THE ROMANIA’S ARMED FORCES
PARTICIPATION TO COLLECTIVE
DEFENCE UNDER NATO LEADERSHIP
AND TO ESDP

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THE ROMANIA'S ARMED FORCES PARTICIPATION TO COLLECTIVE
DEFENCE UNDER NATO LEADERSHIP AND TO ESDP

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Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is my honour to salute and welcome you to the seminar organised by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University “Carol I”.

As you all know, in the last years, the scientific research activity within the National Defence University intensified and diversified. This is expressed not only in scientific research products, but also in their dissemination. That is why, every year there are organized NDU scientific sessions by our structures and of course by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, NDU’s component specialised in scientific research.

The results are seen in libraries, in the teaching process, in the modernization of courses, but mainly in the process of transformation and modernizing the Romanian Army. Each time there were published volumes comprising the papers presented and the debates, the NDU’s Bulletin, the “Strategic Impact” magazine, the monthly bulletin “Strategic Colloquia” issued by the Centre have become prestigious publications, with a national and international value.

The seminar’s topic – “Romania’s Armed Forces participation to collective defence under NATO leadership and to ESDP” – represents a central place in the transformation strategy and, generally speaking, in the concept for modernizing and using the military institution in the integration process. It is also an intellectual challenge because it approaches a topic that has never been put into practice. It is placed
in the general effort related to the transformation, both by Alliance and the European Union. As you all know, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article IV of the Bruxelles Treaty have created the concept of collective defence. Two organisations have been established around this idea - NATO and WEU -, that will manage the European and Euro-Atlantic security environment in the future. Subsequently, the European Union has taken over from WEU, by its security and defence policy – ESDP – this concept elaborated complementarily and in concordance with the North-Atlantic Alliance.

We consider that the chosen topic for this seminar is appropriate and opportune and I am sure the debates will be consistent and useful, both for the teaching process within our National Defence University, for other educational institutions that approach topics related with national defence and security, and also for the ones dealing with Romania’s Army transformation and modernization.

Good luck to you all!
THE MESSAGE
OF THE CHIEF OF THE
GENERAL STAFF

General Professor Eugen BĂDĂLAN, PhD,
Chief of the General Staff, Romania

The annual scientific sessions and seminars organised by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University “Carol I” have become important, traditional events, with echoes in the university scientific area, but also in national and international military area.

The contribution of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies to the development of the personnel’s military culture and of all the others involved, in a way or another, on different competency and responsibility stages, on security and defence is remarkable. Dozens, if no hundreds of studies, valuable books, and articles published in “Strategic Impact” magazine, but also in other specialised papers as “Romanian Military Thinking” are working tools for the Romanian militaries, governors and parliamentarians, sent to national and university libraries. They respond to the actual requests regarding the strategic reflection, the profound understanding of the contemporary military phenomenon, the networked philosophy and physiognomy, the Allied strategy, the very complex dynamic of dangers, threats and risks that are assumed or imposed by unpredictable, sometimes chaotic evolutions, determining sudden changes of the political-military and strategic situation, significantly marked by unexpected crisis and terrorism, new tensions and vulnerabilities.

All these phenomena, some of them hard to explain and understand, impose the intensification of research activity, developing a strategic culture, as the situation evolves fast and complex and the decisions and actions regarding the armies’ transformation and the timely adaptation
of action and reaction structures, military and civilian-military, to the new conditions required by the security by cooperation, by the crisis and conflict management, by the dynamic of the collective defence, by the Alliance’s strategic concept and by the European Security and Defence Policy, all of them require scientific arguments.

Nowadays nothing can last outside science and scientific research. Obviously, collective defence is a concept that has evolved. Collective defence aimed the participation to the European defence in concordance with the Bruxelles Treaty (article IV) and Washington Treaty (article 5), that state the signing states are obliged to ensure each other assistance in case of an aggression in order to re-establish the security. The European Security Defence Policy aims also a common European security and a common European defence.

These provisions are general. They do not designate the forms and procedures of actions, but only action itself. Certainly, other documents are elaborated and permanently updated – this is actually the meaning of the Alliance and the European Security and Defence – but, despite the procedures, a profound investigation of the phenomena shaping this concept is necessary.

In the process for transforming the Romanian Army we significantly confront with such a necessity, but the Romanian scientific research in security and defence area, in concordance with the European and Euro-Atlantic ones, significantly helps us in identifying, establishing and prioritising the most suitable ways of action. This has become concrete in a coherent transformation strategy. We are looking forward the debates during this seminar and we are sure they will substantially contribute, as always, to the enlargement of the epistemological horizon of the scientific research and teaching within the Romanian Army.

Good luck!
Dear guests,

For the beginning, I will make some historical remarks on the relations between NATO and EU. My presentation will largely refer to the relations between NATO and EU’s Second Pillar (as defined by the Maastricht Treaty), European Security and Defence Policy.

Secondly, I will review the current stage of cooperation between these two international organizations, stressing the institutional cooperation dimension.

Then I will try to propose a set of elements that represents the pool of advantages and obstacles in the cooperation between NATO and EU, considering the evolutions in the international security environment after September 11. Therefore, I will present a set of pre-conditions for strengthening their cooperation.

The last but not the least, from an interdependent perspective, I will try to present two of the possible dimensions that may the base for creating a new strategic cooperation frame, that is the geographical and functional variables.

The relations between these two international organisations that particularly separate the European and the Euro-Atlantic areas have started during the Cold War. As a matter of fact, there are experts with radical views stating that NATO was exclusively created as a response to the security challenges generated by the Cold War and it should have been dissolved.

The end of the Cold War determined a strategic re-order of priorities from these two organisations. For example, in 1991, NATO
launched an ambitious internal transformation policy coupled with an ambitious engaged policy towards the East Europe. EU built also in 1991, at Maastricht, its own European Security Defence Policy (ESDP), and then an ambitious policy regarding the East.

The European Security and Defence Identity was created in Berlin in 1996. NATO Washington summit (1999) launched the Defence Capability Initiative, intended to improve the issues related with the European defence capabilities, considering the unstable security environment (for example, the conflicts from the former Yugoslavia).

On EU side, the European Council Summit from Nice (2000) stipulated certain cooperation arrangements between EU and NATO member states that were not EU members. In 2001, after EU launched its ESDP, there were established the first official relations between NATO and EU.

2003 may be considered as the “magic” year of the collaboration between them.

Right after 9/11, after the necessary strategic repositioning of the organizations, in just five months (March-July), NATO and EU were able to generate the strategic mechanisms of cooperation. The five months successes prove the real cooperation potential between them.

After signing, in March, the Agreement on the security of information, there were also signed the “Berlin +” agreements, the base of the cooperation between NATO and EU on planning and operational level. Few days later, there was launched the first EU operation (Concordia, in Macedonia). In December 2004, it was followed by EUFOR-Althea operation (Bosnia-Herzegovina).

The other two common NATO-EU initiative dated 2003 are NATO-EU Capabilities Group and their concerted approach towards West Balkans.

When speaking of “Berlin +” Agreements, there should be stressed their importance from the two organizations’ strategic repositioning in the new international security environment. As a matter of fact, these Agreements, by their dimensions, planning, capabilities, operational and command prove the institutional cooperation between NATO and EU.
For the time being, the institutional cooperation arrangements between NATO and EU have become more complex. They are probably used at their maximum potential offered by the institutional framework, as we will see later on during this presentation.

There are certain cooperation mechanisms at the institutional dialogue level: NAC-COPS (at ambassador level), NATO and EU Military Committees, the relation between NATO Executive Working Group and the Political-Military Group, the relation between NATO International Secretariat and EU Council of Europe General Secretariat, NATO-EU Group on Capabilities and permanent Liaison Arrangements between these organizations.

There should also be mentioned the areas they cooperate on developing capabilities and strengthening the collective planning mechanisms.

An important aspect of the capabilities cooperation is the relation between PCC and ECAP, that includes six common Project Groups (UAVs, medical – campaign hospitals, strategic air transport, strategic maritime transport and airborne refuelling). Following the transfer to EDA of all the six (PGs), starting January, 1st, 2006, it is necessary to revise the institutional cooperation framework (for example, NCAD-EDA).

I also mention the assistance NATO offered to EU on preparing HGQ 2010.

On possible weak points that might affect enhancing the synergy between NATO and EU, I will mention only the ones I consider to be relevant for both cases, and not the particular ones.

First of all, both NATO and ESDP (second EU Pillar) are intergovernmental organisations and the importance of the member states is decisive for the decisional processes and internal strategic debates. We know intergovernmental organizations have specific problems on consensus generating.

Secondly, both NATO, and EU may be considered real epistemic communities, organizations based on a high expertise level (on security and defence matters), as they generate and process information and knowledge. However, the international organizations similar to
epistemic communities tend to be inner-oriented, individualise and survive autonomously.

Thirdly, due to the above characteristics (intergovernmentalism and epistemic community), their international staffs are not just fundamental for generating internal consensus between members. NATO International Secretariat and the General Secretariat of the EU Council are bureaucratic autonomous structures, trying to self-preserve themselves. Therefore, there are often debates related with duplications of their prerogatives on security and defence issues between NATO and EU.

Although there may other weak points able to affect enhancing the synergy between NATO and EU, their importance will not exceed the number and the consistence of the good points regarding the future cooperation. The successes dated 2003 are relevant in this matter.

Probably the most important element that represents the essence of an optimistic approach regarding enhancing the synergy between NATO and EU is represented by the common perceptions on security. A simple assessment of the two organizations’ strategic documents (NATO Strategic Concept, European Security Strategy) shows that in both cases we deal with an indivisible approach of security, with its definition in a broader sense (with military and non-military aspects), but also with a similar hierarchy of common risks and threats.

Moreover, both organizations follow similar paths of transformation in terms of capabilities and planning tools. I would mention only the development of NRF and EU Battle Groups concept. It is probably necessary a common strategy regarding the use of force concept, rotation policy, training standards, considering the compatibility between NRF and BGs in terms of types of missions, reaction capacity, multinational nature, and interoperability.

After a compared evaluation of the advantages of the synergy between NATO and EU on security and defence and the disadvantages that might impede its enhancement, it is necessary to develop that conceptual framework that might allow an appropriate evaluation of their future cooperation potential.

At conceptual level, it is obvious that for the time being the synergy between NATO and EU on defence and security needs a new impetus,
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probably a framework within certain classic leadership principles might be appropriate for this matter.

First of all, the relation between NATO and EU needs a set of priorities that should establish a sense of urgency on consolidating the cooperation.

Secondly, building a coalition of support, especially within the member states, might be useful for generating the necessity to strengthen the cooperation.

Obviously, the most important role is played by political leaders, as they have to develop a strategic common vision to be followed.

Finally, the most important element to be considered is communication, both inside each organization, and the communication between them, in order not to miss the possibilities generated by the initial consensus.

Regarding the vision, one of the most interesting principles in the international relations and diplomacy states that when you have a problem, it is important to widen the context, in order to avoid traps of details. This idea belongs to Robert Cooper, General Director in the EU Council General Secretariat and a well-known supporter of preserving the transatlantic relation, by strengthening the cooperation between NATO and EU.

On “widening the context”, for getting a better view of the areas that might contribute to the enhancement of synergy between NATO and EU, we chose two main categories.

The relation between these two organizations may be improved by generating some common strategic approaches in the geographical areas where both NATO and EU developed successful partnership mechanisms. For example, as mentioned previously, NATO and EU have developed a common strategy on West Balkans since 2003. For the time being, due to the success of Concordia and Althea operations, the predictable solutions for Kosovo status issue, without mentioning the actual challenge determined by the recent referendum from Montenegro, NATO and EU need an updated strategy for Balkans.

There are no clear strategies for the Black Sea, regarding a regional approach from these organizations. That is why there is a major
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potential for launching a common NATO-EU approach in this “border” area for them.

Moreover, in the South Caucasus area, close to the Black Sea, there are outlined certain clear institutional cooperation mechanisms between the two organizations, such as NATO special policy of Partnerships or EU European Neighbourhood Policy. Moreover, if you compare these approaches, you find plenty of possibilities to commonly approach one of these matters.

In the Mediterranean Sea and Middle East, both NATO and EU have developed, on their own areas of responsibility, solid partnership, as the Mediterranean Dialogue and Barcelona Process, or the European Neighbourhood Policy in its Southern dimension. That is why EU’s intention to develop a security and defence dimension within Barcelona Process, in the Mediterranean area, may be materialised in cooperation with NATO as its Mediterranean Dialogue faces similar problems, at least on matters concerning public diplomacy and building trustful mechanisms with the partner states. The same pattern is applicable for the Middle East and Gulf states.

On the other side, when it is about Africa, NATO’s intention to expand its cooperation to this continent may learn from EU’s experience in implementing its own strategy for Africa.

Moreover, the cooperation arrangements between NATO and EU on assistance missions offered to the African Union in Darfur may represent the foundation of a better future coordination on operational level between these organizations.

Probably the exclusive tendency on the geographical dimension of cooperation seems not to be enough without trying to develop a matrix that should be doubled by functional aspects for each geographical area that has a certain potential for the cooperation between NATO and EU. In other words, there may be developed a list with specific functional cooperation elements for each geographical area mentioned above.

Therefore, generally speaking, the problems related with security sector and defence reform, the border security and intelligence sharing (taking into consideration the international fight against terrorism) may benefit from common NATO-EU approaches in the relations with
partners. We should bear in mind that both organizations have developed cooperation mechanisms with the same partners.

On the particular aspects of the functional dimension of a possible functional cooperation matrix between NATO and EU, there are at least two aspects that worth to be mentioned.

On one side, in their relations with Mediterranean countries, both NATO and EU try, separately again, to develop some special partnership and cooperation relations on combating terrorism and weapons of mass destruction proliferation, including the cooperation on intelligence.

On the other side, regarding the East geographical dimension of the partnerships, without excluding the South and Mediterranean areas, the energy security issues seem to be more and more debated at NATO and EU level. Both organizations act on a large definition of the security concept and the energy issue has got a strategic nature especially for EU member states and for European NATO members. Therefore, it is useful to explore the cooperation potential at the two organizations’ level within this field, with a clear attention paid to a geographical security complex that includes the Black Sea Area and the Caucasus. The foundation of the cooperation on this dimension has already been created, both at NATO level, by the initiated discussion, and EU level, following the preparation of the Green Papers on energy matters in EU by the European Commission.
Determinations of the evolution of Romania’s Army missions

The beginning of this century finds Romania in a complete process for reconstructing its way to modernity, to the club of the big European and American nations.

The Euro-Atlantic and European integration is not only a national priority, but a chance for development and prosperity, safety and peace.

The European and Euro-Atlantic integration, in the context of the intensification of the efforts for economical and social development is actually the only direct and viable way for our country to reach prosperity, and also for a safety and stable security system. The coexistence of these two aspirations has become compulsory because we can not talk of social progress and welfare without individual and collective security.

National states remain international law subjects but, taken into consideration the complexity of our world, it is harder and harder for each them to offer adequate answers to all the problems they confront with. That is why they associate, for short or long term, in order to solve out common issues. This is not something new. This has always happened but it has never had an integrated value as in the globalization era. That is why security and defence are a well-defined area.

We are in an era with a future hard to predict. People, nations, states, international organizations and bodies created can not be unaffected by some armed conflicts, whether they have a low intensity or they are frozen.
The relation between national defence and collective defence

National defence is one of the main state’s important functions. It results from the very dynamic dialectics of war, as a complex social phenomenon, with hard to manage determinations. National defence is represented by those political, economical, military measures adopted by a state in order to protect its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Endangering them may represent one of the worst malfunctions a state might suffer when promoting its interests.

Even in the globalisation era, national defence will continue to have at least two essential coordinates:

a. Individual defence of the political states against aggressions coming from other political states;

b. Does not exclude associations with other states for achieving the proposed objectives, namely collective defence.

The two coordinates and dimensions of the national defence are not sectarian, exclusivists, immutable. On the contrary, they become more flexible, transparent and persuasive due to the increase of complexity and hostility of the security environment.

That is when the extended national defence dimension comes into play, which allows and even imposes its internationalisation, their movement to collective, common forms, expressed by association formulas like alliances, coalitions, partnerships, etc.

Generally speaking, there may be identified at least four visions on national defence in comparison with the collective one:

a. National defence is considered as opposing collective defence, as it is the state’s inalienable attribute;

b. National defence is considered as a support, generating collective defence, as the sense and the reason of the common or collective defence are related with ensuring the inviolability of frontiers, security, protection and defence, by common participation;

c. Collective defence is complementary to national defence as we face an internationalisation of the assumed, imposed or induced risk, taking into consideration the recrudescence of global dangers and threats;
d. Collective defence is a product of globalisation, as the globalisation of dangers, threats and vulnerabilities requires a globalisation of defending the state and the international community against them.

The actual Romanian legislation regarding the national and collective defence is according to this framework, even if not all the coordinates, all the dimensions and all the implications are developed.

