SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE BLACK SEA AREA

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The Message Addressed to the Participants on the International Scientific Session “Security and Stability in the Black Sea Area” by the Minister of National Defence

It is my honour to salute this new scientific approach of one of the most important institutions for the Romanian scientific research – the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University „Carol I”.

This scientific session tends to complete the efforts of the Romanian Ministry of Defence for integrating the Romanian Army in a knowledge-based society that has academic teaching system and scientific research as main pillars. Improving the education’s quality and competitiveness are important steps on implementing the action directions mentioned within the Bologna Process and optimising the relation between education and research and the needs of the society.

The military science field requires our special attention, being considered a landmark of the Romanian Army’s transformation process, connected with the North-Atlantic Alliance and the European Union, on our attempt of adapting ourselves to the nowadays security environment, of creating and developing a security culture and community. The solutions for the actual challenges, for the dynamic transformation of the military body have to be deeply substantiated. This debate is a good opportunity for military and civilian specialists to contribute to this process.

The issue of the security and stability in the Black Sea Area is very actual and very ample, as it has been taken into consideration by the whole international community. Once NATO’s borders will move to the Black Sea, and hopefully, the EU’s ones, too, this area has
become a special one. Turning the region into an international one has to be understood by the changes in the regional security environment generated both by the obvious affiliation to the democracy’s and market economy’s values and by "frozen conflicts”, the risks, dangers, threats and vulnerabilities emerging from this space. Analyzing and clarifying these aspects may offer unique projections on the Romania’s security policy on regional initiatives and strategies, on the opportunities the Romanian state, as an active actor, has to exploit fruitfully. NATO and EU enlargements, the establishment of the US bases in Romania and Bulgaria, the possible extension of “Active Endeavour” mission within the Black Sea and strengthening the regional cooperation are the main pillars on achieving a peaceful, secure and prosperous area.

The Romanian Ministry of Defence will continue ensuring the requested conditions for stimulating the creative effort in order to get the best solutions for our fully integration in NATO and EU. Therefore, the National Defence University „Carol I” and its Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies are very important on our way of achieving these purposes.

I am sure the annual scientific session “Security and stability in the Black Sea Area” will be a successful one and I wish you all the best.

Teodor ATANASIU,
Minister of the Romanian Ministry of National Defence
Honourable audience,

Let me salute, on my turn, the attendance to this scientific event and the valuable lectures that are about to be presented by distinguished foreign guests, Romanian researchers, military and civilians! I would like to address, as well, a warm welcome to the entire assistance!

It is already a tradition for the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University “Carol I” to organize, every autumn, the Scientific Session. This is a scientific event of major importance for the Romanian Army and for all the factors involved in the security field.

The today manifestation is, at the same time, an expression of the quality of the education, scientific research and other activities developed by the University, a high standard institution that remains a role model for the scientific act within the Romanian Army. It is a fact that every scientific activity hosted under the University’s aegis becomes a deep-seated confirmation for the activities to come.

It is worth mentioning that the scientific dimension plays an important role during the actual transformation process of our Army and in the Romania’s participation to the actions of the Alliance and EU. Nothing should be done by chance or conjectural. Everything should be based on a thorough scientific argumentation of the geopolitical and strategic options.

The world we live in is transforming and reshaping. The confrontation strategies are replaced by partnership strategies expressed in political and economical cooperation, in actions of international crises and conflict management. These do not exclude the competition. As a result, the responsibility of the states, international organisations and bodies, and international community has increased.
One of the areas where this trend is primarily represented is the Wider Black Sea Area, a region of strategic opportunities, which should be characterised by prosperity, stability and security. We assist, at present, to its transformation into an area of confluence for the XXIst century. The confluence in the Wider Black Sea Area features the economic dimension, specially the one designed to manage the energetic resources and the access to resources, the political dimension, and the military dimension and the security process, much more comprehensive, practically including the first two also.

The partnerships created within the Black Sea Organisation for Economic Cooperation, the bilateral and multilateral relations established in the Black Sea area are tangible realities of the general and economic policies applied in this area, and their results added to other results generate this so necessary security construction.

If it is desired to have a strengthen stability in Eurasia area, the process should start in the zone that used to be a confrontation area. One of these is the Wider Black Sea Region. The effect of this security construction would be the transformation of the Black Sea into an area with a strengthened democracy, an area of security and stability irradiation.

We do have the fundamental interest to build security, economical, political and military pillars in this area, which would extend in the adjacent area contributing to the tensions defusing, and to a better crisis and conflicts management in the Middle East and Central Asia.

This strategy of transforming the Wider Black Sea Area into a security and stability pillar corroborates with the strategy of the fight against the terrorism, with the active efforts shown within Southeast European Cooperation Initiative and Border Defence Initiative.

That is the reason we consider that the Wider Black Sea Area should necessarily benefit a special and focused interest from NATO, EU and Russia.

The region should consolidate its role of strategic security and stability, of confluence and cooperation in order to remain the major link between the two strategic areas, the Euro-Atlantic one and the Middle East, the Caspian Sea and the Central Asia one. It should also strengthen its control and improve its risk management generated by regional
frozen conflicts, drugs, human and weapon trafficking, illegal migration and trans-national organized crime, which represent destabilizing regional factors.

Within this area, we generated the above mentioned partnership system as modern peace, stability, stability and security institutions which represent a viable framework for the dynamic democratic and globalization processes and for preventive actions against the current challenges and threats.

The strategic partnership between the USA and Russia, the relationship with Turkey and the partnership with Ukraine are notable; also, within the same strategy to transform the Wider Black Sea Area into a durable development, security and stability pillar, the EU partnership with Russia and Ukraine and the willingness of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine for EU integration remain relevant.

In order to ensure the security in the Black Sea Area, a broad regional cooperation is necessary, as multiple security interdependence arose in this regional environment. The cooperation should mainly focus here on prevention, antiterrorist control and action, combined and complex measures – military, political, economical – for improving the life conditions and equality of chances.

Romania and its Armed Forces represent reliable partners for the process of cooperation and regional stability. They contribute to broader forms of cooperation development, to effective crisis management and to the prevention of the conventional and non-conventional risks. Romania also promotes the transatlantic values and the security standards, ensures the crises management interoperability throughout the Wider Black Sea Area, the cooperation in border and seashore security and in civil emergencies. Another field of interest would be the assistance given to the neighbour countries in the reform of the security sector as well as the development of the security programs’ reform. The activities of the Romanian Armed Forces and the armed forces of other states in the region for building confidence should also not be ignored.

It is worth mentioning the Romanian contribution to the complex measures of confidence enhancement through armament control, contacts at all levels, “Open Sky” agreements implementation with mutual
flights over the national territories in order to improve the confidence and transparency regarding the military operations.

In its effort of projecting a durable cooperation model in the area, based on the principles of mutual empower, multinational and regional responsibility, Romania takes an active position in South-Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial – Coordinating Committee (SEDM-CC) and in its military structure, SEEBRIG. These represent instruments to fight against the asymmetric risks, to increase the political and military confidence, to enhance the crisis resolution dialogue and to plan and conduct Humanitarian and Peace Support Operations under UN, EU or OSCE mandate.

Romania participates, together with our neighbours and the Black Sea coastal countries, in the exercises and activities of the regional initiatives SHIRBRIG and BLACKSEAFOR. The last is currently under Romanian command and represents a regional fertile element for the development of the cooperation and interoperability among the states’ armed forces in the region.

Romania is a true provider of regional stability and is constantly involved, using a dynamic, active and anticipating strategy, with specialized personnel in stability missions, international counterterrorism operations and in ensuring democracy implementation and post-conflict reconstruction. The Romanian military proficiency is already confirmed in the stability and reconstruction operations in Western Balkans, Greater Middle East and other regions where their support was requested.

In a changing security environment, with new crisis situations, with intensifying Alliance’s control over the East European routes of drug traffic, organized crime and other asymmetric risks, our country ought to have a more active contribution with its Armed Forces to the stability projects promotion, regional security and to guaranteeing a positive evolution in the area.

For the fulfilment of this goal, it will be necessary to have a thorough assessment for the challenges of the security environment, ways of crisis management, own capabilities, in such a manner we can act efficiently in the most complex and diversified situations, adapted to the requirements, through training and endowment.
The military cooperation in the Black Sea area needs new strategic models. Some of these are ad-hoc coalitions, integrated actions, an emerged functional solidarity, renewed and consolidated initiatives in order to create efficient operational tools in fighting against the terrorism and other trans-national threats. The differences are no longer impediments to the efforts of regional stabilization if no actor - state or non-state – could control by itself the complex processes in the area.

The numerous and diverse dynamics in the Wider Black Sea Area, neighbouring regions – Mediterranean Sea and the Greater Middle East – or Central Asia, which cannot be controlled or predicted, demand genuine solutions and actions, generated only through cooperation and mutual consultation.

Ladies and gentlemen,

I strongly consider the theme of this scientific forum as one of a stringent actuality and the following lectures and discussions, from the distinguished foreign and Romanian personalities, may represent a possible solution foundation for multiple and critical Wider Black Sea Area issues.

On behalf of the Romanian General Staff, I wish this scientific session a full success and I am looking forward to seeing your efforts published and useful for our own study. Because your work is very important!
I. Argumentation: why governance and security in the Black Sea Area

In the last few years, the non-military dimension of security has gained some points in front of the military one. The main reason is simple and over advocated in the security studies: the awareness of the fact that the end of the Cold War brought with it both the diminution of the military threat’s amplitude and the emergence of new political, economic, social, and environmental risks, dangers, and threats. Still, there is a constant that transcends those two periods of time – the need for democratization of both ex-communist countries and all of the Third World countries. The intensity of this need varies by the existing paradigms, but the culminating point was reached after 9/11 when the USA and NATO had initiated military operations in the Near and Middle East. Black Sea area became a subject of a controversial debates because it rejoined to the continental and regional geopolitical transformations flux and there is crystallized a conception of a distinct zone which, even extremely diversified, is changing in an entity with many common interests in these geopolitical games, sometimes divergent.

This change was reflected even in security strategies elaborated after 90’s. European states and other states (USA as the world solitary superpower) introduced new concepts, besides war against terrorism and European and Euro-Atlantic integration: bad governance as a potential risk, good governance as desiderate and modality to achieve the security state. Furthermore, the international organizations – UN, European Commission or World Bank – started to be more and more preoccupied by identification and solution of governance problems. Good governance became an essential condition for development assistance
provided by donors’ international agencies. Also, good governance is one of the Millennium Development Goals main targets, the UN agenda for poverty reduction and life conditions improvement.

The Black Sea states are among those ones that the international organizations politics is addressed to, because of the proximity of NATO and EU frontiers or even integration, their security state will direct influence the security of these international actors. Over a decade, the international security is confronted with Black Sea area’s fragmentation trends and in particular the Europe security with a geopolitical dilemma in its relation with that: integration and stability building versus disintegration and latent conflicts. It seems that the response to these challenges rests in international cooperation based on four main elements: willingness to make a partnership, reciprocal sustenance and respect, opportunities creation for regional cooperation and positive and constructive relations with governments in this area. This desiderate can’t be achieved on a base of distrust and internal political instability. So, it is necessarily that the riverside and extended area states to solve with or without the international support the internal problems, especially governance ones.

However, why is needed such stabilization and development efforts in the Black Sea region? The Black Sea has a strategic location: it is situated to the intersection between Europe and Asia, between big Russia and Middle East and directly links South-East Europe with Occidental Europe through Danube River, but also Mediterranean Sea, and, in present, the NATO and EU expansion transformed this area in a near vicinity of great Euro-Atlantic powers. Also, the Black Sea area is important for the huge diversity of humans and cultures that characterizes the riverside states, diversity that constitutes both a conflict source and a cultural development source. We mustn’t forget the economic factor, especially the natural resources, which confer the Black Sea the status of a strategic interest area.

Moreover, we think that there are many arguments that lead to the connection between the Black Sea area, the six riverside states, with the far regions of Caucasus and Caspian Sea when we talk about security problems. The most important refers to the fact that area represents a
linking bridge for various actors of international scene that have distinct economical, political and strategic interests. Thereby, the concept of the Black Sea region is a useful instrument for description and explaining the complexity of the dynamic relations manifested here.

2. Governance’s measuring and diagnotization in Black Sea Area

2.1. Theoretical guidelines

The specialists on economic, political and social sciences succeed to respond to the question of what are the governance indicators, especially of good governance. So, some suggested the following analysis grille, formed by six good governance indicators:

1. Participation – the implication degree of decedents;
2. Decency – the grade in which the elaboration and implementation of law take into account the human dignity;
3. Correctness – the grade in which the rules are uniform applied to all, without any reference to the social status;
4. Responsibility – the grade in which the public officials, elected or appointed, assumes the responsibility for their actions and responds to the requirements formulated by population;
5. Transparency – the grade in which the decisions adopted by public officials are clear and open to citizens’ or their representatives’ vote;
6. Efficiency – the grade in which the rules rapidly and timely facilitate the decision process.

In some analysis\(^1\) there are used different six indicators. We notice that the first proposal aims only the government positive aspects, while the last one introduces the possibility of some social problems that must be controlled and solved out by government officials, passing to the bad governance concept:

1. Voice and Accountability – measures the political, civil and human rights;
2. Political Stability – measures the possibility of some violent manifestations breaking, especially terrorism/government changes;

\(^1\) http://info.worldbank.org/governance
3. Government Effectiveness – measures the bureaucracy competence and public services quality;

4. Regulatory Quality – measures the incidence of unfriendly market politics;

5. Rule of Law – measures the law respect level and the possibility of some violent/criminal actions breaking;

6. Control of Corruption – measures the public power exertion for private interests, inclusive high-level bride and corruption.

Consequently, the governance can be measured and we choose the last presented methodology. We can use different types of data, objective and subjective, but it isn’t that easy as it seems. It is easy to record the economical growth, force labour or education system characterization indicators but it is so difficult to create and apply unanimously recognized indicators of large range political phenomena, as government or political rights.

But, what does good governance mean? In international environment is manifested the trend of considering it a collocation synonymous with liberal democracy. The international organizations raise the governance characteristics of Occidental political systems to the level of universally valid desiderate. The motivation is originated in communist system collapse, moment when liberal democracy was affirmed as only viable contemporary political doctrine. So, there are many states in the world claiming that they are liberal democracies, but they have serious governance problems. Often, citizens and those states’ leaders request their right to good governance, creating the favourable conditions for Occidental influence extension on international scene. That situation offers important advantages due to the fact that the good governance constitutes the basis for economical development that is an essential condition for providing security and, consequently, for creating a favourable framework for human growth. Referring to the bad governance, at the first view it obviously represents the contrary to good governance, but where is the limit between them?

All governance characteristics can be difficult met and not completely. Very few states are near the standards set by different interna-
tional development organizations and agencies and, in generally, the poorest world states constitute the bad governance subject.

2.2. Measuring governance. The case of the Black Sea countries

The analysts preoccupied by the Black Sea geopolitics argue that this area is characterized by some complex vulnerabilities. The most important one is the great economic, political and cultural diversity of its actors. Also, the Black Sea countries are at different stages of development. In a pessimistic vision on the regional trends, those differences might create negative effects on European and Euro-Atlantic integration process. But generally speaking, the region’s vulnerabilities are specific to the transitional countries and they have historical origins:

- The majority of the region’s countries are former communist ones and the end of the Cold War cast them in a geostrategical void.
- The process of transition from dictatorship to democracy is still ongoing in all of the social life’s fields. The economic analyses prove that at least on the Eastern shore of the Black Sea the quality of life is lower that the one reached in the Cold War period.
- The region is characterized by great ethnical, cultural, and religious diversity (for example, Turkey is very vulnerable to the regional instability due to its ethnical relations with Georgians, Azers, and Abkhazians).
- There is no regional coherent juridical framework for combating corruption.
- There is no coherent juridical framework for fighting against the organized crime.
- There are some countries that did not complete their options regarding European and Euro-Atlantic integration process (the case of Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova).
- There are some simultaneous interest games that regard the Russia’s regional hegemony against the European and Euro-Atlantic integration trends.

- The Black Sea countries are addicted to the Russian energetic resources.

The problems of Black Sea countries’ governance are the most important issues that burden the management of those vulnerabilities.

According to the chosen methodology, in the case of Black Sea countries (including the Republic of Moldova due to its argued geopolitical status), the selected indicators are as follows:

[Table: Voice and Accountability - 2004]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Voice and accountability indicator has the highest scores in the Bulgarian and Romanian cases. It shows the high level of achieving the human rights, the civil liberties (freedom of speech, of assembly and demonstration, of religion and political participation; equal opportunity; government censorship, etc.).

In the same time, it is to be noticed that Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Turkey form a compact group placed on the negative half of the figure.

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3 Corresponding to the data base Aggregate Governance Indicators 1996-2004, Daniel KAUFMANN, Aart KRAAY and Massimo MASTRUZZI, The World Bank.
The political stability has very low values for all of the seven analyzed countries. For the Ukrainian case, this year events proved that the so-called “Orange Revolution” brought political instability rather than democratic reconstruction. Romania and Bulgaria are on the top half of the figure although the indicator’s values are rather low. The situation is normal due to the fact that the prospects of EU integration call for political stabilization measures.
The government effectiveness indicator measures the proficiency of the bureaucracy, the quality of public services and also the consistence and the future-orientation of the governmental policies.

The value of the indicator for each country places them on the extremities of the figure: Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine with low values, and Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey, with higher values but still under zero.

The meaning of this situation is very clear: all of the analyzed countries have serious issues regarding the governmental policies’s creation and implementation.

The regulatory quality measures the efficiency of norms and regulations from the field of imports and exports and other type of business. From this point of view, Bulgaria has the higher regulatory quality.

Romania and Turkey, on the one hand, and Ukraine, Moldova, and Russia, on the other hand, follow it. The worst situation is Georgia’s. It has the worst regulatory policies.
The rule of law indicates the state’s ability and capability to counteract various risks, dangers, and threats such as: violence, organized crime, injustice, black market, etc. Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey have the higher indicator’s values, but Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia – the lowest. The reason for this state of facts is to be found in the security problems of those countries. They confront with a high level of organized crime’s activity.
The last analyzed indicator – *the control of corruption* – completes the image created by the other five indicators. It measures the level of anti-corruption policies. In the case of Romania and Bulgaria even if they are on the first half of the figure, the low values of the indicator show some acute problems of corruption. That is why there are still some issues regarding the EU accession of those two countries.

The first two governance indicators (*voice and accountability* and *political stability*) capture the first part of the governance’s definition: the process by which those in authority are selected and replaced. In this respect, the Romania and Bulgaria’s quality of governance is not compromised by the likelihood of wrenching changes in government, despite the Ukrainian and Georgian cases.

The correlation of the next two indicators – *the government effectiveness* and *the regulatory quality* – summarizes the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies. Again, Bulgaria and Romania have the higher values, but Georgia and Moldova are still confronting with acute problems.

The last two indicators – *the rule of law* and *the control of corruption* – summarize in broad terms the democratic pattern of the interactions between the civilians and the state. Bulgaria, Turkey, and Romania are again on the higher half of the figure and Ukraine and Georgia – on the lower half.

### 3. Some conclusions

If we choose the human being’s security as a starting point of analysis, we are able to argue the fact that each level of security is crucial for the superior one. Thus, the internal stability of the state is an essential factor for its capability to cooperate at international level and much more the domestic security is a determinant factor for the quality of regional security. There is the danger that in the same period of time and in the same region, some states consolidate their democracies and some others are mismanaged.

From this point of view, it is obvious that the governance in the Black Sea region is a very delicate problem. There is a security deficit
concentrated on the Northern and Eastern shores of the Black Sea. This situation is also indicated by the great powers and international security organizations’ interest in this area. Romania and Bulgaria are already NATO members and EU candidates, but Turkey, a NATO country, is contested for its EU membership. Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia are hardly at the middle of their road to NATO and EU. The Russian case is a different one due to its attempts to recreate the former political-military and economic bloc and to become once again an important partner of the world’s superpower.

Thus, Romania and Bulgaria are able to assume the role of Euro-Atlantic values’ promoters. They are regional stabilization factors and catalysts of the regional cooperation arrangements. Still, there is the risk of some demarcation lines in the Black Sea area that are created by the simultaneity of two regional processes: the NATO and EU integration, on the one hand, and the Russia’s pressures to CSI integration of the former soviet states, on the other hand. In this framework, the *good governance* is the main desideratum of the Black Sea countries. Its fulfilment is possible only by some accomplishments such as: the completion of the transition process from dictatorship to democracy; common projects promoting liberalization, markets’ privatization, and an attractive investments environment; programs and projects regarding the accelerated European and Euro-Atlantic integration of the regions’ states and the improvement of the strategies for preventing and fighting against new regional risks, dangers, and threats.
THE WIDER BLACK SEA AREA
BETWEEN THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE TRADITION AND THE CHALLENGES OF THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Major-general (ret.) Mihail E. IONESCU, PhD, Director of the Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History, Romania

The Wider Black Sea Area and the evolution of its regional security environment in the post-Cold War period became only after a long time an independent topic of research and also related to other areas of interest. The GBSA concept has been launched in a study written by the well-known researchers Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson in 2004, being inspired by similar concepts like the Greater Middle East. The specialized literature asks for a redefinition of the working concepts in order to respond to the new realities of the security environment and the new structure of the international system, as they emerged after September 11, 2001. This conceptual redefinition is only the last part of a big file containing the studies dedicated to the Black Sea region and its neighbouring areas in the post-Cold War area and especially post September 11, 2001 period.

The geopolitical and geostrategic position of this area in relation with the major vectors that structure the international system and the European security environment - such as the vital interest of EU’s states to keep an easy access to the energy resources from the Caspian Sea, the EU’s need to build a stable and coherent security environment in its neighbourhood, the willingness of US and their allies from within the international anti-terrorist coalition to use this region as a key area for carrying on the anti-terrorist campaign in Iraq and Afghanistan - transformed it in a high priority on the international security agenda.

Beyond these arguments and also connected to the present developments, the “Black Sea Question” is one of the historical

permanencies of Romanian history and the European history, asserted, years ago, by the well-known Romanian historian Nicolae Iorga.

The internal navigation, the connections between its shores reached by the same famous routes such as the route “from Varegs to Greeks” through the Pontic-Baltic isthmus, then later, the route from Central Europe and Flanders as well as the “silk route”, and nowadays, the “Caspian Oil Route”, conferred to this area the statute of a historical region. As a maritime area placed in the interior of the South-Eastern Europe, closed by the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits, opened towards the Oriental Mediterranean Sea, the Back Sea and its shores, represents an individualized region of the continent, a linking bridge with anterior Asia, Middle and Far East. Permanent and favourite way of ancient and medieval invasions through its northern steppes, “plaque tournante” of the Middle Age great trade (G.I. Brătianu), the Black Sea all together with its Strait and the Lower Danube is an essential vector in order to reach the sense of the historical evolution of peoples belonging to this part of Europe and anterior Asia.

The profound transformation of Europe generated by the Great French Revolution’s wars and the Napoleonic campaigns led to the internationalization of the Black Sea issue, which had previously been confined to the balance of power between the two great sea shore owners: the Russian and the Ottoman empires. Directly associated to the so-called “Oriental Question” and to the historical retreat and succession of the Ottoman Empire, a brief review of the balance of the two powers is necessary.

According to the Treaty at Kučuc Kainardji (July 21, 1774), Russia gained the right of free navigation on the Black Sea and the Danube together with the possession of the Kerč Straits meaning, in fact, the total control of the Sea of Azov².

In 1792, signing the peace agreement with the Ottomans- the peace agreement from Iasi-Husi - Russia took over the whole northern shore of the Black Sea, from Kuban River eastwards to Dniester westwards³.

Thus, the Black Sea was evolving, in relation with the recession of the Ottoman power, from the “Turkish lake” and the Turkish exclusive economic monopoly to a Russian-Ottoman condominium status. Of course, one should remark the obvious imbalance of power between the force of the new Russian master and the decline of the Bosporus one.

Gradually, from 1784 to 1802, the other great European powers – Austria, Great Britain and France - gained the right for free navigation in the Black Sea. The presence of the military ships and mostly, their trespassing over the Straits was still not allowed. Napoleon’s military campaign in Egypt and the Peace Treaty from Campo-Formio (1797) determined for the very beginning a Russian-Ottoman alliance (December 23, 1798) that Great Britain soon joined; according to the 10th article, Russia got the right to cross the Straits during the joint war against France.

The Black Sea with its Straits and the Danube had a primary European strategically value for Napoleon I. The fail of his alliance with Tsar Alexander I in 1807 was due to Napoleon’s refusal to hand over the mentioned territories to Russia. Because of their special interest, it is interesting to reveal the Russian argument concerning their rule of Constantinople: “Both the geography and our Black Sea ask us to have Constantinople even more than the political interest” (our emphasis). Meantime, for the French authorities, the Russian control over the Straits was considered a direct threat against a French Mediterranean Sea. The main effect of Russian-French alliance was the signing of an English-Ottoman Treaty in 1809. In article 11, the Ottoman Empire, under British guarantee, committed itself to close the Straits to all battle ships during peace time. It was the first step towards internationalizing the Straits’ status and, consequently, of the Black Sea. The second step was the Peace Congress in Vienna (1815), which stated the free navigation on the rivers crossing several states or on the rivers that constitute the border between them as a law principle.

5 S. Tatistcheff, Alexandre Ier et Napoléon, d’après leur correspondance inédite (1801-1812), Paris, 1891, p.329, p. 413.
7 E. CARATHEODORY, Du droit international concernant les grandes cours d’eau, Leipzig, 1861, p.106.
The Peace at Adrianople (1829)\(^8\), - the highest point of Russian expansion over the Western shore of the Black Sea by dominating also the Danube’s mouths -, envisaged, under the international pressure, the free navigation of the commercial ships, bearing pavilions of all the nations, through the Straits and in the Black Sea (Article 7). In spite of the obstacles generated by the Russian military presence in the Danube Delta, the unprecedented development of trade in the Black Sea area was one of the main causes of the emergence and evolution of capitalism in Moldova and Walachia\(^9\).

It is worth to say that the preliminaries of the Adrianople peace offered the opportunity for the government of Sankt-Petersburg to analyze the geopolitical situation of the Black Sea. Russia concluded that keeping alive a weak state such as the Ottoman Empire was more profitable than dividing it because Russia was yet unable to solve this problem in its own exclusive benefit, without involving other great powers\(^10\).

This finding did not deter the Cabinet of Sankt-Petersburg to adopt a pragmatic policy and to take advantage of any circumstance, so that the obvious Russian domination in the Black Sea and the lower Danube to be also extended to the Straits.

The proper moment showed up quicker than they expected, when the Egyptian crisis eventually forced the Ottoman Empire to ask for Russia’s help. The Unkiar Iskelessi Treaty (July 8, 1833) inaugurated the “intimate” alliance between the two powers, when, in fact, the Ottoman Empire was under Russian protection. A separate and secret article imposed the Ottoman Empire, in exchange for the Russian protection, the closing down of the Dardanelles Straits to any foreign warship, regardless of the reasons they invoked\(^11\). Therefore, through Ottoman complicity, the Black Sea truly became, in 1833, a Russian lake.

The situation was taken as such by the British Cabinet of Lord Palmerston, who, in the first moment, did not hesitate to propose to the French government to take part in a naval expedition in order to force

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the Straits, to enter the Black Sea and destroy the Russian fleet. Only the Austrian intervention eased the situation, Russia stating its peaceful intentions towards the Ottoman Empire. The revival of the Egyptian crisis in 1839-1840 reopened the issue of the Unkiar-Iskelessi Treaty, which eventually led to the Straits Agreement, which was signed in London on July 13, 1841. Through it, the “European concert of powers” – Britain, France, Russia, Austria, Prussia – committed itself to respect the inviolability of Sultan’s sovereign rights and declared the Straits closed for foreign warships during peacetime. The importance of the London Agreement is undeniable: for the first time, the issue of the Straits was finally settled by the European concert of powers, which dramatically decreased both the Russian and Ottoman possibilities of manoeuvre. A unilateral agreement between the two concerning the Straits and, consequently, the Black Sea was now impossible.

The constant Russian policy, of having a “say” regarding the Eastern Mediterranean issue, provoked the new oriental war of 1853 and the Crimean campaign (1854-1856). At the end of the war, a new and more determined intervention of the “European concert of powers” on the Black Sea issue took place.

Prepared in long and laborious negotiations, many of them secret, the Peace Congress took place on March 30, 1856, and it was signed by the representatives of France, Great Britain, Russia, Sardinia, Ottoman Empire, Austrian Empire and Prussia. From the very beginning, the treaty stated the inclusion of the Ottoman Empire into the European concert, into the international public law and, concomitantly, the obligation of the signatories of guaranteeing its independence and territorial integrity. The completely new element of including the Ottoman Empire in the European public law had been briefly discussed before, thus pressuring the Ottoman Empire to guarantee the religious rights of the non-Muslim populations and to announce new internal reforms. In what concerns the Black Sea, it became neutral through article XI, both Russia and the Ottoman Empire committing themselves not to build or keep on its shores any military naval arsenals (art. XIII). As Danube

12 François GUIZOT, Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire de mon temps, t.IV, Paris, 1861, p. 51.
and its mouths were subjected to the principle of free navigation on the rivers that separate or cross several states (art. XV), the creation of an European Commission for a two years term was stipulated, comprising delegations from France, Austria, Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Ottoman Empire, with the tasks of planning and executing the necessary works in the river downstream, from Isaccea to the mouths and in the neighbouring maritime areas in order to achieve the best conditions for a proper navigation. For financing these works, the commission had to collect a tax from every ship (art. XVI). A commission of the littoral states (Austria, Bavaria, Württemberg, Ottoman Empire, Serbia, Walachia, Moldavia) had the task of creating the regulations of navigation and river police, to ensure the navigability of the entire river and to take over the attributions of the European commission after the end of its work (art. XVII, XVIII). The execution of the dispositions referring to the mouths of Danube and the neighbouring maritime areas was ensured by the right of each of the signatories of keeping two light military ships – called “stationary” ships – at the mouths of Danube (art. XIX).

In exchange for the part of Crimea that the allies conquered during the war, which was returned for a better freedom of navigation on Danube, Russia agreed upon the rectification of the frontier in Bessarabia, the yielded territory (Cahul, Ismail and Bolgrad districts) being reunited with the Principality of Moldavia (art. XX, XXI).

Therefore, as a direct consequence of the changes in the force ratio in the Black Sea, for the first time since the Middle Ages (1486), an old state of the region – the Romanian Principality of Moldavia – reappeared as a littoral state on the western shore, which was the first step for the modern reconstruction of this European region.

A revised Treaty of Straits was annexed to the peace treaty, which prohibited the access of warships of foreign powers, as long as the Ottoman Empire was in peacetime.\footnote{Ibidem, pp. 1084-1086.}

Complete freedom of navigation and trade in the Black Sea was accompanied by the acceptance in every port of the littoral states of foreign powers’ consulates, which were subjected to the principles of international law (art. XII). The second annex to the treaty was the
convention on the neutrality of the Black Sea, by which Russia and the
Ottoman Empire limited the number of warships that they could have
to six 50 meters long ships with no more than 800 tones and four light
ships (with steam or sails) with no more than 200 tones. During the
negotiations, Russia’s possibility of having military ports and carrying
out naval military constructions in the Sea of Azov or in Nikolayev was
also debated and the general restriction eventually applied to them.

Concerning the fulfilment of the treaty provisions, Britain, France
and the Austrian Empire signed, on April 15, 1856, a secret convention
for ensuring the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire,
stipulating the use of land and naval forces for this purpose.

The Congress of Paris, in particular, laid the grounds of maritime
law during wartime for the neutral parties, abolishing corsair activity;
stipulating the flag of neutral parties covers enemy load except
smuggling; the commodities, except the smuggled goods, cannot be
captured, even on enemy ships; the blockade was not mandatory unless
it was effective.

The acceptance of the terms of the Peace of Paris was due to the
complete Russian exhaustion during the war. Its gradual recover was
accompanied by a continuing diplomatic pressure for revising the
provisions of the Treaty of Paris. Just a few days after the French defeat
at Sedan (on September 9, 1870), on October 31, 1870, the Cabinet of
Sankt-Petersburg sent a circular to the signatory powers, which stated
that Russia is unbound by the obligations that this treaty imposed it.

It is interesting to notice that, among the breaches of the Treaty of Paris
invoked by Russia in order to justify its repudiation, one can find both
the union of Romanian Principalities and their choice of having a foreign
ruler. The London Conference of the signatory powers of the Treaty of
Paris ended with the adoption of the Convention of March 13, 1871, by
which the neutrality of the Black Sea was abandoned and the principle
of closing the Straits was modified. Therefore, the sultan had the power
to permit, during peacetime, the passing through Bosporus of friendly

16 Ibidem, pp. 1086-1087.
17 Ibidem, p. 1189.
18 Ibidem, pp. 1087-1088.
and allied fleets in case he thinks it is necessary for safeguarding of the provisions of the Treaty of 1856. During the same day, a Russian-Ottoman convention abolished the Special Convention of March 30, 1856, concerning the limitation of the number and tonnage of military ships of the two powers in the Black Sea.

The London Convention in 1871, a victory of the Russian diplomacy, reopened the perspective for Russia to dominate both the Black Sea and the Straits. The 1877-1878 war was the first opportunity to resume the Russian expansionist policy. Its results, even diminished at Berlin Congress (July 13, 1878), were important both in Caucasus and for reaching the Danube maritime riverside (through attaching the Northern Bessarabia). The changing of the Straits status provided by the preliminary Treaty of San Stefano was not taken into consideration by the Peace Congress of Berlin which maintained the provisions of 1871 and partially of 1856.

A significant consequence of the events of 1877-1878 was the strengthening of the independent Romania – a Kingdom since 1881 - a state that owned an important maritime side, where a harbour at Constanța and a maritime navy were developed. Another consequence was the setting up of the Bulgarian principality, still vassal to the Ottoman Empire, extended in 1885 due to its unification with the Eastern Rumelia. The Russian control exerted over this state was gradually eliminated. In this way, the western shore of the Black Sea came to be covered with national states willing to play an important role within the world capitalist system and interested to develop economic and free trading relations in the Pontic basin.

The European Commission of the Danube, one of the notable achievements of the Paris Peace Treaty, has continuously prolonged its mandate, extending its competence up to Brăila. This interfered with the Romanian sovereignty, but the commission made a very useful technical work at the Danube mouths.

The Straits issue and the question of closing the Black Sea issues strongly came into attention during World War I, especially during the French-British operations at Gallipoli. In March 1915, at the end of the

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21 Tratatul de la Berlin urmat de protocoalele Congresului, ed. română oficială, București, 1878.
war, the Russian diplomacy gained the right to occupy the Straits and Constantinople, the Tenedos and Imbros islands, according to a secret agreement with the French and English governments. In exchange, the London government obtained the following: the modification of the 1907 agreement on Persia, the setting up of Constantinople as a free seaport and also the free navigation of the commercial ships through the Straits. A consequent agreement assesses the English and French requests in the Asian Turkey. It was contained that this deal reached in March 1915 will be kept secret for Greece, Bulgaria and Romania. Actually, this meant that the French and English governments already accepted the Russian domination of Constantinople and the transformation of the Black Sea into a “Russian lake”\(^{22}\). Hoping to keep Russia involved in the war further on, in December 1916, English and French governments agreed to recognize to Russia the already reached achievements through the previous agreement from March 1915\(^{23}\).

England and France through military campaigns (the Gallipoli military expedition) and France by itself (through the Eastern Army led by the General Maurice Sarrail) were interested to keep their presence in the Straits region in order to avoid the complete Russian control over Black Sea.

