


ROMANIA
NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY "CAROL I"
CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES



STRATEGIC IMPACT

No. 2[27]/2008

68-72 Panduri Street, sector 5, Bucharest, Romania

Telephone: (021) 319.56.49; Fax: (021) 319.55.93

E-mail: cssas@unap.ro; Web address: <http://impactstrategic.unap.ro>, <http://cssas.unap.ro>

NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY "CAROL I" PRINTING HOUSE
BUCHAREST, ROMANIA



The Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies' scientific quarterly magazine acknowledged by the National University Research Council as a B+ magazine

STRATEGIC IMPACT

Editorial Board:

Marius Hanganu, Professor, Ph.D., president

Constantin Moștofleu, Senior Researcher, Ph.D., executive president, editor-in-chief

Nicolae Dolghin, Senior Researcher, Ph.D.

Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, director, Ph.D. (Institute for Compared Strategy, Paris, France)

John L. Clarke, Professor, Ph.D. (European Centre for Security Studies "George C. Marshall")

Adrian Gheorghe, Professor Eng., Ph.D. (Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia, USA)

Josef Procházka, Ph.D. (Institute for Strategic Studies, Defence University, Brno, Czech Republic)

Dario Matika, Ph.D. (Institute for Research and Development of Defence Systems, Zagreb, Croatia)

Gheorghe Văduva, Senior Researcher, Ph.D.

Ion Emil, Professor, Ph.D.

Editors:

Vasile Popa, Researcher

Corina Vladu

George Răduică

Scientific Board:

Mihai Velea, Professor, Ph.D.

Grigore Alexandrescu, Senior Researcher, Ph.D.

The authors are responsible for their articles' content, respecting the provisions of the Law no. 206 from the 27th of May, 2004, regarding the conduct in scientific research.



CONTENTS

THE POLITICAL-MILITARY PRESENT

<i>Security and NATO perspectives after the Bucharest Summit</i> Corneliu DOBRIȚOIU	5
<i>Strategy for Afghanistan</i> Mircea MUREȘAN, PhD.....	11

GEOPOLITICS AND GEOSTRATEGIES ON THE FUTURE'S TRAJECTORY

<i>Les caractéristiques de sécurité de la région étendue de la Mer Noire. Le paradigme de "sécurité gélée"</i> Marius-Sorin MICLEA	17
<i>The risk under the global conditions of modern management</i> Camelia ȘTEFĂNESCU, PhD	23

NATO AND EU: POLITICS, STRATEGIES, AND ACTIONS

<i>Civil-Military Cooperation: a new aid paradigm</i> Kristin H. COORSEN	28
<i>La corrélation nationale-colective dans la défense de la Roumanie</i> Petre DUȚU, PhD	35
<i>European Monetary Unification and Security</i> Doina MUREȘAN.....	40

SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

<i>Contemporary challenges of securing national borders - military perspective</i> Evgeni MANEV, PhD.....	47
<i>The need of a global security theory</i> Eng. Eugen SITEANU, PhD.....	59
<i>Israel - military capabilities determined by conflicting situations</i> Marina MUSCAN	64

TERRORISM. WAR ON TERRORISM

<i>Mass media and terrorism</i> Cristian DELCEA	74
--	----



ANALYSIS. SYNTHESIS. EVALUATIONS

<i>European Security and Defence Policy. Philosophy, principles, missions and prerogatives</i> Sorin VICOL	81
--	----

STRATEGIC EVENT

<i>Decisions of the NATO Summit in Bucharest</i> Vasile POPA.....	87
---	----

POINT OF VIEWS

<i>A possible Euro-Asian geostrategic pivot</i> Gheorghe VĂDUVA, PhD	91
--	----

REVIEWS

<i>The terrorist organizations.....</i>	100
--	-----

CDSSS' AGENDA

<i>The activities of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, April-June 2008</i> Irina CUCU.....	101
---	-----

<i>Instructions for authors.....</i>	103
---	-----



SECURITY AND NATO PERSPECTIVES AFTER THE BUCHAREST SUMMIT

Corneliu DOBRIȚOIU

One of the most ample diplomatic events in the history of the Alliance – the Bucharest Summit – brought back on the agenda of the High Representatives from the Member States but also from the Partner Countries, topics of major importance for the Euro-Atlantic security. After the Riga Summit¹, the Bucharest high-level meeting was conceived from the very beginning as a transition towards the 2009 anniversary² summit. Now, at conclusions time, one can certainly assert that the 2-4 April reunion in Bucharest raised a special interest for the international community, while bringing together, for the first time in an extended framework, all the decision-making actors with a role in ensuring and preserving a stable security environment.

In spite of the apparent division of opinion within the Alliance that impacted upon the achievement of consensus on certain points of the agenda, the solutions that were finally imposed demonstrated once more the existence of a constructive diplomacy in all Member States, which allowed a cooperative resolution of disagreements, in line with the indivisibility of Allies' security principle. We will point out, in this paper, the main subjects that generated decisions of the Heads of State and Government and the impact of these resolutions. From the enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance to the discussion concerning the possible development of a missile defence allied system, complementary to the US efforts, the defence transformation in general and the future of Afghanistan by supporting the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the Bucharest Summit concurred to the resolution of several issues, relevant for both, the Allies and their Partners' security.

Obviously, taking into account the security context specific to the current international environment, the strategic opportunities opened by the decisions taken at Bucharest leave place for further debates, a real food – for – thought

for future analysis. Nonetheless, we shall focus, further on, rather upon NATO's positive evolutions, respectively upon the Summit resolutions, on specific areas of interest for the Allies and their Partners, while trying to estimate the direction in which the Alliance will develop its potential until the next meeting at the highest level.

Keywords: NATO, MAP, IPAP, ISAF, KFOR, NRF, NATO transformation, security.

NATO's European security dimension and the policy of compromise

The Alliance enlargement and the missile defence are two problems strongly connected with the European security. Moreover, these issues set up the core debate that brought to the centre of the Bucharest event an international actor frequently taken into account by the NATO member states in their defence connected decisions, namely the Russian Federation. In spite of the obstinate reiteration, by numerous voices, of the principle of independence of the NATO decision-making process and actions³, the impact of the Russian opinion was felt in the Allied discussions regarding the Georgia and Ukraine's accession to MAP⁴ and the installation of the American missile defence shield in Central and Eastern Europe.

In their candidacy for MAP, **Georgia and Ukraine** have constantly benefited from the United States' support. This support was confirmed by President George W. Bush's visit to Kiev right before the Bucharest Summit. On one hand, the clear opposition of France and Germany, who considered the MAP as premature for the two states – since they are still under the influence of the Russian Federation - impeded a resolution favourable to the American interests. On the other hand, the compromise also suited Washington's political objectives, by including in the final declaration the British proposal: "these countries (Ukraine and Georgia) will become members of



NATO”⁵. Thus, not granting the MAP due to the Russian pressures can be perceived only as a limited victory for the Russian Federation, as it is only a temporary delay of the accession process of the two countries. The Bucharest Summit Declaration states that “MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership”, and the delegation of the decision-making powers (regarding the two candidacies) to the NATO foreign ministers cannot be interpreted otherwise than a positive signal for the future enclosure of the two Eastern states in the Alliance’s action plans. This is actually a compromise solution with positive impacts for both the internal coherence of the Alliance and the candidate states, which practically have the certitude of their accession, while being encouraged to continue their internal reforms. The latter issue has also a significant role in preparing the candidate countries’ armed forces to properly respond to the highly demanding requirements of NATO.

Thus, Georgia and Ukraine’s integration becomes only a matter of time. The Allied commitment into that direction is also reinforced by the article 43 of the Declaration, confirming the NATO support in securing the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova⁶.

The strategic importance of the security in the Balkan area is acknowledged by the Alliance, and the official invitation addressed to **Croatia and Albania** to start the accession talks for integration in NATO structures adds further guarantees for the stability and the security of the region. As a technical detail, the signing of the Accession Protocols is foreseen before the end of July 2008 in order to speed up the ratification process. The enlargement triangle will be completed with the invitation addressed to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, once a solution commonly agreed with Greece regarding its name is found.

The increase of NATO involvement in the Balkans aims at, as decided at Riga, states like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia. At the Bucharest Summit, the first two mentioned states were invited to an Intensified Dialogue with the Alliance and they also decided to develop an Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO (IPAP)⁷. Meanwhile, Serbia chose to maintain its status of PfP⁸ member and, as in the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro, the allies expect an

official request from the Belgrade authorities to develop an IPAP or an Intensified Dialogue. These collective decisions taken at Bucharest send a double signal to the Balkan states: first of all, they confirm the fact that the region is still extremely relevant for the security and the stability of the Alliance’s Southern flank and that the Member states are favourable to substantially involve in the area, by using the partnership instruments at their highest capacity and by integrating the candidate states into NATO; secondly, the Alliance stresses out the importance of the availability and real commitment of the candidates and partners alike to abide to the requirements imposed by the Alliance. Nobody shall be exempted from that, and as we very well remember, Romania, too, had to cope with a long list of requirements that were not only technical, but also political. And maybe the most important aspect, from this point of view, is that the candidate state develops good relationships with its neighbours. For example, the success of the bilateral talks between Greece and FYROM would guarantee the beginning of this type of relationship, and the enlargement with the two other countries, members of the Adriatic Charter, which were invited to join NATO, would act as a strong incentive for Skopje towards compromise. Furthermore, let’s not forget that the decisional process within NATO is still based on consensus, and once they become members, the states will have to make sure that this capacity of diplomatic negotiation has been fully appropriated with the purpose of carrying out the national objectives and in support of maintaining the relevance and coherence of the Alliance.

Pushing forward the analysis, it must be stressed out that a considerable success was achieved with regard to the missile defence. NATO recognizes – the Russian opposition being tempered following the bilateral dialogue with the United States – “the substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided by the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets.”

The American missile defence system is going to be completed, in the spirit of the indivisibility of the Allied security, by integrating it in a “comprehensive architecture”, able to “extend coverage to all Allied territory and populations not otherwise covered by the United States system”⁹. The consensual agreement on the “comprehensive



architecture” formulation constitutes a major innovation and a step forward towards the materialization of a common missile defence in the framework of the North-Atlantic system. By the decision taken in Bucharest, the Romanian security interests in the missile defence area are integrated into a collective, allied dimension. Through the decision to carry on the efforts in that direction, all NATO members will have a contribution to the security of the states that are not currently covered by the US system. If, concerning the enlargement, a single state, with interests comparatively diverging from the rest of the Allies, was able to block the decisional process, in the problem of the defence against the attacks of long-range ballistic missiles, the interest of a relatively small number of states made possible the shifting of the decision towards the provision of a security guarantee.

For Romania, this means a significant contribution to the consolidation of the national security, especially taking into account that, owing to the very large costs, this measure could not be sustained only through national effort. At the same time, the two situations mentioned above send a positive signal, since they are concrete examples of the remarkable ability, of the largest political and military Alliance in history, to accommodate the objectives of a number of states with different defence profiles and with sometimes diverging security interests.

NATO’s operational capability and transformation – the necessity of continuous adaptation and strong commitment

If the main priority of the Alliance, in terms of operations, is represented by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, which otherwise made the object of a distinct public declaration of the Heads of State and Government¹⁰, other areas of interest for allied security in fighting the asymmetrical threats, as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, are mentioned as **major concerns** requiring concrete measures as well.

ISAF, the operational priority of the Alliance, is based on the following guiding principles for Afghan reconstruction: a firm and shared long-term commitment; support for enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility; a comprehensive

approach by the international community, bringing together civilian and military efforts; and an increased cooperation and engagement with Afghanistan’s neighbours, especially Pakistan. A civil effort, generated by the extended reconstruction needs, as well as the supplementation of the existing troops, is mandatory. The appointment of a coordinator that will synchronize the efforts of all the involved actors, the United Nations’ Special Representative, the Norwegian Kai Eide, marked a positive evolution. This additional effort in coordination answers to a real necessity for achieving a certain level of operational coherence of the international community in Afghanistan. The unity must be provided not only through the coordination of international involvements and by paying extra attention to the reconstruction and development components, but also by providing a robust military presence in all the provinces of Afghanistan, especially in those ones which are the most vulnerable when faced with insurgent attacks. On this line of action, the Bucharest Summit reiterated that the effective supplementation with forces in the framework of ISAF will involve the major contribution of the United States, which have deployed additional troops in the South of Afghanistan, and of France, that will participate with forces for the first time in the Eastern region. From the military perspective, maintaining the Canadian troops in the Southern part of the country represents another positive development.

Returning to an issue presented before, the strategic importance of the security in the Balkans is sustained both by the confirmation of the necessity of the Alliance’s enlargement to the states in the area, and by the reiteration of the Alliance’s commitment to maintain the mission in Kosovo mandated by the United Nations (UNSR 1244), **KFOR**. There is a need to maintain “international presences throughout Kosovo, whose efforts contribute to freedom of movement and the flow of people and goods, including border monitoring.”¹¹ The dialogue with the parties involved in the conflict is essential and it is KFOR’s responsibility.

Romania’s position on this issue is relatively delicate, due to the political decision not to recognize the unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo. This generated a certain difficulty for the Romanian military presence in KFOR that may have to assume new missions, implicitly contributing to the construction of the Kosovo security



institutions. Nevertheless, we will maintain our military presence in the framework of NATO mission in Kosovo and we will complete our previous missions, as an expression of our concern for the security of all the communities in the province and of the interest of the Romanian state in effectively contributing to the stabilization efforts in the Balkan region.

Focusing on another geographical area than South-eastern Europe, NATO states, among other things, its availability to get involved in the conflicts from **Darfur** and **Somalia**, by providing support to the African Union's missions in the respective areas.

As far as the situation in Iraq is concerned, the Alliance maintains its commitment to support the Iraqi Security Forces and intends to extend the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM I) until 2009.

The NATO transformation process initiated at Prague (2002) and continued at Istanbul (2004) and Riga (2006) is based, along with the new missions and partnership relations of the Alliance, on the transformation of forces and capabilities that support the current and future operational engagements. The Bucharest meeting offered an important opportunity for discussing and making an inventory of the Allied efforts in the field of the military transformation, while focusing on two distinct dimensions: ensuring deployable and sustainable forces for the current operations of the Alliance, strategic reserve forces and NATO Response Force, as well as developing the capabilities for the future.

The attention was focused on the **ways of limiting the shortfalls in ensuring the forces necessary for operations**, starting with the assessment that, at present, the Alliance has at its disposal the necessary forces. In spite of this, the acceleration of the rhythm in which the Alliance is required an involvement in operations, as well as the political implications of the decisions to increase the contributions in the theatres, at member states level, are elements that render, the process of generating forces for a specific operation, difficult. A measure proposed to improve this situation is the **adopted option to gradually generate the forces needed for the NATO Response Force (NRF)**, as a temporary solution.

At the same time, in the new security context, NATO assumed a number of missions to be

carried out in difficult areas, far away from the Allied territory, situation that raises a range of problems related to the provision of the specific capabilities. For example, engaging the Allies in the assistance and security mission in Afghanistan and, in particular, the preparation and training of the Afghan security forces, brought to light the severe need for capabilities such as: manoeuvre and reserve forces, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, surveillance and recognition elements, electronic warfare systems, helicopter units. In this context, in the framework of the Alliance transformation meeting at the Bucharest Summit, the participants underlined **NATO's priorities in the field of the capabilities that need a more substantial support from the nations in filling the needs identified by military authorities**. Key areas as strategic airlift, multinational logistics, special forces for operations, ground surveillance and the medical assistance in the theatre are already on the working agenda of the Alliance and, in some cases, notable progresses were made.

Possible scenarios – an overview

The Bucharest Summit asserted itself not only through the amplitude of the overall organization and the impressive number of participants, but also through the decisions consensually adopted (or the perspectives of taking such decisions in the future); and one can make only estimative suppositions as regards the announced perspectives. Therefore, although Russia's position remained as firm as before in many concerns, the degree of tolerance shown towards the American project on missile defence rose, and the non-disapproval of NATO's comprehensive architecture in the same fields is also a sign of evolution, obviously positive, of the relations between the Occident/US and Russia. In addition, the agreement on the transit on Russian territory of NATO non-military equipments for ISAF was also concluded.

France's reintegration in the North-Atlantic command structures could lead to a relative gap between Paris and the German positions concerning the MAP for Georgia and Ukraine. The recent summit has already decided that the two states will become NATO members, the formulation leaving no doubt on this matter. Therefore, the 2009 anniversary summit may mark the recognition of the success of the democratic reform in the two



mentioned countries by granting them the MAP and leading to an irreversible straightening of their relation with NATO. The ceremony for the official adhesion of Croatia and Albania will take place at the same time. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will most probably solve, with UN support, the disagreement with Greece concerning its name as a distinct state. The clarification of this issue is essential both for obtaining the NATO membership status and for a potential future EU enlargement. The open doors policy is maintained and states like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia could reach a new stage of dialogue with NATO, aiming at the complete stabilization of the Balkans.

Regarding the transformation of forces and capabilities, the extended and long-term process is continued, but its results depend on Allies' political will and effective involvement. The augmentation of ISAF forces in Afghanistan cannot be efficient in the absence of an adequate coordination between all the actors involved, and of the support of the Afghan government and administration within an institutional construction effort. A sustained effort for reconstruction in Iraq should not be missing from the agenda of the future summit either.

A special place, among the Alliance's priorities, is taken by the defence policy against cyber attacks. The implementation of this policy implies the development of structures and authorities that could be defined and even approved in 2009. We could also conclude on the actual role of NATO in the field of energy security starting with the areas where the Alliance firmly states its engagement: "information and intelligence fusion and sharing; projecting stability; advancing international and regional cooperation; supporting consequence management; and supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure"¹².

Both the Defence Policy against the Cyber Attacks and NATO's role in energy security involve an active consultation with the European Union since the strategic partnership NATO-EU implies the need for synchronization and coordination of the collective security efforts.

The transformation of the Alliance, the bringing in of new members, the efficient answers to the security challenges, the development of deployable capabilities, the establishment of new relations with the Alliance's partners – are all reference points for the future Summit in 2009 to focus on.

They will be included in a Declaration on Alliance Security as a starting point in advancing a new Strategic Concept of the Alliance. The complexity of NATO's transformation process, which needs continuous adaptation in accordance with the evolution of the international security environment, involves the call for a sustained allied effort, the political will for effective engagement, especially at operational level, being an essential factor for the success of the adopted policies and initiated actions. The political consultations represent an indispensable tool in obtaining the consensus, and in maintaining a global vision common to all the Allies and NATO's partners.

Under these circumstances, the historical summit announced for 2009 at Strasbourg and Kehl will have to finalize the negotiation process launched at Bucharest on several issues, and advance concrete results in order to accelerate the transformation process, essential in capacitating the Alliance for the provision of a prompt and efficient response to the multiple challenges and threats to the international security.

NOTES:

¹ Riga Summit, November, 28-29, 2006.

² The next year reunion will celebrate 60 years since the creation of the Alliance and will be co-organized by France and Germany.

³ "We believe the potential of the NATO-Russia Council is not fully realized and we remain ready to identify and pursue opportunities for joint actions at 27, while recalling the principle of independence of decision-making and actions by NATO or Russia", art. 28, Bucharest Summit Declaration.

⁴ Membership Action Plan.

⁵ "We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO", art. 23, Bucharest Summit Declaration.

⁶ "Our nations support the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova", art. 43, Bucharest Summit Declaration.

⁷ Art. 25, Bucharest Summit Declaration.

⁸ Partnership for Peace Programme.

⁹ Art. 37, Bucharest Summit Declaration.

¹⁰ ISAF's Strategic Vision. Declaration by the Heads of state and Government of the Nations



THE POLITICAL-MILITARY PRESENT

contributing to the UN-mandated NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

¹¹ Art. 9, Bucharest Summit Declaration.

¹² Art. 48, Bucharest Summit Declaration.

Lieutenant General (ret.) Corneliu V. DOBRIȚOIU (cdobritoiu@mapn.ro) graduated the Land Forces Academy in Sibiu and post-graduated the Naval Studies School in Monterey, US. Since 1995 he has occupied different executive positions such as Head of the Euro-Atlantic Integration and International Military Relations Directorate or Deputy Secretary of State and Head of the Euro-Atlantic Integration and Defence Policy Department. From 2006, he has been Secretary of State and Head of the Euro-Atlantic Integration and Defence Policy Department.



STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN

Mircea MUREȘAN, PhD

The prolonged delay of the insecurity situation in Afghanistan, regardless the impressive presence of the allied and partner forces, has been the reason why this "hot subject" was considered of utmost importance on the agenda of the NATO Summit, Bucharest, April, 2-4, 2008. The decisions that have been made design the Strategic Vision of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which will offer, through the underlined proposals, a wider contribution to the peace and reconstruction of this country. The proposals took the form of a concrete and immediate engagement, which represents the acceptance of certain major risks in ensuring security of a conflict region that has never been safe.

The present analysis concentrates on the solutions found to make ISAF mission more effective, through the Strategy for Afghanistan: NATO and its partners' engagement to continue the long-term efforts to secure and rebuild the country. The people of Afghanistan will be more responsible and its leadership will be reinforced. It will be offered support in building up, training and endowing of Afghan armed forces made up of 80,000 persons until 2010. The international community will offer a global support, thus combining the military and civilian efforts, for a better coordination, a cooperation and engagement with its neighbours, especially with Pakistan. The extremist propaganda will be discouraged and the communication with the Afghan and international public opinion will be improved.

Keywords: cooperation, strategic communications, terrorism, stability, reconstruction, leadership, partnership.

The forces engaged in the first important confrontation with terrorism, launched by USA after the events of September 11 2001 on the Afghan territory have been facing, for some years, a more or less accepted deadlock, which calls for the projection of a strategic vision of ISAF, of

an all-embracing approach of the international community to put an end, in a reasonable period of time, to the internal extremism, which is hugely financed by the drugs industry that also promotes corruption, and criminality, thus impeding and efficient governing. The forces are represented by NATO and its partners and they act under a UN mandate.

During the recent French- British summit it has been appreciated that Afghanistan represents a strategic defiance, and this is the reason why NATO member states, with the support of the Afghan government, have to remain in this theatre as long as it is necessary, in order to ensure the stability of this country. It is not a hazardous statement when we talk about increasing efforts, in the same sense the leaders of the two countries do; this statement shows a necessity under the present conditions. That is why Great Britain and France call for their partners to unify their efforts and to ensure the success of the Support Conference to Afghanistan that is to take place in Paris, in June.

To build in a continuous chaos, in an atmosphere of continuous asymmetric confrontation is extremely complicated and not very productive. The proliferation of permanent religious extremism in a vast space of Afghanistan does not call for the abandonment of the political means to solve the problem, but for a better use of them, at the same time with granting a greater importance to the multiplication and the effectiveness of the military effort.

Such an undertaking is extremely difficult, especially in a territory described by the mass media of the recent year as being in an acute material backwardness; 60% of the Afghan territory has no electricity, 80% of the population does not have a stable source or drinkable water, the police forces are extremely weak, and they have to cope with numerous anti-governmental forces - Islamic fundamentalists, and ex-combatants of the '80s war, drug dealers and so on.



On this territory, undermined by poverty and economic backwardness, where tribalism and religious beliefs have deep roots, Al-Qaeda has a huge influence and its actions blocked the real progress for a democratic transformation of the country made by the government and the international forces. A perpetual guerrilla war puts face to face the well-trained and endowed forces of USA and NATO and the less numerous troops, but ideologically motivated, which have more modern means of communication than sophisticated weapons, but which have better tactical results that shock at political and strategic level. The call for intelligence, as a weapon that can better prevent or kill, and the accomplishment of a growing un-predicament of the asymmetric actions of the Taliban put in danger the peace and safety. They can be ensured only through the sacrifice of the military representing the states that are part of ISAF, and the members of the local forces.

But beyond anything else, the human sacrifice of the American soldiers, and of their partners from the theatre, as well as of the Afghan innocent population, together with the lack of effectiveness of the reconstructive and stabilizer actions of the International Force, have made the strategic challenge addressed to the Alliance to be even stronger and to play a decisive role in placing the Afghan problem on the agenda of NATO Summit from Bucharest, April 2008.

1. Strategic solutions for a more effective ISAF mission

Two months before the summit, on February 7 and 8, the 26 NATO Defence ministers have analyzed, during a ministerial reunion in Vilnius, the activity of the military from ISAF and the growing difficulties that they have to face, looking for solution to turn the mission into more effective.

From a chronological point of view, it is known that ISAF was founded after the military actions of US and NATO from Afghanistan had begun, on December, 21, 2001, through the Resolution 1386 of UN Security Council. Within the forces, NATO is “a key component of the international community’s engagement in Afghanistan, assisting the Afghan authorities in providing security and stability, paving the way for reconstruction and effective governance”¹. The Alliance plays a

key role in the Afghanistan Compact, a five-year plan between the government of Afghanistan and the international community, which sets goals relating to the security, governance and economic development of the country. The organization is engaged on three fronts: it leads, through leadership of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), an international force of some 47,000 troops that assists the Afghan authorities in extending and exercising its authority and influence across the country, creating the conditions for stabilisation and reconstruction; it has a Senior Civilian Representative, responsible for advancing the political-military aspects of the Alliance’s commitment to the country, who works closely with ISAF, liaises with the Afghan government and other international organisations, and maintains contacts with neighbouring countries; it develops an important programme of cooperation with Afghanistan, concentrating on defence reform, defence institution-building and the military aspects of security sector reform.

On August, 11, 2003, NATO has officially taken over ISAF command, accomplishing its first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic region. On October 13, 2003, The UN Security Council Resolution no. 1510 has renewed for another year ISAF mission and extended it all over the Afghan territory. On September 19, 2003, Security Council Resolution no 1776 has prolonged ISAF mandate until October 13, 2008.

According to the latest information from the theatre, ISAF had the following structure in March, 2008: 13,900 military at the Regional Command East, Bagram, USA; 11,600 military at Regional Command South, Kandahar, Canada; 4,800 military at Regional Command Capital, Kabul, with a mixed structure and Turkey; 3,300 military at Regional Command North, Mazar-e Sharif, Germany; 2,500 military at Regional Command, West Herat, Italy².

Mass media sources³ indicate that ISAF presence is up to 28,000 military: 15, 000 Americans (total effort of US is over 26,000 military), 7,800 British, 3,210 Germans, 2,880 Italians, 2,500 Canadians, 1,650 Dutch, 1,515 French, and 1,100 Poles. The states that have a military presence less than 1,000 military, as Romania, are not mentioned. ISAF losses increased from a year to another, from 57 people in 2003, up to 232 in 2007, and, according to Deutsche Welle, over 600 military lost their



lives in Afghanistan. The development of events has proved that the forces present in the theatre are insufficient and that they should be increased. The public opinion from some of NATO member states was against increasing the number of military in the Afghan theatre. Thus, a public opinion poll made by Focus magazine showed that 63% of the Germans consider that the present deployment of troops in the Northern part of Afghanistan does not serve the German interests, and 84% of the Germans are against sending more troops, as US has required.

A Canadian public opinion poll from last year shows that 55% of the Canadians are for a withdrawal from Afghanistan, while 67% of them consider that the presence of the Canadian troops in Afghanistan makes Canada more vulnerable to terrorist attacks. The Italian opposition against the presence of their troops in Afghanistan is very strong. Taking this into consideration, it seems normal that the citizens of the member states are concerned for the lives of their sons, because of the high risk represented by a certain region, in which they act. However, the North-Atlantic Organization was forced by the realities to take another option: to increase the troops in the Afghan theatre. Before Bucharest summit, and during it, a few member states, as France and Romania, have announced that they intended to send more troops in Afghanistan, in order to fight against Al-Qaeda.

NATO's high ranking military experts have noticed the organisation's credibility is at stake in Afghanistan. A possible failure in accomplishing the mission by ISAF has mobilized the strategists of the Alliance to find the best solutions to succeed, to obtain new operational successes, despite the bigger risks, which are the following according to the specialists⁴: the assault of political and religious fundamentalism, international terrorism offensive, organized crime and the spread of the weapons of mass destruction, the weaknesses of the nation-state and of the most important international organizations in the field of security - UN, NATO and EU.

The Taliban regime has long died, a new Constitution has been adopted, free elections have been organised, schools have started to function, an almost inexistent infrastructure has started to develop, and public health has also started to develop. From time to time, the past shows its hideous face: ignorance, under-development and

illiteracy, the lack of water and of basic hygiene, the growing number of the victims amongst population and multinational military, poverty and the fear of common man for tomorrow, in spite of international political, military and financial support, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams' actions, and the cultivation of opium in the countryside - white death, which destroys the local and world's population, the large net of drug dealers and organized crime in Afghanistan.

It was thought that ISAF would be able to create, in a reasonable amount of time, the needed environment for the local security structures, which were to extend their influence all over the country⁵, thus creating the premises for NATO to leave Afghanistan. But the Afghan government does not have the necessary capacity to take all the responsibilities: to ensure the security of its citizens, and to ensure a good functioning of state's institutions and national Afghan agencies. The military situation of the country has been worsening lately, as a French analyst noticed⁶. The Taliban's actions have grown in intensity, especially in the Eastern and Southern parts of the country, supported by the drug producers. Terrorism has also been more present in 2007 in the North and the West of the country. More than 200 terrorist attacks have taken place only in 2007. The strategy used by the Americans in the border regions with Pakistan has failed. Under these circumstances, NATO is forced to find a solution to end the crisis, and the solution has been found and adopted at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008.

2. Afghanistan: A priority for the Alliance

The conclusions of the NATO summit from Bucharest⁷ project an objective analysis on the realities of the Afghan theatre. The presence of the Allied forces has a strong motivation: the Euro-Atlantic and international security tightly connected with the future of Afghanistan as a peaceful, democratic state that observes the human rights and lacks the terrorist threat. This is why ISAF, a force formed by military belonging to 40 states, represents the main priority of the Alliance. The member states' leaders seem to be aware of the fact that, beyond any significant progresses in the cooperation with the Afghans, there are numerous challenges, which call for supplementary efforts, not to allow the extremists and the terrorists to take



back the control over Afghanistan or to use the country as a base for terrorism in order to attack other regions of the world.

The Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the Nations on Afghanistan, together with ISAF partners, and with the direct implication of the president Karzai, establishes a clear vision, based on the principles of a mutual long term engagement, on the support for a better Afghan leadership and responsibility, on a wide approach from the international community, which has to unite the civilian and military efforts, as well as on a better participation of the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan, especially Pakistan. It has been also decided at the summit that the allies and their partners should contribute with new forces and other forms of support to the mission. This measure should generate a constant flow of forces in the theatre, with the participation of the states that, at least for the moment are reticent to sending more troops. The Support Conference from Paris (June) should review the progress on and will contribute to the strengthening of the international efforts to further implement the Afghanistan Compact.

It is also important that NATO leaders have underlined the necessity of a better dialogue with the international and local public opinion, on the policies and the engagement of the Alliance in the Afghan operations, as it is required by the information environment. They considered more then welcome the progress in the strengthening of NATO capability for strategic communications with the Media Operations Centre. During NATO summit a web-based NATO TV channel has been launched. It will present news and report from different Afghan regions.

The lessons learned in the theatre, including the Afghanistan ones, make the international community to work closer and to use a wide approach of the today challenges on security, by developing the cooperation and the contribution of all important actors, inclusive the contribution of the nongovernmental organizations and of the local bodies, by using a wide range of civilian and military instruments, in a united effort, which takes into account each and everybody mandate and advantages. The Declaration refers to the approved Action Plan, which presents a set of pragmatically proposals for the development and the implementation of NATO contribution. The

proposals, which refer to areas like planning and conduct of operations, training and education, a better cooperation with the external actors call for the coherent application of NATO crisis management tools. Thus the cooperation will be stronger at each level, supporting the process for stability and reconstruction.

NATO and UN have been developing for more than a decade an operational active collaboration in the field of peacekeeping in the theatres from Western Balkans and from Afghanistan. The operations, under UN mandate and led by NATO, are common experiences, which demonstrate the value of an effective coordination between the two organizations. This cooperation has to continue, based on the statements of UN Charta and the Washington Treaty. The cooperation between NATO and Russia will continue, the Russian Federation is ready to give support to ISAF and NATO in Afghanistan, by facilitating the transit on its territory, and by continuing the training of the Afghan officers for the fight against drug trafficking. In this context it is mentioned the continuation of the dialogue with the partners from Central Asia regarding Afghanistan, the important contributions of EAPC partners to the Alliance, especially the contributions of Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Singapore, under NATO command in Afghanistan, as well as the support offered to the mission by the Republic of Korea.

3. ISAF strategic vision

The document dedicated to Afghanistan at NATO Summit in Bucharest, is ISAF's Strategic Vision⁸. The Declaration makes clear the fact that this strategic projection is the common work of the states' leaders that take part to the mission, of the Afghan president and of UN Secretary General. The leaders of the 40 countries that take part to the mission present, based on the complex dimension of the Alliance implication in security, reconstruction and development of Afghanistan, a series of principles, measures and actions "to help the people and the elected Government of Afghanistan build an enduring stable, secure, prosperous and democratic state, respectful of human rights and free from the threat of terrorism." The ample space reserved by NATO leaders to Afghanistan shows how important is this mission for the Euro-Atlantic community. The Declaration



on Afghanistan underlines that that this mission is a “key priority for the Alliance”. After the tragic events from September 11, 2001, everybody has understood the relation of dependence between the stability and future of Afghanistan and the Euro-Atlantic security, as well as for the international security. NATO has sent its forces on the Afghan government request and under a UN mandate. The Alliance understood that if the terrorists and Al-Qaeda had taken over control on Afghanistan, they would have been able to create a terrorist base that could have threatened the whole world.

Bucharest Summit has adopted the four fundamental principles of the Alliance’s contribution to the next stage of reconstruction in Afghanistan: a long-term commitment, support for enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility, the need of a cooperation and a growing contribution of the international community bringing together civilian and military efforts, and the last, but not the least, supporting the regional stability, stressing out Pakistan.

These statements are supported the accomplishments and the significant progress in the development of democracy and in improving living conditions, national reconciliation and the improvement of security and vital infrastructures, free access to health care and education, protection of women’s rights by law. These accomplishments were reached by the instauration of a security and peace climate by the international and Afghan forces, based on a continuous development of the response capability to the extremist actions, and terrorist attacks.

The vision of the people that have signed the document considers that the success will be when extremism and terrorism will no longer pose a threat to stability, the Afghan National Security Forces will be in the lead and self-sufficient, the Afghan Government will be able to extend the reach of good governance, reconstruction, and development throughout the country to the benefit of all its citizens. These desiderata will be possible by a medium-term, internal political-military plan - consistent with the Afghanistan Compact and the Afghan National Development Strategy.

The support offered to the Afghan government in the field of security in order to maintain a secure environment and good governance consists of the mutual support in sharing the burden in Afghanistan, providing ISAF military commanders

the forces, training teams and enablers for overcoming the shortcomings, actively counter extremist propaganda and to communicate more effectively the ISAF goals, accomplishments and remaining challenges to Afghan and international audiences.⁹

The objective of the building up, until 2010, of Afghan armed forces formed of 80,000 military¹⁰, capable of leading and sustaining operations independently, will be reached by offering forming teams and offering the needed materials, the progressive transfer to Afghan forces, sustained by ISAF of the main responsibility for the security of the whole country. The Afghan authorities have already requested to appoint a senior Afghan military officer to ISAF Headquarters, creating effective civilian-controlled security and defence institutions, to assist the development of the Afghan National Police, building the capacity to communicate more effectively and respond to extremist propaganda, to strengthen the state institutions, to protect human rights and promote our shared values, while respecting Afghan culture and traditions, to support the upcoming elections and to fight against the drug trafficking.

The biunivocal relation security- development will continue to grow based on continuous coordination for security, governing and development¹¹. All local and international partners should associate to help the Afghan government. The UN cooperation with ISAF should be strengthened. The cooperation between civilians and military should be improved, by permanent talks between all the partners from the theatre, according to necessities and in a close coordination with the Afghan government. The international efforts should develop after Paris Conference to continue the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact by using all the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), by enforcing the civilian components and by synchronizing the strategies for development with the priorities of the Afghan government.

The threats on Afghanistan - eviolent extremism and narcotics - influence the whole region. This is why the 40 leaders ask Afghanistan neighbouring countries, especially Pakistan, to call on Afghanistan’s neighbours to act resolutely in support of the Afghan Government’s efforts to build a stable Afghanistan with secure borders. It is estimated a better collaboration with the



neighbours, especially with Pakistan in order to improve security and stability at their borders including through the Jirga mechanisms, the Ankara process and the Tripartite Commission.

ISAF's Strategic Vision is a projection and a promise for a new future for Afghanistan. It represents as warranty for the creation of all the conditions so that the Afghan people, assisted by the allies and partners, to be able to control its own destiny, security, reconstruction and development of the country, thus being able to aspire to a better, safer life, with no risks or threats.

Conclusions

The Euro-Atlantic security is connected to the peaceful future of this country, to the respect for the human rights and to the fight against terrorist threats. These elements motivate the whole content of the Strategic Vision adopted during NATO's Special Session during the Bucharest Summit on Afghanistan.

The common long term efforts assumed by ISAF in Afghanistan represent the main priority for the Alliance. A wide coordination of all the efforts of the forces and Afghan and international institutions is needed.

NATO has a limited responsibility in Afghanistan, namely security and stability. NATO assumes as an objective, for the next stage, the development of military cooperation in order to support the mission. The final goal is to ensure the security of Afghanistan using national forces and institutions.