The Romanian Constitution establishes the Army’s role, ensuring the supreme legal framework for the collective defence (article 118, point 1):

“Army is exclusively subordinated to the people’s will, for guaranteeing the sovereignty, the independence and the unity of state, the territorial integrity of state and the constitutional democracy. According to laws and international treaties Romania has signed, army contributes to collective defence in the system of military alliances, participates to peacekeeping or peace enforcement actions”.

Organizing the national defence is the Romanian state’s attribute and can not be considered outside collective defence. As a NATO member, the obligations we have for the other allies, and theirs for the Romanian state impose this remark.

Collective defence does not substitute the national defence, does not diminish and does not dilute the state’s responsibilities, on the contrary, increases, amplifies and expands them to a larger, international dimension. The contemporary military phenomenon has evolved that the individual self-defence is rather an exceptional situation that may be invoked when the other tools do not work. It is unlikely a state to sustain such a situation.

UN Charter sustains and encourages “the right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations”. As a matter of fact, by this provision, UN Charter regulates the right to national defence and association for achieving it.

The experience of the main international treaties having provisions in the defence area has imposed collective defence as a complex, very varied form, one adapted to the concrete historical realities. Summarizing, its essence may be defined as “… an arrangement, usually formalized by a treaty and an organization, among participant states that commit
support in defence of a member state if it is attacked by another state outside the organization”.

There is a mutual relation between national and collective defence, as they inter-condition each other. The purpose and objective of the national defence may be efficiently achieved within collective defence. There are NATO member states that do not have an army or allot low budget amounts for defence but benefit from collective defence.

National defence may be a part of the collective defence when all its objectives can be found within the collective defence ones, as it is when we speak of the first moments after launching an aggression up to projecting the main forces of the alliance (coalition) in the conflict area and starting the fight. That is why the national defence within an alliance (coalition) is conceived and planned integrated, based on the principles stipulated in normative papers commonly agreed by the participant states.

**Romania’s Army missions within collective defence and military coalitions**

The fact that Romania is a NATO member offers not only the guarantee of the state’s security and stability, but also new derived responsibilities and missions. National defence also benefits from a Euro-Atlantic support that defines and achieves the collective defence, peace and the one established by the European Security and Defence Policy. Romanian national defence has never had such a solid support and a lasting sustainability.

Our country participates actively and efficiently to NATO and EU missions outside the national territory, as the functions and attributes of the national defence expand significantly in the global space related to crisis and conflicts management. To participate to crisis and conflicts management, to combat terrorism means undoubtedly to participate to war prevention, to control the conflict, to ensure the regional and global stability and therefore creating that security environment to allow the borders protection, economical and social development, progress, prosperity, increasing and consolidating the state’s power
and also the efficiency factors for the national defence. Under these new circumstances, there is no national defence outside this collective commitment, outside these international responsibilities.

Taking into consideration the Alliance’s transformation policy, dominated by the efforts for finding solutions required by combating and eradicating the threats on the Euro-Atlantic community and also the ones aimed to other states, such an international responsibility becomes compulsory, essential. Our country understands perfectly such an exigency and acts accordingly.

That is how Romania and its army assumes an active and efficient role in promoting the Alliance’s value and objectives, participating with significant forces to joint and multinational operations, led by NATO or a coalition.

The Romanian political-military decision-makers, after a deep analysis of the real capabilities we will have in the coming years, have come to the conclusion that Romania’s Army may participate to simultaneously ensuring the national territory defence and fulfilling the commitments assumed to NATO, EU, regional organizations and coalitions. ³

These two fundamental missions are treated unitary and responsible. Even if they are distinctly formulated, each of them having its role and place in the context of military action, they are a whole and define an assumed behaviour. That is how we can identify and analyse the precise and flexible area related to the new conditions of the missions the Romanian Army has to fulfil when being part of some military actions undertaken in cooperation with other armies.

One of the most important missions of the Romanian Army, as to each national army, is represented by rejecting an armed aggression. This has always been the fundamental mission of the Romanian Army. It is and it will be so as the state’s army will not be alone any longer, but based on the allies’ support. This does not mean our responsibilities regarding the national defence will diminish or will be transferred to the Alliance. It means that when it comes about national defence, Romania will have the Alliance’s total support. This perspective has at least two major implications:
a. National defence benefits from collective defence;
b. The perspective of merging the national defence with the collective one has a strong disuasive function, as any military action against Romania is considered an attack against the Alliance and will be treated accordingly.

Obviously, such a reality discourages the potential aggressors, but not also the terrorist organizations, aiming all the states that are member of the North-Atlantic Alliance and the ones that are member of the European Union.

As a matter of fact, it is about a group of missions that may be carried out in two ways:

a. Rejecting an armed aggression on the national territory. If the aggression is done by surprise, for the beginning, Romanian Army acts with its own forces (the ones designated to NATO and the generating and regenerating ones) in order to stop and push back the enemy, afterwards participates with the allied force group to reject and annihilate the enemy.

b. The second way refers to Romania’s participation, on a NATO or EU member state territory, for rejecting an armed aggression against that state, group of states, Alliance or EU.

In both situations, the ways for action, procedure for intervention, rules of engagements are strictly established within the Alliance and ESDP and permanently updated.

The transformation process the Romanian Army deals with, aiming “passing from concepts specific to the territorial defence to collective defence”, is related with the Alliance’s transformation and takes into account the above-mentioned exigencies. Also, the strategic planning and the whole military training system is in concordance with NATO’s standards and exigencies that give rigour not only to collective defence, but also to national one.

Another group of missions related with collective defence and security refers to fulfilling the commitments related to NATO, EU and other regional and international organizations or coalitions. Those missions derive from an objective necessity and are the most effective way for building, stabilizing and managing that security environment.
able to prevent war and armed conflict and keep all crisis and tensions under control. Therefore, collective defence, rigorously and firmly defined in NATO and EU (common defence) documents, moves the centre of gravity to collective security, to common security.

In this process there are strongly involved both direct strategies aiming destroying the vital centres generating terrorism, crisis and conflicts and indirect strategies aiming discouraging arming and armed aggression.

That is why the Romanian Army participates to the whole spectrum of missions within NATO and EU:

- The participation to collective defence within NATO and/or EU area and to each member of Alliance, according to article 5 of the Washington Treaty and article V of the Bruxelles Treaty, as this is the traditional meaning of the concept;

- The participation to defence against terrorism, as they imply counterterrorist measures, protecting the military and civilian-military systems, states, infrastructures, persons and institutions against any terrorist attack and actions for combating the terrorist networks and organizations and eradicating the causes and processes generating terrorism;

- The participation to non-article 5 missions, regarding crisis response operations, crisis and conflict management and the whole spectrum of peace support operations.

As new dangers and threats on national and international security, new vulnerabilities and new risks have been more visible, missions have become more precise, as this is in concordance with the Alliance’s transformation process and the European Security and Defence Policy. The first products of these transformations are NATO Response Force and EU Rapid Reaction Force.

That is why the Romanian Army has to set out the following for **NATO Response Force**:

a. Capacity to act as an independent force for:
   - Non-combatant evacuations;
   - Supporting the civilian authorities when it is about natural disasters, nuclear, chemical or biological accidents.
b. Capability to act as a forerunner force in order to:
   - Ensure the arrival of the main NRF forces in the Joint Operation Area, directly, with or without Host-Nation Support;
   - Securing the lines of communications and the strategic points.

c. Possibility to undertake missions that are specific to the show of forces.

According to the commitments, Romania will participate to EU Rapid Reaction Force and will allot forces for building-up two Battle Groups-BGs. Their main mission is preparing the conditions for the intervention of the “main forces” (peace imposing or peacekeeping ones), usually acting autonomously for up to 120 days.

These are very well organized forms within NATO and EU that define the main missions on ensuring common security and collective defence. Romania’s forces offer in order to participate to NRF and BGs and their missions are well harmonized.

In the same wide and very precise spectrum of the international cooperation, Romanian Army participates and will continue to participate within coalition in order to stabilize some areas, in order to combat terrorism and fulfil the whole area of missions specific to re-establishing and consolidating peace.

The experiences Romania has gained in multinational actions underline a large range of missions we can achieve. Separating the clashed forces, disarming them, piling up the weapons, munitions and explosives, ensuring the protection and the freedom of movement of the political decision makers, international authorities, protecting the people against the insurgents’ attacks, ensuring the security of the economical and political objectives of the states in conflict, all of them are just some of the activities we may perform.

Even if within coalition Romania has a large freedom, as it offers its services and forces, without other special investments, its responsibilities and missions have to be also achieved. Not only the solution’s viability is at stake, but also the state’s credibility and military institution within the multinational actions. This is the case in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The last but not the least, our Army participates to all the missions specific to **post-conflict military actions**, in order to rebuild some structures and infrastructures, to stabilize some areas and reconstruct some governmental, central and regional capabilities.

More and more we deal with a very wide area of missions that are close to the national defence, collective defence, common security, security by cooperation and so on. NATO and EU amplify their role in this process of ensuring security, stability and defence in European and Euro-Atlantic area. This role is not against the political states, state entities, but together with them.

Concluding, national defence and collective defence – two concepts marking two historical eras, the one referring to achieving and consolidating the states and the globalization one, that turns states interdependent – are complementary unitary and completely justified. Therefore, the spectrum of missions Romania has to fulfil becomes wider, more modern and permanently adapted to the state’s political decisions. A consequence of this process refers to the Army’s Transformation in order to ensure “credibility of the defence of the national territory, fulfilling the commitments within collective defence and participating to international missions, in concordance with the priorities and requirements related to foreign affairs policy”.

**ENDNOTES**

1*UN Charter, Art.51.*
5*Ibidem, p.31.*
NATO NEC AND INTEROPERABILITY

Gerard DONELAN,  
Head of the Government Services, SES-ASTRA Luxembourg

My today presentation does not intend to be a technical paper, but to generate ideas and thoughts. 
First of all, just to give you where our company is because, I’m sure, many people are unaware where SES ASTRA is. We are part of the world largest satellite company based in Luxemburg and we have a lot of experience, a lot of groups companies and a lot of knowledge. And today we have covered 100% shareholding of a company called ND SatCom, we are the providers of satellite equipment to the German Bundeswher and the Netherlands’ Army. 
This is an overview of our satellites, we are the world’s largest satellite company with over 41 satellites, we launched one last month, from Florida, Cape Canaveral, and, as you can see, this is a very large fleet, and is a lot of real estate on the sky.
We hear a lot, recently, about Network Centric Capability, but what does Network Centric really mean? 
NATO calls it NNEC, the US calls it NCW, and the UK calls it NEC. But what is Network Centric Warfare? NCW is the application of a network force to achieve a decisive war fighting advantage. This translates information superiority into a superior combat power. 
The UK defines NEC as a Network Enabled Capability that encompasses the elements required to deliver controlled and precise military effect, rapidly and reliably. At its heart there are three elements:
- sensors (electronic or human) to gather information, 
- network to support fusing, exchange, and exploitation of information, 
- strike assets to deliver the effects.
**NATO’s working definition**

What do they mean by working definition? It is changing as they learn and implement the NATO Transformation. I was fortunate last month to be sharing a conference in Bruxelles and Major General Ruud van Dam, from the Royal Netherlands Air Force, ACOS C4I and Director IS & NNEC, gave the statement of what NATO NNEC is. He said “NNEC is the Alliance’s ability to federate the various components of the operational environment, from the strategic level, which includes NATO HQ, down to the tactical levels, through a networking and information infrastructure”. So, NATO has a vision, and its vision is to face the change in uncertain environment. NATO forces need to be adaptable, and then need to be responsive, and then need to be aware.

Synergies and cooperation between capabilities need to be developed. To achieve this, NATO needs to improve its capabilities for Communications, Information Sharing, Collaboration, and its efficiency in rapid deployment and fielding of ad-hoc solutions. NNEC implementation can help NATO to realise this vision.

But what does this really mean? It means information superiority. Recent operations have demonstrated the need to get effective communications in the field. It also means a better coordination required between distributed forces, a better coordination is required within international forces, between US military, NATO, other allies. This includes the EU civil authorities, and this is much more evident when NATO deploys its NRF, whose responsibility will exchange between nations.

There’s now much more data to exchange: voice, images and data. It is more affordable, and satellite communication (SatCom) half provide this ability, half provide NEC and allows interoperability between nations.

So, information is key that links the navy, the air force, the army, all this need to be connected by satellite and information is the key back to the command post. Network Centric Environment is required to achieve this information superiority, and to fuse all the elements together. This is an overview of everyone is working towards wide area
wireless PDA to troops on the ground connecting hospitals and civilian authorities.

*The satellite communications*

How can satellites provide the network enabled capabilities NATO wants? Satellites encompass all the elements involved in linking the collectors, as a sensor, the effectors, and the decision-makers together.

They enhance and support the joint development, the employment and the sustainment of forces. Globally, they enable decision-making agility, fast decisions, allow for initiative and coherence of operations across the battlespace and, more important, provide the interoperability everyone is looking for.

There’s the demonstration of some ground equipment, from a large deployed troops based, to a roof mounted on the top right you can see this is mounted on an American Humvee. And this will provide for the communications on the move. And I’ll talk about that later.

**The GIG concept**

This is the Global Information Grid (GIG) which is US standard for NCW, and this is the way of working towards the interoperability
for the globally deployed forces. This is going to central to the doctrine of NCW and the C4ISR strategy. As you can see, the commercial SATCOM is essential and complementary between the infrastructure and service layers, but enables them to provide or increase the Network Centric abilities.

This is an overview, and we can see the joining and the fusion of the communications into what the Americans want as a ubiquitous network. This is another global view shown the deployed forces. It’s a bit (for what I was looking for) confused but believe me is all there. And they all are connected by satellite communications.

So what is NATO’s view? That’s for US perspective: NATO as part of its NNEC has a requirement for an Aerial Ground Surveillance System (AGS) using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) on ground. The NATO AGS has been provided by a Transatlantic Industrial Proposed Solution consortium known as TIPS. SES ASTRA is the satellite company involved in TIPS. The TIPS solution consists of mixed fleet of Airbus 321 manned, mid-sized aircraft (that is the mother-ship), which will gonna work with High-Altitude Long-Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (HALE UAVs). This solution provides critical capabilities for
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the NATO Response Force (NRF) and it is the key to NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC) and it will be a component of mobile and transportable ground stations. It should be at an Initial Operating Capability by 2010. And this is design to be work and complement the AWAC fleet that venues of the moment. So this is NATO’s view.

Now we can see an overview, we can see the fusion not only of the military but of the civil forces in traffic management. It’s very important in nowadays to include the civil authorities. We can see that we’ve got connecting the Navy, the Army, and the ground forces. You can see the mother-ship talking with the UAVs with reach back capability with NATO HQ and the Air Operation Command (AOC).

Next we have TIPS, the mother-ship that flies and connects to the ground and to the UAVs.

*The NATO Global Hawk* connects to the mother-ship, by a satellite, if you see it is got Wide Band & UHF SATCOM and very important Link 16. So, this is the Global Hawk. NATO wants to deploy two elements of these, the UAVs at mother-ship so they can deploy to two theatres of operations at once, this is to give them part of the Network Enabled Capability very important to NATO.

Let’s look at current trends supporting this interoperability. There is a lot of talk now about Satellite Mobile Broadband (MBB), what can it do for the Network Centric? So this is satellite based, in the sky, and away from a lot of terrorist attacks, they provide for a broadband. They have high speed data rates, duplex and more importantly, we’re about to see it, transmit/receive on the move. Don’t want to stop; we want to move on the battlefield. Therefore, this is very good for network centric operations, C4ISR to/from the warfighter and the command. And in order to be flexible, there should be on Air, Sea and Land-based operations.

A quotation from USAF general Joseph W. Ashy, who states that a “superior satellite communications are absolutely essential to fight and win on the modern day battlefield…”.
Command and Communications on the Move (C2OTM)

The ability to command and communicate on the move is a step forward for Network Enabled Capability.

JSIC (Joint Systems Integration Command) personnel from Norfolk, Virginia, set up a hub in Germany for US V Corps and installed on the mobile terminal which has the size of the suitcase at the back of this M4 command and control vehicle (C2V). This is the mobile command vehicle, it can hold six soldiers in the back. What they do is to connect it by wireless LAN out to the vehicles and troops on the ground. So, now you have a mobile moving network. This was designed specifically to be deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, this is similar view with the antenna being installed on the back of the Humvee. You can see the size of it on the right. Inside you can see the new antenna we just design, which is about the size of the profile of the vehicle. Now it’s the important point, this vehicle can be connected wirelessly to other devices, laptops, PDAs to troops on the ground and this is a major step forward.

So what should do? We should think positive about NNEC. National network capabilities are being fielded, and NATO must build on these. NATO processes, although slow, are robust and federative. And the diversity of solutions that nations can offer is hugely beneficial. NNEC implementation can realise NATO’s vision. This is what we are working for and we should work together to wrap an interoperable NATO. NATO should not think reinventing the wheel, but look at the nation within NATO and take the best advantages from them.