The defeat of the Central Powers allies from Balkan and Near East, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, together with the Russian crush down, seemed to modify the very basic data of the Black Sea and the Straits issues. The truce of Mudros (October 30, 1918) established the occupation of the Straits by the allied military forces. The Peace of Sevrès (July 10, 1920) opened the demilitarized Straits to the trade vessels and warships, both in the peace and wartime, turning the Pontic Basin into a *mare apertura*. The new status of the Straits has been put under the control of a Straits Commission composed by two representatives from Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and one representative from Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, and two representatives for the United States and Russia, after they joined the League of Nations. The situation seemed to continue the application of the internationalization principle

\(^{22}\) Cf. N. **Daşcoviţă**, *Marea noastră sau regimul Strâmtorilor*, Iaşi, 1937, pp.144-145.

of the European Commission established in 1856. The Kemalist Revolution, the emergence of the new Turkish Republic, supported by Soviet Russia through the Moscow (March 16, 1921) and Ankara (January 2, 1922) agreements, imposed by the Lausanne Treaty (July 24, 1923) a new status of the Straits. It has been admitted the free shipping principle and the free access of the trade and war ships, both in the peace and wartime (art. 23; art. 1-2 of the Straits Convention). Yet, in case of non-riverside power warships, their dead-weight had to be equal with the greatest riverside state fleet, meaning of the USSR. In order to accomplish the free shipping, the Straits were demilitarized (art. 4). The security of Turkey in this area was ensured under France, Italy, Japan and Great Britain guarantee.

At the beginning of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva (1933), Turkey, supported by the USSR, asked for the revision of the Straits Convention. In 1934, Turkey proposed a “Black Sea Pact” among the riverside states, establishing the Straits remilitarization and the free navigation only for the riverside states. This proposal was based, of course, on the Soviet-Turkish agreement accepted both by the French authorities and the Foreign Affairs Minister of Romania, Nicolae Titulescu. The Great Britain doubts partly disappeared due to the military preparations of Mussolini’s Italy in Dodecanese; consequently, a new convention on the status of the Straits was signed in Montreux on July 20, 1936. According to this, the immediate remilitarization of the Straits was decided; military aircraft surveillance, as well as the free passage of submarines, was banned; new limits on fleet capacity were decided: 30,000 tones (up to 45,000 tones) for non-riverside fleets getting into Black Sea area for no more than 21 days, while the Soviet fleet had the right to carry 95,000 tones. During war time, in case that Turkey would have decided to be neutral, the free passing through the Straits of military ships belonging to belligerent states was going to be restrained or even completely forbidden.

24 N. DASCOVICI, op.cit., p.151.
26 Ibidem, pp.267-288. See S. SEFTIUC, I. CĂRȚĂNĂ, România și problema Strâmtorilor, București, 1974 for an analysis made from the point of view of regional alliances of Romania, including the Warsaw fidelity.
Beyond the importance of this new convention for Turkey’s security, the advantages the Soviets achieved were obvious. The new convention, having the Turkish accord, assured the naval domination of USSR in the Black Sea and the possibility to use its fleet in the Mediterranean Sea. All these aspects and their implications for Romania have been noticed by several well-known specialists on the Black Sea issue, such as Gheorghe Brătianu and Nicolae Dașcovici, both professors at the Iași University, who supported different visions on this matter than Nicolae Titulescu. Regarding Nicolae Titulescu, the position adopted at the Montreux Convention decisively marked his political career, being excluded from the government in August 29, 1936.

The fears expressed by the Romanian specialists on this issue will soon prove to be justified by the aggressive Soviet policy during 1939-1941 and by the pressure put on Turkey in the Straits area at the end of the Second World War.

The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 and the decisions of the Belgrade Conference of the Danube riverside countries (1948) resumed the interwar decisions on the Straits issues and on the international status of the Danube. These decisions are still into force. The complete freedom of navigation, the equal treatment of the ship flags, the respect of the national sovereignty of the riverside states, the deadweight limitations, and the restrictions of access for the non riverside warships into the Straits were stated.\(^\text{27}\)

During the Cold War, USSR achieved the undisputed domination over the Black Sea. Controlling more than two thirds of the seashores, through its own territory as well as through the territory of the satellites states, Romania and Bulgaria, USSR tried to impose the complete control over this area by direct pressures on Turkey, the single waterside state that was not under its domination\(^\text{28}\).

From the evolution of the Pontic geopolitical and geostrategic area perspective, the result was the transformation of the Black Sea in a “Russian lake”. The Soviet naval bases, especially those from Sevastopol, exerted the domination over the entire Black Sea area. The possession of the Snakes Island and the bordering with the Danube

\(^{27}\) Iulian CÂRȚĂNĂ, ILIE SEFTIUC, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 345-349.

Delta assured the control of USSR over this important river watercourse. Here, in the Black Sea, there was settled and continues to be the most important Russian naval force. The Black Sea harbours are, in fact, the only seaports that USSR (or Russia, later on) may use all the time of the year.

At the end of the Cold War, the Black Sea region, especially its Western part (South-Eastern Europe), is in full process of redefining and reorganizing the relations between the countries within this area. The creation of the Balkan Cooperation Initiative in Belgrade (1988), - the first structure of political cooperation that had strong influence in increasing mutual trust and security among the countries in the region and enhancing the economic relations – represented a climax in the process of resuscitating the frame for economical, political and military cooperation, a frame of cooperation which had existed in the inter-war era. Unfortunately, the collapse of the communist regimes (1989) and the disintegration of the Soviet Union (1991) will put an end to the improving cooperation efforts for a long period of time.

The end of the Cold War determined an almost explosive reopening of the Black Sea question. The collapse of the communist political system, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union have determined an increasing of the number of the riverside states, and thus, the balance of power specific to this region in the Cold War area have been seriously disturbed.

These fifteen years that passed since the end of the bipolar order have been defined, regarding the Black Sea region, by the unpredictable evolutions in the regional security environment; these evolutions emphasized the fluidity of this regional security environment and the exponential increase of security risks against the regional security. There are two major conflict hotbeds within this region. In the West, in the early ‘90s, there are the conflicts in ex-Yugoslav area which generated instability in this region for more than a decade. In the East, the Caucasus region – the ex-soviet republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – or the Russian Federation territory – Chechnya; within this region there are significant conflict sources caused by different national movements, and also by different ethnic tensions that have emerged after the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Having multiple explanations, like the nationalist propaganda, the frontiers problems, territorial autonomy and segregation – these conflicts had a highly potential of contamination of the neighbouring regions.

The Trans-Dniester conflict is, in fact, a typical crisis for the post-Cold War era, having its origins in Soviet Union’s policy of creation artificial territories and of modification the existed ethnic realities. This conflict, that started in 1992, after the declaration of independence of Moldova, has been “frozen” by Russian intervention – the ex-imperial power – by means of peacekeeping troops.

If one also adds the sinuous evolutions of the transition from the communist economical and political system to democracy and market economy, and the difficulties the states from the Wider Black Sea Region are facing regarding social reorganization, one could say that, for the beginning of the post-Cold War era and for the coming years, this region comprises multiple sources of instability, and therefore is characterized by an unstable and fluid security environment.²⁹

Here we could also add elements external to this region which, in fact, add a greater complexity to the security equation and to the ‘game’ of interests in the Black Sea region.³⁰ Among these external factors one could mention the oil and gas resources from Caspian Sea and the competing interests in exploiting and transporting these resources. The Wider Black Sea Area is almost the mandatory route used for transporting these resources to the West. The evolutions of the international security environment after 9/11 and the key-strategic and geopolitical position of this region regarding the major purposes of the war on terrorism led by the international coalition and the United States have transformed it into a top priority element of the strategic and security agenda.³¹

Taking into consideration these evolutions, we should mention that there have been a lot of answers to the equation regarding regional security of the Black Sea region. Due to the fact that a vacuum of power has emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey started to

²⁹ Ronald D. ASMUS, Bruce JACKSON, op. cit.
³⁰ Ibidem.
promote a foreign policy asking for itself a role of a regional power\textsuperscript{32}, at least on a declarative level. This new Turkish foreign policy was focused on the idea of regrouping and supporting the Turkish speaking people from the neighbouring independent and new emerged countries. The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia as well as the competing geostrategical interests of the global powers, regarding the Caspian resources (the main actors involved in this competition are USA, EU, China, and Russia) represent additional elements to this policy. It is also true the fact that maintaining a security paradigm aiming at keeping Russia out from the strategically and geopolitical debate also played an important role in promoting this new Turkish foreign political strategy.

On the other hand, the ex-dominant power in this region – the Russian Federation – has never accepted this new role and place Turkey asked for it in the new security equation; Moscow tried to regain the lost positions on multiple levels. Therefore, the Russian actions were accordingly. The Caucasian conflicts (Chechnya, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh) and the conflict in Trans-Dniester all have common features and contain a series of external factors linked to the existence of the Soviet troops on these territories and also to the economic, political and military support provided by Russian authorities to the secessionist movements. The creation of CIS and the Russian military doctrine issued in the early ‘90s (with its concept of “near neighbourhood”) represented a materialization of Moscow’s efforts aimed at regaining the lost positions in this region.

Finally, the energy sector and the interests in combating terrorism and other non-conventional threats in the region justify the emergence and the profound involvement of another major actor, the United States, in managing and controlling the regional security environment. The increasing of US military presence in Turkey and also the existence of some military forces trained in anti-guerrilla warfare in Georgia, and recently the deployment of military bases in Romania and Bulgaria, are factors that enable to make an assessment regarding the importance of the Black Sea region for the Washington decision-makers.

\textsuperscript{32} Nasuh USLU, \textit{The Russian, Caucasian and Central Asian Aspects of Turkish Foreign Policy in the post Cold War Period}, in “Alternatives. Turkish Journal of International affairs”, Vol.2, No.3/4, Fall&Winter, pp.164-187, \textit{passim}. 36
Russia’s weakness and the firm emergence of other global actors in the region made different experts to talk about the emergence of a “geopolitical pluralism” within this area, which is still viable.

Beyond these evolutions, it was tried, and it was succeeded, to found the necessary answers concerning the processes that took place in the regional security environment. Such proofs are the cooperation agreements and the cooperation elements in the realm of military security established at the end of the Cold War.

In the security realm, these efforts generated the creation and the development of some regional cooperation organizations. The first ones have been established in the economic field. Thus, in 1992, BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation) has been created, followed by other projects and cooperation arrangements aiming at building new oil and gas pipelines. These projects are seen as materialization of Western strategic interests in the region.

Simultaneously with the beginning and the structuring of the economic cooperation relations, the states located in this area, facing with the evolutions of security environment, with the re-emerging of risks and threats against regional and states security, started the process of building up and institutionalization of various regional security structures. BLAKSEAFOR, a regional initiative aiming at establishing a naval force for peacekeeping operations under PfP aegis, Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, NATO Initiative for South-Eastern Europe, SEEBRIG, as well as SECI Centre for combating the transnational organized crime. In 2002, at the Prague Summit, NATO states launched the individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs), open to countries that have the political will and ability to enhance their relationship with NATO. These agreements are complementary with the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy, the recent instrument used by Brussels to improve its relations with the neighbouring states and make them ready for more cooperative security and increased border control, while providing them with economic advantages. One could also add the evolutions developing within the ex-Soviet area. The divergences between the interests of former imperial power – Russia - and those of the states from the Wider Black Sea region as well as the later efforts to
find alternative solutions to the CSI integration process in order to assure their own security and defence needs, had as a result the establishing, years ago, within the CSI space, of a new initiative, namely GU(U)AM, made from Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan\textsuperscript{33}, Azerbaijan and Republic of Moldova.

One first conclusion is that the Black Sea region, regardless the evolution of balance of power, played a major role in maintaining security and stability of Europe. Our initial assertion - stating that the Black Sea region is an area of both confrontation and cooperation, a region of permanent contacts between people and civilizations, between Europe and Asia – is sustained by the historical facts as well as by the current efforts made in order to organize it.

Although there were periods of relative freedom of navigation and commercial trade in the Black Sea and the Danube River, yet the competition for taking control over the region between different regional actors was a steady characteristic of this region. The Greeks, the Romans, the Byzantines, the Turks, the Russians, they all have built their status as regional or continental power by exerting control over this geopolitical and geographical region and over its resources.

Although for a historian saying that “What Herodotus and other ancient writers saw as a distinct region – a set of shared cultures or histories, a network of economic and political connections – has been lost”\textsuperscript{34}, the Black Sea continues to represent a historical region and an essential element of the European strategic game.

\textsuperscript{33} Uzbekistan eventually withdrew from this cooperative structure in 2002.

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At the very beginning of ’90s, the states from the Black Sea basin, concerned of solving out their problems, generated by their new situation given by the end of cold war, created rather a rejection sentiment, a focus that come into the prominence of the international community. At that time, the main tendency of the Black Sea states has been to defend their own interests, then to cooperate. Any occidental values adhesion perspective looked utopian.

Both NATO and EU had concentrated their attention to the Central and East Europe flank. In North, there was intended the detachment of Baltic States from Russian Federation control and their integration in Euro-Atlantic space, in South it was intended the stopping of the fratricide wars conducted in Balkans and the cultivation of democracy essences and law state.

The Black Sea riverside states have been re-evaluating and re-dimensioning their national security systems in accordance with their new status. Possibility of losing the national prerogatives, as in Cold War period, led them to reject the idea of performing a common security system. Instead, the cornerstone of the security sector reform was put. The first stage represented the civil control over the military. From the consequent improvements and political willing, the reform becomes at the end of ’90s a mean that facilitated practical coordination and conceptual integration of recasting home security.

At the same time, the states involved in war (the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Armenia), after the frozen of conflict, were

determinate to reconstruct the security sector. There were wide actions which have imposed: (re)settlement the real forces necessary to ensure national security and making their actions effective and overall civil control over the military.³

09.11.2001 showed a lot of vulnerabilities, proving that no world’s corner can ensure its own security without the neighbours. The Black Sea states realized they depended one on another. They needed solidarity for waging war against risks, dangers and threats which affect their common future. Therefore, the political, social, economical and the security problems, older or more recent, might be better discussed in a homogenous framework, with a particular cohesion and experience for developing the understanding between partners. The region has the power to offer a suitable frame for putting into effect the cooperation mechanisms, having as the final target the improvement of international security environment.

They started to identify, codify and eliminate the erroneous perceptions between the Black Sea states and building the cooperation mechanisms. But the bulk of problems that needed to be solved out in the fight against threats addressed common security field and the realization of stability on the space lead to an exponential growing of these mechanisms.

The past situation, prolonged till today, the conflicts and tensions from the neighbourhood, the lack of confidence and prejudices, the concrete realities carried on blocking the security structures activities. Finding a proper answer to the multitude of risks, threats and menaces that appear in a short period of time can’t be done easily. Common management appear to be the right solution. Its achievement has been more difficult, stipulated by well known scholars, because the Euro-Atlantic community “allocated few time and few political resources for approaching Wider Black Sea region”⁴. They stressed out that in Occident there is a tendency to ignore or neglect the problems “hard to solve”⁵. This understanding was generated by an exaggerated fear not

⁵ Idem.
to irritate Moscow in its succession to the Soviet sphere of dominance and to not disturb it by opening the subject of “near abroad”.

NATO made first conclusive steps in the direction of attracting the states within the Black Sea area by the PfP Program. The new democracies understood this event as very important for their future and subscribed the adhesion statements. The active implication of these states in the PfP Program exceeded the most optimistic prognoses of its success. This changed the traditional Western perception about the area and has changed the climate. A new process was on the way: a process of building economic, political and security partnership among the Black Sea nations.

NATO and UE enlargements in the last years transformed the Wider Black Sea Region in the East border of Occidental security and co-prosperity space. But the area was taken both with values which identify it and with the wrong activities as illegal migration, drugs, armament, human being trafficking, smuggling, corruption, fraud, frozen conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and so on. All of them have the tendency to gather around Black Sea. In the background of liability transitional period they may grow, become mature and becoming waves to break on the Atlantic shore.

Therefore, it is likely the insecure factors which act in East Europe to meet, sooner or later, but in a worst manner, on the opposite side of the continent. This strictly determines the Euro-Atlantic community to offer the status of a primordial supervision and to fight against the existing or emerging risks, dangers and threats in the Wider Black Sea Region.

From this point of view, UN, NATO, EU, USA, European states and economical, security, etc., regional organisms have been involved in a very thin net of cooperation mechanisms. Fairly, Romania is in each junction of them without any exception.

The enforcement of regional cooperation and solidarity are essential for security of Wider Black Sea Region. For Romania, just as Bulgaria and Turkey, similar to other states which adhered or are on the way of adhering at the Euro-Atlantic values, performing these objectives, is complementary with the European integration.
SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE BLACK SEA AREA

The need to solve out concretely and lasting the crisis emerged at the continental level represents our motivation and the impetus for proactive actions. Thus, this kind of tackle becomes a rule in the Euro-Atlantic community and in the same time with our EU integration we can’t elude it.

Lately, the Wider Black Sea Region countries proved they achieve their security and stability area and consider them as their fundamental interests. The state organisms and nongovernmental organizations were constrained to look for and to propose genuine solutions for accomplishing these interests, turned to good account regional specificity and similitude.

Certainly, not all negotiations have been finalised, but the main part of them is brought out. All of them show that each local actor pays great attention to the Black Sea panel, as to a vital national problem and an important issue for the international community.

In closed relations with this region, Romania assumed a very important mission: transitions from subject role in various formulas of cooperation to promoter of the area’s interests in the universal dialogue, actually, the moment to open a new chapter in the Romania’s diplomacy. From this behaviour change, it is intended the internalization of proper knowledge and understanding of Black Sea Region issues, making the international organisms and interested states to understand the risk management, dangers and threats with which this area is confronted.

Final objective is a regional coherent, dynamic and anticipative policy achievement, having as a primary scope the improvement of confidence and cooperation in the Black Sea Region. We expect an improvement from the economical, social and civilization perspectives.

With the purpose to avoid a possible isolation from a more and more united and selective Europe, the Wider Black Sea Region states develop actions in order to adopt the European values: democracy, respect of human rights, liberty and fight against terrorism\(^6\). Most of these states wish to join NATO and/or EU.

The multiple problems that need to be solved out and not the so easy objectives to achieve, tough stages of “road map” and the quality

assigned to the results determine the Black Sea states to turn their forces and means operationally. Above all we may add the competition for joining, in a nearest stage of enlargement, the Euro-Atlantic structures.

Security sector is in “the second generation of reform”\textsuperscript{7}. It is likely, if there is a lack of a clear political orientation, an unfinished agenda of international experts’ training, a new comeback of the nationalization of security policy may occur. Probably, security and stability area’s problems shall be less attractive for the Wider Black Sea Region states after Euro-Atlantic border removal beyond their frontiers. NATO and EU states, concerned by achieving their security in collective systems, may move in the second row the accomplishment of other cooperation tools, proper for this area. In the frame of this vulnerability, there may emerge the risk of losing control over the whole security and stability Wider Black Sea Region, with severe consequences.

Concluding, it is difficult to present a model, a paradigm well shaped about the future of security of the Wider Black Sea Region. This can be done just after we will find out that the area will be able to become an extension of Euro-Atlantic space or will leave a rupture zone which strictly earmark the united Europe vis-à-vis an Asiatic states conglomerate. Each option contains a minimum certitude: the region’s geopolitical importance will be maintained, its geo-economical value will be conserves as long as other more attractive energetic resources will not appear.

SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE BLACK SEA AREA

FROZEN CONFLICTS
IN THE BLACK SEA AREA

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The security situation in the Black Sea region is extremely complex, being characterized on one hand, by the redefining process of the security regional architecture as part of the Euro-Atlantic one and, on the other hand, by the important conflictual potential due mainly to the frozen conflicts in the majority of the states of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

1. Moldovan and Trans-Dniester conflict

The Moldovan and Trans-Dniester conflict is still frozen, because of the negotiations’ blocking process occurred in the summer of 2004. A worsening of the Moldovan and Trans-Dniester relations is currently reported. Tiraspol accuses Chişinău both of military preparations for force actions against the Dniester Moldovan Republic and of “the aggressive blockade” promoted towards Trans-Dniester.

In the context of USSR’s dissolving, on June 23, 1990, Chişinău Parliament adopted “The Sovereignty Declaration of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova”. In the autumn of the same year, two Moldovan regions, the Gagauz (in the South of the state) and the Trans-Dniester (in the East of the state) proclaimed themselves as independent autonomous republics.

On May 23, 1991, the new name of Republic of Moldova was adopted; on August 27, 1991, it proclaimed its state independence.

The Moldovan and Trans-Dniester military conflict started in the spring of 1992 and ended on June 21, 1992 as a result of the agreement concluded by the Russian and the Moldovan Presidents, Boris Yeltsin and Mircea Snegur respectively.
SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE BLACK SEA AREA

The President Voronin’s refuse (On November 2003) to sign the so called “Kozak plan” to settle the Trans-Dniester conflict, that represented the beginning of a new Moldovan foreign orientation, a pro-occidental and not a Russian one. The plan offered to the separatist region multiple conditions of separating itself from the Moldovan territory and to proclaim its independence or/and affiliation to another state.

In spite of drafting several plans to settle the separatist conflict from the Republic of Moldova, this remains frozen. All the rounds of negotiations were either blocked and boycotted or ended in delays and avoidance of adopting an applicable and efficient resolution.

Chişinău is willing to offer a larger autonomy status to Trans-Dniester (adopting the Law regarding the Trans-Dniester autonomy status within Moldova, rejected by Tiraspol and Moscow) but only within Moldova which should be recognized as a unitary state, with the current borders, including the Trans-Dniester region.

For the future, Chişinău supports a more consistent implication on behalf of the international community and the withdrawal of the Russian troops from its territory, as decisive elements for the democratization process of the Trans-Dniester region and for settling the conflict.

Tiraspol secessionist regime acts in order to obtain independence, particularly economical and administrative.

Possible evolutions:

- In spite of the commitments undertaken by Russia during the OSCE Summit from Istanbul and also, in spite of the persistent requests made by the International Community for Russia to observe these commitments, on short term, Moscow is less likely to accept the withdrawal of its troops and armament from Trans-Dniester.

- Bearing in mind the negotiations which occurred within the Unified Control Commission, it results that the Russian Federation wishes that the Russian troops to be in majority, no matter the format that the future peacekeeping forces from Trans-Dniester may have.

- In spite of the fact that an enlargement of the participants took place at the negotiations process in October, by the presence of the US and EU representatives, there are neither major differences nor concrete
results since USA and EU participate only as observers.

- The Trans-Dniester separatists and Russian Federation will keep preventing the adoption of some decisions regarding the effective solving of the conflict and the acceptance of the Moldovan current territoriality, recognized at the international level.

- The worsening of the Trans-Dniester conflict, the corruption and the poverty, the borders’ permissibility have all concurred to the establishment of the necessary background for the increasing organised crime activities in Moldova, mainly the one concerning the armament and ammunition trafficking, illegal migration and human trafficking. Tiraspol separatist regime has the capability to sell various models of light armament, assault armament and reactive projectiles.

2. Nagorno-Karabakh — the Azeri-Armenian conflict

The Armenian-Azeri conflict is the most complex one, and probably the most difficult to settle of all the conflicts occurring in the region, as it is an inter-states one in which the parts involved have adopted irreconcilable positions.

The separatist movement started in 1987 in the form of some manifestations. In 1991, Nagorno-Karabakh self-proclaimed as a republic and declared its independence. This fact triggered the conflict. In 1992-1993 the Armenian militias occupied the Latchin Corridor thus creating a terrestrial connection between the enclave and Armenia, as well as other territories outside the enclave, reaching the Iranian frontier. At the end of the fights, approximately 14,000 square km of the Azeri territory were occupied by the Armenians (4,400 square km – the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and 9,000 square km – security area; a total of 15% of the Azeri territory), having as consequence the existence of almost one million Azeri refugees.

In the beginning of 1994, the international community imposed upon the parts involved in the conflict to stop the hostilities. On July 27, 1994, a tripartite agreement was concluded under the aegis of Rus-

1 Nagorno-Karabakh is an enclave with an Armenian majority population, situated on the Republic of Azerbaijan’s territory.
The Azeri attitude related to Nagorno-Karabakh province remains firm, requesting the province’s reintegration. Azerbaijan states its option in favour of a gradual solution (in the first stage, in exchange of raising the blockade, the Armenian Forces to leave the Azeri districts around the province occupied by the Armenians); this solution is not however internationally supported. Ilham Aliev, the Azeri President, stated that Armenia must unconditionally clear out the occupied Azeri territories. Unless this thing occurs, “we will liberate ourselves our territories”. The Azeri government intends to increase by 100% its military budget for 2006. According to the Azeri part, the OSCE Minsk Group’s mediation is not sufficient for settling the conflict, and thus the involvement of the international organisations – EU, the Council of Europe, UN, etc. – turns out to be necessary. The Baku authorities think Moscow plays an extremely important role, but they accuse Kremlin for their pro-Armenian position.

In the Armenians’ opinion, without the recognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh people’s right to self-determination, Erevan and Stepanakert do not intend to make any type of concessions. In the Armenian government’s opinion, the final agreement related to the conflict settling must proclaim the Nagorno-Karabakh people’s right to self-determination, which should also be recognised by the international community; for this, Erevan is willing to adopt a flexible position on the deadline imposed for this goal to be achieved.

The Stepanakert authorities have stated that they accept only two options: obtaining independence for Nagorno-Karabakh or union with Armenia.

Russia does not want to become an “unacceptable” partner for one of the parts and that is why Russia is ready to take part, as mediator and guarantor, in establishing some arrangements between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) thinks that the Nagorno-Karabakh independence and its exit from Azerbaijan’s structure may be carried out only peacefully, according to the international law. PACE requests the countries’ governments to refrain themselves from using force and to forward constructive proposals for settling this conflict.

**Possible evolutions:**

- A short or medium-term settling is less likely, due to the parts’ irreconcilable positions;
- Armenia will most likely give up its rigid position concerning the conflict only by use of the “all included” method, accepting a more complex approach which includes the elements of both methods – “all included” and “step by step”. However, Erevan will most likely not give up its basic requests: Nagorno-Karabakh to become independent or to be incorporated with Armenia.

R. Kocharyan, the Armenian President, has declared that “the most appropriate status for Nagorno-Karabakh is, for the near future, the independence, and on long term, the incorporation with Armenia”;

- The difficulty in settling the conflict is increased by the two states’ population’s intransigency regarding this solution as the people are less willing than the political leadership to accept a compromise solution. Consequently, the parts involved will attempt to delay as long as possible the reaching of a final peace agreement, as this thing involves accepting some major compromises which may trigger increasing discontent among the population and expansion of some trends against the regime at power in the two states;
- There is also the option, less likely to be adopted, of Nagorno-Karabakh returning to Azerbaijan within a federative or confederative state.

Even though an increase has been recently reported in the number of incidents at the armistice line, there is no risk, on short term, for a major reactivation of the conflict to occur.
3. Georgian Conflicts

Tensions between the central power and South Ossetia and Abkhazia separatist republics are maintained in Georgia, but the probability for a war to break out is reduced, the situation in the area being characterised by a relative stability.

_South Ossetian conflict_

On September 20, 1990, the Ossetian authorities proclaimed South Ossetia as “Independent Democratic Soviet Republic”. Georgian authorities undermined the region’s autonomy, fact that determined the armed conflict in 1991.

On June 24, 1992, Georgia and Russia, monitored by South and North Ossetia, concluded the Sochi Agreement by which they guaranteed each other the territorial integrity. The ceasefire, the withdrawal of different armed formations and the establishment of some peacekeeping military forces were imposed without being settled the status of South Ossetia.

Relations between Georgia and South Ossetia were not very tensioned in spite of those stated by the Ossetian President regarding his country’s independence or integration into Russian Federation.

Connections between the two political entities were affected by the collaborations between the Mafia clans expanded up to the Tbilisi leadership and also by the fact that Georgia did not exert its state attributes in this region.

Following the changing of the leadership of Tbilisi, in November 2003, the relations became more tensioned, the Ossetian President declaring many times that the South Ossetia’s intention of joining Russian Federation is a consequence of the recent political changes.

_Abkhazian conflict_

Abkhazia proclaimed its independence by the Constitution adopted in 1994, but it was not recognised at international level. In 1991 it proclaimed itself as an autonomous republic within Georgia and on August 15, the two sides concluded an agreement for the establishment of an

In the end of the war, Abkhazians had occupied the entire Abkhazia. About 270,000 people, most of them Georgian ethnics, had to leave the region. Georgian refugees set up militias that carried out infiltration operations in Gali region of Abkhazia.

In 1994, a cease fire agreement (Agreement of Moscow) was negotiated. There was decided a double ceasefire control with Russian troops as peacekeeping forces and the UN observers task, but the fights broke again in 1998 and 2001. In 1991 a local referendum reconfirmed the independence status as sovereign republic.

The main actors – Russia, Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia – act for accomplishing their own objectives using different means for influencing the current situation.

Tbilisi agrees to offer an enlarged autonomy to the two self-proclaimed separatist republics, but with the condition that they must observe the Georgia’s territorial integrity in its current borders. The Georgian President, M. Saakashvili stated he will permanently act for the integration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but only by peaceful means. In this purpose he has proposed a “step by step” plan for the settlement of the conflicts with separatist regions. It is about a three phase plan: redressing the trust, demilitarizing the conflict areas and internationalising the peacekeeping operations carried out in Georgia.

Authorities in Sukhumi and Thinvali, benefiting from the Moscow’s support, ask for the recognition of the two separatist republics’ independence.

The sides accuse each other of incidents that could tension the situation, carry out force protests by organising military exercises nearby the administrative borders, without amplifying the conflict.

Russia remains the main actor in the process for the settlement of the two conflicts.

Russia considers that “sensitive problems like Abkhazia and South Ossetia must be settled only by peaceful means, negotiations, taking into consideration the interests of all people living in these regions”;
a first step in this direction is the clearing away the economic routes by the Georgian authorities; those routes make connection between the two regions.

Possible evolutions:
- The two conflicts are less likely to be settled on short and medium term;
- The conflicts’ settlement process is also influenced by other two important subjects: the Russian bases’ withdrawal from Akhalgalaki and Bat’umi and the signing of the Russian-Georgian basic treaty. Together with the breaking up of the Russian military bases in Georgia, Russia reconfigures its military system in Caucasus. Hence, Russia will act for maintaining its military presence in the area by its peacekeeping forces CIS PKF;
- Currently, Tbilisi does not hold a force necessary for settling the two conflicts in its favour and for bringing the two separatist republics under its authority again. A military action that could be successful in the case of South Ossetia, at least, might determine a conflict with Russia, too, fact that neither Tbilisi nor international community desire.

Kremlin stated a few times that it will not agree with the “use of power” in the settlement of the conflicts in Georgia.

4. The Chechen conflict

The conflict from Chechnya is the most serious security problem in the Wider Region of the Black Sea, source of terrorism and potential destabilising factor for the entire Caucasus. Following the USSR down-fall, the Chechens refused to join the Russian Federation, and in 1991 the political leadership from Grozny declared, unilaterally, the Chechen independence. This republic’s separatist manifestations became conflictual; this transformation may be separated into two phases (some political-military analysts estimate them to be two separate conflicts).
The first phase – 1994-1996 - started with the offensive launched by Moscow against the Chechen forces. After 21 months of fighting, with major losses for both parts involved, the Russian troops withdrew from Chechnya, and this phase of the conflict ended in an undecided manner.
According to the Hasaviurt agreement, concluded on May 12, 1997, by Aslan Mashadov, the Chechen President (elected in 1997, following D. Dudaev’s death) and by Boris Yeltsin, the Russian President, the parts involved in the conflict were to analyse, until 2001, the Chechnya’s status within the Russian Federation.

The second phase of the conflict started in 1999 and is still the most active of all conflicts occurring in the region. In October 1999, under the pretext of the attacks carried out by the Chechen Islamist groups of fighters in the Republic of Dagestan and of the terrorist attacks against Russia (with a death toll of about 300 people), Russia launched an offensive operation against Chechnya. The Chechen leadership also tried to internationalise, or at least to regionalise the conflict, unsuccessfully however because of the firm position adopted by Russia which, in the name of the fight against terrorism, requested the international community not to get involved in its domestic affairs and to eliminate any type of support offered to the “Chechen bandits”. The Chechen political leadership from that time stopped to be recognised by Moscow which installed a pro-Russian military administration, and later a civilian one.

During the second phase, the main feature defining the Russian forces’ actions was the increased use of air and artillery rounds against any type of targets, including against the localities and the populated regions. The land intervention occurred only in the case of precise targets, well-determined and it had also been preceded by land and air search operations for the efficiency of the attacks carried out and the need for using the land forces to minimise the human and the material losses.

The Chechen fighters, obviously inferior in number and armament and military equipment outfit, used the tactic of not engaging in direct combat, preferring the night raids and the diversion operations in the territories occupied by the federal forces. Many of the operations carried out by the Chechen separatists consisted in trap attacks, attacks against some Russian commanders or against some pro-Russian Chechen leaders, but also against the civilian population (operations carried out on Chechen territory, but also on the Russian one, or in the republics from the region – Ingushetia, Dagestan), taking hostages, including Chechen
civilians. The need for funds determined the Chechens to associate these actions with a series of organised crime activities (drug and armament trafficking, etc.); all these aspects allowed Moscow to define the Chechen fighters’ actions as terrorist.

In 2001, the command of the operations in Chechnya, which had been in the Ministry of Defence’s responsibility, was taken over by the Federal Security Service (FSB), in order to accredit the idea that this conflict is inscribed in the line of the fight against international terrorism. On September 1st, 2003, the Ministry of Interior took over the command of the operations against terrorism from the FSB that became “operation of law and order keeping”, intended to “prove” the proper end of the conflict and the development of a process to pacify and stabilise Chechnya.

The current state of facts does not offer yet a viable and long lasting solution. The parts involved are still rejecting the political solutions for the conflict in Chechnya. The pro-Russian Chechen militias are more efficient in their operations against the rebels, but they are also the ones generating the worst violations of human rights.

**Possible evolutions:**

- The separatist conflict from Chechnya will continue to be the main domestic security problem in the Russian Federation, a source of terrorism and a potential destabilising factor in the entire Caucasus. The military campaigns in Chechnya will most likely continue to be just as rough and inefficient as the ones carried out in the past.

- In the context of some major ethnic and religious tensions, corruption in administration and justice and security structures, spreading Islamic fundamentalism, and also in the context of the increasing operations of the Chechen separatist groups, there is the danger for the Chechen conflict to spread in the entire North Caucasus;

- There is also a danger related to the terrorist methods that could become the main instrument in settling various separatist, ethnic and religious claims and requests;

- Following the death of Aslan Mashadov, the former Chechen President, leader of the moderate group, the radical group’s role might
increase in importance as it is more oriented towards terrorist actions. Moreover, the moderate group’s orientation might become more radical, as in the absence of a strong leader, it could become subordinated to the radical movement;

- In the military field, in order to compensate the troops’ downsizing from Chechnya, two special troops brigades will be established in Dagestan and in Karachay-Cherkessia. This is how the Russian Federation alters the action strategy in North Caucasus and the main forces will have as main task to forbid the Chechen fighters to cross the border, whereas the fighting actions proper will be carried out by some mobile subunits.

5. Conclusions

The “frozen” conflicts from the region of the Black Sea are major destabilising factors not only for the security of the states where they occur, but also for the entire region; this thing is due to the major conflictual potential, to the strongly connected relations between the separatist regimes’ leaders and the organised crime leaders, to the increasingly active involvement of the terrorist and radical Islamic organisations.

Consequently, settling these conflicts should become the main attribution for region’s states and also for the international community whose absence would actually make impossible to find a real solution.
POSSIBLE WAYS OF CONDUCTING TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST MARITIME TRADE AND SHIPPING

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An analysis of the terrorist acts targeted against maritime shipping in the last 50 years enables us to predict the possible methods of attack to be employed by perpetrators of similar violent acts in the future. The following terrorist activities are considered likely:

- attacks in ports or at sea with the use of explosives brought aboard a ship together with freight;
- attacks in ports or at sea with the use of explosives brought aboard a ship by a member (members) of a terrorist organization;
- hijacking merchant ships by persons on board;
- hijacking merchant ships carried out with the assistance of other vessels;
- firing merchant ships manoeuvring in offshore areas or inland water lanes;
- attacks with the use of explosives-ridden vessels that are remotely controlled or manned by suicide bombers;
- combat divers (frog-men) attacks;
- mines attacks.

