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***THE COMPLEX AND DYNAMIC NATURE
OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT***

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PANEL 1:
**New aspects in the evolution
of the international security
environment**

NATO IN THE CURRENT SECURITY ENVIRONMENT. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

*Sorin IOAN, PhD**

In this time of uncertainty, a strong NATO is a source of confidence. It is an essential contributor to wider international security and stability. It means we can face today's challenges from a position of strength¹.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen- NATO Secretary General

Abstract: *Challenges of the current security environment necessitate the transformation of the Alliance, while maintaining a high level of responsiveness to external stimuli in order to promote the interests and values of the organization. Since its founding, NATO has acted with priority to ensure the security of member states, continuously adapting to the challenges of the security environment. Thus, we can say that the objectives of the organization were relatively constant. What differed was the manner of addressing them.*

Currently, due to a strong and prolonged economic crisis, NATO is facing new risks and threats, requiring, again, a review of the challenges of security, functional mechanisms and organizational structure. Providing relevant capabilities, cooperation with other actors, and operations represent the NATO's current priorities that require identification and development of pragmatic solutions in line with future changes in the security environment.

Keywords: *NATO transformation capabilities, missions, Afghanistan, strategic concept.*

1. Introduction

The end of the Second World War left behind a Europe ravaged by the atrocities of a violent war, unimaginable today. Postwar European area abounded in apocalyptic images describing cities with smoldering ruins and full of millions of starving orphans crying for their parents lost in the cavalcade of war. People, sheltered in refugee camps or waiting in endless lines to receive meager rations of food, were dreaming with the effervescence and enthusiasm of the survivor for a better world, while shedding tears of sadness for the about 36 million Europeans lost in the horrors of war.

Under these auspices, authorities in European countries were facing complex challenges, normal to post-conflict stages, due to the urgent need to assist populations in need, to stabilize the overall situation and to lay the foundation for rebuilding nations, in some situations from scratch. Even with the United States of America, abandoning traditional isolationist policy and being actively involved in European reconstruction, both through the Marshall Plan and other means contributing substantially to the economic stabilization of Europe, the situation was difficult.

* **Lieutenant General PhD. Professor, Chief of Romanian Land Forces Staff.**

¹ Anders Fogh RASMUSSEN, "NATO – delivering security in the 21st century", 04 July 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_88886.htm accesat la data de 12.10.2012.

General context was still far from being favorable to a rapid progress, given the reluctance of nations to engage in political and economic cooperation initiatives in the absence of strong security guarantees. War trauma manifested in the collective consciousness and people had difficulties in understanding how they could identify common solutions to return to normality cooperating with countries that they had recently faced on the battlefield. Moreover, the aggressive policy of the Soviet Union to impose its influence and dominance over Europe through local communist movement was perceived as a major threat contributing to overall climate of insecurity, and that marked the dawn of the Cold War.

Under these conditions, some of the Western European democracies have launched military cooperation projects that promoted a broad framework of common defense against threats coming from the East, the most relevant being the foundation of the Western Union in 1948. Even in these conditions, security issues were far from being solved, soon being identified the need to build a transatlantic security system to deter a potential Soviet aggression, while prohibiting the return to power of militarist-nationalist regimes, and to ensure conditions of political integration.

Therefore, after much discussion and debate, on 4 April 1949 was signed the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO's birth certificate, by which the Allies² established the new priority that *an armed attack against one or more members shall be considered an attack against all* and noted the obligation of all allied states to carry out all actions necessary to repel any aggression, including the use of armed forces, thus defining the basic function of the new organization: collective defense.

Further development of the Alliance demonstrated its determination to promote and protect the values and interests of its members to adapt to changing security environment regardless the complexity of the challenges that occurred. Treaty's benefits were visible relatively soon after signing. Western European nations, economically aided by the U.S. and benefiting of the security framework provided by NATO, have been realizing rapid and dramatic economic progress, simultaneously with the development of organization political dimension. Rapid maturation of the Alliance determined flexibility as fundamental feature, both in relation to the main threat of the Communist Bloc³ and the problems of a domestic nature⁴. Moreover, in relation to the main adversary, the Soviet Union, NATO has taken the first step to defuse the situation resulted from the *Cuban missile crisis*. Thus, since 1967, the organization had begun to act not only to maintain de facto balance, but also to open up dialogue with members of the Warsaw Pact, thereby laying the foundations for OSCE.

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty signed by the U.S. and Soviet Union in 1987, the defeat of the Soviet communism in the intellectual struggle with the West, the situation in Poland in the late 80's, when the communist regime was

² Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Island, Italy, Luxemburg, Holland, Norway, Portugal, U.K, U.S.

³In 1955 was established the Warsaw Pact in response to West Germany accession in NATO.

⁴ See the event of the withdrawal of France from NATO's military structure in 1966, which showed that the organization can tolerate different views of members, compared with the Warsaw Pact.

forced to make some concessions to an democratic movement, and the decline of communist economies were clear indicators that the Cold War was inexorably approaching its end.

The fall of communism in 1989 brought, along with the joy of achieving the conditions for democracy and peace in Europe, also many worries on the future role of NATO.

2. NATO in the post Cold War Era - new security issues

Undoubtedly, the major events occurring in the international arena over the past 20 years have influenced both the physiognomy of current security environment and the NATO's evolution. In 1991, NATO was in a similar position as in 1949, being the basic element in the reconstruction of the European security architecture. The establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1991 has opened channels of consultation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia which saw achievable their aspirations of democratization, stabilization and European integration only by the cooperation with the Alliance. In the same vein, three years later were laid the foundations of the Mediterranean Dialogue, by which NATO, alongside Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia and later Algeria, expanded the cooperation for security in the Mediterranean area.

Following the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (when NATO became involved in peace efforts in support of the United Nations), Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia and others, it was shown that the power vacuum left after the dissolution of the Communist Bloc represented a dangerous source of instability, which reaffirmed the need to strengthen cooperation as a tool to promote NATO's interests. A particularly important result was the creation in 1994 of the Partnership for Peace forum where all nations who wanted to break away from the strategic isolation, could cooperate with the Alliance for reform and modernization of democratic and military institutions in order to join the organization, if that were desired. Enlargement process was materialized at NATO Summit in 1999, held amid the events in Kosovo, when Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary were admitted as full members of the Alliance, highlighting a new fundamental objective of the organization necessary to strengthen democracy and security in Europe.

NATO's experience in Bosnia and Kosovo showed the need for the Alliance to become a more dynamic and proactive organization. Cold War doctrine of nuclear retaliation had to be replaced by a more pragmatic approach, governed by the Allied determination to use military force even beyond NATO's traditional borders in a balanced manner and in cooperation with specific elements of diplomacy, economic development and humanitarian aid, and only after all peaceful means for settlement of conflict were exhausted.

Consequently, by the 1999 Strategic Concept, NATO described the security environment as particularly complex, characterized by new risks that included ethnic conflict and oppression, economic underdevelopment, the collapse of political systems and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Unfortunately, in 2001,

the organization's fears were confirmed when U.S. were attacked by al-Qaeda terrorist group, demonstrating that social disorder in some remote areas of the world can dramatically affect international security, with dire consequences for citizens of the Alliance. The reaction of the civilized world has resulted in military intervention in Afghanistan, executed by a coalition of forces including many NATO nations. Launched in 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom initially sought annihilation of al-Qaeda operating bases and capture of its leaders. Subsequently, by Resolution 1386 of December 2001, UN authorized the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) to help stabilize Afghanistan and ensure conditions of achieving a lasting peace in the area, mission that was conducted by NATO starting with 2003.

Along with the deployment of ISAF, NATO continued development of the cooperation policy, both by initiating new partnerships and by expanding the organization. Thus, in 2002, a NATO-Russia Council⁵ was established, and in 2004 the foundations of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative⁶ were laid, which enabled new *bridges* with countries in the wider Middle East. Meanwhile, in 2004 and 2009 new states joined the Alliance, including Romania, raising the number of members to 28.

3. NATO's approach to security in XXI century

In Afghanistan, Bosnia and Kosovo the Allies realized that only the use of the military instrument is not sufficient to address a crisis. Maintaining a climate of peace was as difficult as peace enforcement. Range of security was expanded to include protection of persons against extremism fueled by instability and failed states. This was illustrated by the crisis in Libya, where NATO got involved to protect civilians against attacks launched by their own government and the allied mission has contributed substantially to the end of the conflict and to achievement of minimum conditions for reconstruction and reconciliation.

Peacekeeping has become not only an issue of providing security for several elements, but one that should ultimately contribute to the progress of humanity. As demonstrated by recent conflicts, most current threats are not strictly military. Their parameters and features are rather of a hybrid nature that manifest multidimensional and therefore can not be neutralized only by the traditional NATO military means, these threats requiring an imperative holistic and comprehensive approach. "None of these threats or challenges can be thwarted or solved solely by military action. One of the main lessons learned by NATO since its mission in Bosnia is that military capabilities and determination are not sufficient when acting in failed states. The military can contribute to restore a safe and secure environment but governance, the rule of law, economic development and basic civil services, for example, need civilian experts and civilian capabilities that are complementary to military action. And this civilian expertise needs to be incorporated at the beginning, in a process completely integrated with that of military planning, to maximize the effects of civil-

⁵ <http://www.nato-russia-council.info/en/about/>

⁶ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-B00FA84D-61E398DD/natolive/topics_58787.htm?

military cooperation."⁷ Alliance is not and will never become a civilian agency for reconstruction, but it can make an important contribution to a possible coherent international response. *In this way, NATO actions and efforts will only be effective if it will develop the ability to work with other actors, countries or organizations that provide resources and expertise in reconstruction of modernity.*

Therefore, through the new Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit (2010), NATO commits itself to act in resolving crises in all phases of their manifestation in a multidimensional approach, requiring an increased role of security cooperation⁸. This idea is the very essence of the concept of "comprehensive approach" to security issues. Geopolitical instability requires finding complex solutions for resolving crises, in which the military and diplomatic instruments must be employed in a concerted and coherent manner, along specific actions for stabilization.

The new strategic concept describes the security environment as being characterized by the existence of a broad set of opportunities and security challenges still evolving and still including conventional threats, even if their likelihood is low. *“Strategic interests now transcend national boundaries. The wars of the future will not be about territory but about resources, from oil to water to rare earth metals, and about informational and cultural dominance, prosperity and employment.”*⁹ In this context, the Alliance regards with concern some developments in the security environment, especially those related to active regional conflicts, increase defense spending in some countries of the world and particularly procurement of modern military equipment by some emerging powers. Globalization, new security challenges such as cyber attacks, resource constraints and environmental sphere, including risks related to growing energy demand or limiting access to energy sources, the health of the population, climatic changes, lack of drinking water in some areas and new technologies with destructive potential are all issues affecting security physiognomy of NATO area of interest. Continuous manifestation of the phenomenon of increasing capabilities of non-state actors, along with the existence of declining states are also potential sources of instability that can quickly evolve into conflicts. These factors, plus the current challenges and threats, the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, piracy and terrorism, define the complexity of the security environment and emphasize its unpredictable nature.

The current economic environment brings, by its instability, a special series of security challenges. First, the economic austerity measures adopted by many nations to alleviate the economic crisis have created the premises of domestic instability, even in NATO countries, with indirect effects on regional security. Manifestation of

⁷ Massimo PANIZZI, *The emerging security challenges under NATO's New Strategic Concept*, 16 Nov. 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_81033.htm, accessed on 12.10.2012

⁸ *Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty*, Lisbon, 2010, <http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf> accessed on 30.05.2012

⁹ Ivan DEBONO, *The relevance of Nato today*, *The times*, Saturday, May 19, 2012, <http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20120519/opinion/The-relevance-of-Nato-today.420324>.

this phenomenon can be detrimental to the overall strategy of the Alliance, effects determined by the failure to meet commitments made by members or by hindering the decision making process. *In particular, the defense spending cuts that will certainly continue are real problems in maintaining conventional forces within modernity and efficiency parameters.*

North Atlantic Alliance has become more than a regional organization and act firmly, in a manner becoming more flexible, innovative and pragmatic in the construction and maintenance of peace and security of the planet. Thus, NATO *has identified and it act in accordance with international law to meet three essential tasks*¹⁰ necessary to achieve those objectives, namely:

- *Collective defense* - NATO members reaffirms the obligation of mutual assistance both in the case of an external aggression on any member, and in the event of threats to security of any member;

- *Crisis management* - the Alliance is committed to act, using a variety of political and military means, to prevent potential crises that may affect the organization security, to manage those already active and strengthening post-conflict stability if it provides Alliance security added value;

- *Cooperative security* - NATO will be involved in international security issues acting towards achieving partnerships with countries and relevant international organizations to maintain a stable security environment and in the arms control for nonproliferation. At the same time, the organization remains open to all European democracies that wish to join it.

NATO's fundamental objective expressed in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty remains unchanged, but the requirements for accomplishing it have changed. The New Strategic Concept emphasizes that conventional military aggression against the Alliance and its members is unlikely, but the possibility can not be ignored. Therefore, in order to remain credible, NATO should develop appropriate contingency plans to maintain military forces supported by a robust logistics and able to act rapidly. NATO also needs to identify solutions to counter threats to the Alliance under Article 5, as well as those that may occur within the organization, regardless of their origin.

To ensure the necessary capabilities for this goal, during the current economic crisis, NATO has developed the concept of Smart Defense intended to use with maximum efficiency the limited resources allocated to defense in order to maintain the ability to perform tasks and hence, the level of ambition. The concept was promoted in March 2011, during the informal meeting of NATO defense ministers and it is based on multinational cooperation on three specific directions: identifying and prioritizing critical capability requirements, promote extensive cooperation in the defense field and NATO capability development through innovative multinational approaches. To facilitate the development process and sharing capabilities, projects developed under Smart Defense were grouped into three categories namely: Pillar 1 -

¹⁰ *Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty*, Lisbon, 2010, art. 4, <http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf> accesat la data de 30.05.2012.

recommended projects (projects that have a leading nation and can be implemented in the first phase), pillar 2 - possible projects (projects for which nations manifested a moderate desire to participate and no leader nation has been identified) and Pillar 3 - proposals (projects coming from industry and nations, that can not be developed yet due to insufficient resources and low interest shown by the nations, but have a good potential for further development of capabilities within NATO defense planning process targets). Given the critical capabilities agreed in 2010 as well as the and priority areas for completing the deficits indicated by NATO defense planning process, during the meeting in Chicago in May of this year, the Heads of State and Government endorsed the launch of multinational projects Pillar 1 and agreed the implementation of policies in *Defense Package for the Chicago Summit*.

Romania pays special attention to cooperation under the auspices of this initiative, being involved in 40 of the total of 148 developments and sharing capabilities projects, this cooperation is a course of action distinct within the Governance Program¹¹, approved by the Romanian Parliament on 07th of May 2012. In the spirit of increasing efficiency and complementary with the allied forces Smart Defense, NATO has developed "Connected Forces Initiative"¹², which aims to develop functional relationships between allied education and training structures in order to increase interoperability (the ability of allied forces to work together, to interconnect). The initiative is built around three main functions represented by the expansion of education and training, increasing the number of exercises conducted jointly by Allied forces by using organizational framework provided by NATO Response Force and a better use of technology in support of interoperability of technical capabilities.

The relevance of the initiative is mainly given by the perspective of Alliance reducing the operational tempo, this approach being the solution for maintaining the ability of forces to operate together in future operations. The first fundamental requirement for the implementation of the concept is the ability to communicate. At the basic level, this involves the ability of individuals to communicate in the same language using the same technology. At a higher level, involves using the same conceptual approach, doctrines, concepts and procedures and use of equipment and systems capable of operating over long distances and in unfavorable conditions. The second requirement that forces can work together is common training. It involves joint and multinational training and exercises, of a complexity which challenge the human aspects, procedural, logistical and equipment. Normally this requirement will result in a third important requirement, the need for validation and certification efforts results.

Current operations and missions of the Alliance underline its determination and materialize its efforts subscribed to the objective of participation in crisis management. Undoubtedly, the main effort in this direction is the completion of ISAF mission in Afghanistan and preparing NATO's contribution to rebuilding the

¹¹Programul de guvernare 2012, <http://www.gov.ro/upload/articles/117322/programul-de-guvernare-2012.pdf>.

¹²http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_84865.htm, accessed on 12.10.2012.

country after this moment. In 2010 it was established the exit strategy from Afghanistan targeting gradual transfer of responsibility for operations specific to armed combat to the Afghan armed forces until 2014.

Analyzing the current situation in Afghanistan progress is seen in the transfer of responsibilities to Afghan authorities, and it is estimated that in 2013 the transition will be completed in each district and province in Afghanistan, by allowing the change of international mission's role from combat to mostly support. By the end of 2014, when it will enter a new phase of transition, probably there will be situations when NATO forces will be involved in combat, but the trend will be the increase of support activities to the detriment of the battle. At the end of 2014, according to the schedule agreed, Afghan forces will be fully responsible for security. At International Conference on Afghanistan held in December 2011, the international community pledged to support Afghanistan beyond 2014¹³, and NATO will participate with other stakeholders in building Afghan forces capable of providing sufficient and efficient security for their own country.

The new Strategic Concept offers partner countries around the globe more opportunities for dialogue and cooperation and an important role is given to enhancing cooperation with Russia. This reflects the realization that partners are vital to global security challenges that NATO faces today, and there is a broad consensus within the Alliance that the existing and the future partnerships must become more effective. The new policy was designed not only to facilitate increased dialogue between current and existing partnership frameworks, but to create new opportunities for cooperation, which was previously available only in one of NATO's partnership structures established.

To this end, in April 2011, NATO foreign ministers met in Berlin, where they adopted a policy of partnership agreements designed to facilitate efficient and flexible partnership with partners becoming more numerous and more diverse. At the same time, Arab movements in spring 2011 highlighted one of the main challenges for promoting cooperation policy. Thus, NATO was forced to enter into discussions with some "undemocratic states", but relevant for crises resolving, countries whose domestic political practices are different from liberal democratic values that NATO has pledged to defend and remain the basis of its identity - individual freedom, democracy, human rights and rule of law. This will require further analysis means to resolve this dilemma.

Conclusions

Alliance was designed as a political-military organization with role to defend the fragile democracies of Europe in the post world war against communist aggression, represented by the developing military capabilities of the former Soviet Union. After the collapse of communism, defending territory became much less important than projecting stability and support security interests of allies in other

¹³ The International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, 5 December 2011, http://eeas.europa.eu/afghanistan/docs/2011_11_conclusions_bonn_en.pdf accessed on 12.10.2012.

parts of the world. Acting preventively Alliance did not wait for security threats to unfold in its own territory, but preferred to deal with them at strategic distances, through the stabilization of remote countries and societies of which the vast majority will never be part of the Alliance.

NATO has evolved from a defense organization into a security organization - from a single mission (defense) now offers members and partners a range of security services from immediate protection to long-term cooperation. *“In this time of uncertainty, a strong NATO is a source of confidence. It is an essential contributor to wider international security and stability. It means we can face today’s challenges from a position of strength”*¹⁴.

NATO cooperates actively with other actors and international organizations in matters of defense and security, and tries to develop this cooperation. The complexity of current operations in support of peace and Stability as well as the nature of XXI century security challenges require a comprehensive approach to effectively combine political, civil and military instruments. Security involves much more than defense - instead of one strategy and one set of military responses, now there are many more options possible and requiring a wide range of military and civilian capabilities to be developed and maintained.

To succeed, the Alliance will have to show real ability to counter new security challenges, harmonize allied positions on regional potential or actual crises and establish as many partnerships as possible in North Africa, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific areas to create a structured security community through consultation, training and interoperability¹⁵.

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PARADIGM AND APPROACHES OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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Abstract: *Security has always been one of the main topics addressed by the theory of international relations, starting from fundamental questions were never exhausted like "why wars occur?" To "which are the bases of a system of universal peace?". Ultimately, the differences between theorists refer to the imperative of action: the world can be changed through political action (eg. security cooperation) or the world is governed by objective laws, escaping control individual (or state) and it must be obeyed without trying to change them, if they want to survive and thrive.*

We intend to present some of the most important theoretical approaches security issues. The criteria for selection of these methods were the analytical field amplitude and their functionality with respect to our research methodology. We do not want to research these theoretical categories exhaustive, but to highlight those elements necessary for image reconstruction propagated by these approaches concerning international security issues in general and European security in particular. We will focus on several paradigms: realist, liberal institutionalist, globalist and socio-constructivist, will also report the development of the CFSP integration theories.

Keywords: *security paradigms, international security.*

There is no universally accepted a definition of the field of study of the theory of international relations, just as there than conventional definition of the discipline to which it belongs. However, as noted Chris Brown, on the origins of the main concepts of the theory are: (1) was developed in response to events / changes that have occurred in the real world (conventional conception) or (2) the development of theory (theory development) is an intra-discursive process, a product of dynamics within a particular community (revisionist approach supported by some historians)¹ The two concepts evoke old philosophical dilemma structure-agent relationship (agency) which may be reduced, in fact, to the following proposition: to what extent are we the product of our environment relative to the degree to which we can determine the future²?

Also, the two perspectives are not mutually exclusive, as one might think at first glance, at least if we look at the empirical evidence so rich in the twentieth century and early twenty-first century. Theorists have tried to provide an answer to the real challenges both policy states, as well as intellectual challenges launched by other theorists.

They got often influenced or deceived or let events and processes and were self-deceived even in their desire to simplify reality, to introduce objective criteria for analysis, allowing more predictive power. However, we can not say that all theories have influenced decision-making institutions both governmental and non-

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¹ Chris BROWN, *Understanding International Relations*, 2nd edition, Palgrave, London, 1997, p. 21.

² Stuart McANULLA, *Structure and Agency*, in David MARSH, Gerry STOKER (ed.), *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, Palgrave, Houndsmill, New York, p. 272.

governmental entities in. Before analyzing in depth the subject, it is necessary to clarify the role and functions of international relations theory. In their paper, Lepgold and Nincic distinguish between the first two categories, "International Relations" and "international relations theory". "International relations are to exchange political, economic, military, social and cultural borders between sovereign states, both in institutionalized and ad hoc. Also, the study of international relations has always engaged the participation of historians, jurists, theologians, philosophers, psychologists and economists, political scientists together. We must therefore distinguish between international relationships as a set of real-world processes and science that analyzes these processes"³.

The two authors conceive, also, the theory in its modern sense, as a "sum of efforts of researchers in the social sciences and especially political scientists to report on interstate and trans-state processes, problems and generally results in terms of causality"⁴. Be it their regulatory functions, explanatory and predictive theories are attempts at understanding international events beyond their particular character, which implies reductionism and generalization. They aim to create "images", "models" virtual international political reality, on which predictions can be made with some degree of probability.

According to Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, a theory is "an intellectual construction which helps one to interpret something in a way to facilitate explanation and prediction characteristics and phenomena observed relapses or rehearsals"⁵. It means to think theoretically be interested central tendencies, as James Rosenau expressed⁶. The same trend is reflected in reductionist definition shown by Kenneth Waltz "A theory is a photograph formed mentally a bounded domain or domain. The theory describes the field organization and the connections between its parts"⁷. These "superiority" generalization and prediction are increasingly challenged with the advent of the current post-positivism and constructivism challenging objective character of scientific knowledge in the field of social sciences, international relations.

As shown above, International Relations and default spread increase academic community interested in this field have transformed international relations theories in broader categories and seemingly more abstract but essentially expressing the same thing, such as meta-theories, paradigms, research programs or epistemic communities. Ultimately, taking *lakatosiana* methodology, which often relates theorists in their attempt to assign their scientific hypotheses, each theory (progressive) tries to convince as many followers, rejecting the central propositions of the other theories, trying to replace them by providing a more consistent and valid perspectives in relation to empirical evidence. Also, theories (in the sense of research

³ Joseph LEPGOLD, Miroslav NINCIC, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

⁵ Paul R. VIOTTI, Mark V. KAUPPI, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond*, Allyn and Bacon, Boston, Londra etc., 1999, p. 3.

⁶ James ROSENAU, *Thinking Theory Thoroughly*, in Paul R. VIOTTI, Mark V. KAUPPI, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-37.

⁷ Kenneth WALTZ, *Evaluating theories*, American Political Science Review, no. 91, 1997, p. 913.

programs) are surrounding a protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses⁸. Another formula distinguishes between theories and methods or theories and approaches.

The problem was present and continues to be but the theory is otherwise. If the first generation theorists seeks no more and no less, than to continue the work of classical authors such as Niccolo Machiavelli namely to advise policy makers, contemporary theorists have attempted to establish a new science boundaries, often losing contact with practical reality. Barry Buzan and Richard Little have illustrated this by referring directly to formal models built by theorists. According to them, metaphors imagined by theorists to describe the nature of contemporary global system (billiard balls, spider webs, octopus, etc.), Systematically failed in their attempt to cross discipline boundaries (international relations) concepts with which they operated remaining popular unfamiliar vocabulary and even general vocabulary of other social sciences⁹.

We intend to present some of the most important theoretical approaches security issues. Criteria for selection of these methods were the analytical field amplitude and their functionality with respect to our research methodology. We do not want to research these theoretical categories exhaustive, but to highlight those elements necessary for image reconstruction propagated by these approaches concerning international security issues in general and European security in particular. We will focus on several paradigms: realist, liberal institutionalist, globalist and socio-constructivist, will also report the development of the CFSP integration theories.

1. Realist paradigm

Realism has exceeded far beyond a simple theory of international relations. More correctly we should talk of “realism” (political realism, neo-realism, structural realism, neoclassical realism, offensive realism, defensive realism etc.), Depending on how he defends is based methodological and scientific hypotheses. Other authors distinguish between two research programs realistic “hegemonic realism” and ‘realistic balance of powers’¹⁰. But just realistic variety and adaptability major changes that have occurred in the international system (actually their response to discussions with proponents of other theories and paradigms) are made realistic so far remain dominant school of international relations study. Almost all the authors (or

⁸ According to Colin and Miriam ELMAN (Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, Mass. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2003), these propositions are tested, checked and changed as quick as new evidence. The authors cite the case of the realist research programs that distinguishes between the two versions of protective structure: defensive realism, while the states will maximize security protecting the status-quo; offensive realism where states accomplish the same thing by maximizing their power (p. 19).

⁹ Barry BUZAN, Richard LITTLE, *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p. 9.

¹⁰ Jonathan M. DiCICCO and Jack S. LEVY, *The Power Transition Research Program: A Lakatosian Analysis*, in Colin Elman, Miriam Fendius Elman (ed.), Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, MIT Press, Cambridge, Londra, 2003, p. 111.

opposite realistic realism) recognize the existence of a research program realistic or realistic paradigm.

In general, we can say that all realist theorists have center stage role in ensuring the security of power (the key variable explaining behavior (actors) and the state as the main provider of security (statistical ontology)¹¹.

Realistic approach is the traditional approach to security studies, focused almost exclusively on military power as a means of achieving national security. In fact, a careful analysis of Cold War history reveals that the main criticism of realism (by schools globalist and liberal) critics were more or less conjectural, about moments of relaxation in Soviet – American relations, when it looked like weapons lose importance in favor of other means of accumulating power¹². In periods of high conflicts between nations, realistic principles could not be tackled with much success. And these times, unfortunately, not free.

Realistic analysis on security derives directly from how its realists imagine international politics, as a brutal arena where states pursue profit opportunities from other states and therefore have little interest to trust others.

Normal politics is seen as a power struggle, in which the state aspires to become not only the most important player in the system, and to ensure that no other state not realizing this goal¹³. For classical realists (like Carr, Niebuhr, Kennan and Morgenthau), self-conditioning of primate national interest, it was a vision of international politics unshakable. Power appears almost as an end in itself, defining the national interest in international politics, in terms of power¹⁴. Security is thus the intersection between the interests of international actors, and the most natural form of it is, the classical realist conception, the balance of power. The partial order thinking will alter lifelike be Kenneth Waltz, neorealist father. One of the works that reflect realistic perspective on security is the work of the author entitled *Man, the State and War*, first published in 1954.

The three images designed to identify the causes of war Waltz summarizes the main arguments of neorealist predicts realistic. Thus, the first “picture” corresponds to pessimistic vision of realism regarding human nature (but is inspired and behavioral studies). Human nature is essentially evil, selfish impulses subject, these psychological factors widened the presence of mental illnesses. The second image identifying the State as the unit upon which the decision, a decision which is often the result of collective behavior often wrong (e.g. the collective mentality is projected distorted image of "the other" when two companies come into conflict). The third image is the systemic state behavior in the international system, behavior determined

¹¹ Andrei MAKARYCHEV, Alexander SERGUNIN, *International Security*, Teaching International Relations Online, Berlin, 2002.

¹² See Jean-Jacques ROCHE, *Théories des relations internationales*, Editions Montchrétien, Paris, 2001, pp. 37-38.

¹³ John J. MEARSHEIMER, *The False Promise of Institutions*, in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller (ed.), *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security*, Cambridge MIT Press, 1995, p. 336.

¹⁴ Hans MORGENTHAU, *Six principles of political realism*, in *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, edition a 5-a, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1978, pp. 4-15.

by the condition of international anarchy inducing security dilemma: "Force is a means by which foreign states achieve their goals because there is no consistent and effective process of reconciliation conflicts of interest that inevitably arise among similar units, are in a state of anarchy"¹⁵.

Neorealist of Kenneth Waltz initiated in the mid-'70s as a reaction to behaviorism and transnationalist theory and structural realism developed by authors such as Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little in the 80s, departs from tradition by supporting a realistic perspective structuralist¹⁶ regarding international system and a broader definition of the concept of security in this context. Security mainly focused on national and military power in realistic end to the neorealist systemic dimension. It should be noted that neorealism is born in an international context dominated by geostrategic conflict between the superpowers, but also increasing evidence of growing economic interdependence between states, which cancels the power formula based solely on force of arms.

Also, Reagan's victory over Democrats in the 1980 elections led to a return to the White House foreign policy based on the concept of power and less on the premises transnationalist of Brzezinski's vision or moralistic vision promoted by Jimmy Carter¹⁷, this has given new impetus to realistically focus around Kenneth Waltz. In fact, (neo-) realism are becoming a paradigm of international relations, a starting point for many theories that take some of its premises¹⁸: structural realism, liberal realism (evoking the possibility of cooperation between states, not only perpetual conflict for power) regime theory¹⁹ (principles, norms, rules and procedures that constrain the behavior of states in a given field - see security schemes - the shift from state-centric view of security in systemic vision²⁰) Hedley Bull's anarchic society or realism "neoclassical" by Barry Buzan.

According to neorealist, the key variable explaining state behavior is no longer the power to "end in itself" but "system state" characterized by anarchy. The structure and material violence in an anarchic environment of states with unequal distribution of military capabilities, causing states to be always concerned with survival and security²¹. Or as expressing Waltz in anarchic environment, security is the highest goal of a state. Only after he manages to ensure survival, he can try to achieve goals

¹⁵ Kenneth N. WALTZ, *Man, state and war*, European Institute, Iasi, 2001, p. 242.

¹⁶ According to that, social reality is governed through a complex interaction of ideological structures, economical and political ones, relatively autonomic one in report to another. Still, the individuals(or agencies), are not aware of their existence and do not have autonomic power, they being but carriers of these structures (see Stuart McAnulla, art. cit., p. 275).

¹⁷ ROCHE, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

¹⁸ Generally, these theoreticians admit, as well as the neorealist members do, the main role of the state in the international relations, the anarchy as a functioning principle and the necessity of the states to survive in an anarchic environment, on the ground of self – help principle, the constraint of the international system on the component units.

¹⁹ Associated, more often, to the institutional liberalism.

²⁰ The author that develops the idea of the security regimes is Robert Jervis in his work *Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics*, Princeton, New York: Princeton University Press, 1976.

²¹ Edward A. KOLODZIEJ, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

such as peace subsidiary, the profit or power²². In fact, states are forced to act based on a self-help (self-help), i.e. to rely on their material capabilities, not those of other entities and therefore are forced to pursue the acquisition of power by various means. Under the condition of anarchy, states are forced to balance each other constantly, otherwise their survival is questionable²³. The international system is, according to neorealist composed of three basic elements: ordering principle (anarchy), differentiating units (characterized by similarity functions and features state) and distribution capabilities²⁴.

A key concept of realism is the "balance of power", the model that we propose rennet followers to understand the current international security.

Whether power is an end in itself or a means of survival in an anarchic environment, it creates the premises accumulation of establishing a hegemonic system. Member - rational actors - naturally tend to counteract the hegemonic tendencies of other countries, hence the balance of power that is established between them and that is permanent, whether recognized as such or not. In other words, the power extends to the point where power meets as them. It is a natural principle that can be associated both domestic policy, as well as international ones. According to Waltz, the balance of power can be explained as a result of the constraints of the international system: "A self-help system is one in which those who do not help themselves or are less effective than others, will not prosper, be exposed to dangers, will suffer. It also fears unwanted consequences stimulate states to behave in ways that tend toward the creation of balances of power"²⁵.

Neoclassical and post-classical realism developed by Barry Buzan (1983) departs from the (neo-) realist tradition that is engaged in a new debate "between the two realisms". Neoclassical Realism addresses concepts such as peace, power and interest with the referent concept analyzed in this paper: security. Buzan contests the objective of the concepts that underlie realistic and neorealist theory (power, national interest) but also of those concepts that form the infrastructure transnationalist theory²⁶ (e.g. peace, which would have a high explanatory power value)²⁷. The author challenges even to define a concept as complex and problematic as the security, nothing that the very nature attempt to defy security a generally accepted definition²⁸. The author takes part in Waltz analysis at three levels, which, however, a develop

²²Kenneth WALTZ, 1979 apud Joseph M. GRIECO, *Realismo e neorealismo*, in G.J. IKENBERRY, V.E. PARSI (ed.), *Teorie e metodi delle Relazioni Internazionali*, Editori Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2001, p. 32.

²³ Edward A. KOLODZIEJ, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

²⁴ See, *Neorealism: EU as an International Actor?* in EU-E learning units. Internet: http://www.epsnet.org/episteme/Unit2/Unit2%20II.1%20neorealism/unit2_II.1_neorealism_A.htm (accessed in 10.01.2006).

²⁵ Kenneth WALTZ, *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley Press, Reading MA, 1979, p. 118.

²⁶ This theory is developed by Robert O. KEOHANE and Joseph S. NYE in the book *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1972.

²⁷ ROCHE, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

²⁸ Barry BUZAN, *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda of International Security Studies in the post-Cold War Era*, Longman, 1991, p. 16.

specific manner: individual-state relations (how individuals conceive their security in relation to the State, the State does not provide perfect security of its citizens and sometimes in the name national security, individual security is seriously impaired - if weak states), state-state relations (how states relate to each other in order to achieve security. Buzan distinguishes between powerful states - affected only external threat and state weak - where threats arise both internal and external.

The third element that Buzan's analysis resembles that of Waltz is the manner in which the company states participate in this security. Buzan takes the concept of anarchy, classifying it into two categories: immature anarchy, synonymous with state of chaos and anarchy mature recognition of sovereign legitimacy)²⁹. But what makes Barry Buzan one neorealist in the true sense of the word is focus on the state as 'referent object' of security. While human security is what matters ultimately is the only state able to provide security in front of anarchic international environment armed states, says British author³⁰.

Barry Buzan defines the term "security complex" approximating the concept of "security community" developed by Karl Deutsch in the late 50 (concept claimed and liberal research program). The theory of "classical" security complex Buzan developed the first edition of volume or People, States and Fear (first edition appeared in 1983) starts from the observation that all states are covered in a global network of interdependent security. But, as political and military threats more easily penetrate short distances, insecurity is often associated with proximity³¹. Normal pattern of security interdependence in geographically diverse and anarchic system is one of the regional clusters³², called the author "Advanced Security".

Security complex theory (appearing in "Copenhagen School") under the initials RSCT, is an example of the security dialogue between the followers of three current theories: neorealism, globalism and constructivism.

Summing up the above mentioned, we see once again the main landmarks of realistic approach to international security: the state as referent object of security remains the main reference common realistic, be it state that the individual actor involved in the accumulation of power (meaning realism classic), be it the state system (meaning neorealism). Power is perceived as an end in itself (classical realism) or aim to ensure maximal after previously survival in a lawless state (neorealism or structural realism). Balance of power stems from the actor's rational nature, nation-states, for states naturally tend to balance each other, in order to

²⁹ ROCHE, op. cit., p. 58.

³⁰ David MUTIMER, *Beyond Strategy*, in Craig A. SNYDER, *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, Deakim University, 1999, p. 80.

³¹ Barry BUZAN, Ole WÆVER, Jaap de WILDE, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, pp. 10-11.

³² The expression, used by Buzan and his mates, is taken from the economical language. We might translate it as regional concentration, but, owing to its specificity, we preferred an approximate translation, just to keep the original English term, a procedure already noticed within more works of the social sciences in Romania. A regional cluster, can be defined as a geographic delimited concentration by interdependent firms ("Regional Clusters for Europe", Observatory of European SMEs, 2002/nr. 3, European Commission, Bruxelles, p. 13).

prevent the domination of one over all other (hegemony). An important element in this case we see that the companies may be replaced by states is anarchy, whether it is caused by the behavior of the state or the nature of the international system.

Globalization and interdependence neorealist logic does not cancel, as stated institutional liberalism, but connects states in a global network of threat (reminiscent of the concept of risk society) and regional networks of interdependent strategic (security complex). State can not rely only on himself in order to ensure security, gathering capabilities (military). However, as recognized the neorealist members, these capabilities are readily available by strong states with higher internal cohesion, external relations more developed.

Realism and neorealism, with liberal institutionalism (as discussed below), in their attempt to transform international relations a science based on the rules and canons of positivism (rational actor paradigm) will not be able to adapt to system changes ample occurred at the end of the Cold War precisely because their self-imposed boundaries on the methodology and empirical evidence³³, accepted, that just because reductionism so lauded for its usefulness for generalization and prediction.

Neorealism praised the bipolar model and believed in its stability, only that the U.S. and USSR had the largest strategic arsenals of the world and does not seem that this situation can be changed in the near future. Waltz and his colleagues ignored the tremendous importance of ideas, culture, political institutions, whether government and bureaucracy were competing domestic political regime change from within, without being subject to systemic logic.

In conclusion, neorealism (especially version waltziana) was apparently invalidated the research program outcome even by Cold War does not mean that there was a notable contribution to the evolution of international relations discipline. Based on the methodology lakatosiana, realists have not left discouraged and have not completely abandoned the premises empirical evidence brought before other theorists as Karl Popper believed to proceed in his theory of knowledge. This behavior is illustrated even by the way they looked European construction, as you can see below. Moreover, a great deal of realism ideas retained their scientific relevance, especially in the study of state-state relations, if removed other variables than those of national interest.

Model promoted realists “billiard ball” that illustrates the anarchy that govern relations between states, as illustrated³⁴ by Richard Ned Lebow's and Under, neorealism (as shown in the work of K. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*) has limited the analysis to two variables: one was the dependent variable inclination towards war international system (proprietary system), while the independent variable was made up of polarity system (structural characteristic of it). This reductionist character of his theory made Waltz to continue to assert and after 1990 as the international system is bipolar because as neorealist prediction that multipolar systems are more prone to war is not fulfilled.

³³ Edward A. KOŁODZIEJ, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

³⁴ See Richard Ned Lebow, “The Long Peace, the end of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism”, *International Organization*, vol. 48, nr. 2, JSTOR (spring of 1994), pp. 249-277.

Classical and contemporary debates that continue realism is currently engaged in international relations theory, not only in their relations with non-realist theorists. Interestingly, realists are presented in this single phrase in front of liberal theorists and critics of the controversy, while within neoclassical realism detached two branches were in dispute, offensive realism and defensive realism³⁵. In essence their dispute centers on the lead actor of international relations behavior, state: defensive realism (the dominant theory in realist research program) argues that states balance power or threats, while offensive realism suggests that states engage in a predator behavior³⁶ not hesitate to take advantage of weakness in other states.

2. Liberal paradigm

Liberalism does not start from realistic reluctance according to which the state is a key actor in international relations, but consistency and unique appeal of this actor. For liberal-institutionalist paradigm, non-state actors (transnational corporations, international organizations, ONG) are as important as the nation-state in defining international security. International security can be ensured by balancing interests of different actors through negotiations and establishing international security regimes than by weapons and the arms race³⁷.

It should be mentioned that this theory should not be confused with a certain political ideology, but is the result of inspiration sharing democratic values Anglo-Saxon favorable idea of progress and international cooperation. These ideas are put in opposition to the principles of conservative thought, as the specific classical realism. If it were to subsume some theoretical paradigms broader liberal institutionalism is part of the rational choice paradigm, with neorealism.

Western democratic social community launched the idea of “common security”, inspiring many concepts such as partnership, cooperative security, mutual security and so on, all based on the principle of retaining the use of force and cooperation between enemies and former enemies³⁸. Later theories of complex interdependence (or mutual dependence) have started from the assumption (confirmed for the West) as the high degree of interconnection of companies is a powerful deterrent to war as a means of settling international relations³⁹.

³⁵ A synthetically presentation, though partly accepting this debate can be found in the article signed by Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, 'Security-Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Reconsidered,' *International Security*, 25, 3, Winter 2000/2001, pp.152-86.

³⁶ Stephen M. SAIDEMAN, *The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001, p. 18. Stephen M. SAIDEMAN, *The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001, p. 18.

³⁷ Sergunin MAKARYCHEV, *art. cit.*

³⁸ *Ibidem.*

³⁹ The theory of liberal inspiration, just like liberal school of Kantian inspiration or the so – called pax democratica, idea developed by Melvin Small and David Singer, they propose a moralist vision on the international relations. The theory of democratic peace rejects the realistic approach, sustaining that “nature of the regimes” exercises a more determined influence than power, the

Complex interdependence theory (which had arisen “transnationalism”⁴⁰.) developed by Keohane and Nye opposed the dominant paradigm of the Cold War, the national security, behind which were considerations of power and national interest. But the authors noted that complex interdependence does not guarantee a priori mutual benefit.

It should be noted that transnationalist approaches have been developed and the globalist paradigm. Instead, asymmetrical interdependence can be a source of strength, power considered as the control of resources⁴¹ or control the outcome of a transaction⁴². The two dimensions introduced by Keohane and Nye in complex interdependence analysis - vulnerability and sensitivity - can be useful tools for the researcher aims to reconstruct source security/insecurity arising hypothetical relationship between two actors. Sensitivity involve speed and extent of change induced by the first state on the other⁴³ or, as expressed Keohane and Nye, how quickly changes from one country to another train changes and how big are the effects of cost. The vulnerability lies in the relative availability and cost of alternatives increased.

It can be defined as an actor's disposition to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered⁴⁴. The proportion of these costs and availability policy is to support them as vulnerability. Institutional research program proposed by Keohane and Nye argues that international interactions are best suggested by the “cobweb model”⁴⁵ than that of “billiard ball”.

'80 - '90 years liberals have supported the concept of cooperative security, focused on these dimensions become almost universally accepted in the literature of recent years: individual security (internal and external protection of human rights), collective security (maintaining stability and peace in the common area of security), collective defense (external aggression mutual protection before), stability (active promotion of the concept in theaters of conflict that may threaten the common security values using political, economic, information and if necessary military)⁴⁶.

This theoretical perspective is found in critical studies on security. Moreover, a critical analysis of European security emphasizes the integration and European construction as a whole were based on the assumptions of a common European

interest or security on international life and that is possible pacification of duration of international relations assuring the promotion of the democratic values. (See ROCHE, *op. cit.*, p. 89).

⁴⁰ The theory of the complex interdependency or of transnationalism is developed for the first time, within a bipolar international political distention climate, in the book published by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972, 428 p.

⁴¹ Robert O. KEOHANE, Joseph S. NYE, *Power and Interdependence*, Harper Collins Publishers, 1989, p. 11.

⁴² ROCHE, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

⁴³ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁴ Robert O. KEOHANE, Joseph S. NYE, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-14.

⁴⁵ The model taken from Economics Sciences. The model explained the cyclic fluctuations between demand and offer then when there was delays between the producers answers and the change of a product price.

⁴⁶ Sergunin MAKARYCHEV, *op. cit.*

security missing centuries it was concerned with maintaining a precarious balance of power. Thus, the process of European construction is called by some authors "European institutionalization," based on the argument that a network of institutions developed during the Cold War focused Western European states, creating frameworks for economic cooperation, the political and military nationalist policies were discouraged.

History of European Integration (Including transatlantic component) just comes to prove that what separates Europe from other continents is unprecedented high level of institutionalized cooperation between some nations which have fought wars against one another dozen in the last centuries. During the Cold War in Western Europe grew only alliance in the world which is based on total hegemony of a single "Great Powers", but on shared values and interests, and from the 50 European states began to dismiss a part of their national sovereignty Community institutions, making a cooperative management of domestic and foreign policy in a European framework⁴⁷. Institutional liberalism (because of their debate with neo-realists, these theorists still entitled and neo-liberals) does not propose to remove the state from its position as the central actor of international relations. Institutionalists aim to extend only to state interests, beyond the limits of national security, to the "multidimensional interdependent economically, socially and environmentally"⁴⁸.

In terms of security, institutionalists are not too far from realistic (especially the "English school"). Thus, they confirm that military power is the main determinant of interstate relations results when invoked (!) Leaders (policy makers) are rational actors, that make decisions as it deems best, but are uncertain because pursue their interests on condition of anarchy⁴⁹. Such realistic, institutionalists are concerned with the problem of "prisoner's dilemma"⁵⁰, but they argue that institutions and regimes can improve collaboration between states, forcing them to a predictable pattern of action that reduces uncertainty and mutual distrust. Moreover, they extend, as we saw above, levels of analysis (reduced to three realistic and neorealist).

However, either the liberal school is not unitary. I saw it removes liberal institutionalism than liberal tradition of neorealism methodological approaches, theory that controversy. In fact, both assumptions are based on "rational choice" (rational choice). If realistic logic is used today to understand national security and strategic studies remain essentially state-centric and dominated by realists, must however be noted that-neoliberal institutionalist logic had a significant impact on security studies. First, the absolute gain economic liberalism promotes economic transactions for all parties involved (win-win game), unlike the win-loose game promoted realistic. This is the essence of the concept of "perpetual peace" was

⁴⁷ Przemyslaw GRUDZINSKI, Peter van HAM, *A Critical Approach to European Security: Identity and Institutions*, PINTER, London, New York, 1999, pp. 3-4.

⁴⁸ Robert O. KEOHANE, Joseph S. NYE, *Power and Interdependence*, 2001, p. 246, cited in Edward A. KOLODZIEJ, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

⁴⁹ Edward A. KOLODZIEJ, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*.

referring to Immanuel Kant⁵¹, the idea that free trade promotes cooperation between countries but also in developed prisoner's dilemma game theory describes a situation of decision-making by two rational actors under the condition of uncertainty. Two prisoners are isolated and questioned by police in connection with their involvement in a crime. Both could be released if they cooperate and would not denounce each other. But if one fails, the other not, the former may be issued, while the second gets 10 years in prison. If the two denounce each other, both will receive lighter sentences (three years). Of course, the first situation is the most acceptable for both, but the temptation to intervene and denounce distrust leading to a negative result.

3. Globalist paradigm

In this chapter we will address several theories and approaches with the referent object of security of the overall system. Although some authors gathered under the dome globalist paradigm, some differ greatly from globalization, but its share and develop critical to the realism. Some are close to constructivism, the theoretical approach that we examine in the next section of our paper. To better clarify our point of view, a clarification is required: we concur definition of globalism designed by Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi but in their work⁵². Another explanation is that "globalism" as idealism (utopianism), has a pejorative connotation, especially his critics attributed that assigns particular quality of an ideology, not a paradigm⁵³. Viotti and Kauppi identify four theoretical assumptions of globalization, corresponding to a global-centric vision of the world⁵⁴: (1) the need for understanding the global context in which states and other entities interact, (2) globalists' historical analysis highlights the importance of understanding the international system, and historical factors defining characteristic of the capitalist system, (3) the existence of specific mechanisms of domination that maintain Third World states outside the

⁵¹ See Immanuel KANT, *Essay on the perpetual peace* (1795). Kant proposed a schema of perpetual peace, seen as a moral norm that is to be followed by sensible people. His proposal is based on the conviction that the system of states nations and dominant national interests can be restructured by an illuminated political order, other actors (the person getting a very important profile). Just like we said, the most interesting case study is given by the European and Euro – Atlantic institutions. This "liberal logic" is found today in the political – diplomatic language of the democracies and can not be denied the fact that it promoted peace and economic and social progress, even whether in a certain part of the world.

⁵² Paul R. VIOTTI, Mark V. KAUPPI, *op. cit.*

⁵³ Here is an illustration of this criticism: "Globalism reduces complexity of the new globality and globalization to a single economic dimension which is itself conceived in a linear fashion constantly expanding world market dependence. All other dimensions (ecological globalization, cultural globalization, political polycentrism, emerging transnational spaces are treated, if only to the extent assumptions domination of economic globalization. Society is so truncated and falsified world as global market society). In this sense, neo-liberal globalism is a form of one-dimensional thinking and action, an economist mono-causal view of the world" (BECK, 2000 cited in Maurice MULLARD, *The Politics of Globalisation and Polarisation*, Edward Elgar Publishing, Northampton, 2004, p 41).

⁵⁴ Paul R. VIOTTI, Mark V. KAUPPI, *op. cit.*, pp. 341-342.

development process and contribute to an uneven global development, (4) economic factors are critical for explaining the evolution and functioning of the global capitalist system and maintain it in a subordinate position republican constitution, a federal and state system global citizens, to found a community of humanity.

Of course, criticism is too harsh and omits the existence of critical theory in international political economy as third world states paradigm. Of course, this definition could lead to the hypothesis that globalism is identical with Marxism, but even Viotti and Kauppi deny this association, pointing out that there are non-Marxist globalists. Also, we can speak of a neoliberal globalism which opposes "addiction" another worldview, "interdependence". This school of neoliberal globalism falls but from the perspective of security studies in liberal-institutional paradigm.

Under globalization, international security can be ensured, but it is necessary to know the sources of insecurity (the causes of violence and violent behavior). Globalist perspective indicates extensive security concept involving several areas: economic, societal, environmental, cultural, etc. Globalists conceive security as social order ensuring favorable conditions for the development of safe and creative human being, absence of threats allowing such development (see above concept of societal security)⁵⁵.

Globalism is part of the third debate classical theory of international relations⁵⁶ realism, globalism, held mostly during the 80s. Although globalism and liberalism have many things in common (the connection between the two research programs is provided by the theory developed by Keohane and Nye transnationalists), though there are elements that differentiate them. First, institutional liberalism does not vary much from state-centric and positivist assumptions of neorealism. Globalism questioned even these premises. Furthermore, some theorists globalists wonder if the state is not a factor of insecurity for the individual, not only its security provider. If institutionalists are security studies advocates a broad agenda of security ("wideners" see Introduction), but with the referent object state globalists are followers of a comprehensive security agenda. In fact, globalists argue antithetical vision of the world in relation to the realistic one is centered on "globalization" and "Deterritorialisation world politics", the recognition of an independent role of transnational entities and focuses on how territorial sovereignty, the ordering principle of human activity, is redefined or even surpassed interaction networks involving several categories of actors and many types of levels⁵⁷.

4. Constructivist approach

Although the last decade stands increasingly important development of constructivist theories, we can not say that they are integrated into a new paradigm of

⁵⁵ Andrei MAKARYCHEV, Alexander SERGUNIN, *op. cit.*

⁵⁶ The first debate was the one opposing the realism and idealism, and the second scientism vs. Traditionalism (behaviorist-systemic revolution).

⁵⁷ Barry BUZAN, Ole WAEVER, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 7.

international relations, although some authors (even rivals) constructivism ranks among the three dominant paradigms of international relations, realism and liberalism with⁵⁸. However, even constructivists (such as Alexander Wendt and Nicholas Onuf) refuse to assign it as constructivism. According to Onuf, “Constructivism is a theory is an approach to social research. Is particularly relevant and pertinent as a critical tool to address empirical and normative theories widespread”⁵⁹ Alexander Wendt recognizes same thing: “Constructivism is a theory of international politics. Just as rational choice theory (constructivism lineages) is applicable to any form substantially unlimited and social - capitalism, families, states, etc. - So to say something concrete, we must specify which actors (units of analysis) and structures (levels)'s important”⁶⁰. Here are some reasons why constructivists and adjust their response as a criticism of existing theories, not necessarily a new image of international relations. Moreover, constructivism lacks a unified set of predictions to be defined as a theory, at least in the sense accepted by the scientific community. However, what can assign constructivist or reflectivism⁶¹ is their integrative quality. Constructivism has taken a lot of ideas main trends critical schools of international relations theory. Security studies we can talk, we believe, by a constructivist paradigm.

Important in developing constructivist security studies lies not so much in the news it brings, but precisely in this critique launches dominant paradigms. In their view, the security of individuals and the state (taking the ontological concepts and realistic liberals) are “social constructs” susceptible to a reformulation without time limits made by actors willing or likely, not a static concept, based on immutable conditions, as realists assume⁶² (eg. condition anarchic international system).

Constructivism does not reject all theoretical assumptions of rival paradigms. For example, it rejects the existence of anarchy, but challenges its impact on state behavior. But what the realists and liberals criticize is their emphasis on material factors such as power or trade, stressing instead the impact constructivists ideas⁶³ Instead of maximizing emphasize the role of state interest, aiming primarily survival, constructivism emphasizes that state interests and identities are malleable product of historical processes, manifestations of dominant discourses reflecting the beliefs and norms of accepted social behavior⁶⁴.

⁵⁸ Stephen M. WALT, *International relations: one world, many theories*, in *Foreign Policy*, Washington, spring 1998, pp. 29-46. According to Walt, constructivism substituted “Marxism” as a paradigm of international relations.

⁵⁹ Onuf, apud: Edward A. KOLODZIEJ, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

⁶⁰ Alexander WENDT, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, p.193.

⁶¹ Such defines Robert O. KEOHANE this trend.

⁶² Edward A. Kolodziej, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

⁶³ Stephen M. WALT, *International relations: one world, many theories*, in *Foreign Policy*, Washington, spring 1998, p. 40.

⁶⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 41.

In debate with neoclassical realism represented by Mearsheimer⁶⁵, Wendt does not reject realist assumptions, but says it is necessary to analyze social relations, not only material capabilities⁶⁶. Moreover, dismissing some of the charges Mearsheimer, Wendt is currently estimated that own, like neorealism, a structuralist current. But while neorealists believe that “structure” is formed from a material distribution capabilities, Alexander Wendt emphasizes the role of “social structures”. This concept does not belong to any of them, nor constructivist, standing in the center of the structure-agent debate of the 80s (also known as the 3-to debate, realism, globalism)⁶⁷. “Social structures” are defined but different constructivist by “understanding, expectation or shared knowledge”⁶⁸. They are not only abstract or theoretical, but are included in the political practice of States⁶⁹.

Another important element risen by constructivist Alexander Wendt and refers to the problem of systemic anarchy, the central concept of neorealist, and neoliberal members also discussed. Wendt explanation they give is: "Self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy and if we find ourselves today in a world of auto help, it is due to process, not structure. There is no logic of anarchy, outside of practices that create and materialize a structure of identities and interests rather than another; structure has no existence or causal powers outside processes. Self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of it"⁷⁰.

Author response to central assertion neorealist send the importance they have social structures in international politics. At their center are sociological concepts such as “identity” and “interest” which will now come forward in the study of international relations in a new light. Of course, this conceptual revolution is not only due to Wendt, but the many critical theories will attack the central assumptions of structuralism (neorealist and neoliberal) especially after their failure to answer the fundamental question: how will it end the Cold War? The role of ideas, culture, identity and interest will be addressed by a host of researchers, which it defines as Michael Desch phrase “culturalist members”⁷¹.

Another question on trying to solve constructivists is the following: how inspiring his identity / identities of political actors? While realists argue that state

⁶⁵ The debate was triggered by John J. Mearsheimer's article, *The False Promise of International Institutions*, published in the journal *International Security* (Winter 1994/95, Vol. 19, No. 3), pp. 5-49. Alexander Wendt's answer was the article “Constructing International Politics”, also appeared in *International Security* (Summer 1995, Vol. 21, no. 1), pp. 71-81.

⁶⁶ Michael E. BROWN et al. (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. xxx.

⁶⁷ Alexander Wendt got involved into this debate (see Alexander WENDT, *The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory*, *International Organization*, vol. 41, nr. 3, summer 1987, pp. 335-370).

⁶⁸ Alexander WENDT, *Constructing International Politics*, *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 1, summer 1995, pp. 71-81.

⁶⁹ Michael E. BROWN et al. (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 418.

⁷⁰ Alexander WENDT, *Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics*, *International Organization*, vol. 46, nr. 2 (spring, 1992), pp. 391-425, quoted from page 395.

⁷¹ DESCH, *art. cit.*

interests are constant over time, the constructivists claim that they change as actors and identities change or evolve. Moreover, even states may have also human beings, several identities; they are not, after all, than social constructions⁷². Based on these findings, constructivism (or “social theory” as it defines Alexander Wendt) aims to study the relationship between security studies, identity and interests. The most important attempt of this kind is represented by Barry Buzan and his associates, especially Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, the so-called “Copenhagen school”.

Copenhagen School (Buzan Barry⁷³, Waever Ole, Bjorn Muller, Jaap de Wilde, etc.) exceeded the analytical framework of realistic and globalization, stating the idea that groups / communities to be human security actors, which led to the concept of societal security: the ability of a company to maintain its essential character in the face of different conditions causing her identity and cultural framework⁷⁴. In fact, this “school” provides partial answer discussion of Mearsheimer and Wendt; it is not coincidence theorists or neoclassical realist or constructivist. These authors reviewed the concept of human security, covering aspects of religious, ethnic, gender, environment, etc.. A lot of the concepts of the “Copenhagen school” in the introduction we have defined our work so that we do not consider necessary to repeat them. It can be said that the “Copenhagen School”, but other schools Scandinavian study of international relations (we refer particularly to the Oslo and Stockholm) tries leading security studies replicate the structure-agency debate that dominated the 90s.

Barry Buzan in his work synthesizes *People, States and Fear ...* (1983, 1989) is the main areas of security in view of the Copenhagen school. Thus, in his view, the security of human collectivities is affected by factors in five major sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental (ambient)⁷⁵. This sectorial approach to security was recovered in subsequent discussions with scholars from Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, whose actual result was a number of essential books for researchers interested in contemporary security studies, some bibliographic essay mentioned in the introduction of this paper.

In school globalist vision, security agenda is extensive, justifying the term global security now, although acceptances used by globalists not differ greatly from that of liberal-institutionalist school, identifying “international security” with the largest expression of security⁷⁶. Global security can be considered today but not in

⁷² KOŁODZIEJ, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

⁷³ Although Barry Buzan is a known representative of English School, having in mind his collaboration with the scientists of the old Peace Studies in Copenhagen, is known as belonging to the School in Copenhagen”.

⁷⁴ Andrei MAKARYCHEV, Alexander SERGUNIN, *op. cit.*

⁷⁵ Barry BUZAN, cited by David MUTIMER, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

⁷⁶ Global security itself refers to a system of world order and security, common security embodying a program of global community. This concept, developed by Palme Commission - Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues in 1982 does not adequately describe as Helga Haftendorn (*art. cit.*, P 11-12) the real situation of humanity as it implies the existence of strong institutions, if not a "world government". UN failure prevents the establishment of a global security system.

relation to institutions, but by reference to common security agenda and common perceptions of threats.

Barry Buzan identifies three reasons why it was such adoption agenda today (both in security studies, as well as working documents of international organizations): change priority between security problems caused by increasing density, useful political skills of concept, and integrative intellectual qualities⁷⁷.

Increasing density (international system) creates a powerful combination play between anarchy and interdependence⁷⁸ (author combines two concepts belonging paradigms discussed above).

Same increase in density changes threats and vulnerabilities profile defining issue of security. More developed countries increasingly lose their fear of foreign military attacks, in part because they are included in the "security community" - resulting from transformation of social norms, perceptions of political and economic interests. Also, raise awareness of non-military threats or non-local (financial, commercial, societal, environmental), and these threats grow in influence without regard for the military decline.

School in Copenhagen introduced the notion of "securitization" - raising security concerns over politics, making them to be accepted and shared by the whole society. Ole Waever is the author of the term. Waever notes that identifying security issues was a privilege enjoyed by member nations through their governing elites. Only states may require the use of securitization instrument a problem to gain control over it. But most times tend states is to militarize problems while they securitize (obviously this advertisement costs can sometimes outweigh the benefits of such a course of action). Waever's solution is to desecurise, that progressive removal of security issues on the agenda, leaving only military ones. The ultimate goal of this desecurisation as demilitarization of politics⁷⁹. A further notion, mentioned above, is the "regional security complex".

This concept is perhaps best illustrates the fusion between two distinct theoretical approaches such as neorealism and constructivism. This is exactly what advocates intend RSCT⁸⁰, Barry Buzan and Ole Waever when you say: "TCSR uses a mixture of materialist and constructivist approaches. In the materialistic uses ideas of territoriality and power distribution are close to those of neorealism (...), but contrary to neorealist analysis tend to focus heavily on the overall structure. In the constructivist theory builds on securitization TCSR established in earlier work (...), which focuses on the political processes by which security issues are built"⁸¹

In conclusion, this analysis of contemporary security studies is far from being exhaustive. Along with theories, paradigms and approaches that I mentioned above,

⁷⁷ Barry BUZAN, *op. cit.*, p. 368-370.

⁷⁸ To illustrate this fact, it is sufficient to relate the number of UN Member States which exceeded 190, even though many are not relevant to international policy process. But we live in a real "galaxy" sub-state actors, state and transnational involved in varying degrees and at different levels in interdependent security.

⁷⁹ David MUTIMER, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

⁸⁰ Regional Security Complex Theory.

⁸¹ Barry BUZAN, Ole WAEVER, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

there are a large number of authors and work that address contemporary security issues and who claim membership in other research programs. We mention here behaviorism, feminism, postmodernism and post-structuralism. Some theorists are categorized or auto-categorizes as “critical scholars” as part of the so-called critical theory but can be hired and the globalists or constructivist. In essence, these theories are opposed to the dominant paradigms of security studies and especially realism and neorealism. Their analysis goes beyond the objectives of this work. What I'm trying to point is that the definition of security is a difficult undertaking as “loans” theory needed to be able to make light of this intellectual universe.

However, note that if we confront these theoretical approaches reality would become clear that, regardless of intellectual debates, we are dealing with two opposing views: one traditional, state-centric, focused on issues of power and interest (appropriate security studies) and one critically focused on a broader and more thorough definition of security. Beyond this, each of the mentioned approaches is a major contribution to conceptual clarification security: reality confirms that the nation state is a key actor of security, but not the only, security interdependence is that states are more favorable cooperation than conflict involved due to relative gains and costs caused by the conflicts, requires a comprehensive approach to security (sectorial perspective). Security can be further considered in terms of actors (for instance state as referent analytic) interactions/transactions (interdependent, sensitivities, vulnerabilities), systemic effects (globalization, transnational phenomena).

Therefore, various theories about security helped us to establish levels of analysis relevant to this paper. It is useful to relate Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU integration theories, not only to general theories about security. Why? First, integration theories have as their object just actors, institutions and processes. Second, although part of the institutionalist paradigm, they were influenced by other paradigms of security studies. Theme European political integration has attracted many apologists, but many critics.

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SCIENCE-TECHNOLOGY-INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS TOWARDS SECURITY

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Abstract: *Science-technology-innovation trinomial plays a pivotal role in the coherent development of humankind; promoting these elements is a prerequisite in achieving national and international security, but also an evolutionary trend that needs a secured environment to develop. By investing in this trinomial it makes possible, on the one hand, the decrease in intensity of social and economic problems of one country and, on the other hand, the enhancement of its competitiveness and security.*

Key-words: *Science, Technology, Innovation, Competitiveness, Security, Weak State, Failed State.*

On national security dimensions were written thousands of pages where security was analyzed in relation to all areas of social life (from the geographical one to the psychological one), but less space was allocated to the correlations with science, technology and innovation that are vectors of human development. The issues of our debate do not relate to military technology and equipment or the Revolution in Military Affairs, as might seem at first sight, but on general aspects such as security challenges resulting from intentionally or unintentionally marginalization by a State of the Science-Technology-Innovation trinomial. The analysis will include, in addition to a theoretical framework we consider very necessary, correlations between the stability/risk of failure of a State and its competitiveness, revealing the indisputable link between a country's ability to manage this trinomial and the development/survival of that State.

1. Security and Sustainable Development based on Science-Technology-Innovation Trinomial

Security studies - from individual to global society - should consider the increasing global interdependence whose main consequence is the development of a mosaic of new domestic situation in which each individual is subjected to global trends. Consequently, vulnerabilities arise, particularly to external influences, which vary from country to country, depending on the existent historical, political, economic and social environment. In response to this global interdependence, the international community has suggested to increase security by implementing specific concepts, policies and strategies for various areas of human life. One of these globalized and globalizing concepts is *sustainable development*.

Sustainable development is one of the humankind's last Century main goals. Unfortunately, although it is one of the most important points on the international agenda and the topic of discussion of the most prestigious think tanks, the concept

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seems to be too ambiguous and broad and that can harm its practical application. The close connection between the economy, society and environment introduced by this concept is viable in terms of theory and practice, but its complexity makes it difficult to obtain widely positive results. Moreover, the recent economic and financial crisis has significantly delayed deadlines and objectives set by the programming documents on sustainable development. In this context, the security issues increase, requiring even more resources to resolve them and impeding the international community to develop along the established lines.¹

Agenda 21 is one of the basic documents on sustainable development that was adopted in 1992 (the Rio Summit) by 178 governments. It addresses social and economic issues (poverty, changing consumption patterns, health, population movement and so on), those relating to the conservation and management of the development resources (protection of the atmosphere, combating deforestation, protecting fragile environments, conservation of biodiversity, pollution control) and major groups in society (children and youth, women, NGOs, local authorities, employers and trade unions) whose role is intended to increase. *Agenda 21* also provides ways to implement its goals by science, technology transfer, education, international institutions and financial mechanisms². Alongside *Agenda 21*, the Rio Summit proposed 27 principles that support the understanding of sustainable development and the implementation of the Agenda. One of these principles (No. 9) refers directly to the importance of science and technology in achieving sustainable development: *States should cooperate to strengthen internal administrative capacity for sustainable development, improving scientific understanding through exchanges of scientific and technological knowledge, and by enhancing the development, adaptation, dissemination and transfer of technologies, including new and innovative technologies*³.

Eight years after issuing the *Agenda 21*, UN introduced the *Millennium Development Goals* (MDGs) at the Millennium Summit in September 2000. MDGs were established to strengthen efforts for achieving human development and security. Simply reading the eight goals (end poverty and hunger; universal education; gender equality; child health; maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS; environmental sustainability; global partnership⁴) proves the need for science-technology-innovation (STI) trinomial in identifying and developing the necessary means to achieve them.

Rio +20 Summit, June 2012, raised the issue of reviewing the MDGs after the 2015 deadline for achieving the eight goals; there was introduced the term

¹ See for more details Alexandra SARCINSCHI, *Dezvoltarea durabilă – deziderat viabil într-o lume în criză?*, in “Lumea 2011. Enciclopedie politică și militară (Studii strategice și de securitate)”, Teodor FRUNZETI and Vladimir ZODIAN (coord.), Bucharest: Ed. CTEA, 2011, 820 pag., pp. 98-117.

² UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Sustainable Development, *Agenda 21*, 1992, URL: http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/res_agenda21_00.shtml.

³ UN General Assembly, *Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992), Annex I, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development*, URL: <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm>.

⁴ UN, *Millennium Development Goals*, f.a., URL: <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>.

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). SDGs will be established by the end of this year (2012) by a working group, based on several criteria contained in the final document of the Summit, *The Future We Want: to be action-oriented, concise and easy to communicate, limited in number, aspirational, global in nature and universally applicable, focused on priority areas for the achievement of sustainable development*⁵. Most UN Members quickly accepted SDGs idea because it basically promotes one of the universally valid goals, i.e. human welfare and, obviously closely connected with this, security at all levels. Experts explain the concept of human welfare through the classical approach based on the relationship between economic development, environmental sustainability and social inclusion, but complemented by an essential element, namely good governance at all levels (local, national, regional and global). The good governance was introduced because sustainable development targets all the countries of the World; it is not about what should rich actors should do to help the poor, but especially about what all the countries should do together for achieving overall welfare of the current generation and those to come⁶. Also, we can not argue about welfare without reference to scientific and technological component because the poverty eradication - the main goal of sustainable development, the MDGs, and certainly the future SDGs - can not be achieved without extending the range of dissemination of critical technologies (medicine and diagnostics, electrification, communications and so on) from large and medium-income countries to those with low incomes. To grow in the right direction, the world will need new technologies and new ways of organizing human activity so that living standards are improved without affecting the environment. Consequently, technological change and social change are considered critical both in rich countries and in poor ones.

We must note the need for emphasizing the STI trinomial in the coherent development of humankind, as a prerequisite to achieving national and international security, but also as a development trend that needs a secured environment in order to flourish. Trinomial's elements are constantly evolving, influenced by structural changes that occur in the global economy, constant globalization of the innovation activity and by the emergence of new actors and new ways of innovation and development. STI are important components of strategies for economic growth, living standards improvement and poverty reduction; those strategies are the basis for an increased level of national and international security. This assertion is valid both for developed, industrialized countries and for developing countries. The latter cannot flourish unless they strengthen their STI capacity that will enable them to fit into the more competitive global economy and open trade system.

We introduce here the concept of *competitiveness*, which includes, in addition to institutional components (institutions, infrastructure, health, education,

⁵ UN, *Agenda item 10. Outcome of the Conference. The Future We Want*, A/CONF.216/L.1, Rio de Janeiro, 20-22 June 2012, p. 46.

⁶ Jeffrey D. SACHS, *From Millenium Development Goals to Sustainable Development Goals*, in "The Lancet", Volume 379, Issue 9832, 9 June 2012, pp. 2206 – 2211, URL: <http://jeffsachs.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/From-MDGs-to-SDGs-Lancet-June-2012.pdf>.

macroeconomic environment, goods market, labour market, financial market, etc.), components on STI (technological readiness and innovation)⁷. This concept is important because national and international security cannot be achieved without focusing on initiatives that increase competitiveness and quality of life and work together to successfully meet the security challenges.

A hypothesis can be drawn from all above: stability/risk of failure of a state is correlated with its level of competitiveness. In what follows, we will attempt to validate this hypothesis by analyzing statistics on these two elements.

2. Security, weak/failed states and competitiveness

The State is currently under double pressure: internal, to meet the basic needs of its citizens and institutions, and external, to cope with the changes taking place internationally⁸. Globalization is already known as one of the main factors eroding state sovereignty, thereby global markets, transnational networks, international norms and cosmopolitan values significantly reduce the role and control sphere of the State. In this context, the State needs to maintain and develop the ability to provide some of the key-political goods associated with statehood: physical security, legal political institutions, economic management and social welfare. The willful or unwillful failure to supply these goods defines it as a *weak state*⁹. Weak states have become an important topic in International Relations from the second half of the '90s; they are viewed as an epidemic of the International System, whose symptoms arise by combining a wide variety of factors, and left untreated could contribute to the spread of instability in vast regions of the world. Most rumoured scenario was one in which violence from one weak state would escalate and affect neighbouring countries and, then, the International Community would be forced to intervene¹⁰. This scenario became reality with the breakup of Yugoslavia and the military interventions in the Middle East.

Compared to other developing countries, weak states are likely to be more affected by slow or zero economic growth and be very far from achieving by 2015 the MDGs. In most cases, their citizens are poor and underdeveloped, suffer from chronic diseases and have a low life expectancy, are deprived of access to education and basic health services, are victims of gender discrimination and they lack access to modern technology.

⁷ Klaus SCHWAB, (ed.), *Insight Report. The Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013. Full data edition*, World Economic Forum, Geneva, 2012, pp. 4-8, URL: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2012-13.pdf.

⁸ See for more details Alexandra SARCINSCHI, *State între slăbiciune, eşec sau colaps*, in “Lumea 2009. Enciclopedie politică și militară (Studii strategice și de securitate)”, Teodor FRUNZETI and Vladimir ZODIAN (coord.), Bucharest: Ed. CTEA, 2009, 1104 pag., pp. 161-178.

⁹ Stewart PATRICK, *Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?*, în “The Washington Quarterly”, No. 29:2, Spring 2006, pp. 27-53.

¹⁰ Stacy R. CLOSSON, *The Nexus of the Weak State and International Security: It All Depends on the Location of Sovereignty*, Paper presented at the British International Studies Association, 2006 Annual Conference, University of Cork, Ireland, p. 2.

Causes of the weakness vary from State to State. It is obvious that poverty erodes state capacity through human capital degradation, hindering the development of effective institutions and markets, creating a favourable environment for corrupt governance, power conflicts, etc. Although poverty emphasizes the weakness of state, the weakness itself is a consequence of other capacities deficit: lack of political legitimacy, lack of competence in economic governance and in providing essential services to the population, the absence of security that is evidenced by the presence of conflict and instability. Each of these capacity problems may in turn exacerbate poverty¹¹.

When the State can only provide a very limited amount of essential political goods, we can argue about *failed state*. These countries lose their role as the main providers of goods policy in the favour of non-state actors or even some *war lords*. Thus, a failed state is a form of political organization devoid of content that is unable or unwilling to fulfil its basic obligations as deriving from the status of a nation state in the modern world. In such State, institutions are flawed, democratic debate is absent; executive and judiciary are not independent; citizens know they cannot rely on the judiciary; bureaucracy has lost its sense of professional responsibility and is a factor in the oppression of citizens. Robert Rotberg identifies other characteristics of failed states: *exhibit deteriorating or destroyed infrastructure; literacy rates fall; infant mortality rates rise; the poor become more and more impoverished; corruption flourishes; failure in projecting power much beyond the capital city, or control their national peripheries; crime rates rise; insecurity level rises*¹².

We shall note that in these States, as defined, STI are not the object of government policy, but rather are seen as negative elements. At most, in such a state, the STI trinomial can be promoted only for the development of new tools and instruments of control and oppression.

Weak/failed states, in most cases, fail to meet the preconditions for the application of standard models of economic development promoted by the UN. In general, this type of states is characterized by a high degree of internal violence that makes it more difficult to help them. The most serious cases are recorded in failed states, where erosion of state capacity has reached high levels, the economic outlook is negative and the potential for violent conflict is high.

In this context, the correlation between the level of stability/risk of failure of a State and its competitiveness is obvious because both elements of the analysis are defined according to the State's ability to provide certain goods to its citizens.

Competitiveness is defined as *the set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country*¹³. The level of productivity sets the level of prosperity and consequently the level of security. Competitiveness is based on 12 pillars: 1) institutions; 2) infrastructure; 3) macroeconomic environment; 4)

¹¹ Lael BRAINARD, Derek CHOLLET (Eds.), *Too Poor for Peace? Global Poverty, Conflict, and Security in the 21st Century*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 2007, p. 34.

¹² Robert I. ROTBERG, *Nation-State Failure: A Recurring Phenomenon?*, NIC 2020 Project, 2003, p. 3-4.

¹³ Klaus SCHWAB (ed.), *op. cit.*, 2012, pp. 4-7.

health and primary education; 5) higher education and training; 6) goods market efficiency; 7) labour market efficiency; 8) financial market development; 9) technological readiness; 10) market size; 11) business sophistication; 12) innovation¹⁴. These columns support each other and a weakness in any of the listed areas may have a negative impact on others. For instance, the strong innovation capacity (pillar 12) cannot be achieved without a healthy, well-educated and trained workforce (pillars 4 and 5) that is able to absorb new technologies (pillar 9), and without sufficient financing for Research and Development (pillar 8) or an efficient goods market that makes it possible to take new innovations (pillar 9) to market (pillar 6)¹⁵. There are three types of economies resulted by the aggregation of these elements:

- Level 1: factor-driven economies (pillars 1 to 4 are key-elements and basic requirements);
- Level 2: efficiency-driven economies (pillars 5 to 10 are key-elements and efficiency enhancers);
- Level 3: innovation-driven economies (pillars 11 and 12 are key-elements and innovation and sophistication factors).

The World Economic Forum's *Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013* (GCR) identifies according to this typology 38 factor-driven economies, 17 economies in transition from level 1 to level 2, 33 efficiency-driven economies, 21 transition economies from level 2 to level 3, and 35 innovation-driven economy. In the following, we correlate the scores of some of the countries analyzed in the Report with the scores reached by the same countries in the *Failed States Index* by the Fund for Peace.

The *Failed States Index* (FSI) proposes 12 indicators of the state failure: demographic pressures; refugees and internal dislocated persons; group grievance; human flight and brain drain; uneven economic development; poverty and economic decline; loss of state legitimacy; deterioration of public services; violation and unevenly protection of human rights and rule of law; monopoly of the security apparatus on the use of legitimate force; factionalized elites; external intervention¹⁶. The analysis of these indicators in 117 countries resulted in a classification in which the high values (up to 10) means that the State has the characteristics of a failed state, while small values, close to 0, signifies the absence of these features. Are thus established four categories of States' statuses: alert, warning, stable, and sustainable.

Starting with FSI, we try to show the existence of the correlations between the status of stability/risk of failure of a state and its competitiveness, based on analyzing a sample of the top three countries with the highest score in each category of alert status, and the country with the lowest score, i.e. with the highest level of sustainability. As for states having the highest score, the failed states (Somalia, Congo, DR and Sudan), there GCR has no data, so we introduced the next three

¹⁴ *Idem*, p. 8.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ The Fund for Peace, *Failed States Index 2012*, 2012, URL: <http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-grid2012>

countries from that alert category for which data on the competitiveness exists (Chad, Zimbabwe and Haiti).

No.	Country	FSI Score	Level of alert	GCR Score	Level of development
1	Somalia	149.9	Alert	<i>No data</i>	<i>No data</i>
2	Congo, RD	111.2			
3	Sudan	109.4			
4	Ciad	107.6		3.05	1
5	Zimbabwe	106.3		3.34	1
6	Haiti	104.9		2.90	1
7	Iran	89.6	Warning	4.22	Transition 1 to 2
8	Rwanda	89.3		4.24	1
9	Malawi	88.8		3.38	1
10	Romania	59.5	Stable	4.07	2
11	Kuwait	58.9		4.56	Transition 1 to 2
12	Mongolia	58.8		3.87	Transition 1 to 2
13	Australia	29.2	Sustainable	5.12	3
14	Iceland	29.1		4.74	3
15	Netherlands	28.1		5.50	3
16	Finland	20		5.55	3

Table No. 1 - Failed/sustainable states and uncompetitive/competitive states¹⁷

We must note that in most cases a high FSI score is correlated with a low GCR score, in other words, if the State has a higher alert level, the level of development is lower.

There are three cases that might be exceptions in the sample above, for which the level of alert is not correlated with the level of development: Iran, Kuwait and Mongolia. We must emphasize that the levels of development are not the mere sum of the indicators representing the 12 pillars of competitiveness, but they have different weights in determining the level of development (corresponding indicators for pillars 1 to 4: 60%; 5 to 10: 35%; 11 and 12: 5%), so there may be discrepancies between ascending classification of countries according to the GCR score and development levels (as seen, for example, in the case of Romania which, although it has a lower score than Iran and Rwanda, is placed on a higher level of development). Mechanisms should be sought in the 12 indicators of FSI and the 12 pillars of competitiveness of the GCR.

¹⁷ According to *Failed States Index 2012* and *The Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013*.

The FSI indicators are fitting 3 areas: social (demographic pressures; refugees and internal dislocated persons; group grievance; human flight and brain drain); economic (uneven economic development; poverty and economic decline); political and military (loss of state legitimacy; deterioration of public services; violation and unevenly protection of human rights and rule of law; monopoly of the security apparatus on the use of legitimate force; factionalized elites; external intervention). We shall note that mainly the first two areas can be correlated with the competitiveness that is based primarily on an economic component, even if involves a political one identified by the institutions whose role is to foster competitiveness and growth. Thus, for example in the case of Iran, the high FSI score is influenced by political and military indicators, which account for over 50% of the final score, placing the country on a high alert level, though, in terms of GCR score, Iran (4.22) is better placed than Romania (4.07). Furthermore, the same political and military problems negatively affect the basic social and economic indicators, so Iran is included in the category of countries in transition from factor-driven economy to efficiency-driven economy, although it has a higher score than countries which are on the first three levels of development: Greece (level 3, GCR score 3.86), Slovakia (level 3, GCR score 4.14), Argentina (transition from level 2 to 3, GCR score 3.87), Croatia (transition from level 2 to 3, GCR score 4.04), Montenegro (level 2, GCR score 4.14), Ukraine (level 2, GCR score 4.14), etc. This means that the political, social and economic situation of Iran is reflected in the sophistication and innovation factors that are crucial for a high level of development of a country (according to a ranking based on these two indicators, Iran ranks 77 in the world, unlike the 66 position it occupies in the ranking based on the overall GCR index).

The same situation is in Kuwait and Mongolia where, although the GCR score is higher than some countries at higher levels of development, social and economic problems are reflected in the indicators of efficiency, sophistication and innovation.

Therefore, we can say that there is a biunique correspondence between a country's level of alert and development, measured with instruments provided by FSI and GCR. Not only the weakness of a State is reflected in reduced competitiveness, but the reduced competitiveness prone the State to failure in providing essential political goods.

Conclusions

STI are key-elements of sustainable development. This means that by investing in this trinomial is possible, on the one hand, the reduction of social and economic problems of a country and, on the other hand, increasing competitiveness and security of that country. Failure to develop and promote STI in beneficial purposes can lead to the failure of that State since it will not be able no more to provide citizens with no welfare, and there will be no reason for its legitimacy. A State, which is unwilling or unable to develop this trinomial, intentionally or unintentionally fosters poverty, highly skilled labour migration, unemployment, illiteracy, corruption, pollution,

discrimination, organized crime, terrorism, etc. and hence a low level of development and a high level of insecurity.

Thus, stability/risk of failure of a state is correlated with its level of competitiveness. The biunique correspondence is complex and complicated, involving multiple elements that are illustrated by the indicators presented above, which influence each other although they are part of different domains of social life. Consequently, science, technology, innovation, competitiveness and security are the basis of humankind progress both by creating it and being enhanced by it.

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY RISKS AND THREATS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS. OPPORTUNITIES FOR ROMANIA

*Iulian POPA, PhD**

***Abstract:** At present, the international situation is more and more complex, boosted by the dynamics of the international relations area.*

The global security must be assessed from a political, military, economic, ecologic, food supply and demographic perspective.

The particularity of this overall situation resides in the fact it unfolds amid this severe economic and financial crisis which enhances the difficulty of identifying solutions to challenging problems that must be settled by the International Community.

In addition to that, we may add the need of vigilance as regards the phenomenon of terrorism, including that related to Romania which must not be considered safe from this type of threats.

On the other side, in order to render an accurate overall image of Romania, we must take into account the opportunities it has and which are likely to offer support in successfully facing such risks and threats.

All these are new aspects in the evolution of the international security environment and must be assessed in their complexity and particularly in their simultaneity.

***Keywords:** risks, threats, economic crisis.*

The domain of international relations has always been considered to be the most dynamic amongst all sciences. This is due to the fact that, for instance, in the fields of physics, chemistry or mathematics, new elements appear once every ten years or more, while in the international relations scope new events, new evolutions or involutions occur on a daily basis.

Therefore, in order to be the best in these fields, a permanent state of awareness and information, a good power of synthesis and analysis are required, just as in the game a chess, in which one has to anticipate the moves of the competitor. In this context, it is worth mentioning that the Russian diplomacy is deemed one of the most redoubtable. Few people know that an eliminatory test upon employment in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the game of chess.

This period we are crossing is particularly complex, being characterised by an overlapping of a series of risks and threats, all triggered by the economic and financial crisis, which complicate even more the international situation.

The current **risks and threats** are political, military, ecological, food supply, cybernetic, terrorist, demographic and this list is far from being comprehensive. Let us try to identify the most significant ones and then emphasise – paradoxically at first sight – the **opportunities for Romania** in this extremely complicated context.

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1. Risks and threats

1.1. Evolutions in the political – military sphere

Situation in the European Union

The economic and financial crisis has contributed to the deterioration of the situation in the European Union too. The economic evolutions have a direct impact on the political actions in all community countries. The elements that pinpoint these obvious evolutions are those indicating the change of governments in various countries, the centre-right regimes being replaced with centre-left governments which are considered to be closer to the interests of the average-income social classes.

The question that rises is: how is this aspect connected to our topic? The correlation is as follows. The European Union aging trend rises sharply (unlike the United States of America). It goes without saying that this elderly community has centre-left political orientations, that the needs of these people are rather linked to social aspects such as: medical assistance, pensions, and other social aids. It is more difficult to propose and promise to this type of population austerity budgets and then put forward arming or equipment programs for the special services, the Police or Armed Forces.

At the end of September 2012, a reunion with the topic *The Changing Role of Intelligence Since 9/11: Lessons for Governments, Industry & The Public* has been organised in Brussels. Within the debates, Lord George Robertson (the former general secretary of NATO) characterised the current situation as a complicated one firstly due to the lack of appropriate resources, able to sustain the proper measures for the fight against risks and threats.

Taking into account that the most important economic partner of Romania is the European Union, it goes without saying that Romania too is affected by these evolutions, including in the correlation between the economic evolutions, national budgets and – implicitly – the financing of the institutions from the defence system, public order and national security. The recent novelty for Romania is the purchase of aircrafts for the equipment of the Army Air Forces, given that the flight resource of the Romanian fleet expires within 2-3 years.

This is a very delicate situation because it is difficult to explain to the public that in such challenging times from an economic and financial standpoint, we have to buy aircrafts. Unfortunately, approximately 3 years ago a key political leader, ex-prime minister, raised the famous question: “Why should we buy planes? Romania is not at war.” It is sad that a major political leader fails to understand the subject. What can we expect from the population, preoccupied by the daily needs and concerns?

Therefore, a country which lacks equipment – as we have exemplified above – is vulnerable. Indeed, we are not at war. And this is a good thing. But wouldn't it be worse to begin the equipment procedures on the verge of war? The great part of the public ignores that such procedures last for years, within large purchase contracts.

Going back to the overall situation at international scale, it is worth mentioning that all countries had to cut off the defence spending. It would be advisable in this difficult situation to approach the following elements:

- Establishment of the priorities and;
- Establishment of outfitting through programs carried out during several years to ease the budgetary load.

Having in mind the actual situation of Romania and given the conclusions drawn in several international conferences I attended, I consider that the acquisition philosophy should undergo some changes as follows: at present, several acquisition programs are launched and smaller funds are allotted to a great number of such programs. In the Occident, they opt for the formulation of priorities and each and every program is fully settled at a time. The next year, the following programs on the established list of priorities will be financed and so on.

At European level, we observe a state of anxiety, including in the European Parliament. Now the popular parliamentary group is dominant but the trend for next year (2013) is towards the socialists and the liberals, if we take into account the trend throughout the last 2-3 years in the national elections. This leads to a state of uncertainty, especially as regards the future budgets because these budgets trigger all the debates, all the calculations regarding the equipment for the security line.

Situation in the Middle East

The moment I write these lines, (26th of September 2012), the elements in the Middle East were roughly as follows: Iran intensified its nuclear program, reaching to more than 3.500 centrifuges for the uranium-enrichment process, driven by the declared ambition to exceed 7.000. The Iranian leaders allege that it is a civil program focused on domains such as health or electricity. Israel accuses that it is rather an intensified program for the construction of the nuclear weapon and insists on obtaining international support allowing them to attack the Iranian nuclear installations (great part thereof being underground).

On the other side, the Arabic world threatens Israel, the entire situation running the risk of causing a very dangerous conflict. Some Arabic leaders even speak of a Third World War.

In another train of thoughts, the US presidential election will be held in November 2012. The Israeli leaders are trying to convince Obama Administration to give its blessing to the attack against Iran until the November elections. Until now, they failed and President Obama declared that he will do his utmost to avoid this attack, at least until the elections or throughout his mandate as he would rather encourage negotiations.

Scientists appreciate that Iran lacks the means to build the nuclear bomb, from a technical point of view, sooner than one year and a half. In other words, they cannot account for the haste of such an attack which would be extremely risky given the possible evolutions and consequences for the entire international community.

At the end of September 2012 in New York a new series of negotiations took place between Iran and G5 +1, at foreign affairs ministers' level. The group of the six great powers that negotiate with Teheran in the controversial Iranian nuclear file is made up of the 5 permanent member states of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Great Britain, Russia and USA) plus Germany.

Representatives of Iranian authorities affirm that, should the negotiations with G5+1 fail, Iran shall obtain 60% enriched uranium necessary for the running of its submarines. Occidental nuclear experts consider that Iran already obtains enriched uranium over the allowed level, that of 20%. (90% enriched uranium serves at the production of the atomic bomb).

In all this diplomatic and political game, the Russian Federation discretely takes the Arabs' side, by supplying them with weapons. All these aspects are supplemented by the incendiary situation in the North of Africa, where various countries changed their political regimes; we must take into account the predictability of such governments whose behaviour is yet to be verified, given the recent evolutions.

At present (beginning of October 2012), the Syrian situation is the most alarming since the conflict escalades into a civil war with many victims (over 31.000 until October 2012) – especially amongst civilians – and the population faces an increasingly distressing food crisis. Apart from the internal problems, related to the protests against the current regime, there is also a foreign affairs aspect, connected to the deadly bombing that stroke Turkey the night of 3-4 of October 2012 from the Syrian territory. In the same night, in Brussels, NATO ambassadors gathered to assess the situation, invoking article 5 of NATO Treaty which committed each member state to consider an armed attack against one state to be an armed attack against all states. On the other side, the Syrian officials declared that they shall start an investigation in order to find out who carried out the attack, suggesting that it was not a governmental action but rather the action of some terrorist groups or of the rebels, striving to turn Turkey against the regime of Bashar al Ashad. The events are continuously and rapidly progressing.

Combing all these elements we may draw the conclusion – on this topic – that the situation is particularly complex, dynamic and dangerous and – worst of all – totally unpredictable. This is because it is common knowledge that in any analysis carried out in this field, the predictability level is the first aspect considered in the assessment of an international player, a region or a conflict.

Romania is not completely safe as regards the situation in this region, given that – according to the most recent evaluations – the medium-range missiles of Iran are likely to reach the territories of Bulgaria and Romania. Let's just hope that Romanian diplomacy will use its best talent, tradition and reputation to efficiently mediate the Middle East situation, including for its own interest.

Situation in the former Yugoslav space

Kosovo represents the main controversial topic of this region. In the attempt to find solutions, in October 2012, the Serbian government established a team of negotiators that will work with the representatives of the Province of Kosovo.

Situation in the Eastern vicinity of Romania

The Republic of Moldavia and Ukraine represent two major points on the Romanian foreign affairs agenda, including from the security perspective – first of all for our country and, second of all for the European Union, taking into account that we have become the eastern border of the EU.

The Republic of Moldavia has the disadvantage that it is in the sphere of interest of the Russian Federation as well. From this perspective, the caution with which Romanian diplomacy must tackle this topic is fully understandable.

For instance, the Moscow pressures have indirectly led to a decision that does not live up to Moldavia's reputation and I refer to the fact that the dialogue between the European Union and Chisinau is carried out through Budapest.

Another example: lately, we have been facing the idea that the union of the Republic of Moldavia with Romania is engineered, inciting to anti-Romanianism, increasing the anti-Romanian feeling.

As regards Transnistria, this separatist province declared its independence and Russia is ready to recognise it, seemingly as an answer to the envisaged intention of Chisinau government to modify its Constitution so as to allow the hosting of NATO military bases in the territory of the Republic of Moldavia.

Ukraine – on the other side – remains the same unfriendly neighbour with Romania, in all subjects of common interest, namely: the Serpent Island, Bystroe Canal, the Kryvyi Rih metallurgical centre, the situation of Romanians living in Ukraine (Bukovina). Moreover, an Ukrainian politician has recently launched the idea that Bukovina region could become a reason of conflict between Ukraine and Romania and, continuing this nonsense, Romania, as NATO member state, would be helped by the Alliance and thus it would be an inequitable fight. This is a situation that the Romanian diplomacy must manage with patience, tenacity and wisdom.

These are just a few examples of the vast and complex situation that may foster risk factors or threats in the nearby Eastern vicinity of Romania that must be managed thoroughly and globally given the inherent interconnections.

Situation in Asia and Asia-Pacific

This continent is crossed by an increasing frenzy, gaining a growing importance on the political as well as economic scene. The entire region benefits from all sorts of underground recourses. Unfortunately, this region ranges between the densest ones, as conflict zones, as more often than not the underground richness represents actual causes of conflict. It is worthwhile mentioning that conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Ossetia (Georgia / Russian Federation), Nagorno-Karabach (Armenia / Azerbaijan), Pakistan / India.

Recently, in September 2012 we have been facing a dispute in Asia-Pacific region between China and Japan, the object thereof being the control over the Senkaku islands which apparently are rich in hydrocarbons and fish.

These islands are located at approximately 200 km North-East of Taiwan and 400 km of Okinawa, being under Japanese administration and claimed by China. The diplomatic conflict between Tokyo and Beijing started after the Japanese state signed an agreement by which it took over three of the five islands from a private owner, a Japanese businessman.

A potential military conflict between these two powers could uncontrollably escalate, with consequences which are hard to estimate, not only for the respective region. Another sensitive problem in the Asia-Pacific region is the existence of

North-Korean ballistic missiles which represent a permanent threat to the security in the region and which could trigger an armed conflict in the Korean peninsula.

Situation in Africa

At the ONU General Assembly held in October 2012 there have been analysed the current world crises and conflicts as well as the risks and threats that must be taken into account. As regards Africa, the worrying zones – other than those from the north of the continent, in Syria which we have dealt with above – are in Mali, Democrat Republic of Congo, Somalia and Yemen.

With regard to the Mali situation, on 15th of October 2012, the European foreign affairs ministers agreed to plan a military mission of the European Union within the Common Security and Defence Policy. This plan aims at regulating the severe political and military crisis in the country. Basically, it focuses on helping the African state's army to reconquer the north side of the country occupied by Islamic groups. The justification of this intervention has been synthesized by the French ministry of defence, appreciating that the country is on verge of becoming a “terrorist sanctuary”, stating that the integrity of Mali means European security.

Somalia faces the issue of piracy in the waters located in its eastern side as well as serious social problems. The piracy aspect fails to come to an end and the international community is attempting to bring the country on the right track. Our country sent a frigate in the area (‘King Ferdinand’) within the “*Atalanta*” counter-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden.

1.2. Terrorist risks and threats

The idea according to which we must make our mind easy about terrorist threats is counterproductive. Recently, the manager of the Romanian Intelligence Service declared in an interview that Romania cannot be considered safe from terrorist risks and threats, on the contrary, they are on the rise – regarding Romania. Moreover, in October 2012, this topic has been one of the subjects debated in a CSAT (Supreme Council of National Defence) meeting, given the recent terror attack in Burgas, Bulgaria. Let's not forget that recently, an Afghan leader declared that Romania and Bulgaria are among the countries that are exposed to terrorist risk. Therefore, an increased vigilance is required for the monitoring of the possible risk sources.

At global scale, the terrorist threats and risks seem to be boosted by the complicated international context, both as regards the political, economic and financial evolutions. In other words, the economic crisis leads to a crisis of financial resources which in its turn triggers a resources crisis for the institutions in charge with the security and safety of each and every country. It seems that this international context serves the interests of the partisans who consider that terrorism represents the only way of doing justice.

1.3. Food supply risks

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has been warning us that *food will become the new oil and land will become the new gold*.

There is a correlation between the climatic changes and the food crisis, because these modifications of the normal evolutions of the climate automatically lead to the decimation of the cultures, to the starvation of the animals, to the increase of food prices, of the fuel prices, which triggers the increase of all other expenses.

For instance, in Romania, the draught led to the drastic reduction of the water resources, which led to the reduction of agriculture production – domain which represents an essential chapter in the Romanian GDP. In addition to that, the lack of water led to the lack of resources for hydropower plants and therefore it meant an alarming reduction of the water resources, so necessary including for the cooling of the nuclear power plant in Cernavoda.

Going back to the climate changes, we must show that biofuels, the star of the years 2000, ceased to be what they seemed because in the original estimation, more fuels should have meant the need for fewer foods. But things are different. We really need more foods given that the planet population is on the rise.

Another recent problem is the one regarding the speculations on the agricultural goods stock exchange which artificially increase the price of such goods, starting with the year 2008 when the world economic crisis began, thus including the agricultural crisis.

The solution would be the establishment of a Central Bank for Cereals and of an International Cereals Stock Exchange which could limit the abuses related to the speculations which are hard to control.

On the other side, another solution would be to try to change the consumption habits, as for instance: the meat is no longer a luxurious product. In the last 20 years the consumption doubled. Only in China, India, Brazil, Russia (BRIC) the annual income per capita has considerably increased. Year after year, we witness an increase of the food consumption. The offer is limited. What is to be done?

Therefore, a starved population is a population hard to control, easy to manipulate and easy to deceive, which triggers risks and threats.

1.4. Ecologic risks and threats

If 30-40 years ago, the environment topic was rather regarded as a triviality, at the beginning of the third millennium the environment issue became the second preoccupation for the international community. The subject is vast and would require large volumes of analyses.

Therefore, I shall limit this presentation to the main updated elements of interest.

Climate changes are more and more alarming, year after year. The accelerated warmth is no longer a seminar topic, but instead it became a very serious problem for the health of the planet population. Such climatic changes lead to the change of seasons and extreme phenomena – such as floods or abundant snowfalls – have serious social and economic consequences. We may infer that these climatic changes indirectly affect the economy of a country and the social situation thereof.

Taking into account these effects, the European leaders decided in 2007 to reduce the greenhouse effect emissions by 20% until 2020, by 30% until 2030 and by at least 50% until 2050, reported to the year 1990.

Moreover, it has been developed the concept of the need to adapt to the new climatic conditions, the need to counterattack the possible floods, earthquakes, temperatures exceeding the normal level. At the same time, we must identify the ways to manage more efficiently the water resources which are more and more limited and more and more precious.

Among the concern reasons in terms of climatic evolutions, we may indicate the following:

- the increase of the average annual temperature with approximately 1 degree Celsius (in certain regions, this increase ranges between 2-4 degrees);
- the food crisis may boost, given the appearance of the draught phenomenon;
- the state of health of people and animals may worsen due to the extreme natural phenomena which are increasingly frequent.
- the increased pressure on the budgets intended for the counterattack of the effects on the weather (new construction standards, performance of new dams, fire-fighting materials and means – as a result of the extreme heats, etc.);
- the reduction of the GDP in each country, as a result of the fact that certain activity sectors are affected: agriculture, forestry, tourism (especially the seaside one), transports and infrastructure, etc.

In a nutshell, it is imperative that Romania adopts the adequate measures to diminish the impact of the climatic changes on its territory and to protect the population against the negative effects of the climatic change.

1.5. Economic risks and threats

Since 2008, the entire international community has been facing a severe economic crisis. Given that all economies are deteriorating, it goes without saying that we produce less and less resources. As a result, the resources for the fields of security, public order and national safety are more and more reduced.

For instance in Romania the defence sector is as follows: according to the NATO commitments, the budget of the Ministry of National Defence should be of 2.38% of the GDP. In the last 4 years, the budgets have been decreasing, reaching in 2012 1.1% of the GDP, that is less than half of the required value. The budgets of the other military institutions are always declining. At least in the next 2-3 years, Romania will face an additional difficulty, from an economic standpoint, which will also extend to the budgets afferent to the defence and national security sectors as Romania will confront with a “peak load” as regards the foreign debt in the following years.

Under such circumstances, the state institutions in charge with the assurance of security function are at bottom level. More often than not, the part of their budgets that is frequently close to zero is related to the equipment of such institutions.

Consequently, the economic aspects, the current crisis severely affect the above-mentioned state institutions (and this occurs in all countries, except, maybe,

for China) that must compensate the lack of resources with an increased vigilance so as to counterattack the possible risks and threats to the security of the population, of the infrastructure and of the state in general.

On the other side, as an additional constraint, the Romanian decision-taking factors must be very cautious as regards the indebtedness degree. A large amount of money is very useful on a short-term basis but will turn into a burden on the future. This is why we must find a balanced solution.

1.6. Cybernetic risks and threats

The extension and the development of information systems have led to the situation in which there is basically no domain which does not use computer technology, with all its benefits.

It is exactly this extension that may trigger vulnerabilities of the various systems with unpredictable consequences, hard to estimate, depending on the field. The notion of cyber-terrorism has already become well-known. The interconnection between all domains of the social life must encourage the authorities to act diligently so as to avoid the successful attacks of the terrorists. The special services have already created special departments in charge with this important topic.

Let's just image the consequences of a hacker's successful attack on the banking system. The chaos it would trigger, the loss of the population's savings, the disarray it would be at the level of the entire society!

Due to the complexity of the domain, to its importance, the peak IT specialists are now recruited and very well-paid. The best of them are recruited during college. In some countries and in the Pentagon, even the most "skilled" hackers are recruited and used for noble purposes.

In October 2012 the international mass-media promoted the idea that NATO and Russia are intensely preparing for an electronic war (AGERSPRES / 18th of October 2012). As a matter of fact, Moscow does not hide its plans regarding the elaboration of cybernetic weapons. Therefore, the Russian Ministry of Defence has recently announced the organization of a competition for the study of the potential of offensive informational weapons.

Within the period 13-16th of November 2012, NATO organised a military exercise ("NATO Cyber Coalition 2012"). The scenario has been conceived, according to some sources, as follows: an African country came into collision with NATO and launched a massive cybernetic attack on two countries of the Alliance, Hungary and Estonia. The African hackers succeed, by means of a virus, to decommission the board devices of a transport military aircraft of the Alliance, aircraft which crashes on the Hungarian territory. This event leads to the death of several NATO officers and of some peaceful civilians. At the same time, the hackers carry out a series of mass cybernetic attacks on some Estonian infrastructure objectives, which triggers the suppression of the activities in this country. In an emergency NATO reunion, it is decided that the prejudice caused by the hackers calls for the application of Article 5 of the Treaty regarding the collective security signed in Washington (on 4th of April 1949). The alliance must repair the prejudice, identify

the aggressor and propose counterattack measures, through cybernetic and military means.

In spite of the fact that in this scenario we are dealing with an “African country”, in reality the cybernetic aggressors (the most probable) are considered to be Russia, China and Iran. As a matter of fact, the American secretary of defence, Leon Panetta, has recently announced “efficient preventive measures” in case of a serious cybernetic danger for the USA national security. According to the American official, the consequences of such attacks may be compared to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and may lead to a ‘Cybernetic Pearl Harbor’.

1.7. Demographic risks and threats

At first sight, the formulation may seem weird and one may wonder what connection is there between the demographic factor and the security domain. The reasoning is as follows:

The European population is decreasing and undergoes an ageing process. In the United States the phenomenon is reverse, in other words its number increases and the age average decreases.

On the long run and from an economic point of view, the aging of the population (and Romania falls into this category) means the deformation of the pyramid of age categories, which translates into the decrease of the number of active persons which must provide for the inactive persons withdrawn from the economic system. The medium and long-term consequences of this trend may become hard to estimate and particularly serious.

From a military and security perspective, this demographic decrease trend has also negative effects because the ageing of the population ruins the changes of improving the military, sports and other similar types of performances and abilities, necessary for special professions. Euphemistically, in 10-20 years’ time, the young people wishing to work in such activity domains will be rare and extremely valuable.

2. Opportunities for Romania

2.1. Anti-missile shield

Although this is a highly criticised topic, both in Romania and beyond its borders, it may become an opportunity for Romania, if tackled and implemented with intelligence, tact, perseverance and in collaboration with the American partners as well as with the other NATO allies.

The decision regarding the acceptance of the anti-missile shield on the Romanian territory has been a bold and visionary one. Briefly, the arguments have been the following:

- a) reinforcement of our partnerships, proving that we are able to exceed the theoretical framework of the collaboration;
- b) strengthening of the allies’ trust in the collaboration with the Romanian Army;

- c) the assimilation on the European map of our country as regards the strategic and military coordinates;
- d) the adding to the national dowry of a new and rich experience both as regards the military collaboration and the exchange of technology.
- e) Enhancement of the infrastructure in the region, similar with the developments in Dobrogea, in the region of the military basis from Mihail Kogălniceanu;
- f) The creation of new jobs in the region.

2.2. Strategic partnership with the Unites States of America

In spite of the fact that certain tendentious analysts consider that USA are a falling superpower, they will continue to be the biggest political, economic and military power for at least another 20 – 30 years. Therefore, Romania is compelled to entertain a privileged relation with the United States.

It is an opportunity for us to have a privileged relation with this superpower and this approach must be maintained irrespective of the political party that forms the Government and regardless of the political affiliation of the American president – Republican or Democrat. This is extremely important since, upon drafting this text, we don't know who will be the new USA President (Barak Obama – Democrat – or Mitt Romney – Republican) after the 6th November 2012 elections.

Apart from a good collaboration at political and economic level, we can give two examples from the military sector in which the good collaboration between Romania and the Unites States has been proven: the modernization of the military basis in Mihail Kogălniceanu and the polygon from Cincu, county of Brasov.

As regards the American military basis in Mihail Kogălniceanu, county of Constanta, we don't know the investment value in the actual military basis, since this represents USA's private business, but we can easily observe the improvement of the infrastructure in the region, which the inhabitants benefit from.

With regard to the Cincu polygon, the Romanian party provided the location, while the Americans provided the investment which until November 2012 amounted to approximately 21 million USA dollars. This collaboration on our national territory has been supplemented by a very good collaboration on the operation theatres where American commanders appreciated the high level of performance proven by the Romanian militaries. To conclude with, I can appreciate that – within this partnership – both parties are well intended, display a fair behaviour and enjoy mutual benefits.

2.3. Other strategic partnerships

Besides the strategic partnership with the USA, Romania signed documents that initiated new strategic partnerships with: Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, Poland, Turkey, Hungary, South Korea, and Azerbaijan.

Basically, only the strategic partnership with Azerbaijan has been materialised, starting from the energetic file. It is well known that Azerbaijan is a country rich in oil and natural gas resources. Moreover, both countries entertain good relationships with the USA. To complete the overall image of this theme, we must keep in mind

that Azerbaijan is at latent war with Armenia, which enjoys the outright support of Russia.

As regards the other partnerships, we must admit that they act out mainly at a declarative level or within certain consultations, conferences, seminars or common exercises, at least until now.

Conclusions

The period we cross is extremely complicated. The risks and threats are as diverse as they are sophisticated, as I have shown in this paper. Therefore, we must consider not only the military aspects of this topic.

In order to prevent certain catastrophic events, we must promote and encourage an efficient collaboration between all institutions in charge with the security, public order and national safety sector.

All important sectors such as education, infrastructure, health, and mass-media must join these institutions for the fulfilment of this objective. Moreover, the state reserves must be consolidated in order to face the possible natural catastrophes as well as military conflict situations.

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IS STATE STILL THE MAIN ACTOR IN SECURITY AGENDA?

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Abstract: *From the perspective of the concept of the paper it was necessary to solve the structuring of the security from the perspective of its non-military aspects of individual spheres. The basis of this analysis is the division of security into horizontal and vertical level which leads to division into sectors and analytical levels, thus we want to stress the widening and deepening of the security agenda. The main aim of the paper is to show if the state is still the main actor in security agenda, or entering into this relationship other actors – non-state actors or international organizations. In paper we use analysis of the social constructivism as main theory.*

Keywords: *security, state, non-state actor, international organisation, security environment, social constructivism.*

Introduction

With the deepening of security agenda is related with the actors in security agenda. In the paper we use the analysis as the research methods, with focusing on state as main actor in security agenda, with compare of increasing power others actors in this sphere. For better demonstration we use theory of social constructivism as main theory (with their sector security) to show, where state is still the main actor or even not. By the more limited definition of the term security authors use the military-political understanding of the security (the scope of the definition is more limited) with the main object of the research focused on the state as the main participant (only one main participant). The wider definition of security focuses its attention on other spheres of social life as economic, societal (social)¹, environmental or information sphere (this sectoring shows the width of security/safety problems). The security is perceived not from one perspective only – the state, but from many basic perspectives: individual security, intrastate groups' security, state security, regional groupings security, international environment security (according to some authors there is a deepening of the concept with the amount of participants)². While in the more limited scope, the researchers focused mostly on one analytical level – the state in the military-political sector – the modern understanding, the wider definition is not dealing with only state as the main participant but allows as research levels

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¹ In the Anglophonic literature, authors use the term societal security, its viable equivalent in Slovak is difficult to find, term as social security, societal security and more are used, however, these terms have larger scope and are not exact the same as the term in the Anglophonic literature, that is the reason to use the term societal security.

² See more: Š. DANICS, *Bezpečnostní politika*. Praha: Vysoká škola ekonomická, 2007; LASICOVÁ, J. 2006. *Bezpečnost'. Bezpečnostná agenda súčasnosti*. Banská Bystrica: Univerzita Mateja Bela, 2006.

other elements as – the international system, regional groupings, intrastate groups and individuals and their position in the widened scope of the security agenda (the concept of security is deepened and the number of levels of analysis is increased) in the context of widening of the security problem in different sectors – environmental, economic, societal, information and energy. This perspective of the researched problems of security caused other potential threats to arise for all analytical levels (the widening and deepening of the security concept) that are connected to individual sectors and individual participants, thus creating a room for new approaches to the research of security.