Translated by Alexandrina VLAD

NOTES:

¹ See *Les dossiers de l'OTAN: l'OTAN en Afghanistan*, <http://www.nato.int/issues/Afghanistan/index-fr.html>

² Source: ISAF Mirror, no. 47, March 2008, page 3.

³ Gary LEUPP, *The Independence of Kosovo-Threatening the Foundations of a World Order*, CounterPunch, 19 February 2008.

⁴ Five of the highest rank officers and strategists of the Alliance – the American general John Shalikashvili, the German General Klaus Naumann, the Dutch general Henk van den Breemen, the British Marshal Lord Peter Inge, and the French Admiral Jacques Lanxade - the authors of a manifest-study about new NATO, while enumerating the risks, sustain NATO's readiness to launch a massive pre-emptive nuclear attack, in order to put an end to the imminent propagation of the nuclear weapons and other world mass destruction weapons. *Pre-emptive Nuclear Strike a Key Option, NATO Told*, The Guardian, 22 January 2008.

⁵ General Lieutenant Rick HILLER, *Great Expectations*, NATO Magazine, Summer 2004.

⁶ Aurélien GIRARD, *Afghanistan: La traverse du désert des troupes de l'OTAN*, La Grande Epoque, Paris, 10.02.2008.

⁷ See the Bucharest Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008.

⁸ ISAF's Strategic Vision. The Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the Nations contributing to the UN-mandated NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan

⁹ Ibidem, p. 2.

¹⁰ Ibidem, p. 2.

¹¹ Ibidem, p. 3.

General Professor Mircea MUREȘAN (muresan@unap.ro), PhD, commandant (rector) of the National Defence University "Carol I", concentrates once again on the analysis of the topics of the Euro-Atlantic Organization, with one of the most complex themes of NATO Summit from Bucharest, the Strategy for Afghanistan, presenting in details the Alliance's and the ISAF partner states' engagement to continue the long-term efforts for the Afghan's states security, reconstruction and development.



LES CARACTÉRISTIQUES DE SECURITÉ DE LA REGION ETENDUE DE LA MER NOIRE. LE PARADIGME DE „SECURITÉ GELÉ”

Marius-Sorin MICLEA

Dans cet article, l'auteur focalise son attention sur les changements produits dans le cadre de l'environnement de sécurité de la Région Etendue de la Mer Noire, dans la période suivante à la chute du Rideau de Fer.

L'approche du sujet du point de vue des relations internationales est systémique, en poursuivant une radiographie des domaines de référence pour les communautés de la région. Ici sont visées cinq domaines d'importance majeure, dont, conformément à l'opinion de Barry Buzan, sont les plus exposées aux nouveaux types de menace survenus suite au changement de la polarité au niveau mondial. Il s'agit des domaines militaire, politique, social, économique et d'environnement. Cependant, sont développées les recherches d'autres auteurs sur cette période soumise aux changements significatives d'après la Guerre Froide.

Elle est une étape de la redéfinition identitaire des acteurs régionaux mais, dans le même temps, du manque de la coopération, des suspicions, de l'apparition des menaces diffuses, de la compétition, mais aussi de l'introspection. Elle comprend la redéfinition de la politique de sécurité régionale, où des Etats appartenant aux systèmes politiques différentes, se retrouvent ensemble, au cadre d'un nouveau paradigme de sécurité, définie par l'auteur comme „le paradigme de sécurité gelé”, suite aux similitudes avec l'ancien paradigme de sécurité de la guerre froide.

Mots-clé: le paradigme de sécurité gelé, le paradigme de la coopération, Région Etendue de la Mer Noire, la Guerre Froide, l'environnement de sécurité, le Pacte de Varsovie, l'OTAN.

1. La transformation de l'environnement de sécurité de la Mer Noire d'après la chute du Rideau de Fer

Les événements qui se sont déroulés en Europe Centrale et de l'Est à la fin des années '80 début des années '90, ont transformé d'une manière irréversible l'environnement de sécurité global et européen. Elles ont marqué la fin de la Guerre Froide, remontant à la rivalité russo-américaine de 1917. La fin du système de sécurité et de défense du bloc des pays communistes a créé un déséquilibre global majeur, laissant les Etats-Unis, dans le nouveau monde unipolaire, sans les principaux ennemis personnifiés par les pays de l'OPV.¹

La chute du communisme a modifié d'une manière dramatique l'architecture de sécurité et de défense de la Région Etendue de la Mer Noire. (REMNE). Avant l'implosion de l'Union Soviétique, dans la région étaient installés face en face les troupes du Pacte de Varsovie et celles de l'OTAN. La région était un enjeu important dans la lutte pour la suprématie stratégique globale, ayant en vue les principaux objectifs stratégiques, les bases navales soviétiques dans le bassin de la Mer Noire, les radars de l'Armée Rouge basés sur l'Île des Serpents, les bases américaines de Turquie et les Détroits Bosphore et Dardanelles.

Jusqu'à 1991, quatre Etats, positionnés dans les deux organisations politico-militaires-l'Union Soviétique, la Roumanie, la Bulgarie et la Turquie-dommaient les zones littorales autour de la Mer Noire. La dissolution de l'Union Soviétique a doublé le nombre des pays riverains, l'actuelle géographie régionale de ces Etats étant constituée par l'Ukraine, la République de Moldavie, la Russie, la Georgie, la Turquie², la Bulgarie et la Roumanie. Après l'euphorie générée par la libération de sous tutelle soviétique, un avenir



obscur se préfigurait pour les pays de la région.

Dans le cadre actuel post-Guerre Froide, un nouveau paradigme de sécurité remplace l'environnement de sécurité spécifique à la guerre froide, basé sur la dissuasion, mais dans le même temps, qui assurait la stabilité et la sécurité dans région. Les nouvelles menaces, vulnérabilités, défis et risques asymétriques apparus, ont démontré une réalité incontestable: les philosophes et les dialecticiens du marxisme-léninisme ont prévu toujours les effets spécifiques caractéristiques au passage de capitalisme au socialisme. Mais personne n'a pas été capable de prévoir les effets du passage dialectique de socialisme au capitalisme.

Dans ces conditions historiques données, le cadre de la coopération entre les Etats appartenant au bloc socialiste a été abrogé, étant remplacé par un système "gelé" de sécurité, dont les principales caractéristiques ont été la défiance, les dissensions, l'insuffisance de la coopération, la suspicion, la compétition acerbe dans toutes les domaines, la perception des pays voisins comme des potentiels ennemis et la perception de la détermination de la Russie de récupérer le statut d'ancienne grande puissance et de regagner l'influence dans la région. Ces éléments forment, à notre avis, la substance du „paradigme de sécurité gelé" d'après la Guerre Froide.

Dans le même temps elles représentent les piliers d'un model conceptuel qui redéfinit l'environnement de sécurité de la Mer Noire, dans la période de transition entre le paradigme de la Guerre Froide et celle actuelle, de la coopération. Le cadre de la coopération des Etats lesquels, après 1990, formaient le système de sécurité de la Mer Noire a été miné par ces questions égocentriques spécifiques à „l'enfance" du capitalisme, et à un monde en transition. Elles ont retardé le développement de la région, et dans le même temps ont alimenté l'anxiété des pays occidentaux vis-à-vis de l'extension en Europe Orientale. Spécifique à cette région, dans une période de temps de vingt ans, trois paradigmes de sécurité ont influencé la sécurité et la stabilité de la région: **le paradigme de sécurité de la Guerre Froide** (il est apparu en 1945, jusqu'au les années '90, étant, quand même difficile de définir une date précise de transformation de l'environnement de sécurité). Il est possible que ce point final de transformation a été en 1989, à l'occasion du

sommet de Malte ente Bush et Gorbatchev. Dans une autre approche, nous pouvons déclarer la fin de la Guerre Froide à l'occasion de la signature de l'acte finale qui met fin au Traite de Varsovie. Nous pouvons aussi déclarer le changement du paradigme à l'occasion du „putsch" de Moscou, ou en décembre 1991, où officiellement l'Union soviétique est devenue histoire. „**Le paradigme de sécurité gelé**" est le successeur de droit du paradigme de la Guerre Froide, sa caractéristique principale étant le manque de coopération. Nous essayerons à démontrer que des éléments de la panoplie de la Guerre Froide subsistent aussi dans le période d'après la chute du communisme dans le climat international spécifique au sous-système géostratégique de la Mer Noire. Son encadrement en temps représente une étape de la transition vers capitalisme des anciens Etats communistes, au début des années '90. Il coïncide dans une grande mesure, du point de vue temporel, à la période d'unipolarité, d'après la perte du statut de grande puissance militaire de la Russie. „**Le paradigme de la coopération**", ou le paradigme par lequel la Russie commence le retour en force, en qualité de partenaire égal avec les Etats-Unis, inclue dans son cadre conceptuel plusieurs éléments, comme les germes du nouveau monde oligopolaire en cours de cristallisation, la guerre globale déclarée contre le terrorisme et une dissémination sans précédent de la globalisation. Pour la plupart des pays de la REMN, le paradigme inclut l'étape des reformes, cette fois décisives, au cadre de la société, et particulièrement pour quelques Etats, il inclut la finalisation de l'offensives diplomatiques commencées immédiatement après 1989, concrétisées par l'accès en l'OTAN et par l'adhésion à l'Union Européenne.³

2. L'encadrement du paradigme de sécurité de la REMN d'après la dissolution de l'URSS dans une approche élargie du système des relations internationales

L'un des plus importants défis à l'adresse de la sécurité internationale d'après la fin de la Guerre Froide a été la tendance de fragmentation dans l'Europe, un phénomène qui n'a pas évité la région de la Mer Noire. Les entités appartenant à l'ancien système soviétique ont commencé l'action de séparation, suite aux tendances nationalistes alimentées par la dissolution de la „carapace"



de l'idéologie communiste qui a tenu „au froid” les questions ethniques et séparatistes. Les orientations et les manifestations des tendances sécessionnistes des anciennes républiques soviétiques confirment leurs regroupements vers les civilisations d'origine. Malgré la volonté de paix et de coopération des Etats de la région, la vraie pacification était en retard, suite aux orgueils de la Russie, qui n'acceptait pas la perte du statut de grande puissance. De plus, une impressionnante diversité anthropologique des races, des cultures, des populations et des habitudes, compliquait le tableau stratégique de ces pays, „déroutés”⁴. Les tensions et les dissensions entre les Etats ont été copieusement alimentées par la Russie, à l'aide d'une politique bien ciblée, efficiente et pragmatique d'utilisation des pressions dans le domaine énergétique.

Bien que les facteurs de décision (les dirigeants et les classes politiques) de ces pays conscientisaient la vraie situation politique et de sécurité, la stabilisation de la région était loin d'être achevée. Une minime coopération utile aux desiderata du moment aurait compris l'esprit de partenariat (inconnu à l'époque pour les pays branchés à l'ancien esprit de COMECON), le respect mutuel, et la création des opportunités pour la coopération régionale. Malheureusement, les acteurs étatiques de l'époque n'ont pas réussi à aboutir vers un paradigme efficient de coopération.

L'héritage du communisme a marqué profondément, d'une manière dure, l'individualité du chaque pays, ainsi que l'absence d'initiative et de volonté politique, la suspicion, les initiatives diplomatiques sans aucun résultat concret, étaient les prédominantes de la vie politique régionale pendant ce deuxième paradigme de sécurité. La crainte perpétuelle des Etats de la région à l'adresse de la politique perçue comme menaçante de la Russie à l'adresse des leurs indépendances, fait aussi partie du héritage maléfique du communisme, étant à la base du manque de l'implication et de décision des acteurs zonales.

Une Union Européenne désintéressée, un OTAN circumspectif, mais, qui a déclanché, quand même, le processus de Partenariat pour la Paix, en 1994, mettent en évidence les difficultés de l'Occident de remplir le vide d'influence, suite à la fragilité temporaire de la Russie. Mais l'affaiblissement de ce pays a été limité en temps. Les difficultés identitaires, économiques, politiques, militaires,

attirent l'attention introspective de la Russie vers ses propres problèmes, en la déterminant de regagner le statut de grande puissance dans quelques années.

Dans le nouvel environnement correspondant au „paradigme de sécurité gelé”, une explication s'impose: les ingrédients de la guerre froide ont été remplacés par les piliers de ce nouvelle construction conceptuelle. La dissuasion entre des superpuissances est remplacée par la suspicion sur les deux coordonnées: celle des Etats de la région à l'adresse de la force militaire de l'URSS, et celle des nouveaux Etats entre eux. La confrontation entre les idéologies a été remplacée par les problèmes existentiels des Etats de la région, les anciennes républiques unionelles étant tentées de orienter leurs politiques vers l'Occident, mais, dans le même temps étant dépendantes du point de vue énergétique de la Russie.

Bien que la Roumanie et la Bulgarie étaient touchées par les mêmes problèmes économiques, elles ont su mieux gérer les options vers la „couverture vers Ouest”. Au moins en Roumanie, une réserve accentuée à l'adresse de la Russie en qualité de héritière de l'ancienne URSS, était évidente en permanence. Une grande majorité de la société civile manifestait l'option sans équivoque de raccorder la Roumanie en totalité aux valeurs occidentales, la vraie place de la Roumanie.

Le plus grand danger pour les nouvelles démocraties de la région était l'attitude négativiste, mais prévisible de la Russie, à l'égard de la volonté de l'extension de la communauté occidentale dans la région de la Mer Noire.⁵ Les signaux politiques provenant de Kremlin ont dévoilé la forte opposition de la Russie contre l'extension, concrétisée en des menaces d'augmentation du prix des hydrocarbures, voire la fin temporaire des livraisons de pétrole ou de gaz „pour la révision des tubes ou pour les réparations temporaires”. Evidemment, les cibles des menaces étaient les Etats désirants de suivre la voie vers l'Ouest et les Etats occidentaux, dont les importations des hydrocarbures représentaient environ 45 % du propre nécessaire.

Le „paradigme de sécurité gelé” de l'espace géostratégique de la région de la Mer Noire englobe dans son cadre, à côté des éléments hérités de la période de la Guerre Froide, des nouveaux éléments, suite aux transformations causées par la pulvérisation des régimes communistes. Une

série des menaces asymétriques diffuses, comme le trafic de stupéfiants et des personnes, le crime organisé, les menaces terroristes, le trafic de matériaux radioactifs, sont spécifiques à la période de transition d'après 1990. A côté d'eux, on retrouve la suspicion, la crainte, les idées préconçues, les indicateurs économiques négatifs spécifiques aux pays englobés dans la Guerre Froide. On assiste à la volonté de la Russie de s'imposer la politique de force et l'accréditation de la confirmation de la Russie de grande puissance dans la région. La pression de la Russie sur les Etats qu'ils ont une autre vision que sa propre vision, représente un raison en plus afin considérer que la région est non-attractive pour l'Occident.

3. Le cadre conceptuel du „paradigme de sécurité gelé” de la REMN

Le concept est la suite des observations empiriques et contient des raisonnements et idées ordonnées dans une construction logique, dans le but de mettre en évidence les caractéristiques de sécurité de la REMN. L'étape analysée est celle de transition entre la période de la Guerre Froide et celle de la détente des relations entre les acteurs zonaux, sur le fond de la coagulation de la lutte contre le terrorisme. La période analysée s'encadre dans, les grandes lignes, entre 1990 et les attaques d'onze septembre 2001.

Les paradigmes représentent un instrument utile d'analyse, étant nécessaires à la pensée humaine, qui ait besoin des modèles explicites ou implicites pour être capables d'effectuer les opérations de pensée suivantes:

- Ordonner et généraliser la réalité;
- Comprendre les liaisons entre les phénomènes;
- Anticiper et prédire les développements ultérieurs;
- Déchiffrer ce qui est important et ce qui est moins important;
- Décider et choisir une voie pour accomplir les buts.⁶

Sur le plan des idées, „le paradigme de sécurité gelé” (le *paradigme* dans l'ouvrage) est une construction rationnelle qui surprenne un état d'esprit caractéristique aux anciens Etats communistes de la REMN après la chute du communisme. Elle inclut dans sa matière un

sumum de faits qui ont marqué d'une manière négative les cinq domaines représentatifs des communautés humaines existantes dans la région: les domaines militaire, sociétal, politique, économique et d'environnement.⁷

Le cadre conceptuel de la construction logique réunit des notions-clé lesquelles bien articulées, permettent d'explicitier l'ensemble de la théorie. Pour réussir d'accomplir le but, s'impose la présentation des principaux concepts théoriques qui composent le fond scientifique du *paradigme*. Les outils de travail seront les notions qui nous aideront pour construire le concept. Nous utiliserons comme principal outil d'analyse l'approche systémique des relations internationales, dont les notions fondamentales nous les utiliserons.

Le cadre géographique général de référence est l'ancien espace ex-soviétique de la Mer Noire, composé par l'Ukraine, la Moldavie, la Russie, la Georgie, la Roumanie, la Bulgarie, la Turquie, l'Arménie et l'Azerbaïdjan, avec la région caspienne importante du point de vue des ressources d'énergie, et le Caucase. A côté de ces acteurs importants, *sujets du paradigme*, la région inclut aussi les acteurs externes, les Etats-Unis, l'OTAN, UE, OSCE, et d'autres organismes internationales concernés et les partis des initiatives régionales.

L'interaction entre les Etats sous *sommés au concept du paradigme* a été influencée, sur le plan militaire, politique, économique, par les menaces spécifiques aux ce région et à l'étape historique d'étape la Guerre Froide. Du point de vue des menaces, elles ont été ordonnées d'une manière inégale, suivant un modèle descendant des zones „chaudes” vers les Etats démocratiques consolidés et des systèmes étatiques plus stables. Sujet de l'analyse, les Etats, ils sont sur le même pied d'égalité, le seul Etat qui fait note discordante étant la Russie, qui se trouvait dans une période de „décadence impériale temporaire”, mais qu'elle reviendra, dans le plus bref délai, au premier plan des jeux de pouvoir.

Quant au principe organisateur du système et quant la spécification des fonctions des unités durant la Guerre Froide, la puissance dominante incontestable de la région était l'Union soviétique, bien que les régimes communistes proclamaient l'unité de monolithe, la fraternité et la légalité des Etats communistes sur l'arène internationale. En conséquence, les Etats communistes comme la Roumanie et la Bulgarie, étant engrenés dans



les systèmes de l'OPV et de COMECON, ne se permettaient d'avoir des initiatives propres dans les questions principales, étant tributaires à la politique de bloc. **Dans la période de la Guerre Froide, sur le territoire de la REMN coexistaient des pays appartenant à deux organisations militaires, étant difficile d'argumenter que, dans cette région, la vie internationale était caractérisée par l'anarchie. Chacun des deux pactes politico-militaires avait son propre statut, son propre set d'hierarchies et de règles, en pouvant affirmer que la constante principale de la région était l'équilibre instauré par le besoin de stabilité soumise à la dissuasion spécifique à la Guerre Froide.**

La transformation du système s'est produite, conceptuellement, à l'occasion de la dissolution de l'Union soviétique, celle-ci en perdant, au moins au niveau théorique, l'autorité induite par le statut de grande puissance. Par la suite, la modification au niveau du principe organisateur du système a contribué dans une certaine mesure au changement du système. Donc, les événements qui ont contribué à la chute du communisme ont transformé le système de sécurité spécifique à la guerre froide dans un système „gelé”, caractéristique à la période d'unipolarité post communiste.

Une polarité autour des principales superpuissances de la guerre froide prédominait dans la région. La Roumanie et la Bulgarie étaient encadrées dans l'OPV, et au moins au niveau déclaratif, leurs propres besoins de sécurité coïncidaient aux besoins de sécurité de l'URSS. Quant à la Turquie, elle était la seule représentante de l'OTAN dans la région, mais un acteur d'importance majeure, suite au contrôle des Détroits, et la possibilité d'accès à l'océan planétaire, en étant le plus important allié américain dans la région.

Les aspects négatifs ont apparus à l'occasion de la chute de l'URSS, dans les principaux domaines qui définissent l'organisation du sous-système, des Etats et des individus. Chaque domaine contient des menaces à l'adresse de la sécurité des entités étatiques, voire à l'adresse de la sécurité régionale, qui est la somme des sécurités étatiques. Ces aspects négatifs ont agi au niveau extérieur et intérieur des Etats. Au niveau exogène, elles ont altéré les relations interétatiques et au niveau intérieur elles ont agi contre la hiérarchie institutionnelle, en affectant les mécanismes de

l'autorité étatique. **La faiblesse des Etats dans les cinq domaines majeurs essentiels pour la société représente une constante de la période du paradigme.**

Apparemment, les aspects décrits revendiquent leur origine aux effets pervers des phénomènes de rémanence qui ont continué une bonne période de temps d'après la chute du communisme de se manifester sous le masque des nouvelles formations „démocratiques” émancipées après la pulvérisation du système socialiste. Effectivement, ces entités neocommunistes, soutenues par les anciens bénéficiaires des privilèges, ont produit des effets négatifs au niveau des systèmes économiques internes de chaque Etat de la région, mais, quand même, ces aspects ont représenté des facteurs secondaires de la détérioration de la situation. Les vraies raisons de l'amplification et du développement du paradigme ont été les graves questions générées par la situation produite par la chute du communisme à la fin de la Guerre Froide. Ainsi, l'étape „gelé” des relations internationales concourait avec les questions difficiles au niveau interne, le résultat final étant l'éloignement des entités étatiques d'un modèle pragmatique de coopération. A cette époque, „la compétition représentait l'exception et le manque de coopération-la règle”.⁸

L'interprétation du concept s'avère d'être difficile parfois, suite à la complexité des phénomènes qui affectent les cinq domaines majeurs de la communauté. Chaque Etat, suite aux agressions spécifiques non militaires et asymétriques à son adresse, réagit d'une manière spécifique, ainsi que la place des tonalités diplomatiques est remplacée par les nuances manichéennes, les voisins étant perçus comme les principaux concurrents, voire ennemis. Dans un sous-système où chaque Etat se positionne dans une concurrence permanente, seule la Russie a tous les atouts pour profiter de cette situation inédite. Au cadre du paradigme, la grande constante de la politique externe de la Russie a resté l'action de récupérer du statut de hyperpuissance perdue à l'occasion de la chute du communisme.

En conclusion, nous désirons souligner que le „paradigme de sécurité gelé” de la Région Etendue de la Mer Noire crée un cadre scientifique d'analyse du concept de la sécurité régionale, intégré dans le sous système des relations internationales de la REMN.



NOTES:

¹ Caractéristique à la période de crépuscule du communisme et à la déroute qui avait accompagné la fin de la guerre froide est la déclaration de Grigori Arbatov, le directeur de l'Institut pour les études nord-américaines à l'Académie soviétique des sciences. Il disait aux journalistes américains „*Nous sommes en train de vous faire quelque chose terrible, le plus grand mal possible: nous sommes en train de vous priver d'ennemi !*” Source: André FONTAINE, dans *Le Monde*, le 27 mai 1988.

² Concernant la Turquie, une explication s'impose: bien qu'elle fait partie géographiquement de la REMN, elle n'as pas traversé la période d'après la guerre froide marquée par les problèmes difficiles des anciens pays communistes (la Roumanie et la Bulgarie), ou les anciennes républiques soviétiques. Depuis longtemps, la Turquie était un Etat démocratique, un fort allié des Etats-Unis dans la région, en bénéficiant des aides militaires réguliers de la part des Etats-Unis. Quand même, elle a une position ambiguë dans le „paradigme de sécurité gelé”. D'une côté, elle a une position politique commune avec la Russie contre la présence des forces navales américaines en région, (spécialement sur le transfert de la mission ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR dans la Mer Noire), et d'autre côté, suite à son appartenance au monde musulmane, elle soutient des anciennes républiques musulmanes soviétiques dans leurs conflits avec le Kremlin. (S. HUNTINGTON, *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order*).

³ D'après STOINA (N.), dans *l'Evolution des paradigmes de la sécurité de tradition à la contemporanéité*, article sur www.actrus.ro, le paradigme de sécurité s'est cristallisé au travers des siècles, en se mûrissant au stade de suffisance dans les

décennies d'après la seconde guerre mondiale, où les peuples se posent une question paradoxale: si la guerre nucléaire à grande échelle menace à la destruction totale, comment pourrait-elle aider le monde à survivre? Officiellement ce paradigme accorde aux armes de destruction massive l'hypothèse d'étape sur l'échelle d'augmentation du degré de létalité des armes.

⁴ D'après Dr. G. ALEXANDRESCU, A. SARCINSCHI, *Modalități și posibilități de amplificare a cooperării în regiunea Mării Negre*, București, Editura UNAp „Carol I”, 2005.

⁵ Il est intéressant de dévoiler un syntagme qui exprime l'actualité de la position de la Russie à l'égard de l'extension de l'organisation de sécurité occidentale dans les anciens espaces de l'OPV. Ainsi, à l'occasion d'une conférence tenue aux stagiaires de la XIX-ème série du Collège National de Défense à Bucarest, en décembre 2008, le Directeur de cette prestigieuse forme d'enseignement politico-militaire, la plus haute de la Roumanie, M. Iulian FOTA, a observé que „les conflits tenus à chaud sont les tranchées creusées par la Russie devant l'avancement des pays et des organisation occidentales vers l'Est”.

⁶ HUNTINGTON, *op. cit.*

⁷ Barry BUZAN reconsidère la question de la sécurité, en spécifiant que chaque communauté humaine est affectée par les divers facteurs dans les cinq domaines d'importance majeure spécifiques ci-dessus. Pour lui, le system international, les Etats, les individus, sont des objets de référence, et les cinq spectres contient les principaux menaces à l'adresse des ces objectifs de référence. (B. BUZAN, *Les Etats, les peuples et la crainte*, 1991).

⁸ Dr. G. ALEXANDRESCU, *Dinamica modificărilor paradigmei de securitate a zonei Mării Negre*, en *Securitate și stabilitate în bazinul Mării Negre*, București, Ed. UNAp „Carol I”, 2005, p. 43.

L'auteur, Marius-Sorin MICLEA (miclea_m@yahoo.com), a suivi les cours du Lycée Militaire „Mihai Viteazul”, l'Ecole Militaire d'Officiers Actifs d'Aviation „Aurel Vlaicu”, la Faculté de Droit, l'Institut Diplomatique Roumain et le Collège Nationale de Défense, le cours de base. Il a étudié en France, en qualité de boursier du gouvernement français, suivant un Master recherche en Relations Internationales et Européennes, spécialité Sécurité Internationale et Défense, aux universités de Grenoble et Lyon. A mentionner sa participation aux Troisièmes Cycles Universitaires de Défense, du cadre de l'Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale, à Paris. En présent, il est doctorant en Droit, spécialité Sécurité Internationale et Défense, à l'Ecole Doctorale de l'Université de Lyon. En présent il est conseiller à la Direction Maîtrise des Armements, au cadre de l'Office Central d'Etat pour Affaires Spéciales.



THE RISK UNDER THE GLOBAL CONDITIONS OF MODERN MANAGEMENT

Camelia ȘTEFĂNESCU, PhD

The amplification and acceleration of economic, social, technologic, demographic and environmental changes that take place on global scale bring into the attention of modern organizations numerous and significant challenges and their materializations reflect in new much more complex realities that generate risks. These situations involve, on one hand, numerous behavioural conditionings for the organizations, and on the other hand, give the measure of capacity of a performing management of risk, efficient and effective in the same time.

Through intentions and realization, this work wants to approach the problem of risk under the conditions of modern management, under the pressure of the globalization phenomenon, in a manner that would bring more clarifications, by including new concepts, terminological determinations and proper analysis to this field.

Keywords: economy, modern management, risk management.

1. Generalities

The ability to administrate and operate with the rationality criteria, under the global conditions of the contemporary world, is a condition for the survival and success in the management of modern organizations.

Although the notion of "risk" is discussed until banality, we must accept the fact that it constitutes an objective reality of the contemporary world, reality that is amplifying with the phenomenon of globalization. In this fight, only the ones that are ready for a direct tough and courageous confrontation with the problem of managerial risks are the winners.

The risk is permanently manifesting and amplifying in the crucial moments. This is why in confronting with the risk states, it is necessary for the general managers and managerial teams to manifest a strong initiative, to adopt decisions

on short notice, to elaborate anti-risk measures, permanently modelling their behaviour according to the multitude of risks that may appear in the managerial activity.

As the specialists highlight¹, the manager, under global conditions of modern management, may act, either as commercial engineer, permanently oriented to generating commercial solutions, either as business "bearer", in the concrete meaning of specialist capable of managing the business. Regardless of these two cases, he is responsible to undertake the risks that may appear and accompany the processes of construction, development and management of the business.

Its risk and influence over the social life differentiate the contemporary times of the times when people considered that the future represents a reflection of the past or something unpredictable. The "contemporary" era, Peter L. Bernstein (1996, p.23) says, must be understood as the period that begins, not with the industrial revolution, but with the era of Renaissance. In his opinion, all the means we use today in the risk management and in the process of analyzing the decisions and alternatives, from the strict approach of games theory to the theory of chaos, are dated in that period.

Together with the elaboration of analysis mechanisms for probabilities and risk states, the managerial world changed, gradually integrating in the global environment. The national economies that are under the action of two opposite forces: the general movement towards globalization, internationalization, openness and the organic need to maintain identity. (Mecu, Ghe., 2003, p. 90). In this context, the necessity of conceptual research, the discerning of the meaning of risk stages and of the interrelations between different types of risks appears.

Among the numerous theoretical developments involved by the specific highlighted situation, theory and practice of modern management must approach in terms of strategy, decision and



informational system the problem of risk. The managers have to report themselves to the concrete realizations generated by the global dimension of the business world, the humanity's evolution as planetary society, with its complex problems, generated by the trade globalization, capital movements and communication means.

2. Global tendencies that generate tensions in modern management

In the managerial system, the homogeneity and heterogeneity assiduously manifest with the following great tendencies that generate tensions:

- Globalization versus regionalism, with a series of specific elements:

- The globalization in the general meaning represents global economy, global politics and global civil society (Woods, 2000, p. 48);

- The globalization has, first of all, a quantitative dimension that is related to the increase of international trade, investments, international capital transfers and people circulation and, secondly, a qualitative dimension of the process, that consists of changing the way people think and identify themselves, new ways the states, companies and other actors of the social life perceive and pursue their own interests;

- In the analysis of globalization related to the regionalism, the "global economy" differentiates as importance, having as fundament the transnational networks in production, trade and financial area and the following characteristics: the transformation of national economies in "colonies" of the world economy; the accentuation of transformations in the trade structure; encouraging investments on long term and the acceleration of capital flows circulation; the apparition of an independent "symbolic economy" generated by currency speculations and the proliferation of transactions with derived products; the increase of foreign direct investments and the redefinition of competitiveness determinants (Habermas, I., 2000, p. 31);

- In the latest period, the regionalism has been under a powerful dynamics, coming to the stage in which the world countries participate to a certain regional commercial arrangement. In this environment, the European Union exceeded the stage of common market, reaching the one of economic and monetary Union. The concept of "opened regionalism"² has been promoted. Some

specialists (Balassa, B., 1991, p. 31) consider the regionalism hard to get together with the accentuation of the globalization process.

- The second tendency that generates tensions is the one regarding autonomy – interdependency – economic integration, about which we can make the following appreciations:

- In the evolution of world economy there is a pass from autonomy to economic independence;

- "the complex independence", called by R. Keohane and J. Nye (1987, p. 68), is presented as an economic process that develops between a multitude of actors, through a variety of channels and without the existence of authority and hierarchy structures;

- In the general environment of development without precedent of the integrationist product also situations in which the integration policies and national policies are not compatible appear and this leads to controversies and tensions, especially on decisional level.

- The third tendency that generates tension is the modernization versus underdevelopment, process with numerous specific features:

- Due to the development of modern political structures and new technologies, we come to a globalization of the productive, investment and commercial processes;

- The modernization process also generates development inequalities, income distribution, wealth, coming even to underdevelopment between regions, as well as inside them;

- The inequality generally contributes to the displacement of production from one country to the other, facilitating the access to technology and markets; the inequality within the states is accompanied by the deregulation of concurrence and facilitation of accelerating the turnovers, introducing the flexible accumulation and generating jobs and market increase. The inequality between the states offers the companies the possibility of distributing their production outside the states regulations, determining counter-reactions at regional and global level (Biersteker, Tk., 2001, p.61).

3. Problems in risk plan

Under the impact of these three tendencies, the border between national and international is fading and numerous problems in the risk plan appear.



They can be grouped in two categories:

➤ The first category refers to the fact that the risk is generated in certain countries or regional groups that do not accept the alternative, that are based on the element of the clause of the most favourite nation in conditioned form. Concretely, some countries members of an integrationist group decide to apply custom taxes reduction and attenuations of the non-tariff barriers only regarding the third countries that encourage, in counter, the same type of measures;

➤ The countries or groups that remain in the stage of preferential commercial arrangement are in the second category, with zonal effects that amplify the effects of trade defalcation, minimizing the advantages of market economy.

The way out of the risk stages mentioned is based on the reconciliation of alternatives, by combining the regionalism with multilateralism and starting special plans of anti-risk actions (Bernstein, C.F., 1996, p.105).

Together with the globalization, the impact of the unique European market over the economic environment of companies and their behaviour may also generate risks. The specialists (Dan, V., Răgălie, Șt., 2004, p.19) include in this risk category several generating situations, that are: the dynamism of economic growth is not the same within all the member countries due to the structural particularity of economies and obstacles at the apparition and propagation of productivity bonuses; pressures exerted over companies in order to reduce costs and reduce prices and profits; the apparition of oligopoly and even monopoly market structures; the possibility of triggering the functioning of "perverse" mechanisms that lead, in the end, to reducing the salaries, reducing the social protection and increasing the difficulties regarding the occupation of work force, and others.

4. Inequalities of perceptions and practices

For Romania, the process analyzed above is amplified, as a result of the main characteristic of the actual non-use of intangible assets context, as strategic economic assets. This situation is generated by two factors: first of all, the inertia of some perceptions and practices with the origins in the industrial society; secondly, the still fragile regime of intellectual perception and the beginning stage of maturation of the mentalities

proper to the society of knowledge are taken into consideration. As a result, compared to the stage considered to be the reference on international level, in Romania inequalities of perceptions and practices that generate risks have manifested, caused by the unbalances between the potential offered by inexistent intangible assets and their actual capitalization level. Here are some of these unbalances:

➤ The incomplete use of innovating capacities, under the aspect of generating, as well as absorbing new knowledge and technology;

➤ The insufficient use of work force, reported to the forming effort, with significant implications in the international migration area;

➤ The presence of under-privileged economic areas, affected by the "digital part" and knowledge disparities, actually contoured, especially between the rural and urban environments, but also between various regions of the country;

➤ The differences between the superior qualification of the personnel and the degree of physical and moral tear of infrastructures, fact that amplified the attractiveness of foreign investments regarding the de-localization of some industrial activities with small added value;

➤ The existence of inadequate structure for exports, in which the share of the highly processed products is still insufficient.

The undesirable aspects mentioned expose the national economy to severe risks, hard to administrate and which, in the end, may manifest as crisis.

The risks we referred to, present under the conditions of transition to the world economy and of the economic integration on European level, manifest themselves on the level of external competitiveness, quality and integration costs, dynamics of own professionals body and the international cooperation capacity level. As a whole, the risks negatively influence not only the rhythm and quality of economic, scientific and technological cooperation of the country, but also Romania's position on European and international plan. We next synthesize the major risk categories, identified by reporting to the intangible assets use, insisting on their manifestation manner and the specific implications of each category:

• The risk of improper adaptation to the pressure of competition on the European market, with the following underlining:



➤ The overrunning of this risk depends on the quality of the integration process and the result is the possibility of greater or smaller fructification of integration advantages;

➤ By direct reference to companies, the high performances may accompany the activities only if they appeal to practices based on continuous knowledge and offer products and services with high innovation, creativity and high added value investment. For this purpose, the companies must give up the practice of extracting concurrent advantages from the exploitation of classic, tangible assets and from the specialization in energy-intensive and material-intensive products;

• The risk of substantial increase of after-adherence costs, with the following specific features:

➤ The integration in the European Union assumes the adoption and transposition in the internal regulations of community aquis. The entire process, by reporting to the Romanian companies, involves the insurance of quality, through an ample and complex effort of self-reorganization and alignment to the recommended European practices;

➤ The after-adherence process requires a concentrated effort, having the following essential orientations:

➤ The functioning in European parameters of the Romanian organizations involves the necessity that they develop viable activity profiles in the Union's space;

➤ Another major objective is represented by the alignment of Romanian companies to the quality and good practice standards, the increase of the ability to cooperate with partners from the other member countries and to absorb the community assistance;

➤ Together with the formal requests of accreditation type, the quality or good practice certificates, it is necessary for the Romanian companies to develop their ability of administration, professional and managerial competences, good informing about the European markets, institutions and legislation, the own potential of technological and organizational innovation;

➤ The problems of maintaining the costs associated to the effort of after-adherence, under supportable limits, may be solved only by intensive mobility of each company's potential, as it follows:

◆ Good preparation in report to the legislation exigencies and European market and the elimination the out of date regime of intangible assets administration;

◆ The elimination of inequalities regarding organizational conceptions and practices, especially under the form of structural rigidity;

◆ The prevention of the risk of non-use of a part of the funds allocated from the community budget for the after-adherence period.