Attacks with the use of explosives brought aboard a vessel together with freight should be regarded as the easiest to organize and carry out. The explosive material can be put into any freight during its transportation and provided with a time fuse to set off detonation. The basic shortcoming of such a method is the inability to predict precisely the place of the explosion and estimate the destructive impact of an explosion on the vessel (port infrastructure). The impact of an explosion may be enhanced or reduced, depending on where the cargo containing explosives is hidden on the ship. Taking into account the above considerations, the
purpose of attacks thus carried out is to generate a sense of threat, a psychosis of fear, rather than to destroy or damage selected targets.

From the terrorists’ point of view, the advantages of such an attack are the difficulties in identifying the perpetrator (perpetrators), a relative ease of getting the charge on the ship, a low level of risk to the perpetrator (perpetrators), a very limited possibility of organising effective counteraction, and the possibility of carrying out an assault without having detailed information concerning the operation of the port, the dates of departure and entry of ships, the destination of cargo, etc.

Moreover, it should be underlined that such a method (its idea being akin to the oft-employed mailing of letter bombs) can be used by small groups, possess a relatively primitive equipment easy to procure, and are active beyond offshore areas, both within a country and abroad.

The terrorist acts (bomb attacks) with the use of explosives brought on a ship by a member (members) of a terrorist organization make possible attacks on selected, carefully screened targets, and thus enhance the impact of the explosion by proper positioning explosives aboard.

At the same time, in what appears to be an important aspect, the scale of threat can be enhanced by destroying or damaging a vessel transporting hazardous cargo. In order to organize such an attack one must obtain detailed information regarding the movement of ships in a selected port (ports), the type of cargo transported, the system of port security, the system of watch duty on a targeted ship and the ship’s construction (in particular the layout of its compartments as well as the traffic arteries). It can be assumed that planning the attack would require carrying out long-term observation of the ship or port, or, more likely, obtaining information from a recruited member of the crew or employee of the port or shipyard where the vessel had been constructed.

In addition, information from open sources may play a considerable role (press publications, Internet sites, advertising materials of the shipping companies and shipyards). In contrast to the methods described above, the perpetrators of such an attack must have some knowledge of ship-building; they also face considerable risks, as their activities in the port, and especially onboard, could attract attention.
All vessels are potential targets for hijacking. One should regard the following vessels as the most likely targets for this type of attack:

- passenger ships (passenger and passenger/cargo ferries, cruise liners), from the perpetrators’ point of view, the attractiveness of these ships arises from the possibility of capturing and exercising effective control over a large number of people with the intention of either holding them hostage or executing them;
- ships transporting hazardous cargo (tankers, LNG and LPG carriers, chemical cargo carriers). Their attractiveness results from the possibility of taking over cargo for the purpose of gaining a strong negotiating position or destroying the ship and thus effecting catastrophic results.

An analysis of terrorist attacks carried out to date with the aim of taking over passenger ships as well as targeting freighter and fishing boats makes it possible to formulate a thesis that the perpetrators may get aboard a ship:

- in port, secretly, with the intention of attacking once the ship is at sea,
- in port, openly and legally (with a purchased ticket), along with passengers, with the intention of carrying out an attack once the ship leaves port,
- in port, by force, with the intention of seizing control over the ship and then forcing the crew to leave port,
- while riding at a roadstead or at anchor,
- at sea, by secretly getting on board and forcing the ship to stop.

1 Four terrorists maintained full control over more than 1,000 passengers and members of the crew during the hijacking of the Italian passenger ship Achille Lauro.
2 This is what the terrorists did during the already-mentioned hijacking of the Portuguese passenger ship Santa Maria on 22.01.1961; the Italian ship Achille Lauro on 7.10.1986; the attempt to hijack the Greek vessel City of Poros on 11.06.1988; the hijacking of the Turkish ferry Avrasya on 13.01.1996, cf. K. KUBIAK, “Terroryzm morski zagrożenie dla żeglugi” Morze, (5) 1990; “Groźba wysadzenia promu,” Rzeczpospolita, 18.01.1996.
3 An example here was the hijacking of the Laju ferry in Singapore on January, 3rd, 1974, when four terrorists from the People’s Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Japanese Red Army captured a vessel and took five people hostage following an attempted attack on the Shell Oil installations.
4 In 1994, Islamic fundamentalists murdered the sleeping crew of the Italian merchant ship Lucina in the Algerian port of Iyel.
5 It is a method employed primarily by contemporary pirates. Documents of the International Maritime Organisation describe two rubber pontoons (without angular fenders and hence practically invisible to radars) linked by a
with the help of machine gun fire (small-calibre artillery) from fast motor-boats\(^6\). When examining the threat to passenger ships from hijacking, it should be noted that the fundamental element taken into account by perpetrators while selecting a target for the attack and planning it is the nationality (citizenship) of the passengers to be held as a consequence. The flag of the ship is of practically no importance. The threat to passenger ferries servicing the same routes and always ferrying passengers from the same two or three countries may arise whenever one of these countries engages in conflict (direct or indirect) with terrorist groups or a state sponsoring them. The threat to cruise liners depends predominantly on the number of passengers of specific nationality embarked on a given cruise and it rises together with the increase in the number of passengers from countries that are currently in conflict with a terrorist organization or are undergoing an international crisis.

A ship may become a target of a terrorist attack by receiving ground fire when it manoeuvres along coastal or interior water lanes, awaits entry into port or when lying in harbour. So far, mortars, guided missile launchers and grenade launchers of various kinds have been used in such attacks (both in terrorist attacks and in local conflicts). Now the use of armour-piercing guided missiles, automatic grenade launchers and multiple-calibre sniper rifles cannot be ruled out. The need to acquire these weapons plus ammunition, ship them to an operational area and position them for combat seriously limits the possibility of such attacks launched by weak organizations without the support of states or terrorist groups linked thereto.

Mortars and guided missile launchers can be used mainly against ships manoeuvring relatively slowly or immobile\(^7\). A flaw

\(^6\) The aforementioned method is used by pirates primarily in regions without intensive activities of police and military units, or where the littoral states do not exercise effective control over their shorelines. Among others, it was employed by Eritrean groups close to the Bab el Mandeb strait.

of such an attack is a relatively low accuracy of fire.

Several dozen ships came under fire from other vessels, especially fast, armed motorboats\(^8\) (called also speedboats or Boghammers\(^9\)), in the post-war period. These vessels have been used as weapon platforms or as the so-called exploding boats (filled with explosives and guided on target, including by suicide bombers).

Boats with at least displacement about 1-3 metric tonnes, armed with machine guns, grenade launchers, armour-piercing guided missile launchers, unguided rocket missile launchers, and even mobile anti-aircraft systems have been used in operations and have reached a speed of up to 40 knots (at calm seas).

The parameters of the weapon systems installed on fast motorboats (first of all an effective range of fire from a platform of little stability, which a motorboat is) determine the choice of tactics.

Effective use of machine guns, grenade launchers and unguided rocket missile launchers requires approaching the target at no more than 300-400 metres, with the accuracy of gunfire increasing as the distance closes.

We can thus assume that an attack by armed fast motorboats against a merchant ship would amount to the following:

- a swift and insofar as possible secret approach of one or more boats towards the target,
- continuous gunfire lasting from a few to over 10 minutes (it would more likely be aimed at surfaces, i.e. the deckhouse and the hull, concentrating on the upper storeys of the superstructure, rather than precise gunfire aimed at specific elements of the ship’s construction),
- a retreat.

The types of weapons fast motorboats can be armed with do not pose a serious direct threat to the buoyancy of a mid-sized merchant ship.

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8 In the post-World War II period armed motorboats have been used by Cuban anti-Castro groups, Arab terrorists targeting Israel’s shipping and sea-coast, the Nicaraguan Contras fighting the Sandinistas, Iranian navy irregulars during the Iraqi-Iranian war, Croatian forces during the civil war in Yugoslavia and the Tamils in the domestic conflict in Sri Lanka.

9 The Swedish company provided the fast motor boats to Iran during the war against Iraq. They were used by Iranian Revolutionary Guard for attacking tankers.
However, there is likelihood of inflicting losses among the crew, causing damage to the plating above the water line, the freight or the deckhouse, and also of fires that might lead to the loss of the vessel.

It should be recognized that in countries pursuing a liberal policy in regard to shipping, registering a shipping activity and purchasing a boat is limited solely by the financial resources of a group planning terrorist activities.\(^\text{10}\)

It may thus be assumed that a legal purchase of a boat with the aim of converting it to a mother ship for fast motorboats is within reach of terrorist groups.

In the post-war period there have been several attacks against maritime shipping carried out by armed divers trained and equipped by non-state actors.

The organization of such an attack is facilitated by the fact that the training of scuba-divers, at least at the basic level, is an element of recreation in the broad sense, in the most developed countries, with basic equipment offered for sale on a regular commercial basis.

Whilst it is certain that a terrorist with a few days of recreational training and with equipment purchased at a sports store presents a military potential that is inferior by far to that of a member of naval Special Forces, he still remains a dangerous adversary, particularly when he launches a surprise attack. Thus, even organizations that are relatively weak and do not have significant financial resources at their disposal may be able to field “amateur frogmen,” but this is the only danger.

Strong and affluent organizations can afford to organize and train fully professional teams of underwater subversion even when they do not enjoy state support (it is worth mentioning that the Palestinians were the first to organize a group of combat divers with the support of Yugoslavia).

An example here are the combat divers of the Tamil Tigers

\(^{10}\) This opinion is confirmed by the ease with which organized criminal groups involved in human trafficking acquire ships. Cf. Z. KUSOVAC, “Stemming the Flow of People - Smuggling at Sea,” *Jane’s Navy International*, (4) 2002, pp. 18-20.
equipped with closed circuit oxygen diving apparatus (rebreather), called also Dräger\textsuperscript{11} (purchased in the Netherlands), which the naval units of many countries would take pride in.

A weapon that is particularly useful in terrorist attacks against shipping is mines\textsuperscript{12}. On the basis of post-war experiences\textsuperscript{13}, the use of this weapon can be expected in terrorist attacks against merchant ships riding at the roadstead or anchorage, against vessels approaching ports port of the state attacked. Its use in a way that would jeopardize the interests of third states should be considered less likely. Use of temporarily adapted vessels made to look like merchant ships, recreational or fishing boats in the role of minelayers should be regarded as feasible.

It follows from an analysis of the methods employed for carrying out terrorist attacks against shipping that the perpetrators of such attacks have at their disposal a broad range of combat means. Hence not only strong organizations with considerable financial resources and hundreds of members and sympathizers (sometimes also enjoying state support) may pose a threat to a merchant ship; weak organizations with limited resources in terms of personnel, finances and equipment can be dangerous as well.

\textsuperscript{11} The German firm, which is the World leader in the field of military diving equipment.
\textsuperscript{12} According to Jane’s Underwater Weapon System the following countries manufacture sea mines: Brazil, Chile, People’s Republic of China, Denmark, Germany, Iraq, Italy, North Korea, Poland, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Republic of China (Taiwan), United Kingdom, United States, Yugoslavia. Between 250,000 and 450,000 mines of all types and uses (according to American estimates) were to be found in the arsenals of the former Soviet Navy alone, cf. F. B. KELSO II, “Building Blocks of Naval Power,” USNI Proceedings, (11) 1992, p. 40. The deployment of mines by the Tamil rebels attests to the proliferation of mine ordnance. This is also confirmed by the damage done on 29 May 1987 by an underwater explosion to a Greek vessel of 29,423 d.w.t. approaching the post of Trinkomali. Cf. “Shipping News,” BIMCO Weekly News, (26) 1997, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{13} Since World War II mines were laid for terrorist purposes by the Contras in the fight against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua; by UNITA in the civil war in Angola (mainly on the approaches to Luanda); by Iranian irregular formations in attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf; during the Iraqi-Iranian war; by Libyan naval forces and special services in the Suez Gulf in 1984; by the Tamil separatists.
THE NOWADAYS MARITIME POWER EVOLUTION IN THE BLACK SEA AND ITS INFLUENCE ON GEOPOLITICS

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The new geo-political context, in which Western Europe has become the continent’s main source of power (capital, technology, information and military power), and its Central and Eastern part the most important manifestation area, questions Europe’s future. After almost half of century of separation, Europe redefines a new identity – peace, cooperation, and integration – as an alternative to confrontation. The evolution tendency is the most powerful and the future of the European community depends on it.

The reality of the present European geopolitical and geostrategic environment and its evolution tendency point out two alternatives:

- achieving a total integration through the gradual inclusion of the Eastern and Central-Eastern states in pan-European, European and Euro-Atlantic structures and realizing a united Europe, or:
- spreading the instability to the West by deepening the present economical and technological discrepancies, amplifying the risks and threats to the security. The result could be resuming the arming process against the background of dividing the continent into hostile groups of states created as a result of economical and religious differences.

The first alternative is the most probable but the world contemporary realities lead to the idea that the European integration will be extended beyond the first decade of the 3rd millennium because the globalisation phenomenon, omnipresent, the European and Euro-Atlantic integration efforts of ex-socialist states, Russia development and orientation, the increasing affirmation of Asian
countries in the world political life and the reconsideration of the Arab countries role in the Middle East peacekeeping, condition decisively the security environment evolution at regional level. To all these add the effects of world natural processes (the global warming, lack of water, floods, earthquakes, exhaustion of natural resources, demographic evolution, etc), of poverty, organized crime and terrorism revival. The consequences are more and more present in determining the security environment.

The ample process of international rapports redefining in the conditions of evolution to multipolarity and new power poles affirmation has, as a corollary, the competition for the strategic resources control and the access ways to them together with the increase of interdependence and interaction degree between the states.

Being in a process of redefining its role and place among the states and of materializing the irreversible political options regarding the total integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures, Romania, based on the security environment evaluation in the realm of interest, needs to elaborate and adapt the content of its objectives and action directions in order to achieve the fundamental strategic goals.

From the strategic point of view, Romania has some important advantages: the population number and quality, the natural resources, the relief, the economical, scientific, cultural and military potential. Meantime, by Rhine-Main-Danube-Black Sea channel and the increase of the Black Sea harbour areas strategic importance, Romania is very important in the European economical circuits and Europe connection to the neighbouring areas – the Middle East and the Persian Gulf area.

The situation in the countries in South East Europe and those close to Romania in the Black Sea area is characterized by their measures to implement The South East Europe Stability Pact provisions and the efforts to integrate in European and Euro-Atlantic structures.

Romania’s immediate vicinity can be characterized on one hand by stability and sustained measures to integrate in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures and on the other hand by instability, insecurity and the Russian Federation tendency to re-increase its influence.

Romania, as an actor on the European stage, irreversibly connected
to political, economical and security integration in European and Euro-Atlantic structures, makes sustained efforts to develop itself as a state and to affirm the democratic principles in all the sectors of the social life, together with the market economy implementation, human rights observance and affirmation of the Romanian people moral and spiritual values in the gallery of European and world values. Active participant to the International Community efforts to manage and solve out the crisis situations, Romania proves to be a real factor of stability and regional security through its involvement and communitarian support.

All these make Romania very important for the great powers of the world. This implies both the possibility to become an interest pole in South Eastern Europe, through political and diplomatic ability and the disadvantage to be, once again, an object of understanding between the great powers.

Therefore, we may assert that, in Europe, Romania’s security policy is defined by the perspective of its total integration in European and Euro-Atlantic structures, by diversifying and amplifying its links with the great Western democracies. At regional level it is defined by the consolidation and intensification of the cooperation with the states situated in the Black Sea area.

**The increase of maritime space importance, as a manifestation of the national interests and the naval force role in managing the crisis situations in the area is an obvious matter and more and more emphasized by our state officials.**

The capacity to control the maritime space is, at present, one of the major strategic factors even though, at the same time, there is a decrease of the level and the change of possible threats typology.

The complexity of the problems linked to the necessity to ensure control in the interest maritime area makes the maritime strategy to be considered an element of the global strategy at national level. The new element which adds to this constant strategy – the tendency to consider the Naval Forces as “operational arm” for peacekeeping and crisis management interventions – and which has as a consequence the use of military means needs a re-evaluation of the criteria regarding these forces composition, training and use. In this context, crisis management,
as an important objective of the security policy and the increasing operational necessities, demand restructuring the Naval Forces mainly on increasing the flexibility, mobility, logistic autonomy, adapting to different missions or involvements at different levels and the reaction readiness.

The naval forces have shown, without any doubt, that besides classical naval operations, they are the most capable to be a flexible, continuous and prolonged support during political and diplomatic actions and crisis management.

Capable to act at great distances, without any constraints imposed by the national borders or by the weapon control limitations, the Naval Forces are frequently the first ones acting in crisis areas. Their flexibility, the resistance and capacity to maintain the balance, make them an ideal participant in the first moments of the crises. A naval force can thus be a security foreign policy tool, visible from the exterior and whose presence has a much more convincing influence compared to its elements size and costs.

The Naval Forces have always represented the symbol and support for the maritime power, the guarantor of the free use of the sea mainly for economical reasons. The economic and financial effort required by the necessity of the creation of a credible naval force and maintaining it operational is sustained by a series of arguments of present interest such as:

- The seas and oceans have become a privileged area for the interests and naval diplomacy and crisis management monitoring;
- There is a considerable increase of the economic, strategic and military importance of the aquatic environment and of the interests regarding the national security on the seas and rivers;
- The Naval Forces’ capacity to participate in crisis management in different geostrategic area, determined by their possibility to be a non-combat presence for a long time, with outstanding effects in military deterrence;
- The great diversity of forces in the Naval Forces composition (ships, submarines, maritime aviation, marine, fight divers, Special Forces, etc) allows large military operations for long periods of time in
order to achieve strategic or operational goals;
   - The Naval Force possibility to pass quickly from peace to war and to accomplish thus the strategic surprise.

The future importance of the Naval Forces is demonstrated also by the preferential treatment these forces have at the military arsenals reduction conventions.

Next, we’re going to analyze some tendencies and evolutions in the development of the Military Maritime Forces of the countries in the Black Sea area.

The Military Maritime Forces development and modernization and improving their fight procedures and methods are among the top priorities of all states in the Black Sea area which have this force. Its importance has been demonstrated in the last regional conflicts.

The dimension of a state maritime fleet can’t be conditioned only by its shore length but also by the dimension of its maritime interests as well as those of the neighbouring countries in accordance with the level of their naval forces and economic and financial possibilities.

1. Bulgaria’s Military Maritime Forces

During the past years, Bulgaria has built only small ships in its own naval yard, patrol and air borne boats and mine sweepers. Bulgaria’s military maritime forces main forces and means were imported from the ex-USSR and consist of: 2 submarines (used now only for training), 1 frigate, 6 corvettes, 6 missile-borne vedettes, about 35 ships and mine-planting vedettes and mine-sweepers and air-borne boats (in 2001, 2 Vidra vedettes were given to Georgia as a military support), 12 anti-submarine helicopters, 12 search and rescue helicopters.

As the other Central and East European countries, Bulgaria faces the inherent hardships of passing to the market economy, situation which has negative repercussions for the armed forces as well as regarding both the implementation of their restructuring program and also stopping or compromising most of armed forces endowment and modernizing plans.
At present, Bulgarian Navy leaders have elaborated studies regarding the balance of forces, action and logistics possibility, modernization of old ships and acquiring new modern ones at the same time with discarding old ships and battle technique.

Having in mind the importance of the missions for the Bulgarian naval forces, the country’s political and military leaders are determined to pay special attention to the increase of their fighting capacity so that it may be equal to the other countries located in the Black Sea area. However, even if the military maritime force reform plan has been elaborated and focuses on important changes in their organizational structure and endowment until 2010, there will be a delay because of both the legislative environment still not adequate and also the economic problems. In this context, even though the naval forces future structure has already been prefigured, it can’t be realized in the present conditions. It needs a longer period of time during which several fighting ships will no longer be operational and they will be replaced with new ones, Bulgarian or imported from the West.

Following several consultations with NATO representatives, Bulgarian military leaders have set up a project called “Bulgarian Army in 2015” which, if approved, will impose some amendments to Law of Defence, and to the present army reform program, mainly in the sense of increasing army strength.

Bulgarian military leaders appreciate the military navy which, due to its specific activities, has been faster in achieving the military reforms. At the same time, Bulgarian Military Maritime Forces have the important role to strengthen the cooperation relations with the fleets of the other countries in the Black Sea area, in the context of general concern, to ensure the stability and security in the region.

2. Turkish Military Maritime Forces

Starting with 1995, Turkish armed forces have been undergoing a modernization program on long term, until 2020 respectively, a program of about 150 billion dollars. Within this program, Turkish Military Navy Forces have been allotted an important part of this money as their
role and importance tend to increase comparing with the other military branches.

The main naval tendencies are:

**Equipment:**

- The development of submarine fleet, acquiring new submarines, class 209, in order to increase the influence and deterring capacity of military maritime forces in the Aegian Sea and the North East of the Mediterranean Sea and not last, the counterbalancing the Russian Fleet influence in the Black Sea.

- The development of the frigate Fleet and building new frigates, especially class “Meko – 200” both in Golcuk naval yards and in those ones from Hamburg, Germany. The same objective will be achieved by acquiring “O.H.Perry” frigates, no longer operational within US naval forces. In this respect, eight such frigates have already been transferred to Turkey.

- The development of mine-sweeper fleet by building new ones in Turkish naval yards and also by buying new modern ones from France.

- The development and modernisation of Rapid Reaction Corp naval component destined to deter any aggression coming from the sea.

**Ship building:**

During the last years, an important emphasis has been laid on the development of Turkish military yards production capacity. At present, almost all categories of battle ships can be built, both surface and classical submarines.

The development of the Military Naval Forces tends to be reflected in army strength. At present, The Military Naval Forces strength is almost 10% of the total Turkish armed forces strength and the present tendency is to increase this percentage.

**Missions:**

Apart from the main mission, that one of deterring any sea aggression, The Military Maritime Forces are involved in achieving numerous and diverse missions: participating in peacekeeping international
operations, humanitarian aids safe shipping, deterrence of sea terrorist acts, polluting prevention and maintaining the sea ecological balance.

3. Ukraine Military Maritime Forces

The delays in dividing the ex-Russian Fleet in the Black Sea have led to delays in Ukraine fleet restructuring and modernization.

Given the existent potential (sufficient and well equipped infrastructures, strong naval yards and a growing economy), Ukraine has the necessary conditions to create a strong military fleet equipped with modern battle ships.

Starting from the missions and objectives established for the Military Naval Forces in the national military doctrine provisions their future structure and equipping will have to meet these demands:
- efficiency and safety in force conducting and enduring;
- achieve the capacity to deter any sea aggression;
- defend the shore objectives and those in the exclusive economic area;
- take part in international missions and activities under competent international organizations.

Together with the force organization and composition plans, Ukraine military and political leaders will set up, in the next 10-15 years, programs to build and modernize ships in Ukraine own naval yards, both for the military fleet and also for export.

As for force training, a special emphasis will be laid on the manoeuvre qualities, action and rapid regrouping capacity, in any situation of the air-naval operation.

For the next period of time, Ukraine authorities want to develop The Military Maritime Forces. They will establish programs to build and modernise battle ships in the naval yards in Nikolaev (large and medium surface ships), Cernomorskoe (air-borne ships), Feodosia (ships on lift wings and air cushions) and Kerci (river ships). At the same time, the naval research programs will continue, having in mind that there is a specialized institute in Nikolaev and there are also several joint projects with Russia, in order to build modern battle ships. There
will be some programs to build and modernize submarines.

As for surface battle ship building, they will be equipped with high-tech weapon systems integrated with modern electronic warfare elements and command and control automatic systems, to monitor the information and to conduct fire. Emphasis will be laid on the maximum efficiency in military production, given the fact that the material and financial resources are limited. To optimize the use of the existent resources, they will have in view to develop or acquire high-tech systems with a very large standardization, the defence industry rational conversion, using healthy ecologic weapons and economically profitable, increase the fire power and weapon mobility, so that they could be competitive on the world market.

An important element will be the creation of a new infrastructure for the Military Naval Forces, according to present demands.

4. Russian Fleet in the Black Sea

Much delayed because of the economic crisis, Russia general reform process continues to be applied respecting certain priorities, the military reform having become lately the major concern for the Russian political and military leaders.

The main beneficiaries of the restructuring and modernization program are the Military Naval Forces which, besides creating a smaller structure, will have modern weapons and technique in order to be able to act efficiently in any situation required by the necessity of their intervention.

The objectives of the Military Naval Forces restructuring and modernization programs refer to achieving a balanced structure of the naval power dimension (submarine, surface, air-naval, special forces), maintaining and increasing the strategic maritime force groups, reforming the troop structure, leadership and training system, increasing the ship unit combat capacity, improving logistics, equipping the ship with modern weapons and technique and at the same time their reduction, maintaining the efficiency of military maritime main net and improving the integrated automated system of troop leading, improving
the communication system using computers and satellite transmissions, implementing the new leading systems and satellite navigation.

In the near future, the Military Naval Forces will undergo a restructuring program having as an objective improving the mobility, efficiency and interoperability by setting up several naval hit groups consisted of modern ships equipped with modern Russian technique. This is the only measure the Russian political and military leaders can hope for taking into account that the economy, financial support and the new technologies integration degree don’t allow yet the radical change of the military naval construction programs.

In this context, the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea is still in a restructuring process concerning its organization, composition and breaking up. It was reorganized in two naval groups, one in the West with its HQ in Savastopol and one in the East with its HQ in Novorosiisk. Due to this reorganization the Western Naval Group will go on using the military naval bases in Sevastopol harbour (Ionia, Karantinnaia, Kazacia, Streletkaia) and Feodosia harbour while the Eastern Naval Group will use the bases in Kerci, Novorosiisk, Ghelendiik and Tuapse.

Following this restructuring, the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea will have about 300 ships, over 100 planes and a few dozens airplanes.

Although the present naval high units will be maintained, there will be created heterogeneous operational groups with air tactical support in order to meet the complex demands of present naval operation and the fleet main missions: destroy some important seaside enemy targets, attack and destroy naval groups breaking up into the sea or military maritime bases, interdict the enemy air and naval forces in home maritime communication ways, debark the maritime air-borne and execute the crossing in no more than 15 hours to the farthest place in the Black Sea seaside, observe the maritime communications in Central and Western parts of the Black Sea.

As a perspective tendency their concern is to increase the efficiency and modernize the main combat units in the fleet.

The new state configuration of the Black Sea coast and the political, military and economic evolutions will make necessary that the countries in the region modernize their military naval forces within the limits of
their economic and military potential and the quantitative restrictions imposed by the CFE treaty.

The efforts of the countries in the Black Sea to make this region an area of peace, stability and cooperation can be successful in most of the fields of mutual interest only if each country acts accordingly.

5. Geopolitical problems in the Black Sea Area

The Black Sea is almost a lake on the world map and Bosporus, only 700m wide links it to the World Ocean. An enclave in Eurasia, this medium aquatic basin (422,000 km²) has had a tumultuous history for three millennia. Due to the fact that it is far away from the ocean, the Black Sea has an important and huge “hinterland”. It lies between two parts of the world (Europe and Asia), two religions (Christianity and Islam) and two families of peoples (Slav and Turkish). A great contemporary power, Russia, and two regional powers, Ukraine and Turkey, build their strategic, political and economical conceptions taking into account this sea and the area around it.

In 1945, German geopolitical pioneers had a double nightmare – on the one hand Germany catastrophe – of the whole geopolitical tradition from Ratzel to Haushofer and on the other hand, Mackinder’s “Heartland” was a reality of the post-war world. In his books between the two World Wars the great British geo-politician said that the greatest danger would be the alliance of the continental enemy powers (Germany and USSR) and forming a compact region, controlled by them, which would include Eurasia interior regions, with a natural border on the Rhine – Alps – Danube – Black Sea – Caucasus – Elburs – Kopetdag – Hindukus – Himalaya – Huanhe (territory called “Heartland” and “The Interior Semi-moon” in geopolitics. Defended by a strong “mountain wall”, with a desert in the south and the impenetrable Arctic Ocean in the north, this “horror semi-moon” as it was called, borders all the world strategic places, being in itself inaccessible. “Who leads ‘Heartland’ will lead the world”, said Mackinder. The German classic geo-politicians hoped in a German Heartland, their great disillusion and the westerners’ too being the Soviet Heartland.
It took less than half a century to endure the shock of the World War Two and the cold war which had frozen the 1945 truce for four decades. Only two years have passed since the dramatic events near Brandenburg Wall until the lowering of the Soviet flag from the Kremlin. A new historic era began for that part of the world under the Soviet domination. Artificial geopolitical ensembles disappeared and new ones appeared which, under the Soviet domination, a part of history seemed forever. So was the case of the Black Sea – arena of some of the most dramatic moments in history – which, after half a century, resumed its multi-millenary epos.

After 1991, six countries have access to the Black Sea: Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Georgia being the only maritime access for four of them: Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia. Due to the deep penetration into the continent, the Black Sea has an enormous “hinterland”. It’s about the countries whose only maritime way is the Danube, the largest river in the Pontic basin – Austria, Slovakia and Hungary. The Republic of Moldova is also considered a country in the Black Sea, through the maritime Danube, 1.8 km long. The Republic of Moldova can be considered a Pontic country not only geographically but also politically, from the end of the 14th century the Principality of Moldavia being in the vicinity of the Black Sea.

Through the Danube with its status of international aquatic way, Germany, Yugoslavia and Croatia have access to the Black Sea as well. Belarus too, the largest European country, without a maritime outlet, has access to the Black Sea through the Nipru (Belarus river axis).

Another access to the Black Sea – the Cimmerian Bosporus – seems to be “false” and with no value as it leads to a dead end – The Azov Sea. Starting with 1952 however, this dead end has had a new geo-strategic value, due to the Volga channel – the Caspic Sea - Don to the World Ocean. This channel, built from strategic reasons, allows 5000 ton ships, meaning maritime ships. In 1991, when three Caspic states – Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan were independent, the “Cimmerian dead end” has a geopolitical and geo-economical added value. Not plenary capitalized, the “Caspic” factor is already considered by the Russian and Turkish geo-politicians and geo-economists and can
SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE BLACK SEA AREA

represent one of major advantages of the Pontic geopolitical area.

The syntagm “Pontic area” must be clarified. Firstly, there is a
physical and geographic explanation. In this respect we have a very
precise answer considering the fact that there can’t be different opinions
regarding the Black Sea basin. From the physical and geographical
point of view, the Pontic region embodies the basin of the river flowing
into the Black Sea (Danube, Nipre, Nistru etc). The Black Sea region
includes all or most part of Romania, Moldova, Bulgaria, Slovakia,
Austria, Hungary and Ukraine and considerable parts of Turkey,
Georgia, Russia, Czech Republic, Germania, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Yugoslavia. However, all talking about the Black Sea
region in a political, historical, economical or cultural way will be
reluctant in admitting that Vienna would be in that category and not
Istanbul which from the hydrographical point of view, belongs to the
Marmara Sea.

From social and geographic point of view, the Black Sea region
would include some regions that physically and geographically belong
to other hydrographical basins (Ciscaucasus and Transcaucazia), but
from political, historical, economical and cultural point of view it is
a distinct entity and would exclude territories which, physically and
geographically, would exclude some territories belonging to the Pontic
area but which, socially and geographically, belong to other area entities
(Austria and Belarus).

Let’s try and set up a social and geographical border of the Black
Sea region, admitting that any attempt of this kind has an arbitrary
element. The Pontic area embodies not only the Black Sea countries
but also the two sub-continents situated at the extremes of the Pontic
basin. On one hand, seven Balkan states – Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria,
Macedonia, Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Greece – on
the other hand the three Caucasian countries – Georgia, Armenia and
Azerbaijan. Literally and figuratively, the two regions are connected
by Turkey. Even Cyprus, given its geopolitical specific nature, could
be included here. All 12 countries have political interests linked to the
Balkan Caucasian and Pontic area. Russia and Ukraine can hardly be
called Pontic countries; their regional power, geography and dimension
make them hard to be included in a geopolitical ensemble. At the same
time, Russia is without any doubt “the Prima Donna” of the Pontic
geopolitical scene and the main “political climate supplier” in the area.
But, in Russia’s case, a country in the Black Sea, it’s obvious that we
can’t include Vladivostok or Petersburg in the Pontic geopolitical area.
Already Astrakhan considers the problems in the region. From a historical
point of view, the Pontic area would include only the Ciscaucazia. This
region is a distinctive economic part of Russia – North Caucasus.

A social and geographic border takes into account especially the
geo-economical similitude of a region and its geo-cultural and geo-
historical unity. The Caucasus and the Balkans, despite the distance,
have more in common than the Caucasus and Central Asia on one hand
and the Balkans and the Apennines on the other hand, even if the distance
logic would make us think otherwise.

A geopolitical ensemble would be an area with specific conditions to
create a region’s own political climate. This climate could be influenced
by the presence or absence of a great power or a regional one, the
position to the main gravity poles of the international relations system
(the map-political aspect), the demographic, ethnic and confessional
map (the bio-political aspect), the regional economic interdependence
(the empire-political aspect), the region isolation or its wide opening
caused by natural factors (the county’s configuration, and large internal
barrier: mountain ranges, deserts, international rivers, seas – factors
defining the morpho-political aspect.

The debates’ intensity and echo regarding the Pontic area have
increased with the demise of the USSR the edification attempts, beyond
the East-West geopolitical barrier of a coherent geopolitical ensemble.
The Pontic area frontiers are hard to establish or define. And it is even
harder for us to understand, after the USSR implosion, those “space
valves” determining history in this part of the world, or, more, to
completely understand “the space mystic”.

The “Pontic area” notion appeared in ancient times as a purely
geographically definition. Later, it was associated with great Balkan
and Caucasian bi-pillar Pontic empires, Turkey and the Byzantium,
in modern age. Today, the Pontic area is an ethnic and confessional
mosaic, an area reuniting the two corridors (the Balkans and Caucasian) between Asia and Europe, the Islamic and the Christian worlds.

The geographic situation and the existence of this unique sample of “space architecture” which is the succession: sea (the Adriatic Sea) – continent (The Balkans) – sea (The Black Sea) – continent (the Caucasian) – sea (The Caspic Sea) give a complex identity to the Pontic area. The two continental “geopolitical corridors” (The Balkans and The Caucasian) have hosted for four millenniums the changes and moves between Asia and Europe. Here the two parts of the world don’t just meet but interact too: the continental and maritime identities, the ethnic and confessional identities, “the third world” and “the first world” identities, the Europeans and the Asian identities. Following this “Euro-Asian traffic”, there is a permanent tension between the two corridors which degenerates after some accumulative periods in a destroying whirlpool. The Muslims and the Christians, South and North, the European and the Asians dissipate periodically drawn by “the power of the torrent” in a macabre “political dance”. The turbulence and the complexity of the Pontic identity – two qualities generated by the space architecture – certainly are the most important characteristics and the only ones capable to distinguish and separate them from the neighbouring ensembles.

The last decade of the 20th century appeared to be the end of an “accumulative period”. After the calm caused by the USSR’s “geopolitical dictatorship” and by the East-West geopolitical fault’s “attraction force” which focused all the destructive energy of the Black Sea region, there is here a serious transversal fracture dividing the Pontic area along the geological fault forever opposing the North and the South.

The Pontic unity risks, more than ever, becoming a myth. The Pontic area is not a geopolitical notion but a symbolic one – it’s the ground of a society cursed by the “space providence” to be forever in transition and transitional.

The link area between Europe and Asia, West and East, Christianity and Islam, the Black Sea area reflects the evolution and tendencies in the political, economical and social life, international and European.