1. Social Constructivism

This theoretical trend started to develop in 1980s and was strengthened after the end of the Cold War. Some of its representatives see its start in the politics of perestroika of M. Gorbachev that resulted in the dissolution of the USSR through accepting new ideas that resonated in the society³. Other sources of constructivism were the strengthening and reflecting on the questions of national identity, differentiating of the society not on the level of classes but on the level of identity forming factors (intellectuals, believers, apolitical citizens, committed citizens, culturally oriented citizens, etc). The source of the security sphere became interests of many of the already mentioned institutions (nation, ethnicity ...). One of the founders of the constructivism is A. Wendt who claims that realism and liberalism are unable to react to realities that are happening in the international political system through their concepts⁴. Among other followers can be included P. J. Katzenstein, M. Barnett, E. Adler, N. Onuf, J. Ruggie, K. Sikkink that perceive the international community as the basis of the social constructivism and its role in the process of stabilization and sustainability of peace and security in the world, which can be reached mainly through the security culture that would be created in the consciousness of all security participants. The creation of this culture can act the stabilizing factor in the society. Among the constructivist approaches there is the Aberystwyth School or the Copenhagen School.

The end of the Cold War brought the change in the perception of security and security threats. The previous understanding of the security was of in the concepts of the military-political understanding of the security. The threat was considered to be the threatening of the state sovereignty, its territory or citizenship and everything connected to the army, even if it was not a correct assumption. Only B. Buzan, O. Waever a J. de Wilde – representatives of the social constructivism in the 1990 brought the concept of the sector security to the security studies, this concept is

³ S. M. WALT, *International Relations: One world, many theories*. In *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1998, no. 110, pp. 29-46.

⁴ A. WENDT, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

known as the Copenhagen School (COPRI⁵). The Copenhagen School presented as one of the outcomes of its new concept of the security that was connected to the division into sector security the so called sector approach to security studies. Till the end of the Cold War the security studies managed with the dichotomy division with the security using only two basic terms of “war” and “non-military conflict” (non-military threat). All non-military aspects of security were pushed outside of the agenda to the periphery of the interest. The Copenhagen School brought the process of securitization into the international relations in the scope of the paradigm of the social constructivism as an innovation and assigned the existential character to non-military threats in particular⁶.

The Copenhagen School talks about the expediency of the delimitation of threats through division of security into individual sectors – military, political, economic, societal and environmental. In each of the sectors it stresses the referential objects that if they are existentially threatened may legitimately claim the right to survive through its representatives. It further defines the major existential threats. If the major existential threats endanger the referential objects participants of the securitization have the opportunity to unite and advance against the common enemy. The security became the social and intra-subjective construct that is represented through the ability of the participant to persuade of the topic to be as urgent to require immediate solution even by overstepping the rules valid for solution of different disputes – securitization theory. This theory was later developed by different authors, mainly R. Taureck⁷, R. Emmers and others that were trying to combine ideas of representatives of the social constructivism and neo-realism. Both these paradigms agree on the fact that the “security as no other concept in the world politics has the power to push a neglected topic to the top of the political agenda where it can be discussed quickly, with no regard to democratic rules and regulations.”⁸ This process is called the mobilizing power that the Copenhagen School attributes to the security.

2. Security Sector and the state

Spheres of the state security according to the Copenhagen School concept can be divided into five sectors – military, political, societal, economic and

⁵ COPRI – Research institute for peace and conflict established in 1985 with one of the research projects with the name of Non-military aspects of the European security that was the basis for the Sector security.

⁶ See more: B. BUZAN, O. WAEVER, J. de WILDE, *Security: A New Framework For Analysis*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

⁷ Rita TAURECK – an author dealing with the Securitization theory, in her book “Securitisation theory – The Story so far: Theoretical inheritance and what it means to be a post-structural realist“ she deals with thinkers that influenced O. Waever and researches the securitization theory in her works.

⁸ R. TAURECK, *Positive and negative Securitisation – Bringing together securitisation theory and normative Critical Security Studies*, France: Paper presented for the COST Doctoral Training School at Centre Europeén, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris, 2005, p. 9.

environmental sector with the contemporary tendencies show the need to widen the sector security by a minimum of two more sectors – energy and information.

The position of the state in the field of the military authority will always be a priority; the state will contrary to the present tendencies always struggle to maintain the security of its citizens, territorial integrity and sovereignty as its priority.⁹ The integration tendencies into the military-political organizations are only the presentation of weak and medium-strength states that to maintain the advantages and the feeling of security integrate into these allegiances regardless of the loss of a certain level of independence in decision-making. Large states will always struggle to maintain the superiority and to bypass the submission to the collective decision-making or to minimize it. In this sense, the military security will always rely on the large states and the power potential of the individual state and the relation to power centers.¹⁰ This is expressed through the most important military-strategic doctrines of states as the USA, USSR/Russia, China, India, the North Korea, Israel, etc¹¹.

The example of our region (the European region) in the sphere of military integration of states, e.g. NATO requires to be the state that bears the political decision of conditions of integration. The integration is decided by member states. If there is one state that expresses its disagreement the whole process of the NATO integration is blocked¹². To summarize the above-mentioned facts, the military security is the matter of the state which structure is related to the intrastate political system.

Political security sector can be disrupted by the influence of different groups that are aiming for their change. At that time, the state's effort is to maintain its political system at any costs. It is positive if the change is from the authoritative to the democratic political system. A negative would be, if the tendencies inside the democratic regime lead to fights over power and an election of undemocratically ruling elite. The question of the free decision of people or a military subversion of power is the question of morality, however, the reality is that the change from the democratic to undemocratic political system leads to destabilization of the whole state even its surroundings and can further lead to the disruption of the regional security situation in the region and a threat to neighboring countries. The positive

⁹ J. KRÁLIK, *Územná samospráva a otázky vytvárania stratégie bezpečnosti jej územia*. In *Bezpečnostné fórum 2010*, Banská Bystrica: Fakulta politických vied a medzinárodných vzťahov UMB, 2010.

¹⁰ J. KALICKÝ, C., J. RIEPL, *A Transatlantic Alliance for the 21st Century*. In: *Process of EU Enlargement in the 21st Century-New Challenges*. Banská Bystrica: Faculty of Political Sciences and International Affairs, UMB and Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences, Faith University Istanbul, 2005.

¹¹ O. KREJČÍ, *Zahraniční politika USA*. Ideje doktríny, strategie. Praha: Professional Publishing, 2009, pp. 103-106.

¹² NEČAS, P., BUČKA, P., TEREM, P., LIPPAY, B. 2010. Security challenges of NATO-UN interoperability for better fight against new threats. In *The knowledge-based organization: KBO - 2010*, Sibiu - Romania: Nicolae Bălcescu Land Forces Academy, 2010.

change can reduce such tension in the region and potential risks.¹³ This sphere of the social life of the state is the main security participant the state in particular while bearing in mind that in the framework of the state there are no groups striving for the undermining of the state ideology and sovereignty. The problems have to be solved by the state, since the outside interference is less probable.

In the economic security sector connection to the global challenges it is predominantly the state that can in its own framework of social politics regulate the growth of poverty, since only the state has the means and measures for continuous social politics. In this situation, the responsibility should be taken even by international economic institutions that are the reasons for the contemporary situation based on their decisions on the macro-economic level, but these are not taking the responsibility, thus it is again the state that has to solve problems on its level. The securitization of the social situation presents a time bomb for the state and desecuritization of this problem is too expensive for the charity organizations and cannot be successful because it is campaign based. The state apart from the inner interference to eliminate the worst problems can serve as a donor of the development help which increases its international prestige and helps to liberalization of economics. The state can ask for help from international organizations like the World Bank, etc.

The most important role in the societal security sector is played by the state. Whereas, in the classic security approaches the term identity is always connected to the national (state) identity as a synonym and the idea that the state identity is only the combination of many different identities inside the state was not allowed, the new security studies brought new and currently in the framework of the existing development tendencies of the international political system a well-supported concept (Kosovo, the Georgia region). The role of integration on the basis of identity is a process that significantly changed the territorial division of the world mainly after the World War I up until the fall of bipolarity in the international political system. At present, these tendencies are considered to be destructive (already mentioned Kosovo, the Southern Ossetia). It is an indisputable fact that there was a double movement in formation of states – from the territorial state to the national state (e.g. the Slovak Republic), and the reverse movement from the national “territory” to territorial sovereignty (e.g. Poland, Germany, Italy). This movement started in the groundbreaking periods like the dissolution of the Roman Empire, the 30-year War, Napoleonic Wars, and both World Wars and as stated by B. Posen – the post-conflict era is characterized by the “re-evaluation of values” even from the perspective of finding a new argumentation for self-determination in the “worldwide space”.¹⁴ The function of the motivated groups leads to the statement that they form the moving

¹³ From the long-term perspective is the violent establishment of the democratic regime a positive example, e.g. Japan, from the short-term perspective the establishment is disputable, e.g. Iraq in 2003, Afghanistan after 2001/2002, with the development of these countries can be positive in the long-term, but this will be clear in the future.

¹⁴ B., R. POSEN, *The Security Dilemma and the Ethnic Conflict*. In *Survival*, vol. 35, 1993, no. 1, pp. 27-29.

force in confrontation with the majority population and are displayed even in the form of extremism and extreme radicalism that intrudes from the societal into the political sector and influences the solution of all important state questions, from the gain of certain autonomous standards to the extreme case of a demand of the formation of a new state in the original state. The above-mentioned statements show that the role of the state is the societal sector is important in the form of integration of minorities and elimination of the destabilization of the society and even if the international community belongs to important partners in the solution of such conflicts its role is in assisting not decision-making.

From the introduced threats in the environmental security sector it is possible to single out participants in the securitization that are aiming for prevention of threats and disturbance of the balance in the environment through various researches, conferences and activities directed to the protection of the environment. There can be included large international organizations that fight against pollution of seas, air and drinkable water and are striving for rational use of drinkable water or protection of soil and protected zones, etc. Currently, many states have the protection of the drinkable water and its rational use incorporated in their Constitutions, thus not only international organizations but states as well started to protect the environment on a large scale. At the beginning of the 21st century, there are states that through its egotistical character¹⁵ do not see problems that are not directly related to the particular region.¹⁶ For example, states of the European Union do not pay such attention to rational use of drinkable water as countries with its shortage (Africa, Near East) since this problem is not directly related to them. In the future, states will realize the importance of natural resources on a larger scale because they can cause fatal damage on their territory, e.g. through migration waves caused by the drought. In the environmental sector, the importance of state will rise; this importance is related to the realization of possible threats in the future and with understanding of the responsibility for the world peace and the stability of the international community.

Conclusions

When comparing the theoretical approaches to research of the security, as the most important approach can be understood the theory of the social constructivism as the new type of the security problem research. The social constructivism is based on

¹⁵ The example of the states' egotism is mostly related to realization of the responsibility of states of the world stability, e.g. the so called developing countries have no intention to reduce the emission quotas, reduction of the use of natural resources, reduction of the energy dependency of their industry on natural resources and their saving because at the time they are experiencing the first phase of the economic growth that the developed countries experienced long ago and thus they can focus on the secondary factors of the economic growth, the reduction of the energy demands of the economy. The so called developing countries have no priority intention in participating in different environmental programs.

¹⁶ M. VOŠTA, J. ABRHÁM, *Geografie a proměny poznání geografické reality*. In Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, 2005, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 219-221.

the assumption that the behavior of participants of security is a very strong social construct and it stresses the power of ideas. While in the realism and liberalism the main participant is the state and their efforts for survival, in constructivism participants are not only individual states, there can be various institutions (nation, ethnicity, group, regional grouping, and ecologic grouping) that can elevate certain problems to the security problem through various actions appearing in the society. They pay attention to these problems and react to them. These groupings are especially attentive to changes in society, because the social reality is never unequivocally defined. The social constructivism perceives the reality as ever-changing through social interactions.

Within the all security sectors the state plays the most important guarantor of human rights and liberties claimed by any small or big group of citizens or individuals. The role of guarantor can as well be played very positively and flexibly by non-governmental organizations which look after obeying these rights and have a less demanding administration than the international governmental organizations of similar type. From the state's point of view this role is played by the non-profit sector, where various types of associations are established according to particular interests with own agenda. Most of these organizations and associations have a functioning connection to the international structures and a big opinion shaping power also with respect to creating a positive environment for protecting all human security values.

At present, these can be perceived as equal security sectors that are required attention from the state. The concept of the Copenhagen School stresses the fact that participants of the securitization in the contemporary international political system are not only states but other participants as well. As we presented in the paper, today in many security sectors is not only state the main actor, but there is many of others non-state actors and international organization.

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THE IMPACT OF THE EMERGING STATES UPON THE REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POWER CENTERS

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Abstract: Since the struggle for power was a constant feature of human history and policymakers involved in it whenever tried to meet goals, we believe that the spirit of competitiveness will always remain an essential feature in the international relationships issue. The major paradigm changes that marked the transition to the new millennium, and the problems that humanity as a whole must solve maintain this spirit of competitiveness and international political configuration which marks the evolution towards equilibrium. The emergence of some states in the current context is decisively influencing the international relations whether by exploiting favorable international contexts or by exploiting middle situations that helps them in developing as regional or even as international centers of power.

Keywords: emerging countries, BRICS, power centers, globalization, international relations, multi-polarity.

Introduction

The researchers have always studied the phenomenon of International Relations and relations between states; they were concerned about how it will evolve on medium and long term. As the paradigm changes occurred at the end of eight or ninth decade of the last century marked significant changes in the “grand chessboard”, more poignant questions about how international relations will develop acquired a special importance. Of course, this study can not analyze all the trends occurring on the international scene, all political actors involved, but will try to present some ideas and theories expressed at the political level and the actual reality on current world politics and choices expressed or understood the main competitor to the development of global influences.

We can not find in any dictionary the meaning of power structure or power center, but we can say that they could be organizations or states with huge capabilities and huge economic, political and financial resources that can influence smaller states to take action for their own interest.

Nowadays, in the world, we have regional or worldwide power structure and the finest example of these types are the United States of America or the Russian Federation.

History shows us that there are three specific periods for the development of power structures during the last two centuries.

1. In the XIXth century and the first part of the XXth century, Germany, France, Great Britain, the Czarist Empire and the USA had a permanent battle for the spheres of influence in the world. This continuous battle resulted in a huge loss of resources for the entire mankind during the first and the Second World War. The

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bipolar power structure has been installed in the world.

2. After the end of the World War II, the structure of power and spheres of influence were divided between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Their purpose was to have the absolute power upon the international political system. While the Soviet Union has developed a system whom the main actor was the people, USA has approached a system that permitted to other states that were affected by war, to develop under USA's influence. The development of the Western Europe's states, the foundation of the European Union for economical issues, conducted to the collapse of the Soviet Union. USA were the winner of the Cold War.

3. At the end of the XXth century there was only one super power in the world: the United States of America. For almost twenty years, USA was the only state that had a great influence all over the world. Nowadays, it looks like the USA's hegemony is about to be over because of other states that have also developed their political and economic influence.

1. The power dispersion in today's political system

1.1. The non-polarity theory

At a first sight, today's world seems to be multipolar. Together, the main powers, manage to reunite half of the Earth's population, 75% from the global profit and 80 % from the defense budget. The hegemony of the USA is undoubtedly also in the military domain. If a state has a huge budget for defence, it does not mean that that state is really secure. We can have as example the 11th of September 2001 when a terrorist organization caused huge loses to the USA, without spending a lot of money and resources in order to do those things. Many of the latest innovation of the US Army are not efficient against the insurgent's tactics and in an urban guerrilla way of fighting. Even so, USA is the biggest power concentration in the world. Its military is spending about 500 billiards dollars a year; they have the most modern army in the whole world and the most efficient economy. Although the USA's profit represents 25% of the world's profit, we do not have to forget that USA is in a real decline concerning its position in the world. The non-polar world is a consequence of globalization.

The non-polarity is consolidated by the globalization. It also increases the power of the non-state actors: the energy exporters, terrorist organization and multinational corporations. It is more obvious today, if you are the most powerful state in the world, it does not mean that you own the supreme influence in the economic domain. It is very easy for the individuals and for specific groups to have a substantial power. It increased the speed and the volume of the international traffic starting with energy, drugs, humans, TV and radio signals, viruses and weapons. Much of this traffic is done without the governments to know about that. A non-polar world means the absence of the institutional formulas and alliances, and order structures from previous ages. The alliances will be very much decreased because they require the needs and solidarity capacity.

1.2. The multi-polarity theory

In accordance with the specialists, the states are the main political units which determine the evolution of the international relationships and the global organization of the society. The diversity of the economic progress have generated new perspectives and national goals that affects the identity of the populations, generates intern and international conflicts and influences the decisions of the political factors. As the multi-polarity theory says, USA will have to accept in the so-called “hegemony club”, the power centres from China, European Union, Japan, India and Russia.

Due to the redistribution of the power, the political and economic consequences are unpredictable. USA will have to accept major compromises with other states. Other states, which will be conscious of this redistribution of the power, will have the intention to be orientated to the new power centres. The economic development of other states will create instability. The new powers, unsatisfied by the anterior hierarchy, will no longer accept the subordination statute. More or less, normal alliances between power centres will create a fluid multipolar configuration. Unfortunately, past experience suggests the redistribution of power between states tends to create political and military conflicts.

In the meantime, claims may occur. Countries as China can achieve a GDP comparable to that of the United States. But, for China, this welfare tank will certainly be absorbed in the first phase by its huge population and can not be used to finance global commitments comparable to those assumed by the United States today. The end of the uni-polarity was rushed also by the US strategic errors. Both by what they have done and what failed to do, the United States accelerated the emergence of alternative power centres in the world, thus weakening their position.

Therefore, multipolar power centres are a fact growing every day its international presence on the political scene, and each power centre will have to take into account the intentions of other centres when they intend to manifest in any part of the world.

2. The regional emerging power structure reflection

In order to develop a competent foreign policy, states leaders need access to useful analysis capability to make rational and mature political culture. Ambitions, claiming and attitudes of other countries and, particularly, of the powerful states with major interests in the region, have a direct influence on the foreign policy decision makers. Leaders must take into account the aspirations, views and collective emotions of their populations. In any social system in which authorities serve national interests, governments need political support “at home”. Politicians tend to exaggerate certain political issues that they consider favourable and ignore real information that would contradict the decision criteria. Local public perceptions partly formed by unrealistic promises of politicians can force the government to take wrong political decisions.

1. In the United States, Canada and the European Union, some people are

alarmed by the ascendancy of other centres of power which, in time, could threaten “Western civilization”. Fearing that they will be overwhelmed by unassimilated immigrants, Western Europeans feel intimidated by the erosion of their identity. They are hostile to globalization, which, in their perception, means reducing wages, loss of jobs and the elimination of social benefits.

2. After many failures, a large part of the Muslim countries’ population feels deeply humiliated. Muslim resentment towards the West, held responsible for their failures, was exacerbated by the level of hatred. Consequently, an important part of the Muslim world tends to join around radical elements, to adopt a fanatical religious fundamentalism and believe that detestable acts of violence against civilians are justified.

3. The Africans from the south of Sahara, with exuberant rate of birth, excessive unemployment and corrupt government, toss in poverty.

4. Encouraged by the growth and success of reforms, people in China, India and Southeast Asia show optimism, dynamism and confidence in the future. Their governments, feeling accepted by the public, aspire to maintain political stability, to enhance their image as economic development sustainers and to temporarily avoid major conflagration that could affect their legitimacy. Unavoidably, these countries will become stronger and stronger on the international arena and they will affect the geopolitical evolution of the mankind.

5. Traumatized by the chaos of post-communist transition, Russia's population has accepted authoritarianism of the so-called 'Tsar' Putin, in the hope that the country will regain global power status and that maybe Russia will improve respectability in the international arena with Medvedev and Putin, as promised they will restore the grandeur of Soviet times. Empowered with revenues from oil and gas exports, the Kremlin adopted a duplicitous, arrogant and aggressive foreign policy.

6. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are still not able to give up their national identity in favour of Europeanism. Not having enough confidence in military capability and political inclinations of Brussels towards Russia, the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe are convinced that the fact of maintaining a special alliance with NATO and especially the U.S. are giving them valid security issues.

The existence of huge resources together with an economy generating profits and a balanced policy in recent years has driven a number of states in elite international political system, they being able to zeal great power status and claims to spheres of influence. Thus, it may be referred to the BRIC group of four countries currently known to have rapid economic growth and could rise soon, among the biggest world powers. It is about Brazil, Russia, India and China. To these might be added, with some reserves, and U.S. Mexico. Group Goldman Sachs predicted that the economies of these countries will eclipse all existing great powers of the world by 2050. Together, the BRIC countries collect more than 25% of the total surface of the Earth, 40% of the world population and gross domestic product amounts to 15,435 trillion. Goldman Sachs also notes that together would be an unstoppable force and it will occupy the first place in every ranking, worldwide. Aware of this, the leaders of the four countries have already begun to establish relationships and connections,

making alliances aimed, firstly, to overthrow the U.S. dominance in both economic and political fields.

In the first phase, China and Russia formed the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization” (SCO), along with the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, rich in energy resources. Therefore, the two powers, which were recently joined by India, now, control huge oil reserves in an area where Americans have tried on several occasions to extend their influence. Neither India nor Brazil stays still, their volume of bilateral economic cooperation increasing from year to year. In regard to some forecasts of World Bank, China will surpass the U.S. in terms of economic development by the year 2027, India will reach the Americans in 2050, and the BRIC countries, in total, will exceed the G7 by 2032. The figures submitted by the World Trade Organization (WTO) supports this hypothesis. According to the WTO, global trade increased in 2007 by 15% and more than half of this increase is due to the countries being in full boom. However, America still has major influence on domestic and international policy of other states but their role as global hegemony begins to be challenged by the emerging power centres. On the other hand, the European Union and Japan, traditional allies of the United States, have detached of some aspects of Washington's foreign policy. Since it abandoned socialism, India has remarkable economic progresses. This democratic country, with over a billion people, promises to become a formidable powerhouse. But, China is America's biggest rival and worst contender for world hegemony. Southeast Asia covers a vast territory, a region with over 580 million people with a combined GDP in 2010 up to approx. 1.5 trillion U.S. dollars, energy and natural resources, is also a huge market and a centre of attraction for foreign investments, including those from the European Union.

In a historical retrospective, the first observation in defining developments in Southeast Asia is that here emerging economies called “Asian tigers” have risen, many years ago and much sooner than other areas. The first four “tigers” were Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, which were followed by Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and China. During 1960 - 1995, the growth of their economies was around 6% per year, propelling the area through these performances, to the top of the global growth. Catalyst for these developments was the massive presence of foreign capital. Then, the financial crisis of 1997/1998 came, which mostly hit Thailand and Indonesia, but it affected the whole area, which demonstrates that the Asian miracle had no solid national or regional economic base to cope crises and recessions. President of Indonesia, during his visit to Germany, referring to the crisis in 1997/1998 that hit his country, affirmed that Indonesia economy shrank at a rate of 13%.

Southeast Asia has a special place and role, particularly important in the context of “Future World Economy”, given the developments and trends toward regional integration, which have triggered the successive visions perspective, with formation of the Southeast Asian Nations Association - SEANA in 1967, and in the next four years, more exactly by 2015, will reach a significant step - the creation of the SEANA. In 2003, on the island of Bali, in the SEANA Vision 2020, the Heads of States and Governments of the 10 member states of SEANA, Indonesia, Malaysia,

Thailand, Philippines, Singapore (the five founding countries), Vietnam, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar (the second group subsequently accepted by the organization, by extension) adopted at that summit the Bali Concord II Declaration. This declaration, with a historical symbol, provided the creation of the SEANA by 2020. In 2007, at the same level it was determined that the project will be achieved by 2015.

3. The current power structures of the world

3.1. USA

With a great military economic and political power, USA influenced for more than 20 years, world politics. All the major world powers have taken great endorsement mentioned. However, today is increasingly looming the idea that the uni-polar American domination is over. It took nearly two decades, more than a moment in historical terms. Why has ended? One of the explanations is history, says Richard Haas, President of the “Council on Foreign Relations”.

The rise of new centres of global power can not be stopped. The result is a greater number of actors able to exert regionally or globally influence. This does not mean that the U.S. has become weaker, but that many other entities have become stronger. Still, analyzing the conditions that led to the emergence of several power structures, it should be noticed that some of them are found in the American political system and in the decisions that have been made in the past 10 years. Thus, we can state that one of the main reasons for the end of the uni-polarity is just the U.S. policy. Both by what they did and also failed to do, the U.S. has accelerated the emergence of new power centres and have weakened their position in relation to them.

U.S. energy policy (or lack thereof) is another reason behind the end of uni-polarity. Since the first oil shocks of the years 1970, U.S. oil consumption have increased by about 20 percent and oil imports have more than doubled in volume and nearly doubled as a percentage of consumption. This increase in demand for foreign oil has helped to raise the world price above \$20 a barrel to over \$100 a barrel. The result is an enormous transfer of wealth and leverage to those states with energy reserves. Also, the economic policy played a role in this issue. President George W. Bush has fought costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; he has allowed discretionary increased spending by 8 percent per year and cut taxes. U.S. fiscal position declined from a surplus of over \$100 billion in 2001 to an estimated deficit of about \$250 billion in 2007. The current account deficit is now rapid growing by more than 6 percent higher than GDP. These places downward pressure on the dollar stimulates inflation and contributes to the accumulation of wealth and power in other parts of the world. Poor regulation of the mortgage market and the credit crunch has exacerbated these problems.

As a result, the United States must adapt to a multipolar power configuration. U.S. internal political system can propose what kinds of mechanisms are proper to work in a multipolar world.

The concept of balance of power represents the essence of American political thought. Understanding the republican power separation mechanism will well prepare president Obama for multi-polarity. He should not dominate the new system or stop the rise of emerging markets, but to keep them controllable power by creating a balance.

3.2. The European Union

The European Union is another power structure that manifests internationally especially economically, but we must not forget that most of its members are also members of NATO's North Atlantic Alliance, the most significant military power in the world. Alliance's military capability is far superior to any other military force in the world.

As regards EU manifested world power, we should mention the major influence in a global organization such as the WTO, the UN specialized bodies also at international summit on environment and sustainable development.

We must recognize, however, that the EU motto (unity in diversity) has left its mark on the world arena management representations: as regards the political and diplomatic regards, its Member States and the Union as a whole, did not reach to speak with one voice over the utmost importance issues of peace and stability, terrorism, Middle East and approval or disapproval of U.S. policy in context, the role and composition of the UN Security Council, most recently, the issue of Kosovo independence.

Of course, EU has great influence on global politics when speaking with one voice in international affairs. Trade negotiations are a good example. EU world power status is undoubtedly due to its economic strength. With a share of world GDP by 23% and is the main trading partner of the world (import by 18% to 16% of the world total and the 2nd U.S. exports), EU is certainly a world power concerning the economy, but it is also the first importer of energy. It should be noticed that the EU is the main contributor of development aid in the world.

By creating the Common Foreign and Security Policy, EU has created its own active political dimension that adds to its role as a major economic and trading power in the world arena. But, we should not forget that this is about the size of inter-governmental and supranational not inclusive of the European Union. In 1999, after the end of the Kosovo conflict, the UN Security Council authorized an Administrative Mission to begin the process of building peace, democracy, stability and self-government. One of the four pillars of the mission is the responsibility of the EU: economic reconstruction, recovery and development. In fact, the EU has the greatest contribution, in terms of financial and human issues, in restoring damage caused by war and decades of neglect of the province by the communist authorities. Cold War largely reduced European dependence on American security guarantees offered through NATO. The lack of the Soviet Union danger removed the certain extent and cohesion existing between European countries in terms of foreign policy and defence issues. This may explain the relatively minor progress registered by the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam on the line of defining European security

policy.

3.3. China

China's economy, the second economy in the world, will only increase by 7.7% this year, compared to 9.3% last year, but the risk of a forced landing is “low” and growth is expected to accelerate in 2013 to 8.1%, announced the World Bank (WB), quoted by AFP. China's growth will slow down to 7.7% this year, compared to 9.3% last year due to the reduced exports and slower growth investment bank predicted in its latest report on East Asia and the Pacific, published in Singapore. WB expected to attend an advance of 8.2% of the Chinese economy this year.

The increase of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of China will accelerate again in 2013, reaching 8.1%, due mainly to the effects of the economic recovery measures adopted by the government and the expected increase in investment, said WB. China's slowdown of this year is significant, and some experts fear that it could be worst is WB mentioning that expects a sharp fall in economic growth. WB added the risk of forced landings remain low.

This slowdown of China would lead to self-assembly by developing countries in East Asia and the Pacific, which will cap growth this year to 7.2%, one point below last year. Countries from the region called “developing” do not include Japan and Australia, according to the World Bank definition.

The economy of this region will recover in 2013 to reach 7.6%, fuelled by domestic demand, but a worsening of the crisis in the Euro zone, a strengthening of fiscal austerity in the United States or prolonged slowdown in Chinese growth remain important risk factors, WB attention. Any developing region will not be protected if the situation in Europe continues is going to deteriorate significantly (...) A 'major' crisis will lead to a fall of more than two points of GDP growth in the region in 2013, warns World Bank. China must be taken into account by other power structures, and can not be isolated, but integrated into a global power.

3.4. Russia

Russia seems to be a formidable opponent of the U.S. political field and especially economic field. As surface, Russia is the largest country in the world, occupying the eighth part of the total area of the globe. It is so great that neighbours to Asia continent (China), and the European continent (Norway, for example). Moreover, it is located really close to the United States, but also to Japan. However, as population is only 9th place in the world with 142 million inhabitants.

However, this information does not place Russia among the world powers, but its energy resources and mineral reserves, are the largest in the world. This is at one hand, because, on the other hand, this country is one of the recognized nuclear powers and has the largest arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. After coming to power of the president Vladimir Putin in 2000, Russia began to rise slowly, but surely, its economy has grown, wages have increased eight times, and the unemployment rate has halved. Moscow's external strengths are oil and gas, and wood - they, along with metals account for about 80% of the country's exports. In

addition to economic development, Russia is recognized for quality education, research and industry. According to UNESCO, Russia has the most graduated people in Europe. Concerning the geographic position that Russia has and the claims denominated in circles of Russian intelligentsia increasingly circulate ideas about the so called theory of the “eurasianism”.

If we look to the policy pursued by President Putin and taken over by his successor Medvedev, we can notice these ideas are found in practice to some extent in the last 5-6 years by Russian governors.

It is full of unknowns also the evolution of the Central Asian countries. These countries are having high population growth rates and, at the same time, are among the poorest republics of the former Soviet Union. The shadow of Russia is felt over all these countries, its military and its resources are making Russia the first power and decision making centre in the area. Other centres of power have attempts to infiltrate the area but they are still weak.

3.5. India

With a growth of 9% per year, a military nuclear program and a population of over a billion people, India's potential and its place on the world stage can not be ignored. At least for the next two decades, India is very dynamic concerning the economic and technological issues. Here lives a fifth of the world population and 54% of Indians are under 25 years. India remains the second largest producer of highly qualified specialists in the world - after the United States. Indian economic boom could still be delayed to fight pollution. In just 20 years from now, India will have a surplus of skilled labour, while most of the world will have a shortage of specialists due to population aging.

It is now believed that India should seek a permanent seat on the UN Security Council if it will be restructured. In economic, military, strategic and diplomatic fields there is no doubt that India's position is strengthened. It is still impossible to predict whether India will be able to exploit its full potential, but many Indians consider that their country is finally ready to get the place that they deserve on the international stage.

Although India will face severe pressure as a result of climate change caused by global warming, Government of New Delhi's attitude is one of indifference upon the crisis that arises. It was however agreed that developed countries which are responsible for most greenhouse gas causing global warming to have a higher level of restrictions.

3.6. Brazil

Brazil is at the 5th place in world ranking in terms of exports and in terms of number of inhabitants, nearly 190 million citizens. In South America, however, this country dominates both rankings and it is also being the largest and most populated from this continent. Inhere, thoughtful economic reforms led to the development of the country, which reached the tenth economy in the world and the ninth in terms of gross domestic product, in regard to IMF and World Bank. Once they have developed

internal sectors of the economy (agriculture, mining, services), Brazilians focused on exports, and currently sell abroad all kinds of products, from coffee and soybeans to airplanes and cars, to electronics, textiles and footwear, from orange juice and steel. In 2002, Brazil received IMF record support of 30 billion dollars meant to boost the economy. Country's leaders have used the money extremely inspired, so the loan was returned before one year deadline in 2005. The economy could not be better, and now authorities are thinking about infrastructure.

The Brazilian agriculture, particularly the massive soybean production is oriented towards the requests of the states in south-western Asia, India and China being the main destinations. Agricultural exports from Brazil to China have surpassed the U.S. to Japan. But Brazil still has agricultural potential, even in the competition between soybean crops for export and cane for ethanol from 440 million hectares of arable land, only 1% is used for cane, 4% for soybeans and 27% for livestock. Most of the land belongs to large local and multinational agricultural landowners.

Therefore, China wants to invest in Brazilian agriculture and in its related infrastructure to secure food supplies beyond those who control it now. Since 2004, Brazil has doubled annual soybean exports to China by 11 million tons last year. Brazil immensity put volume two problems: dependence on commodity exports and diversification purchasers. It is therefore clear that Brazil has the tendency to seize key to the markets and to increase its economic influence worldwide concurrently with the issuance of claims to accede to the Security Council and also to increase its influence in the global arena.

Conclusions

New world power structure is multipolar, whatever the approaches are initiated by various states. Either power structure will not be able to involve in another part of the world without taking into account the interests of other power structures. Old structures of power, the United States and the European Union will have to adapt to the new balance of power. By not recognizing the importance of the power poles and their integration into existing power structures can only lead to either a global military conflict or to build a new world order where the old power poles to hold a much reduced influence. The last set of discussions on trade in Cancún was stopped by Brazil and greatly of India.

Those superpowers impulse is to criticize Brazil and China, but their purpose should be the exact opposite. They should feel strong enough to be considered regulators of the global system. Which is the secret of countries aspiring to become world leaders? Firstly, there are the labour and resources. Their advantage is the large number of people able to work, workers who do not require high salaries, but are willing to work long and hard, rich resources and economic liberalism promoted by the government. Secondly, there are the well-developed economic reforms, continuity and determination of the authorities to put things in motion to raise living standards. Which is the role and position of Romania between these power structures? Romania's interests should correspond with the interests of power structures to which

it belongs, namely the European Union and, by military perspective, NATO. Its policy to develop its influence and regional power must mould on mentioned structures' policies taking into account the national interest and geopolitical situation in the region.

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METHODS, TECHNIQUES AND TOOLS THAT CAN BE USED FOR EFFICIENT COOPERATION WITHIN THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

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Abstract: *Cooperation in the National Intelligence Community ensures optimum and effective use of all intelligence resources, participating in carrying out specific actions and operations, provided by the component institutions.*

In the intelligence field, efficiency implies the existence of effects in causal relation with efforts to obtain it, and effectiveness consists in achieving tasks and objectives in such conditions. Efficiency cooperation within the National Intelligence Community is not an end in itself but a decisive boost efficiency and effectiveness of intelligence field. Also, it is an objective necessity, due to the emergence and trends of potential new risks and threats to national security of Romania.

The efficiency process of cooperation within the National Community does not occur randomly. To be viable there must be a national strategy, which circumscribes similar processes in the countries members of NATO and the EU, or general global trends and specific protocols for each field, mission, area of responsibility, period, etc.

Keywords: *cooperation, efficiency, effectiveness, intelligence.*

Motto:

*“The most effective intelligence service has countries
who do not even know that they have it”.*
(Victor Martin¹)

Introduction

Increasingly, and especially lately, is used both as term efficiency and the action. But many confuse efficiency with effectiveness and often face numerous problems. Effectiveness means doing the right thing, effectiveness is doing better. Considering these aspects, we can say that efficiency should be a combination of efficiency and effectiveness.

Even if you do the right thing, it's clear that you can not afford wasteful but on the other hand can not do anything with maximum efficiency should not. Theory and reality confirms that says excessive efficiency has negative consequences.

Cooperation within the National Intelligence Community ensures optimum and efficient use of all resources for intelligence field participating in the activities and operations specific institutions provided by components.

Effective cooperation within the National Intelligence Community is the main “supplier” performance in intelligence. In the field of intelligence, efficiency implies

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¹ Victor MARTIN, *Book to read while driving (aphorisms)*, MJM Publisher, Craiova, 2005.

the existence of effects in causal relation with their efforts to obtain and effectiveness is to achieve tasks and objectives in conditions.

For national security performance required to be obtained in the fields of defense, public order and national security. Effective cooperation within the National Intelligence Community is not an end in itself, but a decisive factor for increased efficiency and effectiveness of field intelligence. From this point of view, it requires good management, provided by professional managers.

1. Effectiveness - efficiency

The central idea of the organization is to achieve efficient management of its activities. Typically used in this plan are three concepts that are closely related - efficiency and effectiveness.

Mean efficiency measure results of activities in relation to efforts made during the activity. Are well known and easily understood physical meanings of efficiency and economy, where they are using energy efficiency (efficiency is all the greater as the energy lost between input and output is lower) and the relationship between economic gain and cost (efficiency be high when earnings are as large as lower costs).

“Efficiency is the foundation of success” or “effectiveness is the foundation of survival”². “Efficiency measures how well resources were used”³.

In the social sciences, sociology, the theory of organizations and management, efficiency analysis is more difficult than physics and economics, primarily due to the difficulties of comparing inputs and outputs, and these usually units different. As a result, both the social sciences and in ordinary language, efficiency means maximizing outcomes and reduces costs.

In a general sense, to be effective means to do something better with lower costs. In other words, efficiency is the ratio of efficacy (that is, how does the degree of achievement of the objective, function) and cost (cost of resources and the effects of that activity).

So:

$$\text{Efficiency} = \frac{\text{Effectiveness}}{\text{Costs}}$$

“Praxiology or general theory of efficient action was born as a philosophical and logical-methodological discipline of systematic reflection on the status of human activities. Praxiology goal that he assumed was to build a unified conceptual apparatus and appropriate language that can describe and qualify in terms of efficiency of all human activities, providing rules and criteria for streamlining and improving the efficiency”⁴.

² John, C. MAXWELL, *Develop the leader within you*, Amaltea Publisher, Bucharest, 1999.

³ Gh. Gh. IONESCU, Emil CAZAN, Adina Letiția NEGRUȚĂ, *Modeling and optimization managerial decision*, Dacia Publisher, Bucharest, 1999, p. 60.

⁴ Ofelia VASILESCU, *Praxiology formal and logical action theory support the construction of expert systems*, Annals of Spiru Haret University, nr.4, Bucharest, 2002, p.137.

Leadership effectiveness is based on the optimal correlation between structure and management functions. From many perspectives that can be viewed and management functions, the most useful is precisely the perspective of efficiency, under which are ordered vital activities of management, domain knowledge led totality of solving problems faced by diagnosis, detecting evolutionary trends of organization and development of the construction project was to solve new problems faced by construction forecasting and foresight, essential when formulating and solving decision about a problem or the life of the whole organization, organize implementation of the decision, first by planning and ensuring cooperation within the organization and between organizations, staff motivation organization to achieve its efficient action, control the function of management is the activity measured results are compared with the costs and establish corrective measures for new business cycle effects influencing new diagnostic control etc.

“We call effective action leading to intended effect intended”⁵.

So praxiological sense, efficiency is conceived as a ratio of concordance between the results obtained by action and purpose.

In practice the concept of efficiency is found in two meanings: the performance - results that effects bigger and bigger in relation to resources. The first sense has a narrower connotation and is defined as the effectiveness and the second deals with an activity in terms of understanding the correlation between the effects and the efforts and is defined as efficiency.

Effectiveness is the extent to which an activity satisfies a requirement, a goal, fulfill a function. For example, the effectiveness of national security is given by the degree to which it succeeds in ensuring national security of Romania and thus contributes to regional and global security.

Effectiveness of activities may be positive (function, activity envisaged are made to some extent), null (propaganda activity does not convince anyone, for example) or negative (by the activity yielding opposite to the desired effect). In conclusion, the efficacy is a characteristic of the organization functions (and, in particular management functions), indicating the degree of achievement as measured by effects thereof.

“Effectiveness is defined as the level or share the objectives have been achieved”⁶.

Effectiveness of an organization is contingent on the ability of managers to ensure the use of human, material and informational goals. The main content of the decision making process is to select an alternative from those available to managers.

Praxiology is thus the development of categories such as those of: basic act, the author intentionally impulse, work, product, tools and premises, means and methods, possible action, act complex practical values of action, effective action, training actions, instrumentalization actions, etc.

⁵ Tadeusz KOTARBINSKI, *Treatise on work well done*, Politic Publisher, Bucharest, 1976, p.148.

⁶ Gh. Gh. IONESCU, Emil CAZAN, Adina Letiția NEGRUȚĂ, *Modeling and optimization managerial decision*, Dacia Publisher, Bucharest, 1999, p. 60.

Efficiency means the act, process (complex of measures and actions) to increase efficiency, or in other words, is profitable.

2. Efficient intelligence cooperation

Efficient intelligence cooperation involves extensive and complex, involving the use of a wide range of measures that decision, organizational, action, technical, logistical, financial, educational, etc., aiming at creating more favorable conditions so that objectives, goals common intelligence are met on time, human effort and material lowest possible.

The efficient intelligence cooperation can not produce expected results without a thorough grounding decisions at all levels of action, however circumscribed the need to achieve the objectives/goals. This can not be achieved without accurate and timely intelligence measurement system parameters in dynamics, in relation to references initially set for the entire action.

The efficient intelligence cooperation is dependent on performance criteria. This dependence takes, so need to take the most appropriate decisions on joint action and the need to quantify its effects, resulting practical way that indirectly they contribute to increased efficiency.

Efficient intelligence cooperation will be based on a thorough assessment of the effects they produce, or could produce dynamic parameters of these variables, primarily aiming at their weighting in relation to the objectives and goals of actinium.

The efficient intelligence cooperation involves assessing the performance of all time/action steps, and each participant. In this context, the assessment must leave both the purposes of the action itself, but also of where the intelligence field in the national security system.

Efficient intelligence cooperation is mainly intended integration of the participants, ensuring the effectiveness and timeliness of actions, and thereby fulfill common tasks and achieving the shortest time possible, with losses as low as possible. Pursued at this level are generally qualitative aspects of operations/intelligence operations. Practically all the capabilities acquired are valued in earlier periods of formation, employment, equipment, training and evaluation.

Efficient intelligence cooperation covers all components, from theoretical foundations, strategies, structures, systems selection, training and personnel training, equipping, command and control, degree of interoperability, standardization and integration with respect to internal and external requirements (NATO, EU), the level and quality of logistics support, etc.

System components work as national security, the intelligence structures, and especially the National Intelligence Community, subject to the need for efficiency. Achieving a high level of efficiency as the intelligence, requires conscious action of all structures involved in different types and instances of cooperation, fueled by a combination of factors (causes) objective and subjective, and direct or indirect influence a variety of circumstances that occur inside and outside the system, by

employing a wide range of means and methods of action, all of which are embedded in what we can define as process efficiency.

3. Methods, techniques and tools that can be used for efficient cooperation within the National Intelligence Community

Method ABC (Activity Based Costing)

It is a calculation method type absorber (full-costing) the institution/service network is viewed as transverse processes. The process is defined as a set of activities that contribute to achieving a goal. Work is a set of ordered operations and connected. Consume resources and cost of operations will be incorporated through cost drivers (key distribution used in activities affecting resources).

Full cost (full costs of joint operations) is given by: direct costs (the technology, equipment, resources, etc.) Plus indirect costs centers are charged with pro rata aggregation inducers activity (fuel, specific materials, etc.).

ABC method believes that all activities are mains in determining transaction costs. For ABC activities are considered as a place where behavior is studied law expenses by activities, operations cost calculation is only a secondary process that is crucial: the cost and process activities. The concept of activity is closer to the concerns of staff involved than the notion of operation.

Benchmarking technique

Benchmarking technique involves confronting organizational practices between National Intelligence Community components, or in other words, comparing the results of these actions is common. A practice benchmarking in intelligence equals to go in search of the best methods used in the field, these methods allow National Intelligence Community to improve performance.

Benchmarking is a method of modern management designed to increase the performance of the National Intelligence Community “observation” between its components and establish performance to be achieved.

Service wishing to practice benchmarking aims to achieve superiority over other components of the National Intelligence Community, measuring the distance between them and establishing measures taken to mobilize its energies to increase performance. Benchmarking purpose is to reveal how others get service performance. Benchmarking is a management process that manifests through self-improvement, so it is a process that must be done continuously in order to be effective.

QUARTERBACK technique

Quarterback technique results in a systemic approach to collecting information on applications, exercises, conferences and scientific meetings, seminars, exhibitions, visits, exchanges, symposia, workshops. Collection of information is facilitated by special concentration of specialists, scientific debates and confrontations acted many documents, presentation materials, brochures, pictures, etc.

The main advantage of collecting data and information in such cases is the scientific confrontation, actually considered an authentication of the information provided and therefore a guarantee of their veracity. The core of the collection of

information in such situations relate to compliance with the general strategy of action intelligence. In this way, the comparison is made double further information regarding services within the National Intelligence Community, on the one hand, and information about the same service in different intervals, on the other hand.

Exchange places method

Often, in order to understand the image of a service that must cooperate instead you stand to see how he thinks, how he feels, how it behaves and especially common in actions such reasoning. The most direct way to get the situation instead of cooperation partner is to understand its purpose.

Goals are more tangible than his personality issues, so answer the question: What exactly trying to make partner? How does he define success? is a first step in the transfer of personality. Goals are elements that facilitate the knowledge partner rationality and is, therefore, a porting a static landing. To complement this, it is necessary to know its behavior, so assumptions, beliefs, and ways to share derivatives thereof.

What is seen? What is the appreciation own? How does the environment? Are 3 questions that answers the second step ensures the transferability of personality? According to Michael Porter assessments of business strategy, method transferability exchange places or personality is based on answers to four questions: What will make partner? What are their options? How will your partner react? How effective will be reaction partner?

Reengineering

Reengineering is the radical redesign of organizational processes to achieve major improvements such as improved response time, low resource allocation, performance increase.

Reengineering process is a fundamental rethinking of the processes of service National Intelligence Community and its radical redesign in order to obtain significant improvement in certain indicators, today considered critical in performance evaluation, such as resources, performance, and speed reaction.

ORTID technique

ORTID technique (Objectives, Resources, Transformation, Integration, and Development) consists in solving the problems that arise in the context of cooperation according to their importance in terms of the criteria of targets, resources, transformation, integration and development.

This technique is used to identify and prioritize issues faced by the National Intelligence Community: defining determinants in solving problems, interpreting related to the criteria used, identify ways of solving problems, setting priorities in problem solving.

SWOT analysis

The SWOT analysis characteristics are studied simultaneously cooperation within the National Intelligence Community: strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats with which they can influence, helping to define appropriate business strategies and directions. Strengths and weaknesses refer to matters within the

problem analyzed, and the opportunities and threats are external factors that relate to beyond.

(1) INTERNAL FACTORS

(2) EXTERNAL FACTORS

- Strengths**
- foster collaborative work;
 - is based on the generation of new ideas;
 - combines ideas are mutually completes;
 - provide better information from different sources;
- (3)**
- develop skills autoevalutive;
 - develop cognitive skills: imagination, creativity, investigation;
 - positive networking through communication, negotiation, conflict constructively;
 - develop communication skills;
 - stimulate metacognitive attitudes;
 - use aware mechanisms logical thinking, critical.

- Opportunities**
- possible opposition of goals and habits of partners;
 - communication difficulties between partners;
 - difficulty with coordination from those nominated;
- (4)**
- some partners may try to dominate;
 - partners may decrease performance sometimes when forced to cooperate with other partners.

- Weaknesses**
- promotes real responsibilities;
 - all partners can provide valuable alternative problem solving;
 - can express their grievances, and expectations by expressing desires and satisfactions;
- (5)**
- problem solving and community is the profit of each participant;
 - community enables test ideas.

- Threats**
- excessive dependence on others;
 - avoid their responsibilities;
 - some work and others;
 - imposition of ideas, solutions.
- (6)**

Conclusions

Efficiency is an objective and necessary feature of all actions, processes and phenomena of human conscious steps circumscribed channeled towards satisfaction of wants, needs, aspirations, needs, etc.

At the same time, efficiency is not just an abstract relationship between outcomes and resources consumed, but a more complex process, which rests transformation of values into other values.

Being the transformation process of quantitative accumulation qualitative effects embedded in the system that allow carrying out tasks more quickly with as little effort and without losses, the efficiency of cooperation within the National Intelligence Community assumes both a mechanism to monitoring and evaluation of one.

Effective cooperation within the National Intelligence Community is an objective necessity, determined the emergence and evolution trends of potential new risks and threats to the national security of Romania.

The efficiency of the National Community cooperation does not occur randomly. To be viable there must be a national strategy that circumscribes similar processes in the countries members of NATO and the EU, or general global trends and specific protocols for each area of activity, mission, area of responsibility, period etc.

The efficiency of cooperation within the National Intelligence Community is a priority for Romania's national security system. This should include the area, on the one hand intelligence system elements - structure, relationships, procurement, training, etc., and on the other hand aim to optimize and streamline processes and relationships developed with other structures, superior, located on horizontal or in other positions or relationships, and they all run similar processes synchronized with the NATO and EU member states.

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STRATEGIC SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE FREE MARKET

*Stanislav MORONG, PhD**

Abstract: *The author analyzes the causes of distortions between the interest of economic operators in an article in the use of resources and raw materials, and their strategic importance for national and collective security. Particular attention is focused on the conflict between the immediate economic effect in the interest of its impacts on the security-service and of strategic importance for society as a whole.*

Key-words: *free market, strategy, security, raw materials, resources, energy.*

Introduction

During the several centuries as successful cults of various important and unimportant figures in world politics grows, cult integrity, autonomy and absolute infallibility of economic dogma emerged to be presented as a market mechanism.

Now that all the theoretical postulates on which it was built are undoubtedly refuted disruptions not only economic, but also social relations and social processes, there are very few of those who still defend these postulates. Their supporters have even alleged that the self-regulatory skills across the board do not act systemically and in terms of the progressive development of human society. Globalization processes in the world economy, where rising trend is particularly striking in recent decades has deepened the disproportion between the growing demand for raw materials respectively, energy resources and limited supplies in the world.

That loss of control over national economies of these resources, as a natural consequence of the control of economic processes of country transnational corporations, state causes uncontrolled exploitation of these raw materials and resources. This not only deepens the gap between the economic developments of individual countries, but also contributes significantly to the disproportion in the social structures of society. Economic profit of these commodities is concentrated in the hands of a negligible percentage of human society, which is an increase manifestation of poverty growing in part of the world's population. The situation is even more enhanced by the fact that increasing poverty is not the only downside of the process of spontaneous looting resources.

Short-term goals and objectives aimed at maximizing the amount of income produced negative externalities at the time, but especially in the strategic time frame, are a source of danger and harm individual interests, including producers of processes, which ultimately leads to a threat to life, health and environmental degradation.

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1. Consolidation of economic functions and the free market

In situations where the competence for collective, national and homeland security in the world, at least theoretically, a clearly defined responsibility for these tasks are delegated to the various elements of the security systems at the national and transnational levels, in the absence of a system operator, which should eliminate the threat stemming from exposure market mechanism. This assertion, given the dogmatic perception of the market a few years ago interpreted as a single, infallible, the level of deities built mechanism to create links between the different actors of the market, seem too radical and dogmatic. Let us therefore reason that claim on the basis of at least the most important and well-known example of market failure in the recent period, the consequences of which we are experiencing currently.

The enormous demand for low-cost housing in the United States up to the year of 2006 meant for the supply of loans from U.S. banks and providing them less creditworthy customers who have been evident from the beginning that they will not be able to meet its long-term financial obligations to providers of such loans. Awareness of the possibility of providing uncapped virtual money without any real coverage meant, ultimately, the creation not only of the financial market crisis, but in the history of one of the most serious economic crises that have ever hit the modern society.

The reality was unable to determine, within the framework of economic relations functions, if in the case of incapacity, to fulfil the market themselves to be assumed by the State. In addition to the individualized goals, which were created as prerequisites for attaining the public interest, in this particular case, the market, in addition to the inability to take into account qualitative aspects in relation to housing demand and supply side of financing, also mishandled *feature selection*.

In the long term, one of its major strengths, through which could be excluded from the process unviable for the other market participants, are the risk subjects without prejudice to the real processes. The reason for this situation lies in the unequal position of economic entities on the market.

In addition, anomalies in this area, which are more specifically mentioned in the context of another function, uncontrolled market economic relations, the problem of the privileged position of banks as market-specific entities. Theorists are defending the free market, as with other operators, even if banks promote minimum State involvement in their management and advocate for their private property. Access to the banks at the same economists, but fundamentally changing, and is rare in conformity with the interests of national authorities in the development of problematic situations in the financial sector. The financial state intervention in the form of public funds for the benefit of the private entity is not only possible, but even promoted as a measure necessary for the system to stabilize the market as a whole. This question inevitably evokes a sense of private ownership of banks and their management responsibilities. Equally logical is the answer to the problem. Our tradesman have market substitutes amount – competitors are able to replace it at any time, without its disposal to affect the functioning of the market as a whole.

Liquidation of the Bank is not only a signal to destabilize financial markets, but also reflects the serious to the functioning of the market in its comprehensive concept. Market turbulence leading to the development of crisis management is the breeding ground of social unrest, which is neither in the interest of the state or other market actors. That is the essence of not only the privileged position of banks in the market, but also a high tolerance to such non-standard economic approach.

Due to the mentioned qualitative blindness caused by deformation of supply and demand, as well as the assessment of rating a specific position in the market, even on the eve of the originators of the crisis – the bankers on Wall Street boasted-rated AAA. It is therefore appropriate to ask whether the market is really as autonomous and self-regulatory system than is the theory of economic liberalism and neoliberalism presented to the public. It is really the fact, that so immune market system, with respect to exogenous factors that caused the U.S. mortgage market to collapse, despite the fact that he was and is managed by graduates of the prestigious “brand” universities in the United States is also the case for qualitative assessment of blindness type rating in the financial market.

Self-regulatory function begins and ends with the equilibrium state of demand, supply and prices conditional ideal state of the market environment. As is known, the ideal is ideal because it is unattainable. This means that at present market environment may operate subject to monopoly, not absence of the cartel, is not expected to affect corruption, population is existentially dependent on goods or services without substitution, and so on. This is only part of the factors that show that self-determination proclaimed by economic agents in the market allocation of factors of production is only illusory.

Most striking example of this failure is the access of economic operators to scarce resources such as limited State licensing. Licensed financial gains “freest” candidates with no difference, whether the acquisition was subject of its official sales or technical criteria which were suppressed by the purchasing power of the candidate and corrupt behavior by government officials. The denial of the principle of freedom of decision for allocation of production factors documented failure function, which can be described as a *function of equal opportunities*.

Regardless of whether the allocation of factors of production involved a single entity under a license or for the allocation of an unlimited number of entities, each pursues its individual goals and interests. These are usually accumulated in content templates defined by minimizing costs and maximizing profits. This implies, if possible, unrestricted access to raw materials entering into the transformation process, the available energy resources, cheap labour and the like. In countries with adequate levels of law enforcement is state interference can be at least partly to minimize the tendency for individual gain at the expense of other operators, and the public interest.

Addiction and the ruling power structures of nation states to transnational corporations, and their mutual overgrowth, allows a key player in world trade and uncontrolled use or dispose of resources raw material basis of humanity. Here again, the market fails when it is not able to fulfil the *function of a strategic perspective*.

This function can be considered two-dimensional. In the first level, entity that operators in pursuit of maximizing profits ignore the unwritten policies or legislative restrictions aimed at sustainability, thereby condemning the time limited exposure in the market (which is often intended in the spirit of “make and disappear”). Loss of perspectives presented the second plane is qualitatively more serious implications because it is not, as in the first case, only a manifestation of irresponsibility, indifference or wilful act. Inherently affects the entities that are interested in the strategic development, unfortunately due to the above mentioned activities are doomed to failure. The effect of negative externalities in this context can be combined with the loss of prospects for development and conservation:

- other operators in the sector,
- other traders trade bonds linked to the entity (industry)
- part of the human way of life of the population dependent on the resources in question,
 - of fauna and flora dependent on the existence of often unique resources (food, habitat, etc.)
 - environmental parameters injurious environment at the quality of life of the human population and other forms of life.

With this economic function for which, as presented, does not have adequate market coverage is closely related to the *function of a comprehensive approach*.

At first glance, it might be viewed synonymously with the previous function, because it is based on the principle that the individual operators in the market do not act on their destructive activity of other market participants.

Qualitative higher position, this function has its second meaning, which gives it a strategic dimension. It lies in the long-term planning of economic development, and not only must be minimized conflicting interests of individual entities and the state sector of the economy, but in the public interest should their activities create synergies towards achieving strategic goals. This can be achieved by:

- prescriptive (characteristic of the centrally controlled economic systems)
- indicative planning.

Objectively, it is clear that the indicative planning using motivational tools in the form of investment support, in the form of subsidies or lower tax burden is a good solution for a market economy. Paradoxically, the market produces other extreme, when considering the benefits offered are a critical part of producers focused on the financially lucrative commodities. The result is a lack of cultivation of crops needed to produce basic food, which inevitably leads to rising food prices and the associated increase in poverty. Examples of recent years is the growing of oilseed rape and maize for biofuels at the expense of cereals, potatoes and other crops essential for food security.

Quantitative data given in Table 1 clearly present enormous growth of oilseed growing areas for the period, with special attention given to the year 2004 to 2005, which were adopted by the EU and the government to promote the production of agricultural crops for biofuel production needs. More than two-fold increase in

harvest areas biennial years 2003 - 2005 is only slightly lower than the increase in these areas for a decade years 1970 - 1980.

Year	1970	1980	1990	2000	2003	2004	2005	2010
Spring and Winter Canola	10 909	26 572	31 732	91 706	52 180	91496	106204	163989
Potatoes together	108 097	67 331	55 160	27 067	25 703	24226	19101	10993

Table no. 1 -Area of collection of agricultural crops in the Slovak Republic (in ha)¹

The foregoing conclusions contrary to the functioning of the market and features a comprehensive approach are striking from the data illustrating the decline in harvest areas of potatoes, which grow after year 2000 stabilized at around 25,000 ha harvest areas. As a result of the same measures, which led after year 2003 to 2010 to double the growth of oilseed harvest areas was recorded in the same period to 2.5 – fold decrease in collection areas potatoes. Statistical data for the years 2011 and 2012 are not yet available. This undoubtedly confirms the interdependence of both growth and decline in commodity prices during the reporting period. There is evidence that such an indicative tool for influencing the market is ineffective and, in terms of public interest work, counterproductive. In this context, the facts are just striking. Also, noteworthy is the fact that despite the now well-known analysis of the effects of so-called real biofuels to reduce emission pollution in the environment, where indicators are not as favorable as anticipated, still not taken corrective measures to eliminate this economic deformity.

2. Market failure and safety

2.1 Strategic risks in the agricultural sector

Some security risks arising from market imperfections were already described in the previous chapter, primarily on the issue of food and economic security. In this chapter, we will pay attention to other problem areas that generate market share for its inability to fulfil economic functions described earlier. Although the analysis is based on the current situation in the Slovak Republic, the creation of this type of security risks can not be eliminated by similar economic conditions or other countries.

The so-called industrial restructuring was performed with the deadline for its almost complete destruction by the year 1989, in addition to other industries under pressure from multinational companies and the agricultural sector. Legislative limits, which were originally set up to protect the land and defended its transfer of agricultural land to other classification categories, were revised. The aim was to accommodate groups of developers and companies to which the soil has become merchandise without semantic priorities. Although the so-called industrial restructuring and provide still offers plenty of defunct industrial sites in which they

¹ Source: processed by the author on the basis of Slovstat.

may be situated so. For the brown industrial parks, Slovakia most quality offered their land to new industrial parks being built “from scratch”. This investment servility raises doubts not only in terms of return on this type of investment, but also from the aspect of their operation time and thus the comparison of the effects in time-limited action of Slovakia will bring these investors and soil annuity in the strategic timeframe.

Loss of agricultural land in Slovakia, according to Table 2 is not as menacing such as in Germany. If the trend zoning of agricultural land in Germany continued in the future at the same rate as before, he would not have in 2050, available to less than 1 square meter of land designated for agricultural production. Nevertheless, it is necessary to point out several aspects that contribute to the destabilization of food security.

The first aspect, which significantly alters the scope and finally the available agricultural land, is the change in the nature of civil housing. The transition from public housing in the center and the periphery of urban agglomerations of individual family in the most lucrative urban construction, the most affluent and mostly soils is considerably higher demands on land, which is still enormous pressure multiplied by the size of the building land.

Year	The area of land-utilized agricultural area (ha)	Areas-arable land (ha)	Areas-permanent crops (ha)	Areas-Permanent grasslands (ha)	Used arable land-fallow land (%)
2001	2 254 801	1 409 222	28 934	783 905	0,25
2010	1 921 961	1 354 436	22 092	513 029	2,51
Decrease in area in ha	332 840	54 786	6 842	270 876	-
The increase in area in%	-	-	-	-	2,26

Table no. 2 - Land use in the Slovak Republic (2001-2010)²

Equally engaging is a dangerous trend of agricultural land in favor of industrial construction and other investment purposes. It is important that the issue of foreign investment analyzed in relation to the protection of agricultural land. It is irresponsible to the highest quality land designated for agricultural production was provided by investors without strategic economic analysis. Soil by its nature is a scarce resource, which guarantees long-term agricultural production in the employment of the population. Working in agriculture provides jobs for citizens where they live. Towards citizens are jobs for all citizens without any extraordinary demands on education, gender or age. For state is working with a strategic perspective positions. Their importance to the state is also in guaranteeing food security. It is not possible to generalize in relation to foreign investment. As an example, warehouses and logistics centres of retail chains and multinational companies were built on fertile Trnava board, and around Bratislava.

² Source: processed by the author on the basis of Slovstat.

At first glance, seemingly advantageous investments are large industrial type PSA Citroen in Trnava and Kia Motors in Žilina and others. These generate a significant amount of quantitative job opportunities directly and a considerable proportion of the jobs generated by subcontracting companies. The accumulation effect of reducing government expenditure on social security now unemployed these sites, there is a real benefit to the regions and the Slovak Republic as a whole. This effect has investments in several strategic understanding of the critical points and important context that is necessary to identify, analyze and draw them into the information database needed for decision-making on similar investments in the future. Priority is the answer to the following questions:

- if there is a pull factor for temporary “tax holiday” motivated only temporary effect of the investor in the Slovak Republic,
- what is the extent to which the process of production, respectively industry perspective in terms of anticipated changes to raw materials and sales markets (prospects vehicles with internal combustion engines and the like),
- what is the structure and amount of costs associated with the consequences of early retirement investor lucrative investment-in other countries (such as land reclamation, retraining employees, etc.),
- what are the risks of food stemming from excessive dependence on the orientation of industrial production and the service sector with adequate structure, education of citizens and jobs?

Table no. 3, expressed as an independent country from food can change the economic priorities of the state become dependent on imports of almost all basic foods and commodities.

Year	Bovine animals together	Pigs together	Poultry along
1970	1 330 091	2 106 575	13 196 302
1980	1 502 809	2 788 124	15 810 863
1990	1 563 070	2 520 524	16 477 763
2000	646 148	1 488 441	13 580 042
2010	467 125	687 260	12 991 916
With the highest output and a decline in the year 2010, in pieces	1 095 945	1 833 264	3 485 847

Table no. 3 - Status of livestock to 31.12. in pieces³

In these quantitative indicators contained only presentation decline in agricultural production, but also points to the unfavorable situation of food security and food self-sufficiency of the tool. Slovakia has an annual consumption of food supplement from external sources. Import selected commodities represents about 70% of pork, about 50% of beef, 15 to 20% of poultry meat. The Slovak Republic is self-sufficient in the production of eggs and milk and not just because of their low power consumption.

³ Source: processed by the author on the basis of Slovstat.

With this in mind, we do not continue to show us how to handle the so-called market transformation of the economy in fulfilling its functions, strategic perspective and a comprehensive approach. Even the feature selection of market players practically demonstrated its perversion disposal prosperous and promising farm called the so-called transformation of family farms, which are non-competitive global market conditions. The market makes room for financially strong, multinational corporations that control the food market from primary through to manufacturing and trade sales to consumers.

2.2. Market failure and strategic risks in the sectors of forestry and energy

Security of the Slovak Republic due to the market, which opened multinationals in trade of timber, is strategically threatened just as dramatically in the event of bankruptcy of agriculture. Forest can be seen in its essence, as a renewable source of wood, which is the production function; it may not be a valid claim in full. Renewable in the case where compliance with at least the following elementary conditions:

- deforestation and mining volume is balanced,
- reforestation planting native trees is not limited to,
- mining in mountainous terrain has resulted in extensive erosion,
- works control mechanism focuses on the ability of the forest to meet other than just economic function.

How the market handles the fulfillment of these conditions guaranteeing the recoverability of the forest as a source of wood, which does not take into account all of its public utility function is expressed in Tables no. 4 and no. 5.

Year	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
The deforestation total	11 562	11 842	11 293	11 278	12 420	11 002	9 812	9 044	8 972	9 476	9 320	9 984	9 143	8 551

Table no. 4 - Reforestation and cultivation of forest (in ha)⁴

According to data from table no. 4 it is evident that since 2000, the reduction of afforested areas and vice versa logging me growing trend. The economic function of the strategic perspective of production capacity in the forest Slovak Republic alarmingly operates this fact in percentage terms. In the reporting period 2000 - 2010 increased logging by 37%, mining and forested land area has decreased by almost 25%.

Year	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Logging in total ⁵	5944	5532	5809	6179	6184	6248	6652	7268	10190	8378	8634	9467	9248	9860
Supplies for domestic use-softwood market	2100	2300	1737	2472	2435	2411	2636	3417	5369	4298	4483	5551	5398	5570
The supply of utility for the export of softwood	732	281	528	215	278	169	314	284	604	192	223	289	579	514
Supply of leafy wood for domestic use-the market	1660	1403	1862	1880	2146	2156	2304	2743	2 748	2652	2848	2734	2511	2826
Supply of leafy wood for export utility	351	431	663	666	719	589	504	285	160	142	60	65	99	167

Table no. 5 - Production and supplies of timber in the Slovak Republic (in thousands of m³)⁶

⁴ Source: *Slovstat*

⁵ The figure does not include some of the other supplies. timber for own consumption

The market in order to maximize profits creates strategic disproportion between the gain and loss of forest. Without state intervention uncontrolled mined materials today and in the future shortage will mean the demise of firms who now insist on uncapped timber supply. At best, it will not mean the demise of firms but significant increase in raw material costs, which are the basis for the loss of competitive advantage and the same for the existence of the company. Question of the more determined according to the data of Table no. 5 it can be seen that up to 85% of total harvest is delivered to processors in the Slovak Republic. This conclusion is a flagrant example of how the market can not systematically enter into economic processes.

In order to maintain a strategic perspective, the state must intervene in setting limits on the use of resources and raw materials, in order to guarantee their availability for manufacturing companies in the future. The paradox is that these companies stand behind the limitation of resources today criticized although it measures the strategic perspective.

Market settles after its filling with further economic functions - functions selection. Due to lack of raw materials wood industry enterprises go into bankruptcy regardless of their market position and performance. The problem of security risks associated with the exploitation of wood as a production function of the forest is in a much broader term strategic dimension, which we consider important to highlight as one more serious threat to economic development.

The steady loss of forests is reflected in the production functions of the forest, which, in addition to the production of wood, are very often forgotten. Plenty of underground sources of drinking water create a feeling of relative safety in the process of the provision of Slovak Republic this vital resource. Relativity in this sense can be understood in the context of that part of the underground resources that is existentially connected with surface water resources. Significantly important event for the safety of the surface effects of deforestation (whether due to natural disasters, biological pest or planned mining) whole mountain ranges, which reduced more than 40% of the forests. This extreme loss of forested land in the High and Low Tatras, Slovak Ore Mountains causes destruction of springs that flow reductions stemming surface where water flows. This is primarily a problem of negative externalities related to the energy industry. At these water resources are dependent on whole network of hydroelectric installations on the river Vah, known as "Vah cascade", which in the past two years 2010 - 2011 was forced to water shortages temporarily shut down some power facilities.

The lack of surface water in the energy sector has even more serious consequences, such as the threat of energy supply for industry and households. Electricity produced at nuclear power plants in the next decade will become the primary source of energy in the energy mix. Two nuclear reactors operating in the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) Mochovce showing annual water consumption for cooling in the transformation process in the volume 20 mil. m³. The source of the water tank has been filled to the river Hron. After running two other NPPs water

⁶ Source: processed by the author on the basis of Slovstat.

consumption rises to about 47 million m³. Due to the flow of the river Hron time processing feasibility study and impact assessment of nuclear power plants on the environment (year 2008) created the reservoir up to 100 times the provision of water consumption for cooling for all four units of the plant. To what extent, taking into account the development of hydrological basin after processing of the document, which was an enormous forest loss from river source to the dam in question, is debatable. Therefore, the subject of safety analyzes must also potential risks originating in other economic sectors. Important it is to predict the development of a comprehensive security at the national economy and not only in the economic sector. An example of this may be a condition for the dam Ružín in spring 2012, where despite the abundance of snow in the catchments supplying, this water work in a situation that the tank was filled with only the tiny percentage of its normal size. Should this situation occurred at Waterworks, which is the source of water intended for cooling nuclear power reactors would be a crisis which did not arise in the assessment of complex economic processes. The role of the state is controlled by certain operators to protect others from the negative externalities and public threats against the occurrence of inadequately analyzed impacts of economic processes. Reported industries chosen as an example of putting economic processes which have "invisible hand of the market" reach guaranteeing economic development of the state as a whole, the safety and security of its citizens, only a fraction of all areas of economic and social life, which translates into natural effect of the liberal market.

Conclusions

The aim of the author of the article was to identify in the theories of economic development of liberal market features that should be implemented in practice, so that the influence of the subjective intentions and objectives of the competition has not suffered consistent public interest. He could not identify and reduce the development of the economy; because of all the turbulence just in the economy have their reflection in the issue of personal and collective security.

The theory of "the invisible hand of the market" by A. Smith is no longer valid nowadays. It can be seen that this hand never existed. The state is required in the public interest to create such an economic environment that will guarantee adequate resource without compromising the other group of economic operators and the public interest of society as a whole.

The market has in the past allowed almost unlimited spending precious resources and raw materials. It brought short-term financial effects for a small group of human population, but at the expense of the future and the public interest. As it has been presented on the examples of selected sectors of the economy in this article were placed in a situation which can be called humanity is the crisis of resources. All the security threats of the present and future have a common basis and these are conflicts for resources. In contrast to the media information and arguments about the causes of armed conflicts in the world of political purpose, it is necessary to say that the primary fighting for resources.

The luxury of the past will have to compensate for the cost of an illusory mankind new technology to maintain your current standard of living, but not send it will be a fight for the very existence of humanity. There is no doubt, that if "the visible hand of the State" would not be able to force the market to behave responsibly, human population will be increasingly confronted with the security challenges in all possible dimensions of understanding and interpretation of safety.

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PRINCIPAL ASPECTS OF MODULAR TASK FORCE STRUCTURES GENERATION

*Ján SPIŠÁK**

Abstract: *Conduct of operations requires employment of military units with a set of specific operational capabilities. Based on operational situation, a suitable task force structure must be generated with abilities to fulfill tasks efficiently and effectively, according the objectives and character of operational environment. The paper points to considerations regarding modular task force generation for use in military operations and proposes possible approach of such modular structure development in procedural terms. It describes the inter-relationship of individual categories: threat, scenario, type of operation, operational task, basic and specific military capabilities and a module, with respect to various types of military operations. The paper describes in detail the activities that the armed forces typically perform during stability operations and peace support operations. To support the main idea of the paper, there is offered a specific case of modular task force structure generation in terms of fictional task performance: Rescue people from the besieged embassy.*

Keywords: *modularity, scenario, operations, capabilities.*

Introduction

Aspects of modularity in military environment had raised shortly after the end of the Cold War at the beginning of 1990's. Modularity, at its very basic, was the idea for creating a pool of standardized, self-contained units-combat, support, and headquarters-that could be assembled into, or "plugged into" (and unplugged from), larger formations as needed with minimal augmentation or reorganization¹.

Modularity was then defined as a design methodology aimed at creating standardized, expandable military elements capable of being tailored to accomplish virtually any assignment. The new units are as capable as their predecessors, but they are also adaptable enough to assume whatever form is necessary to meet a broad range of missions².

Modularity in the last years has become a principal and decisive area of transformation for majority of Alliance armed forces with implications to generation and development of purpose-built military organizational structures. Modularity in both theory and practice has significantly boosted the ability of the military forces to build packages of units tailored for specific missions.

Modularity has naturally entered discussions inside the Czech armed forces in terms of its ability to follow strategic ambitions and objectives set by political representatives, directed towards the use of the armed forces in the future. With regard to the interests and available resources of the country, it is expected to be used

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¹ William M. DONNELLY, *Transforming an Army at War: Designing the Modular Force 1991–2005*, p. iii.

² William M. DONNELLY, *Transforming an Army at War, Designing the Modular Force 1991–2005*, p. 3.

mainly in the types of operations, whose objective is to stabilize the environment and fostering peace. Modular structures attract the attention of a number of experts from the military, but also the academic environment. Their aim is to create a comprehensive picture of the factors and processes involved in the development of such structures and provide available information to the appropriate authorities.

1. Factors influencing development of modular structures

Until military unit with modular structure is capable to carry out its selected role in specific environment, there are various factors and aspects that influence development of such structure politicians and military commanders must take into account, starting from strategic to tactical level; the basic include categories (and their demonstration) as security *threat*, *scenario*, *type of operation* – usually typical to the emerged scenario, *task (tasks) in the operation*, which result from the particular type of operation itself. There exist the key and specific operational *capabilities*, required from members of the armed forces, filling the assigned tasks. Character of those tasks will then correspond to the *module* (or unit with modular structure), acting either separately or in cooperation with other modules, grouped into a larger team – a modular task force. The next chapters consider all those aspects and in some form of organizational hierarchy point on interconnection they have.

1.1 Security Threats

Environment that influence the security of the Czech Republic has constantly undergone dynamic changes and its predictability, due to growing interdependence of security trends and challenges, is decreasing. The White Paper on Defense identifies a number of security threats and risks³ that may have a direct impact on the security of our country, and thus adversely affect our vital, strategic, and other important interests. Security threats (internal and external), their sources and originators have both national and transnational character, they are intertwined and the differences between them are blurred.

According to capstone Czech strategic security documents generally recognize three fundamental types of threats:

- Intentionally caused by human (war aggression, crime, political violence, sabotage, etc.);
- Unintentionally caused by human (technological and industrial accidents, failure of systems or elements of critical infrastructure);
- Caused by nature (natural disasters or catastrophes).

The probability of threat of a massive military attack against the Czech Republic territory is low in the foreseeable future. Basic guarantees of this favorable position lies in the Czech Republic's membership in NATO and the EU and in favorable relations with neighboring countries. With this reality, however, contrasts increase of asymmetric security threats. They are associated with trends in the global environment that enhance their potential and increase the possibility of spreading

³ *The White Paper of Defense*, pp. 40 – 41.

threats from relatively remote areas of local or regional conflicts and tensions. A characteristic feature of the current security environment is the fact that even instability and conflicts outside Europe may have a direct impact on our security.

Within the security environment, where Czech Republic settles, other specific threats can be identified. These are not of purely military nature and have no direct impact on its security, but threaten its allies. Such threats include: political extremism and its demonstration (particularly terrorism), proliferation of weapons of mass destruction with their delivery systems and their potential applications, cyber-attacks, instability and regional conflicts in the Euro-Atlantic area and its surroundings, disintegration of state authority in conflict-affected areas and the emergence of failed states, mass riots and sabotage, negative aspects of international migration, organized crime and corruption, threats to critical infrastructure functionality (communication, transport and energy), disruption of strategic supplies or energy, weakening of international organizations and institutions critical for the safety and security of the Czech Republic, the creation of spheres of influence through political, economic or military coercion, regional and local conflicts within the Euro-Atlantic area and its wider neighborhood, including “frozen” conflicts, humanitarian disasters and many others, regardless of their natural or anthropogenic origin.

All those threats and risks may have undesirable impact on the Czech Republic’s security interests defined in its Security Strategy⁴.

1.2 The nature of future operations

Future operations, in which the armed forces may contribute to the elimination of the above-mentioned threats, are much more complex than in the past. Military operations are conducted across the spectrum of conflict. However, no conflict is the image of only one type of operation. There may be a blending of different situations requiring various approaches to address them and multiple ways of employing military force at any time. While humanitarian assistance can be provided at one place of the operational area, nearby can be conducted an intense fight against the insurgents, groups of armored combat units or a war fighting in a built-up area. The very next day, other activities may be provided, e.g. forensic evidence, supply of electricity, water supply and other commodities procuring to the civilian population and/or return to combat again. Individual statuses of peace, tension and fight can be local or spatial, as well as their duration and intensity. Any crisis might be a variety of combat, counterinsurgency, stabilization, peacekeeping or support activities, the boundaries of are often blurred and are not apparent entirely. Changes in situations can occur suddenly and very quickly and can happen with increasing intensity and almost continuously.

The operations the members of the Czech armed forces will participate in may be conducted at a considerable distance from the Czech Republic territory. Because the operations will be performed in various operational environments, military units will have to quickly adapt to ever-changing progress of operations, including the

⁴ For better understanding, see *The White Paper of Defence*, p. 38 – 39, available at: <http://www.mocr.army.cz/ministr-a-ministerstvo/odkazy/odkazy-46088v>.

operations of high-intensity, lethal and non-lethal methods of warfare with a wide variety of stability, peace promoting or supporting humanitarian activities requiring diverse set of capabilities and skills.

1.3 Scenarios of the armed forces employment

Scenarios for employment of the armed forces represent a detailed description of conditions for the future operational situation in which the armed forces will perform determined tasks. The purpose of the scenarios is also to facilitate analysis of how best to fulfill mission tasks, to meet the objectives and contribute to achieving of the desired end state. Scenarios are a key element for capability based planning (CBP), the initiation of force generation processes, elaboration of tasks list and capability goals, the successive capabilities development and the creation of investment plans.

Scenarios provide an opportunity for better decision-making, facilitate assessing of what the most likely fundamental (key) capabilities will be required, analyzing their impact and significance in the long and medium horizon and predicting what technologies will be associated with the requirements related to these key and other capabilities.

There are four basic scenarios in which the Czech armed forces assume its employment; three of them response to threat of military nature and one scenario relates to support of non-military crisis management.

Scenario 1 considers operational situation when the Czech armed forces have to address the major threat and to plan, prepare and conduct defense of their territory within the framework of NATO collective defense in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Considering such situation, it is assumed sufficient warning time (even several years), during which it will be necessary following a progressive adaptation of the armed forces in terms of its size, complementation and methods of employment for defense contrary to those that the Czech Republic maintains in peacetime.

Scenarios 2 and 3 characterize involvement of the Czech Republic in stabilization, respectively peacekeeping operations by regular professional armed forces. Involvement in such operations does not require declaration of emergency state or state of war on the territory of the Czech Republic. These scenarios are not associated with defense against external attacks.

Scenario 4 represents situations in which the armed forces led non-military crises operation with peacetime available forces.

The general scenarios overview (S1 - S4) is as follows:

S1: The conduct of combat operations within the collective defense of the NATO and the EU territory, including military activities inside the Czech Republic territory.

S2: Stabilization operations (security operations), including counterinsurgency operations (COIN), led outside the NATO and the EU territory.

S3: The peace support operations (PSOs) conducted outside the territory of NATO and the EU.

S4: Peacetime military engagement and operation in support of civilian authorities (e.g. Humanitarian Operations, Capacity Building, Restoration of Essential Services etc.) in non-military crises situations led inside the country and outside of the NATO and the EU territory.

These scenarios symbolize a general framework for the use of the armed forces not only of the Czech Republic but also the other NATO (EU) Member States.

1.4 Operational scenarios

The Czech armed forces will deploy within the broader efforts of the international community, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (UN) principles in the whole spectrum of operations led by NATO, EU and UN or ad hoc created coalitions. Prediction of security threats indicate that the emergence of a conflict, which would require conducting of collective defense in the near-term is less likely. On the contrary, engagement of the armed forces will be expected in scenarios with the characteristics of the stability operations and peace support operations⁵.

The experience from the NATO military operations indicates that such sub-scenarios may include e.g.:

Sub-scenario 1: Rescue of captives in built-up area with critical infrastructure;

Sub-scenario 2: The threat of use of weapons of mass destruction in a built-up area;

Sub-scenario 3: Protection of critical infrastructure and equipment;

Sub-scenario 4: Providing the distribution of humanitarian aid in crisis areas;

Sub-scenario 5: Protection and evacuation of minority populations;

Sub-scenario 6: Elimination of asymmetric threats;

Sub-scenario 7 - N: Other, further unidentified.

Each of these sub-scenarios represents a clear description of the possible operating conditions of a future situation in which the armed forces will perform its tasks. It may appear that the different sub-scenarios are specific in nature and in some cases are unique. True is, that the character of activities the members of the armed forces will have to perform in the following sub-scenarios, will be common and in many cases they do not significantly differ.

Depending on the situation within these sub-scenarios, the armed forces will focus on stabilization activities (security and control, support of security sector reform, building the host nation security forces capabilities, the initial reconstruction of services and facilities) and their accompanying tasks (e.g., patrolling and searching, observation/monitoring, escorting, providing humanitarian assistance or training of local security forces).

Members of the armed forces will also cover other specific tasks, resulting from the nature of sub-scenarios. Such may include preventing and blocking the entry of individuals or groups into the embarkation, detention and guarding, prevention of toxic substances and their dissemination, searching for material used for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction or weapons themselves, tracking, retention and defeating of terrorists. They also may ensure the security of the local

⁵ *Non-Lethal Weapons and Future Peace Enforcement Operations*, pp. 1-2.

population by preventing violence against it, crowd controlling, protection of entry points to the military base (checkpoint), protection of convoys, supplies and installations, evacuation of individuals and groups and many other activities related to the basic scenarios or sub-scenarios.

The historical experience indicates that the difference between war and peace cannot always be clearly identified and separated. It may occur within a short time that the character of the situation will change very quickly and the armed forces members must conduct not only stabilization and peacekeeping activities, but come back again to those of offensive and defensive character.

1.5 Required capabilities

Managing these activities in the framework of main scenarios and sub-scenarios requires development of basic capabilities and skills by individuals and units that will support the tasks and the achievement of the objectives. With regard to individual sub-scenarios, the basic capabilities of the individuals, units or task forces (modules) will obviously copy the required tasks and may include:

- crowd control (or dispersion the crowd) and directing of its movement;
- separation of individuals or groups;
- rescue (release) of individuals or groups;
- pulling of individuals from the crowd;
- identification of individuals or groups in the crowd;
- prevention the entry of peoples, vehicles, planes vessels into space or area;
- protection and support of individuals and groups;
- elimination of individuals and groups;
- protection and/or elimination (destruction, damage, etc.) of weapons and military equipment, vehicles, aircraft (UAVs) or vessels (submarines), civilian infrastructure and equipment;
- ensuring and protection of communications;
- others.

During application of such capabilities, there should be a general requirement for rules of engagement compliance, minimizing of civilian casualties and violence against prisoners and noncombatants, causing minimal damage to civilian infrastructure equipment and observance of international laws of war, treaties and conventions.

2. Fundamentals of modular structure development

Displaying of all aspects that influence modular structures development is possible via logical flow of all factors mentioned above. They are indicated and described in following four figures. The general consideration about threats and their impact on security environment are issues for high ranking politicians and selected flag officers. They constitute the way to cope with the crisis, assign resources and limitations and determine all necessary steps to solve the problem. Demonstrations of

threat are obviously visible as impacts on environment where the threat occurs and as such they indicate precaution needed to undertake. According to character of the situation, a decision about execution of military operation is taken to solve the problem. As indicated in Figure no. 1, the predominant themes of the operation are then similar to the character of the scenarios.




Figure no. 1 – Interconnection between threat, scenario and type of operation

Based on character of operation that is going to be executed, the related military tasks will be evident. Each type of operation require fulfilling those fundamental tasks which support achievement of intermediate and final operational objectives in accordance with the strategic end state. There exists broad set of military tasks which are common in all types of military operation and no particular modular structure must be built. Depending on changing nature of variables in operational environment there are other accompanying specific tasks that must be executed regardless the previous assignment of units.

Focusing on stabilization and peace support operations, as indicated in Figure no. 2, the specific tasks are implied under the (stabilization and peace support operation) boxes. Fulfilling those tasks requires employment of military units with related capabilities or generation of new capabilities that will be created within the units additionally. Experience from operations warn the more actors are situated in operational environment the more operational situations may be visible.

When the situation in the operation becomes more obvious and requirements for specific task execution are determined, the military commander must approach to matching of capabilities to the specific task.




Figure no. 2 – Illustration of specific tasks in stabilization and peace support operations

The military commander may utilize the general capabilities all members of the unit possess and combine them with specific capabilities that will guarantee the execution of a particular task. In case the specific capabilities are not intrinsic for the

unit selected to execute the task, they must be built, generated, trained or acquired from another unit, e.g. as portrayed in Figure no. 3, required capabilities (skills) must match anticipated tasks.




Figure no. 3 Relationship of capabilities (skills) and anticipated tasks in operation

Precise analysis of operational environment may indicate that the specific task will demand execution of simultaneous or subsequent, synchronized and complementary activities performed in logical order. Each task or group of tasks is then assigned to the modules, mutually cooperating groups of soldiers fully equipped with capabilities for the specific task – as indicated in Figure no. 4 – *rescue people from the besieged embassy*.

There is no purpose to describe the definite set of tasks and capabilities related in this scholar example. One may assume that the crowd dispersion, elimination of hostile individuals and/or groups, protection and escort of people, securing and/or protection of communication on which rescued people will be transported, and finally

evacuation of rescued to the safety are typical tasks for such kind of operation. As indicated, there could be very specific capabilities the soldiers must possess to be able to disperse the crowd e.g., from peaceful persuasion of curious civilians to brutal assault against insurgents. Definitely, tasks and related capabilities will vary.




Figure no. 4 Relationship of specific capabilities and particular modules

Conclusions

Development of military units with the modular structure can be seen in a wider context. Such development has been affected by factors such as threats and their demonstration and related aspects of military operations. Characteristic tasks in predominant themes of operations indicate the need for the use of a broad set of operational capabilities. Regarding the changing character of operations is to be expected that the generation of modular structures will be focused on the tasks of stabilization and peace support operations. Aspects of modular military structures are

matters of military commanders, their use, however influence other factors in the operating environment.

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THE CHALLENGES TO THE CONTEMPORARY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

*Liviu IONIȚĂ**

***Abstract:** The challenges to the security environment have simultaneously developed and they are interconnected with the worldwide exhibited tendencies of the main state and non-state actors. These challenges are closely related with the vulnerabilities of the security environment and the threats generated by the developments within the main crises and conflicts of the world.*

The contemporary security environment is the result of transformations induced by two major events, the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks, which led to dramatic changes within the international relations.

Several complex phenomena such as globalization, international terrorism, weapon proliferation, ethnic and religious violence, organized crime, population issues and other, are major challenges to the present time security environment.

***Key words:** globalization, terrorism, security, challenges, conflicts, crisis, proliferation*

Foreword

A clear outlook on current security environment requires an evaluation of geopolitical developments following the Cold War era, since present geopolitical situations, as well as the global security framework, are deeply rooted in events at global level occurring in the last two decades.

We assess that the current security environment at global level has as historic turning points two major happenings: the end of the Cold war and attacks on 11 September, 2001 against US territory. Both events are to be viewed as crossroads in the development of nowadays society, considering that they earmark the beginning of relevant transformations at global level, as well as major changes at the very heart of international relations.

In the period shortly after the end of the Cold War, i.e. the '90, the global security environment was characterized by political, ideological, economic and social adjustments triggered by the end of the bipolar system and the fall of communism. Most states focused on their own development and security, notwithstanding the fact that at that period no solid reason for a new global confrontation was at sight. From the perspective of global threats, that period is deemed as one of calm, distressed by conflicts at local level, with outcomes limited to the confrontation area and its neighborhood (the first Gulf war and the war spurred by the dissolution of the former Republic of Yugoslavia).

The period following events on 11 September, 2001 has been of a different nature in comparison with the former one, as the major event in terms of security, the global war on terror, had a worldwide reach and led to major changes as far as the security environment is concerned.

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Challenges to current security environment are rooted in the period preceding the Cold War, yet most of them shaped themselves and developed gradually, depending on the environment and changes brought about by relevant events in the last two decades, with the following yielding outmost relevance in the shape of nowadays world:

- *Globalization* - the phenomenon with the most spectacular evolution, coupled with a prominent effect on contemporary security environment, witnesses an outstanding development after the Cold war, amid dissolution of ideological, cultural, political, economic and technological barriers between the East and the West, besides the spread of the principles of freedom market economy;

- *Terrorism* - major challenge to current security environment, turned into the most important threat to the civilized world following the events on 11 September, 2001, thus becoming a major preoccupation for the Western states and besides;

- *Ethnic and religious-related violence* – manifested itself long before the Cold War era as well as during this period, yet the spreading of this phenomenon emphasized that the modern world is short of the necessary means to tackle conflicts raised by hostility on ethnic and religious grounds. This period has witnessed an escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, inter-ethnic rows in the former republic of Yugoslavia, while violence triggered by the proliferation of Islamic radicalism has reached unprecedented levels;

- *Major living shortfalls* – such as poverty, hunger, ailing systems of education, diseases, have grown in various parts of the world, despite progress in science, technological developments, as well as the international strive to work them out.

Of notice, recent geopolitical developments, as well as the far-reaching outcomes of globalization have nurtured optimal economic and social premises for many regions worldwide, conversely leading to vulnerabilities in the area of economic and financial equilibrium, thus paving the way for the deepest economic and financial crisis in the last 80 years.

Consequently, the present paper aims at outlining a report on global features which generated the setting up and upholding of current challenges to the security environment, as well as providing a brief presentation of these features.

1. The development of the security environment in the post-Cold War era

1.1 The development of the security environment in the '90

The Cold War period was dominated by the strategic confrontation between the Soviet Union and USA, coupled with an ideological clash between capitalism and communism, leading to a geopolitical framework that kept Europe and Germany divided for over 40 years and fuelled the competition for control over the third world.

The demise of this confrontation was a surprise to everybody, both in terms of swiftness and unpredictability of events, and major transformations occurring soon after 1989, mainly within the former communist bloc. Analysts in that period failed to predict how the Cold War would end. More than that, even now there are still factors

which have determined the fall of communism and the Soviet block dissolving unknown.

The main coordinates of the post-Cold War world have been marked by the increase of USA domination at the global level, the geographic and political re-establishment of Europe by re-unification of Germany and the reintegration of the former communist states and the preservation of the difference between North and South. Against this background the communist ideology disappeared from the international political system and the East European states began to implement the principles of liberalism.

While the geographical development of capitalism had been limited by the communist opposition during the Cold War, starting with the '90s globalization and the principles of the free market would rapidly spread in the entire world.

In the power balance domain, the developments in early '90s have been marked by the abolition of the bipolar system and the instauration of the unipolarity by increasing US hegemony. This development was due to a combination of factors to include the fall of the Soviet Union, the rapid defeat of Iraq in 1991, the consistent growing of the American economy and not the least to mention, the high level of budgetary allocations for defense (at the end of the '90s, the US expenses designed to ensure security were at the level of the total expenses in the field of all other states)¹.

The '90s represented a period of decline in all fields for Russia. Even though it was the main inheritor of the Soviet Union, the internal problems (malfunctioning economy, political struggles, generalized corruption, social difficulties, and the war in Chechnya) and the international isolation have limited Moscow options for intervention at the global level.

The main coordinates of the European development in the first decade after the Cold War have been represented by the unification of Germany, the European extension and integration, the war in former Yugoslavia and the decision to extend NATO.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia represented the first major exam to fail for Europe. The USA/NATO military intervention in former Yugoslavia demonstrated that Europe was unable to ensure its own security and the US were still the only security provider in the European environment.

To conclude, the period following the Cold War has been defined by major transformations in the security domain triggered by the end of bipolarity, the collapse of communism and dissolution of the Soviet Union, the expansion of the US (in political, economic and military fields), the European re-establishment, the decline of Russia, the Chinese economic growth and the burst of conflicts (Iraq, Former Yugoslavia).

1.2 Security environment development after September 11, 2001

There are similarities between the events that generated the end of the Cold War and the attacks against America on 11 September, 2001: they were not

¹ Michael COX, *From the cold war on terror*, in *The Globalization of the world politics*, the third edition, OXFORD University press, 2005, page 134.

foreseen, they were not completely elucidated and they have had significant effects on world geopolitics development, by generating major transformations of the global security environment.

The attacks against America on 11 September, 2001 should not have come as a surprise. A thorough analysis of the factors that favored those developments pointed out that what happened on 11 September, 2001 or something similar were very likely to occur. There have been signs regarding the amplitude of the Islamic radicalism, the association between the US and Israel, the previous similar but lower amplitude attacks connected with the name of Osama ben Laden and the dangerous developments within extremist-terrorist elements in several states (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan).

The important event that changed the world after 11 September, 2001 was not the series of attacks itself, but the US decision to launch an unprecedented military campaign, on global level, against the international terrorism. The war against terrorism generated connotations on planet level: it divided the world in civilized states and states supporting terrorism, fuelled the conflict between Western values and the ones of the Muslim world, extended the terrorist threats' manifesting space on planet level, led to Islam followers radicalization and the increase of terrorist organizations number and strengths, unprecedentedly developed the insurgency phenomenon.

The first phase of the antiterrorist campaign launched by the US was the occupation of Afghanistan and the removal from power of the Taliban regime that hosted and supported Osama ben Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda network and author of the attacks of 11 September, 2001. Subsequently, the American strategy focused on combating terrorism on the whole world, especially in states supporting this phenomenon under different ways. The concept of the Axis of Evil emerged, consisting of Iran, Iraq and Northern Korea, how former US President George W. Bush defined the states that support threats against civilized world. The direct accusations addressed to the three states were that they intend to hold weapons of mass destruction (nuclear weapons in case of Iran and Northern Korea and chemical weapons in the case of Iraq) or that they support Islamic radicalism and international terrorism (Iran and Iraq).

In this context, the Washington Administration launched a strong media campaign against Baghdad and accused Saddam Hussein' regime it holds large quantities of weapon of mass destruction, it has liaisons with Al Qaeda and it represents an imminent threat for the humankind. Even if there were no proofs to support these accusations (which later on proved wrong), the White House claimed at that time that war in Iraq could not be avoided, as part and parcel of the global war against terrorism.

On March 20, 2003, the International Coalition invaded Iraq, in a flagrant violation of the international rights and with no approval from the United Nation Security Council. Similar with the case of Afghanistan, the immediate objectives of the military campaign were achieved in a very short time. The Iraqi Armed Forces

were not able to cope with a highly trained and equipped adversary, which led to Saddam Hussein's removal from power.

The period that followed has been characterized by the involvement of international coalitions under NATO or US umbrella in major (Afghanistan or Iraq) or local conflicts (Western Balkans), which required immense military spending, casualties and material losses and caused long term economical effects.

The way these military campaigns have been conducted proved that the US strategies of engagement in important conflicts were very well thought, and the major military operations were successfully completed, but the post-conflict strategies totally lacked or, in other words, there was no clear vision on what would happen after the military intervention. It is because this reason that Afghanistan and Iraq currently face the danger of political, social, economic and security collapse.

2. Challenges to the contemporary security environment

The main challenges to the contemporary security environment are interconnected with the economic and social processes under development, existing material resources, environment conditions and multiple states of state and non-state actors. Following is a brief outlook on the fields of manifestation and development trends of the main challenges to the contemporary security environment.

2.1. Globalization

Is the phenomenon that generates most of the challenges to the security environment with profound implications in all the fields of social life (political, economic, military, cultural etc.).

In time, the phenomenon of globalization has evolved reaching today a level which could hardly be imagined over the last century. So, the increasing development of the worldwide interdependence between individuals has made world to become today a unique social system. The crossing-border social, economic and politic connections strongly influence the individuals' lives with these ones becoming subjects of the global system within the boundary of which they develop and evolve.

The globalization manifests diversely in all the fields of the social life. In the military field, which is of reference for the security environment, the globalization manifests through the global weapon commerce, proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, spreading of the international terrorism, the significant development of transnational military corporations etc.

The globalization favors the emergence of new centers of power such as transnational companies and international non-governmental organizations. These new international actors fully use the advantages of the informational era, both to assure achievement of their objectives and to assert and strengthen their presence within the new global game of power.

The effects of globalization brought into the international community focus issues like: communications, conventional weapons, corruption, development assistance, global finances, international commerce, interstate conflicts, health,

human rights, global communication, environment preservation, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, pollution, refugees, cross-border organized crime and terrorism. These new vulnerabilities imposed by globalization created not only new conflict environments, and new risks and threats, but also new response dimensions from the security politics which require crisis management capabilities to be developed.² The impact of globalization on the security environment manifests both by the direct consequences it generates and by being a catalyst among the other challenges.

2.2. International terrorism

It is one of the most complex phenomenon and, at the same time, one of most complicated ones of the present world with profound influences on the security environment. Terrorism is closely interconnected with the dark areas of the power phenomena, by their extremes and limits, which make that the term of “terrorism” to be very difficult to define. According to the British Universal Encyclopedia, terrorism is “the systemic use of violence in order to inculcate fear on population in the pursuit of a specific political goal”.³

In his book “Political Sociology”, Professor Virgil Măgureanu analysis the factors that fuelled the increase and development of the terrorist movement.⁴ According to the author, the first and most important factor is the development of state terrorism toward the second part of last century, in Germany and Soviet Union, where both extremist political regimes used violence on a large scale to reach their political objectives.

The second factor is the Second World War when both totalitarian systems referred to violence in order to conquer the world.

The third factor is the Cold War, being actually an extension in a fragmented way of the classic war by using every weapon possible, including propaganda means. According to Professor Măgureanu “*during the Cold War, the revolutionary terrorism has been continuously supported by the communist system under its extremist left-wing best tradition, but extreme violent means were present also on the other side*”.⁵

The fourth factor is the fall of communism. The decrease of the terrorist phenomenon did not occurred even if the source of the revolutionary terrorism dried out with the fall of communist systems in Europe.

The causes of the contemporary terrorism are complex and lie in the dynamics of economic, cultural and social crises, in the alienation policy of youth (especially Muslim) living abroad, in the extreme reactions toward intrinsic influences the

² *Effects of Globalization on States Security*, posted on <http://studiidesecuritate.wordpress.com/2011/04/05/efectele-globalizarii-asupra-securitatii-stator/>, accessed on 14.10.2012.

³ *British Universal Encyclopedia*, Litera Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010, vol. 16, p.183.

⁴ Virgil MĂGUREANU, *Political Sociology*, RAO International Publishing Company, Bucharest 2006, p.506.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

Western civilization exercises on areas frozen in fantasies and prejudices, in the recrudescence of social anomie, criminal activities and traffickers.⁶

The main generation sources of the terrorist phenomenon lies in the current society configuration under a continuous change but unsecure and in the state of chaos which humankind will cross. It is not accidentally, of course, that terrorist attacks aim at US and its allies, Russia, China, India, Western Europe and even some Islamic states considered traitors, as Turkey and Pakistan.

Terrorist threats are highly present. Even if Al Qaeda actions reduced with the killing of its leader (May 2011), on a medium and long term they will not disappear. Today and in the period to come, terrorist attacks will remain atypical, unethical and outside of any rule of peace and war. They will aim at everything vulnerable – states, governments, public institutions, international organizations, urban areas and public places, infrastructure, communication and internet networks.

2.3. Weapon proliferation

Under current context, weapons of mass destruction and ultimate conventional weapon systems may become a major threat to the international security if state (as, for example, Northern Korea and Iran) or non-state actors (terrorist organizations) enter their possession and may use them against the civilized world.

Even if proliferation is supported by a limited number of states and non-state actors, it represents a real danger by technologies and information dissemination as these parties may help each other.

At present, the main concern of the international community regarding the nuclear weapons proliferation is the Iranian Nuclear File.

Iran's nuclear program has been launched in 1950, with help from the United States, as part of the "Atoms for Peace" program⁷. United States and Western governments participated in Iran's nuclear program development until the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Following this moment, the Iranian Government temporary abandoned some of the program elements and resumed them later without Western assistance. The Iranian nuclear program included several research sites, two Uranium mines, a research reactor and Uranium processing installations (three Uranium enrichment facilities). The first nuclear reactor from Bushehr nuclear plant which was built with support from some Russian companies became operational in September 2011. After that, the authorities from Tehran stated that another 360 MW nuclear plant is currently under development and that the program to build new medium power nuclear plants would be continued.

During the entire period of time, the United States and Israel accused the regime in Tehran for using dual technologies to produce nuclear armament.

⁶ Gheorghe VĂDUVA, *Contemporary terrorism – a risk factor to the national security and defense, in the context of Romania's statue of NATO member*, National Defence University "Carol I" Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005, p.11.

⁷ In 1950, the United States launched the "Atoms for Peace" program that supplied equipment and information to schools, hospitals, and research institutions within the U.S. and throughout the world. The first nuclear reactors in Iran and Pakistan were built under the program.

Following a report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in November 2011, Iran has been accused for conducting researches and experiments with the purpose of developing nuclear weapons' production capabilities.⁸

Controversies on the Iranian nuclear program are based on the lack of transparency on behalf of authorities of this state to report IAEA data relevant for the Uranium enrichment process. The enriched uranium may be used as fuel for nuclear plants or for nuclear weapons (with a higher level of enrichment in the latter). Iran claims it develops nuclear plants for peaceful purposes, and the level of Uranium enrichment of less than 5% is relevant for its designation as fuel for nuclear plants. The Iranian File continues to be a controversial matter on world level which may at any time generate a regional conflict, with major effects on the international security environment.

2.4. Ethnical and religious violence

Recrudescence of ethnical and religious phenomena is not exclusively an effect of globalization. It has multiple historical, cultural and economic connotations. In contrast with ethnical movements, the extremist religious movements tend to be universal and consider that their ideas and opinions must be assimilated by all their followers. There is a tendency to establish a cross-border motivation by transferring their own opinion on legitimacy from the field of conception to the one of political actions. These extremist movements have an exclusive nature and reject any other theological, political or social order options contrary to the ones they promote. In reality, this means that within the societies where such opinions prevail, any individual who is not a follower or a believer is considered a "second category" citizen. Moreover, they have an active militant nature and use easily coercive means.

Even if militant religious extremist movements are not the only non-state actor whose activities fuel violence spreading and exacerbation, many experts consider that they have the tendency to stimulate destabilizing international activities. Among others, irredentism may be emphasized, that is the tendency of some ethnical or religious groups to claim the acquisition of territories included in an adjacent area, which under some circumstances had been lost to another state that currently holds them. In most of cases, military force is used in order to fulfill such objective.

2.5. The Economic and Financial Crisis

The world economic crisis that has started in 2008 is the most eloquent example for the exhibition of globalization effects on the field of world finances. This is one of the greatest threats to global security, with a profound negative impact on world economic development and with political, strategic and social consequences.

The economic recession which has been generated by the chaos from the financial system led to panic on the bank market, business circles and political and

⁸ Report of IAEA Director General "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran" posted on : http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IAEA_Iran_8Nov2011.pdf, accessed on 20.05.2012.

social fields. Initially started in the United States, the crisis spread very fast in Western Europe and it propagated in the whole world due to globalization.

The beginning of recession lies in the mortgage market crisis from the United States, which rapidly spread to all states and the entire bank system, and culminated with Lehman Brothers' Investment bankruptcy. Following this moment, the central banks were forced to allot huge amounts of money to save other financial giants, but in 2009 most of economic systems of Europe, including those of Germany, France or Austria entered recession. Once the recession reached all countries, population and companies were strongly affected, consumer market collapsed and profits rapidly reduced. As such, the effects of globalization made a crisis of the private financial and bank sector to evolve to a public crisis of states that were not able to get their revenues and spent too much, the case of Greece being the most debated one. The way this crisis started and developed and the effects it had on world economy pointed out at its current vulnerabilities generated especially by the phenomenon of globalization.

2.6. Organized crime

The transformations that world economy and international politics have undergone after the Cold War gave a strong push to criminal activity and strengthen its organizations. The criminal organizations extended their influence and power and become wealthier than state governments which they are confronting with, based on the increase of illegal international traffic of goods, money and persons. This kind of activity is increasingly threatening to the national security of many states and to the international security in general.

In most former communist states, violence, corruption and unscrupulous robbing of national riches and wealth (to see our country, where many state companies' managers succeeded the double "performance" to bankrupt the firms they led and, at the same time, to enriched themselves by establishing "tick" firms in many fields of activity) along with mafia-type organizations under development and in progress greatly endanger democratic reforms and bring nostalgia among most unfavored parts of populations toward dictatorial regimes.

In many countries like US, Japan, Italy and, lately, Russian Federation and Ukraine there are concerns related to the increased scope of illegal operations of organized crime groups along with expansion of their geographical areas of operation and the increasingly higher power these ones hold. As a consequence of their cross-border activity, criminal organizations are able to accumulate wealth and power to such an extent that they become a threat to the efficiency and even to the legitimacy of state apparatus in some countries.

2.7. Populations issues

The main population issue is the rhythmical growth that mainly manifests in China, India, South-East Asia, Near and Middle East. Toward the year 2050, the current population of 7 billions individuals will likely double.

In the XXI century, Asia will remain the most populated area of the world, while Africa's population will triple, from one billion in 2011 to 3.6 billions in 2100 (Figure 1).⁹

The demographic expansion (with economic consequences and political and military blows) intersects with the ageing and decreasing of population in Russia and even in US and EU. Overpopulation of some countries corroborated with deepening of poverty in those areas fuel the immigrant waves threatening to flood EU and US.




Figure no. 1 – World population projection and assessment in the main regions of the world over the period 1950 – 2100 (in billions)¹⁰

Other population issues are generated by diseases, extreme poverty and education decline.

Conclusions

The beginning of the XXI century has seen profound transformations of the security environment, which has become increasingly fluid and flexible, with multiple ways of development, related to predominance, political and economic trends, but especially related to the interests of main state and non-state actors on the international arena.

The main military confrontations on global level during the last decade (Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns) had as dominant element the establishment of coalitions of states with influence on world level, acting under US lead to remove non-democratic regimes from power, annihilate terrorist networks and support fundamental state institutions. Both conflicts have had an asymmetric nature and their development generated new problems on security field, which the international community has currently no viable solutions to resolve.

⁹ http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Analytical-Figures/htm/fig_2.htm, accessed on 02.05.2012.

¹⁰ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Population Division (2011): World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision*, New York (updated on 15.04.2012), posted on: <http://www.un.org/esa/population/>, accessed on 23.05.2012.

On local and regional level, there are numerous tensions and conflict centers, from the latent and frozen conflicts (Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cyprus, Middle East, Transdnister, Northern and Southern Caucasus, Korean Peninsula, Kashmir) to the ones in progress (Iraq and Afghanistan).

In the years to come, the insecurity trends will belong to the spectrum of confrontations between the great powers in their fight for supremacy and resources, between civilized world and non-state actors within the field of terrorism, underground economy, narcotic and human traffic, and between forced globalization followers and those ones supporting national sovereignty, state individuality and independence.

Besides the political and economic phenomena that earmarked the last decade there should be emphasized the ones recently exhibited and currently under development, whose consequences and finality are yet difficult to be anticipated: the world economic crisis and the Arab Spring.

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MARKETING APPROACHES TO THE SYSTEM OF MILITARY PERSONNEL RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

*Mihai Bogdan ALEXANDRESCU, PhD**

Abstract: *The problem of recruiting quality people seems to be, more or less, a universal one. Armies face difficulties in recruiting and retaining military personnel. The reasons are generated by the change of civil society values. The interest and motivation of joining the army are decreasing, especially among young people. The competition between private market and the military system is growing due to the high level of education of the young generation and to the low rate of unemployment. This paper deals with the success and challenges in recruiting professional military personnel within the British Army.*

Key words: *strategiy, promotion, military profession, recruitment, selection, marketing.*

Introduction

In the British army, recruitment and selection are inseparable phases of a process that aims to provide the personnel training system to soldiers and officers.

Out of 100 applicants, on average: 76 are present for selection, 40 are admitted under preparation, 32 succeed to get through this phase, and 30 are employed.

To become an officer in the British Army, several ways can be taken. But no matter the way, or if the applicant has university studies or not, whether civilian or soldier, he must usually go through the following three stages:

1. Information Office regarding Career;
2. Selection Committee (three days and a half);
3. Sandhurst Military Royal Academy (the only military academy in Great Britain, schooling lasts 11 months).

If it is a soldier, what is expected of him is not a great intelligence but discipline, sense of duty, specialization skills, fighting skills, group spirit (leadership qualities are not developed) and the quality of being obedient, easily led during a crisis.

A civilian who wishes to work as a soldier in the Land Forces of British Army, follow these steps:

1. Information Office regarding Career (from several months to several years, if not eligible or did not finish university studies);
2. Selection Center (two days)
3. Training Regiment – 2nd phase (variable time, according to specialization);
4. School - 2nd phase (variable time, according to specialization);
5. School /center of excellence - 3rd phase;
6. Position taking.

Costs for training a soldier are high, so there is a particular concern for reducing losses, no matter the reason. For example, recruitment cost is £ 3,400 per

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person and the cost for a graduate of the first phase of training is £ 7780. A training period of 11 months at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst costs £ 37,500 and the formation of an artillery NCO, for 46 weeks, is £130,200.