• The risk of delay in the direction of economic development based on knowledge, with the following specifications:

➤ For fighting against this risk, we start from the opportunity and necessity of ensuring the Romanian economy's competitiveness and the administration of the globalization effects by fusing the demarches of elaborating the strategy of durable development with the ones for the promotion of the society based on knowledge;

➤ Together with the application of adequate macroeconomic policies, for the economic development based on knowledge it is necessary to create the micro-fundaments of an economic dynamics of endogenous type, based on continuous innovation and learning and using the intangible assets;

➤ In order to obtain the results easy to articulate on the level of economic systems, a sustenance promoted through strategic orientated effort is necessary.

• The risk of "brain exodus" persistence, understood as a significant presence of the specialists qualified in the international migration flows of the work force and which may be analyzed as it follows:

➤ On individual level, the phenomenon can be explained by personal aspirations for freedom of movement on the international market of work force. Getting of an intercultural experience, the capacity of professional affirmation, reaching a life standard and a superior status are wanted this way, aspirations hard to obtain in the professional and social origin environment;

➤ On country level, the "brain exodus" is manifesting as a negative dynamic of the professionals body that the respective country has;

➤ The essential problem in fighting this type of risk consists of transforming the individual competences in collective competences and,



furthermore, in competitive realizations. For this purpose, the professionals manifest a proactive behaviour, cherish the non-pecuniary stimulants, of the way their merits are recognized, benefiting from affirmation chances, a cooperation climate and conditions favourable to learning, being attached to the organizational cultures centred on the values of pertinence and responsible legitimacy ethics in the intellectual creation act.

5. Conclusions

Seen from the globalization perspective, the problem of the risk in modern management generates an increased interest, in the area of theoretical approaches as well as in the practical – applicative one. Under the impact of the same globalization process, the managerial risk gets new dimensions and forms of manifestation. The necessity of reconsidering the manner of approach of the manifestation of risk stages and the interrelations between different types of risk in strategy, decision and informational system terms puts to the issue new approaches in the analysis process of decisions and alternatives regarding the anti-risk measures, from the perspective of their application to realities specific to the global environment. The correct and effective operation of the general principles of risk management, their adaptation to realities specific to each nation and organization, by various modalities, some presented in the paper, may represent a way to ensure the dynamic connection to the global environment. As a matter of fact, in the modern organizations' management, knowing the causes that generate risks and the right administration of the risks are perceived as factors with a major influence over the economic performance of the company, the development of the social behaviour and its reputation in the activity environment.

REFERENCES:

- BALASSA, B., 1991, **The Theory of Economic Integration**, Irwin Homewood, Illinois.
- BERNSTEIN, L. P., 1996, **Against the Gods, the Remarkable Story of Risk**, John Wiley & Sons.
- BERNSTEIN, C.F., 1996, Globalizing Free Trade, *Foreign Affairs*, no.75/1996, May.
- BIERSTEKER, Tk., 2001, **Globalization as a mode of thinking**, Princeton University Press.
- DAN, V., RĂGĂLIE, Șt. ș. a., 2004, **Întreprinderea și integrarea europeană**, Ed. Expert, București.
- DRAGOMIR ȘTEFĂNESCU, C., 2004, **Afaceri economice internaționale. Probleme, provocări și perspective**, Editura Expert, București.
- HABERMAS, I., 2000, **Beyond the nation-state, Democracy in the UE, Integration through deliberation**, edited by Erike, O., ERIKSEN & John E., FOSSUM, Routledge, London.
- KEOHANE, P., NYE, J., 1987, **Power and independence: World Politics in Transition**, 2nd ed, Boston, Litle, Brown.
- MECU, Gh., ș.a., 2003, **Economie de piață contemporană**, Editura Gericod, București.
- MIRON, D., 2000, **Integrarea economică regională de la prototip la producția de serie**, Editura Sylvi, București.
- PAUL, M., 1999, **Conflictele secolului XXI. Proiecții în spațiul strategic**, Editura Militară, București.
- WOODS, N., 2000, **The Political Economy of Globalization**, Mac Millan Press Ltd, USA.

NOTES:

¹ For a more advanced study see DRUKER, P., **Managing for results**, Editions d'Organization, Pan Management Series, 1977, p. 12, FRAISSE, H., **Manual de l'ingénieur d'affaires**, Ed. Dunod, 1990, pp. 16-21, POPESCU, D., **Conducerea afacerilor**, Ed. Scripta, București, 1998, pp. 14-15.

² About the opened regionalism and its essential features see MIRON, D., **Integrarea economică regională de la prototip la producția de serie**, Ed. Sylvi, București, 2000, p. 27.

Camelia ȘTEFĂNESCU, PhD, is a lecturer within "Spiru Haret" University.



CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION: A NEW AID PARADIGM

Kristin H. COORSSEN

The crux of this paper will hinge on understanding the challenges that face the development of Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) missions, and the seven reasons supporting its indoctrination. Michael Pugh's work, which will feature heavily throughout the paper, contributes to the list of five primary challenges faced by CIMIC: (1) the 'blurring' of boundaries for humanitarian agencies; (2) resistance from classicist humanitarians; (3) the possible endangerment of the civilian aid workers; (4) the potential to compromise the integrity of the mission; and, (5) some donors' unwillingness to be associated with a military presence.

The paper will argue that CIMIC will be a more successful method of conflict prevention in the complex conflicts that arise in Muslim-dominated regions. Dispelling the myths about the aforementioned challenges, the paper will argue that those challenges are fallible and subsequently provide a sufficient channel into the reasons why Civil-Military Co-operation missions will prove to be an adequate and efficient new aid paradigm. Other featured specialists will be Mark Duffield and T.G. Weiss. The scope of the paper will be through classical realism and reiterate the concerns and issues focused on amongst realists in relations to justice, influence, religious extremism and order.

Keywords: CIMIC, conflicts.

Introduction¹

The contemporary states system has transformed into a hemispherical power struggle in the wake of the Cold War and developing globalisation. The boundaries of states are metaphorical suggestions made by cultural pluralism and reinforced by the design of the north and the south – the developed and developing world, respectively. Although conflict within global society has always been an innate characteristic of states' interactions, the post-Cold War era has bred a new type of conflict that is complex and incompatible with the previous

straight-forward methods of conflict prevention and management. To understand this issue of lacking compatibility new questions are posed regarding the viability of humanitarian missions in Muslim regions, the difficulties that arise from the religious unrest, and the effects of the West's myopic endeavours for democratisation. While the West investigates these issues, a responsibility to protect remains, leaving one real option: the implementation of civil-military co-operation missions. Civil-military co-operation missions, or CIMIC missions, should be employed at the suggestion of early warning systems in instable regions for the facilitation of a comprehensive response to increasingly, unpredictable conflicts². CIMIC is vital in addressing conflicts that can only be quelled through a competent and prepared approach that seeks to rebuild infrastructure and establish a self-sufficient society.

Utilising a classical realist lens, this essay will address the implementation of CIMIC as a tool for facilitating the normalisation of a prepared approach to escalating, manmade crises in predominantly Muslim regions. The paper first identifies the characteristics of contemporary conflict and the distinguishing roles of civil and military operations. Next, it addresses the challenges that CIMIC has met from both sceptics and humanitarian classicists. Finally, the paper will outline the seven reasons that CIMIC missions are a more compatible conflict prevention method for present conflicts.

CIMIC & Contemporary Conflicts Defined

In the 1980s, civil-military co-operation was a twinkle in the eye of maximalist humanitarians; that is, humanitarians who were focused on tackling violence at the root to "prevent, mitigate, and resolve conflicts," rather than simply providing for the temporary "relief of life-threatening suffering."³ Maximalists sought the interplay



of humanitarianism and military operations to facilitate this need. Today, nearly a decade into the twenty-first century, the indoctrination of CIMIC as a form of conflict prevention has rooted itself in the Western world's foreign policy. The missions are predicated on the complexity of conflicts and offer a range of services from "sustaining life to restoring government."⁴ Military components of the mission offer protection, defence ministry funding and transferable skills. The humanitarian component suffices the immediate schooling, medical and food aid needs to strengthen the health, well-being and education of societies. With the two agents working in tandem, aid is more comprehensive, but not necessarily welcomed by all parties involved in the regional conflicts.

While the end of the Cold War indicated a reassertion of the states system, it also gave birth to the prominence of intra-state conflict as a consequence. Likewise, it reformulated the concept of 'other'. Conflict was no longer concentrated amongst the super powers, but it had infected the states lining the periphery of the developed world, most prominently Muslim states indignant with their global status. These developing regions are spotted with guerrilla combatants whose impetus for aggressive action is rooted in deep, antithetical sentiments, buttressed by both historical and contemporary claims of Western oppression, and facilitated through radical tactics and with methods that reap a magnitude of devastation that was only possible with organised state militaries until two and a half decades ago. The organised, non-state actors who perpetuate this unrest have, as made strikingly evident with the 9/11 tragedy, marked the Western world as its target.

There are five distinguishing characteristics of today's conflicts. First, the aggressors are typically non-state actors without specified control centres, or they are repressive regimes. In the context of recent conflicts these groups include the Taleban, Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Fatah, and Saddam Hussein's regime. They exercise a system of what Thucydides would label 'might rather than right'. Second, many of the conflicts are intra-state and arise from manmade tensions, rather than natural disasters. Some cross-border disputes still erupt, such as with the Israel-Lebanon dispute or the fairly recent Eritrea-Ethiopian conflict, but the claims or assertions of culture within pluralist states have resulted in divergences such as with the

Kosovar Albanians, the Kurds, the Palestinians, and the Hutus. Third, the disputes in recent years have been concentrated to developing countries: countries lacking a stable, democratic government and that have been susceptible to corruption and black market economies perpetuating violence and removing incentive for efforts to correct their systems. Many African and Middle Eastern governments fall into this category. Fourth, contemporary conflict is characterised by terrorist strategies and other non-traditional means of combat; suicide bombings, guerrilla warfare, and warlords play calculated roles in cultural aggression. Finally, religious extremism, particularly in the Middle East, has characterised both the motivation and the justification for attacks on both other parties or groups within the aggressor's state, and against the Western world's civil and military factions – vividly recalling Samuel P. Huntington's 'Clash of Civilisations'.⁵

A question often asked is: *why do Muslims hate the West?* There are two interconnected reasons. On the one hand, while civil unrest unfolds in the developing world, the developed world applies an agenda of a responsibility to protect, which confirms an agenda invoked by the Geneva Conventions. But Esposito and Mogahed confirm resistance to the intentions is rooted in an anti-Western sentiment that is fuelled by "exploited memories of the Crusades and European colonialism and charges of American neocolonialism as threats to Islam... [and that this] view is reinforced by the power of globalization."⁶ On the other hand, there is also an understanding that Muslims often doubt the seriousness of the West's democratic intentions, though several Muslim extremists do claim that they would like democracy.⁷ So while they harbour anti-Western sentiment, they also entertain thoughts of democracy, the harbinger of which would not be the West.⁸

Factors Complicating CIMIC

Because anti-Western sentiments exist in regions where humanitarian aid is in the highest demand, the nature of humanitarianism becomes increasingly complex. Strict focus on temporary aid through neutral endeavours is unsuitable, and a compatible means of addressing the issue of inaccessible refugees or suffering individuals arises from the addition of a military component.



But sceptics, and adversaries from the classicist humanitarian approach, argue that there are five challenges to Civil-Military Co-operation missions.⁹

First, the roles of humanitarian aid personnel in conflict regions are 'blurred and limited' by their association with military agencies.¹⁰ Michael Pugh's arguments suggest that a civil-military relationship will result in the restriction of capabilities for both parties providing the assistance. Having worked in separate capacities throughout the decades, the pairing of the two may result in hierarchical confusion, uncertainty about jobs, potential overlaps, and interlocking of opposing objectives.

A second complicating factor with the employment of CIMIC missions is the possible resistance from aid agencies that prescribe to classicist notions of humanitarianism. Classicists believe that the military element mutes the neutrality that formal humanitarian work was founded on when Henry Dunant established the International Red Cross. Calls to revive the Dunant doctrine have been largely bypassed and the perceived erosion of traditional humanitarianism has been compounded by the partnering of the agencies. Consequently, this has also led to the perceived politicisation of the projects.

A third observation about the interplay between the agencies is that there may be an endangerment of the civil aid workers. The military presence can invoke a sense of hostility, aggression, and, as mentioned, a sense of partiality. The military efforts may also be associated with foreign imposition, which in turn endangers civil aid workers who could be caught up in one of the potential drawbacks of a military approach: rather than preventing and containing conflict, coercion could fuel it.¹¹ With a particular awareness of anti-Western sentiments in many of the Middle Eastern regions where aid is deployed, mistaking a military component of an aid mission for foreign imposition is likely, especially when, "virtually every predominantly Muslim nation surveyed in 2005 doubted that the United States is serious about the establishment of democratic systems in the region."¹²

The doubted seriousness of the West's intentions brings forward the fourth challenge that is met by CIMIC: the questioned integrity of the humanitarian component. The symbolic nature of military presences can imply an underpinning of

ulterior motives or suspicion within the regional conflict. The mimicking imagery of the occupation by a foreign military presence may summon unsettling feelings of subordination; this is a perception that, due to the dynamics of the states system and the aid system, in the eyes of doubting Muslims could easily become reality.

Finally, some donors do not want to be associated with military endeavours. Supporting the deployment of CIMIC missions on the call of Early Warning Systems would be the goal of conflict prevention. Supporting the deployment of strict humanitarian missions would be the goal of providing for the livelihood of suffering peoples. Donors may want to forego the possibility of acting as party to the conflict and may simply want to provide for basic needs.

Facts Supporting the Indoctrination of CIMIC

Civil-Military co-operation has been indoctrinated with such documents as the United Nations' Inter-Agency Standing Committee publication, "Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies", and the United States' publication, "Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations", by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although the documents outline how to address co-operative processes, they can do nothing to motivate or improve the responses to Early Warning Systems' suggestions on the immediacy of threats to peace. However, by indoctrinating civil-military relations, the Western community has acknowledged a new aid paradigm.

Mark Duffield argues, "Since culture-based perceptions exclude power, it is difficult for aid agencies to grasp the significance of the organisational systems through which they operate, or the political formations with which they interact in a disaster zone."¹³ Duffield precursors his argument by indicating that complications arise for humanitarians when there is an absence of formal power within the state in need. As discussed, this absence of power is characteristic of contemporary conflicts; the military capacities employed in manmade disaster zone can help to establish a channel, or 'organisational system', through which civil aid agencies can operate. This organisational aid, in conjunction with seven other advantages to be enumerated, elucidates the aforementioned new aid paradigm.



First, there is a question that arises about the financial viability of capabilities-building in comparison to the increasingly unsustainable food, medical, and educational aid. In the first months of 2008, the World Food Programme reported that the cost of food had more than doubled.¹⁴ With recent hikes in oil and gas prices, the transportation of aid has increased as well. Price increases coupled with the increase in humanitarian missions are resulting in donor fatigue. To combat donor fatigue the circumstances of the individuals in need must be improved and they must be trained in basic and essential skills to become self-sustaining societies. 'Hand-to-mouth' finances are simply unsustainable and do not improve living conditions.¹⁵ Foreign troops play key roles in mine clearing, building of basic infrastructure, water-ways, and training.

Mark Duffield comments on developmentalism's utilisation of the 'strengthening of local structures and capacities', but these structures and capacities can only prosper with supervision and stability.¹⁶ Because climates of instability are incongruous with successful developmentalism, the United States saw the importance of capabilities building in the Bosnian crisis in the mid-1990s. With the Dayton Peace Agreement they sought to implement the Train and Equip Programme to facilitate the "elimination of destabilising external influences" and stabilising the infrastructure.¹⁷ It is one of the clearer examples of the goals for capabilities building, and it also addresses the issues of political dissidents and delinquent actors by building armed forces.

Second, building state infrastructure may also mean establishing an organised military to combat the political dissidents. Military presence can quell aggressive groups in moments of conflict escalation to allow humanitarian aid workers to enter into volatile regions and to provide an outlet for diplomatic relations. One of the characteristics of contemporary conflict, as outlined in the introduction, was the prominence of these non-state actors – it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between criminals and combatants. Contemporary conflict is fuelled by ambiguous actors. States are often corrupt and unreliable. Due to a combination of these issues, and because pockets of terrorist groups have taken root sporadically throughout the landscape, safe passage is never guaranteed.

Third, since safe passage is never guaranteed, it must be created – particularly for the transportation

of aid resources and civil aid workers. In Afghanistan reports have been cast that, aid convoys were hijacked en route to refugee regions resulting in thousands of people going unfed.¹⁸ The cost was even more than the food. Because the routes proved more treacherous truck drivers demanded more money – yet another argument for the financial un-sustainability of strict humanitarian projects. Military security in these circumstances makes for less confident bandits.

Fourth, CIMIC can be utilised to help quell the effects of prosperity wrought by the careful manipulation of violence by dominant groups in regions of civil clash. Conflict in developing countries, which include many Muslim-dominated states, often witnesses aid-pirating, economic manipulation, and black market economies. In situations where at least one of these three aspects of a developing state are prevalent, it can be understood through realism that lagging central authority and/or domestic politics in developing nations have resulted in the disintegration of accountability. For example, as sited in the civil conflict of Afghanistan and with the Taliban in the late 1990s, the problem of order has been perpetuated by a system of trade manipulation and by a means of aid-pirating that has become endemic within the socio-political landscape of the state.¹⁹ In the case of humanitarian aid Weiss and Gordenker argue, "supplies intended for humanitarian relieve have been treated as having military significance and been used as weapons by both sides to exert pressure on civilian populations."²⁰ As these weapons fill the arsenal of the powerful, dominant groups in developing regions, the aggression utilised to continue their position becomes an appendage of their existence. David Keen states, "War can involve cooperation between 'sides' at the expense of civilians; peace can see adversaries striking deals that institutionalise violence, corruption and exploitation. These similarities help to explain how peace can be possible, and why it has often swiftly relapsed into war."²¹

As exploitation and corruption become normalised in a system that provides few genuine means of prosperity to its citizens, the violence and intimidation enacted to continue it becomes normalised. CIMIC can reverse the effects of profitable civil conflict by instituting and normalising a system of accountability and transparency which, in turn, deters efforts of



intimidation to influence political power. The infrastructure-building and capacity-building of civil-military co-operation negates the hierarchy imposed by the opium trading, for instance, by helping to build, monitor and stabilise a legitimate economy within the developing region, which is prone to civil violence.

Fifth, developing nations are essentially unstable environments and susceptible to manipulation by political or religious dissidents. Dissolving cultural plurality, resulting from globalisation, has strengthened ancient identities and formed an animosity for the forced creation of heterogeneous societies. In developing regions this breeds aggression through territorial claims, which the West has tried to placate through developmentalism. However, progressive developmental reparations have been an unsatisfactory 'band-aid' to the wounded tradition of antiquated cultural divisions, which serve as the innate, 'default' state of the human condition. Mark Duffield's commentary on the absence of formal organisation reiterates these cultural boundaries that exist essentially void of superficial governance and Western societal structures. To prevent conflict military presence, in conjunction with aid programmes, can work together to facilitate the demands that cultural groups seek; NGOs are often less aware of the political and historical roots of the conflict, because they focus on immediate needs, and military agencies often contribute that background knowledge.

More than knowledge, military agencies provide a chain of command, a system of accountability, and a structured approach with more stable funding, which is the sixth point. The coupling of developing nations (absent of formal organisation) with NGOs simply reveals the severe organisational drought that a military regime with a chain of command can correct. Michel Pugh suggests, "One might reasonably conjecture that there has been a trade-off between the power to command efficiency and the principles of justice and neutrality. It is perfectly rational for high-level political decisions to be implemented by a large organisation on the ground that is in close touch with key funding departments of government at home, and which can cut through bureaucracy by virtue of its security role."²²

Finally, the coordination of civil aid programmes with military agencies gives legitimacy to the

downtrodden populations who are the victimised by oppression, natural disaster, insurrection, or the by-product of internal warring. Hugo Slim identifies a 'super-ordinate identity', or a common identity shared as human beings; he argues that, as a supplementary factor of this identity, we must make provision to "allow people a fundamental and vulnerable human identity", unmarked by the governmental structures of developed civilisation.²³ An argument that is often undertaken is that the negotiations held by states or intergovernmental actors with rebel groups who resist the government and wreak havoc, gives a 'de facto' legitimacy to those rebel groups. The same can be stated for the recognition of a victimised people and the movement to protect them. Because the nature of manmade disasters are inherently volatile, the support and protection of these people will be seen as taking a side, hence provoking a hostile reaction from belligerents resulting in an unsafe environment for humanitarians. Now with military security it can be duly noted that the oppressed, maimed or victimised individuals are legitimised in the eyes of the international community and peace talks for conflict prevention can encompass all individuals.

Conclusion

Civil-Military Co-operation does several things in the public realm; it keeps Western military intervention in the affairs of developing nations 'honest' in the eyes of the global community; and, it addresses both the conflicts that have potential to rise, and the destabilisation that may occur after a military intervention has commenced. CIMIC missions are operations that are equally born of foresight and the recognition of a moral imperative. Though seemingly irrespective of state sovereignty, the mantras of a responsibility to protect trump territorial integrity, hence reassessing the universality of sovereignty. Sovereignty, in this circumstance, is redefined as a privilege, rather than a right, bestowed by the international community unto those states who exhibit the ability and will to protect its citizens. This classical realist reformulation of the states system is one of the factors complicating civil-military co-operation missions. Weiss and Gordenker argue that the simple fact of a military presence in a foreign conflict places a 'de facto' illegitimacy on



the administration in government by highlighting the government's incapacity to deal with their own conflict.^x But with signifying that there is an escalating conflict, CIMIC can commence in a top-down approach to bottom-up infrastructure building that is in high demand.

This post-Cold War demand on global awareness and humanitarian aid has met new challenges from recalcitrant, tribal extremist and/or religious non-state actors who recast Western agendas of the spread of civil society and democratisation as threats of a new age of imperialism, occupation, or an infringement on territorial integrity and sovereignty.

However, although humanitarian efforts in the Middle East have appeared to prove that colonialism is a *fait accompli* embedded in the history of the north-south tradition, CIMIC might also reveal itself as a useful tool to disabuse the Western world of its tainted image.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

[1] * "Afghan Aid Convoy Hijacked", BBC News. (17 January 2002), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1766818.stm

[2] BESSLER, Mael, "**Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies**", *UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs*. New York, New York. (2008).

[3] DUFFIELD, Mark, "The Symphony of the Damned: Racial Discourse, Complex Political Emergencies and Humanitarian Aid", *Disasters*. 20:3. (1996), pp. 173-193.

[4] ESPOSITO, John L., MOGAHED, Dalia, "Battle for Muslim' Hearts and Minds: The Road Not (Yet) Taken" *Middle East Policy*, 14:1. (Spring 2007), pp. 27-41.

[5] GOODHAND, Jonathan, "From Holy War to Opium War? A Case Study of the Opium Economy in North-eastern Afghanistan", *Disasters*. 24:2. (2000), pp. 87-102.

[6] GORDENKER, Leon, WEISS, T.G., "Humanitarian Emergencies and Military Help: Some Conceptual Observations", *Disasters*. 13:2. (June 1989), pp. 118-133.

[7] KEEN, David, "The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars." *International Institute for Strategic Studies*, Adelphi Paper 320 (1998), pp. 1-85.

[8] PUGH, Michael, "Military Intervention and Humanitarian Aid: Trends and Issues", *Disasters*, 22:4. (1998), pp. 339-351.

[9] PUGH, Michael, "The Challenge of Civil-Military Relations in International Peace Operations", *Disasters*, 25:4. (2001), pp. 345-357.

[10] SHEPPARD, Robert, "Rice Riots and Empty Silos: Is the World Running Out of Food?", *CBC News* (27 March 2008), <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/food/prices.html>

[11] SLIM, Hugo, "Why Protect Civilians? Innocence, Immunity and Enmity in War", *International Affairs*. 79:3. (2003), pp. 481-501.

[12] Van MATRE, Lauren, BURCU, Akan, "Dayton Implementation: The Train and Equip Program", *United States Institute of Peace*, Special Report No. 25. (September 1997), http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/early/dayton_imp/train equip.html

[13] WEISS, T.G., "Principles, Politics and Humanitarian Action", *Ethics & International Affairs*. 13:1 (March 1999), pp. 1-22.

NOTES:

¹ An earlier version of this paper was presented in the electronic proceedings of the conference, **Strategies XXI**, held by the Romanian National Defence University "Carol I" from the 17th to the 18th of April 2008.

² This paper presupposes that Early Warning Systems are not only effective, but that their findings are legitimate calls for the implementation of CIMIC missions. However, the credibility of these Early Warning Systems will not be taken into account as the purpose of this paper is to discuss CIMIC only.

³ WEISS, T.G., "Principles, Politics and Humanitarian Action", *Ethics & International Affairs*. 13:1 (March 1999), p. 17.

⁴ *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations* (2001), p.xiii.

⁵ DUFFIELD, Mark, "The Symphony of the Damned: Racial Discourse, Complex Political Emergencies and Humanitarian Aid", *Disasters*. 20:3. (1996).

⁶ ESPOSITO, John L., MOGAHED, Dalia, "Battle for Muslim' Hearts and Minds: The Road Not (Yet) Taken" *Middle East Policy*, 14:1. (Spring 2007), p. 27.



⁷ Ibidem.

⁸ It is important to make a distinction here, because it was discovered in a Gallup Muslim Studies survey that Muslim countries, ironically, have greater anti-American sentiments than they do anti-European. But because of the nature of many of the attack on the West, this paper will stick to the terms associated with 'anti-West'.

⁹ The list of six challenges enumerated in this section has been inspired by Michael Pugh (2001). Some alterations have been made to bring the work up-to-date with contemporary conflicts.

¹⁰ PUGH, Michael, "The Challenge of Civil-Military Relations in International Peace Operations", *Disasters*, 25:4. (2001), p. 346.

¹¹ PUGH, Michael, "Military Intervention and Humanitarian Aid: Trends and Issues", *Disasters*, 22:4. (1998), p. 341.

¹² ESPOSITO, John L., et al, op. cit., p. 36.

¹³ DUFFIELD, Mark, op. cit., p. 174.

¹⁴ SHEPPARD, Robert, "Rice Riots and Empty Silos: Is the World Running Out of Food?", *CBC News* (27 March 2008), <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/food/prices.html>

¹⁵ GORDENKER, Leon, WEISS, T.G, "Humanitarian Emergencies and Military Help: Some Conceptual Observations", *Disasters*. 13:2. (June 1989), p. 130.

¹⁶ DUFFIELD, Mark, op. cit., p. 180.

¹⁷ Van MATRE, Lauren, BURCU, Akan, "Dayton Implementation: The Train and Equip Program", *United States Institute of Peace*, Special Report No. 25. (September 1997), http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/early/dayton_imp/train equip.html

¹⁸ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1766818.stm

¹⁹ A war devastated Afghanistan developed its economy from its number one export, opium poppies, in the late 1990s. The cultivation of it was banned in 2000, but remained the main export; this played into the black market economy. The profits from the opium trading have been used by the Taliban to fund armed, tribal conflict and warlords. For more information about the Taliban and opium trading during their time in power see Jonathan Goodhand's "From Holy War to Opium War? A Case Study of the Opium Economy in North-eastern Afghanistan."

²⁰ GORDENKER, Leon, op. cit., p. 120.

²¹ KEEN, David, "The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars." *International Institute for Strategic Studies*, Adelphi Paper 320 (1998), p. 11.

²² PUGH, Michael, op. cit., p. 348.

²³ SLIM, Hugo, "Why Protect Civilians? Innocence, Immunity and Enmity in War", *International Affairs*. 79:3. (2003), p. 483.

²⁴ GORDENKER, Leon, op. cit., p. 120.

Kristin H. COORSSSEN (KristinCoorssen@gmail.com) has a Master Degree in International Conflict Analysis from the School of International Studies from Brussels, Belgium.



LA CORRELATION NATIONALE- COLLECTIVE DANS LA DEFENSE DE LA ROUMANIE

Petre DUȚU, PhD

Aujourd'hui, on discute forte sur la corrélation entre la défense nationale et collective d'un pays. Ce problème est valable y compris pour les Etats membres d'une organisation politico-militaire.

La défense nationale doit être forte dans même la situation quand un Etat appartient à une Alliance politico-militaire, par exemple, comme OTAN, parce que le pouvoir collective dépende significatif de la puissance de chaque pays membre. D'ici la préoccupation constante de la Roumanie pour avoir une défense nationale crédible et compatible avec ses responsabilités assumées en matière de sécurité et défense collective.

Mots-clés: défense nationale, défense collective.

1. Caractéristiques des composantes de la défense de la Roumanie

Aujourd'hui, la Roumanie est un pays membre tant OTAN que l'Union européen. Ce statut signifie des avantages, d'un part, et des responsabilités, d'autre part. Dans ce contexte, sa défense a deux composantes essentielles - *nationale* et *collective* - qui, depuis que notre pays est devenu membre de l'OTAN, jouent un rôle significatif tant sur le plan régional que global. Bien que le rôle de deux composantes soit important, cependant chacun participe forte dans certains moments à la réalisation de la défense nationale¹.

La **composante nationale** possède une série de caractéristiques définitives pour la défense du pays. D'abord, elle est **omniprésente** en ce qui concerne le réponse donné à toutes agression militaire extérieur qui amènerais atteint à l'intégration territoriale du pays, à sa souveraineté, à l'indépendance politique et, bien sur, à la sécurité de ses habitants. Puis, elle **existe**, elle est structurée, organisée et préparée du temps de paix d'entreprendre des actions

défensives. Ses éléments - les forces humaines, les moyens de combat, les aménageons de génie etc.- sont présents et en mesure d'intervenir, au besoin, pour donner la riposte méritée à tout agresseur. Sûrement, cette chose pas pour un période grande de temps, mais jusqu'au moment dans lequel la composant collective de la défense devienne activée, c'est-à-dire elle entre pleinement dans son rôle.

La composante nationale este aussi **tridimensionnelle**. Celle-ci veut dire qu'elle a dans sa structure les suivants éléments: *la défense militaire* (c'est une composante essentielle de la notre politique de défense global); *la défense civile* (celle-ci représente la garant de la sécurité des pouvoirs publiques, protèges la population et assurais l'ordre publique). Ces éléments constituent un entière dont ses composantes sont interdépendantes et ont la même importance en matière de défense; une certaine *tradition* en ce qui concerne son but. Une histoire entière se trouve dans son derrière et d'ici elle extraire ses ressources motivationnelles qui la soutenait dans ses actions de défense déploie. Dans ce contexte, il faut rappeler la possibilité d'engager et d'autres structures militaires et civiles dans les actions défensives au niveau national ainsi au soutien de la population du pays.

En fin, on peut affirmer que la défense nationale a aussi une **dimension civique** qui se fonde sur la lois fondamentale du pays - Constitution de la Roumanie- qui souligne qui chacun citoyen a le devoir éthique el l'obligation légal de défendre sa patrie².

Les deux - le devoir et l'obligation - représentent des éléments essentiels en ce qui concerne la garantie aux droits de l'homme qui a un rôle majeur en renforcement de la cohésion nationale et en préservation de l'indépendance



nationale, de la démocratie et de la paix. Le devoir et l'obligation du citoyen de défendre sa pays doivent aussi intimement lier de réflexion sur la politique actuelle de défense, surtout des moyens d'assurer de la sécurité face de nouveaux risques et menaces régionales et globales. Mise en œuvre de cette exigence fait apparaître une convergence de l'engagement intellectuel et moral de parte des trois pôles de la communauté nationale: *le citoyen, le militaire et le politicien*. Cette convergence fonde l'esprit de défense qui, partagée par la nation entière, donne efficacité à la défense nationale et apporte la preuve que la défense constitue une caractéristique du citoyen.

La défense nationale représente un concept complexe, dynamique et multidimensionnel. Elle s'inscrit dans un concept global de sécurité et de défense. Ses objectifs sont: de garantir l'intégrité territoriale nationale; de protéger la populations; de veiller la souveraineté nationale; de défendre les valeurs que se fonde l'Etat; de préserver les intérêts stratégiques de la Roumanie; de réduire les vulnérabilités économiques du pays en matière d'accès aux ressources et aux transferts de nouveaux technologies.

Ainsi, la défense ne se réduit pas seulement la protection d'une espace délimité par les frontières dans lesquels s'exerce la souveraineté de l'Etat. Aujourd'hui, la notion de territoire se comprend dans le sens de l'espace global de sécurité où s'utilise une défense à la fois militaire, civile, économique, culturelle. Cette défense est dans le service de l'Etat dans lequel elle mise en œuvre sa politique et protège ses intérêts vitales et stratégiques.

Par la suite, la défense de la Roumanie représente donc la tâche de l'Etat. Celui-ci exerce sa souveraineté, selon le droit que lui donne la pouvoir exclusive d'assumer la défense de la population et d'utilise la force, au besoin, dans ce but. Son champ d'agir s'entend sur un espace dans lequel est souverain et reconnu, par conséquent, de la communauté internationale. Cette souveraineté s'exerce grâce à ses représentants élus de la nation, selon la Constitution du pays, et s'appuie sur un outil adéquat, qui est l'armée nationale.

Aujourd'hui, les enjeux mondiaux sont d'une telle manière que la Roumanie, comme d'ailleurs tous les pays du monde, doivent tenir compte de contexte international pendant qu'elle promeut ses intérêts stratégiques. Autrement dite, les actions

internationales du notre pays se déroulent dans une réseaux d'interdépendances qui rassemblent des Etats souveraines dont les décisions sont l'expression du consensus. Dans ce sens, les choix que la Roumanie fait sont semblables avec celles que tous les pays font sur le plan mondial. Parfois, ces choix imposent d'effectuer des transferts de souveraineté vers les instances internationales, mais ces transferts sont ratifiés par les instances nationale. L'intégration de la Roumanie dans l'OTAN et l'Union européenne, par exemple, signifie que notre pays a transférée une part de sa souveraineté vers ces organisations internationales, en ce qui concerne surtout sa défense et sa sécurité nationale. L'intégration dans une défense européenne aussi mérite attention. Longtemps, en vérité, l'OTAN était la seule organisation capable de garantir la sécurité européenne.

Maintenant, l'Union européenne a créé ses institutions nécessaires pour promouvoir une Politique européenne de sécurité commune (PESC), dans le cadre duquel il y a une composante destinée à la défense, c'est-à-dire Politique européenne de sécurité et défense – PESD³.

Bien sûr, les institutions qui appartenaient PESC n'éliminent pas le rôle de l'OTAN dans la défense collective de l'Union européenne.

La composante collective représente un élément significatif et très important dans l'architecture de la défense nationale à un Etat membre d'une alliance politico-militaire redoutable. Choisir la variante défense collective par un pays ou d'autre tiens compte des avantages qu'amène cette composante.

Parmi les éléments définitoires de la composante collective de la défense nationale se trouvent: **le découragement que génère cette type de composante de la défense**. Le statut de membre d'une alliance politico-militaire d'un Etat agit comme un obstacle dans la voie d'agression militaire de la part n'importe quel Etat.

La crainte de conséquences possibles qui viendraient, sans doute, de la part d'alliance politico-militaire on sait se faire avec beaucoup discernement et soin; **la garantie de la riposte adéquate** c'est un autre trait définitoire de la composante collective de la défense nationale. L'agression d'un Etat membre de l'alliance politico-militaire ne reste pas sans la réponse méritée; **la certitude du soutien donné par l'alliance** à tout l'Etat membre qui serait la victime de l'agression



militaire extérieur.

La qualité de membre de l'alliance politico-militaire confère la garantie que, au besoin, le pays attaqué reçoit l'aide militaire nécessaire pour riposter ferme contre l'agresseur soit que celui-ci soit un acteur étatique ou non étatique; le caractère non conditionné du développement de cette composante de la défense nationale. L'intégration d'un Etat dans une alliance militaire fait que sa défense d'obtenir la dimension collective, tant nécessaire dans les conditions actuelles, d'intensification des risques et des menaces en matière de défense et de sécurité.

2. Impact du statut de membre de l'OTAN d'un pays sur ses composantes de défense

L'appartenance d'un pays à une alliance politico-militaire a un fort impact sur la structure de la défense nationale. Celle-ci est organisée pour résoudre tant de problèmes internes que extérieurs en ce qui concerne les risques, les périls et les menaces en matière de sécurité et de défense individuelle et collective. La défense nationale d'un pays membre d'une organisation politico-militaire comme OTAN, par exemple la Roumanie, a les caractéristiques ci-dessus mentionnées.

L'analyse de ces caractéristiques peut conduire à décrire le impact du statut de membre de l'OTAN d'un pays sur ses composantes de défense. Pour la Roumanie, en tant que pays membre de l'OTAN, cette analyse conduit à la conclusion que **le impact mentionné est l'un forte, significative et variable comme importance dans un moment ou l'autre de la défense nationale**. Ainsi, dans le cas d'une agression armée contre lui, de la part d'un autre Etat ou groupe d'Etats, la Roumanie pourrait compter, dans les premiers jours, seulement sur ses propres forces armées.

Celle-ci parce que la manière dans laquelle la composante collective de la défense entre en son rôle a besoin de temps. D'habitude, la défense collective qui existe dans l'OTAN se fonde sur les prévisions du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord⁴. Ainsi, les articles 3, 4 et 5 du Traité mentionné contiennent l'essence de cette activité.