Through its geography, risks and threats and the advantages offered by the political, economical and military cooperation, the Black Sea
region has been increasingly important for European and transatlantic organizations and for the great powers, thus determining a more careful approach of the problems this region faces.

The importance of this area, situated between two areas with very large conflict potential (The Balkans and the Caucasians) and near the Mediterranean Sea Eastern basin (marked by conflicts in the Middle East and the Islamic terrorism recrudescence) has the following elements:

- it is the interference area of three very important geopolitical and geo-strategic areas, with very acute security and stability problems (South Europe, Eastern Europe and the Middle East);
- it represents the opening to the Planetary Ocean for Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and the trans-Caucasian countries;
- it has different routes for oil and hydro-carbonates transportation from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia to the West and, at the same time, includes the future energetic route TRACECA;
- it represents a segment of Russia’s Southern border and, at the same time, the North part of NATO South East flank;
- it includes at least a segment of drugs traffic network in Central Asia and the Middle East, weapon traffic in the ex-USSR countries and even the immigrant traffic from the East to the West;
- it has important underwater resources, a large harbour network and an agreeable seashore, providing multiple commercial and tourist cooperation facilities;
- it is a good environment to extend military cooperation.

The increase of the Black Sea area strategic importance materialized in 1998 by two major regional initiatives, based on a perspective on Europe’s new security architecture at the beginning of the third millennium placing the OSCE respectively NATO and EU/WEU in the middle:

a. The negotiation of a multilateral agreement, with measures to increase the regional security and trust in the spirit of OSCE documents in 1994 in Vienna (Ukraine proposal)

b. Setting up a multinational naval force in the Black Sea (BLACK SEA FORCE), capable to act in crisis situations and when asked for by international security organizations like NATO or EU (Turkish
Intercmediary area between different worlds, the Black Sea and the areas around it is equally placed from the strategic areas of interest of the two nuclear superpowers. The security vacuum after the demise of the ex-USSR has led to its transformation into an area of instability marked by political, military and economical disputes between the countries in the Black Sea area and other countries concern to revise their regional interests.

The consolidation of NATO presence in the area stresses the fact that NATO South-East flank moves from the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea to the Black Sea. If in 1994-1998, there were about 20-30 foreign battleships in the Black Sea harbours, nowadays, their number has continually increased.

As a conclusion, we may say that the present security environment which includes Romania as well, on global and regional level, is in a process of transformation and remodelling characterized through certain tendencies which, in time, will be certain and complete evolutions.

Situated, from geostrategic point of view in the “grey area” between Western Europe, the Russian Federation and the Balkans, Romania will affirm itself in the European power pole. Even though it will integrate in the European and Euro-Atlantic political, economical and security structures, its geographic place makes it a link with Russia and its area of interest in the Black Sea and the Balkans. Under these circumstances, Western Europe and US interests in Romania could coincide with those of Russia. They wouldn’t be divergent but at most competing. However, even though Romania’s security and stability can be totally solved only as its NATO member quality, we mustn’t neglect the possibility to achieve an armed forces structure which could ensure a viable and credible defence capability.

As a country in the Black Sea area and having a 900km long river border, situated among three conflict areas (the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East), with explosive potential extended in the neighbouring areas, Romania needs modern battleships and adequate surveillance and warning components, allowing the interoperability with NATO members fleets and ensuring Romanian rights at the Black Sea.
ENVIRONMENTAL TERRORISM AND AL QAEDA: PROSPECTIVE EUROPEAN/GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

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Introduction

Although terrorism has deep roots in human society and it has always existed in human society, in different shapes, it always charged innocent and precious souls of humanity, whenever it happened. But humanity has never suffered after a terrorist attacks, as it suffers nowadays.

As a matter of fact, terrorism has been a science in this modern 21st century and now, terrorists are not illiterate persons, unfortunately, sometimes they are highly-qualified persons, computer engineers, pilots, strategists, doctors and biologists, etc. They can kill and be killed just for the sake of money and in the name of religion, and Al Qaeda is a very big example of that terrorist network that does not only kill innocent people in the name of religion, but also disgrace the true peaceful and loving picture of Islam.

Modern terrorism history has proved that al Qaeda network is the major threat for innocent humanity, because it has a worldwide network of operational and preparative cells and affiliated organizations capable of being activated at any time and carrying out terrorist attacks on their own initiative1. So, through the critical reviews of Al Qaeda’s previously terrorist attacks or attempts, I tried to access their masterminds psychological behaviour, in order to determine what kind of terrorist attacks could be attempted in the future in the European countries and in America.

And the picture I got is not only terrible, but also could be extremely fatal for humanity.

Sooner or later, terrorist masterminds may pay their attention on environmental terrorism [ET]. They may mix toxic substances, such as cyanide in urban area fountains and parks lakes water, they may use different birds, such as pigeons, in order to spread toxic agents and anthrax virus powder in urban populations areas, they may put fire in European countries and American urban areas forests, etc.

**Prospective Terrorism attacks in European countries and in America:** Now we will look at the most vulnerable areas, where possible terrorist attacks could be executed by Al Qaeda terrorist network.

**The use of pigeons for spreading anthrax powder in urban areas:** Spreading fatal viruses such as anthrax to the high ranks governmental officials and to embassies has always been a favourite tool for creating terror and fear in the civil society. Terrorists have always been using anthrax for creating fear and terror in the society sending it to the targets by post offices and courier services. In the past, they sent anthrax powder through letter envelopes and parcels, but now terrorists may use some other means for spreading anthrax powder in large population, and pigeons may be their most favourite means for their cruel deeds.

**1. Possible methods used by terrorists:**

As almost all European countries have numerous amounts of pigeons, and usually these pigeons are in urban areas, big squares, where human population is also large.

Terrorists may first collect hundreds or thousands of pigeons outside the city areas and they may glow anthrax powder on their claws and then release all those anthrax-polluted pigeons to the urban areas.

**2. Impact on Local Population:**

And these “anthrax polluted pigeons” will cause spreading anthrax to human population, because when human population will come to those places, anthrax could be penetrated in humans, because of the mix with pigeons. And now one can imagine what the situation would be like, a person would have been polluted with anthrax, while he or
she would be totally unaware, that anthrax virus has been penetrated inside his or her body, and when the person would be diagnosed with anthrax virus, it would have been so late. On the other hand, single person anthrax affected means that a whole family is also in danger.

3. Impact on Global Population:
And this virus would also be reached in other parts of the world, first by means of those international visitors, they would be affected by anthrax polluted pigeons, and in this way, anthrax virus would be spread to the global population. And secondly, this fatal virus may also go to the neighbouring countries, through the pigeons, that would fly from one country to another.

4. Recommendations:
A regular test of pigeons’ claws should be done from time to time, in order to detect, whether the pigeons’ claws are free from anthrax virus or not. We can select some pigeons, randomly, as a sample for anthrax test, and if an anthrax virus is found, even in a single pigeon, then we must declare an emergency in the area and humans should be prohibited to come to that “anthrax suspected area” and further investigation should be done, all around, in order to determine how much area has been effected. On the other hand, each pigeon must be caught and gone through under anthrax virus test, and the effected ones should be treated.

Adulteration of Toxic Substances or Viruses in Urban Areas
Fountains and Lakes Water: In the future, terrorists may also show their anger and hate by using urban areas fountains and lake water for their terrorist attacks. Terrorist may mix or adulterate any toxic substances or any fatal virus in urban areas fountains and lake waters.

• Impact on human:
If once such a situation would happen, it will have fatal impact on humans, because, when some one will go inside these toxic fountains and lake waters, he may get fatal consequences.
SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE BLACK SEA AREA

• **Impact on birds and animals:**
  This situation will also affect birds and animals when they will drink water from these fountains and lakes, which would have been toxic, by fatal chemical substances or with any fatal virus. This situation will not only cause birds’ and animals’ destruction, but these effected birds and animals will also spread toxic chemicals and viruses all around, and ultimately will effect humans as well.

• **Impact on earth fertilization:**
  Such kind of terrorist attacks will not only damage humans, birds and animals lives but will also have negative effects on earth fertilization. When any toxic substance will be adulterated in a lake’s water, that toxic chemical substance will be penetrated in the land, and I believe this thing will produce negative effects on earth fertilization.

• **Impact on environment:**
  Since humans, birds, animals and waters are part of the environment, and if there is any negative impact on them, that will also effect environment directly, for example, when virus and toxic substances effect birds and animals will travel to other part, these toxic elements will also go with them and cause different diseases in other healthy birds and animals, and as a result, we should not forget, that human will also effect in this situation.

• **Recommendations:**
  In my opinion, we can tackle with such kind of terrorist attacks, with two ways:
  a) First, we would have to have to invent and develop such devices that would be installed inside urban areas fountains and lakes, and the responsibility of this device would be the constant check on the water chemistry. If this device detects any toxic or viral substances in to the fountains and lakes waters, then this device should turn an alarm on, which would be connected, with this device and the alarm, should be installed in each nearest rescue or police station. And now if this device detects any toxic or viral substances into the waters alarm would be
automatically turned on and the rescue teams would come promptly and prevent people to use the water, which has been polluted with toxic or viral substances. Not doubt, this method will be much costly, so we can also use another cheap and simple method;

b) We should put fishes into the urban area’s fountains and lakes and if any toxic substances would be adulterated into them, fishes would die and this is how we can notice if there is something wrong with the water and would be able to act fast before getting any huge human loss. But this method has also a very big risk, because if the lake water would be polluted with any virus, there are many chances the virus would not kill fishes at once, but it will penetrate them and will also reach the human body, when anyone will come to such viral polluted lakes for fishing.

**Adulteration of Toxic Substances or Viruses in Agricultural fields:** Just as adulteration of toxic or virus in fountain and lake waters, terrorists may also adulterate toxic substances or viruses to agricultural fields, for example, in wheat and sugar cane fields.

I am afraid these toxic substances or viruses would be penetrating the targeted agricultural crops, if such adulteration would be done on large scale. And as a result, these toxic substances and viruses would be part of targeted agricultural crops, and it means “toxic-agro-crops” would be in the markets.

**• Impacts on humans:**

Of course, there is no doubt that if such terrorist attack will happen, and a toxic-agro-crop arrives in the markets, then innocent people will have to bear severe losses.

**• Recommendations:**

In order to be safe, we must be sure that every crops should be tested, directly from fields, in order to check whether it is clear from any toxic substances and viruses or not.

I don’t mean that we should test every single grain of a crop, in order to make sure whether it is clear from toxic or viruses of not. We can take only some samples from different parts of a single field, and this sample will determine whether the entire crop is safe or not, and
if there would be some toxic elements or viruses found during the test, entire crops of that specific field should not be allowed to be brought into the markets, and also further investigation should be done.

**Fire in Urban Areas Forests:** Urban areas forests are also one of the most vulnerable places that terrorists may attempt for terrorist attacks. And as we know, there is no need of any expertise, in order to execute a terrorist attack in forest. The only thing a terrorist has to do is just pour patrol or gasoline oil around the forest and throw his cigarette lighter, and we can easily imagine what would happen next.

- **Impact on humans:**
  A huge layer of smoke would be produced all around and certainly this smoke will have bad impacts on humans, such as lungs and respiratory problems, especially senior citizens and children would be more affected by this situation.

- **Impact on environment:**
  This situation will ruin environment directly, because destruction of forests means destruction of environment, and on the other hand, ecology of earth will be also dangerously be disturbed and will also harm the ozone layer.

- **Recommendations:**
  In order to be safe from such kind of terrorist attacks, in my opinion, we should install smoke alarms in different parts of urban area forests. We should install smoke alarm sensors in different places of a forest, all alarms should be installed far in the nearby rescue office room or police station. If there would be smoke or a fire in the forest, smoke alarms would ring and the rescue teams could reach promptly the targeted forest, for a quick rescue operation.

**Conclusion**

It is concluded that environmental terrorism is an alarming threat for humanity, and we must prepare ourselves for combating it.

Some people may think that my research study stands merely on my imagination, but Al Qaeda’s past history tells us that they have planned to
carry out a number of attacks involving chemical weapons and poisons on targets in Europe, which were fortunately thwarted, as a result of police/intelligence cooperation. Al Qaeda planned, for example, a sarin nerve gas attacks on European Parliament in Strasbourg and a cyanide attack on the water supply to the U.S Embassy in Rome², as Al Qaeda does not apparently feel constrained by any moral or humanitarian limits to the lethality of their attacks. They do not distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, or between civilians and military. On the contrary, Bin Laden has explicitly urged all Muslims to attacks America and their allies, including civilians, whenever and wherever the opportunity arises³. And the terrible side of this scenario is that any single individual could use these vulnerable places for terrorist attacks, as I have pointed out here.

So, in order to get rid of currently and prospective environmental terrorist attacks, first of all there should be a critical review of American and European global policies, and all global disputed issues should be resolved by political and meaningful dialogues on equal humanity basis. On the other hand, we would have to use modern scientific technology and must invent new tools, to identify all kinds of prospective terrorism, including environmental terrorism in advance, because I believe, “early recognition of possible terrorist attacks” means “early protection of human and properties in advance”. I also believe that its not only governments or other security agencies’ duty to work against terrorism, but also it’s the duty of every single individual, no matter what religion or background he or she has, we must all keep on stand in order to tackle with terrorism.

² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
As an emerging security complex region within the Greater Middle East geopolitical and strategic area and the new direct neighbouring region of the enlarged Europe, the Black Sea region has a major strategic relevance for Europe and the larger Euro-Atlantic community. It is part of the unfinished business of erasing the Cold War legacy and of building stability and democracy throughout Europe. This process, which started in Central Europe, the Baltic Sea area and South Eastern Europe has began to embrace the Black Sea area as well.

The 9/11 and 3/11 terrorist attacks have led to a thorough review of global geopolitics as they have underscored the fact that the greatest security threats are likely to come from the Greater Middle East. Against the background of the redefinition of the Heartland, the Black Sea region has been “rediscovered” by the West and pushed “from the periphery to the center of Western attention”.¹ Becoming a springboard for combating terrorism and exporting democracy, the Black Sea region requires now a comprehensive Euro-Atlantic strategy for dealing with frozen conflicts, transborder crime, democratic deficits, failed states and economic backwardness.

As the source and barrier to traditional and non-traditional security threats and the terrain of a mixture of competitive and cooperative approaches, the Black Sea encompasses a variety of risks and problems, but also opportunities to solve them. OSCE, the Council of Europe, EU, NATO and the UN are already present in the region by specific mechanisms and programmes. The last couple of years have witnessed a renewed interest in the region both from an economic and security perspective. The Istanbul Summit signaled NATO’s interest to contribute

to stability and security in the region. The EU has included the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP aims at building up at the EU’s periphery a “ring of friends” who share a set of principles, values and standards which define the very essence of the European Union. Moreover, the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia, the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine and the unrest in Kyrgyzstan are likely to act as role models for Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Republic of Moldova. However, the resolution of frozen conflicts is lagging behind, separatist forces are more and more active, uncontrolled territories have become havens of criminal activities, and economic difficulties and political tensions are seriously impairing democratic choices. The region has moved in the forefront of geopolitics and energy security, but its Eastern part, where the bulk of energy resources are located, is still security problematic.

In order to create a virtuous circle and a win-win scenario in the wider Black Sea region, the EU-NATO-US strategic triangle needs to develop a joint blueprint for future action in the region. A first step in that direction might be the setting up of a comprehensive framework of inter-institutional cooperation in the region in the form of a Black Sea Security and Democracy Forum, with a view to gradually shape an integrated Euro-Atlantic strategy and regional crisis and response capability for the Black Sea region. Such a comprehensive Forum, comprising the member states of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) organization, the EU, NATO and the US should explore a wide range of issues relating the contribution of international and regional organizations to enhancing security and stability in the Black Sea region and come up with answers to a series of preliminary questions such as:

• What are the security challenges and security priorities in the Black Sea region?
• Is there a common understanding, by the Black Sea countries, of the regional challenges and the role of the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions?
• How do key international and regional organizations view the Black Sea region? As a buffer zone towards the Middle East or a bridge for reaching it? The end part of the Caspian-Black Sea transit corridor
of energy resources, or the corresponding part of the Baltic-Black Sea strategic passage? The middle part of the emerging Mediterranean-Black Sea-Caspian geoeconomic axis, or the corresponding part of the Baltic-Black Sea-Adriatic geopolitical axis?

• How to solve out the dilemma of opting for closer ties with EU and NATO while also preserving a good relationship with the Russian Federation?

• How to avoid creating new dividing lines while responding to the needs arising from the newly created borders of the enlarged NATO and EU?

• What is the contribution of international organizations (OSCE, Council of Europe, NATO, EU, UN) to enhancing stability?

• How effective are the Black Sea regional cooperation organizations (BSEC, GUAM/GUUAM, BLACKSEAFOR, SECI, SEECP, SEDM) and in what areas do their interests converge?

• What are some key ways to deepen cooperation in the Black Sea region?

• What are the impediments to the deepening of regional cooperation?

• To what extent the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) offer new opportunities for the EU involvement in regional crisis and settlement of frozen conflicts in the region (Transnistria, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabagh, Southern Ossetia, Adjaria)?

• How could be institutionalized some of the Black Sea regional informal collaboration arrangements?

• How feasible would be the inclusion of the Black Sea region on the US-EU transatlantic agenda?

• To what extent a synergy of international and regional organizations could be envisaged in the Black Sea area?

Providing answers to those key questions is far from being an easy task. It is suffice to say that both the inter-institutional cooperation of international organizations in the region and the multilateral cooperation at regional level between local actors are currently obstructed by a variety of factors.
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Conceptual differences, which in turn speak about differences in vision and strategic priorities between EU and NATO in dealing with the security problems of the Black Sea region, are currently impeding a unified approach of the Euro-Atlantic community. Via the *Wider Europe-New Neighbourhood* concept, the EU emphasizes the idea of setting up a band of friendly countries at its periphery, which includes as a distinct component the Black Sea region, whereas NATO either points to the Caspian Sea-Black Sea energy corridor, via the *Wider Black Sea* concept, referring to the Black Sea and Southern Caucasus countries, or underlines the fact that the Black Sea region is a springboard towards the strategic and unsettled area of the Middle East, via the *Greater Middle East* concept.

Furthermore, by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) the EU is prepared to offer “more than partnership and less than membership” to its eastern neighbours. Being no more than a compromise between the desire of the new neighbours to become EU member states and the limited capacity of EU to take up new member states, ENP does not offer the new neighbours sufficient incentives to reform. In contrast, by leaving its door open for prospective future inclusion in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) and, eventually, in the Alliance as full members, NATO offers its Black Sea neighbours powerful incentives to pursue democratic defence reforms. Moreover, combining cooperation on reform through the Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP) and the Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB), with regional instruments such as the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T), NATO works towards creating an ad-hoc Black Sea identity.

The latter point is particular important in light of the fact that empirical studies have shown that in the local elites’ perceptions the sense of regionness is very little in evidence.

As far as the regional cooperation is concerned, one of the factors that in the local elites’ perceptions hinder the Black Sea regional cooperation the most, together with the economic backwardness, namely the Black Sea states’ differences in terms of political and strategic orientations,²

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has started to be removed with the Orange and Rose Revolutions and their expected spill-over in neighbouring countries. This new window of opportunity should be used for revitalizing the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) organization, considered to be by local elites as having the biggest impact among the regional initiatives in the region. By embracing projects in the areas of energy security and fighting against organized crime in the region, BESC could be made efficient and re-branded as an economic and security organization instead of just an economic one.

To sum up, projecting stability beyond the borders of the current member and candidate states is the second greatest contribution to sustainable stability and security that the Euro-Atlantic community could make after the “big bang” enlargement of NATO and EU. From various security reasons, the Black Sea region has become a strategic area where such a projection is needed in order to complete the project of a Europe whole, free and safe. For the time being, the Euro-Atlantic community lacks a unified strategy towards the region. This is due to a variety of factors, including differences in concepts covering the region and approaches in dealing with the Black Sea states and offering them incentives to reform. A first step towards overcoming the current obstructing factors would be to set up a Black Sea Security and Democracy Forum, bringing together the member states of the BSEC organization, the EU, NATO and the US, in order to gradually shape an integrated Euro-Atlantic strategy for the Black Sea region.
The Black Sea, as a semi-closed sea, has a set of unique features for littorals. It is the sea area where most of its littorals have established exclusive economic zones and delineated the maritime borders with each other. For instance, we have no maritime border disputes in the Black Sea. On the contrary, we have signed 36 different international agreements with the Black Sea littorals in the last 15 years.

Globalization has its effects over the Black Sea, which is manifested with a steady increase in the maritime traffic over its sea lanes of communication. The security challenges in the Black Sea region can be seen under two different categories as hard and soft issues. Hard security challenges, based on ethnic conflicts and territorial secessionism in some areas, may be seen to have spill over effects over the soft security challenges in the maritime domain.

However, in reality, the security of the maritime domain in the region is most affected by the increase in the shipping volumes.

The information exchange under the framework of the BBCIC (Black Sea Border Coordination and Information Centre) at Bourgas/Bulgaria, which was established by six littoral coast guards in 2003, provides important information regarding the illegal activities in the Black Sea.

Our experience in the Black Sea demonstrates the fact that most illegal cases in Black Sea maritime domain involves different sorts of smuggling, mainly fuel smuggling but not terror or proliferation of WMD, and they are based on isolated cases, not on systematic patterns.

Although we face isolated cases of illegal action in the Black Sea maritime domain, we all know that asymmetric risks and illegal actions in the Black Sea have a potential to increase and to transform themselves into threats as long as no deterrent action is taken.
We also know that there is no systematic illegal activity carried out in the Black Sea maritime domain although they exist on isolated and small scale levels, we have to stick to 3D paradigm to deal with these risks:

We have to **deny** potential terrorists to utilize BS maritime domain.

We have to **disrupt** illegal activities in the Black Sea maritime domain.

And finally we have to **develop** an effective information exchange mechanism to enhance inter-littoral cooperation in the fight against terror and preventing WMD proliferation, as well as other illegal activities at sea.

The BLACKSEAFOR has carried out a total of five deployments under Turkish, Ukrainian, Bulgarian, Georgian and Romanian command. At first, planned activities have been focused on mine countermeasures, humanitarian assistance and basic formation drills.

But starting from 2004, and in accordance with the decision taken during Black Sea Naval Commanders Committee Meeting, BLACKSEAFOR has been tasked to exercise on maritime security and maritime interdiction type of activities. Moreover, BLACKSEAFOR has been activated twice as two separate sea periods in a year since 2004.

During those extra activations, BLACKSEAFOR interacts with national exercises, in the spirit of PfP exercises and annual naval exercises under confidence and security building measures in the naval field in the Black Sea, thus further enhancing interoperability and confidence between littoral navies.

During last sea period in last August, the Task Group had conducted combined training with Operation Black Sea Harmony stressing on maritime security operations, for the first time.

Another noticeable achievement of the BLACKSEAFOR during this sea period was the establishment of PC to PC Secure Communication Network developed by Turkey with special crypto amongst the different warships of the forces which enabled the Romanian Task Group
Commander Exercise his command and control functions over widely dispersed units.

Throughout these activations, BLACKSEAFOR conducted numerous port calls. Dialogue and friendship of the sailors with one another as well as with local people during port calls are excellent indicators of potentiality to further existing relations amongst the littorals. BLACKSEAFOR has proven that it attracted enormous support from the peoples of littorals.

The Post 11 September period increased the need for the solidarity and interstate cooperation worldwide to fight against terror, proliferation of WMD and all sorts of illicit trafficking also on the seas. This was reflected in the Black Sea maritime domain with the activities of BLACKSEAFOR and enhanced cooperation amongst the littoral coast guards.

A new process envisaging the utilization of BLACKSEAFOR for those kinds of tasks continues. All the Black Sea littorals have expressed their will and intention for these efforts as a result of the two high level representatives meetings of the BLACKSEAFOR at the level of Deputy Foreign Ministers or under Secretariats in 2004.

Being well aware of our responsibility to maintain smooth flow of shipping through the Turkish Straits as well as navigational order along the vital sea lines of communication in the Black Sea maritime domain, the Turkish Navy Launched “Operation BLACKSEA Harmony” on the first of March 2004.

This operation has been carried out in accordance with the principles contained in the United Nations (UN) Charter and the objectives set forth in the UN Security Council Resolutions 1373, 1540 and 1566.

The mission of “Operation Black Sea Harmony” (OBSH) is to:

• Conduct periodic maritime surveillance operations in the maritime jurisdiction areas and the airspace above those areas in accordance with international law
• Conduct reconnaissance operations for suspect vessels/COI’s
• Trail/ shadow suspect vessels/COI’s
• Show naval presence in the traffic routes of merchant shipping.
The Turkish Navy aims to provide deterrence against potential illegal activities and maritime-related asymmetric threats by showing naval presence in the traffic routes of merchant shipping in the Black Sea, where 85 different nations ply its waters with more than 300 ships daily in move. In other words, OBSH generates deterrence and produces maritime security for good of regional as well as global order.

We hail all merchant vessels in the surveillance areas in order to obtain the necessary information regarding their identity, destination, last port of call and cargo. Since the beginning of the operation, no ship denied cooperation with our units in response to hailing.

If there is a clear ground and credible intelligence on any vessel, suspected of being involved in any illegal activities, the Turkish Navy or the Turkish Coast Guard conduct compliant boarding/search, as appropriate in territorial waters.

Turkey has extended invitation to all littorals of Black Sea to join OBSH, first time at the July 2004 Meeting of BSF Special Representatives in Moscow.

In the Kiev meeting of BLACKSEAFOR Special Representatives at Deputy Foreign Minister level (March 2005), Ukraine became the first country to announce formally its intention to participate in OBSH. The Russian Federation has followed suit and the two countries formal announcements were reaffirmed at the BLACKSEAFOR Naval Commanders Committee Meeting in May 2005 at Constanța/Romania.

Turkish and RF Navy technical talks have started in June 2005. Exchange of letter process was adapted to finalize the legal procedures for RF participation in OBSH. Our approach for security in the Black Sea maritime domain is based on simplicity and applicability. We think OBSH satisfies security needs of all NATO Allies and partners alike.

In this regard, the acknowledgement of operation Black Sea Harmony as an instrument for regional cooperation in support of security and stability in the Black Sea, in NATO Forums, along with other regional institutions and initiatives, is very promising.

We expect NATO, as reflected in Istanbul Summit Communiqué, to continue to encourage cooperation achieved in the Black Sea, while maintaining its attraction and openness for increased interactions with
OBSH, BLACKSEAFOR and the regional consensus behind them.

What Turkey is striving now through OBSH and BLACKSEAFOR as available and working instruments in the Black Sea maritime security domain, is to create an interface where the interests of NATO overlaps with those of littorals with a view to anchoring all of them in the Euro-Atlantic security system.
BLACK SEA SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND ITS INFLUENCE OVER THE ROMANIAN NAVAL FORCES PROJECTION

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1. The geostrategic importance of the Black Sea Area

From the ancient time Black Sea area was a transit zone for the economic, politic and strategic interests. To support this statement, there are the caravans and the antique sea lines of communications which created “the silk road,” as a linkage between the eastern and western civilizations and the numerous movements of the greatest strategists of the time with their troops from south to north and vice versa.

The geopolitical and security developments in the Black Sea area, its geographical location, the existing risks and threats, as well as the advantages offered by the political, economic and military co-operation have focused, more and more, the interest of the European and Trans-Atlantic organizations, generating a more careful approach of the issues related to this area.

Romania’s foreign policy has established among its priorities those ones concerning the Black Sea area¹, which are considered to be “a very important issue, of national interest.”

When we analyze the geopolitical features of the Black Sea area, we must first begin with the recognition of the key obstacles and dilemmas the region faces, the attempts the countries make to line up their efforts into the systemic and dynamic process, to build the regional security and, as a follow up, the global security. Also, an essential factor to understand the current phenomena is generated by the impact of the transition after the post-communist era over the littoral states, during their adjustment to the new Euro-Atlantic security environment. The

¹ Speech of President Traian BĂSESCU, Meeting with the Romania’s ambassadors and consuls, Cotroceni Palace, Bucharest, 29.08.2005.
last but not the least, the geo-economic analysis of the local regional powers (Russian Federation and Turkey), especially from the energy competition and the transit corridors of these resources point of view, connecting the Mediterranean Sea, Black Sea, Caspian Sea and Central Asia, are essential to define the geopolitical perspectives over the short and middle term period.

In this new geostrategic environment, the influence of the historical evolution is a factor that should be taken into consideration on the configuration of the relationships between this region with NATO and EU and to prove its increased importance. Thus, centuries ago, the Greek, Roman, Ottoman, and Russian seamen used the Black Sea for their economic and military purposes. In the past, the large empires extended their control over the Black Sea region due to its richness (grains, minerals, wood and fish), and because it is important from the geostrategical perspective. For this reason, the Black Sea was considered for many times as a buffer zone between civilizations. In the last years, the Black Sea area has turned, at global level, into a transit zone between Central Asia, Middle East and Central and Western Europe.

We have to underline that South-Eastern Europe, including the extended Black Sea area, is the only European area where there are yet “frozen conflicts”, which are still under international debate.

Romania’s status as a member of the Euro-Atlantic security organization and, in the near future, as a member of the European Union, as well as the characteristics on the development of the geopolitical relationships in the Black Sea region and its proximity areas, demand as a compulsory manner, to reassess Romania’s national security strategy, with major changes over the role, place and the missions of the Armed Forces in general and, of the Naval Forces in particular. This new status means, besides the national security and stability guaranty, responsibilities to generate European and regional stability and security.

We may anticipate that, subsequent to the European Union integration, Romania will bring its national contribution to the European security, which will increase the tasks and responsibilities assumed as a NATO member state. The state counsellor, General Constantin Degeratu, has made an assessment over the Black Sea importance, at
the annual Black Sea Naval Commanders Committee Meeting, held in Mamaia on May 17th, 2005: “in our opinion, Black Sea is recognized as an important geopolitical area, which also covers the countries placed around it and in its closeness. It claims a real Euro-Atlantic strategy in order to ensure the democratic stability, security and prosperity, on one hand and, to properly promote the dynamism of democratic changes process, on the other hand. In order to support such strategy, we have to start from the region’s realities, as well as from the ways this area is integrated onto the global processes.”

From this point of view, as well as from the latest statements of the Romanian president, there are at least three specific elements for the Black Sea area.

First of all, all states within the area are united among the same fundamental values and interests, which govern the current development of the international relationships: democracy, human rights, free market economy and fight against terrorism.

Second, all countries are linked, one way or another, to the Euro-Atlantic security configuration. In relation with NATO, there are Alliance members, PfP members, and countries which share a special partnership with NATO. From the EU point of view, the littoral countries express more firmly their will for integration; to this respect, there are countries which have signed the adhesion treaty, some will start the negotiations for integration and others develop a very active and dynamic co-operation with EU.

Third, the Black Sea region develops as a major chain loop, which links the strategic Euro-Atlantic area and the Middle East, Caspian Sea and Central Asia.

Black Sea area is placed as a central point between two major strategic axes, which have complementary components: the axis of the energy producer and the energy consumer, on one hand and, the axis of the security producer and the security consumer, on the other hand.

Nowadays, there are profound changes of the international environment, which consist of the progress over democracy, to seek and define the security options, as well as a further development regarding the character and nature of regional and global security risks and threats.
In this context, Romanian concerns over the international relationships and co-operation are oriented towards an active contribution to the peace, stability and security policy. The importance of the region, located between two areas with a very high conflict potential (the Balkans and Caucasus) and, located near Eastern Mediterranean area (marked by the Middle East conflicts and by the exacerbated Islamic terrorism), is underlined especially by the following factors:

- this is the space where three geopolitical and geoeconomical zones interfere; they are considered to be on top of the areas with very high level risks, concerning the security and stability (Southern Europe, Eastern Europe and Middle East);
- this is the exit gate to the Planetary Ocean for Romania, Ukraine, Russian Federation, Georgia and Bulgaria;
- it is crossed by many transportation routes of crude oil and hydrocarbon products, from the Caspian Sea to the Western countries and includes, in the same time, the path of the future energetic highway TRACECA;
- it is a part of the Southern border of the Russian Federation and, in the same time, NATO’s edge to the South-East;
- includes at least one segment for the drugs trafficking channel, from Central Asia and Middle East to Western countries, for weapons smuggling from the former Soviet Union countries and, even for immigrants trafficking from Central Asia to the West;
- there are numerous marine resources, a large net of ports and port facilities; Black Sea seaside can offer numerous opportunities for trade and tourism co-operation;
- stands for a very good environment for the military co-operation in the framework of PfP program and even for the development of the special partnership between Russia and NATO.

The increased importance of the Black Sea region in the geopolitical context, at the beginning of this new millennium, is given by the necessity to establish the strategic raw materials flow, by the economic and military co-operation and by the increased involvement of the great powers and of the international institutions’ contribution to solve major issues of the region.
2. The Romania’s maritime interests on the stability and security in the Black Sea Area

We think that the geographical position of Romania in the vicinity of the Black Sea and its connection to the Planetary Ocean represents a strategic advantage that must be fully exploited.

As said before, in the context of Romania’s external policy priorities, a special attention is given to the Black Sea issues. This concern is a very important matter, of national interest.

Romania wants to promote its own maritime and river interests, which are sustained by its maritime power, by the access to the sea and by the length of the maritime and river borders (from its length of more than 2500 km, Danube flows in Romania 1075 km).

From this perspective, our country has major interests to support the supply with raw materials through the maritime and river lines of communications, to exploit the sea bed, to develop the submarine exploration and exploitation, to support economic activities at sea and river – naval transportation, tourism, naval building – and to promote its image worldwide, by showing the flag at seas and oceans. Also, the Euro-Atlantic involvement on the extended region of the Black Sea is very important.

The spirit of the maritime power of a state is represented by the possibilities to efficiently use the sea richness and facilities on its own interest and by its capacity to deny the use of the sea by its potential opponents.

According to “The Naval Forces Doctrine for Operations”, an unclassified document, the elements of the maritime power are:

a. The Naval Forces and their means, including those of the Border Police, the Maritime Aviation and the Marines;

b. The commercial fleet;

c. The infrastructure and the logistic resources: naval bases, ports, supply centers and warehouses, naval building yards, naval repair shops, airfields;

d. The naval educational system;

e. The naval leagues and associations;
f. The specialized mass-media components;
g. The naval shipyards and the firms with such profile;
h. The firms, installations and ships specialized in the research and exploitation of the maritime and river resources and of the sea bed;
i. The firms and associations that promote the sea and river tourism, and their means;
j. The research institutes with activities in the water environment researches and their logistics.

The elements of the maritime power come from specific sources of the overall power of the state (a short definition of A. Mahan, at the end of the 19th century).

- the geographical position: the physical configuration, the territorial size; the length of the littoral; the existence of the gulfs and of suitable sites to set up ports and to shelter ships on bad weather conditions; the existence of the inland water courses, lakes, rivers and navigable channels;

- the maritime policy of the Government: the political and economical external relationships; the maritime policy of the state;

- the resources and the defence capabilities: the economy; the natural resources; the inland communications system; the telecommunications and radio communications system; the population; the armed forces, etc.

Considering these, the maritime power can be represented as a coagulated and inseparable system. Thus, we deal with an interconnection, in which the maritime trade influences the maritime resources; the resources determine the state’s naval strength, which, also, is transcribed in maritime supremacy, encouraging the commerce.

The economical and political evolution of Romania is tightly linked to the policy regarding the activities on sea. A developed Romania will also mean in the future Romania, as a maritime power.

Romanian maritime and river interests are a component part of the national, economical, political and military interests. They evolve in time, in accordance with the maritime power and the political status of the state.
The maritime and river interests are promoted through negotiations and treaties and the protection of the maritime and river interests is accomplished by the Naval Forces, which must be able to project the power in the blue seas, in order to defend the economical objectives and the maritime sea lines of communications wherever is needed by the national or by the Alliance interests.

