational and training activities by hosting meetings, conferences, seminars or courses on specific topics (ESDP, BG concept, legal issues, use of force, identified lessons, procedures for handling crisis situations, ATHENA mechanism, Civil Military Co-ordination/CMCO, etc.), if requested, provides an OHQ or response cell for OHQ(F)HQ exercises.

General methodology of assessment and certification - general checking of the activities covered by the BG structure in training to fulfil a mission is done through evaluation and certification.

Evaluation is a structured process of critical examination of an activity and/or capacity compared to defined standards and criteria, and certification is official recognition that a military authority gives an official assurance that a unit/ a HQ/a band/programmed package to be, or already being under his command comply with requirements to perform a task and/or mission. Certification may be the result of an evaluation process. For the defined standards to be met, the evaluation of the necessary required skills is to run before the final certification. BGs Certification remains a MS’ national responsibility, which should make this certification in accordance with procedures established and agreed by the EU, recognizing multinational principle and the principle of general evaluation. For the purpose of certification, the EUMC is general guidance authority and should monitor the certification process.

The assessment/certification of Combat Group is based on two phases: (collective) assessment/
certification to the unit level and assessment/certification of BG package. The EU BG evaluation and standards should, when applied, be similar to those defined in NATO, taking into account the specific nature of EU crisis management. Although the process of evaluation and subsequent certification must be sustainable over time, it should not be cumbersome, complicated or too intense. He must, however, have sufficient details to ensure that critical aspects of force capability and combat readiness status are properly addressed and implemented.

4. Evaluation and Certification procedure

To ensure that the offered units meet all applicable standards, the contribution of Member States should carry out assessment procedures leading to final certification. In planning and conducting an evaluation process are taken into account the following nine criteria, standards and recommendations for EUBG:

- The availability of specific tasks outlined in the BG Concept;
- Flexibility in meeting all kinds of missions, from combat to the less risky;
- Recruitment and deployment in action anywhere in the world outside the EU, BG using the necessary means of transport and logistic support planned in advance;
- State of preparedness for war - BG must always have during the preparation stage, staff, resources and capabilities prepared and trained (at least 95% of total capacity) so as to achieve combat ready status in 5-10 days;
- Connectivity - BG forces and headquarters must have adequate means of integrated command-control (C2), efficient and interoperable and deployable and also communications and computing capabilities necessary to conduct integrated operations;
- Supporting the theatre - a BG would be able to sustain operations from a minimum of 30 days up to a maximum of 120 days if they are properly supported logistically, then, if necessary, forces providing rotation will be deployed until it reaches a stable situation;
- The ability to survive - in the BG should be an adequate emphasis on force protection and the prevention of fratricide (rules of engagement);
- Medical Force Protection - previously identified personnel to be deployed in a BG package must have an adequate psychological, medical, dental and physical level. A medical protection program (including vaccination, in accordance with national regulations) should be adjusted - during the preparation phase - for possible areas of deployment;
- Interoperability - having regard to the multinational principle, interoperability is of utmost importance to ensure efficient use of military forces in theatre. Interoperability can be achieved through effective and efficient training standards and procedures.

BG Point of Contact (POC BG) has the following tasks: establish specific instructions for contributions in accordance with TCNs capabilities, conducting evaluations BG package as a whole (facilitators/contributors are not necessarily evaluated) in relation to agreed standards and criteria for EU BG; certify BG package (including facilitators) and inform the EUMC and EUMS, as appropriate, about the program, progress and achievements in the certification process of the package compared with EU BG standards and criteria. EUMS records all the information on certification and informs the EUMC.

Certification. The Member States contributing to the BG are responsible for ensuring that provided forces and facilities respect (or are able to perform in the time spent lifting and strength training) all applicable standards and requirements specified in the reference documents available. They must provide their capabilities to participate in training, exercises and other training activities in accordance with agreed training program. MS will authenticate to the BG point of contact the achieving of preparedness and certification in conformity to the standards. One month ahead of the waiting period, BG point of contact will certify that the BG package meets the standards and criteria agreed with the BG concept. Member States with forces involved in the formation of a battle group could invite other Member States to observe EUMS certification exercise.

Conclusions

The Member States that have contributed forces are responsible for conducting the units/elements evaluation and their choice of assessment methods appropriate for their contributions,
thereby ensuring a procedure to allow certification over the BG contributions to the point of contact not later than the date agreed. They could invite other Member States and EUMS to observe the evaluation process. The use of existing evaluation methods, such as NATO assessment procedures are recommended if they are appropriate and applicable.

Defined standards and procedures should be complementary to the NRF documents, however, taking into account the EU. Member States with forces involved in the formation of a BG would be, by mutual agreement with all concerned parties, prepared to make available forces for joint assessments under the contact point of BG command, especially with regard to the joint/integrated functions such as those from force headquarters.

NOTES:

3 Declaration on European Military Capabilities Commitment Conference, November 2006.
4 Julian LINDLEY-FRENCH, Headline goal 2010 and The concept of the EU battle groups: an assessment of the build-up of a European defence capability, Cicero Foundation, Paris, 2005.

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Our approach starts from the premise that in the contemporary times the economy has become more obviously the driving force without which national power – whether political, social or military – can not properly perform. On the state of the economic component of the security system – normality, crisis or failure – directly depend the state of other components and therefore the entire security environment. The latest strategic documents of the main actors in the international system underline the increasing interdependence between economic power, military power and security.

The financial crisis started in early 2007 and the economic recession that has followed it is an important source of insecurity. Its gravity and extension are unprecedented, immediate consequence consisting in creating a disruptive effect that is experienced in all structures and areas, including the military system. The deepening economic difficulties lead to a reduction in financial support to specific activities and tasks of the Armed Forces. This situation needs a more efficient planning and use of state’s resources according to domestic and foreign policy priorities. Thus, analysis of recent years’ changes in military budgets can give us an insight on the capacity of the world states to cover their defence and security needs in a period of deep economic and financial imbalances.

The resizing of military expenditure, in the sense of maintaining or reducing them, may create some problems in the military dimension of international security that could affect not only the security interests of each state, but also those of entire world. Therefore, we will project the main effects of defence budgets resizing that can develop in the future and may lead to critical impairment of security, at both global and regional level and national and armed forces level.

Keywords: security, economy, military power, military budget, economic and financial crisis

The interdependences between economy, military power and security

The dynamics of global system have eroded the old boundaries between internal and external affairs and between economy and security. Economic determinations on security have become clearer in the current system of International Relations in the sense that everything that means security and defence potential requires resources. Even a less detailed analysis of the latest strategies and documents of world state and non-state actors shows an increasing interrela relationship between economic resources and security.

Article 26 of United Nations Charter recognizes that “in order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources” is need to establish a system for armaments regulation. Furthermore, the Organization’s report, A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, states more clearly “the necessity for all members of the international community to be more forthcoming in providing and supporting deployable military resources” in order to achieve an effective, efficient and equitable collective security system.
This means of course significant national resources, financial and material.

NATO’s Strategic Concept of 2010, Paragraph 37, specifies that “NATO must have sufficient resources – financial, military and human – to carry out its missions, which are essential to the security of Alliance populations and territory”. The defence planning process in NATO enables “the best use (...) of collective national resources which are available for NATO roles”. Therefore, the security of Member States can not effectively be achieved without respecting their established share of GDP for military expenditures and assuring an adequate economic support.

EU Security Strategy of 2003, A Secure Europe in a Better World, states “security is a precondition of development”. Furthermore, in its National Security Strategy of 2010, the USA argues that each of four enduring national interests, including security and prosperity, “is inextricably linked to the others”. It follows a truth of our days, namely that economy and security enhance each other: the more pronounced feeling of security, the better creation of conditions for a solid economic growth; the more pronounced economic development, the more strengthened security.

The other major state actors in the international system also stress the increasing interdependence between economy and security. Article 25 of The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020 affirms that “national security is directly dependent on country’s economic potential”. Likewise, according to the China’s National Defense in 2008, Beijing remains faithful to “the principle of coordinated development of economy and national defense and (...) strikes a balance between enriching the country and strengthening the military”.

Therefore, achieving security in the contemporary world increasingly depends on the economic development. Establishment and support of a professional and credible military power requires significant financial, human and material resources. Economy, beside finance and technology, is the most dynamic and complex factor that can generate military power. Economic, financial, technological and military components are interrelated, so that the economy, finance and technology affect the achievement of security, as security provides the support of proper operation and development of economy, finance and technology.

State capacity to achieve security depends on the extent of the economy to produce and make available the necessary resources and means. Only a strong economic performance can provide the conditions needed to generate an advanced military power. Moreover, a modern, stable and powerful economy cannot exist if the individual, community, society or state does not feel safe.

Figure no. 1: Evolution of world GDP during 1996-2009 (billion US$)
Therefore, the state needs a balanced and well structured economy in order to support a credible and effective military power, able to satisfy both internal security needs and external obligations.

**The dynamics of military budgets**

Like almost in each field of activity, the financial funds are the “engine” without which no military forces can exist and operate. Training, equipment and military remuneration, equipping forces with proper capabilities, providing material resources and necessary logistics, participation in missions abroad, etc. requires significant financial resources.

Amount of funds allocated to the defence depends in most cases by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), namely the size of the state budget. Dependence between the two indicators is illustrated by analyzing the global GDP over the past 14 years. We use as a benchmark year 1996 that is considered the moment when the period of decline in total defence spending after the Cold War ended.

According to Figure no. 1, global GDP reached a maximum of US$ 61,221 billion in 2008, over five times more than the one in 1980 and double compared with 1996. Global GDP has increased steadily in the analyzed period, excepting the years 1997-1998 (the Asian financial crisis), year 2001 (terrorist attacks) and, especially, year 2009 (the peak of global economic and financial crisis). The first two events have disrupted the global economic growth and ultimately led to slight reductions in overall GDP. The financial crisis triggered in the first half of 2007 in USA had serious repercussions on the global economic system that have resulted in recession for most world countries and contraction over US$ 3,000 billion of global GDP in 2009.

In addition, the global military expenditures increase almost continuously, as seen in Figure no. 2, accounting approximately 2.7% of global GDP in 2009. The exception is 1998, when global budget that was allocated to defence has declined about US$ 13 billion due to the pronounced reduction in military spending in North America, Eastern Europe and some Asian countries.

2001 was the last year that military spending have increased in so-called normal limits. The 9/11 events represent the starting moment of the war against terrorism, which will be supported with more and more funds. Thus, the world’s military budget has been dramatic growth in just nine years (2001-2009) by almost US$ 500 billion. USA was the main contributor to the increase of the military spending. Their budget grew in the same period over US$ 280 billion. Also American funds allocated for operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and other missions in the war

![Figure no. 2: Evolution of world military expenditure during 1996-2009 (billion US$)](image-url)
In recent years, there was a concentration of military expenditures, meaning that a small number of countries allocated large funds on defence. For instance, in 2009 the amount of military spending of the first 15 countries represents about 82% of world total. USA is responsible for 42.4% of the global military budget, distantly followed by China (6.3%), UK (4.4%), France (4.3%), Russia (3.9%), Germany (3.1%) and Japan (3%).

The table above shows that the first places in world ranking military spending are occupied by major economic powers (excepting Saudi Arabia) but not exceeding 5% percent of the GDP. These are the main countries that allocate large amounts of money for modernizing their military forces and capabilities and contribute significantly to multinational missions. The link between economy and security is obvious: if a state has economic power, it is able to build up and sustain a military power capable to ensure its own security and, if necessary, of other territories and states.

Although we have expected that the current economic and financial crisis to generalize a downward trend in military expenditures, it does not seem to change much the behaviour of a large part of world governments on budgetary allocations for the military sector. Thus, military spending continue to rise in all regions, with Asian continent in the leading.

Economic problems USA faced in the recent years have diminished only at a reduced extent the Washington government willingness to allocate increasingly larger funds to the military system. Growth rate of defence expenditures, including those for operations abroad, has declined in the past two years: plus US$ 64.8 billion in 2008 compared to 2007 and plus US$ 44.9 billion in 2009 compared to 2008. In perspective, estimates indicate a resumption of growth in defence funds – US$ 71.2 billion in 2010 and US$ 74.9 billion in 2011 –, and then a gradual decrease – US$ 68.1 billion in 2012 and US$ 66.3 billion in 2013. Perhaps, the USA should take certain measures to optimize the spending on military procurement and to reduce the funds allocated to military operations abroad, taking into account that the war against terrorism is no longer a sufficient reason for the steady growth of defence budget.

Some concerns regarding the evolution of Member States’ military expenditures and their contribution to Alliance missions are already visible at NATO level. The GDP allocation to the military budget of European Members steadily decreased from 2.05% of GDP in 1999 to 1.65% in 2008 per entire organization, excepting USA.
We noticed in 2009 reductions in defence spending compared to 2008 in Italy (US$ 1.1 billion), UK (US$ 0.9 billion), Poland (US$ 0.73 billion), Turkey (US$ 0.3 billion), Spain and Hungary (US$ 0.2 billion each of them)\textsuperscript{18}. This is the effect either of planned reductions in military spending or of the financial and economic problems facing these countries. Other European countries have recorded slight increases in military budget. The leaders were France and Germany with an additional US$ 3.2 billion each and the Netherlands with US$ 1.1 billion\textsuperscript{22}.

The forecast regarding the European economy downward by more than 3\% in 2010\textsuperscript{20} will result in a reduction of funds allocated to defence. In June 2010, NATO Secretary General announced that “in more than a half of our NATO member nations, real defence expenditure is already lower now than in 2008”\textsuperscript{21}. Moreover, European states within NATO have adopted in 2010 different positions on military expenditures. On the one hand, countries with developed economies have planned increased budgetary allocations for defence, except Great Britain and Netherlands\textsuperscript{22}. On the other hand, less developed countries have programmed reduced funds for military system, such as Czech Republic, Romania, Latvia or Lithuania\textsuperscript{23}. Perhaps, as the effects of the crisis will deepen, many European economies will no longer be able to support the planned military budgets. In this regard, a NATO Report\textsuperscript{24} suggests that if the economic situation does not improve substantially, the governments will be compelled to make reductions in military spending after 2011. Consequently, the worsening recession, the costs of economic recovery plans and the growing pressures of budget deficits will have a negative impact on the achievement of European security and defence objectives.

The economic and financial crisis has less affected the economies on the Asian continent, where the trend of gradual increase in defence spending continues. The growth of military budgets of most Asian countries can be justified by their desire to develop new weapons and technologies to access or maintain their position in the top of the world military powers. Japan’s military expenditures have remained relatively constant, with values of US$ 46.3 billion in 2008 and US$ 46.9 billion in 2009\textsuperscript{25}. China, Russia and India still contribute significantly to increasing regional and global military spending. Amid economic expansion, China has recorded a plus to the military budget of over US$ 67 billion within 10 years (2000-2009)\textsuperscript{26}. India continues to invest significant funds in its military potential – US$ 32.3 billion in 2008 and US$ 36.6 billion in 2009\textsuperscript{27} – and tries to keep up with its potential rivals (China and Pakistan). Russia has allocated important amount of money to the modernization and professionalization of the national Military Forces – US$ 58.3 billion in 2008 and US$ 61 billion in 2009\textsuperscript{28} – but this level will no longer be supported because of the decrease in energy and weapons exports. Although the economic crisis has dampened the growth rate of Asian countries’ military budgets, it appears that 2010 will bring an increase in defence spending as a long-term strategic option of their governments.

We believe that the global defence spending will continue to growth in short term but at a much lower level. In medium term, the world’s military budget will record a certain decrease and significant funding will be allocated to other priority areas such as programs for economic consolidation and social protection. However, it is unlikely that the range of threats facing the world states will reduce or decrease in intensity amid the current economic and financial crisis. Rather, we consider that there will be needed more resources to maintain world stability and security.

The impact of military budgets resizing on security interests

Conflict is becoming increasingly difficult to manage at the beginning of the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century, requiring the strengthening of military power of various international state or non-state specialized actors. Essential conditions are the access to resources and markets, the reduction of vulnerabilities and the development of a capacity for action in crisis and conflict situation. However, the current economic and financial crisis causes a specific deficiency of the available financial and material resources, which can generate major disruptions in fulfilling the specific tasks by modern Armed Forces.