Thank you very much indeed.
DIMENSIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES’ ENDOWMENT IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT

Air Flotilla General Eng. Ion-Eftimie SANDU, PhD, Deputy Chief of the Department for Armaments

I am honoured to be here today and to present, on this occasion, some aspects regarding the dimensions of equipment of the Romanian Armed Forces in the present context of our country’s adhering to the European Union.

At the same time, I want to salute all the participants to the seminar on “Romania’s Armed Forces Participation to Collective Defence under NATO leadership and to ESDP”, organized by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University “Carol I”. I also want to salute all the specialists from academic, university and scientific fields from Romania and abroad, as well as the representatives of the Romanian and foreign companies which activate in defence industry.

I. Generalities

The equipment policy of the Romanian armed forces, according to the modern principles and concepts, and to the international practice in acquisitions of weapon systems, is concerned with the modernization of the existent military technique, as well as with the acquisition of new technique and equipment, compatible with those ones from the armed forces of other NATO and EU member states. The technique and the equipments are manufactured in Romanian or are the products of an international cooperation with well-known foreign companies.

EU policies consider that science and technology are the vital instruments for a European future. For Romania, the need to increase
the growth of economic competition, especially between 2007-2013, the first post-adhering period, is essential in order to reduce and overcome the technological gaps which separate our country from the rest of EU member states. This has to be a major objective in accomplishing a dynamic and competitive economic background, able to assimilate and to develop high technology fields and to answer to the strategic needs of long term development, in the context of global evolution of an economy based on knowledge. From this perspective, Romania is mainly interested to develop the capacity and to grow the competitiveness of the research-development system, which has to ensure the infrastructure and the resources needed for the development of high technical equipments and the endowments.

All these actions are put into practice by force, resources and weapons planning, in an integrated management system of acquisitions of weapon systems.

This process is an integrated part of Romania’s defence policy, in the field of accomplishing the military capabilities needed to develop the defence capacity of our country and to ensure the interoperability with the military structures of NATO member states as well as with the EU member states.
The process of acquisitions and modernization of Romanian armed forces is influenced by the phenomenon of globalization, which implies a multitude of interdependencies of political, military, economic, technological, social and cultural nature, which are imposed to a larger scale to the nations of this world, in the economic, political and military background.

From the defence perspective, the transformation process of the military capabilities needs a deep analysis and an evaluation of the efficiency and the effectiveness, which will lead to coherent decisions regarding the possible material alternatives to pass to a new generation of technologies and systems, able to cope with the threats of the future, being able to help the allocation of important resources, to protect the personnel, to maintain, operate and modernize the existent equipment.

In these conditions, the industry has to be able to adapt itself to the evolving political, military, economic and technological environment. It has to exploit to the maximum its own capability to adapt to the “new” regulations that characterize the market economy, the higher competitiveness on the markets as well as to the ever growing competition on European and international level in the field of research, development, production and trade with weapons and weapon technique.

In order to be able to cope with acquisition and modernization of military technique activities, the Ministry of National Defence has some projects of development and important programs to train, modernize as well as some acquisition programs that have to transform some military capabilities through:

- The modernization of acquisition closely connected with the operational demands and with national interest;
- The modernization of armed forces acquisition, correlated with the operability of the units that belong to the new force structures;
- To develop a credible defence capability, by growing the technological level and the performance of the combat technique;
- To develop defence capabilities and the interoperability with the ones belonging to NATO and EU member states;
- The accomplishment of the international objectives assumed by Romania.
Taking into consideration these transformations and modernizations, which can be done at high costs, paid from public funds, it is important that all those activities are well planned, especially those ones that have an effect on the already designed capabilities, the processes, the procedures, the projects, the programs and the contracts already in development, with future implications in costs, performances and risks. A real professionalism is needed, in other words, we need military experts, researchers, engineers, economists, legal experts, as well as other specialists, managers, not just military leaders.

In this context, the preoccupations and the results obtained at national level in system management, project, programs, contracts and associated risks management are important.

The process of analysis and adaptation of the decisions regarding the acquisition management are to take into consideration some elements:

- **The acquisition policy strategy**, reflected in the general conception regarding the military capabilities, as well as the medium and short term objectives in planning the forces, the weapons, and the resources needed to endow the troops with equipment and combat technique;

- **The legal and normative field**, represented by the national and international normative acts (which govern the activity in defence economy) and the legal acts that refer to public acquisitions, that have an important role in the armed forces endowment, as well as the system of orders, regulations, procedures and instructions specific in acquisitions, and which are used by the Ministry of National Defence;

- **New technologies**, in the military field and the capability level of the industry, as fundamental factors in accomplishing some new categories of combat technique, that have to be performing a international level;

- **Human, material, financial and IT resources** needed by scientific based decisions, which will allow their use in planning, programming, budgeting and executing system;

- **System engineering** and acquisition systems have to be integrated in a unitary system, and they have to concentrate on management
activities needed to develop a weapon system, making sure that its design is well done, it has the requested logistic, so that it can be made, used and maintained, without endangering the health of the military or damaging the environment;

- **Acquisition transparency**, based on equal chances, without too much bureaucracy and within the legal system;

- **International cooperation**, has to comprise a global implementation, to be correlated with the strategies, the processes, the procedures, and the tendencies from EU and NATO, and concretized in adopting common points of view in defining an economic national policy oriented to the needs and operational requests of the cooperation in weapon and the security of equipment cooperation.

By the integrated management for military systems acquisitions we understand a whole complex process of execution formed by: research, development, testing and evaluation, production, and installation in the operative units, the definition of logistic support integrated through the whole duration of exploitation of a weapon system.

This process is developed according to the priorities and planning in achieving the military capabilities established by the General Staff and services, according to the international treaties, multi-annual contracts and within the limit of the established funds.

The activities regarding the acquisitions, the major acquisition programs of systems and equipments, of national and international contracts, the relations with the industry, the research-development activities in the defence field, the international cooperation in weapons and in ensuring their quality, according to the established priorities, are the responsibility of the Department for Armaments from the Ministry of National Defence. In order to develop these activities at a high quality standard, the Department for Armaments stresses the operational needs and requests for each service, the acquisition of modern weapons, the compatibility with the technical systems belonging to NATO and EU member states.

Promoting the international cooperation in the acquisitions of military equipments, through transfer of high technology and through
offset agreements, are some of the most efficient methods to raise the general level of the performance of the military technique, with the help of national industry. In its role, as a regulating authority in acquisitions of products and services needed by the armed forces, the Department for Armaments takes into account the necessity to integrate the modern technologies, to promote the transparency and competitiveness, the optimal use of the resources as well as the maintaining an equilibrium between acquisitions from the national industry with those ones imported.

The optimization of the processes regarding the weapon systems acquisition needed to endow the armed forces is a difficult task. To obtain the best balance cost-performance, to follow the charts of producing the technological components of the military capabilities and ensuring an equilibrium needed by the services are the most difficult tasks in defence planning, in the sub-domains of force, weapons and operational logistics planning.

Real performances are obtained in organizations that are led by a team that uses an efficient decisional system that has a sound vision of the ways to accomplish the objectives and the aims of the organization and to adapt itself to the new realities. There must be a strict management of all resources as well as preoccupations for improving the transformation and change management. The modernising process of acquisition is a continuous one, and it is important to ensure the competences and responsibilities, to apply in a unitary way the regulations regarding the public acquisitions of products, services in the Ministry of National Defence.

The main mission of the scientific research activities in defence consists of ensuring the necessary conditions thus the Romanian weapon systems and military technique are in accord with the newest accomplishments in science, technique and technology, and to be able to cope with the needs imposed by the military actions from a modern theatre of operations.

The activities of scientific research in defence area have as a major objective the development of those military capabilities that allow the implementation of the general concepts of acquisition strategy,
with a special attention given to the growth of efficiency of Romania’s participation in multinational operations all over the world.

Maintaining the capabilities’ and the competences’ rhythm of the Romanian military scientific research is and will be a vital condition to ensure the combat potential of the Romanian armed forces in the present conditions.

II. Organizing the acquisition process in the Ministry of National Defence

The Department for Armaments is a central structure from the Ministry of National Defence, with specific attributions and domains of responsibility:

- It ensures the integrated management of major acquisitions programs, according to the procedures from the Ministry of National Defence, according to NATO and EU standards, regarding the acquisition processes of weapon systems, the research activity and technology, as well as international cooperation in the field of weapons;

- It is the technical authority that regulates, contracts and develops the public acquisitions in the Ministry of National Defence, ensuring the activities of certification the products’ quality, research and development in the military field, the activities of protecting the intellectual property;

- It ensures the development of NATO concept regarding the joint approach in the weapons domain and the centralized management of the resources.

The structural organization is based on the following elements:

a) There are three councils, needed for a better functioning of the Integrated System of the Military Acquisitions management. It is based on three components that coordinated the council:

- Planning, programming, budgeting and evaluation (execution) system (PPBE), ensured by the Department of Euro-Atlantic Integration and Defence Policy (DIEPA) and is coordinated by the Council for Defence planning – CPA;
- **The system for issuing the demands** – ensured by General Staff, all the services and other structures and it is coordinated by the Council for Supervising the Demands- CSG;

- **The system for the acquisitions management in Defence**
  - ensured by the Department for Armaments and coordinated by the Acquisition Council –CODA.

  b) The attributions of these organs differ from those ones of the Department for Armaments, because they have a well delimited role in the *Integrated System of the Military Acquisitions management*, thus:

  - **CSC validates and approves**: The Documents with the Needs of the Mission (DNM) and the Documents with the Operational Needs (DCO).

  - **CPA approves**:
    i. The Directive for Defence Planning;
    ii. The Programs for constituting, modernizing and training in the Ministry of National Defence;
    iii. Annual modernization plans;
    iv. The Project of the annual budget;
    v. Reports regarding the stage of development of the programs of constituting, modernizing and training for the Ministry of National Defence.

  - **CODA approves** the documents regarding the acquisitions programs.

  c) The councils are formed by representatives with command attributions in the structures of the ministry, they have a decisional role and not a role of execution. These councils have a periodical activity, and the secretariat is ensured as it follows:

  - For CSG, by the General Staff;
  - For CODA by the Department for Armaments;
  - For CPA by DIEPA.

  d) The councils cannot be credit coordinator and they do not have contracts authority, they cannot organize acquisitions procedures and they cannot develop contracts;

  e) The Department for Armaments is entitled to put into life, according to the legal norms, the decisions of these deliberative organs.
III. Similitudes in organizing and coordination the acquisition process

The Department for Armaments is a structure similar to those of the national authorities in the weapons domain that exist in NATO and EU member states (USA - The Under-Secretary of Defence for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics; UK - The Agency for Equipment in the Military Filed; France – The General Directorate for Weapons; Germany - Equipment Department; Denmark – The Directorate for Materials; Italy – The National Directorate for Weapons; Spain - The General Directorate for Weapons and materials, etc.).

The Department for Armaments, as other similar structures, is managed by personalities with ranks of State Secretary and represents the national Directors for armaments in relation with NATO and EU.

The decisions within NATO regarding the mutual development of main projects of equipment with NATO level weapons (AGS, MD) are taken by the Conference of the national Directors for Armaments (CNAD).

CNAD coordinates the activity within NATO - RTO, DAT and LTCR.

Within EU – European Defence Agency (EDA) - the decisions regarding the projects of research, technology, equipment, weapons, industrial cooperation are taken by the Ministry of National Defence or by the National Director for Armaments.

IV. European Defence Agency

The European Defence Agency was created to answer the exigencies imposed by surpassing some major shortcomings in the field of European defence: insufficient resources, the market, standards and requirements fragmentation. The Agency proposes to act as an “integrator system”, creating the best background to unify the political will.

The advantages of EDA compared with other European initiatives (WEAG) refer to the high level participation. EDA acts
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for the development of a whole brand of defence capabilities, using a 
comprehensive and synergetic approach. EDA wants to promote the 
projects of cooperation between states (Ad-hoc Projects), as they are 
the key to surpass the fragmentation in defence field. The Agency will 
represent only the catalyser of this cooperation, but the initiative belongs 
to the interested industries.

The collaboration policy regarding the capabilities, promoted by 
EDA, will enforce EU position at international level, especially in its 
relationship with USA. The Union cannot survive on long term, if the 
fragmentation of the defence equipments markets will continue.

On such a market, the dumping policies are hard to be counter-
acted. EU and USA have common objectives regarding the development 
of the European defence capabilities. This is why the transatlantic 
cooperation is a must.

Voted by the defence ministries on November, 21, 2005 and 
valid from July, 1, 2006, the Conduct Code in acquisitions of defence 
equipments will represent a voluntary and transparent intergovernmental 
mechanism, for public acquisitions. It will be used for the contracts 
that are bigger than one million euros, with some exceptions: chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear equipments (CBRN), cryptographic 
equipments, common programs, R&T. The role of EDA will be one 
of implementing, observing and reporting so that the mechanism to be 
Improved permanently.

The Conduct Code will allow a relaxation of the art. 296 TCE - 
which excludes the defence equipments from the regulation of a unified 
market, by making use of interests of national security - by allowing 
the graduate appearance of competition (a progressive approach, not 
a frontal one) and it will be complementary to the initiatives of the 
Commission (Green Card adopted on March, 11, 2005, the intentions to 
elaborate a Means of Communication to interpret the application of art. 
296 TCE and of a Directive of coordination for the national procedures 
in the Acquisitions of defence equipments).

In 2006, the collaboration must be improved and the budgets for 
science and technology must grow. Some decisions must be taken in 
this area, one of the arguments being represented by the differences
between EU and USA. The 5% of the budget allocated for common research projects in Europe has to grow up to 20%.

As a result of the decision taken at Hampton Court, Javier Solana has proposed to the ministers of defence in Innsbruck, in March 2006, to create a common Program for Investments for research and technology. The funding is to be taken from a special fund, managed by EDA (but separate from its own budget) and controlled by the contributor states. The proposal, agreed in principle, is presented in details for further discussions in May 2006, at CAGRE, where the ministers of defence took part. Some reticence has to be dealt regarding the control over the funds, that are to be managed by EDA (their destination, capitalization, because some projects can last decades).

The priorities of the Department for Armaments comprise: the design of a “new generation armoured vehicle” (AFV), the rationalization of the Defence testing and evaluation base (DTEB), Future European Soldier System.

Regarding AFV, some rapid measures are needed, because of the problems regarding the interoperability which result from the existence of 23 different programmes within EU. Some long term measures (2010-2015) are needed, and in the first stage some sub-systems and common platforms will be developed. By the end of 2006, a study of feasibility will be accomplished in order to achieve a technological demonstrator.

EDA has a strategic approach regarding the Future European Soldier System. The member states and the national industries must direct themselves to a deeper specialization, thus each state to become a leader in several domains. Some “European domains of excellence” will be constituted. They will offer a double advantage of effectiveness and the duplications will be avoided, reducing the unjustified concurrence. Therefore, the small industries will not be excluded or absorbed; on the contrary, they will have a new value in some sub-domains. This approach will lead to a balance between the big and small companies and to a synergy of all European markets.
V. The Association of Aerospatiale and Defence Industries in Europe

ADS acts as a unique point of contact and expertise between partners and stockholders in front of European industries. The members have agreed upon a common strategy. The association lobbies to influence and to create some legal norms for the sectors it is responsible (aerospatial, spatial and defence). Thus, ADS has a direct dialogue with all EU institutions (Commission, European Parliament, and Council-General Secretariat), EDA and the permanent representatives of the member states.

The national associations are active in their own countries in order to determine the adaptation of a certain position in the Council. ADS policy is a professional one, in order to influence an exact number of governments to get the majority needed by the Council to adopt a legislative project. ADS is open to new members, some national associations are accepted if they pay an annual contribution (according to the number of employees, but this contribution has to be of at least 11,000 euros).

There is the possibility to accept a new member with a special status, and with a symbolic contribution. This special member can take part in all the commissions of the Association, but it cannot vote. Such a status is recommended during a period of transition, so that the national industries have the necessary time to restructure themselves.

The lobby made by ASD is sometimes official. Two examples are the “Group of Personalities” and ESRAB (EU Security Research Advisory Board) that deal with the research in the security field. The ASD representatives play an important role.

VI. The characteristics of public acquisitions in EU

EU directives regarding acquisitions define the legal frame for public acquisitions. They are applied in case in which the authorities and the public services want to acquire goods, services, constructions or construction works. They state the procedures to be followed before a
contract is granted and which value is bigger than the relevant threshold level, excepting those ones that contain confidential data.

The aim of these unitary regulations is to open the market for public acquisitions and to ensure the free movement of goods and services in EU. In most cases, competition is needed. EU regulations reflect “the value for money” of the govern policy in acquisitions.

All public acquisitions must be based on VFM (defined as an optimal combination of the cost and quality in order to fulfil the user’s requests), which has to be achieved through competition, and only very well argumented situations are exceptions to the rule.