Dans ce sens, l'article 3 stipule les méthodes de travail des parties impliquées et les voies pour les mettre en œuvre. Ainsi, d'abord chaque „pays ... agissant individuellement et conjointement, d'une manière continue et effective, par le développement

de leurs propres moyens en se prêtant mutuellement assistance, maintiendront et accroîtront leur capacité individuelle et collective de résistance à une attaque armée”. D'ici peut résulter les suivants aspects:

- *on ne prévoit pas expressément que l'action sera obligatoirement collective pendant d'une attaque armée, mais optionnelle*, c'est-à-dire elle peut être individuelle ou collective. Par la suite, il semble qu'on fait appel à l'action commune seulement dans les deux cas: lorsque les forces armées du pays attaqué ne font pas seules face à l'agression armée externe ou quand l'Etat agresseur demande l'aide aux autres Etats membres de l'OTAN;

- on impose pour chaque Etat membre *la condition d'agir d'une manière continue et effective*, d'abord, par les propres forces armées et puis, dans la même manière, ensemble avec l'Alliance;

- *il y a donc l'obligation de chaque pays de développer ses propres moyens* tant pour sa défense que pour la défense collective. Autrement dit, l'appartenance à l'OTAN n'absout aucun Etat membre d'efforts soutenus pour sa défense et de ses alliés. Donc, les efforts de constituer un système de défense et de sécurité apparaissent comme une nécessité imposée tant des propres besoins de défense que de la contribution à l'effort collectif de défense. De règle, chaque Etat s'établit, en fonction d'une série de critères, en ce qui concerne sa contribution à l'effort collectif de défense et de sécurité. Mais, une fois fait public son option, l'Etat concerné doit assurer tant la force humaine que les ressources matérielles et financières dont il s'engageait à la projet commun de défense et de sécurité de l'Alliance politico-militaire;

- *l'assistance s'offre*, ce qui signifie: d'abord, elle doit demander de l'Etat qui a été agressé militairement et puis, elle s'offre mutuellement, c'est-à-dire chaque Etat membre de l'Alliance sait qu'il doit venir en secours à ses alliés s'il veut recevoir, à son tour, au besoin, un soutien adéquat pour se défendre;

- *chaque pays a la responsabilité d'augmenter sa capacité individuelle et collective de résister contre une attaque militaire externe*. Cela-ci peut signifier deux choses: *chaque Etat de l'Alliance doit croître sa capacité individuelle de résister à une attaque armée*, au moins avant que l'OTAN adopte la décision de soutien collective pour le



pays victime de l'agression; *la capacité de résister collectivement à une attaque armée* conduire à *l'idée de constituer de forces militaires*, la fruit de la participation de tous les Etats, au niveaux d'Alliance, qui soit en mesure de prévenir, de repousser et de résister à une attaque armée contre n'importe quel pays membre.

A son tour, l'article 4 du Traité Atlantique Nord stipule:

- ***L'obligation de consulter tous les parties***, chaque fois lorsque, de l'avis de l'une d'elles, quelqu'un (un pays ou un groupe de pays) menacera son intégrité territoriale, son indépendance politique ou sa souveraineté. Par la suite, *s'il est obligatoire de consulter tous les parties auparavant de prendre une mesure concrète*, alors cette chose signifie que *chaque Etat de l'Alliance doit avoir la capacité de répondre prompte et décisif à toute attaque armée contre soi*, au moins avant que l'OTAN adopte une décision dans ce sens, au sein de ses organismes délibératives et selon des normes et des procédures unanimes acceptées et reconnus;

- **la consultation a lieu lorsque un Etat membre de l'Alliance croit que quelqu'un - un pays, un groupe de pays - menace son intégrité territoriale, son indépendance politique et sa souveraineté.** D'habitude, le terme avis c'est une synonyme pour le mot opinion, par conséquent, l'Etat de l'Alliance qui demande la consultation ne doit pas disposer de preuves absolument inébranlable en faveur de sa sollicitation de secours.

L'article 5, le plus fréquent mentionné lorsque on parle de défense collective au sein de l'OTAN stipule la modalité dans laquelle on réalise cette forme de défense. La prévision du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord selon auquel „Les parts convient sur le fait qu'une attaque armée contre l'une ou plusieurs d'entre elles survenant en Europe ou en Amérique du Nord sera considérée comme une attaque dirigée contre toutes les parties...” révèle la manière utilisée pour assister la partie ou les parties attaquées.

Dans ce sens, de la début on part de la prémisse que toutes les attaques armées contre l'une ou plusieurs d'entre elles sera considérées comme une attaque dirigée contre toutes les parties, c'est-à-dire contre tous les Etats membre de l'Alliance. Ce secours c'est donné à tous les pays membres OTAN, sauf exception. Par la suite, si l'agression est perçu comme étant collective, alors le réponse donnée il faudrait soit similaire.

Cet article souligne aussi la légitimité d'action individuelle ou collective de défense selon l'article 51 de la charte des Nations unies. En conséquence, la défense individuelle ou collective des Etats membres OTAN contre une agression armée est justifiée selon le Droit international. En même temps, tout l'Etat membre de l'Alliance peut entreprendre des actions diverses, qu'il jugera nécessaire, y compris l'emploi de la force armée, individuellement et d'accord avec les autres parties, contre le pays agresseur. Cette prévision donne la liberté d'action pour chaque pays membre de l'Alliance de décider la manière dans lequel il actionnera lorsque sera besoin. Le but des actions individuelle ou collectives des parties c'est de rétablir et assurer la sécurité dans la région de l'Atlantique Nord. Maintenant, après avoir s'élargis et commencé le déroulement du processus de transformation de l'OTAN, cette organisation a augmenté son gamma de compétences et l'espace de responsabilité en ce qui concerne la défense et de sécurité de ses Etats composants.

Conclusion

Aujourd'hui, les risques, les périls et les menaces en matière de défense et de sécurité, surtout celles asymétriques, ont connus un développement sans précédent.

Dans ce contexte, il semble que la défense d'un pays ne peut pas être assurée individuellement, mais dans une manière collective. C'est pourquoi la Roumanie s'intègre dans l'OTAN. De plus, la Roumanie désire jouer un rôle significatif en ce qui concerne la sécurité en Balkan et peut-être dans le monde.

Bien sur, la responsabilité quant à la défendre du pays reste toujours une importante tâche pour chaque Etat - nation, même il appartient à une organisation politico-militaire. En même temps, il y en a l'obligation pour le pays membre de l'Alliance de participer activement à la défense collective.

OTAN, en tant qu'organisation politico-militaire, joue un grand rôle en matière de paix et de sécurité dans sa région de responsabilité et aussi dans tout le monde. Dans ce but il faut nécessaire que ses Etats membres soit unis et puissants, et aussi capables de secourir aux pays en besoin.



NOTES:

¹ Dr. Constantin MOȘTOFLEI, dr. Petre DUȚU, **Național și colectiv în apărarea României**, București, UNAp „Carol I”, 2007.

² Constituția României, Monitorul Oficial, București, 2003, p. 32.

³ Voir: Dr. Petre DUȚU, Mihai Ștefan DINU, **Politica Europeană de Securitate și Apărare – cadrul de manifestare și dezvoltare a intereselor de securitate națională**, București, Editura UNAp „Carol I”, 2007.

⁴ Voir **Manualul NATO**, Bruxelles, Bureau de l’information et de la presse, 2001, pp. 22-32.

Petre DUȚU (dutupetre@yahoo.com), PhD, est chercheur le degré deux au CSSAS, sociologue militaire, auteur de livres et des nombreux articles sur la sécurité nationale, régional et globale, ainsi que sur le moral des militaires et d’armée, etc.



EUROPEAN MONETARY UNIFICATION AND SECURITY

Doina MUREȘAN

Security is an important system and process function in Europe, a condition of the systems functioning and of the dynamic balance keeping needed for a living inside a complex environment, always changing, tensioned, and competitive, with intricate evolutions and, most of the times, unforeseeable ones. Security has an economic-financial dimension, as well, by the fact that economic power generates security and the poverty generates insecurity, uncertainty and anxiety. In order to provide stability and security in Europe an integrative, complex process was started, not only with the real economy but also with the monetary one. The economic and monetary process has visible advantages for the European Union financial security, assuring the monetary stability by accepting the unique currency – Euro - that has the potential to become one of the main transaction currencies, at the world level, just like yen, leading, in this manner, to the increase of the international economic stability and to the international trade stimulation. At present, the economic and monetary Union is an achieved economic event that assures the economic and financial security of all the EU member states.

Keywords: vulnerabilities, Oil Shock, liberalization, unique currency, interdependence. .

The fact that security has an economic-financial dimension is already a truism. Everyone knows that, whether you have enough money and economic opportunities, in spite of the numerous vulnerabilities that richness generates, you may have the needed security, as well. In other words, although the vulnerabilities are direct proportional to the value and the social impact of the richness, and security is direct proportional to the economic and financial power. Uncertainty is direct proportional to the poverty, to the incapability,

to the hardships of the living. A person that has a working place and earns enough money can buy a house, can have a family, can assure a minimum of conditions to live in peace and in security, at least, in report to another person that has not the same a job, a house, a secure place for the future. The fact that, annually, 45 millions of people die of malnutrition or starvation means a reality of insecurity generated by poverty and by the huge lags between the rich and prosperous world on the one hand and the poor and miserable world on the other hand.

Therefore, the economic dimension of the security is needed and obvious. Always, the economic power generates security and the poverty produces uncertainty, anxiety and insecurity. But security does not mean but a protection system against the evil-doers, and the insecurity does not reduce to the lack of such a protection system. Security is an important system and process function, a condition of the systems functioning and maintaining a dynamic balance, for living into an intricate environment, always changing one, tensioned, competitive, with intricate evolutions and, most of the times, unforeseeable ones.

In 1987, the governors of the central banks from the countries belonging to “*The Ten Industrialized Countries*” signed at Basel, in Switzerland, an agreement regarding the criteria for establishing the optimum capital of a bank, an agreement known as *Basel Convention*. “If a bank has a loan portfolio with a high risk level, then it has to get assured that it has enough financial resources to protect it in case of some disadvantageous loans, respectively, in case some of the clients will be unable to pay their loans back.”¹

The Basel Convention foresights hinting at the attempt to appropriate the capital are the following:



➤ minimum 8% from the assets fitted depending on the risk must be as a base capital, structured into first rank capital and second rank capital;

➤ minimum 50% from the bank capital must be the first rank capital, meaning the social capital (stock-holders funds), plus the declared (published) reserves, got from the undistributed profit;

➤ the rest of the base capital can be formed from the second rank capital, or the additional capital, got from undeclared and re-evaluation reserves;

➤ there are taken into account elements that are not included into the balance, like the guarantees;

➤ each country can frame and apply its own criteria to establish the adequate capital, but the minimum level is the one established in the *Basel Convention*.

Risk Dial:

➤ 0 - cash down;

➤ 20% - the money to be collected from the foreign banks, with a term of payment more than a year;

➤ 50% - the loans guaranteed with mortgage on the buildings;

The more a bank has more active loans, with a high risk, the greater must be the base capital.²

The risk assets are those ones that would lead to loss for the bank, as a consequence of the following risks:

➤ The risk that the investment portfolio of the bank would not reach the accounting value, when it is sold;

➤ The risk that other assets are to be sold under the accounting value;

➤ The risk that the credits beneficiaries (debtors) will not pay back the debts, regarding the overdue rates or by the breach of the refund chart established when the credit was obtained.

Regarding the European Economic and Monetary Union, this is the result of an integrative intricate process, not only at the level of the real economy, but also at the level of the monetary economy, unrolled all along a half of a century inside the community area, a process that supposed the scanning of some more stages at whose end people arrived at the adoption of the European Unique Coin.

At the beginning of the seventh decade, on the ground of the Custom Union closing and of the launching, with positive results, of the Common Agricultural Policy, a number of divergent monetary - financial events, at the level of the member states.

The first attempt of monetary unification to assure stability and security in Europe appeared at the same time with the Werner Report (according to the name of the Luxemburg Prime-Minister Pierre Werner, who presided the working group that was to lay down this report), established the objectives and the stages of the Monetary Union until 1980. In the respect of this plan, the monetary union had as a hint “the total and irreversible convertibility of the coins belonging to the member states, the elimination of the changing appreciation fluctuations, the irrevocable stability of the parity and of the appreciation of the currency and the complete liberalization of the capital flows.”³

Between 1971- 1973 the oil shock and the crises of the International Monetary System from Bretton Woods produced a strong financial instability and led to high inflation ratios and deep turbulence of the currency appreciation of the national coin, what meant a stop of the Werner plan. In this context, in order to provide economic-financial security under the pressure of the events, within a very short time, only a few months, the European countries have created the essential elements of the European Monetary Union.

Starting April 1972, it was put into place the arrangement known as “the monetary snake”, that is the currencies of the seven founding member states of the Economic European Union (Great Britain and Denmark were added afterwards) were keeping between them a certain degree of fluctuation of about +/- 2,25% having the American dollar as a cone.

Keeping the value reports between the coins was done by frequent interventions of the central bank. It was changed as the result of the Brussels European Council in December 1978, on the ground of the common proposal of Helmut Schmidt and the French president, Valerie Giscard d’Estaing, with European Monetary System, seen as a tool to create a monetary stability area inside the community area, but also a connection between Bretton Woods and the Monetary and Economic Union.

The European Monetary System, negotiated in 1978 and adopted in 1979, by the nine member states of the European Community at that time, that became de facto members, proposed – mainly - the formation of a monetary stability and economic-financial security space inside the economic area of whose member states were recording, at that



moment decreasing trends of the differences between their developing levels.

In 1986, the French government re-launched the idea of the European Monetary Union and addressed, in this respect, a memorandum to its partners in the European Community. The European Council decided, on April 28th, 1988, to entrust a committee, presided by Jacques Delors, to establish and propose the needed concrete stages to settle the European Monetary Union. The final architecture of the Monetary and Economic Union was established at the Maastricht Reunion, where on 9-10 December 1991, the chiefs of states and governments of the European Community signed the treaty that laid down the politico-juridical characteristics of the European Monetary Union.

The European Monetary Institute was founded in 1994, in Frankfurt, Germany. By specific tools and procedures, the European Monetary Institute had to strengthen the cooperation between the National Central Banks of the community countries, supervising the functioning of the European Monetary System and strengthening the coordination of the monetary policies of the member states, in order to provide the prices' stability. Excepting these operations, the Central Banks integrated into the European Monetary System had the right to intervene on currency markets through the so-called marginal interventions, when one of the participating currencies to the European Monetary System reached the maximum bilateral limits towards another currency or, intra-marginal interventions, when the exchange intervention appreciation of the coin was inside the fluctuation strip of the European Monetary System.

Also, in 1979, there was introduced the change ratio mechanism, in order to reduce the fluctuations in the nominal value of the member states' currency, on the ground of the mutual support and of the collective actions of the central banks in the member states. The banks interceded into the currency markets by buying or selling, for influencing their value. The intervention was made on the base of "Offer and Demand" Principle: when the value of a currency was decreasing under a certain value, established by all and named a fluctuation lane, the central banks interfered, rearranging the market value of that currency.

During the 1992 crises, the change ratio mechanism had ten members. Spain joined it in 1987, Great Britain in 1990 and Portugal in April

1992. Due to its unfavourable economy, Greece did not join it and Luxemburg had the currency bound to the Belgian one. The change ratio mechanism was based on a parity system that allowed each currency to have a limited fluctuation in relation with each of the system currency, also establishing a central parity ratio in ECU.

The 1992-1993 crisis when two currencies (the British pound and the Italian Lira), were withdrawn from the system, five of them lined up the change ratio (Spanish peseta, Portuguese escudo, Irish pound, Danish crown and French Franc) and one of them reached the fluctuation values of +/- 15%, showed the vulnerability of the system by the fact that the monetary integration with more currencies found into use would not give the expected results and that the only way to reach this point just like to get a totally safe European system, as well, is represented by the unique currency.

Therefore, it was brought into question the problem of the monetary-financial discipline within the system by the operational flexibility and the creation of some new mechanisms to allow the monetary integration. On this ground, in 1999, when the unique currency was adopted, it was launched a second change ratio mechanism, named "Change Ratio Mechanism 2", where the multilateral system was replaced with a bilateral one, through which each participating currency has a defined central parity comparative to Euro. This mechanism allows the intervention of the European Central Bank and of the member states central banks, then when the change ratio exceeds the value of +/- 15% comparing to the central rate.

The member states within the Euro area and Denmark (this one opting for a fluctuation value of +/- 2,25%), belong to the "Change Ratio Mechanism 2", other six from the new EU member countries from 2004. An important objective of the change ratio represents the help given to the member states outside the Euro area in applying some macroeconomic stability policy in order to stimulate them to get the necessary convergence entering the Euro area.

On stability and the security of the whole financial community system, the functioning of the exchange ratio mechanism has the following advantages: the increase of the financial environment stability, by using a semi-fixed appreciations, that allowed the decrease of the



investments and business risks; collective actions that permitted to the member states to rely not only upon their own efforts in maintaining the value of their currencies; imposing financial discipline in the fight against the inflation by establishing an admitted fluctuation of a coin depreciation; a better use of the resources, as a result of the incertitude elimination linked to the establishing of the change ratio and, by this, of the prices mechanism as an instrument to allocate resources; the stimulation of the manufacture sections by establishing the change ratio; the stimulation of the small and middle business less exposed to the change ratio risk; the increase of the commercial changes at the intra-union level.

Not even this mechanism was perfect. The following are the disadvantages that made it vulnerable in front of some risks and threats, so that it was unable to avoid a great crisis, similar with the one from 1992: it started from the assumption that the value of the currencies could have been maintained with a governmental intervention, that is a limited governmental intervention capacity in covering the market; the fact that it started from the wrong assumption that the governments would be willing to intervene when other member states' currencies got depreciated, contributing by this to their stability; the mechanism worked well in the condition of a low or stable inflation ratio, but it reacted violently and negatively when there were perturbations generated by Germany's reunification or by the rejection, through the referendum, of the idea of monetary union or unique currency in some of the member states; it encouraged the speculators who found a guaranteed buyer for the weak currencies in the system, namely the member states' central banks; it contributed to the loss, by the member states' governments, of the monetary sovereignty upon the national economies with all the future deriving implications.

In the conditions of some varied financial services, sometimes from a country to another and submitted to some specific national rules, the liberalization of the financial services and the capital changes seemed hard to be achieved.

The prudent way to build a common financial area supposed, first of all, the gradual harmonization of the appearance and functioning conditions of the institutions and the financial products, the complete release of the concurrence from it. The European Monetary System functioning and especially the

change ratio mechanism implied the observance of the fluctuation values within the imposed limits, that meant, through the undertaken engagements, a decrease of the central banks' independence, generating the so-called - impossible trinity- namely, the impossibility of having, both an independent monetary policy, a system of stable appreciations and a complete mobility of the capital.

During the functioning of the system, the members of the change ratio mechanism generally opted for a stable change ration combined with a rigorous control of the capital variations. The monetary independence permitted the member states to operate with different inflation ratios but the oil shocks in the '70s led to an increase of the difference between these ratios what determined fitting the inflation ratio through the renunciation to the stable appreciation system or a renunciation of the independence in establishing the inflation ratio and maintaining the stable appreciation system. The chosen solution was the one of maintaining the divergences between the inflation ratios and the change ratios fitting whenever it was necessary, in order to avoid the problems on the competitive feature at internal and external level.

The problem that is bound to the correlation between the European monetary unification and the security is more complex. The economic and monetary union is the result of a political decision based on a strong economic component. If only one of the two components (economic or political) had been at the base of its creation, the economic and monetary Union would not have as it is today, only as economically or politically speaking the arguments would not have been enough.

Politically speaking, the formation of the economic and monetary Union means the sovereignty and control giving up upon the decisions regarding the economic policy of the member states. Moreover, the introduction and the use of the unique currency suppose a single economic management that demands the transfer of the responsibilities and even the functioning of the unique policy leading.

Essentially, the states belonging to a group or those ones that adhere to a group can gain mutually from a common currency only when they belong to a favourable monetary area, namely when their economic structures are similar and when there is not the risk that the asymmetric shocks to produce



insecurity only in some of these countries. As between the economy of the member states there are notable differences between on the development levels, these will react differently to the outside shocks. Therefore, for those member states that are net exporter, the world price change of a good will have opposite results to the results recorded by the states that are the net importers. Similarly, the consumers belonging to some member states will borrow more, others less and will understand differently the fluctuations of the interest ratios in the international markets.

The asymmetric shocks affect the economic-financial security also, by generating dysfunctions from the incompatibilities of the business cycles, in the respect that some member states can be found in the increase period, others in the decline or stagnation one, so that a unique monetary policy, belonging to the favourable monetary areas, could not carry out the problems of all the involved states.

For the Euro area, that does not represent, not even now, a favourable monetary area, its member states do not have anymore the opportunity to establish their own interest ratio or to use the change ratio as an instrument of the economic policy. Moreover, none of the adjust alternative mechanisms, as migration, the wages levels, the capital fluctuations, the fiscal policy, the fiscal transfers or the direct supports do not work properly within the Euro area. Meantime, there are cultural and linguistic barriers dependent on the working force mobility, meaning variations linked to the wages level and the unemployment level.

On this ground, the European Union is, nowadays, an unfavourable monetary area that still shows risks, even if not major ones, for the regional security, that is an impediment for this stage of integration. In spite of the unfavourable area statute, there are still a lot of favourable arguments (and unfavourable ones as well), for the constitution of an economic and monetary Union within the European area.

The favourable arguments for an economic and monetary European Union were: the completion of the unique market, that a unique market needs a unique coin; the increase of the transfer speed of the monetary fluctuations and the conversion costs elimination; the reduction of the risks bound to the commercial changes and investments by eliminating the change ratio fluctuations;

prices' transparency and a better information of the participants in transactions; the monetary discipline, in the meaning that the governments will not be able to use the currency as economic policy instruments; the inflation reduction, due to the discipline imposed by the economies that form the Euro area; the merging of the financial markets, that could lead to scale economy; the increase of the efficiency and the possibility to obtain some high flows of the economic development; the consolidation of the European Union position inside the international monetary system; facilitating reaching the target of creating a political union.

The arguments against the formation of a monetary union inside the European Union were: the loss of the control and of decisional power regarding the monetary problems; the flexibility loss, meaning that the national governments will not be able to come to monetary policy decisions to allow them to protect their savings from the external shocks, to the prejudice of other countries; relatively great differences inside the business cycles and living standards within the member states; the danger to divide the European Union into states from inside and outside the economic and monetary European Union; the material costs that the replacement of the national currencies with the unique one imply, the institutional creation and the legislative modifications needed for this action.

In spite of all, the monetary unification process went on showing visible advantages for the European Union financial security, assuring monetary stability by accepting the unique currency -Euro that has the power to become one of the main transaction's currencies at the world level, just like yen, determining, therefore, the increase of the international economic environment stability. The unique currency was introduced officially, into use on January, 1st, 1999, in the middle of the night, replacing the old European monetary unit ECU (European Currency Unit). The national coins of the participating countries stopped existing anymore, legally, becoming simple divisions of the European currency, but they went on being used inside those countries up to the introduction of the new banknotes and currencies in January, 1st, 2002.

At present, the Euro participating member states are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,



Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Holland, Portugal and Spain. They are frequently named “Euro Area” or “Euroland”. Since January, 1st, 2007 Slovenia also joined the “Euro Area”.

Andorra, Monaco, San Marino and Vatican use euro, as well, though they are not officially Euro members, not even European Union ones (they used previously currencies that were replaced by Euro). Out of them, Monaco, San Marino and Vatican made their own coins with their own symbols on the back side. Andorra uses French and Spanish currencies, as long as they used the French Franc and the Spanish Peseta as their currencies. These countries use euro due to some misunderstandings with the European Union member states (Italy, in the San Marino and Vatican city matters, France on Monaco), approved by the European Union Council.

Montenegro and Kosovo that used the German Mark as their own currency, accepted to use euro, too, though, despite the three previous states, did not sign any legal agreement with European Union, to allow them. The countries that have a stable national currency, comparing to the German one, as Bulgaria and Estonia, established the change ratios in comparison with Euro.

Denmark and the United Kingdom are not legally apt to adhere to Euro, until their governments come to other decision. Sweden was not accepted to participate by any legal document; still, in 1997, Sweden decided not to join the Euro area, so, no effort was done to fulfil the needed criterion to have a stable change ratio. In Denmark and Sweden there was organized a referendum regarding the European unique currency, in September, 28th, 2000 and September, 14th, 2003, most of the participants voting against.

In spite of the hardships or syncope, at present, Euro is a good currency, set on durable public finances, due to the increase and stability accord and guaranteed by a central independent bank whose objective is the prices’ stability. Therefore, it is a credible currency that confers credibility to the financial users and a catalyst for the integration, both macroeconomic and microeconomic.

At the microeconomic level, in the same time the states can not have the same currency and dispersed economic policies, able to work in all directions. The economic policies coordination is essential for the currency’s credibility, for the balance and the success of the economic and monetary union. The

great orientations of the economic policy represent a test of the member states’ will to coordinate their policies using instruments having this purpose. In other words, the appearance of euro leads to the fiscal harmonization in the savings and the taxes of the enterprises (there was not a risk of the private persons, as they are very little mobile: less than 1% of the Europeans work in a member state, another than the native one).

The subject was an avoided one, for a long time, but nowadays the things are different: euro has a total transparency of the taxes differences, differences that could create for some of the member states a temptation of a fiscal dumping. But this could prejudice everyone, as it would mean whether a decrease of the cash collecting – a thing that could affect the public finance, or a transfer of the taxation principles towards the least mobile bills, namely towards the wages. Some steps forward were done: so, in December 1997 a conduct code regarding the enterprise fiscal laws was done. 250 measures were examined by a working group presided by Mrs. Primarolo; 40 of them were considered as derogatory. This is an important step forward, but it is not yet the question of a good guidance code. It is difficult for the continuous fiscal guidance to be accepted entirely.

It is impossible to harmonize wages, because the differences often the lead to the productivity differences. To impose the same minimum wages all over the places would mean to generate unemployment inside the countries where the working productivity is weak. The law harmonization is difficult to be achieved as this hints straight the society model. At present, it is not yet desired to achieve a European wages policy. The economies found in the recovering stage (for example, Portugal, Greece), have more important progresses on productivity and possibilities of wages increase that would determine an undesired policy ordered by Brussels. The only valuable solution is to have a minimum number of common rules, like a social charter.

At the macroeconomic level, euro will accelerate the price convergence phenomenon. There are, indeed, important differences inside the European Union. The price variations remain, at the average, more than 30% for the pharmaceuticals products and with 15% for the chemical industry or for the food. The periodical study of the General Competition



Direction upon the car prices shows the existence of the prices without taxes differences, some rising up to 40% for the same car type. The transparency brought by euro, that makes prices much easier to be compared, strengthens the competition inside all the goods and services markets for the enterprises, for the food, as well, where the big deliverers begin to draw, systematically, the most interesting differences. The quick development of the electronic trade is emphasizing more and more this phenomenon of prices convergence, allowing the European citizen to look for the most attractive opportunities.

Europe is at the beginning of the economic, politic and monetary integration process whose dimensions and effects are difficult to be determined exactly now. For the first time, since the fall of the Roman Empire, most of the Europeans have the same currency. As a conclusion, the economic and monetary union is an economic achieved event, able to provide the economic and financial security of all the states belonging to the European Union. Its success shows the European capacity and the one of the institutions to reach the final of such a great project.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

APPLEYARD, Dennis, Alfred FIELD, **International Economics. Payments, Exchange Rates & Macropolicy**, Richard Irwin, 1995.

BALDWIN, R, WYPLOSZ, C., *The Economics of European Integration*, manuscript, 2003.

BASNO, Cezar, DARDAC, Nicolae, **Integrarea monetar-bancară europeană**, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, București, 1999.

DARDAC, Nicolae, VĂȘCU, Teodora, **Monedă și credit**, vol. 2, Editura ASE, București, 2001.

DOMOKOȘ, Erno, KATONA, Levente, **Pași către integrarea europeană**, Editura Expert, București, 2002.

MIRON, D, (coordonator), **Economia Uniunii Europene**, Editura Luceafărul, București, 2000.

MOUSSIS, N, **Guide to European Policies**, European Study Service, Belgium, 2003.

NICA, Dumitru, NEGRU, Titel, **Bănci europene și internaționale**, Editura Fundației România de Mâine, București, 2006.

PĂUN, Roxana-Daniela, **Spațiul monetar european**, Editura Expert, București, 2004.

PORTES, R., *A Monetary Union in Motion: the European Experience*, London Business School and CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2.954, September 2001.

SILASI, G. **Integrarea monetară europeană între teorie și politică**, Editura Orizonturi Universitare Timișoara, 1998.

TOMA, Ramona, **Euro, moneda unică: între național și internațional**, Editura Continent, Sibiu, 2004.

VAUBEL, R, *Monetary integration theory, in Surveys in Economics, International Economics*, Longman, London & New York, 1988.

NOTES:

¹ Dumitru NICA, Titel NEGRU, **Bănci europene și internaționale**, Editura Fundației România de Mâine, București, 2006, pp. 19-20.

² Ibidem, p. 20.

³ WERNER P., B.H. ANSIAUX, G. BROOURWERS, B. CHAPPIER, Report to the Council and the Commission on the Realisation by Stages of Economic and Monetary Union in the Community, Bulletin II, 1970, in Dumitru MIRON, **Economia Uniunii Europene**, Editura Luceafărul, București, 2002, p. 162.

Lieutenant-colonel Doina MUREȘAN (doinidza@yahoo.com) is the Administrative Director of the National Defence College and a PhD candidate in military sciences within the National Defence University "Carol I".



CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES OF SECURING NATIONAL BORDERS – MILITARY PERSPECTIVE

Evgeni MANEV, PhD

During the recent years, the Bulgarian institutions have worked actively on the implementation of the government's policy in the area of security, and have made a considerable progress in the area of border control, visas, migration, asylum, fight against organized crime and terrorism.

Therefore, the security risks to the country were minimized, and the border security was increased. The accession of Bulgaria to NATO and to the EU have increased the responsibilities of the institutions ensuring the national security and the internal order, including the security of the state's sea borders and the protection of the sovereign rights of the country in the seas.

Taking into account the existing circumstances on regional, European and world scale, Bulgaria has been working towards the building of reliably operating border controls in order to ensure the internal security and the public order in the border areas and facilities, as well as in the maritime areas of the country.

The described specific features of the security environment testify that, as a result of the contemporary positive changes, there is no threat of a global military opposition. There are no challenges, risks and threats from a direct military aggression against Bulgaria and the sovereignty of its national borders. Besides, the responsibilities increase as Bulgaria is the EU outer border. Our country is a part of the common European zone of security, freedom and justice.

Keywords: securing, challenges, threats, national borders.

The course of historical events is a striking evidence for the truth that the most constant factor for the countries' development is their geographical location. Without giving too much importance on the location of the individual countries at world level, we have to admit it significantly influences

the development of social processes. That is true mainly of the peripheral zones of the continents and peninsulas where borders and closeness to other civilizations have great impact on their overall way of life.

A telling example of the unbreakable connection between geographical factors and political processes is the current development of the countries of Southeast Europe, the Black Sea area and East Mediterranean, a region that the Republic of Bulgaria belongs to. It is that part of the old continent that in time became a boundary as well as a kind of mediator between Orthodox religion, Catholicism, and Islam, between various cultures, stereotypes and policies that caused a multitude of bloody wars.¹

After the end of the Cold War, those parts of Europe had the most differentiated pattern of security guarantees, the weakest connections and relationships between the countries and a lot of unsolved ethnic and other problems, outdated claims to changing national borders, deep economic disproportions and a high degree of insecurity.

As a result, hardly can we find any other region in the world with so many "stitches, breaking ups and borders" – some of them as old as the world, and others completely new and still unstable, because there is no other part of the old continent where territorial fragmentation is still going on and new frontier posts and customs barriers appear.

In that sense, the region acts as a peculiar laboratory where national borders have been a subject to "Balkan specificity" for many years. That specificity consists of border lines forming nets of invisible walls on both sides of which there are small provincial towns and a single road leading to them. The highways finish to the border lines, and the borders resemble front lines rather than windows to the world.²

That is a symbol of a past reality which is changing quickly because the dynamics of the



SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

political, social and economic processes, for the last years, involved significant political events.

The changes in the economic, political and military strategic environment in the Black Sea region are indicative of developing positive tendencies and strengthening common security. There are no military operations, a fact that reduces an opposition based on ethnic origin and religion. Democratic processes and reforms, for most region's countries, gather momentum. EU and NATO have supported the striving of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Armenia for European and Euro-Atlantic orientation. EU realizes the necessity of supporting the countries in the East Europe and South Caucasus including them in the European policy of maintaining good relations among neighbouring countries and the fact that policy would contribute to the development of democracy and lasting stability in the region.

The processes of peaceful settling the existing problems and strengthening stability have been achieved in conditions of a lot of conventions, because in the light of transatlantic perspective the region is an area where the West touches the immediate security interests of Russia. Along with that, the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea are of primary importance for the development of security relations with Central Asia and act as a gate to the Persian Gulf and Near East, too.

Parallel to its growing significance, the Black Sea region includes a lot of many-sided risk conditions and factors for Europe and America security that involve the whole spectre of challenges: from organized crime, drugs, weapons, human trafficking, money laundering, organized terrorists, radical Islam to the existence of failed states, frozen conflicts in Abkhazia, the Dniester area and Nagorni Karabakh, areas for which, at present, there is no will for international regulation.

Along with the positive tendencies for a peaceful development in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea area, threats related to the contradictory interests of the countries situated there and to their complicated way to democracy and hard social and economic problems still exist. The fact that the trajectories of all hypothetical nuclear strikes to Europe and the East Coast of America from all hypothetical aggressors pass over the Black Sea region should not be underestimated.

That situation generates a security environment appropriate for development of the so-called

“non-traditional threats”. Their unusual way of demonstration and influence on society makes them “asymmetric” and the sea as natural globalizing environment and the maritime transport system are extremely convenient for their achievement.

Our national borders measure 1808 km with the neighbouring countries, and 354 km Black Sea coastline.

Military aspects of challenges to border security

Border security is an integral part of the security of each and every country. Nowadays, due to the new non-traditional threats and challenges, its significance is increasing. Border security encompasses not only armed guarding of land and sea boundaries, but also the protection of the country's air sovereignty. In peacetime, the security and the protection of the national borders is a responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Related to this activity there are customs structures, air traffic control authorities and some other services having responsibilities in this area. Air Force and Navy have key tasks in guaranteeing the security of air space, sea borders of our country.

However, in crisis and wartime, the functions of the armed forces related to guaranteeing border security increase and military formations are used for enhancing surveillance, as well as securing threatened areas along the sea and land borders of the country. The protection of air space is provided by the Air Force. The surveillance of the national air and sea space is one of the main responsibilities of the armed forces.

The main challenges and threats to border security in peacetime and during crisis are:

- armed conflicts and civil wars in neighbouring countries and regions;
- ethnic and religious extremism and conflicts;
- terrorism;
- international organized transborder crime;
- illegal migration and refugees flows;
- human and drugs trafficking;
- illegal trade and smuggled weapons, ammunition and nuclear substances;
- corruption.

Some challenges and threats have military aspects, fostered during crises and need the



intervention of the armed forces for their elimination. This armed forces' participation in the fight against them relates to the scale of their demonstration.

The main task of the Bulgarian Armed Forces is the security and defence of its air space and sea areas. Regarding the participation of the armed forces in providing border security in its land forces component, it is related with the following basic aspects: existing and possible future conflicts in the region, close to the national borders, and requiring a higher level of alertness along the border; carrying out operations against intensified military activities in the region and operations for demonstrating power and determination; counteraction to armed provocations by troops and other armed formations; armed incidents along the border at a greater scale; mass invasion of refugees from neighbouring countries as a result of a major armed conflict; undertaking reconnaissance along the border as a result of a complicated situation and exchange of information with other services and authorities dealing with border security.

Having in mind the main responsibility of Air Force and Navy, to air and sea sovereignty of the state, a conclusion could be drawn, namely that on protecting sea borders the armed forces intervene when the capabilities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are exhausted. The armed forces have the main responsibility of protecting the national air space. In intensified terrorist activity by air and sea the contribution of the two army services increases.

The challenges to national border security outlined above show that in all cases other than war or a state of emergency the border security is a priority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Armed Forces guarantee that.

The role of Intelligence

The challenges and risks in the unstable geopolitical region, in which Bulgaria is located, set new, contemporary requirements to the state and military authorities, command and headquarters of the armed forces for providing national borders security.

Lately, it has become increasingly obvious that being a NATO and EU member, the Republic of Bulgaria must contribute to the defence of its national borders but that in turn leads to new and

higher requirements to intelligence and more complicated tasks for the structures of the arms and services of the armed forces.

The continuity and activeness of intelligence are priority requirements determined mainly by the fact that in peacetime the armed forces have limited strength and reduced capabilities, compared to wartime plans and needs in case of a potential threat or a military and political crisis close to the national borders.

The goal of intelligence related to providing national borders security is obtaining, processing and disseminating intelligence information necessary for timely decision-making by state and military authorities.

The main mission of military intelligence is to prognosticate and clarify the strategic and operational situation in the regions of potential tension, risks and threats for the security of the country as well as possible challenges and military operations. That provides opportunities for the responsible structures, authorities and institutions for prompt reaction for protecting the country in case of a further escalation of that respective threat.

In a military aspect, military intelligence being an important and inherent element of the national early warning system, can carry out the following main tasks:

- continuous study, assessment and prognostication of the state and development of the situation in the region;
- identifying as early as possible an evolving military and political crisis, threat or risk to the national security;
- permanent monitoring the activities of the main threat sources endangering the national security and implementing operational warning concerning terms and degree of threat;
- timely detection and participation together with formations from other structures and institutions in operations against diversion, intelligence and paramilitary formations penetrating the country's territory;
- providing information for a possible intention and beginning of hostile actions;
- interaction with other elements of the intelligence community of the country (intelligence of ministries, institutions and national agencies and services) as well as with NATO and EU member states and PfP countries;



- developing required information, reports and other intelligence documents and presenting them to the responsible authorities and interacting units and subordinate staffs and services to the required extent;
- developing and maintaining own intelligence database for storing and providing intelligence information to those ones with granted access to classified information.