“The Naval Forces Doctrine for Operations” emphasizes the fact that Romania is vitally interested to: maintain its own territorial integrity within the limits of the land, maritime and river borders; keep the exit of Danube river to the Black Sea unmodified, mainly through its branches and, secondary, through the Danube-Black Sea canal; guarantee the conditions to enforce and keep the maritime areas of interest for the economical use and freedom of action; preserve stability in the area; keep freedom of movement on the maritime and river lines of communication; to protect the river infrastructure; protect the sea, river and delta environment; to participate to the naval events of the Allies and partners.

In the conditions of such a complex economical and political situation, especially in the Black Sea area, the existence of the Naval Forces is the sound argument that grants credibility to Romania’s policy, on defending its own maritime interests. In this context, the completion of the restructuring and the shift to the new stage of modernization of the Naval Forces is a national priority.

There is also the co-operation of the Romanian Naval Forces with other national institutions with responsibilities in the domain, to combating the naval terrorism and preventing other risks and threats to the security, such as: organized crime, drugs traffic, illegal weapons traffic, and also the illegal exploitation of the maritime resources in the Romanian maritime and river sovereignty.

In case of natural disasters or emergencies on crisis situations, the Romanian Naval Forces can ensure the evacuation of the civilian population and of the non-combatant personnel. Also, the Naval Forces can provide, through its specialized structures, emergency medical treatment, can fix or evacuate the damaged infrastructure, can restore or build bridges and roads. Also for the humanitarian support, the Naval
Forces actions can focus on measures for human life saving, such as medical support, water supplies, food, clothing, fuel and also the transportation on sea of the persons affected by the disaster.

We consider that the reconstruction and modernization of the Naval Forces must be related permanently with the following goal:

*On long and medium term, Romania must be able to protect its interests in the Black Sea and in the other maritime areas, on its own and together with its Allies.*

*As a consequence, Romania must become a regional maritime power.*

In the future, the potential participation of a Romanian naval component, in the permanent structure of the Allied Naval Forces, might be a support factor to place Romanian policy inside the international decisional political organizations.

At the present stage, there have been identified a series of possible threats which might occur within the area of responsibility of the Naval Forces and in the neighboring areas, such as: the escalation of the inter-ethnic and religious conflicts in the vicinity of Romania; the restriction of the freedom of navigation or of those actions guaranteed by the international maritime laws; the violation of the maritime, river or land borders; the conduct of terrorist actions; weapons, ammunitions, drugs and hazardous materials smuggling; the conduct of specific informational and economic actions against both the civilian society and the military organizations; illegal emigration; pollution and, not the least, a potential nuclear accident.

Romania doesn’t consider any state as a potential threat to its national security and, as the entire Armed Forces, Naval Forces can bring their contribution to solve sea and river issues, especially through peaceful means, to contribute to the security environment in the region.

Participation at common naval exercises under the auspices of the regional initiatives, such as the Group for Naval Cooperation in the Black Sea – BLACKSEAFOR, consolidates the trust, friendship and relations of good vicinity with all Black Sea littoral states.

The principle mentioned in the “Romanian National Security Strategy”, according to which the military force acts as the last resort to
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provide country’s security, compels us not to neglect the possibility of a military involvement.

From the analysis of the present risks and threats in the region, there results a certain hierarchy, in relation with the probability of occurrence of conflicts and events to which the Naval Forces will have to react. These can be non-military actions of asymmetric type, materialized into actions against organized crime, drugs traffic, smuggling and refugees flow from the sea, against the piracy and terrorist acts at sea and in harbours.

These do not exclude the possibility of an outburst of, either a regional armed conflict characterized by the combination of conventional actions with unconventional ones, low to medium intensity on all environments, nor a major armed conflict, consisting on a conventional war, based on means with high manoeuvring capacity, precision on hits, multi-dimensional protection of the forces, use of the electronic means and informational warfare.

We add to all of these the natural disasters and ecological incidents that, due to their unpredictable character, cannot have hierarchies based on the probability criterion, but have important effects that demand the intervention of the Naval Forces.

3. The Romanian Naval Forces’ Contribution to the Provision of Cooperation and Security in the Black Sea Area

The capability to control the maritime space is, at present, one of the main strategic factors, even if, simultaneously, we witness a reduction of the level and a change of the types of the virtual threats.

The new element added to this constant strategy – the tendency to consider the Naval Forces as the “operational arm” for peacekeeping operations and crisis management – needs, necessarily, a reassessment of the criteria regarding the composition, training and the use of these forces.

Able to operate remotely, without constraints imposed by the national borders or by the limitations of weapons control, the Naval Forces, frequently, are the first ones to operate in the crisis areas.
Thus, a naval force may constitute a tool of the external security policy, whose presence often exercise a much more convincing influence, in comparison with the size and costs of its elements.

Although the region is characterized by instability, the relationships between the littoral states of the Black Sea have been drastically modified in the last decade. The main tendency for the Black Sea is that this area will become an area of co-operation, development and regional security. The regional co-operation is a reality with significant results, especially regarding to the level of trust between the littoral states. For the first time in its history, Black Sea is about to become a source of unity, development and stability in this extended geographical area, which has permanently been unstable and represented a border between various political, ideological and religious systems.

The co-operation relationships are focused on the economic development and the prevention and elimination of the risk factors that may generate crisis situations, with harmful effects over the regional stability and security. Thus, there are promoted political, ideological, economic, diplomatic and cultural relations in order to maintain and consolidate the stability and, also, the military co-operation relations in order to increase the trust and security through transparency.

Consequently, the Romanian president, during his visit to the USA (March 2005), in the speech regarding the importance of the Black Sea, stated: “We are prepared to participate in a mutual fund of the Black Sea, which will be implemented with the financial support of our American partners, USAID and German Marshall Fund, with the participation of the European Union. This mutual fund will seek to support the democratic developments in our vicinity, by the creation of public-private partnerships. Moreover, we will continue to initiate projects under the auspices of the Community of Democracies, in order to join Georgia and the other states to the Euro-Atlantic community”.

The preservation of peaceful and stable climate, desirable in order to achieve the economic and prosperity objectives there must be ensured by an appropriate tool that will guarantee the regional security. Romania’s option for the future achievement of the Multipurpose Naval Force, able to fulfil traditional naval missions and, to fight also against
the asymmetric threats, is subscribed under and has been determined by the present capacity of the Romanian economy to sustain reduced military structures, by the great diversity of the actions in which the Romanian Naval Forces are engaged, and also by the transition to modern technologies and multifunctional equipments in the naval field.

The existence of a multinational maritime force to which all Black Sea littoral states participate represents a mean to achieve some of the co-operation activities, such as: fighting against the danger at sea, human life and environmental protection.

By participating to the activities of the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group BLACKSEAFOR, the Romanian Naval Forces are mainly engaged in the fulfilment of humanitarian and Search and Rescue missions. The contribution of the Romanian Naval Forces to the regional stability can be evaluated also by the adoption of “The Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures in the naval field in the Black Sea”, which is the result of the negotiations between the six littoral states.

The domains provided in the “Document on Confidence and security building measures in the naval field in the Black Sea” that increase trust, security and, consequently, peace preservation, are:

- cooperation in the naval field;
- reciprocal visits of ships and observers of the littoral states in the naval bases;
- exchange of naval information;
- notification of the forces and the main national naval activities;
- planning and executing common naval exercises yearly.

4. Transforming and adapting the Romanian Naval Forces

Starting with 1990, the Romanian Armed Forces began an ample process of reform, whose goal is the interoperability with the armed forces of NATO countries.

The Romanian Government supported and will support this costly and long process, so that Romania will hold a military force capable to address any threats to its national security and sovereignty.
In this general context, the Naval Forces passed through a reform process, which led to the transformation of this military service into a more flexible and powerful force, that passes at this moment through a process of conceptual, structural and actional modernization.

The present and future activity of the Naval Forces is oriented towards the setting up of a new structure of force, capable to respond to the threats and risks specific to the new security environment in our region and, meantime, to be able to be interoperable with the other NATO’s navies. The main objective of this approach is to review our concepts, legislation, doctrine, regulations and manuals in order to ensure the legislative framework for all new missions, to approach the planning system and to conduct military operations from a new perspective, to implement standard procedures on execution of operations together with the Allied and Partners navies, to modernize our fleet, to endow with the latest military equipment that will provide the interoperability and carry out all missions with maximum efficiency.

The doctrines, regulations and other internal leading documents have a clear, easy to understand content and easy to apply each echelons. The endorsement, within these documents, of the concept of “centralized leadership and non-centralized execution” will allow commanders to adapt to the changing conditions.

In the past 15 years, the Romanian Navy’s staff participated, within the Partnership for Peace framework and, in the last year, under NATO command, to military exercises in the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea. Multinational exercises we participated, aimed to strengthen the co-operation with the other NATO navies, as well as with the navies from the Partnership for Peace. We remind the exercises carried out in the Black Sea, such as COOPERATIVE PARTNER, BLACK SEA PARTNERSHIP, LIVEX with Bulgaria and Turkey and annual training activities, under the BLACKSEAFOR.

For the fully integration into NATO, Romania keeps a firm line to hold a capable fleet that can respond to all requirements of the Alliance. Besides the Mărăşeşti frigate, our country acquired 2 new frigates, in 2004 and 2005, which increase the operational capability of the Romanian Navy. Also, the corvettes and mine hunters received a good appreciation
from our partners, due to the success in multinational exercises they participated. The divers unit has an important place within Romanian Navy, due to the special use of this kind of force. These elite divers carry out missions with a high impact in the theatre of operations.

Romania continues its consistent policy to impose its maritime interests in Black Sea region and its main objective is to become a real partner within the Alliance. Through the Naval Forces, Romania will be capable to respond to any kind of threats to global and regional stability. Beginning with the participation between 15 October and 15 December of frigate Ferdinand to the Active Endeavour Operation, Naval Forces show their capacity to accomplish the missions of the Alliance and also the possibility to protect the Romanian interests in others maritime theatres of operations. The Naval Forces prove that the fleet has made important steps in the transformation from a coastal force into a new force which can be deployed and sustained in a military theatre far away from its maritime bases (a so called blue waters navy).

The Black Sea region and, especially the Eastern part, represents an area with long periods of instability and insecurity, a source of concerns for the European democracies, but also an important turning point for the world wide energy corridor. From the NATO and EU point of view, there must be taken firm measures to reinforce the safety of commercial routes and pipe lines in the region. Thus, Romanian Navy becomes a core factor which can be used to accomplish these objectives. The responsibilities Romania will assume in the region, the means will use were presented by the president of Romania, Mr. Traian Băsescu: “Black Sea area is the area of criminality in which Romania must be involved. Not only we have a Navy capable to participate to the control of what happens in the Black Sea, but last month, Romanian Navy got two new frigates, excellent equipped, which together with Mărăşeşti frigate, form three units of a maximum importance, capable to participate to the process of controlling what happens in the Black Sea”.

In order to successfully monitor the sea crises and prevent the sea conflicts, Romania must have the capability to protect its legal and legitimate interests of using the sea peacefully. To accomplish this aim, Romania needs a Naval Force able to address any situation of crisis or
conflict, to be able to act when and where is necessary, a force that, in order to be well-balanced, must include elements required to lead under water, surface or air warfare operations.

To cope with all risks and threats against the national security, Naval Forces will pass in the next years, together with the other services, through an adaptation process of its structure and capabilities, to accomplish as well specific missions for high intensity conflict, as non combat missions, which determine the existence of minimal military structures, flexible and quick deployable, able to sustain itself in an area of operations.

Thus, our option refers to the development of a Multipurpose Naval Force, structural, manned, equipped and trained in order to use the same resources, will correspond to the evolution of military phenomenon, in order to easily adapt to the qualitative leap in naval technology and to be based on a highly motivated and qualified human resource.

The Multipurpose Naval Force will be fully interoperable with the Romanian Armed Forces’ services, with the other partners in joint and combined operations and, high potential to modify the operational capability of forces and their capabilities proportional to the evolution of the situation at the strategic level. The Force will have the capacity to exploit the advantages of the technological level of ships to obtain, in an efficient manner, the success in all undertaken actions.

An effective and economic Multipurpose Naval Force needs a self-sustained logistics system, composed from resources dislocated in permanent bases and own means for replenishment.

The structural reform and the modernization of Multipurpose Naval Force will continue to achieve a force capable to accomplish the role of naval component in combined operations, to accomplish all type of missions, comprised in the Romanian Military Strategy. The requirements that must be accomplished by the naval force which we project are as follows: command and control, a balanced structure of forces, interoperability and infrastructure.

The components of this effective naval force will match each other and, all together, will be able to cover the operational spectrum, in order to respond to the requirements and conditions imposed by the new geo-
strategic situation and by the increased importance of force offered to NATO, able to accomplish the whole range of missions.

The composition of the Multipurpose Naval Force is determined by the necessity to balance at least two essential requirements: enough forces to accomplish the missions and the capability to sustain and maintain the forces in the planned operational status.

The strategy for the endowment and development of the Naval Force, on a long and medium term, comprises programs of acquisitions and modernizations whose completion is represented by the creation of a balanced structure of modern capabilities, required in order to accomplish the new missions. The equipments’ modernization is determined not only by the evolution of the security environment and the need to respond to new risks and threats, but also by the progress imposed by the transformation process of the armed forces in general and of the navy, in particular.

The endowment program of the Naval Forces refers to: replacement of the littoral surveillance system with the SCOMAR system; finalizing the program of modernization for frigates and their endowment with helicopters and modern warfare systems; replacing the corvettes with new multifunctional corvettes; replacing the mine sweepers with modern mine hunters; revitalizing the submarine and, on a long term, the acquisition of two new modern classic submarines; the endowment of the divers with performing equipments and competitive support vessels; providing logistics and support capabilities for the deployed forces in the theatres of operations.

Starting from the present status of the Naval Forces, analyzing the probability of risks and threats’ occurrence in the region and, considering the possibilities to sustain financially the development and modernization processes, we can assess that in the present and predictable conditions, the accomplishment of such an endowment of the Multipurpose Naval Force is possible to be accomplished, gradually, on a long and medium term, until the year 2020.

Therefore, a strict planning will be kept on a long term, for the processes that will continue to be the core of the development and modernization of the capabilities; the achievement of the projects
will be monitored, by getting, prevalently, the necessary resources in order to address the probable risks and threats; the expenses for the modernization of the ships designed over 20 years ago will be avoided, over the acquisition of new ones. On the modernization of the ships or on the acquisition of the new ones, the new equipments must be as modern as possible, and should ensure the interoperability of the Naval Forces with the NATO navies.

The number of years required to accomplish the Multipurpose Naval Force is directly dependent on the evolution of the economic progress and on the value of the allotted financial resources. The process can be accelerated by an optimal distribution of the allocated budget of the Ministry of National Defence to the services, in accordance with the most probable risks and threats, as well as the analysis of the acquisition costs for ships and equipments and the costs for their operation and maintenance.

The accomplishment of these requirements will greatly depend on the level of financial resources that can be allocated to the Naval Forces. The assertion of the appreciation regarding the increased role of the Naval Forces in the crisis situations management and in the coverage of the security requirements in the Black Sea region, by prioritizing the financial resources and by the support on getting those resources, together with a well judged planning of the use of funds, can make possible the fulfilment, on a long term, of these needs of endowment and modernization.

In our opinion, setting up of a balanced military fleet is the key for the fulfilment of the national operational and strategic goals.
1. The effects of the NATO and EU transformation and their new role as peacekeepers

The radical change of the strategic security environment and the establishment of a new multilateral system of international cooperation since the end of the bi-polar Cold War confrontation model provoked a vigorous flow of two parallel main streams within the regional European and Euro-Atlantic organizations. They can be concisely defined as transformation and enlargement. The concurrent dual process of transformation and enlargement both of NATO and the EU, attended by similar re-institutionalization of the OSCE and rising up of various new regional initiatives and agreements determine the actual international security architecture, challenged nowadays by new asymmetric risks and threats. In the same time, the essence and the meanings of some core doctrinal and terminological definitions and aims were significantly developed and extended thus producing new substitute terms like “out-of-area” missions, “Non-Article 5” obligations, and “VI and ½” UN Chapter goals.

The new understanding of a more coherent global world with more dynamic interdependent and supra-regional Trans-European and Eurasian security cooperation, approaching the widening neighbouring areas (Greater Middle East as an example), logically led to the vision of both NATO and the EU as global peacekeepers and providers not only of regional but also of international cooperative security beyond the traditional spheres of their previous engagements. Under this vision, NATO would essentially be the core element linking the world’s major
powers together: the USA, the European Union, Russia and China, into a security dialogue and a form of security partnership, which would not exclude, obviously, difference between them and among them on certain tactical questions, but would keep them working together on the largest strategic questions like proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fighting against terrorism, where their common interests truly lie. This vision of a more global Alliance would draw in the peripheral regions, the Middle East, Afghanistan, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Africa, into a system of security and co-operation based on the success of NATO’s Partnership for Peace activities. Speaking about some regional dimensions of the current Alliance policy at the last NATO summit in Brussels in February 2005, the Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer underlined: “The importance of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue which is being strengthened, the importance of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative for the activities of NATO in this very pivotal region where security and stability is not only important for the region but far beyond.”

The contemporary European Union’s approach to conflict prevention and crisis management, displayed in the European Security Strategy, is also a global one, using the whole range of foreign policy instruments available to the EU (political, diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, civilian and military). The more and more wide spectrum of missions requires a better institutionalised and practical co-operation with NATO through the permanent arrangements on EU-NATO security cooperation (“Berlin Plus”). Among the principal aims for the realization of these new roles and missions of crucial importance are the establishment of more effective military instruments and capabilities and the further development of more adequate civil-military cooperation. Obviously, such unique instruments are the NATO Response Force and the EU Battle Groups, first of which will be fully operational by 2006. On 29 April 2005, NATO Military Committee approved MC Memorandum 0003-05, providing the necessary guidance relating to the NRF-EU BG Relationship.

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1 Since 2001 there were led in total 12 EU missions: EUPM (BiH), MilOp ALTHEA (BiH), EUPOL PROXIMA (FYROM), CONCORDIA (FYROM), EUJUST THEMIS (Georgia), ARTEMIS (DRC), EUPOL KINSHASA, EUSEC RD CONGO, EU support AU (Sudan), EUJUST LEX (Iraq), Aceh Monitoring Mission (Indonesia), and EU EOM (Sri Lanka).
2. The strategic viewpoints of NATO and EU countries on the Black Sea area security

Many authors claim today that in some sense “the Black Sea has been a civilization black hole in the Western historical consciousness” and a kind of Western “historical amnesia”. According to them, until recently the Black Sea has been somewhat marginal to NATO’s concerns. The same comments were distributed a decade ago for the Balkans compared with a constant sensible attention to the Central Europe during the Cold War years. However, the views that the US and EU interests in the Black Sea region emerged after the 9/11 terrorist attacks “due to the region’s vulnerability in the context of global war on terrorism” are just partly justified. As Ian Lesser from RAND Corporation argues, NATO’s southern periphery – the Mediterranean basin together with the Black Sea and its hinterlands – attracts growing attention in transatlantic debates since the early 1990s. If, just as an example, we look at the constantly increasing amount of funding expert projects on the broader Black Sea region, managed by some respectful think-tank organizations from the mid-1990s, it would be seen as a valid new indicator for the deepening interest of many special agencies on this particular area.

A valuable contribution to the revealing and exposing of a modern Western vision on the Black Sea area as a significant component within the global Euro-Atlantic security system was made a year ago by a former US Assistant Secretary of State, Ronald Asmus, in collaboration with Dr. Bruce Jackson, President of the Project on Transitional Democracies. In their paper “The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom”, which has been quoted so many times by various experts and politicians, the authors underline:

“The Black Sea region is at the epicentre in the grand strategic challenge of trying to project stability into a wider European space and beyond into the Greater Middle East. As NATO expands its role in Afghanistan and prepares for a long-term mission there and contemplates

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assuming added responsibilities in Iraq, the wider Black Sea region starts to be seen through a different lens: Instead of appearing as a point on the periphery of the European landmass, it begins to look like a core component of the West’s strategic hinterland.”

Speaking about a “wider Black Sea region”, we have to describe more or less correctly its frames by definition, strategic links, existing and potential regional security risks and emerging multilateral initiatives. The Black Sea is the hub of a large number of transport corridors and pipelines connecting Europe to the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. One popular expression for this supra-regional interconnections and interdependency claims for the Euro-Atlantic system viewed as a provider of security, stability, and democratic values; and the wider Black Sea region as an energy and resources supplier. We should consider as well “a northeast arc and access to the great commercial rivers that flow into the Black Sea: the Danube, Dniester, and Dnieper.” Furthermore, the region has been linked tight with some other conflict zones in the southwest direction – in the Mediterranean and the Balkans, or rather a “wider” South East European-Mediterranean area. The common interests that link NATO and non-NATO states on the Mediterranean and Black seas “offer the potential to strengthen ties between the two groups”.

With the last NATO enlargement in 2004, almost whole west-south Black Sea coast is considered as the Alliance outpost in the eastward. Having in a very short perspective two Black Sea countries – Bulgaria and Romania as EU members, and a third one – Turkey, starting a negotiation process with Brussels, the Union borders will also extend to the Black Sea basin. There can be specified various principal security threats and challenges for the Euro-Atlantic community in the area: “frozen conflicts”, “bad governance”, terrorist led activity; organized crime; illegal traffic of arms, drugs, and human beings; money laundering, trans-border corruption, environmental disasters, etc. The primary security concern is that the organized crime channels which flourish through the

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region may provide support to terrorist organizations, providing illegal entry and exit for their activists, and trafficking conventional arms, dual use materials and even weapons of mass destruction on their behalf. Criminal conglomerates operate regionally and have international tentacles, reaching westwards, into NATO and the EU area. Security of the maritime domain is most affected in the last few years also by the increase of the shipping volumes – approximately 25 tankers each day pass along the Bosporus.

The new threats cannot be detached from each other and dealt with piecemeal\(^6\). NATO’s outreach efforts include policies designed to bring new nations closer to the alliance. The Alliance and EU approaches encourage, in particular, both regional maritime security cooperation and civilian peacekeeping operations, such as police, border guards, customs, and unarmed civilian observers.

Within the last decade and half about 36 bilateral agreements were signed between the countries in the region. There are a lot of multilateral regional initiatives beyond the NATO, EU, and OSCE formal frames that can contribute to the development of an effective early warning and conflict prevention security network – Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), BLACKSEAFOR, Stability Pact for South-East Europe, Southeast European Initiative (SECI), SEEBRIG, Southeast European Defence Ministers (SEDM) meetings, GUUAM, Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO), etc. In the last BSEC Foreign Ministers Council meeting on 28 October 2005, there were discussed the implementation of joint programs and infrastructure projects in cooperation with the EU. Among the priorities there were mentioned the combat with the trans-border organized crime, providing assistance in emergency situations. The USA, the Czech Republic, Croatia, and Belarus received a status of observers at BSEC. Some experts suggest the extension of few current national or multilateral initiatives, like the Turkish led Operation “Black Sea Harmony” or NATO led Operation “Active Endeavour” in the Mediterranean basin.

The first ever participation of Bulgarian military contingent in peace support operations was carried out in the time of the transformation from traditional UN peacekeeping to a “wider” or “second generation” peace operations. In the beginning of 1992 Bulgaria received an invitation from the UN to take part in the commencing peace support operation in Cambodia UNTAC. The Bulgarian Armed Forces participated in UNTAC with one infantry battalion of 850 servicemen (one rotation was conducted), 10 staff officers working for the mission’s headquarters, 34 officers - military observers, military police consisting of 11 servicemen. Since then, Bulgaria attended ten other multinational missions, led under the UN, NATO, OSCE, and EU management. These missions were held not only in the close neighbourhood, like the Western Balkans – Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, FYROM but also in Georgia and Tajikistan, Angola and Ethiopia/Eritrea, Afghanistan and Iraq. The scope of the operations was highly varied – from peacekeeping, monitoring, and police missions to demining, disarmament, humanitarian, force enforcement, and post conflict peace building missions.

The first NATO led operation where Bulgarian troops participated was SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Then KFOR followed in Kosovo, and ISAF in Afghanistan. Sarafovo Airport near the Black Sea port Burgas was used in 2002 as a base by the American aircraft that participated in the mission “Enduring Freedom”. Bulgarian government and parliament expressed their will to deliver its servicemen to the NATO mission for training the Iraqi armed and security forces. Meanwhile, the country still continues its participation with an infantry battalion in the multinational coalition operation CFIR in Iraq. Most currently, the Bulgarian government announced its readiness to attend new NATO relief mission in Pakistan⁷.

On the 19th of April 2001 Bulgaria presented a list of forces and

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⁷ However, the Pakistani jihadists opposed the presence of about 1 000 NATO soldiers there with the argument: “NATO is a defence alliance… It was never seen working as a relief agency. Nothing justifies its presence in Azad Kashmir… We fear that the rulers have sold our nuclear assets to NATO.” – South Asia Intelligence Review, Vol. 4, No.17, November 7, 2005.
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capabilities from the Bulgarian Armed Forces available for EU-led crisis management operations. This contribution is one of the main components of the Bulgarian participation into the build-up of ESDP, and especially of the European Rapid Reaction Forces. The forces and capabilities, which Bulgaria has declared, are in accordance with its national capabilities and respective needs. They are a part of the forces and capabilities our country contributes to NATO-led operations. This guarantees their interoperability with the forces of NATO and EU countries both in the field of procedures and doctrines used, and concerning the level of their preparation and equipment. As of March, 1, 2003, the list of forces and capabilities from the Bulgarian Armed Forces has been updated. It was later confirmed in March 2004.

Since April 2005 Bulgaria has had a new status as it concerns European Union. The country is an active observer to the EU institutions and has more opportunities to be informed and to discuss ESDP issues with its EU partners. On a meeting, held in Brussels on 22nd of November 2004, Bulgaria declared its readiness to participate in the evolution process of EU Battle group formation with amount of light infantry company, staff officers and medical team. There were held consultations and discussions with Greece as a framework-nation and Romania as a contributor regarding our readiness to contribute to the Multinational battle formation which will be on EU disposal for its further plans in ESDP area from 1st of July 2007. Cyprus declared its readiness to join this Battle Group. Bulgarian representatives were invited to attend as well the first BGs Coordination Conference in May 2005. The Bulgarian government makes all necessary efforts and takes all necessary legislation measures to encounter its responsibilities and obligations stemming from the future EU membership dated 1st of January 2007.

The Strategic Defence Review launched in July 2004 provided a vision for the development of defence and the armed forces by 2015. It is yet another step in harmonizing the national defence policy with the Alliance’s policy, and with the aims and goals of the ESDP. According to the Strategic Defence Review, the new risks to the country’s security stem from the international terrorism, the proliferation and the use of the
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WMD, the instability of democratization processes in the neighbouring conflict zones, organized crime, illegal traffic of strategic raw materials, technologies, arms, drugs, and people, as well as from destructive impacts on information systems, economic instability, environmental disasters. In the Black Sea region, Bulgaria has important responsibilities in respect to all these risks and threats. The complex global and regional environment of dynamically changing opportunities and barely predictable challenges require the use of non-traditional, preventive and anticipatory approaches and solutions, complementary and coordinated efforts involving political, economic, technological and informational – both military and civil – measures.

4. Some implications for Bulgarian foreign, defence, and national security policy in the Black Sea area

As a NATO member Bulgaria has a chance to influence neighbouring regions, acting as a kind of gateway for the spread of the Euro-Atlantic values and principles to adjacent areas. Bulgaria should not be trying to impose solutions or positions in its relations with partners from the Western Balkans or the Caucasus. This would be beyond its powers and may well prove counterproductive. On the other hand, however, Bulgaria should not merely follow and react to events but initiate policies mutually beneficial for everyone involved. After the latest NATO enlargement, now almost half of the Black Sea states are in the Alliance, while other three maintain active relations with it.

Viewing the Southeast European initiatives as a model of regional cooperation under NATO auspices, one of the major roles is to exert effort of mobilising the Balkan region for the task of embarking on supporting the further expansion of the civil and security space eastwards by involving the other states of the Black Sea basin and the Caspian area into stabilization efforts and building-up the prerequisites for future EU membership. In practical terms, certain South-East European formats of cooperation should be provided to such countries as Moldova, Ukraine and the Southern Caucasian states. The combination of ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ partnerships in the Balkans catalysed the tendencies of
transformation towards an EU-compatible sub-region. NATO and its security network provided major arguments and prerequisites to this process’ development.

Due to the geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-strategic inducements of the Western Black Sea coast on the Eastern one, Bulgaria, as well as Romania, needs to prove the case of NATO and EU membership is a political, social, economic and security success to the friendly nations of Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Armenia. The Black Sea region continues to be dependent on the security situation in the Southern Caucasus and the Caspian Sea area to its East. There is still no adequate concept for shaping the crossing of the North-South and the East-West corridors in a cooperative way while regulating the conflicting interests peacefully. The influence of the broader Middle East developments and the continuing democratization of the post-Soviet space add new elements of both uncertainty and hope.

One of the long term foreign policy projects foresees the consolidation of the process of regional cooperation through active and many-sided contribution by institutionalization of the South-Eastern Defence Ministerial Meetings (SEDM). Initiatives which are realized in the framework of SEDM process are the Multinational Peace Force in South-Eastern Europe; establishment of an engineering-construction unit; establishment of an information network for actions under crises on a regional scale; establishment of a Civil-Military Planning Council for actions under natural disasters; building of an information exchange system in the sphere of military reforms between the countries in South-Eastern Europe.

The Bulgarian Ministry of Defence participates in the multinational brigade with one mechanized battalion which is prepared to fulfil peacekeeping tasks. In order to react to the necessity to broaden the regional cooperation in natural disasters and crisis response and planning measures there were taken for the practical realization of the initiatives to establish an engineering construction unit within the Multinational Peace Force in South-Eastern Europe, as well as to establish an information crisis response information system.

After joining the “Partnership for Peace” initiative in February 1994 the Bulgarian government declared its readiness to organize “Breeze-94” – an operational and tactic military exercise in the spirit of this initiative with the participation of the naval forces of eight countries. This military naval exercise was a first one of this kind on the Black Sea. For a decade, seven more “Breeze” naval exercises were carried out. Bulgaria hosted as well the first NATO/PfP LIVEX Black Sea exercise ”Cooperative Partner” in 1995, which were regularly organized every next year. In the end of August and the beginning of September 2005 a Cooperative Key 05 (CK 05) combined exercise was undertaken in Plovdiv, Bulgaria. It aimed to allow PfP and Mediterranean dialogue countries’ Air Forces to practice and refine interoperability in air and limited land operations in support of a Crisis Response and Peace Support Operations scenario. The Cooperative Key 05 (CK 05) has been designed as a combination air exercise (AIREX), command post exercise (CPX) and live exercise (LIVEX). This exercise involved air forces from fourteen NATO member nations. Few partner nations - Azerbaijan, Croatia, the FYROM, Georgia, Moldova, Sweden, Switzerland and Ukraine also participated. France, the partner nations Albania and Russia, Mediterranean dialogue nations, Algeria, Jordan, Morocco and other nations, Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina attended the exercise as observers.

Bulgaria’s principal contribution to the Black Sea security cooperation lies on four basic assets: political/diplomatic (by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs); naval (by the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff of Bulgarian Armed Forces); coastguard and special police forces (by the Ministry of the Interior); civilian emergency and relief organizations (by the State Commission of Civil Protection). From the operational point of view, of particular significance is the establishment of bilateral and multilateral coordination and cooperation in the last three directions.

**Naval cooperation:** An Operational Group for Naval Co-operation in the Black Sea (BLACKSEAFOR) was established in April 2001. It includes all Black Sea littoral states. The main tasks of BLACKSEAFOR include search and rescue operations, humanitarian assistance operations,
the clearing of sea mines, environmental protection and any other tasks agreed by all parties, for instance peace support operations. Units assigned to the Force remain at their permanent home base locations and come together to form the appropriate force, either in accordance with jointly prepared programs or, in the case of ad-hoc operations, in the combination deemed necessary to perform the specified tasks. BLACKSEAFOR is under the command of the Black Sea Naval Commanders Committee (BSNCC), which is also responsible for the overall planning of BLACKSEAFOR activities. Decisions are taken by consensus among member states, and the presidency is rotated. BLACKSEAFOR is composed of naval elements only, without direct participation from air or army elements. Naval co-operation among the littoral states is also the subject of the Document on Confidence and Security Building (2003), since the Document contains explicit reference to co-operation in the field of counter-terrorism activities and the provision of assistance in fighting organized crime and illegal drug and weapons trafficking.

Surveillance, reconnaissance, early warning of threats and the timely warning are essential for the favourable operational regime in the sea space. The vision for the development of Bulgarian Navy contains the concept of a National Integrated System for Information and Control of the Sea Spaces, which organizationally is structured by some core elements: Naval Sovereignty Operations Centre (NSOC); Regional Centre for Control of the Sea Traffic (RCCST); Coastal System for Control of the Sea Traffic (CSCST); two autonomous Vessel Traffic Systems zones (VTS) respectfully for the areas of Varna and Burgas; Integrated Digital Commands and Information System (IDCIS)⁹. In addition, this sub-system is integrated with the National Military Command Centre (NMCC) as well as with adequate organizations within the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Transportation and Communications, Ministry of the Environment and Waters, and other governmental agencies.

**Coastguard cooperation:** The basis of coastguard co-operation has been a series of bilateral agreements between the littoral states - the most recent being the one between Bulgaria and Turkey in 2003. But

a multilateral element has been introduced by the regional meetings at commander and expert levels which have been held annually since 2000. The high point of the process was the decision taken in 2003 to establish a Regional Integrated Coordination and Information Centre for the Black Sea in Burgas, Bulgaria. The Centre is meant to improve communication and integration on a regional and international level by maintaining direct communication with all border police centres and coordinating joint police operations. Overall, the potential of regional coast guard cooperation has been largely unrealized because political commitment has been low, coastguard assets inadequate and under-funding chronic. Moreover, that potential is inherently limited because coastguard forces can operate only within the territorial waters of the state in question.

Civil protection cooperation: On April 3, 2001 four countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM, and Slovenia) signed in Sofia an agreement for the establishment of a Civil-Military Emergency Planning Council in South East Europe (CMEPS SEE). Romania joined the agreement in 2002 and Turkey in 2003. The principal Council’s role is to facilitate regional cooperation in disaster management. Within the frames of the CMEPS SEE four working groups (Information Technology, Information Management, Standards and Procedures, and Planning and Exercises) were organized. The agreement envisaged the development of regional Emergency Network Architecture and national Emergency Operating Centres in each CMEPS SEE country.

In July 2004 a CMEPEX-04 exercise was hosted by Bulgaria with about 1 000 participants from six countries and observers from four other countries (Greece, Moldova, Serbia-Montenegro, and the USA). The aim of the exercise was to practice and improve CMEPC and Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre procedures and capabilities.

A very serious challenge is to create a dynamic Civil-Military Emergency Planning activity in the Black Sea area. In October 2004 a new “Black Sea Initiative” conference was held in Varna. The undertaking of a series of Table Top Exercises (TTE) in the next years was agreed in the workshop. The basic task of the TTE is “to enhance cooperation and
collaboration among the Black Sea littoral nations while preparing for any regional risk, including terrorist use of WMD”. Following the well known formula “think globally, act locally”, probably it would be useful to apply adequately some actual national and regional “toolboxes” of security instruments and coordinated measures, like those proposed at the last G-5 EU ministerial meeting in Evian in July 2005 (joint naval intelligence, new Shengen Information system, etc.). A new interesting approach in this direction gives as well the proposed US Homeland Security Department’s “National Infrastructure Protection Plan”\(^{10}\), whose basic aim is to suggest a national security strategy for physical protection of Critical Infrastructures (CI) and Key Assets (KA). Such a strategy defines an integrated system on federal, state, local, private sector, academia, NGO and think tanks levels, but also a substantial increase of the international cooperation and coordination in this critical issues.