Depending on the intensity of the economic and financial crisis’ impact on the military dimension of security at global and regional level and national and Armed Forces level, the effects might be:
ANALYSIS. SYNTHESIS. EVALUATIONS

− Major – they lead to the total failure of military systems and actions;
− Moderate – they cause some changes in the structure and goals of military systems and actions;
− Minor – they do not affect the military systems and actions.

A projection of such effects on the military dimension of security does not offer us a reassuring picture. Perhaps these potential chained effects can be yet assigned to the category of moderate intensity impact for most of the world countries.

Effects at global and regional level:

- Increased insecurity of individuals, institutions and property;
- Increased vulnerability, multiplication of older risks, dangers and threats and the emergence of new ones, especially asymmetric;
- Increased worldwide tensions, crises and conflicts by multiplying the “hot spots” or reactivation of latent ones;
- Destabilization of states that already are vulnerable to some internal and external pressures and increased likelihood of aggression against them;
- Amplification of the need for peace missions; fight against terrorism, organized crime and illegal trafficking; humanitarian assistance;
- Movement towards forms of regional and global management of the security environment: increasing the international cooperation; enhancing the role of military alliances and coalitions and regional security structures; developing both some new strategic partnerships and the existing ones;
- Changed the approach on security: reviewing policies and strategies on security and defence; promoting asymmetric strategies; enhancing the use of “soft power” instruments, which are less costly;
- Disruption of the activity of international security organizations: increasing the need for reform some security organisms; slowing the process of transforming NATO forces and capabilities; disturbing the process of establishing the European Armed Forces; increasing trend of training and allocating the same packages of deployable forces to the NATO and EU missions by the Member States and Partners; disrupting the decision-making process in these institutions; promoting a more equitable burden-sharing between participating countries in NATO and EU missions; lowering the consistency and response of forces to crises and conflict situations; increasing the number of countries willing to reduce/cut the resources allocated to multinational operations; decreasing the coordination and joint action capacity, the level of standardization and interoperability of forces; increasing difficulties of NATO Candidate Countries to meet the necessary criteria;
- Reconfiguration of power relations and international military balance: increasing dependence of world countries on security provided by specific regional organizations; strengthening the role of Western military powers in crises and armed conflicts management; increasing the military gap between USA and European countries’ Armed Forces; deepening debates on burden-sharing between USA, European Allies and Japan; mitigate disparities between Western and Asian military powers; intensifying regional powers’ efforts to play a more important status in world military hierarchy; lowering support and intensity of war against terrorism; “brain-drain” and diminishing the technology and military equipment development efforts; reducing exports and imports of weapons and military technology; emphasizing the process of Armed Forces’ “privatization”;
- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and increasing danger of their use;
- Proliferation and development of terrorist networks, organized crime and illegal trafficking;
- Expanded underground economy and economic and financial crime networks;
- Increased number of paramilitary groups, NGOs, private companies and mercenaries who are involved in the management of some crises and conflicts;
- Establishment of strong anti-globalization entities that are deepening the conflict.

Effects at national and Armed Forces level:

- Orientation of budget funds towards non-military dimensions of security;
- Disturbance in operating the subsystems of security and national defence system;
- Review of the security and defence policies and military strategies, the doctrines of forces, means and actions;
- Increased military gap between countries with economic problems and their neighbours;
- Reduced/cut contribution to some operations
abroad and focus on internal security and defence missions;

- Abdicate the purpose of maintaining complex integrated structures in favour of niche ones;
- Increased externalization of specific services;
- Weakened protection of critical strategic systems and infrastructure;
- Degradation of economic and defence industry capabilities designated to support the war effort;
- Disturbed system of military training and procurement: dysfunctions in the defence planning process; lowered morale and motivation of troops due to both deficiencies in leadership, organization and equipment, as well as personal financial shortfalls; diminished strategic transport capacity and logistic support; disruption of the supply of various specific goods, products and services; affected process of generating and regenerating force; dysfunctions in the process of achieving interoperability with other forces; reduced quality of education and training system; degradation of the scientific research and defence industry;
- Disruptions in major military procurement contracts and programs: allocating resources only towards priority programs and categories of military expenditures; reducing investment in modern weapon systems; limiting the purchase of specific goods, products and services; delaying the payment of products, goods and services provided by allies/partners/agreed countries or national/local providers; selection of contract bids on the “lowest price” criteria; being in impossibility to provide some reserves and alternative sources for supplying the essential equipment, materials and services to the mission; reducing some repairs/maintenance operations.

The effects listed have more or less serious disturbing facets for the establishment and operationalization of military power. If they combine, they will critically affect security on all of its levels. Identifying these potential harmful effects to the military component of power allows, first, to clarify the dysfunctions occurred in the system at a time, and secondly, to adopt the proper measures to eliminate them.

Conclusions

While global economic and financial situation is difficult, the world is still far from concluding the development efforts of the military component of power. Although world military expenditures increased in 2009, we can discuss if economic support is sufficient to generate timely and properly the military power that is needed by a state or alliance/coalition to meet its missions.

Long term consequences of the current economic and financial crisis on military budgets of the world countries are not quite clear and nor easily identifiable. However, previous crises (e.g. the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998) led to some reduction, but also to more efficient government expenditures, including defence spending. We believe that the actual crisis will not be an exception and will lead to some decrease in military spending and reorientation of the defence and security priorities of the international actors. Thus, in the medium term a decrease of defence budgets is inevitable, especially since the pace of global economic recovery is extremely slow as some developing economies are still in recession, budget deficits and inflationary pressures are increasing and maturity of debt is closer.

Therefore, defence and security cannot be achieved without a judicious planning of resources needed, without a detailed analysis of the relations between resources, missions and results. The ideal is to achieve the highest level of security with minimal resources and expenditures. However, given the current economic and financial conjuncture, political and military authorities will have to make difficult choices in establishing the proper funding amount for defence. They will have to find and maintain the balance between power components according to internal and external conditions, the optimal ratio between economic and military power that is a prerequisite for a proper rate of security on all of its levels.

NOTES:

ANALYSIS. SYNTHESIS. EVALUATIONS


15 SIPRI, op. cit., 2010, p. 198.


22 IISS, op. cit., 2010, pp. 111-190.

23 Idem.


26 Idem.

27 Idem.

28 Idem.

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STATE AS AN ORGANIZED POLITICAL POWER AND THE INCIDENCE OF SUCH LEGAL UNDERSTANDING ON THE EU INSTITUTIONS

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Within this article, we are trying to briefly expose the hypothesis of an European body of governance, by showing, at the same time, in what conditions and degree would this be compatible with the hybrid, multi-faced character of the EU, as multi-level governance system, and also, with the political concept of a “state body”. The article is starting from the premise of identifying some state elements within the legal-political nature of the EU, by asking about the modalities in which it is exerted the political power in this original system as EU, in a way more or less closed to the exercise of the political power within a state, from the point of view of the constitutional law main concepts.

Key-words: state; political power; the European Union; state body; European body of governance; level of governance; EU political power; public function.

Strictly technically and legally speaking, the state is nothing but an organized form of political power based on the idea of political superiority that the governors (as persons entrusted with public functions, legally exercising the state power and part of the state apparatus, therefore being able to exercise, on that basis, the force, as a coercive part exclusively state-owned) hold on those governed by them.

In light of this definition, as the EU is concerned, it would primarily mean to clearly respond to the following question: is there, within the EU’s political system, a class of the „governors” and one of the “governed”? To what extent would this political division at the European level reflect the idea of the political organisation of an European “governance apparatus”, similar to the state one? What impact does such legal definition applied to the European Union (understood as an “organized political power”) have on the originality of the European institutional framework?

To answer these questions, it would be necessary for us to consider the assumption according to which the idea that the EU is an organized political power “within the traditional, state meaning” of the word, should not be excluded a priori. The political power keeps its general content, of “power of the people” and is the basis of the European construction, the whole political system of the EU as a reflection of the “power of the European peoples” of the EU member states.

The EU is created, in our view, as an institutionalized form of power of the European peoples, but also as a form of political organization of states, while this political system has separate institutions for protecting the interests, in Europe, either of the European peoples or of the states.

The emergence, consolidation and development of the EU’s political system is a specific argument in support of the idea that the political power can not be exercised only
by the state. As an institutionalized part of the political power, state power is reflected in the complex political system of the EU on two levels, without leading to the conclusion that the EU is a state and without reducing to the idea that the only type of power exercised and institutionalized in this original political system is the state one.

As mentioned above, the state power is, within the EU, an institutionalised power of the political power (i.e., as a result of political power exercised on two different levels of the EU system). Thus, we speak about a political power exercised on a higher level, distinct from the state⁶ (the European level) through the European institutions and representing the power of the European peoples whose countries are part of the EU's political system. At this point, we should, however, mention that, in the constitutional law, the “state power” refers to an entire state apparatus, an entire organizational structure of people’s power, not only a political institution. But the EU's political system can not be reduced to an exact copy at the European level of a classical state apparatus. Due to its complexity and uniqueness, the EU system strengthens its level of European governance where it is not mandatory for the European political power to materialize in an entire state apparatus at the European level, but form an institutional framework (called by some authors “institutional system”) that is specific, distinct from the model of a “state apparatus”.

Secondly, within the EU's political system, at national level, however, the political power is exercised by separate state apparatuses of each Member State (a thesis in which each people belonging to a Member State is the exclusive holder of sovereignty).

According to this perspective, each person belonging to an EU Member State has a political power that is distinct from the political powers of the other nations of the EU Member States. A state power (specifically, as state apparatus and organizational structure, to the authorities of that State, with a specific distribution of functions in that State) derives from each such political power, for each EU member state.

Consequently, on its basic level, the national one, the EU political system has as many different state apparatuses and thus “state powers”, as the number of its states. The bodies, through which these state powers are exercised, on the state-national level of the EU system, will be those of the “state apparatus” of each Member State, thus reflecting the complexity of the EU political system.

To answer the questions posed at the beginning of this section, concerning the existence of governors and governed in the EU’s political system, we should keep in mind that there are two levels of political governance within this system:

a) At the European level of governance, we can bring the EU citizens, who represent a political category reflecting a legal and political bond between the peoples of the EU Member States and the European level of governance, as an argument for the existence of the “governed” class. This bond is absolutely necessary for the existence and operation of both the European level of governance and the whole political system of the EU¹⁰, whereas in its absence the EU becomes a classical international cooperation organization, where the “governance”¹¹ (as a problem that is specific to a state or to a system with state features) is out of the question while there is the problem of the relations between the Member States (international cooperation level). On the other hand, the existence of the European level of political government reflects a reality that is superior to the interstate cooperation. The European level of governance, in our view, can not be mistaken for a state multilateralism whereas it is an institutionalized expression of the “European political power” which translates into multiple types of “powers”, including the state ones. This separate level within the EU system reflects a political report of internal type between the governors and the governed, which can not be seen in the classical international organizations.

The practical expression of the existence and functioning of the European level of governance is the European citizenship, a supranational citizenship¹². The fact that such citizenship derives from and is complementary to the national one¹³ may not be an argument against the existence of the European governance level. If, at this level, the “governed” are the European citizens, who are the European “governors”? In our view, the “governors” would be all those persons exercising political authority within the EU system, regardless of the level of governance (European, state or regional). The participants in governance, at European level, would be the
EU citizens as well, both through the European Parliament and directly, by referendum.

b) At state governance level within the EU’s political system, the “governed” are easily identifiable, since we relate to citizens of the EU Member States (each EU Member State exercising political authority over its citizens). The “governors” category would be illustrated, for this distinct level of governance, by the national public authorities of each Member State, which are also vested with certain powers to act at European level of governance (e.g., Heads of State and Government composing the European Council).

Given the unique legal character of the EU political system, we can not agree with the existence of a “political power at European level”, materialised in a “European state apparatus”14, because the originality of the EU system lies both in the coexistence of three levels of political governance15 and in the originality that the European level of governance has by its very legal nature (while borrowing some state features but not adopting the state model of organization of the “people power”). There can not be more “state apparatuses” at the three levels, as it would undermine the constitutional basis of “the state apparatus” organized at the national level of governance, which basis establishes the supremacy, the uniqueness of such state apparatus, as a direct consequence of the State sovereignty. Therefore we support the idea that, within the EU system, each “state apparatus” of the EU member states is unique and supreme for its State, while the other two (European and infra-state) levels of governance can not have “state apparatuses” as it would affect the sovereignty of the Member States and would block, through unnecessary complication of an already complicated system of political organization, its functioning and development.

On the other hand, the emergence and consolidation of a “state apparatus” at European level could lead to emptying the contents, formalization and then disappearance of the state apparatuses” of the EU member states, the entire EU system getting a strong supranational nature, supporting the European level of governance, which would thus reach the peak of its evolution. In this context, the EU institutions would become the depositories of a single, supreme “European” power16, directly and solely from the will of the European peoples; moreover, if we accept this hypothesis, the direct consequence would be to recognize the existence of an “European sovereignty” (as a political power belonging to the European peoples of the EU nations, directly and exclusively exercised by the institutions of the European level of governance, while the state bodies would have a decorative, symbolic role or would exercise the European political power by delegation from the main, European level of governance). This hypothesis would exacerbate the political role of the EU institutions, which would become promoters of a pyramid type of organization of the European political power and thereby contribute to the decline of the state bodies of the Member States, while, paradoxically, would take themselves a true state model (once the EU is transformed into a European state). It is an assumption that ignores the flexibility, dynamics and complexity of the EU system, condemning it to resume the state experience at European level, removing any innovation and originality. 17

We would thus witness a failure of the development of the EU institutions, once the state institutional model is fully adopted (while the conservative stage becomes a regression phase); implicitly, we would witness a decline in their originality (whereas they become institutions of state type, operating in a pyramidal and rigid political system).

Therefore, while rejecting such a rigid hypothesis, we affirm such legal paradox, namely that the EU system can be understood as an “organized political power” without involving an organization of state type at the European level of governance18.

NOTES:

1 This article is representing, in all its elements, a private opinion, as a result of the fundamental liberty of opinion and expression, specific to democratic states and rule of law. It doesn’t involve the foreign policy of the Romanian state. Also, it doesn’t involve any physical or juridical person of domestic or public law.

2 Some authors consider that we are speaking about a state when we can see that „it has all powers relating to the exercise of the public power”, while elsewhere, the state identifies with the sovereign power, and it is claimed that the state should be limited precisely
because of the existence of such legal nature (Yves GUCHET, Jean CATSIAPIS, Droit constitutionnel, Ellipses, Paris 1996, p. 9). Likewise, equating the state with the public power, regardless of its form of expression, see page 7. Within the meaning of “double face” of the state (as a fact but also as an abstraction) and as institutionalized form of the political power, see Philippe FOILLARD, Droit constitutionnel et Institutions Politiques, 2004, Manuel, Paradigms, Publications Universitaires, Orleans, p. 5 but also Jean-Paul JACQUE, Droit constitutionnel et Institutions Politiques, Dalloz, Paris, 1996, p. 3.


5 In the EU political system, the political governance is exercised simultaneously (which is an excess of neo-functionalism) both at a European level (through the EU institutions) and at the national one (by the state bodies, in case of the obligations to respect the direct effect of European legislation or to transpose European legal acts that have no direct effect). Thus, the EU institutionalizes the simultaneous appeal to integrated Community procedures and those of intergovernmental nature (cf. Guy ISAAC, Droit communautaire général, Armand Colin, Paris, 1996, p. 12).

6 Feature of a supranational organization or entity to the extent that the national authorities “transferred sovereignties” or, in other words, accepted the direct effect of the Community legal rules on the extent to which states are imposed the enacted measures or decisions of the EU institutions, without the formality of a specific procedure, especially when these actions and decisions of the “permanent bodies” of such entity take precedence over the national legal rules (part regarded as affecting the sovereignty of the Member States). See Astrid KOGELS, The pillar structure of the European Union after the Treaty of Amsterdam, November 1999, Pierre PACTET, Institutions Politiques. Droit constitutionnel, Armand Colin, 21\textsuperscript{e} edition, 2002, updated (August 1\textsuperscript{er}, 2004), Paris, Dalloz Publishing House, pp. 60-61.