Women in Land Forces are viewed with great naturalness. Promoting military profession is not gender-oriented, there is no special message for women, and all materials are open to all. But, there are some weapons (military specialties) that women do not have access to: infantry, armored vehicles, submarine, commandos. The selection is mixed (no special series for girls and ones for boys). All tests and standards are common (set for the profession and not for gender). It is considered that during instruction, women are able to achieve the same standards of performance, but in a longer time than men.

1. Army Training & Recruiting Agency - ATRA Upavon, Wiltshire

ATRA was formed in 1997 by merging the structure training with that of recruitment, out of the need to give unity and maximum coherence to recruitment, selection and training of young people who want to join the British Land Forces. From the first contact with a helpdesk regarding military career to employment in the Land Forces, everything is managed in one place. ATRA is the largest non-profit government agency and the largest of its kind in Europe. ATRA is part of the "Personnel and Training Headquarters" (one of the Land Forces Headquarters, subordinated to the General Adjutant-deputy of Chief of Land Forces).

ATRA mission is to provide the British Army with the necessary number of well trained and motivated soldiers, to meet its operational requirements.

ATRA *objectives* are:

- To provide its customers, the need personnel, in number, with skills, in standards and when required;
- To fall within the allocated resources.

ATRA areas of responsibility:

- Recruitment (including marketing activity);
- Selection;
- 1st training phase, basic training of soldiers and officers-cadets;
- 2nd training phase -training specialists in various weapons, for the first service within regiments or corps;
- 3rd training phase - advanced training, continuing training and professional development in order to advance (it provides a career).

ATRA receives from Generalului Adjutant structures: the strategy, the need for training ("what?" and "how many?") and training standards required in case of each weapon in the Land Forces (validated by the arms/services directors).

ATRA has about 11,700 employees, of which 43% are civilians.

For the year 2000-2001, the ATRA budgetary allocation was £ 700 million.

Annually, in average, 12,500 recruits are in some form of training.

2. The British system of promotion, recruitment, selection and training

Within British Army, recruitment and selection are closely related to each other, inseparable, stages that overlap, of the same process, even if carried out in two places: information offices on career and selection centers. Recruiters do not apply only criteria; they begin the selection process, participating in it. *Therefore, selection centers are "suffocated" by "uncalled" resources being consumed unnecessarily.* In fact, recruiters are the most time in contact with potential recruits, even after the selection process is over.

Recruitment and selection process is as follows: the applicant comes to the information office on career and bears the first question at reception. If recruitment criteria are met, information and forms to be filled are received. A physician assesses, according to the applicant's medical history, if he is fit or not for military service. The potential recruit gives the ability "BARB" test (on PC) for learning ability. If the minimum score on the test is not obtained or if the physician considers that he is not medically fit, he is rejected. If admitted, the candidate participates in an assessment interview. Following this interview, he can be rejected. If eligible, the applicant must decide for a particular job (arm / specialty).

At the selection center, the potential recruit undergoes an eliminatory medical examination, then a physical testing (eliminatory), a test of technical skills, a military aptitude tests, a test of reactions and attitudes toward military life and training, the evaluation of maturity, motivation and determination, and finally, he participates in the assessment interview (in further recruitment) and, if he is admitted and if necessary, professional guidance is made.

All potential recruits must give, on recruitment, a computerized test (BARB), which assesses learning. BARB is like an IQ test, but with a rather low degree of difficulty and signifies an aptitude test for the military profession that is also eliminatory.

The British give importance to every potential recruit, making great efforts to maintain their interest and motivation. They are considered to compete with the major recruiters of labor and the most important and well-known private companies. Therefore, they probably give so much importance to the concept of "*nurturing*". It means permanent attitude of care, maintaining contact, interest, confidence manifested by recruiters to candidates who could not be recruited / selected from one of the following reasons:

- They don't have the eligible age yet;
- They are not determined;
- They were rejected for medical or physical reasons, which can be fixed within a certain time;
- They are not yet mature enough to be recruited.

Maintaining the interest and trust is very important especially for future officers, as during the few years of university studies (civil), they may be recruited by various companies.

The “growth” of potential recruits began several years before graduating a form of education. Recruiters don't search for candidates only in their last year of study, because it is usually too late.

About 10% of Land Forces staff consists of women. In the Artillery School, 16-19% of students are women, of all specialties: technical, logistics and combat. Women are considered, in average, even better than men. The problem is to keep them.

Training of trainers (corporals, sergeants, NCOs) are based on instilling the “lead not drive”, meaning “to lead”, “influence”, and not to “drive”. Trainers can be military or civilian, man or woman.

The training style practiced in the British Army is based on strict discipline, maintaining high standards of performance, encouraging overcoming their limitations, fair play, and sense of humor, compassion for the less capable, weaker.

Future military must be firm, just and sensitive.

There is particular concern for minorities and respect for their cultural identity and their religious and food customs, etc. Any form of harassment or discrimination is forbidden.

All instructors receive and carry a brochure entitled “Instructor's Practical Code” which is a guide, a common one for all instructors in Land Forces Recruitment and Training schools. Code addresses, under the form of principles, issues such as: training ethos, leadership training, development training, development ATRA philosophy in training, ATRA principles in employment, principles that ATRA guides after, in matters relating to minority groups. ATRA organizes courses that last several weeks for recruiter personnel (officers and NCOs). The aim of the course is to develop those skills, knowledge and aptitudes of trainers, to determine the passing of as many recruits as possible from Phase 1 to Phase 2 training, well-trained at the required standards. Recruiters are chosen from among the most able former recruits, considering that they can best represent the military profession. Selection centers operate 40 weeks per year, 4 days a week.

The selection process is complex and aims at: medical examinations, testing technical skills, physical testing, test military skills, reactions and abilities to military life and training, final assessment interview. For two days, during selection, potential recruits have a program and are treated as if they were soldiers, in order to know what to expect further on. Some decide to quit after this experience.

Evaluation ends with a "pass" or "fail".

The military skills tests are meant to find out the candidates' ability to work in teams, to follow instructions. Tests include, among others, skills lessons (grenade throwing), completing an obstacle course in the gym, situational tests. Finally, participants in the tests are ranked as “selected”, “risky” or “delayed”. Statistically speaking, the results of the selection process are as follows:

- Of all those involved in selection, 59% are admitted;
- The situation of the other 41% is as follows:
 - 4% rejected on medical grounds;
 - 24% postponed for medical reasons (they can return after solving the problem);

- 7% delayed at physical test;
- 1% withdraw (realize that they made a wrong choice, do not resist);
- 5% postponed after final assessment interview, by the officer in charge of selection (e.g., due to immaturity);

As it can be seen, the percentage of rejected is very low, the majority of rejected being actually postponed. They are kept under observation, with the opportunity to participate in another selection after solving their issues or after a better training.

3. Promotion strategy of military profession in United Kingdom

Activities that support ATRA marketing strategy include:

- ◆ Market studies;
- ◆ Advertising;
- ◆ Promotional activities;
- ◆ Literature.

Out of the £ 55 million budget allocated to promotion, marketing activity has 35% (19 million pounds).

Market surveys are nationally and regionally done and highlight the perceptions and aspirations of the target group. These studies should identify the target (where is and what is its behavior). Some parts of the target group require a specific promotional campaign. Market studies include advertising campaigns. Target population in the UK is 6.4 million people. Of these, 77% are not interested in a military career, 7% apply for it and 16% could be interested in some extent. The interest will be focused on attracting these 16%.

Most women are not attracted to the military profession. Of those interested, 10% would like a career as a soldier, and 15-20%, an officer career. In British *Land Forces*, 9-10% is women.

As key to the future is why the British are not interested in those who have a job or who are not in a certain form of education.

Promotional activities of the national marketing strategy and recruitment efforts are carried outside the major recruitment campaign. These include activities involving national education plan.

Both during the recruitment and selection and training at the beginning of Phase 1, the potential soldier or officer must feel army “taste”, soldiers “flavour” to take informed decision, to know what to expect and if he can face such a change in his life. To give the flavor military candidates, various means are used. Thus, willing young people are taken by recruiters for *one day and one night in a military base*, where they have the same program as the soldiers. If they enjoyed it, they go on a “camp” for 5 days and if they want more, they are offered even more extra days. In the same breath, the daily program in which the candidate selection program takes place, is designed in the style of a military unit, which is a “test” relevant to the ability to adapt to military life.

A principle safeguarded in all stages through which the candidate goes through, is to supply him with various materials (video tapes, brochures) to provide a more complete picture of what awaits him, whether it is about recruitment and selection tests, or, further on, about the program of military training and life in general. For example, potential recruits receive a booklet with 5 variants of the elimination test (BARB Tests) that they need to take on recruitment, before the interview.

Besides materials and explanations they receive directly, potential candidates can get in stores for a fee, computer products containing interactive software package produced by ATRA, very attractive, with the selection presentation, basic instruction from regiments, various lessons (such as reading a map), reviewing facilities within training bases, Internet addresses of all training regiments.

In promoting the British considered the role of the recruiter is essential. The influence exerted by “former” soldiers or officers who have left the system and are part of families or group of friends, acquaintances of potential recruits is also very important. Advertising campaigns are focused on two categories of people:

- pre-eligible population (13-16 years old);
- eligible population (16-24 years old and over).

Integrated advertising campaigns are used, including all media forms. These generate interest in a military career.

National advertising is done and organized in collaboration with the advertising agency **Saatchi and Saatchi** and with the Central Office of Information. There are several ways to increase interest, the trust of potential recruits that are suitable or pre-eligible, starting from a very early age. For example:

- *the phone number* from which they can get information about military career;
- *for all schools in a particular region, there are a number of liaison officers - career counselors* for issues concerning career in Land Forces (“Army Careers Adviser”), whose main task is to convince students and their teachers about the many military career opportunities; students know where to go and whom to discuss about a military career, whom they can get all the needed information;
- *brochures* were designed (*manuals*) of citizenship education, for children of 10-11 years old; lessons are taught by teachers in schools, addressing various topics such as human rights; *children are trained to become good citizens* and as good British citizens will want to join the army;
- also, for pre-eligible young men or for those in the early years of eligibility (13-17 years) a *very attractive* magazine is printed, “*Camouflage*”, distributed free to young enrolled in the “*Camouflage*” Club; it has 62,150 members, of which, 22,800 are 15 years old, 28% are female and 21% have e-mail addresses;
- at any time, young people have *the possibility to access army webpages*; they ask questions, they are encouraged by the fact that they are not face to face with the recruiter; through Internet they have access to *various detailed information, videos, TV commercials*; for the potential candidate it is simpler, more enjoyable and easier way, than to come to the Career Information Office.

The Internet is considered the most common means of advertising used today both for broadcast TV commercials, campaigns and video narrative and for dialogue with potential recruits.

TV commercials are designed to capture the same note of interest. For this, they are very *funny, thought and worked out in the spirit of mentality, behavior and language of adolescents*. Some make reference even to “concerns”, specific to age, as the interest in the opposite sex. An example of advertisement would be one having the topic: “You are face to face with the enemy. What weapon would you use first? If you want to know the answer, call ... or come to the career information office ...”. Another type of advertisement may not have absolutely anything to do with the Army, to be “crazier” up to the end, in which address and telephone number where you can obtain information about Land Forces appear for a few seconds. *Messages are common to both sexes*; there is no customization or explicit reference to gender. *Images include women and men of different ethnicities*.

The slogans Land Forces are: “***Be the best***” and “***Land Forces – first option career***”.

For the near future, the British Army aims at competing with other employers operating in the labor market, to get more quality at lower costs, to reduce potential losses among officers, between the selection committee and the position taking (those who continue their studies are, meanwhile, recruited by other companies), to develop public – private partnership in the field of recruitment etc.

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RECRUITING AND SELECTION OF HUMAN RESOURCES WITHIN CANADIAN MILITARY FORCES

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Abstract: *Canadian Forces must anticipate labour market conditions before the recruitment process started, so it converts threats into opportunities. The necessity of recruiting in order to provide military personnel implies that the structures responsible for this activity engage a number of candidates bigger than the enlisted ones, for an adequate number of qualified candidates which provides Army Forces personnel. As a conclusion this study presents the organization and development of the human resources recruitment and selection process within Canadian Army Forces.*

Keywords: *strategy, promotion, military profession, recruitment, selection.*

Canada is a large country, but the vast majority of the population is concentrated on the 100 miles along the southern border. There are 40 Recruitment Centres and detachments, which are distributed over an area covering approximately 15 million km². Population concentration varies widely from one area of the country to another. Three-quarters of Canada's population lives in the eastern provinces of Manitoba (a province located in prairie central Canada, in the southwest of Hudson Bay having its capital at Winnipeg). The rest of the West population is rarely distributed on the other half of the country.

Canadian military forces should reflect the demographics of Canada. So, the significant opportunity is the new employment candidates who come from the following social groups: women, aboriginal peoples and minorities.

Recruitment success of these demographics targets reflects the effectiveness of measures taken by the Department of *Canadian Forces Recruitment (DRCF)*, as a representative institution of the state. Replacing the most experienced soldiers, sailors, pilots, men and women means that ability, leadership potential and its maturity, become critical in attracting and enrolling the adequate and quality person for the organization.

1. Elements of Strategic Marketing in the operational plan of Canadian Forces recruitment

The operational plan is issued under the authority of the Head of Recruiting Department within the Canadian Forces (DRFC). This document represents the Decision of Personnel Chief for recruitment operation in the Canadian Military Forces. The plan contains guidance on strategic and operational level, guidelines for DFRC staff and commanders of Recruitment Centres in Canadian Forces in the following financial year.

External environment (labour market) where Canadian Forces recruits is characterized by employers as a highly competitive for the candidates. This

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competition is determined by the private sector's ability to adapt and be innovative. This is a distinct competitive advantage for the private sector.

For the efficiency of recruitment, the Recruitment Department of the Canadian Forces (DRFC) is working with labour generators to avoid aggressive position on the labour market and to develop a strong position in relation to the other competitors.

Government of Canada Guide includes guidelines for the development of the Armed Forces, strategic objectives, opportunities, strengths and threats elements.

The considered threat is represented by the external factors that DRFC faces, while exercising its mission, such as:

1. *Public perception upon the Canadian Forces.* Demographics indicate that the resource named *basic candidates* is in permanent decreasing. In the last years DRFC had completed the mission, as the result of a positive image of civil society about the Canadian Forces. On the other hand if national or international events changed public perception about the Canadian Forces and their mission, it will limit the ability to restore the DRFC *basic candidates*.
2. *Competition on the labour market.* Strong economy today is the result of forecasting in recent years. As the birth rate is increasing in the coming years, so the number of working people will increase, so will increase the challenge of engaging candidates in the army.

Creativity is a basic feature of the specialists work in marketing and advertising as key elements that will ensure mission and recruitment system success.

Strategic Plan of Canadian Forces Recruiting (SIP) contains 4-way operation used as axes of development:

- Marketing, including labour market engaging, advertising, planning and prospecting in order to cover the recruits;
- Processing, which includes production, processing and model selection of candidates for enrolment;
- Recruitment capacity management - including knowledge, doctrine development, training, performance standards and quantification;
- Force Management - includes all specific activities other than recruitment, HR career management, Command Control and Communications, Information Technology, and Logistics Control.

DRFC priority is to provide the Canadian Forces with quality recruits for achieving and sustaining force expansion requirements as established by SIP. Another priority is to increase the number of candidates for the Canadian Forces with the target groups especially of indigenous minorities to better reflect the diversity of Canadian society. Simplifying of recruitment process reduces inherent delays in providing the best service to the customer. These three aspects dominate in recent years DRFC activities.

Operations management. For the operationalization of recruiting there are covered three phases: guidance, management and assessment.

Phase 1 - Guidance phase will include reconsideration of resources, commitment and communication with other interested institutions at all levels internal and external in DFRC.

Phase 2 – Management phase is about exploiting the resources of marketing research in order to guide marketing and recruitment team to win the war for talent. The four lines of operation must be synchronized to meet objectives. The completion of priority objectives for all lines of operation represents a critical activity for the success of mission. The plan must be flexible enough to change resources as required.

Phase 3 – Assessment phase, by performance measurement and management structure knowledge are reviewed DFRC results and identified any necessary adjustments for future operations.

2. National marketing campaign for the Canadian Army recruitment

National marketing campaign is an advertising campaign, which aims to support recruitment efforts in a particular time of the year. Communication strategy reflects the priorities set by Canadian Forces Recruiting Group (CFRG) and follows the rules and guidelines of the Government of Canada.

ADM (PA) Advertising Group (AD Group) supports the effort to replace the Canadian Forces' annual personnel retreat (approximately 10,000), plus human resources necessary to increase the number of active and reserve labour.

Marketing campaign objective is to meet the strategic plan by contributing to quality personnel to fill vacancies and increase personnel. Increasing confidence of the population in the army and emphasizing the role of employer, who select, connects with young Canadians, in order to stimulate their desire and their attraction to the military profession.

Target groups

Target demographic group is divided into two subgroups:

- Action-oriented subgroup: predominantly male aged 18-24 years, high school and college graduates; current recruitment requirements of the Canadian Forces emphasizes the need for a more action-oriented personnel to serve in combat forces. Advertising is oriented towards action group from target market, but also includes women and all minorities;

- Focused social subgroup: male and female, college and university graduates, mostly aged between 22-34 years of university graduates, college and / or high school entering a phase of career search.

Geographic target markets are determined by the strategic interests of the army, English and French markets, across Canada, and in certain geographical areas such as Quebec-Windsor corridor, Prairies, British Columbia, Atlantic Canada. The main aspects of the campaign can be focused on specific geographic regions to maximize contact with ethnic communities such as the Chinese communities in Vancouver and Toronto.

Recruitment campaign strategy. Multi-level strategy is designed to reach a selective audience of potential recruits representing approximately 3-5% of the

Canadian population and their motivation to request more information about a career in the army by visiting the site of recruitment Force Canada.

Frequency and repetition are essential to reveal the new concept of Army.

Ad Group Agency operates various events in the lives of the studied population, by analyzing the position of the media, achieving maximum exposure during top periods. The Agency shall consider events such as winter holidays, vacations (travel, preparing for graduation), sporting events (Olympics, NHL Playoffs, Hockey World Championships) and make appropriate recommendations regarding creativity and cost effectiveness of advertising.

There are used the following media channels in order to create employment opportunities:

- *Printed*: school newspapers, ethno-cultural newspapers, free newspapers (Dose, 24, Metro), youth magazines and newspapers entertainment, professional or trade journals and / or magazine for employment groups work mentioned above (e.g. health, engineering profession, chaplains, pilots);
- *Internet*
 - amount allocated: approximately \$ 200,000,
 - oriented market segment of young aged between 17-24 years
 - segment of ethno-cultural group,
 - Advertising on the website of employment for specified groups (e.g. health, engineering professionals, chaplains, pilots);
- *TV*
 - High frequency using specialized media,
 - if possible, high frequency only in major urban centres;
- *Radio*
 - Small communities and ethnic communities and/or aboriginal communities;
- *Out-of-Home and Out Door*
 - universities and colleges posted on or near,
 - signs and posters on billboards on campus
 - If you can not access campus, displaying posters on bus routes travelling to / from college / university
 - providing suggestions for cost-effective which means advertising on public transport;
- *Events* such as Calder and Stanley Cup and other events aimed at the demographic target;
- *Product placement* - are requested suggestions on cost effectiveness of product placement in television success shows of Canada.

Advertising tactics

Using the concept of “*Strong presence and proud creative*”

The objective is to keep advertising in the period before the presentation of the new creative concept, mainly through media such as the Internet, printed and possibly in cinemas.

University / Professional Campaign

Because recruitment is a priority for health services, promoting career opportunity in this field appeals to creative concepts supported the general concept of health services “Recognition makes all the difference” or “The options make all the difference”.

Listing ads in campus newspapers and on campus signs (using both general and specific advertising) will be used for students from last year. There can be posted ads in the student registers for the current school year, assuring that they do not exceed the terms of booking, so (all universities):

- printed on campus
- signs on campus (Zoom, New Ad)
- advertisements on buses on campus or off campus (near the institution and the way to it),
- Internet
- Ethnic magazines / miscellaneous (SAY Magazine, International Women's Day, and so on).

College and Graduates Campaign. The objective is to aware the graduates and students in certain specialties, that the Canadian Forces have active recruitment, by incentives or subsidized programs of education. In order to reach the students segment there are used signs on campus (posters) and advertisements in student newspapers.

Navy and Out-of-Home Army:

In order to reach target audiences there are used outside major colleges and universities or in other locations where you can easily reach the targeted audience to action, such as posters, buses (advertisements on buses, interior and exterior signs, or packaging in case they are available).

The total budget for these national campaigns is approximated up to \$ 3,000,000 out of which: 25% cinema, 65% media, 5% internet, and 5% popular media.

The campaign is carried in major Canadian centres.

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OPEN SOURCE EXPLOITATION AND THE CONCEPTS OF KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT / UNDERSTANDING

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Abstract: *The decision-making process in the contemporary security environment requires the utilization of all available information, from both protected and open sources. The exponential growth in the volume of public information led to the conception of new terms such as «open source intelligence» (OSINT), «open source expertise» and «total information environment». Specialized structures, doctrines și specific regulations have been put in place for the exploitation of open sources.*

In 2008, the Knowledge Development concept has been developed, in connection with the Effects-Based Operations and the Network Centric Warfare. Concept development and implementation went hand in hand but the results did not match the expectations as they produced confusion, management complications in responsibility sharing and a counterproductive boost in information requirements. Therefore, the Effects-Based Operations and associated concepts have been suspended.

Shortly, the concept of «understanding» has been issued and formalised in doctrine papers, in 2010 – 2011. It separates the cognitive activities of the decision-making process from the «single intelligence environment» and aims at deconflicting the information avalanche and the operational, logistic and human realities.

For intelligence support, the lessons learned lead to the need for a pragmatic balance between theoretic developments and the concrete possibilities to implement novel ideas in the complex conditions of the contemporary operational environment.

Key words: *OSINT, information environment, Knowledge Development, understanding.*

Introduction

Intelligence domain is not the only actor in the information environment of the contemporary confrontations. The intelligence acquired from the security environment reality by the collection structures of the intelligence services is not only classified information but also public information, from open sources. In their turn, the decision-makers get information from reality also by other ways than intelligence support: information on own forces, on allied or neutral actors, on the conflict environment, as well as historical and scientific data, any general public information.

1. The complexity of the contemporary information environment

Recently, the extended information environment, where not simply «open source information» is addressed, but «open source expertise», has been called, all in

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all, «total information environment»¹, and open source information became a force multiplier and a way to save resources for the military and security domains.

In the Information Age, the information battlespace shows a number of important trends² such as:

- The information explosion generated by the evergrowing use of the Internet, news television channels («CNN effect») and mobile telephone networks, as well as the huge processing capabilities of computer networks;
- Previously protected or privileged access information domains opened to the public;
- The operational importance of cultural information (the so called «human terrain») increased especially for expeditionary campaigns, conducted in remote areas, away from the obvious interest areas, as well as for humanitarian operations (e.g. in the aftermath of natural disasters) or nonconventional operations (e.g. counterpiracy);
- The non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations increased their role in both crisis management and military operations.

These trends cause the massive exploitation of unclassified information relevant for the management of the security situation or military operations. The huge amount of public information used by intelligence services has been confirmed by the Director of CIA³, who declared in front a congressional committee that “more than 80% (of the information used by CIA) is obtained from open sources”⁴ – percentage that has never been either denied or corrected by any intelligence service. Public information sources also show unbelievable dynamics: in 2002, “one of the major online Internet catalogues receives 22,000 new listings every day”⁵.

These developments are further complicated by the huge possibilities offered by the «new media», which open the information space to the ordinary citizen, who became not only consumer but also a spontaneous generator of information, much of it being of interest for the security environment. However, this large new field of information, bearing a plethora of specifics, does not interfere directly in the mechanics of the information consumption by the relevant authorities in the security or military environment, because their thorough exploitation requires the specialization and focus of the intelligence services. This is why «new media» does not impact on the logic of intelligence support and open source exploitation by decision-makers.

¹ Apud dr. William M. NOLTE, *Rethinking War and Intelligence*, in *Rethinking the Principles of War*, edited by Anthony McIvor, US Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland, 2006, p 432.

² First two also mentioned in *NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook*, Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT), Norfolk, SUA, November 2001, p 3.

³ Allen Welsh DULLES, Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1953 – 1961.

⁴ Richard S. FRIEDMAN, *Review Essay – Open Source Intelligence*, in *NATO Open Source Intelligence Reader*, Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT), Norfolk VA, US, February 2002, p 17.

⁵ Mats BJORE, *Open Source – Lessons Learned*, in *NATO Open Source Intelligence Reader*, quoted, p 82.

Open source information presents three categories⁶: «white» literature (newspapers, books, radio and TV programs, the Internet, various other publications), «ephemeral» literature (publications of extremely short-lived interest – public service schedules, public event agendas), and «grey» literature – products available only through specialized channels and not through the usual public distribution channels.

In the extended information environment logic, the transfer of information is instrumental to achieve *knowledge development* and *understanding*: “It is not enough to transform information into knowledge, it needs to be communicated to those who receive knowledge in order to be implemented. Yet knowledge cannot be transferred”⁷, it remains an attribute of the individual’s cognitive level. The quote that describes these cognitive levels says that “intelligence (knowledge) is knowing a tomato is a fruit, understanding (wisdom) is not putting it in a fruit salad”⁸. The upper level of *understanding* has been added to reach *wisdom* and “the triade «information – knowledge - wisdom» will characterize the XXIst Century society. It will define, on long term, the extraordinary challenges of the Information Age”⁹. As we will see, this progress in the cognitive domain depth does not come cheap.

Inevitably, the decision-makers get open source information on two ways: on one side through the *all-source* intelligence products, which include such input, and on the other side, either directly, through the available means, or through the information system run by the knowledge management structures. This partial overlap should not be a problem, since the ubicuity of the public information is a reality to which all actors active in the information space should adapt.

The complexity of the contemporary flow of knowledge speaks to the semiotic models of the communication theory, based on the interaction between the communicator and the receiver. In the same time, the issue of knowledge management speaks to the vision of Palo Alto School of psychology, which compares communication, as a “permanent social process, in which different behaviour systems concur to produce sense”¹⁰, with the performance of an orchestra: “Communication cannot be conceived but as a system... in which the social actor participates each moment, willing or not... he belongs to the phenomenon of communication, the same way the musician belongs to the orchestra. Yet in this wide cultural orchestra there is no conductor, no staffs. Each musician plays tuning to the others. Only an external

⁶ Mason H. SOULE, R. Paul RYAN, *Grey Literature*, in *NATO Open Source Intelligence Reader*, quoted, p 24.

⁷ George Cristian MAIOR, : *Editorial* in *Intelligence* magazine of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), nr 21, March – May 2012.

⁸ With the variations in the brackets, the quote reflects the language in *JDP 04 Understanding (Joint Doctrine Publication 04)*, Shrivenham, United Kingdom, December 2010, p 2-1, where the Centre for Development, Concepts and Doctrine of the British Ministry of Defence uses a quote by Peter Kay in *List of Universal Truths*, 2010.

⁹ George Cristian MAIOR, *op. cit.*

¹⁰ Dorina SĂLĂVĂSTRU, *Education Psychology*, Collegium. Psychology series, Polirom Publishing House, Iași, 2004, p 181.

observer... can identify and transcript the hidden sheet, which, obviously, will prove extremely complex and difficult”¹¹.

2. The issue of Open Source Intelligence

The intelligence services collect and process unclassified information along secret data and can produce intelligence using only public information. This activity is the intelligence discipline called OSINT (Open Source INTelligence), meaning collecting and processing information from open sources.

Usually, OSINT products are disseminated to UN organizations and missions, and are used in Public Relations. Beside these, OSINT production has a limited use, for example to assure a wide dissemination of certain information – the case of the Country Books in multinational operations or the cultural pamphlets. However, the usual customers in the field of security or in the armed forces need intelligence products which integrate information acquired from all available sources (all-source intelligence).

By the exploitation of data and information collected from all possible sources, the intelligence structures “generate intelligence knowledge”, to provide the specialized support required by the decision-makers from intelligence, in an effort considered to be one of the continuous activities of the intelligence process (along analysis, assessment and dissemination)¹².

A special kind of OSINT products are the *validated OSINT* (OSINT-V), which are described, in NATO doctrine, as open source information products to which a high degree of confidence can be attributed¹³. The increased value of the OSINT-V is provided through confirmation of the products by the intelligence analyst, who does not add classified information but validates the open source information after checking the credibility of sources and information.

However, even the purely OSINT produced by all-source intelligence structures assume a certain validation, because the intelligence analysts cannot simply ignore the knowledge of previously consulted classified information and previous classified assessments. So, the all-source intelligence structures cannot produce «genuine unclassified information» on subjects where they are aware of classified information, because they apply specific intention, analytic procedures and expertise, and they keep in mind assessments which resulted from classified information. This is why public opinions of intelligence representatives or decision-makers privy to intelligence support are more valuable even when they address well-known events.

On the other hand, for unclassified products which need to be «handled with care», there are such specifications as «For official use only», and US Army

¹¹ Yves WINKIN (editor), *La nouvelle communication*, Paris, Seuil, 1981, in Dorina Sălăvăstru, *Op.cit.*, pp 181 - 182.

¹² *Apud: ATP 2-22.9 Open Source Intelligence*, Department of the Army, Washington DC, July 10, 2012, pp 1-2, 1-3.

¹³ *Apud: NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook*, quoted, p 3.

regulations add «controlled unclassified information» and «sensitive but unclassified information»¹⁴.

There are different approaches and practices in OSINT exploitation, either including OSINT in all-source intelligence, or setting separate OSINT structures.

For example, US intelligence community has the Open Source Center¹⁵, within CIA, which serves the whole American government. Also in US, in 2010, the Pentagon established¹⁶ responsibilities for the OSINT domain as high as the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Within the military, by July 2012 regulations, the Department of US Army figured the OSINT architecture from national level down to brigade level¹⁷. Beyond structures, the above mentioned regulations established OSINT functionality and its technological basis: specialized networks, software and IT services. These OSINT bodies perform collection from open sources, as well as analysis and dissemination of its products. The specificity of OSINT domain even generated new terms: operators in OSINT structures and analysts who work in «operational situation development» and «target development» teams, they collect but also «acquire» information by «research» and they produce «studies»¹⁸.

In its turn, NATO issued, in 2001 and 2002, a set of three documents fundamental for the Alliance doctrine in this field: “NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook” (November 2001), “NATO Open Source Intelligence Reader” (February 2002), and “Intelligence Exploitation of the Internet” (October 2002).

An alternative for open source exploitation is the privatization of OSINT activity, suggested even for organizations as large as the European Union, where it is supposed to bring resource savings and benefits in overcoming the limitations in intelligence ex-change. Privatization of OSINT is considered for reasons of targets, sources and costs.¹⁹

In the British doctrine, the rationale of integrating OSINT analytical capabilities into general / all-source analytical capabilities, at national and operational levels, points out that “the same analytical competencies and management processes are required to assess both open source and classified intelligence”²⁰. This approach

¹⁴ ATP 2-22.9 *Open Source Intelligence*, quoted, p 2-9.

¹⁵ In 1941, the US Federal Communication Commission put in place the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service (FBMS). At the end of the second World War, the FBMS was transferred to the Pentagon, and by the National Security Act of 1947 it turned into Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), subordinated to CIA. In November 2005, the changing of its name into Open Source Center has been announced (http://en.wikipedia/wiki/Foreign_Broadcast_Information_Service).

¹⁶ By regulation 3115.12 of August 24, 2010, US Department of Defense ului Apărării al SUA, published at www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/311512p.pdf.

¹⁷ ATP 2-22.9 *Open Source Intelligence*, quoted, pp 1-2, 2-6, E-4 – E-7.

¹⁸ ATP 2-22.9 *Open Source Intelligence*, quoted, pp 2-13 – 2-16, 3-3 – 3-4, 4-1.

¹⁹ Apud Dr. Andrew Rathmell: *The Privatisation of Intelligence: A Way Forward for European Intelligence Cooperation – “Towards a European Intelligence Policy”*, in *NATO Open Source Intelligence Reader*, quoted, pp 74 - 79.

²⁰ JDP 2-00 *Understanding and Intelligence Support to Joint Operations (Joint Doctrine Publication 2-00)*, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Ministry of Defence, Shrivenham, United Kingdom, August 2011, p 5-18.

separates OSINT from other intelligence disciplines, where domain specificity requires specialized analysis of collected data, information and samples before all-source analysis. The British doctrine also establishes «operational intelligence support groups» to act, more than all-source intelligence structures, as “a think-tank for the commander, exploring ideas and concepts”²¹.

OSINT domain characteristics, especially the autonomy provided by its distance from any secret information, allow OSINT operators to perform activities belonging to all main phases of the intelligence cycle, starting with directing day-by-day activities, collection management, source assessment and development, collection / research, processing, analysis, and dissemination.

Even it is regarded as the «poor cousin» in intelligence family, because it does not operate with secret information, OSINT proves to be extremely dynamic, especially after the developments in «new media», and is probably the intelligence branch showing the most advanced integration of the activities belonging to all phases of the intelligence cycle, blurring the barriers among direction, collection, analysis and dissemination.

3. Solutions for the management of the total information environment

As mentioned before, the evergrowing volume of open source information is also used directly by the decision-makers - politicians and civil planners, commanders and military staff. The sistematization of the whole information process is presently conducted through the activity called *knowledge management*, which includes intelligence products, after their dissemination.

In US Armed Forces doctrine, knowledge management is defined as “the act of creating, applying, and transferring knowledge to facilitate situational understanding and decision-making”²². Basically, the definition does not differentiate knowledge management from intelligence activity by anything else but the absence of any reference to the classification of the information it vehiculates. Also in the Pentagon doctrine, the general knowledge processed in support of decision-makers can be *explicit knowledge* or *tacit knowledge*, the latter meaning “comprehension gained through study, experience, practice, and human interaction”²³. The difference is similar to intelligence ierarchy regarding data, information and knowledge, and speaks to the operating levels in the cognitive domain of warfare, in the logic of the Network Centric Warfare (NCW).

Aiming to identify a solution for knowledge management at decision level, NATO put in place, in 2007, a working group joining the efforts of the two strategic commands. One year later, the Alliance issued²⁴ the «*Knowledge Development*» (KD)

²¹ *Idem*, pp. 5-19.

²² *FM 6-01.1 Knowledge Management Section*, Department of the Army, Washington DC, US, August 2008, p. 1-1.

²³ *Idem*, pp. 1-2.

²⁴ *Knowledge Development Concept*, Allied Command for Transformation, and Allied Command Operations (NATO Bi-SC document), SHJ5PLANS/7740-033/08 – 205080 / August 12, 2008.

concept, meant to provide “a common situational awareness based on a comprehensive understanding of the engagement space”²⁵. In its birth certificate, “KD is the integration of isolated data into a usable body of information and relationship. KD supports planning, execution, and assessment by providing a holistic view of the engagement space... This understanding enables the Commander and staff to identify the most effective Political, Military, Civil, and Economic instruments available to achieve the desired effects”²⁶.

Operating in the information space, the KD domain uses many notions, structures and procedures from intelligence language, which reached conceptual maturity. Collection, analysis and access facilitation / *access* have been defined as KD cycle phases, the latter representing, obviously, the dissemination phase of intelligence cycle. The word «access» underlines the extension of the information domain and the pro-active attitude of the decision-makers in obtaining the necessary information.

Similar to the evolution of other complex concepts and large systems, KD development and implementation occurred gradually and simultaneously, due to practical requirements, before the mature formalization of the concept and the verification of its organizational solutions.

The level of ambition of the concept is explicitly assumed in the constitution document: “one of the most immediate operational uses of this document will be to pave the way for developing the KD capabilities needed for the eventual implementation of EBAO (EBO)²⁷ within the NATO military structure”²⁸.

As a “continuous, adaptive, and networked activity which requires a «*community of interest*» working in a «*collaborative environment*»”²⁹, KD means building information superiority by a “comprehensive understanding of the engagement space in a multinational and interagency context... and selectively implementing the four functions of EBAO... effects-based planning, execution, and effects-based assessment”³⁰.

More than that, by applying NCW principles, the KD concept implies «system of systems analysis» (SoSA)³¹, and the management of a large number of extended and various networks, with large interconnected databases and complicated standardisation, and implies, as well, extended intelligence exchange across multiple fields, echelons, and borders. The implementation of KD concept required efforts for the coordination of activities scattered among operational structures, and for the transformation of the working procedures on different levels of information management, knowledge management and data storage, all in a comprehensive process, and in the conditions of ongoing military operations. Even more, these IT

²⁵ *Idem*, p. 3.

²⁶ *Ibidem*.

²⁷ EBAO – Effects-Based Approach Operations, also known as EBO – Effects-Based Operations.

²⁸ *Knowledge Development Concept*, quoted, p 3.

²⁹ *Idem*, p. 8.

³⁰ *Apud* * * * *Knowledge Development Concept*, quoted, p. 5.

³¹ SoSA – system-of-systems-analysis.

and system complications expand significantly (estimated 70%) outside the military commands systems, into the global information environment.

4. Difficulties in implementing the Knowledge Development concept

In practice, the EBO concept, initially intended to optimise target management in air warfare and prematurely injected into joint operations, did not pan out because the dimension of EBO activities caused the stretching of planning and information collection capabilities, generated confusion in mission execution, and induced predictability expectations much over the reasonable possibilities³². The early criticism by Milan Vego towards EBO (2006) inevitably reflects the situation of KD concept: “the trend toward using metrics to assess the essentially unquantifiable aspects of warfare reinforces the unrealistic view that warfare is a science rather than an art and a science”³³.

The semi-failure of EBO concept was heralded by the US Army in 2007³⁴ and was sealed by general James Mattis (USMC), who underlined that we should focus “on reducing rather than aggravating our internal frictions. We seek to reduce friendly friction rather than to inject difficult-to-understand terminology and processes that demand increasingly large staffs to access effects and that tend to inhibit information flow and hinder rapid decision-making”³⁵. Therefore, general Mattis forbade the use of EBO and associated concepts³⁶ in the US Joint forces Command³⁷.

The association of KD to EBO principles brings the cumbersome deterministic endeavour to «overmathematize» the operational planning and complicates decision-making through bureaucratization of the operational environment complexity; in other words, by attempting to organize the clausewitzian chaos, and by establishing and pursuing hard-to-get multidisciplinary operational objectives located even outside the military environment, all this while thoroughly considering a large number of nonmilitary factors difficult to measure.

The KD concept attempts a «mathematicistic» solution for the complexity, including by SoSA, in the dynamic conditions of the contemporary operational environment and the clausewitzian chaos typical to warfare. This requires not only a huge volume of information and a tremendous computing speed, not only the cyber-coordination of different systems, but also an exponential increase in information requirements of all kinds, including intelligence. Thus, KD puts a huge pressure on

³² *Apud*: Gen. James N. MATTIS, *USJFCOM Commander's Guidance for Effects-Based Operations*, Joint Forces Command, Norfolk VA, US, August 14, 2008, published at www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/08autumn/mattis.pdf, p 20.

³³ Milan N. VEGO, *Effects-Based Operations: A Critique*, Joint Forces Quarterly 41, April 2006, p 51.

³⁴ Gen. James N. MATTIS, *op. cit.*, p 22.

³⁵ *Idem*, p 24.

³⁶ Operational Net Assessment (ONA) and System of Systems Analysis (SoSA).

³⁷ Gl. James N. MATTIS, *op. cit.*, p 23.

the information systems, intelligence structures included, both on collection and analysis, in an evergrowing battle-rhythm.

By defining KD as a general responsibility of each command, and by attempting to implement the concept at this scale, the complexity of KD problem also generated dilemmas regarding the location of the KD structure within the military structures. As possible locations, J2, J3, J5, situation centres and external fusion centres have been considered, or a place above all these. The idea was that “implementation programme should include development systems analysis doctrine and procedures, socialisation, education and training of different levels of customers (commanders, staffs, analysts)”³⁸. In any situation, the burden of placing the organisms supposed to instrument knowledge in military commands reflects the importance and sensitivity of the upper cognitive level, where the intelligence products play a crucial role. As a result, intelligence structures have to adapt in order to secure the effectiveness of intelligence support, and intelligence products’ «life» after their dissemination becomes more and more important for the intelligence services.

It seems that the «orchestra metaphor», imagined in 1981, illustrates the difficulties noticed at the dawn of the IIIrd Millenium in implementing the KD concept. It seems that KD attempted a bureaucratic approach for a phenomenon with too many variables and much too loaded with human nature to match an oversimplifying determinism. In the same time, the KD concept level of ambition seems too high to serve effectively the operational requirements in NCW conditions.

5. Is the concept of «understanding» a way out?

The British military intelligence issued national regulations which approach KD with a typical pragmatism introducing the supreme term of «understanding», associated to command: “understanding is the ability to place knowledge in its wider context to provide us with options for decision-making ... Understanding is, therefore, a non-discretionary element of decision-making”³⁹. However, in this approach⁴⁰, understanding is not included in the «single intelligence environment» but interacts with it through activities of the intelligence cycle, such as direction and dissemination. Thus, the single intelligence environment is associated strictly to the epistemic domain, under the jurisdiction of the intelligence structure, while understanding is associated strictly to the decision-maker responsibility, in the deontic domain.

Placing the understanding level in command ownership reflects the direct link of understanding and decision and reinforces the distance between decision and intelligence analysis, which builds the intelligence superiority in support of understanding.

³⁸ *Knowledge Development Concept*, quoted, p. 14.

³⁹ *JDP 04 Understanding (Joint Doctrine Publication 04)*, quoted, p. iii.

⁴⁰ *JDP 2-00 Understanding and Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*, quoted, p. 5-3.

Understanding should be considered, however, also part of the «single intelligence environment», due to actionable intelligence contents, but also due to the direct participation to reaching understanding and the major interest of the intelligence structures in the consequence of understanding, i.e. decision and subsequent action.

British doctrine also considers two aspects of acquisition and development of knowledge for achieving understanding: in the direction of knowledge depth (insight), by situation awareness and analysis; and in the direction of future events anticipation (foresight), which includes knowledge and *judgment*⁴¹. Detailing the «enhanced decision-making», judgment is assessed as “the most important element of decision-making and requires experience and practice”; it implies creative thinking (namely *intuition*), communication, network exploitation, permanent revision, prioritization and assignment of missions and tasks, as well as risk-taking⁴².

Considering understanding both as a mental attitude and an activity, common implications of understanding have been identified for commanders and intelligence structures⁴³ at operational level. As mental attitudes there is a “change in ethos and philosophy” of own activity, by the responsibility to “pro-actively share knowledge”, “a change in the way vision and intent are generated”, as well as “the ability to work with complex and ambiguous problems”. As necessary activities, British approach identified the increasing need to understand the adversaries, allies, neutral actors and ourselves, but also the need to “monitor and evaluate the consequences of the decisions in order to learn, adapt and make better decisions in the future”.

Conclusions

Associating commanders with intelligence operators regarding the implications of understanding as supreme level of the cognitive domain underlines the essential integration of the intelligence products’ actionable substance in decision. Therefore, the destiny of intelligence after dissemination is a paramount responsibility of the intelligence structures, and supports the need to include the construction of intelligence superiority as a main phase of the intelligence cycle.

Maybe the values of KD concept are not entirely wasted. However, for intelligence, the lessons learned regarding KD lead to the necessity to maintaining a pragmatic balance between the theoretical developments and the concrete possibilities to implement novel ideas in the complex conditions of the contemporary operational environment.

Therefore, in the Information Age, both establishing intelligence requirements and developing OSINT and all-source architecture should be realistically prioritized to assure the feasibility of collection and analysis tasks in NCW conditions, as well as the quality of intelligence products tailored to commander’s intent.

⁴¹ *JDP 04 Understanding (Joint Doctrine Publication 04)*, pp. 2-1, 2-2.

⁴² *Idem*, pp. 4-3 – 4-8.

⁴³ *Apud: JDP 2-00 Understanding and Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*, quoted, pp. 1-9.

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DEFENSE PLANNING REFORM IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA AND CIVILIAN CONTROL AS A KEY REQUIREMENT FOR EFFECTIVE DEFENSE PLANNING

*Diana MOLODILO**

***Abstract:** Defense planning has always been one of the most sensitive issues in promoting civilian control of the armed forces. The article examines the defense planning reform and the dimension of the civilian control over that process in Republic of Moldova, a country that is aspiring for EU membership. The paper argues that in order to implement the new defense planning system based on planning, programming, budgeting and execution methodology, it is necessary to develop a new defense planning concept considering trends such as capability-based planning, output-oriented budgeting as well as best practice in its own experience and in the experience of other transitional countries. It also argues that leadership and political will are key requirements for effective defense planning reform.*

***Keywords:** Republic of Moldova, Civil-Military Relations, Democratic Civilian Control, Effectiveness, Defense Planning, Capability Based Planning, Defense Reform.*

Introduction

Defense is, for all nations, at the heart of national security. All nations face a common set of choices – what decisions must be made, who will make them, how resources will be allocated, and what investments will be made. After the end of the Cold War, defense systems in post communist countries were challenged by the significant changes that occurred. The nature of the contemporary security environment as well as permanent pressure on the scarce resources demands the reform of the defense systems both in developed and transitional countries. Demands for building armed forces which are under democratic control and prepared for Euro-Atlantic integration have caused radical changes in the nature of civil-military relations in the these countries. This is particularly significant in the defense planning area where systems should have been replaced with transparent, effective, efficient and compatible ones. Some of the transitional countries were more successful in this process than others and succeeded in building the defense planning system with the practically required characteristics. However, for different reasons, in the greater number of transitional countries there is significant space for consolidation and improvement in this area.

1. Background leading to Defense Planning Reform and the dynamics of Civil - Military Relations.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the new realities such as: changes in the strategic security environment (different challenges and different missions), the new

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definitions of risks and threats, and the ineffective management of national defense have imposed a defense planning reform in post soviet countries. In this context, most of these countries find themselves needing to adapt their heavily oversized defense establishments to the post-Cold war realities, without having adequate national procedures, tools, and expertise.

As regards the civil-military relations aspect, all of these countries until 1989 were entirely part of the Communist bloc and used typical “Communist models of civilian control”. Communist (or authoritarian) models are characterized by the following traits:

- a relatively confusing legal framework, meant to consolidate not only the formal, but also the informal power of the Communist Party’s leadership;
- a focus on coercion rather than consent in implementing and legitimizing policies, ensuring the Communist Party’s control over the armed forces;
- a (mostly conscription-based) military establishment whose leaders held significant political influence;
- an authoritarian political system, concentrating the power in the publicly unaccountable leadership of the Communist Party;
- a virtually non-existent civil society.

Starting with 1991s, these countries started to adopt “Western model of civilian control over the armed forces. This model is also characterized by several key features:

- a relatively clear legal and/or institutional framework regulating the relationship between civilian authorities and the military; A democratic political system, providing the mechanisms to ensure the free expression of people’s will in a majority of situations and to facilitate public scrutiny of military actions;

- a (mostly professional) military recognizing the legitimacy of the political system and the rule of law, and acknowledging the need for its own political neutrality as an institution (i.e., politically nonpartisan);

- the subordination of the armed forces (i.e., the General/Defense Staff) to the Government, through a civilian-led Ministry/Department of (National) Defense, and to the civilian Head of State (i.e., a clear chain of command, with civilian leaders at its top), and a significant role for the Parliament in making decisions on military (especially budgetary) issues¹.

In this regards, they agreed to abandon the previous Communist models of oversight, due to the transformation of the international strategic environment and the new nature of their domestic political systems. They have promoted the idea of a profound transformation of their civil-military relations, yet that has not happened as smoothly as initially predicted.

¹ For more see: P. FLURI, C. EDEN, *DCAF’s “Activities in Support of Effective and Democratically Transparent Defense Planning”*, Connections, The Quarterly Journal, Vol. V, nr.1, 2006.

1.1. The Soviet legacy

In order to understand the dynamics of defense planning reform and the impact of civilians in this process, it is necessary to introduce briefly the legacy factor. Historical legacies matter heavily in most countries, but none more so than in the post-soviet countries. The past decade has witnessed the constant ambiguous and non-uniform transition from authoritarian governments and centrally planned economies to pluralist democracies and free market economies. These countries were almost equally disadvantaged with inefficient governing and planning legacies. The inefficiency of the Soviet planning system and its centralized control and execution of plans is well known and still affects countries that grew up in the Soviet generation. Soviet military systems, as Ronald S. Mangum and William J. Craven well pointed in their paper “were long on directives and short on detailed planning, long on establishing accountability and short on giving authority, long on checks and balances and short on encouraging ingenuity – in short, a system that strangles itself and kills the enthusiasm of its inhabitants”². Other problems that these countries faced were: “bureaucratic resistance against change, especially from the General Staff; the lack of experience among the military in planning, programming and budgeting; the shortage of expertise among civilians within the defense establishment and security agencies; little interest on security and defense matters; and the lack of an appropriate legislative framework for carrying out reform etc”³.

Democratic consolidation of some of these countries (in particular in Moldova), including civil-military relations and defense reform is still plagued by these Soviet / Communist legacies.

1.2. Defense planning trends after 1991 in Republic of Moldova

After declaration of its independence, the defense planning system in Republic of Moldova was characterized by following trends:

- Defense planning was fully centralized by Moscow. There was no knowledge and experience in defense policy and planning;
- It was largely employed variations on threat-based planning. The military culture of defense planning was very much related to Cold War thinking concerning the dominant role played by threat assessments, strategic theaters of deployment, and the use of mass-conscripted militaries;
- Even under the impact of declining economies and the lack of an obvious enemy, senior political and military leaders felt safer adhering to inherited force structures and force development models.
- Weak civilian control on defense planning process. The notion of democratic civilian control over the armed forces was slowly introduced, but General Staffs remained the primary organizations, if not the only ones, thinking how to adapt military establishments to the new security environment. According to Philipp Fluri

² R. S. MANGUM, W. CRAVEN, *Measuring Defense Reform*, Small Wars Journal, April 2010: 5.

³ POP, A., *Romania: Reforming the Security Sector*, in *Security-Sector Reform and Transparency-Building Needs and Options for Ukraine and Moldova*, 49 (Groningen: Centre for European Security Studies (CESS), 2004).

and Eden Cole, defense planning in transitional states had struggled with the same problems: “an executive which has first to learn about transparent planning cycles and gain self-confidence in the implementation thereof; a legislative power which needs to learn about guidance and oversight mechanisms; and national media and institutions of civil society which need to change their expectations from commenting on the successes of authoritarian leadership to the assumption of the responsibility for public oversight”⁴.

In this realm, the Republic of Moldova had to start from scratch in defense planning. Also, it was understood that the best option to redefine its position and to transform would be to initiate extensive programs of reform in most fields based on Western guidelines. Consequently, European and Euro-Atlantic politico-military organizations have become directly involved in the process of transformation of the relationship between the military establishment and political forces.

In this process Republic of Moldova benefited and still benefits, in some way, from foreign guidance and assistance, in particular from NATO’s PfP programs. NATO programs assisted RM to undertake necessary defense management reforms, such as: transparent national defense planning, resource allocation and budgeting, appropriate legislation and parliamentary and public accountability. The PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) and PfP exercises introduced RM to collective defense planning and pave the way for more detailed operational planning.

2. The challenges of Defense Planning Reform in the Republic of Moldova

The need for defense planning reform in Republic of Moldova is explained by the following factors: non existing defense planning system, the changing geopolitical situation that generates new realities and risks, new opportunities for international cooperation in the field of defense and security, the need to adjust the countries defense and foreign policies to this basic principle and the intention to correlate defense and security systems with the real financial and material resources and possibilities of the state, and the need to re-size, rationalize, and re-invest in the force.

As was aforementioned, democratic defense planning is a young practice for the Republic of Moldova. At present, there are very weak structural defense planning methods in place. The legal framework for the Republic of Moldova’s defense organization is provided by the Law on National Defense, adopted in 2003.⁵ The National Defense Law of Moldova does not integrate a unique legislative concept and provides only some aspects related to the tasks and competences of the central public authorities in the organization of defense planning. In this context, we should

⁴ P. FLURI, C. EDEN, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁵ *Law No. 345-XV of 25.07.2003 on National Defense*. According to this Law, in war and during peacetime, the leadership of the armed forces is ensured by the *Supreme Commandment* and led by the President of the Republic of Moldova as Commander-in-Chief. The Supreme Commandment also includes the Minister of Defense, the Joint Chief of Staff, the Commanders of the Border Guards and Carabineer Troops.

mention that existing legislation on security and defense is ill defined with respect to arrangements which have been established for the purpose of justifying a preference for a certain size or type of military force, for its missions and the capabilities the military should develop.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and, respectively, the proclamation of independence, the Moldovan Armed Forces (MAF) have been formed from what was inherited from the former Soviet Army: corruption, consolidated political power, the lack of a political culture, soviet military mentality, weak professional skills, and an attitude to the service which were incompatible to the new realities.

The need to reform the national army became clear during the conflict over the region of Transnistria in 1991 and 1992.⁶ Overall, the defense planning reform in Moldova, which started in 1991, has had three phases:

First phase (1991-1997). As it was aforementioned, the MAF were formed out of the ruins of the former Soviet Army: a highly political power, a Soviet military mentality and views, which has timely proved to be incompatible with new international and national security realities. As a result, the MAF remained a mirror reflection, in many key ways, of the former Soviet Army. A series of reforms were initiated to change the military; yet, without a previous methodological and detailed assessment of the existing state of the military security system or security needs, and without sufficient civilian expertise.⁷ Military reform was rather an internal MoD initiative.⁸

In 1992 when the MoD was established and the first Moldovan Minister of Defense was appointed- new defense legislation was passed (Law on Defense, Law on the Armed Forces and the Law on Military Obligation and Military Service by the Citizens of the Republic of Moldova). These laws established new roles and missions

⁶ Transnistria is the Moldovan name for the breakaway territory on the left bank river Nistru, also known as Trans-Dniester or Transdnestr. The official name of self proclaimed republic is “*Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublika*”.

Transnistrian conflict - “Transnistrian separatists fought a brief war with Moldovan forces in 1992, and a contingent of approximately 1,500 Russian soldiers continues to serve in Transnistria, ostensibly as peacekeepers and guardians of an estimated 20,000 tons of Soviet era weapons and ammunition. In 1999, Russia pledged to remove this equipment, but withdrawals ceased in 2004. Although tensions remain, little political violence has ensued since the conflict, and residents of Transnistria and Moldova proper experience relative ethnic homogeneity and regularized contact compared to other Eurasian frozen conflicts. Nonetheless, Transnistria overtly seeks integration with Russia, and formal status negotiations (the “Five plus Two” talks) held under the auspices of the OSCE have been stalled since 2006.” In United States Senate, *Will Russia End Eastern Europe's Last Frozen Conflict?*, Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Congress (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 8, 2011). For more information about the Transnistrian conflict. See: Bruno COPPIETERS, et al., *Europeanization and Conflict Resolution: Case Studies from the European Periphery* (Gent: Academia Press, 2004).

⁷ At that stage of the reform process, Moldova did not possess the necessary civilian expertise to replace the dominance of the armed forces in the defense process.

⁸ E. SPORTEL, S. FALTAS, *Security Sector Reform in Moldova: Strengthening oversight over the security sector*. Netherlands: The Centre of European Security Studies, 2009, p.71.

for the MAF, the organization and activity of the Moldovan defense sector, and the rights of the bodies of state power and state administration.⁹

The Constitution adopted in 1994 set out the basic principles governing civilian and democratic control and oversight of the armed forces.¹⁰ This led to the development and adoption by the Moldovan Parliament of the key normative acts that regulated the system (system presumes institutions, responsibilities, and chain of command) of national security. In this framework, the National Security Concept and Military Doctrine were adopted in 1995. Also co-operation with the military political structures of NATO through *PfP program*¹¹ was launched while in 1995 - an *Individual Partnership Plan (IPP)* was signed between Moldova and NATO. In this framework, in summer of 1996, Moldovan military contingents participated for the first time in PfP exercises in Ukraine and in Bulgaria.

Civil-military relations, in particular civilian control was emerging, yet it was far from being effective.

Second phase (1997- 2004). During this stage, the appointment, in 1997 of the first civilian Minister of Defense¹² was a positive breakthrough in the democratic civil-military relations in Moldova. In addition, the concepts of civilian control of the armed forces and democratic military reform were introduced to Moldovan society by the elected leaders. In this context, in 1997, the National Army joined the PfP PARP. After having joined this process, Moldova agreed a series of interoperability goals with NATO, related to identified forces and means in order to be made available within multinational peacekeeping operations.¹³ This period saw, also, the approval by the Parliament, in 2002, of a reform plan, “Military Reform Concept,”¹⁴ that recognized that the Armed Forces were in poor condition due to the lack of practical experience in the area of military construction and management, lack of general expertise, an insufficiency of funds; all of which had a profound effect on the structure of defense planning, funding, administration and organization. This

⁹ MoD of Moldova, Legislation, *Law on National Defense*, Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Moldova, July 25, 2003, <http://www.army.md/?action=show&cat=11&lang=2> (accessed October 25, 2012).

¹⁰ Republic of Moldova, *The Constitution of the Republic of Moldova*, July 29, 1994, <http://www.president.md/const.php?lang=eng> (accessed October 24, 2012).

¹¹ On 16 March 1994, Moldova became the 12th state to enroll in NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.

¹² Valeriu Pasat was the first civilian appointed to act as the Minister of Defense.

¹³ NATO, *NATO's Relations with the Republic of Moldova*, NATO Topics, February 24, 2009, <http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-moldova/index.html> (accessed October 24, 2012).

¹⁴ The *Military Reform Concept* states that it is intended to respond to the current geopolitical situation and the need to adapt to the new realities, risks, threats and missions of military character. However, it fails to stipulate explicitly the new role and functions of the civilian and military components of Moldova's security arrangements. It also states that the reform will be carried out over a 12-year period (2002-2014) and will consist of three stages (stage I: 2002-2004, stage II: 2005-2008, stage III: 2009-2014). The Concept also emphasizes modifications in defense budgetary allocations, taking the GDP as the basis and providing an increase in the defense budget from 0.7% to 2.5% of the GDP during the above-mentioned period.

Concept stated also that “democratic command and control of the armed forces” would be a key area of cooperation with other armed forces.¹⁵

Also, during this period (May 2004) the Supreme Security Council of Moldova approved “The Concept of Restructuring and the Modernization of the National Army to 2014,” which was developed in the framework of a Defense Reform Concept. The 2004 Document established a conceptual basis for the development and implementation of state defense programs and plans. However, it should mention that, during this period, both Concepts have been very difficult to fully implement due to a structural lack of funds, low priority of the defense sector, and the lack of strategic expertise among many politicians to understand the complexity of defense reform in a democratic and free market economy country.

Third phase (2005- present). This period is characterized by the creation of a civilian and military command structure of the armed forces with a detailed delimitation of its attributes in the political, administrative and military command spheres.

During this stage, Moldova has taken more security sector reform initiatives; yet, success continues to allude it. These initiatives include: the ratification of an Action Plan with EU (2005) and an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO (2006). The adoption of these tools led Moldova in a serious dialog with Euro-Atlantic institutions regarding co-operation and defense sector reform with the West. In fact, a comprehensive plan for security sector reform was developed in the framework of in the IPAP. This set out a plan for the renewal and reform of national security institutions.

At the present moment, although there are some shortcomings regarding the fulfillment of political and financial obligations at the national level, the effort made by the military institution, aimed at achieving the defense reform goals which less depend on financial resources, can be observed. In this context **the Strategic Defense Review (SDR)** has been finalized and approved in principle by the Supreme Security Council on 6th of April 2011. Despite some progress on the SDR, between 2010-2011, and progress in the national political environment, the final approval of the SDR report still depends on greater clarity about the availability of financial resources. The completion of the SDR remains to be accomplished.

The National Security Strategy has been approved by the Parliament decision nr. 153 from 15 of July 2011 and went into force by being published in the Official Monitor nr. 170-175 on 14 of October 2011. The draft of the **National Military Strategy (NMS)** has been prepared, completed and coordinated at the institutional level.

Also, during this period, the Republic of Moldova has benefited and continues to profit from external technical assistance. The **South Caucasus and Moldova Clearing House (SCMCH) meetings** represent one of those instruments that

¹⁵ Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova, *Reforma Sectorului de Securitate*, Concepția Reformei Militare, Nr 117, Art Nr. 975 Din 15.08.2002, August 15, 2002, http://www.prisa.md/rom/info_security-reforms_CRM (accessed October 24, 2012).

Moldova actively uses and it is considered an important mechanism that can provide necessary expertise and assistance for further development of Moldovan Army.

Moldova was assisted and continues to be assisted in the development of **defense and budget planning system**. Military system is gradually approaching to a modern defense planning system. The defense and budgeting system is established in accordance with the so called capability based defense planning system that includes Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Execution, and Evaluation (PPBEE). At the moment, the system is applicable but still is necessary to make it more efficient and to institutionalize at least at the Ministry of Defense level. Once the final SDR report will be approved and put into force, will be established the premises for an efficient and effective cyclic system for the capability defense planning process (PPBEE). This will ensure a medium and long term developing process for the entire defense planning system.

In conclusion, it is obvious that the defense planning reform in Moldova despite scattered initiatives of interested leaders and foreign involvement and support (including PfP) has to date proved to be very difficult to implement because of a several factors: a lack of funds,¹⁶ inertia of old approaches, lack of political will, and conservative tendencies that still remain very visible.

Despite all the difficulties that continue to dominate Republic of Moldova internal agenda (which were quite thoroughly reflected in the Report of the NATO assessment mission that visited Moldova in the middle of May 2012), the country is firmly committed to pursue the path of effective implementation of all the democratic reforms undertaken by the Moldovan Government. From this perspective Republic of Moldova views its cooperation with North-Atlantic Alliance and its member states as an important mechanism that can provide necessary expertise and assistance for an efficient and effective defense reform.

Conclusions

The transition from Communist to Western frameworks has not been an easy process in post soviet countries. The results of this transformation are sometimes obscure, and the effectiveness of the new provisions in terms of ensuring civilian control over the military is not always clear. In this context, the combination of communist legacy with issues such as ineffective political leadership of the country transformation processes towards functional democracies and, market economy, the legal and institutional inconsistencies on the execution of the national chain of command of the Armed Forces; combined with the lack of professionalism and expertise of both civilian authorities and military leadership caused the delay of the implementation of effective civilian direction and democratic oversight of the defense planning system.

However, Republic of Moldova's decision to join European and Euro-Atlantic structures, have led to the creation of specific dynamics involving systemic changes

¹⁶ Currently a great percentage of the defense budget goes to salary and entitlements, leaving very little discretionary resources for maintenance and modernization effort.

in defense planning processes. Nevertheless, the processes of transformation have not led every time to the expected outcomes.

In conclusion, we can state that in order to develop democratic civil-military relations in the areas of defense policy, defense budget planning, and in professionalizing civilian knowledge of the military, more work is needed. The main areas of further improvement are developing capabilities for better cost estimation, the refinement of different data bases for support of the programming phase, an introduction of the business management tools in order to improve the execution and evaluation phase and development of an adequate selection and training process for personnel involved in the defense planning process on different levels.

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THE ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL ACTIVITY ON THE BASIS OF ERGONOMICS GROUNDS

*Tania STOEAN, PhD**

Abstract: *We consider necessary to analyze the impact represented by this new science identified as defining element in the structure of personnel management activities. The theoretical wideness of ergonomics founds its generous applicability in the sector of activity defined by the military area.*

Keywords: *ergonomics, lucrative activity, activity sector.*

Ergonomics is considered as “*the science of workplaces adaptation to the workers characteristics*”¹. Ergonomics – the science of workplaces organization in regard to institution, employees’ capacities and capabilities – it always was in managers’ attention. Ergonomics is the science of work organization in relation to environment conditions, job requirements and the real possibilities of implementation. It regards the identification and use of those processes allowing the diminution of applied effort concomitantly to the maximization of the wanted effect, the rationalization of consumptions and the growth of services or products quality, generally, of final work results.

Americans use the term of **human factors engineering**, concomitantly with the **ergonomics** term. Europeans use the generic term of **ergonomics**, excepting the Bulgarians (using the **anthrop-technique** term) and Germans (using the **labour science** term - **Arbeitswissenschaft**).

Right now there isn’t a definition unanimously accepted of **ergonomics** concept. Aurel Manolescu², quoting Maurice de Montmollin (who published, in 1986, to the *La Découverte* Publishing house in Paris, his paper *L’Ergonomie*), shows, in the world, there exist “*two main complementary characterizing the ergonomics*”:

- Ergonomics use the sciences to improve the work conditions;
- Ergonomics represents the actual stage of work in order to improve it.

The first trend particularly developed in the United States of America and the latter on the European continent. The both opinion trends and also all the definitions agreed by authors put in central plan the individual in relation to the environment.

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¹ A. MANOLESCU, *Managementul resurselor umane*, Ediția a patra, Editura Economică, București, 2003, p. 89, cited from A. David De CENZO, P. Stephen ROBBINS, *Personnel/Human Resource Management*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1988, p. 7, 603 și 604.

² A. MANOLESCU, *Managementul resurselor umane*, Ediția a patra, Editura Economică, București, 2003, p. 99.

Ergonomics can be regarded as a science of effect or result of human labour concretized in the increase of productivity but also as a science of improving the effort stressed in by the individual in lucrative activities.

Therefore, ergonomics is the same constituted on a multidisciplinary dimension and interdisciplinary dimension because uses in order to define its goal and object a wide range of connected fields.

The multidisciplinary model of ergonomics can be represented as follows:




Figure no. 1– A multidisciplinary pattern of ergonomics

The multidisciplinary ergonomics is a radial construction with complex effects. Simultaneously, ergonomics grounded on a multidisciplinary dimension is flexible but also passive. It presents as an interface between the sciences field (medicine, psychology, sociology, physiology, anthropometry, labour hygiene, technical sciences, etc.) and the activity undergone by the individual designed to improve it. The final goal is “the growth of professional and biological longevity”³.

The most often, it is an instrument of managerial act quality, but, consequently, by the multiple and complex effects it produces can become an

³ Ghe. POPA, Ș. POPESCU, A. DOROBANȚ, *Ergonomie. Aplicații în domeniul militar*, Editura Militară, București, 1981, p. 19.

indirect mean (as interface) of optimization of human resources management. It is still a very important support, even indispensable, because it defines the scientific request in concrete action helping to the effort's optimization and to the increase of human action efficiency; in other words, it is a generator of capability. This capability depends on the mental evolution of the individual, the scientific and technique progress. Surely, the science evolved, the human mentality evolved, and this means progress. Owed to this concept, we assisted to spectacular evolutions in the objects evolvement. The reason of this modification of qualitative parameters was determined by the competition between the organizations, users request, wish to create silent objects.

Other approach as ergonomics architecture is represented by the synthesis. There exists a type of ergonomics defined on the enounced sciences' field intersection. We consider this as an active ergonomics with main function to optimize. Thus, the active ergonomics is a mean to lead the human actions' systems and process to a minimal form able to provide the highest ratio of efficiency.

In the military institution, the impact of the technological revolution produced substantial transformations as regards the solicitation of personnel from all the levels but especially those being part of fighting commandments and units.

We appreciate there are professional requirements manifesting in all weapons and specialities from the military organization, as well for all the compartments, all jobs and functions. For example, for an officer working in a commandment of great unit or in a major staff, the professional requirement mainly evolved as we show below:

CN	Requirements characteristics	The empirical elaboration and the transmission of leadership documents	The typed elaboration and transmission of leadership documents	The standardized elaboration and the transmission of leadership documents	The use of C4 systems (Command, Control, Communications and Computers) and of the network in the elaboration and transmission of the leadership documents
1	Force (manual elaboration)	□□□	□□	□	□
2	Energy (energy consumption)	□□□	□□	□	□
3	Proficiency (skilfulness)	□□□	□□	□	□
4	Observation	□□	□□	□	□
5	Attention	□□	□□	□□	□□
6	Resistance to monotony	□	□□	□□□	□□□
7	Stress (responsibility)	□	□	□□□	□□□

Table no. 1 – Professional solicitation

Other example could be the one over the conception and elaboration of an operation order that needed, very often, a high consumption of energy and

time. Sometimes, to the documents needed for the release of an operation, they were working long time and this lead to physical exhaustion of commandments personnel. Once with the apparition of the pre-printed documents, the introduction of digital communications systems, with the proper standardization and equipment of C4 (Command, Control, Communications, Computers) systems, the activity of the major staff officer was radically transformed, the accent passing to the elaboration of some possible variants of the action course, to the detailed planning, to the effects analysis and knowledge.

The major staff activity management was significantly drifted to the creative dimension to find the most appropriate solutions in regard to fixed goals but also with predictable effects. The officer's personality from a commandment enhanced, the organizational culture specific to the major staff evolved, the importance of the process to conceive the course of actions and on the complex provision of it increased, the routine activities were settled for machines, the personnel undergoing activities in the major staff is more found in the vocation of tactical, operative or strategic "engineering".

Without a strong ergonomic support, without the direct or indirect integrated or particular of the enounced fundamental sciences' support, but also of the accumulated experience in the process of army's training, in the operation fields, in the institution modernization, in the human resources management can't be something else but an empirical trial to solve some organizational and inter-human relations issues.

Particularizing, we affirm the ergonomics as science of lucrative activities optimization. Therefore, the human resources management is more and more a science, an experience and an art to gather and integrate the intelligent, creative resources in complex, coherent and consistent dynamic and complex systems to express and valuate the human vocation, capacity and capabilities for the use of human being, human society and human civilization becoming.

I think ergonomics is one of the most efficient instruments to optimize the human resources management and, consequently, an effect of a very good managerial act.

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THE EFFECTS OF DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS IN THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION

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Abstract: *The role of this paper is, mainly, to clarify certain aspects over how the chief/commandant is reporting in regard to a disciplinary effect decision taking, but also to show the possible risks, malfunctions or errors able to appear after the correct application/non-application of the disciplinary sanction.*

Keywords: *discipline, sanction, crime, personal and professional responsibility.*

From the ancient times, coercion under all its forms represented a manner of systemic regulation, of correction of deviances from norms, laws or statute; the popular sayings “fear guards the melons” or “beating comes from heaven” have relevance at family cell level but also in the organizational culture of all the structures, indifferent the hierarchical level. Thus, the old people unwritten rules, any type of social contract, law or any nature regulation have inserted in their content provisions coming to strengthen by sanctions or penalties the deviations from the norms initially accepted.

By its essence, the army is an institution based on the wholly respect of all the provisions regulating the specific activity, discipline and order governing any activity indifferent of the level of aggregation or representation. At this concern, the civil society associates the military body with the expressions of honour, dignity, respect, loyalty, responsibility, sacrifice and respect of law. The view of the individual dressed in military clothes becomes a factor of balance, trust, respect and appurtenance to the nation.

The regulations prescribe clear and concise means of action in all the circumstances wherein the military can found; it is provisioned how he equips, the place where he rests, aspects regarding his alimentation, the rights and obligations which give him individuality in the organization or outside it. “All these rules are subordinated to a fundamental requirement – to preserve *the military order and discipline*”¹.

Generally, the military formed conscience is enough to channel the individual on the right path of an irreproachable conduit; other times, unfortunately, owed to some objective or subjective reasons, the chief/commandant intervention is absolutely needed to better some states of facts or law. The necessity to preserve the specific climate asserts to be taken some measures of improvement, coercion over those militaries that deviate from the organizational normality.

In the military institution, the discipline role was mainly stated as mean to draw in its members’ accountability when it occur a deviation from the settled rules.

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¹ Gheorghe NISTOREANU (coordinator), Vasile DOBRINOIU, Alexandru BOROI, Ilie PASCU, Ioan MOLNAR, Valerică LAZĂR, *Dreptul penal – partea specială*, Editura Europa Nova, București, 1999, p. 617.

Discipline² must be understood also as mean by which the members of a community respect a normative act involving a status of harmony in total dissonance with the anarchical, conflictive status. Many times the discipline was understood as an act of education at micro-community or macro-community levels if we spoke about the national area.

As regards the discipline asserted by military regulations, these are provisioned in internal juridical regulations but with special impact in the national law, as in the Penal Code wherein is presented an important chapter dedicated to the crimes³ committed by the military or civilian personnel. Under the incidence of this especially important normative act are found in the following deeds: the unjustified absence, desertion, trespass of the instruction, insubordination, beating the superior, beating the inferior, the movement of penal action, capitulation, deserting the battlefield, unauthorized flight, etc. the normative act mentions the infringements done by the civilian personnel among which are emphasized the subtraction from recruitment, non-attendance to the conscription, etc.⁴

The measure to stipulate in the content of Penal Code of some possible facts under the incidence of crimes done by the militaries or civilians was possible owed to the big amount of facts done with peculiarly serious consequences over the state, organization and individual.

There were identified many types of sanctions for persons which aren't part in-between the limits of discipline asserted as: verbal reproof, written reproof, warning, etc.

Many times the asserted measures determine the apparition of some situation more or less agreed by their beneficiaries. There can be emphasized different situations with negative impact which in the most frequent situations represents the reason of that military indiscipline. Usually, the indiscipline act is found in interdependency with the undergone activity.

In this concern, we tried to identify the factors negatively influencing the effect of the disciplinary sanction:

- Decisional factors:

- i. The fault exercitation of the command act;
- ii. The lack of experience;
- iii. The inconsequence in sanction decision-taking;
- iv. The incognizance of law in force;
- v. The incognizance of the subordinated personnel;

² Discipline (DEX) - 1. *The totality of conduit and order rules obligatory for all the members of a collective; obedience of the collective members in regard to the leadership decisions, etc. ◇ spirit of order, habitation with a strict order.* 2. *branch of a science: field, speciality.*

³ Crime (DEX) – *Fact that presents social danger, consisting in the infringement of a penal law in committing with guilt of a deviation from the penal law, and which is sanctioned by law.*

⁴ *Legea 140/1996 privind Codul Penal, Partea specială, Titlul X Infracțiuni contra capacității de apărare a României, Infracțiuni săvârșite de militari, Infracțiuni săvârșite de militari sau de civili, Infracțiuni săvârșite de civili, art.331-361 (Law 140/1996 regarding the Penal Code, Special Part, Title X Crimes against the Romanian defence capacity, Crimes committed by militaries, Crimes committed by militaries or civilians, Crimes committed by civilians, articles 331-361).*

- vi. The lack of organizational transparency;
- vii. The lack of firmness and exigency;
- viii. The promotion of an incorrect motivational system;

- **Executive factors:**

- a) The disrespect of laws and military regulations;
- b) The incognizance of norms regulating the activity field;
- c) The lack of professionalism;
- d) The unassuming of responsibility for the perpetrated facts;
- e) The level of living.

The role of chief/commandant is essential in the accomplishment of the disciplinary climate at the structure's level; in this regard, owed to the above mentioned factors, there can appear significant errors in the projection of a correct system regarding the military authority.

By discussing about the *discipline* concept is needed to present its modality of fulfillment, as *managerial authority*. Prevailing the semantic meaning we will understand its manifestation framework: personal and professional.

The professional authority is conferred by the ensemble of professional knowledge an individual has and exercises. We can appreciate it isn't enough to have a thorough education in the profession we chose. Often, this form of manifestation is necessary to be doubled by individual charisma, strengthened by the assumed principles and consistency.

The personal authority is granted by professional competitions or by assignments in function. There are situations when an individual has enough personal authority but he doesn't have a recognized professional authority. The ideal is to cumulate the personal authority with the professional authority. This is the successful employee. Such circumstances won't be the cause of incidents that assert possible disciplinary sanctions.

Altogether, when the military carrier is chosen, the individual self-evident accepts the specific rigors. Thus, we can speak about a "new-born" who already has the idea of discipline in a primary form. Although, the psychological tests role is also to identify the incompatible personalities for the military carrier and to elect the subject in regard to the systemic requirements. These premises are positive and should generate a viable selection with positive effects from all the regards. Still, the reality proves there are situations and not less when the military personnel in all the stages of his formation and becoming can be the subject of assumed system norms' infringement committing a wide area of disciplinary deviations and not only.

In this regard, keeping in mind the already stated facts, it is normal to ask ourselves which are the reasons determining the transformation of the individual in generator of "discipline problems" and we saw them as follows:

- a) Improper selection owed to an objective or subjective motivation because many times enter into the system individuals incompatible with the military life;
- b) Unprofessional, unmotivated, corruptible instructors;

- c) The absence of motivation in carrier – the random promotion of incompetence by “nepotism”;
- d) The absence of a professional model;
- e) The role of family, civil society.




Figure no. 1 - The individual role in undergoing the professional act

The combating of the indiscipline acts can be done by dismantling the causing factors. Mainly, at micro-structural level to the macros-structural level it is recommended the professional cohabitation. It is necessary the mediation of the conflict situations from the first signs of this signal apparition. I believe the chiefs/commandants have mainly significant role in decreasing the stress and indiscipline states by the attitude they succeed to dissimulate the acts which can bring damages to the entire collective. The existence of some groups in the framework of the same microstructures determines the apparition of partisan or subjective attitude of the superiors in relation to the correct treatment of signaled deficiencies.

By his nature, the human is destined to priory answer the requests in the situations that presume the presence of a mean of coercion: imperative of voice's tonality, different measures of constraint, social and professional control, reminding the measures of punishments in situation of bad cohabitation, etc. Today, it is hard to believe human can understand and agree the elegant expression, much more in a military environment.

This is the main motivation for which the regulation were settled for: interior order, military discipline, deontology and professional ethics, etc. For supporting the materialization of executing measures over the disciplinary deviations there were assigned bodies with role of ascertainment.

The disrespects of professional deontology, moral ethics are actions resulting in significant prejudices to the professionals and organizations. There are multiple the situations when the individual undergoing his activity in an institution and is also member of a professional body is sanctioned by the institution wherein activates but also by the professional body releasing the certificate of free practise (for example, a psychologist). The sanctions the professional body can apply are simple but extremely difficult for the practitioner that goes to the removal from profession. In this regard, it can be understood the professional body withdrawn its professional support excluding him from the profession can't practically be the respective profession in the institution where he works. The Labour Code⁵ updated stipulates concrete specifications in this regard in the chapter referred to the lawful suspension of the individual contract of work by article 56, letter 5) *from the date of withdrawal by the competent authorities or bodies of the notifications, authorisations or attestations needed to exercise the profession;* and also by letter h) *following the interdiction to exercise a profession or function, as safety measure or complementary punishment from the date of definitive settlement of judicatory decision by which the interdiction was decided.*

We must not omit the situation when the conflict situations and, implicitly, indiscipline cases appear as result of lack of respect against the individual owning an inferior professional degree but has and expresses opinions. The right to free expression for all country's citizens is an act consented by *Constitution*, indifferently the professional education, age, experience, etc. Therefore, Article 23, paragraphs (1) and (2) stipulate *“There are inviolable the free expression of thoughts, opinions and beliefs and the liberty of any sort of creations, by speech, by written, by images, by sounds or by other communication means in public. Any censorship is forbidden”*.⁶ Thus, the expression of an opinion doesn't mean to aster rules, to settle pushers or guidelines.

⁵ *Legea nr. 40/2011 pentru modificarea si completarea Legii nr. 53/2003 — Codul Muncii*, art.56 - Cazuri de încetare de drept a contractului individual de muncă (Law no. 40/2011 over the modification and completion of Law no. 53/2003 – Labour Code art. 56, Situations of law cessation of individual work contract).

⁶ *Constituția României* (Romanian Constitution), 2003.

In conclusion, we can affirm “*the organization of a lucrative process involves the respect of some rules or conduit norms by the participants to the working group*”⁷. Therefore, the labour discipline must be understood not only by the contractual obligation regard but also by the nature of the social relations and the disciplinary sanctions application in the disciplinary responsibility framework must be seen as a benefiting corrective mean.

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⁷ Constantin BELU, *Dreptul muncii – ediție revăzută și adăugită*, Editura Universitaria, Craiova, 2005, p. 224.

THE JUDICIAL FRAME OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL PROTECTION COOPERATION

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*Ioan NIȚICĂ^{**}*

Abstract: *In the context of a challenging security environment to human security, threatened by risks and threats of military nature or due to terrorism, natural, technological and biological hazards with effects on more extended fields, cooperation between international organizations in the field of civil protection, based on a legal frame, articulated and specialized tools, is the solution of success for life protection, material assets, cultural and environmental values. Like in all the areas of international security, in this one, the United Nations Organization has the most important role in achieving a synergy of efforts of international organizations, among which the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union are the most consistent.*

Keywords: *civil protection, humanitarian affairs, civil emergencies, civil protection mechanisms and tools.*

Introduction

International security environment has in the center the human individual security as reference point, in the whole evolution of the society. That is why, when man's life was threatened by natural hazards, most due to human activities or military conflicts, there were identified protection measures, which, as the society develops and the risks and threats increase, were institutionalized under the generic name of *Civil Protection*.

The strong and decisive influence of globalization on the security environment has a significant impact on civil protection, fortunately a positive one.

A manifestation of globalization in the field of civil protection is the adoption of the International Humanitarian Law, with reference to the issue of protecting lives, cultural values, goods and emergence of international organizations involved in the protection of civilians.

An important aspect of globalization in the field of civil protection is the assistance provided by international organizations with competence in this field, based on reciprocal cooperation and mutual support.

Taking into account the unique role of the United Nations Organization at the international level, of first actor in maintaining international peace and security and the Euro-Atlantic status of our country, in analyzing the judicial frame for international cooperation in the field of civil protection we will refer to the United Nations Organization, to the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization and to the European Union instruments to achieve civil protection and to the mechanisms of cooperation between these organizations.

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1. United Nations Organization instruments for achieving civil protection activities

The major United Nations Organization instruments that contribute to civil protection - protection of life, property, cultural values and the environment- endorse the maintenance of peace, the prevention of nuclear proliferation, helping the victims of the armed conflicts, eliminating landmines, natural disaster reduction, environmental protection, the prevention of epidemics and the prohibition of toxic substances.

United Nations peacekeeping operations have evolved from locating unarmed or carrying light weapons between the two conflicting forces to their multidimensional approach which began to include more and more non-military elements to ensure sustainable peace, particularly in internal armed conflicts. Thus, there are envisaged the cooperation with regional organizations and the protection of civilians in the conflict, thus emphasizing that civil protection activities should be considered carefully in any armed conflict.

The place of the material regarding the protection of civilians in internal armed conflicts is given by the Security Council resolution no. 1296 from 9 April 2000, which provides as civil protection missions, mine clearance, preventing epidemics and providing humanitarian assistance.

By the resolution no. 1674 from 28 April 2006, the Security Council calls upon all the parties involved in armed conflicts to comply with the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977 on the protection of the victims of the armed conflicts and also the war right established by the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.

Preventing nuclear proliferation is one of the missions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which, through its control system, verifies that the commitments made by States through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are respected and the related agreements, to use materials and nuclear power facilities on peaceful purposes only.

An important contribution to the protection of the victims of the armed conflicts and of those of the emergencies rests to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). It shall establish, for each of the countries which will fulfil its missions, a plan of operations (Country Operations Plan) in which there are provided, clear and concise, the objectives and the priorities of the humanitarian aid. These plans of operations include an inventory operation of the helping needs and of the existing or needed partnerships with other United Nations Organization agencies, international organizations or NGOs.

Another important United Nations Organization player in the humanitarian field which ensures the fulfilment of some civil protection missions in emergency situations is the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA / OCHA). OCHA action is based on a strategic framework that ensures the fulfilment of the humanitarian tasks on time in accordance with the mandate that is entrusted.

A pillar of the OCHA Strategic Frame consists in *partnerships*. They aim the broadening of the coalition for multilateral humanitarian actions. The scale and scope of global challenges requires working together in new ways with new partners. The partnership has always been a part of OCHA's efforts.

One of the most important OCHA tools for support in emergency situations is the United Nations System Assessment and Disaster Coordination (UNDAC) which is designed to provide the ability to support a United Nations Member State affected by an emergency and to ensure cooperation between state response, regional and international levels. UNDAC provides United Nations the immediate information needed and qualified during the first phase of a sudden-onset emergency and coordinates the international aid to the national level and / or directly to the disaster area. UNDAC teams and experts may develop anywhere in the world in a very short time after notice (12-24 hours). If earthquakes occur, UNDAC teams are mandated to establish the On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC) to support the coordination of the Urban Search and Rescue Teams (USAR) according to the concept "effective consolidation and coordination of international urban search and rescue" adopted by United Nations General Assembly Resolution no. 57/150 of 16 December 2002.

A United Nations operational tool for civil protection is the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG), a network of disaster exposed countries and countries providing disaster assistance, as well as of organizations dedicated to urban search and rescue and also to operational coordination on-site, established in 1991 at the initiative of international teams SAR (search and rescue) which acted in the 1988 earthquake in Armenia.

To ensure the international participation and the coordination of search and rescue teams, the United Nations decided that the INSARAG Secretariat should work in the support section of OCHA on-site Coordination Branch in Geneva.

INSARAG has developed a worldwide network of urban search and rescue teams (USAR) has developed a specific guidelines and USAR teams classification system and it is mandated to prepare for emergency actions and more efficient responses and therefore to save more lives, to reduce suffering and to minimize negative consequences, to improve cooperation between international USAR teams working in collapsed buildings, to promote activities to improve USAR teams preparing disaster exposed countries, giving priority to developing countries, to develop procedures and systems for effective cooperation between USAR teams which cooperate in international activities and to establish specific procedures and good practice guides.

Taking into account the experience of the humanitarian actions and the participation of many agencies, organizations and types of structures to such missions, the United Nations Organization created civilian-military coordination. The civil-military coordination in humanitarian United Nations actions (UN-CMCoord) facilitates dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors, which are essential to protect and promote humanitarian principles, to avoid competition, to reduce inconsistency and when necessary, to pursue common objectives.

United Nations CMCoord is a frame that improves a broader understanding of humanitarian actions and that guides the political and military actors towards a better support of this action. United Nations-CMCoord is essential in complex emergencies and in high-risk environments to facilitate the access of the humanitarian aid, to protect civilians and to ensure the security of the humanitarian organizations personnel. One of the civil protection missions undertaken by United Nations Organization is demining, which is coordinated by the United Nations Demining Service (UNMAS), established in 1997 by the merge and the reorganization of the mining Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Demining Unit of OCHA. United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has a unique role in peacekeeping missions, but also in humanitarian ones and fulfilling this role, it runs out and destroys landmines and the explosive elements resulting from war; it also marks the mined areas, educates people about the risks they can be exposed to and about the preventive behaviour which must be taken to avoid danger, provides medical and social care for victims, campaigns for giving up the production, the trade, the transport and the use of mines, but also for the rights of the mutilated people and it also supports countries to and destroy stockpiles of anti-personnel mines according to the Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transport of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction, which came into force on 1 March 1999. The most important operational tool of the United Nations Organization in terms of defence against disasters - Framework for Action 2005-2015: Developing resilience of nations and communities to disasters, known as the "Hyogo Framework for Action" - was adopted by the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, held on 18-22 January 2005 in Kobe, Hyogo, Japan.

Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) is the first plan that explains, describes and details what is to be done in all sectors and by all actors to reduce disaster losses. It was developed and agreed with many partners who were necessary in order to reduce the risk of disasters - governments, international agencies, experts in disasters and many others - bringing them into a common system of coordination. Hyogo Framework for Action highlights five priorities¹ for action providing guiding principles and practical means for achieving disaster resilience. Its goal is to substantially reduce disaster losses till 2015, by developing the resilience of nations and communities towards them. This means reducing the loss of life and property and protecting the environment when disasters strike.

2. Civil protection cooperation in North Atlantic Treaty Organization civil emergency planning

While the United Nations keeps the leading role in coordinating international disaster aid, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization provides an effective frame in which military and civilian resources can be used to achieve a desired result. The

¹ Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters, *Extract from the final report of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction (A/CONF.206/6)*, International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, United Nations.

policy of the Alliance for crisis management has been adapted to the nature of the entirely different risks that it faces to today and one of the items it is based on is cooperation. Taking into account this need for cooperation, the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization civil emergency's planning targets, in terms of civil protection, the support for national authorities in emergencies, the support to protect the population against the effects of weapons of mass destruction and the cooperation with partner countries in preventing and managing disasters.

The plans for civil emergencies are an extensive program of non-military cooperation activities, including seminars, workshops, exercises, training courses and information exchange with an emphasis on more obvious civil protection missions, particularly due to the increase in intensity, frequency and consequences of natural disasters.

The preparation for the disasters and the protection of the population are the common elements of the most of the activities of the Peace Partnership in civil emergency plans. Special attention is given to avalanches, chemical accidents, earthquakes, floods, nuclear accidents and transport of dangerous goods. These activities involve all the partners on various levels of local and national administration and also on the level of the NGOs.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Group for Transport has established mechanisms to coordinate the transportation of national and civil resources in order to be used by the Alliance in areas such as mass and medical evacuation. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has also developed a memorandum on facilitating cross-border transport of vital civilian resources, accelerating and simplifying the international provided assistance in the event of a major incident.

Partner countries have made a significant contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization civil emergency planning and to the preparation of the intervention capabilities for disasters. The countries of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council are represented in the civil emergency planning structures of the Alliance and they are involved in education and training.

As a result of the Riga Summit in 2006 there were taken measures to enhance the ability of North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces to support the stabilization and the reconstruction efforts in all the phases of the crisis. The primary responsibilities for stabilization and reconstruction are normally performed by other actors such as local and international organizations and also non-governmental organizations. However, security problems may prevent these actors to fulfil their responsibilities.

Civilian expertise, coming from national experience, may be required in the future to provide military counselling in the context of support for stabilization and reconstruction, in coordination with the host country. Civilian expertise could provide advice on issues such as the rebuilding of the local industry, the transport networks, the recovery of the agricultural production, the reconstruction of the health infrastructure and of the civilian one of communications.

3. The Mechanism of the European Civil Protection

Cooperation in the European Union civil protection is based on the Council Decision of 8 November 2007, which establishes a Community Civil Protection Mechanism (recast) (2007/779/EC, Euratom) and which is designed to protect people, environment, property and cultural heritage in situations of natural and technological disasters, acts of terrorism, including marine pollution produced within the European Union or outside it.

As it was established, the Civil Protection Mechanism consists of a series of elements and actions² including the identification and the training of the intervention team, of preparatory activities for intervention, creation and sending assessment teams and / or of coordination, establishment and management of the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), of the establishment and management of a common emergency communication and information system for emergency (CECIS) to allow communication and exchange of information between the MIC and the operational contact points of the Member States, the development of detection and early warning disaster, additional transport for major emergencies, consular assistance and so on.

According to CPM, Member States shall provide, on a voluntary basis, relevant ,general information about the intervention teams, about the experts who may be called to work in teams of assessment and / or coordination or in modules and in other ways of intervention that can be provided available ,promptly updating them whenever necessary. Member States, that wish, can provide information about the military capabilities that could be used by CPM for civil protection assistance.

Member States should ensure appropriate transport of civil protection assistance that they offer through the mechanism. If they demand, under certain conditions, they can get the European Commission support to transport forces and means.

A member state that is affected by an emergency situation and that anticipates a possible request for assistance through CPM immediately notifies this to the MIC in order to allow the Commission to inform the Member States and to activate its competent services.

Member States receiving assistance requests through CPM must decide soon whether they can take action and inform the requesting State directly or through the MIC, indicating the scope and terms of the assistance they can provide. If only the requesting Member State is informed, it shall inform the MIC to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort.

The management of the assistance interventions in the situations of civil protection is the responsibility of the applicant state which has to establish a general conception and the duties of various intervention forces, including those provided by CPM. If requested and sent assessment and / or intervention teams in the field, they will facilitate the coordination between the emergency teams and will liaise with the competent authorities of the requesting Member State.

² Council decision of 23 October 2001 establishing a Community mechanism to facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions (2001/792/EC, Euratom).

Interventions outside the European Union, in case of major emergency, may be conducted autonomously or as a contribution to an intervention led by an international organization. If the assistance request is forwarded through the MIC, "the Member State holding the Presidency of the Council of the European Union provides the overall coordination of assistance interventions in civil protection, respecting the Committee operational role of coordination"³.

The European Union Council Presidency shall assure the political and strategic coordination of the use of CPM, especially when it comes to facilitate and manage crisis through it and when the intervention is outside the European Union.

The operational coordination of assistance by CPM is to be taken by the Commission, in close cooperation with the Presidency.

Having the agreement of the Presidency, the Commission may also fulfil other operational tasks. In close cooperation with the Presidency, the Commission may designate the assessment and / or coordination teams.

The Commission is responsible for establishing rules of implementation for CPM, considering the available resources for intervention, MIC, CECIS, the assessment and / or the coordination teams, the training program, the modules the early warning detection systems, the medical resources and even other interventions within the European Union or outside it.

On proposal from the Commission and with the approval of the European Parliament, the Council adopted, on March 5, 2007, as a manifestation of European solidarity towards countries affected by major emergencies, the Decision of establishing a Financial Instrument for Civil Protection (2007/162/EC, Euratom); the role of this decision is to improve efficiency in major emergencies response, to prevent and prepare all types of emergencies and to facilitate cooperation between Member States in the field of civil protection. When taking the decision, the Commission considered the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, and the fact that financial assistance may be granted including individuals.

To achieve the European Union Civil Protection there was established for the period 1 January 2007 - 31 December 2013 a Civil Protection Financial Instrument, with an initial budget of 189.8 million euros, under which financial assistance can be granted, both as a contribution to improving the effectiveness of response in major emergencies, especially in the context of Decision 2001/792/EC, Euratom, as well as a contribution to improve prevention and preparation for all types of emergencies, such as natural disasters and those caused by man , terrorist acts, including terrorism with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear means and technological, radiological and ecological accidents. The protection which must be provided by the financial mechanism targets especially individuals, but also the environment and property, including cultural heritage, inside or outside the European Union, taking into account also the specific needs of the isolated, outermost islands or other European Union regions.

Identifying a number of problems in the functioning of the two European civil protection mechanisms - reactive and ad hoc mechanical cooperation in civil

³ *Ibidem*, art. 8, point (2).

protection at the European Union level, limits the efficiency, effectiveness and coherence of the European disaster response; critical capabilities of response are not available (output gaps); limited solutions and cumbersome procedures in transport impediments the capacity to optimal response; the level of training in terms of training and exercises is limited; there is no integration of prevention policies - the European Commission submitted to the European Parliament and to the European Union Council, on 20.12.2011, a draft decision on an European Union civil protection mechanism which aims replacing Council Decision on Civil Protection Mechanism and the Council Decision Civil Protection Financial Instrument with a decision that brings together the two documents into a single legal act.

The proposal aims: supporting, coordinating and supplementing Member States' civil protection in order to increase the efficiency of prevention, preparation and response to natural and man caused disasters, of any kind, inside and outside the Union; increasing European Union citizens' security and strengthening the resilience to natural and man-made disasters, supporting and promoting disaster prevention measures to reduce costs for the European Union economy disaster and therefore to reduce the obstacles that influence the economic growth; minimizing adverse impact in social, economic and environmental impacts of disasters that can affect the most vulnerable regions and thus contributing to a more sustainable and inclusive growth; simplifying ,by combining in a single text, the provisions concerning the functioning of the mechanism and the financing of the activities; the implementation of the solidarity cause.

4. Cooperation between the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union in civil protection

In order to obtain a synergy of the efforts and to maximize the results of civil protection actions, to eliminate the gaps in prevention and rescue, to avoid the duplication of the efforts and therefore, of the costs, to avoid jams and poor feedback and the complaints of the rescuers and of those who assisted them, the United Nations Organization has developed cooperation mechanisms in humanitarian affairs / civil protection that are respected by all actors involved in such missions.

The most important of these, is developed by UNOCHA, the United Nations System for Assessment and Disaster Coordination (UNDAC). According to this, the best results are achieved if coordination is participatory, meaning that it must be based on the involvement of actors and their consensus on the structure and content of the aid; it is impartial, so, the coordination process should not favour one organization or another, but correctly identify their skills and harmonize their missions; it is transparent and based on trust; a flow of shared information and a public, honest, decision-making process; it is also helpful in terms of achieving the desired results, in a word, if in such missions we talk about cooperation.

There are two interconnected levels of coordination, the strategic and the operational one. Strategic coordination follows to achieve the aim of the assistance program and consists in drawing up a strategic plan that includes tasks and

responsibilities in accordance with the mandates and the capacities of the participating organizations. Operational coordination covers two requirements, the first refers to the coordination of substance, geography and population groups, in a complementary action of the humanitarian actors and the second is to ensure mutual support, security, logistics and communications for deployed forces in the area affected by disasters.

In order to achieve operational coordination of civil protection, UNOCHA may request the assistance of other United Nations bodies that have humanitarian tasks, such as: United Nations Joint Logistics Centre, Humanitarian Information Centre, United Nations Department of Safety and Security, civil-military coordination in United Nations humanitarian actions, United Nations Humanitarian air Services and so on.

The coordination is always carried out by specialized United Nations bodies according to United Nations procedures, whenever at the actions of international emergency assistance, resources of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union are participating. Thus, according to CPM, Article 8, paragraph (7) "Operational coordination is fully integrated within overall coordination provided by UNOCHA, whenever it is present, respecting its leadership role" and in the case of major emergencies, produced outside the European Union 'the possible use of military assets and capabilities to support civil protection should comply with the relevant principles of the United Nations guidelines".

The Euro-Atlantic Centre for the Coordination of Disaster Response (EADRCC) as operational tool for Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPCA) within NATO maintains a continuous contact with UNHCR, UNOCHA, the EU and other organizations involved in the international humanitarian efforts.

Under the "umbrella" of the United Nations it works The Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System - GDACS. It is a framework for cooperation between the United Nations, the European Commission, managers for disaster situations and disaster monitoring systems from all over the world and it aims to remove the completion of information and the lack of coordination, immediately after major disasters occur.

GDACS provides real-time access via the Internet, to the informational system of disasters and to the related system of tools for coordination.

GDACS provides alerting and assess the impact of a major disaster by means of a multi-risk assessment of the impact of disasters, managed by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission (JRC). For this purpose, the JRC establishes scientific partnerships with organizations that monitor global risks. Relevant data are automatically integrated in GDASC.

An important activity of GDACS is the development of standards and guidelines for information exchange in international disasters. It also provides for the managers of disaster situations around the world, a platform for real-time coordination "VirtualOSOCC" (<http://vosocc.gdacs.org>).

GDACS coordinates the creation and dissemination of maps and satellite imagery disaster. This service is facilitated by the United Nations Institute for

Training and Research (UNITAR) and by the Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOS). Relevant maps are automatically integrated into VirtualOSOCC. Similarly, detailed forecasts are provided quickly upon request by SARWeather (Search and Rescue Weather) and integrated into VirtualOSOCC.

Many governments and response organizations for disasters are based on the automatically alerts and predictions given by GDACS when international assistance is needed.

Conclusions

Interventions in civil protection assistance are necessary because of the increasing incidence, due to climate change, natural disasters, the extent of cross-border technological disasters, the imperative of protecting the environment and ensuring the survival needs of populations affected by local conflicts, which implies a very good cooperation between the international institutions that have specific humanitarian and civil protection duties, cooperation based on a coherent legal framework, implemented by specialized structures, on procedures continually adapted to the realities of situations that require civil protection assistance and, especially, it is based on a continuous exchange of relevant information.

United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union cooperation, articulated on a frame developed by the United Nations is essential to the success of international assistance missions in the field of civil protection.

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THE EMERGENCE OF DEFENCE DIPLOMACY AND IDENTIFICATION OF ITS AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

*Sorin FETIC**

Abstract: Defense diplomacy is a worthwhile and interesting issue because it may have the capacity to coordinate a new way of thinking, a new mechanism aimed to answer the new challenges, risks and threats that globalization has generated. While globalization causes major shifts in the way the new international security architecture is shaped, defense diplomacy provides the necessary mechanisms to counteract the negative consequences brought about by the global transformations.

Keywords: diplomacy, defense diplomacy, arms control.

1. Theoretical aspects of diplomacy

In today's security environment, diplomacy has reached an unprecedented level of development. As it is vitally connected to advanced scientific research in the field of political science, state and sovereignty theories, the development of production technologies in all the economic fields of activity, with real time communication abilities, to the level of education of people, diplomacy has come to represent a complex assembly of interdependent variables and constants belonging to various scientific fields, which may become the most effective instrument of foreign policy belonging to a sovereign state or intergovernmental organization for attaining its strategic objectives.

Diplomacy may also be seen as a virtual environment where two or more parties, mandated by the rightful entities, in a normal situation, meet to negotiate or to establish a simple contact, to reaffirm a position or to impose the will of the mandatory or accrediting states.

Although not an easy to quantify subject, diplomacy is a qualitative indicator regarding the level of development of a certain society, as diplomacy, due to the complexity which characterizes it, may be accessed at a certain moment in history when combining information from several fields of work, such as history, political sciences, international relations theories geopolitics and economics may be necessary.

Today's diplomacy is based on the proto-diplomacy of the most ancient human communities, which, though savage and barbarian, managed at times to find a common language either because too much bloodshed, human and material loss scared them or because they managed at times to buy themselves peace and tranquility with certain goods or even because they had the intelligence to cease a fight in order to start some form of dialogue.

The way diplomacy is nowadays is the result of a process which took several hundred years to complete, a time when several transformations took place, determined by the transformations that the large empires have undergone, by the

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dynamics of the relationships among them, by the wars waged for gaining supremacy in certain regions of Europe, Asia, the Far East, by the economical relations among various countries, by the technological industrial and scientific development.

The 21st Century is the century of natural development and unavoidable progress when diplomacy strengthens its role of facilitator of peace and effective and relentless dialogue in order to facilitate negotiations and find peaceful solutions. However, in the 21st Century, people still die, either because of war, internal conflicts among various factions, hunger or religious extremism which proves that technological advance, educational level, intelligence and complex negotiating skills are not enough in themselves to stop the bloodshed and the feeling of insecurity.

The 21st Century is a new century confronted with new threats and risks as well as some inherent ones, inherited especially from the last decade of the last century, amplified by other threats and risks generated by a series of factors such as: globalization, the proliferation of mass-destruction weapons, individuals and state's dependence on cyberspace (which, under attack by viruses or hackers may seriously affect a state's security level), the shift in the power centers, dependence on resources, poverty, hunger, the antagonistic interplays between consumption and production, the climatic changes affecting agriculture, religious extremism, nationalistic extremism, ethnical separatism, the crises of identity that certain states undergo, the level of literacy of a population, incurable diseases, the antagonistic interplay of natality and mortality on the globe.

2. The emergence of defense diplomacy

At the end of the Cold War, the international security environment has entered a new stage, due to the shift in the balance of power among the most important international players. In this case, we may say that the balance of power which was of most importance during the Cold War was upset by the fall of the communist block. An avalanche of new changes in the relationships among states appeared, even new states were born, but it is the concept of security that has been transformed to the highest extent.

Limited in time and space, The Cold War brought face to face two ideologies that have eventually managed to set clear frontiers on the map of the world during the second half of the 20th Century. It is these boundaries that have kept peoples and countries apart, their only blame being the fact that they were placed in certain geographical areas which were meant to fall under the area of influence of a certain state.

The Cold War was the result of the lack of confidence among states and of the greed for influence. The lack of trust of the period was fueled by the fact that each of the two poles of power suspected the other of ill-will, subversive actions that could give rise to mass upheavals and revolts, technological and economical espionage. The impossibility of predicting the movements of the other party further fueled the lack of trust as they excessively took efforts to conceal their activities and the large number of agents and espionage networks active on the territories of the two blocks, which, in

fact represented the indicators of the existence of some strategies aimed at gathering information about the adversary in order to be able to have the upper-hand in a possible confrontation and not at setting the bases of a possible cooperation.

Fear was instilled into men during the Cold War through a sophisticated propaganda, a permanent fear that resulted in the insecurity which gave freedom of action to governments and made extreme measures such as starting some wars legitimate.

At the time of the Cold War the arms race was obvious, fueled by the ambition of each of the two super-powers to hold the best and most sophisticated weapons. This competition was extremely costly for both of the powers, but especially for the economy of USSR whose philosophy of a planned and centralized economy proved to be ineffective as the huge expenses demanded by the military and industrial complex have lead it to an immense budgetary deficit.

The end of The Cold war determined the rise of an international system where the stands, principles, hierarchies and the relations among the new players have undergone serious transformations. Attention from the concept of collective security promoted by the two politico-military alliances (The Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) began to shift towards international and regional security. Whether intended or not, the fall of the USSR modified the European and international security architecture.

The existence of a critical amount of nuclear and chemical armaments which, due to the lack of funding, could not be kept in full security, and which, in some cases could not be controlled by the states any longer, the reform among the former communist countries armies, reducing the number and quantities of conventional weaponry and ammunition were the major problems after the year 1990.

The end of the Cold War did not answer in a positive manner all the people's expectations, because it didn't represent the beginning of an age of international peace, it didn't stop the confrontations, violence and threats, but it only marked the beginning of a new stage in the international life, still accompanied by serious issues. Some of the new entities that came into being, at times lacking legitimacy, turned out to become, either the perpetrators of terrorist actions or its victims. After the 1990s more than ever before, conflicts generated by separatism, secessionism, ethnical claims and religious conflicts grew in numbers and had as a first effect the breaking down of states and as a second one the unprecedented rise of terrorism.

In order to meet all those necessities a new domain of diplomacy came into being on an international level, named defense diplomacy.

3. The responsibility of defense diplomacy

The concept of "defense diplomacy" was used for the first time in Strategic Defense Review¹, drafted in July 1998 and presented to the British Parliament by the

¹ *Strategic Defence Review*, Ministry of Defence, UK, July 1998, http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/65F3D7AC-4340-4119-93A220825848E50E/0/sdr1998_complete.pdf , accessed on 26 February 2012.

Defense Secretary of State, George Robertson, who in 1999 was to become NATO's Secretary General.

By launching this new concept, the states, in their vast majority, accepted it and came to be aware of the fact that the world is undergoing perpetual change, and the lack of predictability and the political and economical instability, together with the new risks and challenges call for new strategies and ways of thinking which may be able to control, within the boundaries of a democratic vision, the sources of insecurity.

Defense diplomacy was seen, in Strategic Defense Review from 1998, as one of the 8 aims established for the British army to be able to fulfill its role as defendant of the British State. Defense diplomacy became a mission in itself from the point of view of the British Army since, among other things; it had the role to build and maintain a climate of mutual trust among states, prevents conflict, intervene in peace keeping actions and humanitarian support and had as area of interest especially the European area².

Even though the activities that gave defense diplomacy its substance were not discussed for the first time in this Strategic Defense Review, it was for the first time that they were named as such. To be more exact, some activities pertaining to defense diplomacy such as conflict prevention, humanitarian aid, peace-keeping operations were put into discussion even after 1990 or even as early as the Cold War but this time they were set into a larger, more complex, better organized and systematic framework which through a sum of synchronized activities was able to produce stability, equilibrium and peace in the contemporary international environment.

Among the more important milestones brought up by Strategic Defense Review one may find³: arms control and control over mass-destruction weapons (which included inspection and monitoring the observation of agreements signed in order to reduce armaments and weaponry systems techniques, the Outreach Program (referring to East-European countries which were provided with assistance, especially in order to implement civilian control over the army), training and education initiatives (which facilitated the access to a number of grants to number of prestigious institutions from the UK, in order to introduce competencies in the field of civilian management of defense necessary to defense employees from the East-European countries).

An important role in making defense diplomacy operational is played by military defense attaches, belonging to both air and naval forces, who take part in the process of international security and cooperation, document closely (by using licit methods) in matters concerning social and politico-military aspects from the countries where they are accredited and, at the same time, gather information regarding the amount of armed forces and military means concentrated in a certain area, as well as its capabilities (also using licit methods), thus being able to participate in the diplomatic talks with the expertise gathered concerning a conflict or some other situation that may represent a threat to the regional security.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

Defense diplomacy represents a sub-domain of diplomacy which came into being from the necessity of avoiding escalating conflicts and banning the use of force, but does not exclude the use of military force as an argument during diplomatic talks. Defense diplomacy, as diplomacy in general, does not make use of force as an argument in negotiation, but uses the strength of the well documented and balanced argument in order to discourage the use of force by the perpetrators of conflict and crises. In order for the party accessing the defense diplomacy to have credibility, it must have at its disposal a serious capacity to mobilize the armed forces and project it within reasonable time into an area of operation. In other words, it is the armed forces that support the defense diplomacy in operations related to stability, imposing an embargo, in missions of imposing exclusion zones, in peace-keeping missions. When defense diplomacy fails and the conflict rapidly spirals out of control, the armed forces may come into action to impose peace.

Defense diplomacy advocates arms control, confirming at the same time the necessity for the states to hold weapons, but only as valid elements of discouraging and of assuring them the sovereignty in case an offensive might be started against them. Arms control is achieved through the intermediary of treaties and agreements resulting from diplomatic talks, which, in their turn, fall under the scope of defense diplomacy. Armaments control and especially reducing the amounts of armaments have an important contribution to increasing the mutual trust among states and to building a more relaxed international security environment where tensions start to lose their meaning the moment when states, out of their own good-will and initiative give up vast amounts of armaments and ammunition whose storage and maintenance in safe conditions becomes costly (being even subjected to the risk of being smuggled from warehouses by arm dealers through various methods, ranging from corruption to theft).

These weapons are at times stored in enclaves, in the close vicinity of state borders or in the strategic interest area for the accomplishment of future missions on a target territory and are easy to identify as a threat and a provocative entity.