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SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE BLACK SEA AREA

UPON CERTAIN MILITARY ASPECTS IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

Major-General Mircea SAVU,
Director of the Operations Directorate, General Staff, Romania

„You can help our Alliance to extend a hand of cooperation across the Black Sea”. (George Bush, United States President, University Plaza, Bucharest)

1. Preamble

The complexity of military aspects or of the issues related to military domain, in the Black Sea region turn any attempt of analysis into adventure and any scientific argumentation into pure speculation. Maybe that is exactly the reason why the endeavours in this respect are so appealing. The current article does not aim to approach holistically the subject nor to teach lessons or issue verdicts. Its purpose is merely to urge the politicians and the military to reflection. It is said that using the military argumentation in foreign policy should be done as a last resort only. That is very true for the internal policy as well. That resort could be literally the last when the things can easily get out of control.

2. About the “environment”

Before getting to the point, I would like to through a glance to statistics regarding world military expenditure to get a rough picture of the attention paid to the military over the globe. According to certain figures\(^1\) it seems that countries spent 162$ per capita and approximately 2.6% of their GDP. Between 1990 and 2004 two trends emerged. Military expenditure decreased between 1990 and 1998, and increased between 1998 and 2004. An acceleration of this expenditure occurred between 2002 and 2004 when, in real terms, annual increase was of 6%. Obviously, the major contributor to these figures is U.S. which spends

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\(^1\) Recent trends in military expenditure, www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_trends.html
around 47% of the money world spends for defence matters. Central and Eastern Europe\(^2\) increased their spending with 22% between 1995 and 2004 which confers them, taken as a whole, the ninth position among the world regions. In the Black Sea region, only Russian Federation (4.3%) and Turkey (4.9%) exceed 4% of their GDP\(^3\) for their defence. Figures regarding Ukraine are either not available or not reliable.

So, it is not a question if the armed forces play an important role in the relationships between states in the future but a question of in which way they are supposed to play their part considering the circumstances of interesting changes among “local directors” within the Black Sea region. Now, let us have a look to state and non-state military actors in the previously mentioned region.

The strategic location of the Black Sea, at the crossroads between Europe, Asia and, Middle East, renders the region extremely vulnerable to asymmetric threats. The countries in the area and those situated in their close vicinity should stay vigilant against an increase in terrorism, drugs and human beings trafficking, illicit weapons transferring and smuggling, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For the military, the risks come from the existing lurking pending conflicts and the uncontrolled armed groups within certain ex-soviet areas.

“What is, in fact, going on in the Black Sea region? First of all, Black Sea is an area of frozen conflicts. Try to picture the map of the zone. To the northern part, very close to the Romanian border, beginning with the Republic of Moldova, there are frozen or active conflicts, all dangerous, constantly accumulating negative energies. I have in mind here situations in Transnistria, Osetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia. All are pretty close to our eastern border. All will have an impact on the future evolution of Romania. While the north of the Black Sea has four frozen conflicts among which the Transnistrian is the closest to Romania, Black Sea and its extended zone are affected by some other actions and activities that endanger Romania’s national security, endanger the security of other European states.”\(^4\)

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\(^4\) Traian Basescu propune internationalizarea Marii Negre, www.ziua.ro/b.html
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The statements of Romania’s President, Traian Băsescu, invite to a careful analysis and caution in drawing conclusions. There is a diversity of opinions regarding who or what exercise influence in the Black Sea region or how is this influence performed, but undoubtedly a great influence upon military domain comes from ex-soviet areas, especially from Transcaucausus. The quite large corridor between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea is populated with aggressive and secessionist tendencies.

Chechnya

Russian troops entered Chechnya by the end of 1994 to prevent its separation from the Russian Federation\(^5\). The separatist were led by Djiokar Dudaev, a former pilot in Strategic Aviation of former USSR. After two years of war that cost many lives and inflicted to over 500,000 people to displace internally, a peace agreement has been reached, mentioning that the independence claims from Chechnya should be postponed with five years.

Even with this agreement signed, the confrontations between Russian troops and various separatist groups went on. To defeat and disarm the rebels\(^6\), the Russian army conducted a major incursion in Chechnya in 1999. The death toll is not known with certainty. Some figures say that over 6,000 Russian troops and over 10,000 rebels among who many civilians were victims of combat.

A lot of civilians perished during the bombing of the capital, Groznyy. In turn, as retaliation for Russian interventions, terrorist attacks conducted by Chechnyan militants caused victims on Russian Federation territories.

The current president of the Russian Federation rejected any dialog with the terrorists so the confrontations are still on. Chechnya is of strategic importance to Russian Federation because it has all the routs from the centre of the Federation to Black Sea and Caspian Sea and it is also crossed by oil and natural gas pipelines from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.

\(^6\) Second Chechnya War - 1999-???, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/chechnya2.htm
According to certain reporters\(^7\), the Chechnyan conflict spilled over the borders affecting other regions in Northern Caucasus.

**Dagestan**\(^8\)

In the second half of 1999, Islamic extremists residing in Chechnya performed incursions in the Russian Federation Republic of Dagestan, in the north-eastern part of Chechnya in order to create an independent Islamic state. Certain sources revealed that the weapons and finance for actions could have come from Osama Bin Laden. The forces loyal to Shamil Basaev, former acting prime-minister of Chechnya and current leader of the movements in Dagestan, continue the fighting against Russian troops. Among the approximately 7,000 de combatants belonging to Basaev, there are mercenaries from former Yugoslavia, Turkey and Afghanistan. In comparison with Chechnya, where the population, although of Islamic denomination, is more homogenous, Dagestan is a melange of more than 30 different ethnic groups, often conflicting with each other.

**Georgia**\(^9\)

Positioned like a possible access road to Caucasian oil, Georgia is still tormented with conflicts despite the institutional and economic reforms, including the reform of the armed forces, started by president Shevardnadze. Foreign military presence on country’s territory adds even more complexity to the situation. Russian Federation asked for an extension of another 15 years to withdraw its troops from the military bases in Ajaria, Akhalkalaki and Javakhetia. The cause of the troubles at the Georgian border is the interesting ethnic distribution. A great concentration of ethnic Russians is in Abkhazia. The Georgian government has practically no control, either upon Abkhazia or upon other parts. South Ossetia and Ajaria are autonomous regions. However, all these regions have an uncertain status. The attempts to assassinate president Shevardnadze by the paramilitary group Mkhedrion in 1995

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\(^8\) Dagestan Incursions August-September 1999, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/chechnya2-2.htm

\(^9\) Georgia, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/georgia.htm
and by colonel Akaki Eliava in 1998 prove how volatile the environment in the area is.

Abkhazia

Interethnic tensions burst in July 1992 when the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet declared independence from Georgia. The follow-up clashes between the separatists and the Georgian National Guard made hundreds of victims and thousands of refugees. In 1993, the separatists finally seized the whole Abkhazian territory. To stabilize the situation in the area UN observers have been deployed. Their current activities are seriously hampered by land mines and the presence of guerrilla forces. Partisans and separatist groups such as White Legion and Brothers of the Forest also make an impact in the area.

Adjaria

Under the rule of Aslan Abashidze, the autonomous region of Adjaria earned a sinister fame due to the internal disorder and the high rate of criminality. Georgia avoided approaching the abuses in the area because it didn’t like the idea of having an open separatist manifestation. However, the open conflict burst in 2004, when a certain general Roman Dumbadze, stated he would not take orders from Tbilisi any more and that the sole authority he recognized was president Abashidze whom he considered his supreme commander. Subsequently, there were violent confrontations between Georgian governmental army and the forces of the rebel general.

South Ossetia

An autonomous region since 1922, Ossetia was denied its autonomy in 1990 and granted it back in 1992 by the president of Georgia, by that time, Sviad Gamsakhurdia. In spite the fact that both Georgian and Russian regular military forces are present in the area, smouldering tensions are ready to become violence any time.
Operational groups of Russian Armed Forces in Transcaucasus and additional military presence in the area

Currently, mercenaries are helping the separatists. Russian peacekeeping forces sent to Transcaucasus in 1993 decreased in number to 8,500 troops in 1996. Based on OSCE agreement, signed in Istanbul in 1999, Russian military bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki should have been disabled. In May 2005, Russian Federation obtained a waiver until 2008. Russian peacekeepers act together with UN observers. Despite the many years spent on negotiations, a clear solution to the situation in the area has not been reached so far. It seems that U.S. keeps encouraging the negotiations in coordination with France, Great Britain, Germany and Russia. UN mission in Georgia, UNAMIG, tries thoroughly to seed the roots of trust among the parties.

3. Outcomes of these conflicts

What is the real outcome of the briefly described conflicts, one can definitely see:

• victims among civilians;
• while the power of certain states are eroding, military confrontation between tribes, religious or ethnic groups racketeered;
• revealed that the aims of conflicts are less military and more local community oriented;
• increase in small weapons international commerce;
• increased risks of using (especially for terrorist acts) of radioactive, chemical and biological substances (the so called dirty bombs).

4. What the Romanian Armed Forces can do

For the moment, what we should try to do is to find right answers to the following question: “What type of adversary we can potentially confront within the Black Sea region?” At least, we identified certain features of such an adversary. The list can continue:

a. It is a non-state adversary, so it does not represent the political will of its country legitimate government. We can not rule out the fact
that it may try with its tactics to win on its side the intervention of 
regular military forces belonging to some other states.

b. Adverse leaders know the classical modus operandi of regular 
military since many of them were regular military themselves.

c. It generally follows separatist aims so the speeches exult fre-
quently of nationalism and ethnic issues.

d. It does not read or simply ignores the Law of the Armed Conflict 
being guided by “the aim excuses the means”. But it knows very well 
that a lot of its opponent’s actions are banned by LOAC.

e. It knows very well the power of media and seldom uses it for its 
own benefits.

f. Armament and military equipment doesn’t seem a problem even 
if the source of it is rather dubious. It is very creative and is a tricky 
improviser. Some of the adversaries have the most lethal biological 
weapon at hand, so suicidal attacks can be expected.

g. It is capable of everything when it comes to find financial sources 
for its war, even to have perfectly legal revenues.

h. Its actions are difficult to predict due to the lack of communication 
and written documentation.

i. Religion can be a very strong motivator.

5. Instead of end

Suffice to see the multitude of political and political-military 
initiatives to realize the attention the politicians and military pay to that 
region.

All these are pursuits of international community to transform the 
Black Sea region into a more predictable area, an area where one can 
develop and analize trends and draw conclusions that would make sense. 
The armed forces of every country in the region should ask themselves 
seriously what is exactly the direction toward they are heading to.

We can affirm that we could face an interesting evolution of military 
actions to “handicraft” operations, unique “artefacts” of military art in 
general and of operational art particularly.

Changes at tactical level will appear accordingly.
Black Sea region, with its economical, cultural and ethnical diversity, is an extremely favourable environment for military “creativity”. I do not think that any national experience can be really extrapolated and applied. As a result, it would be very difficult to “learn” from others experience. Very few people will know the ins and outs of “handicraft” solutions found by various regular armed forces in so much detail as to draw pertinent conclusions from “lessons learned”.

Due to circumstances where we confront an asymmetric adversary, who does not read about military art and ignore its existence, which has to improvise a lot to reach its objectives, will probably have to think of breeding a new generation of military. This new generation, rather than relaying on experience, should be capable of relaying more on its ability to adapt, to learn a wide diversity of new and strange things, quickly and under tremendous pressure.

It seems that the need to use military troops to keep or enforce order in various “hot” spots of the region bring to the military certain police features turning military into a police for “external use”.

Under these circumstances, we should strengthen ties with ministries of interior; further cooperation with them would be very beneficial for situations when we have to conduct operations in conjunction with police against non-state adversaries.

In order to end in an optimistic key, I would say that the most predictable thing is the unpredictability of the military phenomenon in the Black Sea region.

Nevertheless, military support and assistance offered to a country within the region for security matters make a contribution to ones country security because once a crisis bursts into a country and it is not handled immediately and carefully, it can easily spill over across the borders.
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ADDITIONAL RECOMMEND READING ON BLACK SEA REGION:

5. IONESCU, Costin, „Marea Neagră – un pivot geopolitic în dispută?”, *Geopolitica*, Nr.1(5)/2005, an IV, p. 44.
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THE NAVAL COOPERATION TASK GROUP - BLACKSEAFOR - IN THE BLACK SEA BASIN SECURITY CONTEXT

Captain (Navy) Alexandru MÎRŞU, BLACKSEAFOR Commander

The end of the Cold War had both negative and positive effects. While the integrated European area continued to develop in safe conditions, the countries from the South Eastern Europe, passing through a prolonged period of transition towards democracy and market economy, have experienced negative effects.

These effects included major crises, generated by the separating trends based on ethnic and religious criteria, welfare gaps as well as security vacuum spots. However, the positive, dominant element of this period was represented by the openness to political dialogue and cooperation among democratic countries, international security bodies and the old ideological adversaries, so as to strengthen and maintain sub-regional, regional and global security.

This paper shows some aspects of the main risks to security and stability in the Black Sea basin, as well as the regional initiatives that are in place, underlying the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR).

Furthermore, emphasizes the evolution and achievements of BLACKSEAFOR in its four years of existence and its main evolution trends in the future. This paper doesn’t try to find solutions to solve out these regional problems but tries to expose an impartial assessment of the context in which BLACKSEAFOR activates.

The Black Sea basin security context

The Black Sea region is an important component of security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. It lies at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and the Middle East and remains an
important transit route for energy supplies to world markets. Instability in the Black Sea region would have widespread repercussions affecting the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

However, there is no security void in the Black Sea maritime domain from which criminal organizations would benefit and expand, as all littoral states are democratically governed, strongly committed to combating outlaw activities and firmly adhere to the fundamental principles of international law.

Notwithstanding the relatively promising security and stability situation in the Black Sea region proper, it is also evident that the maritime domain is not fully immune to risks of different nature, as well as asymmetrical ones, including organized crime and environmental risks, that may originate from potential sources of instability in and around the region. Terrorism, human beings and drugs trafficking, illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons, as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their means of delivery and related materials require the littoral states to remain vigilant against the probability of the spill-over effects of such risks.

The Black Sea maritime risks assessment

Maritime risks in the Black Sea are endogenous and exogenous in nature. There are asymmetric risks that are terrorism-related risks of non military nature. Organized crime might entail, but it is not limited to drug trafficking, illegal migration, human beings trafficking, light arms smuggling and illicit weapons of mass destruction (WMD) trafficking, delivery systems and related materials. Nevertheless, the last there are environmental risks such as maritime pollution that might be generated by accident, human error or deliberately.

From the asymmetric risks perspective, the Black Sea has become a major route for oil, as well as passenger and containerized cargo transportation. As in other regions of the world where there is an increase
in the volume of maritime transportation, there are chances that cargo traffic may be misused to disrupt security.

On the organized crime issue, although there are no indications that systematic trafficking in human beings exists in the territories of the Black Sea region, it could be done through maritime transportation.

Illegal migration stemming from the region, as well as from other parts of Europe, Asia and the Middle East is mainly using terrestrial routes, but it has already started to cross the Black Sea region.

There is no firm evidence that systematic drug trafficking exists in the Black Sea. Narcotics destined to Europe from Afghanistan via Central Asia are currently transported by land. Although smugglers always use the most secure paths and alter them frequently as possible, the Black Sea may be used as a transit route in some isolated smuggling cases. However, it remains a possibility that the sea lines of communications may be used more often in the future, if not controlled properly.

On the other hand, there have been no reported cases of illicit trafficking in WMD, delivery systems and related materials in the Black Sea. However, this risk cannot be ruled out, given the lucrative nature of such activity. But, as it is the case in any other region, there is also a connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering and illegal arms trafficking in the Black Sea region. The Black Sea is not immune from possible illegal movement of nuclear chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials.

Concerning environmental risks, no major catastrophic environmental incident occurred in the Black Sea originating from asymmetric causes. Some past incidents appear to have been caused by adverse environmental conditions and (or) human error. On the other hand, some cases involving dumping or discharge of industrial waste and maritime cargo ships cleaning their tanks have been reported in the Black Sea.

It can be concluded that the strategic location of the Black Sea at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and the Middle East and as an important transit route makes it vulnerable to asymmetric risks. Instability in the Black Sea region would have widespread implications for the security
and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. While there is no security void in the Black Sea maritime areas, asymmetric risks, organized crime and environmental risks are the main security challenges which might be encountered.

In other words, the principal challenge in this respect would arise from the possibility of the Black Sea maritime areas being turned into a transit route for sinister purposes. In this regard, suspect vessels pose a major challenge and the potential of their use for illegal purposes makes necessary the continuous surveillance of selected maritime areas as well as trailing of such vessels. This requires, inter-alia, combined efforts by the six littoral states in this vein to create synergy.

In this context, regional cooperation among the littoral states adds on a further important dimension in terms of making the most efficient use of existing tools and mechanisms, such as among others BLACKSEAFOR and the Document of Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Naval Field in the Black Sea, as well as tools and mechanisms which may become available in the future.

The Black Sea security achievements

There are a number of available instruments developed by the littoral States for enhancing regional cooperation and stability.

Naval cooperation among the littoral states is the subject of the Document on Confidence and Security Building, which has been in effect since 2003. The Document contains explicit reference to co-operation in the field of counter-terrorism activities and the provision of assistance in fighting organized crime and illegal drug and weapons trafficking. The Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Naval Field in the Black Sea, agreed on 25th of April 2002, is a robust instrument providing a sound basis for regional efforts to that end. This document stipulates cooperation in naval field as well as contacts in naval field, invitations to naval bases, exchange of naval information and confidence annual exercises.

The Coastguard cooperation agreement is the result of a series of bilateral agreements between the Black Sea littoral states, the most
recent being the one between Bulgaria and Turkey in 2003. But a multilateral element has been introduced by the regional meetings at commanders and experts levels which have been held annually since 2000. The highest point of the process was the decision taken in 2003 to establish a Regional Integrated Co-ordination and Information Centre for the Black Sea in Bourgas, Bulgaria. The Centre is meant to improve communication and integration on a regional and international level by maintaining direct communication with all border police centres and coordinating joint police operations. But overall, the potential of regional coast guard cooperation has been largely unrealized because political commitment has been low, coastguard assets inadequate and the budget very low. That potential, moreover, is inherently limited because coastguard forces can operate only within the territorial waters of the state in question.

The BLACKSEAFOR Agreement, as the legal basis for the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group was established in April 2001. It includes all Black Sea littoral states and represents a major leap forward in enhancing cooperation and interoperability among the naval forces of the Black Sea littoral states through a set of well defined tasks and activities. The main tasks of BLACKSEAFOR include search and rescue operations, humanitarian assistance operations, clearing of sea mines, environmental protection and any other tasks agreed by all parties, for instance peace support operations. BLACKSEAFOR is established in order to contribute to the further strengthening of friendship, good relations and mutual confidence among the Black Sea littoral states, as well as to improve peace and stability in the region, through the enhancement of cooperation and interoperability among the naval forces.

Operation Black Sea Harmony (OBSH), launched on March 1, 2004, by the Turkish Navy aimed establishing Recognized Maritime Picture, as well as trailing suspect vessels. OBSH performs maritime security activities, such as maritime presence operations entailing surveillance, reconnaissance and trailing in the South and South-East Black Sea, with the main effort at Bosporus Straits. OBSH is an opened initiative, the contribution of other littoral states being encouraged in this operation.
Another mechanism for strengthening co-operation between law-enforcement services has, in theory, been the Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). BSEC’s primary focus is on trade; however, it can contribute to the regional security by trade enhancement among the littoral countries through the sea lines of communications.

Beyond the Black Sea rim lands, but in the same security context, at the Mediterranean Sea is underway the NATO led operation Active Endeavour (OAE). The purpose of Operation Active Endeavour has been to perform the operational role that NATO plays in countering international terrorism in the Mediterranean. Operation Active Endeavour was initiated in October 2001 under the command of Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe in Naples, Italy. Operations in the Mediterranean are carried out by combined ship, aircraft and submarine assets drawn in rotation from NATO’s Standing Naval Forces in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. The task of OAE is to monitor and deter terrorist-related activities in the Mediterranean. The methods of doing so include route surveillance and control of important sea passages, pipelines and harbours and provision of escorts through the Straits of Gibraltar to non-military ships from NATO member states which request them. Most importantly, since April 2003 OAE naval forces have adopted a more proactive approach, boarding vessels whose origin or cargo has been deemed suspicious.

The Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group – BLACKSEAFOR

Turning to BLACKSEAFOR, it has become a solid example to existing cooperative and creative nature of interstate relations. The underlying philosophy of this initiative, when it was first introduced in Turkey in 1998, was the reflection of a vision of littoral navies of the BS under a framework to accomplish certain maritime tasks through interoperability and procedural standardization as well as to enhance dialogue, understanding and confidence among the littoral navies.

Following a three years working period, the participants agreed in all details concerning the establishment of BLACKSEAFOR and the
Agreement was signed at Istanbul on 2nd of April 2001. According to the Agreement, BLACKSEAFOR is established in order to contribute to the further strengthening of friendship, good relations and mutual confidence among the Black Sea littoral states as well as to improve peace and stability in the region, through the enhancement of co-operation and interoperability among the naval forces. The main tasks of BLACKSEAFOR are:

- Search and Rescue (SAR) Operations;
- Humanitarian Assistance (HA) Operations;
- Mine Counter Measures (MCM);
- Environmental Protection Operations;
- Goodwill visits;
- Any other tasks agreed by Parties consensus.

BLACKSEAFOR is under the command of the Black Sea Naval Commanders Committee (BSNCC), which is also responsible for the overall planning of BLACKSEAFOR activities. Decisions are taken by consensus among member states, and the presidency is yearly rotated. The operational control is carried out by an officer (OPBLACKSEAFOR), nominated by the BSNCC president, who is assisted by liaison officer from each country. Tactical command is accomplished by another officer (COMBLACKSEAFOR) also designated by the BSNCC president responsible for overall activities during the activations. He is assisted by a staff consisting of officers with specified tasks from each country. To fulfil its aim, BLACKSEAFOR conducts exercises, in order to increase its efficiency and interoperability in the execution of the above mentioned tasks. Units assigned to the Force remain at their permanent home base locations and come together to form the appropriate force, either in accordance with jointly prepared programmes or, in the case of ad hoc operations, in the combination deemed necessary to perform the specified tasks.

BLACKSEAFOR as an On-Call Force is activated, as a rule, at least once a year. Units allocated to the Force are based at their permanent home base locations and they will come together to form the appropriate task force for exercises and training activities in accordance with the approved prepared programs, and for contingencies should there be
a decision by the Parties to that effect. A request for an unscheduled activation of BLACKSEAFOR might be made by any one of the Parties. For such cases, activation decision based on consensus of the Parties is required in order to activate the BLACKSEAFOR.

BLACKSEAFOR is composed only of naval elements, without the direct participation from air or army services. It can be supported by elements from other services as and if necessary. It is composed of 4 to 6 ships from the Parties, including one flag ship and the main classes of the warships that are allocated to the Task Force could be:

• Frigates (destroyers);
• Corvettes (patrol boats);
• Minesweepers;
• Amphibious ships;
• Auxiliary ships and vessels.

BLACKSEAFOR is a regional, stand-alone and meantime a transparent and opened arrangement. It is intended to be used in the Black Sea but, if required, can be deployed elsewhere should the Parties so choose through a decision by consensus. BLACKSEAFOR may also be available for employment in the UN or the OSCE-mandated operations. It could also participate in other types of international activities in accordance with its aims and tasks based on Parties consensus.

The first activation took place between 27th of September and 16th of October 2001, having Turkey as host nation and initiative country. Under the Turkish Admiral Nurset Guner command as COMBLACKSEAFOR, at sea period, the Task Force conducted tactical manoeuvres, communications serials, search and rescue exercises and damage control exercises. During the activation period, there were visited some of each country’s ports such as: Istanbul, Varna, Constanța, Odessa, Novorossiysk and Poti. The COMBLACKSEAFOR staff was embarked on the flag ship, the Turkish frigate Fatih.

The second activation took place between 5th and 28th of August 2002, having Ukraine as host nation. Under the Ukrainian captain Ihor Tenukh command as COMBLACKSEAFOR, at sea period, the Task Force conducted tactical manoeuvres, communications serials, search and rescue exercises, damage control trials and antiterrorism exercises.
During the second activation period, there were visited Sevastopol, Gölcük, Constanţa and Varna harbours. The COMBLACKSEAFOR staff was embarked on the flag ship, the Ukrainian command and control ship Slavutich.

The third activation took place between 3rd and 31st of August 2003, having Bulgaria as host nation. Under the Bulgarian admiral Giorgi Gheorghiev command as COMBLACKSEAFOR, at sea period, the Task Force conducted tactical manoeuvres, communications serials, search and rescue exercises, damage control trials antiterrorism exercises, and humanitarian assistance trainings. During the third activation period, there were visited Atya, Novorossiysk, Sevastopol, Golcuk, Constanţa and Varna harbours. The COMBLACKSEAFOR staff was embarked on the flag ship, the Bulgarian corvette Smeli.

After three successful previous activations, the Task Group fourth activation has brought a couple of differences. It took place between 5th and 27th of August, 2004 and was hosted by Georgia. Firstly, under the Georgian captain Genady Khaidarov command, for the first time in its lifetime BLACKSEAFOR was activated for the second time between 4th and 27th of April, 2005. Secondly, apart from its usual trials, it has participated at the Turkish naval exercise BLACKSEA PARTNERSHIP 05 in the Western Black Sea. During the activations period, there were visited firstly Batumi, Novorosssiyk and Sevastopol and secondly Karadeniz Eregli, Istanbul, Bourgas and Constanţa harbours. Due to space and technical limitations of Georgian fast patrol boat Dioskuria, the COMBLACKSEAFOR staff was embarked on another flag ship, the Turkish frigate Yildirim.

Following the alphabetical order rotation, the fifth activation came under Romanian hosting and command. As usual now there are planned two deployments. The first took place from 8th to 28th of August under the Romanian Captain Alexandru Mîrşu command as COMBLACKSEAFOR. At sea period there were fulfilled all the planned exercises regarding mine countermeasures, search and rescue, self protection, tactical manoeuvres and communications. In addition were experienced a new sub-concept procedures for action in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threat environment. Also, for the last
two days period, BLACKSEAFOR has conducted common exercises with the Turkish national operation BLACK SEA HARMONY. During this first phase of the activation there were visited Constanța, Varna and Karadeniz Eregli harbours. The COMBLACKSEAFOR staff was embarked on the flag ship, the Romanian frigate Mărășești.

As a general rule, for all the activations, during the port visits there were carried out official meetings to the local military and civilian authorities, return calls, sport activities and sightseeing as well as thematic exercises, briefings and hot wash-ups. While landed, the ships were opened to civilian population visits.

Looking at its results so far, the BLACKSEAFOR has already become an instrument available to be used effectively for the achievement of its main objectives under the BLACKSEAFOR Agreement, but it has not reached its fully operational maturity in order to be used efficiently in other type of operations that were not enough practiced during the previous activations.

Although the participating navies strive to do their best for the fulfilment of their commitments to the BLACKSEAFOR, they are constrained mainly by their limited navy budgets and over aged naval assets. Despite these important shortcomings, their efforts during the activation periods are praiseworthy.

**Future BLACKSEAFOR Evolution Trends**

Taking into consideration the actual Black Sea security context, a couple of evolitional trends arise for the BLACKSEAFOR future.

One is to continue with the enhancement of confidence building, cooperation and interoperability among the naval forces and the Black Sea littoral states operating within the present Agreement framework. That leads to an employment of the Task Group only in the specified missions, without any alteration of the Agreement concepts and procedures.

Meanwhile, the ongoing elaboration of common, interoperable concepts, techniques and specific procedures as well as the improvement of thematic exercises in order to be updated to the present operating area
situation. Another evolution way might be the effective employment of the BLACKSEAFOR in preventing the maritime risks threat to the security and stability in the region. That could be done only by a structural Agreement modification in concepts and procedures. The most significant aspects regard the mechanisms and procedures development for unscheduled activations, as well as consequence management; logistics support arrangements and host nation support.

Nonetheless to elaborate effective procedures for real time exchange information among littoral states, ensuring the protection of classified information, based upon appropriate legal arrangements, as well as the BLACKSEAFOR command and control structures.

Conclusions

Concluding, the Black Sea is the hub of a large number of transport corridors and pipelines connecting Europe to Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. The primary security concern is the organized crime channels which flourish through the region may provide support to terrorist organizations, providing illegal entry and exit for their activists, and trafficking conventional arms, dual use materials and even weapons of mass destruction on their behalf.

Security co-operation in the Black Sea has been slowly developed. It started from scratch only with the end of the Cold War and has been hampered since by a variety of local and geo-strategic rivalries. As the terrorist threat has been clear recently, it has become logical for all Black Sea littoral states to take the next step and look for a regional strategy to counter potential threats to all of them.

Among several regional security arrangements in the Black Sea region, BLACKSEAFOR is self arising. In its four years of existence, it has proved so far that it is an efficient instrument, on the one hand, for building confidence and strengthening friendship among the littoral states and on the other hand, to enhance cooperation and interoperability among naval forces.

For the future, two main trends occur. The first is to continue in the actual formula within the Agreement framework and the second,
to be effectively employed in preventing the maritime security threats but requiring a serious transformation in terms of political agreements among the littoral states, the establishment of a joint standing naval force, appropriate command and control structures, logistic support arrangements and a common information database.

The Black Sea security environment is fairly complex. However, the foundation to cope with these complex challenges is strong. The Montreux Convention, existing bilateral and multilateral cooperation arrangements, organizations and structures are concrete instruments. What counts is the will and intention of all littoral states to maintain and foster peace and stability in the maritime domain, as reflected on their cooperative participation in the BLACKSEAFOR initiatives are all of them good signs for being optimistic regarding the future.
The Black Sea\(^1\) has a special situation from the strategic point of view. This results from its unique geographical position as a semi-closed sea, on one hand, and from the characteristics of the economic, political, social, cultural and military evolutions of the neighbouring countries along the centuries, on the other.

In a certain way the Black Sea has been in the close vicinity of a corridor of disturbance, which spread from the Caspian Sea up to Manchuria, in the tormented core of the confrontations between the sedentary and the migratory populations. The migratory populations came from the Northern part of the Caspian Sea, or from its Southern one because the Caucasus Mountains were a real obstacle, with their heights of more that 5 000 m and because the Black Sea was as a spur, forcing them to follow the road by the Caspian Sea.

From this point of view, the Black Sea was shadowed by the Caspian Sea, although it is connected to the Mediterranean Sea by Bosporus and Dardanelle.

Both Caspian and the Black Sea are supplied by two of the most important rivers of Europe, the Danube and the Volga.

In the future this can raise a big problem, especially for the Caspian Sea which is a closed sea and the level of its waters has been continuously decreased (in the last seven years the level has decreased with three meters).

If the Caspian Sea is considered to be the largest lake in the world, with a surface of 400 000 square kilometres, but with salted water. The Black Sea, with a surface of 462 525 square kilometres, has compensatory currents, which bring salted waters from the Mediterranean Sea. The Black Sea lacks the power resources of the Caspian See.

\(^1\) Surface: 466 200 square km; medium depth: 1 271 m; maximum depth: 2 211 m (in the Southern Central part); the capacity of water: 537 000 km\(^3\); maximum length: 1 200 km, the maximum depth of the oxalic stratum: 150 m.
SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE BLACK SEA AREA

It is considered to have the largest reserves of hydrocarbons in the world. But it is likely the Black Sea to offer more as the hydrocarbons, the exploitation and the transport are concerned.

Vicinities and partnerships

If the battle between heartland and off shore countries usually has taken place in the rimland space, we must notice that the great confrontations, as well as the collaborations between the centre and the limits of the strategic pivot have developed at the crossroads between the axis of the troubled lobby (the Caspian See, Manchuria - the Balkans) with the axis the Baltic Sea-Persian Gulf. This crossroad is to be found in the Black Sea zone. Such an approach cannot be meaningless. In the Northern part of the Black Sea, three out of four strategic corridors begin; corridors alongside which West and East confronted. This confrontation took place in the European-Euro Asiatic space (the strategic corridor Northern European which begins in the oriental part of Galicia, it passes through North by the European mountain-chain and reaches Normandy; the Danube’s strategic corridor and the maritime strategic corridor - the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea - and the first important strategic shift which is to be found in the space between the Nistru and the Prut).\(^2\) On this East-West axis, the migratory people had attacked Europe, from the troubled corridor. On the same axis, as well as from on the North-South axis the crusades and most of the Euro-Asian wars took place, also most of the terrestrial and aero-terrestrial battles and both of the World Wars. Many authors like Samuel P. Huntington\(^3\) reveal these fissures and confluences in their works.

Because Caucasus and Central Asia represent the main strategic and energetic corridor of Eurasia, the Black Sea plays and will continue to play a very important role in the reconfiguration strategy of the Eurasian space, from a European and Euro-Atlantic vision. This sea is a zone of meeting and confluence, where one can find complex and full of contrast realities, but also many perspectives. Of course, the Black Sea is not important as a space of confluence and contrast, but as a synergetic

\(^2\) The fourth European strategic corridor is to be found in the Baltic zone.

effect on a vast region. This effect was put into life on April 30 1999, when the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) was founded and officially launched on June 25. From this point a view a lot of strategic important directions open but they also meet here. From this perspective, the Black Sea is a real strategic link in the Euro-Asiatic space. Besides the three strategic corridors that merge in the Black Sea, other ones open into Asia, such as: the energetic strategic corridor (space) formed by the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea and the Central Asia; the South-East Asia strategic corridor formed by the Black Sea, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, the Persian Gulf and the Mesopotamian field; the strategic (space) corridor formed by the Don, the Volga, Western Siberia; and the strategic corridor that links Ukraine and Poland. The Black Sea also joins and separates two religions, two cultures and two mentalities: the orthodox North (Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia and a part of Georgia) and the Islamic south (Turkey and a part of the Caucasus zone).

There are some important geostrategic determinations that will reconfigure the space in the Black Sea. They are:
- The East Black Sea space, the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia is very active and corresponds to a part of the silk road, thus ensuring a historical continuity;
- The Black Sea region is situated in a zone that is on a rim of both confluence and confrontation, thus resulting the importance of the Euro-Asiatic security system, in an space full of ambiguities and bifurcations;
- It is near to the Islamic corridor;
- It is near the old corridor of disturbance (from the Ancient times and the Middle Ages), which is still used for drug traffic, illegal migration and for the battle for the natural resources of the Caspian Sea and their transportation;
- The region is next to some chronic conflict zones, raising a lot of problems.

The present physiognomy of the region is also a result of the battles from the past for this space, which had at least two fundamental objectives of security: the elimination of the corridor of disturbance and the control over the natural resources.
SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE BLACK SEA AREA

These two objectives are of outmost importance for the space that comprises the Black Sea\(^4\), the Caspian Sea and the Central Asia.

In the proximity of the Black Sea shores there are some of the most severe tensions of the Eurasian space. The Caucasus zone, the Transnistria zone, as well as those of the Balkans, of the Kurds and of the Aegean Sea are still very hot, being potential zones of conflict. We believe that the riparian countries, the heartland and off shore great centres of power, the Central, the Balkans and the East European countries, the South-East Asian countries together with the USA and all the great powers should reach an agreement and should cooperate in an organization as NATO, EU and other security bodies and organizations in order to manage realities that generate tensions, crises and conflicts\(^5\).

There are numerous premises for the development of the Black Sea geopolitics and for the harmonization with the complicated and long tensions and mentalities that have appeared in the neighbouring zones. There are already organizations of economic cooperation, like the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), as well as other regional organizations for security and cooperation in the military domain. Here we can mention BLACKSEAFOR (Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine) and SEEBRIG (Albania, Bulgaria, Republic of Macedonia, Greece, Italy, Romania, and Turkey, Croatia, Slovenia and the USA have the statute of observers), and other structures like GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and the Republic of Moldova).