8 According to some authors, the EU is a relatively new form of political system which, despite its uniqueness, can be compared with other forms of political regional integration such as ASEAN, NAFTA and MERCOSUR. See Morten KELSTRUP, Integration Policy. Between Foreign Policy and Diffusion, in Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, copra, Working Paper, 17/2000. In this view, the international political integration leads to the formation of political systems based on a political community, having a center of decision making and creating a possible political identity, without being transformed into a state. Following other authors, the EU is a political space that encourages mobilization because it is complex and relatively disorganized, unlike a nation state. The EU does not have a single center of authority and has no claim for creating a sense of community or common identity, while it is “preferred by the stateless nations and regions as a more neutral forum than the state and as a place where issues of sovereignty and the supreme authority are necessarily ambiguous”, which gets the EU away from the project of establishing a new state or federation. See Michael KEATING, Asymmetrical Government: Multinational States in an Integrating Europe, Publius, The Journal of Federalism, Winter 1999, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 76-77.

9 According to some authors, the power comes from potestas, expressing the ability to act and actors holding it are called “public authorities” or “public powers”. The concept of “power” is complex, full of ambiguities [BALANDIER, 1967: 49] because, being born from the need to arbitrate between unequal social forces, the power uses inequality to strengthen itself. But power regulation is made by reference to the rule of law, to ensure the prevention from the abuse fatality and compliance with the rule of law. See Olivier DUHAMEL, Yves MENY, Dictionnaire constitutionnel, PUF, 1992, pp. 770-771. In this respect, the European political power should refer implicitly to the rule of law - the Community Treaties and all types of rules of Community law, but also to the rules of law of the Member States and the rules of international law, to ensuring the protection of the EU citizens’ rights and prevent abuse of power.

10 For authors as Jürgen HABERMAS, the political space of European democracy is just one that is additional to the national democracies and does not jeopardize them; however, in Europe, nation-state has become too small to meet the challenges of the intensified globalization, so that the states choose to transfer the political space and democratic institutions to a higher level. In this space an “European people” will form, in parallel with the EU institutions (due, in this view, to the close links between a nation’s identity and the emergence of a democratic process at European level). Jürgen HABERMAS, Après l’État-nation, Paris, Fayard, 2000, Jürgen HABERMAS, Human

11 While the EU could be based on a constitution, same as a state, however, it is not clear whether the Union will take over other characteristics of a nation state as well, or will get “a supra-national nation state”, defined as a multiethnic state, occupying a large area and encompassing a greater number of dialects and cultures than those of traditionally multi-ethnic countries such as Belgium or Spain. See to length Michael ROSENFELD, The European Treaty: Constitution and Constitutional Identity. A Comment on Professor von Bogdandy, in Jean Monnet Working Paper 5 / 2004, ALTNEULAND, The EU Constitution in a Contextual Perspective.


13 Clive H. CHURCH, David PHINNEMORE, The Penguin Guide to the European Treaties. From Rome to Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Beyond, Penguin Books, London, England, 2002, p. 229. At the same time, these authors explain why the legal institution of “European citizenship” has been incorporated into the TEC and not into the TEU (as a consequence of the lack of legal personality of the EU; due to the pre-existence in a form of mainly economic rights within the TEC, of the rights related to the “EU citizenship”; due to the fear that the EU is interpreted as “a binding state body”; due to the close relationship between the state and the citizenship; due to the “lack of legal protection of the rights concerned”, within the pillars II and III, as intergovernmental pillars). However, we consider the “European citizenship” as a clear character of supranationality indicating a state feature of the Union.

14 Treaties which established and amended the EU do not use the term “state apparatus” or “state body”, but “sole institutional framework” or “EU institutions”, proof that the Union has not reached the state stage in its development yet. The Union is not a state in the sense of being a member of the international state system, which means that international law protects the territorial integrity of the Member States rather than the Union itself and thus a common European defence system would not fundamentally alter the binary logic of statehood within the international system. A military attack of a foreign power would entail an obligation of military assistance from all the other Member States but would be interpreted as an attack against an individual state, not against the territorial integrity of the Union.

Also, the separation of a Member State from the Union would not affect the territorial integrity of any state. See to length Rainer BAUBOCK, Multilevel citizenship and territorial borders in the EU polity, IWE, Working Papers Series, no. 37, Janmer 2003, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften Forschungsstelle für Institutionellen Wandel und Europäische Integration, Wien.

15 The EU’s political system consists of three levels of governance (European, national, regional or local), considered also by the constitutional treaty/2004, art. 1-5, paragraph 1 and art. 1-11, paragraph 3. As representatives of the argument concerning the Union as a multi-level governance system, see Helen WALLACE, William WALLACE, The political process in the European Union, Arc Publishing House, Chisinau, translated by Genoveva BOLEA, 2004, pp. 34-35. Also, Thomas DIEZ, Richard WHITMAN, Analysing European Integration, Reflecting on the English School. Scenarios for an Encounter, Working Papers, 20/2000, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute.

16 According to authors such as Hannah ARENDT and Paul RICOEUR, “any power institutional system which would not be based on a society that is aware of its identity and animated by the desire to live together would be built on sand”. In this context, the European power would be closely linked to the “existence of a European society and its organic, living relationship to the institutional political system”. Without a European society, there is no political entity, according to this opinion. See to length Philippe HERTZOG, Formation d une société civile européenne et ouverture du système institutionnel in La gouvernance dans l’Union Européenne, edited by Olivier de SCHULTER, Notis LEBBESIS and John PATERSON, Commission Européenne, 2001, Luxembourg, Office des Publications Officielles des Communautés Européennes, Les Cahiers de la Cellule de Prospective de la Commission Européennes.

17 The original character of the EU (which is not a federal state, although there is evidence to suggest this) is supported by authors such as Philippe MANIN, Droit constitutionnel de l’Union Européenne, A Pedone Publishing House, Paris, 2004, pp. 66, 70. For another author, the Union is not an international classic organization or a state but is and will remain a partially federal union, due to the principles of direct effect, the pre-eminence of the EU rule of law over the national one, the subsidiarity, the principle of empowerment, due to the execution federalism or indirect administration, according to that the responsibility for the application of the EU law belongs to the Member States and also due to an institutional system allowing adoption of a restrictive legal legislation of the EU. But the Union does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the CFSP and has no power to levy fees and taxes, which distinguishes it.

18 Other authors state that the EU is “a form of collective governance” or “without statehood”, “a collective political system, not an intergovernmental regime”, thus summarizing a whole doctrine trend concerning the legal and political nature of the EU. See William WALLACE, Collective governance. EU political process, in Helen WALLACE, William WALLACE (coord.), cited work, pp. 540-541.
The European integration and road transport development facilitated the movement of citizens and goods in the national and European area. For these significant movements of persons and goods to be done safely, these movements must be organized, must have the means, the material basis and norms for their effectuation. In this regard, are constituted societies for transport facilities (roadways and railways), state’s institutions regulating these movements, societies maintaining the transport ways. Frequently, owed to the increased numbers of vehicles on the roadways, and also to the infringement of circulation rules by some of the auto drivers, there are produced more or less serious accidents. Therefore, the increase of road security level represents a national and European preoccupation.

Key-words: road security; road traffic; road accidents; EU traffic.

1. Preliminary considerations

Nowadays, into the globalization’s conditions, the movements of humans and goods from a part of the world to another are a daily phenomenon. For these significant movements of persons and goods to be fulfilled safely, there’re absolutely needed the proper organization, means, the material basis and norms for their effectuation. For this purpose, there are constituted societies for transport facilities (roadways and railways), state’s institutions regulating these movements, and societies maintaining the transport ways. Often, because of the increased number of vehicles circulating on roadways and the infringement by some auto drivers of the circulation rules there are produced more or less serious accidents, which result in human casualties, persons’ injuries and diverse goods’ destruction.

In the world, recently, road accidents have killed 1.3 millions of persons and injured 40 times more individuals. More than 90 % of casualties happen in countries with low or intermediary revenues, where are counted just 48% from world’s registered vehicles. The world’s record is got by Russia which has, yearly, 12 accidents for 10,000 cars and 35,000 dead individuals. Also, specialists’ forecasting in the field shows that, from now until 2030, road accidents will provoke yearly 2.4 millions casualties, this being the fifth cause of death in the world. In the metropolitan France, in 2005, 4,990 individuals were killed and 105,006 were injured in road accidents and, in 2007, there were registered 4,629 casualties and 103,201 injured individuals. In 2008, there happened road accidents followed by 2,800 injured people and 35 kills from the pedestrian children. Also Romania is confronting with a continuous increment of road accidents’ victims. The statistics show that, yearly, about 3,000 Romanians are loosing their lives on the roads. As regard the persons killed in car accidents, Romania is situating on the second place among the EU countries. In the first mid of 2008 took place 13,000 road accidents, 4,000 peoples were injured and 1.300 died. These comparisons must take into account the structural differences (country’s size, the density and quality of the roads’ network, population) and socio-economic ones (the types of vehicles, the presence of international and tourist traffic, the behaviour of the vehicles and transport facilities’ users).
2. The role of the local communities in case of road accident

In case of road accident, local communities act conforming to their legal competences peculiar for such event occurrence on their territory. Moreover, they act when they have the possibility and the necessary means by giving the first aid to the ones involved in road accidents. Also, they take measures to protect the place where the respective accident produced until the legal and competent representatives come for intervening to solve all the risen problems owed to the road accident producing. Consequently, just in case, local communities offer another services of first aid: the prevention of fire outburst to the accident’s place; the extinguishment of eventual fire; primary medical assistance to the injured; shelter to the ones with minor injures or to the unharmed, but affected by a rail accident, for example.

3. The public-private partnerships in case of road accident

Public-private partnership is a particular form of cooperation among the public authorities and profit-based private organizations situated in the same territory and having as a goal among others the one of local development. It's the process through which public and private sectors are incited to collaborate to the research, elaboration and implementation of solutions without any chances to succeed under the hypothesis that every partner aims strictly to its own interest.

Their interests and perspectives are still different and for a viable partnership there must be fulfilled the both parties. The public sector aims at a general interest, but the private sector, at a particular one. Therefore, for a project to be successful it must gather both interests. On the one hand, the public-private partnership can be represented as an association of public and private decisions and means into the same action system, defined as objective and a period of time aiming as a main goal to simultaneously satisfy the consumers and citizens’ expectances. On the other hand, partnership means cooperation among persons and organizations from the both public and private sectors for the mutual benefit, the mobilization of the interests’ coalition aggregate, composed by the public power and private resources, based upon an accepted degree of risk.

Every private-public partnership is regarded from a bi-dimensional perspective: the political dimension: the public-private partnership is a process producing consequences over communities’ goals. The increase of partnership complexity supposes a bigger investment capital, new institutional arrangements, disturbances in life’s routine and a higher necessary for civic foundation of the process; the operational dimension: from this perspective, the cooperation can get three forms: 1. private initiative for public benefit; 2. administration's initiative for the facilitation or encouragement of private activity in public benefit; 3. joint venture among govern and private administrations, or private firms, NGOs or non-profit organizations.

The economic analysts, peculiarly the European ones, emphasizing this type of partnership, concluded that the transfer of managerial concepts from the private sector to the public one can diminish deficiencies of the public sector’s economy. These deficiencies emerge from the fact that the persons that manages the public money don’t assume any personal risk because these aren’t their funds and also these persons are under a certain pressure or extern influences many of political or administrative nature, and even of their personal interest. These influences can diminish the efficiency of resources allotment. It is obvious that these deficiencies also emerge from the private sector strictly from individuals (all constituting taxes and central or local fees afferent to the salary revenues or other nature revenues, or coming from the possession of mobile and immobile goods), or from companies (to those diminishing the profit and the investment resources).

There are some reasons for the private sector representatives to be willing to accept the conditions of a partnership with the public sector, some of these reasons may be: the acceptance of the social responsibility while obtaining the accession into a market segment which they couldn’t approach without the partnership; a judicious re-allocation of the budgetary resources which, on long term, can reduce the public sector pressure of financial resources taking over; the allocation of some resources (budgetary funds) to the private sector which could produce a measurable economic growth; some personal relations settlement with the public sector representatives to allow the access
to information, financing, sources, to programs for local, regional or national development in the detriment of other organizations, relation that can be suspected of conflict of interests or other nature conflicts.

Besides the mentioned suspicions, all these relations can be analysed also by the fact that all the re-allotted resources from the public sector to the private one will produce visible, measurable economic development. Inclusively the fiscal evasion can be analysed by this excluding the situation when the resources are directed toward another states, fiscal paradises or sustaining some foreign and obscure interests.

Under the conditions of globalisation, it remains to clearly define what local and national interest mean and what foreign or obscure interest mean. Under the same conditions we should, as far as it is possible, to clearly delimitate the public sector from the private one. In regard to the information we have and analysing all the happenings from the contemporary aggregated society, it seems impossible to settle such delimitations.

As far as transport accidents are concerned, in all the means of transport there can be constituted public-private partnerships; these partnerships can aim at building public ways, railways, airdromes or harbours, at maintaining them and managing the specific activities for every one of these sectors of human activity.

4. EU policies and strategies regarding road traffic management and accidents prevention in these fields

4.1. EU approach on road accidents

The European Union has an active attitude regarding road accidents as the adoption and implementation of a coherent ensemble of preventive and limitative measures over the unwanted effects of such events. In this purpose, there are effectuated interdisciplinary studies concerning the road security and there are also collected, processed, analysed and interpreted data referring to road accidents and these data being used afterwards to complete the already implemented measures and to adopt new ones to diminish those events’ consequences. It’s worth mentioning that in the EU, the measures of European citizens’ security augmentation inclusively the public transport of persons and goods are differently adopted in report to the regarded population. Here are regarded children (0-14 years) and old persons (over 60 years), two categories appreciated as peculiarly vulnerable in the modern traffic conditions. Also, a great attention is paid to the security of bicyclists and motorcyclists. So, in regard to a study⁹ of the World Health Organization (WHO) regional bureau for Europe, children and old people due to their vulnerability are the most exposed as compared to the rest of population to decease when they are involved into a road circulation accident. Therefore, the study underlines that from the total of involved individuals into a road circulation accident, about 34,000 are persons from the age group of 0-14 years and over 60 years. Annually, the pedestrians and bicyclists register about 33% of road accidents’ victims from which 40,000 are casualties.

The mentioned study appreciated that the traumatisms from the road circulation accidents are the main cause of mortality for the 5-14 year old children estimating they represent about 5% (meaning 5,000 cases)⁹. Children are especially vulnerable until the ages of 9-10 years because of their insufficient capacity to be attentive to the surrounding traffic. In the European region of the Russian Federation, in Letonia, Moldavian Republic and Romania there are the higher rates of infantile mortality caused by road accidents.

Also, the persons over 60 years are vulnerable to the traumatisms determined by road accidents because of their physical fragility and their diminished capacity to confront the difficult circulation conditions. The quoted source affirms that in the European region of the Russian Federation, more than 27,000 old people loose their lives in traffic accidents. As regard the pedestrians, the old represent almost a half from the victims registered in the EU member states and the ones from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. The old should number a quarter from those countries ensemble until 2030, therefore it is essential to be defined new strategies to respond to their needs of mobility and security. These strategies should comprise an evaluation of the road facilities and their maintenance, the possibilities offered by public transports, the new technologies, the vehicles’ conception and the regulations.

The study includes, in the category of vulnerable persons, pedestrians, bicyclists and
motorcyclists which generally suffer the gravest traumatisms that make their health issues to be more serious and with an increase need of assistance on prolonged period of time. In the European region of WHO, pedestrians and bicyclists represent a range about 20% from the persons involved in serious accidents, but they risk a disproportional possibility of decease in report to the automobiles’ occupants. In 1997, pedestrians and bicyclists represented only 22% from the persons being victims of serious accidents, but 33% from the deceased persons resulted by the accidents. The risks’ analysis for the European Union relates that from all the identified means of transport, the higher risk of decease comes to the motorcyclists: a range of 20 times more than the occupants of particular vehicles. Still, where there were taken efficient measures to improve the security of bicyclists and pedestrians, the cases of traumatisms and decease decreased.