We may also include in the scope of defense diplomacy the issue that brings forward the necessity to redesign the way armies of states are organized. After the end of the Cold War the balance of power among certain states shifted and it was concluded that the technological progress witnessed by humanity in the second half of the 20th Century has undeniable consequences and, as such, all social entities, including the army, must necessarily undergo transformation processes. The 20th Century was one of relentless scientific discovery, of attempting to break all the records in all aspects of life and left to the 21st Century a legacy of large amounts of knowledge and information, an unprecedented technological and scientific capability and the human species has, at the same time, become stronger and more vulnerable than ever before. At the beginning of the 21st Century, humanity, both through the intermediary of states and other organizations has the role to manage the legacy of the 20th Century. Beginning with the management of the virtual environment which has the tendency to make people dependent on computers and streams of information and up to managing the more abstract environment of economy which set the grounds

for interdependence states, but more importantly international organisms, took on the role to preserve security at all its levels (individual, national, regional and international).

As the costs of the new armaments systems are in direct proportion to their level of performance and threats, vulnerabilities and risks have reached an unprecedented scale, states did not need too complicated a decisional instance to realize that it was impossible to provide national security by themselves. In order to answer in an organized and effective manner the risks and new threats coming from the contemporary international environment states have managed to build long-lasting and trustworthy relationships through the intermediary of diplomacy as a main factor and of defense diplomacy as a specialized factor in the field of security and defense either through the intermediary of alliances signed following some treaties (and which have clear goals and regulations and which span over longer periods of time) or through the intermediary of coalitions that are made over shorter periods in certain contexts and with a single goal.

Conclusions

At present we may affirm that alliances and coalitions are a direct result of defense diplomacy which, due to its applicability has been able to crystallize the states and to find the common grounds of security interests of the groups of states which reached the conclusion that, by summing all the resources at their disposal they may promote their national interest and may guarantee security, defense and peace.

Defense diplomacy created a channel of communication and a framework for states with the common interest of ensuring the national, regional and international security, by using military cooperation manifested firstly by the common use of military capabilities in order to meet common necessities and objectives. In today's security environment, most states can not afford to financially sustain an armed force able to accomplish all missions in order to answer the diversity of threats and risks.

We believe that defense diplomacy stands out because of two important dimensions: the first one is the fact that it uses diplomatic protocol in order to facilitate either the decision-making process or a diplomatic negotiation, the second one being the fact that defense diplomacy represents a framework where state representatives, gather, under mandates from their countries in order to present their country's stand related to an international event, accompanied by experts in certain military issues, defense and security whose opinion should theoretically be taken into account in the politico-military decision making process.

In order for defense diplomacy to hold credibility, it must be supported, as we mentioned earlier, by a credible force given by the power factors of the state. Though it may seem nonsensical to support diplomacy with force, the paradox is initiated by human nature which, all along history has proven that the strategic decisions have been made by the most powerful states. In today's international environment, in order for a state to be taken into account, it must hold power, allowing it during diplomatic

talks to use tolerance and compromise, but at the same time allowing it to claim or to give way.

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PANEL 2:
**Balance of power in the light
of International Relations' evolutions**

THE PROBLEM OF SECURITIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS - A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH

*Ioan CRĂCIUN, PhD**

Abstract: *The post Cold War security agenda has been moved towards more interpretative modes of analysis by including referent objects other than state, as well as sectors of security other than military. One of the most interpretative modes of analysis has been proposed by the so called Copenhagen School, who developed securitization theory as an analytical framework to broaden the security agenda and framing of a security problem as a speech-act. While, the focus of securitization literature is almost exclusively on: describing the process of securitization, explaining why it occurs, and examining, in a normative way, whether it is legitimate or not the purpose of this paper is to address some of its implications, especially in the strategic thinking. This is why the subject of this paper calls for an incursional study into what securitization does based on the main ideas developed by the main scholars of the Copenhagen School Barry Buzan, Ole Waever & Jaap de Wilde.*

Keywords: *IR, constructivist approach, securitization, international system.*

Security Studies and International Relations were traditionally dominated by realist and neo-realist conceptions which defined security in terms of the threat, use and control of military force by state actors in an anarchical international system¹. But in the post Cold War era security studies, especially critical security studies, have challenged this conception of security in various ways putting the security agenda into a more elaborated analytical framework. The security agenda has been moved towards more interpretative modes of analysis by including referent objects other than state, as well as sectors of security other than military².

One of the most interpretative modes of analysis has been proposed by the so called Copenhagen School of thought, who developed *securitization theory* as an analytical framework to broaden the security agenda and framing of a security problem as a speech-act³. Securitization theory defines security as a social construction, not as an objective condition, but as the outcome of a specific social process and, actually, represents the currently most elaborated analytical framework for the construction of security problems. In spite the fact that securitization theory become one of the most dominant approaches for examining security practices there is enough criticism around it, especially reflecting the Copenhagen School's inability to contextualize the processes of securitization and its unwillingness to question the meaning and content of security and as a consequence this theory does not conceptualize a direct linkage between security articulations and foreign policy outcomes. However, those interested in the construction of security in contemporary

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¹ Stephen M WALT, *The Renaissance of Security Studies*, in *International Studies Quarterly* 35/1991, p. 212.

² For example, Barry BUZAN, *States and Fear* and Barry BUZAN, Ole WAEVER & Jaap de WILDE, *Security a New Framework for Analysis*.

³ Ole, WAEVER, *Securitization and De-securitization*, in Ronnie Lipschutz (ed) *On Security*, 1995, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 46-86.

international politics have increasingly turned to the conceptual framework of securitization when choosing an analytical framework for their analyses.

While, the focus of securitization literature is almost exclusively on: describing the process of securitization, explaining why it occurs, and examining, in a normative way, whether it is legitimate or not the purpose of this paper is to address some of its implications, especially in the strategic thinking. This is why the subject of this paper calls for an incursion into what securitization does based on the main ideas developed by the main scholars of the Copenhagen School Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde.

1. What is securitization?

There is a general acceptance that the central concepts of the Copenhagen School are *sectors*, *regional security complexes* and *securitization*. While these are all important concepts, the securitization concept represents the central contribution of the Copenhagen School and in the context of this article represents the main focus.

The securitization concept entered international relations in the mid-1990s being first outlined by Ole Wæver as referring to the discursive construction of threat⁴ and fully treated in the book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* published in 1998 by the most prominent exponents of the Copenhagen School: Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. In their initial articulations of the concept, Buzan et comp., defined security as a *speech act*, that labels a particular issue as an existential threat with securitization referring to that spatial move of a particular development from the real of normal politics into a of emergency, hyper-politics. Securitization is constructivist all the way down⁵ claim Buzan and Wæver, however, constructivist approaches vary widely in their nature, and as a consequence the securitization concept should be very carefully assessed and understood.

In simplest terms securitization predominantly examines how security problems emerge, evolve, and dissolve and it has proved to be a useful tool to analysts who want to challenge the notion of objectivity of security threats. Actually, the realist state-centric and military-oriented conception of security is challenged by Copenhagen School, through its insistence upon the exploration of the “logic of security itself to discover what differentiates security and the process of securitization from that which is merely political”⁶.

The elegance of this analytical framework generated much academic interest but in the same time a number of critiques and debates aiming to broaden the analytical considerations and further increase framework’s coherence emerged. These controversies are mainly based on the conceptual inconsistency in the securitization

⁴ P.D. WILLIAMS, *Security Studies an Introduction*, 2nd edition, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2008, p. 72.

⁵ B. BUZAN, O. WÆVER, *Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable? The Copenhagen School Replies*, *Review of International Studies*, 23, 1997, p. 245.

⁶ Barry BUZAN, Ole WAEVER & Jaap de WILDE, *Security a New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998, p. 6.

theory between the understanding of securitization as a productive process focused on the performative power of the speech act and as a constructed process claiming that security is inter-subjectively constituted.

The focus of securitization literature is almost exclusively on: describing the process of securitization, explaining why it occurs, and examining, in a normative way, whether it is legitimate or not⁷. The securitization theory is well accepted within the defense and security community and many debates are focused on this subject but the case here is not to address the theory as such it is to address some of its implications, especially in the strategic thinking instead. This is why the subject of this paper calls for an incursional study into what securitization *does*. Assuming that we know what we mean when we say security it is extremely important to explore the effects of formulating an issue as a security problem through a *speech act* and popular acceptance. *Does the securitization process produces different effects, especially in the strategic thinking?*

2. What security does?

The meaning of security exists within the discourse of security, which identifies a threat and calls for emergency measures. *By saying “security”, a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development*⁸. If this is true then the decision to securitize is a political one and the process of securitization is not an *innocent or neutral*⁹ one. It depends on the acceptance or rejection of the speech act by a dedicated community and the social context in which the securitization is produced. As a consequence, the framing effect of any securitization move needs to be contextualized and very well understood. For example, in an uncertainty or crisis period the communities are more receptive to securitization issues and it is easier for those communities, especially defense and security communities, to facilitate different security strategies and frame the national debate. So, framing a security issue as a special kind of politics and motivating the special measures activated to handle it is what security does. But what does this mean for the strategic thinking, does it have a special effect on strategists? The answer is a resounding yes. Security interlinks systems of knowledge, representations, practices, and institutional forms that imagine direct and act upon bodies, spaces, and flows in certain ways¹⁰. The strategists will first start thinking about the problem presented as a threat in terms of its security implications and possible solutions including military solutions. The results will then be offered to the practitioners to be balanced with their privileged views/pinions and maybe augmented with the non-security community contribution.

⁷ See BUZAN et al, 1998: Chapter 2.

⁸ WAEVER O., *op. cit.*, p. 88.

⁹ J. HUYSMANS, *Language and the Mobilization of Security Expectations: The Normative Dilemma of Speaking and Writing Security*, Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, Manheim, 26-31 March 1999, p. 26.

¹⁰ , A. BURKE, *aporias of Security. Alternatives*, 2002, p.2.

Finally, a sense of prioritization will be attached to the issue and everything will go out of the strategic level to conclude the range of implications of securitization for strategic thinking.

Strategists address situations and events as they perceive them to be in the context they identify them. Their perceptions and thoughts depends very much on the ways in which these issues, are ‘framed’ or represented. This paper tries to demonstrate framing the securitization issues is of particular relevance for strategic thinking in international relations.

Conclusions

Security threats will always exist and securitization will entirely be justified and maybe beneficial. Security is neither always positive nor negative, but rather is issue dependent¹¹. Of course perceptions and social context change over time but, given the powerful framing effects of securitization – for example: considering a situation’s security aspects and potential security solutions; empowerment of security specialists; displacement or diminution of the contribution of others; priorities and timeframes must be considered a critical tool for enlightened strategy making.

*Security is a practice, a specific way of framing an issue*¹².

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¹¹ R. FLOYD, *Towards a consequentialist evaluation of security: bringing together the Copenhagen and the Welsh Schools of security studies*, *Review of International Studies*, 33, 2007, pp. 338.

¹² O. WAEVER, *Insecurity, security and asecuritization in the West European non-war community*, Cambridge, 1998, p.80.

GLOBALIZATION, A NEW WORLD REALITY

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Abstract: *Consequence of the traditional co-operation between states, mainly through the development of commerce, the 3rd Millennium has debuted under the sign of the global interconnection of the national economies. On the one hand, this reality represented the basis of the unprecedented consolidation of the relations existing between states, international organisations and economical conglomerations and on the other hand, a premise that foreshadowed the materialisation of the most pessimistic forecasts, i.e. those which pertained to the extension of the phenomena associated with intensifying cross-border organized crime, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking as well as the appearance of global financial and economic crisis. Considering that in historical perspective, the globalization will move increasingly faster, the international actors are in a race against time for fructification of the opportunities offered by the process and of avoiding/combating negative effects resulting from this.*

Key-words: *globalization, dimension, security, economic, political, social, national.*

Introduction

Globalization, the notion that occurs with an increased frequency at the beginning of the 21st Century, designates a smoothing world dynamic processes complex gearing, placed in a permanent evolution which integrates all spheres of the human existence- economic, social, political, cultural, administrative and security, whose progress overview covers historical periods in which the world, regional, local and individual actors cooperate or, on the contrary, has antagonistic activities so that to achieve, in different ways, at global, regional or local level of some sub-systems or national values. In other words, globalization designates, on the one hand the ability of a phenomenon to have an effect in another part of the world, or, on the other hand, the process of removing the disparities existing between states.

In the matter of the globalization, the social development was an influential factor, because its protagonists are not necessarily among states, entities that traditionally find their place in World Affairs, but they can be also international organizations, national companies or large corporations and world trusts that have gained or, if necessary, surpassed, at least on the economic plan, the power of some countries of the third world.

The effects of globalization can be seen every day of every inhabitant of the Earth who has access to sources of public information containing data transmitted instantaneously from all over the world and which reveal, in some degree the global interdependencies. The traditional relationship cause-effect has undergone a fundamental transformation considering that at present, it transcends the national

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level. Its results, either positive or not, may be felt by each of the human senses, although not always, they can be classified as fruits of globalization.

The process of globalization, which is in full progress at the global scale as well as its main actors, directly and indirectly mark both the life of all the inhabitants of the Earth, and the report global security - national security. Globalization inevitably leads to smoothing, the tendency which goes beyond the national borders and which involves, necessarily, the promotion of some development models.

Thus, the current *fight* between states may be translated, on the one hand, as the competition for leveraging the payoff effects of the process and on the other hand, as the aggressive promotion of the own globalization model - source of social welfare and as combating of the negative repercussions of the same process which may share the world states into two distinct categories: winners and defeated.

1. The dimensions of globalization

Globalization manifests on all the levels of the social activity - and, implicitly of the human existence, with visibility especially on the communications and the economic plans. Although, for simplicity reasons, it is accepted that globalization appeared after the Second World War, the competition between countries for resources and their dependence on the international trade, specific effects of globalization, have appeared in an organized form immediately after the Middle Ages. One can affirm, without fear of being wrong, that the trade international history of inter and intrastate actors represents, at the same time, the globalization becoming in each of its decisive phases. Thus, there can be identified in the foreground the following archetypal dimensions of this particularly complex phenomenon that includes elements of history, realities and trends: economic, political, security, social, administrative and cultural.

The economical dimension of the globalization constitutes the most representative aspect of this complex phenomenon, being at the same time the most visible too. Expression of the common financial interests of individuals, legal persons, communities or states, the economic development transcends the national borders, not being able to undergo artificial fencings. However, it can be observed that the intrastate economic gaps - between the social and interstate layers become deeper, leading to the “poverty even more accentuated and to the increasing of the instability in the already poor countries”¹.

Among the processes that compete to achieve the economic dimension of globalization we can enumerate: the mitigation of the economic protectionism at state level and, implicitly, the opening, to some extent of the national outdoor market in all its segments, the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital (including, at European level, the Customs Union, the customs cooperation and the prohibition of the quantitative restrictions between member states), the cooperation and goods

¹ Eugen BĂDĂLAN, Laurian ZAHARESCU și Vasile BOGDAN, *Sisteme globale de securitate*, București, Ed. Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, 2009, p. 111.

production globalization as well as the existence and development of the large corporations that are actors of globalization by themselves.

Also, the economic dimension of globalization is also favoured by “the disappearance of the global informational privilege”² (most part of the news of public interest are broadcasted and received, almost simultaneously around the world thanks to the satellite and to the other components of the informational infrastructure), the promotion of the fair competition and of the sustainable development, the interdependence of the national economies in the context of the global economy, the existence of the world organizations with vocation in ensuring economic globalization (World Bank, The International Monetary Fund, European Investment Bank, etc.), the proactive involvement of the major powers in mitigating the effects of the global financial and economic crisis (China announced its plans to financially assist the states of the euro area in order to overrun the global financial and economic crisis, the conditions in which they are “the main export market of China and the most important source of technology import”³), and, last but not least, the global financial and economic crisis. World crisis contribute to the achievement of the economic dimension of the globalization because, for its overcoming, as it results from the official positions expressed by the main actors on the stage of the global economy, it requires the continuous effort of numerous nations and international financial organizations.

The political side of globalization is represented by the totality of the political decisions concerning the political integration of the states, the process of their world political leading through the international power structures, as well as by fleshing out the transnational political projects.

The security dimension of globalization is the most problematic integrator part of it because its realization must face many challenges, among which we mention: state sovereignty, globalization of the asymmetric threats, the antagonistic interests of the main state actors that can manifest worldwide and the ineluctable collision between the types of globalization promoted by the great powers. On this dimension, globalization is manifested by expanding the spheres of influence of some countries through promoting the international alliances which they belong to, here including their extension by admitting new members along with the fragmentation of the multinational state entities and the creation of new stable international security architecture. Gradually, it creates a new world order focused on the fundamentals of globalization and the national security metamorphoses, tending to move to individual security.

Military globalization represents a sub-process subsequent to the security globalization, defined by the interconnection, on various levels, of the military capabilities of the political entities on the fundamentals of some common goals, reflecting over the worldwide military relations. This manifests on three main

² John NAISBITT, *Megatendințe*, București, Ed. Politică, 1989, pp. 101.

³ *China Takes on Skeptics of Aid to Euro Zone*, Wall Street Journal, 06.02.2012, article accessed at 23.04.2012 at web address <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203315804577204760639996168.html>.

coordinates: world amplification of the armed struggle, support or stability specific operations; global dynamics of weaponry and technology with military application and implicitly its outlet markets, through military alliances or punctually, according to identified interests; the geogouvernance expansion in military and security issues. This last dimension represents the expression of the political realism approach, according to which the foreign policy of a state is based on power and the balance of power is seen as the mechanism of ensuring the world order.

The social dimension of globalization is directly reflecting on the individual - member of a collectivity through the promotion at international level of the rights and fundamental liberties of the humans and their guarantee, democracy, human values, social protection of disadvantaged categories, as well as through the sharing of the educational resources. In addition, it is noticed that “globalization offers a degree of individual freedom that no state can secure”⁴.

In this context, it is noticed that a manifestation form of the social-legal globalization is represented even by the public international law, on the side of the legal acts that are concluded between more than two entities that have the quality of subject of public international law.

Unfortunately, even in the beginning of 21st Century, it can say that worldwide there are incredibly large gaps in as far as the degree of civilization attained by individuals is concerned, time distance that place some of them, in relation to the others, in full age that precedes the formation of the state units.

The cultural dimension of globalization is manifested by extensively popularized cultural activities, under the aegis of some major international actors like the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization - UNESCO and the EU, thus realising the circulation of the national cultural values at the global level, the acceptance of the common global values and building a common system of values. The cultural dimension of globalization can be achieved only through the acceptance and the embracing of the unity in diversity. Otherwise, if states and their cultures reject each other and do not interfere, it can be relatively easy to discriminate, the way being thus open to conflict.

2. Factors that amplify or hinder globalization

Among the factors that hinder globalization we can mention: the world struggle for exploitable natural resources required by the national economies and the sale markets - expression of the primordial state interest; the economic gaps hard to recover; the historical discrepancies between states; the exacerbated expression of the cultural and national identity, as well as of the sovereignty of states; the fear of chain reactions caused by globalization; certain tendencies of regionalisation.

The global struggle for natural resources and markets has become a continuous fierce competition whose intensity reminds of a war, a predictable result of economic rules, in the event that the subjects of public and private international law (states,

⁴ Teodor FRUNZETI, *Geostrategie*, București, Ed. Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, 2009, p. 122.

international organizations, national companies or large transnational corporations) try to obtain as cheaper and with fewer conditions as possible some from the others, raw materials or various other resources that are necessary to the state and/or economic development. The accumulation of resources underlies any economic process, is indispensable for the maintenance of the economic circuit in a given system and involves the establishment of some interdependence relationships between the entity source and the consumer.

The significant economic differences between states are by nature to generate among poor countries positions contrary to the globalization process that is perceived as gravitating around the exploitation of the poor people by the rich one. Otherwise, globalization will divide the states into two categories: the winners and defeated.

The historical discrepancies between states, usually bordering, as well as the exacerbate expression of the cultural and national identity and the state sovereignty generates nationwide, among population and political ruling class, an erroneous perception over the quality and the interests shown by potential cooperation partners. Often, the cooperation, as dimension of globalization, between various subjects of international law could not materialize or exceed an early stage level because of the subjective prejudices manifested in the established relationships and which caused, instead of a desirable international opening, the introvert ion.

The fear of chain reactions generated by certain punctual interventions in the fabric of global relations has induced a certain reserve of the actors with global influence that were always looking for providing most of their unimportant effects of the own actions before materialising any initiative. The analysis performed in the global context involves important costs of time and its results can determine conceptual changes of any initiative or even it's preventing.

Regionalisation can be defined as one way that states, as a result of the relatively low capacities or dimensions, may associate so that to overrun the worldwide encountered difficulties. This may also represent both a protection instrument against the undesirable effects of globalization as well as a stage of its formation. Thus, some authors consider that the policy of the European Union is not sufficiently open to globalization "except the English Prime Minister, the European leaders didn't publicly argued that the European interests are insecure in an unreliable world or that Europe should globalize the security responsibilities in an era of globalization"⁵.

In this context, we can say that the contemporary model of regionalization is represented by the *sui generis* entity called the European Union. The elements that favour globalization are: strengthening the global economic market, emphasising the economic interdependence, the thundering technological and communications development, the free circulation of goods, services, capitals and persons, the existence and the activity of the international organizations with pro-globalization or integrator vocation (e.g. the United Nations, European Union, World Trade

⁵ David C. GOMPERT, *What does America want of Europe in Shift or Rift – Assesing UE-EU relations after Iraq*, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, Gustav Lindstrom - Transatlantic Book Publishing House, 2003, p. 50.

Organization), as well as the integrated approach of the global problems in order to achieve the effect of synergy.

Strengthening the global economic market encourages and facilitates directly the economic cooperation between the international actors, being a source of globalization. Even now, the existence on the international level is conditioned by the presence and maintaining on the global economic market. Also, the economic cooperation generates interdependence between the actors that manifest internationally that need some of the others, both for governmental support insurance (international relations mediation, providing additional warranties, etc.), as well as providing rare resources so that to augment the own development.

The collapse of the Soviet bloc resulted in the end of the era of centralized economy system and of the Communist classic political regime and represented also the re-launching of the international unrestricted links between states which were, formerly, in the exclusive influence of the USSR. Europe reunited once with the collapse of the USSR,.

The thundering development of the technologies and communications determined, besides the development of the international market, the enhancing of the competition on this segment, the re-launching of the links between the international actors, facilitating, at the same time the exchange of information instantly. The technological advances in this field allowed for example, the appearance of the stock exchanges in which legal persons are listed by different nationalities and where the transactions are effectuated in real time.

The free movement of goods, services, capitals and persons, erected at the rank of policy in some areas of the globe, allows, in the experimental stage, overcoming the traditional borders of so-called legal fiction which is the state, generating globalization because, although it is made in some regions, it automatically triggers the intensification of the interaction with the rest of the world.

3. The globalization effects at the level of states security

Globalization, complex process in full progress, generates reverberations on all the sectors of the human activity including the national security dimension. The State no longer represents a singular entity but a singular entity, among others, similar, interconnected. The interdependence, with its opportunities and restrictions causes permanent re-evaluation of the premises of the national security. In consequence, the security of a state is done at present by efficiently managing, amid globalization, the identified risks, threats and vulnerabilities.

The security of states is the *sine qua non* condition of their existence, the steady state that is specifically required to the prosperity of the own citizens and/or the guarantee of maintaining, developing and affirming on the world scene.

In a relatively nonconventional expression, the security of a state can be compared with the health status of a living organism, representing more precisely, “the state of the physical, emotional, mental ability as well as the social ability to face

the environment”⁶. Thus, the security can be regarded as the equilibrium state that allows to the state to freely and fully exercise all the functional attributions within the strictly defined field by the aspirations and the national interests. The similitudes don't stop here; such as the health, the security is permanently threatened by a category of factors such as: internal and external, volunteers and non-volunteers, individual, collective or even global etc. that may address to a certain vulnerability state of this and that may lead, in the absence of a adequate management, in extremis, to the desegregation of the state entities.

The security of a state represents a conceptual integrated approach of the security of each dimension of activity, all of them regarded both internally and externally - in relation with other states, or as appropriate, international organizations- in the generous context of the sustainable development. Thus, one can speak of the economic security, political security, energetic security, ecological security, demographical security, military security, etc.

The national concept of security of each state is defined either by the National Security Strategy, or by other similar document, inclusively by the White Chart, accessible to the large public, which unambiguously states the official engagement of a state for the security and the prosperity of the citizens, of the allies and of its partners. For example, the national security of Romania, is defined as: “the fundamental condition of the nation existence and of the Romanian state and a fundamental objective of the government; it has as reference the values, the interests and the national objectives”⁷ or as “an imprescriptible law that derives from the people full sovereignty, it is based on the constitutional order and works in the context of the European construction, of the euroatlantic cooperation and of the global evolutions”⁸. In other words, in a theoretical acceptance the national security of a state may be perceived as the constitutional legal state (existing and maintained) concentrated on the protection of the values, of the interests and of the national objectives, and at a subjective level, individually, as a declarative moral right of each one of his citizens and implicitly as a correlative non-divisible obligation of the national institutional gear.

The difference between the theoretical and the concrete dimension of the security consists in the imparity of the ideal and real model pattern marked by the risks, vulnerabilities, threats and assaults identified or not at a given time, found in a permanent transformation. In context it is necessary to make a relevant specification, namely that the international environment, in particular by the existence of some collective organizations in whose activity member states actively involve, influence more and more the national security by eliminating, adding or even augmenting the categories of risks, vulnerabilities, dangers, threats and aggressions.

The analysis process of the security of an entity (state or even international organization) may reveal complete and underlined analyses of the risks, vulnerabilities, threats and aggressions addressed to the entity security, the stage of

⁶ *Enciclopedia Universală Britannica*, vol. 14, București, Ed. Litera, 2010, p. 13.

⁷ *Strategia de Securitate Națională a României*, București, 2007, p. 7.

⁸ DITTO, p. 7.

its development as well as the possible predictions about the evolution of the subject able to serve to the anticipative adoption of appropriate preventive measures by the political ruling class.

Any approach to the study of a State or an organization is required to achieve the dimensions of their security, at least at the level of the context. Furthermore, the specific security events imprint in a certain degree on each activity that is undertaken individually or in organized manner.

In other news, ensuring the national security of a State returns, proportionally to both specialized institutions and to every citizen, while the risks, the vulnerabilities, the threats and the assaults, all appreciated as dangers to its address, directly or indirectly affect the interests and the national values and equally influence each person.

Conclusions

In the light of reality, in the extensive notion, globalization appears as a whole complex dynamic processes with parallel progress in all the areas of the human activity, whose evolution is spread on historical periods, and in that the world, regional, local and individual actors cooperate or, on the contrary, carry out antagonistic activities so that to integrate, in different ways, at global, regional or local level some sub-systems or national values. The results of globalization, both positive and negative, and the planned and carried out course of this process, are subjected to the permanent analysis of the involved international actors, respectively states, corporations and international organizations, which are in a constant competition so that to gain and/or to cause good consequences and to combat the malignant effects of the process.

Although globalization was initiated by the human community's activities, how to process it at the macro level can no longer be controlled, forecasted and directed accurately to the traditional states level, these ones being able to tackle, instead, only specific episodes, without having the ability to significantly influence the entire process.

Globalization has allowed, for the first time in human history, the appearance, the development and the (partial) materialization of the concept of global security. Complementary state of the national security, the global security achieves its ambitious goal of ensuring acclimate of increased stability and predictability at the global level, based on the achievements of the national and regional security.

Globalization causes permanent evolutions, predictable or not, both nationally and worldwide. Considering that ensuring the own security represents zero priority for a State, its resort institutions analyse, on the one hand, the objective evolution of the phenomenon worldwide, and, on the other hand, the effects of globalization that can bring harm on the national plan and identify at the same time the appropriate action directions that allow to limit the negative repercussions.

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“STRATEGY OF FREEDOM” – THE NEW STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES ON ARAB WORLD

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*Motto: “There are only two powers in the world, the sword and the mind. In the long run the sword is always beaten by the mind”.
Napoleon*

***Abstract:** The social movements of emancipation that disrupted the Arab countries starting from last year, known as “The Arab Spring”, were officially driven, encouraged and supported by the United States, and in the Libyan case including military support. This phenomenon with still reverberating echoes, as we can see in Syria, points out a major shift in the U.S. strategy regarding the geopolitical region of the Arab world.*

The new approach, which could be considered “The Strategy of Freedom”, and whose first signs can be traced back to the 2003’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, involves multiple consequences – including new risks and threats – for both regional and global security environment which is reshaped.

The great challenge of the aforementioned strategy is to promote the core concept of the Western civilization – freedom in its various forms – in the heterogeneous Arab environment, this challenge being addressed towards the intelligence agencies, as well.

***Keywords:** U.S. Strategy, “Arab Spring”, geopolitics, freedom, strategic analysis.*

Introduction

For a few decades, the United States was more interested in the Arab states rather than in their peoples.

At that time, the United States cared much more that dictatorships in the Arab countries do not affect them than the people under those regimes.

For example, Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt, has been long time supported by the United States simply because his foreign policy ensured stability in the Middle East. Hosni Mubarak’s internal affairs were, if not overlooked, then put on the second place or sent to the background. Just because Hosni Mubarak offered moderation in the context of Arab-Israeli relations and openness against the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, the United States supported him, including financially. Here's how the US-Egypt relations were described by *Washington Post* in 2006: “Egypt, a staunch U.S. ally, receives \$2 billion in aid annually from the United States”¹. Hosni Mubarak's support in the Gulf War as well as his position in the Iraq War were more important than the fact that Hosni Mubarak was using an extraordinary law, “emergency law” – in force since 1967 – to rule, to preserve and to consolidate his power. Or, this law was strongly anti-democratic by allowing violations of rights and freedoms: “over the law, police powers are extended,

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¹ <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/30/AR2006043001039.html>, accessed on 05.09.2012.

constitutional rights are suspended, and censorship is legalized. The law sharply circumscribes any non-governmental political activity, and street demonstrations, non-approved political organization, and unregistered financial donations are formally banned”². Under the pretense of this law, authorities could detain people in prison without trial for any period. As consequences, according to some sources³ close to the opposition, under this law were detained 17,000 people and the estimated number of political prisoners was of 30,000. Only in 2005, that is, after the events of 9/11, the U.S. President asked Egypt to “take steps toward developing freedom of speech and organization as part of U.S. drive to democratize the Middle East”⁴.

Similarly, the United States were not so much bothered by the authoritarian regime that Muammar Gaddafi imposed to Libyan people, but by the problems Gaddafi created to U.S. and West, in general. And, when they tried to remove him from power⁵ they did so in response to the anti-American⁶ and anti-Western⁷ actions of the Libyan leader only, not in response to dictatorial governing in his country. Ironically, after 9/11 some Western leaders saw in Muammar Gaddafi even an ally⁸, just because he claimed an anti-terrorist stance.

To summarize, for a long time the U.S. foreign policy was determined by the axiom – natural, in fact – to safeguard the values, freedoms and welfare of their own people only.

This selfish strategy was to change dramatically.

1. 9/11 and “The War on Terror”

After 9/11 the world has never been the same.

Seven years later, U.S. President said: “For many years, our nation viewed these attacks as isolated incidents, and we responded with limited measures. That changed on September the 11th, 2001. On that morning, Americans woke to news of a plane crashing into the North Tower of the World Trade Center. Within the span of 90 minutes, a second plane struck the South Tower, a third one pierced the rings of the Pentagon, and a fourth vanished from the skies above Pennsylvania. By nightfall, the sun had set on a very different world”⁹.

The impact of the attack on the U.S. was terrible and its consequences have reached a global level, in space, and a historical level, in time.

² http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergency_law_in_Egypt, accessed on 05.09.2012.

³ <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/759/eg8.htm>, accessed on 05.09.2012.

⁴ <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/30/AR2006043001039.html>, accessed on 05.09.2012.

⁵ <http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/us-bombs-libya>, accessed on 05.09.2012.

⁶ <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/14/world/4-guilty-in-fatal-1986-berlin-disco-bombing-linked-to-libya.html>, accessed on 05.09.2012.

⁷ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-south-scotland-12552587>, accessed on 05.09.2012.

⁸ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3566545.stm, accessed on 05.09.2012.

⁹ <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/12/20081217-6.html>, accessed on 05.09.2012.

Although extremely dramatic, not so much the loss of lives and material damages were those that shocked American people and the whole world, but the fact that the attack showed that the United States – the most advanced and most powerful state in the world – are vulnerable. And for this message to be understood by all – and by Americans in the first place – the attack aimed the symbols of the U.S., that is, things that matter mostly, things of great significance to all Americans and well known by many non-Americans.

Addressing the Chambers and the nation the U.S. President expressly mentioned the purpose and the effect of the attack: “Our nation has been put on notice: We were not immune from attack”¹⁰. And indeed the attack had the expected result: it was regarded as a declaration of war and was answered accordingly. 26 days after the attack¹¹, the United States began “The War on Terror” or “The Global War on Terrorism” by bombing Afghanistan, led at that time by the Taliban regime. Thus was informally called and popularized even by U.S. President the immediate and resolute reply which United States gave to the September 2001 assault, and this name is significant for the way the U.S. understood the state of the facts and how they chose to respond.

We begin from the reasonable assumption that man has always tried to use the most appropriate words to express their thoughts and to communicate the message they want to communicate.

So, we have three key elements building the conceptual analytical framework of the United States’ strategy after 9/11.

1.1 The Terror/The Terrorism

The most used word by Americans was “terror” rather than to “terrorism”: “war on terror”. It’s not a very big difference, but it’s a nuance that should be emphasized. I mean, what the U.S. perceived on 9/11 was terror and from this perception, from this terrible sentiment started the following response of the United States and from that point should begin any psychological, social or political analysis of it.

This feeling of terror is not a fear, nor an anxiety or an anguish, but fear, anxiety and anguish at the highest intensity and of an entire nation.

To this reality were institutions of the state to find an appropriate approach and an optimal response. The fight was to be like no other in the history of mankind: against *terror*. I mean, not only against terrorists, but against all sources of terror, whether individual, non-state, state or any other entity that supports it. United States had to face more than individuals or states: they would face a phenomenon.

1.2 The War

There were other terrorist attacks in the past, but none have resulted in a declaration of war from the United States. The 9/11 attack was not regarded as a “simple” terrorist attack, an isolated aggression that United States would respond

¹⁰ <http://www.britannica.com/presidents/article-9398253>, accessed on 06.09.2012.

¹¹ <http://nymag.com/news/articles/wtc/1year/numbers.htm>, accessed on 06.09.2012.

promptly. The 9/11 attack was considered as an act of war: “On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country”, said U.S. president in his speech aforementioned¹².

This is why the U.S. answer was not an attack, not a battle, not a covert action, but war. This is because these “enemies of freedom” were not only individuals, but also international organizations and even countries. U.S. response was not a matter to concern only police, special forces or intelligence services but, first, the regular armed forces of the United States.

After seven years, in his address to *The Atlantic Council* forum, the CIA director made the same emphasis: “This war – and let me underscore that – you should make no mistake that this is anything else but a war. This war is far from over”¹³.

1.3 Global. The Third World War

“The War on Terror” would not be an ordinary war.

First, the United States faced an unusual enemy whose threat was asymmetric. Removing the Taliban regime was but a step in this war. Not only in Afghanistan war is unconventional: the enemy does not have a well defined identity, ambushing, plotting isolated attacks, mostly by suicide hard to predict attacks. Then, this war was to be fought wherever terrorists would be found or where they would find shelter and support. That is why “war on terror” has been called “global war on terror”.

Second, the United States has committed in this war with great determination: “We will direct every resource at our command – every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war – to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network... Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime”¹⁴.

Third, “The global war on terror” would include numerous other wars undertaken either by United States or by the United States along with its NATO partners. Here's the official name of these wars: “Operation Active Endeavour”, “Operation Enduring Freedom” (“Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan”, “Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines”, “Operation Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa”, “Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans-Sahara”), “Iraqi no-fly zones”,

¹² <http://www.britannica.com/presidents/article-9398253>, accessed on 06.09.2012.

¹³ <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/speeches-testimony-archive-2008/directors-remarks-at-the-atlantic-council.html>, accessed on 10.09.2012.

¹⁴ <http://www.britannica.com/presidents/article-9398253>, accessed on 06.09.2012.

“Operation Iraqi Freedom”, “Operation New Dawn”, plus other military operations: Fighting in Pakistan, Fighting in Yemen and Fighting in Kashmir.

A war of this extent, that involves such important resources and so many nations, waged on a global scale, can not be called other than a World War: Third World War.

2. Structure of terror and war of ideas

But “The war on terror” was a different from another perspective. For, though the response was prompt by attacking Afghanistan, armed war was not everything, and this was the political decision that followed the attack strategic analysis: “You see, in those uncertain first weeks, there was no obvious precedent to follow. We faced a choice among many different courses of action. On one end of the spectrum, we could have responded with a purely defensive strategy – hunkering down behind our borders, and retreating from the world stage. On the other end of the spectrum, we could have sought revenge through instant retaliation – attacking nations that support terror, with no broader strategy to address the root cause of the problem. I rejected both these extremes in favor of a deliberate and comprehensive approach – one where we used all elements of our national power to keep America safe at home, the understanding that we needed to take the fight to the enemy abroad, and the idea of promoting liberty as the alternative to terror”¹⁵.

Terrorist threat analysis done in the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* in 2003 led to the following structure of terror:



THE STRUCTURE OF TERROR

Figure 1

This structure of terror will cause a complex strategy for reducing and dismantling it, a strategy to address the threats differently at each level.

At the levels of organizations and leaderships, the strategy was that of direct and violent confrontation, in order to deter the threats.

At the state level, the level of states directly or indirectly supporting terrorism, the strategy was that of multiple and gradual constraints: political sanctions,

¹⁵ <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/12/20081217-6.html>, accessed on 05.09.2012.

economic and, ultimately, military action: war. That happened in Afghanistan and that happened in Iraq, too.

But at the first, the wider level, at the level of underlying conditions of emerging of terrorism, the approach was different. Because here realities are other than those at higher levels: “At the base, underlying conditions such as poverty, corruption, religious conflict and ethnic strife create opportunities for terrorists to exploit. Some of these conditions are real and some manufactured. Terrorists use these conditions to justify their actions and expand their support. The belief that terror is a legitimate means to address such conditions and effect political change is a fundamental problem enabling terrorism to develop and grow”¹⁶.

At this level, another strategy is required: in addition to “ongoing U.S. efforts to resolve regional disputes, foster economic, social and political development, market-based economies, good governance and the rule of law”¹⁷, to diminish these underlying conditions requires U.S. and his allies to win the war of ideas, to support democratic values and promoting economic freedom. And in this mission the United States are not obliged to act alone, as “the struggle against terrorism is not solely an American struggle. Our friends and allies face many of the same threats. It is essential for America to work with its friends and allies in this campaign”¹⁸. For winning the war of ideas, *The Strategy* mentioned that “The United States will seek to support moderate and modern governments, especially in the Muslim world. We will continue assuring Muslims that American values are not at odds with Islam”¹⁹.

Nothing is more convincing for U.S. having changed its strategy, but the very words of the President of the United States, who confirmed the change brought by the 2003 *Strategy*: “After September the 11th, we fundamentally reshaped our strategy for protecting the American people around three core principles”²⁰. It is significant that one of these principles refer to ideas, values, and liberty: “Thirdly, we recognized that the war on terror is more than a battle of arms. It is an ideological struggle for hearts and minds. And to prevail, we must counter the terrorists’ hateful ideology with a more hopeful alternative based on liberty and justice. So after removing the threatening regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, we refused to take the easy course of trading one strongman for another. Instead, we stayed to help young democracies emerge as beacons for hope for people across the Middle East. We increased our support for democratic reformers and dissidents around the world. We expanded our efforts to combat the conditions of despair and hopelessness that give rise to rage and radicalism”²¹.

¹⁶ https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf, p. 6, accessed on 10.09.2012.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 23.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 24.

²⁰ <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/12/20081217-6.html>, accessed on 05.09.2012.

²¹ <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/12/20081217-6.html>, accessed on 05.09.2012.

This is the context, the war of ideas – which is part of the “war on terror” – where can be placed the events known as the “Arab Spring”.

3. Promoting freedom. Sustaining “Arab Spring”

Why should the United States give up a faithful ally as Hosni Mubarak? Why did U.S. President ask Hosni Mubarak to “step aside”²²? What is the reason to overthrow Muammar Gaddafi, together with NATO allies, when he showed his determination against al-Qaida, and even began to gain Westerners’ confidence?

These questions can only be answered one way: because the United States – and its Western partners – was on the opponents’ side of those leaders, on the side of the majority which rose against their dictatorships.

United States chose to give up a close ally and risk a bad turn of events – such as the accession to power of fundamentalist Islam – because this time they decided to consider more valuable the freedom of Muslim peoples, even if democracy in these regions is not the same thing as it is in the West, due to a combination with elements of Islam.

We can note, also, that the military part of the “war on terror” refers to the concept of freedom: the official name of this operation is “Enduring Freedom”.

And even if the United States were not at the origin of “Arab Spring”, they strongly supported it, at least at the official level. It is as if the United States wants the Muslims to take responsibility for what they do and what they want. That is, not to blame the dictators of their countries or the United States which would agree such dictators, as happened in the past.

In the war of ideas, which is important is Muslim peoples’ belief that the United States and Western values can not only coexist with Muslims, but that are desirable. 11 years after 9/11, U.S. President asks Arab world to ensure freedoms. In his speech to the United Nations, he has used most of the 30-minute speech on the Arab democracy movement and its fallout: “We do so [valuing the First Amendment] because in a diverse society, efforts to restrict speech can become a tool to silence critics, or oppress minorities. We do so because given the power of faith in our lives and the passion that religious differences can inflame, the strongest weapon against hateful speech is not repression, it is more speech – the voices of tolerance that rally against bigotry and blasphemy, and lift up the values of understanding and mutual respect. There is no speech that justifies mindless violence. There are no words that excuse the killing of innocents. There is no video that justifies an attack on an embassy. There is no slander that provides an excuse for people to burn a restaurant in Lebanon or to destroy a school in Tunis, or cause death and destruction in Pakistan”²³.

That United States has developed a new strategy was noted by many analysts of international politics. In an article entitled “The Emerging Doctrine of the United

²² <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WLa3QudS1GM>, accessed on 14.09.2012.

²³ <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/26/world/obamas-speech-to-the-united-nations-general-assembly-text.html?pagewanted=all>, accessed on 28.09.2012.

States”, George Friedman observe that “Under the emerging doctrine, the absence of an overwhelming American interest means that the fate of a country like Syria is in the hands of the Syrian people or neighboring countries. The United States has entered a period in which it must move from military domination to more subtle manipulation, and more important, allow events to take their course. This is a maturation of U.S. foreign policy, not degradation. The important point is that no one decided this new doctrine. It is emerging from the reality the United States faces. That is how powerful doctrines emerge”²⁴.

In his turn, Thomas L. Friedman reached similar conclusions, wondering “How does the U.S. impact a region with so many cross-cutting conflicts and agendas? We start by making clear that the new Arab governments are free to choose any path they desire, but we will only support those who agree that the countries that thrive today: 1) educate their people up to the most modern standards; 2) empower their women; 3) embrace religious pluralism; 4) have multiple parties, regular elections and a free press; 5) maintain their treaty commitments; and 6) control their violent extremists with security forces governed by the rule of law”²⁵.

Conclusions

The old U.S. strategy is rooted in international relations policy which belonged to modern world, whose order “is given by the principle of recognizing sovereignty and, in parallel, by clear separation of internal and external affairs, noting that external interference in internal affairs is prohibited”²⁶. This strategy has proved its limits in Europe. The system of forces the replaced the modern world is the postmodern one, “based on openness and transparency”, the fundamental characteristic of the postmodern world being that “the distinction between domestic politics and foreign affairs begin to disappear”²⁷. And, in such a world, one have to bear in mind that “war refers to changing the way of how people think, or at least change their behavior. If modern weapons creates the illusion that one can manage to remote strangers, these weapons are as dangerous for those who have them as for their victims. [...]. If we find that we are effective in waging war and inept in terms of peace then that means we turn to Genghis Khan’s or Tamerlane’s approach”²⁸.

The United States could crush a Muslim country or a region any time. But “what you do after the conflict is what provides stability and allows restoration. [...]. Napoleon seems to have said: ‘Nothing that endures is based on force’”²⁹.

Apart the war of weapons, to really prevail, U.S. needs to win the war of ideas, too. And the new strategy comes just with this important complementarity. For, the political decision to change the strategy on the Arab world seems to have been made

²⁴ <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/emerging-doctrine-united-states>, accessed on 10.10.2012.

²⁵ <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/10/opinion/friedman-what-romney-didnt-say.html>, accessed on 14.10.2012.

²⁶ Robert COOPER, *Destrămarea națiunilor*, București, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 2007, p. 48.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 55-56.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 127.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 150.

after a strategic analysis which showed that it is better for both the United States and the Arab states that the freedoms and its benefits not to be protected and circumscribed only to a part of the world, but – especially under globalization – to be shared and extended to as many nations as possible.

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THE ROMANIAN ARMY AND ITS TRANSFORMATION IN ORDER TO ANSWER TO THE PRESENT SECURITY ENVIRONMENT'S EXIGENCIES

*Dorin – Marinel EPARU, PhD**

Abstract: *In the last decade, the military body have experienced a wide process of reform and modernization in order to create some credible and effective defence capacities adapted to the new security environment. This process was perpetually correlated to the requirements of North-Atlantic Alliance adhesion and benefited by NATO and member-states' support*

The statute as Alliance and EU member asserts the provision of capacities to be put at disposal for the whole range of Alliance's missions, including the collective defence, the exercising of an important role in the conceptual development appeared in the new security context, and also the active participation in the transformation and development process of new capabilities. This fundamental change of perspective asserting also the translation from the static territorial defence to a global perspective of the military engagements influences the Romanian Armed Forces transformation.

Keywords: *security environment, military transformation, security policies, forces reshaping, efficiency of resources' use.*

At the present time, the Romania's security environment is shaped by requirements with profound transforming character for the military body emphasized by the attenuation of delimitations between the military, economic and diplomatic action fields and determined by the technological progress, the revolution in military affairs and globalization's effects. The basic premises of security policy were adapted by the enclosure of some new missions of the armed forces in security field and by the definition of parameters of adaptation of military structures to these.

Nowadays, "*security policy involves new missions for the armed forces also starting from the premises they are prepared to support other institutions with attributions in the security field*"¹.

The armed forces involvement, inclusively in actions with non-military character, answers to some requirements to provide the efficiency of action and rapid response capacity. In this regard, the Romanian Armed Forces capacity of engagement in missions of stabilization and reconstruction and in operations with more accentuated civil dimension, inclusively in operations of intervention to disasters will be enhanced. Thus, Romania will aim to accentuate the coordination between the institutions in the military, diplomatic, information and economic fields.

The military transformation process will be inter-correlated to the transformation at the North-Atlantic Alliance level and to the EU defence component to the future evolutions at the European security and defence policy level and to other similar processes of some strategic allies of Romania in order to provide the

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¹ Teodor FRUNZETI, collective, "*Lumea 2011*", Editura CTEA, București, 2011, p.78.

connection to the relevant evolutions. Romania will continue to support the wide process of NATO transformation allowing the Alliance to provide more effective answer to the new threats and to have the capacity of global action and rapid reaction adequate to the whole range of assumed missions.

The military transformation represents a peculiar effective instrument in the consolidation of defence role in the security policy framework. Romania aims to create some modern, flexible and efficient expeditionary forces able to provide the defence credibility and the fulfilment of the engagements assumed on international plan.

The transformation offers the opportunity to structure, equip and train the military forces therefore to be able to also accomplish, independently and in multinational framework, in organizations and coalitions, the new missions asserted by the present security context. In order support Romania's international engagements, the armed forces' reform and modernization will evolve to the creation of forces and deployable capabilities, with the capacity to self-sustain in the operations fields and capacity to react in short time. It will be aimed the improvement of joint and multinational operation capacity, the growth of forces generation process efficacy and of defence resources use efficiency. It will continue the multinational cooperation to develop some modern capabilities, inclusively in the field of their common property and operating, in NATO and EU framework.

The increase of reaction speed in operations needs the enhancement of institutional adaptation and reaction capacity correlated to the improvement of inter-agencies cooperation and perfecting the mechanism of civil and democratic control over the military body. Also, it will be granted special attention to the military forces capacity to operate with the nongovernmental organizations which play increasing role in the actual operations and to efficiently interact with the civil population in the operations fields.

In *the conceptual field*, the military transformation process regards the revision of doctrines, forces' training system and how the military actions are led. It will be highlighted the gradual introduction of effect-based operations approach starting from the necessary capacities, moving the accent from the pattern grounded on high consumption of forces and resources to the increase of destructive capacity and force use precision, including on the development of some forces implementing the network-based warfare by using the information technology, the decentralization of tactic and operative levels decision and the real-time use of the information.

In *the military planning field*, the new missions of the armed forces needs perfecting the system and redefining the defence planning concepts and strategies in order to increase the capacity to adapt to the contemporary challenges dynamic and from the perspective of more efficient use of resources used to defence and other security field. Romania will continue the harmonization of planning procedures with the ones existent in the North/Atlantic and EU frameworks.

The military transformation is a continuous, extremely complex process. For the transformation fulfilment will be used material, financial and organizational resources, the intellectual potential of human resource and, not at last, the political

and the Romanian society support resources. The efficiency of resources' use will be provided by respecting the principles related to the application of a basic management of integrated programs and to the coordination of transparent use of public funds for the tax-payers.

In its ongoing, the transformation must involve two vital components: innovation and modernization in order to maintain the change culture to provide advantages in the competition specific for the informational era and as well for reshaping the leadership, education, and organizational process and for maintaining the organizational balances. By this regard, the fundamental requirement of transformation is the continuity asserting the creation and anticipation of the future relating the concepts, processes, organizations/structures and technologies co-evolution. Therefore, the military transformation must be regarded as a process subsuming a set of significances interdependently related.

The transformation understood as mean to adapt – presumes the armed forces shaping in conformity to the new characteristics of security environment. Transformation perceived as reform of defence field – involves the modernization of the military infrastructure, the enhancement of human resources methods and practices of management (particularly as regards the acquisitions of armaments and logistics, the personnel policy) and the reassessment of Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) in the new context, the diminution of forces' size, the change of planning means by passing from the threats-based planning to the capabilities-based planning.

The transformation understood as effect of Revolution in Military Affairs – presumes the adoption and implementation of new doctrines of forces use under the circumstances of armament and military equipments technological development, the restructuring of armed forces concordantly to the requirements of informational era (battle units numerically diminished with high ratio of independence and strong fire power), the flexibility of command hierarchy, the emphasize of the capacity to undergone network-operations (not on battle platforms) and the interoperability of different categories of forces.

“The military transformation involves changes to the level of forces doctrines, organization and structure, capabilities, information activity, training, education and acquisitions, personnel ;I budgetary programming management who become the main fields of application of transformation in the military field”².

Regarded as a strategic process, starting in 2012, the Romanian Army transformation must be associated to the North-Atlantic Alliance and EU defence component transformations.

Under these circumstances, the main goal of transformation consists in providing the necessary capacity to the Romanian Army to promote and protect its national interests against the present and future threats. The accomplishment of the mentioned goal asserts to gain the ability and flexibility to rapid project the forces and then to sustain them in any operations field wherein they must be able to act in

² F. REPEZ, Gh. DEACONU, *Securitate și insecuritate în epoca globalizării*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2011, p 127.

the whole range of conflicts and missions: low intensity conflicts; crisis response operations; humanitarian aid actions; Article V and non-Article V operations. This is, actually, the essence of transformation: the transition from a “defence army” to a “stability army”, accentuating on the maximization of forces’ efficiency and acquiring the capability to forecast the evolution of the strategic environment and, implicitly, finding in time the means to adapt to it.

There are a series of reasons asserting the prior approach of Romanian Army transformation as follows: essential changes in the war typology; the need to adapt the conception of Army’s operations and capabilities leadership to the new risks and threats; the adaptation of forces’ structure to the new technologies exigencies; the necessity of enough time to implement the changes/transformations. Of course, the Romanian Army will gradually transform as to cover all the fields and to acquire the whole range of capabilities needed by NATO and EU, correspondently to the joint action and the multinational effort, in conformity to the philosophy of “network-based war” concept.

The military forces must be differently and diversified trained on the basis of modern battle doctrines for a wide range of classical and unconventional missions oriented to goals, corresponding to the new means of war leadership among which the antiterrorist, counter-proliferation, counter-insurgency and post-conflict reconstruction missions will have an important share. There will be developed adequate capacities for humanitarian intervention and stabilization, to support the public authorities in situation of civil emergencies generated by geophysical, meteorological-climatic or other nature factors, as well as in public security missions in conformity to the constitutional provisions, of country’s laws and obligations assumed in the security organizations framework wherein Romania participates. A peculiar attention will be granted to the transformations in the defence planning field and therefore will be finalized the harmonization process of national procedures of planning with the standard procedures functioning in the North-Atlantic, European Union and strategic partnerships frameworks. In this context, it will be enhanced the force planning process, there will be adopted new operational principles and concepts and it will be elaborates a new military strategy.

The defence transformation is not a goal itself but the adequate answer to the evolution of the security environment, to the NATO, EU transformation and to the engagements Romania assumed on international plan.

Romania must priori develop programs to enhance the national and regional capabilities to monitoring, rapid intervention to prevent and counteract the risks came from the maritime area. Also, there will be supported the initiatives to increase the regional capacity of crises response and of counteracting the proliferation, as well as the capacities to improve the legislative framework to grow the trust at regional level.

The coherent approach presumes the existence of national level inter-agencies and the promotion of the regional identity (to the allies and partners). It will be aimed to avoid the parallelisms and the efficient use of resources, respectively a concerted and coordinated approach of national and multilateral projects.

At executive level, there will be fulfilled inter-agencies action plans with clear statement of responsibilities of all the institutions with attributions in the security field. In order to promote the regional identity, Romania must support on a communication strategy focused to the level of Euro-Atlantic community level. In this concern, there will be used the special partnership relation of Romania with other countries.

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FROM HARD POWER TO SOFT POWER. THE INTELLIGENT POWER

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Abstract: Power, the most perennial human phenomenon, one that has transgressed the entire human history, relied for millennia on the use of force, thus receiving the name hard power. Lately, two concepts have started circulating, introduced by American analyst Joseph Nye Jr.: the soft power and the intelligent/smart power. Soft power is represented by such elements of influence that are neither violent, nor coercive, it is greatly dependent on three resources (culture, political values and foreign policy) and it implies attraction, persuasion and the primary use of diplomacy. Intelligent power is based on the preferably simultaneous use of the two previous concepts. These two new concepts (soft power and intelligent power) have gradually captivated the attention of political administrations around the world. This study is aimed to be a comparative and interpretative analysis of the currently used concepts that are part of power's semantic family.

Keywords: power, hard-power, soft-power, intelligent power, smart power

1. Introduction or About power

Power is the most perennial human phenomenon, one that has constantly manifested from ancient times – from the first cave men, that disputed their shelter and food – until modern times. Or, as a contemporary Brazilian geopolitician was saying: “Power is the only efficient way known to human society able to insure its perpetuation and survival. In the competitive society of the last six millennia power represents the coronation of two great aspirations of the human being: wealth and prestige. Wealth, prestige and power cross the sands of time together. Where there is one, the other two will inevitably appear”¹.

Nobody has better defined the desire for power, the means to get access to it and keep it better than Florentine Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), in his work “Princes”, wrote in 1513. His political doctrine is not reduced at what it is usually called *Machiavellianism*: purpose excuses the means. In fact he introduced a new political concept: “the sovereign must not be preoccupied with the common good (as the Greek philosopher Aristotle claimed in his famous work *Politics*) and neither be in service of God or the Church (as Latin philosopher and theologian Aurelius Augustinus, better known as Saint Augustin, claimed), but to stabilise his power and know how to use force and, above all else, appearances”².

Dictionaries, encyclopaedias and other reference works are relatively poor in defining the term “power”, as well as “great power” and “superpower”, in the meaning that interests us, the geopolitical one. Instead, such works are more generous

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¹ José NIVALDO Junior, *Machiavelli, Puterea. Istorie și marketing*, Editura Economică, București, 2001, p. 24.

² Niccolo Machiavelli, *Principele*, Editura Antet, Filipeștii de Târg, no year.

in terms of power as a social phenomenon: “Power: fundamental social phenomenon that consists of the capacity to make decisions and insure their fulfilment by using different persuasion and constraint techniques; power is expressed through an asymmetric relation (leadership – submission and/or domination – subordination) between the factors at the level it’s manifested.”³ Some analysts consider power and influence equal, edifying in this respect being Robert Dahl’s definition: “A’s power over B is A’s capacity to make B do something it wouldn’t have done without A’s intervention”. Therefore it already appears the idea of pressure, force.

Political power (form of social power) “includes the state’s sovereign power (maintained not only through the <<force of right>>, but also the <<right of force>>”⁴; is manifested through the use of the other “powers” (economical, military etc.) as basis and instruments for it, in conformity with its goals. There is a tight connection between political and economical power: without being directly generated by economical power, political power owes, to a great extent, both its fundamentals and instruments to it.

International power: a concept according to which “exercising power by one or more states (great powers, empires) tends, in essence, to accomplish in the international life a role similar to that of the state in a society’s internal life”⁵.

Also important, in this context, is the relation between politics and power. Politics in its many acceptations: a) superstructure of the social system, including political conscience, political relations, institutions and organisations; b) tactics, strategy, methods and means used by the powers that be in order to accomplish their goals; c) the art of governing a state; a way of organising and leading human communities, through which internal order is instituted and maintained and the external security is guaranteed. An important aspect of politics, in the scope of this paper, is *foreign policy*, meaning the entirety of means and methods a states uses in order to achieve certain objectives on the international stage. But, both externally and internally, power’s objectives are controlled and achieved through the politics of power.

The players on the international stage that apply power in their relations with others are of two kinds: “The first is the direct use of power for imposing the competitor’s change in behaviour. Which means the use of, mainly, military strength to impose one’s will over its enemy/competitor. The second way is the indirect co-opt one (power’s second face), that uses a player’s cultural and institutional attractiveness over others in order to change their behaviours”⁶.

Even from ancient times the political power’s source was given by state inequality. In specialty literature an extremely relevant example is usually cited, mentioned by the great historian and also Athenian politician, Thucydides (460-396 B.C.) in his fundamental work “History of the Peloponnesian war”, that presents the battle for supremacy in the Greek world, between Sparta and Athens, 431-411 B.C.

³ *Mică enciclopedie de politologie*, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, București, 1977, p. 373.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 374.

⁵ *Idem*, p. 375.

⁶ Mihai E. IONESCU, *După hegemonie*, Editura Scripta, București, 1993, p. 13.

He tells us that in the year 416 B.C. the Athenians began an expedition to punish the Melians (the inhabitants of the island of Melos/Milos), Sparta's allies, that refused to submit to Athens. According to tradition the Athenians sent a mission to convince the Melians to freely submit, the message being more than clear: "Since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must" (the Melians didn't yield and therefore they were massacred). The conclusion is not difficult: "the discussion about rights is only meaningful among equals; in conditions of inequality the laws of power rule supreme, the right of the strongest. And this kind of «laws» governs the relations between states since the start of their existence, because among peoples and states were created inequalities in terms of territory, population, natural resources, material and spiritual development"⁷.

This kind of superiority of certain powers has generated over time a different kind of superiority: that of the citizens of those countries, who consider themselves above others. And we have examples since Ancient times until the present day. For example, when an inhabitant of Ancient Rome broke the laws in a region under Roman authority, and was being held accountable, he would answer *civis romanus sum* – "I am a Roman citizen", therefore he would only abide by Rome's laws, not the local ones as well. After the Second World War, in the Communist countries, Soviet citizens (from military to civilians) considered themselves and behaved like they were superior to the locals; also, in many demonstrations in Moscow, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1991, the nostalgia after "Mother Russia" was also accompanied by the contempt for those that had chosen another way. Even the Americans, in some cases, exhibit contempt for other nations or consider themselves above international law.

American analyst Karl Deutsch captured such attitudes very well: "But the bigger and stronger a country is, its elites and often its population raise their aspirations in international business. In other words, they see themselves, increasingly more, as preordained or obligated to put the world's affairs in order, or at least keep them in a certain seemingly healthy one."

On Earth there currently are numerous states, almost 200, more precisely 194, the last to gain independence being South Sudan (2011). Some smaller, some bigger. Some that have been around for hundreds or thousands of years as a state, sometimes being circumscribed to the almost identical area, others, most of them in fact, being the product of rather recent events.

Almost all over history there were states that imposed their will more than others, and more often than not in others' prejudice. In the past there was talk about empires, great empires: Roman, Parthian, Persian, Chinese and others in the Antiquity, the Mongol, Ottoman, Portuguese, Spanish, British and others in the Middle Ages (and some of them even later), the Tsarist (Russian), Austro-Hungary and others. In modern times, the 20th century and in the present, there is talk about *great powers*.

⁷ Corneliu BOGDAN, Eugen PREDA, *Sferele de influență*, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, București, 1986, pp. 16-17.

Their status of preeminent global forces was maintained – and more often than not expanded – in the past through conquests and currently through domination: military, economical, ideological or all of them at once. Past empires, the current great powers have entered into conflicts to increase their areas of influence. But, at the same time, they also reached agreements regarding their spheres of influence, not taking into consideration the circumscribed states or peoples, their interests and desires.

The great power status was always related to the *ability to wage war*, therefore *hard power*. This is, mostly, a reflection of the economical strength. Over the course of time, the two (military strength, usually terrestrial, and economical power) were joined by others (naval power and/or air power, ownership of nuclear weapons or the ability to quickly have them, space power, the position of permanent member of the UN Security Council)⁸.

It is interesting that the manifestations of *hard power* no longer require only the use of military means, but interventions of other kinds, no less efficient, as in the case of the “oil tap” or the “gas war” used lately by Russia.

All of the above remind us of an American analyst’s words that “everything has a price and this is certainly true in the case of power”⁹.

2. Hard power

One could say that almost the entire human history was dominated by force, objectified in conflicts, wars: an analyst identified in the last three millennia only approximately 190 years without wars – maybe there were in those years also, but he couldn’t identify them. Therefore, *hard power* was used. It is very well emphasised by French analyst Frédéric Encel: “Power gives power over others (...). From the moment we identify the field of international relations as an <<arena>>, we assume that the states acting on this stage exhibit behaviour similar to the beasts or gladiators, in other words they act like predators (...). When the circumstances become favourable in terms of the balance of forces, there are few states that would resist the temptation to increase their power”¹⁰.

Even a renowned French scientist and philosopher, Blaise Pascal – preoccupied in the second part of his short life (died at Eminescu’s age) by man’s “grandeur” as a privilege to thought and conscience – stated that “*Essential on Earth is power* (our emphasis), while in the skies, faith”. Similarly, a Romanian analyst stated: “Violence, force, money, wealth, technological secrets, relations and information are the main elements of power. By skilfully using these instruments emperors, kings, presidents or economical and military leaders rule the world. History has shown that power,

⁸ For more details regarding the concepts of “power”, “great power”, “superpower” see Silviu NEGUȚ, *Geopolitica. Universul puterii*, Editura Meteor Press, București, 2008, pp. 43-59.

⁹ Jeffrey PFEFFER, *Puterea. De ce unii reușesc să o obțină, iar alții nu*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2011, p. 161.

¹⁰ Frédéric ENCEL, *Orizonturi geopolitice*, Editura Cartier, Chișinău, 2011, p. 106.

more often than not, trampled and destroyed weaker or more poorly organised human beings.”¹¹

There has been a great deal written about war¹² – defined, usually, as an armed conflict between two or more groups, social classes or states, for the accomplishment of economical and political objectives – starting with the ancient Chinese philosopher Lao Zi (6th century B.C.) and continuing with books (especially memoirs) of so many famous military leaders, among which Caesar (*Comentarii de bello Gallico*, *Comentarii de bello civili*), Napoleon Bonaparte (*Oeuvres de Napoleon à Sainte-Hélène*, translated as *Napoleon's memoirs*), Karl von Clausewitz (*Von Kriege/About war*), Bernard Law Montgomery (*Forward to Victory*), Dwight Eisenhower (*Crusade in Europe*), Charles de Gaulle (*Mémoires de guerre*) etc.

The Famous Von Clausewitz, who stated almost 200 years ago that “war is nothing more than state politics continued through other means” and defined it as “an act of violence, to force the opponent to do our bidding (...). Violence, physical violence (because moral violence doesn't exist outside the concept of state and law) is therefore the *means*, to impose our will on the enemy, *the purpose*”¹³. This purpose made so many victims over the course of time, has led to the disappearance of not only thousands, millions, tens of millions of people, but also many states¹⁴.

Mankind has known all kinds of wars, of an almost incredible variety, as motivations and duration: of only “six days” ((June 1967, Israel vs. Egypt, Syria and Jordan), but also “seven years” (1756-1763, between England, Prussia and Portugal vs. France, Austria, Russia, Sweden, Saxon and Spain), of “thirty years” (1618-1648, between the Protestant princes of the Roman-German Empire and the Catholic princes and the Emperor, subsequently transformed into an all out European war) and even “a hundred years” (1337-1453, armed conflict between England and France for the French territories ruled by the English dynasty and Flanders). A more detailed typology was presented in the conflicts chapter of the book “Geopolitics. The Universe of Power” (2008). Also of note is the fact that now, at the start of the third millennia, conflicts/wars are not a thing of the past, but a living presence. After the fall of communism in Europe and the implosion of the USSR, many thought the true peace will be upon us, but it was not so because it was the time of the *Cold Peace* (Janusz Bugajski, 2005). Furthermore, it was seen that *peace kills* (P. J. O'Rourke, 2004).

The above mentioned analyst, American P. J. O'Rourke, present in several theatres of war all over the world, notices the present world's antinomy – a world in which *hard power* still dictates – between the American hegemon and its challengers.

¹¹ Victor DUȚĂ, *Religie și putere. Noua ordine internațională*, Editura Ștefan, București, 2008, p. 5.

¹² Also see the chapter "Stare conflictuală-conflict-război", Silviu NEGUȚ, *op. cit.*, 2008, pp. 216-252.

¹³ Carl von CLAUSEWITZ, *Despre război*, Editura Antet XX Press, Filipeștii de Târg, no year, p. 6, respectively, p. 9.

¹⁴ An idea of the dangerous, not safe areas in the world is offered in the work of Robert PELTON, , *The world's most dangerous places*, 4th edition, Harper Collins Publisher, New York, 2000, 1024 pages.

After pertinent feedback regarding other main contemporary players, with their weaknesses (Russia, China, the European Union), O'Rourke states that: "(...) Great Britain's, France's, Germany's and Italy's military expenditure together do not reach a third of the United States' defence budget. The USA spends on defence more than the above mentioned countries, plus Russia, plus China, plus the next six countries in the rankings of top military expenditures". And he continues: "Any unilateral military or diplomatic effort that includes the United States is like a canoeing team in which Arnold Schwarzenegger is the helmsman and Nadia Comăneci is the rower. When the other countries ask for a role in exercising global power, America asks the fundamental American question: <<And with what army?>>"¹⁵.

3. Soft power

The concept is rather new, first used in 2004 by university professor and American analyst Joseph Nye Jr. In an article published in the "Public Affairs"¹⁶ magazine and later detailed in a book¹⁷. According to him *soft power* corresponds to "elements of influence, neither violent, nor coercive" and in the case of a country, it greatly depends on three basic resources:

- *Culture* – aspects through which this is attractive for others;
- *Its political values* – when they rise to their level internally and externally;
- *Foreign policy* – when others consider them justified and owners of moral authority.¹⁸

Soft power implies attraction, persuasion, the primary use of diplomacy.

A French analyst – interesting that not an American one – speaks about the "United States' extraordinary capacity to attract" in most of the world, especially after the Second World War: "Even today, the most consumed beverage in the world is Coca-Cola, the most used language, besides the indigenous ones, is English (in reality an approximate form of <<business English>>, using the basic vocabulary), the most worn piece of clothing remains the blue-jeans, the most viewed movies are produced in Hollywood, the most prestigious universities are in the United States, the dominant and flourishing architectural model is the building (inaugurated in New York in 1902 with the Flatiron Building), the most important musical tendencies are born in the *States*, American sports such as baseball are becoming ever more popular etc."¹⁹. Encel's conclusion that the American society is the one that creates, even

¹⁵ P. J. O'ROURKE, *Pacea ucide. O nouă perspectivă asupra imperialismului american*, Editura Antet, Filipeștii de Târg, 2004, p. 14.

¹⁶ Joseph NYE Jr., *Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics*, in "Public Affairs", no. 147, 2004

¹⁷ Joseph NYE Jr., *The Future of Power* (translated in Romanian *Viitorul puterii*, in 2012), Ed. Polirom, Iași, 2010

¹⁸ *Idem*, p. 103.

¹⁹ Frédéric ENCEL, *op. cit.*, 2011, pp. 122-123.

more than the American state, the *norm* at a planetary scale is very interesting. And it seems he is right.

The idea that transpires from the above is that the cultural values – culture²⁰ in its broadest sense (the entirety of material and spiritual values created by mankind and the necessary institutions to communicate them) – can give a state more power than military force. As is the case of prominent elements in the fields of art, literature, religion, sports etc.

According to the adepts of the concept of *soft power*, states that use it have much to gain, more than they would if they were to use hard power. The most conclusive example is communist China, whose international prestige risen a lot thanks to events such as: the hosting of the Summer Olympic Games (2008) and the Universal Exhibition (Shanghai, 2010), considered to be the best organised and spectacular thus far; the assignment of the Nobel prize for literature to writer Mo Yan (2012); the founding of several hundred Confucius institutes for promoting Chinese culture all over the world; extending the international radio and television transmissions; attracting foreign students in its universities; winning the Miss World title for the first time by Zhang Zilin, in 2007, repeated only five years after by another Chinese representative (Yu Wenxia, 2012).

Only these “points” gained by China on the international stage were mostly countered – despite the fact that president Hu Jintao declared in October 2007 China’s intention to increase its *soft power* –, by some measures of *hard power*: the recent persecutions in Tibet and the Xinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region and against civil rights activists, the most famous case being the one of Liu Xiabao, who was forbidden to even participate at the award ceremony of the Nobel Peace Prize (2011).

Romania also benefited, sometimes, during the communist period, of elements of soft power, even though, in case of the political ones, reality was in fact different than what was presented: Nicolae Ceaușescu triggered a wave of appreciation and sympathy in the Western world (for him and, implicitly, Romania), following the events of August 1968, when Romania not only did not participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact countries, at the Soviet Union’s initiative, but Ceaușescu even harshly criticised this intervention.²¹ The Romanian leader’s gesture was interpreted as a distancing from Moscow – hence his subsequent “cultivation” by Western leaders (mostly American, no less than three US presidents – Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter – visiting Romania) –, when in fact he was only pursuing his personal dictatorial project.

²⁰ As we know there is no unitary view in terms of what defines culture and what differentiates it from civilisation. There were identified almost 200 definitions. Some authors use the notion of culture to only designate the spiritual domain and the civilisation one for the kit of means with which men adapts to the environment (physically and socially), synonymous with material culture. In consequence, there are as many cultures and civilisations as there are peoples (Ovidiu DRIMBA, *Istoria culturii și civilizației*, 1984). According to other authors there are thousands of cultures (more precisely 10 000!), but only one civilisation (Mircea MALIȚA, *Zece mii de culturi, o singură civilizație*, 1998). Other authors consider the two terms synonymous.

²¹ Including in the country it triggered a great wave of sympathy.

Instead, in the field of *culture*, in the above defined meaning, Romania gained points due to extraordinary creators (some of them settled in other countries and recognised/ “recovered” only after their death), such as: Constantin Brâncuși (sculptor), George Enescu (composer, violinist, pianist), Sergiu Celibidache (bandmaster), Mircea Eliade (writer and religion historian, Henry Coandă (global aviation pioneer) and many more. An area where Romania asserted its soft power with great effect is sports; at many Summer Olympic Games, world and European championships, Romanian athletes occupied, overall, a vastly superior place than Romania’s position (as territory and population) in the World or continent. Although many athletes became known (in areas such as gymnastics, fencing, kayak-canoe, tennis and table tennis, wrestling, handball and others) they imposed through the propagated effect all over the world (discussing about Romanians, about Romania), athletes such as: Nadia Comăneci (first in that sport’s history to obtain a maximum mark, 10.00, at the Olympics in Montreal in 1976, and thanks to the “suspense moment” at the Olympic Games in Moscow in 1980) and tennis players Ilie Năstase and Ion Țiriac, thanks to disputing three Davis Cup finals (1969, 1971, 1972; plus, Ilie Năstase winning many grand slams as well as the Champions Tour).

4. Intelligent power/smart power

As is the case in our times – and predictably in the future as well –, the soft power is not the solution to all the problems, but the *intelligent power/smart power*, which implies the combination of *hard power*, of coercion and payment, with *soft power*, of persuasiveness and attraction.²² From apparently some concept mentioned by analysts, this captured the attention of political leaders. Thus, Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State (Foreign Affairs Minister) of the greatest power, the United States, suggestively declared, in 2008, with the signing in of president Barack Obama: “America cannot solve the most pressing problems by itself, and the world cannot solve them without America. We must use what is called <<*intelligent power*>> (our emphasis), the entire series of instruments at our disposal”. An year before, Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, asked the Congress, contrary to his predecessors, not for more money for the army but for soft power instruments (diplomacy, economical aid, communications), arguing the “necessity to consolidate the capacity to resort to soft power and better integrate it with hard power”²³.

Russia, on the other hand, doesn’t seem eager to combine the two types of power, continuing to apply hard power: Georgia military intervention in August 2008 (in contrast with China which, at that time, was impressing the world with an exemplary organisation of the Olympic Games and the large number of medals won), the repression of antigovernment (2011) and anti-president movements, with the parliamentary elections (2011) and presidential (2012) etc. As a matter of fact, the Russian invasion in Georgia had a much bigger negative effect than the reality of the

²² Joseph NYE Jr. (2004), *op. cit.*

²³ Thom SHANKER, *Defense Secretary Urges More Spending for U.S. Diplomacy*, in “New York Times”, 27 November. 2007.

conflict, which made some analysts, including Edward Lutwak, consider that soft power is irrelevant.

In case of the United States, we can say that they began using intelligent power immediately after the Second World War.

A first step made was the *Marshall Plan*, initiated by George Catlett Marshall (1880-1959; general, chief of staff of the American army between 1947-1949), and politician (Secretary of State, 1947-1949), a plan to support the reconstruction and economic development of the European countries in the wake of the Second World War, over the course of it (1948-1952) the American government offering to Western European countries credits and grants of approximately 15 billion dollars (a huge sum of money at that time).

Another step was the *Fulbright scholarship*, initiated in 1946 by the lawyer and politician (senator for 30 years, 1945-1975), program still in effect, that benefited and still benefits thousands of students, masters and PhD candidates, scientists and professors.

It followed:

- *the first moon-landing* (July 20th 1969), during the mission of space ship “Apollo 11” that, thanks to the live broadcast worldwide (including in Romania and other communist countries), scored a lot for the United States. The first steps made on the lunar soil and the words spoken by astronaut Neil Armstrong (1930-2012) – “A small step for man, one giant leap for mankind” – will go around the world, triggering a wave of sympathy towards those that achieved such a feat, even though not always for the American great power.

- *the first orbiter* (space vehicle with human crew that is launched into space with the help of a powerful rocket and returns to Earth through its own means), respectively *Columbia*, that flew between April 12th-14th 1981 (with astronauts John Young and Robert Crippen), a feat repeated between November 11th-16th 1982 (with four astronauts: Vance Brandt, Robert Overmyer, Joseph Allen and William Lenoir); four orbiters followed: *Challenger*, *Discovery*, *Atlantis*, *Endeavour*.

Other examples can be identified, as well...

It is interesting to analyse in antithesis certain manifestations of soft and hard power, as was done in 2008 by French analyst Dominique Moisi, who assessed that in that year, “while China wanted to seduce and impress the world through the number of Olympic medals won, Russia wanted to impress by demonstrating its military superiority – China’s soft power *versus* Russia’s hard power”²⁴. In addition, as Joseph Nye Jr. Observed, Russia’s choice to resort to hard power, in 2008, profoundly changed its legitimacy claims and sowed fear and distrust in most of the other countries, the European neighbours becoming more cautious – one of the immediate consequences being Poland’s backtracking its decision to oppose the instalment of the anti-missile shield –, while the other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation didn’t offer any support.²⁵

²⁴ Dominique MOISI, *Russia’s Neurotic Invasion*, in “Project Syndicate”, 21 august 2008.

²⁵ Joseph NYE Jr. (2004), *op. cit.*, p. 10.

Conclusions

The analysis of the phenomenon of power from a geopolitical perspective and especially its translation from the “hard” dimension to the “soft” one leads to a series of conclusions we will briefly present below:

Power is a social phenomenon. Although with a biological imprint (reason for which was developed an entire school of thought in the realist school of international relations oriented towards studying biological determinism in the manifestation of power), the phenomenon of power falls under the human registry, being considerable not the domination of an individual by another individual, but instead the domination of a geopolitical structure over another. The geopolitical perspective brings into discussion the role spatial (geographic) reality plays in the manifestation of power, domination or influence.

The prevalence of “hard power” in history. The entire evolution of the human society was marked by manifestations of power, the thousands of years of existence registering a predisposition towards manifesting hard power, punitive, coercive, military in nature instead of the soft, non-violent one. The conflict/war marked the entire geopolitical evolution from the oldest mega-structures – the ancient empires –, until present day, the last state to appear on the world’s political map, in 2011, South Sudan, being accomplished under similar guidance of violent manifestations.

From “hard power” to “soft power” or the diplomacy of power (the power of force) to the power of diplomacy (the force of power). The geopolitical mutations that happened on the international stage with the end of the Cold War – the multiplication of non-state geopolitical players and the decrease of the state’s attributions, that was for a long time the only geopolitical player on the “grand chessboard”, territorial fragmentation doubled by the expansion of supra-state regional blocks, mass-media’s global effect etc. – have generated a transfer from hard power (whose use is no longer within reach) to soft power. It is a radical shift: in case of the first form, the direction is from “hegemon” to “satellites” (military invasions, manifestations of force etc.), while in the case of soft power the direction is reversed, from “satellites” (that wish to endorse certain values or are attracted by a superior way of life) towards the “hegemon” (that dominates through the force of the positive example).

Intelligent power or the power mix. Present day’s reality confirms the tendency and predilection towards the nuanced and simultaneous use of power: force (when it’s required, but with an obvious tendency towards “humanising” the war) in parallel with a soft form of power (cultural influence, educational programs etc.). This combined use of the forms of power defines the “intelligent power”.

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THE ISSUE OF ENVIRONMENT SECURITY AS A STRATEGIC VARIABLE IN THE WORLD SECURITY ENVIRONMENT EVOLUTION

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Abstract: *The world security environment becomes more and more complex and we are currently witnessing a dynamic phenomenon of new emerging dimensions in the national, regional or international security field. Given its natural characteristics Romania has increased its concern with the issues relating to the environment security which requires conceptual and institutional considerations on the highest emergency basis due to the dramatic reduction of resources and which became a strategic variable in the management of local or regional conflicts. Over the last three years, as an adviser of the General Commissioner of the National Environmental Guard the author of this survey has produced solid documentation to support the elaboration of a National Strategy for the Environment Security Project. This paper aims to highlight the main conclusions of this work.*

Keywords: *environment security, national security, durable development, natural resources.*

Introduction

A larger number of experts have sustained over the last period of time that human activities have an impact on the natural environment which induces more and more significant effects in the national or world security field.

The environment security definition imposes the correlation of a wide range of subsequent fields particularly if security is defined in a generic manner as an interaction between the economic, social and welfare components.

The resource management issues particularly the access to the resources and their utilization in the prospect of sustainable development have increasingly become a national security issue since these are part of security resources by definition.

Colin Powell, former State Secretary of the USA was stating in 2002 that sustainable development is simultaneously an ethical and humanitarian matter but at the same time a security imperative.

Poverty, environment degradation and individual or entire human community despair are destabilizing factors for countries and regions.

Solving these issues is one of the biggest dilemmas of the contemporary world and the variety of options to choose in order to solve the issue regarding the scarcity of resources is directly determined by a country's economic, social, political and cultural characteristics. Unfortunately the predictions and the management of ecological systems which aim to avoid dramatic reduction of natural resources prove to be extremely complex processes as a result of a large variety of factors, of several types of coexisting balances and of the human factor chaotic behavior.

It thus becomes more obvious that natural systems, starting from global climate to regional fishing or forests, are dynamic and interdependent. The exceeding extraction of certain resources in a natural system generates a chain of effects and the

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diminishing of resources in whole ecological environment. Forests, for instance do not constitute only the system that provides wood for fuel, constructions or paper. They reduce the amplitude of the hydrological cycle reducing the effects of the rainfalls by absorbing the water and reintroducing it in the circuit, stabilize the soil and reduce the erosions, absorb and fix carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (which can produce global heating), and last but not least, provide the habitat for a large variety of organisms. Each of these functions help and support other components of the ecological systems.

As a result, deforestations can generate more that the reduction of the quantity of wood for the local communities but can reduce the soil potential, rainfall, hydrological potential of the country, and implicitly the generation of clean power by hydropower stations, the river transport and the reduction of irrigations for agricultural crops.

A significant reduction of forest potential can severely affect biodiversity which provides the necessary resources for medicine and various industrial purposes. One of the most worrying effects is also the climatic parameter modification.³

Bruce Babbit, US former Secretary of Home Affairs (1993-2001) at present, President of the Wild Life Fund Board of Directors, says that “if you want to send a country on the way to disaster you do not need oil, gold or diamonds but something more prosaic, namely “trees” and the World Bank estimates that “ the yearly loss of income and resources amounts to approximately 10 billion US dollars – eight times more than the quantity of aid offered for the forest sustainable management”.

At present it is publicly acknowledged that 3 ha of forest disappear ever day from the Romanian forestry fund.

I made this presentation for exemplifying just one of the aspects of the field known as environmental security. As an awareness of the objective requirement for an adequate management of the natural resources, the Ministry of Environment and Forests through the National Environmental Guard initiated a process in 2011 for the elaboration of a document entitled “The National Strategy for Environmental Security”. A working group was set up under the minister’s order coordinated by The General Commissioner of the National Environmental Guard. The Technical and Operational Secretariat was coordinated by the author of this paper. Unfortunately, this action was stopped due to the change of the government team in May 2012 . We shall present some aspects identified in generating the working version and the data base. The data were supplied by the specialized directorates of the ministry and the working group included also a representative group of the scientific and academic environment.

1. The environment, a strategic variable

1.1. Conceptual definitions

Based on the experience we have gained, we consider that the concept of national security can be defined as follows: “The security of a nation is a parameter of a status and process inherited and accumulated by the nation in its historical

evolution and can be generated complementarily with the potential of all the national and international collective capabilities for the purpose of a performing identification and management of any type of vulnerabilities, risks, threats and aggressions of an internal or external nature”.

Thesis 1. The state institutions, communities and each citizen will act in the nation security field in accordance with the principle of precaution and balance between objectives and available resources, the ultimate goal being that of preserving the fundamental aspects of national identity and values as well as providing the prerequisites for a sustainable development.

Thesis 2. National security is no longer the exclusive state monopoly and its effective management is based on a public-private partnership and performing communication in accordance with modern regulations relating to the cooperation with the academic and scientific environment, business environment, private suppliers of security services and the society as a whole.

A possible definition of the environmental security concept would be as follows: “The environmental security is a series of political, social and economic processes that enables the biotic and non-biotic environment security and maintains in particular a balance between them as a result of human action. Natural and social – economic systems must be managed in terms of sustainable development ensuring the general welfare of present and future generations and creating resources for a nation.

The environment security is one of the national security dimensions”.

1.2 The environmental security

According to representatives of the academic environment whoever will solve the issue of the environmental security is entitled to apply for two Nobel prizes, one for peace and the other for science. In a globalized world the solution for the civilization survival is the sustainable development which supports the current economic paradigm with fewer resources in order to obtain a higher added value. This is the only way to achieve the real “economic floatability” and civilization must choose the nature solutions and must face nature by living together with it.

In accordance with the Romanian Constitution (2004), the article 35(1) “the state acknowledges that any person is entitled to live in a healthy and ecologically balanced environment” and the article 35(2) shows that “the state provides the legal framework for this right to be exercised”.

Mentionable is also article 135 (2b) of the Romanian Constitution wherein is stipulated “that the state must ensure that the national resources are operated in accordance with the national interest”.

During the Cold War, the high policy was included in the national security agenda and it focused on the peace and war problem, on nuclear despondency and the management of the crisis, the meeting diplomacy, the weapons control and political alliances.

By contracts, in the small policy, issues regarding the environment, the management of poor resources and the endeavor to obtain an increased birth rate have

always been looked upon as sources of disputes and very seldom as threats on the national security.

The current aggression on biodiversity, particularly the deforestation of tropical forests in certain regions and areas may destroy in time the common heritage of humanity.

Deforestations destroy the fauna habitats – tropical forests accommodate half of the known species – and have regional climatic effects as the trees represent the fundamental link in the water circuit between the soil and the atmosphere through the evaporation process. Trees fix the soils and control the erosion caused by the landslips and floods.

Global and regional environment problems cause severe local problems and equally the local environment impairment may have local and global environment consequences.

The environment problems have become a subject of maximum interest for the military strategy decision makers who are more and more focusing on the consequences of the use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

The environment impairment caused by the manufacture and location of military equipment must be taken into consideration in terms of environmental security.

Those who sustain those resources, environment and the problems engendered by the increased number of inhabitants should be included on the national security agenda, sustain in a simplistic manner that global development threatens the health and welfare of individuals and countries and therefore can be considered threats to national security.

Analysts in the intelligence field often refer to “the curse of resources” that can be easily detected in the chronic instability of the underdeveloped countries and not only.

Production of gas, oil and minerals acts as a magnet in the arming races and the external interventions. The purpose of current aggressions is not to conquer territories but the seizure of resources, the spoliation of an nation’s riches which have irreversible consequences on natural balances, in most of the cases.

The environment security issue was recognized by the middle of the eighth decade when the final report of the Brundtland Commission included a chapter referring to this problem.

The report was pointing out that “the environment problems of the poor would equally affect the rich in the not very distant future, engendering political instability and riots”.

It is worth mentioning the first sentence of the Brundtland Commission report: “Our planet is unique but our world is not”. This was and will continue to be an invitation addressed to the whole planetary community to solve the problems related to the environment security for the benefit of the entire human civilization.

In 1989, Mihail Gorbaciov was stating that “the future threats coming from the sky are not determined by the nuclear missiles but rather by the ozone layer

impairment and global heating”. He was also proposing at that time that a council for environmental security should be created at the United Nation Organization.

In the last decades, politicians have grown aware of the fundamental importance of the relationship between the environment and human and nature security as a whole.

Studies conducted in the environment security field have highlighted the following:

- the environment is the problem that has the most significant transnational specificities;
- over the next 100 years a third of the global land surface will undergo changes due to certain processes that will force humanity to choose between consumption, ecosystem services, restoring the natural environment, its preservation and management;
- the environment security is the key element of the security of a nation, including dynamic processes, the relationship between the existing basis of natural resources, the state social configuration and the specific economic potential for the local and regional stability and the natural environment which plays an important part in maintaining peace, in the emerging conflicts, in the common and human de-stabilization and insecurity.

One may say that the environmental security, in general, can affect humanity and the current institutions anywhere and anytime. The decision makers’ ability to identify and establish innovative institutional architectures and at the same time to promote technologies for a sustainable development that would enable a very good management of the challenges in this field will result in a strengthened or a more vulnerable environment security at the global level.

A conceptual differentiation can be made between the services provided by the natural environment and the natural resources such as minerals, oil, natural gas. In reality the operation of these resources may cause serious damages to the natural environment by pollution, infrastructure, corruption or violent conflicts – briefly, the natural environment became insecure.

The management of the environment security problems is in the attention of world institutions of high reputation such as the Institute for the Environment Security which delivered a study entitled “Horizon 21”. Professor Norman Myers produced a study of a high scientific level regarding elements of continuity and novelty in the environment security field.

He emphasizes the potential to generate significant conflicts for reasons of access to vital natural resources such as water, for example.

More than 450 conflicts of this type took place in the last half of the century. At least 261 of the major global rivers are delimiting the national territory of which: 176 are flowing between two states, 48 are delimiting 3 states and 37 are delimiting 4 or more states.

Global desertification and drought threatens the existence of over 1 billion people in more than 110 countries.

Professor Norman Myers opinion is that the environment security can be defined as a relational architecture that refers to the environment factors – water, soil, vegetation, climate and other basic components that constitute the natural background of a nation - which can disturb all the social and economic activities and can cause vulnerability as far as political stability is concerned. From this point of view when the environment resources are worn out or are wasted there is a higher degree of insecurity at a nation level. An adequate approach should envisage the general objective: security for everybody, security for ever.

The Foundation for the Environment Security & Sustainability has advanced the following definition: the environment security can be considered a specific condition of a nation or region based on a performing government, capable management and sustainable use of the nation's own natural and environment resources required for development through social, economic and political stability in order to ensure the welfare of the nation.

The sustainable use of the natural and environment resources becomes a critical variable for political and economic stability and for social welfare. ‘The Management of the Environment’ can be defined as the totality of traditions and institutions through which power, responsibility and authority is exercised as concerns the natural resources of a nation.

The following definition has been agreed by international academics: the environment security is the relationship between the security problems such as armed conflicts and the natural environment. This field has imposed itself after having considered the relationship between the low potential of natural resources and conflicts.

Relevant international organizations have not advanced a concept definition to enable the elaboration of environment policies. For example, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Health Organization (WHO) have not adopted a definition for the environment security. UNEP has made certain clarifications on human development in its report dated 1994 (page 28). UNEP considered “the environment threats to countries are a combination of local ecosystem damages and therefore of the global system. These are threats to the environment security”.

2. National Strategy for Security Environment

2.1. Strategy – concept definitions

This document is a first in the environment security field in Romania and contains some specifications regarding the concept of strategy. There is confusion in many cases between the policy and the strategy in a certain field of activity. Policy consists of a set of objectives which define what a nation wants to accomplish in a certain field.

Strategy is in essence a practical and pragmatic activity which integrates policy with the action.

If we refer to “national strategy” that is to a document of a national strategic level then this must be a document that enables the coordination and orientation of all the national resources or of a group of actions in order to attain certain political objectives. Any strategy must be approached from an interdisciplinary perspective and represents a process, a continuous adjustment to the existing conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, incertitude and ambiguity are prevailing.

Strategy was to be an operational instrument for decision makers at the national and local level by the identification of the set of problems in the environment field that may be associated with risks and threats to national security, main actions to be taken in different stage, definition of responsibilities and allocation of adequate resources for early warning, prevention and management of emergency situations.

Strategy aimed at securing the natural environment resources to the best possible and ultimately enabled the state to attain the highest level of management of its security resources and to create the premises for a sustainable development and growth of the general welfare of the population.

The unitary approach of the fields included in the national strategy for the environment security required the issue of a methodology which is now in place and enabled the production of input elements and their integration in a national strategic document.

The methodology has been supplied to the staff involved in the elaboration of the final document.

2.2. The philosophy of the document

After establishing the work group, the coordinator of the technical and operational group presented the elements of the project philosophy in order to have a coherent vision on the documentation that had to be made as well as on the final document to be produced.

The main guidelines were the following:

- to highlight that the environment security and the national security are conditional upon each other and in particular the fact that the natural environment provides the necessary resources for the security of the nation.

- vulnerabilities will be highlighted by analyzing each component in particular- water, air, forests, biodiversity, ecosystems, natural resources, and so.

- to identify the real economic and financial potential of the country in order to avoid the elaboration of a document that cannot be implemented due to the lack of financial resources – a theoretical approach without practical purpose will be avoided.

- once we have a picture of the current situation, to propose the main ways of action for maintaining the natural balances within the limits that would enable a sustainable development .

- the ways of action will be based on the mainstream/holistic approach and on the efficient use of the national resources available – the accent will fall on the main resource (practically inexhaustible) which is the citizen, user and supplier of security at the personal, community level and at the national level.

- to focus explicitly on visionary projects such as the green economy, sustainable production and consumption.

- the approach will also provide solutions for the institutional reconfiguration/adjustment that would enable on one side, the alignment to international patterns and on the other side, the successful implementation of the national strategy provisions for the environment security - to identify the monitoring mechanisms, to establish the time required for an assessment of the results and to improve the whole document.

- the document will clearly specify the required resources for the completion of the actions and the institutions responsible for each action – the explicit responsibility being one of the favorable prerequisites for the implementation of the national strategy for environment security .

- to have in view the reasonable correlation of the development goals including the sector and regional programs with the natural capital sustaining potential and capacity.

- the document will sustain the continuous maintenance, consolidation, expansion and adjustment of the natural capital structural configuration and optimum operation potential as a main prerequisite to oppose the social development and economic growth pressure and especially as against the unpredictable impact of climatic changes.

- this document is part of the complex reassessment process of the documents, national strategies and programs stipulated in The National Strategy for Sustainable Development Orizonturi 2013-2020-2030

2.3. Structure of National Strategy for the Environment Security

A final document structure has been proposed and validated in order to produce the philosophy of the final document, as follows:

a) Preamble/Argument

a.1 The need to define this field in terms of a Romanian Security Strategy and of other documents related to national or world security.

a.2 The Purpose of this Strategy

b) Conceptual Clarifications

b.1 The manner in which the environment issues are presented in the main national and international documents .

b.2 Studies regarding the environment security definition /

b.3 A possible definition of the environment security as viewed by Romania

c) A Strategy for each field envisaged – environment factors – which identifies according to the methodology the risks and threats to the environment and national security, as a result of the currently identified problems or possible environment incidents of a natural or individual nature.

Actions to be taken include identification of 3-5 specific risks and threats, proposal of a minimum plan of actions, the time interval and the person responsible for its fulfillment of the planned actions and the costs involved.

c.1 sustainable development

- c.2 air
- c.3 soil
- c.4 water
- c.5 forests
- c.6 biodiversity and ecosystems
- c.7 climatic changes
- c.8 wastes – including radioactive waste
- c.9 strategic resources
- c.10 genetic modifications
- d. Legislative and Institutional Adjustment
 - d.1 the situation from the perspective of the current status .
 - d.2 possible adjustment of legislation as a result of natural phenomena and possible environment incidents considered threats to the environment security.
 - d.3 proposals for institutional reconfiguration .
- e. Implementation of a National Monitoring and Early Warning System
 - e.1 satellite images
 - e.2 aerial photos, using the INCAS King Air aircraft
 - e.3 monitoring by means of light unmanned aircraft vehicles (UAV)
 - e.4 implementation of a national integrated system for monitoring purposes and early warning, integration with a national platform for civil emergency situations.
 - e.5 Cross border cooperation
 - e.6 use of intelligence products
 - e.7 use of geographic intelligence system
- f. Specific Implementation Procedures - specific procedures related to the environment security will be detailed after the document approval by the Supreme Council of National Defense.
- g. Revision and Adjustment of the Document provision will be made for the time interval required in order to review and adjust the document and for the person responsible for this action and the completion term.

2.4. Methodology for the elaboration of the Strategy

Following the study of a significant volume of literature in the environment security field and possible methodologies for the elaboration of the final document, the following methodology has been proposed and approved by the ministry for the elaboration of the national strategy for the environment security:

- a) Definition of the current situation
 - to be produced based on the latest information available ;
 - accuracy is a an essential condition for the elaboration of an efficient strategy ;
 - the definition will be provided based on the main documents such as The Government Program: The National Reform Program; The National Security Strategy; The National Strategy for Sustainable Development of Romania, Orizonturi 2013-2020-2030; EU and UN Documents; etc.
- b. Identification of Problems

- after defining the current status it is possible to identify the set of real problems;
- realism is clearly required and not a qualitative and quantitative exaggeration;
- interpretation of the reality in terms of one's own perceptions should be avoided;
- there may be current or future problems (on a short, medium and long term) the latter can be generated by the current problem which are not being solved;
- a list of priorities of the problems will be produced based on the options resulting from the problem management real potential.

c. Identification of Objectives

- the short, medium and long term objectives at the regional, national and cross border level will be identified after identification of problems and priorities;
- the objectives will be approached from a holistic point of view, taking into consideration the national and international interdependencies;
- an analysis will be carried out regarding the potential options for the solving of the problems and we will resort to the whole range of policies specific of this field (sustainable development, green economy, pollution, wastes, forestry, waters, biodiversity, etc.);
- each objective will receive a SMART definition (S- specific, M-measurable ,by indicators where possible, A – that can be attained, R-relevant, realistic, T – time scheduled)

d. Identification of other Concurrent Interests

- identification of the objectives and problems as regards other national or cross border actors is essential in the strategic approach;
- a significant case is Rosia Montana (and those in the strategic resources area).

e. Identification and Analysis of Options

- identification of possible and feasible options/solutions in attaining the proposed targets;
- analysis of each option/set of options in terms of associated costs and risks;
- options at the national strategy level will include one or several means/instruments of the national strategy (political, economic, psychological, intelligence, military, etc.);
- options may resort to two or several means simultaneously or sequentially;
- e.g; political means can be used in order to adjust legislation and good governing diplomatic means can be used to promote Romania's position and interests within international bodies and organizations (EU, UN - see RIO+20);
- professional creativity is a requirement in this stage for those who are part of the working group and the scientific council;
- we must admit the assumption that certain problems cannot be solved, have no immediate solutions (for objective reasons, as a rule).

f) Selection of Options

- this is the final stage of the strategy elaboration process ;

- each option analyzed in terms of costs and risks will be examined as concerns the probability to solve the problems and to achieve the objectives;
- in this stage it is necessary to also consider the question: “what if the process does not develop to the plan, are there possible alternatives ?”;
- to implement the selected solutions specific procedures will be elaborated and an integrated monitoring and early warning system will be used (aerial photos or the solution advanced by INCAS Institute ‘Elie Carafoli’ regarding air and soil quality monitoring by means of ATMOSLAB are solutions that should not be neglected).

g) Processuality of Activities

- a strategy is a processuality which is not closed with the implementation of the solutions that have been chosen;
- in reality, each option for the use of means imposes their improvement in line with the dynamics of the events and the assessment of the performance attained by the implementation actions which aim at solving the problems and achieving the objectives (according to the current situation and those on short, medium and long term);
- modifications, adjustments will be required and these will impose new assessment in a continuous processuality upon finding significant deviations from the initial plan;
- national strategy approaches must be flexible and integrating until the proposed objectives are achieved.

3. Creation of database

Based on the national strategy methodology for the environment security and the philosophy of the final document, specialized departments of the Ministry of Environment and Forests, representatives of other ministries (the Ministry of Administration and Home Affairs, The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Business Development, the Ministry of Defense, the Romanian Intelligence Service and academics (The Academy of Agricultural and Forest Sciences) have submitted relevant documents to be included in the strategy project.

Analysis and proposals have been submitted in connection with waters, biodiversity, wastes, sustainable development, forests, climatic changes, mountain area, global information system, legislation. The specialists who were part of the working group have obtained a picture of the current situation in the previously mentioned fields (at the level of March 2012) and have advanced proposals regarding future actions to be taken to enable the adequate management of natural resources.

Based on these data the Technical and Operational Secretariat has initiated the elaboration of the draft national strategy for the environment security. After the RIO+20 Summit in June 2012, the documents approved on this meeting at the global level were supposed to be taken into consideration for the strategy project definition. The political reconfiguration in May 2012 has stopped this action.

Conclusions

In this end of this paper I think it opportune to present one of the opinions advanced by the working group members as regards the risks to the environment security.

With regard to the water field, reference has been made of the risks connected with the hydrotechnical constructions (dykes, dams, hydrological land management systems, etc.) supply of water, in the quantity and at the quality required for population, industry, agriculture, urbanism, aquaculture, navigation or national hydropower system. One of problems referred to by the specialists of the Water Directorate was the safety and stability of adjacent lands of the hydrotechnical constructions and facilities as these may produce the instability of rock prisms in the foundation or in the slopes.

As regards biodiversity, the objectives presented in the National Strategy for the Sustainable Development of Romania Orizonturi 2010-2020-2030 include the continuous preservation, consolidation, extension and adjustment of the structural configuration and of the biodiversity functional capacity as a background for maintaining and increasing the national capacity of support in correlation with the pressure of the social development and the economic growth and with the predictable impact of climatic changes. In the territory of Romanian there is a significant number of biogeographic regions and a large variety of natural habitats and wild species of community interest most of which being in favorable conservation status.

However, the biodiversity conservation indicator for Romania has the smallest value of all the other member states, namely 4,2.

The surface of protected natural areas, of national interest, represents 7% of the surface of the country and the total surface of Natura 2000 sites represents 22.68 % of the Romanian territory . A special importance should be given to the biodiversity of the Danube Delta Biosphere Reservation which has exceptional habitat.

Differentiation of the deltaic area from the first bifurcation to the seashore and from the main arms inward is the result of time evolution that led to the formation of levees, lakes, streams and amphibious lands and ecosystems. Since the delta ecosystems are in close interaction and are determined by the Danube river and the sun energy, this abiotic gearing is considered a an upper ecosystem level of matter organization. Of particular importance is its designation as a site of community importance within the European ecological network Natura 2000 which accommodates 29 types of habitats in the steppe bioregion and 3 types of habitats in the pontic bioregion.

Given the morpho-hydrological configuration, the flora and fauna associations, the impact of anthropic activity over the time, in the Reservation, two categories of ecosystems have been identified as follows: - natural ecosystems partially modified by human beings and anthropic ecosystems. A description was given of 23 ecosystems that have been partially modified by human beings and scattered on all

the surface of the Reservation, from the Danube's arms to the sea beaches and 7 anthropic ecosystems which include agricultural, fishery and forestry facilities or settlements. Another dimension of the national strategy for the environment security is the green gold, i.e the forests. Specialists in the field have noted the high quality of the forests the sustainable management based on the forest planning supplied for the majority of the forests in Romania, the highly trained, qualified and experienced personnel and the existence of time stable structures for the forest management that can provide continuity in the forest management and sustainable development.

Among the risks to the environment security, specialists have noted the exaggerate fragmentation of the forest stock which is private property (the current number of forest owners amounts to 80.000), the lack of financial support from the state budget for the forest owners, the reduced access due to insufficient forest roads (much below The average in the EU – 5,6 lm/ha as against 30 lm/ha) and the increased pressure on forests.

For the purpose of our national strategy for the security environment project we have received most valuable proposals from Professor Doctor Radu Rey, president of The Romanian Mountain Forum, the mountainous area representing 32% of the national territory surface and including 3.2 million agricultural ha. (2.5 million hectares hay-fields and pastures), 3.6 million inhabitants (2.1 million mountain agriculturists), 27 mountain counties (7 development regions) of which 77 localities (84 small towns, 656 communes with 3.320 villages).

The data base and a first version of the National Strategy for the Environment Project is at present in the possession of the author of this paper who has elaborated the philosophy and the methodology of the above mentioned document.

As the decision making staff of the ministry have shown no interest in the matter, in June, the author of this paper withdrew from the position of adviser to the general commissioner of the National Guard of Environment.

Maybe the actions will be resumed after the elections in December considering the acknowledged importance of the environment security issue which has become one of the strategic variables of the national, regional and international security.

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NEEDS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROVIDING UNIFIED COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY IN COALITION MILITARY OPERATIONS

*Daniel BRATULESCU PhD**

***Abstract:** Requirements and opportunities for communication and information services to ensure interoperability of Unified Communications (UCS) for the duration of coalition military operations, are the informational capabilities of different types of equipment, tools and software and hardware composition of these systems, specific procedures for interconnection and technical interface generates unified architectural infrastructure that can provide timely information transfer in accordance with the requirements and needs of specific operational controls theater.*

Technical capabilities information communication and information systems must meet current standards and procedures for systemic compatibility and interoperability in planning, organization and implementation of effective information flow, providing the benefit of participating in the task force.

***Keywords:** Unified Communications, mobility, systemic interconnection.*

Requirements and opportunities for communication and information services to ensure interoperability of Unified Communications (UCS) for the duration of coalition military operations, are the informational capabilities of different types of equipment, tools and software and hardware composition of these systems, specific procedures for interconnection and technical interface generates unified architectural infrastructure that can provide timely information transfer in accordance with the requirements and needs of specific operational controls theater.

Ability to integrate information capabilities of different types of communications and computer equipment in CU is a real trend existing systems, which is materialized by standardizing information formats and IP convergence of data transferred by implementing hardware and software interfacing possibilities specific performance capabilities and collaborative working, to configure a single technical architecture to provide users services of voice, data and video teleconferencing (VTC), encrypted and clearly provided in real time.

Technical capabilities information communication and information systems must meet current standards, and procedures for compatibility and interoperability systemic in planning, organization and implementation of effective information flow, provided the benefit of participating in the task force.

UCS technical requirements to ensure interoperability capabilities are provided by the following information (Figure 1), which must be fulfilled by the equipment and means of communication and information that make up the communication and information systems architecture, for the duration of coalition operations operational level:

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


Figure no. 1 - Interdependence capabilities of media information communication and information in coalition operations

- *Availability* - is the ability architectural technical elements to be able to provide communication and information services voice, data, VTC, wherever possible, depending on the specific mission requirements and operational needs. This requirement necessitates the coherent planning activities, organizing and maintaining a high degree of efficiency of the elements of communication and information systems¹ to ensure continuous and comprehensive volume of specific services;

- *Mobility* - defines means of communication and information capacity to be easily transportable, deployable and deployed so that, depending on the performance of coalition operations, can be interconnected system with specific requirements for interoperability and specific security policies. This requirement enables the technical elements of communication and information to be used quickly, at the right place at the right time, which is defined as a capability that is affected by transmission capacity in theater;

- *efficiency* - is the ability of specialized personnel to design, organize and implement the system architecture and the elements / components of the technical equipment to provide communications services and good quality information that circulated through information flow to produce the expected sending and receiving timely information;

- *Flexibility* - defines means of communications and computing capacity to be availability, the technical and tactical characteristics constructive to the needs of command and operational control of the mission. This requirement is manifested by machinery capabilities to provide multiple opportunities for communication services and also to accept different versions of interconnection and interfacing, in terms of providing multiple ways to reconfigure systems. The chosen solution configuration / reconfiguration architecture should aim to use the technical elements of

¹ *Unified Communications: Top 10 Architecture Considerations*, Adamo White Paper, Cupertino, USA, June 2007, pp.3-9.

communication and information so that, under the particular operating environment, specific capabilities can be transferred easily to reduce or supplement the specific services allocated to users;

- *modularity* - the capacity of the means of communication and information to be established as physically separated components called modules defining element in their entirety by interconnecting their respective technical and enforcement opportunities with ease, the specific procedures to improve systemic or settlement of any damage;

- *Reliability* - is the ability of communication and information equipment to be used for a long time. This requirement generates, in addition to the lifetime of specific technical elements mentioned the need to allow different forms and interconnection interface and provide additional opportunities for improvement and modernization.

Opportunities identified in ensuring interoperability UCS integration possibilities are represented by communication and information systems and to improve the UCS traditional communication services provided by increasing traffic capacity achieved by increasing the quality of communication and information provided, together with the possibility organization of information transfer in real time to users deployed in various operational areas, specific becoming increasingly diverse contemporary military actions.

In this respect, we consider that the Romanian Army (AR) capabilities previously identified information and interdependence generated between them is defined in considerations provision of organization and operation of computer communication systems and the AR (SCIAR), which is the ability of equipment and techniques particular to ensure, as required by operational controls, timely and efficient services and offers the possibility that, through assimilation current technological developments specific contemporary society, allowing the transfer and integration of traditional UCS.

Specific opportunities to ensure interoperability of coalition operations are generated UCS specific procedures and standards and interconnection interface systemic different categories of resources which define the architectural infrastructure for communication and information, which must meet the following significant technical requirements:

- access basic functions of communication and information services can be facilitated by improving processes and phenomena specific security Web technologies;

- Providing adaptive support system and configured networks are generated by a community of hardware and software applications represented by providers and recipients of information conveyed through operational information flow;

- encryption information to organize and perform in accordance with their classification level and their sharing, linking the classification level of the duties, responsibilities and rights of access to information for users;

- representation capabilities of information resources and communication and information services voice, data, and VTC to be planned, organized and secured so as

to justify their request, in order to meet information exchange requirements and in accordance with the needs of operational controls;

- distribution of information within the structures participating in coalition operations rely on methods and procedures which ensure the reduction or reducing information overload by dynamic routing capabilities of information transfer and circulation, easily, information between users;

- Providing technical and procedural interoperability can be organized and carried out by functional service specification, agreed upon standards accepted in the Alliance. Communication and information services specifications may be published in a common register at the Joint Multinational Headquarters (JTF HQ²), according to a coalition agreed standards or may be distributed on the network.

Interoperability and compatibility of equipment and means of communication and information in unified communications (UC) and the possibility of organizing and carrying out the transfer traditional communication and information systems is a current trend towards UCS specific systems, which can be achieved by the following requirements³:

- Coherent development of architectural investments of a single technical infrastructure that will benefit from the possibilities of IP information transfer;

- Identify technical capabilities, implementing and assimilating them into the technical architecture as hardware and software interfacing applications and specific input port;

- fulfillment of specific conditions and use of equipment connectivity IP signal processing;

- planning and organizing high availability networks;

- fulfillment of technical and procedural interoperability and compatibility;

- Use architectural type settings drop-insert;

- Implementing and using active directory migration information flows.

The prerequisites for interoperability and compatibility of equipment and means of communication and information are essential requirement of the UCS used in modern coalition operations. This is caused by specific operational needs and is characterized deployment contemporary trend of these systems by quantifying the benefits of using a single technical infrastructure architecture, the organization and the transfer information of diverse communication and information services, encrypted and unencrypted in a timely real, in accordance with the requirements and needs of command and control.