In EU the public authorities may choose between open or restrictive procedures, but they may also use the negotiation procedure in limited conditions. The public services may choose from these three types of procedures:

- **The open procedure**, when all the interested parties can answer by forwarding an offer for a contract;

- **The restrictive procedure**, when only some companies are selected. This procedure permits the buyers to avoid the situation in which they have to deal with a huge number of offers;

- **The negotiating procedure**, when a buyer can select one or more persons to negotiate the contract terms. From technical or artistic reasons, or in order to protect exclusive rights, only a certain person can achieve the contract.

The European regulations regarding acquisitions define the criteria needed to avoid discrimination based on origin of a member state and to ensure that all the suppliers or contractors have equal opportunities. The criteria cover:

- Specification phase - the requirements are specified, it will be avoided to mention the trademarks and other references that may have as a result the favouring or elimination of certain suppliers, products or services;

- Selection phase - the rejection or the accept of the candidates based on:
  
  - The proof that they are not eligible because of bankruptcy, have committed illegal acts, or unpaid taxes;
-Their economic and financial state (the annual balance proves their financial stability);
-Their technical capability (enough capabilities to deal with the contract).
-The contract granting phase – the contracts will be granted on the minimum price or based on other criteria by which the best offer is determined, if it is in the buyer’s advantage.

The first two procedures present some restrictions in the use on the post-offer negotiations. The European Commission has issued a statement regarding post-offer negotiations, which bans any kind of negotiation regarding the price: “In open and restrictive procedures are forbidden any kind of negotiations between the candidates or bidders regarding fundamental aspects of the contracts, the differences which may change the competition, especially regarding the prices, although some discussions are allowed with the candidates of bidders and only to clarify or to supplement the content of the offers or the requests of the contractual authorities and without discrimination.”

When executing the contract, the main means, in case one of the European regulations or an EU law is breached, are the following:
- A legal trial;
- The EU member states have to answer in front of European Court of Justice, at the European Commission request.

The result may lead to the suspension of the procedure of granting a contract or the decision’s annulment. The court of law has competences in granting compensations.

**VII. Implications and directions of action in research and in defence industry**

In order to be prepared to become an active member of EDA, the moment it becomes an EU member, Romania has to decide over the strategic directions in the field of defence capabilities. Under the conditions of the existence of some old industrial structures, Romania can adopt a strategy to develop the borderline technologies in order
to be competitive at European level. The orientation to main fields, established by EDA, completed with an efficient support in research, development and innovation, may bring reinforcement to the sectors that provide defence capabilities.

This is why the first step in the direction of taking part in the “European mechanism” is to be affiliated to ASD. Unlike EDA, we can become ASD members before our integration in EU. It is necessary to constitute a national association which should comprise the main producers from the defence industry.

In this stage, to obtain the special observer status would present the advantage of our presence in ASD. We will be able to know the activity of the Association, and at the same time to be able to restructure at national level our defence industry, to develop the investments for research and technology in the field of security and defence.

Based on the Instruction regarding the management of the scientific research for military technique and technologies 1.1000.5, the defence research can be accomplished in research units that do not belong to the Ministry of National Defence, in public research units, industrial laboratories and universities. This will allow the military scientific research to reach the field of technologies with double utilization, thus the transfer of technologies will be a two way one.

This connection can be accomplished through:

a) The Council for Scientific Research for Military Techniques and Technologies;

b) The Specialty Commissions of the Consultative College for Research- Development and Innovation from the Ministry of Education and Research;

c) The State Office for Inventions and Trade Marks, The Romanian Office for Copyright;

d) National Plan for Research, Development and Innovation, coordinated and with funds from the Ministry of Education and Research.

Thus, the research units belonging to the Department for Armaments (the Military Equipment and technologies Research Agency and the Technical Military Academy) have formed consortiums
with economic agents and took part in competitions organized by RELANSIN, MATNANATECH, AEROSPATIAL programs with research-development projects.

In order to be able to create the conditions to participate in international projects, in consortiums with economic agents from the Romanian industry, from the future European Program FP 7, at the Department for Armaments initiative, it has been launched a SECURITY program similar to Preparing Action for FP 7, which is developed by some EU member states.

The research units of the Ministry of National Defence, in partnership with economic agents, have presented projects for the program of Research in Excellence, which have been evaluating the projects.

According to NATO concept on the Alliance’s transformation, the equipment component represents the dynamic element which needs important human, technical-economic and financial resources in order to put into practice the research-development programs, starting from the need to maintain a high combat capability.

This is why a real management is needed. It has to be efficient, with a coherent planning and programming so that the technical equipment to be made in an organized manner, in specific programs, which are developed after a thorough verified procedure, with well-defined processes, mostly after long periods of time that need budget funding alongside numerous financial years. The high costs needed by these programs ask for an agreement from the government or with the parliament.

The tendency at international level is to reduce the financial contribution of the state in defence industry, the state acts only as a supervisor in this field. The economic relationships from defence industry are designed, with the help of diplomacy, over national borders by the state itself, although until recently they were part of its sovereignty.

Because of its complexity and of the aspects connected to the compatibility between the military technical systems, as well as from financial reasons, some states chose programs to modernize the already existent systems.
The modernization process, according to NATO standards, represents a complex process, from the point of view of the acquisition of systems of weapons and equipment, and of the logistic support that has to be integrated in those systems to ensure the operability of the forces. It is needed:

- The modernization of the combat technique, with the participation of the national industry, according to the standards imposed by NATO and by achieving the objectives of the force;
- The acquisition of military technique and the integration of modern technologies of fabrication within the national ones;
- The acquisition of some categories of imported military technique what cannot be produced in our country.

The policy of the Ministry of National Defence for weapons and acquisitions is determined by the necessity to provide to forces and other structures from the ministry the equipments and the weapons systems that they need, when they need them and at the best cost/performance/quality. The dialogue between the entire decisional factor and a partnership with the defence industry are essential to obtain the best results within the management of resources, products and defence. This partnership with the defence industry is by itself an important aspect of our industrial policy. This relation will continue to exist as long as the industry will offer products and services at the standards requested by the military factors.

Proposal for vital actions:

- The redefinition of the national general framework of the defence industry (the former inter ministry commission for coordination of the defence production) with specific tasks to ensure a coherent economic policy for the defence industry;
- The founding of the Association of the producers from the Romanian Aerospatial Industry and from Defence Industry (APIRAA). It has to be acknowledged by the government and it has to become as soon as possible an ASD member;
- A study regarding the strategic directions of specialization for Romania and the national industry in security and defence capabilities, correlated with NATO and EU objectives;

- The identification of the strategic problems based on SWOT analysis in the defence industry sector (both private and estate);

- A strategy for the re-technology of the defence industry, the stress being on the development of the technological base, on the domains of excellence, on the capabilities of testing and evaluation (independent or in common with the Ministry of National Defence), on the strategies of production and on market studies;

- The improvement of the collaboration between the ministries and the growth of the budgets allocated to activities of development of new technologies in the domain of security and defence;

- Adopting a mutual national point of view in the definition of the national economic policy oriented to the needs and the requirements that are specific for the security of acquisitions of products and services. These have to be safe and stable, at least in what defence is concerned;

- The development of a partnership with the national defence industry, based on a governmental policy;

- To ensure the financial support so that some representatives of the Ministry of National Defence, of the Ministry of Education and Research (that will work within MND) can collaborate with NAMSA and IC.

The strategic medium will continue to change, as well as the military priorities, and this will lead to a continuous revision on our economic policy, of the economic dimension of the policy promoted by the Ministry of National Defence for the defence industry.

If the activity in acquisitions permits the endowment of the armed forces with modern equipments and services within the limits of the resources allocated, with the participation of a competitive and high performance defence industry, which brings benefits to the economy and to the technological and scientific base, then the political and economic policy of the Ministry of National Defence is coherent in the domain of security and defence, and the defence industry will accomplish its objectives.
The main function of the defence industry and its participation to ensure the economic, political and strategic component, the geostrategic position and the proximity of the new Euro-Atlantic borders, the main vectors of the threat, as well as the objectives of the acquisition programs need a direct, active implication of the defence industry, the producers need not to remain in expectative, in order to obtain some political viewpoints that are to support their expectations, but which will never solve their problems connected to the re-technology, research, production, export, management and international cooperation.

The political will is useful in ensuring a coherent, lasting and credible strategy regarding the economic and industrial future of our country, in establishing the directions and of economic and political alliances, needed in finding and providing for new markets, in establishing the destiny of the national defence industry, in a new environment, with a harsh concurrence, globalised and mostly Euro-Atlantic.

Translated by Alexandra VLAD
Major-General dr. Teodor FRUNZETI (T.F.):

I have few comments on some of the issues mentioned here, and I would like to start with the first presentation, General Mureşan’s one, the Rector of the National Defence University.

He mentioned Romania’s armed forces missions within collective defence and coalitions. I want to add that they are stipulated on the Defence Planning Directive, in concordance with the actual legal framework and based on the Defence Planning Law. The Directive is a political-military document, approved by the Ministry of National Defence. This document is derived from the Military Strategy, from the National Security Strategy, from the National Defence Strategy that is about to be issued. The Planning Defence Directive is itself a document that is used for the time being and there is no contradiction between what it states about these missions and the way the army’s transformation strategy prescribes the ways for turning into effective the military actions, the way the Romanian Army participates to the missions established by the documents included in the Defence Planning Law.

Moreover, we offer the same pool of forces both for NATO and EU. This is a solution adopted not only by Romania, but by all NATO and EU member states, because they have the same vision and the same solutions for these two organizations.

However, we have two main types of missions, related with article 5 of the NATO Washington Treaty and “Non-Article 5”, that are generally speaking crisis response operations or stability missions.

When it is about EU, the missions we may participate – we have already been in some EU stability missions, and as we will become an EU member starting 2007, we will participate to the whole spectrum of missions -, as shown by Mr. Huluban, they will cover another spectrum
as the ones related with NATO. It is, first of all, about Petersberg missions that do not involve the participation to a high-intensity war.

Basically, it is about stability missions, and the way EU may use NATO capabilities, the ones established by Berlin Plus agreements, imply the use of the NATO’s command structure as for the time being EU does not have its own command structure, able to command military structures that are to be turned into operational be used in military operations.

Meantime, we have to show that missions NATO may turn into operational and the EU ones are completely complementary and they are not conflicting. Therefore, the fact that NATO may deploy large intensity fight actions according to article 5, and EU only stability missions, crisis response, shows that the missions are in harmony.

According to Berlin Plus Arrangements, EU uses NATO capabilities and this shows an additional synergy element. The fact that the staff and administrative procedures used by EU-led structures are actually NATO ones brings a new element, a new reason sustaining this synergy. Moreover, the evaluation and certification system for EU forces is similar with NATO’s, as EU does not have its own procedures.

From the military capabilities perspective, from their missions, we conclude there is a full synergy between these two international organizations.

There are also many to be done regarding the second EU Pillar, ESDP. We will see how the Common Security Policy will evolve by the way the Constitution Treaty will be “defrost”. It is sure that on the operational, military side, these organizations work better than on political aspects.

Regarding Romania’s contribution to ESDP, to European Neighbourhood Policy, we should add one referring to regional ownership. This means the solutions for specific issues regarding different European areas or Eurasian ones have to come from the mentioned areas. Therefore, we should not impose solutions and there should not be implemented others’ solutions, but the ones involved should solve them out. There should be found more balanced solutions, appropriate for the ones involved and there should not be mentioned external, less
flexible solutions, less adapted to each concrete situation. This is EU’s approach on conflict situations, frozen conflicts.

**Lieutenant-Colonel Marius ROŞCA (M.R.):**
I have two questions for Mr. Huluban:

a. What is Romania’s level of participation, at Ministry of Defence level, on EU’s process of defining its strategies and doctrines?
b. Does Romania’s potential offer in military field aim other fields, excepting forces and participation to military actions and peace-support operations?

**Sebastian HULUBAN (S.H.):**
On strategies, there is a European Security Strategy, proposed by the High Representative for the Common Foreign Security Policy, Javier Solana, during the European Council meeting from Thessaloniki, in 2003, and approved as an official EU paper starting 2004. As I mentioned during my presentation, Common Foreign Security Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy are part of an intergovernmental field. This means you need the member status in order to gave a clear position and be involved in decision.

In intergovernmental forums, decisions are taken by consensus. States that are not member, partner or associate states do not have a final word in these matters. Obviously, even on doctrines and planning processes, Romania was consulted. Even this year, Romania was part of the additional catalogue for forces. Regarding your second question, we offer a huge pool of expertise in Balkans. When EU will decide to generate a common approach and officially acknowledge the Black Sea Region as one continuing the institutional EU area, Romania offers the same level of expertise on the required political and security level. There is a huge difference though: there are three levels of political relations’ intensity between Romania and EU, especially regarding the second pillar. Up to 2005, when we signed and ratified the Treaty of Accession in EU, we were an associated country, we are a country that will join EU, up to January, 1st, 2007, and starting that date Romania will be involved in these matters as a full member. In a diplomatic way,
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it is the same pattern we had on our way of becoming a NATO member – partner state, invited state and then full member.

**Dr. Nicolae DOLGHIN (N.D.):**

I also have two questions for Mr. Sebastian Huluban:

In order to get the synergy effects, you need at least one condition: all the participant elements to act simultaneously and complementarily. When do you think there will be an exit from this synergy state, when EU focused on its initial economical component and now focuses on the enlargement? The political side, due to the Constitutional Treaty, that should have been the base of the European Security and Defence Policy, is shadowed. It was not a circumstance that 2003 was the last magic year of the relations between NATO and EU. NATO remains a changing political-military organization that has never denied either its role or the status of a main actor on solving security worldwide issues. Which will be the future of the collective defence?

Meantime, you mentioned a tempting area, related with a common energetic strategy of these organizations.

How realistic do you think this idea is, as neither NATO nor EU are energetic resources holders?

What is the future of such a strategy when there is a missing component, as you said, and I mean GAZPROM, whose main shareholder is the Russian state?

As you can see, EU discusses with GAZPROM, not with Russia. As far as I know, there is a meeting between Russia and EU these days and the energetic issue is not on the agenda.

And I have a question for the other eminent speakers, general Sandu, a military engineer, a person that is very close to our Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, and Mr. Donelan, who spoke of the future of the military actions and satellites. Indirectly, they re-launched the eternal military art dilemma - the relations between man and technique.

What do you think the future commandant will be like, General McArthur or Bill Gates?

How do you see the solution of this dilemma?
S.H.:

Regarding your first question, on the future of the collective defence and the synergy conditions. As stated by general Frunzeti and as shown during my presentation, I stressed the strategic and political-military aspects of the issue related with synergy, in the most sensitive point of these organizations – the cooperation in political-strategic area. Obviously, there is a complementarity between new elements, capacities and planning processes and between NATO Response Force and Tactical Battle Groups. Although there is no official paper clearly stating the compatibility between these organizations, there have been created the premises, there have been adopted common planning procedures and so on.

The fundamental issue is at political level. Both in the Atlantic area, and Europe, or mainly in Europe, the North Atlantic Alliance tends to be still perceived as an alliance derived from the Cold War, an alliance related with collective defence. In the 1990s and after 2000, NATO got a huge experience on crisis management, especially in non-article 5 operations and peace support operations.

On the other side, we have EU developing a set of missions and a set of objectives similar to the ones specific to non-article 5 missions. EU comes with additional valuable elements, a concept referring to a common integrated planning process for civilians and military in EU led operations. We should bear in mind that, most of the time, EU missions and operations are managed within the second pillar, European Security and Defence Policy, but projecting a mission requires elements from the other two structures, the operations managed by the European Commission (pillar no. 1) and justice and internal affairs (pillar no. 3). This is one of the latest elements EU brings on the table for cooperation talks.

The second important element refers to the fact that EU, due to its ESDP dimension, moved faster than NATO in generating a European conception reforming the security sector.

NATO led and leads actions in its neighbouring areas, due to its partnerships, in the Mediterranean Dialogue space, East side and so on.
It has a certain experience in reforming the security sector and offering assistance in consolidating the relations between civilians and military on democratic bases. EU succeeded to develop its own concept that may be also analysed by NATO. On the future of the collective defence, I don’t think this is a political matter for the time being, but rather one concerning the European public opinion. We should remember that EU Constitutional Treaty inserted a fundamental element, the solidarity clause. As EU Treaty was not approved, we cannot have any doubts that France and Netherlands voted against this solidarity clause.

ESDP is not a disputed topic within EU or in the public opinion. Unfortunately, due to the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, the solidarity clause was also rejected. As a matter of fact, this clause repeated the idea of collective defence.

Therefore, we think the future will depend on the EU political leaders, if they succeed to preserve fundamental provisions of the Constitutional Treaty, especially the ones related with ESDP.

On the energetic security, first of all, there should be made a clear distinction between the energy security dimension and the issue of energy markets. I don’t think GAZPROM issue should be necessarily considered Russia’s political problem:

1. the Russian political authorities represent the state, GAZPROM is a multinational company;

2. I mentioned the energetic security, both at NATO and EU level, from energetic security and from the security access to energy sources perspectives, there is cooperation potential. However, these talks are about a need that may create fear and insecurity in its absence. What happened at the beginning of 2006 is relevant.