Tourists are another category of persons regarded by the EU to assess their absolutely needed security. This happens also because in the EU road circulation accidents seem to be the main cause of tourists’ deceases representing almost 50% from the decease causes, 20% interned in hospital and 30% taken by the emergency services[11].

Road accidents have also other unwanted consequences besides the already mentioned ones. So, these, among the produced deceases and traumatisms, have a profound impact over the social and health systems. In the EU, there are estimations that, yearly, 200,000 families cried the decease or permanent incapacity of at least one member[12]. Under the conditions of dangerous circulation, citizens’ mobility is restricted and so are the occasions to lead a physically active life, as example by cycling, by walking or by open air games although it was proved that the absence of physical activity constitutes a major risk for health. Physical inactivity is considered responsible for 500,000 to 1,000,000 deceases yearly, meaning about 5-10% from the total deceases in the European region[13]. The quoted source states that about a fifth from the injured people in the circulation accidents examined into a study framework developed an acute stress reaction and a quarter of them presented mental problems along the first year following the accident. Long time mental distresses are the main affective distresses (about 10% of cases), a phobia of road movements (20%) and a post-traumatic stress (11%).

The EU’s competent institutions adopted for 2003-2010 period a program of action for road security[14] in regard to increase the degree of road security in the European area. The start point of this program adoption and implementation was the reality where all the transports means present security risks for all the categories of persons, but road transport gets an essential dangerous place. Moreover, this does the most of the victims as the already quoted study referred. Therefore, the action program developed for 2003-2010 period in the EU prescribes a catalogue of measures as strengthening of the road controls, deployment of new strategies of road security, road facilities improvement and actions viewing the improvement of the participants to road traffic behaviour. The final objective of this program is to be the reduction with at least 50% of the number of killed persons in road accidents.

Yearly, 1,300,000 accidents cause more than 40,000 deaths and 1,700,000 injured persons. Direct and indirect costs were evaluated at 160 billions euro meaning 2% from EU GDP[15]. Certain groups of population or categories of users are more vulnerable: the young between 15-24 years (10,000 killed yearly), pedestrians (7,000 killed yearly) or bicyclists (1,800 killed yearly)[16].

All the member states confront the same problems of road security, as follows: excessive speed; alcohol consume; not wearing the safety belt; the insufficient protection; blind points; failure to respect drive and rest times; poor visibility.

4.2. The EU program of action for road security (2003-2010)

To reduce the number of deceased persons the named program settled a series of objectives and measures differentiated on categories of participants at the road traffic.

A first objective is represented by urging of the participants to road traffic to adopt a civilized behaviour, conforming to the rules and norms provisioned in the Codes of circulation. In this concern, at the EU’s level, is wanted a harmonization of the applied sanctions to the people manifesting an inadequate behaviour in traffic, consequently, insisting on continuous formation of the professional and amateur auto
drivers, on the intensification of road police controls and on the encouragement of campaigns for education sensitisation of the participants to the road traffic. These measures are imposed moreover when the infringement of road circulation rules is the essential source of road insecurity. In fact, this is the main cause of grave circulation accidents. Besides the campaign for education and sensitization of the participants to the road traffic, the European Commission will act to modify the directive on driving license to raise the level of exigency about minimal attitudes of the auto drivers.

Consequently, it will insist on: the generalized use of protection cap, especially by the bicyclists; the settlement of the list with medicines having negative effects over the aptitude of driving; and flexibility of practise in matters of road police control.

Another objective of the analyzed program is constituted by the technical progresses valuation in matter of auto security. Hereby, we speak about making the vehicles safer by harmonizing the security measures (for example, the obligation to wear the safety belt in the vehicle) and by implementing any technical progress into vehicles’ construction. In this concern, through the measures adopted there will be: the generalization of universal fixation systems for children’s safety in the auto vehicles; the auto vehicles improvement as to reduce the gravity of accidents involving pedestrians and bicyclists; the elimination of the blind point for heavy tonnage transports; the ease of circulation for persons with reduced mobility; the improvement of motorcyclists’ security.

Also, the program prescribes the road infrastructure improvement by the identification and elimination of the dangerous places. The road infrastructure improvement can contribute to the diminution of road accidents frequency and gravity.

To develop an “intelligent roadway”, since 2008, the European GPS service was activated, allowing implementing some navigation and ordering information over the road circulation situation or monitoring the vehicles transporting dangerous products. In this regard, at the EU’s level, there will be adopted measures as: the proposal of directives about road facilities security; the development of technical guides for audit methods; security management in urban environment, techniques for speed moderation; the elaboration of a practical guide for rail crossing places; the accomplishment of impact studies over new projects’ security; the improvement of security levels into the tunnels.

Merchandise and passengers’ professional transport security is another major issue for the EU. Therefore, an objective of the 2002-2010’s program is the diminution of the number of accidents involving heavy transports and the regulation of professional auto drivers’ formation and the respect of driving and rest times. In this concern, there will be adopted the following measures: strengthen the regulation regarding the work conditions for professional auto drivers, introduce digital devices to register the driving hours in commercial vehicles; the adaptation to the technical progress of the communitarian legislation on dangerous goods transport; the obligation of wearing the safety belt in cars and another vehicles; the improvement of the protection for vehicles regularly transporting children.

First aid and medical assistance in case of road circulation accidents represents a main EU preoccupation in matter of road security. In this concern, it is foreseen the improvement of intervention and diagnosis in road accidents situation leading to numerous lives savings. 112 phone number allows phone networks operators to offer to aid services the information allowing the localization of the emergency call from the accident’s place. Also, there is needed detailed information about injuries gravity for a better understanding of the possibilities to diminish the damages and to measure the efficacy of emergency medical services. Among the measures proposed for reaching this objective there are the following: to accomplish the demonstrative projects involving the entire chain of aid and the study of the best post-accidents practices.

The objective of accidents’ data collection, analysis and release is very present at the EU’s level and at the level of all the member states as well. There’s the way to improve the data collection and analysis of the accidents to determine the priority action fields. Although the accidents are unpredictable events it is still necessary to know their cause, circumstances and consequences for being able to deal, avoid or attenuate their gravity. The inquiries must be undergone at national level.
but in accordance to the European methodology. The results should be communicated to an independent experts’ committee charged with the legislation improvement and the methodology adaptation to the technical evolutions. Also, the European Commission regards to put into practice a European Observatory of Road Security as a Commission’s interim body. As measures to materialize this objective are the followings: the development and completion of CARE database; the evaluation and amelioration of systems connecting the hospitals’ data with national statistics regarding road accidents; the settlement of a European technology for independent inquiries over road accidents; the institution of an independent experts’ group.

A significant objective is constituted by the elaboration of a European Chart of Road Security. The European Commission counts over the mobilization of the regarded parts’ ensemble as transport enterprises, vehicles’ builders, assurance societies, societies exploiting and maintaining road facilities, local communities, inviting them to adhere to the European Chart of Road Security. Every adherent will assume specific engagements made public and their compliance will be monitored. Actually, the European Chart of Road Security regards to integrate the civil society into the efforts of the communitarian objective to reduce at half the number of killed persons in road accidents until the end of the year 2010.

This EU active attitude against road accidents starts from the reality that the traumatisms and deceases following these unpredictable and unwanted events are the cause of about 1.2 millions persons’ kill and not less then 50 millions wounded in every year in such accidents. The forecasting is showing that these ciphers will grow with about 60% during the following 20 years17. The global report regarding the prevention of traumatisms caused by road accidents is the first thorough report published by WHO and World Bank on this subject. Daily, in the world, about 16,000 people die after the traumatisms suffered18. This represents 12% from the global range of the maladies and the third cause of mortality and, also, the first cause of decease in the 1-40 year old age group.

Widely, the traumatisms’ category is dominated by road accidents’ ones. In regard to WHO data, the deceases following these accidents represent almost 25% from the deceases caused by traumatisms. Due to the limits in traumatisms’ data collection and analysis, the under-declaration problems and differences in interpretations, the estimations of the annual number of deceases imputable to road traffic vary. The numbers are about 750,000, being probably an underestimation because the calculus is based on 1998’s data, at 1,183,492 yearly, this being the equivalent of more than 3,000 lives lost in a day.

About 85% from the deceases imputable to road circulation, 90% from the life years affected by incapacity owed to accidents and 96% from the dead children in road accidents in the world are from countries with poor or medium revenue. For 5-14 year old children and 15-29 year old adults, the traumatisms caused by road circulation accidents are the second reason of deceases in the world.

To continue the adequate implementation of all the measures of road security in the EU member states, its competent institutions will apply a new program of road security for the 2011-2020 period of time. The continuation of these actions in matter of road security is necessary if is regarded “the share” of circulation accidents to the decease of a significant number of persons and to the more or less grave injury of others. For instance, in 2008, about 39,000 persons and another 1,600,000 were injured died on EU roads19. Therefore, we can appreciate road security is a right of every people. The European Union stipulated this right in treaties and from here comes the assuming of obligations and responsibilities in matter of road security. These responsibilities are assumed by the European Union, national governs, local authorities, industry, the users of public roads etc. Consequently, all the European citizens have a responsibility in realising this objective of road security improvement.

The future actions’ program regarding road security continues the application of adequate measures to reach the aimed objectives through the anterior similar program. Therefore, there will be continued the actions regarding:

✓ The security of the vehicles circulating on public roads. In this particular case, we speak about new vehicles, but also the ones in use. In this concern, in the EU, there will be practised a harmonized system of technical controls and regular inspections of the vehicles circulating on European roads (this lexically group is taken in the
The security of the infrastructure is the objective of regulatory framework on road tunnels security and also the general infrastructures. EU decided it won’t give co-financing for the construction and maintenance of trans-European networks’ public roads unless impact analyses and audit on road security are effectuated before the construction and along the maintenance operations.

The behaviour of European roads’ users constitutes the third frame of road security strategy. EU adopted rules concerning the initial and continuous formation of professional auto drivers, concerning the minimum exigencies of formation to obtain a driving license, concerning the control of driving and rest time of the professional auto drivers of trucks, buses etc.

Moreover, another aspect that will be treated is the necessity of road security integration in other European policies as education, health policy, surrounding environment policy, scientific research in the road security field etc.

Conclusions

Yearly, road accidents are the cause of numerous human deceases and traumatisms registered throughout the whole world. Therefore, it raises the preoccupation of all the national, central and local authorities, but also EU’s ones, for a significant diminution. Actually, besides the human casualties, the social and economic consequences of road accidents constitute a heavy burden for society inclusively for the national security.

Most of these consequences can be eliminated and their negative effects can be limited by adequate measures of prevention and qualified first aid given to the one who had the bad luck to be involved in a road accident. Here, local authorities interact with the central national ones and also with the European institutions with competencies in matter of road security.

At national and European levels, there are taken concerted actions aiming to improve and strengthen road security. In this context, we shall remind the European action program for road security for 2003-2010 and the program continuing it for the 2011-2020 period of time.

The implementation of these European actions’ programs for road security will lead to the substantial diminution of deceased and injured people caused by the road circulation accidents.

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13 Ibidem, p. 3.
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Throughout the 20th century, the major powers in the global Anglosphere often found themselves allies in armed conflict. These war-time alliances – sometimes temporary, more often part of a longer term cooperation – are sometimes held to arise because of common histories, common values, similar national ideologies and similar notions of international right and wrong. Indeed, the political rhetoric surrounding the declarations of war has often cited such factors as colonial history, international friendship and “special relationships” as motivators for joining armed coalitions against third party states. Yet while there stand stark examples of these major English speaking powers acting entirely in congress there exist numerous instances where one or more of these powers chose not to join a coalition alongside their Anglophonic associates. This article argues that explanations of Anglophonic coalitions that rely on notions of a shared history, similar political ideologies, common political and social values or similar notions of international morality all fall short of explaining the coalition joining/rejecting behaviour of the major powers of the Anglosphere in war-time during the 20th century. Drawing on data from the Correlates of War (CoW) project, this article will show that pure national interest drove the decisions of states to join or reject coalitions, lending strong support to a structural realist explanation for their behaviour, with this conclusion presenting opportunities for re-assessing alliance politics in Eastern Europe and South America.

Key-words: English speaking states; alliances; wars; Anglosphere.

Introduction

Many individuals belonging to the scholarly, diplomatic and political communities of the major English speaking states consider that there is something that binds them together with those who share a common language that goes beyond words. Phrases like “special relationship”, terms such as “cousins” and allegiances pledged with reference to shared histories are common across the Anglosphere and lead many of them to conclude that alliances between Anglophonic states are motivated by something other than raw balance of power politics. Indeed, when the recourse to war becomes the sole option for an Anglosphere state, it is often held that – as a rule – the other Anglophonic states will join in common cause, supporting the common civilisation, the common history and the common notions of international morality at stake in the fight. Yet a careful look at the record of the major Anglosphere powers over the course of the twentieth-century shows something short of this ‘one for all, all for one’ myth; instead, it depicts an Anglosphere as divided as any other collection of states in an anarchical system. While there are times that all major English speaking powers fought side-by-side, there are others that saw one or another English speaking power acting alone or in concert with only one other Anglosphere power. In short, in times of war there seems to be nothing very special about the “special relationships” the Anglosphere claims.

In the face of this reality, this article seeks firstly to examine and then to explain war time alliances of the Anglosphere powers over the course of the twentieth-century. The article will
be presented in four parts. The first considers the arguments briefly outlined above, presenting and explaining the claims that scholars and practitioners have made for the Anglosphere powers allying out of common history, common morality, colonial or civilization bonds. Having presented these arguments, a second section will explore the reality of the war-time alliances of the twentieth century across the Anglosphere. Drawing on data collected by the Correlates of War (CoW) Project, the war fighting records of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States and the United Kingdom will be presented and the wars in which they aligned, or did not align, will be detailed. Having demonstrated that consistent Anglospheric solidarity is a myth, a third section will detail an alternate explanation drawing on structural realist assumptions of international anarchy and state awareness of power relations. Finally, a fourth section will conclude the article by pointing to the reasons why, even if untrue, the myth of Anglospheric alliance solidarity continues to remain part of English speaking political discourse.

**Big Brothers, Cousins and Special Relationships**

Sharing a common language does not necessarily lead to a friendly parlance between states. Indeed, in recent times, rhetorical and diplomatic relations between Venezuela and Columbia (whose official language is Spanish) and Russia and Ukraine (Russian as official language) have bordered on aggressive, if not completely devolved into the equivalent of international slanging over contentious points of foreign policy. The Anglosphere, by contrast, remains a rather respectful realm where states refer to each other in gracious terms and civility is the norm.

Consider, for example, the “special relationship” that is supposed between the United States and the United Kingdom. Popular accounts as early as the 19th century use this term to describe an unparalleled amity between two major powers in the international system. The following excerpt from *The Times* is typical: “There is, therefore, not the slightest occasion for other States to adopt as their model and example a form of agreement which may, perhaps, be advantage to England and America in their special relationship”.

Similar reference was made to the special relationship in the period before World War One where *The Times* recalled “that Great Britain and the United States stand to one another in a special relationship” and, again, in the early 1920s where “the special relationship of good will and mutual understanding between ourselves [Britain] and the United States” was again explored. Such sentiments remained common in the media as well as in political discourse throughout the 1920s and 1930s, though it took World War II to cement the phrase in the mind of the masses.

It was the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, who popularised the term “special relationship” on both sides of the Atlantic, driving the notion of a unique international arrangement in speeches in both the US and at home. Shortly after the Second World War Churchill asserted that “we should not abandon our special relationship with the United States...about the atomic bomb and we should aid the United States to guard this weapon as a sacred trust for the maintenance of peace.”

Churchill would also refer to the special relationship in his famed “Iron Curtain” speech at Westminster College, Missouri, though he broadened the relationship to include the wider Commonwealth and a “fraternal association of English-speaking peoples.”

The notion of the special relationship endures today. According to press reports, current US President, Barack Obama, used his congratulatory phone call to incoming British Prime Minister David Cameron to reaffirm that “the United States has no closer friend and ally than the United Kingdom” and he reiterated his “deep and personal commitment to the special relationship between [the] two countries, a bond that has endured for generations and across party lines”.

These two English speaking powers, then, share a political rhetoric drawing on more than a century of formal and informal alliances – yet they are not the only example of such trans-Anglo-British appreciation.