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² NC3A, *Notification of Intent new NATO Headquarters Active Network Infrastructure*, Brussels, Belgium, August 26, 2011, pp.1-5.

³ *Microsoft Unified Communications Network Architectures*, March 27, 2012, <http://ebookbrowse.com/microsoft-unified-communications-network-architectures-pdf-d327648648> accessed on 10.08.2012

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“FLAG OF CONVENIENCE” RISK FACTOR IN THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

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Abstract: *After the 9/11 attacks, global concerns have been expressed for security issues and the fear about the risk that ships registered under flags of convenience can be used in terrorist actions or to finance them. Often, the ownership identification and accountability are hidden under the veil of incorporation by several corporate structure types offshore spread over a number of different jurisdictions. The registration of ships under the flags of convenience, without requiring a visible connection between the ship and its beneficial owners, impede disclosure of any possible terrorist assets. More than ever, it is necessary to eliminate the risk of insecurity created by irresponsible flags in international governance of the Sea.*

Keywords: *arms trafficking, organized crime, terrorism, sanctions, smuggling.*

Introduction

During the development of the shipping industry, to limit the liability effects of vessels belonging to the same owner and to optimize their profit, companies of a single ship registered in more lenient jurisdictions have emerged. These companies offer full confidentiality about the identity of shareholders and are tax attractive to investors.

In a world of increasingly globalized capital flow acting aggressively on the open market, more and more states are trying to find ways to attract and keep them. As a consequence of increased economic competition, more states offer favorable tax incentives through maritime open register's establishment, regardless of the real nationality of shareholders of the ships or their place of management. In exchange for a very competitive fee, and in no regard to a company's profit, such registered vessels get the right to fly the state flag. Also, most of these countries offer full confidentiality of financial transactions, while protecting the identity of real owners of such vessels registered and greater ease to complying with safety and security standards of shipping activity and without restrictions of employment.

Following the revolutionary technological advances of recent years, in addition to founded approach of bona fide investors to find new solutions to protect and increase their capital in the context of increasingly fierce competition, internationalization of organized crime and terrorism that led to the appearance of modern organizations cross-border became possible. These have accumulated a considerable financial power that allows the involvement of human and capital resources in the transactions that are much more diverse. To finance their actions, significant revenues are achieved through activities that seem legal, but actually speculate the laws' imperfection and which cover illegal operations of money laundering from smuggling, arms trafficking, drugs, people, etc.

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The involvement of multiple and different jurisdictions and the global dimension of illegal activities make almost impossible the identification and timely blockage of any assets of organized crime or terrorist organizations. Often, investigators tracing terrorist assets have failed to penetrate the corporate veil¹ provided by the legislation of flags of convenience, protected by confidentiality of the system, which in fact protects its own economic interest.

1. “Phantom” Ships, risk factor in shipping

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, worldwide concerns have been expressed about the risk of ships registered under flags of convenience being used in terrorist actions or in their financing.

It is known that terrorist groups can operate individual ships or fleets, to generate funds for supporting their operations. As a means of financial assurance, drugs trafficking, people and weapons, have been frequently used by the terrorist groups like LTTE.

Underlining the importance of naval power for his group, in 2005, Velupillai Prabhakaran, the former leader of LTTE declared²: *"Geographically, the security of Tamil Eelam is interlinked with that of its seas. Its only when we are strong in the seas and break the dominance our enemy now has that we will be able to retain land areas we liberated and drive our enemies from our homeland."*

They have developed a maritime wing, "Sea Tigers", equipped with small boats and crafts for suicide bombings; they launched attacks on military and commercial ships in Sri Lanka, and in September 1997, attacked with machine guns a Panamanian flag tanker. This attack alone resulted in the killing of 33 crewmembers. In July 1997, the “Sea Tigers” were involved³ in the hijacking of the ship "Stillus Limmasul" which carrying about 32,400 rockets for launchers of 81 mm for the Sri Lankan army. Estimates⁴ show that the organizational structure and maritime assets of the “Sea Tigers” *"are quite capable and can well compete with the maritime facilities of a small island state,"* consisting of a fleet of 12-15 seagoing merchant ships with capacities of 1000-1500 DWT, a considerable number of fishing vessels, motor boats of high speed and a well trained staff. Much of the transported goods are legitimate, the vessels are operated on maritime markets, worldwide and the funds generated are used by the organization to support fight against the Government of Sri Lanka. Also, these ships transport weapons, ammunition and other military

¹ A legal concept that separates the personality of a corporation from the personalities of its shareholders, and protects them from being personally liable for the company's debts and other obligations. This protection is not ironclad or impenetrable. Where a court determines that a company's business was not conducted in accordance with the provisions of corporate legislation (or that it was just a façade for illegal activities) it may hold the shareholders personally liable for the company's obligations under the legal concept of lifting the corporate veil. (www.businessdictionary.com).

² http://www.ipcs.org/article_details.php?articleNo=1757.

³ <http://www.lankalibrary.com/pol/LTTE.htm>.

⁴ <http://www.tamilguardian.com/tg323/p9.pdf>.

equipment necessary for terrorism actions and operations carried out by the LTTE. Their network of weapons procurement is extensive and sophisticated, and makes use of extensive knowledge of the maritime practices and business procedures.

Ships that are hijacked, captured or kidnapped by terrorists or pirates are again registered under flags of convenience, and used for transportation and smuggling of arms, ammunition or military equipment, to launch attacks on ports and port facilities, or for transportation of weapons of mass destruction for terrorist organizations.

Although the International Maritime Organization has developed a package of *"Measures to Prevent the Registration of 'Phantom' Ships"*⁵, these measures are quite permissive, and experts recommend⁶ that if a state can not provide assurance that vessels registered under its flag are legitimate, then all ships registered under that flag shall be blacklisted and their access denied in territorial waters of other states. If this does not happen internationally, states could produce their own blacklists.

2. IMO Identification Number Scheme

In 1987, IMO⁷ adopted resolution A.600 (15) which introduced the IMO Ship Identification Number Scheme as a means of *"maritime safety, and pollution prevention and to facilitate the prevention of maritime fraud"*. The use of this number became mandatory in 1996 for all vessels.

The objective was to facilitate vessel identification by assigning a permanent number to each ship. Even in the event of changing name, flag, or ownership, a ship's IMO would remain the same until its dissolution.

In December 2002, together with a number of other amendments to SOLAS⁸, regulation XI-1/3 was amended to enhance the security of ships and port facilities. The amendment stipulated that ship identification numbers be permanently marked in a visible place *"either on the stern of the ship or on either side of the hull, amidships port and starboard, above the deepest assigned load line or either side of the superstructure, port and starboard or on the front of the superstructure..."* Passenger ships shall have the mark and on a horizontal surface visible from the air. Also, vessels should be marked with identification numbers and interior spaces.

IMO ship identification consists of the three letters "IMO" followed by 7 numeric characters assigned to all ships trading powered 100 gross tonnage and over by Lloyd's Register Fairplay⁹. The exceptions are fishing vessels, vessels without propulsion, private yachts, vessels used for special services, shipborne barges mud, warships, timber ships, floating docks, and structures classified similarly.

In May 2005, IMO adopted a new regulation, SOLAS XI-1/3-1, introducing the identification number of the company and of the registered owner, and

⁵ IMO Resolution A.923(22) dated 29 November 2001.

⁶ Gal Luft, Anne Korin, *Terrorism Goes to Sea*, Foreign Affairs, 2004.

⁷ International Maritime Organization, www.imo.org.

⁸ International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea.

⁹ <http://www.imonumbers.lrfairplay.com>.

amendments to regulation XI-1/5 - the mandatory adoption of identification numbers for companies and registered owners, effective beginning January 1, 2009.

Regulation 1.3 provides that *"each company and registered owner will have an identification number corresponding to an allocation scheme IMO unique company and registered owner identification"*, adopted by the Organization by resolution MSC¹⁰.160(78) entitled *"The IMO Unique Company and Registered Owner Identification Number Scheme"*. A number of other amendments require the addition of this unique number on relevant certificates and documents of the ISM¹¹ and the ISPS¹² Code.

Governments that decide to implement these numbers are required to allocate companies and registered owners and insert them in their certificates, informing them of the IMO to be known to other Administrations. These are unique numbers assigned by Lloyd's Register Fairplay only, the sole authority in identifying and allocating the IMO numbers to ships, companies and owners.

The SOLAS Convention, Chapter XI-1/5. states that each ship must have on board the "Continuous Synopsis Record" (CSR) showing continuous history of the ship, in chronological way, from construction to deletion and dismantling. Any change of name, port of registry, flag, class, owner, manager, must be recorded in a ship's synopsis so as to reveal any changes.

Ships constructed before 1st July 2004 are required to be in possession of the CSR, since from that date.

The "Continued Synopsis Record" of each ship must be on board and available for any inspection or control by the authorities.

3. Flag of convenience

Historically, the use of flags of convenience emerged in the second decade of the last century. With tightening shipping legislation, labor laws, and increased operating costs for vessels of the United States of America, the owners began to register ships under Panama flags. This gave the state more competitive cost condition, and allowed for increased flexibility in applying legal rules.

International Transport Workers Federation (ITF)¹³ in 1948 initiated an industrial campaign in the international shipping industry, at the World Congress in Oslo, Norway, in order to protect seafarers serving on flag of convenience ships, regardless of nationality, against exploitation by shipowners. ITF action was accompanied by a political campaign at international government level to eliminate flags of convenience from that system.

In 1974, the ITF has defined flag of convenience (FOC)¹⁴ as *"Where beneficial ownership and control of a vessel is found to lie elsewhere than in the country of the*

¹⁰ Maritime Safety Committee.

¹¹ International Safety Management Code.

¹² International Ship and Port Facility Security Code.

¹³ International Transport Workers' Federation, www.itfglobal.org.

¹⁴ Flag of Convenience.

flag the vessel is flying, the vessel is considered as sailing under a flag of convenience". In this sense, the Fair Practices Committee of the ITF campaign against FOC said that the flags of the following countries were to be considered FOCs: Antigua, Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda (UK), Bolivia, Burma, Cambodia, Cayman Islands, Comoros, Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea, French International Ship Register (FIS), German International Ship Register (GIS), Georgia, Gibraltar (UK), Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia, Malta, Marshall Islands (US), Mauritius, Mongolia, Netherlands Antilles, North Korea, Panama, Sao Tome and Principe, St. Vincent, Sri Lanka, Tonga and Vanuatu.

4. Iranian fleet flag looking lost

The first sanctions on Iran were imposed by the United States following the 1979 Islamic revolution. Subsequently, many other countries and international organizations have imposed sanctions on Iran because of its nuclear program, missiles, illegal arms trafficking, financing Islamic terrorist networks, but also because of its attitude of repeatedly ignoring UN resolutions.

As a measure to counter international sanctions over its commercial fleet, Iran has used a so-called privatization and registration of its ships under various flags of convenience. Since 2008, in an attempt to escape an economic embargo, the vessels that belonged to the largest fleets of state NITC¹⁵ changed from the Iranian flag to flags of convenience such as Cyprus and Malta.

Rather than respond constructively to international concerns, the regime in Tehran has continued to escalate regional conflicts, with security implications at a global level. On July 17, 2012, in Pyongyang, senior officials from North Korea and Iran met to devise a "*common front against imperialism and hegemony*"¹⁶. For several years, the two countries known as the "*Axis of Evil*"¹⁷ and "*Problem States*"¹⁸ are subject to international sanctions for their nuclear activities and for financing terrorism. It is well known that governments in Tehran and Pyongyang share a deep hostility towards the United States and other western countries.

The European Union has imposed its own restrictions on cooperation with Iran in foreign trade, in financial services, energy and technology sectors, and banned insurance and reinsurance companies from Member States to provide services to Iran or Iranian-controlled companies. From January 23, 2012, the EU imposed an embargo on Iranian oil and also agreed to freeze the assets of Iran's central bank and out of SWIFT¹⁹ identified other Iranian banks as institutions that violate the sanctions.

Under pressure from sanctions, former Iranian ships sailing under the Cypriot or Maltese flags were forced to look outside the EU for other flags of convenience.

¹⁵ National Iranian Tanker Company.

¹⁶ <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-08-23/an-nkorea-iran-nam/4217774>.

¹⁷ <http://www.irregulartimes.com/axisanagram.html>.

¹⁸ See Bush administration's "war on terror".

¹⁹ Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication.

Using “shield” companies, repainting ships and registering them under other flags could not escape the vigilance of the U.S. and the EU in their desire to enforce sanctions and force the Iranian authorities to comply with UN resolutions.

Although not yet considered flags of convenience, in an attempt to attract and generate new revenue, Tanzania, Tuvalu and Moldova have facilitated the registration of ships without knowing their true identity. Only international pressure led the governments of these countries to withdraw the right to fly its flag on vessels and cancel registration. Following this incident, the Prime Minister of Moldova, Vlad Filat, said: *“For any future registrations, a permit will be mandatory from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The existing procedure is flawed. An official from the Ministry of Transport cannot make decisions that can result in creating difficulties in our relationships with external partners”*²⁰.

5. Romanian flag registration waving transition

The disappearance of the Romanian fleet is still a pretty hot topic, and cyclically bears controversy. The fact is that in the early 1990s, Romania had a complex fleet, from small tonnage ships to large ships, including almost all types of cargo ships, bulk carriers, tankers and other specialized ships, totaling more than 300 ships, commercial and fishing vessels, classified by Romanian Naval Register and flying the Romanian flag.

During the years after 1989, Romania has tried to cope with the difficulties of transitioning to a free market. The Romanian fleet, subject to competition from an increasingly fierce market, tried to find all sorts of ways to survive, from pledging its management of ships by providing on site management of domestic investors and foreign partnerships, to registering ships under flags of convenience, after reclassifying ships with other classification societies.

From this *“joint venture”* collaboration, Romania has remained both without its fleet and its classification society. The vast majority of specialists from the Romanian Naval Register found employment in foreign, competitor markets, and our classification society has turned into a technical inspectorate, as part of the Romanian Naval Authority.

To save what could be saved, the Romanian Government decided to establish a Special Maritime Regime in which registered companies are exempt from income tax and the ships owned by those companies pay a tonnage tax similar to that of the countries with tradition in open registers and flags of convenience. In this regard was issued by OUG no.116/1998 which was aimed at *“providing facilities and financial support for modernization and development of Romanian flag vessels, to increase the prestige of Romanian flag on the international shipping market, attracting new revenue to the state budget and ensuring free movement of labor employed in shipping industry”*.

Due to changes in government and the legislative instability created by the misunderstanding of the phenomenon of internationalized shipping, this law, subject

²⁰ Moldova Prime minister declaration (free translation).

to multiple amendments and significant content, lost support and has not reached its goal.

Now, 14 years after the first attempt to create an international shipping register, the Romanian Naval Authority initiated a new project to establish the International Maritime Register of Romania. This initiative could not escape the media who reported it and commented, noting the following: *“On the 8th of August 2012, Romanian Naval Authority posted on the European Union website the announcement that it was looking to contract services for attracting foreign ships under a new register that they will also manage.[...]Romanian Naval Authority intends to grant an exclusivity contract of agency for registration services of foreign vessels under the Romanian flag, to a private partner for a period of 30 years. [...]Deadline for applications was 28 august 2012. By that time, a single bidder was presented, a German company ... ”*.

The desire to attract Romanian flag vessels is welcomed in terms of reviving an important economic sector in a globalized economy. It can be a new source of revenue to the budget, but also an opportunity to create new jobs and showcase the Romanian maritime education at a university level.

Problems arise when the registration activity and registry management and more, which should lie solely with State authority, are to be awarded to a foreign private company by an exclusivity contract. It is increasingly recognized that many countries entrust most of their technical duties, but not those of recording, to classification societies, preferably pertaining to IACS²¹, whose professional integrity and fairness are internationally recognized.

However, we must not forget that ultimately, any classification society is a private business organization that is governed by the profit motive in a competitive market. Desire to maintain a portfolio of customers and profit at any cost may be vulnerabilities in the system.

After September 11, 2001, the International Maritime Organization had to consider the risks that may occur as a result of terrorist acts on ships and port facilities. The authorities have been advised to give greater importance to the proper identification of the real owners of ships and their financial transactions.

Interposition of a private company between a shipowner and the flag State authority can be a source of risk in the security environment. Maritime registry management by another entity, other than the Competent Authority of the State, may facilitate registration of the vessels with problems or which can cause future problems that may affect the flag state. The International Maritime Register shall be managed by the authority of the flag State, and shall be open to all who meet regulations and standards.

Above any financial gains, importance should be given to fostering an environment of security compatible to that of any NATO member country and European Union member, through strict adherence to all international agreements and conventions of which Romania is part.

²¹ International Association of Classification Societies.

Conclusions

Article 91 of UNCLOS²² states, “*There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship*”, which must be a true and visible link between the ship and the State whose flag the ship is flying.

To this end, flag States should ensure that ship owners and managers are properly identified and monitored constantly by lifting the corporate veil. Also, administrative and financial institutions of the flag are required to register and keep records of all transactions and changes in ownership, guaranteeing their authenticity.

However, the number of ships sailing under a foreign flag other than the national, rather than decreasing, is constantly growing. If in 1989 only 41.5% of the world’s tonnage was registered under a foreign flag (other than the nationality of the shareholders), in 2011, the percentage reached 68%.

To increase the safety and security of shipping and environmental protection, more than ever emphases should be given to eliminating the security deficit created by the flag of convenience of states that are showing irresponsible international governance of the world’s oceans and seas.

“*Every State shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag*”²³.

In addition to compliance with all current regulations imposing minimum standards of safety for navigation, maritime transport safety, and environmental protection, a global and unified approach to all aspects of taxation of shipping activities is imperative.

The elimination of unfair competition due to differential treatment of financial and economic issues in each state, for globalization purposes, shall be a priority for international organizations, a prerequisite to increasing the security of international shipping.

The authority of a state cannot be delegated; it is imposed and exercised on its behalf and for its benefit, to ensure the creation of a secure environment compatible with its interests and those of its allies.

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PANEL 3:
Potential risks and threats
to the security environment

COMPLEX INSECURITY EFFECTS OF POVERTY, DEPLETION, SOCIAL RESTRATIFICATION AND IMPLICIT ACCEPTANCE

*Gheorghe VĂDUVA, PhD.**

***Abstract:** In the world, it takes place a new and intricate process of populations' depletion and reconfiguration of poverty concept under the globalization pressures, under a very strong anaesthetic network effect by complicated systems of populations and countries indebtedness and acceptance of the new condition, under implicit dependencies and interdependencies. This effect creates new supports for dangers and threats against individual, society and countries' security, and as well new vulnerabilities generating hazardous and unpredictable evolutions able to lead to endogen conflicts and even to asymmetrical and atypical implosion wars. In Romania, this process has extremely some visible, other hidden, aggressive evolutions, and the ratio of implicit acceptance and of reaction's unpredictability, other than emigration, is very large. From here comes a possible reconfiguration of areas of dangers, threats and vulnerabilities, on which intersection it is shaping a new type of security risk.*

***Keywords:** poverty, acceptance, risk, indebtedness, sophistication, network, interdependency.*

1. Wealth and poverty. Conflict, complementarity, connection

Poverty and wealth are not relative but only complementary collocations and, consequently, in conflict, even if in many situations their correspondents in reality can easily pass one into another. Actually, *volens, nolens*, one generates the other, and also the collocations makes sense only together and connected. Perhaps many of us do not want to be very wealthy, either very poor, but somewhere in-between them; there, where to feel secured, at least from economic and financial perspective.

Here from, does not necessarily results that some entities getting wealthy presumes others being depleted, but, usually, the things go like this. The wealth and poverty polarize, and the line of demarcation between the both realities is, actually, a kind of small territorial waters of Wealth Isle, separating this of the huge ocean of poorness, protecting it and maintaining it sole, single, visible and prosper, with the help of this pillar continuously alimending from its waters.

The conclusion drawn by the World Bank is, in world, the poverty diminishes. Still, at the end of 2008, in regard to some studies of this financial institution, 1.3 billions of inhabitants, meaning about a quarter of planet's population, lived under the extreme line of poverty, with less then 1.25 dollars/day.

Indeed, the diminution from 1.9 billions peoples leaving, in 1981, in conditions of extreme poverty, to 1.3 billions, how much they were in 2008 in this situation, is significant, especially under the circumstances wherein the population registered an remarkable growth, getting close, on that time, to about 7 billions (number overlapped meanwhile at the beginning of 2012).

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Also the extreme poverty rate (of population living with less than 1.25 dollars/day) was diminished from 52.2% as it was in 1981, to 22.4% as it was in 2008 and, perhaps, this trend will be maintained.

The most significant results over the reduction of extreme poverty diminution were accomplished in the Eastern Asia, prior on China's charge, who succeeded significant economic performances. In 2008, the extreme poverty rate in this area was about 14.3%, this representing 284 millions of peoples, while, in 1981, this rate was about 77.2%, representing over a billion of peoples. Of course, these substantial reductions are owed to the Chinese miracle because in the Sub-Sahara Africa, the extreme poverty rate, for the same period of time, diminished only by 4 percents (from 51.5% to 47.5%), the area's population growing from 204.9 millions to 386 millions inhabitants.

The extreme poverty threshold (1.25 dollars) is, still, very low, under the circumstances wherein the inflation grew, the prizes exploded, etc. If, for example, this threshold will be of 2 dollars/day/inhabitant, what is very normal when the currencies, even the ones of international circulation decay every day, then the number of persons living under this threshold will be about 2.5 billions, representing 43% from globe's population. Perhaps the number of poor persons is bigger because poverty does not mean only the lack of money, but also all the effects it produces (lack of education, the growth of criminality, the increase of number of persons with serious congenital illnesses, the growth of immorality, etc.).

Details	1981	1984	1987	1990	1993	1996	1999	2002	2005	2008
<1 \$/day	1545	1369	1259	1365	1338	1150	1182	1096	886	806
< 1.25\$/day (the extreme poverty threshold)	1938	1858	1768	1909	1910	1704	1743	1639	1390	1289
< 2\$/day	2585	2680	2710	2864	2941	2865	2938	2848	2596	2471

Table no. 1 Poor peoples in numbers (in millions)




Figure no. 2 Poverty rate evolution (%)

Details	1981	1984	1987	1990	1993	1996	1999	2002	2005	2008
<1 \$/day	41.6	34.7	30,1	30.8	28.7	23.5	23.1	20.6	16	14
< 1.25 \$/day	52.2	47.1	42.3	43.1	40.9	34.8	34.1	30.8	25.1	22.4
< 2 \$/day	69.6	68	64.8	64.6	63.1	58.6	57.4	53.5	46.9	43

Details	1981	1984	1987	1990	1993	1996	1999	2002	2005	2008
Asia-Pacific	1096.5	970	847.6	926.4	870.8	639.7	655.6	523.1	332.1	284.4
China	835.1	719.9	585.7	683.2	632.7	442.8	446.3	363.1	211.9	173
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	8.2	6.9	6.8	8.9	13.7	18.2	17.8	10.6	6.3	2.2
Latin America and Caribbean	43.3	52.9	49.3	53.4	52.5	53.6	60.1	62.7	47.6	36.8
Middle East and Northern Africa	16.5	15.1	14.6	13	11.5	12.3	13.6	12	10.5	8.6
Southern Asia	568.4	573.8	593	617.3	631.9	630.8	619.5	640.5	598.3	570.9
Sub-Saharan Africa	204.9	239.1	256.8	289.7	330	349.4	376.8	390.4	394.9	386
Total	1937.8	1857.7	1768.2	1908.6	1910.3	1704	1743.4	1639.3	1389.6	1289

Table no. 3 The evolvement of number of persons living under the extreme poverty threshold (on regions)¹
Note: The extreme poverty threshold is considered by the World Bank to be 1.25 dollars/day/person

2. World's wealth – a reality with intricate effects

Tenth part of world's population has 83% of its wealth. The other ninth parts have ... the rest, meaning 17% from planet's wealth. Together, America and Europe have 60% of world's wealth.

The global wealth, in 2010, was estimated to 194,000 billions of dollars, in regard to a report of Credit Suisse (4.4 billions of dollars for the adults, about 43,800 dollars per person). If this sum would be shared to all the planet's inhabitants, each of them would get 27,714 billions of dollars!

It is obvious this can not be done because the world, in the actual system, can not function but in certain conditions, in fact, the wealth being not only current account, but a current account plus a huge deposit providing the reserve and the needed flexibility in complicated times of crises, calamities, disasters, wars, etc.

In regard to Credit Suisse, 1% of planet's rich people have 43.6% of its wealth, and 10% from the richest owe 83% of it. 0.5% of the population (24 millions adults) with a fortune about one million dollars owe 35% from world's richness. In order to be part of that 1% of the richest peoples of the planet, one should have 588,000 dollars (420,000 euros) and the capability to reproduce them.

At the opposite pole, half of the poorest persons have only 1% from the patrimony and 20% of the population do not have more than 672 dollars.

Wealth's repartition on regions:

- Northern America and Europe: 62% of the global monetary patrimony;

¹ Source: World Bank

- Asia-Pacific (without India and China): 22%;
- China: 8.5%;
- India and other emergent countries: 2%;
- Africa: 1% of the global monetary patrimony.




Figure no. 4 Welfare distribution on geographic areas

The same discrepancies also maintain to the repartition of average wealth per inhabitant (adult):

- In Northern America and Western Europe, as well as in some very rich Asian countries: over 100,000 dollars;
- In Africa: 5,000 dollars.

These disparities exist in each region. They perpetuated in centuries, and the great crises, war and calamities coming over the planet or certain regions did not essentially change this reality.

In Switzerland, for example, the average wealth per adult person is about 372,700 dollars. The United States are on seventh place, after Sweden and France, on fifth place with an average patrimony of 255,156 dollars.

The number of millionaires:

- United States: more than 10 millions of millionaires;
- Japan and France: each, about 2 millions millionaires;
- The United Kingdom: 1.2 millions millionaires;
- Germany: 1 million.

The most of them, meaning 40% of world's millionaires, are in USA.

The top of the countries with the most millionaires:

	Number of millionaires	Percentage (%)
United States of America	9 940 044	40,5
Japan	2 380 043	9,7
France	2 225 078	9,1
Italy	1 415 000	5,8
The United Kingdom	1 230 959	5,1
Germany	1 040 000	4,3
Canada	904 918	3,3
China	805 002	3,3
At world level	25 545 900	100
Source: Crédit Suisse. Année des données : 2010, see http://www.inegalites.fr/spip.php?article1393		

Table no. 5 The top of the countries with the most millionaires

A trenchant question is raised, and its answer is known or glimpsed by each of us: *Is world's generating poverty or is world's poverty generating wealth? By all means, the rich peoples enrich on behalf of poor peoples or the poor peoples deplete because of the rich peoples accumulating for their use and control all the resources from which they only pay humans' labour generally exercised by the whole active population inclusively by the rich peoples, the one actually producing the accumulated and constituted values in the so-called wealth?*

We know very well how the things are because the system is designed likewise since the world exists and the trials, done along the time to change it, failed.

This system has, mainly, the following characteristics:

- shares the planet's population in rich and poor;
- situates the labour in the centre of human condition and existence, and, likewise, it creates and maintains the needed support for the human nature, human society, its reproduction, survival and development on the Earth;
- by the fact the labour is the only force propelling the human civilization to only in part predictable horizons, is instituted as intrinsic processes to labour philosophy and physiognomy, systems of professional training, of knowing the involvements of labour processes, connexions and inter-determinations, as well as components or intrinsic or qualified security systems which should provide stability to the system and to protect against dangers and threats by reducing its vulnerabilities to those;
- creates and reproduces, by an intricate engagement, hierarchies, competencies, inequalities, and relative balances.

On the beginnings of economic thinking, about Adam Smith times, it was considered the birth rate, in the wealthy and educated countries will be bigger then in the other countries. In time, the wealth per inhabitant will equalize between different countries, by an average convergence.

The reality shows the contrary: as much a country is poorer, as much its population will raise faster. And this conclusion resulted from statistics it is not available for all the countries and for all the countries. Romania, for example, who today is a poor country, has a negative birth rate of population. In 1996, when the country still had a certain economic power, the GDP per inhabitant was about 3,980

dollars, the population growth rate was about 3 to hundred (birth rate was 10 to hundred, and the death rate about 13 to hundred), the country situating on 25th place (from 40 countries) ...

What does mean poverty? In France, for example, it is considered the poverty threshold is defined on the half of average level of living. The average revenue in France, in 2004, was about 1,314 euros per month. The poverty threshold was considered to be on 657 euros, and the “poor persons” representing, in this country, 6.2% of the population. In Romania, this revenue it is not a poverty threshold, but one over the average level and only a small part of employed population benefits by such revenue.

3. Poverty, riot and acceptance

The wealth effect or richness is a game between the profit rate and the value of previous investment (if it follows to be resold). As the profit rate increases the value of the previous investments decreases and inversely. This game represents a danger and even a threat against the wealthy person but also a chance to double or triple his wealth. By these market's games, particularly if the investments are done under conditions of major risk (taking on a danger which can radically change the businessman condition) and even of extreme risk (when all is played on one card), the rich man can become few times richer, but also very poor, only in few minutes; or more, is possible even to get poor all the persons participating in with very large sums (in comparison to their revenues), at his request, in such investments.

Nowadays, more then yesterday, the wealth and the poverty have very wide content. A person who wins 657 euro/month, in France is considered a poor man, but in Romania he is part of the middle class, and if in his family is also other person winning the same payment monthly, this family with revenue of 1,314 euros/month, if he lives within his expenses and investments can become prosperous and even rich.

Under these circumstances, the person's economic and financial security – and even of the family – becomes dependent by many variables, some hard to be understood and, therefore, very flexible because the ratio of uncertainty grows and the probability as each to reach lower to the poverty threshold and even in the area of extreme poverty becomes greater. Anyway, the poverty is inversely proportional with a state economic stability, with the quality of economic policies, with the technology, thinking and political and economic intelligence of each, but also of the strategic decision-makers.

If the state is bad governed, and the economic, financial, educational, social policies and the respective management are precarious, unsure, vassal, lacked of coherence, clarity, inventiveness and, particularly, of knowledge or correct formulation of national interest, of vital national interest; the country gets poorer, the ratio of insecurity increases, the population is unpleased, the strategic investors go far, the corruption grows, the autochthonous investors and wealth peoples speculate, the economic projects – the existing ones – fail, the specialists emigrate, the brains evade to other places wherein can be better valued but also better paid.

For example, the reforms done since now in Romania in industry, in agriculture, in the educational system, but also in the defence, public order and national safety structures did not bring a plus of security but, on the contrary, they destroyed the potential bases of any form of security by own forces, the whole country's security grounding nowadays on the country's status as European Union and NATO member. But, from here does not result any type of security, at any conditions. For example, the food security is seriously affected by the ineffective policies in agriculture development. The paradoxes existing in the agriculture field exist utmost in all the other fields. Romania is a country with very qualitative and wide ranged agricultural land situating, by this regard, among the richest countries in Europe. And, still, Romania with one of the richest cultivable soils in Europe, imports 70% of its agro-food products. This is not really affliction, but a very big vulnerability, which, under crisis and conflict situations costs enormously.

Of course, the irrigation systems were unrigged because no one afforded to invest in them and either to use them because, by using them, would have increase very much the cost price of wheat, corn, industrial plants, etc. tone and this would make these products hardly accessible (as price) for the intern needs of food of population, but also to export, and the competitors have benefited by this temporal helplessness of Romanian agriculture management (it can not be done modern and competitive agriculture with the hoe and the plough pulled by bad fed oxes!) and conquered the Romanian markets of agricultural products. While the Romanian land is in its largest part fallow, we buy low quality agricultural products from abroad. On the Romanian markets, already, the most looked for products – which lack the most – are exactly the Romanian ones. This is obvious an effect of competition, of loosing the capacity to compete with other firms willing to get the Romanian market. Meanwhile, the Romanian peasants – who are among the most hard-working and patient in Europe – noticed they can not do anymore survival agriculture, nobody helps them and they have no clue they should done to survive in a country wherein the land they inherited from generation to generation and got back after socialism decayed and can not be of any use. A great part of them left abroad where collect strawberries, beet, and grapes and gain enough money to support their families and even to modernize their houses. In all this time, on their land, grow all kind of weeds but particularly couch grass, hemlock ...

The same happened with the workers. The hundreds of enterprises wherein peoples worked a life time – some of them from father to son – succumbed in front of the economic pressure on the market and governors inability that, in these 22 passing years, only fought for the power and tried to accomplish without a word and reasons the European norms they adhered to. The population got suddenly poor, without understanding why, because giving away the socialism, it hoped to rapidly go out of the communist-type poverty, the survival solution being, for the most of them, not the country's reboot, by the temporary emigration in Occident looking for a workplace. Peoples, left in few years, without the minimum of means needed for living – literally dismissed because their enterprises succumbed, were bankrupted, were bought to take their market, etc. and were left without any money – they decided to leave abroad.

They left one after other there, far away, wherein they found a workplace and the most of them succeeded to gain few hundreds of euros – more then they would have won in the country – and, such, to continue their life. With all their industry in other countries, Romania is measured among the poorest countries in Europe. And those, the Romanians who left the country for a workplace because of some of them, who went to Europe's roads to beg and rob, are considered some kind of continent's pariah, sort of danglers who damage the great European capitals. In the meantime, Romania is on the first place on the continent to the cardio-vascular diseases, and the death-rate overpass the birth-rate, the population growth being, since 1990, negative.

Under these circumstances, the normal people, the peasant, the worker, the intellectual haunted from all parts – tax rates, impositions, all sort of taxes, precarious medical assistance, continuously reformed education and lacked almost completely by any cultural and professional motivation, closed hospitals, dismantled schools, etc. – and actually dazzled by all these, he had not time to wake up and, peculiarly, to riot. Perhaps he didn't acknowledge he could do something like that. To him, the normal person does not keep his mind to riots, revolts in the street, either vote, neither reforms he does not understand but his only thought is how to bring something on the table to be eatable. And, so, he found abroad his daily food, where he got a workplace where to work and to gain the bread for him and his children. And this slice of bread for ones with high qualification was indeed a gift from God. The doctors went abroad for a few times bigger salary then the doctors left at home, also the cooks, nurses, waitresses, engineers, finance persons, electronicians, etc. benefit of living conditions, at least as regard the salaries, net superior of the salaries got in the country, even in its greatest times.

These temporary emigrants consigned in the Romanian banks, in 2008, over seven billions euros, which, gathered to other seven billions of foreign investors (of course, mainly, in commercial networks, but this does not count, are also workplaces inhere!) created wealth in Romania and a quite substantial rate of economic growth that determined some persons to state the country's economy, in that times, was going very good ... This is a sort of cooking one's own goose ...

In other words, Romanians, strongly pushed to the wall, accepted this status quo because they did not have then as they do not have now or ever will have – because they never had! –, either the needed means, neither the knowledge, or capacity and vocation to civilised riot and to put themselves to the wall the thieves who, each time, destroyed the country, feathered own nests and claiming they did well for the country.

Either the 1989 events are not properly a riot. They are part of other philosophy of the jump to acceptance and not the riot's philosophy. But, this is another issue.

The present situation is paradoxical. Numerically speaking, and not only, the population dramatically diminished and continues to diminish. As we stated below, the growth rate was, in regard to the World Bank data, of -1.5% in 2002, and in 1997, the coefficient of population's growth, calculated by deduction between the death-rate (13 to thousand) and the birth-rate (10 to thousand) was -3 to thousand, being overlapped only by Ukraine and Russia (-5 to thousand). If we will continue in this

rhythm, we can say that, slowly, the country dies. If we take into account the statistics, in three-four thousand years, Romanian's population disappears. The educational system registers negative performances (but is reforming all the time!), the resources were almost entirely sold out or chartered, and the new economy – a network economy, announcing to be very dynamic and prosperous – makes very timid steps in Romania.

These are realities confirming in a market economy the competition must be taken seriously, the things must be done as the citizens to have workplaces and revenues to come them out of the poverty area. Or, this extremely difficult goal can not be fulfilled without providing the necessary conditions of health, living and labour to the people, as well as revenues they need to decently live. If not, the country collapses.




Figure no. 6

Source: The data are taken from the diagrams and studies edited by the World Bank

It is not the poverty, as is the depletion creating the main supports of endogen social conflict situation, specific for the human society shared in wealth and poor peoples.

Sometimes, the main guilt of world's conflict situations generation is considered to exclusively be of the poor stratum because the poor persons aspire, almost by any mean, to wealth, and not the wealth peoples to poverty. There is none rich persons want to become poor and have limited access to welfare.

The most of the poor persons who do not accept their poverty as a given fact, but it considered it as an effect of richness pressure, are convinced their poverty is exclusively, or in great part, owed to the rich peoples cupidity, the rules they assert, the reason of poverty being the wealth and not the poverty itself, meaning the one on which charge the richness is kept and which does not reproduce itself but under the

pressure of the wealth. Therefore, poverty is a forced acceptance, is part of an iceberg submersion, from which is considered to count only what is seen on the surface, meaning the wealth.

Other poor persons will accept as a given fate their own condition and will try to survive. As a matter of fact, as results from statistics, it seems at global level, the extreme poverty percentage – of the population living with less of 1.25 dollars/day is decreasing, while the percentage of fortunes of the peoples being part of the extreme wealth it increases.

The reasons of the riot as well as the ones of lack of riot, do not stand only in the richness or poverty – although the endogen conflict situation's support is here -, but peculiarly in the populations' depletion effects, in discrimination and the new forms of exploitation, humiliation, in the non-unanimously acceptance of their condition and stratification, in their denial.

The denial does not mean either riot, neither acceptance, but only attitude. But the attitude is, in the end. One of the basic components of individual and social behaviour and the accentuated obliteration of the two poles – extreme wealth from extreme poverty -, instead of diluting the conflict situation, accentuates it, as it do not go far, but get near and compress the space, the planet, humans and life. The obliteration creates inverse pressures, of breakage, but the breakage it is not possible because the bees would not ever be rich. They will always be bees and they will always produce honey and will feed the mother bee and the drone. Because this is how their world is designed. And the same is in our world. Of course, the bees do not riot, but accept their condition, as people do.

Instead of conclusions

Insecurity does not come from the poor people area, which, bred, would represent a danger for the planet's peace and stability, but particularly from the pressures the rich peoples' planet exercises over the poor persons' planet by the huge strategic offensive of power centres for power, wealth and influence, meaning for resources, finances, technologies and markets. The oceans, the Earth and humans will always be in the middle.

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TERRORISM – A THREAT TO PRESENT DAY SECURITY. NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTROL ACTIONS

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Cătălina TODOR**

Abstract: *Terrorism is hardly a new phenomenon, specific to the contemporary world. Its evolution from disparate terrorist acts to a sum-up of fanaticism, cruelty and violence determined the corresponding reaction of the humanity at a global level.*

Terrorism has become an asymmetric threat to human democracy and civilization, by the forces and means employed, as well as by the forms and procedures used.

The terrorist attacks in USA, Madrid, London, Moscow or the ones which occurred in the Middle East, Caucasia, Central and South-East Asia prove once again that terrorism, especially that of extremist-religious origin structured in networks represents the most serious threat to individual security, democracy and freedom.

For the EU terrorism represents a serious threat to its security, freedom and values, as well as to the security and values of its citizens. The EU makes sustained efforts to prevent and stop terrorist acts with the purpose of protecting its citizens and infrastructures. Taking these facts as a starting point, the present paper aims to highlight the European efforts in order to control this serious threat.

Keywords: *terrorism, security, threat, human security, sustainable development.*

“Terrorism is not, as it sometimes appears to be justified as, a reaction of the weak against the strong; it is a deliberate, punitive and vindictive action, an inhuman, criminal one – often suicidal and always ferocious – which has destroying, cruelly killing and horrifying as goals”.

Gheorghe Văduva

1. Introduction: terrorism - from concept to practice

At the beginning of the 21th century, terrorist markets cover our entire planet; Ion David highlights their ability to act in all kinds of environments (water, air, and ground) and against every existing country¹.

Nowadays, terrorism represents “the main means of asymmetric protest (action) ... being constantly impelled by ethnical, religious, nationalist or separatist motivations; it is an enemy who can possibly be present in every place on the world

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¹ Ion David, *Globalizarea Terorismului*, Revista ComUnique, Editura Era, București, nr.2-3/2007. http://www.comunique.ro/img_editor/userfiles/file/IonDavid_Globalizarea_terorismului.pdf http://www.comunique.ro/img_editor/userfiles/file/IonDavid_Globalizarea_terorismului.pdf (accessed on 10.04.2011, 5: 35 p.m).

map, especially there where their eagerness for vengeance and violence can manifest as “spectacular” as possible”².

As revealed in one of the CSSS³ published works, terrorism is not a recently born phenomenon. *“It is very old - it preceded the terror strategy practiced by the roman legions against populations from occupied areas, thus surviving this – and, in time, took all possible forms, from cave terrorism to cyber-terrorism, depending on the civilization level the humanity had reached, that is, on the available means, and almost everywhere in the world”*⁴.

Terrorism, as means of reaching a political goal lacking judgment and not discriminating violence, got a complex character at the beginning of this century and millennium, extended at the level of the entire planet, through the amplitude and diversity of its forms of demonstration.

The definitions given to terrorism are many; Global Policy Institute’s David Carlton states that terrorism implies *“significant violence levels, politically motivated, generated by sub-state factors which may or may not be sponsored to a certain extent, but are not normally controlled by a sovereign state.”*⁵ But two of these definitions coming from the presidents of two states – former rivals in the Cold War, two of the world’s greatest powers – highlight the importance and actuality of the phenomenon and must thus be brought to attention: Vladimir Putin defines terrorism as *“the illness of the 21th century”* and Bill Clinton describes it as *“the dark side of globalization which divides the world in rich and poor, promotes competition but also promotes conflicts, fuels feelings of hatred, alienation, pain alongside with creating new relations and interactions of new social, political and economic conglomerates”*⁶.

According to some authors, the present day’s terrorism is *“predominantly anti-american and anti-occidental”* and has a series of characteristics, such as:

➤ the spaces of generation and regeneration of terrorist networks, organizations and groups are tentacular, with flexible and dynamic subsidiaries around the world and especially in occidental countries and areas of strategic fissures⁷;

² *Conflictele Asimetrice –Cerinte Operaționale Privind Structura Armatei Române*, Ed Universității Naționale de Apărare Carol Davila, București, 2001, p. 67.

³ Center for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, “Carol I” National Defence University Bucharest.

⁴ *Terorismul- Dimeniune Geopolitica si Geostrategica. Razboiul Terorist. Razboiul impotriva Terorismului*, Centrul de Studii Strategice de Securitate, Bucuresti, 2002, p. 4.

⁵ Ionel Nicu SAVA, *Teoria si Practica Securitatii*, Universitatea din București, Suport Curs, Bucuresti, 2007, p. 60.

⁶ Anghel ANDREESCU, Comisar-șef dr. Nicolae RADU, *Organizațiile teroriste Conceptualizarea terorii vs securitatea europeană*, Editura Ministerului Internelor si Reformei Administrative., Bucuresti, 2008, p.13.

⁷ Gheorghe VĂDUVA, *Terorismul contemporan – factor de risc la adresa securității si apărării nationale, în condițiile statutului României de membru NATO*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, Bucuresti, 2005, p.24.

➤ “the enemy is a fluid one, one that slips easily out of control; it is transnational, criminal, difficult to identify and exterminate. And that is because it is not represented by a country, a nation, an ideology or a religion.”⁸

➤ the recruiting source of terrorists is the young population instructed and educated in occidental countries;

➤ the main targets of present day’s terrorists are public places, infrastructure, speculating to the highest degree “the weak points of the target state, of its highly sophisticated security and defense system”⁹.

➤ the punitive and vindictive character in the name of causes which become frustrations and altered visions¹⁰.

Silviu Neguț states that “the evolution of terrorist acts from an isolated phenomenon to the level of planned operations, organized and managed according to military rules, led the humanity and thus the international environment to a state of frail security”¹¹.

This means that, given the complexity of the security system and globalization, the EU states cannot cope alone with different challenges to security and democracy such as: energy reserve supplies, climate changes, sustainable development, economic competition, terrorism, etc. In the E.U., terrorism and organized crime are considered transnational phenomena.

The EU responsible for terrorism control, Gilles de Kerochove, stated in 2007 that the danger represented by terrorism can only be abolished by means of realizing the international dimension of security and collaboration between states¹².

2. European steps for terrorism control

After the terrorist attacks in September 2001, Europe has been the scene of some bloody terrorist attacks. The most dreadful were those in Spain (11th of March 2004), when several explosions took place in four commuting trains, leading to 191 fatalities and 1800 injuries, and that in the London subway (7th of July 2005), when four suicidal attackers led the bloody attacks which ended up with 56 fatalities and 700 injuries¹³.

In 2011, Europol leader Rob Wainwright presented to the Parliament a report regarding terrorism in Europe, in which terrorist acts within Europe are described as a mosaic of separatist terrorism, Islamic terrorism and anarchist terrorism. At EU level

⁸ Cf. Anghel ANDREESCU, *Siguranța națională și ordinea publică 1859 – 2000*, Ed. Artprint, București, 2002, p. 35.

⁹ Anghel ANDREESCU (2002), *op. cit.*, p. 35.

¹⁰ Cf. Gheorghe VĂDUVA (2005), *op. cit.* p.24.

¹¹ Silviu NEGUT, *Geopolitică- Universul Puterii*, Ed. Meteor Press, București, 2009, p. 249.

¹² Cf. Anghel ANDREESCU, Nicolae RADU, *Reconfigurarea rețelelor terorismului – securitatea națională și “ecuația globalizării”*, p.11, articol publicat în Buletin documentar nr.1 din 2008, Editura Ministerului Internelor și Reformei Administrative, București, 2008.

¹³ <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/care-au-fost-cele-mai-sangeroase-atacuri-teroriste-din-europa-dupa-11-septembrie-972784.html> (accesat la data de 23 septembrie 2012, ora 19: 40).

there have been 249 attacks in 2011, having as consequences the loss of human lives and material damages.¹⁴

After September 2011, the European Union decided to intensify the combat against terrorism which was regarded as one of the most serious violations of universal values and of democracy and state of law. As a result, the Frame Decision 2002/475/JAI of the 13th of June 2002 Council regarding terrorism control has been adopted; it represents the fundament of EU's policy of terrorism control.

By means of these guidelines, the definitions of terrorist crimes given by EU are harmonized by introducing a common and specific definition, according to which terrorism is a combination of two elements:

- *the objective element*, which refers to a set of criminal acts (murder, physical damage, hostage taking, blackmailing, weapon manufacturing, attacks, threatening with committing one of the above mentioned acts);

- *the subjective element*, which points out that the above mentioned acts are considered as terrorist acts when practiced with the purpose of severe intimidation of a population, of illegitimately forcing a government or an international organization to accomplish or to restrain from accomplishing a certain act, of severely destabilizing or destroying fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a state or international organization.

Through Frame Decision 2008/919/JAI of the 28th November 2008 Council, modifications are made to 2002/475/JAI regarding the control of terrorism by means of incriminating the acts which are related to terrorist activities, in order to contribute to the general political goal of preventing terrorism by reducing the broadcast of materials susceptible to stir up people to commit terrorist acts.

By means of the revised Action Plan of the EU for fight against terrorism, adopted by the 17th – 18th June 2004 European Council, the following priorities have been identified: preventing terrorist attacks, managing their consequences and protecting the vital infrastructures.

Through the EU strategy of terrorism control from 30th November 2005, four action directions have been established for fighting terrorism, as follows: prevention, following, protection and reaction.

- *Prevention*: development of common approaches in identifying and acting against behaviour disorders; controlling stirring up and recruiting in key environments (prisons, sanctuaries, etc.); developing intercultural communication; a better clarification of European policies; promoting a good government, democracy, education and economic prosperity by means of assisted programs; continuing the research in this field and publishing the results and experiences.

- *Protection*: has as purpose reducing the vulnerability of the attack targets and limiting the impact of the attacks by the collective action of securing the frontiers, the transportation and other infrastructures (Schengen Information System II - SIS II- ,

¹⁴ Terorismul: mai putine amenintări, dar pericolul încă există, available on: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/ro/headlines/content/20110415STO17918/html/Terorismul-mai-pu%C8%9Bine-amenin%C8%9B%C4%83ri-dar-pericolul-%C3%AEnc%C4%83-exist%C4%83> (accessed on september 23, 2012, 7: 25 p.m).

Visa Information System -VIS-, FRONTEX – for maximizing the efficiency of border controls).

- *Following*: by means of using tools such as Joint Situation Centre and Europol analyses, the European arrest warrants and the European Evidence of Warrants, the common intervention teams, VIS and SIS, FATF:

- following terrorists outside the frontiers (while respecting international laws and human rights) in order to cut their access to materials (weapons explosives, etc.); disturbing the terrorist networks and recruiting agencies; fighting against the abusive use of non-profit organizations;

- following with the purpose of cutting financing sources;

- following with the purpose of stopping the planning of terrorist activities

- - *Reaction*: acting in case of terrorist attacks through a system similar to those employed in case of natural disasters, technological disasters or disasters caused by humans; by means of using mechanisms of European civil protection which provide operational and information policy exchanges, media coordination, solidarity, assistance and compensation of terrorism victims at national and European level, assistance to European citizens who are located in other countries, protection and assistance of civil and military parties in case of European operational management crisis”¹⁵.

The decision of the 12th February 2007 Council includes in the general program “Security and protection of freedoms” for the period 2007 – 2013 the specific program “Preventing, preparing and managing terrorism consequences and other security related risks”, which has as goal supporting the member states in preventing terrorist attacks, preparing themselves in order to cope with them and protecting the citizens and vital infrastructures.

The 2010 Stockholm program – An Open, Secure Europe at the Service and for Protection of Citizens – stipulates a so-called course sheet for the EU’s activities regarding the law, freedom and security space for the period 2010 – 2014. Point 4.5 of the program called “*Terrorism*” stipulates that the European Council considers that this threat remains significant and constantly evolving and that EU will play an active role in fighting against terrorism in different multilateral forums and within UNO.

The March 2010 internal security strategy of the EU mentions terrorism, in all its demonstration forms, as the first threat to the European internal security and a form of total lack of respect towards human life and democratic values.

Among the steps of Europe regarding terrorism control, forming of the police cooperation agencies and organisms can also be mentioned. As an example, Europol (the European Police Agency) is an EU agency since 1st January 2010, with the purpose of improving the effectiveness of national police authorities and of other similar authorities, facilitating cooperation in preventing and fighting terrorism, drug traffic, and other serious forms of crime.

¹⁵http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_terrorism/133275_en.htm (accessed on 01.10.2012 , 10: 45 a.m).

Through the decision of the 25th February 2010 Council, a permanent group of operational cooperation in terms of internal security (COSI¹⁶) was formed within the Council; it offers assistance in terms of the solidarity clause stipulated in Art. 222 of the Lisbon Treaty, which states that EU calls up all the available instruments to help a member state which is object to a terrorist attack or victim to a natural or human caused disaster.

3. Romania's contribution in the fight against terrorism.

Romania's National Security Strategy mentions terrorism as one of the main threats against national security. After the terrorist attacks back in September 2001, Romania has been enlisted among the countries which fight against this plague of the humanity (as an example, Romania's active participation in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan). The national strategy for preventing and fighting terrorism (approved by the Supreme Council of National Defence in April 2002) represents the fundamental doctrinaire document which turns to account in an united fashion the internal security interests and necessities of the Romanian society, by means of consolidating its mechanisms of auto-protection against the terrorist phenomenon.

At national level, the antiterrorist activity is focused on the concept of prevention and of enforcing the priority and imperative character of anticipate identification, by means of collecting information, of prerequisites of threats of terrorist nature, regardless of origin, demonstration form or target.

In April 2004, the Supreme Council of National Defence approved the National Terrorist Alert System proposed by the Romanian Information Service, as an appropriate mean of preventing, discouraging and fighting actions of preparing and launching possible terrorist attacks on Romania's territory.

In order to prevent terrorism, the Romanian Information Service represents the national authority in charge. The Department for Prevention and Control of Terrorism functions within this service; its responsibilities are the planning, organizing and carrying out, in a unitary conception, of activities of preventing, discovering, neutralising and annihilating terrorist acts on Romanian territory.

At regional and bilateral level, Romania promotes an active policy in order to provide security and stability in South-East Europe, South Caucasia and the whole Danube and Black Sea area, having settled over 50 bilateral cooperation agreements with European and American countries, regarding control of terrorism, organized crime and illegal drug dealing¹⁷.

The participation of the Romanian army in activities of terrorism control are based on the following normative and methodological documents and international instruments: *the Romanian Constitution; the decisions of the Romanian Parliament and Government; Romania's Military Strategy; Romanian National Security Strategy; the National Strategy for Terrorism Prevention and Control*, approved by S.C.N.D.; *the Law regarding Terrorism Prevention and Control; the Decision of the*

¹⁶ Standing Committee on operational cooperation on internal security

¹⁷ <http://www.mae.ro/node/1880> (accessed on September 26, 2012, 8:10 p.m).

EU Council regarding terrorism control; the stipulations of international conventions in which Romania took part: *the International Convention for suppressing the financing of terrorism* (signed in New York, 9th December 1999); *the International Convention for suppressing terrorist bombing* (signed in New York, 15th December 1997); *the NATO Military Concept regarding Defence against Terrorism*; specific regulations regarding the missions of the Ministry of National Defence in terms of preventing and fighting actions aimed towards military objectives, which allow our country's contribution to the international campaign against terrorism, objectified in the participation in operational theatres.

Brigadier General (R) Gheorghe Văduva, PhD stated that Romania participates “*actively and directly in actions of management of crisis and terrorism control with forces of the army, gendarmerie and police in the active operational theatres, but also with specialised services and structures.*”¹⁸ This active participation took the form of measures and projects regarding “*asylum, immigration, visas, pursuit warrants, crimes and criminals, from the economic field to those of forces and strategies regarding security and defence*”.

Colonel (R) Professor Lucian Stancilă, PhD stated that through this our country has “*proved itself to be an essential promoter of European and world security and stability and a valuable ally for the U.S.A. and the North Atlantic Organization, assuming from the beginning constructive engagements in the direction of terrorism and multinational organized crime control, by taking part in all the antiterrorist activities*”¹⁹.

Thus, “*against a global plague, such as terrorism has become*”²⁰, a global effort is compulsory; Ulrich Beck states that “*the only solution to the global terrorism issue (...) is the transnational cooperation*”²¹, with Romania not affording to leave aside the interconnections and interdependences of the international system, especially as a NATO and EU member.

Conclusions

Terrorism has no excuse; it is a planned and deliberately carried out action; nothing is left to accident in terrorist acts. The fight against international terrorism enforces the existence of trust, transparency and interaction between the forces employed in carrying out anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism operations.

A common approach at European level and legislative closeness is a priority in order to counteract this global phenomenon. Adopting common lists of terrorist persons and organisations, consolidating cooperation between police and justice authorities (the forming of Europol and Eurojust) or instituting the European arrest

¹⁸ Cf. Gheorghe VĂDUVA (2005), *op. cit.* p.44.

¹⁹ Lucian STÂNCILĂ, Ioan BURGHELEA, *Combaterea terorismului – multitudimensionalitatea și complexitatea acesteia*, Buletinul Universității Naționale de Apărare ”Carol I”, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare ”Carol I”, București nr 1/ 2006, p.143.

²⁰ Ion DAVID (2007), *op. cit.*

²¹ *Apud* Ioan DAVID, *The Terrorist Threat. World Risk Society Revisited*, Theory & Society, vol.19, No.4, 2002, p. 2.

warrant are proves for the efforts made within EU in order to fight the plague called terrorism.

Romania, as part of the international system, is actively engaged in this process of counteracting the terrorist action occurrence risk, a phenomenon favoured to develop in a world of paradoxes such as the present one, a world more and more organized and at the same time more chaotic, a world in which fission and fusion coexist, as Ignacio Ramonet correctly stated.

Thus, the steps of our country, in accordance and cooperation with the European and international ones, play a fundamental role in maintaining national security and participating in maintaining international security.

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EUROPE OF THE FUTURE FROM THE DEMOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE. THE RELIABILITY OF THE TERM EURABIA

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Abstract: In the context of a world that finds itself in a full demographic transition through which it is redefining itself unprecedented at global level, having to cope with new challenges and threats, the concept of cultural security is becoming increasingly important. The speeding up process of globalization, creator of interconnections and interdependences between national, regional and international actors and the present major demographic changes expressed through demographic growth, aging and increasing international migration as means of naturally counterbalancing the two previously mentioned phenomena, creates favourable conditions for cultural frictions. Against the background of the European ethnic structural changes, the occurrence of the term Eurabia expresses the concern of the international scientific world regarding the cultural security threats. Thus, the present paper aims to answer the questions: Which role do cultural threats play in the context of international security environment, given the paradox of the present day world, where fission and fusion coexist at global level? Is Eurabia expressing the European reality, or does it remain but an exaggerated view of potential threats otherwise perfectly manageable? For this purpose, a combination of theory and practice shall be used, by means of approaching the concepts of cultural security and interethnic conflicts on one side, and on the other side, the practical action of analyzing the probability of occurrence of European cultural frictions by means of the data provided by the current situation and also of the examples already experienced by the European space.

Keywords: cultural security, cultural risk, Europe muslimification, islamophobia, dhimmi, clash of civilisations.

1. Cultural security. From concept to risks and threats.

The 21st century shapes a world of unprecedented changes and of paradox, where globalization and regionalization coexist, as well as fission and fusion,¹ shown at international relations level as cooperation on one side and conflict on the other; a world which redefines its demographic parameters, finding itself in full process of transition from this specific point of view.

Alexandra Sarcinschi stated that “a globalized world is an integrated world, but not a harmonious one... a product of shared visions, but prone to breaking up”². These changes mean opportunities, but also vulnerabilities from the security point of view; as for the globalization, a defining concept for the era we find ourselves in,

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¹ Ignacio RAMONET, *Geopolitics of Chaos*, Algora Publishing, New York, 1998.

² Alexandra SARCHINSCHI, *Globalizarea Insecurității, Factori și Modalități de Contracurare*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I” București, 2006, p.11.

Alexandra Sarcinschi also stated that it “facilitates the expansion of religious ideas ... the so-called religious violence is in fact a political return of globalization. This process accelerates without any doubt the rebirth of cultural and religious identities”³, whereas Mihai-Stefan Dinu highlights the fact that “globalization leads to the setting up of multicultural environments, and the forms of intolerance regarding religious and ethnic aspects represent sources of instability”⁴.

In referring the cultural dimension to security, we shall use the term “culture” as defined by Petre Dutu and Cristina Bogzeanu, “understood as assembly of attitudes, beliefs, customs, values and practices that are common to a certain group of individuals... in close relation to the perception of nationality, defined in terms of religion, nationality, geography, language.”⁵

As evolution through time, as Mihai-Stefan Dinu asserts⁶, “for a long time during the modern era, the ethnic factor and the religious factor were not considered real issues as far as national security is concerned; the beginning of the concerns in the politic and academic environment for debating, among security concepts, the concept of cultural security only materialized as a result of international events which proved the “potential of flaring up” of these factors, “starting as early as the late ‘70s” a striking feature after the events from the last two decades (“terrorism, conflicts based on identity aspects – ethnic and religious – or historical memory”), at present being “of overwhelming importance” to the security”. He also affirms a change of attention as far as the sources of threats against the security are concerned, shifting after the period of the Cold War from the politic and military – that is, the state – towards the society, “the major influence of the religion in particular on the international politics being facilitated by factors such as: the corroborated processes of modernization and secularization, the decreasing importance of ideologies on the international scene and the increasing concern for cultural, ethnic and religious identity aspects”, as well as by the growth in number of conflicts based on or “flared up by cultural differences... thus a civilisational approach of security being imperative recently”⁷

In another work of his, Mihai-Stefan Dinu affirms the inseparable character of the ethnic from the religious - fact previously highlighted by Petre Duțu and Cristina Bogzeanu’s definition – “belonging to the cultural dimension of security... the demonstration space of cultural security lying at the level of interrelation between individual and national security, meaning that individuals or sub-state groups – in our case, ethnic or religious groups – may become a matter of national security, their behaviour degenerating towards terrorist, separatist, revolutionary acts... here laying emphasis on «militant» religions, with aggressive proselytism, which educate their adepts in the spirit of adversity towards all that constitutes the «outer world» , thus

³ Alexandra SARCINSCHI (2006), *op. cit.* p. 16-17.

⁴ Mihai-Ștefan DINU, *Dimensiunea Etnico-Religioasă a Securității*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I” București, 2007, p. 11.

⁵ Petre DUTU, Cristina BOGZEANU, *Provocările Actuale pentru securitatea Europeană*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I” București, 2010, p. 37.

⁶ Mihai-Ștefan DINU (2007), *op. cit.* p. 8, 9, 12.

⁷ *Idem*, p. 14, 39-40.

being easily able of recurring to armed violence in order to achieve their politic, cultural and economic goals”⁸.

The idea of cultural security implies the existence of a cultural risk which may come to be expressed through interethnic/ inter-religious tensions and conflicts; “many of the present conflicts are based on believes, most of them being the result of a clash of the religious and politic aspects of the communities involved and their association with governmental policies”, not to neglect here the existence of “tensions between broader denominations, such as supporters of religion and of secularization”⁹. Concretely, the presence within a state’s territory of communities which are culturally different from the native one can be the source of frictions of the nature of ethnic/ religious conflicts.

Regarding Europe’s specific case, the current demographic evolutions, being in full process of transition from this point of view, which for the old continent represents demographic stagnation and decline, aging population and, as a natural counterbalance, increasing migration - the developed European countries being among the top preferred destinations for immigrants with highly different cultural background – rise questions on both politic actions and academic concern level, such as: Can we consider the hypothesis according to which Eurabia could become an area of clashing civilisations as reliable, or not?

Among the main threats against European security identified by Petre Duțu and Cristina Bogzeanu we mention: “the effects of international migration; the multiculturalism within; terrorism”, these being “facilitated by globalization”¹⁰ and by the previously mentioned features of demographic transition, thus being highlighted the necessity of the approach of cultural security issues.

Thus Eurabia is a geopolitic concept which appeared as a result of these concerns, dividing the academic world in two parties; it is the key concept of the present research, which aims to analyze if this can be the Europe of the future or if there is nothing but a conspiracy theory, an Islam phobic theory, as it is seen by many theorists and experts in the field of European actions.

Following, the Eurabia will be delimited from theoretic perspective, then criticized and sustained by means of scientifically antagonistic approaches, in the end allowing the analysis of current concrete data to establish the rank this concept should have among the security concerns.

2. Eurabia: “The Euro-Arab Axis”

Although the term Eurabia was first mentioned in a journal published in the ‘70s¹¹ by the European Committee for Coordination of Relations with the Arab

⁸ Mihai-Ștefan DINU, *Componenta Etnico- Religioasă a Conflictelor*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2005, p. 22-23, 27.

⁹ Mihai-Ștefan DINU (2007), *op. cit.* p. 7-8, 11.

¹⁰ Petre Dutu, Cristina Bogzeanu (2010), *op. cit.*, p. 6.

¹¹ Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. SALO, United States Army, *Eurabia: Strategic Implications for the United States*, Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050, 2010, p. 3.

World¹², it is Bat Ye'or who first used this term to express one of the most controversial and actual geopolitic theories which are centred on the European demographic issue, in her book called "Eurabia. The Euro-Arab Axis" (published in 2005).

Bat Ye'or's perspective¹³ refers to the islamization process undergone by present day's Europe, both internally and externally, at international relations level. She reasons that during the '60s the term was in accordance with Charles De Gaulle's anti-American policy, a policy which aimed towards a strong Europe as America's opponent; thus, together with Germany, he started working on an integrative policy in order to create this strong Europe. Here, a highly relevant aspect of De Gaulle's policy was the link between Europe and the Arab World, idea that faced resistance from other European countries in the beginning; but by 1971 the other countries became closer and closer to the French approach, due to the development of the demonstrations of "terrorists of Palestinian origin" on European ground¹⁴.

In 1973, as a result of the evolution of the Iom Kipur War (the Arab-Israelian War), when Europe was threatened with oil embargo by the Arab countries and with commercial boycott for the support offered to Israel, Europe ceased to provide ammunition supplies for Israel¹⁵, changing it's policy in relations with the Arab world. Thus, only two weeks after the beginning of the war in October, the EU-15 community of that time accepted the Arab proposal in return for the ceasing of the commercial boycott, proposal which, according to Bat Ye'or, consisted in: European support for Palestinian politics, the demand addressed to Israel to return to it's frontiers from 1949 and Israel's return under Arab sovereignty.

The author presents these facts as the beginning of the Euro-Arab dialogue, which created the premises for the "symbiosis of the two Mediterranean shores", having an unofficial structure though based on a bilateral relation with the participation of European officials such as representatives of the Ministry Council of the European Committee on one hand, and on the other, the Arab leaders and representatives of the Arab League.¹⁶

After '74 - '75, an entire network of committees and subcommittees and informal meets served the cause of fusion of the two entities' policies, both economic and cultural, as Bat Ye'or states; basically, providing oil for Europe was conditioned by respecting the Arab position: maintaining the dialogue in a politic frame solely related to America and Israel.

She affirms that a policy of demonizing Israel and an anti-American vision have been adopted, which did not remain without an echo towards the latter; the anti-Americanism has been reflected many times just at politic level, so that the European citizens actually oppose this trend.

¹² European Committee for Coordination of Friendship Associations with the Arab World.

¹³ Bat YE'OR pseudonym of Giselle Littleman.

¹⁴ Bat YE'OR lecture held on February 17th 2005, at the Hudson Institute, Washington DC <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/185401-1> (accessed on 02.10.2012, 17:45 hours).

¹⁵ William B. QUANDT (2005), *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967*, University of California Press, Berkley and Los Angeles, -California, London, England.

¹⁶ Bat YE'OR (2005), video *op. cit.*

Then followed the cultural policy which meant the spreading of Arab culture throughout Europe, even to the detriment of the native culture, the Christian one, by means of the favourable position and support granted with help from the academic environment – the Islamic vision of history in schools, media – control of the television channels and publishing houses, as Bat Ye’or states.

Regarding the demographic component, the author affirms it is but a component of an entire geopolitic concept, with emphasis on the politic dimension.

Thus, beginning with the second half of the 20th century to the present, the mixture of “energetic blackmailing”,¹⁷ demographic evolution and the strong character of the Muslim culture led to the emergence of a dhimmi¹⁸ behaviour at European level: “the transformation of Europe into a dhimmitude civilisation.”

From the security point of view, Bat Ye’or almost surrenders, stating that “Europe cannot recognize the «Islamic evil», for it cannot protect its own territories; it has now lost the security that exists still in the USA”¹⁹: “Europe in turning into Eurabia- a cultural and politic appendices of the Muslim world, which is fundamentally anti-Christian, anti-Western, anti-American and anti-Semitic”²⁰.

This theory generated an entire wave of approaches which materialized in two main paradigms: a first paradigm supports the Eurabia theory, considering it as the possible future of Europe; the other one does not support this approach, considering it a conspiracy theory, even Islam phobic.

Following, we shall analyze both paradigms as objective as possible.

3. Eurabia – subject of the academic and media debate

As the concept of Eurabia began to appear in theory, the academic world seemed to pay attention to the subject, but especially after the events back in 2011 (Anders Behring Breivik’s terrorist attacks in Norway), the West-European community started to regard this approach as an Islam phobic, conspirationist theory.

As main supporter of this theory, Bat Ye’Or grounds her statements on historic arguments: “for over a thousand years, the jihad has been a potent political force which subdued – and in some cases extinguished – some important centres of power of the Judeo-Christian, Hindu and Buddhist civilisations from Asia, Africa and Europe”²¹, “it destroyed important civilisations (for example: the Zoroastrians), and even empires: the Byzantine Empire, the Roman Christian Empire, so the jihad must

¹⁷Taking into consideration the importance of energy resources for the European economic development and stability.

¹⁸“dhimmi” refers to the non-Muslims that accept to subordinate to Islam, becoming tolerated communities, as an alternative to not being consider a citizen at all; during the two waves of Muslim expansion (622-730 AD,1071-1683 AD), conquered peoples, had to obey Muslim law(dhimmitude) and pay a protection fee; [Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. Salo United States Army (2010)].

¹⁹ Bat Ye'or (2005), video *op. cit.*

²⁰ Bat Ye'or, *The Euro-Arab Axis*, Associated University Press, Cranbury, 2005.

²¹ Ibidem ; Bat YE'OR (2005), book *op. cit.* p. 9.

not be regarded as a minor issue”²²; on arguments from the field of European political actions, stating that these are favourable to the Arab position (as far as influences in Europe’s external policy, such as the anti-American and anti-Semitic orientations)²³; on cultural arguments – the precarious integration process of the Muslim citizens: “had the migration been a slower process, the immigration could have been integrated, but following the Euro-Arab agreement... the Arab population has been accepted starting from the premise that they will keep their Arab laws and traditions”²⁴ and on demographic arguments: the increasing number of Muslim minorities and especially their polarization in important European urban centres.

From the demographic point of view, Bernard Lewis, Professor Emeritus of the Princeton University, makes a rather daring statement: “Europe will have Muslim majorities... by the end of the 21st century at the latest”²⁵, “becoming a part of the Arabic West, the Maghreb”²⁶; Jocelyn Cesari, expert on Islamic studies within Harvard University, lays emphasis on the urban concentrations: “Berlin is a Muslim city, Paris is a Muslim city, and even Madrid and Torino are, to a certain extent”²⁷.

Christopher Calowell, American journalist²⁸, supports the demographic argument, but emphasizes the lack of integration of the Muslim population, fact which can be explained by means of at least two coordinates: first - a great deal of the assimilation should take place at the workplace, but given the concentration of immigrants in activity areas that are no longer practiced by the native population, this assimilation never takes place; second – the existence in some of the countries of policies which do not allow immigrants to work²⁹.

On the other side, Jytte Klausen, from Brandeis University, does not support the demographic argument, stating that: “the concept is supported by people who do not see the numbers. All these statements are purely emotional”³⁰.

Ian Buruma, Dutch writer and Professor at the Bard College New York, also rejects the demographic argument, affirming that there are only 5% Muslims in Europe and, as they advance towards the middle class of the society, their fertility rate decreases, but means that “there is a little more truth in the danger of a clash of values”, and he insists here on the vulnerability of the young immigrants (the second and the third generation especially: the host-country is the one they have been born in and the only one they know, but, as the cultural roots of their parents/grandparents

²² Bat YE'OR (2005), video *op. cit.*

²³ Ibidem ; Bat YE'OR (2005), book *op. cit.*

²⁴ Bat YE'OR (2005), video *op. cit.*

²⁵ Berbard LEWIS for Die Welt Germania, 27.07. 2004. http://www.eppc.org/conferences/eventID.126/conf_detail.asp (accessed on 15.10.2012, 11:20 hours).

²⁶ *The West and Islam- Tales from Eurabia*, The Economist, June 22nd 2006, from the printed edition, <http://www.economist.com/node/7086222> (accessed on 25. 09.2012, 10:15 hours).

²⁷ Simon KUPER, *Head count belies vision of “Eurabia”*, Financial Times, August 19, 2007, 10:22 pm.

²⁸ The Weekly Standard, Financial Times, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, The Washington Post, etc.

²⁹ Christopher CALOWELL, Interview for Fox News Chanal, *Immigration, Islam and the West*, the Wall Street Journal, September 05 2009.

³⁰ Simon KUPER (2007), *op. cit.*

are not cut off, there is the need of identity and allegiance), “vulnerability which may be the cause of religious fundamentalism, jihadism, as sources of violent behaviour.”³¹

As far as the cultural argument is concerned, Oriana Falaci, which had a successful journalistic career and who held lectures at University of Chicago, Yale University, Harvard University, states that: “from the moment you give up your own principles and values... you are dead, your culture is dead, your civilisation is dead”³², and, going from the statement of Huntington, “the most dangerous future civilisation clash... is probable to occur by means of the interaction between the arrogance of the Westerners, the intolerance of the Muslims and the assertivity of the Asians ... The problem of the West being not Islamic fundamentalism, but Islam, a civilisation convinced of the superiority of its own culture and obsessed with the inferiority of the power”³³, idea supported also by Ayaan Hirsi Ali (known as a ardent critic of discrimination of women in Islam and of the Islamic religion): “what we now see in Europe is a conflict between the values of Islam and the European values”; she also adds to this the proneness of the Islamic culture to conflict.³⁴ Debated are both the group that may produce tensions and the existence or absence of this cultural clashes occurrence probability.

There is a considerably significant group, to which belong, among others, Ian Buruma and Douglas Murray (associate director of Henry Jackson Society, well known critic of Islamic fundamentalism), of persons who can distinguish between militant Islam – “a politicized version of Islam”³⁵ and Islam. On the other side, Rainer Brunner from the University of Freiburg, Germany, states that “the Muslims are not able to imagine the separation of religion from politics”³⁶ due to their profound social engagement to Islam; the statement is supported by Jocelyn Cesari through the parallel between the European modernization – which led to secularization- and the Muslim one – which made the link between state and religion stronger. From here arises the challenge this secularized Europe of the 21st century is facing, given the fact that “Muslim immigrants come from countries where Islam is the official

³¹ Ian BURUMA, Lecture: *Eurabia: Truth or Paranoia*, Kenan Distinguished Lecture in Ethics, The Kenan Institute for Ethics, 15 October 2009, 17:00 hours.

³² Oriana FALLACI, *Prophet of Decline: An Interview with Oriana Fallaci*, interview by Tunku Varadarajan, The wallstreet Journal, June 23, 2005.

³³ Professor A.J. BACEVICH, Universitatea Boston, Book Review: *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of the World Order*, By Samuel P. Huntington, pp. 2-3.

³⁴ Ayaan Hirsi ALI, *The Growing Fearfulness of Muslims in Europe*, CNN'S AMANPOUR, Aired March 30, 2010 - 15:00:00, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YWw5x_MB3II (accessed on 17.10.2012, 20:00 hours).

³⁵ Ian BURUMA, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1JY98owk2e8&feature=related> (accessed on 17.10.2012, 16:00 hours), Douglas MURRY, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L5hh-uQpMuE&feature=related> (accessed on 20.10.2012, 13:45 hours).

³⁶ *Apud* Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. SALO, United States Army, *Eurabia: Strategic Implications for the United States*, Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050, 2010, p. 3

religion of the state”³⁷. Interesting here is the study undergone by Gallup, according to which 93% of the Muslims are pacifists, but 7% are radical, the violent minority being motivated by the political side of the religion³⁸.

As a supporter of Eurabianism, Melanie Philips stated that: a criticism towards the European elites is: the extreme interpretation of multiculturalism, which labels any effort of the Westerners for protecting their own values as prejudice”³⁹. On the other side, Ibrahim Kalin from George Washington University states that: “the Muslims living in the Western Europe today have the opportunity to develop following a middle path, that of preserving their own identity while recognizing the identities of the others”... but that “in the name of integration, the Muslims are asked to embrace assimilation and thus lose their identity”⁴⁰. Practically, we can observe that both versions support the identity risk, be it Muslim or European.

Basically, the arguments opposing Eurabia reject the demographic arguments, which they consider to be an exaggeration (given the low percentage of Muslims as compared to the total population, their decreasing fertility rate) and even some cultural arguments (Simon Kuper, Financial Times, gives to understand that jihadism is not characteristic to the majority of the Muslims 23)⁴¹ and in the same time state that this kind of ideological demonstrations generate race hatred and serious discriminatory behaviour. In 2011, a report focusing on “anti-Muslim environment” was released; it fits Eurabia along other ideas such as islamization, the Sharia law, jihad, dhimmification, power that occupies Europe, among inspirational sources which pave the way for acts of glorifying the violence compared even to the Movement of White Supremacy (theory aimed against the Jewish community), ideas that inspired violent attitudes such as the attacks from Norway. According to the authors “Breivik is not alone in this hatred against Islam and multiculturalism”⁴².

On one side, Simon Kuper rejects the Muslim threat: “the majority of those living in the Western countries live an extremely mild existence: work, children, sleep”⁴³, and on the other one, Douglas Murray states that “we cannot take into consideration but the stories of success and ignore things like these (referring to

³⁷ JOCELYNE CESARI, Lecture: *The Rise of IslamistPartier in the New Middle East*, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs, Georgetown University, March 22, 2012, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iPv0frpUYo0> (accessed on 21.10.2012, 9:00 hours).

³⁸ *What a Billion Muslim Think?*, The Gallup Organization, 2008, <http://www.gallup.com/home.aspx>.

³⁹ Melanie PHILLIPS, “Liberalism v Islamism”, *Presentation at Neo Conference*, Stockholm, Sweden (May 11, 2007), quoted in L.S. Leb, “Radical Islam in Europe”, p. 2, 48.

⁴⁰ Ibrahim KALIN, *Islamophobia and the Challenges of Pluralism in the 21st Century*, Georgetown University, Washington DC, 2011, p. 54-55. http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/docs/ACMCU_Islamophobia_txt_99.pdf (accessed on 19.09.2012, 15:00 hours).

⁴¹ Simon KUPER, *The end of Eurabia*, The financial Times, September 9, 2011, 7:35. <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/1c825298-d8f7-11e0-aff1-00144feabdc0.html> (accessed on 22.10.2012, 14:10 hours).

⁴² David LARGERLOF, Jonathan LEMAN, Alexander BENGTTSSON *The Anti-Muslim Environment- The ideas, the Profiles and the Concepts*, Focus Report 2011:1, Expo Research, Stockholm. 2011.

⁴³ Simon KUPER (2011), *op. cit.*

extremist acts that had taken place on European ground) ... Every minority which engages in hatred (he meant hatred against other minorities with different concepts) and bigotry should be criticized”⁴⁴.

We may thus state that Eurabia is one of the most actual and controversial geopolitical theories that are centred on the old European continent. The voice of the West, both at academic level and media level has become more cautious especially after 2011, the majority being criticisms against this theory, but remains strongly represented by the American side and some European non-conformists such as Bat Ye’Or , Douglas Kear Murray, Ayaan Hirsi Ali. We shall see if following this 2011 we will assist the end of Eurabia – this sliding in a cone of shadow, as Simon Kuper states – or if the subsequent developments will make it more attractive and imperative to debate.

Conclusions

Security risks should not generate extreme attitudes without a very deep analysis of all the coordinates. Thus, both extreme feelings of racial hatred – such as Islam phobia – and too relaxed attitudes towards the issue – such as denying that Europe is confronting some cultural challenges – should be subjected to analysis. So, can we speak of cultural risks in Europe? Is Eurabia a reliable theory, or just a conspiracy theory?

As we could previously observe by means of presenting the international media and academic debates, both pro and against Eurabia positions are very well represented. As far as Bat Ye’Or is concerned, none of her statements expresses racial hatred – component of Islam phobia – if we are to refer to the definition: “An exaggerated fear, hatred and hostility towards Islam and the Muslims, perpetuated by negative stereotypes that generate prejudice, discrimination and marginalization, or even exclusion of the Muslims from social, political and civic life”⁴⁵.

From the demographic point of view, even if we speak of the 6% or 8% by 2010 and 8%⁴⁶ for 2030 or 20%⁴⁷ for 2050, or if we state that no precise forecasts can be made in this direction⁴⁸, we must still admit the importance of the localization of

⁴⁴ Douglas MURRAY, *Europe is failing its Muslims*, Centre for Social Cohesion,, The Intelligence Debate, London, 2010, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B4M-whjJs10> (accessed on 22.10.2012, 18:00 hours).

⁴⁵ *Islamophobia: Understanding Anti-Muslim Sentiment in the West*, Gallup Poll 2011, p. 1. <http://www.gallup.com/home.aspx>.

⁴⁶ *The Future Global Muslim Population- Projections for 2010-2030*, Pew Research Center, Janvier 2011. www.pewforum.org.

⁴⁷ Karoly LORANT, *The demographic challenge in Europe*, 2005, European Parliament paper, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/inddem/docs/papers/The%20demographic%20challenge%20in%20Europe.pdf>, p. 5.

⁴⁸ William UNDERHILL, *Why Fears Of A Muslim Takeover Are All Wrong*, article publicat la data de July 11, 2009 in NEWSWEEK <http://www.newsweek.com/id/206230> (accessed on 01.10.2012, 12:35 hours).

these communities: that is, the concentrations from big urban centres such as Berlin, London, Paris, Madrid.

As a matter of fact, from the cultural point of view, we cannot ignore the fundamental differences between the host countries and the countries of origin of the immigrants, which are only easier to observe by means of a simple analysis of Geert Hofstede's cultural dimensions, as well as we cannot ignore the fact that cultural tensions exist – referring to practical estimations, an investigation undergone by Gallup showed as main cause of frictions between Westerners and Muslims political reasons (40%) and religion-related reasons (29%), based on the opinion of the responders⁴⁹.

It may be true that only a small part of the Muslim population in Europe is extremist (data from previous chapter - Gallup), with proneness to degenerating in violence, but it may be equally true that we cannot deny the existence of such phenomena on European territory at least in the past few years – extreme violent examples such as the London and Madrid attacks, the tensions from French suburbs, the outrage caused by the Danish comics representing the prophet Mohammed, the murder of the director Theo van Gogh, etc.⁵⁰ On the other hand, the weak integration of the immigrants also generated Islam phobic reactions, the most violent being Anders Breivik's Norwegian massacre. Such extreme acts from both sides must be condemned.

It is also an issue of integrating these immigrants; we may state that there is a contradiction between the striving of a secularized Europe for assimilating Muslim immigrants and their desire of being integrated without being assimilated. And although statistics reveal that generally the immigrants feel they are being shown respect⁵¹ and feel a degree of belonging to the host country, being able to perceive these aspects as peculiar to integration, there still are issues when it comes to sensitive subjects such as wearing a niqab or women rights according to the European approach.

Is it really fair that a continent with such old cultural traditions must adapt certain coordinates in order to cope with a newly arrived population, or is it fair that those who come for a better living should subject themselves, at public level, to the rules of the host state, keeping their believes and traditions for the private environment? Must Europe make a compromise to reach a half way, or should it be more firm? These are the questions the European policy will have to answer in order to cope with the cultural risk that would be unrealistic to deny.

Thus, if we come to assist prejudices to the justice or “civilisation clashes” or a permanent, irreversible transformation, marked by tensions, it is only up to the capacity of the immigrants to understand the culture in which they alone chose to live in and to the capacity of Europe to adopt an attitude as fair and firm as possible,

⁴⁹ Gallup (2011), *Islamophobia...*, *op.cit* .

⁵⁰ *The West and Islam- Tales from Eurabia*, The Economist, June 22nd 2006, from the printed edition.

⁵¹ Gallup (2011), *Islamophobia...*, *op.cit*.

enforced by the new realities; any violent outburst, be it Islam phobic or islamist, is not acceptable.

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POINTS OF VIEW REGARDING STRATEGIC ENERGY AND OIL AND GAS CONFRONTATIONS IN THE NEAR EAST AND MIDDLE EAST

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Motto:

*"Whoever controls the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf will strangle not only the U.S. economy but also that of most countries of the world".
Michael T. Klare "The Resource Wars"*

Abstract: *Energy and raw materials are generally limited and unevenly distributed across the planet. Industrial expansion and economic globalization acts as "devouring" of raw materials and energy. Power is currently based on fossil and nuclear fuels, and less on renewable resources. The main strategic resources are at the heart of international disputes regarding access and / or control of energy, especially oil, natural gas, and natural consumption such as water and food resources. The world economy is still dependent on oil as a central resource of energy that is consumed as the more, the more quickly it will exhaust even if have other resources such as nuclear, solar or wind.*

Keywords: *resource, resource wars, source of insecurity, risks, threat, economic crisis, national, global, security.*

Introduction

Any human activity depends on resources, defined as "provisions" or "sources of goods to be exploited in certain circumstances"¹, and on how these resources can be used in the production of social values. Experts in economics argue that development implies a form of leadership based on science – resources seen firstly as raw material, but also as finished goods, considered in a certain space and time, according to a specific management style and the human capacity to maintain a good necessity-availability rate of use.

The question of resources is addressed multidimensionality in all social sciences through interdisciplinary research, given its paramount, defining importance, for all areas of social life. According to different theories and methods of investigation, economists came up with four major categories of resources, depending on human interests and needs:

- Human resources - the total number of individuals capable of producing social values in a given community, at a given time;
- Material resources - the total number of raw materials and finished goods sources that a community needs.

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¹ *Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language publishing house, Universul Enciclopedic, Bucharest, 1996, p 920.*

- Financial (economical) resources - the total number of material and money funds a community possesses at a given time, which can be used for development and specific needs.

- Information resources - all data, information, databases which are organized, relevant, available and appropriate for decision making².

Access to all categories of resources is very important, if we consider water, food resources, energy, or information. Given the importance of natural resources - energy, oil, gas and water, each country seeks to ensure its independence and provisions through various means. Competition in the acquirement that can be called strategic due to their special importance, (e.g. water and fossil fuels) can lead to tensions or even conflicts between the states already possessing resources and the states in need of them, an increasing trend nowadays, when some of these resources are starting to diminish and there are studies announcing their extinction.

The main strategic resources involved in international disputes regarding their access and / or control are fossil fuels, especially oil and natural gas, but also nature resources such as water and food supplies³. Everywhere on the globe, developed economies depend on energy, and losing access can have devastating consequences, this is why each state, through external policies and security strategies, deals with issues concerning the availability of strategic resources, pipelines and terminals, future transport routes (pipelines), partnerships, and, last but not least, the future of these resources, i.e. those supplies still untapped.

1. Oil and gas - depleting energy resources

Petroleum (crude oil) and natural gas are hydrocarbons known as fossil fuels or fossil energy, which provide 2/3 of the energy consumed in the world today.

1.1. Oil - Strategic energy resources

*Flammable liquid rock, commonly called 'oil', consisting of a complex mixture of natural hydrocarbons accumulated beneath the Earth's surface. On the surface, oil takes gas form, as 'natural gas', and liquid form, as crude, condensed oil*⁴.

Globally, all known oil reserves amount to 150 billion barrels, plus 100 billion barrels in some deposits recently discovered from The Caspian Sea to Sudan⁵.

Oil is a strategic energy resource, necessary in economy and the military sector⁶. It can be said that the present security of each state, including Romania, depends to a large extent on possession of adequate oil resources. In this sense, each

² According to the *National Information Security Doctrine* adopted in CSAT meeting of June 23, 2004, published by SRI, p.14.

³ Eugene ZAINEA, *Sources of Conflict of XXI century*, Geopolitics, no. 7-8, 2004, Top Form Publishing, 2004, p 81.

⁴ See *Petroleum Law - Law no. 134 of 29 December 1995* published in MO no. 301 of 29 December 1995.

⁵ Pascal CHAIGNEAU, *Petrole et geopolitique*, Défense Nationale, noiembrie 2004, p. 144-145

⁶ Gheorghe N. ANGHEL, Gheorghe Gh ANGHEL, *Components of Romanian National Security* Tempus Publishing Company, Romania 1996, pp. 40-41.

state came up with the solution of creating strategic oil supplies especially for military defence in times of economic crisis and war. The world economy, especially the G-8 member states, also depends hugely on oil, mainly oil that can be found in regions / areas such as the Near and Middle East⁷, Russia and the Caspian Sea⁸, Africa⁹, South America¹⁰, East and Southeast Asia¹¹.

1.2. Natural gas

Today, this type of natural energy resource represents around 23% of global energy consumption, but by 2020 the consumption will rise over 30% and will probably dominate the future development of this century¹².

Natural gas forms in nature without human intervention and contains free gas from methane gas fields, natural gas dissolved in oil, the gas contained in the oil fields, as well as gas resulting from the extraction or separation of liquid hydrocarbons¹³.

Natural gas can be found beneath the Earth's surface, forming independent or underground deposits associated with crude oil deposits, that is why the richest oil fields also contain plenty of natural gas.

Because of this association with oil deposits, the main resources of natural gas can be found in the same areas from the Middle East¹⁴, Russia, the Caspian Sea¹⁵, Africa¹⁶, South America, East and Southeast Asia¹⁷.

⁷ Near and Middle East is the main oil region, which has about 70% of the current reserves main producing countries in the region are Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait. Cf. Andre GAMBLIN, *World Economy*, 2004, pp. 292-293.

⁸ Russia - holds 6.7% of global oil reserves, producing about 11.5% of world production in 2005, Costel BARBALATA, *Russia, with and without God*, World Magazine, April 2006, p 54.

⁹ Africa has a share of 7.2% of global oil reserves, *La geopolitique de l'Energie*, Revue Francais de geopolitique, May 2004

¹⁰ Central and South America, in this region the main countries that have significant oil reserves are Venezuela (fifth world producer), Peru and Mexico.

¹¹ East Asia and South-East - is an area where Indonesia has significant oil reserves (North Sumatra), but through political crises leading to conflicts in the name of religion (internal crises, separatist rebellions due to falling oil output).

¹² <http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/hill>.

¹³ *According to Law no. 134 of 29 December 1995 on oil*, published in Official Gazette no. 301 of 29 December 1995.

¹⁴ Middle East holds 40% of world reserves of natural gas. Two thirds of the world's oil and gas are found in the eastern Middle East (Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf emirates, Iraq).

¹⁵ Central Asia - this Special area is rich in hydrocarbon resources, in particular natural gas reserves holding countries in this important area, of which 2,000 billion cubic Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan 1,000 billion cubic meters. Especially Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, Radu MOLDOVAN, *The logic of conflicts in Caspian space*, Geopolitics, no. 7-8, 2004, Top FOR Publishing, 2004, pp. 209-217.

¹⁶ Resources of this continent represents 10% of world reserves of hydrocarbons and production will increase, on the one hand, oil fields, and putting into operation new natural gas deposits in numerous foreign investment can bring, besides exports electricity, liquefaction and even petrochemicals.

¹⁷ See Andre GAMBLIN, *World Economy*, 2004, p 292-293 - Top 10 natural gas producing countries in 2002.

Russia is the largest producer in the world¹⁸ and also the largest exporter, possessing 29% of the world's natural gas reserves (22% of world production in 2005) and the largest natural gas deposits in the world, followed by Iran and Saudi Arabia. Other areas where natural gas resources abound are: South America [there is a latent conflict between the two largest producers – Venezuela (fifth oil exporter in the world) and Bolivia (second gas producer in the region)] and East and Southeast Asia, Indonesia being the seventh producer in the world; Pakistan and Afghanistan also have large reserves.

2. State conflicts for access to strategic energy resources in the Near and Middle East

The starting point of all major conflicts in the world to this date, regardless of official reasons and pretexts, was the struggle for resources, for access and, if it was possible, control of these resources. Of course, these efforts are focused primarily on essential resources, most of which can be found in nature, factoring development, and potential power. Natural resources can be linked to at least four levels of importance, namely possession, development, control, and use.

The first level – possession – cannot be decisive in the power equation, depending too much on the other levels, primarily on development.

Development is important, but in turn depends on control – *through control of resources, states can maintain positions of power on the international stage; it has often been said that whomever controls the oil, holds the power in the world*¹⁹.

In the Middle East, some states possess large oil resources – the Arab States – like Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates – but are not developed enough to be considered powerful, not even in the region, while other states are highly developed, without possessing rich natural resources – Israel is one of these states.

The use of resources is the final level of importance, because state power depends and rises according to welfare, which can be achieved only through intelligent use of resources. Thus, whoever makes the best use of resources can hold the power provided of course he controls them. Among the natural resources, the energy ones are the most common and necessary for development.

If all world economies depend on energy resources and losing access to them may have devastating consequences on states, there must be a constant concern for accessibility, transportation, and appropriate use of energy resources, and thus today's geopolitics are dominated by resource strategies, especially energy resources.

The seismic effects of the September 11 terrorist attack and the following events resulted in a different strategy employed by the major geopolitical players competing for control of resources; hence today, instead of a single conflict zone –

¹⁸ Russia hopes to increase exports mainly due to a pipeline from the Yamal Peninsula deposit at the mouth of the river Ob and Gulf of Finland, and doubling the current capacity of the Yamal pipeline – Poland.

¹⁹ Cf Corneliu CALOTĂ, *Power sources of a global player from the pre-industrial to the information age*, the Strategic Monitor no. 3/2005, p 105.

the Middle East – there are, potentially, two additional conflict areas / sub-areas: the Caucasus and Central Asia (the Caspian region).

2.1. State conflicts for strategic resources (oil and gas)

The state and geopolitical configuration in the East (the Near and Middle East) is a consequence of the way the great World War I winners retraced the borders in the area; the current Eastern states, except Egypt, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, are a product of the conflicts and struggle of Super-Powers for the redistribution of spheres of influence in a region they considered essential for their strategic position, especially for oil resources.

The Near East is the place where Asia meets Europe and Africa, with countries such as Turkey, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, and Sudan; the Middle East contains Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Lately, this geographical area is called either the Near East or the Middle East, including all countries listed above²⁰. The Near and Middle East is an area plagued with tensions, lack of resources and too many unresolved issues. Among these, the most important are: the problem of Palestinian terrorism, the Kurdish issue, the question of strategic resources (oil, gas, water, etc.) and ethnic conflicts in the area.

The Middle East was faced with numerous crises and wars after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire (1918) and after the Second World War (1945), when many countries in the region gained their independence. Some of the most important phenomena that contributed to the destabilization of the area are: intense exploitation of natural resources, particularly oil, the rise of religious integrism growing population and migration. Crises and wars in the Gulf area always had serious consequences in the evolution of world economy and states²¹.

One of these consequences was the establishment of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) on September 14, 1960, which has a policy of setting a higher price for petroleum sold by its members, higher than the price on the free market²².

2.2. Conflicts for oil and natural gas

Two thirds of the world's oil and gas resources are found in the eastern Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Emirates of the Persian Gulf, Iraq) witch is why the perspective of oil “death” threw the countries of this region at the forefront of the United States political and military interests.

The geopolitical, economical and strategic implication of the U.S. military interventions in the East (Near and Middle East) and Central Asia are generated –

²⁰ Paul DOBRESCU, *Geopolitics*, Editura@comunicare.ro, Bucharest, 2003, p 412.

²¹ See Jean - Louis DUFOUR, *International crises - from Beijing (1900) to Kosovo (1999)*, Corinthian Publishing, 1999.

²² The organization was formed by the top five oil-producing countries (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Venezuela), see Nicolas SARKIS, *Old networks and new challenges for oil supply* in *Le Monde Diplomatique* (Romanian Edition) May 2006 , p 9.

beyond the very well known propaganda excuses (war against terror, democracy, freedom, etc..) - even of the importance of oil and natural gas resources of the two areas, which the United States seeks to monitor in the oil crisis conditions²³.

Eric Waddell - professor of geography at "Laval University" - made a number of details, which caused a sensation in the world of specialists, regarding the real reasons of the war in Iraq, and points in the world to be held in future conflicts. Even in the period preceding the American invasion of Iraq - (...) According to the Eric Waddell, The Bush administration had decided to intervene militarily against the regime in Baghdad, including reasons of oil crisis and of grabbing the last great world resources.²⁴

Since 1990, U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney said in a report (within the Senate Armed Forces Committee) that "Iraq control 10% of world oil reserves, before occupation of Kuwait. Once Saddam seized Kuwait, he came to control 20% of global oil resources and clearly, he is now able to dictate the future of global energy and strangle the American economy, (...). According to the report of Dick Cheney ... in 2020, the Persian Gulf will provide nearly 2/3 of world oil exports.

The control over this region and its resources is therefore more important in the future than it was in the past. Emphasize that over 20 years ago, after removal of the Shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi, the U.S. President Jimmy Carter warned unequivocally: "Any outside attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and against this attack we will answer in any necessary way, including military force" or, as claimed also the former Secretary of State James Baker: "Oil, meaning vital American interests!"²⁵.

High stakes is demonstrated by deepening dispute - of the Iranian issue and not just between the United States (first inter pares - first power of global multi-polarity) and France, Germany, Russia and China, (secondary output / regional) and it is represented mainly by resources, especially the energy resources.²⁶

Among the countries that have oil and gas resources and are involved in actual or potential confrontation for oil in this area are noted mainly Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran's Kuwait.

It is interesting that, geographically, Iran has an enviable strategic position, not far from the largest importers of oil and gas - India, China, and Europe. With oil reserves estimated at 130 billion barrels, Iran holds 10% of the world's resources and also has the second biggest deposit of natural gas on the planet: 36,000 billion cubic meters. Iran's oil sector provides 22.1% of GDP, or 80% of exports and 90% of

²³ Vladimir ALEXE, *A turning point in the history of civilization / Death of oil*, in "Day" (Bucharest), no. 3436 - 9/24/2005, pp. II-III.

²⁴ Clarifications were made in the number 3 in the journal "Global Outlook" in November 2002, apud: Vladimir Alexe, art. cit., ECR II-III.

²⁵ Vladimir ALEXE, *Resource Wars: Who will dominate the Gulf will dominate the world Day on March 1*, 2003, Secret Files.

²⁶ This statement is supported by Michael T. KLAR - author of *The Resource Wars* ("resource wars") - that the work mentioned states: "Anyone who control the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf will not only strangle the American economy but also that of most countries of the world", according www.fpif.org.

government revenues. It is also the only state in the East, which has oil reserves in the Gulf (south) and the Caspian Sea (north), and its gas reserves were leased to Russians (Gazprom) and British (British Gas)²⁷.

Oil allowed the Iranian regime to maintain a growth rate of 6% per year, to improve trade balance, to reduce foreign debt, to accumulate currency and mainly to defuse social pressures subsidizing essential goods such as gasoline, sold at low prices. Moreover, a review of the interests of the great powers to Iran's energy resources explains the current tensions and conflicts of interest which is evident in the U.N. Security Council.

Currently, it seems that the Iranian issue becomes more concerned even with an already existing conflict in Syria and finds the members of Security Council divided.

U.S. claims that the military option remains open, though officially calls for a diplomatic solution²⁸ and EU imposed economic sanctions to Iran even though this was *the most important oil supplier to the EU after Russia*.

For China, Iran imported oil represents 14% of total imports of oil and the second source after Saudi Arabia, and Russia does not seem willing to give up the few profitable agreements signed with Iran in energy and military for sanctions applied by the U.N.

Conclusions

In conclusion, we can say that most oil reserves are located far away from major consumer and create economic problems and environmental policies. If from the economic point of view the price of oil reflects the complex reality starting from the extraction and transport costs to the consumer, in terms of geopolitical future of renewable resources involves complex estimates²⁹.

The current level of production is close to the peak of the last 25 years, while global oil demand for the year 2006 will be placed at the level of 85.1 million barrels per day to 300,000 barrels per day above the previous forecast. This increase is mainly due to an increased demand in Asian countries and the Middle East³⁰.

The world economy is still dependent on oil as a central resource for energy, despite steady increases in consumption and price for the next forty years, but do not forget that the more they consume, the more quickly it will exhaust even if we have other resources such as nuclear, solar or wind³¹.

²⁷ See Pascal CHAIGNEAU, *art. cit.*, p. 147.

²⁸ An article entitled *The Iran Plans*, published by Seymour Hersh in the *New Yorker*, quoting a source at the Pentagon, who argued that the only way to solve the Iranian problem is to change the power structure in Iran which obviously means war cf. Vladimir Alexe, *Why delay Iran war: Ziua* of 22. April 2006, secret files IV.

²⁹ Dr. Nicolae DOLGHIN, *Geopolitics. Dependence on energy resource,s* Defense University Press, 2004, p 9.

³⁰ Alexandra BOTEANU, *OPEC will have to stop oil production in 2006*, cf. Agency "Mediafax" (Bucharest) - April 12, 2006.

³¹ See website [Http // www.dicoff.com](http://www.dicoff.com).

The actual rate of depletion will accelerate and current confrontation will deepen or new ones will appear from Indonesia and Africa³². The resource depletion can explain concerns for replacing oil with gas oil, nuclear and / or other alternative resources.

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³² See Marcel DUVAL, *La géopolitique de l'Energie*, Géopolitique Français Revue, May 2004.

22. MOLDOVAN, Radu, *Logic geopolitical conflicts in the Caspian area*, no. 7-8, 2004, top publisher FOR, 2004, p 209-217;
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ROMANIA BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN ENERGETIC THREAT AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL SHALE GAS EXTRACTION RISK

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Abstract: Romania, after its change of power, does not have a reliable National Security Strategy that includes energetic strategy elements. This statement is based on the fact that the old strategy was elaborated by the former Supreme Council for National Defence component given out by the former government. This can be seen from the comparison of the 2012 Governmental Program with the Governmental actions of the Minister of Economy and the Foreign Affairs Minister.

Keywords: energetic strategy, shale gas, Black Sea, alternative transport routes.

1. Present Situation: Gazprom's monopoly

Russia, the survivor of what was once the Soviet Union and the Tsarist Empire, re-evaluated its foreign policy after Putin-Medvedev's rise to power. This way, a new strategy was elaborated in which affirms the new action plan:¹ the European Union countries have to become more and more dependent on the Russian gas, Russia will realize a big investment in tubing (see Blue Stream, North Stream and the South Stream project), seizure and, enlargement of the transport capacities of former USSR countries: Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan to the West (in January 2012 Gazprom announced a doubling of Azerbaijan's gas to 3 mil. mc/year²), creation of intermediary firms in the western states that occupies with gas imports (Romania imports through two firms this way), Gazprom's association with its "old business partners" in different firms (WIEE importer has shareholding Gazprom³), shareholding as many firms as possible that specialize in gas production and distribution or rolling stock producers for the gas transportation and extraction industry in the West, purchase of national gas and petrol transportation and distribution companies, or their finished products from as many European countries as possible (MOL - Hungary, NIS - Serbia), purchase or association with many European infrastructure companies (communications, railroad transport, etc.) in exchange for a smaller price on gas (Moldogaz, national gas distributor for the Republic of Moldova is held in a 51% proportion by Gazprom and Moldova imports with 100 Euros cheaper than the rest of the countries).

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¹ Roman KUPCHINSKY, Gazprom's European web, Jamestown Foundation Library, JamesTown 2009, p. 2.

² InfoRusia.ro, http://inforusia.ro/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5546:moscova-isi-dubleaza-achizitiile-de-gaz-din-azerbaidjan&catid=38:politica&Itemid=56.

³ WIEE website- <http://www.wiee.ch/>.

The EU statistics say that 84% of the Union's gas consumption is represented by pipeline imports, these being made by the following: 52% Russia, 31% Norway, 12% Algeria, 3% Libya, 2% Iran.⁴

The countries with the largest consumption rate in Europe are: Germany, France, Italy, Turkey, and Ukraine. The first three, being in the European Union subject to the minimum of the laws imposed by the new common energetic strategy. These are: energetic consumption reduction with 20% and 20% of the produced energy must be renewable until 2020 (Directive 20- 20- 20⁵) and the energetic strategy for the reduction of Gazprom's monopoly, elaborated in 2011, which oversees the development and realisation of alternative gas supply routes. Also, the European commission made a decision that obliges all the countries to interconnect their gas transport and electric energy routes.⁶

Energy consuming countries turned their attention to natural gasses in the last 50 years, and the richest resources can be found today in Russia. At that time, there existed a common tacit agreement between a part of the European Communities and USSR: the first of them providing technology and the other resources⁷. In the winter of 2005- 2006, the first gas crisis was triggered in Russia and Ukraine and the gas deliveries to the EU were interrupted. Even though studies that calculated the risk of total disconnection existed, until then there wasn't any syncope in gas provision. The construction of North Stream started in that period, the gas pipeline that goes under the Baltic Sea and avoids passing through Ukraine, Byelorussia, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia and has the purpose to reduce the political influences of these states and increase Germany's energetic dependence to the Russian Federation.

The European Union is energetically dependent of Russia in proportion of over 30% on all raw materials.

	Hard coal									
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	
Russia	11.5	13.1	13.5	18.7	24.1	25.4	25.1	26.3	30.2	
Colombia	12.5	12.6	12.5	12.1	12.1	12.0	13.0	12.5	17.6	
South Africa	27.0	31.4	31.5	26.6	25.7	24.3	20.8	17.1	16.0	
United States	11.2	8.2	7.0	7.5	7.8	8.0	9.3	14.3	13.7	
Australia	16.3	16.9	17.0	15.3	13.5	12.4	13.5	12.0	7.6	
Indonesia	5.7	6.7	7.1	7.0	7.4	9.7	7.9	7.4	7.1	
Ukraine	1.6	2.0	1.3	2.0	2.1	1.6	1.7	2.2	1.6	
Canada	3.8	3.2	2.9	2.5	3.3	2.8	3.1	2.7	1.4	
Norway	0.9	1.0	1.2	0.6	0.6	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.8	
Others	9.7	5.0	6.0	7.8	3.5	3.7	5.0	4.8	3.9	

⁴ Source: EUROSTAT.

⁵ Europa.eu - <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=IM-PRESS&reference=20081208BRI43933&secondRef=ITEM-002-EN&format=XML&language=EN>.

⁶ Europa.eu - http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/energy/internal_energy_market/127081_ro.htm

⁷ Cosmin Gabriel PACURARU, *Europe and the impossibility of energetic security management*. in Strategic Impact nr. 3 (40) 2011, UNAP, p. 104.

⁸ [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Main_origin_of_primary_energy_imports,_EU-27,_2001-2009_\(%25_of_extra_EU-27_imports\).png&filetimestamp=20111123174700](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Main_origin_of_primary_energy_imports,_EU-27,_2001-2009_(%25_of_extra_EU-27_imports).png&filetimestamp=20111123174700)

2. What Russia wants

Crude oil									
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Russia	25.5	29.2	31.1	32.2	32.5	33.4	33.2	31.4	33.1
Norway	20.1	19.4	19.2	18.8	16.9	15.5	15.1	15.1	15.2
Libya	8.2	7.5	8.4	8.8	8.8	9.2	9.8	9.9	9.0
Saudi Arabia	10.8	10.1	11.3	11.3	10.6	9.1	7.2	6.9	5.7
Kazakhstan	1.6	2.4	2.7	3.4	4.5	4.6	4.6	4.8	5.4
Iran	5.9	4.9	6.4	6.3	6.1	6.2	6.2	5.4	4.7
Nigeria	4.8	3.5	4.3	2.6	3.2	3.6	2.7	4.0	4.5
Azerbaijan	0.9	1.0	1.0	0.9	1.3	2.2	3.0	3.2	4.0
Iraq	3.8	3.0	1.6	2.2	2.1	2.9	3.4	3.3	3.8
Others	18.3	18.8	14.2	13.4	14.0	13.2	14.7	16.1	14.6
Natural gas									
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Russia	47.7	45.0	45.1	43.8	40.6	39.3	38.4	37.6	34.2
Norway	22.8	26.2	25.5	25.0	24.4	25.5	28.2	28.9	30.7
Algeria	21.2	21.2	20.0	18.2	18.0	16.4	15.4	14.7	14.1
Qatar	0.3	0.9	0.7	1.4	1.6	1.8	2.2	2.2	4.6
Libya	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	1.7	2.5	3.0	2.9	2.9
Nigeria	2.3	2.2	3.1	3.7	3.5	4.3	4.7	4.0	2.4
Trinidad and Tobago	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.2	1.3	0.8	1.6	2.2
Egypt	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6	2.5	1.8	1.7	2.1
Oman	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.4
Others	4.6	3.7	5.1	7.0	7.8	6.1	5.4	6.3	6.4

2.1. Blocking all transport and provision alternatives

The emphasis on the economic crisis brought to the decrease of raw material need and implicitly of Russian raw material imports with more than 20% in the last years, which does not suit Russia too well. It created political and economic pressures on the European Union and the countries that have economic contracts so that they won't lower their imported gas consumption. Putting in balance the possibility to realise alternative transport routes for resources (Nabucco and AGRI) and discovering alternative resources (shale gasses) made the Russian foreign policy to radicalise and to represent a risk factor in the international security environment.

We can observe that Russia put in remarkable efforts to finish the North Stream gas pipeline before its due date, to bring in discussion a possible South Stream gas pipeline, to minimise the importance of the Nabucco gas pipeline and the liquefied gas transport route AGRI. About the finality of the negotiations overlooking Nabucco, it is found that Russia negotiated with Turkey, the Botas Company key shareholder the realisation of project Nabucco, so that the company would waiver its participation in this project. In exchange, Gazprom engaged not to modify the pumped gas prices through Blue Stream, the gas pipeline that unites Russia with Turkey under the Black Sea. Also, Russia engaged to supply Turkey with the necessary technology to build an atomic-electric power station⁹.

⁹ Radio "The Voice of Russia"- <http://Romanian.ruvr.ru/2011/08/22/55006687.html>.



Figure no.1 (Source: Gazprom.com)

The discovery of new gas resources in the Black Sea close to Romanian and Bulgarian territory, and significant shale gas resources in Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, resources that would guarantee energetic security for the respective countries¹⁰ for a long period of time and would make possible gas export to the western countries. These discoveries represent a major threat in the loss of a significant percentage in Russian gas exports and a loss of influence in its strategic zone.

Another way is buying in advance of gas production of former USSR exporting countries towards transportation and selling, two examples being the doubling of the gas quantity taken by Azerbaijan¹¹ or cutting the pipelines in Turkmenistan to any other importing country¹².

¹⁰ About Romania, we have two interviews: The OMV and Petrom directors (Hotnews - <http://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-energie-13366808-directorul-omv-petrom-extractia-gaze-marea-neagra-putea-incepe-spre-sfarsitul-deceniului-exploatarea-putea-asigura-independenta-energetica-Romaniei-privinta-gazelor-naturale.htm>) și al directorului SRI (Hotnews - <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-13369690-george-maior-seful-sri-prospectiunile-exxon-arata-sunt-rezerve-serioase-extrem-importante-hidrocarburi-marea-neagra.htm>).

¹¹ Inforusia.ro - http://inforusia.ro/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5546:moscova-isi-dubleaza-achizitiile-de-gaz-din-azerbaidjan&catid=38:politica&Itemid=56.