_Gerard DONELAN (G.D.):_

Thank you very much for the question, I was hoping to escape. Let’s talk about the future of technology. Of course, investing in technology is very expensive but by investing in technology we help producing manpower, save military lives and also collateral damages on civilian casualties. I would like to say that the future is Bill Gates’, but, however, for instance, if we invest in UAVs, we’re saving costs of
a very expensive jetfighter, the training of the pilots, the navigators, the supporters on the ground and the UAVs is flown by an 18 years old, who has used to play with a Play Station, with a minimal training. And in the unlikely events, the UAV is shot down, this 18 years old who is 200 miles away presses reload and then there’s another UAV. The UAV exerts deterrence, can detect forces and I believe this is the way forward. I don’t believe you can ever replace boots on the ground, you can’t do that. However, by investing in technology and by exploiting what you already have, within the nations, within EU, I think this is the way forward. Use what you have, make it interoperable with NATO and I think this is the future. Thank you.

Air Flotilla General Eng. Dr. Ion-Eftimie SANDU (I.E.S.):

Thank you for your appreciations. I would like to tell director Moștoflei that in those integrated teams that will be used for preparing the forecasts in different fields related with the future NATO and EU projects there will be also involved specialists from the academic, industrial environment, not only technicians, but also officers and generals from the operational area, so there will be a very wide spectrum.

Regarding Mr. Dolghin’s question, I think there will evolve and co-exist concepts, doctrines and technologies. As an engineer, obviously, I agree with Mr. Donelan, that technology is the future. The fact there are so many performing sensors help you to get the informational superiority that is related with technique and the human factor. The future belongs to UAVs, we speak so often of the future soldier technologies and of course we should equip our staff with latest technologies. I personally see a joint approach: both doctrinal factor and the technological one should walk hand in hand, in order to ensure security and defence.

Major Ovidiu FIZEȘAN (O.F.):

I have a question for Mr. Huluban. It is very known the fact that the South Caucasus has a strategic interest for NATO. Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are part of EU’s Neighbouring Policy. In 2005 there have been noticed certain interesting evolutions in Georgia’s security dynamics. For the first time after 15 years, Georgia issued a National
Security Strategy and a Defence Strategy, in concordance with its partnership with NATO. However, Georgia can’t seriously claim to join NATO, because it has not solved out its so-called conflicts, from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, just as it happens in Moldova and Nagorno-Karabakh. There is another interesting tendency: Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova question deeper and deeper the advantages and the disadvantages of being a CIS member. Under these circumstances, is it possible to have a more intense cooperation between EU and NATO, aiming first of all the exclusion of regional frozen conflicts, and how could this cooperation be materialised? Thank you!

S.H:

There is a particular aspect related with Georgia. It is true, they made certain progresses, acknowledged by consensus, again, I use this term, at NATO level, on reforming their own force structures, generating certain planning mechanisms for the modern defence, all of them within the Partnership for Peace framework. Therefore, Georgia may become the subject of an intense dialogue, using, probably, the same pattern, general elements or certain political-military aspects as the ones offered to Ukraine last year by the North Atlantic Alliance. Obviously, after implementing the mechanisms related with this intensified dialogue, the offer for joining NATO is the next step. That is why I think it is plenty of time to solve out also the issue of borders and the forces presence, not only the issue of the frozen Russian conflicts, the frozen conflicts from South Ossetia and Abkhazia. I read recently that there is a massive Russian forces withdrawal from the Akalkalaki base.

Regarding the frozen conflicts, as General stated, there are two very important aspects: one refers to the way both NATO and EU, separately and together, may assist and offer their expertise in rebuilding the trust between the two parties – the central Georgian govern and the Ossetian and Abkhaz separatist authorities.

I think it is very important to have a cooperation mechanism NATO-EU. Regarding Russia’s approach, I think there is a wide spectrum of ways for actions both from NATO and EU. It only depends on how they will be put into practice. Once again, I think the issue of
having Georgia as a NATO member will be debated from the procedure perspective of partnership actions and also simultaneously with solving out the conflicts. Let’s hope there will be two lights at the end of the tunnel!

On your question about Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and the latest statements on leaving or staying within CIS, I saw these days in media that Ukraine states clearly its will to stay in CIS.

Regarding the other two states, I think nobody will be surprised if Georgia and Moldova leave CSI, as long as there are frozen conflicts. Undoubtedly, there are some distinctions: despite Georgia, Moldova has a military neutral policy. Therefore, it is less likely to intensify its cooperation with NATO, but with EU, while Georgia will intensify its cooperation with NATO.

_T.F._:

I want to add something. It is about the fact that both joining EU and NATO is not actually a technical problem, but a political one. It is not enough to comply a checklist, you can’t assume that if you fulfil all the technical conditions mentioned you instantly join NATO or EU. These are just essential conditions, but not enough for joining one or both organizations. Moreover, at present, EU does not have a standardized accession, enlargement process. For each country, the issues were differently approached. The fact that there were ten countries that became EU members two years ago shows a certain political need of that moment. Undeniably, there were some technical parameters they had to comply with, but it is not a rule that if you fulfil them you will become a member. The decision to join each of these two organizations is mainly a political one, which takes into consideration certain performance parameters.

_General-Brigadier (ret.) dr. Georghe VĂDUVA (G.V.):_

We have included in our annual research plan this topic and unfortunately it was only yesterday we finished a study on optimizing Romanian Forces participation to missions related with the collective defence.
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We approached the topic from two important perspectives. One refers to the validity of the collective defence concept and the other one is related with certain concrete elements or others approaching the physiognomy and the philosophy of optimizing our troops’ participation to these missions. Basically, this concept, as we clearly know why and how, was a political one. Article 5 from the Washington Treaty and article IV from the Bruxelles Treaty had a very precise objective at that time. It was a political concept with a strategic dimension, called on strategic defence, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, with all the events and with the whole dynamic related with these strategic concepts. In time, they were sustained by a very strong and consistent policy, symmetrical between these two treaties. Now we don’t face a similar situation: yesterday’s “enemy” does no longer exist.

Therefore, the political defence concept lost its relevance. Alliance was built-up around the collective defence concept, this is its substance, other elements are related with the value system, interests, defending the common area. I don’t think this concept’s reputation is harmed; its basic significance remains the same, just because the nowadays collective defence is not the one from the past. However, we don’t exclude the possibility of defending against a very strong enemy, as we face the nuclear threat and nations, despite the non-proliferation treaties, keep on arming themselves. Therefore, we shouldn’t exclude the danger of a large conflict from the political and strategic reason. Although it is very unlikely, it is compensated by a different threats dynamics, different dangers, more complex and diverse, from the terrorist and the asymmetric ones to the ones connected with geophysical war. There are lots of things stimulating the Alliance, its member states and the whole world to keep this concept, collective defence, and to give it the right dimensions and significance.

The second element refers to what collective defence should comprise nowadays. Does it have to be a firm strategic defence, with all the elements we know, or do we have to get out of this concept and get into a dynamic of strategic reconfiguration, just to prevent war and ensure peace? I think a strategic and a political reflection on this concept deserves a lot of attention. The study I mentioned is just a beginning, as
it is based on lots of references and presents our reflections and others’ on this long debated topic. We came to the conclusion that there are many other things to be said and discovered, this structure to be done in the Euro-Atlantic space, as it is about the European dimension of this defence, it needs to be solid and lasting, and the European Security and Defence Policy effectively contributes to achieving a secure area that may ensure the Euro-Atlantic space security.
INTEROPERABILITY - KEY WORD FOR THE COLLECTIVE DEFENCE

Lieutenant-General Sorin IOAN, PhD,
Chief of the Romanian Land Forces Staff

Within the North Atlantic Alliance, interoperability is an essential element for the success of the military operations related with the collective defence. In the international military environment, interoperability has gained a major importance and we will try to mention those factors aiming the Romanian Land Forces’ contribution to the required interoperability level achievement.

At present, in Iraqi theatre of operations, Romania has deployed an Engineer Detachment (149 troops) within a Polish-led division, an Infantry Battalion (405 troops) and a Military Police Company (100), operating within an Italian brigade framed by a British Division, an Infantry Company (100 troops) that runs its tasks under a British higher echelon, under the aegis of the United Nations.

Within a coalition, Romania has deployed an Infantry Battalion that acts under American command, within the ENDURING FREEDOM operation from Afghanistan. Starting June, 4, 2006, the above-mentioned battalion will be split and there will be a Manoeuvre Battalion (194 troops) subordinating an American Infantry Company and an Infantry Detachment (166 troops), that will execute specific missions. Both structures will be under NATO command, within ISAF operation.

Also, in Afghanistan, there are Romanian Mobile Observation Teams supporting Provincial Reconstruction Teams, a Military Police Platoon acting under NATO ISAF operation. Under US authority, the Romanian militaries train the new Afghan Armed Forces (ANA Training).

In Balkans, the Romanian Land Forces are represented by an Infantry/Mountain Company that operates in Kosovo, under Italian
command. There are two other Romanian detachments that perform military actions within Althea operation (Bosnia-Herzegovina), under the authority of the European Union.

Romania also participates to other regional initiatives. We may mention here SHIRBRIG (178 troops), SEEBRIG (578), the Romanian-Hungarian battalion (449 troops), EUFOR ALTHEA (there is a Romanian-Dutch detachment comprising 26 troops), a Military Police Platoon (23 troops) and an Infantry Battalion (400) that acts within the strategic reserve for SACEUR.

It is not easy to attain the required interoperability level. We speak of different people with different cultures and traditions, coming from different parts of the world that have to cooperate for accomplishing their missions in very demanding environments. There is a huge diversity of forces provided by the 26 NATO members and by their partners. These forces have to be commanded and coordinated during international missions or military exercises in different theatres of operations, far from the Alliance’s territory. This may be mainly achieved by attaining a certain level of interoperability and then by achieving a certain combat capability that should allow troops to fulfil the same mission and to have the same objectives. These two elements are the main objectives of the units comprising the NATO’s pool of forces.

In order to achieve them, NATO launched the Interoperability Process. This process comprises two complementary elements. They refer to:

- “bottom-up” interoperability (from the bottom side to the upper one on the system’s scale), that begins with reporting the interoperability requirements and/or deficiencies as they result from the collected “lessons learned” from the theatres of operations and military exercises. The process is materialized in the proposals issues by nations and/or by military commanders on fixing the identified deficiencies. These proposals are certified by JALLC - Joint Alliance Lessons Learned Centre – and evaluated afterwards by JWC - Joint Warfare Centre. The Allied Command for Transformation analyses and endorses the proposed resolutions and submits them to NATO Senior Commitees for the due actions.
-the second approach refers to “top-down” interoperability (from the upper side to bottom, on the system’s scale), is initiated when NATO Military Authorities identify and establish the Military Interoperability Requirements (MIRs), as part of the planning process, both by Force Proposals/Force Goals (FPs/FGs), and by Capability Packages (CPs).

Within this interoperability process, NATO Committee for Standardization has identified certain levels of interoperability defining the global forces’ interoperability. There were identified five levels of interoperability:

**Level 1**: when national forces conduct independently an operation, but the independent operations of different national forces are coordinated at political-military level.

**Level 2**: within the same operation there are committed forces separated by geographical or functional forces. The operations are coordinated at strategic level. The key objective of interoperability is ability to communicate.

**Level 3**: in the same theatre/operation there are employed joint combined forces. Operations are conducted by the Joint Operational Command. The main objective is ability to communicate and operate together within certain limitations.

**Level 4**: in the same theatre/operation there are employed joint combined forces. Operations are conducted by the Joint Operational Command, but the main objective is ability to communicate, operate and support each other, within certain limitations.

**Level 5**: in the same theatre/operation there are employed joint combined forces. Operations are conducted by the Joint Operational Command. These forces are fully interoperable and integrated.

Taking into account these interoperability levels, we assert the Romanian structures employed in multinational operations reach the third level of interoperability (capacity to communicate and operate together within certain limitations).

There are many factors that represent the base of interoperability, but their analysis is essential when it is about identifying the missions’ requirements. We may mention few examples: common values and priorities related with the mission; Article 5 and non-Article 5 operational
demands; the other partners’ doctrines and procedures knowledge; planning procedures and tactics; language and terminology; liaison relations (by liaison officers), communication systems and the exchange of information; identification, codification, certification, quality assurance; logistic support; techniques and procedures; training and exercise, control and feedback procedures; civil-military cooperation, etc.

Although the Romanian Armed Forces are familiar with all the aspects related with interoperability, due to the Partnership for Peace programme, this matter has got a formal status when Romanian joined NATO, in 2004. All the documents, doctrines and procedures revealed the importance of interoperability within NATO. We soon realized that our integration in euro-atlantic structures requires a more concerted effort in harmonizing our force capabilities in order to achieve the Alliance compatibility.

Achieving goals as full interoperability, compatibility, standardization and commonality require our special attention on force training and modernization program. We can not achieve them but by an intense reorganizing and restructuring process that is necessary for an optimal integration in NATO and for successfully solving the challenges we face with. We tried to build-up structures compatible with NATO, we built some specific structures with a specific focus on achieving NATO interoperability (NATO Integration Coordinating Branch, Transformation and Lessons Learned). The actual organizational chart of the Romanian Land Forces Staff is relevant in this matter.

According to our commitments to NATO, we prepare a pool of forces that will be available for the Alliance. The Force Proposals 2006 issued by the Allied Command for Transformation offered us a clear picture about what were considered competitive forces. It is important to focus our efforts on achieving the criteria established by NATO structures, in order to affirm these structures in concordance with the interoperability and combat capability criteria stated in NATO official documents. However, it is a costly process. Taking into account our geographical position, it is the
only way we may preserve our actual position, as a security provider within this area.

Interoperability and combat capability are two interdependent parts. Inside an alliance, the combat capability loses its importance if it is not a certain interoperability level. In order to achieve them, there are certain areas that require specific efforts: command and control; logistic support and strategic movement; doctrine, training and certification; technology and weapon systems; decision-making process.

The fact that the Romanian troops are present in the international military environment is an important indicator regarding the development of the interoperability process within the Romanian Land Forces. As shown from the very beginning, the Romanian troops are present in Georgia, Balkans, Congo, Angola, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

The lessons learned from these theatres of operations are very important for the interoperability. They have to be implemented in the training programs. The systematization of the information flow was organised according to the Battlefield Operating System. We established a training and education system that analyses the lessons learned by our troops during the multinational operations. We may state that this is the “bottom-up” approach at Romanian Land Forces Level. One of the major challenges was represented by the radical change and the institutionalization of a modern doctrine in military schools and units. Although we started a modern training system, there are many to be done in order to achieve training in concordance with standards and the mission’s requirements. By rewriting manuals and doctrines, we intend to implement the agreed STANAGs within our own regulations. We may assert that this is the “top-down” approach at Romanian Land Forces Level.

In order to achieve the technical compatibility with NATO structures, at Land Forces Level there was initiated an acquisition strategy. Its most important programs are: C4I system; acquisition of division-level Command Post; advanced individual combat system; armoured personnel carrier. All of them, together with the gradual accomplishment of the force objectives specific endowment tasks, with
all the existent limits and shortcomings, have increased the general endowment level, that will allow the structures that are part of international missions to be operational, interoperable, compatible with other Alliance’s forces.

In the end, we would like to stress out the interoperability process is a very complex one. Achieving the required interoperability level is part of a wider process envisaged by NATO. This overall process aims achieving *commonality*, and that is why it requires standardization, compatibility, interchangeability and interoperability. It is a very difficult process that implies important decisions at political, economical and social level. It requires time and the agreement of all NATO members in this area.
CONSIDERATIONS ON ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES PARTICIPATION TO COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

Major-General Professor Teodor FRUNZETI, PhD,
Deputy Director of the General Staff

Foreword

Even though the end of the Cold War determined the spread of an overall optimism with regard to the international security environment, other risks and vulnerabilities have occurred. The big challenges of the XXI\textsuperscript{st} century are closely connected to the global threat, embodied by terrorism against civilised states, to the likely use of weapons of mass destruction and to maintaining sources of instability in different areas of the world. These factors can generate tensions, crises and conflicts which, by their implications, can directly affect Romania’s interest and implicitly those ones of the North-Atlantic Alliance.

The experience acquired throughout the history has demonstrated that in almost all the modern wars waged in order to defend the national being, the Romanian Armed Forces carried out their military operations within the framework of alliances. From the perspective of providing national security, Romania, as a member of the North-Atlantic Alliance, also relies on the Allies’ force.

“In the case of an armed aggression, Romania’s Armed Forces will take action to repel it, providing and being provided support by the Allies, based on the provisions of the Washington Treaty”\textsuperscript{1}.