The intelligence will carry out the above-mentioned tasks and others in close interaction with certain elements for intelligence and security of the national early warning system as well as with other national services, institutions and agencies and similar from other countries.

When there are prerequisites for emerging a potential threat or risk close to the national borders, the Intelligence intensifies its efforts to provide the necessary information and sufficient time for the state and military authorities to be able to make the most adequate decisions for counteracting threats and preventing crises.

The basic principles, underlying the Intelligence operation for providing information aiming at securing national borders, are:

- Forces and intelligence means' compatibility for gathering information for the national early warning system with C4 systems, in order to disseminate intelligence information;
- Availability of well-developed information structure to monitor, report, analyze, summarize and regularly issue intelligence data;
- High flexibility allowing fast changing of operation modes;
- Achieving common standards and criteria by the management structures controlling military intelligence for consistence and uniformity of database, protocols, formats, terminology, equipment and signals;
- Achieving the highest possible secrecy during Intelligence operations, especially when deploying along the threatened national border;
- High credibility and accuracy of intelligence information and data.

Besides the above mentioned requirements, some others should be set to intelligence service and means. They could be crucial at a particular moment:

- availability of various highly qualified experts, familiar with foreign political and strategic issues, having the capacity to interpret them into end-information product;

- permanent relation between specialized units of intelligence and the means of electronic and fire impact at tactical level;

- opportunity for interoperability and full value integration of military intelligence units with the ones of their ministries and institutions and with NATO intelligence structures and systems;

- opportunity for conducting continuous intelligence not only along the border but also on the national territory, etc.

Reconnaissance formations and special operations maintain permanent readiness and, when needed, separate bodies can deploy a system of observation posts along the border of the particular country together with intelligence structures from other institutions.

Air intelligence is conducted with the assistance of Special Forces and means along specified routes over the territory of the country without violating the air space of the neighbouring countries.

Intelligence forces and means of the navy conduct naval intelligence emphasizing the coastline areas.

All intelligence indicators identifying the danger of a possible threat have to be interpreted as a reason for enhancing the readiness of intelligence and deploying the units of the threatened borders.

Along with that, the intensity of information exchange is increased and there are conducted operations between Air Force units and means of intelligence and the national intelligence and security services including other services and institutions from the country and abroad dealing with the newly created situation.

In order to achieve their mission, to protect the national borders in case of an emergency, commanders and staffs at all levels need continuously to update and offer credible information that requires united efforts of all available forces and means.

The Land Forces' contributions

On emerging a crisis and a danger of its turning into a conflict (armed), the Land Forces will play an important role for protecting and securing the land boundaries. In the escalation of every



military and political crisis there are periods of accumulating and developing contradictions between the opposing countries before activating the military system for protecting the country. It is then that the restraining function of the Armed Forces within the framework of crisis management strategy is realized, and its primary task is covering the national borders.

Covering the national border of the potential theatre of war, depending on the type and character of the threat, is a complex of activities without using, using or ready to use arms for solving the problems by the forces and the protection means. Those forces and means can be deployed and used for intelligence, exchange of information, demonstration of power, deployment of groups of control, special activities among the population, infrastructure or communication activities as well as the participation in preventing and eliminating border incidents. The indicated tasks can be accomplished by formations and structures of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, various specialized services, local governing authorities and administration. Each of those structures carries out its functions on its own or in cooperation with the others.

The analysis of the possible character of threats, risks, crises, wars and military conflicts endangering the security and defence of the Republic of Bulgaria as well as the scenario of their appearance and development allows us to determine the tasks, structure, the necessary state and ways of cooperation of the Land Forces participating in covering the national border.

In the restraining period they could conduct operations without reaching to proper war such as: counteraction to increased military activity in the region; actions for demonstrating power and determination; enhancing readiness; evacuation operations.

Covering of the national border of the potential theatre of war is organized following a uniform plan and involves a developed system of interrelated operations.

The goal of covering the national border of the potential theatre of war is preventing and eliminating border incidents and not allowing them to turn into an armed conflict – providing time for regrouping and operational and tactical deployment of units aiming at eliminating the threat.

The conditions under which these forces

covering the border are able to fulfil their tasks have some specific features that could influence:

1. the content of the overall activity on the preparation and enhancing forces readiness and the means for covering the national border of the potential theatre of wars;
2. composition, structure and the tasks of the units and ways of operation;
3. condition of defence positions, regions, boundaries, support points and the built engineering facilities;
4. organization and ways of support, etc.

The Air Forces' Contribution

Providing air sovereignty is an activity having political, diplomatic, national, military, public and institutional aspects and responsibilities. The biggest relative share among them is of the Air Forces'.

The air sovereignty system of the Republic of Bulgaria includes the following subsystems:

- air space control system – unified system of civil and military control of air space and air traffic;
- air defence system.

The unified system of civil and military control of air space and air traffic is a subsystem uniting the civil and military planning activities, air space control and the air traffic control. This system functions and resolves its tasks within the Bulgarian air space and over territorial waters for which the country has signed a regional agreement to provide air traffic control.

The system is built through integrating all levels of military units of ATC in the appropriate civil structures.

The air borders of the Republic of Bulgaria are included in the NATO integrated extended air defence system (NATINADS), as it aims to guarantee air sovereignty of the NATO European space. NATO Air Defence System is seen as a visible proof of solidarity and unity of the member countries.

The essence of the integration lies in submitting certain national forces and means in peace and wartime to the control of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), who is responsible for the defence of the common airspace against air attacks.



SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

In peacetime, some units of the control and radiolocation reconnaissance system carry out a continuous surveillance of NATO air space, in order to obtain, assess and disseminate early warning information. If necessary, they render navigation assistance to military and civil aircraft. Some air defence units provide fighters on duty for quick reaction alert (QRA(I)), which are capable of performing interception, interrogation and identifying air targets, detected by the control and radiolocation reconnaissance system. Air defence units maintain readiness of adequate forces in case of emerging crises, in order to fulfil the set wartime tasks.

NATO integrated extended air defence system (NATINEADS) does not use Antiaircraft Forces (AAF) for Air Police, excepting the special cases.

Two types of threats are considered in defending the air space – military and non-military - such as of a Renegade type. In peacetime, military threats can emerge from territories out of area of responsibility (AOR) of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). For that, radiolocation coverage out of this area as well as fighters performing combat duty in the periphery of AOR are required. Threats from a civilian aircraft used for a terrorist attack from the air (Renegade type) can emerge from anywhere, including inside AOR. In such cases, the Transfer of Authority (TOA) to the appropriate nation for taking adequate measures and employing national antiaircraft defence units is planned.

At present, units and fighter aviation on duty perform Air Policing based at Graf Ignatievo Air Base. For 24 hours two MIG -29/MIG-21 are ready to take off and intercept within 15 minutes. In 2002, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) approved guidelines for establishing civil and military ATC procedures considering the new situation concerning security. It provides NATO policy for improving short-term antiterrorist air traffic control measures. These guidelines have been developed for improving NATO antiaircraft defence capabilities as a counter-reaction to using civil aircraft for terrorist attacks (a new danger called Renegade). It is assumed that integrated deployed NATO integrated extended air defence system (NATINEADS) will be used as a main system and will be supplemented by the national antiaircraft defence (AAD) when possible.

Implementing Air Policing by Bulgarian AAD system as a contribution to NATO collective

defence does not contradict to the national documents regulating the tasks and activities of the armed forces. However, there is no well-structured system for taking decisions in case of penetrating the national air space by a violator. There is not a regulatory document that allows the use of weapons at such a violator under clear circumstances. Other countries are facing the same problem and they are considering law changes in order to allow the use of weapons at Renegade type targets.

Currently, the laws, doctrines, regulations and instruction books do not clearly permit the activities of the units on duty and the use of AAD while Air Policing and Renegade type cases.

The development and approval of a document allowing the Prime Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria (or a national government body authorized by the Prime Minister) to declare a state of emergency in a limited area or to permit the use of fighter aviation in case of a Renegade type target will substantially facilitate the procedures and will provide a legal basis for the activities of the units on duty.

The contribution to securing national maritime border

The maritime border, as external Schengen border, is a major priority in the efforts to ensure effective border control.

Bulgaria's maritime areas (the internal sea areas, territorial sea, contiguous zone and the exclusive economic zone) are situated in the west and southwest part of the Black Sea. The navigation traffic is about 30000 vessels per year. The detected infringements are mainly related to the smuggling of fuels and goods, industrial fishing by foreign fishing vessels, the violation of the sailing and fishing regulations by the Bulgarian vessels, and pollution of the water environment. There have been single cases of small, unorganized groups of illegal immigrants using cargo ships, their destination being the EU states, in most cases.

According to the World Trade Organization, 30% of the economy of the world depends on international trade. The maritime share in this trade is estimated at 99.7%. Nationally Bulgaria's maritime commercial shipping accounts for 79.6%. Our Black Sea ports, Varna and Bourgas, are the gateway to 60% of Bulgaria's foreign trade. That is why the freedom of navigation, security and



maritime security are so important for us.

Traditional trade routes between the East and the West and between the South and the North cross the Black Sea region. The Black Sea shares the political, regional ethnic, demographic, economic and cultural variety and differences that are typical for the Mediterranean. The specific feature here is this variety is spreading on a geographically very limited area. This is the reason for the high intensity of international processes. That is why maritime security will determine whether the Black Sea will be a bridge or an obstacle for international trade and economy, whether it will be a sea that connects or that it is a water barrier that divides nations, religions and cultures.

The regional complexity that was already mentioned logically reflected the legal status of the Black Sea. All international maritime legal conventions are effective in the Black Sea as well, as it is an element of the world's maritime space. But due to the 1936 Montreux Convention we have a unique regulation in place.

A naval perspective

From Bulgaria's Navy perspective, on one hand, the exclusive Black Sea legal regulation helps the security of the maritime domain. But, on the other hand, it creates some challenges in the struggle against the non-traditional threats at sea.

After pointing out the geopolitical and legal specifics, we will proceed with the definition of the threat and risk factors for the maritime lines of communication on the Black Sea.

Terrorism and organized crime have emerged as the primary threat for the maritime security in the region, with a tendency towards a financial interaction between terrorist and criminal groups, which is also taken into account. The ships in ports are especially vulnerable to this threat. The capability of disturbing sea lines of communication by launching terrorist attacks against vessels in open sea, in coastal areas and in ports are all within this scheme. The political and military confrontation in the Black Sea is already irreversibly in the past. Nevertheless, political instability in the region and the possible escalation of the disputes in the Caucasus could affect negatively the freedom of navigation. The economic instability increases the threats to vital infrastructure facilities, for instance, poorly protected facilities like ports, to maritime

safety facilities, root system, etc., weaken maritime security and they could lead to the disruption of the lines of communication.

The next group of threats is defined as non-traditional, because they do not directly endanger maritime security. This group of factors threatens the sea line communications by generating risks as a consequence. Natural and manmade disasters are not a danger to shipping and human activities in the open sea. But the effects of such crisis may downgrade the supporting structures, which may emerge as a serious risk factor.

The pollution of the maritime environment could result in the adaptation of restrictive regulations, which are not in favour of the freedom at sea.

Finally, the intensive immigration and refugee flows at sea could interfere with maritime traffic by creating navigational danger for human life at sea.

The Bulgarian navy sees the answer to these challenges emerging from the threats and risks as stated, in the multinational and bilateral cooperation in all aspects of the human activities. There are the following preconditions for developing such cooperation:

- the common economic interest related to turning the Black Sea into an important component of the export corridors of crude oil from the Caspian and Asia;

- the well-expressed common will of the Black Sea states to decrease the political risk that creates genuine financial risks for investors. The important role of the Black Sea in the continental ecosystem, in the serious environmental problems, and in the political and economic changes with dimensions into the security threats for each nation and for the region as a whole is well-recognized. This requires coordinated actions that are possible only within the framework of a common regional security system;

- after the end of Cold War, there is a tendency towards an economic consolidation in the region. The ferry lines between the Black Sea states' are important preconditions for peace and stability in the Caucasus, as part of the future transport corridors;

- the trans-regional optic communication line had a similar importance within the framework of the project for creating a united energy system;

- the Black Sea community also shows its concern about the environmental protection and its readiness to cooperate in this area.



SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

The continuous control of the maritime traffic is a prerequisite for maritime security. Naval cooperation has been proven as a valuable tool in security building activities. The commitment of the navies in the field of maritime security has crossed the limits of its purely military dimensions. Following this trend, Bulgaria's Navy is already in connection with all players in the Black Sea security arena on a daily basis.

Bulgaria's NATO membership provides the main guidelines for planning and conducting all activities of the Bulgarian Navy. NATO has assigned an obviously high priority to the Black Sea region as an integral part of the Euro-Atlantic security area. In this aspect, the Bulgarian Navy implements the above-mentioned NATO policy through hosting international maritime "Breeze" exercises with NATO and Partnership for Peace Participation. Regular participation in the NATO operation against terrorism at sea, Active Endeavour, is our contribution to the security of the Alliance in the Southern Europe. The possibility to expand the Active Endeavour operation in the Black Sea will bring additional security to the region and also will actively prevent all illegal maritime activities in the Black Sea.

The European Union considers the Black Sea region as a key point within the comprehensive security system, although the threats identified within the European security strategy are not purely military, they still require the active participation of the armed forces of the EU member states.

Besides the EU integration and NATO commitments, Bulgaria's Navy identifies regional cooperation as the third important tool to be used in the area of the Black Sea security. The operational group for naval cooperation, BLACKSEAFOR, continues the practice oriented towards cooperation between the Black Sea navies. That is why we consider our participation in BLACKSEAFOR as well as in the activities within the Confidence and Security Building Measures in the naval area as a priority, which gives us a platform for the development of cooperation between naval forces and for consolidating the peace in the Black Sea region. Being part of the multinational regional project for the establishment of a virtual regional traffic control centre for the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, the Bulgarian Navy contributes to the joint efforts to make the sea line communications more secure and reliable.

One of the main tasks for the Bulgarian Navy is to generate regional security and stability.

Following the international and the regional commitments of the Bulgarian Navy, we do consider naval forces not merely as a military tool of national defence but also an active co-actor in peacetime maritime security. That is why we have identified the contribution to national security at sea as one of the three missions of the Bulgarian Navy.

The efficient measures for countering the real threats connected with the transborder crime in the Black Sea region require the combined efforts of the bodies vested with competence in the maritime areas (the Navy at the Ministry of Defence; Executive Agencies "Maritime Administration", "Port Administration" at the Ministry of Transport and Communications; the Executive Agency for Fishery and Aquacultures at the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests; the Customs Agency and the Ministry of Environment and Waters).

In line with that statement, the Bulgarian Navy seeks proactive cooperation with all state agencies, local authorities and other organizations that exercise different activities at sea.

At this stage, there is an effective coordination and cooperation between National Department "Border Police" and the Navy, as regulated by the Plan for Coordination between the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior, and the Plan for Coordination between the Navy, the National Department "Border Police" and the Executive Agency "Maritime Administration". They have jointly participated in bilateral and multilateral exercises and training sessions for improving certain elements of the coordination for the prevention of illegal activities in the sea – human trafficking, terrorism, search and rescue.

As a result of these efforts, the Bulgarian Navy, the Border Police, the Maritime Administration Executive Agency and the Executive Agency for Fishery and Aquacultures have signed a plan for interaction. The objective is to unify the efforts of the Navy and other agencies in the maritime security field through exchanging information about the situation at sea and about ships in or approaching restricted areas or dangerous areas for navigation. We agreed to act jointly for the security of ships and Bulgarian ports, the navigational support of shipping, the implementation of search and rescue planned in the Black Sea and to conduct



the activities in the sea area under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Bulgaria, for halting, arresting and escorting shipping violators.

In this respect, we would like to stress out again the vital importance of harbour protection for the economy and the necessity to commit national resources in order to build the adequate naval capabilities to ensure the port security. In order to realize its commitments made to other agencies, the Bulgarian Navy maritime units are in high readiness to participate in joint search and rescue operations and oil spillage containment operations. To keep the high readiness of these units we do conduct frequently exercises with the participation of all other agencies.

It is obvious that maritime security is in a complex relation with the stability and the security in the Wider Black Sea Area. Threats in the maritime domain proved to impose risks for the security of the whole region. On the other hand, maritime stability helps to ensure dependable and safe sea lines of communications. Building adequate naval capabilities is vital for maritime security and requires spending resources. Now, we shall ensure prosperous economy in the future. The model for the development of the Black Sea security must be built in line with transatlantic and European areas and as a link between the West and the East in the security field.

A maritime border police perspective

Building the maritime structures of the National Department "Border Police" is based on the experience of leading European countries. The efforts are directed towards two goals:

- the logistics of the units which are directly involved in maritime border control in the maritime areas and the border zone (provision of materials and machinery, finances and resources, personnel, organization and training);

- cooperation with the other state's institutions vested with control powers in Bulgaria's maritime areas and with the border authorities/border patrols of the Black Sea Countries.

The structural units for the protection of the external borders of the European Union were built as a priority task. Special attention was given to the formation of maritime border police forces complying with the European border control standards and criteria. The best maritime

border protection and control practices have been adopted, comprising forces (close-range and long-range war-ships); coastal forces (mobile patrols equipped with modern technical facilities), and technical surveillance posts.

Our main tactical unit for the performance of the border police tasks in the maritime areas – the Border Police Ship Base, Burgas Regional Border Sector - is equipped with modern vessels, having outstanding navigational features and a high level of autonomous operation, modern technical facilities for navigation, radio technical surveillance, recognition and communication.

With the aim of effectively controlling the vessels in the sea and intercepting the attempts to smuggle weapons, drugs, illegal migration and other illegal activities, a mobile on-board inspection group was formed as a specialized fast-response unit for emergency situations.

A system of technical and visual surveillance posts is used to ensure the control of the navigational traffic. The posts are equipped with modern radiolocation stations. Our goal is to build an integrated automation system for surveillance and control of the surface situation in the Bulgarian maritime areas with capabilities to exchange information with the coastal patrols/border authorities of the other Black Sea states.

The ports and the coastal strip are monitored by four border police sections with mobile patrols, equipped with modern technical facilities for day and night surveillance, communication facilities and special aids. The border control of the vessels in the ports is carried out in accordance with the provisions of the national and international law.

Radiation pagers provided by the US government under the export control and border security program are being used in the ports for the detection of the radioactive substances and nuclear materials for border control purposes. Under a joint project of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Council of Europe, certain actions are being taken with the aim of developing the capability to detect and respond to the transfer of nuclear materials and radioactive substances.

The collection and analysis of the information about the overall surface situation in Bulgaria's maritime areas, monitoring its changes and the management of all border police forces and facilities are carried out by the National Maritime Border Coordination Centre. Its main function is



SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

to exchange information with the structural units of the other state's institutions vested with control powers, as well as with the border authorities/coastal patrols of the Black Sea Countries.

With the aim of achieving effective operational coordination, the Black Sea Border Coordination and Information Centre was established in 2003, and the National Border Coordination and Information Centre began to operate as an international centre. This was the beginning of a large-scale program for integrating the efforts made by all structures related with the maritime border authorities/coastal patrols for overall control of the surface situation, unified management of the forces in the sea, and counteraction to the transborder organized crime, terrorism acts and piracy.

The Black Sea Border Coordination and Information Centre facilitates the coordination between the border authorities/coastal patrols of the Black Sea countries. It ensures:

- operational coordination – by coordinating the actions of the management and executive authorities in charge of the protection of the maritime areas, the maritime traffic control, the surveillance of certain areas or individual objects for building an overall picture of the surface situation in the region;
- technical coordination – by creating of operating channels for communication between the participating states;
- information coordination – comprising the exchange of information in case of operational and technical use of the forces and facilities, including the exchange of information between the individual border control sectors in the maritime region, the patrol vessels and the aircraft.

The Black Sea Border Coordination and Information Centre ensures the unified management of the forces in case of joint operations, e.g., pursuit, detention, escorting and vessels' boarding.

When specifying the main tasks of the Centre and its operation as a permanently operating institution for the surveillance of the surface situation, the key position of the Black Sea as a region of major maritime transportation routes connecting Europe with Asia, the Middle East and the Far East has always been taken into account.

The high intensity of the passengers and cargoes traffic and the acts of transborder crime are analyzed and taken into consideration. Based on

the situation in the Black Sea region, the activity of the Centre is directed towards:

- the creation and maintenance of a database and operational exchange of information about the vessels suspected of smuggling illegal immigrants or drugs, including on a local level – between the patrol vessels and the technical surveillance facilities of the Black Sea states (bilateral and multilateral exchange);
- regular exchange of information about the suspicious vessels which frequently change their names and owners;
- coordination of the activities during joint operations and boarding to find illegal immigrants, illegal transportation of drugs, weapons and generally hazardous substances, with the aim of complying with the international procedures specified in the legislation, collecting and preserving material evidence and punishing the offenders;
- information about the maritime traffic is exchanged in cases when the crews are suspected of international terrorism or illegal activities in the Black Sea or in the entire area of water, as well as the provision of assistance for the security of navigation and shipping;
- control of the traffic in the ports and the risk zones in the sea by specialists from various border inspection departments of the Black Sea states;
- analysing and forecasting the maritime situation for counteracting the criminal structures in view of the new elements in their tactics;
- if a particular event has occurred, or in case of information about illegal activities, "Data concerning a suspected vessel" is prepared and sent to the national border coordination centres, as well as a monthly "List of suspected vessels".

As a result of the successful cooperation and the constant improvement of the forms of coordination, the Black Sea Coordination and Information Centre and the national border centres of the other Black Sea states established themselves as the major bodies for surveillance and control of the surface situation in the region. Stable and permanently operating channels for exchange of information have been established. The suspicious vessels are followed up and controlled for the prevention of illegal migration, human, drugs and weapons trafficking and smuggling. Assistance is provided to vessels in distress, and the boats fishing illegally are being detained.³



Perspectives to national border security

Under the conditions of transformation in the field of security and defence there are possibilities for applying new concepts and approaches in order to ensure sovereignty.

First, it is advisable to focus on determining the forces and resources for guaranteeing sovereignty. That allows effective organization of the national borders security system effectively.

It is necessary to adopt the use of network-centric operations. It provides the opportunity to build a new type of system (network) possessing a high level of information about the condition of sea and air space from geographically dispersed (at the theatre of war) forces. It is able to solve its tasks at a higher level of quality through self-synchronizing and other network-centric operations. The development of NATO's MSSIS (Maritime Safety and Security Information System) and the Italian V-RTMS (Virtual Regional Traffic Management System), which Bulgarian Navy uses, is based on that concept.⁴

The preventive strategy for defending sovereignty acquires new capabilities with applying effects-based operations. That is because at their planning, conducting and assessing the effects of coordinating the participants' activities are considered in advance - minimizing the risk through reducing threats and controlling vulnerability. Applying the networking approach, new capabilities of the participating forces and means of guaranteeing the national borders security can be provided. This allows building a structure of a sovereignty system, capable of joining inter-institutional environment and effective command and control. All these opportunities underlie the new Security Strategy, active up to 2015. A basic component of strategic significance is the necessity of designing, building and exploiting a common information and communication environment, based on an integrated information system under the immediate control of the executive authorities functioning in dynamic interaction with the local government. Since building such environment is an extensive and expensive system, the document allows thus to be done in stages and some sub-systems to be developed considering priorities. The definition "configuring the security space as a network of networks" implies that initially the developed sub-systems have to be designed and

achieved in a way to be interoperable with the ones added later and to provide a possibility for a highly effective interoperability (synergism) at fully implemented system. It is a must to make the system interoperable and compatible with the EU and NATO networks.

Some of the sub-systems are defined in the document: effective system for early warning in crises of different character; integral system for communication and transfer information as a state communication system; inter-institutional system for continuous monitoring the condition of the security environment and for developing timely and adequate proposals for decision makers.⁵

As a whole, the national armed forces play a significant role in handling challenges the border security faces, but the regulatory documents need improvements, regulating their participation in these activities. It is necessary to emphasize that using military when dealing with challenges and threats against border security is an extreme measure and all other possibilities should be exhausted before it is applied.

An immediate step to take is including the above mentioned components of the sovereignty defence system into the developing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR).

The common concept of creating EUROSUR included developing protected computerized communication network aiming at exchanging data and coordination of activities among the centres of member countries, as well as with the European agency for the management of operational cooperation and external borders of the member states (FRONTEX). One of its main functions is to act as a focal point of information exchange in the future European system for border surveillance and to start drawing a common intelligence picture of the regions along the border.⁶

A European Border Surveillance System should support the Member States in reaching full situational awareness on the situation at their external borders and increase the reaction capability of their national law enforcement authorities. Such a framework should be set up without affecting the respective areas of jurisdiction of Member States or the existing systems. A key operational objective should interlink different systems, while paying attention to geographical circumstances and differences between types of borders, in particular between land and maritime borders.⁷



REFERENCES:

BEKYAROVA, N., **Southeast Europe in the context of security**, MP, 2004, pp. 8-9.

BACHVAROV, M., *Geopolitics*, 1999, pp. 35-40.

CIA, *The World Factbook*, updated in January 2008.

DIMITROV N., **Fundamentals of maritime critical infrastructure protection**, Military Journal, no. 1, 2008.

RADULOV N., *What is new in the new security strategy*, The Monitor, March 28, 2008.

Review of Establishing the European system for border surveillance (EUROSUR), Brussels, February 13, 2008.

Examining the creation of a European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), SEC (2008), 152, the Commission staff working paper, Brussels, 2008.

IVANOV V., **State borders security and the new world order**, Military Publishing House, 2005.

Strengthening Black Sea Maritime Security, international conference, Sofia, November 1-3, 2005.

NOTES:

¹ BEKYAROVA, N., **Southeast Europe in the context of security**, MP, 2004, pp. 8-9.

² BACHVAROV, M., *Geopolitics*, 1999, pp. 35-40.

³ **Strengthening Black Sea Maritime Security**, international conference, Sofia, November 1-3, 2005.

⁴ DIMITROV N., **Fundamentals of maritime critical infrastructure protection**, Military Journal, no. 1, 2008.

⁵ RADULOV N., *What is new in the new security strategy*, The Monitor, March 28, 2008.

⁶ *Review of Establishing the European system for border surveillance (EUROSUR)*, Brussels, February 13, 2008.

⁷ *Examining the creation of a European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)*, SEC (2008), 152, the Commission staff working paper, Brussels, 2008.

Major General Evgeni MANEV (emanev@md.government.bg), PhD, is the Commandant of the G.S. Rakovski Defence and Staff College from Sofia, Bulgaria.



THE NEED OF A GLOBAL SECURITY THEORY

Eng. Eugen SITEANU, PhD

The paper presents the arguments in support of conceiving a new theory as a basis of the national and/or global security strategies intervening in the social organizations with the purpose to stop the degradation of the human condition and of the environment and to transform the human social existence into a state of security.

These studies and strategies approach people not as simple objects, but as subjects of security actions who must be well informed and get a proper social culture. Consequently, the socializing processes included in the mentioned strategies must be directed by educators able to explain the connections between the existence of the social organizations and the state of surrounding environment of the planet.

Keywords: global security, national security, human – processual interrogation, organic – processual interrogation, globalizing processes.

Often, security is approached from unilateral perspective and the decisionmakers treat it sequentially, ignoring its need of integrality. The security strategies refer to the national security, but not to security of the nation. Frequently one resorts to the national interests, but not to the interest of the nation or of the national state - a fact which does not exclude the possibility to unleash conflicts, crises and aggressions on behalf of security or to elude the people's, nation's or state's real need of security.

Most of the errors and states of insecurity are the result of an approach of security on the basis of ideological premises - a fact preventing from adoption of the right solution that may be favourable to people and nations.

The scientific examination is needed in order to take into account the connection (relations) between each and every level of the social organization, without forgetting anyone, permanently having in mind that the people's, nation's or state's security cannot be a result of the others' insecurity.

Human society has a unitary character, meaning the human social existence is unitary, what we easily understand with the globalisation. It follows that social existence, as a whole, has to be secured, to be brought into the state of security. In Afghanistan, too, for example, the social existence has to be secured. The opportunities have been lost because "too little of this happened"¹, so that "Washington has failed to transform the region where the global terrorist threat began - and persist"² (the opportunity to build a functioning state would have meant additional troop deployments by the USA and its partners, and a rapid investment in Afghanistan reconstruction, political reform and economic development in Pakistan).

The theoretical research, according to Lucian Culda, PhD, could provide a scientific explanation of the social existence and thus help in finding the solution both of the national security and global security on the basis of delivering the main sources of the insecurity economic – social processes, allowing/providing the most suitable ways of intervention into the social domain in order to produce and maintain a security state.³

But providing the global security needs some essential constructive actions on several directions and strategic objectives, supposing exclusively unaggressive interactions, because the aggressive ones generate insecurity.

However, the settlement of securing strategic objectives requires a previously scientific/ just interpretation of sources determining insecurity that represent in fact solutions to the problem of global security. Therefore, only the identification of the real problem of security and the elimination of the false problems of global security might offer viable solutions which once put in practice could release a positive social evolution (a progressive trend) generating the state of security. "This way the theoretical premises of the elaboration of a promoting the state of global security strategy are sketched out", he appreciates.



The edited studies reveal that the state of global security one can be attained only by giving up aggressions, subversive actions included, and by promoting constructive interactions in support of a lasting social development. The constructive interactions represent the viable alternative to confrontation”.⁴

But the mankind has found solution to the social problems (security problems) in time, during his tumultuous millenary existence whenever people were aware of proper ways or methods to investigate and understand their existence. They have not succeeded to solve the complex social problems, but they asymptotically came closer to a satisfactory interpretation of their existence as well as to the securing solutions.

Without having a critical look at the results of the theoretical research, the society cannot correctly estimate and continuously and systematically make for the right understanding its existence interpretation, with the purpose to remove effectively conflicts and crises. Hence the need for research and security theories as a background for elaboration of a plausible explanation of the social existence, that could be the basis for solving the problem of national and global security.

This new theory or paradigm is needed by decision-making factors in their examinations, estimations and decisions in the field of national and/or global security. With this purpose, the new method of interrogating people’s social existence is useful and it could be denominated human-processual or organic-processual as we can find it in the above-mentioned author’s works.⁵

The human groups, the ethnical groups, the nations do not function in a systemic way on the basis of the general theory of systems, but on the processual basis, because the processes are mediated by the human thinking and that’s why the theory is entitled human-processual or organic-processual, as the public knows it.

That above-mentioned author has demonstrated that the systemic interrogation of the social existence is a reductionist one, meaning it contains too many simplifications of the way the society functions as a complexity, or “the mankind functions not as a complexity”.⁶

On the same route of demonstration, we concluded that the social existence of the humankind has to be examined as a human processuality. By the use of the human-processual analysis, one can

interrogate and scientifically understand at national or global level the globalizing processes and inter-human inter-groups or, generally speaking, inter-social forms of organization relation. Therefore, the theory allows to correctly identifying the action determining the evolution of society at each level of the social organization on the route to functional globalization.

The globalization to others’ detriment leads to crises and conflicts, sometimes-violent ones, hence the conclusion it must be beneficial for everyone in order to generate a state of generalized security or global security.

This ideal yet possible stage cannot be attained by starting from ideological bases, by subversive actions or stratagems even when someone considers them justified by good intentions. Let us not forget that the road to the hell is paved with good intentions. Therefore, both subversive actions and diversions justified as being promoting democracy and human rights will not bring the state of security.

We have found that make too many simplifications, some of them exaggerated because of empirical or ideological interpretations of their social existence, or even more, sometimes of their theoretical interpretations based on a new paradigm insufficiently elaborated or supported by an obsolete one.

Consequently, with their grave decisions and actions, people bring about states of insecurity because the errors in their social existence interpretation. That is why we sustain the above-mentioned point of view i.e. the main condition providing security is the right interpretation of the social, biotic and geophysical existence. Only on these bases, the lasting social development could be achieved.⁷ Therefore, it is important to emphasize those connections taking shape between persons, groups, ethnic groups, even nations and their social existence.

The necessary but not sufficient condition in avoiding the malfunctions within the social organizations is the scientific, that is right, correct, just interpretation of the social existence, social processes, economical – social processes, etc.

It has been countless times demonstrated that people, frequently, appreciate their social existence in a erroneous way because the unsatisfactory epistemological extent of social interpretation and interrogation.



As a rule, this is a consequence of rather simply interpretations not at all helping, but preventing from understanding the real processes taking place within the social organizations.

That is why political analysts, political-military analysts and all the other analysts must have proper epistemological competences and not only causal competences for interpretation of the social processes, as long as these processes are of an inter-actionist type.

With a reference to the international security environment at the end of the 20th century, Fritjof Capra gave the alarm signal: “we are now in a stage of deep global crisis”.⁸

He had in view the crises of the whole humankind: “a complex, multidimensional crisis, whose sides reach every aspect of our life – health and standard of living, the quality of environment and social relations, the economy, technology and policy”.⁹ The same author also pointed out the dimensions of this crisis (intellectual, moral and spiritual) and concluded: “For the first time we are confronted with the very real threat of human race disappearing and totally of the life disappearance on Terra”.¹⁰ He studied, conceived premises estimated and elaborated assumptions in order to draw this shuddering conclusion.

Researchers and experts in respective fields who took part in these studies (examinations) have discovered under Capra’s scientific guidance certain limitations and errors in different domains of theoretical research they correlated with malfunctions/ difficulties in the social existence.

The author of the work *Promovarea securității globale* (Promoting global security) asserted: “the social changes considered by Fritjof Capra to be possible as a result of turning to good account the new achievements of theoretical research are obstructed by small groups of people interested in presenting certain privileges; this attitude is possible because people do not grasp yet the seriousness of the situation”.¹¹

Here is the reason the modalities of trans-causal analysis/evaluation are needed today. In order to understand not only the interactions, but also the consequences these are inducing into the social sphere the scientific examinations of social processes (organizing or disorganizing ones) are necessary.

Consequently, a scientific examination, capable to investigate overall the social processes within

the society is imperative. These processes have been described in the specialised literature¹² (interactions for satisfying certain needs, consequences generated by the social interactions, etc.).

If the analysts and policymakers conceive and apply destabilizing/insecuring interactions (intervention into the social sphere) these lead to/determine in their turn social changes such as, for example, degradation of the human social condition, emergence of the deviating, anti-social personalities, or even of the terrorist organizations.

There is an obviously clear explanation: only if the social processes maintain a biotic and social atmosphere favourably to their socialization and to satisfaction of their needs they can be in the favour of the mankind and can lead up to constructive interactions, avoiding the presented above negative aspects.

Appealing to human-processual theory of social existence (focused on human being and his thinking) one can understand the connections between the social organizing/disorganizing processes and the way the human thinking functions (processing information), determining the persons’, groups’, ethnic groups’ and nations’ social condition.

It implies the fact that the people’s ontic condition cannot be scientifically (correctly) characterized using statistical examination are not able to characterize pertinently the human being’s existence condition.

Consequently, the security strategies cannot provide a security state when they are conceived on ideological knowledge extent, but they can improve the humankind’s situation if elaborated based on the new theory/paradigm of the social processuality (the organic – processual theory).

If the causal examinations are unsatisfactory, because the wrong simplifications, the interactionist and systemic analyses, despite the fact they are transcending the causal ones and solve the processes related to maintenance of the social existence, provide not a unitary, comprehensive way of their interrogation.¹³

This state of insufficient interrogation of social existence can be surpassed by elaborating a theory / paradigm about the social “ontos” addressed to epistemologic research that study the need of optimization in people’s cognitive capacity and for theoretical examination of their social existence.¹⁴



Lucian Culda, a very good expert in ontological bases of the epistemologies, asserts that the sequential interrogation, on restricted areas of the social existence have led to emergence of the study tasks for many scientific disciplines comprising theories which interrogate separate parts representing “objects for us” (as Kant used to say) perceived by us as new domains of reference in scientific research.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the given interrogations to these “objects for us” are obviously unsatisfactory even erroneous because they represent the consequences resulting from certain cognitive heterogeneous activities and therefore they do not allow a satisfactory theoretical research. The scientific examinations could identify later their limits (representing in fact the limits of the scientific disciplines) and their errors in order to elaborate reconstructions of the studied domains and their evaluation by those “objects as such”.

The domain of reference must comprise justifying interpretations of the attempts to identify the laws so that the scientific research may become one of a causal type that is to identify the laws acting within the studied objects.

Therefore, no satisfactory interpretation has been given by now to “objects for us” and some other interpretations are needed. It means we are still in the pre-paradigmatic period of the scientific research.¹⁶

At this stage of our work, we can assert that, unfortunately, people are not familiarized yet with the scientific (pertinent) theories helping them to correctly interpret their social existence aiming at their involvement in a world they cannot understand. But today people owning no scientific ways for an estimation of their existence nevertheless interfere in the social sphere they don't understand and give erroneous interpretations because the distorting simplifications. They cannot give a favourable cause to certain proceedings that keep the humankind functioning as a social process.

The new way or the new theory of security strategies elaboration (interfering in the processes of social organizations) has to stop the degradation of human condition and social environment.¹⁷

On the basis of presented here assertions one understands why the elaborated on ideological background security strategies represent sources of insecurity both for the own nation and for the

other nations (states), because, after all, a strategy conceived to work against a nation can't be a securing one for the other nations.