¹² Adevărul – Chap 2, aligment 5: http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/Cu_Traian_Basescu_in_Turkmenistan-tara_unui_singur_om_0_791920970.html#.

2.2. The creation of “the energetic pliers”

Until this moment only North Stream is functional, which represents the northern route of the energetic pliers, Blue Stream a part of the southern route, South Stream is expected to be designed and realised.




Figure no. 2 - <http://www.south-stream-transport.com>

2.3. The public opinion influence and the respective countries' administration

Articles existed about the minimisation of the declarations and information in reference to the newly discovered reserves. This way article appeared in the Russian press, imported by the other countries that are trying to minimise the resources and reducing the ones that made the declarations to absurd¹³.

In the first week of the new USL government in Romania, a strategy change was produced, which targets Gazprom's entrance or of its subsidiaries in the Romanian market of distribution of fuels or services. After a week from the change of power, the NIS Company, subsidiary to Gazprom in Serbia, took over a chain of gas

¹³ Example: Radio “The Voice of Russia”- “Mariana Gheorghe did not confirm in any way the bombastic declarations of the OMV director, Gerhard Roiss, about the natural gas reserves discovered in the Romanian Black Sea territory. The existence of a “gigantic deposit” or “of global scale” was not mentioned. http://Romanian.ruvr.ru/2012_10_08/90532443/.

stations in Romania¹⁴ and is preparing to invest over 500 million Euros in the domain¹⁵. Three months prior to USL's rise to power, Gazprom overtakes a bunkering firm in the port of Constanta¹⁶ and is in negotiations with the Romanian government to get hold of the Oltchim state company¹⁷. If we analyse the facts, we can conclude that in the period of the PDL governing between 2008- 2011, no powerful Russian firm invested in Romania, only after USL's rise to power this happened.

Still in the first week of USL governing, a moratorium overlooking the exploration and exploitation of shale gasses on the Romanian territory was imposed¹⁸. This was done to stop the American firm Chevron's exploitation in two zones (Barlad and the southern seaside). We can assess that the introduction of this moratorium by the Romanian Government was made at the insistence of the Russian diplomats. A similar thing happened in the case of the gold exploitation in Rosia Montana, which is leased to a Canadian firm. A similar decision was made in Bulgaria overlooking its shale gasses, Bulgaria being 100% dependent on Russian gas¹⁹.

We now analyze both of the protests against the shale gasses performed in Barlad in the spring of 2012, protests at which participated over 5000 citizens²⁰. We consider that no Romanian organisation can gather as many people not even in Bucharest, serving as examples the demonstrations organised over the course of time by any organisation, protest demonstrations that hardly gathered 1000 people.

2.4. The influence of the EU governing and the component countries' administration

Not all the decisions made in the Parliament and Government of the European countries were in their advantage. The last decision which can be put under a question mark belongs to the German Bundestag; this being the decision to close all the atom-electric power station in the situation that 27% of the energy produced comes from nuclear fusion²¹. Gradually, by 2020, all the German nuclear power

¹⁴ Adevărul - <http://www.business24.ro/gazprom/investitii/nis-subsidiara-sarba-a-gazprom-se-extinde-in-sud-estul-europei-1515686>.

¹⁵ Gandul - <http://www.gandul.info/news/nis-subsidiara-sarba-a-gazprom-are-aproape-600-de-milioane-de-dolari-pentru-explorari-in-Romania-ungaria-si-bosnia-9405707>.

¹⁶ Ziarul Finaciar - <http://www.zf.ro/companii/rusii-de-la-gazprom-se-plaseaza-strategic-in-portul-constant-prin-achizitia-unei-afaceri-detinute-de-generalul-pacurei-10069757/>.

¹⁷ Ziare.com - <http://www.ziare.com/victor-ponta/premier/ponta-nu-m-ar-deranja-nici-gazprom-nici-dan-diaconescu-la-oltchim-1190745> si <http://www.ziare.com/economie/privatizare/mitrea-daca-gazprom-a-depus-oferta-pentru-oltchim-i-as-da-gratis-combinatul-1190897>.

¹⁸ Digi 24 - http://www.digi24.ro/stire/Deciziile-privind-Rosia-Montana-si-gazele-de-sist-amanate-pana-dupa-alegerile-parlamentare_21299.

¹⁹ Cosmin Gabriel PACURARU, *Europe and the impossibility of energetic security management*, Strategic Impact, nr.3 (40) 2011, UNAP, p. 107- table no.1.

²⁰ Mediafax - <http://www.mediafax.ro/social/proteste-la-barlad-mii-de-oameni-au-cerut-blocarea-exploatarii-gazelor-de-sist-9427227>.

²¹ Eurostat - [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Energy_production,_1999_and_2009_\(million_tonnes_of_oil_equivalent\).png&filetimestamp=20111123174647](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Energy_production,_1999_and_2009_(million_tonnes_of_oil_equivalent).png&filetimestamp=20111123174647).

stations will be closed, the necessary energy being produced from coal and gas. Statistics say that the risk of a nuclear power station accident is smaller than any other power stations and that pollution is on a greater scale in the case of thermo power stations powered by fossil fuels and that Germany is the largest importer of Russian raw materials, especially gas, we can assess that the law of which we're talking about is in Russia's favour and in Germany's detriment and the decision could have been influenced by Russian organisations and institutions.

	Total production of primary energy		Share of total production, 2009 (%)				
	1999	2009	Nuclear energy	Solid fuels	Natural gas	Crude oil	Renewable energy
EU-27	949.4	812.2	28.4	20.4	18.8	12.8	18.3
Euro area	447.9	448.4	39.8	14.6	17.1	3.3	23.4
Belgium	13.6	14.6	83.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.4
Bulgaria	9.1	9.7	40.8	47.0	0.1	0.3	11.6
Czech Republic	28.7	31.1	22.6	67.0	0.5	1.0	8.3
Denmark	23.8	23.9	0.0	0.0	31.5	55.4	11.5
Germany	137.2	127.5	27.3	35.9	8.7	3.6	21.7
Estonia	3.0	4.2	0.0	79.2	0.0	0.0	20.8
Ireland	2.5	1.5	0.0	38.2	20.8	0.0	40.2
Greece	9.5	10.1	0.0	81.1	0.1	0.8	17.9
Spain	30.5	29.6	46.0	12.3	0.0	0.4	40.2
France	125.8	128.5	82.3	0.0	0.6	1.0	15.2
Italy	29.4	27.3	0.0	0.2	24.0	19.0	54.0
Cyprus	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	91.5
Latvia	1.6	2.1	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	99.6
Lithuania	3.5	4.0	71.7	0.4	0.0	2.9	25.0
Luxembourg	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	75.5
Hungary	11.9	11.0	36.4	14.2	20.9	11.0	16.9
Malta	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Netherlands	59.5	63.2	1.7	0.0	89.2	3.5	4.4
Austria	9.7	11.4	0.0	0.0	12.6	9.2	73.3
Poland	83.4	67.2	0.0	83.5	5.5	1.0	9.0
Portugal	3.4	4.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	97.2
Romania	28.1	28.5	10.6	23.0	31.4	16.4	18.5
Slovenia	2.9	3.5	42.0	32.9	0.1	0.0	24.5
Slovakia	5.5	5.7	64.5	11.4	1.5	0.3	21.4
Finland	15.4	16.4	37.1	13.3	0.0	0.9	47.8
Sweden	32.7	29.9	45.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	52.8
United Kingdom	278.6	156.3	11.4	6.4	34.4	44.2	3.3
Norway	209.7	215.9	0.0	0.8	42.0	51.5	5.6
Switzerland	12.0	12.7	56.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	37.5
Croatia	3.6	4.1	0.0	0.0	54.0	20.4	25.3
Turkey	27.5	30.3	0.0	57.3	1.9	8.1	32.7

Source: Eurostat (online data codes: ten00076, ten00080, ten00077, ten00079, ten00078 and ten00081)

Table no. 2

Other decisions that can be interpreted in this way could be the two moratoriums imposed by the Bulgarian and Romanian governments overlooking shale gasses.

3. What the European Union wants and implicitly Romania

3.1. Alternative supply and transport sources

Knowing the resources found in the Caucasian countries and the annual supply potential of natural gas: Turkmenistan- 80 billion mc/year, Kazakhstan- 50 billion

mc/year, and Uzbekistan- 25 billion mc/year, the European Union assesses this zone to be an opportunity to escape Gazprom's monopoly. Comparing the acquisition price of these countries' supplied gas at the frontier by Russia, these being between 65 and 110\$/ 1000 mc and the price with which re-exports, sometimes over 500\$/ 1000 mc, we can summarize that EU's offer is more advantageous for these countries. This is the reason for the talk about the importance of the Nabucco and AGRI projects.

The Nabucco project started in 2002. With the coming of the crisis, the decrease in gas demand and the completion of North Stream left the project without financing resources.



Figure no.3; Source: <http://eurodialogue.org>

The situation at this moment is the following: there are discussions about an alternative shorter than Nabucco (West Nabucco) that will pass through Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, finally reaching Austria. The Turkish side will be covered by a new pipeline route: Trans-Anatolia Gas Pipeline (TANAP)²².



Figure no. 4; Source: <http://www.tanap.com>

In 2012 the OMV president, coming in a visit in Romania, declared that an immense gas source is present in the Black Sea²³. On October 17 2012, the president

²² The JamesTown Foundation - http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39827&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=27&cHash=5e24ec143db19cf571aeefee2edfa4cd.

²³ Hotnews - <http://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-energie-13366808-directorul-omv-petrom-extractia-gaze-marea-neagra-putea-incepe-spre-sfarsitul-deceniului-exploatarea-putea-asigura-independenta-energetică-Romăniei-privinta-gazelor-naturale.htm>.

of Romania, Traian Basescu, declared after a meeting with the Austrian foreign affairs minister that “the regional energetic strategy can be changed due to OMV Petrom and due to the resources discovered in the Black Sea”²⁴.

About the AGRI project (Azerbaijan- Georgia- Romania interconnector) there are fewer discussions because the project is only at the feasibility study stage. The project does not yet have financing sources and has not yet been discussed in the European Commission.

3.2. Smaller prices for Russian imports

According to Eurostat, over 50% of EU’s energy comes from imports outside the EU²⁵ and the greatest part of those imports come from Russia.

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
All products	45.1	46.7	47.4	47.6	49.0	50.2	52.5	53.7	53.0	54.7	53.9
Solid fuels	27.5	30.5	33.7	33.1	34.9	38.1	39.3	41.0	41.3	44.7	41.1
Crude oil	74.2	75.6	77.7	76.4	78.7	80.9	82.4	83.9	83.6	85.0	84.1
Natural gas	47.9	48.9	47.2	51.1	52.4	53.9	57.7	60.8	60.3	62.3	64.2

Source: Eurostat (online data codes: nrg_100a, nrg_101a, nrg_102a and nrg_103a)

Table no. 3

We can observe that there exists a tendency of percentage growth due to the decrease of EU’s reserves, even though the quantity of the imports are decreasing.

In the last 10 years Russia doubled its gas prices. If in 2003 the average price of gas imported in the EU from Russia was 131\$/1000 mc²⁶, some of them having lower prices (Poland imported with 120\$/1000 mc)²⁷, today we find that prices differ depending on the total export value in a country in relation to the total export value in all importing countries, depending on the dependency of the country, depending on the Russian imports, and depending on Russia’s economical and political interests in the country²⁸. The average import price in 2009 for the EU countries was 301\$/1000 mc; in other countries exceeding 410%/1000 mc.

These growths don’t suit any country, so the European Commission adopted a plan of action in 2008 that provides interconnecting all the gas pipelines from the member states, realising deposits in every country for minimum gas and petrol stock, ensuring a free market for raw material prices in the EU and a supply network

²⁴ Hotnews - <http://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-energie-13433357-traian-basescu-strategia-energetica-regiunea-marii-negre-putea-schimba-dupa-noile-descoperiri-hidrocarburi-zona.htm>.

²⁵ Eurostat - [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Energy_dependency_rate,_EU-27,_1999-2009_\(%25_of_net_imports_in_gross_inland_consumption_and_bunkers,_based_on_tonnes_of_oil_equivalent\).png&filetimestamp=20111123174557](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Energy_dependency_rate,_EU-27,_1999-2009_(%25_of_net_imports_in_gross_inland_consumption_and_bunkers,_based_on_tonnes_of_oil_equivalent).png&filetimestamp=20111123174557).

²⁶ Hotnews - http://media.hotnews.ro/media_server1/document-2011-05-16-8631781-0-raport-gazprom-2010.xls.

²⁷ Cosmin Gabriel PACURARU, Sigurantaenergetica.ro, <http://www.sigurantaenergetica.ro/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/Cat-de-tare-ne-permitem-sa-suparam-Rusia.doc>.

²⁸ Cosmin Gabriel PACURARU, *Europe and the impossibility of energetic security management*, Strategic Impact nr. 3 (40) 2011, UNAP, p. 108.

through more transport routes²⁹. Also, the EU imposed Gazprom to renegotiate the gas prices. In 2012, the negotiations were finalised, Gazprom offering lower prices to the main energetic European companies³⁰.

3.3. Energetic efficiency growths and the use of renewable resources

Another option imposed by the European Commission is the adoption in 2010 of the “Energy 2020. Safety for a competitive, durable, and secure energy” initiative³¹. This strategy defines the energetic priorities for a ten year period and determines actions that should be performed to address a series of challenges, including the realisation of a competitive and safe supply price market, facilitating the leader position in technology and efficient negotiation with international partners, growing the energetic performances by 20% and imputing that 20% of the consumed energy should come from renewable sources.

4. United States and the Eurasian energy resources

Even from the 90s, the United States began partnerships with the Caspian countries in the idea of petrol and natural gas prospecting and extraction. The American companies have advanced technology and are present at this moment in the majority of former USSR countries in various forms: from the Russian joint-venture TNK- BP to the concession of petrol fields in the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea. In the last period, American Company Chevron prospected many zones in Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania discovering resources that could make Europe independent of Russian energy. The only country to start shale gas exploitation is Poland. Romania and Bulgaria established moratoriums to prospect and exploit their shale gas.

Romania and shale gas

Shale gas is considered a non-conventional resource and is a geological formation of hydrocarbons that is present in a small concentration in rocks, with a wide surface span, present 2-3km in the ground³². Its extraction is realised by a relatively new technology called hydraulic fracturing which forces gasses free themselves from the rocks and find their way to the surface. Hydraulic fracturing is controversial because it is thought to have negative effects on the environment. Even though over 60% of gas production in the United States comes from hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling and in Romania, Romgaz Company is using a

²⁹ Europa.eu - <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010DC0677>: RO:NOT.

³⁰ Inforusia.ro, http://inforusia.ro/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5522:companii-energetice-europene-au-obtinut-modificarea-contractelor-cu-gazprom&catid=38:politica&Itemid=56.

³¹ Europe.eu - <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010DC0639>: RO:NOT.

³² Georgeta- IONESCU, *Shale gas, a new challenge*, ALMA-RO Association, July 2012, http://issuu.com/alma-ro/docs/brosura_gaze_de_sist.

similar method, which is now outdated³³ and this company accidentally obtained gasses and shale gasses, the authorities have not yet elaborated a strategy in reference with these resources. The first commercial exploitations took place in the 80s, the technology being improved. For over 40 years the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) studies the environmental risks and has not yet come to any conclusion. With all this, the scientists consider that there are ecological risks related to the contamination of earth and water, and risks related to earthquakes, but there are no major environmental accident recorded. There doesn't yet exist an exploration and exploitation of these type of resources regulation staff in Romania, the environmental organisations invoking the opaque decision of the authorities in this domain.

With all this, after the USL government's coming to power, the Environment and Forest Minister instituted a moratorium over the prospecting and exploitation of shale gasses. We remember that in March of 2012 PSD forwarded in the Romanian Senate a law project that oversees banning this type of extraction.

Analysing the National Security Strategy that contains parts dedicated to the energetic strategy, it can be observed that there is no reference to the non-conventional resources or shale gas resources. Even though the subject of energetic security was secured by President Traian Basescu, no one from the present governmental coalition makes any reference to the energetic security, so neither the shale gasses.

Conclusions

Romania is in the impossibility to decide the future energetic strategy. Knowing that the present National Security Strategy was elaborated by the former CSAT component at the same time as the former PDL government, in the present situation that the government affirms generalities in the Governmental Program in reference to the alignment with the European security strategy we can affirm that at this moment, Romania has no strategy in this domain³⁴.

Romania has two possible energetic strategies: 1. Romania can rely on gas imports from Russia, meaning that the imposed prices depend on the waiver margins on national security problems in favour of the Russian Federation. 2. Romania will rely in its shale gas resources and will sustain and invest in the newly discovered reserves or in the bypass conventional natural gas transport routes.

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ECONOMIC CRISIS - MAJOR RISK TO NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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Abstract: *Sources of security and the risks against peace and national security, as well as the international political reality need to be regarded from the perspective of a era of globalization, characterized by dynamic, rapid changes and the interdependency is presumed by a world interconnected in many plans.*

The international framework of the economic crisis in 2012 was and continues to be dominated by factors determining macro-economic and micro-economic unbalances, factors provoking contagiousness and, finally, the incertitude specific for the global economy dominated by interdependency.

The world economic framework was problematic in 2012 and the effects the global conditions has on international security and on national security are extremely strong. Furthermore, the economic crisis represents the main factor of threat against the national security, this source of insecurity being fully perceived in Romania.

The national and international economic situation determine us to believe is needed a new approach of the institutional framework to contain security elements concordantly with the recent developments of global society.

Keywords: *insecurity sources, risks, threats, economic crisis, national, global, security, institutional framework.*

Introduction

Threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and risks to peace and national security and international political reality required to be viewed from the perspective of an era of globalization, characterized by dynamic and fast changes, and the interdependence that involves multiple interconnected plans. The end of Cold War contributed to the shift from a bipolar world dominated by the nuclear threat and the need for states in conflict to ensure the security either by arms or by a diplomatic lobbying to attract as many allies as they can, in a global world with a new security agenda. This agenda contains risks and threats as interstate conflicts, ethnic and religious violence, minefields, terrorist attacks, threats to democracy, gender discrimination, crime, hunger, inequality, disease and threats to health security, market economy security, water resources security, energy, emigration, and environmental degradation and so on.

The events from last years were constantly under pressure from the global economic crisis which led to unprecedented changes in both the theory and interpretation of the economic, political, social and cultural dimension and the general conception of national and international security. A special attention is given to the economic dimension, a component which is becoming more relevant to

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national security and defence. The era of globalization emphasizes, more than ever, the need for a coherent and integrated approach to economic security which should be analyzed in terms of profound links between national and international economic environments. Understanding the economic dimension as limited by national borders of a state is outdated and inadequate approach in determining risks and real threats, and in developing strategies for prevention and mitigation their effects.

A rethinking of the economic dimension of security is required in the context of globalization due to changes that this process brings. Focusing on military matters should be complemented by a policy of economic security adapted to contemporary needs. This approach should lead to changes in the decision making process in which experts should have a contribution that policy makers take into account. The changes in the analysis of this dimension must continue through innovation and research, interest and responsibility of all those involved in designing security and national defence strategies.

1. The international economic crisis framework in 2012

End of 2011 brought with him one of the most severe stages of global economic crisis, which was accentuated on European Union territory. Thus, the premises of 2012 were not looking, at all, promising. The international framework was not favourable to mitigate the effects of the global economic crisis, but instead added elements of political crisis, social, military, and others determined by the energy, natural disasters and environmental, which decreased the effects of international economic recovery strategies, stimulation of economic growth and to overcome economic crisis.

From the onset of the economic crisis so far, Europe has gone through several phases, but 2012 was a crucial one. “Euro zone crisis is an interaction between several forces. As in other advanced economies, these economies include lack of interest in price changes, inadequate macroeconomic policy approach, an approach perpetuated over several years, and weak prudential policies and frameworks. Those have interacted with specific defects of EMU, accelerating buildup of excessive private and public disturbances in several euro area economies that were exposed after the Great Depression. The resulting crisis had severe consequences”¹. EU had to implement several measures and generate financial mechanisms that can maintain the stability of the entire euro zone and the European Union. European mechanisms have been designed to keep away from bankruptcy economies of heavily indebted countries and generate severe fiscal measures initiated to determine the confidence of investors and creditors in states which had public debt management deficiencies. The failure of these states would determine countless other problems that could hit the European Union as a tsunami whose consequences could be devastating.

Measures taken by the European Union have contributed to efficient fiscal management, the introduction of coherent monetary policy, taking reform measures

¹ International Monetary Fund, *World Economic Outlook: Growth Resuming, Dangers Remain*, Publication Services, Washington, 2012, p. 3.

in the member states to determine economic growth and balance of national economies. A European crisis that could cause even the collapse of European political union, was avoided by measures leading to structural reforms in Spain and Italy and have produced some progress in Greece. The European Union has a number of other harmful elements that need to be resolved, but for now Union proved to be able to manage the crisis of the euro area and to calm the internal and external markets ensuring a balanced and favourable investment climate. "However, stress on sovereign funding markets remain and will probably withdraw slowly from current levels as governments regain investors confidence in the successful consolidation and structural reform Along with weak activity, stress will continue to affect corporate financing markets"².

European crisis need to be addressed further with caution as there is still a large dose of uncertainty about the economic policies applied and their potential effects on medium and long term. Member States economies remain vulnerable and frequent political changes contribute to determination of an unsteady behavior of markets that vary by economic, social and policies indicators and their continuity.

Both in Europe and in United States, measures intended to combat the economic crisis and its effects have generated a number of harmful elements to the already deeply affected economies. They have caused a slowdown in economic growth and unprecedented unemployment. This factors causes a significant imbalance in terms of consumption and production, financial imbalances which forms a vicious cycle that makes attempts to overcome the crisis, even greater challenges and their management can determine the future global economy. "The European Union and the United States form the two largest economies of the world and they are deeply interconnected. Their problems can easily feed each other and may lead to a new global recession"³. The management of the difficult economic situation in Europe and the U.S. depends to a significant extent, maintaining progress in several countries and their economic stability. A new recession in the epicentre of global economic activity which is the economies of the two political entities, would be a disaster for emerging markets that they are in financial, trade and economical relationships in general. European and U.S. policy decisions are closely followed by all entities co-stakeholders and policymakers' responsibility is huge and prudence, inherent in these conditions, causes slow changes whose effectiveness is difficult to predetermined.

Even in conditions of economic uncertainty in the global market, characterized by interdependence, emerging economies recorded growth at a level, sufficient enough, to cause a relative balance. "Emerging countries and economies in transition are expected to continue to fuel the engine of the global economy with average growth of 5.6% in 2012 and 5.9% in 2013. This increase is far below the 7.5% achieved in 2010 when output growth among major emerging economies in Asia and Latin America, such as Brazil, China and India was particularly robust. Although links between developing countries have become more powerful, they remain

² *Ibid*, p. 6.

³ United Nations, *World Economic Situation and Prospects 2012*, New York, 2011, p. 1.

vulnerable to economic conditions in developed economies"⁴. However, economic problems continue to have an impact on markets. Banks have adopted prudent budget, deficits continue to grow, public debt is increasing and fiscal stimuli are not strong enough to generate rapid change.

The banking sector is, also in 2012, one of outposts to fight the recession. Deeply affected by the global economic crisis, this sector was maintained at a sufficient level of trust that continues to be operative, many anti-crisis strategies adopted by governments around the world focused on this aspect. Thus, the banks, under the careful coordination of central banks, have tightened lending or have relaxed them, depending on market requirements and in perfect coordination with overall economic crisis exit strategies. In developing states were recorded tightening of credit conditions, in part, due to difficult access to international sources. The increase of public debts in China and India slowed because of concerns about credit quality. On the other hand, Argentina, Colombia, Brazil, Indonesia and Turkey have recorded accelerated increases in the level of public debt, a factor that determines a degree of caution for those countries⁵.

Another area, in which states have based fiscal policies and economic and political measures necessary to generate growth, was monetary policy. The interest rate is a key strategy leading to direct effects on the market. According to the central banks needs, interest rate can be maintained at a certain level, can be reduced to some extent, and, in countries where macroeconomic prudential measures were successful, they may relax monetary policy measures. "Monetary policy is expected to be maintained, generally at a relaxed level. Many central banks have already reacted to slow activity by cutting interest rates (Australia, Brazil, Euro zone, Indonesia, Israel, Philippines, Romania, Thailand, and Turkey). Recently, the Bank of Japan and Bank of England have expanded their interventions on unconventional monetary policy and the Federal Reserve signalled its intention to keep interest rates low until late 2014"⁶.

The international economic crisis in 2012 has been and continues to be dominated by factors that determine macroeconomic and microeconomic imbalances, elements determining contagion and, ultimately, an uncertainty specific to the global economy dominated by interdependence. Economic crisis in the European Union went through a phase in which were identified unprecedented challenges to the economic security of this political project and to its continuity and development. The situation in the Euro zone has expanded and affected the whole region and international markets that are in close commercial relations.

United States experienced growth throughout this year despite a weak start. The economy showed signs of recovery, inflation was kept to a favorable development, the unemployment rate decreased in comparison with previous years. These elements, in an effective mixed with other measures, have had an impact on business and generated an increase of 2% in 2012 and an estimated growth of 2.5% in

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 2.

⁵ See International Monetary Fund, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁶ *Ibid*, p. 8.

2013⁷. Favourable situation in the U.S. has generated growth in Canada and that contributed to the stability of the internal market.

In Asia, growth has been moderate, but steady. Europe's economic situation caused a slowdown across the continent of Asia, mainly because of reduced demand and, consequently, exports to this region. Economic situation of the countries in Asia has been driven also by internal conditions. Investments have been low in India, the consequences of historic floods of 201, left their mark on Thailand, and in Japan because of their strong economic relationship. Earthquake and tsunami consequences, from March 2011 within Japan, were much stronger than expected. However, China's economy in this year proved to be stable and robust, the consumption and investment level was favourable and generated growth. Although the internal problems of countries in Asia and in close correlation with external events, economic conditions are favourable and the region as a whole has generated an increase of 6% in 2012 and is expected to grow by 6.5% in 2013.⁸

Latin America and the Caribbean have recorded a steady increase even though the European Union has reflected deeply on the activities of states in this geographical area, usually due to the presence of European investors in the area and especially because European banks, in particular, of the Spanish. However, in this area economy grew by 3.75% in 2012 and is expected to increase by 4% in 2013.⁹

Community of Independent States benefited from favourable economic conditions, even if the economic situation in the Euro zone has left its mark on the states that are part of the community, has seen significant growth. Due to natural resources and a recovery in agriculture in countries such as Armenia, Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan, the region experienced economic growth of 4, 25% in 2012, lower than 5% in 2011, but forecasts favourable in 2013, when growth is expected to 5.25%, with exports of energy resources and their prices been in an uptrend.¹⁰

In the Middle East and North Africa economic situation in 2012 had a special character because of specific factors of the area. Armed conflict, political confrontations, social divisions and so on, have contributed to lower economic growth and generalized uncertainty and its related effects. Growth in this area was 4.2% in 2012 and projection for 2013 is 3.7%¹¹, this estimate with the substrate reserves that both the investors and their internal and external political factors have on the future development of a problematic region that has high risk factors, but also taking into consideration the huge interest shown for this energy strategic area.

Sub-Saharan African region has a unique character due to the relative isolation from the harmful effects that collapses foreign markets has generated. Countries in this area, such as Angola, Nigeria, Chad, Congo, South Africa, Ghana and others,

⁷ See International Monetary Fund, *Op. cit.*, pp. 56-57.

⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 60-61.

⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 63-66.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 67.

¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 72.

have recorded significant growth led to a general growth of the area of 5.4% in 2012 and in 2013, an increase of 5.3%.¹²

The world economy was problematic in 2012, and the effects these conditions have on the global international security and the national security are extremely strong. The year 2012 has shown that there may be new vulnerabilities and major risks to security and their management strategies must be directly related to rapid changes in the international arena so that consequences to be prevented and managed effectively. The economic crisis is the main factor of threat to national security, this source of insecurity feeling heavily in Romania.

2. Economic crisis in Romania in relation to the global economic crisis

Threats and risks have transnational meanings, so what is happening outside our country can have rapid consequences internally, to national security, generating, in turn, effects on regional and global security plan. Risks, threats and vulnerabilities already known (terrorism, organized crime, illegal immigration, energy security, etc.) and unconventional threats and risks produce a shift in security paradigm, felt in the domestic security environment. National security interests must be seen in an organic agree with the interests and security assessments of space to which we belong, the European Union.

Vulnerabilities are status quo, processes or phenomena of the internal life of the nation, social communities, which reduces the responsiveness of states to the existing or potential risks, or favour the emergence and development of them, with consequences in terms of capacity to protect, defence and promoting the values, interests and security needs.

In the internal situation of Romania are shown several types of vulnerabilities generated by political, economic and social prolonged transition that our country is passing: depletion of natural resources, coupled with energy dependence, negative demographic trends, uncertainty in strategic infrastructure , inadequate organization of the crisis system etc.

2.1. Negative demographic trends

Unemployment, illegal employment, minimum income and the existence of a small number of private companies who can afford to pay wages similar to those of EU countries generated a migration trend of a significant number of people in search of better paid work.

The downside is meant for Romania as people who usually migrate are in the age group of 26-40 years. But, most times, are established abroad with their children. The first consequences of this are immediate negative economic effects, and the effects of demographic aging and exacerbating decline of the number of inhabitants. "The stability/instability and security/insecurity on local, regional and international level are related, to a large extent, on the demographic phenomena. This category

¹² *Ibid*, p. 75.

includes birth, fertility, infant mortality, population growth, migration, aging, urbanization”¹³.

According to the National Institute of Statistics, at present, our country stable population is estimated at 19.0 million¹⁴, and will diminish gradually so that by 2050 will reach 17.1 million¹⁵.

Mechanisms leading to decline after 1989 and damage the age structure are represented by the declining birth rate, fertility and longevity, mortality and external migration.¹⁶

According to National Statistical Institute data, 54% of Romanian is living in the city. But after over thirty years, internal migration occurred from village to city in recent years has reversed. Most people who move in villages are restructured from privatized industries, unwilling or unable to compete on a market economy requires.

Statistics on the types of activities show that agricultural sector comprise 32% of the employed, slightly down from previous years. Instead, it increased the proportion of those working in industry, construction and services (average 8%). The fact that villagers, peasants or unemployed returned from cities, simply make subsistence agriculture, not interested in the opportunities and facilities brought by the process of European integration, has impact on the general standard of living in Romania. Their low level of aspiration is not suffocating, but certainly reduces the rate of development of the national economy.

Romania's active population is currently 9,793,000 people, of which 751,000¹⁷ are unemployed. Two thirds of employees are employees, and one third is self-employed¹⁸. Occupancy increases with level of education, unemployment is at a minimum level among those with high education (illiterate represents 6% of the population¹⁹).

Inactive segment, which includes 9,250,767, is composed of 50% retired, 40% students and 10% of people able to work, but depends on someone (1.1 million housewives, 100,000 prisoners etc.).

¹³ Petre DUȚU, *Fenomene diverse cu impact asupra stabilității și securității locale, regionale și internaționale*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2012, p. 34.

¹⁴ Institutul Național de Statistică, *Comunicat de presă privind rezultatele preliminare ale Recensământului Populației și al Locuințelor-2011*, INS, București, 2012, p. 1.

¹⁵ A study by American experts say that trend will continue, even reaching 15 million in 2050, according to Radu Sîrbu, "Demographic Statistics of Romania", Transylvanian sheet (Cluj), weekly publication, 01-07.03.2007, p 10.

¹⁶ The average age of the population of Romania has reached 38, an increase of almost 3 years in one decade; about 20% of the population is over 60 years and in 100 older adults are 34 old people.

¹⁷ http://www.rtv.net/circa-un-sfert-din-persoanele-active-au-pana-in-25-de-ani-vezi-aici-cati-someri-intretin_22191.html, 2012, accesat la 21.08. 2012.

¹⁸ Therefore government policies are needed to encourage investment in small towns, to produce value added by all active segment of the population.

¹⁹ <http://www.antena3.ro/romania/romania-are-cel-mai-mare-numar-de-analfabeti-din-europa-6-dintre-romani-nu-stiu-carte-130652.html>, 2011, accesat la 21.08.2012.

Our country is in a demographic crisis, and in the last 20 years the population has decreased by 4,243,027 inhabitants, which requires immediate action on social security systems, health and education.²⁰

Nearly one million families have at least one member left to work abroad. Under these conditions, according to experts, the greatest danger is not Romania's depopulation, but a lack of identity, job vacancies being, in perspective, filled by citizens from Asia, Africa or the Middle East.

2.2. Pronounced dependence on natural resources

Romania has a wide range, but reduced as quantity, of primary energy resources: oil²¹, natural gas²², coal and uranium, as well as an important and valued potentially in renewable resources.

National energy strategy has major implications for national energy security, aiming to ensure a balance between demand and national energy production, optimize the structure of primary energy consumption and increase energy efficiency by acting as a priority to diversify the sources and routes of supply and limiting the imported energy supply²³.

2.3. Inadequate organization of the crisis situations system

This deficiency is due to the fact that in Romania there isn't a single system for crisis management²⁴. The current legislation is insufficient and does not cover the whole issue of crisis area and nationwide we do not have a unified strategy for action to address the full spectrum of crisis types. In terms of structural issues regulations approach only the aspects regarding emergencies²⁵ and preventing and combating terrorism.

To meet efficiently all the challenges of the security environment, a functional National System for Crisis Integrated Management is needed²⁶.

²⁰ At the 1992 census population of Romania numbered 23.286.794, and the data presented by the National Statistics Institute in 2012 and aimed the census conducted in 2011 showed a population of 19,043,767 inhabitants.

²¹ Oil deposits are limited, due to a decline in domestic production and in the conditions that authorities have not identified new potentially important deposits. Current oil reserves are estimated at 73.7 million tons, and annual production of crude oil fell from 14.7 million tons in 1976 (the year with peak production) to 5 million tons in 2006.

²² Natural gas deposits are also limited and after 1990 domestic production is in decline. Current natural gas reserves are estimated at 184.9 billion cubic meters. Annual natural gas production was 12.3 billion cubic meters in 2006, which represented 69% of total annual domestic consumption of natural gas.

²³ Stan PETRESCU, *Politici, Strategii și instituții de securitate*, Editura Academiei Naționale de Informații, București, 2007.

²⁴ Col. dr. Marian BUCIMAN, Lt. col. Viorel ROS, *Sistemul Național de Management Integrat al Crizelor - construcție și repere conceptuale*, in *Gândirea militară Românească* nr. 2/2006, p. 76.

²⁵ For these cases National Management System for Emergency Situations is constituted, see GEO no. 21/2004 of 15.04.2004, published in M.O. no. 361, in 26.04.2004.

²⁶ View in detail, col. Dr. Marian BUCIMAN, Lt. Col. Viorel ROS, *art. cit.*, p. 78.

To operate effectively across the entire spectrum of crises, from crisis prevention measures to collective defence, Romania envisages full implementation of national integrated system of crisis management.

This system aims to provide an optimal level of training and operational planning and functionality of all structures of decision and execution responsibilities in the field, to manage the entire spectrum of internal and external crises. At the same time, the system will be able to respond adequately to various crisis situations, ensuring the autonomy of component systems so that they can become operational and respond according to the nature and scale of the crisis²⁷.

3. Possible solutions to improve the institutional framework

National and international economic situation leads us to believe that we need a new approach to the institutional framework, containing security features in line with recent developments in the global society.

Public policies which address unemployment did not have the expected effects and the problem is now one of the thorniest challenges to economic recovery. Institutional framework should include elements to encourage investment and job creation, should encourage retraining to be in line with the labour market and to assure employment for existing jobs and direct dialogue between educational institutions and training and employers to train specialists needed in the market.

An important element is the public policy through the bidding package of fiscal measures and facilities they can offer to attract foreign investment. This is one of the key factors that can have the potential to cause economic growth, and its approach should be made with extreme caution because of the regional competition for potential foreign investments. This measure should be part of an integrated strategy designed to rethink macroeconomic policies and generate job growth and sustainable development.

Coherent management of the resources available to the State led to growth for countries that have long understood this. As such, institutional strategy should focus on this detail because a deficient resource management can halt progress in the integrated economy. Proper management of resources contribute to sustainable development and to avoid energy crisis, food or other kind.

Rethinking the strategies of import/export and allocation of resources to ensure food reserves, energy and raw materials so that fluctuations in foreign markets no longer feel stronger internally. Developing multilateral strategies for imports in order to have access to a broader range in accord with the contemporary international conditions. Strengthening the existing relations in export and import in close correlation with the identification of other import and retail markets should constitute a core of economic diplomacy.

Policy makers should allocate substantial budgets for investment in new technologies that can develop and diversify the economy. The economies based on fewer areas are prone to economic crisis, while economies dominated by a diverse

²⁷ *National Defense Strategy 2011*, www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/SNAp/SNAp.pdf.

business approach are able to progress, and this is an effective and recommended strategy for development and acquisition of long-term stability.

Development and implementation of financial rules and monetary policy measures is essential to avoid future financial crises. Prudent economic measures had positive effects on economic practice in recent years, and here it appears that this is a trend to be followed in the future.

Economic security threats can affect not only economic environment, but also political, social and even the country's military, distorting the natural meaning of the steps for connecting to the values of democracy and civilization.

Risks to economic security and development should be identified, monitored and evaluated continuously. Unidentified, undefined and unopposed timely, risks can turn into threats. Combined with domestic economic vulnerabilities, they can generate far-reaching negative effects on the entire process of development and modernization of the Romanian society.

Short and medium term, Romania is not directly threatened by armed aggression against its territory and does not consider any state as a potential enemy, and national economic security risks are and will be primarily economic.

In this respect, necessary safety measures need to be taken to prevent, protect, secure and restore economic security, namely:

- Ongoing evaluation of risk factors influence on internal and external economic security state, analyzing mutations in the manifestation and magnitude of the specific threats and proper and comprehensive dimension of dysfunctions, vulnerabilities, risks, threats and threats to economic security;

- Ensure cooperation with other structures of state organs with responsibilities in national security, defence and public order, as well as public and private institutions in the economic sphere, in the problem of achieving economic security;

- Identifying, evaluating and managing disorders, vulnerabilities, risks, threats and/or security threats targeting economic values facilitates, actions/operations to undermine economic, destruction, damage or compromise economic infrastructures or their use for purposes inconsistent with the interests of Romania (especially in the energy, industrial, financial, banking, agriculture, environment and forestry, transport, regional development fields).

- Counter activities/operations of espionage or sabotage in the economic, scientific or technological domain (overall or in their basic elements).

Given the necessity of these measures, we draw attention on a lack of a formalized/standardized system of risk indicators for both economic security and national safety necessary to warn and/or regularly assess security risk status (level/degree of security/insecurity) and the lack of a Synthetic Risk Indicator (SRI).

To establish a system (as a whole) effective warning of the risks for economic security is necessary to select a number of risk indicators, economic representative for Economic Security (RIES), required for a national alert for both economic security and national security .

Forecasts for 2013 are not very optimistic, but recent developments indicate that we are on the right track for economic recovery.

Nature of the global economic crisis underlines an aspect which proved to be of strategic importance when analyzing solutions to combat it. Political decisions have immediate effects on national, regional and international, so that integration and consistency is vital for them to maximum efficiency and to overcome this black period of our contemporary history. For that to work with maximum efficiency requires an international institutional cooperation, difficult premise in a global society that still fails to look beyond the differences of the people who compose it, beyond the historical events that have divided, beyond the issues that separate them, to the common interest of overcoming the economic situation that leaves its mark on everyone.

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POTENTIAL RISKS AND THREATS TO THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

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Abstract: *So many features of uncertainty have not existed before in the history of mankind. On those quicksand of contradictory or often changeable assumptions is difficult to foresee a medium and long term guaranteed evolution for security environment. An era of strategic insecurity seems to have just begun, based on an equation with many unknown factors. New security risks and potential threats require, from this perspective, that Member States of NATO and their partners also should work together to defend and impose the shared values of freedom, democracy and security.*

Keywords: *risks, threats, security.*

Introduction

Over the ages, we find threat in the relationships between people, perfecting his forms and specific technique causing many conflicts that have marred the development of human society.

European Union, as it became a global economic player, must take part in the global security mechanisms, even if the forms of involvement are still not at this moment clearly defined.

The international security environment, from the perspective of Romania, developed since 1990 by increasing interdependence and complexity of international affairs. As a result, today's international stability can be conceived only seen as cooperation among the international community at multiple levels, using dialogue in institutionalized framework, increasing involvement of large international organizations to define the state of security of the world.

It is difficult to give accurate, medium and long term, assumptions regarding evolution of the security environment in the context of ceaseless globalization process that default engages all state and non-state actors. No one can be considered an “outsider” of the play. Risks and potential threats to the security environment are hovering equally on the scanty or on the great powers and consolidated democracies.

Twenty -first century is defined by changeling the security threats and to deal is necessary more than ever the cooperation between all members of the European Union and NATO to protect shared values.

1. Conceptual delimitations

1.1. Threats as a social attitude

Threat was always present in people relationships over the time; it has perfected her specific forms and methods, causing multiple conflicts, obscuring the development of human society. The term “threat” always defined a potential danger.

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The actual meaning of the word “threat” comes from the Latin “minatio-onis”. In French we find the word “menace” signifying “a hostile intention targeting the intimidation”.

The threat is presented in literature as a negative attitude, it is addressed primarily to individual or groups affectivity. Its available techniques and procedures have very various forms, wiggling back and forth between persuasion and manipulation. The British considered threat as being an expression of intention to impose disadvantages or to harm a person by coercion or constraint means. In German acceptance it means the act of putting someone in a dangerous situation, or something that jeopardize an individual. In the Explanatory Dictionary of Romanian language, threat is defined as the intention to harm or intimidate someone to get something. All these definitions delimit the notion of threat, assigning its overall meaning.

1.2. Evolution of the concept

In terms political and military field, the definition of threat has some peculiarities. The threat’s goal either related to security systems or harming the fundamental rights of states, the perception regarding the possibility of achieving this one fits among virtual threats. Counteract the threat effects is based on reactions which may not always be balanced, and their sizing can lead to a chain reaction very difficult to be controlled, which may cause the generator system itself. Asymmetrical threats, becoming more present, can generate an attitude and can lead to actions with unpredictable and disproportionately end. Threat also results from the opportunity to use different means and methods to neutralize or to hit the opponent strength points, exploiting his weaknesses to obtain a disproportionate result.

We often find terms as “threat of force” (action through which a state or several states acts out political, military, economic or otherwise, with the obvious purpose to impose to another state or more to give up the full exercise of sovereign rights and attributes) or “external military threat”, understood by some analysts as the threat to security in the military field and whose source is outside national borders. Its roots can be “territorial claims, interference in the internal affairs of a country, the existence of outbreaks of armed conflict, especially close to the borders of a state or its allies or deployment and amplification of power of those task forces likely to unbalance the equilibrium of forces existent in the area.

It is well known that politologists, theorists and analysts from different fields have generally a tendency to give the same value to the following terms: threat, danger, risk, vulnerability, considering them synonymous. This confusion does not always bother but there are situations where the inadequate use of these terms creates misperceptions.

2. Potential threat to security

2.1. The contemporary international terrorism

Although difficult to be understood and accepted by the modern world, the phenomenon of terrorism has become a reality at the beginning of the third millennium with global implications difficult to be prevented and managed. This is

not only a criminal act but it has established itself as an action against legal order, held out and against the international norms.

Using military assets and sometimes features of psychological warfare, the terrorism seeks achieving of any benefit exclusively sectarian, based on religious concepts, slogans basically taken out of the darkness of history, trying to stop the natural course of human society toward peace, freedom and prosperity. The clashes between terrorists and forces are sporadic, sometimes spectacular performed in the presence of peaceful population. Weapons used is diversified, a mixture of high-tech, cybernetics, and improvised devices. Scientific revolution and technical progress has made possible the access of antisocial individuals to destructive capabilities that were previously designed only for governments and armies. Results clearly that terrorist scourge is and will remain a very serious threat to security.

The response of the international community in the fight against terrorism cover the entire range of actions (diplomatic, political, economic and military) which are equally directed both to the causes and the effects. After September 11, 2001, almost without exception, the international community has formed around the U.S. an antiterrorist coalition in order to eliminate terrorism as a social phenomenon.

Terrorist threat with a high degree of danger persists in this region, and will be as long as there will not be imposed an effective harmonization of security policies on issues of terrorism, drug trafficking, human and arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, and crime organized. This involves the investment of intelligence, influence and money.

NATO and EU enlargement led to increased attention of the critical areas and to organized fight against terrorism, which will lead in the near future to the reduction of this kind of threat on the continent. Fighting against terrorism requires, in order achieving its goals, equally eliminating internal vulnerabilities and a direct action, both within NATO and the international coalition, against terrorist networks, wherever they might be.

2.2. Social threats

Relationships between states, throughout history, have been affected by attacks against national identity due to external threats social. However, majority of social threats have their source within states. They appear due to any kind of social dissatisfactions. Unresolved or delayed settlement of labor disputes; inter-ethnic and inter-confessional conflicts are potential sources of threat to national security.

Taking into account that social security depends on the ability of states to support traditional structures of culture, language, ethnic and religious identity in most of the situations threats to these values comes from outside the state but also internal ways can be used inland. Increased number of such ethnic-religious conflicts, recognized as a characteristic of the current security environment, requires a careful approach of this field. A multidimensional analysis of these types of confrontations asked the development of new strategies and tactics made by the international community necessary to resolve the emerging or ongoing conflicts. Their essential characteristic is the necessity of a continuous improvement and a standing adaptation to the sources of instability. In this way is looking for new ways and sometimes there are success in reducing the effects of tension sources as tension sources.

2.3. Economic threats

The progress and national prosperity in a market economy are the result of the fierce competition between parts involved, competition held in conditions often unpredictable, uncertain and risk generators.

Market represents by far the most effective mechanism ensures certainly increase in production, productivity, distribution and consumption, having his imperfections often invoked by specialists. The danger caused by economic threats and especially when it becomes a disturbing factor to national security can be established only by policy makers. Military capability has always depended on the economic field, laws and principles of armed struggle being the generator of this relation of dependence. Analyzing from the perspective of supplying with strategic materials, we identify the threat supplies security as a national security issue for the state concerned.

Another more recent point of concern is the economic threats of internal stability taking into account the fact that states adopt economic strategies aimed at increasing wealth through expanded trade. In time these policies lead to the increase dependence on trade, to support social structures specifically designed based on general prosperity. Some countries are specialized in selling raw materials becoming addicted to this activity, while others are industrial centers depending both on the supply with the necessary raw materials and the finished products markets. We find a direct link between democracy and economic development. It is an obvious reality that we will not face a highly developed democracy in a poor country.

2.4. Military threats

Military threats, until recently, were perceived as the main type of threat to national security. This situation is easily understood because force was the only action that could cause irreparable loss equally for the organizational structure of states concerned, and for their population. The use of force breaks peaceful relations between international players and put an end to diplomatic recognition. Usual competition in the political, social and economic field is replaced by the military competition with dramatic effects. The destructive nature, multiple and in most cases the military threats irreparable results has been the main concern of security specialists. It is becoming increasingly worrying the disproportion of military potential that exists in the world, bringing a state of discomfort for some states or groups of important states. Using the military knowledge to solve the historical conflicts between states emphasizes that disproportionate accent placed on the military component of security, although the current threats from other sectors are larger and much closer.

Military field is characterized by a development dynamic and independent act also met in countries where an actually civilian control over the army is. Because military capability remains a reality with existence resulted from promoting and supporting the interests of states in the international environment, and strengthen national security and joint alliances, fear of defeat will cause states to maintain armed forces to the optimum rejection effects perceived threats. The continuous modernization of the armed forces can generate a state of concern for some analysts.

The latest generation of weapons have higher performance than those replaced, being more difficult to distinguish between necessary and useful, often neglecting the principle of sufficiency. Direct threats occur different: from harassing people of other countries beyond national borders to raids and incursions into their territory; from the blockade and no-fly zones or naval to demonstrations of force, mobilizing troops to border forces actions, special forces actions in depth of target.

Taking into account the status of our country as a NATO and EU member Romania, important classes of military threat to our country are the threats that are directed directly against allies or alliance. Triggering the mechanisms of defense and collective security, that belongs to entire system engaging all signatories of the Washington Treaty and therefore Romania.

2.5. Cross - border threats

2.5.1. Corruption and underground economy

New trends of fast enrichment, obtaining political and economical facilities, manifested especially among young democracies, go on through the process of generalization on a global scale. Some negative side effect of globalization both economically and politically give the possibility for the corruption event to grow up and emphasized development of the "black" market. That state generates a source of threat to political stability because it affects the citizen's economic security, by abolishing the right to participate with equal chances in solving the "brotherhoods issues" determining him to lose confidence in politics. Earning frustrations, they can turn into actions against the legal order in various ways.

2.5.2. Organized crime, drug and people trafficking, strategic materials

According to some evaluations the underground economy can be considered the second worldwide business. There are certain cases in the world where cross-border crime has political control, financing election campaigns and corruption.

2.5.3. Regional conflicts

The conflict potential in a geopolitical area may be amplified by diversifying sources of growth. Societies in perpetual race of development, based on different sources of economic growth and socio-economic development, will be exposed to a higher conflict potential compared to societies competing in the same development, but using the same source development.

Regional conflicts remain a potential threat to security having sources in inter-ethnic or religious disputes and with a strong political root.

EU enlargement has had a crucial role in the decreasing of threats to regional and European security.

2.5.4. Threats against information

Cyberspace, the proper environment for changing information, is a universal good and will not be not longer remain the property of one state. Compared with traditional threats, the information security requires fewer resources and techniques of counteraction more easily to be hidden and concealed. Improving and diversifying makes them difficult to be followed and evaluated. This is why the estimations of

information threats still remain dependent on the human factor, with all the uncertainty and subjectivity entailed.

We find vulnerabilities for information in all fazes from the acquisition to storage and dissemination them.

In the foreseeable future the importance of cyberspace will require awareness of the protection by governments and by private companies and individuals.

3. Potential risks and threats in Romania's National Security equation

„National security is the prerequisite for the existence of the Romanian nation and state ,a key objective of government, it has as reference values national interests and objectives. National security is a right that stems from the full sovereignty of the people, is founded on the constitutional order and is fulfilled in the context of European, Euro-Atlantic cooperation and global developments”²⁸.

Today, at a strategic level, in the areas of interest for Romania there have been identified risks and threats (political, economical, social and military) able to jeopardize the national security of Romania: International Terrorism structured in cross-border networks; regional instability, proliferation of mass destruction weapons, transnational organized crime, dissemination of mass destruction weapons and related production technologies, inefficient governance.

From this perspective an analysis makes possible identifying the main changes and evolutionary trends of most likely quantifiable risks and threats in national security equation.

3.1. Risks and threats in the military

Risks and military threats were defined as the main type of danger against the security. This is because the use of force the action was the only way to bring irremediable losses. Due to a stable internal environment, Romania has focused lately, to reform the military system focusing on operationalizing of forces for NATO, participation in EU missions, in the European security and defense policy, as the UN and the forums / sub-regional initiatives. Romania is placed at the border Euro-Atlantic and European layout, where political-military component becomes increasingly obvious outline together with the existing economic, offers multiple advantages. Those will be mainly economic, as operationalizing through political dialogue.

There are however possible distortions typical to flammable power relations: forced interpretations of international treaties and agreements (bilateral political treaties, regulations regarding Danube, M. Black, etc.) radicalization of political hostility, malevolence diplomatic gestures, baffle economic difficulties in accessing the resources, etc. Also within the power relations we might mention some risk factors of military which might not be included in armed attacks or a reason to invoke Article 5 and to prepare the necessary actions or other mechanisms within the North Atlantic Alliance. Actions such as the establishment of new military bases, and new equipment endowment programs, demonstrations of force executed with a higher

²⁸ *Strategia de Securitate Națională a României*, București, 2007, p. 7.

rhythm could trigger some media campaigns contributing to the creation of a bad image in the opponent eyes causing serious long term effects.

3.2. Non-military risks and threats

An analysis in this field leads to identification of the following non-military risks and threats:

- possible regress in democratization, human rights respect and economic development;
- proliferation and development of cross border organized crime, terrorist networks, trafficking in drugs, people, weapons and ammunition, radioactive and strategic materials;
- illegal migration which leads to massive flows of refugees;
- actions of inciting to intolerance, extremism, separatism and xenophobia that might affect Romanian state and its promoting of democratic values;
- differences between levels of providing security and the stability of states in the proximity of our country;
- limited access to some resources for the Romanian state and to some regional opportunities, important in achieving the national interests .

3.3. Asymmetrical risks and threats non-classic:

- transnational and international political terrorism, including in its biological and informational forms and information;
- actions infringing the safety of internal and international transport systems;
- individual or collective illegal actions in accessing informational systems;
- actions designed to damage the Romania's international image;
- financial and economic aggression;
- deliberate actions aimed to cause ecological disasters.

3.4. Risks and threats resulting from the internal situation:

- persistent of economic, financial and social problems;
- increased corruption and poor management of public resources which cause the deepening of social inequalities and the proliferation of the underground economy;
- ineffective government's responses to the breaches of legislation;
- maintaining the potential sources and causes of social conflicts which strongly affect people's peace of mind;
- violation of environmental rules;
- low level of confidence among citizens in the state institutions;
- maintaining development gaps between regions of the country;
- weaknesses in meeting their commitments;
- low level of the informational infrastructure;
- deficiency in classified information protection.

3.5. Opportunities to counteract the risk factors and threats to national security of Romania

In the context of the transformation of the international security environment, particularly through the emergence and proliferation of new types of risks and threats outlined above, Romania has paid an increased attention to national security by identifying and developing tools and instruments to combat and counteract them. In this respect there are take into account the two major dimensions: on one hand, by increasing the cooperation between internal institutions with responsibilities in this field and the development of specific courses of action, and, on the other hand, the permanent cooperation with specialized international structures and institutions more efficiently in combating risks and

Foreign policy can identify ways to reduce vulnerabilities and increase national security:

- responsible participation in the activities and decision-making processes of NATO and NATO-led international missions aimed to combat terrorism and also the proliferation of mass destruction weapons of;
- developing privileged relations with the EU, as well as those of the U.S. Strategic Partnership;
- Romania's participation in the process of achieving the European Security and Defense Identity;
- the support at a diplomatic level of participation in UN peace operations and actions meant to ensure stability and strengthen confidence in regional and global.

The economic recovery must be strengthened by creating a stable and attractive business environment and by an adequate connection to the major trade flows, economic, financial and technological. The accelerated growth of the economy is primarily aimed to ensure prosperity for the citizens and of course to support for all internal democratic process. In economic and financial, the main courses of action to provide national security, by reducing vulnerabilities and reducing risks and threats inherent in the transition period are as follows:

- providing functional stability for the national economy;
- providing financial resources to strengthen the defense systems, public order and national security;
- achieving financial and economic mechanism based on market economy, sustained by the principles of efficiency, justice and social solidarity;
- supporting the private initiative by improving the financial and economic, legal and institutional framework;
- speeding up the process of legislative harmonization in financial and implementation of European standards;
- correlation between national economic policies and the achievement of economic and monetary union.

In the national security and public order field, by the measures taken, it is intended to be provided an increased analytical capacity and operational intelligence.

These will work to anticipate threats against national security and with other state institutions will contribute at safeguarding and promoting the national interests of the country. To maintain public order, specific actions are mainly aimed at prevention and fight against crime, protecting public, private property and people. The main ways in this regard are:

- ensuring civilian oversight to national institutions of security and public order;

- development and improvement of knowledge and training the ways of countering the risks and threats to national security, evaluating their complex dynamics;

- informing decision makers of the state, establishing a mechanism to administer, use and protect the classified information due to citizen's right to access information;

- institutionalization of forms of permanent cooperation between structures that contribute to national security and public order;

- strengthening institutional chain of action (Police, Intelligence, Justice) and increasing their activities against corruption and organized crime.

In the national defense field, as a NATO member, Romania will have to provide a modern, well-trained army that can run alongside with other allies' actions aiming settlement of international disputes, conflict prevention, crisis management and collective defense. The main measures to be taken in the national defense filed in the fight against risks and threats are:

- strengthening deterrence capacity by achieving and maintaining a modern and credible military force, equipped with modern technical and military equipment and lead by staffed professionalized, with adequate training;

- setting up, in the armed forces of Romania, the tools to participate actively in NATO and international organizations efforts aimed to prevent conflicts, to settle the international disputes, crisis management and collective defense and military participation in multinational peace support to strengthen confidence and stability in Central and South-East, at humanitarian actions and other military activities;

- building and strengthening the capacity to fulfill the obligations assumed by Romania, participation in peacekeeping, rescue, crisis response, humanitarian assistance and counterterrorism operations at the sub-regional and regional level;

In countering the terrorist threat it has been adopted a national strategy to prevent and combat terrorism and its major goals are:

- identification, monitoring and ongoing assessment of the risks and potential threats and vulnerabilities against national security that can contribute to the emergence and development of terrorism;

- protection of national territory, population, and Romanian inside and outside objectives against related activities to terrorism;

- preventing the participation of Romanian citizens and foreign residents from our country in subsumed international terrorism activities.

Conclusions

As many features of uncertainty did not exist before in the history of mankind. On those quicksand of contradictory or often changeable assumptions is difficult to foresee a medium and long term guaranteed evolution for security environment. An era of strategic insecurity seems just begun, based on an equation with many unknowns. New risks and potential threats to the security requires, from this perspective, that Member States of NATO and their partners also should work together to defend and impose the shared values of freedom, democracy and security.

The political will of all States will be crucial in the process to manage the security issues beginning of this millennium which began abrupt and violent with acts of international terrorism, cross-border structured networks, with the existence and proliferation of mass destruction weapons and also with imminent new conflicts. Economic and financial crisis and the threat of state bankruptcy will make more difficult the financial and military joint efforts towards ensuring a stable and predictable security.

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VULNERABILITIES, RISKS AND THREATS TO THE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES OF THE DANUBE DELTA

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Abstract: *The complexity of critical infrastructure systems generates new categories of vulnerabilities, risks and threats and, therefore, requires elaborating and implementing innovative measures in order to ensure the protection and security of critical infrastructure component. These measures need to be adapted both to the global context, as well as to the specificities of each individual category of infrastructures considered to be vital to the wellbeing and normal functions of a local community, a region, a country or the international system. The present article aims to elaborate on the main vulnerabilities of the critical infrastructures of the Danube Delta. These infrastructures are determined by the particularity of the geographical surroundings in which they exist and function. Subsequently, I wish to illustrate the potential risks and threats to the main categories of critical infrastructures in the Danube Delta, while pointing out that they are partly generated and perpetuated by the interconnectivity and interdependency of critical infrastructure systems, a characteristic feature of a new security paradigm.*

Keywords: *critical infrastructure, security, Danube Delta, threats, risks, vulnerabilities.*

Introduction

Globalization, alongside the evermore alert rhythm of technological innovation, have generated a novel understanding of the concept of security, determined by accentuated interconnectivity and interdependency of national and regional defense systems. The response mechanisms and efficiency of such systems in the event of an actual threat largely depends on the optimal parameter functioning of networks vital infrastructures. Moreover, it can be assessed that it is not only the security, but also the wellbeing of a community that are directly determined by the degree of development, the functioning and efficiency of critical infrastructures.

The interdependency of vital infrastructure systems within the wider context of a global society has provoked a modification of the place and role of individual critical infrastructure components, as well as a series of new threats and vulnerabilities. To researchers of the matter it became evident, in light of recent shifts and developments within the international system, that the issues of critical infrastructure protection and security must be approached through a multidisciplinary framework.

The protection of critical infrastructure has, therefore, transformed itself into a premise for system analysis, ensuring a theoretical basis for understanding and interpreting present threats to national security. This framework of analysis uses the level of security, efficiency and functioning of critical infrastructure systems and networks to determine potential threats and dangers to national or regional security and is characteristic to a new paradigm in security studies, in which system

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weaknesses or vulnerabilities, primordially caused by malfunctioning critical infrastructures, are the main cause of concern.

According to some authors¹, this manner of approaching the issue of security is representative for the post-modern world and has as its most significant features the following: the concern for critical components, elements or structures, on which contemporary society, the economics as well as current political regimes depend; the preoccupation to identify vulnerabilities, risks, threats and menaces to destabilize these systems and distress national security; and last, but not least, the effort to elaborate and develop techniques and mechanisms to alleviate or counter structural system vulnerabilities.

1. Working definitions and conceptual delimitations

1.1. Defining the concept of critical infrastructure

Although certain natural and man-made structures that are vital to the existence and functioning of territorial and administrative units have existed since the dawn of times, the concept of “critical infrastructure” is relatively new, and was theorized by American governmental experts in the context of the Cold War, in their attempts to identify and define new threats to national security.

The characteristic traits of critical infrastructure components were outlined at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s. At the same time, potential threats issuing from infrastructure vulnerability were identified, such as energy crises, industrial accidents and terrorist attacks. These new threats were substantially different from those of traditional war or from those presented by a potential nuclear attack and could not be anticipated. The probability of events such as those enumerated above could not be calculated by classic formulas. It therefore became evident that, in order to alleviate systemic vulnerabilities, one needed to elaborate new methods and techniques of organizational management and control.

The term of “critical infrastructure” was used for the first time in 1996, within the provisions of the Executive Order 13010 – *Critical Infrastructure Protection*, issued by the Clinton Administration, which stemmed from the necessity to implement a set of efficient measures for preventing and countering potential cyber-attacks against American critical informatics infrastructures.

The Executive Order defines critical infrastructure as being a part of national infrastructure so vital to the United States defence or economy that its destruction or incapacity to function can produce serious harm to the nation². It also establishes that the critical infrastructures of the United States are: telecommunications, the national

¹ Stephen COLLIER, Andrew LAKOFF, *The Vulnerability of Vital Systems: How Critical Infrastructure Became a Security Problem* in Myriam DUNN, Kristian Soby KRISTENSEN (ed.), *The Politics of Securing the Homeland: Critical Infrastructure, Risk and Securitisation*, Routledge, 2008, available at <http://anthropos-lab.net/wp/publications/2008/01/collier-and-lakoff.pdf>, accessed on the 10th of June 2012.

² Executive Order 13010—*Critical Infrastructure Protection*. Federal Register, Vol. 61, No. 138., 17th of July 1996, available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo13010.htm>, accessed on 12th of August 2012.

electrical grid, the water supply system, the oil and gas sectors, the financial and banking systems, emergency services and those institutions that allow the continuity of government functions.

The notion of security of critical infrastructure therefore refers to the protection of those specific elements or components that are vital to the economy, population, government and national security. In the American interpretation of the term, amongst the criteria used in the identification process of critical infrastructures one can include the following: the percentage of population affected by the disruption, the impact on the national economy and the costs of rehabilitation, as well as the impact on people's morale.³

By comparison, the European approach on critical infrastructure uses geographical criteria such as spread and surface of the critical sector, the magnitude and intensity of possible effects, the probability of damage or attack and the timeframe of potential repercussions⁴ in the process of identifying vital components. The Council Directive no. 114/2008 on the identification and designation of European Critical Infrastructure and the assessment of the need to improve their protection defines the concept of critical infrastructure as “an element, a system or a component, situated within the boundaries of Member States, that is essential to the maintenance of vital functions for society, health, safety, security, social and economic welfare, and whose disturbance or destruction would have a significant impact within two or more Member States as a result of the states' incapacity to maintain those vital functions.”⁵ Moreover, in order to distinguish from national critical infrastructure and European critical infrastructure, the Directive specifically states, aside from the necessity of affecting two or more Member States, that the importance of a potential threat's impact of critical infrastructure is evaluated not only from a multinational perspective, but also from a cross-sector one, which includes the effects that result from multi-sector dependencies on other types of infrastructure⁶.

In its traditional interpretation, the notion of *critical infrastructure* is inextricably linked to the idea of territoriality, in the sense of a physical connection to an administrative, territorial unit, as well as to a certain military connotation of the term. In fact, perhaps one of the first understandings of the term was that of “territorial infrastructure”, defined as the totality of works, objectives and improvements that, built in times of peace, can be used for defence in crisis situations or during war periods, in order to multiply the advantages and proprieties offered by the geographical factor, with the purpose of maintaining the viability and security of

³ Radu ANDRICIUC, *Considerații privind protecția infrastructurii critice*, Editura MAI, București, 2009, p. 21.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 21.

⁵ Cf. *The Council Directive no. 114/2008 on the identification and designation of European Critical Infrastructure and the assessment of the need to improve their protection*, the 8th of December 2008, p.43, available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:345:0075:0082:RO:PDF>, accessed on the 24th of August 2012.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 43.

a territorial or administrative unit.⁷ The main role of infrastructure components is that of increasing “the capacity for defence”⁸, to which could be added the role of ensuring proper means of communication between various sectors of the unit.

From an economic perspective, critical infrastructures can be defined as production factors whose absence or unavailability would generate unacceptable costs for the economy and for society in its whole.⁹ It therefore becomes obvious that investing in critical infrastructure generates economic growth. By way of consequence, the socio-economic importance of critical infrastructures derives from the fact that, through the services that they offer or make possible, they bring benefices to social development, giving economic agents necessary stimuli either for improving their activity and production, or for approaching new markets and expand.

Concerning the social dimension of the idea of critical infrastructure, it is worth mentioning that there is an ambivalent relationship between it and the economy in the sense that developing and increasing the performances of critical infrastructures contributes to the betterment of life, producing prosperity, whereas the medium per capita income of a community and economic growth generate supplementary investments in essential infrastructure sectors, thus stimulating the expansion of critical infrastructure, increasing interdependencies between its components and creating the need for more efficient protective measures and high performance security systems for critical infrastructures.

By employing a multidisciplinary approach to the subject, one can reach a more complete definition of critical infrastructures as that part of special or regular infrastructures without which the stability of a system or process would irremediably be compromised. In other others, there is a direct dependence between systems and the composing critical infrastructures, and the security of the whole ensemble is inextricably linked to the system’s capacity to administer and protect its vital elements.

From this point of view, critical infrastructure can be defined as the totality of physical or virtual entities whose damage or destruction significantly affects the service and product flow, and which are indispensable to the normal functioning of a state or a community.¹⁰ More synthetically, they can represent those infrastructures that play an important part in ensuring the security and functioning of systems, as

⁷ Cf. Adrian CERNĂIANU, *Considerații privind infrastructura teritorială și militară a României în contextul deplinei integrări a țării în NATO*, in *Buletinul Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”*, nr.2, Editura UNAP, București, 2006, p.29.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p.29.

⁹ Xavier DELACHE, Eric OLLINGER, *Critical infrastructure identification: a case for economic analysis application in France*, in *Contribution to the Transportation research board Committee on Critical Transportation Infrastructure Protection (ABE40) meeting*, 14th of January 2009, p.5, http://itri.tsu.edu/TRB_ABE40/Documents/SDS-ERA-08-071-TRBcritical%20infrastructures%20identification%20-economic%20approach-V2.doc, accessed on 5th of September 2012.

¹⁰ Adrian CERNĂIANU, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

well as in ongoing economic, social, political, intelligence and military processes.¹¹ Last but not least, because of the place and role played by critical infrastructures within a state, they can be considered a true backbone of countries, regions and continents.¹²

Even though the approaches may differ, there is a common starting point, which is generally accepted as grounds for defining the term and is identifiable in the quantifications attributed to safe functioning, as well as in the impact of the effects that potential vulnerabilities or threats to critical infrastructures have on the whole system. Also, it is widely accepted the classification of critical infrastructures in physical infrastructures, cosmic infrastructures and virtual infrastructures.

1.2. Vulnerabilities, risks and threats to critical infrastructures

Because of its inherent quality of being an indispensable part of system functioning, the critical infrastructure is subjected to multiple threats, coming from a variety of environments. Also, it is confronted with a wide array of risks, dangers and vulnerabilities from within the system. A potential deterioration or destruction of comprising components may cause cascade effects, having an impact on the whole process or system.

The vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures can be defined as those phenomena that diminish the capacity to react to existent risks or potential threats, or that favor their apparition or development, with consequences on the utility of critical infrastructures.¹³ Vulnerabilities are effects of process deficiencies and result either from objective limitations or events, or from unwarranted human intervention.

According to some authors, *vulnerability* is a weakness that leads or can be used to induce disastrous consequences.¹⁴ From this point of view, the vulnerability of a critical infrastructure component, once identified and localized, may generate solutions, by means of implementing additional security measures, for new functions or project of protection and security systems for critical infrastructure.

The flawed management of vulnerabilities may create, by perpetuating deficiencies and dysfunctions, entirely new risk factors, threats of dangers. Moreover, because of existent interdependencies between various critical infrastructure components, the vulnerabilities of the so-called “civilian” vital infrastructure may

¹¹ Grigore ALEXANDRESCU, Gheorghe VĂDUVA, *Infrastructuri critice. pericole, amenințări la adresa acestora. sisteme de protecție*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2006, p.7.

¹² Stelian ARION, *Protecția infrastructurilor critice managementul securității la nivelul deținătorilor și al operatorilor in Alarma* Magasine, available at <http://www.revista-alarma.ro/pdf>, accessed on the 9th of May 2012.

¹³ *Protecția infrastructurilor critice*, Ed. Centrul de Informare pentru Cultura de Securitate din cadrul Serviciului Român de Informații, p. 11, available at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/46017416/BrosuraProtecțiaInfrastructurilor-Critice>, accessed on the 30th of August 2012.

¹⁴ Lăcrămioara Mariana PETRIU, *Vulnerabilitățile infrastructurii critice a sistemelor de alimentare cu apă*, in MOȘTOFLEI, Constantin (coord.), *Perspective ale securității și apărării în Europa (Sesiunea anuală de comunicări științifice 19-20 noiembrie 2009 București)*, volume 4, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2009, p.101.

have repercussions on national security. A potential attack on critical infrastructure will exploit and, implicitly, reveal the pre-existent system vulnerabilities.

Risk factors refer to situations, surroundings, elements, as well as internal and external conditions, sometimes doubled by action, that determine or favor the materialization of a threat to critical infrastructure, producing some insecurity effects.¹⁵

According to some authors¹⁶, *risk* or *danger* is a grave and perilous malfunction of a system or process, which causes distress to the system or process itself, as well as to others nearby or in a relationship with it, while as by *threat* one can understand a direct, targeted danger. Moreover, *threats* can also be represented by capacities, strategies, intentions and plans that augment a danger to critical infrastructures, materialized in attitudes, gestures, actions or deeds that create instability or imbalance and generate dangerous events, with major impact on national security¹⁷. It is worth mentioning, at this point of the argument, that by dangerous events we understand the result of materialized *threat* or the imminence of a perceived aggression to critical infrastructures.

In other understandings of the terms, a *threat* can refer to the existence of an intention or of the capacity to provoke disastrous consequences and is characterized both by its means of production and the probability of occurrence.¹⁸ From this perspective, a system of critical infrastructures can face multiple threats that can be grouped in three major categories: internal threats, external threats, and external threats that became manifest with the contribution of internal factors.

Another classification includes cosmic threats, climatic and geophysical threats, threats resulted from human activity and cyber-threats directed towards virtual critical infrastructure components.¹⁹ They are all characterized by unpredictability and dynamism, traits that require a permanent monitoring, analysis and evaluation of interdependencies and systemic vulnerabilities.

The risks that critical infrastructures are confronted with can be categorized by taking into account the following: the structure and length of the malfunction, damage, intervention, the incidence or probability of its occurrence, as well as the potential of human action or intervention; starting points, factors or events and trigger dangerous occurrences and systemic vulnerabilities; the nature, ambiguity, uncertainty or unpredictability of emergency situations. In order to assess risks, one can use quantitative methods of analysis, that provide numeric values, determined through calculus of risk or danger levels, or means of qualitative analysis, based on determining values for risk parameters and placing them within a given scale or graphic.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p.101.

¹⁶ Grigore ALEXANDRESCU, Gheorghe VĂDUVA, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

¹⁷ *Protecția infrastructurilor critice*, Ed. Centrul de Informare pentru Cultura de Securitate din cadrul Serviciului Român de informații, p.12, available at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/46017416/BrosuraProtectiaInfrastructurilor-Critice>, accessed on the 30th of August 2012.

¹⁸ Lăcrămioara Mariana PETRIU, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

¹⁹ Classification according to Grigore ALEXANDRESCU, Gheorghe VĂDUVA, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-37.

Last but not least, *aggressions* to critical infrastructure can be materialized in violent or non-violent actions, carried out by armed, electronic, psychological or computerized means, based on strategies or plans by a given entity (states, pressure groups, non-state actors, centers of power etc.)²⁰.

By taking into account all of the above, one can conclude that the economic, technical, social and legislative changes have determined a shift in the preexistent relations between infrastructures, whereas the computational boom has generated new connections and dependencies between components, creating complex systems whose control is, usually, computerized and centralized. At the same time, the interconnectivity of networks accentuated by globalization caused a whole new array of “uncertainties”, system vulnerabilities, risks and security threats.

The links between different sectors of infrastructure have become extremely complex, increasing interdependencies as well as the system’s overall vulnerability. The level of vulnerability of a single element or sector part of a system of critical infrastructures therefore contributes to the augmentation of the vulnerability level of the entire ensemble. Threats to critical infrastructures are cross-border and asymmetric, while states’ capability to ensure their protection in the absence of an international organizational framework is limited. Similarly, the incomplete understandings of the notion of security and the inadaptability to occurring shifts within society increase the degree of vulnerability, which leads, in its own turn, to an inadequate or delayed response to threats or dangers.

2. Critical infrastructures of the Danube Delta – risk factors, vulnerabilities, dangers and threats

2.1. Main critical infrastructures in the Danube Delta

The critical infrastructures in the Danube Delta are man-made and were developed in accordance to natural conditions. Traditionally, the network of infrastructures in the delta used the natural flow of water courses, closely following the direction of the shoreline.

The Danube Delta’s critical infrastructure networks constitute complex systems and were determined by the vital necessities of communities in the area. From the wide array available, we consider that the following categories fulfill essential functions and ensure the stability of the system, therefore comprising the main characteristics of critical infrastructure:

a) *critical infrastructures of river and maritime transportation*, such as the maritime port of Sulina, the Danube ports of the area, the most important being Tulcea, the river transportation network for people and commodities, port infrastructures that provide utilities such as electricity, drinking water or gas, port infrastructures for handling commodities, Tulcea shipyard, the Sulina, Sf. Gheorghe and Portita lighthouse installations, radio navigation, communication and

²⁰ *Protecția infrastructurilor critice*, Ed. Centrul de Informare pentru Cultura de Securitate din cadrul Serviciului Român de Informații, p. 12, available at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/46017416/BrosuraProtecțiaInfrastructurilor-Critice>, accessed on the 30th of August 2012.

radiolocation networks, the system of beacons for river navigation, the dam and water course improvement systems, the installations and equipment used for dredging the river, components, networks and ensembles that ensure the safety and security of river navigation, vessels for maintaining river navigability (such as icebreakers) and for emergency interventions in the delta region (for example, ambulance and sanitary ships), environmental control systems (especially since the Danube Delta is a strictly protected area), for evaluating the quality of the water and air;

b) *critical infrastructures of the Danube Delta settlements*, a category in which one can include: water treatment plants, water transportation and water supply networks, the electricity grid of the area, which is part of the national and regional electrical grid, electrical generators and local electricity power plants (such as that in Sf. Gheorghe), telephone and mobile networks, relays and networks for radio and television, part of the national or local system of alert, public lighting, public transportation systems, the emergency hospitals in Tulcea and Sulina as well as others medical facilities, infrastructures for fire prevention, civil protection services, canals that permit access into inhabited areas of the Danube Delta;

c) *critical infrastructures of the socio-economic sector*, such as electricity grids (including high voltage grids), water supply systems, gas and oil supply systems for economic agents, computer and communications networks, especially their physical components (relays, cables, switches, stations etc.), strategic road infrastructures, warehouses or other storage facilities for raw materials, strategic supplies, food and medicine, including cold storage buildings for fish, canals and waterways that permit access to lakes and other water surfaces used for fishing, infrastructures for reed plantations, especially for collecting reed.

d) *Critical infrastructures of the public order, defense, national security and intelligence systems*, that includes police and national gendarmerie facilities, border control and national coast guard structures, Special Forces for rapid intervention structures, the National Inspectorate for Emergency Situations system, as well as material possessions of the national intelligence community.

These complex systems and networks of critical infrastructures and confronted with a variety of risks, intra-systemic vulnerabilities, threats and dangers. In order to ensure their protection and security it is needed to acquire interoperability, as well as to cooperate both with various national institutions carrying a certain responsibility in the matter, and at a regional, cross-border level (for example, with similar organisms in Ukraine).

2.2. Risks, vulnerabilities and threats

The main risks to critical infrastructures in the Danube Delta are generated by a series of regional characteristics that can favour certain systemic vulnerabilities, perpetuate and accentuate them in time, or even produce new threats to the system's safety. In other words, the risks and vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures in the Danube Delta can constitute an eloquent example of existent interdependencies between different categories of critical infrastructure, as well as of the way in which a

component's vulnerability can generate a chain reaction, with effects on the whole Meta – system of critical infrastructures.

To start with, the large surface occupied by the Danube Delta in the economy of Tulcea County's total surface has determined a low density of population on the whole territory of the county (approximately 29,7 inhabitants/square kilometer²¹), thus leading to less beneficial social and economic conditions for leaving. The lack of a diversified economy and of socio-economic opportunities has led to the absence of employment opportunities, unattractive salaries, under or over qualification which, in turn, generated massive depopulations of the area as the active population sought better conditions for living in other areas of the country or abroad. This phenomenon had, in its turn, an impact on the development and protection of critical infrastructure, especially concerning the investments in infrastructure, as well as the amounts allocated for research, modernization or rehabilitation works for its comprising components.

Moreover, the underdevelopment of the region, comparative to other areas, has lead, alongside the above mentioned lack of economic opportunities and a diversified industry, to a low density of road and transportation infrastructure. Subsequently, it must also be added that the percentage of modernized roads and transport routes, including those used for river navigation is extremely small, as this critical infrastructure sector still has issues with the quality of transport routes, a weakly developed public lighting system and a critical state of rural area access routes.

Leaving aside the poor quantitative and qualitative performances of the transportation network, both on land and on water, the protective measures for this part of the critical infrastructure still have some problems, as most of them are exposed to major threats in case of floods. The critical infrastructures of the river transportation network have vulnerabilities due to the wear of port installations and ships that ensure human and commodity transportation. They are threatened both by natural, systemic and human risk factors. Equally, due to a lack of substantial investments, there are some difficulties in identifying back-up routes in the event of a crisis situation, thus leaving unsolved the problem of leaving isolated extensive portions of the Danube Delta.

When it comes to the critical infrastructures of the human settlements in the Danube Delta, one is confronted with major shortcomings concerning the development of public utilities systems, as some communities still do not have functioning networks for water distribution. Where they do exist, the installations are fairly old and in need of rehabilitation or replacement. The critical infrastructures of the medical services are underdeveloped and most of them require organizing a process of medical planning. As far as the medical equipment is concerned, the health sector has precarious facilities and is confronted with a shortage of qualified personnel. In most cases, a rehabilitation of medical facilities is required.

A significant part of the vulnerabilities of the Danube Delta's critical infrastructure can be resumed as follows: the critical sector of the localities is

²¹ According to data from the Ministry of Regional Development and Tourism, available at http://www.mdrl.ro/_documente/regiuni/2.SE_ro.pdf, accessed on the 3rd of October 2012.

insufficiently developed, causing some settlements to remain isolated, the river transportation network is not very efficient and the safety of transports could be improved, the medical infrastructure does not cover the entire Danube Delta region, there is a small volume of investment compared to the necessity of modernizing and rehabilitating critical components as well as an insignificant percentage allocated to research, development and innovation activities for the protection and security of critical infrastructures.

The dangers and threats that menace the integrity of critical infrastructures in the Danube Delta come both from the physical realm as well as from the virtual one (although their incidence and impact is, for the moment, somewhat smaller). They are equally natural and produced, the latter usually being a consequence of irrational human intervention. For example, they can be natural climatic threats, such as massive rain, floods, storms or other meteorological phenomena like massive snow falls and frost, sudden changes of waterways and canals, the shortage of drinkable water supplies, desertification or excessive soil salinization. On the other hand, they can also be provoked by irrational human action such as changes in the precipitations regime or climatic shifts due to over exploitation of natural resources, destruction of ecological balance, ecosystems and food chains by excessive hunting and fishing etc. A whole other category of threats can be represented by geophysical threats mainly consisting of earthquakes and coastal erosion.

However, the main threats to the critical infrastructures in the Danube Delta come from human activity and can be intrinsic (systemic, of process, or of dynamics) or can result from the employment of unconventional warfare methods²². Systemic threats are effects of internal malfunctions of critical infrastructure networks and their number is equal or greater to the number of infrastructure meta-systems deemed as being vital. They borrow a series of traits from the systems that they stem from and are, most often, unpredictable. Amongst the most important ones can enumerate: ageing and degradation of comprising parts, the tendency of some critical infrastructures to wear out prematurely, both physically and morally, partly because of inadequate or inappropriate security measures; the evolution of technology which inevitably leads to the destruction of certain infrastructure components; unforeseen malfunctions of the system of increased pressure exercised by deficiencies in another, interconnected system.

Process threats are complex and can produce large scale effects. They manifest suddenly and are hard to counter. Amongst them we can include asymmetric threats such as terrorism and organized crime. Last but not least, dynamic threats include sudden variations in the functioning and behaviour of critical infrastructure systems, as well as in the interdependencies established between their individual components.

Conclusions

Critical infrastructures play an important part in the economic and social development of a region, ensuring the vital functions of human communities. In delta

²² Classification according to Grigore ALEXANDRESCU, Gheorghe VĂDUVA, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

regions, critical infrastructures enhance the natural potential of the area and contribute to the reassuring process of creating decent living conditions for local populations.

Current threats and pre-existing system vulnerabilities have led to the development of complex, mutually dependent critical infrastructures. Paradoxically, the increased level of complexity and interdependency has generated novel vulnerabilities, dangers and threats. In order to elaborate adequate protective measures for securing them one must, therefore, develop a multi-sector and transnational approach, even though, traditionally, the responsibility to upkeep and upgrade critical infrastructure belonged to national governments.

From this point of view, in order to assure its protection and security, a critical infrastructure must be dynamic and complex, dependent on multiple information and communication technologies and, perhaps most importantly, must not have a sole provider, regulator, operator or beneficiary²³.

The vulnerabilities and threats of the critical infrastructures in the Danube Delta require significant investments in the field for rehabilitation and development. In this context, the need for promoting public-private partnerships in the field of ensuring the security of critical infrastructures becomes obvious, especially since such projects are still in their early stages both at the national and the regional level. Moreover, a series of current risks could be diminished by initiating and developing certain forms of cross-border cooperation, especially when it comes to elaborating and implementing efficient protective measures for critical infrastructure components. On the long run, investing in the critical infrastructure in the Danube Delta, and cooperating in the matter at a transnational level could lead to the diversification of economic opportunities, growth and employment, better education, employment opportunities, health and other public services, thus increasing the area's degree of cohesion and integration.

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²³ Cf. Mihai MACUC, Cătălina PREDOIU (coord.), *Protecția infrastructurilor critice în spațiul euroatlantic*, Ed. ANI, București, 2008, p.10.

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THE ROLE OF NONGUVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN PRESERVING THE HUMAN SECURITY

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Abstract: Referring to the civilian society involvement in preserving human security, we conclude the Civilian Society Organizations (CSOs) at all their levels of existence and manifestation – local, national and global – levels, are actively involving together with the state, regional and international structures assigned in the elaboration and practise of some measures concerning the human security.

Thus, the civilian society organizations act in the following directions: the protection of persons in conflict situations, the protection of persons moving along or after the end of the conflict; the protection of persons after the country is out of the conflict; the elimination of economic insecurity; the provision of basic health services for the whole population; the preservation of transparency of state institutions in the human security field; the respect of human fundamental rights; the active, responsible and consistent involvement in actions designed to provide a sustainable and equitable development for all.

Nowadays, thousands of civilian society organizations participate to the great conferences organized by UN and, of course, to other activities of this, more and more gaining the quality of active member and not only of observer. Thus, CSOs participate and express their opinions to the extraordinary sessions and in the commissions of the General Assembly, addresses to the members of the Security Council and take part to some of the preparing committees and are members of the Administration Council in certain programs and initiatives. Actually, the CSOs involvement in UN activities constitutes a key-element of perfecting this global intergovernmental organization's activity.

Keywords: human security, UN, civilian society, protection, CSO

Introduction

Nowadays, it is fully recognized the essential role of the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as main partners and non-state actors in the development, defence and practise of human security¹. The ministers and other representatives of the member states of the Human Security Network recognized the expertise and energy of NGOs engagement in order to progress in a field or another with key-stakes related to the human security as: light weapons, children damaged by war, land mines, promotion of the International Criminal Court. Also, NGOs significantly contribute to the organization and undergoing of national and international forums to promote more the engagement, integration and transparency between the governments and the civilian society as regards the different aspects of human security.

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¹ *Société civile*, <http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/society-f.php> – accessed on 20.09.2012.

1. Directions of action of some Civilian Society Organizations in preserving the human security

Civilian Society Organizations at all their levels of existence and manifestation – local, national and global - levels actively involves together with the state, regional and international structures assigned in the elaboration and practise of some measures concerning human security. Thus, Civilian Society Organizations acts in the following directions:

❖ *The protection of persons in conflict situations.* Is known, frequently, the civilians and non-combatants are the main victims and sometimes the violent conflicts' targets. The existent juridical mechanisms and norms must be reinforced to make them more efficient for civilians' protection. This asserts the elaboration of some integrated strategies connecting the political, juridical, military, humanitarian and social aspects in a coherent and concerted manner. Here involve a series of Civilian Society Organizations acting to satisfy the vital needs of persons damaged by conflict and also solicit the assigned persons to sanction the massive violation of human rights;

❖ *The protection of moving persons along and after the end of the conflict.* For some persons, to emigrate means to take a chance to improve their living conditions. For others, to emigrate means the only way to get their safety. The civilian society, by its humanitarian organizations, supports and defends the rights of these people forced to emigrate in order to preserve their security;

❖ *The protection of persons after the exit of the country from war.* The peace and cease fire treaties do not necessarily involve the guarantee of human security. The responsibility to protect the persons in conflict must be completed with the reconstruction issue. The elaboration of a new framework and proper financing mechanisms are needed for the reconstruction of a country ravished by war. In order to provide security, there must be un-deployed the armed elements and strengthened the civilian police, satisfied the essential needs of damaged persons, led the reconstruction and development activity, promoted the coexistence and reconciliation, fulfilled a good governance. In all this complex and multilateral activity are also involved different organizations of regional and international civilian society;

❖ *The elimination of economic insecurity.* Extreme poverty ravishes. For its combating also intervene Civilian Society Organizations acting to create the conditions to fulfil a profitable economic activity and also by social security measures which they can make by own forces;

❖ *The preservation of basic health services for the whole population.* The national but particularly the regional and international civilian society poses efforts together with the peoples assigned in this sector to provide the minimum needed for a basic medical assistance for all the persons. Also, the Civilian Society Organizations involve in the activity of diseases with serious effects over population's health;

❖ *The transparency preservation of state institutions in the human security field.* The Civilian Society Organizations are able to provide the training in matters of person's rights and conflict management. Also, these can improve the social capital and to take in civilian charge the processes of peace consolidation and can rapidly alert in situations of human insecurity increase;

❖ *The respect of fundamental human rights.* Locally and nationally, the Civilian Society Organizations acknowledge the citizens about their fundamental rights and act for them to be respected by the state's institutions, contributing to the preservation of human security, the provisioning of a sustainable and equitable development. In this concern, many of the Civilian Society Organizations particularly act at regional and international level to put in practice the goals of UN program of sustainable development;

❖ *The active, responsible and consistent involvement in actions designed to provide a sustainable and equitable development for everybody.* UN has a Program over the humanity's sustainable development in the next years², wherein also take part organizations of international civilian society.

2. International security and human security organizations

UN, as intergovernmental organization with wide competencies on matters of international security, has statute and role well-defined in its Charter. By the Security Council, its Secretary General and General Assembly activity, it intertwines anytime is necessary by different measures to re-establish the peace and set the stability in the world. Still, the complex, dynamic and multidimensional international life asserts the reformation of this organization for it will be able to promptly, adequately and flexibly respond to all kinds of dangers and threats against the international security, including the human security. Also, in its whole, the UN framework is shown to be better disposed as regards the human security goals, the bureaucratic structure of this organization is a drawback in front of efficient means to crises. A great UN institutional reform will serve the development cause and the humanitarian aspect of human security.

The intervention in Kosovo, for example, restarts the discussion over the role of Security Council in the international order, particularly as regards the consequences of a humanitarian intervention in force led by a regional military body (NATO) outside the UN apparatus. Essentially, this military intervention was a breakage with the passed international practice and requires a finer analysis.

The Security Council is marginalized as regards the new security issues owed to the lack of political will to engage and because its capacity is already overused. This void was filled in by "coalitions of volunteers" and by regional actors, ravishing novelty for it. This feeling undoubtedly reflects a more general tension in UN

² *Déclaration du Millénaire*, in <http://daccessads.un.org/UNDOC/GEN/NOO/559/52/PDF/N0055952.pdf?OpenElement>, accessed on 20.09.2012.

between, at one hand, the promoters of human security, human rights and humanitarian interventions, and the people willing to protect the sovereignty ascendant, the non-use of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of a state by other states. The post-Cold War Security Council becomes more problematic. Moreover, the great powers right to veto is a serious obstacle in the human security practise.

Finally, we must highlight the mechanisms the Security Council it have to promote human security, as the Convention over genocide, are poorly used. They might support on this Convention but it must be clarified the genocide's definition, widened the range of regarded atrocities and provisioned what mechanisms can be used to prevent genocide.

The active and responsible involvement of international civilian society, as UN partner, in matters of human security must become reality. Also, the participation of world civilian society is essential to promote the human security. NGOs are not interested by traditional military matters as security and disarming, but they have more influence in debates over policies, in their elaboration and their practise in the fields related to the human security.

Some states are reticent to the idea of an increasing role of world civilian society because they estimate it substitutes the legitimate actors and the processes, by all means, the states and the classical interstate systems. UN system initiated measures to compel the civilian society to participate in the decisional process but it can work further. In the promotion of human security goals at international level, the accent is more and more put on "voluntary coalitions", partners animated by the same ideas as states, governmental organizations and international organizations.

UN started to support on them as much possible because they prove to be useful and necessary. These partners reunite more knowledge and raise more interest of the regional organizations compensating the lack of UN financing resources. The "coalitions of voluntaries" success depends on the regulation, region and interstate interests issues. "The Network for Human Security"³, for example, reuniting 11 countries and nine nongovernmental organizations and important international organizations could be very well to serve the world human security goals.

Briefly, the possibilities to promote the human security in the Security Council could seem enough limited, the eventual use of Convention over genocide, on which they can support by juridical regard to intervene in situation of genocide, represents an exception. The UN general framework is more receptive to the human security collocation, greatly because of the support of the Secretary General and of the "voluntaries coalitions".

Nowadays, more then before, the international community is interested to guarantee and preserve the human security. This it happens owed to a series of reasons, among which priorities seem to be the following: the changes produces in

³*La vision de Reseaux de Securite Humaine*, <http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/menu-f.php> – accessed on 20.09.2012.

the security strategic environment after the Berlin Wall fall, the collapse of the socialist system in Europe, the abrogation of Warsaw Pact, the NATO and the European Union enlargement by the accession of new members as the former communist countries; USA manifesting for a while as the only world's superpower; globalization as complex, dynamic and multidimensional phenomenon; regional integration as form of adequate response to the globalization's effects; the strategic interests of international community in matters of world stability and peace⁴.

Still some mentions must be done as regards the involvement of the international community in preserving the human security. Firstly, the international community intervention in the mentioned field characterizes by the following essential aspects:

- ❖ Is *selective*, as intervenes where its interest, namely, the strategic interests of world's powerful states requests it;

- ❖ Is *subjective*, meaning the international community takes one part of the parties involved in the conflict;

- ❖ does not always have the *intended effects*;

- ❖ is *expensive* from human perspective,— casualties and injured peoples being part, at one side, of the peace-keeping forces, and local population and, on the other side, material losses;

- ❖ *means of intervention* comprise a wide range of measures from the diplomatic to economic and politic means, or even military intervention;

- ❖ *heterogeneity of organizations and bodies* by which the international community is present in the preservation of human security. Thus, firstly, is UN and then different regional organizations (for example, the European Union, OSCE), political-military organizations, Civilian Society Organizations to all the levels (national, regional and global). Some of these organizations have their action legitimacy guaranteed by the provisions of the UN Charter and the Constituting Treaties of respective organizations. Other, as they are the Civilian Society Organizations must acquire their legitimacy by representing the international community interests in different regions of the world.

Nowadays, it is emphasized the dissemination of the conception over the human security and global security concepts. The basic main idea is that in comparison to the Cold War times when was precisely known who represented threat for states security, meaning the external military aggression of one of the two political-military blocks; at present, the range of risks and threats diversified and it can not be clearly identified their source location.

Moreover, the risks and threats against the national and international security got a profound global feature. Therefore, the answers must be also global the to the world threats. In this context, there were enhanced, particularly, the preoccupations of

⁴ *Déclaration du Millénaire*, in <http://daccessads.un.org/UNDOC/GEN/NOO/559/52/PDF/N0055952pdf?OpenElement>, accessed on 20.09.2012.

the world community about the human security guaranteeing and preservation and, generally, the global one⁵.

UN profoundly involved in the human dignity protection. The fight for person's integrity is the essential and legitimate goal of our days. This perception of security seems to basically differ from the classical conception of state's security as military and defence capacity of the national territory. At present, world grounds (or, at least, this aims) on the increasing recognition of human individual importance in a significant manner, in words and facts, in the political actions or others.

Consequently, the acknowledgement there exist also other threats against individual and population security than the military threat, delimitates more clear the content of the international security as is designed by the international and regional organizations having as preoccupation to provision of adequate conditions of relaxed, safely and peaceful living for people. Of course, to the striving efforts of the mentioned organizations are also added the efforts of the democratic states owing the capacity to properly support the activity related to individual, populations' security, and by them, the global security. Among the threats against individual's security are the following: the systematic infringement of human rights, the interdiction for the humanitarian organizations to help the suffering population, all persons' access to education, water and food resources.

Each person can undergo in peace his life and activity if and only if are created and maintained a series of conditions proper for them. Such conditions are mainly represented by: *the person's feeling to be out of real or imaginary dangers* able to produce him physical, material or psychical damages; *the existence of a control system* exercised by the individual, human group and/or the state over the possible dangers able to damage the physical and/or psychical integrity of any person; *the optimum psycho-social climate* present, particularly, in the human group and, generally, in society; *the climate of trust among the world's states* based on collaboration, cooperation and co-working in all the fields of activity; *norms and rules of behaviour and cohabitation unanimously recognized and respected* by all humans, as individuals and, also, as members of different groups and communities, of states and unions of states.

Therefore, it can be considered the global human security is that *normality situation of the planetary security environment* wherein the risks and threats, able to harm the physical and psychical integrity of person as well as its materials goods, are under an efficient control of the peoples managing humans' activity at national and global level. In other words, global security does not represent a state wherein the dangers and threats against the individual and population are part of, and also of stability and peace in the world are absent but is a situation of dynamic balance resulted by the multiples and complex interaction between the states of the world,

⁵ *Société civile*, <http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/society-f.php> – accessed on 20.09.2012.

between those and the non-state actors in the natural development of every place's human life and activity.

By all means, we can affirm the human individual and population's security the individual is part of there is the main goal of each national state or of international community. This concept implementation in possible to prove to be: *a political resource* that will bring legitimacy to the international community actions to preserve the human security; *a new value* allowing the emergence of an inedited security regime grounded on a true multilateral collaboration between the international institutions; *a premises* of compatibility between the states sovereignty exercitation in juridical plan and the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs.

In the late years, the relations between UN and international, regional and even national Civilian Society Organizations considerably improved. As a matter of fact, the United Nations Charter provisions "The Economic and Social Council can take all the useful dispositions to consult the nongovernmental organizations dealing matters in its competence. These dispositions can refer to international organizations and to national organizations after the consultation of the members interested in the organization"⁶.

Until present, UN was the single intergovernmental organization provisioning in its Charter some defining elements over its relation to the civilian society, even there was about only by the Economic and Social Council. From the beginning, CSOs officially participated to the Secretariat's activities, to the deliberation processes, to the education and information work, to operational activities of the United Nations.

The nongovernmental organizations can request "the consultative statute" among the Economic and Social Council and can be admitted in the next three categories: *general statute* granted to the great international nongovernmental organizations interested in the most fields of Council's activity; *special statute* refers to the organizations with special competence in Council's activity fields; *statute of nongovernmental organization listed among the nongovernmental organizations* interested in one or two fields of Council's activity and can be consulted to the Council or its subsidiary bodies' request.

In the '60s, meaning while the Cold War, even the CSO participation was more frequent, they were more and more controversial and involved in the political games of the two military blocks. Some occidental countries, particularly USA, regarded the numerous nongovernmental organizations of the Warsaw Pact member countries as communist gatherings and, reversely, some occidental anticommunist nongovernmental organizations were regarded as being financed by CIA. This polemics, partly, influenced the Committee tasked with the nongovernmental organizations from the Economic and Social Council whom was trusted the requests of accreditations near the Council. This Committee, at present numbering 19 governments, is the single intergovernmental committee exclusively consecrated to

⁶ *UN Chart*, article 71.

the NGOs issue. The worsening of doubts existing over the nongovernmental organizations debuted with an exam over this matter. By Resolution 1296 in May 1968, the Council settled new consultation procedures, asking for periodic reports of the nongovernmental organizations accredited (particularly over the details regarding the contributions received from the governments), put in practice a new procedure for accreditation's withdrawal. All these did not produce the expected changes in this field of activity.

Still, from '60s, the NGOs participation to the UN important events started to become preponderant. Thus, the participation of an important group of nongovernmental organizations to the Human Rights International Conference (1968) and Environment Conference (1972) marked a positive change in the relations between UN and such organizations. The latter were not only tolerated but considered and important actor on the world scene.

In a matter of fact, the period between '70s and '80s lead to the intensification and diversification of Civilian Society Organizations participation to the UN life and activity. Thus, SCO attended to activities in the operations and also in the political field. In the same period of time, the member states and Secretariat trust in the CSO contribution to the elaboration of general policies elaboration grew as it proved by their participation to the *Decade for Environment* and to the *Decade for Women*, and also other manifestations organized by the UN. Consequently, it could be noticed a profound respect for the CSO enhanced capacity to influence the global development activities as it shown by their fight against apartheid, the fight for the improvement and increase of public help, inclusively in the food field.

Moreover, CSO seemed to be valuable operational partners, particularly when came about the humanitarian crises (Cambodia in 1979-1980 and Etiopia in 1984-1985). CSOs became more and more active in this timeframe and, step by step, they gained their merited role, especially by their participation to hearings, debates, reunions of information and dialogue with the governments. In the same time, is seen a progressive increase of Southern Civilian Society Organizations⁷.

Along the '90s, was noticed a spectacular amplification of CSOs participation in all UN activities. Their participation, particularly to the great conferences opened new horizons in quantitative and qualitative plans. At the Human Rights Conference (Teheran, 1968) and at the Environment Conference (Stockholm, 1972) participated only the Civilian Society Organizations specialized and favouring UN, their majority being from North, looking to discuss some specific ideas and to debate them with their technician homologues of national delegations. Afterwards, it is noticeable the participation improves in the sense of accepting all the Northern and Southern CSOs, agreed or non-agreed by the UN. Simultaneously, the range of CSOs' aimed goals was diversified by their participation to UN activities. Thus, some CSOs pressure to

⁷ Sabina ALKIRE, *A conceptual Framework for Human Security*, Centre for Research on inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity(CRSE), Working Paper 2, London: University of Oxford, 2003, p. 15.

be put into practice a “world parliament”, other organize educative meetings or present their very diverse (from the educative to economic fields) programs.

Thereby, for the first time at international level, these manifestations gathered, on a precise theme, specialists coming from the key institutionalised groups: governments, specialised institutions, NGOs, syndicates, think-tanks, representatives of the private sector and mass-media, parliamentarians, religious organizations and other components of civilian society.

Owed to their structural diversity, human and financial force, aimed goals, their members’ quality, although they were not united, the Civilian Society Organizations shown they are capable to assume a more important role at global level, not only national or regional. This intensification of CSOs participation to UN activities strengthens the appreciation that, at present, we assist to the construction of a vigorous international civilian society. In this context, Internet played and, undoubtedly, it will also play in the future a strong role, favourable to the apparition and actions of international civilian society. Internet allowed the opportune information of all the peoples interested in the activities and manifestations organized by the United Nations. Along the Internet, the easy communications and relatively cheap transports permitted the Northern and Southern CSOs to be present to all the important activities undergone anywhere in the world.

In the Table no. 1, are presented some data over the NGOs participation along the time to diverse UN activities⁸.

Years	Reunion’s place	Conference’ theme	Number of newly accredited NGOs	Number of participants to the parallel Forum of NGOs
1968	Teheran	Human rights	57	-
1972	Stockholm	Environment	>300	?
1975	Mexico	Woman’s International Year	114	6,000
1985	Nairobi	The End of Woman’s Decade	163	13,500
1992	Rio de Janeiro	Environment and Development	1,378	18,000
1993	Vienna	Human Rights	841	about 1,000
1994	Cairo	Population and Development	934	- no data
1995	Copenhagen	Social Development	1,138	30,000
1995	Beijing	The 4 th Woman’s Conference	2,600	300,000
2001	Durban	Racism	1,290	about 15,000
2002	Monterrey	Development financing	107	- no data
2002	Johannesburg	Sustainable development	737	35,000

Table no. 1 - Civilian Society Organizations participation to the great conferences organized by the UN⁹

⁸ *Les Société civile et les Nations Unis*, in <http://www.un.org/> – accessed on 15.02.2012

⁹ Mircea MUREȘAN, Petre DUȚU, *Societatea civiliană – actor nonstatal major*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2006, p. 214.

A brief analysis of the statistical data in the below Table highlights the increase of nongovernmental organizations number participating to the important UN activities and also to their capacity to assume more important tasks at international level.

These conferences were settled to mobilize a wide palette of nongovernmental actors inciting them to share contacts, to engage joint campaigns, to acknowledge their experience and regard and to try to influence the intergovernmental decisions. The Northern countries CSOs trended to make visible their goals by campaigns of pressures and the Southern ones particularly tried to exchange contacts. This difference of approach tried the existence of special means to conceive how the CSOs achieve goals and their wider or lesser experience in the field. In regard to the quoted source, the most part of participants stand active also after the conference ending and involved in the efforts to deal the settled and assumed tasks of each SCO, taking part in the Economic and Social Council's commissions activities despite the intensification of frustrations owed to the conferences' results and the agreements were not enforced.

Also the great conferences were an useful tribune for the affirmation of civilian society power in the general policies, the establishment of contacts and the formation of some work-groups, almost all the analysts intended to qualify the relation as being symbiotic. The civilian society participation attracted the attention to world's mass-media and the parliamentarians over convincing the governments to get more seriously and concretely interest in the approach of stated questions and to more closely control the engagements taken at national and global scale.

Still, the civilian society participation sometimes considerably contributed in obtaining, along the conferences, of a consensus over some matters of sensitive general policy (particularly in women health and rights). Thus, CSOs allowed to the public to understand some issues, to thorough the significance of policies' elaboration process, incited to the concerting of international efforts to regulate matters related to the global collective goods and diminished "the gap" between the governmental actions and the political rhetoric. This proves the most of the UN member states and clerks see in the wider participation in the international life of the civilian society a positive fact, or at least a contribution to the democracy's reaffirmation. Perhaps, this explains more and more organizations of the regional and international civilian society are recognized and accredited along the United Nations.

Conclusions

The traditional concept of security was constructed grounded only the state's need to protect itself, while human security aims state's protection as individual's protector. The traditional dangers against state's security considerably diminished but appeared new dangers mainly regarding individual's security. The actors of the international relations were changed. State is not the single actor, either the most

important. The international organizations (NATO) or the supra-state ones (European Union) are more powerful on the international scene. Also the transnational, international corporations or NGOs already settled their roles.

The security issue must be approached in a global manner to involve the excluded actors. But is also a more precise definition of human security in order to not create tensions between this concept and matters related to development. Moreover, a clear definition would help also the politicians in their researches, in the process of policies' formulation. The former Secretary of the United Nations Organization, Kofi Annan, declared, in 2005, the persons involved in violent conflicts suffer more then the persons living in relative calm regimes. Therefore, the efforts must focus on the prevention of factors determining the conflicts burst. There are voices to sustain the poverty and the denial of human rights would not be the main reasons for civilian wars burst and terrorism and organized crime apparition. Still, all these aspects enhance the instability and violence risks.

On the other hand, the economic and social insecurity, the human insecurity can not maintain without more or less serious new conflicts. Though, not necessarily the application of a wide international protectorate and the integration in NATO and EU could change the situation but the development of peace culture for a new concept of development to be grounded on peace, justice and democracy. The main directions of action should be, generally, the promotion of human rights and, particularly, women rights (the fight against the domestic violence, the fight for the women emancipation and their participation to the public life); the local solidarity development (a program to sustain the school attendance and the diminution of school abandonment of minorities' population, as Rrom; the promotion of tolerance and helping people to find the trust in their own forces. All these matters are related to peace culture and Romania has got diverse programs at governmental and NGOs levels approaching such issues. In fact, individual's security matter is also a issue of tongue and depends how each of the people involved describe, analyze or understand the types of insecurity they are exposed to. The human security paradigm borroughs terms and nuances from a whole range of concepts, doctrines and political, economic and social patterns, particularly the ones centred of the individual. But, also appears a new dimension of the concept, the community's security wherein the individual is part of, trying to protect the individual's living environment against the disturbing or even destructive elements.

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PANEL 4:
**Emerging states' impact on regional
and international centres of power**

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY VERSUS TERRORISM

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Abstract: *In regards of the technological facilities offered, WEB 2.0, is the ideal event space for terrorist organization in order to organize/coordinate operations abroad, to claim terrorist acts or to promote their ideology.*

Practice has demonstrated that intelligence agencies have the most difficult task in absorbing, processing, going through the analytic filter an enormous volume of data, in order to produce, deliver or disseminate a valid intelligence product to the policy-makers. Therefore, gaining a technologically superiority as well as training the human resource is vital. Consequently, this will lead to a raise in efficiency of the response.

Keywords: *terrorism, information technology, intelligence services, WEB 2.0, intelligence analysis.*

Introduction

World public opinion has been accustomed by media networks with global coverage with a stereotypical cliché of the terrorist: mentally alienated from a violent family background, marked by serious financial shortages, armed with rudimental means of communication and battle.

In fact, the assessments on biographical data and statistic analysis on the profile of terrorist leaders and bombers reveal surprising aspects such as:

- The existence of a deep political/religious motivation;
- Higher education – they are graduates of some international renown technical universities;
- Members of a well-defined social segment – middle class;
- Training in the military - have good knowledge, both theoretical and practical in military tactics, especially in urban guerrillas

The paper aims to unveil the false cliché referring to the so-called technologically “ancient” means of fight used by terrorist entities from the perspective of communication and subsequently to present briefly an opinion on the intelligence and security services’ response to the threat which is already manifesting in the virtual space.

1. Information and communications technologies and terrorism

1.1. New information and communications technologies on WEB 2.0 Platform

Symbiotic relationship between the occurrence and development of the Internet, on one hand and the revolution of the information and communications

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technologies, on the other hand, led to the evolution from World Wide Web (on WEB 1.0 platform) to New Media (on WEB 2.0 platform), an essential element that radically transformed the mass communication process.

Social media is the most successful exponent of the social interactivity of the online environment and, also the main component of New Media Philosophy.

Elements of the cyberspace representative of what is called New Media include: *Blogs; Forums, chat rooms; Social networks; Instant messaging (messenger type applications)*.

Each of these open source categories can be subject for the information technology tools used in the intelligence activity to prevent and counter terrorist threats. In this respect, is worth mentioning some relevant issues:

Blogs allow unrestricted comments and this gives them interactivity, an essential attribute in unfolding the communication process being represented by the possibility of collecting feedback from the targeted audience.

Forums and chat rooms are data sources of specific and immediate operational interest (maps, charts, comments etc.).

Social networks are valuable sources of information in terms of developing the psychological profile of the targets.

Instant messaging (messenger type applications) provides the possibility of anonymously provoking and manipulating the communication process with an extended group of people.

2. “WEB 2.0” terrorism

In regards of the technological facilities offered, WEB 2.0 is the ideal event space for the terrorist groups in order to manifest, for a number of reasons such as: easy access; lack of regulation and censorship or other forms of government control; broad audience formed by people all around the world; anonymous communication; rapid stream of data; limited financial resources; multimedia communications possibilities; source of information for the journalists using traditional communication media on WEB 1.0 platform.

Exploiting these characteristics gave the terrorist organizations, especially the jihadists from the Middle East, the possibility of a higher operational coordination and distribution of propaganda materials.

In the context, in order to secure the communication both with their own cells and the potential candidates for recruitment, the terrorist groups have used public available encryption software with exponential key, such as Pretty Good Privacy (P.G.P.), that allowed encoding mail traffic that was disseminating data about weapons, targets and fighting tactics.

In the same context must be specified the use of WEB 2.0 as an agora for the readers of some electronic publications which provide a religious, ideological and military training for the jihad volunteers.