As a matter of fact, this is done based on the provisions of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty that prescribes that “an armed
attack launched against a member state will be considered an attack launched against all the members of the Alliance”.2

The security of Romania, as a European state, can be defined and promoted only within NATO and EU, according to national interests harmonised with the specific policies of the two organisations.

The Prague NATO Summit and the EU meetings that followed after this turning point of the Euro-Atlantic Organisation as well as the events from Madrid, London, Kosovo and Middle East brought about a new dynamic of the continental security institutions and of their relationship. Shifting focus on European security, after March 11, 2004, joins even more the efforts of NATO and EU for a common preventive action and a multilateral professional approach against the dangers posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, so as to leave behind any belated and inconsistent response.

The new overlapping borders of NATO and EU, starting with the 1st of May, 2004, require a joint security providing action in order to block terrorist attacks as well as penetration and trafficking within the unique area of security, weapons, ammunition, drugs and organised crime and also in order to set up an efficient political and strategic response to the ever increasing threats in the continental and global environments.3 So, carrying on common NATO-EU missions within the Balkans area has represented the element of unique relative political and security stability in the area. Meantime, it meant the undertaking of enhanced political, economic and security commitments by EU, fact that determined the gradual decrease of NATO presence in the Western Balkans and the Alliance’s getting specialised in supporting the reforms of the military structures of the states in the area.

All these changes in the political-military field, as well as the very close perspective of joining EU, brought about major changes also in the military doctrine on the defence of our country. As for Romania’s integration in the EU and its contribution with capabilities meant to protect EU’s interests, our country will participate with structures selected from the operationalised forces, assessed and designated for NATO. These forces can generally be the same, established on the principle of complementary missions, based on the Berlin Plus arrangements.
Definition of Collective Actions

New realities claim giving up solitarily performed actions and engaging forces in order to carry on collective actions meant to preserve security interests. In this respect, it is useful to briefly define these actions.

**Collective actions** can be defined as military actions carried on by engaging armed forces belonging to two or more states, within an **alliance** or **coalition**, under the aegis of an international authority (UN, OSCE, NATO, EU), for the purpose of collective/common defence (art. 5 – Washington Treaty or ESDP) or to prevent, limit, stop a crisis/conflict (non-art.5 CRO). The activities performed within common exercises, with the participation of structures belonging to two or even more countries, based on previously established plans aimed at training/checking interoperability relating to structure, action, procedure and equipment, also belong to this category.

**Military alliance** represents an agreement concluded within a treaty, by which the signatory states undertake the mutual commitment of taking action with all or part of their armed forces against a common adversary. The engagement to commonly take action and each party’s input stands for the clause of the Alliance. The provisions of the International Law in force allow only defensive military alliances, which are set up for the purpose of collective self-defence of states against a likely armed attack and are compatible with the goals and principles of UN.⁴

From a technical perspective, the alliance’s operations are combined operations, though in the current language the term **combined** is frequently used as a synonym for multinational operations, in which only member states participate.

The **coalition**, in its turn, is defined as being an ad-hoc arrangement between two or more nations in order to carry out a common action. The multinational action within a coalition is performed beyond the special relations established by the alliance, as a rule, for unique situations or for a lasting co-operation, in a specific field, which is strictly determined
and of common interest. As a rule, the coalition is temporary, agreed upon for a limited period or for a common goal.

Trying to classify collective actions in which Romania’s Armed Forces could participate, the followings have to be outlined:

- collective defence actions within NATO “in order to repel an aggression against Romania or its allies”, in compliance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;
- crises response operations, which can be non-Article 5 operations within NATO or „in ad-hoc coalitions... in order to support allies and partners to fight terrorism and to provide international stability” under UN or OSCE mandates;
- common defence operations within EU, based on the concepts of European Security and Defence Policy – ESDP or respectively Common European Security and Defence Policy - CESDP.
- multinational military exercises.

Collective defence actions within NATO

They are stated by the provisions of Article 5 - Washington Treaty, according to which an aggression against any member of the Alliance is considered an aggression against the Alliance.

Concurrently with Romania’s becoming a full NATO member, its national defence policy acquired a well marked pro-active character. Thus, Romania’s responsibilities are not limited merely to national territory defence policies or to preventive diplomacy but they also include policies that offensively promote Romania’s interests and support global stability in any area in which NATO performs its missions.

By the end of 2015, Romania will provide the Alliance with fully operationalised forces, in accordance with “Romania’s Answer to the Defence Planning Questionnaire” and the assumed commitments.

The collective defence concept prescribes that Romania further develop its already existing capabilities in order to counter the threats which occur inside or outside NATO’s territory or in its neighbourhood.
THE ROMANIA’S ARMED FORCES PARTICIPATION TO COLLECTIVE DEFENCE UNDER NATO LEADERSHIP AND TO ESDP

Common actions within EU

As a future European Union member, Romania has continued to comply with all Positions, Declarations and EU approaches and, when invited, it joined the Common Positions and Actions.

Romania has actively participated in the process of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) organisation and operationalisation, from the perspective of its future EU membership, at the horizon of 2007.

Within the political-military dialogue, Romania took part in the informal meetings of EU Troika, in those of the European Union Military Committee and General Staff, which are open to the candidate states. As a NATO member, Romania has supported the consolidation of NATO-EU dialogue on capabilities, within the framework provided by NATO-EU Capability Group.

Further on, Romania will continue to participate in the dialogue formats opened to candidate states and to increasingly get involved in the programs and projects initiated by EU on this dimension, as ECAP, Battle Groups and the European Defence Agency.

Participation in collective actions under the command of a NATO Command

Romania is integrated in the NATO command chain, at strategic level through the Allied Command Operations (ACO), which is responsible for the planning and conduct of defence operations and of operations for the restoration of the territorial integrity of the Alliance’s states in the area of responsibility, within the limits authorised by the political-military leadership of NATO (NAC), while at operational level, through the Joint Force Command (JFC) in Naples, Italy. – (figure 1)

The Romanian Armed Forces, as related to NATO, can be in one of the following situations:

A. Under NATO command – forces under the operational control (OPCON) of a NATO command (The military police Platoon in ISAF that is an ongoing operation);

B. Nato designated - Those forces that are to be placed under the OPCON of a NATO commander, for a clearly defined period, determined
by the convened operational readiness (readiness category - RC) - examples: an NRF designated structure (RC 1 or RC 2) or a brigade with RC 5 to be subsequently subordinated in order to participate in the development of the operation started by NRF;

C. At NATO disposal (developing for NATO) – are those forces to be put at NATO disposal in the future, according to the finalisation of their operationalisation and the affiliation to the Alliance’s plans of operations.

D. Other forces for NATO – forces that will be subordinated to the Alliance only for specific/outstanding situations or those which could co-operate with NATO forces during an operation;

E. Generation/regeneration forces - they can be NATO subordinated/ in co-operation, only if an operation is carried out on the national territory. Under these circumstances, they belong to the D item category.

In the case of an aggression against Romania, the empowered constitutional authorities of the state ask the Alliance for support,
THE ROMANIA’S ARMED FORCES PARTICIPATION TO COLLECTIVE DEFENCE UNDER NATO LEADERSHIP AND TO ESDP according to the provisions of art. 4 (threat with aggression) and 5 (collective defence) of the North-Atlantic Alliance Treaty.

The Commander of the Centre of National Military Command (CNMC), is authorised by the constitutional authorities of the Romanian state to participate directly or through representatives, based on the political mandate, in the elaboration of decisions by the Allied Command Operations (ACO) on planning and carrying out military actions at strategic level, in order to strengthen the defence capability or/and to defend Romania’s national territory.

The adopted decisions are brought to Supreme Defence Council (CSAT) notice. The Joint Operational Command conducts the military actions in the area of responsibility set under the complete command of CNMC and under the operational control of the Joint Force Command/ Joint NATO Command established by ACO, until the complete functioning of NATO commands which are designated to conduct military actions.

After the transfer of authority (TOA), the Romanian Armed Forces will be led within a collective NATO operation, by a component command (land component/CC-Land, Air component/CC-Air and maritime component/CC-Mar or their subordinate component commands) of the Joint Force Command/Joint Command designated to carry out the operation.

The conduct of the Air Force’s actions at NATO disposal is done by the Joint Force Command (JFC) through the NATO designated Centres for Multinational Air Operations Conduct (CAOC), while the conduct of the own Air Force actions in the area of responsibility, is exercised by the Joint Operational Command, according to the NATINEADS Concept.

The conduct of the actions carried on by maritime forces at NATO disposal is done by the Joint Force Command (JFC) through its designated NATO Maritime Component, while the conduct of the actions performed by own available maritime forces, in the area of responsibility, is done by the Joint Operational Command in co-operation with JFC. The technical support necessary for the conduct is provided by the subordinated communications and computers structure, which is supported by request with elements of the strategic system.
Participation in multinational operations

The increasing involvement of the North-Atlantic Alliance in non-Article 5 operations, in crises response operations, has determined the adoption of specific planning procedures which must be well known and applied by the states assuming to be ready to participate in this kind of operations.

Making multinational command and control arrangements (figure 2), to prepare and carry out operations, requires the use and support of forces deployed in the area of operations. In the conduct and execution of joint combined operations the following principles are applied: unity of command; continuity of command; clear and well defined structure of command; decentralization; co-operation and mutual understanding.
**Unity of command.** The conduct of joint combined operations is the result of collective decisions taken by the sovereign governments within the coalition or the alliance. The base of the decisions is determined by the common goals and interests. Unity of command ensures the cohesion necessary to plan, organise and carry out operations. Unity of command is achieved by giving the necessary authority to a single commander so as to command and co-ordinate the actions performed by forces and means.

The command relations this authority is put into practice are mainly determined by the make-up of the Joint Force. In order to ensure unity of command, the Joint Force Commander has operational control over all the forces within the area of operations.

**Continuity of command.** Unity of command will be reinforced by ensuring continuity of command during the joint combined operations. The hierarchically superior command authority must establish the sequence of conveying the command, based on consulting the commander of the Joint Combined Force.

**The clear and well defined structure of command.** The structure of the command and control system is and must be based on hierarchy. According to the actual situation, whenever necessary, the command and orders given to subordinate commanders will also include missions for certain elements of the forces, which are subject to limitations imposed by additional orders.

**Command integration.** The command structure must provide the concrete action of the military capabilities of the services belonging to one or more nations, so as to decisively and efficiently achieve the envisaged operational objectives of the joint force commander.

**Decentralisation.** The responsibility of a Combined Joint Force Commander to fulfil the mission is indivisible. Decentralisation implies the possibility of delegating authority to subordinates. The subordinate commanders and those delegated with authority must report their intentions, the pursued objectives and provide subordinate forces with the necessary conditions in order to fulfil their missions.

**Cooperation and mutual understanding** provides the foundation of confidence, based on the common implementation of
the joint doctrine. One will get acquainted with the standard operation procedures by performing joint combined exercises.

At present, Romania’s Armed Forces are preparing, developing and supporting their participation with forces in combined operations, both under NATO and EU leadership, in order to solve crises situations that affect the international community’s interests and the national ones. In Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan and Iraq, 12 battalion, detachment, company and platoon level military structures are engaged, totalizing over 1340 military men, all of them being placed under the operational command of the 2nd Joint Operational Command “Marshall Alexandru Averescu”.

So far, the Romanian Armed Forces have participated in international missions carried out in theatres of operation only with execution structures (up to battalion level) and with staff officers, taken on the staff of different level multinational commands.

Thenationalmilitarystructuresdeployedintheatresofoperation were and are generally used in the phase of post-combat operations, performing mainly the following types of missions: force protection; antiterrorist reaction (mainly search/check); Military Police specific missions; Combat Support missions (engineering-infrastructures); information gathering missions; participation in INFOOPS and CIMIC missions.

**Participation in joint multinational exercises**

Romania’s integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures implies also the adjustment of doctrines, procedures as well as of equipment, at the NATO and EU standards and requirements.

Joint multinational exercises represent an efficient way to identify operational requirements for training and procurement.

Participation of Romanian military structures in these exercises plays the role of increasing the interoperability with NATO.

Joint multinational exercises are coordinated currently, mostly by the 2nd Joint Operational Command “Marshall Alexandru Averescu”.

The most important exercises are:
The Romania's Armed Forces Participation to Collective Defence Under NATO Leadership and to ESDP


b) Bi-lateral exercises “in the PfP spirit” (BLUE DANUBE - 2002 in Bulgaria and BLUE DANUBE – 2004 in Romania with the Bulgarian partner, with the participation of 107 staff personnel, BLUE ROAD – 2004, with Serbia-Montenegro.

c) Training exercises for the reserve of SFOR/KFOR (DYNAMIC RESPONSE, yearly, in 2004 it was carried out under the title of “DETERMINED COMMITMENT” with 2 officers).

At national level, specific exercises have been conducted by structures of services, in co-operation with other NATO member states.

While planning these exercises, the 2nd Joint Operational Command and the other participants have implemented NATO Exercise Planning Guide (EPG) and the operational planning has been done according to the NATO Guide for Operational Planning (GOP) 2004.

In the next years, Romanian Armed Forces will increase participation in joint multinational exercises, especially with NATO member countries, aiming at training the forces made available for NATO and those ones that complete their operationalization process.

Conclusions

Romania’s security policy is based at present on the certainty of belonging to NATO and EU.

Additionally, the Enhanced Strategic Partnership with the USA gives Romania security guarantees.

As a European state and future EU member, Romania will encourage the consolidation of the European Defence Security Policy (ESDP) and will actively participate in it. Having a good military potential Romania can be an important pillar of ESDP in the Central and South-Eastern part of the European continent which has been demonstrated through its participation in the Multinational Peace Force–South–East Europe (MPFSEE) in the Stand- by High Readiness Multinational Brigade of UN (SHIRBRIG) in the Black Sea naval cooperation group.
(BLACK SEAFOR) the establishment of a peace-keeping brigade with countries in Central Europe (CENCOOP) and in mixed military units - a Romanian - Hungarian peace-keeping battalion, a Romanian – Ukrainian - Hungarian – Slovakian engineer unit and a Romanian – Moldovan Battalion.

As a NATO member country, Romania will fulfil all its assumed commitments.

The firm and clear engagement in the fight against terrorism has been already proved for about four years, when our country has become a very active member of the Alliance.

ENDNOTES

1 Romania’s Military Strategy (draft), Bucharest, 2004, p.10.
6 Romania’s Armed forces transformation strategy, 2005.
8 In compliance with the Joint Combined Operations Doctrine, Bucharest, 2001, p.129.
ICRC AND NATO COOPERATION - AN OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENT

Zoltan TOTH,
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To reach the ability to contribute to collective defence with their full potential, armed forces have to develop a profound understanding of all of the actors in their prospective theatres of operation. These actors, among others, include armed and security forces, representatives of national and international authorities, governmental and non-governmental organizations and various categories of civilian population. This paper is aimed at introducing one of these actors, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). By understanding some of its basic principles, its modus operandi and contemporary institutional preoccupations and perceptions, Romanian Armed Forces may enhance their operational ability to contribute to collective defence.

ICRC

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance.

It directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the Movement in situations of conflict. It also endeavours to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles. Established in 1863, the ICRC is at the origin of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

The ICRC has developed a broad network of delegations around the world. It has delegations and missions in more than 80 countries with
some 12,000 permanent staff. The ultimate purpose of such a network is to enable the ICRC to fulfil its mandate in favour of those affected by armed conflicts and other situations of violence, by responding in a timely, efficient and adequate manner to the resulting humanitarian needs.

ICRC delegations adapt to the specific needs of the contexts in which they are active and endeavour to develop the most appropriate strategies and effective means of responsive, remedial and/or environment-building action. They also act as early-warning systems with regard to political violence or nascent armed conflicts and their potential consequences in humanitarian terms.

In ongoing or emerging situations of armed conflict or violence, the delegations focus on operational activities such as protection, assistance, prevention and cooperation at the responsive and remedial levels, for the direct benefit of victims – civilians, people deprived of their freedom and the wounded and sick. In other situations, the delegations focus primarily on environment-building preventive action, cooperation with National Societies and humanitarian diplomacy.

This is the case in Romania, too. The ICRC liaises with the Romanian authorities, including the Romanian Armed Forces, through its Regional Delegation for Central Europe. Established in 1997, the Regional Delegation has been monitoring closely the positive developments of the Romanian society during the previous decade. One of the most important of these changes, from the specific point of view of the ICRC, is the increased role and influence Romania has gained in the international theatre.

This enhanced significance is partly derived from the internal political, economical and social developments, but partly in addition as the result of country’s successful NATO (and in the coming months also EU) membership. As member of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union, Bucharest is becoming net contributor to stability and development in the region and beyond, utilizing the achievements of its internal developments, its system of alliances and its strategic position in the Balkans and in the Black Sea Region.
ICRC – EU/NATO

The ICRC is engaged in many forms and modalities of cooperation with EU and NATO. The contributions of the EU and EU countries represent a significant part of ICRC’s budget, enabling it to perform its protection and assistance activities. However, the endorsement provided to the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) by EU and NATO is not less important for ICRC, which is the custodian of IHL.