As an argument in supporting the asserted ideas, we can specify that the situated on ideological positions policy makers do not have any possibility or capability to approach in a correct, scientific, desirable manner the problems of people's security, nation's security, social security or the global one. Moreover, here is the explanation: the ideological positions are always partisan ones, consequently leading to people's polarization, to prevention from their identification with the social organizations to which they belong and to refractory attitude by decision-making factors against the demands of their affiliations to society generally and to respective nations, especially.

The parcelling out of the theoretical interrogation's objects, as it is known, is a question of conjuncture characterized by the ways of scientific disciplines separation in the past. But the researchers, by the use of ontological reconstructions – critical ones in comparison with the previous interpretations of the social existence come close to a satisfactory interpretation of the social existence. The 20th century research didn't allow an unitary interpretation of the social existence because those processes and connections facilitating the transcendence of cuts done by the theoretical disciplines within which the scientists have cut their objects of study have been ignored. Nevertheless, the theorists have perceived errors and made many attempts to surpass this situation, being aware of and accepting, “the society as a system capable to produce and transform its orientations and the ways it works”.¹⁸

The future theory/paradigm of social existence must distinguish the organizations -complexities (unable to manage their existence and development) from the organizations - processualites, which have the capability to manage their becoming, as the kind of contemporary human society does.¹⁹

In conclusion, people must be very well-informed and benefit from a social culture good enough to transform them from simple objects into subjects, of securing actions.

Socializing processes comprised in the global security strategies should be managed by competent persons (educators), able to teach people the connexions between the groups', ethnic groups', nations' existence and the state of security



environment as well as of planetary surrounding environment.

REFERENCES:

Barnett R. RUBIN, *Saving Afghanistan*, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2007, Volume 86, Number 1.

Lucian CULDA, **Procesualitate socială**, Editura Licorna, București, 1994.

Lucian CULDA, **Promovarea securității globale. Repere teoretice**, Centrul de Studii Sociale Procesual-Organice, SRL, 2006.

Lucian CULDA, **Dimensiunea epistemologică a existenței sociale a oamenilor**, Licorna, București, 2000.

Fritjof CAPRA, **Momentul adevărului (The Turning Point)**, Editura Tehnică, București, 2004.

NOTES:

¹ Barnett R. RUBIN, *Saving Afghanistan*, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2007, Volume 86, Number 1, p. 66.

² Ibidem, p.74.

³ Lucian CULDA, **Promovarea securității**

globale. Repere teoretice, Centrul de Studii Sociale Procesual-Organice, SRL, 2006, p.5

⁴ Ibidem, p.6.

⁵ Lucian CULDA, **Procesualitate socială**, Editura Licorna, București, 1994, p.7.

⁶ Lucian CULDA, **Promovarea securității globale. Repere teoretice**, Centrul de Studii Sociale Procesual-Organice, SRL, 2006, p.7.

⁷ Ibidem, p.9.

⁸ Fritjof CAPRA, **Momentul adevărului (The Turning Point)**, Editura Tehnică, București, 2004.

⁹ Ibidem.

¹⁰ Ibidem.

¹¹ Lucian CULDA, **op.cit.**, p.5.

¹² Lucian CULDA, **Dimensiunea epistemologica a interogarii existentei sociale a oamenilor**, Bucuresti, Ed. Licorna, 2000.

¹³ Lucian CULDA, **Promovarea securității globale. Repere teoretice**, Centrul de Studii Sociale Procesual-Organice, SRL, 2006, p.23.

¹⁴ Ibidem.

¹⁵ Ibidem, p.24.

¹⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁷ Ibidem, p.19.

¹⁸ Apud, Lucian CULDA, **op.cit.**, p.27.

¹⁹ Lucian CULDA, **op.cit.**, p.28.

Colonel (ret.) professor Eugen SITEANU (esiteanu@yahoo.com), PhD, graduated the National Defence College, the Technical Military Academy. He is a professor within the Commercial Academy from Satu Mare and an associated professor within the National Defence University "Carol I". He has published numerous specialised papers on management, logistics, fiability, maintenance, national security, strategy and military art.



ISRAEL – MILITARY CAPABILITIES DETERMINED BY CONFLICTING SITUATIONS

Marina MUSCAN

Israel is today, in a so-called “shatterbelt” zone, consisting of six regional powers - Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria and Turkey. The degree of political fragmentation and the specific tension between them will be maintained for long in the region.

Following the tensed situation in the area, Israel had to develop its military capability in order to take action fast, short, in order to ensure its existence. Its military force supports the idea of survival in a region where most of its close neighbours show a certain degree of hostility. But this military force can create a paradigm of security for Israel, which can reignite conflicts between it and its neighbours.

Key-words: military capabilities, nuclear weapons, conflicts

1. General overview

The state of Israel is situated in the Middle East, on the East coast of the Mediterranean Sea. Defined as the country of the Hebrew people, it has a population predominantly Hebrew but also consistent non-Hebrew minority, formed in particular from Arab Muslims, Christians or Druze. Israel is bordered, from North to South by Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt, with exit to the Mediterranean Sea, the Bay of Aqaba and the Dead Sea.

The total area of the state is 21,671 km². Israel relief is varied, including: Galilee Mountains, field Esdraelon, the coastal plains, the Jewish and Samarian hills and the Negev region, which is mostly arid and it is located in the southern half of the country.

The country's small size and long, thin shape has a formative impact of on military thinking. The absence of strategic depth, particularly in the east and north, and the tremendous relative length of the border shaped the Israel's strategic thinking. But, although its small size and geographical

encirclement deny the safety margin of strategic depth, they confer the advantage of interior lines. Israel can rapidly concentrate its forces on one front, or shift its forces from one front to another.

Israel climate varies from tropical to temperate. There are two main seasons: a rainy season, from November to May, and a hot summer, which lasts the following six months. Rainfall is relatively abundant in the north and centre of the country, far fewer in the north, in the Negev region and practically insignificant in the south.

Situated at the edge of a desert area, the country has always suffered from the lack of water. To control the regional imbalance of water resources, the vast majority of resources basins of the country is grouped in a national pool. Its central “bloodstream conduit” is represented by the National Water Pipeline, inaugurated in 1964; it carries water through a series of huge sewers, aqueducts, open channels, reservoirs, tunnels, dams and pumping stations from the north and centre of the country, into southern semiarid region. The problem of water has caused many conflicts in the region.

Israel is a developed state, with a market economy. From a political point of view, it is organized as a parliamentary republic based on the principle of separation of powers in state: legislative power (Knesset), the executive power (government) power of judicial (courts, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court). The President is the head of state, elected by the Knesset. The Knesset, Israel's legislative body is a unicameral parliament with 120 members.

Israel is, in essence, an urban society, about 90 percent of its inhabitants living in over 100 urban centres and three main cities: Jerusalem - the capital, the historic spiritual and national centre of the Hebrew people, Tel-Aviv - the industrial, commercial, financial and cultural life nucleus of Israel, Haifa – an important port and industrial centre in northern Israel.



The risk of terrorist attacks in Israel is high. Since 2000, the terrorist attacks provoked by Palestinian terrorist groups were and are very common. Terrorist actions are manifested by attacks with bombs, machine-trapping, suicide attacks and kidnappings.

2. External situation

Israel is, currently, in a so-called “shatterbelt”, zone as it is defined by Saul Cohen, or “a zone defined by a combination of two properties: the fragmentation of space in small state cells having low power and intensity of the interference influences from foreign competing, rival powers, that have strategic and tactical actions in local state cells (Kelly, 1986)”¹. This “shatterbelt” is composed of the Middle East, which seems to develop itself into a maritime zone, especially after the collapse of the USSR.

Although comprises five regional powers - Egypt, Iran, Israel, Syria and Turkey - the degree of political fragmentation within them, and also the tension specific of such situations will be able to maintain for long the region in the state in which it currently is, more precisely that of a “shatterbelt” zone.

Due to the unstable situation in the area, Israel has had to develop its military capabilities in order to survive. Currently, Israel has diplomatic relations with 162 states. Between 1991 – 1993, 32 states have renewed their links with the Hebrew state. Currently, Israel supports 71 embassies, 18 consulates and 5 diplomatic missions.

Morocco, Tunisia and Oman have closed the Hebrew diplomatic offices on their territories in October 2000 and have broken relations with Israel. Niger renewed diplomatic relations with the Hebrew state in 1996, and then it broke them in 2002.

With regard to relations with Saudi Arabia, it is noted that in 2000 was signed an agreement establishing the borders between the two countries. It is a portion of the 1500 km border, which crosses a mountainous area. The agreement stipulates each party should withdraw its forces on a portion of at least 20 km from one side and across borders, and the area in question to be considered demilitarized strip.

Currently, Saudi Arabia decided lifting a security fence on the border with Yemen as a

defence, aimed at stopping illegal arms trafficking and illegal passage to the border by terrorists. The reason for this decision is in the last terrorist attacks which took place in Saudi Arabia, when the weapons used were introduced over the border. The fence resembles very much with the same type of initiative that Israel had with respect to Palestine.

Israel, in turn, raises a “protective fence” against terrorism. Israeli fence is projected to be 703 km in length and is destined to separate the Palestinian territories from Israeli state, given that there is no natural border between the Hebrew country and the Palestinian territories. Until now, there was built about 58.4% of it and about 8.96% is under construction.

In general terms, borders can create a measure of territorial depth and provide Israel with some sort of defensive advantage. Israel tries to create some sort of strategic depth between its own territory and the Palestinian land.

We have shown in parallel both very similar initiatives and may cause long-term effects. If other countries in the region will employ the same policy in relation to their neighbours, the entire region can become an enclave.

From our point of view, the Israeli initiative was not the most fortunate measure of security. Given that was taken by the Saudi Arabia; it may be taken by other states, worsening the situation in the long run and aggravating “shatterbelt” process.

Concerning relations with Palestine, the State of Israel is considering continuing the peace process. On June, 6, 2004, the Israeli Government has adopted the Revised Disengagement Plan. From the Israeli point of view, the Revised Disengagement Plan will lead to an improvement in the state’s security by reducing dissensions between Israel and the Palestinian population.

The conflict between Israel and Palestine has known the most agitated period in 2001 - 2002, when Palestinian terrorist organizations have declared “second Intifada” against Israel.

In 2005, an agreement on Movement and Access into Gaza was signed between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Negotiations were facilitated by U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, and the international community’s envoy for the Israeli disengagement from Gaza, James Wolfensohn.



In 2006, Abu Mazen and Ehud Olmert have reached an agreement on ceasing fire in Gaza Strip, which was not accepted by the other Palestinian factions and all culminated with the suicide attack of Eilat, 2007.

The relations with Palestine remain tensed. However, in a report on anti-Israeli terrorism^b is mentioned that the suicide bomb attacks have a significant decrease in 2006. During 2006 abductions and rocket fire replaced suicide bombing terrorism as the dominant factor of the campaign against Israel. Abductions and rocket fire are less lethal than suicide bombing attacks, but their consequences have long-term strategic influences.

In 2006, the abduction of three Israeli soldiers was to illustrate the above. This incident has put the Gaza Strip in the shade for a period of time and triggered the second war with Lebanon for 33 days.

In this context, Hezbollah was able to use its arsenal against Israel. According to Israeli party, this arsenal was purchased from Iran and Syria. In total, there were issued 4,000 rockets daily against Israel. Defensively, Hezbollah's advanced anti-tank missiles were effective against Israeli ground forces in south Lebanon, as was the attack of a Chinese-made C-802 rocket fired at an Israeli Navy ship. During the war the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) succeeded in destroying some of Hezbollah's long-range rockets, caused extensive damage to the organization's military infrastructure and created a new situation in south Lebanon. The manifestations of that new situation were the transfer of three Lebanese army brigades to the south.

In 2006, the UN Security Council voted unanimously the Resolution no 1701 on the cessation of conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, known in Israel as "The Second War with Lebanon". Termination of fire occurred at 14 august 2006, at 8:00. At 12 august, the leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, in a m speech, said that Hezbollah will continue to fight as long as the Israeli forces are in Lebanon³.

Israel had to rethink its policy, based on lessons learned in the 33 days war with Lebanon. A first result of this change of strategy may be anti-missile defence programme developed by the Hebrew state. Hezbollah has used mostly missile, which has resulted in emphasis and in the last period in

Israel on the ARROW anti-missile defence, which is presented in details in the next chapter.

The relations with Lebanon remain tensed, especially due to Hezbollah's actions. According to Israeli, Hezbollah began to restore its arsenal, especially with Syria and Iran's help, which caused the relations between Israel and these two countries to continue to remain tense. Iran and Syria see Hezbollah as a strategic tool against Israel and therefore they give armed support to this group. According to the data presented by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, there is a smuggling network that introduces weapons into southern Lebanon from Syria⁴.

Also, Iran promised Prime Minister Ismail Haniya an aid of 250 million dollars for the development programmes. Moreover, Israel considers Iran as the main guilty party for the increasing number of missiles attacks from Gaza Strip towards Israel. According to data presented by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, between 2001 - 2006, the number of rocket attacks from Gaza onto Israel increased from 60 to 861.

Israel's relations with Jordan may be regarded as fairly peaceful, mainly due to efforts made by Jordanian security forces to stop the fundamentalists to enter their territory. This has led Israel to look at Jordan as a viable partner in the fight against terrorist elements, while Egypt is seen as a non-viable partner in this regard.

However, the peaceful relations that exist today between Israel, Egypt and Jordan have contributed to the isolation of Syria from its Arab neighbours, causing it to move closer to Iran. Although Syria is now isolated and quite weak in terms of the military power compared to Israel, an open conflict between the two parties would be very costly. Therefore, Syria prefers to support extremist movements which have intentions to attack Israel.

Israel, too, has nothing to gain from a conflict with Syria as occupying smaller or bigger portions of Syrian territory would reactivate Sunni movements in the area.

Syria and Libya have chemical agents of mass destruction that could be used against Israel, which forced the Hebrew state to cast worried eyes towards Libya.

Israel has very active relationship with the United Nations. The right to existence of the



Hebrew state was confirmed by the General Assembly in November 1947 when it approved the partition of Palestine with a two-thirds majority.

Also, Jerusalem maintained normal diplomatic relations with most NATO members. They developed a special relationship with France since 1955, allowing Israel to purchase the weapons needed to survive. Since the French-Israeli relations have deteriorated during the '60s, the Jewish state had to buy arms from the US – first anti-aircraft missiles, then tanks, and finally combat aircrafts.

After the Israeli-Arab war dated 1967, there were strengthened the ties with Washington. Thus, in the Yom Kippur war from 1973, the US has sent the aircrafts necessary for the survival of Israel. In 1982, the U.S. signed a "Strategic Memorandum" with Israel.

Israel's relations with NATO, although considered by some as ambiguous, have improved. Israel has participated in the Mediterranean Dialogue since its creation in 1994. Indeed, in 2001, the Jewish state became the first participating country which has signed a security agreement with NATO, providing the framework for the protection of classified information. Moreover, in 2004, there could be observed an improvement in the atmosphere. Israel took part in the first meeting of NATO - the Mediterranean Dialogue at Foreign Ministers level of in December 2004.

A first joint naval exercise Israel-NATO was held in Israeli waters. Israel has been admitted as a member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and Israeli troops have participated in NATO exercises in the Mediterranean and in Ukraine.

3. Israel's Military Capabilities

Zahal (Israel Defence Forces - IDF) was established during the War of Independence in 1948; since then, Zahal had to defend, in a number of occasions, the country's independence and sovereignty. Zahal is based on compulsory military service and reserve, as well as on active service. All young men and women that are fit for military service are recruited at the age of 18 – men for three years, women for two years, the first remaining in reserve until the age of 51, women until 24. Israeli Arabs are not obliged to serve in Zahal, but may enrol as volunteers. Since 1957, at the request of their communities, Druzes and Caucasian Israelis have been recruited into the

armed forces. Students from institutes of higher education may postpone their incorporation, to serve in Zahal, after graduation, a period of 3-5 years, as part of their specialization.

The IDF's doctrine at the strategic level is defensive, while its tactics are offensive. "Defensive strategy executed offensively" is a formula that defines Israel's military doctrine⁵. The major operational elements of Israeli doctrine include an emphasis on offensive operations, pre-emption, speed, the indirect approach, the exploitation of superior "macro-competence", and all-arms, combined-arms operations.

With a restricted standing army, Zahal counts mainly on its reserve forces specialized in training. In essence, the Jewish people and its armed forces form a whole, between civilians and soldiers there is a permanent experience exchange. Although its main task is to defend the country, Zahal responds to the general needs of society. Along the years, it assumed the duties regarding the social integration of the new immigrants and increasing education level of the soldiers.

Israel currently holds about 3657 by tanks, 10419 armoured vehicles and 5432 pieces of artillery. The self-propelled artillery pieces owned by Israel are of 155 mm in calibre (548 pieces). The state, however, holds 36 self-propelled artillery pieces of 203 mm and also as many of 175 calibre. The Hebrew state has about 390 missile launchers, among which the most numerous are 122 mm in calibre.

In terms of human resources, Israel had, in 2007, about 168,000 people under arms, active, of which 125,000 troops in the army. Also, in 2007, it had 380,000 soldiers in reserve. Around 300 people were registered as part of special troops (commando / marines), and the 8000 people were part of border police.

Israeli air forces had, in 2007, around 35,000 people and about 402 aircraft. The number of aircrafts for combat operations held by Israel dropped from 432 in 1972, to 402 in 2007. Last year, the Israelis had:

- 39 combat aircrafts type A-4N;
- 89 combat aircrafts type F15 in three versions;
- 248 combat aircrafts type F16 in three versions.

In addition to the combat aircraft, Israel still has about 33 aircrafts designed for recognition and



SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

electronic warfare operations. These aircraft do not have arms on board.

Israel has 96 combat helicopters.

Also, Israel may launch offensive and defensive operations, and at sea, having a fleet quite well equipped, compared with those ones of its neighbours. The Israeli navy had, in 2007, 8000 people in the active service and 3500 in reserve. In terms of fighting ships, Israel had, according to data

from 2007, 3 submarines, 3 corvettes and 51 patrol ships. We may say that the Israeli navy has the potential to grow to a three-dimensional military force.

The military expenditure have grown relatively constant from 7486 billion U.S. dollars in 1985 to 9.373 billion in 2000 and, according to estimates, they will continue to rise, as can be seen in the following chart:




Fig. nr. 1 - Source: International Futures v 5.4.5 (IFs) with Pardee – Full Country Set for UNEP, created by Barry B. Hughes

As a result of these developments, Israel's military capabilities will grow exponentially as in the following chart:




Fig. nr. 2 - Source: International Futures v 5.4.5 (IFs) with Pardee – Full Country Set for UNEP, created by Barry B. Hughes



SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

The Hebrew state's power will increase, what could lead to its neighbours to react. In the long run, Israel can have serious security problems, just because of a possible growing border conflict.

Therefore, it may be necessary a new security paradigm for the entire Middle East, and in

particular for Israel.

Besides conventional weapons, Israel has nuclear weapons. According to data from 2005, locations in the territory of Israel in which they were nuclear weapons were the following:



©Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Deadly Arsenals* (2005), www.ProliferationNews.org

Fig. nr. 3



SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

A more detailed picture of Israel's nuclear weapons one can be seen in the following table:

Missiles	Year of deployment	Maximum Range (km)	Launcher Total
Jericho 1	1973	500	50-100
Jericho 2 ⁶	1986	1450-1500	~50
Jericho 3	1980-1989	5000	
Lance	1975	130	160
Aircraft	Year of deployment	Maximum Range (km)	Launcher Total
F-4E		1600	20
F-16	1980	630	232
2000 Phantom			50

Sources: Center for Defense Information, *Nuclear Issue – The World's Nuclear Arsenal* - <http://www.cdi.org/issues/nukef&f/database/nukearsenals.cfm#Israel>, accessed in 18.05.2008 and Anthony H. CORDESMAN and Arleigh A. BURKE, **Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and Prospects of War**, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, US, August 2007.

According to data from 2000, Israel also holds cruise missiles with the range of 1,500 kilometres, which can be launched from the "Dolphin" Class submarines that are constructed with German assistance.

Also, as we indicated earlier, Israel has developed a independent anti-missile defence system. ARROW Weapon System (AWS) is an independent defence system against ballistic missiles. According to the data, it is a modular system, which was designed to have an effect on ballistic missiles equipped with various types of warheads. This program was developed because, according to observations, both Hezbollah and Hamas are trying to procure advanced weapons especially long-range missile that are to be used against Israel.

The system is thought to have an open architecture, enabling it to operate in tandem with other systems of anti-aircraft defence held by Israel. Its base can be expanded, allowing more intercepting space for enemy ballistic missiles. Parts can be easily transported and the missiles control can be done either manually or automatically.

The overall architecture ARROW can be seen below.

The main components of the Israeli anti-missile defence system are the following:

- Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence Centre ("Citron Tree") consists of a mobile container which is full with electronic devices that link all sub-system components. Here it is gathered and processed the information which is then used to draft an action plan against a possible ballistic missile attack.
- Fire and Control Radar, called "Green Pine" has a dual operating system and it is able to intercept several targets simultaneously. It is a simultaneous dual mode operation system that can offer an early warning and it can control trajectory.
- Launch Control Centre ("Hazelnut Tree") is conceived as an interface between the Fire Control Centre (FFC) and the Launchers. It has an automated system to generate codes for military operations and a system diagnostic and maintenance of missiles. It also has multiple levels of security designed to prevent errors release.
- Launchers are mobile and easily transported. All have vertical orientation (azimuth).

The system is administered by the Israeli Missile Defence Organization, which is part of the Research and Development Directorate (MAFAT), from the Israeli Ministry of Defence. The main beneficiary of the program is Israel Aircraft Industries.




Fig. nr. 4. Source: Israel Missile Defense Organization - ARROW Weapon System, <http://www.mod.gov.il/pages/homa/index.html>

4. Conclusions

Relying on religious heritage and ethnicity, Israel has managed to put the foundations of a state in the Middle East.

In terms of national objectives, related military capabilities, Israel is able to take rapid short actions, to ensure its existence. Its military capabilities are for survival in a region where most close neighbours show a certain degree of hostility. But just this military force can create a paradigm of security for Israel, which may reignite conflicts with its neighbours.

According to forecasts, these are conflicts that can take place in the Middle East between 2010-2020:

- Israel's preemptive attacks against Iran.
- U.S. preemptive attacks against Iran.

- The beginning of a small scale arms race for intimidating purposes between different countries.

- Attacks caused by non-state actors.

In the first place, there is a possible conflict between Israel and Iran, primarily due to proximity of the two states and, secondly, because of the policy of intimidation carried by both players against one another. The possible conflict can have devastating effects if we take into consideration that both countries possess nuclear weapons.

A possible open conflict with Syria or Iran would be very costly for Israel. Therefore, we can say that such a situation can be perceived as a "zero sum game" because the occupation of territories from Syria or Iran by Israel would reactivate extremist movements in that area, and Israel would be put in a position to cope with another wave of violence.



REFERENCES:

1. Anthony H. CORDESMAN and Arleigh A. BURKE, **Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and Prospects of War**, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, US, August, 2007.
2. Anthony H. CORDESMAN and Arleigh A. BURKE, **Warfighting and Proliferation in the Middle East**, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, US, April, 2007.
3. Anthony H. CORDESMAN, Khalid Al-Rodhan and Bobby ROSHAN, **The Arab-Israeli States Military Balance: National Forces Developments and Trends**, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, US, March, 2005.
4. Martin van CREVELD, NATO, *Israelul și pacea în Orientul Mijlociu*, NATO Magazine, „NATO și Orientul Mijlociu“, 2005 (<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue4/romanian/art4.html>), accessed on May, 18, 2008.
5. Paul DOBRESCU and Alina BÂRGĂOANU, *Geopolitica*, Faculty of Communication and Public Relations “David Ogilvy” – SNSPA, București, 2001.
6. Yoav BEN-HORIN, Berry PASEN, **Israel’s Strategic Doctrine**, RAND Corporation, 1981, US.
7. *** *The Land: Geography and Climate*, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008, available on <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts+About+Israel/Land/THE+LAND-+Geography+and+Climate.htm>, accessed on May, 7, 2008.
8. *** *The State: Political Structure*, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008, available on <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts+About+Israel/State/THE+STATE-+Political+Structure.htm>, accessed on May, 7, 2008.
9. *** Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008, available on <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts+About+Israel/State/THE+STATE-+Israel+Defense+Forces+IDF-.htm>, accessed on May, 7, 2008.
10. *** Map of Israeli Nuclear Facilities – Deadly Arsenal - Endowment for International Peace www.ProliferationNews.org, accessed on May, 18, 2008.
11. *** *Nuclear Issue – The World’s Nuclear Arsenal*, Center for Defense Information, <http://www.cdi.org/issues/nukef&f/database/nukearsenals.cfm#Israel>, accessed on May, 18, 2008.
12. *** *Anti-Israeli Terrorism, 2006: Data, Analysis and Trends*, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S), Israel, 2007.
13. *** *The implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 after six months Interim report*, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S), Israel, 2007.
14. *** „One year since the acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the second Lebanon war: An interim report”, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S), Israel, 2007.
15. *** “Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah publicly admits that his organization is rearming and secretly transporting arms to south Lebanon, in blatant violation of Security Council Resolution 1701. Nasrallah sends a clear message to his opponents: Hezbollah is determined to maintain its status as “the defender of Lebanon”, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S), Israel, 2007.

NOTES:

¹ Paul DOBRESCU and Alina BÂRGĂOANU, *Geopolitica*, Facultatea de Comunicare și Relații Publice David Ogilvy – SNSPA, București, 2001, p. 45.

² *** *Anti-Israeli Terrorism, 2006: Data, Analysis and Trends*, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S), Israel, 2007.

³ *** *Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah publicly admits that his organization is rearming and secretly transporting arms to south Lebanon, in blatant violation of Security Council Resolution 1701. Nasrallah sends a clear message to his opponents: Hezbollah is determined to maintain its status as “the defender of Lebanon”* - Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S), Israel, 2007, p. 4

⁴ *** *Anti-Israeli Terrorism, 2006: Data, Analysis and Trends*, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S), Israel, 2007, p. 13

⁵ Yoav BEN- HORIN, Berry PASEN, **Israel’s**



SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

Strategic Doctrine, RAND Corporation, 1981, US, p. 29.

⁶ It is assumed that these missiles are located in 50 underground locations near Kefar Zeharya

(See Anthony H. CORDESMAN and Arleigh A. BURKE, **Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and Prospects of War**, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, US, august 2007, p. 128).

Marina MUSCAN (marina.muscan@gmail.com) graduated the National Defence College and the Faculty of Communication and Public Relations „David Ogilvy” from the National School of Political Studies and Public Administration. She also has a Master Diploma in Project Management and now she attends the master courses in International Relations at the Department of International Relations on the National School of Political Studies and Public Administration.



MASS MEDIA AND TERRORISM

Cristian DELCEA

The present essay looks into the effects of the 9/11 media event upon media consumers, approaching the attitudinal change from several theoretical or pragmatic perspectives: the social-cognitive one (drawing on Bandura, 2006; Bongar, 2006; Kellogg, 2007; Goldstein, 2007), the social-political one (drawing on Post, 2007; Hoffman, 2007; Chomsky, 2002) and the US governmental one (Kean, 2007). This multiple perspective is meant to capture the civil society's cognitive and behavioural responses so as to prevent selective and preferential media releases aimed at consumers, as well as to instruct consumers on information management when the content of this information falls within the anti-social, terrorist field.

Keywords: terrorism, mass media, ad-terrorism, psychology.

The social-cognitive approach

In the social-cognitive approach, due importance is given to both social factors that influence behaviour and cognitive processes such as motivation, emotions and reactions. This paradigm was the only one to analyze the media consumer's attitudinal change to 9/11 by looking at the relatively stable tendency to respond to irrational fear in a way that reflects cognitive evaluation (Goldstein, 2007). In fact, consumer's attitudes are shaped by the tendency to assess predominantly negative entries subjectively, through emotions and behaviour. The 9/11-triggered change depended on mass-media features of the coverage (Delcea, 2007; Hoffman, 2007; Kellogg, 2007). Bandura (2007) also analyzes attitudinal change from a social-cognitive perspective: both adults and children are liable to pick up "the whole range of aggressive conduct" from the media. Elworthy and Rifkind (2005) advance a phase-model of attitudinal change by comparing media consumers' reactions to the media events occasioned by the terrorist acts of September, 11, 2001 in the US and July, 7, 2005

in the UK, respectively.

The two authors also include in their research cognitive schemata and established and codified beliefs and opinions which the consumer has developed over the years in connection to 9/11. Here is a good opportunity to remark the worldwide consumer's progressive de-sensitization, or even saturation, to terrorist activity following 9/11. This is not to say that we overlook other attitude-shaping factors like context and culture. Yet, there is an unmistakably transformed media consumer's behavior originating in that major anti-social event. And since this attitude rests on a cognitive schema, it tends to be re-enforced each time a terrorist attempt or a terrorism-informed media message re-enacts the schema. Research (Post, 2007; Hoffman B., et al, 2007) supports the assumption that collective memory reaches a top level after a terrorist attack and intimidation builds on when other attacks follow. In his book *Changes in Social Behaviour and Public Opinion Resulting from Terrorism*, Hewitt (2003) goes on to say that through the media's re-iterative pattern irrational fear seeps in consumers' minds to the extent of causing adaptation malfunction. Eldor and Melnik (2007), from the Institute of Intelligence and Terrorism Information in Israel, claim that 9/11 is a landmark in the history of attitudinal change because it radically affected both those ones who experienced the unmediated historical event and those ones who experienced it through the media. Unfortunately, there is little research on long-term effects on attitude as compared to the short-term. If one is to add the types of attitudinal change on the list of variables, then research appears all the more complicated. Therefore, the present study focuses on short and long-term negative changes in the attitudes of Romanian media consumers. In order to measure this attitudinal change using the descriptors in the opinion list on terrorism we resorted to the academically validated ATQ reference framework.



Experiment

The present experiment was targeted at Romanian media consumers and was aimed at collecting objective data on attitudinal changes in respect to terrorism. Therefore, it belongs to the area of fundamental scientific research steadfastly integrating the analysis of proposed and verified empirical data, the establishment of logical inferences based on that analysis and the maintenance of an objective attitude in drawing conclusions to the experiment.

Objectives

Objective no. 1:

The present study aims to validate the Ad Terrorism Questionnaire (ATQ).

Objective no. 2:

The present study aims to investigate media consumers' attitudinal changes when exposed to anti-social, terrorist-content messages in the aftermath of 9/11.

The hypothesis

We surmise that there will be differences in the subjects' answers to the questionnaire before and after exposing them to anti-social, terrorist-content messages.

Participants

This research included 99 subjects, out of which 80 were male and 19 female. The average male age was 28.62, while the average female age was 32.89. The subjects were all urban residents of large towns and cities: Bucharest, Baia Mare, Cluj-Napoca, Craiova, Târgu Mureș, Timișoara, Satu Mare.

Materials

To ensure fidelity, both the α -Cronbach quotient of internal consistency and Guttman's λ -3 quotient will be employed. As for validity, there will be an item analysis, the one proposed by Lawshe, performed by a group of nine experts. We designed two variants of the same questionnaire to be used before and after the exposure, avoiding the risk of perturbed results (subjects giving same answers as in the previous questionnaire based on mere contextual resemblance). Free responses will be interpreted according to the frequency of answer

patterns. The questionnaire uses the Likert scale for assessment. Exposure consisted in a 15-minute footage (news and video reports) on the suicidal attacks of September 11, 2001 at WTC, New York.

Procedure

The subjects participated on a voluntary basis, they were all urban residents and tended to be college graduates (there were several cases of high-school level education). All agreed to take part in this experimental study. In the preliminary stage, there were potential female candidates who withdrew when instructed on the nature of the experiment. This might explain the gender difference in the number of participants. The experiment was carried out in the same day and started with the handing of a questionnaire on their attitudes to terrorism and potential terrorist threat to Romania. The procedure followed the pretest – intervention – posttest staging.

Psychometrical results (ATQ)

To verify fidelity, both the α -Cronbach quotient of internal consistency and Guttman's λ -3 quotient were calculated. The whole group of respondents were included, namely 150, none of them having been exposed to the questionnaire prior to the test. The pretest fidelity check-up employed a sample group of 30 participants. As for validity, there was a Lawshe item analysis, performed by a group of nine experts. Each expert was given a list of test items and was asked to catalogue them under the following tags: 1 – essential, 2 – useful but not essential, and 3 – irrelevant, in relation to the phenomenon under study. The results were later used in calculating the contents proportional validity. Out of the 12 items subjected to scrutiny for each of the two lists, two items on each list were deemed irrelevant by more than 50% of the experts and were consequently excluded as non-compliant with the content validity requirements.

The α -Cronbach fidelity check-up for pre- and post-intervention questionnaires yielded the following results:

Pretest $\alpha = .57$

Pretest $\alpha = .60$

For Guttman's λ_3 fidelity quotient:

Posttest $\lambda_3 = .91$

Posttest $\lambda_3 = .92$



The results interpretation

An α -Cronbach quotient value above 5 ($\alpha = 57$ pretest and $\alpha = 63$ posttest) indicates increased fidelity for the questionnaire. Moreover, the results for Guttman's λ_3 quotient are indicative of precision, being close to real value ($\lambda_3 = 91$ pretest and $\lambda_3 = 92$ posttest). T.L. Kelley suggests that, for a questionnaire to distinguish well enough between individual respondents, its fidelity quotient should rank over 90. Since these psychometric features were found compliant, the questionnaire can safely enter service for its targeted audience. The test-pretest fidelity results are inferior to those ones of internal consistency but relevant to a sufficient extent.

The sample group for the test-pretest fidelity

Low level of terrorist threat for Romania	1 to 11
Medium level of terrorist threat for Romania	12 to 23
High level of terrorist threat for Romania	24 to 35

The final scores are computed by adding up the participants' answers; there are no reverse proportionality items.

check-up (30 in numbers) only allows medium effect findings ($p < 0.05$, minimum no of subjects = 28), barring the enhanced effect ones (minimum no of subjects = 85).

The value of contents validity proportion adds to this. The two items excluded from each of the two variants of the questionnaire gathered only 45% of the experts' perception as "essential". Content validity is considered significant for $p < 0.05$ ($N=150, 78$).


As a consequence, the remaining items comply with the purpose and will therefore be included in the questionnaire.

The scale for this questionnaire reads as it follows:

Quantitative results and their interpretation

This research included 99 subjects, 80 of which were male and 19 female. The age mean was 28.62 for males and 32.89 for females.


The subjects' age representation



a) for pretest ATQ ($N=99, m=14.3, \sigma = 1.94$)



The pretest ATQ Histogram




The results are distributed according to the Gauss curve, so that the whole range of questions in the questionnaire were answered, making it possible to analyze them statistically.

Let us turn to results distribution for the posttest questionnaire.

b) for posttest ATQ (N=99, m=28.8, $\sigma = 3.61$)

The posttest ATQ Histogram





TERRORISM. WAR ON TERRORISM

We may conclude that the results distribution again follows the Gauss curve but tend to sway to the left, so that one can notice a difference between the two sessions, including the increase in the answer mean. Thus, if the pretest answer mean ($m=14$) ranks between the medium range (12-23), the posttest answer mean ($m = 28.8$) marks an increase to the next level range. Nevertheless, the questionnaire is deemed as valid since it distinguishes between various testing circumstances without reaching maximal values. For more consistency and rigor in the analysis and presentation of these data, let us go back to hypotheses. We surmised that there would be differences between the subjects' answers before and after their exposure to the anti-social, terrorist-contents footage. The nil hypothesis (H_0) assumes that there will be no such differences. To try and

verify that, we will employ a simplified ANOVA. The option for ANOVA is in keeping with the layout of this research, namely the two variables (the two questionnaires) involved. Each of the two has more modalities, though, and since not more than two groups need to be compared, test t on sample pairs can suit our purposes, too. We will thus look comparatively into the two differences that entered the study. In addition to that, we want to bring down type-1 error which can interfere with the working hypothesis trial. As for the nil hypothesis trial, since ANOVA is a more complex situation, we will use the F-value. Following post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons between the specified groups, the chances to keep the .05 threshold within reasonable limits increases considerably. The 1.22 value difference between the means of the two groups is large enough to support the idea of a

The test of Variance Homogeneity for AD-ATQ (Levene test)

	Levene Statistics	Degrees of freedom df1	Degrees of freedom df2	Relevance threshold
Ad - Atq Pretest	1.881	7	91	.082
Ad - Atq Posttest	3.131	7	91	.005

The simple ANOVA for AD – ATQ

		Sum of square values	Degrees of freedom	The square of mean	F	Sig.
Ad - Atq Pretest	Between Groups	42.661	7	6.094	10.465	.000
	Within Groups	52.996	91	.582		
	Total	96.657	98			
Ad - Atq Posttest	Between Groups	45.450	7	6.493		.000
	Within Groups	63.055	91	.693		
	Total	108.505	98			



difference in the AD ATQ questionnaire between the two sessions. To refute the nil hypothesis, we have to prove that the differences associated with the two sessions are hazardous and represent less than .05 (to be studied by equal dispersion analysis and the Levene test, respectively).

The results associated with the two sessions of pretest AD ATQ are statistically significant $F(7.91) = 10.465, p < 0.01$.

The results associated with the two sessions of posttest AD ATQ are statistically significant $F(7.91) = 9.371, p < 0.01$.