Australia has long demonstrated its strong support for the more powerful English speaking states. A long colonial history with Great Britain, a strong post-colonial alliance with the same state and a post-World War II alliance with the United States have been the three historical cornerstones of Australian foreign policy since the end of the
18th century. Indeed, so close were Australia’s ties to Great Britain that it was largely unremarkable for Prime Minister Cook to announce in August 1914 that “when the Empire is at war, Australia is at war”. This sentiment would continue during the first part of the twentieth century with Prime Minister Robert Menzies announcing quite matter-of-factly Australia’s declaration of war upon Germany in 1939: “Fellow Australians, it is my melancholy duty to inform you officially, that in consequence of persistence by Germany in her invasion of Poland, Great Britain has declared war upon her and that, as a result, Australia is also at war. No harder task can fall to the lot of a democratic leader than to make such an announcement”.

While doubts could be raised as to the independence of Australian foreign policy at the outbreak of World War One, its independence from the British Empire was both de facto and de jure by September 1939 yet, again, the ‘if, then’ statement of the Prime Minister was again unremarkable. The bonds of history and culture between Australia and its antipodean neighbour New Zealand with the stronger and more prominent Great Britain were so strong that there was no question of refusing to involve either state in a major conflict in a European theatre.

Then, in summary, the special relationships, the “if, then” political decisions and the strong cross-Atlantic links between Canada, the US and Britain all suggest, to some extent, a link between being an English speaking state and acting in concert with other English speaking states. Alliances in the Anglosphere make the consistent connection to historical elements, colonial pasts, longstanding friendships and even familial bonds between nation-states, all with at least some link to the common language and culture that the English speaking states of the world system share. Yet is this political rhetoric matched by actual “boots on the ground” in times of crisis, conflict and war? To what extent do the obvious strong historical and diplomatic bonds across the major powers of the Anglosphere correlate with the common cause in war fighting? In short, do Anglosphere states ally in times of war because they are Anglosphere states or can their choices to ally or not ally be explained completely without reference to the Anglosphere at all? In the following section, this article will present data that suggests that Anglospheric alliances are not nearly as common or automatic as the political rhetoric might suggest.

### The Data Sets

The data collected here is sourced from the Correlates of War (CoW) Project, an international research project launched by J. David Singer in order to analyse the link, if any, between quantifiable elements of international politics and the outbreak, evolution and resolution of conflict in international politics. With complete data sets stretching back to the 19th century and including all of the period under investigation in this article (the 20th century), the CoW Project data sets exist as an incredibly detailed and greatly useful tool for political scientists with interests in conflict and socio-economic realities that may correlate with that conflict. While any attempt to quantify political and historical events is open to question – and, indeed, the CoW Project has been roundly criticised by some for its inclusive and exclusive decisions on certain data, including battle deaths – the CoW data sets remain one of the only collections of international information available to all researchers in political science and international relations without restriction. As a result, it has been used a source or a drawn into analysis in hundreds of published works over the course of its existence and continues to play an important role in quantitative efforts within the discipline.

This article will draw on three different CoW Project data sets:

- State System Membership (v2008.1)
- Inter, Extra and Intra-State Wars (v3.0)
- Formal Alliances (v3.03)\(^\text{10}\)

### The Focus States

Though the extent of the English speaking peoples is significant, this article considers only a sub-set of the Anglosphere. Limiting the analysis to the major English speaking powers and middle powers does obviously affect the breadth of the conclusions reached in this article; this is accepted and clearly stated. However, it is also held that the analysis of the larger elements of the Anglosphere and also the most internationally active elements of the Anglosphere can allow political scientists to draw conclusions about alliance politics within
the broader sphere of English speaking peoples. For the purposes of this article, the chosen focus states are Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.

**Formal Alliances in the Anglosphere**

There is a paucity of formal alliances between the major elements of the international Anglosphere. The following table, drawn from the CoW Project data set on formal alliances, illustrates both the small number of formal alliances and their largely non-Anglosphere exclusive nature.

As it is demonstrated by Table no. 1, formal alliances across the Anglosphere are uncommon and Anglosphere exclusive pacts even less common. Of the eight formal alliances involving more than one major Anglosphere power only three are exclusive to the Anglosphere and only two of those are ongoing, including one with a membership reduced from the date of first signature.

These three Anglosphere exclusive alliances have some similarities. First, two of the three can be considered alliances only between neighbours: the 1944 Canberra Pact and the 1958 NORAD treaty, respectively, Australia and New Zealand and the US and Canada ally bilaterally. The sole exception to this bilateralism is the 1951 ANZUS Treaty signed by Australia, New Zealand and the United States. This is the only formal Anglosphere-exclusive pact involving at least two regions (Oceania and North America), though it should also be noted it was also reduced, as a result of New Zealand’s withdrawal, to a largely bilateral pact between the US and Australia by the century’s end.

A second similarity is that it is the US that is a single recognised stronger partner in each of these three alliances: Australia in the Canberra Pact and the US in both ANZUS and NORAD. Even while bringing Anglosphere states together, then, there is no equality in burden sharing in these alliances. Less an alliance of equals, these seem to be clear cases of relatively weaker Anglosphere states seeking assistance, protection or support from stronger states.

It is also interesting to note that, for all the rhetoric surrounding the “special relationship” between the US and the UK, there is no formality to the alliance between the two states. While both were or are members of the Four Party Treaty, NATO, SEATO and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, these are also alliances that involve other members, some of whom bring or brought either equal or greater power to the alliance table. The organisational structure of NATO, for example, gives a voice to dozens of other nation-states in symphony with the UK and the US – the strength of that US voice aside, of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alliance Name</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>Finish Date</th>
<th>Anglosphere Members</th>
<th>Exclusive</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Four Power Treaty</td>
<td>13 Dec. 1921</td>
<td>18 Sep. 1931</td>
<td>US, UK</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canberra Pact</td>
<td>21 Jan. 1944</td>
<td>1 Sep. 1951</td>
<td>Australia (AUS), New Zealand (NZ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>4 April 1949</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>US, UK, CAN</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>1 Sep. 1951</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>US, AUS, NZ (until 12 Aug. 1986)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>8 Sep. 1954</td>
<td>33 Jun. 1977</td>
<td>US, UK, AUS, NZ</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>12 May 1958</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>US, CAN</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe</td>
<td>19 Nov. 1990</td>
<td>1 July 1991</td>
<td>US, CAN, UK</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table no. 1 – Formal Alliances in the Anglosphere
course – and could not be considered a simple expression of the lauded “special relationship”. Similarly, the short lived SEATO Treaty and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe saw the US and the UK as simply two of many states allied formally. No matter the diplomatic or political agendas of the UK and the US, the formal alliance behaviour does not support the notion that there is anything particularly special about their interrelationship in international affairs.

Alliances in Times of War

Alliances and coalitions in international politics are not usually formal, long-standing institutions in the vein of NATO. More often international conflict leads to short-term coalitions between states specific to the mission and disbanding when the mission is complete, the danger is passed or the situation resolved in some manner. These non-formal alliances are far more common than formal pacts and the English speaking world is no stranger to driving or joining such coalitions when circumstances demand. Thus, if the special relationships in the Anglosphere are not confirmed by formal signed pacts, there is a real chance that the relationships will be proved by assessing the conduct of Anglosphere powers in times of war. Simply put, if we are to believe that Anglosphere states share some special bond, we should be able to recognise that bond through the consistent allying of Anglosphere states in times of war and conflict.

Returning to the CoW datasets, we can identify various types of conflict across the course of the twentieth century. The CoW project differentiates between interstate wars (defined as military conflicts between states), extra-state wars (conflicts between states and non-state actors) and intrastate wars (conflicts within states/civil wars). In this part of the article we will consider these types of conflicts in turn, identifying all twentieth century wars that involved at least one of the focus states and noting which, if any, other focus states fought in alliance during that war.

Table no. 2 considers interstate wars, defined for the purposes of this article as interstate wars that began after 1st January 1900.

As Table no. 2 demonstrates, the alliance activity amongst the focus Anglosphere states is mixed. Clearly, there were conflicts where all Anglosphere powers were active alliance members. World War One, World War Two, the Korean War and the Gulf War saw all focus states active and in concert with their English speaking contemporaries. Yet these four conflicts represent just half of the interstate wars that the Anglosphere participated in during the twentieth century with another four interstate wars involving only one, two or three of the focus states. The Boxer Rebellion involved only the US and the UK, the Suez Crisis only the UK, the Vietnam War only the ANZUS states and the Falklands War saw the UK fight alone. It seems, then, that the chance of the Anglosphere uniting in common cause in times of interstate war is even: half the time they unite and the other half of the time they do not.

Table no. 3 considers the same focus states and their involvement in extrastate wars during the
twentieth century, again defined as wars between states and non-state actors that began after 1st of January 1900.

Clearly a different trend is evident when considering extra-state wars during the twentieth century. Firstly, in every case the Anglosphere state involved fought without an English speaking ally. Indeed, except of the war in Cameroon where France allied with the UK, the Anglosphere state involved in the war fought without any ally at all. Secondly, except of the Caco Revolt in the Western Hemisphere in which the US was a belligerent, every other Anglosphere extra-state war of the century was a war involving the UK alone. Australia, Canada and New Zealand – lacking the emerging power the US in their own hemisphere or the collapsing colonial empire of the British – did not find themselves fighting non-state actors between 1900 and 2000, though it might be noted that the post-9/11 War on Terror in the early twenty-first century saw each one of the those states involved in fighting a non-state actor, though it falls outside the temporal scope of this article.

Finally we can consider intrastate wars involving the focus English speaking states during

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extra-state War</th>
<th>AUS</th>
<th>CAN</th>
<th>NZ</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British Conquest of Kano &amp; Sokoto</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>YES</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caco Revolt</td>
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<td></td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British-Afghan War of 1919</td>
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<td>YES</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraqi-British War</td>
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<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moplah Rebellion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>YES</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saya San’s Rebellion</td>
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<td>YES</td>
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<tr>
<td>British-Palestinian War</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>YES</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia Rebellion</td>
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<td>Malayan Rebellion</td>
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<td>British-Mau Mau</td>
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<td>Cameroon</td>
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Table no. 3 – Anglosphere Participation in Extra-state Wars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intrastate War</th>
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<th>NZ</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>UK</th>
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<td>Russian Civil War</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Greece v. Communists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon v. Leftists of 1958</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Vietnam v. NLF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos v. Pathet Lao of 1963</td>
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<td>Dominican Republic v. Leftists</td>
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<td>Cambodia v. Khmer Rouge of 1970</td>
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<td>Somalia v. Clan Factions</td>
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Table no. 4 – Anglosphere Participation in Intrastate Wars
Again, clearly, there are some differences in comparison to the sometimes-united Anglosphere war fighting alliances of the interstate wars during the twentieth century. First, in all but one case there is a sole Anglosphere state involved in each war, the exception being the Russian Civil War that saw the US and the UK combine in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent the Bolshevik takeover of Russia. Secondly, excluding the earlier wars in Russia and Greece, the sole belligerent from the Anglosphere is the United States. Indeed, every intervention in the second half of the century is a US-only affair in the Anglosphere, with the UK settling into an era of post-Empire international relative decline in comparison to its trans-Atlantic collaborator.

Considering interstate, extra-state and intrastate wars in total, then, we can find few examples of pan-Anglosphere solidarity. Table no. 5 summarises wars of all types during the twentieth century in terms of their rate of Anglosphere participation.

The overall trend seems clear, then: most Anglosphere states fought most wars in the twentieth century without an Anglosphere ally. While pan-Anglosphere solidarity is the second most common reality at around 15% of the wars fought, this is around five times less common than Anglosphere states fighting their wars alone. For the English speaking powers in the twentieth century, then, it is easy to conclude that for all the rhetoric of “special relationships” and civilization bonds there wasn’t enough of a trans-Anglosphere bond to bring the five focus states together more than a handful of times.

What, then, explains the sometimes-allied, usually-not-allied behaviour of the Anglosphere states? Turning to the theory of international politics, it provides an answer that is simple, of great utility and explanatory power, and devastating to the notion that the Anglosphere states share some bond with each other that they do not maintain with their non-English speaking competitors. A realist analysis of the alliance forming behaviour of the major Anglosphere powers seems to better explain the trends outlined above (Tables no. 2, 3, 4 and 5) as well as the perhaps surprising lack of formal bonds across the English speaking world.

### The Realist World View

While the realist school of international politics is as broad as any other social science movement, it is possible to identify some elements of international relations that most realists consider central to their explanations of international affairs. The nature of the international system, for example, is held by almost all realists to be anarchical; that is, the system is held to be one in which there is no over-arching authority with the ability to direct the behaviour of the states in the system. Unlike, for example, the government of an individual state which has the legitimate recourse to arms and the capability to compel the subjects of the state to act in a certain manner – the international system exists without a central authoritative arbiter and all states (because it is states that the realists focus upon as the central actors of the system) are sovereign equals, in rights if not in material capabilities. As well, realists tend to agree that states have goals in international relations. While some realists focus on survival as the key goal of states (the so-called structural realists) others focus on goals such as power, territory or economic gain. Whatever the goal, though, it can be expressed as being an element of a state’s national interest in the international system.

For realists, national interest drives behaviour and explains why and how states become...
involved in conflict with other states and with non-state actors in the international system. Hans Morgenthau, often termed the father of classical realism, spoke of permanent national interests, describing the “Monroe Doctrine and the policies implementing it [as expressions of the] permanent national interest of the United States in the Western Hemisphere”\(^{11}\). Morgenthau would go on to argue that the centrality of the national interest could be denied only at great cost: “For the individual nations to take care of their own national interests is, then, a political necessity. There can be no moral duty to neglect them; for as the international society is at present constituted, the consistent neglect of the national interest can only lead to national suicide”\(^{12}\).

Other realists concur with Morgenthau on the centrality of national interest in international politics. Niccolò Machiavelli, for example, argues in *The Prince* that the interests of the leader must always take precedence over the notions of good and evil or right and wrong in international dealings\(^{13}\). Similarly, E. H. Carr argues that those who would deny the significance of national interest in world politics are “naïvely egotistical” about international affairs, with even non-realists such as James Caporaso arguing that states in the international system tend to act in a rational and self-interested fashion\(^{14}\).

National interest, in spite of its centrality and popularity as an explanatory tool, is a difficult term to define. Griffiths, O’Callaghan and Roach admit as much by describing the concept as vague and labelling the term one “easily used and abused, particularly by politicians”\(^{15}\). Griffiths *et al* do outline what realists imply via the term “national interest”, summarising the notion as policies that endeavour to further the “acquisition and rational management of power” in an anarchic international system, though this definition is problematic, as the authors admit\(^{16}\). For one, the term ‘power’ itself is contentious, particularly so when considered in the wake of the expansion of the notion of power from a purely military-industrial notion to one that involves culture, language, influence and other ‘soft’ elements, too\(^{17}\). This is further complicated for, as Griffiths *et al* note, realists define power as interests and interests as power, leaving a tautological nothingness at the centre of their approach\(^{18}\). As well, Griffiths *et al* note the tension between “free will and determinism” that realists encourage which, again, is problematic in theoretical terms\(^{19}\).

Yet despite problems in definition – and it should be noted that realists like Morgenthau have much less of a problem with their power-backed, interest centred definitions than their critics do – national interest is a useful realist tool to explain the alliance joining or rejecting behaviour of Anglophone states in the twentieth-century\(^{20}\).

If we consider the interstate wars in which the focus states in the Anglophone stood completely united then we can suggest a significant national interest for all states in joining the coalition. World War One and World War Two both stand as global conflicts where the Anglophone states were either under attack by common enemies, had security policies closely tied to the British empire (in the case of Australia and New Zealand in World War One) or where broad national interests – for example, not ceding mainland Europe to a single power – provoked intervention alongside other English speaking states. The participation of the Anglophone states in the Korean War, being the first major intervention authorised by the Anglophone backed United Nations Security Council, can also be explained by shared national interests in supporting the UN and rejecting communist control of East Asia. Similarly, the Gulf War stands as another example of Anglophone interests in multilateralism and supporting the UN they helped to create, though it is also important to note the significant energy resources that the modern economies of the Anglophone need to continue to maintain their standards of living. In each case of pan-Anglophone wartime alliance joining, then, a case for the national interest can be made for each of the alliance joining states.