The security background from this zone is extremely important for the future of Eurasia, which is determined by the present partnership policies or by the confrontation regarding the exploitation and the transport of the natural resources from the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. The battle and the partnership for these resources are both actions and pressures belonging to the centres of power of the world. The pressures resulting from the strategic partnerships are, in general,

\(^4\) Because of the natural resources that are used or about to be discovered, as well as for the role that the region plays and is going to play in the transportation of the hydrocarbons, we consider that the Black Sea is a part of the great strategic Eurasian corridor (Central Asia, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea).

\(^5\) In fact, an efficient cooperation in the Black Sea region has already started with the foundation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), BLACKSEAFOR and SEEBRIG as well as with the foundation of other regional and bilateral organizations.
stabilizing, and the confrontation between the great powers, the centre of power and the outside factors are visible enough and are centred on the Caspian region. They tend to make room for collaborations between the Russian Federation, USA and China and all the countries belonging to this real zone of strategic synergy represented by the Black Sea.

There are also extremely dangerous external pressures from the terrorist networks, the organized crime and other centres of interests of the mafia and underground economy, interested in maintaining the contrasts, the tensions and the uncertain situation, much needed for illegal actions: the manufacturing and the sale of raw materials for weapons, human beings and drugs trafficking. The disturbance corridor is the place for the connection between the resources from the South Central Asia and the activities connected to it. From this point of view, the Black Sea is a space for the infiltration and the transit that can produce a destabilization of the zone, of NATO, EU, OSCE and the strategic partnerships. The role of the sea ports is developing; we can mention here Istanbul, Bourgas, Varna, Mangalia, Constanța, Sulina, Odessa, Simferopol, Novorossiysk, Batumi and the Turkish ports from the south shore. These ports will play an important role in the reconfiguration of the strategic function of the Black Sea space.

There are still internal pressures, specific to this space; they can produce great worries.

The pressures are numerous. Some of them are inherited from the past, other bear the sign of the strategic mutations produced at the end of XX century by the disappearance of the Soviet Union and by the successful strategy used by US during the Cold War. Most pressures result from the crossroad between the economic and social problems confronting the countries from this region and the external pressures from the international and regional terrorist networks and from the other centres on interest.

The NATO presence and the partnerships between the Alliance and Russia and Ukraine, other organizations and organisms will influence these pressures and will create the conditions to build up a stable and lasting security background.
Security and Stability in the Black Sea Area

From confrontation to confluence

The Black Sea region can be an example of cooperation between countries with different cultures, economies, religions and mentalities. Of course, this cooperation is still at the beginning. It is based upon principles different from those ones that had governed and influenced for hundred of years the relationships between the countries from this region. The problems inherited from the past confrontations haven’t disappeared. In that period the Black Sea was considered a strategic rim.

The Black Sea is no longer a strategic rim, but one of confluence, economic cooperation and security. There is no longer a problem concerning the frontiers.

The Black Sea offers rich and important energetic resources, some of them already exploited. The applications of the articles of the Montego Bay Convention and of other documents which regulate the relations between the states from this region prevent the appearance of tensions and of conflicts. Still there may appear development of some situations hard to control and to manage. This development can be the result of the proliferation of organized crime, drug, human being and weapons traffic, of illegal migration and of neopiracy.

The Black Sea’s special situation, in general, and that one of Romania, in particular, can generate some problems regarding the security of marine ecosystems. In the western part of the Black Sea there is a process in which the water takes over the land, and the less resistant rocks (loess, clay, marl, limestone) have helped the phenomenon. That is why the Romanian shore has fewer gulfs, and the capes and promontories are rare. In the last decades the shore had undergone a lot of changes because of the fluvial alluvia and because of the industrial and city development, the hydro-technical facilities, the development of the ports and the marine transport, the hydrocarbons exploitation and the transport.

The Romanian shore has a length of 264 km and may be divided in two sectors: the Northern sector, 165 km, which includes the Danube Delta and the complex of lagoons Razelm-Sinoe, characterized by river
accumulations and beaches with fine sand coming from the Danube; and the Southern sector, 99 km (Cape Midia, Vama Veche) characterized by high coasts, made of limestone, with narrow and rugged beaches.

The continental platform has a surface of 22,998 km², 1,327 km² being in water, and the distance from the shore varies between 100 and 200 km, in the Northern sector, and 50 km in the Southern sector.

The western cyclonic current moves the waters from North to South, because of this movement the Romanian shore is affected and it has a regular configuration. The residual waters affect the shore and the marine species, being a real threat to the ecological security of the Black Sea, in the Romanian sector.

The development of the exploitation and of the transport of the hydrocarbons will only enhance the ecologic insecurity of the region. The relationships within such organizations as OCEMN, BLACKSEAFOR, SEEBRIG and other economic and security bodies and organizations will develop trust and cooperation, transforming the Black Sea region in a strong zone of strategic confluences within EU and other Eurasian organizations.

Conclusions

1. The Black Sea is a strategic binding agent for the neighbouring countries, with a synergetic effect on maintaining a stable security medium, which will help the economic and social development and the regional cooperation. This medium may influence positively the regions of conflict from the Caucasus, Transnistria and even the Near East.

2. Meantime, the corridors and the directions of action for the drugs, persons and weapons traffic, the illegal migration, and the trans boundary crime in the Southern and the Northern part of the Black Sea are extremely active and dangerous. They are direct and indirect threats to the regional security and may influence the development of terrorist organizations, groups and networks.

3. The region, surrounded by the conflicts from the Caucasus, Transnistria, by those caused by the Kurds and the vicinity with the Islamic countries, is still full of tensions and instable. At the same time, NATO enlargement to the Black Sea and the coming enlargement of
EU make way to the transformation of this space in a vital centre of confluence and communication. Thus, the relationships East-West and North South will develop and the strategic rims that separate Europe from the Islamic world will be diminished.

4. Organizations as OCEMN, BLACKSEAFOR, SEEBRIG – that promote the economic and security cooperation - as well as GUUAM represent the will for peace, cooperation, security and stability of the nations belonging to the ex-strategic Eurasia rim. The Black Sea region is a centre of confluence between the European and the Asian continents. This process must be encouraged and developed by all means and instruments of European, Eurasian and Euro-Atlantic security.

5. NATO enlargement and EU enlargement, the emplacement of some mobile and flexible military bases of the Alliance so close to the conflict or potential conflict zones will only increase the role played by the Black Sea region in a space of strategic security and stability, of confluence, cooperation and diminishing the effects of strategic rim, which were to be found here for hundred of years.

6. Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, are now NATO member states. They have more than half of the Black Sea coastline. Those countries cooperate with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and others Caucasian states in issues related to border traffic and security matters in relation to the Danube maritime and fluvial transit. Transports on the Danube have significantly increased and now they have a renewed strategic importance for the European community. In this matter, Romania plays an active role, as a key factor or more precisely as a pivot for the new regional South-Eastern European construction, with important perspectives of development.
We may state that NATO and EU extension towards east – a process which has not reached its limits yet, for neither organization – is about to transform the ancient Euxin Pont into a sea area of an alliance/union of democratic states, that is politically and socially stable, economically developed, and closely connected due to the values and interests that it sustains. Of course, this wish will not just simply come about without the decisive and unanimous action of those implied, first of all of the riparian states.

Romania, as a Black Sea riverside country, as a NATO member and a future EU one, is located at the Eastern limit of these organizations, and it is not clear enough for how long it will still remain in the same situation. The further extension of the two organizations is a remote future matter that is being discussed. At the same time, the territory situated east to Romania, which is insufficiently clarified with opposing tendencies, is rearranged, in terms of geopolitics and geostrategy. Thus, the following question arises: what be can the role of Romania in the configuration of the ultimate lines of the future sea space? In other words, is it possible to influence, in the desired direction, the last features of this space, so that they should be suitable for us? And if affirmative, which are the basic requirements we, as a European nation, have to face in order to make this desideratum occur?

Of course, the answers to these questions cannot be categorical. They must be nuanced and motivated, and this is what we have proposed for this paper. Essentially, it is necessary to understand the reality beyond
appearances, the deep determinations of the political, economical, and social environment of the Black Sea region, and on this basis, to know what it can and must become, we, as subjects of our own history, can determine the main directions of the action, so that the economical and social progress could become a reality of this area. We, together with the other regional and global actors, must plan and implement the core lines of this process, with wisdom and political determination, but also with steady effort, just like for any other long-lasting and valuable thing.

1. The General Characterization Of The Black Sea Area

The Black Sea area has a great economic potential, a large scale of resources and an important infrastructure, the security dimension being very strongly related to the economic one. Here there are six states having a direct access to the seacoast area. Their population is about 285 million inhabitants and a value of the gross domestic product totalized 1.049.020 million $ in 2004 out of the world total of 40 894 780. Reflecting influences from the Ottoman and Soviet period of the history of the region, the population living around the Black Sea area is formed of varied ethnical groups very well limited, inhomogeneous from a structural, educational, cultural, behavioural point of view regarding the traditions and habits but living together in a relative harmony.

1.1. Social and Political Aspects

The extended Black Sea area – a very frequently concept used in the world of geopolitics and geostrategy – is characterized by a great variety of problems and specific phenomena for transition from authorial governments and centralizing economy to pluralism democracies and free market economy. Unlike other areas of the Euro-Atlantic space where specific developments of the post-post-cold war can be remarked in the extended area of the Black Sea the overcoming of the problems associated with the Soviet inheritance is delayed.

Nowadays, the Black Sea area goes through a historical stage that can be described by the separation of some of the riparian states from the communist period inheritance from the affiliation to the Soviet influence sphere to the transition from a society and a closed economy to the values of the democracy and of market oriented economy some states from the region are already members of NATO and will join EU (Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria) while others are committed to accomplish the requirements of the EU (Ukraine and Georgia), however, Russia maintaining its great power statute, trying to remake – on the basis of the new geostrategic coordinates - the former political military and economical block in order to remain a credible partner for the great powers in the world and to keep the main role in the region.

The states from the Black Sea area depend to a great extend on the Western economic support that proves to be an essential force stimulating the changing process of economic social bases of the states and the increase of the democratic evolutions. Each state confronts with different problems, such as: backward mentalities, fragile democratic background and corruption, activities of international criminal organisations; illegal drugs traffic etc.

1.2. Economic Situation and Potential

The unequal economical development of the states in the area influences the Western investments negatively. In order to remedy this state of things, they grouped themselves in different economical organizations, their main purpose being to promote a long-lasting development. Among these we could mention the Organization for Economic Cooperation at The Black Sea (OCEMN); Community of the Independent States (CSI); GUAM Group, OCEMN being the most significant in this regard. Its basic principles are cooperation and involvement, not confrontation and isolation.

The Black Sea itself has very important economical advantages for the riparian states. Besides its commercial aspect, good transport (especially of the oil extracted from the Caspic area), the Black Sea has some important hydro carbonic resources on the continental plateau, as well as a large quantity of fish, all these leading to a good, mutual
cooperation between the riparian states. Thus, the sea unifies all the states through the interests it generates. More than that, the Black Sea assures the naval connection between them, namely the navigable way Rhine-Main-Danube with countries as Russia, Georgia and Turkey. Thus, they can benefit from the advantages of this mean of transport, the cheapest one to carry imperishable merchandise. However, we should take into account the fact that the Black Sea offers to four of the seven riparian states the only way of access to the World Ocean.

Concerning energy, most of the area states depend on the oil and gas delivered by the Russian Federation. This explains the efforts that are being done in order to allow the access to the energetic sources in the Caspian Sea and Middle East areas; on one hand, this could reduce the East Europe and European Union dependence on the Russian Federation. On the other hand, the Russian companies forced to obey the European Union rules in order to extend to the West are meant to make the Russian Federation give up its firm position with its neighbouring states and accept the Western partnership and cooperation with well-known transnational companies.

1.3. Security Issues

The Black Sea area is one of the richest on number of minorities and religions. That is why the interethnic and inter-religious relationships represent one of the main sources of potential or active conflict.

Generally speaking, the vulnerabilities in the area are specific to the countries in transition from totalitarianism to democracy. The communism breakdown created a geostrategic “void” that initiated the transition process, one with difficulties, both internal and external, that led to an unfinished process in the social life domains such as: economical, political, and social. The main consequence is the low quality of life, as it used to be under the communist regime.

Meantime, the coherent, firm legal framework necessary to combat corruption and crime isn’t developed well enough as it can be easily broken without the normal consequences in a law state.

Just because some states haven’t expressed firmly their external political options in contrast with the European and Euro-Atlantic values,
it creates an insecure and unstable potential for the whole region. The solving of this problem in the near future is rather difficult because these states are dependent to the Russian energetic resources.

Taking into account all these vulnerabilities, the Black Sea countries seem to concentrate their own perceptions – in different degrees – in order to face the new threats and, implicitly, to launch new initiatives into the security area, problem omitted when OCEMN was created.

Concerning the risks and the threats on the security of these states, we may say that they come from the vulnerabilities mentioned above, being, at the same time, linked with the global risks and threats to the security. We intend to talk about the most important risks, without any additional comments:

- The transit of the terrorist elements and the organized crime to Central and Western Europe;
- The waves of migration from Asia to Western Europe;
- The neighbouring area of some of the most unstable areas of the world: Central Asia, Caucasus and the Balkans;
- The existence of some relations based on mutual trust between important countries of the area;
- Russian tendencies to remake the hegemonic order during the period of the Soviet Union.
- The traditional conflict between Russia and Turkey regarding the leader position for the Black Sea;
- The lack of international law instruments acknowledged by the states from the area regarding the peaceful solving of autonomy or sovereignty requests of some ethnic minorities.
- The lack of interest regarding the environment degradation caused by the industrialization process of the ex-communist states.

The main threats regarding the area states security are logically originated in the listed risks and refer mainly to:

- The unwanted Russian military presence in Chechnya and Transnistria;
- The conflict from Southern Osetia;
- The conflict from Transnistria;
• The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, within Nagorno-Karabakh enclave;
• The Afghanistan anti-terror campaign;
• The Iraqi war;
• The underground economy, organized crime and high level corruption.

2. Potential and Perspectives

According to the actual modern political environment, the geostrategical environment, the geostrategical position of a state on the shore of the Black Sea becomes increasingly important\(^3\). In spite of classical geostrategy experts’ opinion that considers the sea control was the main condition to obtain a dominant position, today the main opinion is that a state’s position by the seashore creates favourable conditions to its development and of its adjacent area and it has an overwhelming importance for the state. We could only agree to the statement that “sea by itself, cannot have an important political function unless there are connections between the two shores.”\(^4\)

2.1. Social-Political Field

In the Black Sea area there are two noticeable antagonic tendencies: including the states from the this space in EU and NATO and increasing the attraction towards these organizations; Russia’s economic efforts to rebuild the political military block by Ukraine, Moldavia and Georgia integration, maintaining the influence within “the immediate neighbourhood” as well as military presence in the area. EU expansion by incorporating the area states seems to be irreversible. Romania and Bulgaria’s perspectives for integration are relatively certain for 2007, and Turkey has already started the negotiations, that can be only but beneficial.

Meantime, EU itself significantly increases its capacity to influence the region, by promoting the stability and modernity in the proximity

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\(^3\) Alfred Thayer MAHAN, *Influența puterii maritimi în istorie (1660-1783)*, 1890.

area of the states by the Caspic Sea and of Middle East.

The Ukraine “Orange Revolution” had as a result a pro-Western president. The recent governmental crisis proved the frailty of the democratic game. Under these circumstances, the future parliamentary elections will be a decisive test for the relevance of the democratic and market economy direction strategy, which the largest European state (except Russia) has been engaged on. The Russia’s rebalance and stability, ensured by the Putin government, may become temporarily if he doesn’t manage to implement a democratic mechanism, able to ensure the continuity of the project after his second mandate would expire, though until then there is enough time to continue the clarifying process of the political-strategic options and of the ways of promoting Russia’s interests by the overall manner of managing the state’s business, but as well as in the relations with the other regional or global actors.

Another problem of the future configuration of the Black Sea area consists in the relative ambiguity of Ukraine’s political options, as well as Moldavia’s options regarding their integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Though lately there has been a certain determination from both states regarding their pro-Western statements, the cultural, political and economic realities continue to submit to various opinions its final or conjectural character.

2.2. Economic Field

The energetic dependency of the Black Sea states, being a clear advantage to the Russian plans of re-creating its ex-integrated block. It has to take into account the fact that its main oil and gas pipes cross Ukraine and Poland, regional actors over that it exercises its weak control, or at least uncertain. That is why it is expected Russia to attend to diminish the influence that other states can exercise over its strategic experts, its main purpose being the special importance of the Novorosiiik-Eastern Balkans and of the underwater gas pipe in the Black Sea, within terminus point Istanbul. However, it will continue to support by all its resources the “offensive” of the energy companies owned in Eastern Europe and South Eastern Europe under the logo “buy anything that can be bought.”
Ukraine, due to its geographical position, enjoys the role of a petroleum dispatcher in the region, because of Odessa-Brodii pipeline. While Russia tries to avoid the oil access through this pipeline, EU allocated funds for its prolongation to the Baltic. Kiev also has an influence upon the oil transportation through pipelines towards Romania and Bulgaria.

Turkey is interested in oil and gas administration that comes from the Middle East, Caucaz and the Black Sea, promoting Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan project as an alternative to the “The North Route” but it doesn’t give up the huge imports of natural gas from Russian Federation, although it took some measures to diversify the sources of supplies (the Nabuco gas pipeline between Iran, Balkans and Central Europe). That is why Turkey gained a relative independence from Russia regarding the energetic capability.

In this whole equation, Romania might play an important strategic role regarding the international economies ties, both as an oil products exporter and the oil transportation from the Russian Federation or The Caspic Sea area to the Western and Central Europe (see Constanța-Belgrad-Trieste project).

2.3. The Security Environment

As seen above, the complexity of risks and threats to the global and regional security is highly representative. Generally speaking, the security perspectives in the Black Sea region are determined, on one hand by the success of internal transitions of the states in the region, and on the other hand by its acceptance into the Euro-Atlantic complex of security. For this reason, NATO and EU relationships established by all the countries from the Black Sea region are some of the best premises for a future in which the role of these organizations for the security and stability in the region should be a decisive one.

- Romania and Bulgaria are NATO members and they have a clear schedule for EU integration;
- Turkey is a NATO member and has recently started the debates for the EU integration;
- Russia and Ukraine have special relationships with NATO,
together with Georgia they are members of Partnership for Peace since 1994 and have agreements for partnership with EU since 1996.

- Ukraine and Georgia officials have recently declared their intention to tighten NATO and EU relationships.

On the other hand, the presence of these countries in other international organizations whose official goal is the stability and peacekeeping (OSCE, The Argument of Stability for the South-Eastern Europe, CSI, GUUAM, OCEMN, SECI, SEDM) reveals the good intentions of the politicians that initiated and maintained the countries inside these organizations, that constitute the favourable premises for an optimistic evolution.

Although there are voices that affirm the impossibility of a common strategy for the Black Sea and Balkans area, its main lines were established by the so-called SIMN⁵, which consists of the following elements:

- Creating a legitimate space for NATO in order to operate in this area;
- Drawing Russia as a partner;
- Coordinating the Euro-Atlantic community efforts and interests;
- Stabilizing the less developed states through democracy and institutional development;
- The civil society’s mobilization and participation;
- Development of the regional cooperation;
- Transmitting the democratic experience from the Central and Eastern Europe towards the Black Sea countries.

There are also distinct NATO and EU strategies for the Black Sea area, which are appreciated as having many success chances. Regarding NATO, after the Prague Summit (2002) they revised the Partnership for Peace Programme, offering the Action Plan for the Individual Partnership and the Action Plan for Partnership. EU passes through a development process of a new instrument of neighbourhood which offers to the countries situated at the new union widen frontier the statute of members

of an “Extended Europe”, including Ukraine and Moldavia. Although there are opinions that consider this instrument should be extended for the Southern Caucasian countries, EU politics don’t offer a coherent conception regarding Russia’s integration. Also in the EU framework, the riparian region countries adopted the “Declaration concerning the water and the union between the water and the ecosystems from the extended region of the Black Sea”, a document meant to promote the cooperation in the area and effectively support the nominated countries for the acceleration of the process which imputes the community legislation. The democratic deficit was although emphasized as one of the important challenges for developing the Black Sea countries and as the effort of the regional cooperation. Despite all of these, there are premises to begin an ample process of building a successful region beginning from creating a dynamic nucleus, which considers the geopolitical and functional factors and the intellectual ones, political management, giving priority to the security operations.

3. Directions of Action

Romania has a special place as part of the new European political option, through its own approaches of institutional transformation, collaboration, cooperation and integration. The diversity of the regional initiatives for cooperation, where Romania takes part, represents ways of stability achievement in the Central-European region, Balkans and the Black Sea. The Central and South-East European leaders and annalists admit, without any exception, that the regional security and stability are only the result of many factors and types of security: cooperative, democratic, military, political, diplomatic, economic, juridical and police, coexisting in the effort of asserting a global model for security in the 21st century. In the equation of the regional stability, our country joins:

- OSCE, in the efforts of preventing the conflicts and the establishment of cooperative security;
- The 45 states, members of The European Council, to promote and protect the human rights, therefore in a democratic society;
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- The 25 NATO members, to guarantee collective defence and crisis management “outside the region”, therefore the military and strategic security;

- The 25 EU member states for economic and military integration, external politics for common security, juridical and police cooperation, guaranteeing the economical development and political stability of Europe.

The firm integration of our country into this ensemble is to contribute to a new regional order for peace, cooperation, security and stability.

3.1. An Active Policy

Considered as an important actor in the region, Romania, a new NATO member, proved through its actions that may constitute a stability pillar.

As for the Romania’s major objective, of European integration, its accomplishment comes together with the regional actions, at this level the cooperation being the action carried out for the improvement of the security in the region. So, some political, economical, security and cultural issues may have a more efficient treatment, in a relative homogeneous environment with a certain level of cohesion, creating valuable mechanisms for cooperation, whose necessity is proved not only at the regional level, but at the subregional and global one.

Romania is and must remain an active presence in the process of regional cooperation from the Black Sea region, institutions and organizations already mentioned: the Organization of the Economical Cooperation to the Black Sea; the Initiative of South-East European Cooperation; GUAM Grouping; the Process of Danube Cooperation; the Pact of Stability in the South-East Europe.

Our country must continue and develop new forms of bi and multilateral co-operations in order to develop the economical connections and the regional stability as the trilateral: Romania-Bulgaria-Greece; Romania-Bulgaria-Turkey; Romania-Moldavia-Ukraine.

The integration of our country in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures will have a positive impact on the regional security and stability, favouring cooperation, agreement, reconciliation and settling
some eventual historical disputes on subregional plan. Romania will continue and consolidate the cooperation with the other member states, in order to solve out the important problems having an impact on the Black Sea area, which are under the consideration of NATO and EU officials: the economical and special disparities; the ethnical and religious conflicts; the organized crime; weapons, drugs and human beings trafficking; corruption and human rights.

Together with the other states of the region, Romania may contribute to stop the inactivity, the lack of implication in the reconstruction and stability issues and the lack of efficiency from the international security institutions.

By collaboration and cooperation, Romania may develop politics and use instruments which may allow the approach of a decisive manner of the interethnic conflicts and other type, applying the European standards and promoting decisively a system of values which can favour the interests of all the nations from the Black Sea region.

3.2. Intensive and Varied Economical Relations

Without underestimating the role played by the other European states and by the USA concerning the stabilization of the region, the states from the area are able to participate at the development of a common strategy consolidating the regional stability and security. Romania, by its geostrategical position and by its realistic and economical potential, has to carry a very important role. The common efforts will ensure the overcome of the economical and social underdevelopment, by applying some new forms and mechanisms for consolidation and extension of the regional cooperation in the most different fields, starting with the creation of an integrated market for energy, up to transport and telecommunication infrastructures.

In the OCEMN, Romania contributes significantly to the economical changes of the Black Sea countries by solving the area conflicts, co-operation, economical growth and stability.

In the future, the economic stake of the Black Sea region will increase more and more, thus the lasting Romania’s development and of the other countries as well as the tight cooperation among them will
give a higher consistency to the region’s security and stability. The Black Sea Basin should confine the development of a dynamical and complementary energy market, as part of a comprehensive regional approach, connected to the Euro-Atlantic process. Our country is and will remain subject and actor of the changes provoked by globalization using the opportunities offered, but also its contribution to the regional prosperity and development all over the world considering the collaboration between countries from this region and between them and the great powers outside the region. Together with the European partners, Romania will handle creating a South East Europe Free Trade Agreement, which is meant to be a successful philosophy transfer from CEFTA to Eastern Europe.

3.3. Co-Operation and Military Action

As NATO will continue to be the most lasting regional security arrangement, our country, as an Alliance member, will actively contribute to security and stability of the Black Sea area as well as of the adjacent regions; to the organization’s enlargement and development, the consolidation of the EU and Russia relations; to leading operations outside the Euro-Atlantic space, fighting against terrorism. Our country’s contribution to the regional stabilization consists in its new quality obtained in March 2004 when it took part in the entire NATO spectrum of missions in the European and Euro-Atlantic area but also to maintaining peace operations, humanitarian and post-conflicts ones, other than those leaded by NATO (EU, ONU, OSCE), to the defence diplomacy (conflict prevention, armament control, non-proliferation, collective measures of increasing trust and security, assistance and support in the military field) and to coalition operations. The Romanian space’s adjacency to three out of four main European strategic corridors correlated to its NATO and EU affiliation, will allow it to have a substantial contribution to the strategically control of the situation in the Black Sea area, to prevent the asymmetrical threats and the major conflicts, as well as to protect and to promote the European and Euro-Atlantic interests⁶.

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has a remarkable contribution to the trust and friendship consolidation and to a real understanding among the riparian countries, to the co-operation and interoperability development among the naval forces, is ready to carry on search and rescue operations, humanitarian assistance, de-mining, environment protection and peace support operations.

The Military and Political Directive for the fundamental version of the defence plans (2003) stipulates among the military tasks which devolve upon Romania, its contribution to the regional security by attending to this initiative and to other regional forces as SEDM, SEEBRIG, SHIRBRIG, and CENCOOP.

On the terms regarding the main risks and threats to the national and regional security, the military factors have an important role in fighting against the asymmetric threats by enforcing the reaction capabilities and the adjustment of the resolution mechanism to the objectives of the common security regarding the Extended Region of the Black Sea. Bringing into force the existent projects can determine important steps ahead on achieving the established objectives regarding this field. Among these projects, we mention:

- Promoting the SECI centre in the Caucasus-Black Sea region, extending the borders control, custom common operations, marine patrolling with non-national crews, energetic corridors protection, intervention in case of civilian emergencies, etc.
- Sustaining Georgia by a significant Romanian contribution on developing an anti-terrorist centre at Tbilisi
- Regional cooperation against terrorism and criminality

All of them may be carried out by providing the complementarities with the EU security initiatives for the Extended Region of the Black Sea especially regarding the connected threats: illegal immigration, white slavery, organized crime, terrorism. The first and the foremost projects are:

- Elaborating a convention for risks, unconventional threats and fighting-back measures evaluation
- Promoting a centre that should constitute an example for stimulating and following up the projects developed by the Western partners of the Eastern countries in the Black Sea area.

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Conclusions

On short term, The Black Sea field and the adjacent area will remain an active zone in terms of political, economical and military events, which can affect the regional and even the global security. The conflict potential of this area, from “frozen” to delitescent conflicts and even up to the present ones corroborated with the existence of some terrorist groups and elements of organized crime and also with the increase interest of some state and non-state actors towards the strategic resources in Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East and towards the necessity of controlling the access to them, will imply important forces, means and, of course, political will and sustained efforts.

Back to the initial question, we hope there were outlined the main ideas for a possible response.

1) By NATO and EU integration, Romania is due to significantly contribute to the minimization of the effect of strategic fissure from the South-Eastern European area, by transforming the extended region of the Black Sea in a stable, prosperous and lasting democratic development one.

2) The integration of our country in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures may bring us the extra potential, necessary for an active Romania in the past, but not efficient enough in its stages to have a positive impact, favourable to our own interests on a long term, on the regional, continental and global security and stability, cooperation, understanding, reconciliation and minimization of historical conflicts to a subregional area level.

3) All the states from the Black Sea region must contribute to the regional stability and prosperity. Romania has also an important role to play, as a main purpose, a total coherence among politics, strategies and actions. This accomplishment is possible only by promoting an active policy of cooperation on different levels, including the economic and military ones, as well as concrete action for achieving treaties, the agreements and the bi and multilateral conventions. Our country must sustain the cooperation of the states from the Black Sea Basin in order to provide the regional stability, proving that this regional stability depends on these states’ common fight against terrorism, organized crime, illegal weapons, ammunition, drugs and persons trafficking.
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SECURITY BY COOPERATION
WITHIN THE BLACK SEA AREA

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1. Findings of global security assessment

Experts and organizations in the field of international security have quasi-unanimously reached the conclusion that global security is better today than the Cold War period and a major military act of aggression is highly unlikely in the next decade. Significantly reduced dimensions of the conflict between EAST and WEST, due to Warsaw Treaty and the former Soviet Union dissolution, support this conclusion. Changed attitude of the former adversaries - former NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization members - now fostering partnership to remove disagreements and build mutual trust (Partnership for Peace, NATO-Russia Partnership, etc.) in order to improve the security environment, also proves the above-mentioned conclusion.

The beginning of the 21st century bears all the hallmarks of terrorism recrudescence and is dominated by the actions taken to eradicate it. Surprisingly, military actions are prevalent in meeting this objective, although the lessons learned throughout history have shown us that a war could be won or peace between combatants could be enforced, but the causes of the conflict do not disappear. To this end, I would mention the two wars between some European countries lasting one for 30, and the other for 100 years, the conflicts in Africa, Asia and the Middle East continuing for so many years without resolving the disputes. Moreover, in several cases, the adversaries could not even bring peace between them (Kashmir, Korean Peninsula, the Middle East, etc.). More recently, in Afghanistan and Iraq, the multinational coalitions have achieved the victory but the security is unstable and a lot of resources are necessary for a long period of time in order to ensure the internal security, mainly social and political.
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Although it is well known the fact that security is a multidimensional concept and increasing effects of political, economical, social, informational, and ecological components on security environment configuration are well recognized, military actions are still preferred in resolving conflicts.

Excessive use of the military component in order to improve security in the world has the following inevitable consequences:

- The existing and deepening imbalance between states and groups of states from military power point of view.

- Some countries with relatively modest economical and military capabilities tend to acquire and develop weapons of mass destruction (North Korea, Iran and, probably, other countries which have not declared their intentions).

- The countries with a high military potential tend to initiate unilateral military actions when they consider their interests are at risk, interpreting for their own advantage the right of self-defence stipulated by the UN Chart and developing the so-called preventive military action-based doctrines.

- Risk of minimizing the UN role as a result of the precedent created by the attack against Iraq without a favourable resolution from the UN Security Council.

- A stimulus to develop „smart weapon” systems and, implicitly, qualitative arms race.

- Increase of armaments sales and traffic.

At the political level, the dominance of a single nation over the entire world faces most of the countries disapproval. These countries stand up for multi-polarity and democratizing the UN by increasing the number of the Security Council permanent members and restructuring the decision-making mechanism within the organization. There are also opinions for re-arranging the existing international order because of the situation, which seemingly is no longer similar to post-World War II. Keen supporters of this idea argue, among other things, that multinational organizations and companies, which do not participate in making decisions involving them, have more employees than the population living in many UN countries and turnovers higher than Gross National
Product achieved by most of the members of the organization.

The environmental degradation is an increasingly alarming issue affecting all of us, rich and poor, regardless of nationality, religion or sex because of pollution. However, we have been waiting until the last possible moment while nature keeps warning us through dangerous weather phenomena (tornadoes, floods, etc.) causing huge damages and heavy casualties, the international community has not succeeded yet in reaching any sort of consensus on the environment preservation. That is why the effects are dramatic: extension of the desert areas; reduced sources and amount of drinking water; reduced surface area of arable land; reduced surface area of rain forests; increasingly extreme weather conditions in most of the regions, etc. Environmental degradation and associated physical consequences have generated and are likely to extend mass migration, pauperization of human communities and, most important, fight for resources and water.

All I have shown so far makes me consider that the global security status is generally better than during the Cold War. Nevertheless, the large number of open and dormant conflicts and, especially, their potential spread because of exacerbating ethnic and religious antagonism should make us think more seriously about the ways to solve out the existing problems.

2. Assessment of current security status within the Black Sea area

The Black Sea geographical location as a bridge between Europe, Asia and the Middle East had a strong influence in the past, and still has, over the security of the surrounding states.

Being a border area and often a disputed region between Habsburg, Czarist and Ottoman Empires, numerous wars were fought within the Black Sea basin whose fingerprints have always stuck in the collective mind and recognized as „historical legacy”. Historically, the neighboring countries around the Black Sea became known „more for their conflictive potential rather than for regional solidarity.”\(^1\) During the Cold War, part of these conflicts were kept under control, mainly by the Soviet

\(^1\) Alina BUZĂIANU, Stability and Security within the Black Sea Region, Strategic Impact, no.1/2005, pp.41-42, the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, National Defence University, Bucharest.
Union and USA, separately within their area of influence, and through cooperation within the other areas.

Open conflicts have been caused by latently existing antagonisms since 1991, which had a negative effect on regional security (Caucasus, Transnistria, the Balkans). The "historical legacy" file can be supplemented with the open and dormant conflicts in the Middle East and Central Asia due to their connections with the countries within the Black Sea basin.

Relatively fragile borders allowing drugs and people trafficking from the Far East to Western Europe and USA, as well as illegal weapon traffic from Transnistria to the Middle East could be also added to the previously mentioned risks to regional security. To get a complete picture of the threats causing damaging effects on regional security climate, corruption and organized crime should be included in the list too.

Security-related shortfalls shown above, in conjunction with the way the countries within the Black Sea basin cooperate, made Dr. Paul Duţă to assess that "the Black Sea could hardly be perceived as a region" because "there is no spirit of regionalism in various dimensions of regional cooperation", due to some determining factors which obstruct cooperation, such as "corruption and organized crime, different cultural and religious identities, instability induced by the conflicts and tension in the region... and undeclared conflictive interests of the member states,"

(tension caused by NATO extension eastwards, unilateral measures affecting ecological balance, etc.). Regardless the shortfalls, security environment of the Black Sea area is relatively healthy and it has the potential for further improvement in the years to come. In support of this assessment, regional initiatives have been developed and operate, such as: Organization for Economical Cooperation of the Black Sea (OECMN), the Black Sea Bank for Trade and Development (BSEC), BLACKSEAFOR, and of course broader initiatives, such as Partnership for Peace (PfP) and NATO-Russia Strategic Partnership. All these show the determination and availability for cooperation of the countries in the area, as well as their option for improving the security and stability.

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2 Dr. Paul Duţă, Two Concepts for the Black Sea Extended Area: "friendly neighbourhood" and "partnership for security", Strategic Impact, no.1/2005, p.35, the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, National Defence University, Bucharest.
3. Security improvement through cooperation

Security through cooperation is not at all a new concept. Immanuel Kant developed it in the 18th century in his article „The Perpetual Peace.” This concept could not be used because, at that time, it was a utopia, taking into account that its main theme was how to achieve a new global order by joining together all the countries of the world in a federation of free individual states.

Following the World War I, the concept of collective security was promoted and the League of Nations had the responsibility to implement it. The project failed too because the League member states were fundamentally incompatible as far as their political spectrum was concerned: liberal democracies, fascism and communism.

When the World War II ended, concerns about world security improvement by involving all the countries have been raised again more successfully and they are now developed in the concept „Cooperative Security.” This concept is designed as a system whose core is individual security (at a state or group of states level), and the final goal is security which could be achieved gradually, passing through three stages: collective security, collective defence, and stability promotion.

Individual security could be guaranteed only inside the societies led by a democratic leadership that obey human rights and provide domestic political stability and prosperity for all their citizens.