These results point to objective differences occasioned by the exposure to the media materials. This invalidates the nil hypothesis and confirms the specific hypothesis as true. Despite the limited number of subjects in the sample group, we can rely on data gathered by means of this questionnaire as relevant in the assessment of terrorist-generated threat. The sensitization to danger as affecting small countries as well as the more powerful ones appears to be natural and necessary as part of a routine behaviour that will foster new adaptive skills.

Conclusions

The present research made use of previous studies in the fields of social-cognitive psychology, social politics and public administration (the US Republican government) to answer existent questions on the ethics and work restrictions of mass media as well as on the behaviour of media consumers exposed to repeated terrorist content information. We started from the hypothesis of the aforementioned disciplines, added our own research (experimental study) on Romanian media consumers and validated the Ad-terrorism ATQ questionnaire. In addition to that, we linked the research to the "You too can prevent terrorism" philosophy characteristic of the activities of the Institute for Studies and Research on Terrorism in the education and training of Romanian civil society.

REFERENCES:

AMOORE, L., (2007), *Vigilant Visualities: The Watchful Politics of the War on Terror*, Security Dialogue. Vol. 38, no. 2, June, pp. 215-232, Prio,

Oslo.

BANDURA, A., (2006), **Psychological Modeling: Conflicting Theories**. Aldine Transaction, Oxford University Press, USA.

BONGAR, B., et al., (2006), **Psychology of Terrorism**, Oxford University Press, USA.

CHOMSKY, N., (2002), *September 11 Aftermath: Where is the World Heading?*, pp. 66-70. Beyond September 11, edited by Phil Scraton, Pluto Press, London.

DAUPHINEE, E., (2007), *The Politics of The Body in Pain: Reading the Ethics of Imagery*, Security Dialogue, Vol. 38, no. 2, June, pp. 139-156, Prio, Oslo.

DELCEA, C. (2007), *Mediatizarea terorii ca schimbare de atitudine la consumatorii de media*, Universitatea Babeş-Bolyai, Cluj-Napoca.

DODDS, K., (2007), *Steve Bell's Eye: Cartoons, Geopolitics and the Visualization of the 'War on Terror'*, Security Dialogue, Vol. 38, no. 2, June, pp. 157-178, Prio, Oslo.

ELDOR, R., & MELNICK, R., (2007), *The Impact of Terrorism on the Media*, Small Investment and Large Return: Terrorism, Media and the Economy, pp. 7-9, IICC, Israel.

ELWORTHY, S. & RIFKIND, G., (2005), *A programme for change*, Demos, UK.

GOLDSTEIN, E. B., (2007), *Cognitive Psychology: Connecting Mind, Research and Everyday Experience*, Wadsworth Publishing, 2 edition.

HEYMANN, B. P., (2001), **Terrorism and America**, the MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England.

HEWITT, C., (2003), *Changes in social behavior and public opinion resulting from terrorism, Understanding Terrorism in America, From the Klan to al Qaeda*, pp. 107-109, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, New York.

HOFFMAN B., (2007), *The Victims of Terrorism: An Assessment of Their Influence and Growing Role in Policy, Legislation, and the Private Sector*, RAND Corporation, USA.

HOFFMAN B., et al., (2007), *State of the Struggle: Report on the Battle Against Global Terrorism*, Council on Global Terrorism, USA.

KAPFERER, N. J. (2002), *Persistența în timp a schimbărilor de atitudine*, pp. 241-287, în **Căile persuasiunii**, Ed. Comunicare, București.

KEAN H. T., et al., (2007), *The 11/9 Commission Report*, US Department, USA.



TERRORISM. WAR ON TERRORISM

KELLOGG, T. R., (2007), **Fundamentals of Cognitive Psychology**, Sage Publications, Inc.

JULA, C. (2003), **Prăbușirea unui mit**, Universitatea Babeș-Bolyai, Cluj-Napoca.

MOLLER, F., (2007), *Photographic Interventions in Post-11/9 Security*, Security Dialogue, Vol. 38, no. 2, June, pp. 179-196, Prio, Oslo.

POST, M. J., (2007), **The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to Al Qaeda**, Palgrave Macmillan.

POWER, M., (2007), *Digitized Virtuosity: Video War Games and Post-11/9 Cyber-Deterrence*, Security Dialogue, Vol. 38, no. 2, June, pp. 271-288, Prio, Oslo.

Cristian DELCEA (cristiapoc19@yahoo.com) is the President of the Association for Studies and Researches on Terrorism, an author of studies and papers on the terrorism's psychology.



EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY.

Philosophy, principles, missions and prerogatives

Sorin VICOL

This paper approaches the topic of the European Security and Defence Policy - ESDP, the main instrument of the second pillar of the European Union: the Common Foreign and Security Policy. In the first part, the author reviews the past six decades previous to the establishment of ESDP, highlighting the most important events that have led to its creation. In the second part, he points out the main bodies that are involved in ESDP, as well as the decision-making process and writes about the EU Battlegroups. In the final part, the author mentions the European Gendarmerie Force and enumerates the operations in which the EU takes part.

Keywords: EU, ESDP, EU Battlegroups.

The security and the defence of the European Union represents one of the most dynamic dimension of the European project, the way through which the Europe may contribute to the assurance and keeping of its own security, representing a continuous preoccupation of the decisional factors of the political level since the project of the European community has been launched, in the middle of the 20th century.

In the alarming context of the realities of the Second World War and especially of the after war evolutions, it was born the first defence collective reaction towards the threats and the dangers imposed by the trials of the Soviet Union to impose its control over the Central European states.

The actions taken with the aim at developing of the European security and defence dimension dates since 1948, when it was founded the Western European Union - WEU, so after the founding Agreement of EU (The Treaty of Rome – 1957). The Brussels Treaty signed in March 17, 1948 and which established the Western European Union, signified the initiations of the first attempt aiming at translating into practical arrangements some

of the ideals of the European construction.¹ But after NATO was founded, the importance of WEU significantly decreased, the hardly designed and non-operational military components of the Union were transferred to the North-Atlantic Alliance.

In 1950 it was unsuccessfully tried to create an *European Defence Community* by West Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Luxemburg and Belgium. The idea belonged to the French prince, Rene Pleven but it has never put into practice. The Community desired it to be as a reply, at the level of security and defence, of the European Steel and Coal Community, actually a trial of the European Western powers assisted by the United States of America to counterbalance the overwhelming military ascent of the Soviet Union in Europe.

This attempt was not the single one during the Cold War period, its failure emphasizing the fact that the defence field is the most sensitive part of the national sovereignty, the European states not being prepared to renounce its decisional control over it.² However, it should be mentioned that the organic need of the European defence and security became as more as acerb once the process of European construction advanced.

The end of the Cold War settled the end of the bipolarity and rearranged the necessity of imposing a common policy that should aim at defence and security in which the Europe should find itself by declaring its own values and becoming a global player with a decisive impact over the evolutions at any level, at the European level as well as international one.

The end of the Russian Empire, the decisive changes occurred in Central and South-East Europe determined the European Union to seek to involve in the creation of its own reaction capacity to the crisis situations of its neighbourhood, at the political level as well as at the military one. If, after the Treaty of Rome (signed in March 25, 1957 by France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,



Luxemburg and Belgium, that established the European Economic Community), the European construction focused especially on the economic, social, cultural and educational aspects etc, the political change occurred at the end of '80s decisively contributed to the institutionalization of the intergovernmental cooperation. In what concerns the *Common Foreign and Security Policy –CFSP*, known after the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) and the creation of the European Union, its three pylons, FCSP being the second one and which offers “*a potential framework of a common defence policy that could lead in time to common defence*”.³ Practically, by this treaty, WEU became the military arm of the new European Union.

In the same year, soon after the Treaty was concluded, the representatives of the member state of WEU met at Bonn, in Germany (Hotel Petersberg) to come to an agreement on the procedures by which they could face the realities of a destabilized Central and South-East Europe. These are in principal (at that moment known as Petersberg Tasks) humanitarian tasks, peace keeping and settle, that European Union is empowered to fulfil.

The first revision of the Treaty of Maastricht took place in Amsterdam in 1997 by the occasion of the European Council reunion; the CFSP dimension knew some changes, the most important ones being the establishment of the High Representative office for CFSP as well as the takeover of the WEU capabilities, actually the Petersberg tasks. However, the European Union did not possess own military forces so that in the event of a conflict, the Member States could intervene only through UN and NATO ways.

“During 1990-2000, took place over the entire world a number of 56 major armed conflicts, located in 44 different areas. The most of them were produced during 1990-1994 when the annual number of major armed conflicts situated between 30-33, and the smallest number of conflicts registered in 1996-1997, with 23, respectively 19 conflicts”⁴.

In these conditions, the Franco-Britannic Summit of St. Malo of December 1998 and the European Council in Köln of June 1999 (that represented in fact the “Europeanization” of the St. Malo provisions, i.e. their adoption by the Member States) settled the development of “an

autonomous action capacity based on credible military forces”⁵, aimed at ensuring the European Union the possibility to quickly and efficiently action in the event of certain crisis situations emerge and to coordinate the military operations under its authority, in the case the North-Atlantic Alliance is not involved.

However, it has to be clearly mentioned that the adopted decisions did not refer to set up a European army and neither bringing prejudices to NATO activity. The most important aspects approached during the two conferences referred to the nomination of Javier Solana as the High Representative for CFSP and as General Secretary of the Council of Europe Union, as well as the shaping of the institutional framework on the new European Policy of Security and Defence - ESDP (the arm of CFSP in the security field which the principal objective is to achieve a common defence policy and to support the Foreign Security and Defence Policy).

The problematic of ESDP has known several developments, the most important meetings of the Council of European Union having on its agenda this subject took place at: Helsinki (December 10-11, 1999), Lisbon (March 23-24, 2000), Santa Maria de Feira (June 19-20, 2000), Nice (December 7-9, 2000), Goteborg (June 15-16, 2001), Laeken (December 14-15 2001), Seville (June 21-22, 2002), Brussels (October 24-25, 2002), Copenhagen (December 13-13, 2002), Brussels (March 20-21, 2003), Salonic (June 19-20, 2003) and Brussels (December 12-13, 2003).⁶

In this respect, at the Helsinki European Council in 1999, December 10-11, the representatives of the member states of EU decided to adopt the global objective of ESDP – *Helsinki Headline Goal*, which proposed, aiming at developing the European capabilities, to set up a target, i.e. the year of 2003 by which a package of forces and capabilities addressed to the Petersberg task type to be at EU disposal. These constituted the *EU Rapid Reaction Force*, a force at the level of army body counting 50,000 – 60,000 persons, deployable within 60 days and sustainable in the field for a year. As I have mentioned before, EU Rapid Reaction Force is not an European army, in fact it is composed of fight units at EU disposal, which are not deployed by the member state they belong to only pursuant to a decision of the European Council related to the involvement in such a crisis situation.



Another meeting of the European Council that had a decisive role in developing the European defence capacities was that one held in Seville in June 2002 when the representatives of the Member States decided, in the context the terrorist phenomenon got bigger dimensions, to extend the tasks of Petersberg type so that to include the fight against terrorism. Not of less importance was the Copenhagen European Council of December 2002 that institutionalized the relationship EU-NATO by adopting the “*Berlin Agreements +*” regarding the access of the EU to NATO capabilities. The agreements refer to a sizeable package of understandings, based on the conclusions of NATO Summit in Washington and they represent the basis on which the relations between NATO and EU are founded.

The actions taken, as well as the measures adopted by the beginning of the 21st century were meant to face especially the European realities and certain conventional threats. After September 11, 2001 attack over the Twin Towers in New York, given the evolutions occurred at the level of international environment after the adoption of the *Global Objective of the European Security and Defence Policy* in 1999, the emergence of the threats of asymmetric nature as well as the objective of the EU to become an international player, it became more necessary the enlargement of the action field of the European Union and for this, “*the outlining of a common European perception over the international risks, a common political will for the use of the existing capacities and a common decision regarding the improvement of these capabilities*”.⁷ All these aspects led to the adoption by the European Council in Brussels in December 12, 2003 of the *Security Strategy of European Union, A Secure World in a Better World*⁸, known then as *Solana Strategy*, because it was elaborated under the coordination of the High Representative for the Common Foreign Security Policy, Javier Solana.

The document establishes the guidelines of the domestic and international security strategy of European Union:

- Promotion of an efficient conflict preventing policy by using the whole set of capabilities (military and civilian) which EU possesses;
- Orientation of EU actions aiming at creating a security climate in the close neighborhood of Europe (Middle East, Balkans and Caucasus);

- Keeping of the international order by promoting the effective multilateralism, by respecting and developing the international law, fully in agreement with the principals of the United Nations Charter⁹.

The objective of the European Union is not the usage of the armed force against the terrorism with a preventive scope, but rather the flexibility, i.e. using some tactical fight groups in specific and efficient operations.

However, the Strategy does not exclude the use of force in the extreme cases, and the notion of preventive action remains ambiguous. The new adopted *European Strategy of Security* determined the necessity of amending the *Global Objective of EU*. The new objective, *Helsinki Headline Goal 2010* meant to facilitate the quality improvement of the military capabilities of defence was adopted in June 2004 and referred the commitment that EU took that, by 2010 to become able to respond by a quick and decisive action and by a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of the operations of crisis management covered by the European Union Treaty.¹⁰

In what concerns the architecture of the institutional system of the European Security and Defence Policy, this was established pursuant to several meetings of the European Council, the most important being in Köln (June 1999), Helsinki (December 2000) and Nice (December 2000). The principal permanent military and political bodies are *The Political and Security Committee*, *The European Union Military Committee* and *The European Union Military Staff*.

The Political and Security Committee (PSC) holds the decisive role within ESDP. It is composed of the permanent representative of ambassadorial level and treats all the aspect regarding ESDP: it holds the main function in preparing a coherent EU response to a crisis; it is responsible for defining the EU policies and for monitoring their implementation and exercises its political control and strategic direction of the military response to a crisis. The presidency belongs to the state that ensures the Union’s presidency by rotation.

The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body set up within the Council. It is composed of the Chiefs of Defence of the Member States, who are regularly represented by their permanent military representatives. The EUMC main functions are: providing



the PSC with advice regarding the relative concept of the crisis management and recommendations on all military matters; evaluating the risks of the potential crisis and elaborating, evaluating and submitting of reconsidering the specific objectives in the field of the military capabilities development; providing of general military orientations for the European Union Military Staff.

The European Union Military Staff is composed of military and civilian experts of the Member States and has the following objectives: early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for the whole scale of military tasks, identifying the European national and multinational forces.

Within the European Security and Defence Policy there are also other political-military structures such as: *the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, Civil-military Planning Cell, EU Cell at SHAPE, the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit and the Situations Centre.*

In the same time, the activity of the European Security and Defence Policy is based on the following agencies: *Satellite Centre – SATCEN* (located at Torrejon de Ardoz, Spain) that assures the requirements of EU and of Member States regarding images and analyses based on satellite photos; *Institute for Security Studies – ISS* that is meant to contribute to development of CFSP/ESDP through academic research and drafting analyses in the relevant fields; *European Security and Defence College – CESA* that elaborates a common culture of European security among the Member States by putting in common the resources they already have in the field and not in the last, the *European Defence Agency-EDA*.

European Defence Agency acts under the management and authority of the European Council that elaborates the guidelines and receives the reports from the *EU High Representative for CFSP*, Javier Solana, who is the head of the Agency and chairman of the Steering Board, its main decision-making body (composed of Defence Ministers of the participating Member States, except Denmark and a member of the European Commission), responsible for the detailed control and conduct of activities.

The main responsibilities of the Agency consist in: developing the defence capabilities, especially in the field of crisis management, cooperation in the field of armaments, development of the industrial and technological basis, of military equipment

market, promotion of cooperation for research and technology.¹¹

In what concerns the military capabilities of the European Union, the preoccupation for their identifying and disposal has been commenced together with the initiation of the European Security and Defence Policy. The *Helsinki Headline Goal 2003*, mentioned before, established for the first time the characteristics that should have fulfilled the *European Rapid Reaction Force*.

For fulfilling the *HHG 2003*, it was elaborated the first *European Union Force Catalogue*, in November 2003 composed of the force offers belonging to each Member State. This was able to ensure only the quantity requirements of *HHG 2003*, a range of elements such as strategic air transport, information etc. failed to be covered. For remediation of these deficiencies and also for ensuring the quality requirements of *HHG 2003*, it was launched in November 2001 *the European Capabilities Action Plan – ECAP*. “*The working ratio of the ECAP Process was based on assuming the responsibilities increased by the Member States by coordinating the activity of some analyze small structures (panels that became project groups –PG) which objective was to offer solutions to eliminate the discovered deficiencies*”¹².

Based on these assessment, it was elaborated a new *Helsinki Headline Global 2010*, designed to identify and redress all the deficiencies discovered in the field of military capabilities such as: deployment capacity, mobility, theater sustaining, C4ISR. The concrete measures adopted referred to set up of the *European Defence Agency*, remediation of the deficiencies related to strategic transport, aircraft carrier endowment by 2008, assuring the compatibility in what concerns communication networks and equipments, performing operation of *EU Battlegroups* by 2007.

The tactical groups of the EU represent a package of minimum, credible, rapid deployment force able to perform operations for the initial phase of bigger operations. *EU BGs* are designed on different categories or weapons, at the level of a battalion, sustained by combat support, being mainly characterized by interoperability and military efficiency. They are based on multinational principle, being formed either by one nation, “framework nation” or by a group of nations. As for the contributions of each Member State at the *BGs*, the stated trend is that the developed states



create their own BGs, while the others create common groups, as is the case of Romania.

The *European Rapid Reaction Force* is followed-up by the *European Gendarmerie Force – FJE* pursuant to some initiatives meant to develop the rapid respond to any type of crisis, military or civil. The *European Gendarmerie Force* was constituted on the agreement among 5 Member State, France, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Italy in order to create an intervention European force that has the attributions of military police and to be specialized in crisis management in sensitive areas.

The *European Gendarmerie Force* is meant to respond to the need of rapidly conduct of the whole range of civil security actions, either on its own or in parallel with the military intervention, by providing a valid and operational, multinational and efficient instrument at the disposal of EU but also of other international organizations as NATO, UN and OSCE or ad-hoc coalitions.¹³

The *European Gendarmerie Force* is under the political control of the Ministerial Interdepartmental Committee, created at the level of the Defence or Interior Ministers. It is headquartered in North-West Italy, at Vicenza, the core of the troops being formed of 800-9000 persons, deployable within 30 days, with 2,300 troops available in stand by. The *European Gendarmerie Force* was declared operational by the ministers of defence of the five participant states in 2004, September 17, at Noordwijk, The Netherlands.

Beginning with 2003, the European Union is able to perform operations of crisis management with or without call for NATO capabilities, but without affecting NATO actions.

The European Union has proactively engaged in security matters, covering a range of tasks, from those of policy to military intervention.

By now, the European Union has successfully concluded 10 operations in areas as the West Balkans, South Caucasian, South-East Asia and Africa (*Concordia* and *Proxima* in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, *EUJUST THEMIS* in Georgia, *AMM* in Aceh, in South-East Asia, *Artemis* in Africa, etc.).

European Union is currently conducting the following operations:

- *EUFOR-Althea* (since December 2, 2004, by taking over the mandate from NATO SFOR forces) – military operations performing in

Bosnia Herzegovina aiming to assist the country's authorities;

- *EUPM* (since January 1, 2003, after the takeover of the attributes of the UN international police force), aiming at support the reform process of police forces in Bosnia;

- *Kosovo Planning Mission* (April 10, 2006) – its objectives focus on the reconstruction of local police structures;

- *EUPOL COPPS* (since January 1, 2006) – EU police mission in the Palestinian Territories meant to support the local structures in achieving the reform of justice and security;

- *EU BAM Rafah* (since November 30, 2005) – a mission of border assistance established at the crossing border Rafah in Palestinian Territories;

- *EUJUST LEX* (since June 1, 2005) – mission aiming at assuring the integrated training of some representatives of judicial, penitentiary and police systems;

- *EUPOL Afghanistan* (since June 15, 2007) – aims at providing support for achieving certain police structures in compliance with the international standards;

- *EUFOR TCHAD/RCA* – operational since the middle of March 2008, its objective is the protection of the civil in danger, to facilitate the humanitarian aids providing, to protect the UN personnel and facilities in the area, as well as to assure the security and freedom of movement of the mentioned personnel;

- *EUPOL RD CONGO* (since June 2007, has followed the *EUPOL Kinshasa* mission, initiated in February 2005) – meant to provide support and assistance for the security reform;

- *EUSEC RD CONGO* (since June 8, 2005) – aims at promotion of policies compatible with the person rights and international humanitarian law, transparency and observance of the state of law¹⁴.

*

**

This was briefly the route the European Unions has passed, more than half of century aiming at developing its own dimension of security and defence. There is no doubt that the international environment of security is affected today by a whole spectrum of complex and interdependent threats that are unpredictably increasing.

By the actions taken, the European Union is that one which has generated not only a high level



of economic development on the continent, but also a new approach of security, founded on the peaceable disputes solving and on the international multilateral cooperation through certain common institutions.¹⁵

Its instrument for declaring and protecting the general interests related to security is the European Security and Defence Policy, which very important role is to achieve the integration of the security policies of the Member States aiming at achieving a comprehensive security and defence policy for the entire European Union.

The success of this action is what made possible that European Union become a complete key player on the international scene, able to autonomously action to conflict prevention and crisis management and to involve more and more in democracy promotion and prosperity in its own borders but also outside them.

REFERENCES:

1. <http://europa.eu>
2. <http://consilium.europa.eu>
3. http://www.mapn.ro/diepa/eventiment/20060713/Brosura_PESA.pdf
4. ***, **Integrarea Europeană. Dimensiunea de securitate și apărare a Uniunii Europene**, scientific seminar științific, June, 23, 2006, Bucharest.
5. DINU, Mihai-Ștefan, BĂHNĂREANU, Cristian, **Actualități și perspective în Politica Europeană de Securitate și Apărare**, Editura UNAp, București, 2006.
6. DUȚU, Petre, DINU, Mihai-Ștefan, **Politica Europeană de Securitate și Apărare: Cadrul de manifestare și dezvoltare a intereselor de securitate națională**, Editura UNAp, București, 2007.
7. McGIFFEN, Steven P., **Uniunea Europeană. Ghid critic**, Regia Autonomă a Monitorului Oficial, București, 2007.
8. MUREȘAN, Liviu, POP, Adrian, BONCIU, Florin, **Politica Europeană de Securitate și Apărare – element de influențare a acțiunilor României în domeniul politicii de securitate și apărare**, Institutul European din România,

București, 2004.

NOTES:

- ¹ <http://www.weu.int>
- ² Irina DIACONU TICĂ, *Cadrul strategic al dimensiunii de securitate și apărare a Uniunii Europene, în Integrarea Europeană. Dimensiunea de securitate și apărare a Uniunii Europene*, scientific seminar, June, 23, 2006, Bucharest, p. 38.
- ³ Treaty of the European Union, art. 4, <http://eurolx.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html0001000001>.
- ⁴ *Armed Conflicts Report 2001*, Project Ploughshares, Waterloo, Ontario, 2002, apud Liviu MUREȘAN, Adrian POP, Florin BONCIU, **Politica Europeană de Securitate și Apărare – element de influențare a acțiunilor României în domeniul politicii de securitate și apărare**, Institutul European din România, București, 2004.
- ⁵ British French Summit, St. Malo, 3-4 December 1998, *From St. Malo to Nice: European Defence: core documents*, Chaillot Paper 47, Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 2001, <http://iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai47e.html3>
- ⁶ http://europa.eu/european_council/websites/index_en.htm
- ⁷ Irina DIACONU TICĂ, *op. cit.*, p. 40.
- ⁸ European Security Strategy, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, Brussels, 12.12.2003, ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf
- ⁹ http://www.mapn.ro/diepa/eventiment/20060713/Brosura_PESA.pdf, p. 5.
- ¹⁰ <http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf>
- ¹¹ <http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=Background&id=122>
- ¹² Teodor FRUNZETI, *Dimensiunea militară a Politicii Europene de Securitate și Apărare în ***, Integrarea Europeană. Dimensiunea de securitate și apărare a Uniunii Europene*, scientific seminar, June 23, Bucharest, p. 65.
- ¹³ www.eurogendfor.org
- ¹⁴ http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en
- ¹⁵ Javier Solana, *A secure Europe in a better world Thessaloniki European Council, June 20, 2003, la http://www.eu.int./oressdata/EN/reports/76255.pdf*.

Sorin VICOL (sorin.vicol@avas.gov.ro) works for The Authority for State Assets Recovery within the Romanian Government.



DECISIONS OF THE NATO SUMMIT IN BUCHAREST

Vasile POPA

The largest summit as participation rate from NATO's history was also the most disputed one because of the complex approached topics, the numerous difficulties into decisions' taking and Russia's firm position in the issue regarding a possible Ukraine and Georgia's accession, considered a direct threat against Russian Federation national security.

The summit's agenda was initially centred on some main topics as NATO enlargement and Afghanistan. Afterwards, this was completed with some new ones and to the Reunion's opening session on the agenda there were: accepting into Alliance some West Balkans states (Albania, Croatia and Macedonia) and the preparation of a future organization' enlargement toward East (Ukraine and Georgia); establishing a clear vision on ISAF, the UN-mandated NATO-led International Security Assistance Force and the future of Afghanistan; the analysis of the Western Balkans' security and stability and NATO and KFOR's participation to Kosovo stabilization; the analysis of the Alliance's involvement in Iraq and expanding NATO's Iraqi Training Mission (NTM-I) until 2009; the American anti-defence missile system and a complementary one it will be built up by NATO; the NATO – Russia strategic partnership; the problem of continuing the Alliance's transformation; the issue of protecting the key NATO's information systems; increasing the Alliance's role in the energetic security environment. Due to Romania, the summit touched the Black Sea region importance issue, its role for the Euro-Atlantic security and also the persistence of the regional conflicts from the Republic of Moldova and South Caucasus.

The decision to receive new members from the Western Balkans was joyful for Croatia and Albania, as they were invited to join the Alliance, but displeased Macedonia that because of its state's name, similar with the one of an ancient

Hellenic province, was opposed by Greece and, consequently, rejected. The Bucharest Summit Declaration stated that its invitation will be extended as soon as a mutually acceptable solution has been reached.

The Croatia and Albania examples show the Alliance's determination to receive "European democracies willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership". This decision may be taken "only by NATO itself", as stated into the Summit Declaration, not with so-called "permission" given by outsiders. There are made steps toward "the common goal of a Europe whole and free, united in peace, democracy and common values". The future of the West Balkan area is one of stability and integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures, process through which the region won't generate insecurity but it will be itself a major contributor to the European and international security.

Actually, the Accession Protocols should be signed by the end of July 2008 and the ratification process should be completed without delay. Until the accession, Croatia and Albania are involved into Alliance's activities and they get continue to receive support and assistance, including through the Membership Action Plan (MAP).

On having both ex-soviet states' – Ukraine and Georgia -, the 26 member states expressed completely their support and agreed that in concordance with the Georgian parliamentary elections results and the progresses made, the Foreign Ministers are to make a first assessment of progress at their December 2008 meeting.

If this will be positive, they decide on the MAP applications of these two countries. It is important to notice that, from the very beginning, Russia constantly opposed.

It perceives the NATO's enlargement toward Eastern Europe as "a close military infrastructure"



STRATEGIC EVENT

to its borders, therefore, a threat to its own security.

NATO's interest over the Western Balkans region was also underlined by the assessment of the progress accomplished by Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, after the Riga Summit, in their cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic organization and also through the encouragements to use all the dialogue, reform and cooperation opportunities offered by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and, for the 26, to continuously develop the relations with each and every one. During the summit, there were made references to the decision of the first two mentioned states to develop an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO, to the future Alliance's support in the reform efforts and their invitation to start an Intensified Dialogue on the full range of political, military, financial, and security issues relating to their aspirations to membership. NATO is ready to further develop an IPAP with Serbia and also to consider an Intensified Dialogue following a request by Serbia. The 26 expect Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and will closely monitor their respective efforts in this regard.

One of the main decisions for the Euro-Atlantic and international security was on Afghanistan and, as priority, as the Alliance's state leaders expressed, ISAF, the UN-mandated NATO-led International Security Assistance Force where 40 nations contribute today. The ongoing multiplication of this area's challenges and threats against peace and democracy obliged the Alliance to settle, together with other human and material involved states in that theatre field and the Afghani president, present to the summit, a future strategy to increase the actions' efficiency of the employed forces in the support of the Afghanistan's peaceful and democratic development, to forbid the extremists and terrorists to regain control of Afghanistan or use it as a base for the international terrorism.

The Declaration on Afghanistan, adopted here, settled a clear vision over the supplementary efforts to be done in the next phase. In essence, it is about a firm and shared long-term commitment; support for enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility; a comprehensive approach by the international community, bringing together civilian and military efforts; and increased cooperation and engagement

with Afghanistan's neighbours, especially Pakistan. The firmer engagement comprises a growth of contribution in personnel and other forms of support, a supplementation of the national contingencies from the field. Unfortunately, from different reasons, but especially because of the opinion trend more and more against the continuation of the presence in Afghanistan, not all the states hurried to announce an increase of own troops figures. This doubts the amplitude, dynamism and coherence of the international community future actions. The summit participants' hope was toward the June Conference from Paris which is to assess progress on and strengthen international efforts to further implement the Afghanistan Compact.

After a complex analysis of the Western Balkans over the security and stability issues and NATO and KFOR role to Kosovo stability, at Bucharest, the 26 renewed their regional involvement, stating "the prompt, impartial and effective performance by KFOR in the face of violence". The summit emphasized that the KFOR mission will continue until the UN Security Council will decide otherwise. In Kosovo, NATO and KFOR will continue to work with the authorities and, bearing in mind its operational mandate, KFOR will cooperate with and assist the United Nations, the European Union and other international actors, as appropriate, "to support the development of a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic and peaceful Kosovo", "full implementation of their commitments to standards, especially those related to the rule of law and regarding the protection of ethnic minorities and communities, as well as the protection of historical and religious sites, and to combating crime and corruption". NATO stands ready to play its part in the implementation of future security arrangements and is willing to contribute with the other international forces to freedom of movement and the flow of people and goods, including border monitoring.

The future "comprehensive approach to address successfully the security challenges of today and tomorrow" the Alliance referred to, is about the experiences in the Balkans and Afghanistan that demonstrate that the international community needs to work more closely together, to apply a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments in a concerted effort that takes into account their respective strengths and mandates. NATO's contribution "to a comprehensive approach" is



STRATEGIC EVENT

materialized into an Action Plan with proposals that aims to improve the coherent application of NATO's own crisis management instruments and enhance practical cooperation at all levels with other actors, wherever appropriate, including provisions for support to stabilisation and reconstruction, on planning and conduct of operations, training and education, enhancing cooperation with external actors. For more than a decade, NATO cooperates with the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security, operational cooperation in peacekeeping through the UN-mandated NATO-led operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, an effort that will also continue in the future.

The same spirit will lead the NATO relations with EU on security, defence and crisis management, including the fight against terrorism, the development of coherent and mutually reinforcing military capabilities, and planning civil emergency. The Final Declaration speaks about the future cooperation into key crisis management operations, the support for a stronger and more capable European defence, capabilities to address the common challenges both NATO and the EU face, improving the NATO-EU strategic partnership, in order to increase the cooperation efficiency and to avoid unnecessary duplication, in order to provide common security.

The Alliance decided to have a closer dialogue and cooperation with other international organizations to protect populations, territories, infrastructure and forces against the consequences of terrorist attacks, intended to develop and contribute to policies to prevent and counter proliferation, with a view to preventing terrorist access to, and use of, WMD. They will also support the programme of work to develop advanced capabilities to help defend against terrorist attacks, including through the continuing development of new technologies, strengthen the Alliance's ability to share information and intelligence on terrorism, especially in support of NATO operations, they welcome efforts towards revitalising the implementation of the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism and reiterate commitment to Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean.

NATO Training Mission (NTM-I) is an outside Euro-Atlantic NATO-led operation. The participants to the summit decided to extend it on: Navy and Air Force leadership training, police training, border security, the fight against terrorism,

defence reform, defence institution building, and Small Arms and Light Weapons accountability. Until now, NTM-I has trained over 10.000 members of Iraqi security forces. NATO has also approved proposals for a structured cooperation framework to develop NATO's long-term relationship with Iraq and continue to develop Iraq's capabilities to address common challenges and threats. On the other hand, in the actions developed into further geographical areas, NATO assisted the African Union Mission from Sudan (AMIS) and accepted to support the African Union Mission in Somalia, being "prepared to consider further requests for support to this mission".

In spite of the already numerous successes registered into the NATO – Russia partnership and here we have in mind the political dialogue substance and the concrete projects on international security, the fight against terrorism, in the area of non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery. It was mentioned that the potential of the NATO-Russia Council is not fully realised as there are opportunities for joint actions and cooperation. The Alliance stressed out that the open-door policy and the current, as well as any future, NATO Missile Defence efforts are intended to better address the security challenges we all face, and reiterate that, far from posing a threat to our relationship, they offer opportunities to deepen levels of cooperation and stability. The summit underlined the important contribution that can be brought by the United States-Russia bilateral discussions on missile defence and CFE, appreciating Russia's readiness to support NATO's ISAF mission in Afghanistan by facilitating transit through Russian territory, the support to Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean, cooperation on military interoperability, theatre missile defence, search and rescue at sea, and civil emergency planning.

NATO's policy of outreach through partnerships, dialogue, and cooperation for the Euro-Atlantic area security and outside will increase in the future, as within the Alliance's missions and operations the partners participate with troops and the Euro-Atlantic organization provides information, expertise and assistance on promoting the reforms from the security and defence field. There will be strengthened the partnership arrangements with states from important strategic regions – Central Asia and Caucasus -, but also with the states



STRATEGIC EVENT

from the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Gulf area as well with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore or Republic of Korea. Also, due to the Romanian initiative, there was decided to develop the dialogue and cooperation among the Black Sea states and with the Alliance. The Alliance reaffirmed the continued importance of the Black Sea, recognizing the region's importance for the Euro-Atlantic security. Also, due to Romania, there was taken the extremely important decision "to develop options for comprehensive missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory and populations not otherwise covered by the United States system", underlining the ongoing support NATO provides for the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova.

The Summit Declaration gives a generous space to the continuation of the Alliance's transformation process and capabilities, in order to make it able to successfully accomplish its operational engagements and the entire range of missions this involving: sufficient resources, by the growth in real terms of the defence expenses, increasing the revision of flexibility, efficiency and liability of the command structure at peace, the revision of the processes of defence planning, development of policies and capabilities to comply with the new challenges and threats, the improvement of the strategic lift and intra-theatre airlift, strengthen information superiority through

networked capabilities, to enhance the capability and interoperability of our special operations forces, improving trans-Atlantic defence industrial cooperation, providing forces required to accomplish Alliance's operations or other engagements, supporting NRF and improving the operational and strategic reserve forces, etc. Meanwhile, the 26 are committed to strengthen the NATO key-informatics systems against the cyber attacks.

On the other hand, NATO pays a special attention to its role in the energy security field by the common use and exchange of information; the stability projection, promoting the international and regional cooperation, promoting the protection of critical energy infrastructure. Also, the summit decided to support the ongoing improvement of the strategic communications requirements because of "the need for appropriate, timely, accurate and responsive communication with local and international audiences in relation to NATO's policies and engagement in international operations."

The reason for these decisions is the one underlined at the beginning of Declaration: to further strengthen our ability to confront the existing and emerging 21st century security threats, achieving a strong collective defence of our populations, territory and forces – the core purpose of our Alliance and the most important security task.

Colonel (ret.) Vasile POPA (vspopa9@yahoo.fr) is a scientific researcher within the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University "Carol I".

A POSSIBLE EURO-ASIAN GEOSTRATEGIC PIVOT

Gheorghe VĂDUVA, PhD

In the huge Euro-Asian platform, there are two countries with an exceptional Euro-Asian geographic position: Russia and Turkey. The first one is from an inexhaustible root, the biggest country in the world, geopolitically and territorially speaking, and comprises almost all that is stable and natural, hidden resources even mysterious from the European and the Euro-Asian continents. The other one is an essential country, a synthesis one. The first – huge Russia – generates forces, resources and potential. The latter – cursed, controversial and isolated Turkey – becomes more and more a country of synthesis and, consequently, an exceptional geopolitical and geo-strategic valuable space.

Keywords: strategic partnership, geostrategy, Turkey, Russia.

Beyond partnerships

Russia and Turkey, enemies in the past, possible partners today. They are countries coming from two wide empires and representing great civilizations. We speak about the Slav civilization being part of the European complex of civilization and the Muslim civilization, generating one from the most interesting philosophies of human existence and knowledge over the planet. Each of these countries have its distinct and special role in the European, Asian, Euro-Asian and even global security environment configuration and reconfiguration if we consider that the Euro-Asian platform with the Indian sub-continent has the territorial, resources and population planetary supremacy.

Even if, nowadays, the big world's states or organizational entities – The United States, the European Union, Russia, China, Japan and NATO – play the essential role in the global security environment architecture and building, Turkey remains a pivot-country in this sensitive area of the globe. It lies between the restless Middle East, the explosive Near East, the Europe's unpredictable

powder cask – Balkans -, the Caucasian fault, the Black Sea, beyond them being a part from the last operation theatres of the ex-Ottoman Empire with their complex effects coming from a common and restless history as are Romania, Balkans, Albania, Serbia, Hungary, Croatia, Montenegro, etc., but also Ukraine and Russia, countries along the Black Sea. It neighbours hundreds of kilometres with Armenia, Iran, Iraq and also Syria exactly in an area with compact Kurd population which counts over 20 million peoples and raises an extremely fragile problem for our days, a Kurd state configuration in the area by invoking history, the Sévres Treaty from 1920 and the right to separation and self-determination. All the fourth countries – Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria – have great difficulties with the Kurd population but their policies and strategies regarding their resolution are very different. The separatists Kurd actions embrace all the range of forms from the ones designed to soften the international public opinion and Diaspora's pressures to violent actions and even to war and all types of terrorist actions.