Consider, too, the incidences where either two or three Anglophone states allied while other Anglophone states did not. The participation of the US and the UK in the Boxer Rebellion is better explained with reference to the interests of both of those states in China than it is with any reference to a sort of special relationship. Similarly, the refusal of the UK and Canada to provide troops in Vietnam to aid the US, Australian and New Zealand forces on the ground can best be explained with reference to national political interests rather than any repudiation of the relationship demonstrated a few decades before in Europe and the Pacific. Finally, the participation of the US and the UK in the
Russian Civil War is best explained with reference to interest – including stability, maintenance of the status quo, access to Russian markets and opposition to Bolshevism – than it is by a special relationship between two English speaking powers or some civilization bond that, presumably, Canada, New Zealand and Australia had forgotten immediately after the First World War.

National interest also serves as a useful explanatory tool when considering the more numerous incidences of Anglosphere states fighting wars (interstate, extra-state and intrastate) without a major Anglosphere ally. What would be the interest, for example, in the UK joining with the US in Cambodia when it refused earlier to become involved in the war in Vietnam? The British-Palestinian War, the Iraqi-British War and the Malayan Rebellion all stand as examples of colonial struggles on the behalf of the UK; the US, Australia, New Zealand and Canada saw no civilization or Anglospheric attack here and chose, in accordance with their own interests, to remain uninvolved. The Caco Revolt was a war in the Western hemisphere, geographically removed for the interests of the South Pacific Anglosphere powers. The Suez Crisis – despite the significance of the conflict for global trade – could not convince the US to engage in battle and the Falklands War, perhaps the last of the British colonial wars, saw the US and the other Anglosphere states remain physically distant and even rhetorically uncommitted to the UK’s action against Argentina in the South Atlantic.

Indeed, while the incidence of pan-Anglospheric cooperation is so low as to be indescribable with reference to special relationships, the realists and their reference to the significance of the national interest offer a better explanation of both the times of alliance and the times where alliances did not emerge. While there remain problems with the realist definition of interest (noted above) and significant criticisms of the realist approach more generally, in this case it seems that national interest offers explanatory value that a resort to “special relationships” cannot.

Implications and Further Research

If bonds of language are rejected and, instead, the national interest is held to be the deciding factor for states entering or avoiding alliances in times of war in the Anglosphere, then there are obvious opportunities to consider the alliance behaviour of states in the non-English speaking world that regularly use the rhetoric of language, culture, religion and civilisation to explain their international behaviour. For example, Argentine and Mexican reservations over reform of the United Nations Security Council to include a permanent place for Brazil are often linked to relations between Spanish speaking and Portuguese speaking parts of Latin America. Could not these reservations be better explained with reference to fear of regional hegemony and the national interests of Argentina and Mexico being better served by not promoting Brazil to the level of ‘regional spokesperson’? Similarly, while links through a common Christian Orthodox religious confession have often been held to explain Russian support for Serbia in the Balkan region of Europe, could not modern Russian interventions and support be better explained by the broader Russian national interest in preventing European and American influence from completely dominating the south and south-east of Europe? Both the Latin American and Southern European examples are obvious candidates for further research in examining and explaining alliances in international politics that are held to be linguistically or culturally informed but may, in fact, be nothing more than the national interest wrapped in tastier political rhetoric.

Conclusion

This article has argued that explanations for the international behaviour of the major English speaking powers during the twentieth century cannot be explained with reference to the civilisational bonds that those states share through virtue of their common history and language. While it is clear that the past of the states is somewhat similar and that, even today, the legal systems, economic systems and other significant social and cultural institutions are remarkably similar, the behaviour of those states in international politics is governed less by what they have in common and more by the individual interests of the states themselves. In terms of formal alliances it was demonstrated that they are few, mostly limited and never across all Anglosphere powers. It was further demonstrated that, outside of these formal pacts and during times of war, coalitions and alliances...
between Anglosphere states were rare. In only four cases in a century did all the Anglosphere powers fight on the same side in a war, while in nearly 75% of all cases an Anglosphere state fought a war without an English speaking ally. With the “special relationship” explanation seeming little more than rhetoric, this article offered an alternative explanation: the realist backed notion of national interest. It was argued that, if the various national interests of the Anglosphere states coincided, then coalitions are formed. However, where national interests are not threatened or where national interest precludes involvement even with a close political partner, alliances are not formed. This explanation, for all the caveats that go with the notion of national interest as a concept and realism as an approach, is found to be superior for explaining twentieth century alliances in the English speaking world, relegating the civilisationist ‘special relationship’ explanation to the level of soothing political rhetoric in a world where rhetoric counts for little at all.

NOTES:

1 An earlier version of this article was presented as Anglosphere United? Examining and Explaining 20th Century Wartime Alliances in the English Speaking World at the Cultural and Political Exchange in the English-Speaking World conference, Tours, France, 22-23 October 2010.

2 Declaration: I am responsible for this article’s content, respecting the provision of the Law no. 206/2004 regarding the conduct in scientific research.


5 Interestingly, Churchill surmised that Britain’s special relationship with the United States also included a Canadian dimension.


7 Agence France Presse, 2010, Obama calls news


8 Argus, Australia’s Patriotism, Argus, 1 August 1914, http://tinyurl.com/Cook1914.

9 Screensound Australia, Speech by Prime Minister Robert Gordon Menzies, 3 September 1939, National Screen and Sound Collection, Title No. 387919.

10 All data sets are available for consultation and download online at www.correlatesofwar.org.


12 MORGENTHAU, cited work, p. 854.


16 GRIFFITHS et al., p. 217.


18 GRIFFITHS et al., p. 217.

19 GRIFFITHS et al., p. 217.

20 See MORGENTHAU, cited work.


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When we talk about the security environment in long term, at a national, regional or global level, it looks like a combination of reality, perspective, rationality, vision and prophecy. Much more than in the past, we see a great number of new security items to be included and elements to be considered within this subject area. As a consequence of symmetric or asymmetric effects, there might be thousands of combinations of security situations which can escalate in this world. Experience of the last 20 years has shown that even a small event can create deviation from the traditional rules experienced during the history. Clausewitz “fog of uncertainty” is a valid expression for the future security environment.

To predict or to expect, the later looks more realistic. Today, we can expect rather than predict exactly what could happen next year. Further, it becomes more difficult to provide a clear view of what might happen in a longer term. However, it is the task of the strategic leaders and their staffs to think carefully about the future, to follow carefully the trends, to influence what we can, to anticipate with the appropriate actions, and to produce today those capabilities needed to provide the best response for tomorrow. The author gives his personal views of what we can do to influence what we want to happen tomorrow, and what we can do to avoid what we do not want to happen. As a case study, this paper focuses on a short analysis of the retrospective, the actuality and the perspective of Albania and regional security environment.

Views of this article are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Albanian MOD, GS or TRADOC.

Key-words: Albania; NATO; Strategic Concept; scenario; region; military; transformation.

At the summit in Portugal, NATO adopted the New Strategic Concept (NSC), the so called concept for the second decade of the 21st century. According to some unofficial statistics, the development of this strategic document “involved all 28 allied countries, some other interested 32 non-allied nations, more than 90 national or international think tanks and NGOs on security and defence, 30 corporations and agencies, and some 4500 individuals in and out NATO community”. Albania also contributed to this collective engagement with several conferences, one of them in Albanian TRADOC, providing a non-paper to the group of experts with almost 20 recommendations. We hope we have been somewhat helpful.

The approval of this recent NSC document is a step ahead for all NATO countries, Albania included. It means that all of them agree on the framework of security environment described in this document, for which all the countries have been contributors. It also means that, with this document approved, we have an official paper to be based upon, to the development of our national security and defence strategies.

This article is not about the findings of the NSC on future security environment; it is only a personal view based on this document which is still in process. With primarily focus on Albania and the region, I will try to touch upon the best and the worst case future scenarios and discuss on the right capabilities to face those scenarios,
the role of Education and Training institutions, and the transformation of defence institutions in harmony with the challenges ahead. And, with a good understanding of the readers, I will avoid mentioning specific countries while focusing on general issues of their concern.

In order to know something about future security environment, both imagination and analysis are important and complementing elements. Of course, there is nobody who could make a prophecy of what will happen in our region, let’s say in 2030. George Friedman took the responsibility to do that globally, but his “The Next 100 Years” is more an illusion and influence making book. In terms of development, what happens in only one year in 21st century is almost equal with what used to happen in ten or more years in the previous century. The world of the information age is moving faster ahead and this speed will be much higher in the coming decades. Security issues in a more globalized world will be associated with a myriad of other unexpected events.

That spectrum of future uncertainty is well articulated by the US President, Barack Obama, at the Naval Academy, in May 2010. He said that “we do not have the luxury of deciding which challenges to prepare for and which to ignore. We must overcome the full spectrum of threats - the conventional and the unconventional; the nation-state and the terrorist network; the spread of deadly technologies and the spread of hateful ideologies; 18th century-style piracy and 21st century cyber threats”.

In this context, for different reasons, even an individual or a group of individuals using asymmetric warfare rules can cause more damages than a local traditional war. The adversaries of the 21st century are becoming more unpredictable and their tactics and strategies are surprising even the most skilled military. They have the luxury and time to attack when they identify the „…weakest link in the chain” of the security systems of the country. The situation is asymmetric since the defender must cover all points of attack while the attacker need only identify a single weak point upon which to concentrate and cause considerable damages.

Most people principally agree that we, the human kind, might influence in the normal flow of history, but we can not definitely change that. In this article, I found reasonable to make a parallel in history. In my opinion, before we discuss what will happen 20 years ahead we should remember and analyze the security situation we had 20 years ago. This method will better drive us to what might be the situation several years ahead.

Twenty years ago, for a period of more than forty years, we all suffered the consequences of the Cold War. My country, Albania, like almost all other regional countries, was an isolated communist, single party state which was under a dictatorship rule. Defence of the country was based on the total defence concept from the external Cold War threats supported by the enemies from inside. All state economic efforts and financial burden (some 13 to 25% of GDP) were focused on facing a confrontation between states, for the survival of the country against “all capitalist or revisionist foreign countries and Alliances”. As a consequence, to apply the strategic concept of total defence of our country, we developed a big Armed Force (some half a million conscript and reserve soldiers), focused on tank units, heavy artillery, ships and aircraft, major weapons and systems. Main defence concept was the defence of every meter square of the country under the “territorial defence” under the implementation concept of “every citizen is a soldier”, and a fully conscription-based army. Several thousands small fixed territorial defense installations and infrastructure and some half a million bunkers and fortification areas all around the country were in support of the total defence concept. With some exceptions and intensity, this line of territorial defence was adopted by most of the countries in the region.

That situation was 20 years ago. Now, 20 years ahead from that time, almost everybody believes that was a crazy period. We know that the Cold War was an ideology-based “war”, based on state-to-state and block-to-block confrontation, which never happened. If it would have been a “hot” war during that period, it could have been a nuclear war with disastrous consequences. God helped us!

What is the situation in 2010 and what it is going to be 20 years ahead? Nobody could predict 20 years ago the current security situation in 2010. Nobody has predicted all the geopolitical changes that happened during these 20 years in the Balkans. A new regional map is the result of the dynamic development of the region.

All countries have to accept the changes and
look ahead. In fact, with some minor reminiscences, the countries in the region are now open countries. They have developed democratic and multiparty system, and all they are members, candidates or aspiring for NATO and EU membership; so they are either NATO members, aspirant or partner countries. The defence policy of all the countries in the region does not reflect “any declared country as an enemy” and no use of force policy or threat to use force is in their agenda. There are no open statements or visible chances in the region for potential state-to-state confrontation; while major attention is paid to the solution of issues remained unsolved and the management of asymmetric and transnational threats. Almost all countries understand the obligations of contribution and benefits from the “collective defence” concept stemming from the integration into Euro Atlantic security and defence structures. Long term development plans foresee further downsizing of the armed forces and a special focus on fully professional forces. Reforms are underway, but in some cases still difficult to be managed properly. There is some progress on joint regional projects on security and defence, but they still needs to be further developed.

We cannot say that the situation is perfect, but we see by almost all countries the will to leave behind the problematic issues of the past and look ahead to solve technical issues, handle economic development, fight corruption and organized crime, etc. We also see a presence of NATO, EU, UN, OSCE and other organizations having a closer look to the security environment and economic development.

**What about 20 years later?** As mentioned, I have designed two extreme scenarios: the best and the worst case scenario, but there are hundred other scenarios that might be developed in between. I believe that none of these scenarios will really succeed, but this is made only for study purposes, so that everybody could design in his mind a set of other unlimited potential scenarios.

**As a best case scenario:** Best case scenario is generally built on hopes. We can see a further development of the positive path of cooperation already followed by almost all regional countries, supporting the already started integration in NATO and EU. We hope the collective security and defence will be the main trend ahead. Before 2030, all Balkan countries will be mature democracies and most likely full members of NATO and EU. We expect a much better climate of cooperation among the regional countries. We highly believe there will not be any conventional war and conflicts in the region. The role of leadership and democratic institutions, national, regional and international, will grow and lead the processes ahead to progress. Democracy, rule of law will prevail to corruption and organized crime and all other illicit trafficking. Economic development will have constant progress and unemployment will constantly reduce. On the other side, joint regional projects and broader projects will be more prevalent. Regional concerns will have more regional solutions with regional-based resources. **So, as the best case scenario, we expect a prosperous and stable region in 2030.**

**As a worst case scenario:** Worst case scenario is generally built on doubts. It is very difficult to see a clear future through such a long term. Almost none of small regional countries have a long term vision till 2030. At most, we can not look ahead until 2020, and we see a grey zone between 2020 and 2030. At least the general perception is that risks and threats of the 2030 will be more global and will come from other regions.

Trends of economic development and financial issues of the regional countries will be a key driver ahead. Determination of the governments to perform reforms in these areas may not be decisive. Lack of determination in the fight against terror, organized crime, corruption and all illicit trafficking could be in some cases very harmful to all regional countries, because they could find a “safe haven” all around the region. Any rogue or failed state in the region could be a great problem for the entire region.

Nationalism, ethnic rivalries, political instability and cultural diversity in the region could be a problem in the future if they are purposely sponsored by other external actors and factors. So, they need to be handled properly by smart leaders with no bad reminiscences from the past.

The future of the current Collective Security and Defence Organizations may not be definitely certain. Ad Hoc Coalitions of global powers or other formations might become more practical ahead. Competition for resources and other powers may become more evident.

Yet, we expect a more complex and uncertain security environment. Clausewitz is still valid...
and will probably get more terrain. The unknown will surprise us and becomes the key driver in the future. Nothing can be predicted with certainty in the long run through 2030.

On the other side, with the flourishing of the information age, individuals and other groupings with different orientations will have more access to influence the decision-making processes in our countries. Our region is not immune to the information age implications; it is even more fragile than the rest of Europe. With their actions, they might create chaos to the fragile states and their actions can cause deviations from the traditional rules. So, as a worst case scenario, we expect potential re-nationalization or further fragmentation of security and defence policies.

Current Situation of Transformation

For the time being, generally speaking, we witness to the prevalence of asymmetry on symmetry of conflicts. On the other side, software war is taking priority to hardware war and the Human Factor is being more and more a decisive factor of the future security environment. Leadership is playing a key role in decision shaping and making (for right or wrong), as well as speed up or delay in transformation decisions.

Security and defence reforms in the countries in the region are generally in the right way, but associated some times with delay and difficulties of processes. There are still some social, financial and political pressures to the required reforms. Sometime, heritage Cold War oriented units are still surviving with new units focused on current and future reality of threats. Classic Armed Forces with all the services and specialties included may no longer be valid; traditional build-up of forces is not any longer efficient. Old and modern military capabilities of the countries harshly compete for resources, and sometimes, we have also often witnessed the spending of millions of dollars are for unusable or little use capabilities. On the other side, for almost all the countries in the region, new modern deployable, sustainable and well trained capabilities for expeditionary operations are on the transformation agenda. This is a good signal.