First magazines of this kind belonged to the Al-Qaida section from Arabian Peninsula, such as Muaskar Al-Battar (Camp Al-Battar) (<http://muaskar-al-battar.cjb.net/>) and Sawt Al Jihad (The Voice of Jihad).

Recently, cyberspace has helped spread a dangerous phenomenon, respectively *the spontaneous generation of terrorist cell* whose members gathered ad-hoc without previous training, just for the terrorist act, subsequently communication made on forums or chat rooms (London attacks, July 2005).

2.1. Terrorists intended purposes through WEB 2.0

Advertising and propaganda

WEB 2.0 offers terrorists the possibility to directly control the content of the message which means a greater ability to manipulate public opinion in the target countries, building a better self-image and a worse image for the opponent.

Note that messages broadcast by the most jihadist websites are compliant to the characteristics, timing and sequencing of special intelligence operations, with three distinct rhetorical structures: propaganda, countering propaganda and influencing.

A data thesaurus for planning a terrorist act

Previously performing an attack, terrorist organizations conduct a strategic planning activities involving knowledge of the objectives, setting limits for the action, the participating forces, necessary logistics, steps that involve the collection and centralizing a relatively large amount of data. On the other hand, direct contact between participants and collaborators - to provide detailed documentation on target - is inconvenient as it may cause a security breach. The easiest solution identified by terrorist groups was to develop capabilities to use information technology tools provided to collect anonymously data and information.

Recruitment and mobilization

Currently, there is an increasing trend of using WEB 2.0 as a platform for recruiting and mobilizing followers, for them to play a proactive role in supporting terrorist activities or causes. Terrorist entities collect data about users who frequently access their sites. Users that seem interested in the organization's cause are selected, and then the most suitable are activated in the contact.

Recruiters can also make use of supplementary interactive technologies to access chat rooms or to hang in Internet Cafés, in search for receptive individuals, especially the youth segment. The recruitment process is lengthy being preceded by "brainwashing" with strong religious emphasis.

Communication

Through WEB 2.0, terrorist organizations which could not afford maintaining strong ties now are capable to communicate with their members as well as with other similar groups. It's more and more probable that in the future terrorist will be organized in a much more decentralized way, with transnational groups that will communicate more horizontally than vertically.

Planning and coordination

Terrorists use WEB 2.0 not only to learn how to manufacture bombs but also to plan, synchronize and trigger certain attacks.

It is also used stenography technique that involves concealing messages (instructions in the form of maps, photographs, directions and technical details about using explosives) inside of graphic files (e.g. a card online).

3. WEB 2.0 terrorist challenge and intelligence activities

As can be concluded from the previously presented global situation, the challenges of the WEB 2.0 terrorism to the intelligence activities are numerous and would have been difficult to address if the intelligence communities would have preserved the structural and technological recipe now obsolete specific Cold War period.

The documentation, planning and coordination of the logistic, financial and human resource involved by a terrorist operation are difficult to identify and control as their informational “signature” on WEB 2.0 is diffuse. On the other hand, to many times the intelligence collected doesn’t fill the pattern of a threat in time.

In this context, the intelligence communities’ response has been focused on development and specializing analytic capabilities, while equipping them with the tools of information and communication technology (ICT) able to identify in due time credible terrorist activities “signature” within the virtual space which can result in terrorist acts. Especially in case of a failure of preventive measures, the intelligence product must be updated and presented to the policy makers in order to take the appropriate measures to limit the effects of the attack.

Experience has shown that intelligence agencies have the most difficult task in absorbing, processing, going through the analytic filter an enormous volume of data, in order to produce, deliver or disseminate a valid intelligence product to the policy-makers. Therefore, gaining a technological superiority as well as training the human resource is vital. Consequently, this will lead to a raise in efficiency of the response.

According to studies developed within the U.S.¹ intelligence community indicate, some relevant ICT in preventing terrorist threat include:

- **Biometry** – identifies suspect persons due to a diversity of biometric signatures: face, iris, fingerprint and voice pattern;
- **Indexing and data clustering** – implies a technological approach aimed at automatically extracting key concept from unstructured informational stream and indexing via a taxonomic information pattern.
- **Event detection and notification** – monitor simple or complex events and notify users in real time of their detection.
- **Geospatial information exploitation** – fuse, overlay, register, search, analyze, annotate and visualize high-resolution satellite and aerial imagery, elevation data, GPS coordinates, maps, demographics etc.
- **Predictive modeling** – predict the behavior of the terrorist groups and possible

¹ J.L. HENNESY et al, *Information Technology for Counterterrorism*, Washington DC, National Academy Press, 2003.

acts due to a history log and a variety of approaches including behavioral sciences techniques neural networks etc.

- **Assessing intelligence “pills”** – generating by exploiting open source information of short, concise and exact media summaries of intelligence value ensuring consumers visualization of a unique content, no matter of the frequency of appearance of the media items.
- **Video stream processing** – analyzing and identifying by digitally enhancing the video signal of the behavior and activities unfolded by suspects of terrorism.

Also must be mentioned some of the ICT elements considered to be of paramount importance in the field of countering terrorism especially at the intelligence analyze and prognosis level, tools used for:

- Providing channels of communication and cooperation both within the intelligence and security services and the intelligence community as a whole;
- Analyzing and assessing intelligence products;
- Translating foreign languages;
- Ensuring decision support for the policy makers.

These technologies allow users to:

- Search, formulate queries and explore content of a variety of files (text, audio);
- Automatically identify entities (persons or organizations) and causalities from a vast amount of unstructured data in order to find relationships associated with terrorist activities;
- Collaborate, analyze and sharing intelligence, in order to formulate working hypotheses on possible future trends;
- Enabling policy makers to assess future courses of action.

In practice, during the “classic” process of assessing intelligence products that meet all the requirements to be disseminated to the policy makers, intelligence analysts consume a disproportionally time between research, analysis and production phases.

Thus, most of the time is allocated to data research (search, visualization, collection, reading and pre-processing of data in order to build an assessment) and to a lesser extend for data analysis (formulation of correct, real and verifiable assessments), precisely the phase which defines the value of the intelligence product.

Various experiments conducted on international level aimed at developing the analytical capabilities by implementing information technology have undoubtedly demonstrated that using ICT tools have led to an impressive increase in quality of the intelligence product. Moreover, the time allocated to the research period has been drastically reduced, which allowed an appropriate time for refining and certifying the analysis.

ICT instruments for cooperation support within the intelligence communities, as well as those ensuring decision supports for the policy makers allow man-machine team to analyze and solve complex informational problems, efficiently and timely. The big winner of the use of these tools lies in transforming huge volume of data that often tends to overburden analytical capabilities of the intelligence and security

services in what could be called intelligence precursors.

Why to be called intelligence precursors and not intelligence? Since ultimately only human factor can turn data into information and information into knowledge. ICT tools can only amplify the capabilities of the human intellect. Especially in the field of terrorism prevention, addressing a problem by using information technology is allowing the analyst to avoid mental traps generated by biases or errors caused by limited data input.

Conclusions

The issues presented in this paper highlights the role of information technology to add value to analytical approach of simultaneously processing both the socio-cultural, operational indicators associated to the genesis of asymmetric threats and predictive elements which are component of an early warning.

Currently, the three main questions to be answered by the intelligence communities are concerning the problem of deciding:

- *What data and information is truly relevant?*
- *What is the best way to analyze and transform relevant data in a valid intelligence product?*
- *How can be optimized the interaction producer-consumer of the intelligence product?*

We must emphasize that, the major problem lies not in collecting intelligence, but to transform intelligence in knowledge and action.

In this context, the ICT concept it reveals its triple role to:

- ***Deepening understanding***, by the intelligence analysts, of threats, identifying data sources and intelligence gaps;
- ***Intensifying cooperation*** between the analysis and collection intelligence departments;
- ***Increasing vertical interaction*** between producers and consumers of the intelligence product.

It would be wrong to argue that the development of the Internet is the cause of the global escalation of terrorism. It can only be concluded that the information technology revolution has put into motion all the intimate resorts and manifestations (beneficial or not) of the human society, in its effort to adapt to a globalized environment.

As regarding the actual terrorist phenomenon and its current power source – the transnational nature -, ICT tools available to the global intelligence community can only support the effort to counter the effects. Solving the causes is up to the human factor.

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COMPETITION FOR RESOURCES AND AREAS OF INFLUENCE AMONG THE ACTORS OF GLOBAL SCENE – FACTOR OF REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INSTABILITY AND INSECURITY

*Petre DUȚU, PhD**

Abstract: Sustainable economic development and the achievement of national interests are facilitated by the existence or access to human, natural, financial or informational resources. Therefore, there has always been a hard competition among the world's states in order to gain access to all the types of resources.

The influence spheres contributed and contribute to the facilitation of the access to resources or to its maintenance. They are in an interdependence relation with the possession or access to human, natural, financial and informational resources.

In time, competition for resources and influence areas has frequently led to tensions and even armed conflicts between different states of the world.

Keywords: *competition, resources, influence sphere, state actors, non-state actors, re-composition of influence spheres.*

1. Preliminaries

For a correct understanding of communication's text, we start by clarifying certain terms used ahead. We speak about: state actor; non-state actor; resource; instability; insecurity and sphere of influence.

By *state actor* we understand any national or federative state/federation with autonomy, being independent and sovereign but the international community recognized as self-standing entity.

By *non-state actor* we understand any organization of civil society, political-military organization (for example, NATO), regional political-economic organization, multinational society recognized as such by the international community.

Instability means the status a social, political, economic, financial, informational or environmental system confronts with major malfunctions with negative impact over the dynamic balance of the respective system. A system's instability can manifest at **local, regional and international** level.

Insecurity is a status wherein exist dangers, risks and threats of security affecting negatively the conditions proper for human life and activity. Of course, the manner of perception and representation the insecurity, at local and regional level, differs from a human community to other, in regard to the ratio of social and economic development of each of them.

Resource, indifferently the reference field, refers to a material good, person, idea, instrument etc. which use in a activity accomplishes the settled goals. Usually, we speak about: *human resources, material resources* (natural raw materials, sub-

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ensembles), *natural resources* (hydrocarbons, potable water, wood, rare metals, etc.), *financial resources*, *informational resources*.

In the International Relations, a *influence sphere* is an area or region wherein a state or organization has great economic, military or political influences¹. The system of influence spheres by which the strong nations intertwine is present also nowadays.

2. Resources for which international actors compete

2.1. Types of natural resources

A natural resource is the raw material; its properties are used by human or living species to satisfy themselves a need². The natural resources can be used in gross by different procedures which do not alter their qualities and can be transformed to be exploited.

Here we speak about *two great types of natural resources: biological resources and energetic resources*.

Natural biological resources are the potable water, cultivated soil, the air we breathe, woods provisioning the atmosphere oxygenation and the whole range of vegetables and animals.

Natural energetic resources, by definition, are those exploited to produce energy. We speak about air, sun, water, geothermic, vegetal and fossil materials as coal, oil, natural gas or uranium.

Also, there can be distinguished, *the exhaustible resources and renewable resources*.

In the first group are included the mineral raw materials and fossil combustibles coming from fields formed along the geological history of our planet and corresponding to a stock essentially exhaustible.

As concerns the *renewable resources*, basically, they can be exploited without them to exhaust; they are able to permanently regenerate. They comprise water, arable land, biological resources (forests, pastures, fishery, and biodiversity) and the genetic resources (the variety of cultivated plants and the breeds of domestic animals).

The actual way of living of humankind exhausts the planet's natural resources. In order to illustrate this, it is used the ecological hallmark concept. In regard to William Rees "The ecological hallmark is the corresponding surface of productive land and aquatic ecosystems needed to produce the used resources and the assimilation of wastes produced by a defined population to a specific living level, wherein this land is situated on the planet"³. In all the planet's inhabitants would live as the Americans, there should exist 5 planets, for the French average consumption

¹ *Sphères et les cercles d'influence à travers le monde*, <http://www.intervalle-dz.com/t2125-spheres-et-les-cercles-d-influence-a-travers-le-monde>, p.1.

² Cédric NEWMAN, *Les Ressources Naturelles*, <http://www.terre-finance.fr/les-ressources-naturelles.php>, p.1.

³ *L'épuisement des ressources naturelles*,

<http://www.interligo.org/index.php/fre/Les-cons%C3%A9quences/L%27%C3%A9puisement-des-ressources-naturelles>, p.3. (William Rees est professeur la Universitatea British Columbia).

we need 3 planets, and a quarter of planet will be enough if all peoples would live as an inhabitant from Malawi, a small state laid in the Austral Africa⁴.

OCDE published in 2001 a document⁵ defining the strategies regarding the sustainable development at international level, by its Development Aid Committee (DAC). Essentially, we speak about the stakes engaged in the management of natural resources the world disposes of. The natural resources exhaust (soil erosion, deforestations, habitats and biodiversity destruction, fishery resources exhaustion), as well as pollution phenomena. The present modalities of production and consumption and the climate change at global level are factors leading to the question if the planet's natural resources basis will remain sufficient to satisfy the needs of more numerous and urbanized global population. Some studies highlight the land lost 33% of its richness in ecosystems and renewable natural resources in the late 30 years, period when the request grew with 50%⁶.

Because the natural resources, particularly the exhaustible, are limited, it is necessary to be exploited more rationally than in present. On the other hand, it asserts the adoption of a way of living to allow the exploitation of natural resources in a longer time.

The limited feature of exhaustible natural resources and their role in the sustainable development of states determine a serious competition among different actors of the world's scene for the access to those or its maintenance.

2.2. Exhaustible energy resources

By knowing thousands of years are needed to form, the exhaustible energies⁷ are limited resources. They are also called fossil energies (oil, gas, and coal) because they come from the soil and their fabrication is done in geological times.

In order to satisfy the actual world energy request, humans use without resentment the energetic resources, particularly the exhaustible energies. Appreciatively 80% from the energy consumed in the world is of fossil origin⁸. The fossil energies are mainly used for heating, transport and industry. Their combustion is pollutant and responsible for green gas emissions and global warmth. Under these conditions, all the exhaustible energies will exhaust in less than two centuries and others in few decades.

The coal represents 24% from the global request of primary energy. This energy is massively used since the industrial revolution. The world consumption is in constant growth because this energy is very looked for by the emergent countries as China (37% of the global consumption). The coal reserves are estimated to 909,000 tones and would cover, in the actual rhythm of consumption, about 150 years of production.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p.1.

⁵ *Les lignes directrices du CAD. Stratégies de développement durable*, OCDE, 2001, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/42/31588757.pdf>.

⁶ Cédric NEWMAN, *Les Ressources Naturelles*, <http://www.terre-finance.fr/les-ressources-naturelles.php>, p.1

⁷ *Espace environnement*, http://www.ecomet.fr/V32b_ressources_non_renouvelables.html

⁸ *Espace environnement*, http://www.ecomet.fr/V32b_ressources_non_renouvelables.html, p.1.

Gas represents 21% of the world request of primary energy. This type of energy is a raw material of chemical industry but particularly a combustible for house or industrial uses. World's gas reserves are estimated to 2,749 milliards cube meters. With the actual consumption, the reserves will cover about 70 years of production.

Oil represents 35% from the global request of primary energy. It is mainly used as raw material in chemistry and to produce carburant. The estimated oil reserves are about 1,200 milliards of barrels. Being aware the world consumption is about 82.4 milliards of barrels, the reserves cover less of 40 years of production. Of course, there exist are oil reserves yet unexploited. Still, the latest are at biggest deeps and in forms difficult to be exploited.

Nuclear energy represents 5% of the world's request of primary energy. This energy comes from the uranium's fission in plutonium in the nuclear plant reactors. The latest produce electricity transmitted in high tension networks. 443 reactors are settled in the world and produce 75% of the electricity needs. Differently from oil, gas and coal, the nuclear energy does not produce CO₂ type green gas effect but a problem is represented by the nuclear wastes extremely difficult to treat. Moreover, Chernobîl (1986) and Fukushima (2011) accidents highlighted the unwanted consequences of such events. The uranium reserves are difficult to estimate. Still, they are not inexhaustible.

2.3. Renewable resources

An energetic resource is called renewable when its period of formation is smaller compared to the human living period. *The biomass combustion* emanates carbon dioxide (CO₂) and other wastes (smoke, resin, heavy metals) if the biomass used is polluted. It represents 59% of the renewable resource⁹. *The photovoltaic solar panels* provide electricity, *the thermo solar produces heating*, *the geothermic heating* is the heat extracted from soil. Also, the *wind energy* is renewable. In many countries wind plants are built and produce electric energy introduces in high tension networks. The use of these types of energy present advantages and also disadvantages.

Water is a renewable resource needed by all worlds' states. The increased request of water at global level determined as in some regions of the planet to be created the premises or to already exist armed conflicts for the control of this resource.

Is known 97% from Terra's water is salted and 3% potable water, lakes, rivers and the ice from poles is just about 0.14-0.26 %¹⁰. Moreover, its repartition on the globe is very unequal, 9 countries have 60% of the available potable water. Nowadays, there are appreciations one third from the global population is deprived of the access to potable water, meaning more 2 milliards persons¹¹.

⁹ *Utilisation des ressources énergétiques*, [http://physique-chimie.info/IMG/pdf /fiche_2_ressources_energie.pdf](http://physique-chimie.info/IMG/pdf/fiche_2_ressources_energie.pdf).

¹⁰ Marc FRAISSE, *L'eau source de confits?*, http://mouvementdelapaix.aude.over-blog.com/pages/Leau_source_de_confits-484598.html, p.1.

¹¹ Marc FRAISSE, *art.cit.*, p.1.

The quantity of potable water on the globe, renewable resource, can not diminished, either increase and this constant recycled volume is the object of an increasing request which moreover is decaying because of the population.

In regard to UN, there are about 3000 areas of potential conflicts in the world whose stake is water¹². The competition for water is not only between the states, but also between different sectors of economy (industry, agriculture, house use).

Also, the conflicts related to the potable water frequently appear between states having in common or using together the same sources of water¹³. Among the regional conflicts, we can quote¹⁴:

- India with the triggering of conflict on Cauvery river between Tamil Nadu state downstream and Karnataka state upstream, or the upstream taking off caused a serious lack downstream and aliments the violence between the populations of the both states;

- in Austral Africa, Botswana claims for preserving the delta of Okavango river and its purification are to the origin of a conflict to Namibia, situated upstream, regarding the channelling of Okavango river water to the Windhoek capital to satisfy the industrial and houses consumption needs;

- in the basin of Mekong river, in 1994, after the inauguration of the Thailand barrage in Park Mun, the environmental conditions are rapidly decaying;

- Central Asia is since more then 50 years the theatre of a very persistent conflict of the planet for the use of water of the Amu Daria and Sir-daria rivers both alimenting the Aral Sea. The very special geographical distribution of water resources makes the both countries to be very interdependent;

- in The Near East and in the Gulf countries, the lack of water is a reality triggering tensions. Those countries suffers more and more by a structural unbalance between their limited capital of water and their consumption in a great increase taking into account the demographical rhythm and their economic development. The resolution of matters related to water partly conditions the hopes of peace in this region.

Despite the shown will to leave the other access to potable water there still were in the Water World Forum debates in 2003 in Kyoto, Japan.

If the shortage persists and generalizes, the risks of open conflicts will be more real and the single viable way to be the renegotiation to reach to equitable agreements or treaties in the population's interest.

The request of sweet water used in domestic, agricultural and industrial environments increases. Sweet water is essential to life. This is a natural renewable but limited source. The access to healthful water is considered as an elementary right of human for the most of peoples. Still, there are 1.3 milliards of persons today without the adequate provisioning and more then half are lacked of elementary

¹² Marc FRAISSE, *art.cit.* p.1.

¹³ Marc FRAISSE, *art.cit.* p.2.

¹⁴ Marc FRAISSE, *art.cit.* p.2.

hygiene¹⁵. The unprecedented growth of request threatens all the major goals of development, attentions the UN World Report over the water resources assessment “Water management under uncertainty and risk conditions”.

The exploitation of sweet water resources designed for agriculture, energy generation, industry and transports allowed a meaningful number of countries to advance economic. Still, the increased competitiveness for the water designed to certain uses decays even these natural resources they depend on. The normal cycle of the water and the ecosystems of sweet water as the lakes, rivers and swamps participating to it, provide main means helping the water to be collected, stocked and released in the environment. Also, the sweet water ecosystems provide a great variety of goods and services as food, function, the fight against pollution and the floods management. Still, these ecosystems are threatened by their human over-exploitation. The challenge for the humankind is one of unbalance, equity and sustainability. It comes the problem how to act to satisfy the actual request of sweet water with the need to maintain the ecosystems healthy safeguarding the resources and biodiversity of future potable water.

Not only states compete for using the water, but, even into the states, different sectors of economy (industry, agriculture, and housing). The relations between the upstream countries (controlling the sources) and the countries downstream (receiving the debits decided by the upstream countries) are complementary. The institutional mechanisms are but, beyond speeches, the reality shows they have malfunctions. Therefore, we can appreciate the potable water so necessary for all lives, can be a reason for cooperation or for tensions and conflict between its diverse beneficiaries.

3. The re-composing of influence areas

The so-called influence sphere, interest sphere or even, in the XIX century, hinterland, the area of influence is a territorial space situated outside the borders of a state, wherein still it leads a political or economic action without meeting a concurrent action from other state power¹⁶. The influence the state exercises by dominating the area can vary from a case to other. It can aim to annex the territory, in a more or less long time, or to settle a juridical regime consecrating its dominance, as protectorate. Also, this influence can consist in maintaining this area under a certain political or economic dominance. The main feature of the influence area seems to be certain exclusivity or at last the preponderance of a state in comparison to others.

The constitution of influence areas is a mean to offer advantages as the improvement of state security by creating a “firewall”, the growth of its state on international plan owed o its supplementary means which brings them in its sphere of interest and the provision to find abroad certain resources of raw materials, as well as markets to deliver its exports. Also, the influence sphere is aimed in the international

¹⁵ *Augmentation des besoins en eau*, <http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/programmes/fr/lead/toolbox/Mixed1/MS1water.htm>, p.1.

¹⁶ *Zone d'influence*, <http://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/zone-d-influence/>

life by the states willing to affirm their power. Practically, the existence of an influence sphere offers a state the possibility to satisfy easily its national interests.

The influence sphere, as space situated outside the frontier of a state, was, is and will be the stake of military conflicts between different states of the world. This happens because in this space, the dominant state exercises its influence. This can have historical, economic, military or other nature roots. In this regard, the bipolarity period can be an example for how two superpowers “shared” the world between them. In all this time, USA and USSR, mainly, looked to maintain and even to widen their influence sphere not only in Europe but also in the whole world.

The end of the bipolar world trained three important phenomena for the recomposition of international reports structure (political and economic reports)¹⁷:

- acceleration of two parallel dynamics: the globalization and the regional integration processes, passing through different forms and levels (regional regroupings, association agreements, agreements of free trade, custom union);
- thoroughness of the European architecture and its widening, but, also, strengthening its economic and political heaviness on the international scene;
- acceleration of Uruguay Round negotiations, its conclusion and the creation of World Trade Organization wherein adheres the majority of plant's countries governments.

Therefore, at one hand, there exist a multiplication of forms of regional regroupings and, on the other hand, an international organization whose principle is the one of multiplication the exchanges, liberalization of economies and transparency. These rules assert to all the member states. Actually, here is about two complex and multidimensional phenomena – the globalization and the regional integration. The both lead to the re-composition of influence spheres of state and non-state actors. The latter, we have organizations as UN, European Union or the North-Atlantic Alliance.

Among the factors of influence spheres re-composition a significant role comes to the *human migrations*, temporary, oscillator or definitive because they affect the most the great lines of world's sharing, where are the spaces of richness, of level of living, demographic profiles, liberties of expression are the most highlighted. Thus, the Mediterranean Sea is one of the biggest gaps of the world as the border between Mexico and Russia or Russia and China. In the last case, the demographic aspects versus territory and the ones regarding the subsoil are greatly disputed.

The human migration has strong impact over the re-composition of influence sphere by:

- *New forms of mobility*. Recently, certain regions of the world known great migratory mutations from the status of departure country to the receiver country. It is the case for the Southern and Eastern Europe wherein installed a migratory chain from East to West: while the Polish want to work in Germany, the United Kingdom or in Ireland, the Ukrainian and Belarusian want to work in Poland. The same is in Romania, hit by drain, the professionals' exodus from health replaced by beyond Prut Moldavians. The same situation is encountered in Maroc, Mexico and Turkey, where

¹⁷ Chérifa CHAOUR, *La recomposition des rapports régionaux*, <http://www.cairn.info/revue-diogene-2001-2-page-59.htm>, p.6.

from departure countries became receiver and transit countries for the migrations coming from the Sub-Sahara Africa, the Near East and the Middle East and Central America. These three countries, as well as China, India and Philippines – wherein a Philippines of 10 lives abroad – have substantial benefits from transfer of funds overlapping the public development support fund¹⁸;

- *Globalization of commercial exchanges, the free movement of humans and capitals.* The end of the XX century and the beginning of XXI were marked by the globalization of migration reaching to 3% of world's population¹⁹. Thus, a great number of countries are regarded by migrants, particularly the developed countries are the targets of persons looking for better conditions if living and work;

- *Population sharing.* If the population is not an attribute of power because the military conquests are not a stake anymore despite the anxiety of some states as Russia for its demography, in exchange, the repartition and its demographic profiles sketches the contours of present and future movements. Practically, the world goes toward a demographic big bang: the world population is now about 6.5 billions and will reach to 8 or 9 billions until 2030²⁰;

- *Access to natural resources.* Natural resources and richness they generate are the source of many migrations. Thus, the countries rich in oil, for example, know an emphasised migration to other states. Russia, the first producer of natural gas in the world, and wherein Siberia has rich subsoil in coal and hydro-carbonates attracts on these territories almost empty and with an aged population a Chinese population troubling the area as well as the persons came from the Muslim republics from Central Asia. Water is also a stake of persons' migration;

- *Environmental phenomena*²¹. The climate changes and natural disasters, desertification, soil's poverty, deforestation, the rising of seas and oceans level provoke the increase of migrants number;

- *Political crises.* These are to the origin of millions of persons which choose to migrate. For example, in the Near East, in Europe (ex-Iugoslavia) and not only known a growth of population choosing to migrate because of political instability from the origin countries.

Globalization, at its turn, particularly as regards the non-state actors has very significant role to recompose the influence spheres. First of all it is about the great transnational enterprises extending their activity, by developing production and selling of goods and services in the whole world.

In our regard, *regional integration*, simultaneous effect and answer to globalization, leads to the modification of influence spheres. In this regard, the European Union is a convincing example. This organization by the adhesion of new members from former communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe lead to

¹⁸ Catherine WIHTOL DE WENDEN, *Les enjeux migratoires comme facteurs de recomposition des sphères d'influence*, <http://www.aedh.eu/plugins/fckeditor/userfiles/file/Asile%20et%20immigration/CWWenden%20enjeux%20migratoires.pdf>, p.2.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p.4.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p.4.

²¹ Petre DUȚU, *Fenomene diverse cu impact asupra stabilității și securității locale, regionale și internaționale*, Editura UNAp "Carol I", București, 2012.

the significant change of influence spheres on the European continent. Consequently, the bipolarity disappearance and the pregnant manifestation of emergent states lead to the re-composition of influence spheres. Emergent states – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – grouped in an informal organization: BRICS aiming to affirm as international not only regional non-state actor.

4. Instability and insecurity generated by the competition of national regional and international actors for resources and influence spheres

The competition for resources and influence spheres between different state and non-state actors generates regional and international instability and insecurity. This happens because the competition for resources and influence spheres at regional and world level do not always undergo by non-violent means but, often, the involved actors appeal to violent means, inclusively military. Different military conflicts after 1990 had as stakes the access to natural resources, peculiarly the hydro-carbonates. In this regard, there can be reminded the first war in Persic Gulf, Iraq war or Afghanistan.

Along the energetic resources, water is and will be in the next years a reason for tensions and conflicts at national, regional and world levels. Thus, on the national level, the water requests can lead to the apparition and manifestation of tensions among the actors in different activity fields, for example, between agriculture and industry. On the regional level, there can appear tensions and conflicts between the states using commonly sources of water. Such, many points of interstate tensions enter under this category, and the ratio of tension is more or less increased: we mention the Near East conflicts, in the Nile basin, but also between the Saudi Arabia and Jordan, or between Libya and Egypt for the Sahara water sources. Also, the 6 days war was presented of some annalists as the first contemporary water war. The unilateral Israeli decision in 1959 to send the National Water-duct, started in 1953 which detoured the waters from Tiberiade lake toward the rest of the Israeli territory, provoked a tightening of Arab position²². Consequently, the competition for rare metals raises tensions and armed conflicts between the states necessitating such raw materials and the owner states. The influence spheres sustain and stabilize the access to natural and human resources. From here, the interest of the great powers to maintain and enlarge the geographical areas wherein they can exercise their economic, political or cultural influence it comes. Therefore, we can state the competition for resources and influence spheres represent an insecurity and instability source on national, regional and international levels.

Conclusions

Natural, human, financial or informational resources are the fundament of any country sustainable development. Wherefrom the competition of world's states to

²² Frédéric LASSERRE, *Guerres de l'eau: paradigme des guerres du XXIe siècle?*, http://archives-fig-st-die.cndp.fr/actes/actes_2008/lasserre/article.html, p.2.

have full access to the resources needed and sufficient to satisfy the needs of human and economic development.

Natural resources – potable water, hydro carbonates, minerals, coal , and rare metals – are quantitatively limited and some of them are exhaustible. These two features determines as states and non-state actors initiative to gain access to natural resources to be usually tensioned or including an armed conflicts.

The sphere of influence, as outside space of the state borders, wherein it exercises its influence eases the access to the natural resources. Therefore, states and actors with high international status consistently and systematically acts to maintain or even to develop the geographical areas wherein it manifest its will in relation to the other actors in the respective area.

The access to resources and the influence spheres are interdependent. If a state actor possesses or has direct access to the necessary and sufficient resources for its sustainable development and for export then its influence sphere growths. Reversely, the existence of a significant sphere of influence opens the unlimited access to any type of resources.

Owed to the resources' importance for the sustainable development of states, among them is installing a competition which, sometimes, can take less peaceful forms. Thus, the competition for resources and influence spheres manifests as regional and international instability and insecurity factor.

The tensions and the regional conflicts related to the access to potable water in Asia or the Middle East are a proof in this regard. Also, some armed conflicts in the Persic Gulf, after 1990, were generated also the competition for resources, but for hydro carbonates. At its turn, the competition for rare metals necessary for high techs in the spatial and nuclear field lead to the apparition of tensions and conflicts among the interested actors.

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CIVIL PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

*Vasile DOBRESCU**

Abstract: *The International Humanitarian Law represents an aggregate of rules which, on humanitarian grounds, endeavour to limit the effects of an armed conflict. The International Humanitarian Law protects those that do not join in hostilities and restrict the means and instruments of war.*

Keywords: *civil protection, International Humanitarian Law, conflict, Geneva Convention.*

Over time, the rules regarding the law of armed conflict have referred especially to aspects concerning the protection of the casualties of armed and the protection of cultural domains in case of armed conflict¹. International Humanitarian Law is also being known as the law of war or the law of armed conflict. We specify that the problems of war, of the means of carrying out the armed conflict, have been tackled since antiquity and continued to be reflected in the works of many jurists (among whom Hugo Grotius, in his work named “On the Law of War and Peace”), also in documents that are international in nature (The St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, the first international document that establishes certain limits for the use of some types of guns), the Hague Conventions of 1899, 1907 respectively, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, as well as the efforts made by several states on both national and international level to manage issues concerning International Humanitarian Law and cooperation in this field. The last aspect has been carried out by establishing several national commissions of international humanitarian law and through the cooperation between these organizations and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is made up of two streams: the law of The Hague and the law of Geneva or the so-called humanitarian law, which is destined to protect the military staff which does not or at least, not anymore, join in the battles, as well as those who are not involved actively in hostilities, especially the civilians; the law of The Hague or the war law, which establishes the rights and obligations of belligerents in the display of military operations and which also imposes limits for the means of injuring the enemy.

The two streams of IHL are not completely separate from one another, given the fact that the purpose of some of the rules of the law of The Hague is to protect the casualties in the conflict, while the aim of some of the rules of the law of Geneva is to limit the actions that the belligerents might make during hostilities. Once the Additional Protocols of 1977 had been adopted, which combine both streams of IHL, this distinction preserved only a historical and didactic value. Domestically, in Romania have been undertaken actions that were meant to reflect the state’s

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¹ B. JARCA, *International Humanitarian Law*, Universul Juridic Publishing House, București, 2011.

preoccupation with promoting and spreading the relevant norms of International Humanitarian Law. Therefore the main international treaties with incidence upon International Humanitarian Law, known in the specialized literature as “the law of Geneva”, representing the four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and the Additional protocols of June 8, 1977 which regulate the protection of casualties in case of armed conflict (the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded; Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; the Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, the Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War; the Protocol relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts; the Protocol relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts) have been implemented in Romania as consequence of the ratification of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (through the Decree no. 183 of May 14, 1954) and of the two Additional Protocols (through the Decree no. 224 of May 11, 1990).

In order to facilitate the process of implementation in conformity with the decisions of the European states as an important step towards a better respect of the International Humanitarian Law, there were created National Inter-ministerial Commissions for the enforcement of International Humanitarian Law. In Romania, the National Commission of International Humanitarian Law (NCIHL)² has the role of consultative authority of the Romanian Government regarding the spreading, enforcing and developing of humanitarian law, bearing the following attributions: it examines and suggests the necessary measures to be elaborated and taken at national level with the object of abiding, enforcing and preventing the infringement of the norms of humanitarian law comprised in the international juridical instruments which Romania is a party to; it watches closely and analyzes the transposing in the domestic legislature of the norms of humanitarian law, it decides over projects of normative acts in the field of humanitarian law and it suggests the ratification of juridical instruments from the field of humanitarian law, it elaborates the National strategy of enforcement of humanitarian law, which is afterwards being subdue to governmental approval; it elaborates annual reports, sent for informing to the government, regarding the state of the measures of enforcing humanitarian law, which are elaborated by the institutions represented in NCIHL, as well as concerning the activities that are being developed in the capacity of consultative authority of the Government; it promotes the diffusion of humanitarian law by means of the national education system and the one specific of the component institutions, it organizes scientific reunions, formation and specializing in humanitarian law classes; it collaborates with foreign national commissions and international institutions of profile.

The armed conflict law, based for centuries mainly on international traditional norms, is today to a great extent seized within conventional juridical instruments, which have strengthen the established traditional norms and developed successively

² *Govern Decision no. 420/29.03.2006*, Substantiation note MAI, 2006.

the former regulations³. The fundamental principles, as well as the rules of law in domain, are to a great extent included in Hague Convention IV of 1907 regarding the laws and customs of terrestrial war and its annexed set of regulations, in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 regarding the protection of the victims of war, which refers to the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field, the amelioration of the condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea, the treatment of prisoners of war, the protection of civilian persons in time of war. All these regulations have been reaffirmed and developed in 1977 through two protocols referring to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), respectively to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (Protocol II). Other international juridical instruments, conventional in nature, regulate individual aspects of the armed conflict law, especially regarding the prohibition or restriction of using certain types of weapons or methods of fighting. Proof of the importance given by states to International Humanitarian Law over time can be found in various documents that have historical nature today which are worth drawing attention to and which will briefly be reviewed in the following paragraphs⁴.

Ever since the oldest civilizations, there have been some rules on how to declare war, how to treat prisoners, how to use the war pray, how to put an end to the war and how to conclude a truce etc. For instance, Manu's Laws, dating back in the XII–XI century B.C. contained a collection of norms regarding the means of carrying on a war and the ones to direct it towards. These rules prohibited the using of bows with poisoned arrows, as well as the attacking of defenceless persons.

The peace treaties between Sparta and Athens of 446-445 and 421 B.C. included provisions regarding arbitration and mediation for working out the differences concerning borders, commerce etc, between both sides. Regulations regarding the solving of the litigations peacefully can also be found in Romanian law. Thus, the Romanian Senate and some sacerdotal college (Fetial College) were given important competence to regulate differences.

Later on, in the Middle Ages, the Church had had a substantial influence in the elaboration of rules concerning the carrying on of wars. The close look to war as a collection of norms regarding the commencing of hostilities, their carrying on land, sea and air have been subject to several studies and investigations, as well as to some important and vast scientific synthesizes which have highlighted the regulations' role in restricting as much as possible the evil effects of war. Without a doubt the multiplication of rules regarding wars have a special significance in mentioning not only the framework of the war, but also in establishing the responsibilities of those responsible of infringing the laws and customs of war. It must be mentioned that the International Committee of the Red Cross has been the one traditionally responsible with the protection of civilians in case of armed conflict, but, starting to 1968; this has increasingly become a concern of the United Nations. As showed before, ever

³ E. POPESCU, *International Humanitarian Law Conflict Law. War Law*, Universul Juridic, București, 2011.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 3.

since the emergence of states, the humanity has been preoccupied with restricting by various means the rigors of war and protect its casualties. A young Swiss businessman, Henry Dunant, who took part in such an event of conflict, noted that thousands of wounded soldiers are abandoned without receiving care. Thus the idea of the emergence of a society that contributes as effectively as possible to protecting the wounded combatants in armed conflicts is coming into being⁵. With this purpose in mind, in 1863, Henry Dunant and a small group of Genovians found the International Committee for the Relief to the Wounded, the future International Committee of the Red Cross, which would play a crucial role in the development of international humanitarian law. They succeed in persuading the Swiss Government to organize an international conference in 1864 at Geneva, in which twelve states participated. The outcome of this conference marks the emergence of international humanitarian law, respectively the adopting and signing of the first humanitarian law conference the same year – the “Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field”. This treaty, which embodies ten articles, overturns the until-then-belief that war and law are two irreconcilable opposites and sustains, that, on the contrary, the law can take action even in times of war and can regulate in certain fields, the behaviour of combatants. From now on, the sanitary and religious personnel, the ambulances, the hospitals will be recognized as neutral, protected and respected by the belligerents.

Also, the wounded and the sick will be under care and shelter, no matter on whose side they are. This is also the point where the distinctive symbol, one red cross on a white background, is adopted. In 1899, at the first peace conference in Hague, the principles of convention of 1864 had been extended to the maritime war, a second humanitarian law convention being adopted, for the protection of the wounded, the sick and the shipwrecked marines. This convention has been reaffirmed and developed in 1906. Also in Hague, in 1907, during the second peace conference, the fourth adopted convention was defining the categories of combatants who have the right to the statute of prisoner of war and who benefit from a specific treatment during the whole period of their captivity. In 1929, in Geneva, the first two conventions are being developed and reaffirmed (the one of 1864 and the one of 1907) and a new convention concerning the treatment of the prisoners of war is being adopted. The second world war, fundamentally different from the former wars because of the profound mutations in the methods and the means of battle, the number of casualties, had launched intense efforts from the side of the states, from the side of the ICRC especially for re-examining the humanitarian conventions.

Thus, in 1949, the efforts of the diplomatic conference for the elaboration of international conventions that are meant to protect the victims of war, in which 63 states took part, including Romania, took place. The outcome of the conference was the adopting of the four conventions which are still valid in the present time, and to which almost all states have adhered, which are the following: Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the

⁵ I. POP, *Interferența dintre Drepturile Omului și Dreptul Internațional Umanitar*, Studiile Asociației Române de Drept Internațional Umanitar, București, 2003 – 2005.

Field, Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.

After 1949, several armed conflicts have taken place and have demonstrated that the instruments for the protection of victims, especially the civilians, were not enough, prompting the necessity to elaborate and adopt new rules, in conformity with the existent realities. Thus, during 1974-1977, a diplomatic conference took place in Geneva with the purpose of discussing two projects of additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

The 102 states being represented at the convention have adopted:

- Protocol I, additional to the Geneva Convention of 1949, relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts;
- Protocol II, additional to the Geneva Convention of 1949, relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.

In the present, to these additional protocols adhere the majority of states. As a conclusion, we can affirm that the most important of the rules have been adopted during the post-war period, the international humanitarian law scoring an obvious progress as against the former norms. Still, we can't discuss a real progress as against the realities of the present, because of the fact that there are still different categories of potential war victims and because the international humanitarian law is lacunose/flawed (fact visible within the armed conflicts in the last few years), due mostly to the imperfect means of holding the responsible ones accountable for their actions. Although the creation and development of the international humanitarian law had as bedrock the norms of war with all the motivations imposed by the protecting of the casualties of armed conflicts, both for the participants in the scene of operations and for the population in the conflict areas, the evolution that took place up until the present day has imposed the expansion the sphere of inclusion and the proximity to what we know today as "human rights"⁶.

Through the adoption in Rome, June 17, 1998, as result of an effort which lasted more than half a century of the Convention regarding the creation of the International Criminal Court, the International Humanitarian Law has acquired a new institutional dimension, which completes the intern sanction mechanism established through additional conventions. Under these circumstances, one can affirm that the contemporary architecture of the international humanitarian law is being illustrated also by its new components – the protection of human rights by means of humanitarian law, humanitarian protection of the environment during armed conflicts, natural or technological calamities, but also by means of the struggles to develop the norms that govern the non-international conflicts, which constitute the characteristic phenomenon which is the most barbarian of the end of the century. As consequence, as new, increasingly threatening dangers have emerged, without neglecting its traditional field – which is the restricting of excesses of armed violence – the international humanitarian law has extended its area of protection to the

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 6.

spiritual inheritance of humanity, to new categories of persons in suffering or menaced – refugees or immigrants. The frequency of armed conflicts during the post-war period, and their increasingly devastating character, points out the contemporary character of humanitarian law.

The two world wars, which took place in the past century, plus over 150 conflicts during the post-war period, among which many are still in process, with all the suffering they brought along – dead, wounded, refugees, hunger and poverty – all serve as proof of a dramatic reality which the humanitarian law is being convoked to regulate. Consequently, humanitarian law is not always a substitute for peace; it remains the humanity's shield in the face of blood-shedding challenges. Here is why, its infringing represents a singular testimony of the rationality and hope of restraining force, as well as cultivating compassion in the face of destructive aberration. Unfortunately, the facts that took place during the last decade of the former century, as well as the first decade of the new millennium contradict the humanitarian principles. Nowadays, international humanitarian organizations, academic societies, prestigious scientific personalities, numerous associations are debating in seminars, at round tables, in writings etc the humanitarian problems with the aim of coming up with viable solutions of adapting the norms and principles of humanitarian law to the imperatives of the contemporary world. The problem today seems to be completely understood: the international humanitarian law and the international human rights are both sides of the same coin. Constantly and often repeated, this finding imposes itself. One might think that ever since the beginnings there have existed and have been perceived close relationships between these fields. But, after a close analysis, we are not able to come to a clear conclusion. Affiliated at a certain point to different juridical categories, they have never unveiled this common background, which makes them seem to be predestined to multiple and productive exchanges, necessary to modern people⁷.

There are two reasons that explain the almost complete independence of the international humanitarian law from human rights, immediately after the World War II, which are the following.

The first reason is related to genesis and the development of the fields of discussion. The war law is deeply rooted in antiquity. It has been formed especially alongside with the war fought in the European states, which were in permanent consolidation at the time, ever since the Middle Ages. It is one of the oldest fields of the international public law and occupies an important place in the works of the classic authors of this science. Its international aspect is being highlighted also by the contribution of Christianity, by the laws of chivalry etc. The second reason is referring to the human rights which operate in the structure of state power in relation to the individual. They represent the product of the theories regarding the state dating from the Age of Enlightenment, expressed through the intern constitutional law, naturally. In the case of England, we have the example of the Petition of Rights of 1628, Habeas Corpus Act Bill of Rights in Virginia of 1776; for France, we have the

⁷ I. POP, *The Interference between Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law*. Studiile Asociației Române de Drept Internațional Umanitar 2003-2005, București.

Declaration des droits de l homme et du citoyen of 1789 (The Declaration of humans and citizens, 1789). Only after World War II, as a response to the abuses committed by the Axis, human rights have pervaded the international public law. The end of the 40s marks the moment when human rights are being placed near what they used to call back then the war law. Thus, we can't discuss their reciprocal relationships within international law than starting with this moment. The link we made concerning human rights and international humanitarian law was vital for explaining the civil protection in the context of the development of the norms and principles of International Humanitarian Law. Civil protection, as it has emerged and developed in our country, with its evolution from the beginnings until the present day, has materialized its scope and activity, inclining towards a generally humanitarian aim of preventing and involvement in emergency situations prompted by natural calamities, human made and asymmetrical, for reducing the effects of disasters upon human communities, especially when these occur independently of the actions and will of the people. It can be inferred that, through the references that international humanitarian law makes beyond armed conflicts with principles and rules which regard humanitarian aspects in the case of emergence of different types of disasters both during military operations and externally, it determines the importance and the place that this stream occupies in the administrative and territorial structure of the constitutional state⁸.

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⁸ M. TEODORESCU, *International Humanitarian Law in the Romanian Army Forces at the Beginning of the Third Millennium*, Lumina Lex, București, 2007.

THE INFLUENCE OF “RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT” ON THE POLITICAL STRATEGIES AND PLANS OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ACTION PLANS FOR CIVIL PROTECTION

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Abstract: *The need to provide a priori human security by securing communities is found in “the Responsibility to Protect”, constituted as new norm of International Humanitarian Law following the failure of the international communities in preventing and stopping genocide, crimes of war, ethnical purifications and/or crimes against humanity fully manifesting particularly at the beginning of III millennium.*

Keywords: *responsibility to protect, human security, risk, population.*

The global Summit undergone in New York on 14 – 16.09.2005, wherein took part representatives of all the member states of the United Nations Organization (191, on that time), was finalised with the document entitled 2005 World Summit Outcome, adopted on 16.09.2005 by the UN General Assembly by 60/1 Resolution. In the Summit’s framework there were approached few major themes as: the development, the environment, the terrorism, the humanitarian assistance, the health and the Responsibility to Protect (we can state the document adopted by 60/1 Resolution represents the birth certificate of the “Responsibility to Protect” collocation.

In conformity with Paragraph 138 of the Resolution “*Each state has the responsibility to protect its own populations against genocide, crimes of war, ethnical purification or crimes against humanity. This responsibility involves the prevention of such manifestations by adequate and necessary means ...*”¹. Furthermore, Paragraph 139 underlines the necessity to involve “*The international community by the United Nations Organizations to use the adequate diplomatic and humanitarian means, as well as other peaceful means, concordantly to Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter in order to help to the protection of populations against the genocide, crimes of war, ethnical purification or crimes against humanity*”.

As regards the provisions of the Resolution 61/1 we also have to think about how *the international community is ready to act collectively, opportune and decisively in cooperation with the relevant regional organizations, even if the peaceful means are inadequate and the national authorities visibly fails in protecting the populations against genocide, crimes of war, ethnical purification or crimes against humanity*”².

The Responsibility to Protect as important collocation of XXI century is part of sovereign nation-states but also of the international community. If the states aren’t able to exercise or, lately, they don’t wish to exercise this responsibility, the international community is legitimated to priori intervene by peaceful means to stop

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¹ *General Assembly Resolution no. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, p. 30.*

² *Idem.*

the abuses committed by those against their own populations. Here from, it can be seen two main principles of Responsibility to protect³, as follows:

- the state sovereignty asserts responsibility, and this, which we consider primary for the citizens protection is part of state itself;

- when a human community suffers following some internal conflicts, insurgency, repressions or state failure, and the respective state isn't able or isn't dispose to prevent or to stop the crimes or abuses, the non-intervention abandons it on the favour of international responsibility to protect.

Furthermore, *the Responsibility to protect* involves three aspects (sub-responsibilities):

- *the responsibility to prevent* – defining the primary and direct causes of internal conflict or other crisis situations damaging the human security;

- *the responsibility to react* – the answer to the conflicts and crisis situations damaging the human security by adequate measures including the coercive ones as: sanctions and military interventions;

- *the responsibility to rebuilt* – the extension by the participating states to the military intervention after the action of full assistance for reconstruction and reconciliation for community returning to normality.

In a Report released in 2009⁴, the UN Secretary General points out *three pillars of responsibility to protect*, as follows:

- *pillar I*: the responsibility of the state to protect the human communities members against the aforementioned crimes and abuses, and also against the instigation to those, with the respect of Human Rights and the law as essential elements of responsible sovereignty. By this regard, all the states are united and firm.

- *pillar II*: The international assistance representing the engagement of the international community to support their efforts to respect the obligation to their own citizens; assistance grounded on the international cooperation, regional and subregional arrangements, the civil society and the private sector. This pillar is particularly important for the implementation of some policies, procedures or initiatives which can constantly be applied and widely supported. When one state's leadership is determined to commit crimes and abuses against their own citizens, then the assistance measures of Pillar II framework can have limited effects; in such situations is more useful an opportune and decisive answer of the international community.

- *pillar III*: Opportune and decisive reactions which consist in the international community responsibility to a collectively opportune and decisive answer when a state obviously fails in offering protection to its own citizens and community. When the world states sufficiently and rapid react, the options are only two: to do nothing or to use force. The reactions of the Pillar III involve peace support operations or regional and subregional cooperation, but also coercive measures fully conformant with the international laws and legal habits.

³ *Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Responsibility.*

⁴ *Report of the Secretary General no. A/63/677, Implementing the responsibility to protect, 2009.*

If the three pillars are unequal, the *Responsibility to Protect* concept could become unstable, dangerously leaning to a direction or another. Similarly, if all the three pillars aren't enough strong, the edifice can collapse. Thus, the all three must be ready to be used at any time. Nowadays, *The Responsibility to Protect* represents one of the stronger but also less understood ideas of our times. Although, *the Responsibility to Protect* is an allied not an adversary of sovereignty: the protection of own population is one of the basic goal of the modern sovereign state; by the sustenance of states in order to comply this goal; *The Responsibility to Protect* effects in the strengthening of sovereignty, and at no situation in its weakening⁵.

When referring to the human security, we mention that until 90s, the international relations were characterized by two main trends: the economic development and the military security, being in perpetual interaction. Once the Cold War ended, the both trends suffered important changes being more and more related to the human security concept⁶. Actually, the end of the Cold War only determined the liberty to amplify some discussions and analyses partially blocked until then, which rooted in the dissatisfaction feeling risen by the traditional methods of analysis of the international relations area. For the first time, the human security took shape when it was defined in the "Human Development Report" framework in 1994 as part of United Nations Development Program – UNPD. As the conclusions of the report shows, the security concept was used in a narrower manner this representing only the borders security against the external aggression or the defence of state's international interests, the daily needs of the individual being ignored. In a new context, the human security concept appears in a new dimension, being also identified the security of the community the individual is part in, trying to protect the individual's living environment against the disturbing or even destructive elements⁷. Under these circumstances, all the constitutive elements of the human society can be considered to be essential, in regard to the person doing the analysis⁸. We state that today owed to the all comprehensive valences of human security, the state can't be the only one entitled to provide the security, but either can't fulfil such comprehensive role being even a destabilization element.

The both world wars, as well the Cold War, represented important sources of changing the international mentality and society. The societies became aware about

⁵ UN Department of Public Information, SG/SM/11701, Secretary-General Defends, Clarifies "*Responsibility protect*" at Berlin Event, 15 July 2008.

⁶ The human security, although is new, has its roots at the beginnings of 60s, 70s and 80s, when for the first time were discussions about the need to settle a new system of economic and human development. In 1992, the Institute for Strategic Studies in the Great Britain primarily proposed the change of the strategy successfully adopted until then. The same as other similarly institutions, grounded on the security concept from the military perspective, but with all these, was constraint to recognize the importance, less or more ignored until then, of some notions as: political, economic, social or ecological security.

⁷ Stuart CROFT, Terry TERRIFF, (ed.), *Critical Reflections on Security and Change*, London: Frank, Cass, 2000, pp. 13-17.

⁸ Jared DIAMOND, *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies*, W.W. Norton, New York, 1997.

the danger and elected other way than the military confrontations. Presently, the risk of a conflict, where to be attracted the great powers of the moment is at the lowest level in the history. Now, the state isn't the single main actor on the international relations scene. The great corporations and NGOs start to step up stronger and stronger in this field. Such, state's security passes on the secondary plan, the individual security becoming the main preoccupation and the concept of state security becomes just a supplement of the human security. The human development can't take place without the provision of human rights respect, and for the provision of the human rights is necessary the provision of society and individual development, for the individuals to understand their importance⁹.

In the *Romanian National Security Strategy*¹⁰ framework, all these factors are analyzed in a coherent vision mainly involving the classical, traditional criteria of national security concept on internal plan. Such, the internal security represents the ensemble of activities of protection, guard and defence of inhabitants, human communities, infrastructures and property against the military or non-military asymmetrical threats as well against the dangers generated by geophysical, meteorological-climatic and other natural factors endangering peoples and communities' lives, liberties, goods and activities, the infrastructure and economic-social activities, and also other values at different level of intensity and wideness than normal situation. The internal security overviews the citizen's safety and public security, borders and transport security, critical infrastructures protection and the security of systems supplying with vital resources. It also involves the societal security and the provision of legality situation, the counteraction of organized crime and the security of the financial-banking activities, the security of the informatics and communication systems, the protection against disasters and environmental protection. The provision of internal security is a complex and interdependent activity. It involves responsibilities of a great number of institutions and agencies. These responsibilities preponderantly are asserted to the public administration and structures of security and public order, and as well to the ones occupying on: civil protection, borders security and the coast guard; intelligence structures; counterintelligence and security; bodies of preventing money laundering and of controlling the strategic imports and exports. Other series of elements are asserted to the industrial and services operators¹¹ undergoing vital or very dangerous activities, or involving a great number of peoples or major social interests¹².

In regard to the amplification of risks generated by the possibility to produce some asymmetrical risks, inclusively by using some radioactive, chemical or bacteriological means, or by provoking some sabotages, destructions or dangerous

⁹ Ted HOPF, *The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory*, in *International Security*, 1998, p. 171.

¹⁰ *Strategia de Securitate Națională a României*, București, 2006 (Romanian National Security Strategy, Bucharest, 2006)..

¹¹ *Tratatul de la Maastricht (Maastricht Treaty)*, 1992 (into force since November 1, 1993).

¹² *Tratatul de aderare al României la Uniunea Europeană (Romanian Adhesion Treaty to the European Union)* by Law no. 157/2005 published in Official Monitor no. 465 din June 1, 2005 (in force since January 1, 2007).

functional modifications, and also the increased risk of industrial or natural disasters, the task to provide the internal security becomes increasingly complex¹³.

The need for a real identification of all the problems, for an establishment of the conceptual organizational and action framework, and also the need to connect to the exigencies promoted by the European Union, determines a major interest as regards the national security for such wide, complex and vulnerable field directly impacting on human lives. The enhancement of crises management mechanisms is an essential condition in maintaining the internal security. In the globalization époque, the frontier between the internal and external risks effecting over citizens, communities or state's security becomes less relevant and the possible consequences of some catastrophic threat, particularly in the field of preventing conflicts and managing crises, there are permanent coordinates of Romania's security policy. "*To slight the dangers and threats which can come over the state of law, means lack of responsibility over the national interest and identity*". In order to efficiently act on the entire spectre of crises, Romania implemented and continues to implement an integrated national system for crises management which undergoes in a modern and functional network and the activities of all the national structures with attributions in this field – civilian and military -, from the central and local administration, are provisioning the efficient coordination of human, material, financial and other nature resources to prevent dangers, to control the manifestations, to eliminate the consequences and to re-establish the normality. This system aims to provide an optimal level of preparation and operational planning and functionality to all the structures of decision and execution responsible in the field in order to manage the whole spectre of crises.

At national level, the legislative and procedural harmonization with the system of management of security crises, tensional situations in the field of public security and civil emergencies in NATO and the European Union represents an effective mean of action at the both organizations level; Romania directly contributes to the conceptual finalisation and the implementation of NATO Crises Response System, as well of stipulations of the agreement with the European Union over the framework of participation to operations of crises management. The security concept evolved from a preponderantly military, the military aggression being the main threat for a state, to a multidimensional one. The life quality is, consequently, the indicator confirming the efficiency and performance of the effort to protect the national security.

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VULNERABILITIES, RISKS AND THREATS FOR THE EU SECURITY – THE MAIN DETERMINATION FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF EUROPEAN COMMON ARMY

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Abstract: *The paper aims to evaluate the main vulnerabilities, risks and threats to the EU' security which can generate - on medium and long term - the beginning of negotiations between European policymakers, in order to establish a proper military instrument of the EU, as a means to support the global interests and ensure the security of Union.*

The economic crisis the EU is facing has determined – more than ever – the cutting of the national budget for defense. However, the international security situation doesn't know a tension release, in order to allow the EU to consider protected from unforeseen developments in the security field. It can be estimated that in the future, in order to give a proper response to risks and threats, the EU will be forced to turn to other entities: the U.S. and NATO. This would put the EU in a position of inferiority and dependence on major economic competitor - U.S. - but would also challenge the one to the increasing political and economic influence of major state actors emerging: China, India, Brazil and Russia, through the competition for control the vital resources of the planet.

Keywords: *vulnerabilities, risks, threats, security, European Common Army, pooling and sharing*

Introduction

The new developments in the international relations field, determined mostly from globalization - with its most negative manifestation, economic crisis - generate in the European Union high debates concerning its future. The debate “Deeper integration” vs. “Dissolution” gets dramatic accents in the context of deepening of the economic crisis and of sovereign debt crisis, specific for European countries. The European policymakers adopted a package of economic measures; these, in order to curb the economic mess, at least. This attitude attenuated partially the radicalization of anti-unionist current occurred at the level of national states.

The increase of strength of new emerging countries, especially China, India and Brazil, requires a review of the manners in which the European Union - as a subject of international law - seeks to promote and defend their interests as a first world economy and as a Union with global geopolitical interests. Also, in the international context must be carefully analyzed the influence that it may have on EU the trend of diminishing U.S. involvement in "European affairs", simultaneous with a more active implication of Russia in the European context. To these challenges, both internal and external, EU must respond, especially through the establishment of policies and strategies meant to safeguard the European interests. I believe that, in this context it is essentially to carry on the development of institutional construction

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of EU, by strengthening the role of the EU institutions that already exists, but also by creating others to help in maintaining the European unity. I estimate that the establishing of a European Common Army (ECA) may represent a major step in finalizing the European construction, in order to promote and defend the European interests, especially in order to consolidate the unity and to create a common European identity.

Although EU countries invest in defense more than 300 billion dollars per year (711 billion dollars USA, 143 billion China, 72 billion dollars Russia)¹ this huge financial effort is not re-found in the manner in which the EU manages to support its interests as a distinct political entity.

The International development, on the medium and long term, may suggest that the battle for control of vital resources of the planet, certainly, will be carry on in the future, even with the support of the armed forces. But Union lacks just that issue: a force instrument that will allow it to manage - according its own interests - the economic, technological and scientific advantages that it has been created.

1. Vulnerabilities, risks and threats to EU security - brief evaluation

In my opinion, the easiest way to identify the need of establishing an ECA can be achieved by analyzing the new challenges to European security and by forecasting the European priorities of its construction. The ways could be:

1. Study the main risks and threats to European security in strong relation with the U.S., Russia, China, Middle East, Africa;
2. Analyzing all aspects that can predict the evolution of the international security environment on medium and long term.

In order to give o proper answer to this goals I believe that the main arguments that could determine the European leadership to launch a profound debate on the need for establishment of ECA could be:

- the EU's economic and demographic problems limit its investments in defense;
- the U.S. is in economic crisis and shift their main direction of action in foreign policy toward the Asia Pacific area, while the reducing of involvement in the European affairs;
- Russia is trying to strengthen its military capability and its defense considering it the main vector of major policy advocacy;
- globalization has generated a “globalization of risk and threats”;
- the sovereign debt crisis of EU member states caused an adversity reaction among a large part of European opinion towards the EU, and generate a deeper anti-integration attitude.

However, the main reason that will determine the future establishment of an ECA is, in my opinion, the following: *vulnerabilities, risks and threats to EU security on medium and long-term*. If this will happen in the near future, medium, or long,

¹ SIPRI Yearbook 2012, p 8, <http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2012/files/SIPRIYB12Summary.pdf>, accessed on October 18, 2012, 16.25 hours.

depends on the willingness of European leaders, but in the same time this is dependent on positive or negative perceptions of European civil society (at least, for electoral reasons). Therefore, increasing the public awareness of European citizens on the positive implications of a European common defense policy is a very important first step for the establishment of ECA.

1.1. Common vulnerabilities that EU is facing and will face on medium and long term

As it was expected, the deepening integration of EU member states has generated the emergence of vulnerabilities, risks and threats to the security of the Union as a whole². In this context, we can speak about a corollary which summarizes all facets of security, in its widest meaning - political, economic, military, societal, and environmental - on which acts the same types of risks and threats.

The first question that we should answer is: *What are the common vulnerabilities that EU facing and will face on the medium and long term EU?*

- a reduced administrative capacity that will not allow the control and the guidance of national policies according with common policies assumed;
- continuing the trend of excessive politicization of European administrative act;
- the rising of extremist political views at odds with European values;
- lack of an effective and coherent prediction, forecasting, scheduling, planning, execution and control in order to support budgetary and fiscal policies assumed;
- organized crime, pressures and influence that these will try to put in the central administration of the member-states;
- development gap between countries;
- negative demographic trends and population aging;
- illegal emigration;
- the increasing political and administrative corruption (political likely to be blackmailed and to serve other interests
- deficiencies in the protection and operation of pan-European critical infrastructure.

The second question I should consider to answer: **What are the main risks and threats to EU security?** It must be said that there is no clear hierarchy of them and even there is a line separating them.

They are interlinked, interdependent and therefore it should be treated together starting from the assumption that they are most probably the manifestation of an increasing anti-Western reaction.

² *European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p.1, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.

1.2. The main risks and threats for the EU security³

1. *Terrorism*: the manifestation of terrorist phenomenon, from classic manners of action through new manners, such as cyber terrorism or propaganda actions in the virtual environment;

2. *Religious fundamentalism*: religious radicalization and generate of violent inter-confessional conflicts;

3. *Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)* and the increase of the potential of some non-state groups to get nuclear weapon;

4. *The development of the capacity of strike with ballistic missile that can be used by radical states, having an anti-Western attitude*;

5. *Organised crime, drugs trafficking and drugs consume*;

6. *Maintaining of an instability level in the next neighborhood of Europe*;

7. *The increase of the military potential of the Russian Federation* linked with a possible radicalization of anti-Western attitudes of the Russian political elite;

8. *The relative decline economic and military of Europe's most reliable ally: the United States*;

9. *The development of global geopolitical competition*: the involvement of strong economic and military global competitors (China, India, Brazil) in the interest geopolitical areas of the European Union;

10. *Espionage* against the interests of the European Union as a whole, focusing on actions aiming to undermine its unity, credibility and coherence;

11. *Non-including of Balkans countries in the Union*, action that could generate new competitors in the next interest area;

12. *The decrease of military and security potential of EU member-states*, without establish a common way to ensure the common defense and security;

13. *The reduce of NATO cohesion in strong link with the decrease of American interest for a significant support of Alliance*;

14. *The block of access for EU' countries to the vital resources*;

15. *The damaging of international financial system*;

16. *Risks for the public health*;

17. *Ecological risks: the strong degradation of environment, natural disasters and change of climate*;

18. *Economic risks, especially risks for the energetic security*

Of course, this list is ongoing one. Currently, there are ignored European security sensitive areas and beyond. The list emphasizes just some of the risks and most pressing threats that EU will be forced to deal with in the future. Their proliferation is encouraged by security environment increasingly violent and competitive, which ignores the benefits of peace and stability in the long term, in opposition with immediately gains.

³ European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2010 on the implementation of the European Security Strategy and the Common Security and Defence Policy (2009/2198(INI)), <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2010-0061+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>.

A paradox of the postmodern society is the threat potential induced even by technology and informatization. Even though they are overall improving our lives, they are making us more exposed to vulnerabilities or faults resulting from their design. I consider that EU should close the Balkan gap (or trap) using its most powerful tool of peacemaking: the European integration. Even though there are voices in the European Union against continuing the enlargement one must consider that enlargement brings positive gains, especially for the European economy, gains that should not be neglected. During the last decades there has been a substantial capital and technology flow from the West towards the emerging Asian markets. Companies are even now relocated from the West to Asia due to the prospects of greater profits, especially cheaper working forces (e.g. Nokia). This weakens the economic power of the EU and its Member States. Another enlargement towards the Balkans (including also Turkey) could restart the damaged economic engine of the European Union. In fact, the European Commission acknowledged that: “*The enlargement has contributed to economic growth in the old EU members through further investment opportunities and increased demand for their products (7.5% of their exports went to the new members in 2007, compared with 4.7% in 1999). The larger internal market has boosted competitiveness in the EU as a whole. In the long term, the economic potential of countries, with around 100 million additional producers and consumers is considerable*”⁴.

Another vulnerability that can easily become a risk is the *scarcity of common military capabilities*. The role of the army has changed in the last decades, but military assets are still important for maintaining the credibility of a certain actor in the international arena. The latest announcements of investments in the military equipment made by the Russian or Chinese governments emphasize that emergent economies develop or modernize their armies, in order to obtain global advantages. However, the austerity plans of the European governments do not allow for the time being significant developments in the European militaries⁵, not to mention the partly abandoned project of a European Common Army. In this case, the sovereign debt’s crisis involving the EU countries is a threat not only to the European economies but also to the European security.

2. Assessment of the international security environment and EU development on the medium and long term

Monitoring the international security environment at the beginning of the XXI century, is meant to prepare the European decision-makers in order to elaborate the best decisions. This section of our paper is prospective. It is a scenario that may or may not happen, comprising elements that have happened, are happening or could happen. It is almost impossible to predict accurately the evolution of a system as

⁴ European Commission (2009), *Facts and Figures. Economy: Growth and Jobs*, p 2. URL=http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/5years/pdf/economy_growth_and_jobs_en.pdf.

⁵ This happens after decades of military budgetary cuts in Western European countries following the Cold War and the illusion of liberal/democratic peace.

complex as the international security environment, but it must prepare strategies and scenario ready to offer the proper solutions.

2.1. Assessment of the international security environment on the medium and long term

The current international financial crisis could eventually spread in the entire world. This development will be favored by the phenomenon of globalization. However, emerging economies (such as China, India, Brazil, Russia) will not likely be affected in the same manner as the Western economies, because they have sufficient space for development, especially within their own area. This, in conjunction with the fact that the living standard of the population is significant below Western standards, will conduct to availability of sufficient funds for defense field.

Although *China* appears to play a growing role in international scene, it will not be able - in the next 20-30 years - to become a center of power comparable to the U.S. and its Allies⁶. However, China will play an important role in the Asia-Pacific area, and it could affect in a significant measure the Middle East zone (Persian Gulf), the Central Asia and the East Africa⁷. The development of some naval capabilities for projecting the forces to long distance will allow China to spread his influence area and to have a significant role in the Pacific and in the Indian Ocean area. The maintaining of South Korea, Japan and Taiwan in the USA' security architecture for this region, will allow the control of China's movements. The settle of the problems regarding the sharing of resources from the China Sea zone will prove how much China is involved and could dictate in the Asian affairs.

India will seek to develop its military capabilities and defense field closely with the regional competition with China, but also influenced by the relationship with Pakistan⁸. Nevertheless, India will not have forces and means able to block access to key resource-rich areas⁹. It is expecting a more active involvement in the East Africa, Golf Zones, but also in the South-East Asia.

Brazil will seek to develop its influence in the Latin America area and probably will manage to obtain a certain role in Africa, without coming into direct competition with Western interests. Its enormous size and natural resources, as well as its demographic dynamics, makes Brazil less vulnerable to global crises and less involved in the global fight for resources than other international actors.

⁶ Dean CHENG, *What China's Leadership Turmoil Means for the United States*, *The Heritage Foundation*, March 16, 2012, URL=<<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/03/what-chinas-leadership-turmoil-means-for-the-united-states>>.

⁷ George FRIEDMAN, *The State of the World: Assessing China's Strategy*, in *Stratfor Global Intelligence*, March 6, 2012, URL=<<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/state-world-assessing-chinas-strategy>>.

⁸ Arun JAITLEY, *Indian Foreign Policy Priorities in a Shifting Global Landscape*, *The Heritage Foundation*, June 22, 2011, URL=<<http://www.heritage.org/events/2011/06/arun-jaitley>>.

⁹ Derek SCISSORS, *Indian Globalization: How It Could Happen and How the U.S. Can Help*, *The Heritage Foundation*, December 8, 2010, URL=<<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/12/indian-globalization-how-it-could-happen-and-how-the-us-can-help>>.

The *Russian Federation* will continue its anti-Western rhetoric but oriented more towards influencing its own population, in order to distract the attention of its citizens from social and political issues that exist in the country. Although it will try to create a new union, a Eurasian one¹⁰, established around it, composed by Asian countries who were once parts of the former USSR, it is unlikely that this union will take shape because the lack of common interests of the countries from Central Asia¹¹. However, Russia will be able to maintain significant military capabilities, especially nuclear and ballistic. Regarding the relationship with the EU, Russia will seek to have a beneficial economic relation which would allow to sale raw materials and to have access to new technologies. Its overall role will diminish together with the disappearance of friendly regimes in Cuba, Venezuela and probably Syria.

Iran will continue to strengthen its military and economic potential, but will not put in danger the integrity of its neighbors and especially of Israel. However, it could ban, temporary, the access to the oil resources from the Gulf area, fact that can determine a serious international crisis, with significant consequences on the global price of oil. A future major conflict with the US and its Allies depends entirely on the Iranian government. However, the West should acknowledge that the Iranian regime's attempts to develop unconventional arsenals is related to the existence of internal and external pressures or a growing need of national and international legitimacy. The weapons of mass destruction may be seen by the Iranian government as a means to achieve this goal since it perceives it as a successful deterrent for external actions against Teheran. Behind the nuclear program could be the Iranian regime that wants to eliminate the growing internal opposition. Its ballistic missiles' development plan will pose serious threats for the European security, for the US interests in the area and their Allies. The Islamic regime in Teheran will resist under the international pressure, even will try to export its concept of democracy to the Middle Eastern and North African countries.

Turkey, although not likely to join the EU in the near to mid term future, will remain a major economic and political partner for the EU, with important shared interests in North Africa, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, and in the Middle East. Another linkage will be provided by the Balkan region in which both Turkey and the EU are deeply committed. The enlargement of the EU towards the Western Balkans might provide the incentives for a future Turkish successful attempt to join the European Union. The EU should also take into account that Turkey is one of the emerging powers in today's global politics and it was considerably less affected by the global financial crisis than the EU Member States.

The *Eastern Europe* (Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova) and Caucasus (Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia) will continue to be swept between European and Russian

¹⁰ Stratfor, Analysis: Russia's Inevitable Customs Union in Central Asia, *Stratfor Global Intelligence*, February 17, 2012, URL=<<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/russias-inevitable-customs-union-central-asia>>.

¹¹ Stratfor, Analysis: The Next Stage of Russia's Resurgence: Central Asia, *Stratfor Global Intelligence*, February 11, 2012, URL=<<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/next-stage-russias-resurgence-central-asia>>.

interests. The lack of an alternative European integration formula could be exploited by the Russian Federation which might try to develop an integrated market comprising the ex-Soviet states (this aspect is suggested already by Russian projects of regional integration with their near abroad). Even though the Community of Independent States (CIS) had proved to be a failure in past, the emerging Russian economy could exercise a much more important attraction for the smaller economies of its neighbors than that of the European Union.

The *Western Balkan countries* will be integrated completely in the EU, but much later on in the Schengen area due to their difficulties in the fight against corruption and organized crime. This enlargement wave will be natural if one considers that the Western Balkans is surrounded by EU Member States and the EU wants to consolidate its frontiers. In fact, a non-enlargement policy toward the Balkans could be disastrous for the global ambitions of the EU.

2.2. Considerations on the EU development on medium and long term

In the economic field: after the national debt crisis will be over, the EU has the necessary potential to reclaim its place in the world as an economic superpower. However, its loose political integration may threaten its influence in the global politics. The relationships with USA, Russia and the Middle East countries will be main pillars for the economic development.

In the political field: the slowness of integration process could diminishing the influence in the global policy of EU. The measures against the crisis may create the necessary political framework for a deeper integration that could generate a federation or a confederation of states.

In the military field: the EU will try and probably succeed in developing joint military capabilities, more adapted to solve small scale Petersberg missions in the European neighborhood. A success could be obtained only with the Europeanization of defense industries across the EU. The European countries will continue their partnership with other NATO countries, particularly with the U.S., in order to preserve the global military primacy and to keep American involvement in Europe. European Army, newly formed probably in 20-30 years, might become a real partner of the United States within NATO.

In the societal field: The most difficult problems that EU must manage will remain the demographic one, the illegal immigration and the threat of structured terrorism. If the problem regarding the terrorism will be under the direct responsibility of the EU Intelligence Agency, the demographic issue and the immigration problem will remain in the sphere of social and economic policies, the defend of global interests will be under the responsibility of European Common Army¹².

¹² The implications of a 'fiscal union' within the EU may be extended beyond the rich countries of the 'core' (Euro-zone) to the poor countries of the EU periphery. If all the Member States of the Union must comply with fiscal conditions established at the community level, the next issue will be to reduce the development gap between the rich and poor Member States. The issue of a more balanced Europe will eventually restart the debate on the future of Europe.

Conclusions

I estimate that vulnerabilities, risks and threats on EU' security must be managed by strong institutions able to provide both decision support and to monitor the implementation of the decision itself soon. Because the current situation in the European institutions is characterized by indecision, slowness and negotiations centered on the interest of states, it is obvious that this fact must be changed.

It is more than obvious that national security structures will no longer be able to provide effective support for European institutions, because they mainly will focus on national armies and intelligence services and because of the lack of resources.

First of all, any army of EU countries has a national guidance and leadership, and due to this its behavior is influenced by national interests but also by the suspicion of foreign countries, even EU states-members.

Secondly, it's a matter of size: an army of any EU member state does not have the resources comparable to those held by world powers such as the USA or China. Currently the EU budget is limited, but potentially much higher in the future, comparing what can offer the national budgets. Establishing a common defense budget can be an effective approach in reforming the military capabilities of EU countries and achievement of common military capabilities in order to use them in common (pooling and sharing). These could be steps through the establishing of European Common Army.

However, only the gradual development of a real European security culture can provide incentive to create an European Common Army.

Although currently such institution construction in the European Union seems to be difficult to become a reality, it is expected that developments in the creation of a common European identity to determine making such a decision. However, the developments surrounding the CFSP-CSDP after the Lisbon Treaty are revolutionary compared to the previous periods. A European identity security policy may gradually form an institution of the type under discussion. Finally, it can get a critical mass requiring the need to establish EAC on European agenda. The institution is not important. With the role and mission instead is.

The economic crisis and the pressures of the globalization on the European interests could lead to speeding up of the decision establishing the European Common Army.

The resurgence of nationalist discourses mostly generated by the economic difficulties specific to the EU zone and the gap between the more stable Northern economies and those of the Southern Europe, will postpone the discussion regarding the establishment of such an institution for a long time.

Probably, the debate on the establishment of the European Common Army will overlap with the need for a European Intelligence Agency.

I consider that the establishment of the European Common Army and European Intelligence Agency could complete the process of the European political

union ending the never ending dilemma on the future of Europe toward a federation or confederation of nations.

However, the developments surrounding the CFSP-CSDP after the Lisbon Treaty are revolutionary compared to the previous periods. A common European security identity is gradually taking shape while we are speaking. Eventually, a critical mass may be achieved regarding the need to establish the ECA. The economic crisis and the pressures of the globalization on the European interests could lead to speeding up of the decision establishing the ECA. The name of the institution is not important. The function is.

The resurgence of nationalist discourses mostly generated by the economic difficulties specific to the EU zone and the gap between the more stable Northern economies and those of the Southern Europe, will postpone the discussion regarding the establishment of such an institution for a long time. However, the talks regarding the future of the European Union will be resumes sooner than later.

Probably, the debate on the establishment of the ECA will overlap with the one generated by the need for a European Intelligence Agency. It is our view that the establishment of the ECA and of the EIA could complete the process of the European political union ending the never ending dilemma on the future of Europe toward a federation or confederation of states.

On the other hand, the establishment of these two institutions will end the process regarding the settle of needed institutional framework, in order to ensure the European security in whole.

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ASSYMETRICAL RISKS AND THREATS AND THEIR EVOLUTION IN THE GLOBALIZATION CONTEXT

*Sorinel POPESCU**

Abstract: *The author's analysis is focused on the most important asymmetric risks and threats against regional and global security environment, as an effect of globalization phenomena. The main important risks and threats are: the international terrorism, the weapons of mass destruction proliferation, organized crime and regional (frozen) conflicts. Additionally, other associated risks and threats must be considered.*

Also, the author emphasises the necessity of progressive and conjugated efforts made by the states together with other international organizations in order to efficiently deal with these risks and threats.

Keywords: *risks, threats, globalization, terrorism, WMD.*

Human society evolution, as main condition of its perpetuation, plenary manifests in all the fields of humankind existence. XXI millennium started under globalization umbrella changed radically the world and did as the environment we live in to be extremely different, new and unpredictable.

Once with the shift to the new millennium, the humankind is at the cross of roads as regards the security issue confronting with multiple manifestations able to damage the peace and stability of states and regions, the democracy and civilization values¹.

The recent security environment is completely different from the Cold War years. The danger of major military threats against the European states, inclusively against Romania, diminished but assisted to the amplification of non-military risks against national, regional and global stability and security. The great majority of new risks and threats are asymmetrical. Usually, their promoters are non-state actors (terrorist, international and transnational organized crime, insurgent groups and networks, etc.).

The threats against the international order are not clear and one-dimensional anymore but multipolar and diffuse. They express at different levels and present different ratios of intensity. Following this fact, the new threats are multiple and of different intensities and therefore for the veritable (occidental) democracies, as well as for the Eastern Europeans ones, is more difficult to successfully confront them.

In the late period, the possibility to easily identify and define the enemy disappeared. The globalized world, the free movement of persons, goods and financial flows determined new challenges, as a result of explosive progress we live and we are part of.

“The present security environment – direct consequence of profound transformation came in the late decade / is characterized by a high ratio of complexity

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¹ Brigadier Gen. PhD Gheorghe NICOLAESCU, *Războiul informațional*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, Editura TOP FORM, București, 2005, pp.11-12.

and a fluid dynamics, as well by the initiation/persistence of some destabilizing processes and forms at regional or global level”². Moreover, the new world sometimes bruised and “haunted by the past ghosts” seems to confront the same danger, the asymmetrical actions. Is obvious for all the states strongly threatened by this infliction owed to the globalization phenomenon, not only the conjugated action can lead to efficient results.

These events of century’s beginning have “triggered a process of profound transformation of the security environment generating long-term and profound damaging consequences over the international community. In such tensioned and complex context, each country’s security, as well as the international community security in its whole, grounds not only on the capacity of reaction and adaptation but particularly on the anticipation and proactive action capacity”³.

As a consequence of globalization phenomenon, the international security environment is characterized by a deletion of borders between the internal threats and external threats, these being unable to be clearly delimited and, thus, easily combated.

Globalization manifests by the accentuation of multiple interdependencies between states, and also by the liberalization of world’s flows of merchandises, services, capital and information, which lead to the mutual generation and potentiation of internal and external asymmetrical risks and threats.

In the following lines, we will try to briefly analyze the main asymmetrical risks and threats and also their evolution in the globalization context. In our regard, these are: international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime and the regional conflicts existence. Moreover, we consider there exist also other factors of risk, complementary to the already mentioned ones, which, in conjugated action to those can maximize the unwanted effects against regional and global security and stability.

1. International terrorism

International terrorism imposes more and more as antipode of human society development, as contradiction of levels of development of different regions of the world. The basic motivation of terrorism is to win the international recognition and capitulation of public opinion attention. Following the globalization phenomenon, the terrorism became a reality with global implications hardly predictable and manageable by the states.

²Brigadier Gen. PhD Gheorghe NICOLAESCU, *Războiul informațional*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, Editura TOP FORM, București, 2005, p.11.

³ Lieutenant-Gen. Prof. PhD Teodor FRUNZETI, *Securitate și stabilitate regională*, Sesiunea anuală de comunicări științifice cu participare internațională- 09-10 aprilie 2009, București, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “CAROL I”, București, 2009, p 13.

In the late times, the terrorist phenomenon evolved from the stage of isolated criminal gesture produces as act of desperation following some evolutions of social system, to the stage of very violent action undergone outside and against the international norms and against the state of law and social evolution of states. “With the help of military means and grounding on psychological war elements, terrorism aims to get some exclusively sectarian advantages prevailing by so-called religious precepts, basically slogans taken outside from history’s darkness, looks to stop the normal course of human society to liberty and prosperity”⁴.

One of the elements contributing to the increase of destructive actions of terrorist actions is the use by these networks members of some devices, many times, of last generation, transforming the terrorist infliction into a serious and omnipresent threat against the civilized world security. The technical progress put to some asocial individuals’ disposal some destructive capacities which, in other times, were found only to the disposal of governments and armies. Nowadays, the armament used by terrorist groups is a mix of cybernetics, high-tech and hand-made means, all combined to obtain maximum effects.

International terrorism represents for the euroatlantic community and not only a complex and continuous threat needing an adequate, comprehensive and multidimensional response at strategic level requesting a significant involvement of the North-Atlantic Alliance.

At the euroatlantic community level there are two different approaches over the terrorist phenomenon: the approach of terrorism as “war” or as “risk management”. The first approach is sustained particularly by USA and presumes a massive mobilization of resources in an unitary effort of the entire international community, concomitantly with the assertion of some limitations of individual liberties for the civilian population. At their turn, the European specialists consider as unsuitable the approach of the fight against terrorism as “war”, but sustain the conjugated actions against “its roots”, and this does not peculiarly claim the use of the armed forces. The European regard sees terrorism as being a dangerous, unavoidable risk which must be properly managed and not a war to win by armed fight.

Although at first sight, the both approaches seem to be completely different, these do not mutually exclude but have own priorities and strategies needing different measures for the corresponding collective actions undergoing. The war-type vision tends to assert strategies which emphasize the offensive and preventive measures, while the risk management-type vision sustains a strategy focused on defensive measures. Beyond these differences, the both visions assert some real efforts to be posed in order to prevent and combat the terrorist phenomenon.

Owed to the serious nature of international terrorism threat, NATO decided to respond to this challenge by settling its own Plan of Action Against Terrorism

⁴ *Amenințări la adresa securității*, Editura UNAp, București, 2004, p.17.

approved to the Prague Summit (November 21, 2002). By this occasion, the NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson emphasized: “the North-Atlantic Alliance and the rest of the international community will act shoulder to shoulder to combat terrorism, a threat regarding us all, no matter our religion, culture or nationality. The last events only strengthened our solidarity”⁵.

Comparatively to NATO, the European Union does not have crystallized an own strategy to combat the terrorism and either forces and means designed for this goal, although the events produced in Madrid in 2004 highlighted the terrorist networks availability to act of the European Union territory but also the important vulnerabilities of West-European states systems of protection against this infliction. We appreciate the terrorist threat will persist inside the Union as long there is not existing an effective harmonization of Member-States policies vis-à-vis the terrorist phenomenon, the nuclear proliferation, the traffic of human beings, drugs and armament, organized crime, etc.

Logically, “NATO is part of the efforts orchestrated by the United Nations in order to accomplish the most general goals and the national approaches efforts concerning the fight against terrorism with a sharp specific character. But, in order to treat the symptoms and also the infliction itself, it is needed a combination between the efforts on the third levels – national, regional and global. Together, these can provide the most possible efficient response to the terrorism threat”⁶.

Keeping in mind the previously mentioned facts, we appreciate the fundamental responsibility for counterterrorism fight is, in first stage, of each state, even the phenomenon as a whole has global character and the connections of terrorist networks transcend the national borders. By all means, UNO, the European Union, NATO, as well as other international organizations and bodies must assume concrete tasks with permanent applicability in the coordination, integration and support of the Member-States efforts to prevent, limit and eradicate the terrorist phenomenon.

2. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

Consequently with the accentuation of globalization phenomenon, the existence and proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction became a daily reality and this generated worries and insecurity because of the permanent danger of their use. The main feature of these weapons is their capacity to provoke simultaneously and in short time massive destructions, not only to the military structures involved in an operation but also to their means of fight, civilian population and economic objectives situated on wide surfaces of land.

⁵ <http://www.acus.org/>.

⁶ <http://www.nato.int/>.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitutes an increased threat against international peace and security. Although the international treaties and agreements of exports' control slowed down the dissemination of weapons of mass destruction and of their vector of projection, some states continued or try to produce or to acquire such weapons. Therefore, the risk for some terrorist organizations to acquire such dangerous materials adds a critical dimension to this threat.

States' vulnerabilities related to the use of this type of armament exponentially increased consequently with the modernization of projection and use vectors (Unmanned Air Vehicles, ballistic or cruise missiles, artillery projectiles, etc.) of the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear charges, but also with the "enactment" of their use by the states which "officially or unofficially" have got such weapons by programmatic documents: military doctrines, strategies, etc. Concomitantly, the weapons of mass destruction maintain their destination as means of strategic deterrence, multiplication of the military power and, lately, as means to promote to the strategic level the foreign policy interests of the states which have got them and increasingly constituting sources of worries and suspicions for the international community requiring firm, open and efficient measures on all the third levels: prevention, protection and consequences' management.

The danger of this type of armament use is stronger as these can reach to the possession of some terrorist groups or organizations which might use them against civilian population inflicting significant human casualties with peculiar impact over the international public opinion. Under these circumstances, it can be brought to discussion a new concept, bioterrorism, which consists in the use or the threat to use viruses, bacteria, fungi or toxins, micro organisms with the declared intention to provoke important human casualties over civilian population or armed forces involved in a conflict, over animals and plants to reach the terrorist organizations goals.

Biological weapons have "the redoubtable superiority to be able to keep up by themselves their own *proliferation*, once released in a proper environment. The dissemination of biological substances does not need modern means, either much cleverness. They can easily be vaporized from an air projectile launched over a wide surface, by an atomizer in a close space or, easier, introduced in the networks of potable water distribution or in food products"⁷.

The efforts done by the UN states to harden the access of terrorists to the weapons of mass destruction did not have until present the aimed results and because of the organizational inadvertencies over the proliferation approach the counteraction of weapons of mass destruction is harder and harder to be fulfilled.

Therefore, one of the challenges the North-Atlantic Alliance should confront is to define its place and role in the international efforts framework of combating the proliferation. Along to connected terrorist phenomenon dangers, the threat of

⁷ http://rft.forter.ro/2007_4/00_texteprint/04-3.txt.

chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons proliferation is among the most important preoccupations of the euroatlantic community, and not only, over the security challenges following the Cold War area. In order to remain a credible provider of security, NATO must assume concrete and acting responsibilities over the limitation of weapons of mass destruction proliferation.

Nowadays, NATO and EU actions over the weapons of mass destruction issue ground on *NATO Strategic Policy to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and defence against CBRN threats* and *European Union Action Plan in the CBRN field*. In our regard, also they respond to the punctual interests of the North-Atlantic Alliance, respectively the European Union, is needed a new unitary approach of CBRN defence concept at the level of euroatlantic security structures. We mention, in the Alliance is in course of elaboration the *NATO Conception over CBRN defence*. The basic conceptual element the new conception will be grounded on is the CBRN defence can not be considered anymore as a predominant military task of force protection, but a new understanding of this must be comprehensively politically, military and civilian approached, concordantly with the three pillars (prevention, protection and recovery) which ground *NATO Strategic Policy to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and defence against CBRN threats*.

3. Organized crime

In the context of the late geopolitical, economic and social evolutions, the organized crime, as phenomenon, got new valences diversifying its “object of activity” and extending its operation area and these are reasons of worries for the majority of the world’s states and particularly for the states with economies in transition because of the legislative systems vulnerability and democratic institutions fragility of those countries. The organized crime structures proved to be more adaptable to the new conditions and more mobile then the ones of the formal economy, the example of the countries from the Central and Eastern Europe being concluding.

In the late 15 years, the transborder organized crime gained special wideness because of some own structural modifications (peculiar human, material and financial components and the continuous enhancement of their organization and operation means) but also because of globalization outburst. To these state of facts, firstly, contributed the governments of many states preoccupied to provide rather their own survival by acting to impulse the world commerce and particularly the exports by adopting some measures of fiscal leisure, simplifying custom and visa procedures, creating some weak financial institutions, etc. These “measures” allowed the organized crime networks to easily infiltrate in the structures of licit economy and to control an important sequel of those.

In the globalization context, the organized crime organizations do not need anymore a well-defined territorial base from where to plan and coordinate their actions. The unprecedented development of communications and informatics means created the possibility for the chiefs of the transnational crime networks to lead their businesses from everywhere. Thus, the use of electronic transfers, the free access to Internet and the super-sophisticated communications technology allow the organized crime structures to increase the criminal activity with unidentified authors weakening the economies of the states they interact with and eroding their authority.

Mainly, organized crime activities are materialized in: “illicit traffic of drugs or psychotropic substances and money laundering; falsification of currencies; traffic of persons; theft of nuclear materials, their improper use or the threat to use them against population; the illicit traffic or theft of cultural objects; terrorist acts and corruption of the public officials”⁸.

4. Regional conflicts

Once with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the states components of the former communist block showed the image of some regions generating conflicts with enlargement and security destabilization potential at European regional level. After 2000 year, following the firm measures adopted by the governments of many of those states, but also of the international bodies, the apocalyptic security scenario seen before was avoided. Still, on the European continent remained few “hot areas” with “frozen or prolonged” conflicts many of those grounded on different ideologies and religions but also on cultural and demographic differences. These continue to be “modern threats” against regional and European security able to lead to the serious damage of those areas if they “reborn”, even in this moment they are kept under control.

In concrete, we can state “the great novelty the post-communism brought to the European security issue consists in the fact it replaced a global security issue – the Cold War -, with a plurality of regional security issues: in Balkans, in Southern Caucasus, in the northern part of the Black Sea. All these regions are laid down to the periphery of the European Union and the invoked sources of threats seem to limit, each time, to an internal issue – religious conflict, interethnic conflict, internal political confrontation – weakly related to the global issue of security”⁹.

Even the existence of these regional conflicts does not seem to be an imminent direct threat against the European security, we must not forget those can constitute platforms of development and enlargement at European level of the other factors of global threat; international terrorism and transborder organized crime can use the conjectures created by the regional conflicts for their own goal.

⁸ http://www.onuinfo.ro/biblioteca/sistemul_de_documente/.

⁹ <http://www.actrus.ro/biblioteca/anuare/2002>.

Among the fourth categories of presented asymmetrical risks and threats, there can be brought into discussion also others, complementary to the first, which conjugated with those, can increase the insecurity level at European or even global scale. In this category we can mention¹⁰:

- International political terrorism, inclusively in its biological and informatics forms;
- Actions able to attempt to the safety of internal and international systems of transport;
- Individual or collective actions of illegal access to informatics systems;
- Actions premeditatedly designed to damage – in different forms and varied situations – one state image on international plan, with effects upon credibility and seriousness in accomplishing its assumed engagements;
- Economic-financial aggression;
- Deliberate provocation of ecological disasters.

In the end, we would like to emphasize the main role played by all states which commonly with the international bodies and organizations must firmly act to prevent and limit the extension of those asymmetrical risks and threats forbidding the free movement of terrorist and organized crime networks and, consequently, developing an efficient system of consequences management. Beyond any religion, culture, historical past, etc. differences, the states should unite under UN umbrella to provide the sustainable security needed for the human society development.

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¹⁰ Cf. Declarației Summit-ului de la București, http://www.summitbucharest.ro/ro/doc_202.html.

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PANEL 5:
The role of non-state actors
in the evolution of the security
environment

“POOLING AND SHARING” AND “SMART DEFENCE”. BEYOND THE CONCEPT

*Cristina BOGZEANU**

Abstract: *Current times are marked by the efforts to implement new concepts related to defence planning both at NATO and EU level. The implications of “smart defence”, at NATO level, and “pooling and sharing”, at EU’s one, go beyond the area of defence planning, their significations being much more ample and complex, even disclosing aspects related to strategies, geopolitics or to international relations. Within the present demarche, we set ourselves to make a short approach of these aspects, the issues related to the area of defence planning being studied only in order to justify the other conclusions. Starting from definitions and the identification of the main trends in international affairs, as well as the main phenomena influencing them, we intent to analyze these significations going beyond defence planning and defence resources management.*

Keywords: *smart defence, pooling and sharing; world economic and financial crisis, strategic interests, European states.*

Introduction

The development of “smart defence” and “pooling and sharing” concepts may be considered to be determined by a combination between factors related to innovation with factors related to tradition, between new and old, between security classical approaches and the necessity to find innovative solutions to security challenges. “Smart defence” and “pooling and sharing” appeared and gained a notable success in those environments with responsibilities in security and defence matters within a unique international context, favoring a perception on them according to which a smart manner to make investments in security matters is the only way in which states composing the euro-atlantic security community can obtain and/ or increase the security level they have enjoyed until presently.

World economic and financial crisis has been playing a crucial role in creating the favorable context for the two concepts’ development. Presently, it is well known the fact that, among the economic and financial crisis’ effects, there was also the need to adopt some austerity measures, with impact on national budgets. Military domain wasn’t an exception from this trend as the states from the euro-atlantic community have registered decreases in military budgets. Concomitantly with the decrease of military budgets, there may also be noticed not only the topicality of the already known security risks and threats – international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, inter-ethnic conflicts –, but also the increased complexity of international system’s characteristics. The mutations occurring at the level of power configuration at international level which are translated in the decline of US power and the emergence of new centers of power which are also known as BRICS, the delineation of new spaces with a high

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conflictual potential such as the South of the Mediterranean Sea, the increasingly sharpened and diversified competition for resources (determined by the increase of the number of actors involved – BRICS –, and by the identification of new types of resources such as rare earths and shale gas), the manifestation of a new version of nationalism as well as a Realist¹ vision and behavior of international actors.

Thus, world economic and financial crisis turns out to be the main stimulus determining the amplitude and the success which the idea of smart defence has recently achieved, although the issue of the necessity to share resources and use them together by NATO and EU Member States is not of recent date².

1. The conceptual substance of “pooling and sharing” and “smart defence”

In essence, “pooling and sharing” is translated into practice by the decision of various states to contribute materially, financially to the construction or procurement of certain military equipments (pooling) which, afterwards, are to be used by more states (sharing). The idea supposes an effort of cooperation and harmonization regarding security and defence industry. In fact, it is an economic solution to manage the impact of the economic and financial crisis on military budgets and, even if it isn't a genuinely new idea, its amplitude and the importance it is attached is.

The designation of this type of practice is a merely economic one and, at EU's level, it has existed ever since the first stages of EDA's creation (2004), the institution by whose intercession are coordinated the two stages of the described process. Thus, according to the Treaty of Lisbon (2010), EDA is defined as “the Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments”, being in charge with the identification of operational requirements and with the implementation, when necessary, of any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector³.

Smart defence concept is defined at NATO's level as a “new way of thinking about generating the modern defence capabilities the Alliance needs for the coming decade and beyond”⁴. Smart defence implies the idea that the Alliance's Member States will not be able any more to rely preponderantly on US contribution regarding the advanced and expensive capabilities, the proof for this being the intervention of international community in Libya. Subsequently, smart defence is very similar to pooling and sharing concept, but there is not a full equivalence between the two ideas as NATO implements a more developed, refined version of the concept which took birth at EU's level. In this respect, even the definition given to smart defence concept

¹ In this case, we refer to the realist paradigm of international relations theory.

² For details, see Cristina BOGZEANU, *NATO-EU relation from the perspective of the implications of “smart defence” and “pooling and sharing” concepts*, in *Strategic Impact*, no. 3 [44]/2012, pp. 33-40.

³ European Union, Consolidated Treaties. Charter of Fundamental Rights, Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2010, p. 39.

⁴ *Smart Defence*, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_84268.htm?, accessed on 5th September 2012.

is relevant – “pooling and sharing capabilities, setting priorities and coordinating efforts better”⁵, pooling and sharing constituting only a part of the definition given by NATO to smart defence. The mention regarding setting priorities is very relevant from our perspective as, at NATO’s level, the areas in which smart defence will be implemented are clearly defined, namely those capabilities which have a critical importance for NATO and which were established during the Lisbon Summit (2010) – ballistic missile defence, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, maintenance of readiness, training and force preparation, effective engagement and force protection.

The two organizations are already coordinating projects elaborated on the strength of the two principles. Thus, within NATO, the efforts to implement smart defence focused on developing those capabilities which are expensive and necessary for preserving the Alliance’s capacity to carry out the assumed missions. It is about systems of land, maritime and air surveillance; airborne early warning and control systems, countering improvised explosive devices, command and control systems etc. Simultaneously, EDA coordinates other projects of developing military capabilities which are distinct from the ones approached by NATO so as to their efforts would be complementary. Helicopter Training Programme, Maritime Surveillance Networks, European Satellite Communication Procurement Cell, Medical Field Hospitals, Air to Air Refueling, Future Military Satellite Communications, Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance, Pilot Training, European Transport Hubs, Smart Munitions, Naval Logistics and Training⁶ represent the actual initiatives developed in virtue of pooling and sharing principle. It is also remarkable the fact that the two organizations focus on those capabilities which are necessary to carry out the established missions, as well as on those in which there is already a certain degree of expertise.

As a consequence, smart defence and pooling and sharing represent an intelligent way to invest in the capabilities necessary to guarantee security and defence and its development was propelled by the economic and financial crisis’ effects on EU and NATO Member States’ military budgets; but, at the same time, the concepts under discussion are also completely adapted to the specificities of international security environment which is still under the influence of globalization forces, characterized both by integration and interdependency concerning the relations between the main international actors, but also mined by trans-border risks and threats. Intelligent investment in security and defence is an idea whose roots can be found in the early stages of the development of security and defence dimension of the two organizations, whose utility has been understood and accepted for a long time, but for which NATO and EU Member States are willing to make real efforts only under the current conditions of the economic and financial crisis.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ European Defence Agency, *EDA’s Pooling and Sharing*, 24 November 2011, www.eda.europa.eu, accessed on 5th of Septembrie 2012.

2. Smart defence – the signification revealed by the intervention in Libya

What emphasized at a considerable extent the need for a new approach in security and defence matters for the European states were the events happened in Libya in 2011. The way in which the main actors of the euro-atlantic space, with responsibilities in security and defence, mainly, NATO, EU and US, reacted was relevant in this respect and constituted for their leaders a stimulus for developing a new manner to approach defence. Thus, when the crisis in Libya escalated towards a civil war⁷, making international community intervention necessary, one could have noted that the state well known internationally for its decisive involvement in such situations had a rather slight and marginal implication. Therefore, even when taking place under NATO's aegis, the military operations were led by European states – France and UK. The reasons for this state of facts can be found in the fact that Northern Africa is comprised in the area of interest not only of the EU (by the fact that this region is included in the European Neighborhood Policy), but also of its Member States (France, for instance)⁸.

This situation may be understood as a US withdrawal from the foreground of the management of those international crises occurring at a large distance from their national borders, causing Europeans' efforts to increase their capacity of defence within EU's framework. Also, under the same line of thought comes the shift of US strategic interest towards Asia-Pacific⁹ which supposes the concentration of defence resources preponderantly in this region. Even more, under the conditions of the economic and financial crisis' impact on military budgets, US engagement in the process of guaranteeing the security of a region which is militarily stable (Europe) or of other regions for whose security there are other actors which assumed their responsibility (the Mediterranean space, already taken into account by the European Neighborhood Policy and EUROMED Partnership) knows an obvious process of diminution. In our opinion, it is possible for this state of facts to have been contributed to the increase, at European level, of the awareness degree regarding the necessity to give a new incentive to the development of security and defence policy in order to enable the European states to ensure their own security and the one of the region from the close vicinity.

⁷ The motivations laying at the basis of international community's intervention in Libya have been subjected to a fervent debate both at the academic and political levels. This happens because the intervention was made in the virtue of "responsibility to protect" (R2P) principle, adopted by the UN in 2005, but the intervention resulted in the removal of Gaddafi regime from state's government and in Gaddafi deaths, who had been Libya's leader for more than 40 years, which exceeds the content and signification of R2P principle.

⁸ For more details, see dr. Mihai-Ştefan DINU, *Evoluţii geopolitice actuale – consolidări şi aspiraţii*, in *Echilibrul de putere şi mediul de securitate (The balance of power and the international environment)*, The 11th Annual International Scientific Session, 17-18 November 2011, Vol. I, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2011.

⁹ Hillary CLINTON, *Secolul Pacific al Americii*, in *Foreign Policy Romania*, no. 25, November/December 2011.

In this context, there may be made some connections with previous events that strongly influenced the development of EU security and defence dimension and which may turn out to be useful in understanding “pooling and sharing” and “smart defence” concepts’ significations. I demonstrated in my previous studies the reactive nature of the this dimension’s development at EU’s level¹⁰, observing that all the evolutions in this sense were predominantly registered only under the conditions in which there was an external stimulus determining the increase of the cohesion level between European states which, in our opinion, still have a Westphalian type of behavior, strongly attached to sovereignty’s implications and significations. This fact is apparent not only the maintenance of the inter-governmental nature of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), respectively of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), but also in the low level of coherence and cohesion of European states in security and defence issues.

One of the moments to which one could compare, without mistaking, the current stage of security and defence is represented by the range of wars which determined Yugoslavia’s disintegration, especially the one happened in Kosovo in 1999, which triggered changes in the way of approaching security and defence not only at EU’s level, but also at NATO’s one. Thus, events in 1999 demonstrated EU’s incapacity to act opportunely and efficiently in the management of a crisis happening at its borders, representing equally a threat of itself. In the train of the wars in Former Yugoslavia, at EU’s level, European states’ efforts to crystallize and develop security and defence dimension gained a new impetus. Concomitantly, the need for the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization to involve militarily beyond the its Member States’ borders triggered the reconsideration of its strategic vision on international security, determining the elaboration of a new strategic concept and the definition of what we know today as non-article 5 missions, namely missions whose area goes beyond the space demarcated by Member States’ borders.

Although 2011 Libyan crisis has other causes and significations than the one determining the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the ‘90s, one cannot neglect the similar nature of their impact on the evolution of the two security organizations. Both crises generated repercussions on security or, if we were to consider these events from another point of view, offered the context of a direct manifestation, of the emersion of latent tendencies which had already existed within NATO and EU. The motivation laying at the basis of our affirmation is represented by the fact that recently, both organizations adopted new documents revealing novelties in terms of visions and organization, respectively the Treaty of Lisbon (2010) as far as EU is concerned and the New Strategic Concept (2009) in NATO’s case.

¹⁰ For details, see: Petre DUȚU, Cristina BOGZEANU, *Reforma instituțională a UE din perspectiva Politicii de Securitate și Apărare Comune*, Bucharest, “Carol I” National Defence University Publishinghouse, 2011; Cristina BOGZEANU, *Rolul NATO și al UE în managementul crizelor din Balcanii de Vest*, Bucharest, “Carol I” National Defence University Publishinghouse, 2011; Cristina BOGZEANU, *NATO-EU relation from the perspective of the implications of “smart defence” and “pooling and sharing” concepts*, in *Strategic Impact*, no. 3 [44]/2012, pp. 33-40.

At the same time, in both crises, EU's intervention stood as a proof of the lack or insufficient character of its capacity to intervene efficiently in the management of a crisis happening at its borders. In 1999, EU's "paralysis" determined NATO's intervention, with a major US contribution, and, in 2011, the superficial character, the preponderantly diplomatic nature of EU's action made necessary for this intervention, even under the conditions in which the European states (France and UK) were the ones assuming the its leadership, to be carried out under NATO's aegis and not under the EU's one. In Kosovo's case, in 1999, the events triggered the European Security and Defence Policy's crystallization, while Libya demonstrated to the EU that it needs to make more progresses in implementing the provisions of Treaty of Lisbon, in increasing the functionality and efficiency of the newly created services and positions.

Additionally, in the context of the events occurred in the northern area of the African continent and of the topicality of the world economic and financial crisis' repercussions, NATO and EU launched the new visions of defence planning – "smart defence" and "pooling and sharing". Generally, as we have previously demonstrated, these initiatives regard the efforts of making defence spending more efficient in the conditions when military budgets registered significant decreases while security risks and threats remained the same and when there is a necessity for finding a balance between US financial contribution to the fulfillment of the missions related to European security, on the one hand, and European states' input. This, together with the shift of US strategic interests towards Asia-Pacific area, seems to lead us to the idea that the initiatives related to smart defence are actually meant to resolve a problem of European defence, to increase the capacity of European states to act as the main security providers on the continent and in the areas of strategic interest – Northern Africa, Western Balkans, the Wider Black Sea Area, areas where, in our opinion, we will witness a gradual withdrawal of US as security sponsor and/ or provider.

3. The central role plaid by the European states in the context of smart defence

Our opinion, according to which smart defence initiative, no matter how technical it might seem, has at its core preponderantly a European issue is also shared by other specialists in the area¹¹. Overcoming the gap between US investments in security and defence and other NATO's Member States financial contribution to NATO, as well as developing and consolidating the existing military capabilities at EU's level reflect the necessity of a greater implication of the latter in the process of managing their own security. This becomes even more obvious as "smart defence" and "pooling and sharing" are two extremely similar concepts, developed within two security organizations which have 21 common Member States and between which

¹¹ For instance, see: Jacopo Leone MacDONALD, *The Basics of Smart Defence*, in HENIUS, Jakob; McDONALD, Jacopo Leone, *Smart Defence: A Critical Appraisal*, NATO Defence College, Editura Deltamedia Group, Rome, March 2012, p. 8.

there is a strong cooperation relation, based on the principle of avoiding the duplication of functions and efforts and on complementarity.

Although the role played by the US within NATO and trans-atlantic partnership should not be minimized, the challenge of overcoming the difficulties afferent to these concepts – the coordination of NATO and EU efforts, the maintenance of action independency of each one of them, considering each state’s freedom to act according to its national interests when establishing specialization, the optimum management of the implicit modification at the level national military structures and defence industry – also rests, in our opinion, in Europeans’ hands, of the ones which are part of both organizations, of the ones who have to increase their level of transparency, cohesion and mutual trust in security and defence matters. Moreover, by comparison with NATO, EU also has a plus of expertise in this respect, at least at institutional level. This time, we refer to the fact that European Defence Agency was established ever since 2004, seeming to have been created especially as an institutional framework within which “pooling and sharing” could evolve naturally from the conceptual stage to full implementation. NATO, on the other hand, implements “smart defence” using as an institutional framework the Allied Command Transformation, this task being to be taken by an institution designed especially for smart defence implementation – NATO Procurement Organization¹², which is expected to become operational in 2014. But all these challenges have to be managed while EU is passing through a legitimacy crisis, while there is an increase in the skepticism regarding EU’s capacity to manage and overcome optimally the difficulties generated by the world economic and financial crisis which has had strong impact on EU’s economic dimension, extending subsequently to the social, political and military dimensions. Even more, given EU sovereign debt crisis and the long-term measures required, smart defence also seems to be a part of the solutions for managing the economic and financial crisis and an eloquent example in this respect may be found in the strong accent laid on research and development at EU level as compared to the approach of the same issue within NATO.

The greater weight gained by research and development in EU’s approach can be justified by the nature of this organization, which took birth as an economic integration organization, this being the basis on which the rest of EU’s dimensions were built. Therefore, the crisis affected the very basis, the fundament of European construction, “shaking” the entire ensemble. On the other hand, NATO has always benefited of US consistent investments which strongly contributed to NATO’s becoming one of the main non-state actors of the international arena. “Smart defence”, though better developed and refined at the Alliance’s level, represents the solution for a punctual issue, placed in the military sphere, determined by an economic context and which also has implications in the geostrategic area. As a consequence, the efforts made within this framework have been concentrated on identifying solutions for the acquisition and development of the necessary military equipments for the Alliance to be able to respect the assumed engagements.

¹² The NATO Procurement Organization (NPO), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_89040.htm.

For the EU, “pooling and sharing” has all these implications but it also exceeds them, as it is also a part of a more ample solution to this state of facts. EU’s approach regarding the impact of the economic and financial crisis was to identify innovative solutions no matter if we took into account economy, finances, defence, society or environment protection. EU Commissioner responsible for research, innovation, and science recently asserted that Europe faces a debt crisis and the greatest economic challenges in decades, that EU Member States undertake measures of reducing budgets, but that it is also necessary to ensure that these measures would not affect the very engine of economic recovery – research and innovation. He also stated that investing in research and innovation in these times represented the ideal solution for creating work places and future growth¹³. In this respect, it becomes clear not only why the two initiatives took a run only in the context of the economic and financial crisis, but also why research and development is a strong component of “pooling and sharing”, but not so strong for “smart defence”.

Conclusions

“Smart defence” and “pooling and sharing” were launched as initiatives in defence planning in the context of the world economic and financial crisis which strongly impacted on the military budgets of the states comprised in the euro-atlantic area. Both of them suppose making defence spending more efficient so as to maintain or develop NATO and EU military capabilities.

But, the analyses on the international context in which they developed, on their implications, the correlations with recent or past events from the history of the two organizations development reveal that their implications go beyond the sphere of defence planning, also having connotations on the strategic plan, coming under the series of complex transformations happening at international security environment’s level in present. In other words, “smart defence” and “pooling and sharing” also illustrate the fact that it’s high time for the European states to become more involved in guaranteeing their own security and even in guaranteeing the close vicinity’s security; these concepts also reflect not only US power decline and the emergence of new centers of power, but also the shift of US strategic interests towards Asia-Pacific area and, last but not least, they offer clear indices on the future challenges the Europeans will have to face.