Turkey is not manoeuvrable or malleable. Turkey does not play by others' rules. It manifests in geo-strategic issues a firm, proud and stable position. Even if it is not a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it does not accept its will to be bypassed when it is about vital interests or values. In the international affairs, exercises a sort of natural right to veto in problems regards or involves it. So, this state surely says NO, when is convinced that must say NO. Moreover, we also consider its position is justifiable as long as Turkey is in an area where, although, apparently there are not too many problems (excepting the Kurd one), and it has an increasing special role in all the conflict management policies and strategies.

We consider that due to its special geographical position, Turkey has and will have an important role for Europe's and Asia's geopolitical configuration in this part of world being at the confluence between



Central Asia, Middle East, Near East and Europe, especially in the Euro-Asian dimension.

Turkey isn't anybody's servant; even the West doesn't offer its support or assistance. It is a candidate to be accepted into the European Union, strives to fulfil the requested criteria but, no matter the stake, it cannot pass that threshold that can endanger its security, territorial integrity and philosophy of strong and stable country even its political and strategic option is toward occidental democracy and modernity.

As stated before, Turkey has a very special role into area's conflict management. This could lead to the configuration of a strategic partnership with the United States peculiarly for such objectives' accomplishment. There are some opinions that president Bush contributed and contributes to "strategic partnership" concept loose of contain even such a concept is often used into the Alliance from the American partnership with Greece, Romania or France to the traditional one with the United Kingdom. The only viable American strategic partnership in global dimension is considered to be, by some Turkish analysts, the one with the United Kingdom and, at regional level, the one with Israel. Excepting these configurations, the others are considered to be just relations between allies on different plans¹. The document entitled "strategic vision", signed at 6th of June 2006, by Abdullah Güll and Condoleeza Rice, in fact, represents a restriction but not an enlargement of the cooperation field that in spite the field is smaller, the cooperation doesn't become more precise, as expected, but, on the contrary, can become dizzier, more sensitive and, in this dimension, little more profitable and realistic or intelligent.

Even if the document prescribed cooperation consolidated in many "touchy" dossiers of our époque – the peace and stability promotion by democratic means in the Greater Middle East the Israeli-Arabian conflict resolution, fight against terrorism, energetic security -, it did not open a strategic partnership between the United States and Turkey but just led to an agreement.

A strategic partnership means a lot more. First of all, it means the same positions' adoption over all the issues. Or, Turkey and the United States don't have, in many directions, the same approaches also in the Kurd issue, in the Middle East ones, the energetic (even if Baku-Ceyhan pipeline passes across Turkey), neither in the Lebanese one. It

seems Turkey is one of the countries opposing to some US policies. This clear position does not put a disadvantage on Turkey but, on the contrary, imposes respect because the role of this country in the area, although Turkey doesn't have extraordinary relations with none of its neighbours, is very important.

Possible questions, difficult answers

Geopolitically and geo-strategically speaking, Turkey is one of the certain areas and countries' generating numerous questions but although possible answers for nowadays' great problems. These responses are not yet very clear and easy to formulate but they exist, they are to be expected and, probably, some will be formulated in time. The geopolitics' specialists, always interested in the pivots' theory or the vital space one – to justify the great conflicts or aggressions -, preoccupied too much by this area that figures to be of main importance for the Euro-Asian security environment configuration and reconfiguration and throughout a certain kind even for the entire world. There are also other explanations. Turkey has not always been what it is now. Or, maybe the world didn't understand or didn't wanted to, what Turkey means and what it possible would mean for today's and tomorrow's horizons of the Euro-Asian civilizations.

Turkey, reduced after the Ottoman Empire decrease, decline and disappearance to the place it owns now, for many people, seems to be out of the big world's strategic corridor and isolated in the Little Asia peninsula for never regain what it had once. Even if Turkey still owns an important European bridge front as the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits being so, in a way, the winner for the Black Sea battle, the Western Europe after the World War I took all the measures for the revival of the ex-Empire to be in vain. At least, this is some people's opinion but the things are not that simple. While Samuel P. Huntington in his famous book **Clash of Civilization...**² considered Turkey a possible nucleus of the Islamic civilization, by tradition's force, its glorious past and its leadership capacity, the leaders of this country from the Kemal Atatürk until now choosing a way for this country that never gone down under its ancestors dignity: the way to modern democratic civilization.

The theory that, in the actual circumstances,



predicts the balance into the international relations has its origins in the system built on the Westphalia treaty from 1648³. In this system, all the countries share the European common culture that distinguishes clearly from the Ottoman Turkey and other peoples' ones. They consider the state-nations to be the basic unit of the international relations and accept the theoretical and legal equality between states with different sizes (dimensions), wealth and power. The common cultural roots and the legal equality ease the use of powers' balance to counteract a unique hegemonic power emergency.

In that era, still, the results were far from being perfect. Will they be now? It is a certain thing that EU, although cannot separate by the United States, constitutes a counter-weight to its tendency to dominate the world, to maintain as hegemonic power, and, especially, to keep in respect the European continent, guilty for the burst of both global wars. Also Turkey, candidate for joining the European Union, although effectively cooperates with the United States does not accept what it is not suitable for it. And this is normal. Turkey has enough problems in the area and the United States' policy regarding the democratic and prosperous Greater Middle East, even if isn't in the detriment of Turkey, is far from the effective preoccupations of it to solve the acute security issues from its neighbourhood. Moreover, in time, Atatürk barrage built on Euphrates could generate a deepening of the water crisis that will launch in this part of world, one of the most awful wars – the water one⁴. Of course, Turkey does not seem to be guilty of such a kind of war but it could be involved especially because a part from the water sources provisioning the region comes from the Turkish mountain areas. Turkey is one of the few regions' countries that does not lack of water but can generate problems of water control in the entire area.

Overpassing the 1648 Westphalia peaces complex, more acutely and necessarily many questions arise: What is, basically, Turkey? Is Turkey still a pure Islamic country and a leader of the Islamic world? Did it exit from its millenaries traditions becoming an Western, democratic and prosperous country that denies its origins and works now in a victorious march toward West? Therefore, is Turkey a hundred percent European country, part of the Western civilization? These questions generate other needed, harsh and acute interrogations: Can be Turkey a European front of

bridge in the Islamic world, in the Greater Middle East, on the main strategic fault of our world, more exactly, between the European or Euro-Atlantic type civilization and the Islamic one, as long as we remember this country's European vocation? On the other hand, is Turkey building an Islamic front bridge into the European civilization with hard predictable consequences for Europe's future? This is because we must remember that, in its profoundness, it remains a country where Islam is the main religion. Otherwise, is Turkey a double front bridge and, actually, the bridge between the both fronts – one from the Islamic world and the other one from the West -, this being the benefit for a possible pattern of tomorrow's reconciliation? Is Turkey an interface country, a place of confluences between two huge civilizations?

There are big temptations to affirm, justify and sustain the wanted answer. We do not know if this response is or can be more realistic. Of course, Atatürk's Turkey chose democracy, modernization, modern state, secular, the way of economic and social development, required liberties for prosperity and culture. But Turkey never lacked a projection for future or respect for the past. The Ottoman Empire was not better or worse than other empires but nowadays Turkey is a country engaged with all its forces into region's problems resolution, in the security environment's consolidation in one of Euro-Asian very sensitive areas.

Turkey is a powerful and stable country even if confronting with many problems, some of them coming from the circle of fire that surrounds it and others from the internal conflict realities that have lasted for thousands of years.

Therefore, there are two important questions: Is Turkey an entity with complex functions for building the future or remains just an interface between two worlds being in conflict? Is there really a conflict between these two worlds or is it just about an enormous misunderstanding, a huge mistake?

Over an erupting volcano

During his short visit to Erbil, the capital of the Kurd autonomous area from the Iraqi Kurdistan, at the end of the March 2008, Dick Cheney⁵ sent to Massoud Barzani, the president of the Kurd autonomous region from Iraq, an invitation from the President George Bush. The United States



released a symbolical but not categorical signal. The autonomous Kurds' representatives from the north of Iraq are convinced – at least they declare – that the relations between them and Americans are very good. Five years after Saddam Hussein's dismantle, the Kurds seem to be the main allies of the US in Iraq. They have huge hopes in Americans to fulfil their dream – a state to reunite the entire region's Kurds – and want to benefit quickly from such a favourable conjecture that won't last very much. Even if it lasts, the Kurds will also have to solve out a hard problem – the hardest from their entire history – the fact that they have never been united. In this regard, under the American umbrella, the Kurds from the North of Iraq emphasized their autonomy and independence in relation with the Baghdad government. In the strategic environment it evolves, we do not know very clear what they will be doing with such an autonomy, excepting the conflict's accentuation and the Turkish riposte intensification over PKK movements, that are considered terrorist.

The proximity between Washington and Ankara diminished very much the Kurds' hopes and supporting the Turkish army offensive against PKK, deployed on the Iraqi territory, and undermined more the idea of autonomy and the effective reality of Kurds' autonomy in Iraq. They also believe in this possibility based on the indirect American support, because there is oil in the area.

And, still, the situation isn't simple at all. Dick Cheney ended his tour in the area with a visit to Turkey's capital. In Ankara, he underlined that the United States continues to provide Turkey information to help it fight against PKK, the Kurdish guerrilla. This game is not to affect the Kurdish concept of autonomy and independence. Moreover, if the American soldiers leave Iraq, the embryonic Kurd state from Iraq will be threatened from both sides: from the north, by the Turkish soldiers and from the south, by the rivalry between Shiites and Sunnites. Here we add the most serious of the threats: the Kurd disunion and the Kurds' lack of unity.

Turkey proved to be intransigent on such problems and its allies can't understand this attitude. In 2003, Turkey didn't allow its territory to be crossed by the American intervention team toward Iraq, creating some tensions with the American ally within NATO. In exchange, in February 2008, the United States gave free hand for

the Turkish army, to develop actions against PKK on the Iraqi territory. So, we come to the conclusion that between the Kurd autonomy and Turkey, the United States can't give up its NATO Turkish ally and partner, because Turkey plays a peculiar role for the area's balance and stabilization and the Americans can't miss. Turkey's role will increase significantly in the future and the Americans know this.

The Kurd authorities know the Americans can't support the Kurds in the detriment of the geopolitical Turkish ally, a very important one in this area. Therefore, the Americans can't renounce to support Turkish policy to stabilize the area, to manage the Kurd crisis – crisis assimilated with a complex of terrorist actions -, to maintain a powerful and stable ally here, with a disordered Iraq and a hostile Iran which, moreover, assesses a doubtfully nuclear program and may be quite dangerous, with a boiling Caucasus and an Afghanistan impossible to calm down.

Although some analysts sustain that Israel us the main ally of the US in the area, more and more, the reality shows that not Israel but Turkey can be a truly Euro-Asian geo-strategic pivot, with an important role in the both dimensions: the Euro-Atlantic and peculiarly in the Euro-Atlantic – Euro-Asian one with its composite fragile and extremely tormented – the Middle East and the Near East -, but also in the Euro-Asian part. Fortunately, Israel may be used as an avanpost, on one hand, to manage the Palestinian hostility and, on the other hand, the intolerance and hostility of the Arab world and the ones against a Jewish state in the area. This fact is only locally but, although it is as it is, it continues to gain a double geo-strategic impact:

- First, it maintains tensions within the Middle East which, in the new geopolitical and geo-strategic games, doesn't have, practically, any value but undermines the real great problems the world confronts with in the power, influence and crisis management centres' reconfiguration;

- Secondly, even if it irradiates conflict within the Middle East by offending the Arab world, this conflict maintains the Arab world in disorder and lack of unity.

The real geopolitical and geo-strategic problems meant to centre and concentrate the great powers and international organizations' attention is in Asia-Pacific, in the Eastern Asia, in the South-Eastern Asia and, especially, on the strategic fault between



the Islamic world and the West one. Turkey lies here, right in the middle of this fault.

So, Turkey isn't a fault country – even if the fault effect is felt within -, but it is effectively laid on a place where if you aren't very strong you disappear or suffer all the time this effect as happened to Romania (also situated on a strategic fault between three empires), for hundreds of years, being fragmented in three countries, and this is how it feels even now in the West Balkans and other world's areas which have or had such a fate, to be crossed by the big battles hurricanes or the great human ambitions.

Turkey knows this better and reacts accordingly. That is why, some years ago, chose the way to a democratic development and, confronting huge obstacles, and has continued even today the wide opened direction by this great visionary, Kemal Atatürk.

The only impediment in this geopolitical architecture is the fact that Turkey – with all its special achievements in the modernization and democratization plan – is still a country with a remarkable Islamic configuration. Constantly, the Islamists (politicians of Islamic religion) gain during elections 16-20 percents and the way of living can't be pulled out and, in our opinion, it shouldn't be, from the ancient traditions. Or, maybe it isn't a disadvantage but a big advantage ...

After the integration in NATO, in 1952, due to its exceptional geographic position, Turkey benefited by a special attention from the West, especially from the United States and Germany. Turkey got a substantial military aid from both countries, 7.8 billion dollars from US, over 86% from the Turkey armament being provided by the United States. Although Germany offered Turkey, in 1994, a big amount from its surplus of armament, especially the one coming from the Former Democratic Republic of Germany (300 tanks, 250.000 machine guns, etc.) but also 100 Leopard tanks, 100.000 antitank missiles, etc. We should not also forget that few millions of Turks work in Germany.

Some analysts, especially from Cyprus⁶, consider that Turkey continue to be a sort of bridge front used by West, especially by the Americans, for controlling or supervising the former Soviet space, or in a certain form, even Russia. Moreover, the military bases from Turkey offer the possibility of an efficient surveillance of Iraq, Iran, Near East

and Caucasus, the most tensioned zone from the planet.

Neighbours and vicinity

Turkey's neighbours are: Georgia (252 km of land border); Armenia (268 km of land border); Iran (499 km land border); Syria (822 km land border); Greece (206 km land border in the European area); Bulgaria (240 km land border). The length of Turkey's land borders is 2.639 km and the maritime littoral is 8.333 km. Turkey owns 34 percent from the Black Sea littoral, 1374 km from the total length of 4040 km.

Excepting a little border portion with Georgia, Turkey has tensioned relations with almost all the other neighbours because the border areas from this part (Armenia, Iran, Iraq, Syria) are inhabited by Kurds and Armenia is considered by Turkey as a destabilization and aggressor country. As result from the Armenian-Azeri war, started in 1994, 40.000 Azeri and 700.000 from other seven Azerbaijan's provinces became emigrants in their own country. Therefore, Turkey closed in 1993 its border and in 1994 the air space with Armenia. Armenia considers that the embargo imposed by Turkey and Azerbaijan costs between 570 and 720 million dollars per year. Armenia claims from Turkey a part of East Anatolia, including the Ararat Mountain. With all these tensions, Turkey was the second country after the USA that, on 16th of April 1991, recognized Armenia's independency. Moreover, Turkey supported economically Armenia, allowed its territory to be bypassed by the convoys transporting aids for Armenia and on 25th of June 1992 invited this country to take part to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation initiated by Turkey, even to send a permanent representative to Istanbul.

One of the most intricate problems of the Middle East – excepting the Iraqi one and the Iran's nuclear program – constitutes, as we well know, the Kurd's population situation. This population is somewhere around 20.000.000 people. The Kurds are distributed in five countries (Turkey, Armenia, Iran, Iraq, Syria) but are grouped about the same area and this creates big border problems.

After the Ottoman Empire deterioration, the Great Britain, tutelary power in this sector, decided to create the Kurdistan state, according to the Sévres Treaty from 1920. The country should have been officially created but the Foreign Office



POINT OF VIEWS

didn't succeed to find a representative for Kurdistan because the Kurds were very much divided. Practically, it was impossible to create this state. Therefore, the territory was split between Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran and Armenia. None of these states accepts the formation of the Kurdistan state. This territory is very rich in resources especially in oil and water.

In the Middle East, water is even more important than oil. Also, the Kurd population is Sunnite while all the others are Shiite.

Within the Kurd population, there are different sects. States where Kurds are part have different policies especially acculturation. Three alphabets are used in the area: Arab (Iraq, Syria); Cyrillic (Armenia) and Latin (Turkey).

Since 1920, the Kurd population launched the armed fight for its unity and, obviously, for the creation of a Kurd state.

During World War II, the fights ceased in intensity but began again after 1960 and in 1994 the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a Marxist orientation party, launches the war against Turkey.

After 1995, candidate to the European Union, Turkey relaxed the situation offering rights to the Kurd population and, after 2000, lifted the emergency situation in some places.

The Kurds are still nomads but, today, a part of them settled to towns, that is against their tradition, and therefore they hardly adapt to this lifestyle. Many of them migrated abroad, constituting Diasporas that support the battle for autonomy and for a Kurdish state.

The autonomy obtained in Iraq and the creation of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region got into new problems. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) manages the Northern part of this region and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) manages the Southern part.

Moreover, elements of PKK retreated also on this territory, as they intensified the actions against Turkey. This determined the Turks to develop offensive armed actions on the Iraq territory, including air raids against the Kurds. These actions were authorized by the United States, as they were

Location	Estimated Kurdish population		Percentage from the Kurdish population	
	Minimum	Maximum	Minimum	Maximum
Turkey	9.630.000	12.160.000	49,0	46,4
Iran	5.000.000	8.000.000	25,7	30,5
Iraq	3.750.000	4.550.000	19,2	17,4
Syria	877.500	1.096.900	4,5	4,2
Armenia	302.000	373.000	1,6	1,5
Total Kurds	19.559.500	26.180.100	100	100

Source: http://www.empyree.org/cours/geographie/geographie_politique/TD/Kurdistan.html

considered counter-terrorist measures.


By the end of the 20th century, the numeric situation of the Kurd population was estimated as below.

The autonomous Kurdistan situation from Iraq is quite precarious.

Even if such a region was born because of

the Baghdad's government vulnerability and impotence, the surrounding countries – Turkey, Iran and Syria – don't support it but also make everything possible to malfunction.

As we see nowadays this region – situated exactly to the border with Turkey -, it is unlikely to have a major international support.



Source : Institut kurde de Paris ; Mehrad R. Izady, Université de Columbia, New York.

PHILIPPE REKACEWICZ

It is very hard to say or suppose what will happen in the future. On one hand, everything is up to this population's capacity to stabilize itself and to correctly and unitedly organize – less probable to happen –, but especially on the attitude of the involved countries and the international community.

Or, as we all know, the Kurd problem isn't a priority on the great powers' or the international organizations' agenda.

The world is more preoccupied today by the globalization's effects, preventing and combating terrorism, crises and armed conflict management, the real control of the weapons of mass destruction and other numerous problems.

The situation from Iraq and also from Afghanistan, too, remain tensioned, the American casualties in Iraq overcome 4.000 dead soldiers and many wounded people, the Taliban intensify their actions in Afghanistan, Iran continues its nuclear program, the Tibetans move on, the transborder criminality proliferates, the oil price is still up, overcoming 116 dollars/barrel, the economic crisis blooms.

The only country that reacts firmly against any Kurd movements is Turkey.

Turkey and the Black Sea

The Black Sea doesn't seem to get a special interest, militarily or otherwise, although the neighbouring states try to attract the attention over it.

Less from military perspective. In the ballistic missile era, when they can travel, in tens of minutes, 10.000 kilometres and the one's of aviation's strategic bombardment that can travel at any distance, to close a fleet of strategic value into the Black Sea is similar with a suicide.

It would be almost the same thing as once in the past, when the Romanian military fleet was deployed in the Limanu Lake. This lake exit to the sea, on the communication bridge Mangalia – Vama Veche, and it could be easily interrupted with a grenade. It is true, now, the Black Sea borders the European Union and is also part of NATO area. This is seen from the fact that Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania – NATO members – have almost 47% from the Black Sea Littoral⁷ and Turkey manages the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits.

And, still, the interest for the Black Sea area, even for the Wider Black Sea Area is low. Undoubtedly, the Black Sea has no military strategic value. So, why should we still emphasize the special value of



the Wider Black Sea Area?⁸

There are many arguments. They have value only if it is clearly understood that the process it generates and fundamentals is the Euro-Asian value. This value results, in our opinion, from:

- The existence of two countries of Euro-Asian dimension and composition – Russia and Turkey – riparian states that managed for ages this sea and the region's fate;

- The Black Sea region represents today also an area of fault but also one of Euro-Asian confluence;

- The energetic resources the Black Sea basin contains and the ones that will be discovered by the existent geophysical potential exploration;

- The Danube's commercial and infrastructural potential.

The stabilization, safety and economic growth of the countries from the Wider Black Sea Area (Russia, Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine – riparian countries – and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece, Macedonia, Albania, Serbia, Hungary, Slovakia, Moldova – countries interested and dependent on the Black Sea) but also the European Union's involvement – peculiarly Germany, as a Danube country, therefore, being part of this region -, also the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization as entity of security and dynamic and complex global security building can constitute, in and from this area, a zone of Euro-Asian strategic suture and synopsis where there will be harmonized the interests specific to Near and Middle East, Central Asia, Russia and the European Union.

The main pillars which can generate such a policy and, consequently, a complex strategy of Euro-Asian synthesis are: Russia, Turkey and Germany, each representing also a type of civilization, a type of religion, a type of economy, obviously mutually accepted by all the area's countries.

Of course, without concrete actions, that should sustain by facts such a possibility, the initiatives, studies and theories remain simple words without loud resonance. Basically, *epistola non erubescit* (the paper bares everything).

In our opinion, Russia is too far away from the area in order to treat it with priority, has major global interests peculiarly in the Central European and the Northern European areas, the North-East and Central Asia. Germany is, for now, centred on the so-called MittelEuropa (but not only), the European

Union and NATO have their own problems with the enlargement, the areas' reconfigurations, the world's conflicts' management, especially in Iraq, Afghanistan and West Balkans, Caucasus and other hot spots, the creation of a peaceful vicinity, etc.

Therefore, we consider that the only country being able to engage in such a project is Turkey that already got into action. The creation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC), some bilateral structures, BLACKSEAFOR entity, etc., is elements to be considered.

The future project of a littoral freeway, the exploration and the assessment of some projects to explore and prospect the Black Sea depths, the unprecedented tourism development, peculiarly on the Turkish littoral, in Bible-known areas as Ararat, situated not so far by the littoral, as well as the revival of the old silk way could rise, step by step, the region's value.

The areas' countries adhesion to the European Union and NATO, the traditional conflicts diminution, the exit from the history's shadows and the good reconsideration of the common historic values, the implementation of some programs of lasting economic development are, in our opinion, and as a result from many analyses, big steps toward the area's geopolitical and geo-strategic re-dimension.

Turkey, together with Russia, plays here an essential role. That is why, at the beginning of the paper I called it "a synthesis country".

The Black Sea region, by its resources, its depths unknown content but also by its confluence of cultures can become a pivot with stabilization and integration function in the Euro-Asian area, if only Russia and Turkey want it, if these Euro-Asian countries, the former enemies during the empires' era, supported by the European Union and the United States, but especially by Germany, a Danube country, therefore, interested in the Black Sea, ally and decide that in this confluence zone – the biggest confluence on the planet -, to assess and implement a huge plan of dynamic reconstruction of the Euro-Asian area around the place Noah's Ark saved the humanity. Maybe there's a chance for humanity to be saved again, for the second time.

NOTES:



¹<http://www.turquieeuropeenne.eu/article1459.html>.

² Samuel P. HUNTINGTON, **The Clash of Civilizations the Remaking of World Order**, Simon & Schuster, 1997.

³*La revue internationale et stratégique*, in no. 34 from the 1999 summer, Samuel P. HUNTINGTON, *Superpuissance solitaire* (article quoted from the Foreign Affairs/New York Syndicate, 1999).

⁴Turkey doesn't miss water. Turkey's surface water debit is 270 billion cube meters per year. Turkey disposes of 900 natural lakes with a million hectares surface, 100 barrage lakes with a surface of 170.000 hectares and a 53 billion cube meters volume of lagoon zones in a total of 70.000 hectares, 700 natural ponds with a million cube meters of water, 37 barriers with a surface of 25.000 hectares. The total length of the Turkey's water courses is of 175.000 kilometres.

⁵ <http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2008/03/27/01003/20080327ARTFIG00325-la-turquie-s-invite-dans-l-alliance-amricano-kurde.php>.

⁶ http://www.kypros.org/Chypre/autres_pays/le_role_geopo.htm.

⁷ The 4047 kilometers of the Black Sea littoral are distributed as: Turkey – 34%, Ukraine – 31%; Russia – 15%; Georgia – 14%; Bulgaria – 7% and Romania 6%.


⁸ The Black Sea has a surface of 413.488 square kilometers, with an average depth of 1.282 meters and the maximum depth of 2.245 meters. According to other data, the Black Sea surface is about 466.200 square meters; the average depth: 1271 m; the maximum depth: 2211 m (in the Central-Southern part); the waters volume: 537.000 square kilometers; the maximum length: 1.200 km; the maximum depth of the oxygen layer: 150 m. The Black Sea salinity is just 55% from the planetary ocean one. Into the Black Sea acts a circular current, with a deviation toward its center, coming from the Mediterranean Sea, along the Turk littoral and comes back to the Mediterranean Sea after surrounding all the littoral area through Marmora Sea. The current brings salty waters from the Mediterranean Sea and carry to

the Mediterranean Sea less salty waters from the Black Sea. Is presumed that the Black Sea was, before 7460 year, a lake separated by the Mediterranean Sea by a isthmus (the place where lays Bosphorus today) with a water level 150 m lower than the Mediterranean Sea. Into the last glaciations, about 6820-7460 years before, because of the significant growth of the planetary ocean level, the isthmus between the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea broke and the Mediterranean waters burst over the Black Sea ones with about 100 km/hour, the flood – knew as the “Noah Flood” lasted for 40 days. To support this hypothesis, except the legend, were brought many scientific arguments. On the Ararat mountain where it supposed was anchored Noah's ark were found, under the ice, 5000 years old wood elements and the expeditions made by the discoverer of the Titanic wreck, dr. Ballard, in 1999 and September 2000, confirmed the theory elaborated by William Ryan and Walter Pitman in 1998 regarding the Mediterranean overflowing the Black Sea and discovered some human presence traces in the Flood's era. There exit 13 variables of this Flood coming from different parts of world perfect justifiable because in the ices melting era, the oceans' level rose and waters overfilled the low terrains.

In the Black Sea aren't vertical currents. Therefore, exist two water overlaid layers. The first, until a depth of 150-200 meters, oxygenated, reduced salinity and allows living. Under this layer, water is strongly sulfured, oxygen lacks and doesn't exist life. Still, the lack of oxygen makes possible the intact conservation of the last civilizations traces. Grigore Antipa made a scientific expedition to the Black Sea and realized a monumental paperwork. After Ballard's expedition, when they found out the ex-littoral before the flood (maybe the Black Sea littoral from Paleolithic corresponds with the place where the abyssal path is nowadays), the mysteries over the Black Sea profoundness multiplied. Moreover, when was discovered that deep down the Black Sea exist areas with unsalted water. A lot of questions expect their answers, among them are the ones regarding the energetic wealth that must be found under the bottom of this strange sea.

Brigadier General (ret.) Gheorghe VĂDUVA, PhD (vaduvageorge@yahoo.fr), is a researcher within the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University "Carol I". He wrote numerous strategy papers, among which we mention "The Rapid Actions Strategy", AISM Publishing House, 2003, "Military Strategy for the Future", Paideia Publishing House, 2003, "Military Art During Millenia", CTEA Publishing House, 2004, co-author of "The Future's War, the War's Future", NDU Publishing House, 2004, "Essay on Strategic Art", Military Publishing House, 2005, "Partnership Strategy, the Strategic Partnership", NDU Publishing House, 2006. He also wrote studies, article, essays on the military art and the strategic culture, issued by the NDU Publishing House and by specialty papers.

THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS



The volume *“The terrorist organizations”* is an important paper, elaborated by experts of the topic - General questor Professor Anghel ANDREESCU, PhD, head of the Public Order and Safety Department within the Ministry of Interior and Administration Reform and chief inspector lecturer Nicolae RADU, PhD, counsellor within the Ministry of Interior and Administration Reform.

The paper, structured in ten chapters, approaches the whole spectrum of the terrorist field managing the topic from different perspectives: psychological, sociological, political, religious, military and chronological. There are few books where we may find such a complex and complete approach of the phenomenon. There are discussed not only the Islamic extremist organizations. It is stressed out the progress from the international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, resulted in the neutralizations of actions from ETA and IRA, but, meantime, rendering more difficult Al-Qaida actions, especially the ones related with launching rebellions in the Muslim states for toppling certain leaders.

Starting from the first chapter, the authors state not only the effects, but also the causes of this phenomenon. On the other hand, they underline

the fact that the military way of fighting against terrorism does not yield results anymore, but the economic progress would be a cheaper and an easier way, and with better results. The terrorists are recruited from the underdeveloped areas. These are also the best places for training and developing organizations. A way for combating terrorism would be the elimination of the causes that determined this phenomenon, as probably the most important one is the cultural barrier.

According to the authors, world needs a multi-faceted strategy, that should de-legitimize the attacks on civilian, should discourage the countries that offer terrorists shelter and resources, should strengthen the guard of the main objectives within their states and should hinder the terrorists’ access to weapons of mass destruction. There are new rules to be imposed, related with the fight against terrorism, including by the careful study of the ones used by some states confronting for many years with this calamity.

Terrorism may be combated but as a phenomenon it is unlikely to be dismantled, determining us to start acting. So far, there have been adopted more than 1600 UN Resolutions, most of them broken. Under these circumstances, on average term, the authors assert, the connected infringements will amplify, the organised crime, the drug trafficking, money laundering, corruption, etc. have unprecedented thresholds. The terrorist actions will become more and spectacular, the excessive media exposure determines the amplification of terrorism as a form of the “holy war”, directed against the democratic societies and having unimaginable consequences.

In the actual geopolitical context, when the worst war is the terrorist one, it is very important to understand the phenomenon.

With a detailed bibliography and footnotes on each chapter, “The terrorist organizations” is a well-documented paper that may be used both for courses and as an important source for scientific research.

I.C.



THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES

APRIL-JUNE 2008

As a traditional event, the annual International Scientific Session, STRATEGIES XXI, organised by the National Defence University "Carol I" (April, 17 – 18), approached "The Security and Defence within the European Union" and was organised in 13 sections. There were guests from the Romanian Government, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Education, Research and Youth, Ministry of Interior and Administration Reform, rectors from military and civilian universities, other personalities within the Romanian scientific community. CDSSS was responsible for organizing the Section on "Security and defence".

There were presented analysis, opinions and estimates on the future of the European security environment, the evolution of risks and threats and the challenges' projection as there is an increase of the exigencies' complexity on the security and defence architecture. There has been stressed out that, in order to be effective on accomplishing the new types of missions generated by the nowadays' realities, the armies are obliged to continuously transform themselves, to adapt to the new forms and resorts to the armed violence. The guests insisted on the role played by the South-East Europe within the globalization process, related with security issues, military and energy aspects, emphasizing the need of a balanced approach, complying with the international norms, of challenges on the regional and European security environment. The participants expressed their satisfaction for the chosen topic, the way the event has been organised and the debates' level. They have also expressed their interest for the future scientific events organised by the National Defence University "Carol I".

Within this period of time, the most important activity organised by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies was the Seminar on "Opportunities and perspectives for the national defence industry after NATO Summit from Bucharest". The seminar was organised on May, 23, 2008, together with C. N. „Romarm". There participated representatives from the Committee for Defence Public Order, and National Security from the Chamber of Deputies, from the General Staff, the Armaments Department, Department of Policy of Defence and Planning, the chiefs of the Services' Staffs, researchers from education institutions, military research institutions and the Romanian defence industry.

The reunion was a direct dialogue between the leadership of the Ministry of Defence, the Services' Staffs, the President of the Committee for Defence Public Order, and National Security from the Chamber of Deputies, and representatives from the companies involved in the defence industry. Taking



into consideration the increased complexity of the NATO's and EU's military structures, the Romanian Army that our state assumes, there have been debated actual and future issues related with the troops' endowment, the exigencies on the armament's and fight means' quality, the perspectives of fulfilling them by the producers, the future of the Romanian defence industry, etc. The event was a good occasion for an exchange of opinions between two traditional partners from the Romanian society, an attempt to identify some solutions for developing this sensitive field of the Romanian economy, an offer to the perspective of the future defence industry in the process of the Romanian integration within NATO and EU.

Researchers from The Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University "Carol I" participated at different scientific events, both in Romania and abroad. In Slovakia, in April, 01 – 06, there were organised some international scientific activities in the restrictive framework of the "Visegrad Group". Our Centre has been represented by two researchers that presented interesting papers.

Another international activity that our Centre sent a representative was the Conference on "Current and future threats on security – their influence on the armed forces". It was organised in April, 9-11, in Warsaw, Poland, by the Polish National Defence University. There were more than 100 participants from Poland and other foreign countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Romania, Russia, Hungary). The Centre's representative presented a scientific paper on "The Future of the armed conflicts – nature and challenges – Romania's approach" and there were developed the main ideas of the Romanian official documents on the future of the armed conflicts, security and security strategies.

There have been also presented papers on the Scientific Session organised by the Air Forces Academy in Brasov, May, 16-17, "Scientific Research and Education within the Air Forces", and on the International Conference organised by "Danubius" University from Galati, in May, 16-17, on "The European Integration – realities and perspectives".

Within the research project on "The security of systems, military and civil-military actions used for crisis management and armed conflicts", some representatives from the Centre participated at a workshop on "The experience and the lessons learnt from securing the dispositions acting in the theatres of operations. Requirements, challenges, dangers, threats, vulnerabilities, risks", organised by the Land Forces Operational Command in Buzău.

The most important scientific activity organised this year by Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies is the Annual International Scientific Session on "Policies and strategies on managing conflictuality" that will be organised in November, 21-22. The information on enrolling to this session will be timely posted on our website, <http://cssas.unap.ro>.

Irina CUCU



INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

On selecting the articles there are taken into consideration: the area of the subjects presented in the magazine, the actuality of the topic, its novelty and originality, its scientific content and the adequacy to the editorial norms adopted by the magazine.

The paper sent to be published should not have been published (print or online) or simultaneously submitted to another publication. The article should not contain any party political connotations.

The papers' scientific evaluation is done by two scientific experts that are either professors or senior fellow researchers.

The article, written in a foreign language (English, French) may have maximum 10-12 pages (6.000 – 7.000 words) and has to be sent both in print and paper, using Times New Roman font, size 12, one line, and the tables and schemes have to be printed separately. The translation into Romanian will be provided by the editor.

The text has to be preceded by an abstract which is not to exceed 250 words, both in Romanian and English. The papers have to be signed adding the authors' scientific degree, name, first name, name and have to end with a short curriculum vitae, 60 words maximum, specifying the professional qualification, the institution he comes from and other information considered necessary, including the e-mail address.

The footnotes are to be included by the end of the article and have to respect the international regulations. Authors can publish only one article by issue.

The text has to present an easy structure, using titles (subtitles). The abbreviations will be marked on the text only at their first mention on the text. It is likely to end the papers with some important conclusions regarding the importance of the research.

The articles will not use classified information.

As the magazine does not have a profitable purpose, the articles cannot be paid.

Our address is: National Defence University "Carol I", the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, 68-72 Panduri Street, sector 5, Bucharest, Romania, telephone: (021) 319.56.49; Fax: (021) 319.55.93, e-mail: cssas@unap.ro, web address: <http://cssas.unap.ro>, <http://impactstrategic.unap.ro>



After seven years since its first edition, STRATEGIC IMPACT magazine, edited by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University “Carol I” is a quarterly scientific magazine acknowledged locally and internationally for the wide area of topics - the political-military present, security strategy and military security, NATO and EU actions, informational society, strategic synthesis and evaluations, a special column “Strategic Event” that studies the strategic impact of the dynamics of the actions undertaken nationally, regionally and globally.

STRATEGIC IMPACT has as collaborators important researchers and personalities within the scientific research area and from the civilian and military university system, both national and international, from the Ministry of Defence, General Staff, services’ staffs, the Ministry of Interior and Administration Reform, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, military units and other state’s organizations, NGOs, companies, etc.

The international acknowledgement of the magazine’s quality is confirmed by its editions presented on sites belonging to prestigious foreign institutions (The International Relations and Security Network of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zürich; Defence Guide, in collaboration with the Hellenic Institute of Strategic Studies – HEL.I.S.S.), The Institute for Development and Social Initiatives – IDIS from the Republic of Moldova – the virtual library for political and security studies, etc.

The magazine is accredited by the National University Research Council and acknowledged as a B+ magazine that demonstrates the potential to become an international acknowledged magazine.

STRATEGIC IMPACT is a representative forum for reflection and debates on topics related to strategy and security for the scientific, academic, national and international community.

At present, STRATEGIC IMPACT magazine is issued separately in two editions, Romanian and English, and disseminated in the domestic and international scientific environment and also to the main institutions involved in security and defence.

Issue organizer: Corina VLADU
Designer: Corina VLADU
Masterproof: Corina VLADU
The National Defence University “Carol I” Printing House