One of the recent examples of this endorsement was the recent adoption of the European Union Guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL), as published in the Official Journal of the European Union in December 2005.

The NATO equivalent of the mentioned document is the Standardization Agreement STANAG No. 2449, regulating the Training in the Law of Armed Conflict (which is the term preferred by the military when dealing with IHL), adopted on 14 February 2003.

The cooperation between ICRC and NATO goes much beyond the theoretical level focusing on IHL. All NATO members, as well as the states included within the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, are Parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 which protect the wounded and sick, prisoners of war and the civilian population. They have a duty to disseminate knowledge of the Conventions within their armed forces and to the civilian population at large.

Through its contacts with these states, the ICRC offers its support for training in international humanitarian law and strives to make clear its mandate and working procedures in order to facilitate coordination and communication during armed conflict. Moreover, developments during the past decade - notably in South-Eastern Europe - have brought the ICRC and other humanitarian organisations into close contact with multi-national forces engaged in conflict as well as in peace support operations; both the ICRC and the military have identified the need for greater transparency and heightened coordination.

Central to this dialogue is the ICRC’s firm belief that while good working relations with the armed forces in any conflict situation are
a natural and essential ingredient for its work, a distinction must at all times be maintained between military and humanitarian activities and mandates, and that humanitarian organisations must preserve their neutrality towards belligerents, impartiality towards the victims and independence from political, military or any other kind of interference.

Forms of practical cooperation include regular participation of ICRC representatives to courses in the NATO School in Oberammergau, in both capacities, as students as well as lecturers. ICRC delegates perform regularly pre-deployment training to NATO units (or military units of NATO member states) before their deployment to peace support and other operations. At the same time, regular operational dialogue takes place between the two institutions on essential topics, e.g. detention issues. Most importantly, the ICRC has permanent access to NATO on both political and military levels, through its Secretariat and SHAPE. By means of this ongoing dialogue, the ICRC is able to convey its institutional concerns and preoccupations regarding the conditions of contemporary humanitarian action.

At this occasion, keeping on mind the focus of the topic, the contribution of Romanian Armed Forces’ to NATO collective defence and to EDSP, three of these institutional preoccupations have to be singled out.

Neutral and Independent Humanitarian Action

Namely, the pertinence of the ICRC’s operating principles in today’s environment is regularly called into question. What place is there for neutrality, goes one line of argument, when the stakes are so high in the current “global confrontation”? The ICRC is aware of the challenge and the need to develop new ways to explain and communicate its resolute stance on this and other issues.

The way in which the organization interprets the mandate it has been given by the community of States is that it has a responsibility to act in all situations of armed conflict and internal violence. To fulfil this duty, the ICRC is firmly convinced that it must abstain under any circumstances from taking sides and must seek dialogue with all actors.
It makes neither a political judgment on a given situation, nor does it attribute a specific status to any group or actor.

In today’s conflicts, neutrality is often perceived as indifference. In the case of the ICRC, this could not be farther from the truth. Its 11,000 staff members in the field are confronted daily with individual or collective tragedies, suffering and pain that goes beyond what most people can even imagine. They feel revulsion and outrage at what they see, but more than anything else they are spurred on by an even greater determination to alleviate that suffering, to prevent it from happening again or to mitigate its worst effects. To do this effectively, the organization believes that it must steer clear of political controversies and keep its action distinct from the political or military agendas of any one actor. This explains why the ICRC will continue to voice its concern at the current blurring of the lines between political and military action on the one hand and humanitarian action on the other.

The ICRC does not claim that there is only one definition of humanitarian action. It does, however, want its own action to be clearly understood as separate from the current integrated approaches which see humanitarian action as part of broader security objectives or crisis-management responses. Such approaches conflict with the ICRC’s interpretation of neutral and independent humanitarian action.

There is a need for creative thought in considering the relationship between multinational military missions and humanitarian actors in time of armed conflict, the current trends and the potential consequences. It is no longer sufficient to limit the discussion to how humanitarian agencies and multinational military missions might cooperate or coordinate. Humanitarian actors are obliged to understand the evolving non-combat doctrine, operations and aims of the military forces with whom they are obliged to share their working environment. Most importantly, civil-military relations can no longer be considered as a subject in isolation. In order to understand the effects today — and more importantly, in the next five to ten years — the evolution of how armed forces see their capacity to take on civilian roles and tasks has to be understood within broader trends of nation-building and integrated approaches to conflict management.
"Advocacy for an independent and neutral humanitarian approach includes a claim for maintaining a clear distinction between humanitarian action on the one hand and political-military action on the other. Not because the ICRC shies away from the military: on the contrary, we want and often have an active dialogue with them. Nor because we claim that there are not circumstances when — other actors being incapable of fulfilling their missions — a military unit might be a last resort. But because we want to avoid the current blurring of lines produced by the characterization of military ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns or reconstruction efforts as humanitarian. The ICRC has in that regard a problem with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. Not on account of the strictly speaking military or security objectives they have set for themselves. In keeping with our neutrality, that is not a dimension we wish to comment on. We are however concerned because they integrate humanitarian responses into an overall military and security concept, in which responding to the needs of parts of the population can be a constituent part of a strategy to defeat an opponent or enemy."

(Statement by the ICRC, 31 March 2004)

CIMIC

(Based on the article Contemporary challenges in the civil-military relationship: Complementarity or incompatibility? by Raj Rana, published in the International Review of the Red Cross, September 2004)

In 2001, the ICRC adopted Guidelines for Civil-Military Relations (CMR), based on the experiences of the previous decade. While a relationship with armed forces is natural for an organization that works in contexts of armed conflict, there was a particular need to address both the complexity of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations and the growing trend towards integrating the efforts of political, military and humanitarian actors.

The ICRC’s Guidelines address the risks and threats posed by multinational military missions engaging in humanitarian activities or
deployed under a humanitarian mandate, while potentially becoming an active participant in hostilities.

Some indications of the more recent developments:

• Humanitarian operations have become a mainstream, non-combat function of armed forces, employed equally in combat, stabilization operations or as part of nation-building agendas. Providing assistance to the civilian population, or influencing the humanitarian and reconstruction efforts of others, is considered as a mean of “force multiplication” or “force protection”. Political authorities expect their armed forces to have improved their civil-military capacities so as to meet their obligations under international humanitarian law, in addition to becoming part of the integral post-conflict political and reconstruction efforts of local authorities, State civilian agencies, humanitarian organizations and others.

• The phenomenon of armed forces engaging in humanitarian action in the 1990s was a new and evolving concept without a road map, and there was room for humanitarian agencies to contest the perceived “militarization” of humanitarian assistance. Today, military and political actors are more certain of how they want to intervene, and consider each armed intervention as a fresh opportunity to test new integrated approaches to conflict management. Humanitarian organizations that fail to align themselves with these integrated approaches are perceived as being entrenched behind the inflexibility of their mandates, or simply out of step with the times.

• At both national and regional levels, there are active efforts to streamline and merge State and military capacities in carrying out future armed interventions. The concept of the latter is one in which the military is able to jump from waging war to peacekeeping to humanitarian assistance on the same day, at times within the same city. Civilian experts will be embedded into military structures to provide support for policing, civil administration and political reform, and to act as advisors to military forces and even as donors to humanitarian, reconstruction and private sector actors.

Civil-military cooperation and civil affairs should not be considered as a completely benign military function or one that can be
considered in isolation from combat and intelligence gathering. With the restructuring of armed forces over the last decade, civil-military cooperation and civil affairs have been bundled together with the bulk of non-combat operations that are part of a commander’s range of tools for waging war — globally referred to as “information operations” (InfoOps).

Civil-military cooperation and civil affairs are complementary to the other public function of “media operations” (MediaOps), while “psychological operations” (PsyOps) and “electronic warfare” are often undertaken in support of intelligence objectives. As such, there can be no complete separation between military humanitarian activities and intelligence gathering. This trend extends equally to armed forces involved in UN-mandated peace operations.

In relation with multinational military missions the ICRC advocates:

- maintaining its independence of decision making and action;
- keeping a clear distinction between humanitarian, political and military roles and actors in times of armed conflict; and
- maintaining a dialogue at all times, and at all levels, with multinational military missions, whatever their status in the conflict.

This dialogue, however, cannot be performed exclusively through the CIMIC cell. Taking into consideration the mandate of ICRC as described above, a clear distinction has to be made between topics that can be discussed in presence of other humanitarian actors, aid organizations and others, and those that merit the attention of the commander or his legal advisors, due to its confidentially.

To the first group belong issues, such as access to victims by roads, air or sea, notification of movement, demining/mine awareness, dissemination of IHL, targeting (in sense of notification), use of military assets for humanitarian assistance and all the issues related to aspects of security.

The group of confidential topics includes access to PoW, their identification and notification, observations on grave breaches of IHL and possible actions of ICRC as neutral intermediary between the parties to the conflict.
Emblem

The emblems recognized by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are the red cross, the red crescent and the red lion and sun. Because of the Conventions and the rules of the International Movement, a National Society had to use one of them to be recognized as a Movement member. Since 1980, only the red cross and red crescent emblems have been in use.

The red cross and red crescent emblems are used in more than 190 countries in the world to protect medical personnel, buildings and equipment in time of armed conflict and to identify national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

Unfortunately, the red cross and red crescent emblems are sometimes wrongly perceived as having religious, cultural or political connotations. This has affected respect for the emblems and has diminished the protection the emblems offer to victims and to humanitarian and medical personnel.

The solution, which has been endorsed by governments and national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, involved the adoption, by States party to the Geneva Conventions, of an additional protocol to the Conventions, creating an emblem additional to the red cross and red crescent. The additional emblem, known as the “red crystal”, has been designed to be free of any national, cultural, religious, political or ethnic connotations. It will have the same international status as the existing emblems, a status enshrined in the Geneva Conventions.

The adoption of the additional emblem enables National Societies that find it difficult to use either the red cross or the red crescent to become
members of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The additional emblem will enable the Movement to achieve its goal of universality.

Conclusion

As member of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union, Romania is becoming net contributor to stability and development in the region and beyond, utilizing the achievements of its internal developments, its system of alliances and its strategic position in the Balkans and in the Black Sea Region. Its Armed Forces play an increasingly enhanced role in NATO collective defence and contribute to EDSP. This role can be further developed by engaging in collaboration with ICRC in implementing International Humanitarian Law and disseminating the principles embodied in the Geneva Conventions to the members of the Romanian Armed Forces.
The challenges Europe faces in the first decade of the 21st century have changed the importance of the Black Sea Area and Azov Sea sub-region, in the context of the continent’s security. This area has become again an important one from the geopolitical perspective. And this is determined at least by five reasons:

- first of all, it is the risk of terrorism rising, as a second consequence of the global war initiated by the United States in 2001;
- secondly, due to its geographical position, at the border between Europe and Asia. It is a very attractive area from the perspective of the raw energetic materials transport and the traffic channels related with criminal groups dealing with drugs, illegal weapons and people trafficking;
- thirdly, due to the political immaturity and economical instability of the most young countries within this region. That is why these states become shelters for international criminal groups and organised crime at international level;
- fourthly, due to the persistence of certain “frozen” conflicts. There are no ideas related to their ending, either from the interested state or the international community;
- fifthly, due both to Russia’s traditional geopolitical importance (that tries to impose to the regional countries its pattern of functioning), and NATO and EU (they have a special interest in developing the security and the stability in the Black Sea Area), and also due to some other smaller regional players, but having the same importance.

Understanding the most of the time particular interests of Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, North
Caucasus, Stavropolsk, Krasnoiarsk and Rostow areas from Russia, Ukraine, together with Crimea and Moldova, together with Transdniester, this is the key of understanding the Black Sea’s geopolitics. The one who controls Danube’s and Dniester’s openings, the Bosporus and Dardanelles, Crimea and Georgia, controls also the Black Sea and the areas within the continent.

Starting the Argonauts’ legendary trip to Kolchida (nowadays Georgia), the Greeks understood this thing and put up numerous harbours during the Hellenic colonization of the Black Sea Coast. The Republic of Jagiellons also understood this thing, trying to build up a Poland “from a sea to another”, even the Ottoman Turkey understood this, as it was vividly against the Polish expansion.²

Above all, Russia understands these things, as it is the traditional strategic player within this area. The history of Crimea is an example, we would call it an “unsinkable Russian aircraft carrier”. For the time being, Georgia’s, Ukraine’s and Moldova’s centrifugal tendencies determined Moscow to seize the danger of losing its irreversible position within the region and also to start to rebuild its influences, with a double energy. This serves the policy of the “controlled chaos”. It is characterized by the “frozen conflicts” from Abhazia, South Osetia and Transdniester, by the “hot situation” from Chechnya and by „mastering” the enclaves from Georgia (Abhazia and South Osetia), Azerbaijan (South Karabakh) and Ukraine (Crimea). These “specific shadow areas”, places where “the state smuggling” works perfectly together with the illegal goods trafficking, including weapons and drugs, determined the interest of both the Russian Foreign Affairs Minister and the organised crime at international level.³

This phenomenon is largely observed by the United States; we may have the impression that NATO ignores these processes, but the European Union accepts them.

From European and Euroatlantic perspective, the Black Sea region is still perceived as having a high risk. This is the area where elements of political correctness towards Russia are accumulated (accepting the “neighbourhood policy”), as well as the unpredictable and the fear. From Washington and Bruxelles perspective, breaching human rights, the lack
of certain real mechanisms of the market economy, the omnipresence of mob structures, the poverty present in most of societies represent the standard, and the lack of progress on implementing a modern democracy that is a characteristic of the countries situated in the Euroatlantic area, is constant. From Warsaw perspective, Romania is usually perceived from the Gipsy beggars perspective, Moldova is confounded with Mozambique, Chisinau with Kinshasa.

These stereotypes do not win. Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania are already NATO allies. EU will enlarge soon and will include Romania and Bulgaria, and probably Turkey on a longer perspective. The “coloured” revolutions from Georgia and Ukraine, the changes from Moldova determined the appearance of other situation within the region, from the quality perspective, have represented the beginning of the transformation of the archaic structures inherited from the Soviet Union.

For the time being, in terms of economical conditions, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia exclude the status of an EU member as it seems more real to become NATO members. For the Alliance, the next strategic aim should be the enlargement of the security area to East. Using the pattern of isolating (neutralizing) the Balkan conflicts (by opening the NATO doors to Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania), NATO’s enlargement with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia would turn the political situation and the security in the Black Sea Area into normal. The Black Sea would no longer be an isolated enclave. It would connect, by a coherent security system, the Mediterranean Sea with the Caspian one, the raw energetic materials from Caucasus, Kazakhstan and Middle East.

According to Boris Asarov, from the Republic of Moldova, the main conditions for achieving this scenario may be:

- turning GUAM into a political and defence alliance;
- solving out the “frozen conflicts”;
- establishing a regional leader who has a certain experience for integration and who might offer some help and a real support for the young post-Soviet democracies.\(^4\)

The first condition. Achieving GUAM as a political and defence alliance (especially after Uzbekistan, the weakest link, left the organization) would include Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova.
in a multilateral security system. This seems logical, as Romania and Bulgaria are GUAM observers and the organization itself is interested in having them as full members. This is how GUAM may a play a similar role to the one played by the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe: it would promote certain regional initiatives as the “Stability Pact for the Black Sea” or the “Stability Pact for Caucasus”. Therefore, it would become NATO’s waiting room.⁵

From a further perspective, accepting GUAM countries in NATO would have a strategic importance for the Alliance. It would strengthen the centralised control on the continental airspace, it would enable the fight against trans-border organised crime and would improve the trans-shipping of the military troops to Caucasus and the Caspian Sea. The possibility to build new bases for the rapid reaction forces deployed in this so less stable region would be next strategic influence NATO would have, from the Danube la Delta, to Crimea and Caucasus. NATO’s south flank, apparently strong (Turkey) has weak points. The control of NATO on the Black Sea Coast and region would guarantee the security of the Central and South Europe. That is how the East border of NATO would cross the Baltic Sea – Azov Sea. The South border would cross from Turkey to the Caspian Sea, ensuring proper conditions for planning the defence also for confrontations, if it will be about asymmetrical threats.

Fair enough, accepting Belarus and Kazakhstan in NATO seems to be a remote problem (at least judging by their actual political situation); however, the Belarus democratization process would be sooner if the neighbour Ukraine was in NATO. This solution seems logical only for the Ukrainian “protectorate”. With American assistance, Kazakhstan started a program for building up its own fleet to the Caspian Sea and it is sure it will become a democracy.