Regional oriented transformation is associated with difficulties of purely national interests. Regional projects are more efficient and less expensive for the security of the neighboring countries. Less tanks, guns and major weapons are needed to face future threats.

As a conclusion, I think no country can provide its security and defence in isolation and with its own capabilities. The quicker we change in this direction, the more efficient and less expensive we are. The need for integration of the countries in the region in collective security and defence structure is imperative.

Matching Security Environment with Capabilities - Albanian Case

Based on the lessons learned from the history, we believe that world development makes threats and risks more influential in distance. It makes transnational and global threats more dominant to local threats. That means that we need to develop the right capabilities to face the real threats when and where they arise. This is valid for all countries, Albania included.

Being a NATO member, Albanian Armed Forces have done a lot to meet the basic requirements and contribute to NATO membership, but there is still a lot to be done ahead. The defence institution has done a lot to meet the membership tasks, but as mentioned in the national document of Timetable for Reform “... the challenges ahead will have the main “target” focused on the quality of transformation rather than the quantity of the Albanian Armed Forces institution”.7

In this context, we support the concept for usable forces: “that means forces in real missions, instead of forces in garrisons for the missions and threats of the past”.8 The experience of the last 20 years has shown that we have had enough forces and capabilities we did not need, and we have not had enough of those we needed. That is why we have adopted the process of continuous transformation based on the concept of “forces both in missions and transformation”. A deep defence reform has been carried out in Albanian Armed Forces (AAF) during the last two decades consisting of a vertical downsizing from 100 thousands active personnel and 400 thousands in reserve in 1992 to only 13 thousands fully professional personnel in 2010 and a reserve roster.

With this vision in mind, especially after being an aspirant country in the 1999 Washington Summit, Albania developed an updated NSS, a NMS, and later on, a Strategic Vision and Long Term Development Plan (LTDP 2020). The LTDP
authorized the deactivation of most unusable forces, structures, infrastructures and capabilities, and the activation with priority of the capabilities needed for current and future missions. The defence reform was implemented through the concept of “reduce in size and improve in quality” through development of a fully professional force 2010. When saying professional forces, I mean not just professional in numbers, but first of all in the quality of the performance of their missions; forces that can adapt and react promptly to the more complex situations of future missions. With this concept, light and easily to reorganize forces are in the priority of the agenda; development of “task force” organizations for specific missions: forces easy tailored to the full range of missions. Albania has now some 350 personnel deployed at one time in international NATO, EU, UN, Coalition-led operations, or some 5-6 % of the total Land component (2010), with the target of 8-10% for 2014.

Based on the NATO Planning process, we are committed to meet the requirements of the Force Goals (FG) Package for contribution to NATO Pool of Forces. This FG Package will become one of the key drivers for our force planning community in mid and long run. It will support also our national commitments for EU membership and other international commitments. In Albanian perception, small countries with limited resources can not contribute with separate forces and capabilities to each international security organization. We have adopted the concept of “A single set of forces” for contribution to NATO, EU, UN, Ad-Hoc Coalitions etc.

To support the implementation of the FG Package the government has committed to spend 2% of GDP on defence and around 20% of that allocated to force modernization through 2020. First priority is given to the motivation of professional force; modernization of equipment and systems for national and deployed operations; training and education of the force, and participation in international operations. So, the basic concept is the development of Usable Forces for now and for the future, instead of the heritage forces and infrastructures of the past which are being transferred to the local authorities.

The focus of the reform in 2010 is the cultivation of a new culture in Albanian AF through training and education. Modern management issues are being applied in order to manage a smaller defence organization with more efficient results. A new organization structure of AAF is recently approved by the President of the country, focused on an increase of operational capabilities and the reduction of unnecessary staff structures. Also, a new integrated MoD and General Staff (GS) organization structure has been recently established where integrated civilian and military staffs work together combining civilian expertise and military professionalism.

Reform of Education and Training institutions

One of the top priorities of the Training and Education Reform is the transformation of Albanian AF in a knowledge-based institution. In my opinion, education and training institutions of the country must be at the lead of the transformation process. Their vision should be at least 5 years ahead the rest of the Armed Forces. Change of mentality and mindset of military personnel is a real challenge, keeping in mind Liddell Hart saying that “the only thing more difficult that to put a new idea in a military mind is to get the older idea out”16. Building a new mindset for the military is more important than change of numbers and structures of military organizations.

To do that, we have started to revise first the philosophy of training and education. Bloom Taxonomy of “teach what to learn, not how to learn” is already introduced with the aim of learning and teaching the military personnel with the methodology of creative tools, critical thinking, logical reasoning, multiple choice and diversity of ideas in the education and training institutions through application of Chatham House rules. A little bit contrary to Liddell Hart, General Patton logic was to encourage the use of universal dimensions of human mind, especially in education. He said “don’t tell people how to do things, tell them what to do and let them surprise you with their results.”

As a new NATO member, priority is also given to the training and education for collective defence operations, collective decision-making, building consensus and consultation issues. Training and Education for deployable Article 5 and Non-Article 5 missions far away from home basis is already introduced in the education curricula. A special role in the transformation agenda,
especially after Strasbourg & Kiel Summit, when Albania got the membership status, has been given to the transition from individual defence planning to collective defence planning.

AAF leadership supports that “transformation and reforms must become continuous and never ending processes at strategic, operational and tactical levels, based upon lessons learned from real operations we are committed to. Since 2009, we have in place a Lessons Learned system in the Armed Forces, which will be one of the tools for the transformation of forces and capabilities. A special role in this transformation process is played by the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), especially the Defence Academy and the Center for Defence Analyses, which have given a special focus on the research projects of the future security environment and required capabilities.

**Challenges Ahead**

Elaborating the objective professional force of a small country, like Albania, TRADOC has identified the assumptions, priorities together with the basic recommendations for the future capabilities of the country to face future threats. They are given below in bullet form:

- Small countries like Albania have and will always have limited resources. Develop a list of priorities to be completed in short, mid and long run;
- Treat human component as a key driver for change rather than material aspect of capabilities; Give priority to “software” rather than to “hardware” capacities;
- Train people and develop leaders to be creative, promptly reactive and quickly adaptive to complex situations of security environment; Building leadership is the backbone of a real professional force;
- Include future security environment challenges in the curricula of the Military Academies and schools;
- Need for strategic security and defence vision documents at national level and related Long Term Development Plans to develop related capabilities;
- Follow a continuous transformation process under the concept of “develop the force we need and not the force we might desire”;
- Develop more deployable and sustainable military capabilities than the fixed ones; special emphasis on specialized “niche” capabilities;
- In addition to military capabilities, develop modest civilian capabilities for non-military Effects-Based Approach Operations (EBAO);
- Promote a more fruitful regional cooperation and projects to respond jointly to common risks and threats.

**NOTES:**

3 President Obama Speech at the Naval Academy Commencement day, May 2010.
6 Ibidem, p. 16.
8 Ibidem, p. 16.
9 Ibidem, p. 22.
11 Minister of Defence Speech at the Defence Academy, Closing ceremony of Higher Officer Course, Sept. 2010.

*Colonel Thimi HUDHRA (thimi.hudhra@aaf.mil.al) is the Chief of the Center for Defence Analyses, TRADOC, Tirana, Albania.*
The Internet offers diverse opportunities for manipulation because it is an excellent virtual communication medium for political activists representing all ideologies, especially those who do not enjoy the attention of other media of mass communication, and many leaders of extremist organizations use the Internet to advertise and spread their ideology. The ways of using Internet are expanding and evolving, turning it into an attractive socializing and mobilization network for terrorist organizations. One way to counter these “terrorist attacks” made by various organizations on the Internet in order to attract other supporters and/or future activists is the virtual diplomacy.

Key-words: terrorist organizations; Internet; attracting; activists.

1. Considerations on the Internet and terrorist web sites

Terrorist organizations represent a security risk to state actors because they are able to cause chaos in ordered systems such as the states.

If security means, from the individual point of view, living without fear and anxiety, and, from a country’s point of view, the protection against threats coming from other states or non-state actors, then we can say that terrorist organizations are a threat to security because their actions cause fear, anxiety and chaos and, by attracting other members, can disrupt human communities.

In the current century, terrorist organizations have become international players able to exist as organized, power generator networks.

Another fact that must be taken into account is the definition of terrorist organizations. The term “terrorism” is usually used to refer to nondiscriminatory, brutal acts of violence. Thus, when a group is labeled as a terrorist group, by default, it means that its members are immoral and have no basic ethical principles. If other terms are used to define the members of a group as “revolutionaries”, “freedom fighters”, “soldiers for national liberation”, it means that such persons are defined by another label which means that the violent acts they have undertaken were made for a noble cause and they also have higher moral values than the average violent person. If a group is defined as a terrorist organization this signifies a negative evaluation while if it is believed that it is composed of fighters for freedom then a positive assessment is applied. Victims of such a group of “freedom fighters” are seen as supporters of a totalitarian regime that denied citizens their basic rights and if the victim is innocent they are seen as victims of the totalitarian regime.

Why make an analysis on terrorist organizations and the Internet? Because if the main offensive action of these organizations are psychological then the Internet provides a highly conducive environment for the manifestation of terrorist organizations then they become a security risk. But as the Internet itself cannot be stopped without creating a revolution „of all those who remain dependent on the Internet we have little else to do other than to analyze the behavior of terrorist organizations in this environment and try to counteract its effects.

The Internet can be seen either as a security risk or as a window into the terrorist organizations that can be used to gather information about them and counter them in the long run.

The Internet is a medium that has matured because:
a) It is a global network;  
b) There are expressed beliefs through it; agendas and action plans are articulated and transmitted, and one can be connected to human resources that could not be accessed otherwise. Therefore, we can say that the Internet as a network has become indispensable for humanity in its current state of evolution.

It is reasonable to assert that there is an intrinsic connection between human society and the Internet in particular, taking into account the general trend displayed by human communities regarding their organization in general and terrorist organizations in particular.

If we consider the above statement that terrorist organizations have moved towards the psychological offensive then the action is undoubtedly continuous. Because the information has already become global and the genesis of its support and circulation consists of a very complex network, namely, a network of complex systems, therefore it can be concluded that the information war is a network war performed into the information space and conducted for information, targeting information dominance and, obviously, manipulating information1.

Terrorist organizations use the Internet in more ways than to launch cyber-attacks. The range of actions that they take begins with the psychological warfare and may finish with gathering information, virtual training, fundraising, propaganda and recruitment.

Sociological models have been used to predict the behavior of terrorist organizations; however, there are voices that argue that these models are not very complete for the study of terrorist organizations because some of these terrorist groups have no moral values. From the standpoint of this research, this observation is questionable because some large terrorist organizations begin to see themselves as having certain value systems. For example, a lot of messages transmitted by the terrorist organizations are focused on the allegation that the members of the organization resorted to violence because this was the only remaining alternative. Most terrorist organizations use this claim in order to promote radical propaganda messages. The Internet promotes radicalization because it is an environment for active and passive propaganda. Chat rooms are virtual environments where violent opinions and beliefs can be transmitted, strengthened and validated among participants. Even those that are only present in the chat rooms can be influenced by extremist views that are continually affirmed by the militants and the opinions of those who are passive users can be assaulted.  

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<td>252,908,000</td>
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<td>Oceania/Australia</td>
<td>34,700,201</td>
<td>7,620,480</td>
<td>20,970,490</td>
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<td>1,733,993,741</td>
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Source: *** “INTERNET USAGE STATISTICS. The Internet Big Picture World Internet Users and Population Stats” http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm
with violent messages that can erode their prevalence. The degree of anonymity offered by the Internet and violent set of values that are offered into the chat rooms organized by terrorist groups increase the degree of radicalization because the individuals who spend many hours in such virtual environments are beginning to conform with the group norms set into the chat room.

As a communication medium, the Internet provides opportunities to manipulate because it gives everyone the opportunity to express their views in a non-discriminatory manner. The case of the User Irhabi (Terrorist) 007 is representative, because under this nickname, Younis Tsouli, became a notorious activist leader frequently participating in online extremist forums. The large number of messages posted on forums by Younis Tsouli helped him to win the confidence of other participants when he affirmed his support for the Internet-postings showing the decapitations ordered by Al-Qaeda, Younis Tsouli was strongly supported by the organization.

Procedures for using the Internet expand and evolve, turning it into a social and mobilization networking which becomes attractive because it provides diverse methods to attract and recruit members that can be used by terrorist organizations.

A tactics used by Hamas is to put those fighting against them in situations in which they may not comply with the general principles of a conflict or they may respond inefficiently to the situation or risk being accused of war crimes. This tactics was successfully used by Hamas in the Gaza Strip against Israeli forces during Operation “Cast Lead” in 2009. During these operations, Hamas used people who had mobile phones with cameras or the staff of several NGOs to shoot the right situations to be used so that they were able to accuse the Israeli forces of atrocities or war crimes. And then these NGOs seem to have received funds from several donors.

Leaving aside the veracity and reliability of these accusations and materials used against the Israeli forces which do not represent the main research focus of this paper, those records can be viewed on YouTube by thousands of users contributing to the radicalization and helping the organization to attract sympathizers or activists.

One way to counter these terrorist attacks by various organizations on the Internet that aim to attract other supporters and/or future activists is the virtual diplomacy.

The Internet is an excellent virtual medium for political activists representing all ideologies, especially those activists who do not enjoy the attention of other media of mass communication, and many leaders of extremist organizations use the Internet to advertise and spread their ideology.

Unlike other communication media, the Internet is not a medium with one producer and a mass of consumers. It is a decentralized communication medium where each user can be both producer and consumer of products. The Internet has removed some of the barriers represented by distance and time between different ethnic groups and created a mass of interconnected users who can choose what information to access or not provided that they posses the ability to discern the value of the information which is given by the intrinsic values of each individual.

The Internet provides the ability for individuals and groups to exchange ideas in an interactive way and cause some of these individuals to enhance and preserve their own views or change them to the contrary. This is applicable to political ideas and the extremist groups are groups of individuals who promote extremist ideas and concepts in cyberspace.

An example might be that of the journalist Daniel Pearl who was kidnapped as a result of e-mails containing false information and then he was beheaded. After having been captured and killed, the tape showing his decapitation was posted on the Internet.

Various extremist groups also use Yahoo Groups to create forums and to promote their ideology.

The websites of the terrorist groups have three major target groups:
• current and potential activists;
• international public opinion;
• unfriendly/hostile audiences.

According to a STRATFOR document, Al Qaeda began to recruit minors to cope with the lack of resources and it seems that the organization focuses on children with mental disabilities or low IQ or from broken families. According to the document, Umar Hamzah bin Laden, one of the 19 children suspected to be Osama bin Laden’s sons, was responsible for recruiting minors aged

POINT OF VIEWS
between 13 and 16 years from areas where there are small jihadist cells. The group intends to increase its recruitment rate in Mauritania where the number of poor and homeless children is high.

This shows the organization’s interest in people with mental disabilities which demonstrates not only that group is going through a difficult period in terms of membership but also that it is able to evolve. For example, in 2003, it was perhaps easier for a prominent clocked man to approach a certain place in order to attack it than it is at present. Terrorists have quickly understood that a woman with large garments may be more effective in fooling the security forces and to move towards the desired point to detonate a bomb. As women began to be increasingly more often used for suicide bomb attacks, the terrorist groups have begun to keep more stable people and with more experience for other operations such as bomb-making, fundraising, planning attacks, rather than to lose by sending them to execute suicide attacks. Hence, the need to expand the group’s influence towards categories represented by young people with problems; those with mental disabilities or drug addicts who can be convinced that their only salvation is the ultimate sacrifice. Although these individuals have limited experience they may be the “cannon fodder” that the organization can use to maintain the number of attacks without losing key members.

In addition, the insurgents have found ways to ensure that the attack is successful even if the suicide attacker’s mental capacity is limited. These methods include:

• remote detonation of a vehicle parked near the site targeted for attack;
• tying the hands of the suicide attacker who is driving a vehicle and placing an armed man at the place that is to be attacked with the order to shoot the suicide attacker thereby triggering the explosion of the vehicle – in case the suicide attacker forgot what he was supposed to do or was afraid of procedures.