Security through cooperation model operates between states governed by democratic leadership because they are available for an open and permanent dialogue, for negotiations aiming at identifying mutual acceptable solutions in order to overcome the disagreements occurred. The reasoning behind this assertion is the way the United Kingdom and Iceland solved their divergences during „the war of the cod”, as well as Spain and Canada during „the war of fishing.” As we know, Western Europe has also a „historical legacy”, including the wars between France and Germany, Germany and the United Kingdom,

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e等，但过去的事件引起的怨恨已经被克服，而这些国家现在是北约盟友和欧盟成员。

在黑海盆地，"historical legacy" 和文化差异对合作的效率有影响，隐含的是安全。

从西欧历史中汲取的教训表明，安全是可行的概念。黑海盆地的评估表明，我们有理由乐观，因为最重要的合作需求已经满足：
- 一个共同的目标——安全和稳定改善；
- 改善彼此的了解，无论是通过双边关系还是通过区域倡议、伙伴关系、OSCE 和其他安全相关的机构联合举办的活动；
- 通过双边和国际协议和理解（如CFE 条约、"Open Sky" 协议等）来增加信任和改善安全的措施；
- 强有力的基础，包括众所周知的区域倡议。

为了改善该地区的安全和稳定，不应再将此目标视为欧洲大西洋整合的主导因素，并同时，该地区国家之间的关系应由以下原则治理：双边和多边咨询、透明度、相互依赖和主动态度。此外，考虑到安全是一个“多维”因素，重要的是我们的努力必须集中在共同目标——安全和稳定。为此，当前和未来的区域倡议应被视为综合部分，而不是部门的，并且其结果应通过更好的合作来促进该地区的繁荣和安全。

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ACHIEVING STABILITY IN THE BLACK SEA THROUGH ACTIVE POLITICAL-MILITARY COOPERATION

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Developments of the security situation have put the Black Sea and its immediate neighbourhood in the spotlight. However, this is basically the only point everyone agrees. Some of the littoral and non-littoral countries advocate for an involvement of the Alliance in solving the Black Sea’s security problems while others do not see the regional threats as being so dangerous. Moreover, the concept of Black Sea area does not have the same meaning for everybody.

Before speaking about the region’s geostrategic importance and the Euro-Atlantic and regional solutions to the region’s problems, we have to answer a basic question: What is the Black Sea area and where does its importance lie?

1. Why do we need a Secure Black Sea Area?

Defining the Black Sea area

From a historical point of view, the Black Sea area has always been at the confluence of great empires (Ottoman and Russian) and, why not, at the crossroad of Western and Eastern civilisation. However, it is very difficult to speak about the influence of those cultures upon the littoral states, as the Black Sea area’s geopolitical structure has been the subject of continuous change. The last change was witnessed fifteen years ago when the Soviet Union dismantled and some of its territories became states (Moldavia, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan).

The Black Sea region is an area with extremely dynamic geopolitics. From this perspective, the Black Sea region is a “relatively small area, historically crossed by conflicting forces from northeast (Russia, via-Ukraine and/or Georgia), from south (Turkey), and west (European
powers such as France, Germany, Austria, Great Britain or countries like Romania and Bulgaria)". Historically, this was an area of active proselytism among Christians and of minor bruises and continuous awareness between Christians and Muslims. Its control was important from both the strategic/military and the economic aspects.

Taking into account Halford Makinder’s theory of concentric areas, the Black Sea could be considered a part of the inner crescent. According to Makinder’s law, the one who controls the inner crescent (also known as rimland - Spykman) dominates the heartland, the one who dominates the heartland dominates the World Island and therefore the whole world. If we consider that Makinder identifies the heartland as being Eurasia and the rimland as the Eastern Europe, it’s clear that the Black Sea is a part of the inner crescent and its development as a secure and stable area is the key factor for spreading democracy and the Western values in Eurasia.

However, as security is indivisible, the Black Sea area can not be analyzed as a single unit, without taking into account the nearby space which exerts direct influence upon its security. Thus, the Black Sea area is composed by the littoral states, the Republic of Moldavia and the two non-littoral states of the South Caucasus (Armenia and Azerbaijan).

**Geostrategic importance of the Black Sea**

The Black Sea’s importance has to be considered within the wider framework of international relations. Globally, there are two main elements that coordinate the policies of strategic actors, whether they are states or international security organizations: the need for energy supplies and the threat posed by the terrorist organizations. Most important, these two elements are, to some extent, interrelated.

Due to its geographical position, the Black Sea area has an answer for both these questions. On the one hand, it represents a unique strategic corridor connecting the Western Europe with the Central Asia and the Middle East, matching the European and American energy demands


2 Halford Makinder defines three concentric areas: the heartland (the axis of geography and history), the inner or the marginal crescent (the cradle of civilization) and outer or insular crescent (the territories that can be connected only by maritime ways).
with the resources of the Caspian Sea and Central Asian markets. Middle East originated terrorism is a global threat with no ideological basis, which has targeted three continents so far (European, American and African). The terrorist attacks in the United States, Spain, England and Egypt (from a chronological approach) were directed against the Western civilization and also against Muslim moderate values. Once again, the Black Sea has part of the answer for this problem, as it represents a perfect platform for projecting troops to two hot spots of the security map: Iraq and Afghanistan.

Romania’s approach

The strategic position of the Black Sea area has also disadvantages as it connects the stable and secure area of Western Europe with a region plagued by instability and insecurity. However, if this situation is handled properly, the disadvantage can be turned into an advantage. Thinking in terms of supply and demand, we can say that the Black Sea is a bridge between the security providers in need for supply and the security consumers in need for stability, thus creating a fine opportunity for importing democracy and economic development.

Romania considers that a multifaceted approach to the Black Sea region challenges is the most suitable one. The approach envisaged by Romania is a multifaceted one. As principle, we consider that it’s time to stop considering the Black Sea area as a buffer zone, but as bridge, an area that needs an increased awareness. This approach calls for joint national, regional and Euro-Atlantic efforts, using a wide range of instruments attracting private economic partners and the civil society.

Romania strongly believes that regional developments can only be effectively addressed by opening the Black Sea region towards the Euro-Atlantic cooperation framework that will bring consolidation of a stable, democratic, and prosperous area in our neighbourhood.

In Romania’s view, the countries in the region should pursue together the development of the democratic institutions, the successful development of the rule of law, the consolidation of the regional stability and security by combating trans-border organized crime, securing the

3 The pipeline structure: Caspian Pipeline Consortium, Blue Stream, Odesa-Brody (existing), Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (under construction) and other multiple Bosporus bypass plans.)
Eastern frontier, both on land and sea, the peaceful and durable settlement of the frozen conflicts and sustainable economic development on the basis of the business opportunities in the area.

All these goals could be achieved within a consolidated regional cooperation framework that needs to incorporate both NATO and EU policies in order to meet the strategic goals of the countries in the area.

Having established that an indispensable ingredient, for anchoring this region to the western community of values, is to attract NATO and the EU in an effort to democratically transform and stabilize the Black Sea area, the next logical step is to build a regional identity for the Black Sea area following the pattern of Central Europe and South-Eastern Europe.

During the Cold War years, the concept of South-East Europe did not exist. The region situated south and west of the USSR was usually assimilated to the Eastern Europe, a synonym defining the Communist Block. The division of Eastern Europe began during the 1980s, when three East-European dissidents came up with the concept of Central Europe as they defined the Central European region in cultural and historical terms as the place occupied by the former Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary. It was an initiative meant to detach, at a conceptual level, the three countries from the Soviet Block and to induce in the Western Europe’s policy the idea that Central Europe was by its identity more part of the western civilization rather than a part of the Communist Block.

This strategy paid the efforts. After the Cold War, Central Europe was relatively fast assimilated to the Western democracy, also due to the fact that it was Eastern Europe’s most advanced region both economically and militarily. This situation showed to other countries of Eastern Europe that they needed to assume a new identity as well and so it appeared the concept of South-East Europe.

This is the moment to follow the same strategy for the Black Sea area, as the process of anchoring the South-East Europe to the Western democratic community is approaching a most desired end (the only remaining problem being the final status of Kosovo and future of the

SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE BLACK SEA AREA

Serbian-Montenegrin Union).

We appreciate that it is high time to take advantage of the niche created in Western interests and actively promote the Black Sea area on European and Euro-Atlantic agenda.

The sceptics, at least, have to admit the commonality of the Balkan area and Black Sea area in terms of religious composition, security challenges and economic perspectives with an advantage for the latter due to resources aspect.

Security challenges

Unfortunately, with great opportunities also come great risks, as the great development potential of the Black Sea area is counterbalanced by the instability and high conflict potential of some neighbouring regions (Transdniestra, Chechnya, Abhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh).

On short and medium term is highly unlikely to expect a settlement of the frozen conflicts from Georgian soil (Abhazia and South Ossetia), as the tensions between the central power and the break-away regions remains tense. The Abkhaz and South-Ossetia officials do not recognize Georgia’s authority over the territories and have constantly rejected all the offers made by president Saakashvili.

The Russian Federation is the actor that holds a great responsibility as some of the conflicts’ keys are within its reach. The break-away regions are exclusively dependent on Moscow both economically and from the security point of view since the secessionist regions are protected by the Russian troops involved in peace support operations.

Another factor that needs to be considered is the change in the demographic structure of the regions, as most of the inhabitants have received Russian citizenship and have been included in the Russian social-security system.

After a period of time when it tried to promote plans for the conflicts settlement, the Georgian government adopted a more vigorous approach, due to the inefficiency of the negotiation format and of the peace support troops.

5 These offers consisted, mainly, of extended autonomy granting offers as well as other facilities, among which, Tbilisi’s agreement regarding a privileged relationship between those regions and Russia.
Tbilisi officials announced that they passed a motion by which the activity of the peace support troops will end next year.\(^6\)

During the last two months, the closure of the Russian base in Akhalkalaki triggered new social tensions between ethnic Armenians and Georgians in the Javakh region. At the moment, we can not speak about a secessionist movement in the region, but the deterioration of the internal economic situation, corroborated with the failure of the Tbilisi government to find a solution to the Armenian minorities’ problems, could lead to the resurface of secessionist thesis promoted by the Armenian community leaders right after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

As regards the Nagorno-Karabakh frozen conflict, the resumption of the negotiations at the beginning of 2005 and the improvement of the Baku-Erevan dialogue are good incentives for a renewed approach. However, even if this is a new start, taking into account the complexity of negotiations, we appreciate that no major break-throughs will probably appear on the medium term.

In the Republic of Moldavia, the fact that the five sided negotiation format (Moldavia, Transdniester, Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE) has been resumed after a long time gives us reasons to believe that this may be a new beginning. Beyond the differences existing between the parties, there are chances for an improved consistency to the settlement of the Transdniestra conflict as the United States and European Union will observe the negotiations.

Romania is constantly interested to be a part of the efforts leading to a durable settlement to the Transdniestra conflict. We constantly advocate for any viable solution of the Transdniestra conflict in observance with the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, according to existing domestic legal framework of the Republic of Moldavia.

Romania believes its contribution can bring additional value, one added to those efforts that could reinforce the process of this new negotiation format since the improvement of security and stability of all its neighbours is a strategic interest for Romania.

The Chechen conflict represents the main insecurity factor for the

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\(^6\) According to the Georgian authorities, the peacekeeping mission should end February, the 10\(^{th}\) 2006 in South-Ossetia and July, the 7\(^{th}\), 2006 in Abhazia. The alternative solution suggested by Tbilisi was to internationalize the peace-keeping missions by involving US troops.
entire region. The conflict’s spill-over in North Caucasus is possible taking into consideration some characteristics of the area: the ethnic and religious tensions, the spread of the Islamic fundamentalism, the corruption in the administrative, justice and security sectors.

The spread of violence in the North Caucasus is actually one of the objectives envisaged by the Chechen fighters. Taking into account their actions, a change of strategy is obvious: instead of concentrating their actions in one area, they opened new fronts in the regions close to Chechnya (Ingushetia, Dagestan, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria).

The frozen conflicts are not the only source of instability. These remnants of a forgotten era “serve as shipment points for weapons, narcotics, and victims of trafficking and as breeding grounds for transnational organized crime — and, last but not least, for terrorism”7. Weak state authority in Georgia8 and, on the contrary, authoritarian political regimes (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), corroborated with a high degree of corruption at government level, create the premises for future potentially conflict situations.

We believe that the democratic consolidation of each state from the region brings additional value to the region’s security as a whole. This is why political, economic and financial support for the emerging democracies in the region has to be perceived as a component of a broader strategy embracing the efforts of the littoral states and the Euro-Atlantic community.

Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey as NATO allies and EU candidates have a moral and political responsibility to provide assistance to emerging democracies in the area on the one hand, and, in a wider concept, to positively engage the Russian Federation to the benefit of all parties and the region as a whole. The EU and NATO involvement is needed and required to accelerate the democratic transition process and enhance the confidence of peoples in the region in a better, safer and more prosperous regional development.

8 Due to the territorial conflicts of Abhazia and South Ossetia, approximately 20% of the Georgian territory remains outside the control of the Tbilisi government.
2. Regional Cooperation

*Divergent geostrategic views*

The increased relevance of the Black Sea led to emerging divergent, to some extent, regional strategies of the littoral states, expressed through political, military and economic actions. Nowadays, at regional level, there are two main strategic approaches regarding the Black Sea security:

• “opening and internationalizing” the Black Sea to allow democratic development of all littoral states and for tackling all regional security challenges;

• closing the Black Sea to any NATO and EU involvement, on the principle of regional ownership even if some countries in the region do not have enough capabilities and expertise to deal with the complicated regional security challenges.

Thus, the main challenge for the states in the region and also for their allies and partners is to find a way to harmonize these strategic interests and to transform their approaches into win-win solutions.

*The regional cooperation framework*

At regional level, cooperation is and will remain one of the important pillars of the security system in the Black Sea area. The *regional cooperation framework* in the Black Sea area has many elements: the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Group (BLACKSEAFOR), the Confidence and Security Building Measures Agreement (CSBM), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSECO), the Black Sea Border Security Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Community of Democracies, the Southeast Europe Cooperative Initiative (SECI).

The regional cooperation framework is far from being complete. However, we must take into account the existing regional initiatives and make the best of them whether they are multilateral such as BSECO, BLACKSEAFOR, Black Sea Bank, Black Sea University, bilateral or national forms of cooperation like Black Sea Harmony. This framework has to be completed and harmonized with the involvement of the
other allied states, as a guarantee of an increased responsibility for an effective support of democratic developments in the area. Taking into account the present situation, when threats gained more and more a transnational nature, a regional security system that excludes our allies is not viable solution for addressing security risks, whether they are present or future.

A successful regional cooperation format is the BLACKSEAFOR, whose purpose is to build and increase confidence among littoral states, enhancing interoperability among the naval forces in the region (Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, the Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine). The missions this multinational naval task force has to accomplish are: search and rescue (SAROp); humanitarian assistance (HA); mine counter measures operations (MCM); environmental protection (EPOp) and good-will visits (GWHV).

The Southeast Europe Cooperative Initiative (SECI) aims at an improved cooperative law enforcement initiative of the Black Sea states, including customs, border security, anti-narcotics and anti-trafficking initiatives.

In the same context, OSCE has an important role to play, in order to increase confidence and stability of countries in the Black Sea area through the CSBMs Agreement in its portfolio. Reaching a mutually acceptable agreement was not an easy ride but ultimately this is a solid proof that demonstrates the potential good cooperation of countries in the region.

The CSBM brought additional value to our relations as regards confidence and security-building measures. On the basis of this agreement, the participating states could pay reciprocal visits to their naval bases in order to familiarize with its functions and activities.

A very important feature of the CSBM is the CANE (Confidence Annual Naval Exercise) concept. Accordingly, each participant state requires the participation of representatives and/or units of other participating states, in order to join a national naval exercise.

On the long run, security initiatives will probably proliferate, as they did in Central and South-Eastern Europe, but they will lack focus and strategic orientation in the absence of minimal coordination. Moreover,
without a sound and politically agreed basis for mutual reinforcement, existing and future initiatives would lead to waste of resources at a time when resources are hardly enough.

For the time being, we need to make a realistic analysis of the existing regional cooperation framework and try to determine the place of each initiative in the wider regional security context. Moreover, we need to make sure that the initiatives (old and new) are connected to the Euro-Atlantic community as a mean to enrich our democratic practices, to mutually reinforce each other in order to enhance stability and sustained economic development.

3. The involvement of outer-region actors

We consider that a challenge for NATO and the EU is to develop a coherent regional strategy once both organisations have already established active bilateral projects. The greatest problem facing NATO, EU, the United States involvement is the fact that they all are involved in the region on a bilateral basis. The Partnership for Peace and European Union’s New Neighbourhood Policy, as well as US’ assistance programs, are meant to address specific country needs and tend to overlook the regional problems. The region as a whole has to be recognized and treated as such.

A reason for this long time situation concern antagonizes Russia’s interests in the region. However, the time of zero-sum games should be a chapter in the history books. Progress in the Black Sea area is unlikely if Russia is treated as an adversary and not as partner. West’s involvement in the region has to follow two coordinates: to promote stability and security and to develop a two-sides partnership while Russia takes into account security and economic factors.

On its turn, Russia has to act as a responsible world power and to realize that it has much more to gain from being surrounded by a stable and secure neighbourhood than from an immediate neighbourhood plagued by conflicts and organized crime.

Both NATO and the European Union enlargement processes have generated the unique opportunity of having the European and the
EURO-ATLANTIC COMMUNITY AT THE BLACK SEA SHORES. SOONER OR LATER, THIS SITUATION WILL PUT ROMANIA, BULGARIA AND TURKEY IN THE POSITION OF ACTING AS A DOUBLE FRONTIER, OF BOTH EU AND NATO, THEREFORE MAKING THE ISSUE OF MARITIME SECURITY MORE AND MORE IMPORTANT. ANOTHER ELEMENT THAT MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IS THE CHANGE IN THE VIEWS OF THE STATES IN THE REGION. ALMOST ALL THE COUNTRIES HAVE CHOSEN TO PURSUE A DEMOCRATIC WAY, SHARING THE VALUES OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC COMMUNITY: DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, RULE OF LAW, MARKET ECONOMY AND THE NECESSITY OF CONTRIBUTING TO THE GLOBAL EFFORT AGAINST TERRORISM.

NATO AND EUROPEAN UNION POLICIES

Although NATO has refocused the Partnership for Peace program to South Caucasus and Central Asia, NATO’s involvement in the Black Sea area still lacks consistency. First of all, within NATO, the Allies have not yet reached a consensus on placing the Black Sea issue on the common agenda. Taking this situation into account, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the Alliance to shape a Black Sea strategy. What strikes as odd is that although the Black Sea is a half NATO sea and also a frontier of the Alliance, there is almost no dialogue inside NATO on the Black Sea maritime security.

All the Black Sea states have institutionalized relations with NATO, as a part of the Euro-Atlantic community, as Allies and Partners. Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey are member states, Georgia and Moldavia are partners and Ukraine and Russia are involved in special partnerships with the Alliance.

The European Union, on its turn, has shown active interest for the region since it is closely supporting and monitoring Romania and Bulgaria for EU integration. Once Turkey has started the accession dialogue with the EU, we may assume that the area will be strongly anchored in the European mainstream.

European Union has institutionalized relations with Moldavia, Georgia and Ukraine, under the New Neighbourhood Initiative, trying to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours. The EU program is also aimed at offering those states the chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater

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political, security, economic and cultural co-operation.

Although this is not an equivalent of EU membership, it is safe to say that it represents an important step both from these countries, which expressed once again their attachment to the democratic values of the European community, and also from the European Union which starts to give a special attention to this region.

An important part of EU’s policy is the relation with the Russian Federation, which covers a broad range of issues ranging from trade and economic cooperation to political dialogue and cooperation on justice and home affairs.

The future accession of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey will set the new frontiers of the European Union in the Black Sea. This aspect calls for a more active and permissive cooperation framework in the Black Sea area alongside the littoral states.

**Conclusion**

The Black Sea is an area with extremely dynamic geopolitics. In the last fifteen years a communist empire collapsed, new states appeared, the communist regimes were replaced by democratically elected governments, and new relations among actors of the region were established. They began to interact directly with NATO as future partners not as defeated adversaries. Unfortunately, the disappearance of the Soviet influence allowed the appearance of some ethnic, territorial and religious conflicts.

The new security environment is no longer characterized by the threat of massive conventional confrontation. The major challenge right now is the establishment of democratic processes in the former Soviet countries.

Despite the interest shown by NATO and the European Union, the region still needs much more active support from them. What lacks at the moment is a clear Euro-Atlantic strategy for the Black Sea region to bind the international efforts to settle the frozen conflicts and transfer the democratic culture that will ultimately bring more confidence, more stability and more prosperity. The Black Sea is no longer a marginal
part of Europe but a new centre and, to some extent, a new Fulda Gap. The way Western states choose to handle the problems of this area will probably shape the future of Europe for many decades.

The responsibility for the region’s security does not lie only outside the region. A part of the responsibility for providing security in the area lies, of course, within the littoral states. However, the littoral states have well established strategies. The challenge here is how to harmonize them.

To sum up, we may assert that, at the moment, there is a window of opportunity to anchor the Black Sea area to the European and Euro-Atlantic community and both the EU and NATO states are fully aware of this situation. However, being aware is not enough and windows will not remain open forever.

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The end of Cold War has revealed a potential and supposed opportunities, proved but never operational in the Black Sea Basin. Being located at the crossroad between Europe and Asia, Russia, Middle East and the South Europe, having links with the Central Europe and the Northern Sea through the Danube, this region exceeds its strictly geographical significance that becomes a security one for large areas from the Northern Hemisphere.

The first ones to notice the chances offered by the new geopolitics, as a result of the Soviet empire breakdown, were the states neighbouring the Black Sea. On the 25th of June 1992, the leaders of 11 states (see map) have signed The Istanbul Declaration which founded the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Macedonia and Serbia-Montenegro joined the Organization later. Thus, it was stated that the confrontation and isolation ended in this region, and they were replaced by cooperation and engagement. The new organization covered an area of nearly 20 million km², a market of 330 million people, a highly skilled human potential, huge reserves of minerals, oil and natural gas, but at the same time a long and disputed history, rich and diverse cultures. The offer is still acting today. The main aim of BSEC is to enhance security, stability and prosperity by regional economic cooperation in the region.

Even if the formula chosen by the organization’s founders tried to avoid the past’s traps it did not fully manage it. Overlapped on the current geopolitical and strategic realities, these traps have complicated the security environment in the Black Sea. That’s why the interest to change the Pontic space into a distinct geopolitical region, able to find

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1 [http://bsec-organization.org/temp/discover.htm](http://bsec-organization.org/temp/discover.htm)
solutions for its own problems, has diminished, despite the generous perspectives. At the same time, sooner than it was hoped, the region found itself at the crossroad not only of multi-directional communications, but also of the three integrationist processes.

NATO enlargement in the Black Sea, a process initiated after The Istanbul Summit, is a political-military one and is the first of its kind. It was not preceded by a dialogue such as the “Mediterranean” one; the majority of the countries declared their strategic option to join NATO. Some of them reached this goal. For others, the doors are open even after the last wave of enlargement, which included Romania and Bulgaria, Black Sea states. Russia has opposed and continues to oppose NATO enlargement, but recognizes the states’ right to choose their own security arrangements.

EU enlargement is the second integrationist process. Romania and Bulgaria will join the EU at the 1st of January, hopefully. The decision for Turkey to start negotiations has already been made. That means that, after a few years, European organization will become a decisional one in the region. No country opposed the process. It is a matter of how candidate countries will manage to transform their own societies in
order to join European organization. The EU future depends mainly on the organization’s capacity to overpass its own challenges. For the time being, the European leaders are focused on the internal EU difficulties, thus many questions on the future of integration have yet no answers. But there are many chances for EU to become neighbour of Black Sea by 2007. US support the enlargement and observers did not miss the detail that the EU attitude towards Turkey became more favourable due to the American ally. Russia is also aware of its Eurasian geopolitical specific to join EU soon, and such an option could provoke a lot of problems for itself and for the organization. That’s why it prefers to deepen the cooperation. EU is its main trade partner and, should Russia decide to join EU, it could invoke the precedent of Turkey, namely its neighbour, on the Black Sea covering two continents.

Finally, the third integrationist trend is the one conducted variously by Russia inside CIS. Even if CIS members are critical on the efficiency of the organization and suspect Russia of imperial intensions, no country has stepped aside, neither Georgia, in the top moments of the conflict with Russia, or Ukraine at the peak of the victorious Orange Revolution. The destabilization factor is the following: if the first two processes are complementary for the future, the third is an alternative to them. Anyway, Russia is the only actor belonging to the Black Sea region which has offered such an alternative and used to support it with various means and results. In addition, in the CIS area, where the Russian state is the main vector, there are different ways of military integration.

EU has to return to its own problems. Even if the Black Sea will become a “European lake” in the enlargement process, is less probable the organization would influence politically the region stability. The postponement of the European Constitution adoption delays the moment when EU will be a major political actor of the world.

The first victim of this situation would be, most likely, the European Security and Defence Policy which would have to wait some more years in order to be efficient in the neighbouring. But there will remain the real economic advantages, concrete for all the Black Sea actors, irrespective of their political and security difficulties, resembling EU’s own advantages.
EU takes part in the Transdniester negotiation as an observer. Of course, this participation has its undoubted political significance, but it has no concrete instruments to achieve a long term solution. The US and Russia have such instruments though they have motivation and common fields of action.

Without taking into account the integrationist process Russia plays a central role on unifying Belarus, the unique economic zone, the Eurasian economic zone etc. – it has not succeeded in solving the conflicts within the post-soviet space. It has just “frozen” them for nearly 15 years. Meantime, in these hot spots, almost half a generation of people for whom the realties and practices in hot points are quasi-normal has grown. Thus, there is the risk for such points to repeat the sad history of Israeli-Palestinian conflict with its consequences for the Middle East stability. Such an evolution would be a major threat for Russia’s national security, even if the conflicts are situated at its periphery. Additionally, Russia has not yet demonstrated it has a strategy to neutralize conflicts in its zone of interests.

The whole post-soviet space, Russian territory included, is in a situation we call “the Kosovo trap”. Next year, the international community will have to identify a political solution for the province from the ex-Yugoslavian space. It is obvious its status would not remain the same as before the NATO’s intervention and that would not be possible after the ethnic cleansing in the recent years. It would make the violent Euro-Atlantic operation absolutely senseless. How could the secessions from Transdniester, Abkhazia, South Osetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and we listed only the zones from the Black Sea, see the officially changed status of the Serbian province? Taking into account that all the above mentioned areas are motivated pseudo-state structures, large amounts of weapons and people who wish to use them, interests, including those of some Russian groups, it is hard to believe the Kosovo solution would not be invoked. That means their reactions could be violent, if they were forbidden things that had been accepted for others. Russia could lose the control, as in Chechnya. We should not forget that, in the Georgian-Abkhaz war, from the beginning of last decade, a Chechen battalion fought side by side with Abkhaz forces. The commander of this battalion
was the well known Shamil Basaev, the most wanted terrorist by the armed forces that created him.

That’s why Russia has to be interested to find long term solutions for the security environment challenges in the space surrounding it. Thus, it could stress on the responsibilities it assumed in front of the international public opinion. It would also be difficult to explain situations like those presented by the president of Moldova in a meeting with Russian journalists: “the transdniestrian leader is a Russian citizen, the majority of his ministers belong to the Russian special services and the Russian weapons are <a political shelter> for self-proclaimed authorities”².

The Russia’s isolation is also an unrealistic solution. To ignore its interests could transform it into a heavy burden for the world. Russia must be involved in mechanisms that could made it an efficient partner, to stimulate it in developing good relations and to contribute to spreading Western democratic values in the Russian society.

USA is the global actor traditionally engaged for solving out European security issues. At the same time, it seems to be the only world power able to successfully manage all security fields.

The instruments which supported transatlantic relations worked either through NATO or through bilateral relations between US and its European partners. We can also see this kind of relations in The Black Sea basin.

We could say all countries from this part of world, Russia included, consider US to be, if not an ally, a future one. At its turn, US support processes which would not threaten its interests.

The oil issue added new decisive elements to the American policy: the need to diversify oil sources as an alternative for avoiding dependence to the Middle East oil slowly became a security interest for the US. The oil fields from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia are a future alternative and for its strengthening the US promote economic, political and military strategies.

The Black Sea basin offers the US the possibility to establish long term mechanisms for assuring free oil transit. Russia could be involved in such combinations for at least two reasons.

Firstly, sooner or later, it would raise the need to increase the volume of traded oil. The oil from Azerbaijan, where firms from the US and the United Kingdom, but also from Russia, have a good presence could be insufficient. Moreover, a new competitor has appeared in the Caspian region, China, the second oil consumer in the world, and the moment when India appears, another large economy whose growth depends on energy resources, is not far. Therefore, the rise in importance of oil and natural gas from Russia, Central Asia and, why not, Iran will be a reality. US need the Russian cooperation, not its opposition, to assure their and its allies’ long term oil supplies. In their turn, Russians are interested in the advantages of Western, especially US, market. The second reason is suggested by the Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan oil-pipe which avoids the territories of Russia and Iran. Planned to start working by the end of this year it was presented as a great success in the emancipation of Caucasus. But even a rapid analysis of the pipe, which lies in the post-soviet soil, shows vulnerabilities linked not necessarily to efficiency: it passes through a zone with many colliding clearly defined ethnic communities, some of them with a long history. It is easy to de-stabilize the environment, even if the space is under the jurisdiction of two states, Azerbaijan and Georgia. As communities grow more conscious of possible financial advantages brought by the pipe, they could crave for them, which would bring them in a conflict with central authorities. From here on, troubles for the free oil transit could begin.

Oil pipe Baku-Ceyhan

The relations between USA and Russia are contradictory, a mixture of collaboration and concurrence. Anyway, during the second mandate
of President Bush, Russia is not among the priorities of the American foreign policy. The president of the USA and his foreign policy team are focused, first of all, on Iraq stabilization, the war against terrorists, the growth of China, Iran and North Correa issues and, probably, relations with Europe, as stated in an article on Russia, published in “Policy Review”\(^3\). Analysts from both countries stress on the fact that US – Russia relations are based mainly on good relations between the two presidents and are not supported by great common economic, political or cultural projects.

There are some fields, especially those in relation to strategic nuclear weapons, where the dialogue belongs exclusively to the two presidents. It is important but not sufficient. The lack of ground for mutual enhanced relations, the reduction to mere leaders’ dialogue has as result not solving problems but postponing them. There is an excessive politicization at the top which does not allow strengthening the relation on the whole vertical. Concerns of US policy related to the authoritarian practices in Russia show the fact that the US have no instruments to influence Russian internal policy. It has reached a situation characterized by President Bush, at a meeting with a Russian businessmen delegation, as it follows: “...I never agree to what Putin says. Putin does not approve to what Bush is saying. But it is important we are telling each other this.”\(^4\) The Internet also offers an interesting dialogue: American analyses on Russia conclude to the difficulties that are to come for Russia, the Russian’ ones send the message the US domination is coming to an end and publish American and European authors who write about such things.

US president initiative of emerging democracy from Baltic Sea to Black Sea, stated at his last visit in Poland got colder relations even at leaders’ level. It is difficult to say it is just a coincidence or it was planned but from that moment, Russia has done concrete steps towards China. Before that, it used to keep a certain distance. US saw the result of closer links between Russia and China in the new attitude of Uzbekistan who asks US authorities to withdraw their troops. Russia has considered

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4 http://www.vremya.ru/print/137480.html
the democratization as a strategy of its isolation especially after the last elections from Ukraine. The elections were finally presented by the media from all over the world as a confrontation between USA and Russia won by the US. The event is considered even today as a great victory of Western democracy even if it was a tide score between the candidates.

Soon after the elections, there were revealed the real Ukraine’s problems having few common things with democracy: a country dependent quasi-totally on the Russian natural gas, a concrete perspective of the gas price raising, a more interconnected economy with the Russian one as we could imagine, a Ukraine society divided between East and West. These are sufficient characteristics for revealing that Ukraine’s security still depends more on Moscow attitude than on the NATO’s one. More than that, too often, Russian media mentions the fact that Ukraine left the Soviet Empire five times larger than it entered some hundred years ago. Thus, there were reactivated the real problems of the post-soviet area borders.

Such kind of problems is also met in other ex-soviet states from the Black Sea area: Moldova, Georgia, Armenia. To have no doubts, the Russian Foreign Affairs minister stated in a meeting with the Federation Council representatives – the second Chamber of Russian Parliament – what was presumed, Russia will use all the arsenal of the economic pressures against the non-loyal ex-soviet states. In other words, there was said that Russia will use what US has been successfully for many years\(^5\).

USA and Russia could successfully cooperate to build a stable zone in the Black Sea area. The mutual interests in the region, recognized by both Foreign Ministries’ statements, each of them interests in the Black Sea states and those countries for them would be a solid basement. There is also a bilateral political ground.

The most recent is the Bratislava Initiatives\(^6\), at the beginning of this year, during the Slovak capital summit. There were established the following fields of cooperation:


\(^6\) [http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ris/prsrl/2005/42694.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ris/prsrl/2005/42694.htm)
SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE BLACK SEA AREA

- Nuclear Security Cooperation;
- World Trade Organization;
- Energy Cooperation;
- Counterterrorism;
- Space Cooperation;
- Humanitarian, Social and People-to-People Cooperation.

Their cooperation in the oil field at the Black Sea would be a good opportunity to take part to the stabilization of the Caucasus region. This could answer as well to the USA security interests as to Russian intentions to enter US oil market. The cooperation will also be in concordance with joint statement of the presidents, where the energy ministers state “…to enhance energy security, diversify energy supplies, improve the transparency of the business and investment environment, reduce obstacles to increased commercial energy partnerships, and develop resources in an environmentally safe manner.”

Baku-Ceyhan oil pipe will assure the transit of about 1 million barrels of oil daily, about one percent from the global consume. It has the advantage that assures the transit’s continuity, overpasses the Black Sea’s Straits to Mediterranean Sea and slows down the more intense Turkish environmental concerns. There are also pipes with terminals at Black Sea in Ukraine and Russia. When Burgas (Bulgaria) - Alexandropolis (Greece) and TRACECA (from Central Asia-Caucasus-Black Sea-Constanta-Adriatic Sea) projects will be finished, practically, oil will transit the territories of every Pontic country. It is obvious, each country will be interested in attracting investments, oil and assuring pipes’ security. For now, both projects search finance and that could be a good opportunity for the US firms to invest on stabilizing an important region of oil transit.

Antiterrorist war could be another Russian-American collaboration field in the Black Sea area. The both are actively engaged in this war. Turkey which has its own experience in this kind of actions could be their ally. Russia has closely collaborated with US in the war of the antiterrorist coalition against Talibans from Afghanistan in the

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intelligence field. Some officials’ declarations confirmed that they are going on the collaboration even if the Russian Armed Forces doesn’t take part with troops. Also, to fight against terrorism is discussed and projected in the NATO-Russia Council meetings’ framework.

USA have added Chechen leaders and organizations on its terrorist lists, recognized their connections with Al Qaeda and condemned the terrorist actions from Russian cities. Meantime, they continue to be critical about the lack of political solutions, violence against civil population and human rights in Chechnya. At its turn, Russia speaks about double standards and more Russian conservatives state the Chechen separatism is encouraged by West in order to weaken Russia. It could be said that both partners are aware of the terrorism threats, search solutions even if sometimes the ideas concerning terrorism are different and watch carefully their actions. Collaboration with other states from the Black Sea basin in the anti-terrorist war had as a concrete result the decreasing of the terrorist actions frequency, proportions and effects over the civilian population.

We tried to avoid the fields where the Russian-American relations are in competition. One of them is the military one, the most sensitive. The future evolutions show rather an increasing of the military competition. The issue is more complex. It comprises distinct moments beginning with troops’ location and relocation and military conventional facilities and ending up with nuclear weapons and technology.