The second condition for gradually integrating the region within EU and NATO is solving out the “frozen conflicts”, mainly the ones from Transdniestra. The OECD experience (especially when the negotiations in “5+2” formula turned into a discussion club) shows that this organization has already used its possibilities. The European Security and Defence Policy may become a “European” alternative,
allowing the military observers’ missions. But NATO’s participation to solving out the conflict from Transdniester would be the premise for working out a suitable strategy for the region and a test of Ukraine’s pro-West attitude.\(^6\)

Generally speaking, the “euroatlantic” perspectives of Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan depend on how necessary will be these countries for the West, as “alternative” energy sources. The key-element of this sort of system is Georgia, the South Caucasus channel of communication. After Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline was put into practice, May, 2005, Georgia “exerts” a certain control on this line from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean one; it is an important strategic and economic line for EU and the United States (NATO). BTC diminishes the risk of a possible blackmail from OPEC countries on establishing oil prices. However, the certain functioning of this pipeline requires a security system, and one of its elements may be Georgia’s status as a NATO member. The competing Caspian oil and gas transmission lines close to the Russian borders hit its economical interests; therefore, whatever it would mean, Russia is interested in exerting at least a secret control on them.

The third condition seems to be easiest to be put into practice. Romania is a natural leader in the region, a NATO member and, most probably, starting January 2007, an EU one.\(^7\) It has a certain potential in different areas, it starts to play the role of a strategic ally of the United States in the Black Sea Area, as Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu asserts.\(^8\) The Romanian phenomenon is based on the fact that the power has been overtaken by the political option that has no connection with the communist past, but the Romanian diplomacy, within its effective tradition, offers landmarks that should be taken into consideration by GUAM diplomats. Romania should be a model for Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. This model refers to how you effectively can mix the orthodox culture with the modern liberal and democratic values. Romania may be a support for reorganising the region from sociological and cultural perspective.\(^9\)

This observation refers mainly to Moldova. The main condition implies its political leaders to understand that the only way that goes
to West stops in Romania and that is why there should be established relations similar to the ones between Ukraine and Poland. Activating the military and strategic collaboration between Romania and Moldova is a strategic imperative (whether the relations between Ukraine and Russia were built on a limited economical and energetic base, the military collaboration between Ukraine and Poland seems to be a long-term one).

The solidarity is a form of commitment, obligatorily consisting of the mutual responsibility and legal assistance. This is about mutual support, the responsibility residing from the same opinions, aspirations and behaviour. In other words, unanimity.

In Ukraine and Georgia disappeared the hope lit a year ago by the coloured revolutions. The political elites are responsible for this, accusing both West and East (especially the West), based on the immediate EU disposition of offering assistance. But this assistance does not come or comes in another form than expected, expressed in the “neighbourhood policy” that does no longer assume the automatic adhesion. Disappointment and crisis are intensified in the Black Sea Area. Under these circumstances, the reasonable euroatlantic solidarity to the Black Sea Area may determine the chance, for the region’s states of being active participants to the security policy and to improve their position in the internal relations hierarchy. The tactical purpose should be the one referring to the region’s security, the strategic one – the “European” future of Turkey and Russia. These states need to become as soon as possible security providers within the Black Sea Area. Especially the democratic Russia. Trying to build a stable security system in this region without Russia is going to be a failure, from the very beginning. Meantime, trying to build-up a system against Russia seems to be a political utopia.

**ENDNOTES**

1M. Falkowski, Problemy bezpieczeństwa państw regionu Morza Czarnego. [w]: A. Ciupiński, K. Malak (red.), Bezpieczeństwo polityczne i wojskowe, Warszawa 2004; Alexandrescu G., Milestones of Wider Black Sea Region in the

2Piskozub A., Via Pontica. Tradycje i perspektywy pomostu bałtyko-


5Ibidem.


7Băsescu nu vrea să fie lider regional, „Adevărul”, April, 27, 2006.


THE ROMANIA’S ARMED FORCES PARTICIPATION TO COLLECTIVE DEFENCE UNDER NATO LEADERSHIP AND TO ESDP
DEBATES
SECTION II

Gerard DONELAN (G.D.):
First of all, this is to the General, actually, this is not a question but a comment. I was impressed by the presentation on the complex issue of interoperability at all levels culturally, languages and so forth. When I worked for NATO for 11 years in the field of satellites, most of my time I was deployed in the field designing and building communication interfaces so the nations could actually talk to each other. And this was a continuous job for 11 years. We constantly were going to ships of different nations, building interfaces so that the British could talk with the French and the French could talk to the Spanish and this was a problem that no one seemed to address. And, in fact, it was also a national problem during the first Gulf War. The American army could not talk with the American Air Force and the British had to deploy communication vehicles to enable them to talk to each other. So, it seems that finally interoperability has taken the main stage, and I find it extremely interesting and refreshing to see that the Romanian Armed Forces have given this topic the seriousness it deserves. Well done!!!

Lieutenant-General dr. Sorin IOAN (S.I):
Thank you, Sir, thank you so much. I would like to add something I haven’t mentioned during my presentation, it was long enough anyway, but a different multinational environment is very exciting.

It’s a different view saying when it is about joint troops, if we are taking a battalion, and there is also a completely different view if you are the commander of a multinational environment. So, you have to give orders, to plan a mission and you have to take into account different cultures, different missions and it’s actually an art in military terms, to deliver missions among 27 nations and of course to take into account the differences in terms of the equipment and technique, but
for military is an extraordinary and unique experience to work in a multinational environment.

**Dr. Nicolae DOLGHIN (N.D.):**
I have several questions for the guest speakers.

1. General, you spoke of interoperability, you showed us five levels of interoperability. The cultural aspect of interoperability is very interesting and decisive. What do you think of the interoperability within the national forces? Starting from the classical definition of interoperability, how can Land Forces receive and offer assistance from other services?

2. Mr. Solak, how do you assert Russia and Turkey may be involved in possible security arrangements within the Black Sea area, taking into consideration the actors’ interests diverge on the Black Sea issue? After all, Russia and Turkey are also actors in other international plays. How can we attract them, as the offers made so far were not successful?

3. Mr. Toth, Red Cross is involved, in essence, in protecting civilians. As the military conflicts tend to become more and more complex, when it is hard to make the difference between combatant (the one who wears a uniform) and non-combatant, who is a civilian and who should be protected, when norms and rules of law are breached, both by civilians and militaries, how can you achieve the basic objective, that is protecting civilians?

**S.I.:**
I spoke of a concern I have been aware for six years, of achieving the interoperability between services. It has come to a reasonable limit and the General Staff, as the strategic echelon, the Second Operational Joint Command, as the one who leads joint operations, take this element into consideration when it is about procurement in modernization programs.

Regarding the interoperability, there is no service to do an exercise without using the other services, according to the cooperation programs.
We, the land forces, cannot start an action without aviation support, support helicopters and transport helicopters. Even if the helicopters are not part of the land forces, transport and evacuation helicopters are essential.

Therefore, I have a unit in a mission, it is caught in an ambush, I need to deploy a rapid reaction force, the only proper way is by air, in order to timely intervene or evacuate casualties, sick people from that area.

This is not an easy procedure, because the aviation staff has a specific language. That’s why we felt the need to have well-trained personnel, able to use the aviation or helicopter language. The situation is similar with the one within the theatres of operations: wherever we have deployed forces, we train in advance our liaison officers for the missions within aviation. The language is completely different and requires a specific training. Likewise, Navy doesn’t execute exercises without cooperating with the Land Forces. The latest extensive exercise included paratroopers that landed on Sea and Danube. Two years ago, there was a broad exercise when we had all the services, under a unique command, all the special forces from all the other ministries related with defence and even the intelligence services. I will give you an example related with communication. We need compatible means of communication, we need to get in touch with each other using the same means. Whenever it was about modernization, we took into account compatible communications. Therefore, my answer is yes, we are interoperable at national defence level.

**N.D.:**

So, on short term, we may see that an infantry platoon commander will be able to ask a helicopter to select and destroy targets?

**S.I.:**

He is already able to do that, but only in the military units that have been turned into operational. In the coming future, we will finalize the modernization programs, including the high units from the regeneration forces.
Dr. Janusz SOLAK (J.S.):
Thank you. I think NATO’s South flank, Turkey, even if it seems strong, it still has certain weak parts. NATO’s control on the Black Sea coast and area assured Central and South Europe security. Likewise, NATO’s East border crosses Baltic Sea, Azov Sea, and the South one from Turkey to the Caspian Sea, ensuring optimal conditions for defence planning and for confrontations if it’s about an asymmetrical threat.

The concurrent lines for the Caspian oil close to the Russian border hit its economical interests. That is why Russia is interested at least in exerting a secret control on them. This is my opinion and I wonder if I answered to your question.

N.D.:
The question was how to attract Russia in the regional security arrangements, the ones it has not been involved so far?

J.S.:
I think Russia should be involved in the region. You cannot build stability in the region without Russia. Thank you!

Zoltan TOTH (Z.T.):
Thank you very much for the question, dr. Dolghin, because it indicates that you grasp it excellent, the sense of the international humanitarian law. And that is basically the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. According to the law, those who are taking active part into a conflict are contributing to this war efforts and are legitimate military targets. Those who are not taking part into the conflict or not anymore taking part because they are wounded or sick, they are protected by the law. This protection is a very basic protection, it’s not anything with human rights or this kind of issues. It’s basically just protecting the life and dignity, physical integrity of these persons. Because of this distinction, some of those who might be perceived as civilians but are accompanying armed forces are not protected as civilians. Civilian engineers engaged by the Romanian Armed Forces in
some theatres abroad could be a legitimate target for an opposite force. Indeed, the problem functions excellently right when you confront with structured armed forces. The problem starts when the categories are mixing up, and basically this is a question of rebel movements, the so-called partisan movements, and those movements who are basically appearing as civilians. Therefore, in the law we have two kinds of definitions of these people, and the question, in a brief form, is just one of the distinction, I think. How to in-between to the protection of civilians? There are several layers to this issue. One is definitely what we are trying to do: is not to question the fundamental distinction in the law. After 9/11 we have attempts of re-approving, renegotiating the basics of this distinction which we are opposing very much. Especially since the US government came up with this idea of unlawful combatants which was not in the law. You are either combatant, and you have the right to fight or you are not a combatant and there you are protected as a civilian. We are also trying to provide assistance, as I mentioned already in my presentation, impartiality to everybody which means that my colleagues in Guantanamo are the only outside persons who are visiting those ones who are captured at Guantanamo and they are the only link between them and their families. My colleagues are doing this quite regularly, exchanging messages, bringing letters in and letters out from Guantanamo. Evidently, the US Army has the right to censor, to open messages.

I would make two groups of here: one is a technical one, where we are trying to introduce mechanisms which are, in a technical sense, protecting civilians; we are active in the campaign of banning landmines because most of the casualties were civilians after the conflicts. We also are very active in promoting treaty on unexploded ammunitions from war, we are trying to find new instrument but without reopening this basic distinction of the law.

**General-Brigadier (ret.) dr. Georghe VĂDUVA (G.V.):**

I have been interested for 30 years in a topic I find essential, explaining and respecting life, cultures, diversity, multi-culture and the cultures’ particularity as it is an essence of the human condition. There
was a great man who said: “I was happy only when my thought was stronger than life”. Behind this idea you may find the world’s philosophy. Culture is a product of thought. It is a value synthesis, as products of thinking. There is actually nothing behind culture. Maybe only God, as we know culture is the one raising the human society to word and thought, shows its way. I checked all these elements regarding the philosophy of this culture in all theatres of operations. It is amazing that people coming from different cultures, even having different interests in that area, succeed to get along perfectly. Taking the Romanian soldier as an example, his behaviour in theatres is rather better than in the training process, here, at home. I mean in the confrontation with reality and the inter-communication between cultures, he proved to be himself. Well, I am sure that the network philosophy and physiognomy will solve out this issue, the communication between cultures and the interoperability between actions and between the components that need to elevate this philosophy up to human condition. The world has no other chance. In the actual stage, there is only one chance, the partnerships’ and unity, in order to manage the emerging vulnerabilities and threats that are a product of the evolving society, the society that turns to be an informational, epistemic one, the one when each man will be a scientist.

World is moving, the efforts NATO and EU make, between Alliance and the European world to the Eurasian space, that is very important, are framed in this common, collective tendency. We go back and read again Plato, but differently. We understand that the world cannot exist but integrating and communicating. These are very important elements for reconsidering the term I used before, collective defence.

Maybe tomorrow we will call it differently. However, the communication between cultures and building a philosophy of integrating human action seem essential for the coming times. Thank you!

**Colonel Cornel BARBU (C.B.):**

I have a question for Mr. Solak, about the Black Sea status.

Adding few words to the moderator’s comment, I would say there is a good collaboration between Russia and Turkey. So far, both succeeded to successfully hinder the entrance of other big powers within
the Black Sea Area and I would like to speak of Active Endeavour. This operation has not succeeded to expand in the Black Sea Area and to achieve the purposes it has been created for.

Is there a way to determine Turkey to break its “cooperation” with Russia in this field and to permit NATO’s forces access by straits, in order to control the access of the organized crime structures to Europe from the Caspian area? Thank you!

J.S.:
Russia needs to be involved in the regional stability and security structures, especially the democratic Russia. It is not a solution to try to build a system without Russia. This region is not stable without Russia, as it is the region’s strategic player.

N.D.:
Maybe there should be explained Russia’s approach, its old obsession for borders. There are lots of historians who tried to explain the Russian Empire’s enlargement mechanism and stopped when they came to the natural borders, the deserts from the Central Asia, Caucasus Mountains. Russia has always considered its West border as the most sensitive, the hardest to be defended and the most vulnerable. There are always certain mentions in a certain Russian political discourse that Russia has always been attacked in this area. Probably this may be a solution: How to get rid of this obsession, how to attract Russia in these security arrangements? Otherwise, there will be no security in the Black Sea if it is a system against Russia.

G.V.:
I think the issue of the relations between Russia and Turkey, EU and other interested powers, other entities interested in the Black Sea Area is about to be solved out. Truly enough, it has not been turned into something concrete. Let’s remember that Russia has a partner, it is part of a strategic partnership with EU that is in fact building. Let’s not forget Russia wants to become an EU member. Let’s not forget that EU takes its resources from Russia, according to Solana Strategy,
70% of the resources are taken from Russia. Therefore, a European Union without Russia is a “mutilated” European Union. This means the European integration process continues, it will have to co-opt Russia. Russia should not be perceived as an enemy, as a bad guy, because it’s not. There have been built-up strategic partnerships between Russia and China, Russia and the USA, Russia and India, Russia and EU, Russia and Turkey. All of them are premises for solving out all these issues and transforming the Black Sea Area, an area that has never had its real strategic importance.

In the future, we may witness the Black Sea playing a very important role, even as a strategic pillar, in building this stable Eurasian security environment.

In the studies we have published we came to the conclusion that the Black Sea may be an important player within this area, in building a safe and stable Euro-Atlantic security space. This is very important, because there are many strategic corridors.

It is true, it seems Russia’s no. 1 problem, in this stage, was exactly solving out the border issues that are to be resolved.

So, Russia becomes a strategic partner for all big strategic entities and I think its contribution for building a Eurasian stability space is essential, necessary and compulsory, if you want.

**N.D.:**

This discussion reflects the evolution of the topic we proposed, collective defence and the European Security and Defence Policy. It seems that the collective defence is a solved problem. It is stipulated in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, it is derived from article 51 of the UN Charter, everything seems to be all right, but it is something hard to invoke. It was seen that it is hard to state the principle “all for one and one for all”. **There is one thing at statements level, and another one to activate it.** Things are rather complicated, because there are regional interests, national ones and so on. After 9/11, for the first time in history, they tried to turn article 5 into operational. NATO’s main ally did not accept that, they chose another formula, the coalition one that is a larger form of association, without the rigid procedures related
with an alliance, stated in a political treaty. We can imagine what modus operandi will be chosen in the future, collective defence or other form of cooperation. Meantime, all the European analyses assert that it is unlikely to confront with an armed attack in Europe. Article 5 is meant for rejecting an armed attack, is built on a reality we all acknowledge as one less probable. In turn, there are new risks and threats that seemed unimportant when they signed the Washington treaty. I think that in a way or another all these things have been stressed out or suggested during our debates.

The message is that we have all the reasons to be optimistic. The democratic exercise offers the required mechanisms for implementing certain solutions. Even if the mechanisms are slow, long-debated and negotiated, but democracy always offers a ladder to be climbed, it is nobody’s intention to break it in order to impose the solution.

I think we have attained our purpose when we chose the topic and launched the invitations to the guest speakers, figures with experience and authority.

Thank you once again for your participation and we invite you to other future events organised by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies.
CLOSING REMARKS

Dr. Constantin MOȘTOFLEI, the director of the CDSSS:

First of all, let me thank to our foreign guest speakers, Mr. Donelan, Mr. Solak and Mr. Toth, to our Romanian guest speakers and to all of you that made comments during the debates sessions. Meantime, I would like to thank to all the participants that accepted our invitation.

Once again, I would like to express my gratitude to our sponsors, to our main sponsor, SES ASTRA Luxemburg, and to ROMTEHNICA S.A. Also, I would like to thank our colleagues responsible with technical details and also to the ones that helped us with the translations, as they offer us the chance to be interoperable from the ideas perspective.

Thank you all very much indeed!