Extremist groups have demonstrated their ability to innovate over time. In May 2008, an Iraqi woman pretending to be pregnant blew herself up in the middle of a crowd attending at a wedding in a Shi'a town, northeast of Baghdad. In February 2008, two women with mental disabilities provoked the explosion of a bomb in Baghdad killing 73 people.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban recruit young people who are mentally ill or drug users for the same purpose to turn them into suicide bombers. In the past, they were also known to use camels laden with explosives during the war with the Soviet forces; the animals were sent into the desert towards the Soviet bases to be detonated remotely. This idea seems to have persisted until today in various forms.

So far, there were identified several characteristics of a person who may be attracted by a terrorist group:

• a high level of emotional and/or mental instability;
• cultural disillusionment or frustration caused by unfulfilled idealism;
• lack of a inherent system of beliefs and values;
• family problems;
• trends towards a dependent personality (susceptibility, low tolerance to ambiguity).

Terrorist groups can manipulate these variables in order to attract members of these communities on their side.

Terrorists use the Internet to attract supporters, to plan attacks, raise funds and to gather information. These things can be done especially in chat rooms and discussion forums. According to Gabriel Weimann of Haifa University, the number of websites operated by terrorist groups has increased exponentially in the last decade from less than 1,000 to 4,800. Al Qaeda is a special case because more than 100 to 4,800. Al Qaeda is a special case because more than 100 related sites were uploaded on the Internet of which only a few were active.

Defining a website as terrorist is as complicated as the definition of terrorism. Terrorist sites are sites operated by terrorist groups and recognized as official sites for these groups. Another category is represented by the sites managed by supporters and fans. But, when a website, that has no official affiliation with any terrorist group, broadcasts messages of support for a terrorist group, defining that site as being a terrorist website becomes ambiguous. Analysts at the Pentagon admitted before the Congress that they monitor around 5,000 jihadist websites of which only a few – fewer than 100 – can be considered hostile and as such they can be classified as terrorist websites.

Websites can be regarded as virtual training grounds where you can find instructions on bomb making, on the use of rocket-throwers,
shooting methods regarding U.S. soldiers in Iraq, infiltration methods in other countries. On these websites there are videos displaying executions, bombings and images from the field – aimed to raise militants' morale and foment violence. This information may seem attractive to individuals addicted to adrenaline and mentally unstable individuals who are predisposed to violence.

Violent images such as those presented by terrorist websites can create violent behavior in patients suffering from psychosis as those who are suffering from schizophrenia who may become violent elements within a community and they also can become “tools” in the hands of terrorists. Violent images and messages can attract people towards terrorist organizations.

But videos are not the only way of propaganda. Some sites offer online game in which users aged around seven years old can claim to be “holy warriors” who kill American soldiers. This can create a violent behavior within children starting from a young age giving rise to individuals who may jeopardize the integrity of the communities to which they belong.

However there is no uniform way used by terrorist groups to attract people to their cause in comparison with other groups.

The Internet plays an important role in the process of radicalization, but there are other factors to consider such as the ideology shared by different communities and different individuals, the economic and ethnic background. Therefore, in this paper, there are presented only several forms of recruitment.

2. The Internet and Patterns of Influence Used by Terrorist Organizations

In general, the Internet offers the possibility for each user to communicate with other users without any obstacles so that each user is connected with the others. If we apply the network recruitment model that can be used in mosques to the online discussion forums we have the graphic as seen in Figure no.1.

In this scheme, there is the central leader of opinion as the central presence and the community organizes itself around him with each user connected to the others so that a person receives inputs from all the other users who can be converted, sympathetic, it can be the leader of opinion himself and it can be others users who resist the leader of opinion’s influence. In this case, the community members are equally
exposed to materials meant to attract sympathy for the terrorist group. For example, a videotape can be sent to each member of the group by using the dead-drop method, the video can be either directly sent to their e-mail or be posted on a private chat room where it can be seen by all participants. In this case, the recruiter aims to enhance the link between the community members in order to be able to mobilize the energies of the masses towards action.

Among these actions we can identify the behavior of Al Qaeda which had a very colorful, full of pictures and motivational messages official website designed to attract young audiences addicted to the virtual environment and computer games. These messages, pictures, videos, and games were released with no discrimination towards any member of a community.

These video posts are now produced widely and they are subtitled or dubbed in other languages with soundtracks containing songs that promote violent messages.

YouTube has some violent propaganda messages of this type that are seen by thousands of users. In this case we can treat the internet community of users as a community whose members are indiscriminately exposed to propaganda messages. The members are interconnected due to the intrinsic nature of the Internet and the recruiters are bombarding them with propaganda messages. Users with extremist views can be easily influenced to commit violent acts this way.

Another example for this model is the broadcasted interview with Anwar al-Awlaki which was broadcast in a chat room on May 23rd, 2010 by al-Malachite Media, which is the public relations division of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The Yemeni cleric who is of American origin urged the users who accessed the chat room to strike American civilians.

The funnel model of recruitment is applicable to the websites that are specialized in offering specific information that directs users' way of
thinking; such are the sites that offer instructions for making bombs, which offer ways of interpretation of the Koran, the ones that teach users how to kill American soldiers etc. These sites may be “educational” for young members of a community. This type of model has an impact on younger members of Muslim communities, even those in the Diaspora, since these young people may not have a system of values firmly secured and often feel the values they share are not consistent with the values promoted by parents or with values promoted by their countries of adoption. In this case, it is enough for a radical recruiter to affect such a young man who can then spread radical views acquired to other individuals with similar psychological profiles. The funnel can be best applied to the case mentioned in the introduction with reference to Terrorist 007, which became an opinion leader, to influence other users on extremist forums.

For this recruitment model, there are suitable veteran activists terrorists who operated in Iraq or Afghanistan, or elsewhere in the world. They may interpret verses from the Koran in such a way as to cause more young people to accept intrinsic different violent values. Young people respect veterans who display an anti-authoritarian attitude.

The model of “infection” refers to isolated, well-defined populations, which cannot be easily penetrated.

The infection model can be used when sending newsletters to multiple users in the community that the interviewer established to be the easiest targets to influence. These private messages can be passed on as coming from a member of this community therefore gaining more credibility.

Also the model may be put into practice within discussion groups that form on yahoo groups. In this case, the population is organized into a “chain” network that can have multiple levels forming a “grid” with each of the members forming a communication node and each user having access to messages posted by other users and being able and receive personal messages via e-mail. During this process a population of individuals with the same interests is formed, this population being more centered than the publics in discussion forums. The recruiter acts as one of the original group’s members and then tries to identify and influence the members who can more easily spread the infection within the group.

This model applied to online groups is apparent in the Figure no. 2.

During the discussions on chat rooms we can apply to all models listed above and these discussions can draw in, because of their content, various members of the community especially individuals who feel marginalized and they spend a large amount of time at the computer without having an active social life – individuals who are dependent on the Internet.

Regarding the application of this model in the virtual environment on a virtual community, it may be used throughout the discussion groups or within chat rooms and on other types of social networks (see Figure no. 2).

Conclusions

Terrorism through the Internet is a very dynamic phenomenon that continues to adapt. Websites with extremist content appear often, change their format or content frequently and often disappear or move their “home” from one server to another to be detected with difficulty.

The Internet offers its users the ability to communicate with other users in a decentralized manner and without restrictions. It creates groups and communities of thousands of individuals who share the same views and become masses which can be influenced by committed opinion leaders in a manner that does not involve using huge resources.

A website belonging to a terrorist organization generally offers the following information: organization's history, notable accomplishments, bibliographies of leaders, founders of the organization, goals, objectives and general ideology of the organization that some internet users can use to form their own values unless they have a well established system of personal values. What is not shown on the official Websites but can be seen on other websites supported by the organization is the more extreme nature of the violent actions performed by the organization. An example might be the difference between the official website of Hezbollah where we can see activists who occasionally have more or less complete uniform and they are holding firearms and Wa'ad portraying violent scenes which came close to being perceived as massacre.

The websites of these organizations use a lot of pictures and slogans directed especially to the
supporters in order to cement their views. Also on these websites press releases are posted to attract the attention of foreign journalists.

The rhetoric used by terrorists in the virtual environment is based on the fact that the members of these organizations use violence only as a last resort method to achieve their goals, and the use of violence is a necessity. According to those individuals, weak targets are chosen to force an oppressive enemy to stop applying pressure, so they attack civilian targets. The organization itself is presented as being small and forced into battle with a large, strong and oppressive organization. These values are presented on discussion forums and in chat rooms.

Terrorist organizations recruit activists online, in chat rooms, using models of recruitment that guarantees the formation of groups of followers who are willing to act on its behalf.

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NOTES:


Marina MUSCAN (marina.muscan@gmail.com) graduated from the National Defense College. She holds a Master degree in Project Management and a Master degree in International Relations from the National School of Political Studies and Public Administration. She is a DScMil. candidate at “Carol I” National Defense University.
The work “Transcaucasia in the security equation of the Black Sea Area”, published in 2009, at the Armed Forces’ Technical-Editorial Centre Publishing House, may be looked upon as a valuable work for the ones interested in the security issues of this region.

The books and articles published previously, as well as their professional activity recommend the authors, Rear Admiral (r.) Marius Hanganu, PhD, and Commander Ion Stan, PhD, as good connoisseurs not only of the problems connected to security and defence but also to the peculiarities of Transcaucasia.

This work comprises four chapters, preceded by a Foreword and followed by a set of conclusions and a consistent series of annexes (25 maps) meant to clarify the explanations offered throughout this volume. The work is a valuable one as, within the 191 pages, the authors build in a comprehensive, but succinct manner the specific image of this subject. The comprehensive character is given by the approach from several points of view of the state of facts from the transcaucasian region. The authors realize a synthesis of the causes, conditions and motives that determined the sense of the internal transformations from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, but also their possible influences on Romania. Thus, the first chapter is meant to introduce the reader in the general problems of the Black Sea Region, taking into account the historic, geographic, geopolitical, geostrategic issues, laying an emphasis on the role that Romania could play in this region’s political-military relations.

The second chapter analyses the sources of risks and threats to the stability of the political-military relations and of the safety within the transcaucasian space, which may affect Romanian society. Thus, within this part, there are analyzed not only the new types of asymmetric risks and threats, such as organized crime, international terrorism etc., but also risks and threats such as the frozen conflicts which characterize the states of this region. Additionally, the present work also contains theoretical information on the utilized concepts; thus, one may find definitions of terms specific to security and defence studies, which makes it a valuable material for students and scientific researchers who approach this domain. At the same time, the authors also analyze the way in which all these risks, threats and vulnerabilities influence the cooperation system of the states from the East of the Black Sea with other states, Romania included.

In the third chapter, the authors refer to the current situation of the political-military cooperation in the Eastern area of the Black Sea and its influence on Romania’s national security. There are described the political-military relations from the East of the Black Sea from the last millennium, as well as the most recent organisms and organizations of political-military cooperation from the regions of the Black Sea and of the Caspian Sea, and their relevance for Romania’s national security. At the same time, there are also taken into account the recent events which had a major impact on the security state in the region – the energy crisis and the war between Russia
and Georgia. The opened conflict between these two states which happened in 2008 is given a high importance as the authors analyze its influence on the political-military relations from the East of the Black Sea and these relations’ tendency under these new circumstances, trying to describe the real causes and purposes of maintaining a conflict state within a region with such a high geostrategic and geo-economic importance for the great actors of the current international arena.

The last chapter is dedicated to the trends in the political-military relations from Transcaucasia and Black Sea Extended Area, in which Romania is included. There are taken into consideration the role of our country in consolidating the good cooperation relations in the East of the Black Sea as well as the involvement of the great powers in defending the interests in the regions rich in hydrocarbons and in the problems related to the political-military relations. Moreover, there are also proposed new forms and types of relations which may be realized in the East of the Black Sea and their influence on Romania.

“Transcaucasia in the security equation of the Black Sea Area” is well structured and approaches the current situation and the regional trends, being useful not only for students and scientific researchers, but also for our country, as a whole, because Romania is situated in the immediate proximity of this region and, as a border member state of the EU and NATO, is interested in having good collaboration relations, the political-military domain included, with the states from the East of the Black Sea and from its Extended Area too.

C.B.
THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRE 
FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY 
STRATEGIC STUDIES

This year, the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies celebrates 10 years since its foundation. This event was celebrated in November, with the occasion of the most important CDSSS scientific activity, the International Annual Scientific Session, which took place between 18th and 19th of November and had as a theme “The impact of the International Relations’ evolution on the security environment”.

This activity took place with the participation of representatives from: the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Administration and Interiors, the Romanian Intelligence Service, the Service of Protection and Guard, the Ministry Education, Research, Youth and Sport, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, professors and researchers from civil and military institutions of education and research, of the non-governmental organizations, but also other CDSSS partners, researchers and professors from similar universities and institutes from the Czech Republic, Estonia, the Republic of Moldavia and Ukraine.

Within this activity, there were debated issues regarding the International Relations’ evolution, the role of the international organizations, the challenges of the security environment under the circumstance of the current global crisis, the impact of cooperation and competition on the security environment, but also the importance of the security institutions in a world which is changing. The materials which were presented within this session may be accessed on-line on the CDSSS website at http://cssas.unap.ro.

Between 2nd and 4th of November 2010, at „Carol I” National Defense University, took place the 4th edition of the Central European Forum on Military Education (CEFME).

The Forum’s agenda included topics as Bologna process in military schools education system, new NATO strategic concept’s effect on education, development of cooperation among the schools in the form of article publication in magazines, e-learning options and usage, and the multinational strategic course for the Visegrad Four countries’ military officers.

Into the Forum’s framework participated 29 representatives from 9 countries (Austria, Croatia, Estonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic), among which attended
also two members of the Center for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, the
director Dr. Constantin Moștoflei and Dr. Mirela Atanasiu that presented “Strategic
Impact”/”Impact Strategic” magazine’s fulfillments to Forum’s partners within a
panel, among other presentations of similar publications of the present institutions’
representatives.

Into the discussions, was settled for the participant organizations to support one
each over into the Thomson ISI accreditation process by mutual publication into
their scientific magazines. Also, from our Center was solicited that international
personalities of the research institutes participant to the Forum to be part of the
Editorial Board of “Strategic Impact”/”Impact Strategic” magazine.

The most recent studies published within CDSS are “The role of Armed Forces in
the fight against terrorism. Forms and methods of action specific to the engagement of
the Armed Forces in the fight against terrorism” and “The Romania’s Energy Security
in the European Context”.

Other information on the publications and CDSSS activities which took place or
will take place may be accessed on-line at the http://cssas.unap.ro.

Irina CUCU
INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

On selecting the articles there are taken into consideration: the area of the subjects presented in the magazine, the actuality of the topic, its novelty and originality, its scientific content and the adequacy to the editorial norms adopted by the magazine. The article should not contain any party political connotations.

The papers’ scientific evaluation is done by two scientific experts that are either professors or senior fellow researchers.

The article, written in a foreign language (English, French) may have maximum 10-12 pages (6.000 – 7.000 words) and has to be sent both in print and paper, using Times New Roman font, size 12, one line, and the tables and schemes have to be printed separately. The translation into Romanian will be provided by the editor.

The text has to be preceded by an abstract which is not to exceed 250 words, both in Romanian and English and not more than 10-12 keywords. The papers have to be signed adding the authors’s scientific degree, name, first name, the institution he comes from and have to end with a curriculum vitae, which should include the following elements: a short bio, a list of personal papers, birthyear, birthplace, address, city, postal code, country, telephone, fax, e-mail address, photo in jpeg format.

The footnotes are to be included by the end of the article and have to respect the international regulations. Authors can publish only one article by issue.

The text has to present an easy structure, using titles (subtitles). The abbreviations will be marked on the text only at their first mention on the text. It is likely to end the papers with some important conclusions regarding the importance of the research.

The articles will not use classified information.

As the magazine does not have a profitable purpose, the articles cannot be paid.

We accept articles from all the persons interested in publishing articles in STRATEGIC IMPACT magazine. The materials have to comply with the conditions mentioned above and to be of interest for the international scientific community. Thus, it is necessary that the documentation resources used in the elaboration of the articles had in their composition prestigious paperworks or publications widely recognized at national or international level.

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