These initiatives are also the sign that Europeans will have to increase their military involvement on the international arena and that the initial European project

¹³ EU Commissioner Máire GEORGHEGAN-QUINN, responsible for research, innovation, and science, in *An Innovation Union. Paving the Way for Jobs and Growth in the EU*, in *Foreign Policy*, EU Focus, no. 195, September/October 2012, p. 17.

of managing the dangers and instability related to power politics¹⁴ will need to be doubled by a real, assumed and responsible development of the European military dimension. Actually, in our opinion, it is necessary for the Europeans to adapt to international reality and to give a higher weight to the Hobbessian-type vision on the world, on inter-state relations, but not in the way in which they did before and during the two world wars, but together, under EU and NATO aegis, also having the necessary instruments (military, in the present case) to promote their common interests. At the same time, following the same line of ideas, European states will pass through a period of ample and diverse challenges which aren't related only to implementing a new defence planning concept, but also to increasing the level of transparency, coordination, cohesion, and mutual trust in the area of security and defence, an area towards which they have always manifested reticence in fathoming the level of integration.

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¹⁴ Robert Kagan published in 2003 a volume titled “Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order”, within which he exposed a theory according to which, given its position on the international arena, America developed a hobbessian vision on the world, which is seen as a space of risks, which made it more willing to use force. On the other hand, Europe seeks to promote peace by laws and diplomacy, creating in this area a space of kantian peace. Partially due to the security guarantees offered by America, the Europeans created a political order in which power is subdued and the use of forces banned. For details, see: Robert KAGAN, *Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order*, UK, Vintage Publishinghouse, 2007.

THEORETICAL APPROACHES ON THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S SECURITY STRATEGY

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Abstract: *The nation states' action in security matters finds its theoretical support in specific law bodies which are suitable or can influence this domain. Time-limited strategies or changeable strategies (due to national or international shifts) can also fit into this legal framework.*

Security strategies point out the policies carried out by the governments in this field, on the one hand, and, on the other, identify the priorities, the specific aims, the domestic or the external threats, risks and vulnerabilities. These important documents, assessed for their strategic, tactical and even operational value, support the most important projects on preserving the national security towards the global one.

Keywords: *security, strategy, threat, Russian Federation, insecurity.*

1. Argument

National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation has a time horizon of 11 years and is intended to be the framework document through which to achieve the security policy of the state, to prevent and counter the threats to the national security, to ensure the national interests and strategic priorities within an integrated system with long term application.

In the General Provisions of the document, the Russian Federation defines itself as a stabile state that overcame the problems of the end of 20th century and gave a special attention to the security of citizens, national reference characteristics, finally managing to occupy a *key subject* position in the multipolar international relations now forming. As every state that passed over the centralized economy era, Russia has strengthened the national economy, making it attractive for all the foreign investment categories. Alternatively, we can talk today about the Russian economic potential exported to many European countries so that Russia can retain its reputation as strategic investor or to gain monopoly on certain economical segments.

Not ignoring her former leadership position, Russia wants to regain it in some certain areas with rising potential as modern technology, the quality of people's life based on the liberty and independence of the Russian state, the traditional family role and patriotism which is not an obsolete concept for the Russian citizen even if the Russian population has a multiethnic structure. In the general, internal context placed within the international situation, the document states that Russia considers that has achieved the groundwork necessary for preventing internal or external threats to the national security.

Like in all modern security strategies, Russia determined her national priorities and a set of objectives and measures in the field of domestic and foreign policy in

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order to achieve both a stable state of security and a durable long-term development of the state. This Strategy is not intended to be an exhaustive document so it is coupled with an economical strategy entitled *Concept for Long-Term Socio-Economic Development of the Russian Federation to 2020*. There is a common element between the two documents referring at the time horizon but there is also an overlap of economic elements over interests on national security.

2. Contemporary world and Russia

Within Chapter II, entitled *Russia and the contemporary world: Current conditions and trends of development*, the document presents Russian Federation as a global leader and as an international equilibrium factor, simultaneously identifying the main threats to the national security.

Although the international context is not a permissive one, under conditions of unequal development between countries and a on the background of general vulnerability of the international community due to the new categories of threats, Russia is placing herself on a position which allows it to *consolidate her influence on the international arena since has the necessary potential to fulfill on medium term, the conditions that placed it among the leader states of world economy, on the ground of effectively participating at global labor division, the rising of national economy at the standard of global competitiveness as well as national defense potential and state/society security.*

Possible threats to the national security of the Russian Federation may be unilateral practice of *international relations based on force and deepening divergences between the main leaders of international politics.*

Other category of threats which meet the criteria of being asymmetric come from the ambient environment or cross border manifestations: *weapons of mass destruction proliferation and the possibility to reach in the possession of terrorists; improvement forms of illegal activity in biological cybernetics domain as well as in advanced technologies; attacks to the stability of industrialized countries of the world or and emerging ones or to the democratic institutions; development of nationalist trends, xenophobia, separatism and violent extremism, including religious radicalism slogans; worsening world demographic situation and regarding the environment; increasing phenomena related to uncontrolled and illegal migration; proliferation of trade in narcotics and human trafficking; proliferation of transnational organized crime; potential virus outbreak caused by new, unknown and freshwater scarcity.*

Access to energy resources in the Middle East, the Barents Sea shelf and other areas of the Arctic, the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia will be a focus of international politics of many countries of the world. Also the problems in conflict zones or generating the conflict will have an effect on the state of international security and thus potentially damage the interests of Russia. *As before, the international situation in the medium term will be adversely affected by the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, conflicts in the Near and Middle East, in several countries of South Asia and Africa, the Korean Peninsula.*

Classical conventional warfare threat and conventional weapons uncontrolled by authorities may cause major risk to regional security through escalation of existing conflicts or by generating new ones. The intention of solving problems by force occurring between states as a result of an exacerbating competition for resources could alter the stability climate of neighboring states of Russia and its allies. The threat identified by all countries and international organizations respectively the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is also a problem for the Russian Federation' national that is only briefly mentioned as it will rise the risk of increasing the number of countries possessing nuclear¹ weapons.

One factor that will maintain global and regional insecurity is the location in Europe of the global missile defense system elements of the United States of America. In fact, this very sensitive topic for Russia was often approached by Vladimir Putin who considers the shield a real threat to Russia's security. "Moscow is open to the idea of further cuts in nuclear arsenals reciprocal if Washington will respond to its concerns on the American missile defense system in Europe"².

*"Missile shield in Europe will be categorically against Russia, when Republican Mitt Romney will be elected as President of the United States. Putin said that there are chances that the U.S. presidential elections are won by Mitt Romney"*³.

Consecrated as a threat, the financial crisis is compared in terms of effects and damages that can generate on economic level with damages inflicted by widespread use of armed force. Consequences of the global economic and financial crisis may be comparable in terms of total losses, with the extensive use of armed force.

Principles of international relations and international law are indicators of security by assuming deductive approach is that non-compliance leads to insecurity.

In the context of some nuances regarding NATO⁴ Russia considers the *United Nations and Security Council of the United Nations as the central element of a stable system of international relations, which are based on respect, equality and mutually beneficial cooperation between states that rely on civilized political tools to solve global and regional crisis.*

In the expanded international relations Russia aims to strengthen links with international organizations and structures aimed at maintaining security and promoting economic interests of Member States: Group of Twenty, BRIC, RIK, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Eurasian Economic Community, the Organization for Cooperation of Shanghai, not least with the CIS member states.

¹Vladimir Putin: "Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is' a key issue on the global agenda. Observance by Russia of the new START treaty, which aims at reducing U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, Moscow is a testimony of commitment in the disarmament". 24/08/2012 Reuters.

² Reuters.

³ Russia Today.

⁴ *Inconsistency of the existing global and regional architecture, oriented, especially in Euro-Atlantic region, just to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and imperfect mechanisms and legal instruments generate increasingly a threat to international security.* National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation.

These organizations are all elements of stability which will enhance the security status both in preventing and combating certain categories of threats both from the illegal trafficking of narcotics and psychotropic substances and in the political-military and military-strategic. Also, a stabilizing role for regional security will have economic development through the development of joint economic projects with impact on the development potential of the countries involved.

Russia also aims to develop mechanisms of cooperation with European Union in all directions circumscribed common interests with emphasis on collective security the can be divided on solid treaties as bilateral interests dictate. *The Russian Federation will develop its relations with the European Union, will promote strengthening in every possible way the interaction mechanisms, including through establishment of common spaces in economy, external and internal security, education, science and culture. Forming in the Atlantic of an open system of collective security with a solid legal basis and treated, corresponds to long-term national interests of Russia.*

Approach in relations with NATO, it is prudent since Russia does not agree with the plans for the advancement of military infrastructure to its borders. However, it is willing to collaborate in terms agreed by both parties so that the security status can be achieved through joint efforts in the Euro-Atlantic area. One of the priorities of international relations supported by Russia is the building of a strategic partnership with the U.S., in the context of Russian-American relations may influence the overall security status. Certainly maintaining national sovereignty and national interests will remain a constant of promoting the building international politics of Russia. In the chapter final is yet identified a vulnerability that comes from economic and is grafted onto Russia's inability to integrate into the global economic system, due to the slow pace of economic growth.

3. Priorities of the Russian Federation for addressing global problems

In Chapter III entitled *Priorities of the Russian Federation for addressing global problems* are prioritized two main directions to ensure the elements that can secure the development and strengthening of Russia's positions on national and international level. This is also the manner in which there are defined national interests⁵ and strategic priorities that come to maintain and sustain security status. Russia's strategic interests are centered on both the internal components and the external component. At the national level it's aimed to strengthen constitutional order and societal security amid increasing economic competitiveness and in terms of international relations, Russia reinvents its positions a former world leader that accepts and understands the issues contemporary world.

National security priorities are targeted on defense, state security and society. These strategic priorities can be supported on a background of stable development which requires a tactical approach focused on: *improving the quality of life of Russian*

⁵ "The national interests of the Russian Federation" - all internal and external needs of state for defense and guarantee stable development of the individual, society and state.

citizens by ensuring personal security and high standards of living standards; economic growth that will occur especially by developing national innovation system and investing in human capital; science, technology, education, health and culture that will grow by strengthening the role of the state and improve public-private partnership; ecology of living systems and the rational use of natural resources, whose support will be achieved through a balanced consume, by developing progressive technologies and adequate recovery potential of the country's natural resources; strategic stability and strategic partnership based on equality, which are consolidated on the basis of Russia's active participation in the development of the organization multipolar world.

The whole security strategy is based on the requirement of economic growth, the development of technologies and maintaining natural resources at a balanced level. All these components come to support a logistics perspective type the Russian security policy both nationally and internationally.

In Chapter IV, there are detailed the priority areas on which security state is based: *national defense, state security and society, improving the quality of life of Russian citizens, economic growth, science and technology education, health, culture and ecology of living systems and the rational use of natural resources, strategic stability and partnership based on equality.* Each of these areas are described in terms of a strategic type guidance while being made to identify the main threats grafted on the area of interest and to design countermeasures against them.

Main threats identified in the content of the Strategy are: *destructive actions by an aggressor state (coalition of states); military security threats that include: policy of states to achieve supremacy in the military, especially in strategic nuclear forces by developing high precision means, information or other advanced technologies, by developing in the course of an armed struggle nonnuclear strategic weapons; by unilaterally forming of a global missile defense system and the militarization of outer space, all capable of generating a new spiral of the arms race as well as the proliferation of nuclear technologies, chemical, biological, through manufacturing weapons of mass destruction or their components and means for carrying it; espionage and other nature from foreign intelligence services and other state bodies, as well as certain persons seeking to harm security of the Russian Federation; the activity of terrorist organizations, groups and individuals who seek change through force bases constitutional order of the Russian Federation; disorganization in the normal functioning of the state power bodies (including acts of violence against the people of the state, politicians and representatives of public life); destruction of military and industrial enterprises and institutions providing vital activity of society; intimidating people, including by using nuclear and chemical weapons or hazardous, radioactive, chemical and biological substances; the activity of extremist nationalist organizations and structures, religious, ethnic and otherwise, aimed at destroying the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation to destabilize the internal political and social situation in the country; the activity carried on by organizations and transnational criminal groups linked to illegal trafficking of narcotic means and psychotropic substances, weapons, ammunition, explosive; continuous multiplication*

of attacks against the person, property, state power, social and economic security in connection with corruption; the existence and possible escalation of armed conflict in Russia's border proximity; unfinished establishment, under international law, of the state border of the Russian Federation with some neighboring countries; banking system crises both regional and global; increasing competition for scarce material resources raw energy, food and water; the delay in the deployment of advanced technology; maintaining a national economic development model based on commodity exports; reducing competitiveness and high dependence of most important areas on the external economic environment; losing control over natural resources; base material deterioration of industry and energy; unequal development of regions and progressive labor shortage; low stability and support of the national financial system; maintaining the conditions for corruption and criminalization of economic and financial relations, as well as for illegal migration etc.

The Strategy presents an extensive array of threats that can be assigned to different taxonomies, the conventional approach being able to align the category classic threats, asymmetric threats, the threats from environmental factors and threats from cyber area.

Conclusions

Russia was a global superpower and wants to maintain this status, with the whole concept of ideology and action nostalgic flair on the one hand and a competitive attitude on the other hand, also accepting the current security trends based on a obvious multipolarity and on the power of state and non-state actors that can evolve constantly or occasionally on international security scene.

With certainty that Russia will have to pay equal attention to the issue of internal and external security as U.S. no longer considers it a superpower, the emerging favorites being China and India, and countries as Moldova and Ukraine, traditionally under Russian influence, are currently seeking to the West.

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PROJECT NABUCCO IN THE POWER GAMES

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Abstract: *This year's launch of a resized version of Project Nabucco presents the occasion for a geopolitical analysis: was this resizing a consequence of the power games between Russia and the Western world? This study places face to face the economical and geopolitical perspectives of addressing energy resources, respectively of transporting them from the Caspian region to the large European consumers. It is also reiterated the idea of reverting to a hard power approach, one that would not rely on military strength, but energy (hard energy), customised and contextualised by the launch of the West Nabucco version. It still remains to be seen whether or not a new gas pipeline (shorter, thinner, with smaller capacity than the old version) is a step back (the games were won by Russia) or a step forward (the Western world tries to regain a small part of a maybe too optimistic project)...*

Keywords: *Nabucco, West Nabucco, power games, (geo)energy players, hard energy.*

1. Introduction

If this study were to carry another title or receive a subtitle, probably the best choice would have been: “Nabucco, ten years after...” or “Ten years of Nabucco”. This is the amount of time that passed – ten years – from that 2002 October night when representatives of the five partners that signed the agreement participated, at the State Opera in Vienna, to a show that inspired the project's name. Its meaning was similar to Giuseppe Verdi's show (1841): the liberation of the Jewish people in Babylon (Europe's liberation) from the Assyrian king Nabucodonosor II's oppression (from Russia's energy “oppression” – dependence, asymmetric relationship). A decade during which were written dozens of articles dedicated to the overrated energy project, launched with much fanfare and accompanied by Europe's unjustified arrogance, a decade that made the difference between a *desirable project* and an *achievable project*.

Ten years later – during which time, according to the estimated time of construction¹, the gas pipeline could have been built twice –, in 2012, the designed pipeline – meant to reduce Europe's energy dependence on Russian gas, through the alternate route it offered (Caucasus – Turkey – Balkans – Central Europe) –, grew thinner and shorter to only a third of what was initially planned: from a volume of 31 billion m³ and a length of 3 300 km (2002) to 10-13 billion m³ and 1 300 km in 2012. And this is still in the project phase, exactly in the year when the gas pipeline was supposed to become functional.

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¹ www.nabucco-pipeline.com (Official page of project Nabucco).

2. From *Nabucco* to *West Nabucco*. *Geopolitical considerations*

What exactly happened to this European “energy dream”? Maybe the difference between opinion and science, maybe the one between economy and geopolitics, maybe the difference between Europe’s calculations and Russia’s interests, or maybe a little bit of all of the above ... At the time when the conclusion of the absolute necessity of creating this alternate route, free of Russian control, was reached and speculative and spectacular numbers were used regarding the probability of a free increase in the consumption of natural gas in European countries, especially the European Union members (numbers that validated the project’s necessity), nobody took into account the international financial crisis, that later evolved into an economic crisis: not only that the European countries decreased their natural gas consumption, but also Russia decreased its production..

The state in which the *Nabucco* gas pipeline is today is the result of the difference between “we think/estimate we will consume” (more and more the prognosis date being the one when *Nabucco* should have become functional) and “we know we will consume” (the real value). Europe didn’t learn anything from the lesson Turkey received from Russia, when in a similar manner was justified the construction of two other projects – *the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline*, *Western and Blue Stream*, Russian: the Russian project won because it was the first built and because Turkey never reached the forecasted consumption values that would make both pipelines useful². In other words this was the difference between: we forecast (think) we will consume 60 billion m³ in 2010 (taking into account the economic growth we have)³ and real numbers⁴ that never passed 39 billion m³ (a correction of “only” 35% from the forecasted values, but which forced Turkey to watch its market become invaded exclusively by Russian natural gas, transported through the pipeline on the bottom of the Black Sea, and not the Trans-Caucasus and Central Asian “sister” countries, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, the Western pipeline never seeing the light of day).

In 2009, EU-27 was consuming 5.9% less natural gas⁵ than in the previous year, its value almost doubling (negative!) in 2011 in comparison with 2010 (10.5%)⁶. A simple spatial distribution analysis of natural gas consumption in Europe shows an even more nuanced situation: since the first year the economic crisis

² Consult also Susanne NIES, *Gaz și petrol către Europa. Perspective pentru infrastructuri*, IFRI, Paris, 2008, pp. 126-127.

³ Marius-Cristian NEACȘU, Silviu NEGUȚ, *Gas pipelines war*, in “Romanian Review on Political Geography”, year XII, no. 1, 2010, p. 41.

⁴ *BP Statistical Review of World Energy*, British Petroleum, 2012, p. 23 (www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2011/STAGING/local_assets/pdf/natural_gas_section_2012.pdf).

⁵ Ana JIMÉNEZ, *Eurostat: data in focus. Environment and energy*, nr. 20, European Union, 2010, p.1, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-QA-10-020/EN/KS-QA-10-020-EN.PDF).

⁶ European Commission, Eurostat, 2012, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Natural_gas_consumption_statistics.

manifested on the European continent (2008-2009), the large Union consumers were already registering significant consumption drops – 3.7% in Germany, – 2.4% in France in 2009, in comparison with year 2008, and Italy – 7.7% (the first two countries being potential beneficiaries of the Russian alternative *North Stream*, while the latter of the also Russian project *South Stream*, while all of them were member of *Nabucco*); the decreases were even more drastic for the EU new joiners, Bulgaria registering a collapse of consumption with more than a 25%, while in Romania the down slope was reaching – 14.9% in 2009, in comparison with 2008⁷. The situation was not any better in other Central European, Balkan or Nordic countries either... and the reduction in natural gas consumption continued in the following years. For example, Germany's and France's numbers were even lower in 2011 than in 2010, amounting to -12.9% for the first and -13.9% for the latter, while Italy continued its descending path at a more constant pace with only -6.2 %⁸.

Also of note is the fact that, during the same period of time, Russia registered reductions of its natural gas production amounting to -12.1% in 2009, in comparison with the previous year, and only in 2011 the production increased slightly with 3% (in comparison with 2010); in absolute values, however, this translated into a slightly bigger production than in 2008 and 2006 (607 billion m³ in 2011, in comparison with 601 billion m³ in 2008 and 595 billion m³ in 2006). The two countries that, theoretically, should have fuelled the *Nabucco* pipeline had different evolutions of natural gas production: if Azerbaijan had a relatively steady production between 2008 and 2011 (approximately 14-15 billion m³, double of what it had in 2006 and triple to 2001), Turkmenistan witnessed a fall in production, from over 66 billion m³ in 2008 to little over 36 billion m³ in the year after, while currently managing to achieve 59.5 billion m³ in 2011.

This numbers “game” imposes an observation: clearly the drastic reduction in consumption or production will not go on forever, but neither will the economic growth experienced before the start of the international financial crisis (proven in reality, but also by economy's historical evolutionary cycles so far). The transport of Caspian energy to large European consumers is a long term Project that requires, above all else, strategic reasoning, geopolitical vision and not immediate economical mathematics.

When project Nabucco launched in 2002, ten years after the “ideological” unification of the European Community into the current European Union and also after the breaking of the Russian economical and geopolitical monopoly – the Soviet legacy – in the Caspian and Central-Asian region by the construction of the American trans-Caucasus energy corridor (the oil pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, BTC and the gas pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, BTE), that also functioned as a diplomatic

⁷ *BP Statistical Review of World Energy*, British Petroleum, 2010, p. 27 (www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets/2010_downloads/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2010.pdf).

⁸ British Petroleum, *op. cit.*, 2012, p. 23.

corridor, euro-optimism was running high. Euphoria made possible for European leaders to miss certain key aspects:

- Caspian energy projects may have been mainly of an economical nature for Europe but not for Russia, that placed old geopolitical and geostrategic interests before economical mathematics:

1. Russia needs to return in the European affairs sphere (maintaining its status of neither European, nor Asian power, but Eurasian): Caspian energy was not an economical matter, but a geoeconomic and geopolitical one.

2. Russia takes no more steps back in its former sphere of influence (after it “slightly let Ukraine slip”, which evolved into the “orange revolution” in 2004 and the “failure of the orange revolution” in 2009, that led to the official elimination of NATO adherence from its diplomatic agenda);

3. Russia will not be passive and will not make economical computations, but geoeconomical ones ... and also of geopolitical and geostrategic nature: Europe will receive natural gas from Russia (at considerably high prices), or at worst from Azerbaijan (Trans-Caucasus) or Turkmenistan (Central Asia), but intermediated by Russia (even though for all these years, except for a small recession at the start of the crisis when it was surpassed by the USA, Russia was also a natural gas importer ... exactly from the above mentioned regions), through Russian controlled pipelines. To this end, if the Bush administration “invented” the concept of “preemptive war”, the Putin administration invented the concept of “preemptive gas pipeline”⁹: launched two projects – *North Stream* and *South Stream* –, to pre-empt the construction of the *Nabucco* pipeline, less feasible from an economic standpoint, more expensive¹⁰ (which would have translate into higher gas prices for what travelled through these pipelines), but which also respected several of Europe’s requests (!), mainly the elimination of transit through Ukraine and Belarus and the direct supply to large European consumers (regardless of Russia’s relations with its former satellites).

If for Europe *Nabucco* was an especially economic project, for USA it was also a diplomatic corridor (that would have continued its efforts since 1992 of liberating the Trans-Caucasus and Central Asian regions), while for Russia it was a strategic and geopolitical matter: the Russian gas pipeline projects had to mainly prevent the completion of the European one (thus, the *preemptive character*). It is not worth mentioning that even if the two arms of the “Russian pincer”¹¹ would be built – *North Stream* (under the Baltic Sea) and *South Stream* (under the Black Sea) – it would mean Europe’s energy “enslavement” close to suicide.

• Europe placed the “pipeline before the gas”: concentrated more on the route (where the natural gas were supposed to come through so that they escape Moscow’s “eye”), instead of the supplier sources. Because at the moment, at least in

⁹ Marius-Cristian NEACȘU, Silviu NEGUȚ (2010), *op. cit*, p. 39.

¹⁰ If Nabucco’s estimated costs were of around 7.9 billion euros (taking into account high prices for oil and steel, the construction costs of South Stream gas pipeline (more technically complicated, especially in the submarine section) would have surpassed 12 billion euros. Subsequent re-estimates showed much higher costs for both gas pipelines.

¹¹ Marius-Cristian NEACȘU, Silviu NEGUȚ (2010), *op. cit*, p. 41.

the current geopolitical context, the *Nabucco* gas pipeline, especially its original version, is an *empty pipeline* that could be, at most, a touristic attraction, not a viable energy alternative. It is at least funny, if not ... naive, the manner in which this issue was tackled, as if the Europeans were never “schooled” in the Cold War. We cannot ignore the almost philosophical nature of the text appearing on the Nabucco project’s official page in response to the question “from where will the gas come?”: “(...) *the Caspian region* [did someone assume Russia will remain passive?, were the concepts of “limited sovereignty” and “near neighbourhood” not taken seriously?] *and the Middle East* [under American control!], *with their vast resources, will play a crucial part both in terms of diversifying supply, as well as securing it for Europe. Opening of the fourth main supply corridor is the only solution* [doesn’t Europe have the civilisation capacity to make the transition from an energy economy based on fossil mineral fuels, that has reached its pinnacle and will begin to decline, taking into account how many crisis of the current energy system it was able to surmount so far?; are Great Britain’s examples of a country that was born out of “coal” and whose production today is a pale memory of what it was in the past¹² not telling or the French answer to the “oil shocks”, so that we can only know the desperation of this <<single solution>>?] *for coping with all of Europe’s future gas requirements. In consequence, this corridor offers a wide range of supply sources* [in theory half of the global natural gas resources being concentrated in only three countries: Russia, Qatar and Iran!] *for the Nabucco gas pipeline, receiving gas from the Caspian region* [how to elude the Russian-Islamic equation that defines the Caspian region?] *such as Azerbaijan* [important oil producer, but not natural gas, at least not at the moment, plus there are several other issues: litigation over the division of the Caspian sea economic exclusive zones, the high costs of bringing into production currently unused deposits that Azerbaijan cannot sustain and so on], *Turkmenistan* [not only that Russia has bilateral contracts with all the Central-Asian countries to import natural gas for the next 25 years, but Turkmenistan, even before honouring the contract with Russia, became a supplier for China] *or the Kurdish region in Iraq* [as if order and discipline defined this space and the pipelines would be completely secure; what would stop the Kurds use them as a target for achieving political-identity goals]”¹³. It still remains an open issue the supply source for *West Nabucco* (Turkey is a transit region, not supplier).

- The variety and different interests of the players involved in project *Nabucco*: mainly the project is the object of an intergovernmental agreement, each of the five partners involved – Austria (OMV Gas &Power), Hungary (FGSZ, MOL subsidiary), Romania (Transgaz), Bulgaria (Bulgarian Energy Holding), Turkey (Botas) and Germany (RWE) –, holding 16.67 % of the shares, but the financing will be private, and can be taken into account under the conditions of a certain economical return and profitability. Things become more complicated if one

¹² In 1882 it produced over 250 million tones, amounting to half of the world production of coal, while at the end of the 20th century (1981) this production would only reach 120 million tones and in 2011 18 million tones.

¹³ www.nabucco-pipeline.com

of the companies participating in the project have a majority of private shareholders (such as the German company RWE), and the logic of a transnational corporation (the essential purpose is the shareholders' profit, no matter where it comes from or how) transcends the state's logic (which aims or should aim at securing especially the national interest). In comparison, Russian projects are financed by the state, state that is also the majority shareholder of Gazprom – Moscow's main instrument of foreign policy –, company that hasn't invested as much in Russia to increase its own exploitation capacity and natural gas capitalization as it did in other countries, from the European continent to the African and even Latino-American. And all of this to increase its sphere of interest cutting any possible alternative for competitors.

- How “loyal” could the Nabucco partners be when some of them are caught both in the Western project and in the Russian ones, with various degrees of dependency on Russian energy (between 65% and 85% of the national natural gas consumption being imported through Gazprom¹⁴ in the case of Turkey, Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria – four partners out of six – and others that are not part of the project but will be supplied through the pipeline)? Just a few years after the launch of *Nabucco* Germany was showing interest towards the Russian *North Stream* project (an old friendship between Gerhard Schröder, German chancellor at that time and Vladimir Putin, even more, the German politician became the president of the consortium that handled the Baltic gas pipeline), initiative denounced by some Polish dignitaries as a “new non-aggression (this time economical) pact Ribbentrop-Molotov”.

- From the inside they may look like the “United States of Europe”, but from the outside, especially from the USA, who seem to have learnt a better lesson from the harsh experience of the Cold War, one can only see a “European Union Inc.”¹⁵. The phrase was coined to the American political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski (former adviser on issues of national security during the Carter administration, between 1977 and 1981), who posited the idea of a Europe with “variable geometry and several speeds”. The evolution of project Nabucco can be perfectly described by the above phrase: there is no common integrated market of natural gas in Europe and although there were talks in this respect, one could not be established. Thus, each country or group of European countries satisfies its energy needs on its own. This situation was well used by Russia in its favour, perfectly using in the energy sector the Roman quote “divide et impera”, only that the Empire is represented by “Gazpromia”¹⁶, and the divided “geographically unfavoured (...) are at the wrong end of the gun barrel”¹⁷.

¹⁴ Silviu NEGUȚ, Marius-Cristian NEACȘU *Gas war*, in “Romanian Review on Political Geography”, anul XI, 2009, nr. 2, p. 186.

¹⁵ Also see Silviu NEGUȚ, Marius-Cristian NEACȘU *The European Union between “The United States Of Europe” and “European Union Inc.”*, in “Strategic Impact”, nr. 2, 2012, pp. 45-50.

¹⁶ Phrase used in a great work of a French investigation journalist, of Bulgarian descent, specialised in the issues of the countries that were part of the former ideological “East”, respectively Roumiana Ougartchinska (2008), *Războiul gazelor. Amenințarea rusă*, Ed. Antet, Filipeștii de Târg, p. 220.

¹⁷ *Idem*, p. 5.

For each member of the *Nabucco* project, even though they feel united in spirit of the same goal, the interests are different and the relations with the supplier as well. We could say that Russia speaks different languages with different clients:

a) on the one hand, the large European consumers that prefer direct or preferential relationships with the “big supplier” (the case of Germany France, and Italy even though the latter two are outside the “Nabucco sphere”, but are subject to other completely Russian alternatives);

b) on the other hand, there are countries that carry a certain psycho-historical emotion generated by past relations: it is true that economy should transcend history, but we cannot ignore the way Bulgaria was persuaded, the moment chosen for signing the protocol for participating in the Russian South Stream project being precisely the celebration of 130 years since Bulgaria was liberated from under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire (counterargument to the co-participation of Turkey in the Western project), with Russia’s support (argument for joining the Russian project); here we could also add other geopolitical considerations: the problem of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria (counterargument to the Western project) vs. the Slav cultural affinity (argument for the Russian project). There were similarities in the case of Serbia (its sensibility to the Islamic issue – the Kosovo problem, historical differences with Turkey were counterbalanced with Russian assistance and so on) and Greece (the Greek-Turkish differences, the minorities issue, the Macedonian problem etc.). It is not less true that all the above mentioned countries are rather highly energy dependent on Moscow, a situation in which Hungary also finds itself.

c) A third category would be of the countries that have to gain from the pipeline’s transit of their national territory. It is Romania’s situation (less dependent on Russian energy, with a diversified structure of the energy balance). Although it has a high degree of dependence on the Russian supplier, Turkey could also be part of this category, however the problem here would be somewhat more complex: the precedent *Blue Stream*, the different and divided position of EU members towards Turkey’s adherence (which is why Ankara ‘s signature for project *Nabucco* was so difficult to get), the loss of the status of Western’s “favourite” once the Cold War ended and being pulled in “boat” with Russia with which it still has to settle some common issues in the Caucasus and Central – Asian regions.

d) Hungary and Austria were both “tempted” with Russian promises to be transformed into energy “hubs” for Central Europe.

- The “substance” transfer from the concept of “hard power” towards “hard energy”¹⁸ (hard power, but replacing the military aspect with the energy one). The end of the Cold War meant, somehow, also the end (at least at a wishful level) or at least the minimisation of the application of “hard power” in international relations (a concept elaborated by the realist school of thought). Only that Russia established, in the years 2000, a concept that is also materialised through the expression of hard power, only this time it does not take the shape of a military invasion, but by closing the natural gas tap, each time (2006, 2008, 2009) in the middle of winter, right on the new year’s eve. Thus, the targeted countries were not under military occupation (as they were once by Soviet tanks – events such as Budapest, 1956 or Prague, 1969), but

¹⁸ See also Marius-Cristian NEACȘU, Silviu NEGUȚ (2010), *op. cit.*, pp. 29-46.

annihilated by the cessation of energy supply, with or without warning, various reasons being invoked. The “(geo)political tap” has become the main thesis of the “Putin doctrine”¹⁹, through which Russia reasserts its geopolitical and geostrategic ambitions and reclaims its status of energy superpower (instead of the military one during the Cold War).

3. *West Nabucco*, a step back or a step forward...

What is different between the Nabucco “child” and the Nabucco “parent”, perhaps launched too loudly and too arrogantly, as a project for a pipeline that would end the Russian or Russian-Ukrainian “energy slavery” ten years ago? In fact, the “gas pipeline war” started as a consequence to the “gas war” between Russia and Ukraine.

Besides the smaller size proposed for the new gas pipeline (shorter, thinner, with a smaller capacity for gas transit), *West Nabucco* does not solve the old version’s issues. For example:

- the most significant issue of the initial Western project was its supply source; although the designed gas pipeline should have connected with the already existing one, Baku – Tbilisi – Erzurum (Azerbaijan – Georgia – Turkey), also known as the “South Caucasus gas pipeline”, that is supplied by the Azeri deposit of Shah Deniz, its technical capacity of only 8.8 billion m³ (with the possibility of increasing it to 20 billion m³) wouldn’t have solved the problem of the 31 billion m³ designed for Nabucco without another pipeline, still not constructed, under the Caspian Sea, to connect another important supplier, Turkmenistan. However, building another pipeline under the Caspian Sea without Russian involvement, taking into account the complicated equation of dividing the continental plateau and the demarcation of the exclusive economic zones, after the USSR’s implosion, was a rather unrealistic solution.

The new version of project *Nabucco*, *West Nabucco*, only changed the technical parameters (possibly closer to the geopolitical and economical reality of the region from where it wishes to supply) and was cut shorter, not at the end where gas should come out, but rather at the end where it should come in (from Erzurum to the Turkish-Bulgarian border), somewhat complicating the issue: a pipeline still not constructed “splices” with another pipeline as well not constructed, respectively TANAP (Trans-Anatolian pipeline), planned for 2014-2018, with an initial capacity of 16 billion m³ and construction costs of approximately 7 billion dollars²⁰. The idea

¹⁹ Phrase that defines an entire chapter of the above mentioned paper of Roumiana Ougartchinska (2008), p. 18.

²⁰ ...and from the initially forecasted capacity, the numbers follow the same dizzying vertigo of inexplicable optimism as in the case of project Nabucco or the already finished Blue Stream: 16 billion m³ (2018), 23 billion m³ (2023), 31 billion m³ (2026) and...a final stage of 60 billion m³ under the conditions of taking the additional quantity that would be produced in Turkmenistan! – see Vladimir SOCOR Aliyev, *Erdogan Sign Inter-Governmental Agreement on Trans-Anatolia Gas Pipeline to Europe*, in “Eurasia Daily Monitor”, Vol. 9, Nr. 122, June 27th 2012, (www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39545&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=27&cHash=2e9f386bf569ef7ea670cde5a5c3784c).

that *Nabucco*, in both versions, should be supplied from the Azeri field of Shah Deniz remains unchanged...²¹.

- although initially one of the favourable factors for constructing the *Nabucco* pipeline was the geopolitical stability of the Caspian region, this proved to be rather relative after the Russian intervention in Georgia, over the South Ossetia issue in the summer of 2008, context in which supply of gas through the BTE pipeline was seized by the main operator British Petroleum. The end of the Cold War did not bring a geopolitical stabilisation of the region instead it reactivated centuries old conflicts on the both sides of the Caucasus Mountains. These conflicts are partially “frozen” only from a military perspective, not solved. Or in other words, paraphrasing the political scientist from Chişinău, Oleg Serebrian, “the war ended, the conflict continues”²².

Anytime this space is vulnerable and liable to asymmetric actions, such as terrorism, with the purpose of reclaiming various identity matters or settling old accounts between factions. No farther than the beginning of the year 2006 was marked by such an event, an explosion occurred on a secondary branch of the Mozdok – Tbilisi gas pipeline, on Russian territory, not far from the Georgian border, both countries accusing one another of terrorist and sabotage actions. Repairs were done over approximately two weeks while Georgia’s stocks could maintain supply for only 24 hours (again showing the blackmail used by Russia against Georgia)²³.

- there is no guarantee that, taking into consideration the precedents created by Russia, Azerbaijan and, why not, Turkey, could always apply the concept of “hard energy” to pressure the international environment in order to solve own matters (the issue of recognising the Armenian genocide, the tensed Azeri – Armenian relations regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and so on).

- the double participation of actors involved in several projects, both Western (*Nabucco*) and Russian (*South Stream*), that only emphasises one idea: the two projects are not complementary, but competing. Constructing one removes the other, reasoning according to which the mentioned Russian project acts as a “preemptive” one.

- the collapse of European markets in the context of the economic crisis and the rise of the Asian ones (Chinese) could considerably delay the completion of *Nabucco* or China’s rise could absorb considerable energy resources (we recall that Turkmenistan, one of the potential suppliers for *Nabucco* fuels China since 2009) that could simply make it impracticable.

The issue of whether or not *West Nabucco* is a step back (being only recognition of a much exaggerated vision) or a step forward (more feasible and realistic through the new dimensions) remains open...

²¹ Also see Radu DUDĂU, *Shah Deniz End Game & the Plight of the Southern Corridor*, in “Caucasus International”, Vol. 2, Nr. 2, 2012, pp. 93-108.

²² The author using the phrase in the context of the Balkan conflicts – see Oleg Serebrian (2006), *Geopolitica spațiului pontic*, Ed. Cartier, Chişinău.

²³ Silviu NEGUȚ, Marius-Cristian NEACȘU, Liviu Bogdan VLAD, *The Geopolitics Of Strategic Energy Resources*, in “Strategic Impact”, nr. 1, 2007, p. 25.

4. Nabucco in the power games

Disputes regarding the transport routes of Caspian energy to Europe fall under, in substance and context, the pronounced change in the world's geopolitical dynamic with the shift from a bipolar world to a unipolar world, with obvious tendencies towards multipolarity. It becomes more and more objectified Brzezinski's phrase – *the grand chessboard* –, to express this extremely complicated labyrinth of interests, games and various players. Only that both the idea of “chessboard” as well as that of a “game” (quantified and modelled in a complete *Games theory*, especially active in the economic field, but also applicable in the sphere of international relations) implies a standard condition, that players must be rational in the sense that they understand and adhere to the game rules. This is the theory, but reality is rather different...

In one of the recently communicated and published studies²⁴ an idea was shaped, one that suggested that among the stimuli that cause, generate a reconfiguration of an energy economic model is geopolitics. Also, the relation between energy and geopolitics is of a symbiotic nature and proportional: a great accumulation of energy leads to a greater accumulation of power. An accumulation of power leads to the temptation to dominate, in this case to the manifestation of power, most of the times in its hard form (proven by history), but sometimes, in certain periods, in its soft one.

The power games in which the Caspian energy and its transport to the large Western (European Union) and Oriental (China) consumers issue registers can be followed in at least two dimensions:

- a) Global games and
- b) Regional games

As far as the first category goes, the dynamic of the *global games* changed with the USSR's implosion, when the much too “young” and “inexperienced” Caspian region captured the Western world's attention as a potential supplier of energy resources (speculative numbers, used two decades ago by different players heralding the collapse of the Middle East's supremacy in energy resources). It was favourable through geopolitical stability (in comparison with the Arab region, a fact that changed over the course of time) and proximity to large European consumers (subsequently also “subscribing” the Asian ones). It had one major flaw: its proximity to Russia that did not want to remain numb in the “Cold Peace” that followed the “Cold War”, but it precipitously reclaimed the Caucasus region as the sole and great legitimate heir to the defunct USSR.

The enrolment of countries from the former ideological “East” on geostrategic, geopolitical and geoeconomical axes of expansion of the North-Atlantic structures (NATO and the EU) caused the reconfiguration of the former spheres of influence from the Cold War. The Western advance into the former Soviet sphere and, furthermore, the significant approach to Russian borders have catalysed its

²⁴ Damian FLOREA, *Reconfigurări geopolitice ale energiei la începutul mileniului III*, in vol. “Conferința anuală a Societății de Geografie din România. Spațiul geografic – suport al comunității umane”, Ed. Mirton, Timișoara, 2012, pp. 344-352.

transformation from a military superpower to an energy one, speculating to the maximum Europe's rush to feast on the Ponto-Caspian and Central-Asian regions' energy resources. Furthermore, it used a "program" similar to the American one in the Middle East ("oil for food"), respectively "energy for political concessions".

Games were complicated by the multiplication of players on the international scene, on the one hand the state gradually lost its privileged position as sole retainer of power in favour of other players, more dynamic and mobile (such as, for example, the trans-national corporations, of interest for this study being the ones that operate in the energy field), and on the other hand the number of suppliers of instability (not only the state can trigger a conflict or war now, many of the "clashes" being in the asymmetric domain).

Global games gain a more pronounced amplitude at a *regional level*. Reconfiguration of the relationship between the Western world and Russia was individualised at the start of the 90s, after the post-Soviet recoil, through the geopolitical frontier's dynamic between the two poles of power. After the expansion waves of the North-Atlantic structures this geopolitical frontier stabilised, for now, on the line Kaliningrad – Belarus – Ukraine – Transnistria – Republic of Moldova, to which we can add its Asian extension, respectively the Ponto-Caucasus and Central-Asian regions.

Each component of this frontier is a neuralgic point to which Russia proved it is not willing under any circumstances to give up. The problem is not that Russia remained in the Cold War logic, but it claims its presence at "the top" of the international stage and its lost status of "superpower".

Let us tackle some of the above mentioned regions and contextualise them in the issue of the "Caspian energy path" to Europe:

- *Kaliningrad*. By integrating the Baltic States and Poland into NATO and the EU this Russian region became an enclave in the North-Atlantic geopolitical space. The launch of the *North Stream* project, the northern arm of the Russian "energy pincer", has a double significance: the disenclavement of Kaliningrad through energy security and reaffirming Russia's military presence in the Baltic Sea.

- *Belarus and Ukraine*. Becoming vulnerable to the Western world's "overtures", Russia used what was mentioned above, "natural gas for political concessions", more precisely natural gas delivery at preferential prices (way below the market price or the level that European consumers were paying; for a long time this was around 50 dollars for thousand metric cubes, while the Europeans were paying over 300 dollars) versus the "orange counter-revolutions" (meaning these countries will remain in Moscow's political gravity). The attempts to westernise the two countries (rather frail in the case of Belarus but with a more dramatic load for Ukraine) and the prices "blackmail" practiced by Moscow (through its geopolitical instrument Gazprom) triggered from Russia what became known as the "gas war", seizing deliveries of gas, which in turn affected the transit towards Western consumers, that were honouring their contracts. This led to the idea, both from the Western and Russian parts that alternate routes are necessary. This triggered the "gas pipeline war": Western proposals (Nabucco) vs. Russian ones (South Stream)

Ukraine is extremely important for Russia: it represents Moscow's Pontic key, therefore European. After the implosion of the USSR, the greatest Black Sea losses were suffered by Russia in favour of Ukraine and Georgia. Controlling Ukraine (which inherited the best shore to the Black Sea, with the largest former Soviet harbours, with two points of maximum strategic importance – Crimean Peninsula and the proximity to the Danube's mouths) becomes essential for defining Russia's geopolitical destiny (at least from Peter the Great until present times): that of a Eurasian power. For this it requires to remain anchored in Europe: a Northern anchor, to the Baltic Sea (a role currently fulfilled by the "frail" Kaliningrad) and a southern, Pontic one (Ukraine, "the rebel"). Without Ukraine (its control over it) Russia is "thrown" into ... Asia. The "orange revolution" in Ukraine and its failure fell under this logic of force. It is still fresh in memory the threat of president Putin towards Ukraine that, in case it will continue its NATO adherence process, it will take its territory apart. As resounding as the above statement were the words addressed to the Europeans at the summit between the European Union and Russia (Soci, 2006): *"If our European partners expect us to let them access our most priceless possession, energy, to do with it as they will, then we ask concessions that will help us in our own development. (...) Access to infrastructure, production and transport? But what access are we talking about? Where is your production, to what deposits and great pipelines do you allow us access? If you have none of these then we will have to find a replacement solution that will allow us to enter into a reciprocal exchange, in mutual interest"*²⁵.

And the solution was found: avoiding Ukraine, but on Russian terms. Direct relationship between Russia and the large European consumers. North Stream under the Baltic Sea to Germany (plus France) and South Stream, under the Black Sea to Austria (transiting Bulgaria or Greece, Serbia and Hungary). And this is a direct competitor of the Nabucco gas pipeline. A true "energy pincer" with Kremlin holding its control levers.

- *Transnistria*. It represents a more of a pressure element to Ukraine than the Republic of Moldova or Romania.

- *Trans-Caucasus countries*. The southern slope of the Caucasus Mountains is part of Russia's southern security anchor, without which it would have to manage the presence of Islamic fundamentalism directly at its border. The regional equation of the Caucasus is more complex and involves more players, directly interested: Russia, Turkey, and Iran. The relations between the three Trans-Caucasus countries are restless, the Soviet legacy being very hard to deal with: displaced minorities, arbitrary frontiers, enclaves and exclaves, Turkish population – Azeri, of double Islamic origin – Sunni and Shiite, linguistic fragmentation and these are only several of the geopolitical ingredients that shape this region.

What the USA succeeded, starting with 1992, in opening a diplomatic corridor towards this region that they could extend to Central Asia, based on an energy corridor (the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project, the construction of the BTC oil

²⁵ Roumiana Ougartchinska (2008), *op. cit.*, p. 174-175.

pipeline, doubled by the BTE gas pipeline), Europe didn't manage to. Not even to continue, the two South Caucasus pipelines remaining the only accomplishments.

From this same complicated region will the future pipeline, *Nabucco* supply itself, but it all depends on the way the power games, magnificently played by Russia thus far, will be managed.

- *Central Asia*. Of particular interest is Turkmenistan, important natural gas producer and possible supplier, together with Azerbaijan, for the *Nabucco* pipeline. Since 2009, however, what seemed to be good news – the breaking of the Gazprom monopoly – easily became bad news: this monopoly was broken by China, with an energy intensive economy in free growth whose presence in Central Asia somewhat limits even more the already limited European options.

Conclusions

Projecting, at an analysis level, the European gas pipeline – *Nabucco* – in the power games sphere, the subject of this study, generates a series of conclusions we will briefly express:

Nabucco (re)starts, when it should have ended. Ten years from the initial project launch as an alternate route meant to diminish Europe's dependence on Russian controlled pipelines, the project is being relaunched in considerably reduced technical dimensions. The delaying of the completion of this Western gas pipeline was mainly generated by *energetik* (paraphrase after the German geopolitik), the use of hard power, but with strategic energy resources as an instrument (the South Stream Russian project counter-offensive, the persuasion of Nabucco partners, the Russian military intervention in the South Caucasus, in the proximity of the pipeline that should fuel Nabucco etc.).

Different interests, different visions of Nabucco. While Europe preferred an economic approach, with geostrategic nuances (bypassing Russia), Russia preferred a geopolitical and geostrategic approach (balancing the Western project with “pre-emptive” projects), with geoeconomical nuances (routes under exclusive Russian control, supply with Russian gas or at least intermediated by Gazprom).

West Nabucco or “version 2012”. Relaunching the project can be considered a step back (a defeat if Russia won't build South Stream, either ... which, most likely, it didn't even plan to build as long as it achieves its goal – delaying or cancelling the Nabucco project) or a step forward (if through its resizing it will become more feasible and achievable).

West Nabucco maintains all the initial project's issues. With the exception of the technical resizing, the following problems are still unanswered: supply source (the Azeri gas deposit of Shah Deniz should be supplemented with Turkmenistan's contribution), the variety of interest and players that participate in the Western project, the Russian projects' counter-offensive etc.

Nabucco, although an economic project, through the nature of the results obtained so far registers in the power games sphere. After the end of the Cold War and Cold Peace Russia reaffirms its return on the big scene of international relations,

not as a military superpower (proving reminiscences in the Chechen war in the 90s and the Georgian assault in 2008), but through its energy supremacy. In other words, it still relies on the manifestation of hard power, it only replaced the invasion of Soviet tanks with the closing of the natural gas tap and seizing supplying with gas its contractual partners. For this reason it becomes justifiable the use of phrases such as “hard energy” or “energetik”.

Nabucco, caught in the Russian “energy pincer”. The launch of the two Russian projects – *North Stream* and *South Stream* –, the last direct competitor to Nabucco, was done to “pre-empt”, delay or even cancel the Western project. There is the precedent of the *Trans-Caspian pipeline vs. Blue Stream* that confirmed a Russian reality: the Pontic Russian-Turkish gas pipeline was build, while the Western one still is a desirable project, furthermore it can connect with *Nabucco* through BTE, in a similarly desirable register ...

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THE COOPERATION BETWEEN ROMANIA AND UKRAINE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

*Nicolae Ioan PETRAȘUC**

***Abstract:** In a fully globalization process, the states cannot face alone the contemporary problems. Romania and Ukraine, as neighbor countries, must be analyzed from two different points of view. At one side, Romania has responsibilities regarding security, as a result of its NATO membership and, on the other side it has to accomplish the economical and institutional standards as a EU member.*

Due to its geostrategic position, the economic and military potential, Ukraine represents a regional power and after the Soviet Union collapse, it has become a geopolitical “pivot” state of Eastern Europe.

The cooperation of these two countries, at all levels, is necessary, useful for both parts and can concur decisively to preserve security in the Eastern and Southeastern Europe and also to solve some “frozen conflicts”.

***Keywords:** Romania, Ukraine, international economic relations, cooperation, security.*

Introduction

The paper comprises three parts, in which we will introduce several topics regarding the international economic relations and the cooperation between Romania and Ukraine.

The first chapter is a brief introduction on the theoretical aspects related to the field of international economic relations. We will practically define the most important notions which are used in the practice of international economic relations, we will present some theories that underlie any economic activities and we will analyze the concept of international economic cooperation.

The second chapter focuses on the cooperation between Romania and Ukraine from the perspective of economic relations and on the impact that this cooperation on the parties involved in the process.

In the third part of the paper we present several elements of regional cooperation concerning security in eastern and south-eastern Europe involving, on the one hand, Romania as an international actor that contribute to joint management of risks, threats and vulnerabilities in the international security environment, assuming the responsibilities incumbent as a member of the UN, EU, NATO, OSCE and Council of Europe, and, on the other hand, Ukraine, the pivotal state in East- West relations.

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1. Theoretical aspects of international economic relations

The evolution of international economic relations and the increasing economic interdependence have imposed the need to develop theories, concepts, complex approaches that would identify appropriate solutions for the development of the contemporary economy.

The International economic relations have been a major concern of the economic theory throughout its different stages of evolution. At first, when the natural economy was predominant in the world, the economic theory disparately examined some topics of international economic relations.

Later, when the exchange economy became the fundamental characteristic of economic development, international economic relations grew to be an important area of analysis for the economic theory.

Thus, the economic development of different regions led, eventually, to the emergence of economic forms organized in a uniform manner within defined territories, within national states formed and expanded with the development of capitalism.

The national character comes from the fact that this whole exchange of activities is taking place between members of a particular human community, in a well-defined territory belonging to a national state.

The existence of national economies and their development led to relations between various national economies, which meant living together and having access to mutual resources or transferring each other's successes.

Mercantilism¹ was among the first attempts of modern economic thinking to raise to a higher level the analysis of international trade issues as part of the international economic relations.

In the modern and contemporary times the economic liberalism theory or the idea of "free trade" comes into being, founded by the famous thinkers of English political economy, Adam Smith, Robert Torrens, David Ricardo.

Adam Smith believed that "if a foreign country can supply us cheaper goods than the ones we can produce, it's better to buy them from there, with some of our work product, used in a way in which we can draw benefit. The activity of a country is not targeted to the greatest advantage when it is directed towards the production of an article which she could buy for less than the cost of production"².

He originated a real theory on foreign economic relations, which in his time were mostly based on trade. He supported the idea of a liberal economic policy in foreign relations, providing a real source and method of enrichment to the British nation.

In fact, Adam Smith appreciated the enormous advantages generated by foreign trade advantages, namely:

¹ Commercialism was an economic policy in Europe between XV - XVIII, based on the concept that a nation's power can be increased if exports are greater than imports

² Adam SMITH, *The Wealth of Nations*, Public Publishing, 2011.

- On the one hand, it gives a chance to domestic producers to deploy on foreign markets that part of its production which has no domestic demand;
- On the other hand, it creates the means of payment to bring from abroad the products that are domestically required and which local producers do not have the ability or willingness to produce.

David Ricardo³, continuing and developing A. Smith's approach, says that "in a system with perfect freedom of commerce, each country will naturally devote its capital and labor to those types of activities that are the most advantageous". He tried to solve two problems related to international trade: the law of comparative advantage and the theory of automatic balance of trades.

The law of comparative advantage in international trade stipulates that each country will specialize in producing and exporting those products for which they have the most abundant and cheap factors of production, which leads to a wider international division of labor and to the maximization of the economic efficiency.

Both A. Smith and D. Ricardo consider that international trade brings benefits to the economies involved and they closely relate these advantages to the deepening international division of labor, to the specialization of the producers and of the national economies on those products that offer them the lowest cost and highest profit. Production of goods and the foundation of a new global market led, on the one hand, to the emergence of international competition and, on the other hand, to the first theoretical concepts on attitudes toward international trade, either export or import. Therefore, liberal (commercial) policies emerged, serving the interests of exporters, as well as protectionist policies, defending the interests of new participants in the arena of commodity production, of industrialization and then of international trade. Only in connection to other countries' economy can a national economy exist and be viable.

The world economy is based on a comprehensive system of international economic interdependences. Within this system of connections, the interests and topics of national economies interweave and can only exist and progress due to these associations and different qualitative levels. The change in the political configuration of the post- Second World War world, following the collapse of the colonial system, emphasized hence the struggle for state independence and the formation of many national economies. These countries developed new relations with many other countries, with a view to harnessing the human and material resources and to building interdependent economies.

Another milestone in the development of international economic relations and regional and interregional integration was the collapse of the great communist bloc in 1990, events that served as a cause for the emergence and development of new countries, once the communist regimes replaced by democratic governments, which contributed significantly to the development of relations between Romania and Ukraine.

2. Cooperation between Romania and Ukraine

³ David Ricardo was an English economist, representative of the classical school of Economics.

Ukraine is the second largest state in Europe and the main beneficiary of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Its surface, equivalent to that of Germany and Great Britain together, and its population of approximately 45 million inhabitants make it one of the main countries of the continent. If we take into account the length of the Black Sea coast, Ukraine has an important geopolitical status which is catching the attention of the Western powers, as Ukraine might control the balance of forces in Central and Eastern Europe, in the Black Sea region and also in relation to Russia.

From an economic perspective, Ukraine has the potential for development, including a market with opportunities to grow more than the average of the Wider Black Sea Region. It also constitutes a major consumer of energy (hydrocarbons) and the main transit country for natural gas pipelines from the Russian Federation to Central Europe (EU). Thus, the normal functioning of Ukraine's economy is closely linked to the so-called "classic" energy routes, given that the transit services of the Russian gas are currently providing 2% of Ukraine's GDP and over 6% of the salary budget.

Romania was among the first countries to recognize Ukraine as an independent state and the establishment of diplomatic relations on February 2, 1992⁴ was immediately followed by the founding of the Romanian Embassy in Kiev, replacing the Consulate General, which had functioned in the Ukrainian capital since 1971.

The relations between Romania and Ukraine have progressively evolved, and achieved, over time, an upward dynamic as a result of the mutual initiatives and attempts to strengthen trust and cooperation in various fields of interest. Moreover, Romania has as a main objective of its relation to Ukraine, from the perspective of EU membership and NATO ally, to keep it on track for achieving the European goals, as a crucial element to strengthen regional stability.

The Romanian-Ukrainian relations comprise various fields of interaction, the bilateral political dialogue focusing on Ukraine's accession to EU, on the protection of national minorities according to the European standards, on the enhancement of regional and trans-border cooperation (with the use of EU funding).

The dimension of economic cooperation is a very important chapter both in the field of bilateral relations and in the European course of Ukraine. The legal framework of the Romanian-Ukrainian relations include over 40 agreements and conventions governing the bilateral cooperation in different fields such as political, economic, cultural, scientific or humanitarian. The most important documents that have been signed up to now are⁵:

⁴ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomes, on February 1, 2012, the 20th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations with Ukraine, after recognition by our country of the independence of Ukraine, on 8 January 1992. <http://www.mae.ro/node/11971>, accessed 10/19/2012, at 18.44.

⁵ Official Site MFA <http://old.mae.ro/index.php?unde=doc&id=5750&idlnk=1&cat=3>, accessed 10/20/2012, at 21.34.

- the joint statement on establishing diplomatic relations between Romania and Ukraine, as of February 1, 1992, and the foundation of embassies as soon as possible (Bucharest, July 18, 1991);
- the Agreement between the Romanian Government and the Ukrainian Government on the commercial and economic and scientific-technical cooperation (Bucharest, July 28, 1992);
- the Agreement between the Government of Romania and the Government of Ukraine on the establishment of the Advisory Board of the Romanian-Ukrainian trade and economic cooperation (Bucharest, April 19, 1994) - the Convention between the Government of Romania and the Government of Ukraine for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital (Ismail, March 29, 1996);
- the Treaty on good neighborhood relations and cooperation between Romania and Ukraine (Constanta, June 2, 1997);
- the Convention between the Government and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on mutual recognition and equivalence of diplomas and scientific degrees granted in Romania and Ukraine (Bucharest, February 19, 1999);
- the Convention between the Government and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on cooperation in construction and operation of the pipeline Hustle (Ukraine) - Satu Mare (Romania) (Bucharest, February 19, 1999);
- the Agreement between the Government of Romania and the Government of Ukraine concerning International Transportation (07/04/2000);
- the Agreement between the Romanian Government and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on cooperation in railway transport (Kiev, October 21, 2003)
- the Agreement between the Romanian Government and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on economic, industrial, technical and scientific cooperation (Bucharest, October 30, 2007)⁶.

One of the most important events in the 2012 bilateral trade and economic relations was the first meeting of the Ukrainian-Romanian Joint Commission on economic, industrial, scientific and technical dated April 11, 2012 in Kiev. During the event, the parties approached a wide range of issues of bilateral cooperation in various sectors of the economy and acknowledged some problematic issues of trade and economic relations between Ukraine and Romania, outlining the basic steps for a future bilateral cooperation.

The first concrete result of the meeting of the Commission was the organization of the Ukrainian-Romanian Economic Forum "Energy – a field of regional interest"⁷.

⁶ By the date of entry into force of this Agreement the Intergovernmental Agreement for trade, economic technical and scientific, cooperation, signed in Bucharest on 28.07.1992 and the Intergovernmental Agreement establishing the Advisory Board of the Romanian-Ukrainian intergovernmental trade- economic, signed in Bucharest on 19.04.1994, will have expired.

⁷ The Romanian-Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and the Ukrainian Embassy in Bucharest, supported by the Romanian National Chamber, held on May 24, 2012, at the Palace of the Chamber of Commerce in Bucharest, the first edition of the Romanian-Ukrainian Economic Forum, with theme "Energy - field of regional interest".

During this event the former Minister-Counselor of the Ukrainian Embassy in Romania, Yuriy Verbitsky, said that bilateral trade between Romania and Ukraine reached in 2011 a historic high of over two billion dollars, with further possibilities for growth, and he stressed that “there is a huge economic potential still to be exploited by businessmen in the two countries, as confirmed by the dynamic of trades, with growing exports and imports”⁸.

The event was also attended by State Secretary Bogdan Aurescu, who reviewed the recent developments in the Romanian-Ukrainian relations and reiterated Romania's interest in strengthening cooperation in order to consolidate the good neighborhood relations between Romania and Ukraine. He also reiterated the Romanian support for Ukrainian European course.

Although the relations of economic cooperation have known an upward trend lately, Ukraine is still an “unavoidable and, while underutilized” partner, according to former Foreign Minister Teodor Baconschi⁹.

On the occasion of the Annual Meeting of the Romanian Diplomacy - organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs¹⁰ the Foreign Minister, Titus Corlăţean, stated that Romania's relations with Ukraine had lately given rise to a series of opportunity and he reiterated the Romanian support in the European course of Ukraine. Moreover, besides the treaties, conventions and agreements that govern the multi-levelled cooperation between Romania and Ukraine, there are a number of programs¹¹ developed by the European Union, who has initiated an increasingly coherent project of regional cooperation and of openness in their geographical proximity, where both countries are direct actors.

As for the European Union, they are trying to achieve their goals by developing a number of programs aiming at cooperation between Member States and between them and neighboring countries, but also at strengthening the political,

⁸ The website of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, <http://www.ccir.ro/media-si-publicatii-proprii/comunicate-de-presa/view/cooperarea-economica-romano-ucraineana-are-un-potential-deosebit> accessed 19/10/2012, at 22.09.

⁹ We were interested in placing Romania, together with Poland, as a regional leader in the Eastern Partnership, in good neighborhood with its potential in economy and cultural exchanges, in the possible and necessary role of Ukraine in solving the Transnistrian conflict, as well as in the trilateral Romania-Ukraine-Republic of Moldova cooperation. Moreover, we must not forget the geopolitical importance of Ukraine. Baconschi at Romania-Ukraine Civic Forum organized by the Romanian Centre for European Policies, together with the Institute of World Policy (Ukraine) from 24 to 25 May in Bucharest, <http://www.crpe.ro/index>, accessed 10/17/2012, at 23.01

¹⁰ Annual Meeting of the Romanian Diplomacy, 03.09.2012, Bucharest, Parliament Palace, the official website of the MFA, <http://www.mae.ro/node/15062>, accessed 10/18/2012, at 22.18

¹¹ The Copenhagen European Council stated that the European Union is keen to strengthen regional cooperation and cross-border relations with neighboring countries in order to develop the full potential of the regions [...] and to avoid new dividing lines in Europe. Therefore, the EU has proposed policy is to support efforts to reduce poverty and neighborhood partners an area of prosperity and values based on high economic integration, intensified political and cultural relations, enhanced cross-border cooperation and prevention common conflicts. European Council in Copenhagen, 12-13 December 2002, Presidency Conclusions, http://Ue.Eu.Int/Uedocs/Cms_Data/Docs/Pressdata/En/Ec/73842.Pdf, accessed 10/16/2012, at 19.52.

economic and social relations, according to a common set of values. One of the initiatives referred to the European territorial cooperation programs, which provide a forum for discovering joint solutions and developing strategies for problems that transcend the national borders. An example of this initiative is “The Transnational Cooperation Program in South East Europe - *a program for a European area in transition to integration*”. The South East Europe Program aims to develop transnational partnerships of strategic importance, with a view to supporting the territorial, economic and social integration and contributing to the increased cohesion, stability and competitiveness of these regions. In order to succeed, the program seeks to initiate qualitative, strategic, relevant and results-oriented programs.

The South East Europe Program helps promote the cohesion between Member States, candidate countries, potential candidates and neighboring states. Regional cooperation is essential in South East Europe, regardless of the degree of integration of each country. Stability, prosperity and security of the region are of particular interest to EU¹². Although the European Union and Romania, as a NATO and EU member state, aim to develop transnational partnerships on matters of strategic importance in order to improve the process of territorial, economic and social integration and to contribute to cohesion, stability and competitiveness, the areas in the vicinity of our country - the Eastern border of the EU and NATO- are facing some problems that hinder the achievement of these objectives. We will turn now to detailing some aspects of the Romanian and Ukrainian contribution to achieving security in Eastern and South Eastern Europe.

3. Security implications

As an international actor, Romania is contributing to the joint management of risks, threats and vulnerabilities from the international security environment, assuming the responsibilities incumbent as a member of the UN, EU, NATO, OSCE and Council of Europe. The National Defense Strategy, a working tool that shows how to manage risks, threats and vulnerabilities against Romania, includes the threats to which it is subjected and provides courses of action to counter their actions in accordance with the international organizations to which it belongs.

Ukraine is a pivotal state in the West-East relations. Its balance between the West and Russia is obvious, as both relations with Moscow and with the European Union are particularly complex. Kiev is practically trying to make compatible its partnership relations with EU and NATO with an advantageous cooperation with the Russian Federation and the CIS.

¹² The eligible are of the Transnational Cooperation Program South East Europe comprises 16 countries, of which 14 countries participate in the entire territory, namely Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece, Hungary Serbia, Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia and Moldova. In the other two eligibility was supported for certain regions: in Italy: Lombardy, Bolzano, Trento, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, Emilia Romagna, Umbria, Marche, Abruzzo, Molise, Basilicata, Puglia and Cjermovestka areas; in Ukraine: Ivano -Frankiviska, Zakarpatska and Odessa.

In this context, at a regional level, Romania is coordinating the activities through the following cooperation initiatives, in which Ukraine is also participating¹³:

- The South Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial Process (SEDM);
- The Black Sea Naval Group of Cooperation (BLACKSEAFOR);
- The Turkish National Maritime Security Operation "Black Sea Harmony" (OBSH);
- The Multinational Battalion "TISA".

The South Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial Process (SEDM) is a regional initiative that include the Multinational Peace Force in South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE) and the following projects: the simulation network in Southeastern Europe to provide architecture for the organization of computer assisted exercises (CAX) and other issues related to information management and the means to respond to real crises situations (SEESIMNET); the telemedicine network for interconnecting military hospitals (possibly the civil ones also) of SEDM Member States, with a view to using information and communication systems to provide remote medical assistance (IMIHO); the Working Group for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, border security and the fight against terrorism (CBSC);

SEDM aims at intensifying the process of regional political-military cooperation, designed to help strengthen stability and security in South-Eastern Europe. The following, NATO or PfP member states are participating, follows: Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Slovenia, Serbia, Turkey, United States and Ukraine. Georgia and the Republic of Moldova have the "observer" status.

The Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) is a regional initiative, in line with the efforts of the Black Sea countries to strengthen trust and understanding between the signatory States and to develop cooperation and interoperability between naval forces in the Black Sea. The following states are participating in the initiative: Bulgaria, Russian Federation, Georgia, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine.

In the BLACKSEAFOR, decisions are taken by consensus, both at the meetings of the National High Representatives (Foreign Ministers / defense, or their authorized representatives) - the political body and at the Committee of the Black Sea Naval Commanders - the executive body for the control and BLACKSEAFOR command.

The national maritime security operation "Black Sea Harmony" (OBSH) was initiated by Turkey on March 1, 2004, as a national maritime security operation "BLACK SEA HARMONY" (OBSH) for monitoring maritime routes in order to discover vessels suspected of illegal activity or potential asymmetric threats in the area of national jurisdiction, especially around the Bosphorus strait. From the perspective of OBHS, Turkey cooperates with NATO, by exchanging intelligence on suspect ships and tries developing regional cooperation with the Black Sea countries.

¹³ Political and military cooperation initiatives involving Romania, the official website of the Ministry of National Defense, http://www.mapn.ro/diepa/cooperare/initiative_regionale.htm accessed 20.10.2012, time 18.55.

Romania, the Russian Federation and Ukraine signed a bilateral cooperation agreement with Turkey in OBSH.

The Multinational Battalion "TISA" was established at the initiative of Ukraine, in 1999, at the trilateral meeting of defense ministers from Romania, Ukraine and Hungary. Subsequently, Slovakia expressed its desire to join the initiative.

The principles of organization are considering the establishment of a multinational joint headquarters that will be in standby position, while personnel, logistics and internal communications issues will remain aspects of national responsibilities. Romania's contribution consists of a military company (about 200 soldiers - the Romanian module is not specifically designed as a multinational military unit, but it deploys units specific to the type of missions within the existing units). The primary mission of the battalion is to supervise and promptly intervene in the Tisza River Basin, in the event of a natural disaster, and to participate in recovery operations. Yearly, the country holding the Presidency of the initiative organizes and conducts a multinational exercise called "Avalanche Blonde".

Conclusions

The economic cooperation between Ukraine and Romania is on an upward trend. Among the most striking aspects of this phenomenon we can enumerate the treaties, conventions and agreements concluded between the two parties and the intensifying bilateral discussions on various levels, between the decision factors and the scientific environment.

It is worth mentioning that the relations between the two countries are not translated merely in projects managed by the European Union. Both Ukraine and Romania are bordering countries to the Danube and Black Sea, there is a Ukrainian community in Romania as well as a Romanian community in Ukraine, and this leads to increased cooperation between the two states.

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14. Ukraine official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://old.mae.ro/index.php?unde=doc&id=5750&idlnk=1&cat=3>.

SMART DEFENCE, PRAGMATIC MEANS OF OPERATIONALIZING THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

*Maria-Mihaela NISTOR**

Abstract: *This paper analyzes the concept of Smart Defence as a pragmatic means of operationalizing the New Strategic Concept. In an age of asymmetric threats and financial crisis, the need for multilateral cooperation has strongly augmented. First of all, the general framework is briefly presented, including a comparative analysis of the member countries' imbalanced defence expenditures. Then, the definitions and principles of Smart Defence are depicted, followed by the presentation of some projects in this respect. With regard to the implementation of this concept, a list of potential opportunities and threats is sketched. The methodology used is primarily qualitative and its main instrument is document (be it discourse or press release) analysis. Since Smart Defence has yet to be fully implemented, being an ongoing process, some aspects of projective research can be noticed throughout the paper, as well.*

Keywords: *Smart Defence, NATO, multilateralism, burden sharing, effectiveness.*

Introduction

“We live in the World of Smart”¹. This embodies, but is not limited to smart phones, smart boards, smart objectives. The concept of smart power is highly relevant for the realm of security studies, defined by Joseph S. Nye Jr. as “the ability to combine hard and soft power resources into effective strategies”², by means of power conversion. It must be underlined that this smart power concept does, under no circumstances, undermine that of hard or, respectively, of soft power, but emerges from their interference using, as Nye stated, well-designed strategies and skillful leadership³.

Since the need for effectiveness is stronger in the present age of austerity, so is the necessity for implementing concepts that can achieve the aim of doing more with less, of better using limited resources without damaging the quality of the “more” in the detriment of the “less”. Furthermore, in the context of asymmetric, multilateral threats, interdependence and multi-level cooperation become the requisites for maintaining security, aspects emphasized during the Lisbon Summit in 2010. One year and a half later, the Chicago Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities positions the concept of Smart Defence “at the heart of this new approach”⁴.

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¹ Sorin ENCUȚESCU, speech delivered within the “Smart Defence and Defence Investment” Seminar, Bucharest, 31 October 2012.

² Joseph S. NYE, Jr., *The Future of Power*, USA, Public Affairs, Perseus Group, 2011, p. 23.

³ *Ibidem.*

⁴ *Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities: Toward NATO Forces 2020*, Article 7, Chicago, 20 May 2012.

1. The general framework

A brief analysis of the contemporary context is necessary for the overall comprehension of Smart Defence. Thus, certain aspects of the New Strategic Concept relevant for this theme and the member countries' contributions to the defence expenditures shall be summarized as follows.

1.1. The New Strategic Concept (NSC)

The current NSC, "Active Engagement, Modern Defence" was adopted at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, 19-20 November 2010. With regard to its content, it maintains NATO's core tasks, namely collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security and underlines that "NATO seeks its security at the lowest possible level of forces"⁵, due to the recent economic context of financial crisis. A framework for a new NATO Command Structure has been agreed upon and this should encompass "a significant reduction in the number of military HQs and a manpower savings of 35%, representing at least 5000 posts"⁶.

Still, diminishing the budget must not imply a loss of quality, as well. Therefore, "military budget cuts in an age of austerity require the Alliance to do more with less, while not sacrificing its capabilities"⁷, by maximizing "the deployability of forces, ensuring the maximum coherence in defence planning, to reduce unnecessary duplication"⁸ as well as by "developing and operating capabilities jointly, for reasons of cost-effectiveness and as a manifestation of solidarity"⁹. Highly important is how these aims will be achieved. And this is where the role of Smart Defence becomes more and more obvious.

1.2. An analysis of defence expenditures

Analyzing the defence expenditures annual percentage of the GDP in all NATO member countries, it can be observed that in 2010 only 5 out of 28 countries succeeded in meeting the commitment of spending at least 2% of the GDP on defence: Albania and France- 2%, Greece- 2.9%, UK- 2.7% and US- 5.4%¹⁰. Moreover, further calculations reveal that only 15% of the 'European' member countries meet this criterion. Taking into consideration the data presented above, the medium percentage of defence expenditures is of 1.7 of the GDP in Europe and of 5.0% in North America, aspect which reinforces the idea of asymmetric diffusion of

⁵ *Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*. Adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, 19-20 November 2010, p.23.

⁶ *NATO after Lisbon*, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Brussels, 2011, p. 8.

⁷ *Idem*, p. 7.

⁸ *Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*. Adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, 19-20 November 2010, Article 37.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ "Table 3: Defence expenditures as a percentage of the GDP" in: *Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence*, PR/CP 2011(027), 10 March 2011, p. 6.

power. Hence, the enlargement of such an organization does not necessarily mean deepening of stability, but rather a challenge to it, at least in an initial phase. Given the data presented above, the issue of burden sharing becomes a key element. Even if “allegations of an imbalance in transatlantic burden sharing are as old as the Alliance”, they “have become increasingly contentious”¹¹, since the contribution of the European states has substantially diminished. Whereas “ten years ago, the United States accounted for just under half of NATO members’ total defence spending”, today [in 2011, at the Munich conference] “the American share is closer to 75 percent – and it will continue to grow.”¹²

As Robert D. Kaplan observed, “In 1980, European countries accounted for 40 percent of NATO's total defence spending; now they account for 20 percent.”¹³ And they represent 92% of NATO member states. No wonder that a US Air Force planner in Libya associated NATO with the metaphor of “Snow White and the 27 dwarfs”¹⁴.

Therefore, it has become clear that NATO should focus on rebalancing its defence expenditures. As the Secretary General pointed out in February 2011, should Europe not choose to invest in defence more than it does, “we risk a divided, [...] weaker Europe”, one “increasingly adrift from the United States”¹⁵. Furthermore, compared to the Middle East countries’ percentages of the GDP spent on defence in the same year 2010 (Saudi Arabia- 10%, Oman-8.5%, Israel-6.5%, Jordan- 5.2 %) ¹⁶, the situation seems pretty unbalanced. Suffice it to say that, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “China has tripled its defence expenditure over the past decade. And India has increased its defence spending by almost 60 per cent in the same period.”¹⁷ Since the need for reform has been proved, the next step is to identify the means of achieving this goal.

2. Smart Defence- features and principles

The concept of Smart Defence was first mentioned at the Munich Conference in February 2011. In his speech, “Building Security in an Age of Austerity”, Secretary General Rasmussen defines it as a means used by NATO to “help nations

¹¹ “No. 5: Smart Defence or how to reconcile ‘Snow White and the 27 Dwarfs’”, in: *NATO Watch Chicago Summit Media Briefings Series*, May 2012.

¹² Anders Fogh RASMUSSEN, *Building Security in an Age of Austerity*, Munich, 4 February 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_70400.htm. [Retrieved: 10 February 2011].

¹³ Robert D. KAPLAN, “NATO's Ordinary Future”, in: *Stratfor Global Intelligence*, 9 May, 2012. http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/natos-ordinary-future-robert-d-kaplan?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20120509&utm_term=kaplan&utm_content=readmore&elq=8c2aac7b0a8d401dae90d433a4fac68b

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ *Military Expenditure (%GDP)*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS>, [Retrieved: 5 October 2012].

¹⁷ Anders Fogh RASMUSSEN, *Building Security in an Age of Austerity*, Munich, 4 February 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_70400.htm [Retrieved: 10 February 2011].

to build greater security with fewer resources but more coordination and coherence, so that together we can avoid the financial crisis from becoming a security crisis”¹⁸.

It must be stated from the very beginning that critics have actively reacted to the name of the concept itself. Should one consider the dichotomy smart-dull, they could jump to the hasty conclusion that, up to the point of introducing Smart Defence, defence has been rather dull. Of course, there are many counterarguments in this respect. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that, whereas the name of the concept is recent, various hypostases of Smart Defence can be found in previous collaborative actions. At NATO level, Air Policing in the Baltics, the Strategic Airlift Capabilities or SALIS are relevant examples in this respect. Or, as Anders Fogh Rasmussen put it, Smart Defence is about “a *renewed* [my emphasis] culture of cooperation”¹⁹.

Smart Defence has often been associated to its previous European version, i.e. the principle of “pooling and sharing”. As Cristina Bogzeanu observes, “there is not a full equivalence between the two ideas, as NATO implements a more developed, refined version of the concept which took birth at the EU’s level”²⁰. To support her thesis, the researcher uses the very definition of Smart Defence that implies not only pooling and sharing capabilities, but also setting priorities and coordinating efforts better. There are three core principles that define Smart Defence, namely multinational cooperation, specialization and prioritization²¹. Of course all these depend on a variety of variables and must be discussed upon during negotiations. In terms of “multinational cooperation”, it must be emphasized that this should not be perceived only at the interstate level, being rather a multilateral cooperation, process in which both public and private sectors interfere; highly relevant for the implementation of this process is the role of the defence industry. Specialization must take into account the national or regional context and resources. Nevertheless, “the Alliance nations must give priority to those capabilities which NATO needs most, specialize in what they do best, and look for multinational solutions to shared problems”²². The issue of “what they do best” has its part of subjectivity and shall be analyzed later on, in the chapter “Toward the implementation of Smart Defence- A Sketch of Opportunities and Threats”. Part of the process of NATO Agencies Reform, agreed upon during the Lisbon Summit, NATO Procurement Organization has been set up “with the aim of providing a framework for end-to-end management of multinational armaments acquisition programs, such as Smart Defence projects, new major programs or elements of existing procurement programs”²³. It must be

¹⁸ Anders Fogh RASMUSSEN, *Building Security in an Age of Austerity*, Munich, 4 February 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_70400.htm. [Retrieved: 10 February 2011].

¹⁹ *Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities: Toward NATO Forces 2020*, Chicago, 20 May 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87594.htm. [Retrieved: 21 May 2012].

²⁰ Cristina BOGZEANU, *NATO-EU Relation from the Perspective of the Implications of Smart Defence and Pooling and Sharing Concepts*, in: *Strategic Impact*, No. 3 [44]/2012, pp. 3340, p. 36.

²¹ *Smart Defence*, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_84268.htm. [Retrieved: 21 May 2012].

²² *Ibidem*.

²³ NATO Agencies Reform, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_66470.htm. [Retrieved: 17 September 2012].

mentioned that this department is currently in its consolidation phase and is due to become operational at the end of 2014, after two preliminary phases of rationalization and, respectively, optimization. Hence, there is no valid data for analyzing it for the time being.

With regard to the mechanisms of Smart Defence²⁴, special representatives have been designated to deal with the implementation of this concept and to seek cooperation outside NATO, as well. The closest cooperation in this respect is that between NATO and EU, given that the two organizations share 21 members and many common values. Furthermore, the role of defence industry should not be neglected in this respect, as it has been reiterated on various occasions²⁵ and highlighted on the NATO Industry Day: “And for us to do that job properly we need better cooperation WITH defence industry – and we need better cooperation WITHIN defence industry”²⁶. In his video tele-conference message, Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen reiterated the idea that the financial crisis must not be allowed to turn into a security crisis, as well, mentioning that Smart Defence “is all about multinational cooperation. Allies working together to deliver capabilities that would be *too expensive for any of them* [my emphasis] to deliver alone”²⁷. It is questionable whether further Smart Defence projects imply only those capabilities that none of the countries could afford paying alone. And the example of munition is pertinent in this respect.

Furthermore, Smart Defence “is about agreeing what we may cut from our defence, while also agreeing what we need to keep, so we can meet the Alliance's strategic goals today AND tomorrow”²⁸. Secretary General goes on emphasizing that Smart Defence has actually become a must: “[t]here is only one alternative – and that is no contract at all [my emphasis]”²⁹. Whereas at the Munich conference in 2011 the concept of Smart Defence was presented as an option “how NATO can help [my emphasis] nations to build greater security with fewer resources”³⁰, it became a must, an obligation for maintaining security, turning into “the only way to ensure we have the necessary capabilities for our Alliance to do its job”³¹. Suffice it to say that the word “must” appears six times in Mr. Rasmussen’s speech on the NATO Industry day, let alone its similar collocations such as “to need to” or “it is vital that”: “we *must* maintain the security on which our economic prosperity rests”, “we *must* ensure the financial crisis does not turn into a security crisis”, “when it comes to defence spending, we *must* hold the line”, “we *must* leverage the experience, the

²⁴ *Smart Defence*, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_84268.htm. [Retrieved: 21 May 2012]

²⁵ The Lisbon Summit, The Chicago Summit.

²⁶ Anders Fogh RASMUSSEN, Video- teleconference message by NATO Secretary General for the NATO Industry Day 2012 Riga, Latvia.

²⁷ *Ibidem*.

²⁸ *Ibidem*.

²⁹ *Ibidem*.

³⁰ Anders Fogh RASMUSSEN, *Building Security in an Age of Austerity*, Munich, 4 February 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_70400.htm. [Retrieved: 10 February 2011].

³¹ Anders Fogh RASMUSSEN Video- teleconference message by NATO Secretary General for the NATO Industry Day 2012 Riga, Latvia.

achievements and the lessons learned [from Afghanistan], “These are challenging times. Times when we *must* all be smart about defence, [...] when we *must* get the most out of our defence Dollars and Euros”³².

Further analysis of the speech under discussion reveals that its realm of operability should not be limited to equipment development and procurement, but should also include communication and logistics.

In addition to these, emphasis has been laid upon the need “to promote greater participation by small and medium-sized enterprises, in particular in NATO countries with a limited defence industrial capability”³³, but the conditions of their participation have yet to be established.

3. A brief analysis of some Smart Defence projects

As it has already been mentioned in this paper, NATO has implemented some multinational projects prior to the introduction of the concept “Smart Defence”.³⁴

It was decided at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010 “to develop Ballistic Missile Defence as a collective capability for the Alliance”³⁵. As NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow mentioned at the Security and Defence Agenda Rountable “Next steps in Missile Defence”, “Our developing missile defence capability [...] is also an excellent example of Smart Defence – Allies working together to deliver a capability that they would be unable to afford on their own”³⁶. This project is a collective contribution of the Netherlands -with plans to upgrade four air-defence frigates with missile defence radar and to offer Patriot missile batteries, together with Germany, who offered to host the Command and Control System at Ramstein - France, through plans to develop an early-warning capability and long-range radar. Furthermore, there are agreements with Poland, Romania, Spain and Turkey to host US missile defence assets. Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow took advantage of the occasion to reiterate that “Russia’s continuing objections to NATO’s missile defence plans are simply not grounded on facts” and that “NATO will continue to seek closer cooperation with Russia on missile defence”³⁷, but this is part of another research subject.

Another Smart Defence project is that of Alliance Ground Surveillance. Its history can be traced back to the discussions of the Defence Planning Committee in 1992, so this is another example of previous ideas adapted to the current needs. The procurement contracts were signed during the Chicago Summit by 13 member states, namely Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the United States. Once

³² *Ibidem*.

³³ *Ibidem*.

³⁴ SALIS, The Strategic Airlift Capability or Air Policing in the Baltics are examples in this respect.

³⁵ *NATO Multinational Projects*. Fact Sheet. Public Diplomacy Division, May 2012.

³⁶ Alexander VERSHBOW, NATO Deputy Secretary General, The Security and Defence Agenda Rountable "Next steps in Missile Defence", 27 September 2012, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/news/2012/space-120927-nato01.htm> [Retrieved: 29 September 2012].

³⁷ *Ibidem*.

implemented, AGS “will enable the Alliance to perform persistent surveillance over wide areas from high-altitude, long-endurance, unmanned aerial platforms operating at considerable stand-off distances and in any weather or light condition”³⁸ and is expected to become fully operational in 2017.

Other examples of Smart Defence projects include - but are not limited to- Multinational Cooperation on Munitions, Pooling Maritime Patrol Aircraft, Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Multinational Aviation Training Centre. These multinational projects are presented as instruments of Smart Defence. Their implementation is case-specific and depends on a series of factors and a-priori analysis is not sufficient in this respect. As the Deputy Secretary General of NATO, Ambassador Alexander Vershbow put it, “This is a good start, but much remains to be done”³⁹.

4. Toward the implementation of Smart Defence projects- a brief sketch of potential opportunities and threats

Before sketching some of the main opportunities and threats of Smart Defence projects, it must be stated that these belong to the realm of multilateralism. And, when it comes about the actions and interests of whole series of actors, these concepts become relative and highly subjective. Some states have always been reluctant to notions such as pooling and sharing, comprehensive approach or collective defence.

The opportunities of implementing Smart Defence have been underlined throughout this paper, as they appear at the discursive level of NATO officials, as well as in documents such as the *Chicago Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities: Toward NATO Forces 2020* or the *New Strategic Concept “Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”*.

Smart Defence appears as a means -or rather *the* means- of operationalizing the Lisbon Strategic Concept, aiming at building greater security with fewer resources in this age of austerity, by means of multinational cooperation, specialization and prioritization. This would encourage competition and lead to a higher degree of quality. This seems to be a smart solution or, as Anders Fogh Rasmussen emphasized in his speech on Industry Day, *the* solution. Ideally, Smart Defence should be perceived as a win-win aspect, but there might also be actors that feel reluctant to this change, since both loss and gain are facets of the same coin in terms of economy. Therefore, there are some potential threats that should be taken into account while implementing the concept of Smart Defence.

³⁸ *Alliance Ground Surveillance*, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48892.htm, [Retrieved: 17 September 2012].

³⁹ *NATO after Chicago: Struggling for Capabilities, Enlarge or Regionalize?* Introductory remarks by the Deputy Secretary General of NATO, Amb. Alexander VERSHBOW at the 7th annual Riga Conference, 15 September 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-1EAC08C2-D35BE302/natolive/opinions_90005.htm. [Retrieved: 17 September 2012].

Firstly, even when analyzing Allied states, there is a certain degree of scepticism in terms of participation in multilateral institutions. Since people have been used to direct rather than representative democracy, this kind of collaboration challenges its conventional framing. Critics claim that multilateral institutions “allow elites to bypass the onerous process of persuasion and consensus-seeking that democracy requires”⁴⁰. And this scepticism augments when it comes about some states to acquire something to the benefit of all Allies, especially in terms of defence. Furthermore, “[t]here are lingering concerns about delayed delivery schedules, inflated overhead costs, and slow decision-making. And of course, defence is tightly bound with national sovereignty, industry and jobs.”⁴¹

But, as Robert O. Keohane, Stephen Macedo and Andrew Moravcsik show, one should rather perceive multilateralism as rather “democracy-enhancing”⁴². At the same time, one should not ignore the existence of potential “tensions among democratic costs and pragmatic benefits”⁴³, but be prepared to effectively manage them. This management is a question of negotiation and leadership, of combining the top-down with the bottom-up processes.

Conclusions

The implementation of the concept Smart Defence is work in progress. As it has been underlined in this paper, in the current economic context, this notion seems to have turned from “an option” into “a must”, in an age when security interdependencies are predominant and when “cooperation between all involved actors is the only solution to new problems and challenges of modern crises and conflicts”⁴⁴.

Smart Defence is presented as the pragmatic means of operationalizing the New Strategic Concept using of multilateral cooperation, specialization and prioritization. Relevant are the ways in which these instruments act in the implementation of the concept under discussion. Multilateralism moves beyond the limits of national power, which, despite its many benefits, might lead to conflicts or discontent. Special attention should also be paid to the distribution of power in terms of Smart Defence. Could there be any conflicts in terms of power interests? These questions can be answered using careful management and a high degree of transparency at the decision-making level, combining the top-down with the bottom-up approach and making people understand the current defence needs.

⁴⁰ Robert O. KEOHANE; Stephen MACEDO; Andrew MORAVCSIK, “Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism”, in: *International Organization*, 63, Winter 2009, p.3.

⁴¹ Anders Fogh RASMUSSEN, Building Security in an Age of Austerity, Munich, 4 February 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_70400.htm. [Retrieved: 10 February 2011].

⁴² Robert O. KEOHANE; Stephen MACEDO; Andrew MORAVCSIK, “Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism”, in: *International Organization*, 63, Winter 2009, p.3.

⁴³ *Idem*, p. 4.

⁴⁴ FRUNZETI, Teodor, *Comprehensive Approach in Crises Management*, in: *Strategic Impact*, No. 3 [44]/2012, p. 7.

Last, but not least, the intelligent implementation of Smart Defence would add a significant plus to the process of macro-securitisation and to that of building a strong security constellation⁴⁵, with a more balanced burden sharing and a closer, multilateral cooperation.

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⁴⁵ The concepts of "macrosecuritization" and "security constellation" are introduced by Barry BUZAN, Ole WÆVER and Jaap de WILDE.

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PREMISES AND DETERMINATIONS OF CHANGE PROCESS ONGOING IN THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES POST-INTEGRATED IN NATO

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Abstract: In the more globalised world, on the entire planet are seen profound changes determined by the resettlement in new parameters of economic, political and military order. The processes of change in the Romanian Armed forces took many shapes and bear many names. In the post-communist period until the adhesion to NATO, change was known as reform, restructuring and modernization. Presently, it is used the “transformation” term, taken from NATO terminology. Actually, these processes concomitantly and continue undergo, all being elements of changes affecting the military organization in all its activity’s dimensions: conceptual (strategy), structural (personnel), technological and cultural / intra-organizational behavioural.

Therefore, owed to the omnipresence of change, we consider this article’s theme to be interesting for the military scientific environment for a better understanding of premises and determinations of this process ongoing after the Romanian integration in the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Keywords: change, Romania, NATO, reform, transformation, modernization, restructuring, capabilities.

1. Change – process affecting the military organization

In our regard, the change expresses any replacement, modification, transformation or remaking intervened in the form and/or content of a product, object, activity, work, service or process in the military organization.

The organizations do not change just to pass through the changes’ phases but for them are submitted to a wide process of development and concomitantly must react to the external changes came from the surrounding environment, the appeared restrictions, requirements and opportunities. At their turn, the process of individuals adaptation to the organizational change asserts to the humans to change by accumulating new knowledge, accomplishing new tasks, enhancing the competencies in a specific field, elements which usually also determines changes of labor habits, values and attitudes related to the respective organization’s know-how. Thus, we consider the change of behavioral dimension to be essential because it can not be any real change when the attitudinal change lacks. It would not be necessary to be fulfilled a specific analysis over the change process if, in reality, all is going in conformity with the plans of change strategies but is obvious the organizations have difficulties to adapt and react to the social changes. The changes produced in time in

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the military organization had as premises “*the science and techniques achievements, but also some social, political and economic determinations, some of those redound on directly, others indirectly over the military art field*”¹.

Changes consequences can directly damage an organization and if in a given moment the situation is good, in the future it can degenerate just because change unfulfilment. Therefore, the reasons the experienced institutions, particularly the commercial ones choose to do the change are related to the success of change process.

Changes are not good or bad. They equally comprise opportunities and deficiencies. The essential trend of evolvement consists in the manner are implemented and managed those by the organization’s members. Thus, for an efficient management of change, change management intervenes which must elaborate a set of reasonable strategies by using resources and respecting the constraints asserted in the framework wherein the organization undergoes its activity. When the surrounding environment wherein the organization functions is modifying, managers should use other reasonable strategies in order to adapt to the new changes. Understanding how this system works leads to the identification of sources resistant to change process and of methods to annihilate those. Therefore, these strategies must provision efficient forms and methods of communication between the decisional factors and all people which will bear up the changes’ consequences. Personnel participation to the projection and management of change is vital. In this regard, one of the main goals of organization’s members should become the finding and assimilation of new elements in all the activity fields and the approach of change proposals in an open, proactive manner.

Change needs top to bottom vertical support from the highest hierarchical level to the basic structures of the organization. At this concern, also in the change framework the exercise of leadership act can be considered as an inter-personnel influencing technique promoted by the initiators of change by the formal and informal communication grounded on an authentic and solid emotional support used for reaching the organization’s goals.

2. Types of changes affecting the military organization

We already settled in the organizations, inclusively military, framework, permanently, take place a multitude of changes. Some have less amplex, influencing an individual or a group; others are wider influencing the organization as a whole or its major fields. Change is awaited and wanted or, on the contrary, unwanted bringing unpleasant situation to some, sometimes raising major malfunctions at the organization’s level, particularly if the management did not anticipated the nature and dimensions of some endogenous and exogenous factors. Even when is wanted and forecasted, the change can damage the organization’s functionality and security if to the decisions, measures and actions conception and

¹ Filofteia REPEZ, *Știința, tehnica și arta militară în primul război mondial*, p. 121, vezi: http://www.studii.crifst.ro/doc/2011/2011_1_08.pdf.

application there were not taken into account the form, procedure and moment of change, as well as its consequences.

On “Forbes” magazine site, in an article dedicated to organizational change, two specialists in organizational management considers: “*Even the military organization, the great bastion of hierarchy and deference, starts to admit the XXI century organization should be differently thought. The developments in electronics and communication equipments had huge impact over how the battles are lead and, respectively, how the troops are conducted. Command and control management starts to be seen as an obsolete concept and the consultative and decision-taking management at local level start to be introduced in the military practices*”².

The change program at the level of military organization can have as object one or many from the forth essential elements: organization’s strategy, used technology, intra-organizational structure and humans’ behaviour/culture.

Usually, *changes of strategy* are generated by organization’s external factors. The external threats or challenges, as the decentralization, competitiveness intensification at global level and the technological innovations as Internet usually push the organizations to proceed to strategic changes³. As concerns the military organization, the political factor plays essential role in the initiation of some major conceptual changes.

Technological change comprises shifting how the organizational products or services are created and commercialized. For example, the manager would want to modernize the production by the installation or modification of computerized systems or of the systems of enterprise organizing, modification of relation between employees and their physical environment, or the modification of employees interface with the technology itself – for example, the enhancement of work flow or the diminution of discomfort caused by the position of working a machine⁴. As strictly regards the military organization, the technological change refers to the evolutions of Revolution in Military Affairs determining the use of informatics devices in leading the war and fulfilling the real time communication in and to the operations fields.

Structural change refers to the modification of one or many of the organizational elements. Thus, the managers can change their manner of organizing and the components of the organizational structure. There can be done restructurings of personnel by replacements, dismissals or new employments or it can be transformed the organization by the modification of its policy, procedures and rules. In the military organization, there were fulfilled a series of structural changes to adjust it to the requirements of the new security environment and Romania’s quality as NATO and EU member.

² K. MOORE, K. HILL, *The Decline but not Fall of Hierarchy – What Young People Really Want*, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/karlmoore/2011/06/14/the-decline-but-not-fall-of-hierarchy-what-young-people-really-want/>

³ Alexandrina DEACONU, Simona PODGOREANU, Lavinia RASCA, Biblioteca digitală a Academiei de Studii Economice, *Factorul Uman și performanțele organizației*, p. 3, <http://www.biblioteca-digitala.ase.ro/biblioteca/pagina2.asp?id=cap3>

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 4.

Structural reorganization represents a wide spread technique of organizational change in the current times dominated by rapid changes⁵. Structural changes are factors triggering resistance to change, particularly in the rigid military organization compared to the commercial organizations. The resistance is determined by the new hierarchical relations of a part of personnel included in the new structures, personnel which can perceive the change as degradation phase of its carrier. Also, the new structures signify for the employees the adaptation to new sheets of posts and eventually new tasks. Not all the individuals agree the attribution of new tasks, their majority feeling safe when the status quo they already know is maintained.

Changes in the organizational culture are generally accomplished by the same means as the ones used to maintain the culture. Thus, the managers attention focus on secondary elements of culture, the revision of managers and personnel's reaction to the undercurrent in the organization, the modification of criteria standing on the basis of compensations awarding, but also of criteria used to the recruitment, section and promotion of personnel, there are elements stimulating the personnel and the leadership to direct to change some elements of organizational culture.

The organizational culture can actuate changes in the area of: managerial objectives; manner of solving the critical situations; criteria of recruiting new members; criteria of promoting in the organization; criteria of compensations; organizational rituals of ceremonies and habits. For example, a conformist organizational culture penalizing the assuming of risks and innovations and compensating risk's avoidance can change its approach by settling a system of employees compensation therefore the creative individuals to be encouraged to settle riskier or more innovative goals without the fear to be penalized for a less successful attempt.

When the organizational culture is changing, there are two sensitive aspects to take into account. The first is the change of personnel behaviour can be done only if it is grounded on elements of the existent culture. The second aspect of sensitivity results from the difficulty to exactly appreciate the core elements of the organizational culture, the ones should not be altered by either change because they represent the organization's essence itself.

The success of change to the level of organizational culture is expressed by: understanding the precedent culture because a new culture can not be developed without the leaders and the leaded personnel to understand which the starting point to change is; supporting the military personnel proposing ideas of existent culture improvement and willing to act in conformity to these new cultural elements; identifying the most efficient subculture from the organization's framework and using it as example for the employees to learn from it; settling some viable methods of support for the military personnel to accomplish more efficiently their tasks, therefore resulting an enhancement of organizational culture; the perspective of a new culture which can constitute a principle of initiation and guidance of a change; the fulfilment of a forecast of cultural change on medium and long term for conditioning significant improvements at cultural level.

⁵ *Idem.*

In all situations, *strategy, techniques and structural changes* releases varied changes in the organizational behaviour comprising employees' values, attitudes and aptitudes. Sometimes, the employees just do not have the knowledge or aptitudes to execute tasks coming with the change. Then, the managers should focus of training and development techniques in order to improve employees' qualification. In other situations, the "personnel" issues rose from misunderstandings or conflict. Here, the interventions in the organizational development or the efforts to reconciliation of conflicts can be useful. Ultimately, manager can wish to change the organizational culture of the organization – the basic values its employees share and how are manifesting these values in behaviour⁶.

Actually, we can deduce changes determines one on the others and although changes of strategy, technology and structure can be fulfilled on shorter time with the necessary resources, the adaptation of employees to the new conditions created is accomplished harder because intertwines the inherent resistance to change. Change in the cultural dimension of the individuals in the military organization framework is done in longer time because it supposes learning abilities and getting new attitudes resulted from change acceptance.

3. Change in the NATO post-integrated Romanian Armed Forces

Romanian Armed forces restructuring and modernization represented a part of change process considered as sine qua non condition of the Euro-Atlantic integration. Therefore, in a relatively short time, it was needed the implementation of some essential transformations to the military structures' level in order to get the quality as Alliance's member.

The premises deciding the NATO post-integrated Romanian Armed forces restructuring and modernization was some of the following: Romanian national interests; security environment dynamics; the requirement to modernize the military institution in regard to the trends existent worldwide; the allotted budgetary resources; physiognomy, typology and trends of military conflicts; adaptation to the future battlefield as modular organizing, dimensioning and fulfilling some genres of troops concordantly to the spectre of armaments they will be endowed; the necessity of interoperability, compatibility and standardization of own military troops, comparatively to NATO Member States armies⁷.

Also, the military life internationalization represented premises and consequence of changes occurred after the end of the Cold War. The diversification of forms of threats by the apparition of the asymmetrical ones generated changes in profiling the types of missions and as well as the level of military organizations structure. The effectives diminution, once with the reduction of the allotted budget for the armies, asserted the combination of military forces and the sharing of

⁶ Alexandrina DEACONU, Simona PODGOREANU, Lavinia RASCA, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁷ Aurelian RAȚIU, Restructurarea și modernizarea Armatei României – condiție pentru integrarea euroatlantică, Revista Academiei Forțelor Terestre nr. 2/2006, Sibiu, pp. 2-3, http://www.armyacademy.ro/reviste/2_2006_ro/a3.pdf

resources in order to maintain the operational capacity of permanent (*South-Eastern Europe Brigade Multinational Peace Force - SEEBRIG, Romanian-Hungarian Battalion, etc.*), and also temporary (*International Security Assistance Force - ISAF, Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina - SFOR etc.*) multinational forces.

As regards the transformation phenomenon of NATO armies, this was defined as “*as a process of positive and proactive adaptation to the exigencies and challenges of the geopolitical and geostrategical environment, an elaborated reaction to the predictable and/or unpredictable transformations in the adjacent area, to the restrictions, requirements and opportunities appeared in the fields we report to*”⁸.

In the Romanian Armed forces Transformation Strategy is considered “*transformation has implications over: the technologies and armaments (in the informational systems and networks, technologies and subcomponent, inherited/existent systems of weapons, new platforms and intelligent munition); structure of forces (the organization of fighting structures, command, control, communication, computers, information, surveillance and recognition systems, of an adequate logistical support and a proper infrastructure); of operations (the elaboration of joint doctrines, categories of forces; creation of commandments with responsibilities in the elaboration of campaign and operations plans, the achievement of interoperability with the armies of the Alliance member states)*”⁹.

Thus, the change process in the post-integration period represented a chain reaction which is still manifesting. Initially, the integration process was launched from the necessity to rally our country to the global trend of alliances in different European and Euro-Atlantic structures because of the known incapacity of a single state to confront to the threats and challenges emergent of the security environment. Afterward, by the adhesion to NATO, there were created conditions of new changes for the Romanian Armed forces because of the change came in the missions’ dynamic in the organization’s framework as the arguments mentioned in the previous paragraph. The necessity to adapt to the new statute represents other series of changes needed to be implemented in the military organization in order to adjust it in the coordinates of a NATO member state able to fulfil its responsibilities in the organization’s framework. For this, there are needed conceptual, structural, technological and cultural changes of the Romanian Armed forces.

3.1. Romanian Armed Forces change of vision

For NATO or for other states armies, inclusively for the Romanian Armed forces, the transformation represents “*a sustained change, often on large large scale and coherent, aiming to fulfil the strategic goal to create or maintain an advantage in*

⁸ Eugen BĂDĂLAN, *Înțelegerea transformării*, București, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, 2006, p. 57.

⁹ Ministerul Apărării Naționale, *Strategia de Transformare a Armatei României*, București, 2007, p. 9.

the competition or to annihilate some adversary's new or already existent advantage"¹⁰.

The Romanian Armed forces transformation process is correlated to the process of NATO's transformation. In this regard *"under the conditions of forces, concepts and capabilities transformation, the Romanian Armed forces Transformation Strategy represents the medium and long vision referring to the dimensioning, preparation and endowment of Romanian Armed forces to participate to the future operations. This put at the disposal of decision factors a strengthened military vision over the future configuration of forces structure and the capabilities necessary to fulfil the future missions by the Romanian Armed forces. The concepts and capabilities adopted and projected, will be transposed into requirements and plans by the defence planning process in consensus to NATO standards"*¹¹. By all means, any process of change starts with a plan, in our situation, with a strategy comprising a "vision" over the means of implementation of changes in order to fulfil the aimed goals to improve the organization's activity and the achievement of standardization in conformity to NATO requirements.

The change process in the National Ministry of Defence resulted in the implementation of a planning, programming, budgeting and assessment system compatible with the ones existent in the NATO member countries. This system's essence consists in *"the planning, programming, budgeting and assessment of human, material and financial resources designed for the armed forces is fulfilled on long term, in an integrated conception, based on programs. The system of planning, programming, budgeting and assessment comprises cyclic activities combining the centralized elaboration of defence planning directive and the assessment with the decentralized programming and management of programs"*¹².

By all means, for the Romanian Armed forces, the trend of conceptual military change is represented by the acceptance and implementation of doctrinary concepts, performative technology, principles keen to the theory of military organizing, research and goal to provide a common base of capabilities and the justification of fundamental competitive advantages conferred by those in the modern and multidimensional battlespace.

3.2. Changes on structural level

Romanian appurtenance to the Euro-Atlantic military and civilian structures, NATO, UN, EU defined new approaches and challenges in the national and international security field. Romania's integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures was the basic premises for initiating the reform of human resources management in the military institution. Change management in the personnel structure was marked

¹⁰ John GARSTKA, *The transformation challenge*, în: "NATO Review", No. 1 Spring, 2005, accesat la: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue1/english/special.html>.

¹¹ Ministerul Apărării Naționale, *Strategia de Transformare a Armatei României*, București, 2007, p. 4.

¹² Mihail POPESCU, *Reforma Armatei României – prezent și perspectivă în contextul apartenenței la NATO*, in "România – membru al Alianței Nord-Atlantice", Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, București, p. 19.

particularly by the phase of armed forces's switch from the compulsory military service to the military service based on voluntarship and the adequation of candidates selection for courses of formation of officers and under-officers to the profile of modern military leader. Thus, was achieved a restructuring of forces, commandments and command system. The result of the change done by personnel reform "it was reached from about 400,000 militaries, as the Romanian Armed forces numbered before December 1989, to 75,000 military posts and 15,000 civilian posts, at present"¹³ and follows as "until 2015, to reach only to 45,000 militaries"¹⁴. These evolutions in the MOD personnel structure are largely presented in the below diagram.




Figure no. 1 – The diagram of Romanian Armed Forces effectives' evolution in-between 1989-2009¹⁵

At this concern of structural transformations was created a transformation strategy since 2015, with well-defined goals, clear determined and with clear separation between the forces designed for NATO and the generation and regeneration forces to support the participation to Romania's defence or to the collective defence of the Alliance.

¹³ *Opinii: Statul roman, quo vadis?*, <http://www.ziare.com/politica/guvern/opinii-statul-roman-quo-vadis-1065229>

¹⁴ *Idem.*

¹⁵ *Adapted after Eugen Mavriş, Transformarea Armatei României, p. 10, www.andreivocila.files.wordpress.com/.../transformarea-...*

Thus, “*deployable forces are designed to fulfil the whole range of missions in conformity with the international engagements in the security and defence field wherein Romania is part of and comprise fighting, support, logistical support and special operations forces modular structured with actional and transport availabilities in any theatre of military actions able to self-sustain and provide the protection compatible to the allied states armies. These forces are formed by commandments, great units and units with high level of employment of at least 90% for personnel and 100% for battle technique, compared to necessary of war*”¹⁶.

But, “*the generation and regeneration forces are designed for the support of deployable forces and for the fulfilment of missions on the national territory of a state and in its proximity and comprise fighting, battle support, logistical support structures and also military education and training structures from all the armed force categories*”¹⁷.

It can be seen the new forces structures will be created until 2013, although are more diminished (even from the first semester of 2013) will be more supple and flexible, more specialized and centered on the settled goals at strategic level.

3.3. Changes in technological field

The rapid development and popularization of Internet technology yet since 1990 switched the information technology use in a new era. Thus, electronic commerce, electronic governance and electronic society, significant progresses of the informational era were in full expansion in the late ten years. The manner are fully used the informational resources of Internet to help organizations in reaching their strategic goals became a major challenge¹⁸.

There are forecasts the next dominant informatics paradigm will combine Internet and peer-to-peer and wireless technologies. Many experts forecast the following major revolution in the informatics activity will be called “Grid Computing”, offering to users the direct access to all the known electronical resources¹⁹.

Nowadays, when the advanced technology of information is used more widely in all the activity fields, the military organization needs performative informatics systems adapted to the permanent technological dynamics. Owing to the alert rhythm of information and communications technology development and their use in the educational system, the military universities can enhance students’ flexibility as long as the course’s objectives are reached. Consequently, “*the military institutions must*

¹⁶ Ministerul Apărării Naționale, *Planul strategic al Ministerului Apărării Naționale pentru perioada 2010-2013*, p. 6.

¹⁷ Idem.

¹⁸ Rețeaua de administrație publică a Națiunilor Unite – UNPAN, *Dezvoltarea rapidă a tehnologiei informației în secolul XX*, p. 5, <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un-dpadm/unpan041460.pdf>

¹⁹ Delphi Group White Paper, *Global Grid: the Quiet Revolution. So where’s the good news*, 2002, p. 2.

*develop and apply efficient policies corresponding to a new manner of teaching and learning*²⁰ informatized.

In this regard, the informatization of educational and military education process represents a basic component of the military organization which needs to renew the organizational structures, manners of management and means of using the information technologies. It is particularly necessary the implementation in the military education of a complex informatics system *because this system it has remarkable possibilities of performances enhancement. Thus, in the action of military education system modernization and perfecting, such informatics system must provide the fulfilment of two main objectives*²¹: the fundamentation of general and specialty training, starting from management to the provision of material resources and information needed and the development of students' capacities and abilities to efficiently use these informatics systems by developing their adaptability to the changes in the technological dynamics.

In *the Romanian Armed forces Transformation Strategy* it is provisioned "Alliance's requirement to confront all the threats and also the nature of constitutional responsibilities coming to it presumes the Romanian Armed forces to develop capabilities which allow it to undergo operations on the national territory, in the area of NATO responsibility as well as in a larger strategic environment, permanently influenced by factors asserting change"²².

As regards the development of Romanian military capabilities it was settled *the Conception of Endowment with major equipments and systems of the Romanian Armed forces in the 2006-2025 period* provisioning "Modernization and the coordinated acquisition of equipments in the Romanian Armed forces on short, medium and long term aimed the following guidelines: continuation of modernization and acquisition programs' ongoing in order to fulfil the action capabilities assumed by Force Goals; development of integrated systems of communications and informatics with the provision of vehiculated information security and also the implementation of network-centered capabilities; development of management system for the air and maritime space, the achievement of its interconnection in the NATO general system; provisioning some performative systems for battle support of the great units endowed with equipments of efficient and rapid leadership; implementation and development of capabilities of logistical support of forces; continuation of NBC warning and reporting system's accomplishment, concomitantly with the endowment of means of individual and collective means of forces protection; the procurement of licenses for the production in the country of military equipment necessary to enhance the endowment and standardization of battle and communication equipments; participation in NATO programs and cooperation with

²⁰ Elena ȘUȘNEA, *Avantaje și riscuri în e-learning*, The 3rd International Scientific Conference "E-learning and Software for education", Bucharest, April 12-13, 2007, http://adlunap.ro/else2009/journal/papers/2007/lucrare_72.pdf

²¹ C. PETRAȘCU, *Rolul tehnologiei informației în învățământul militar superior*, în "Educație militară", Editura Academiei Forțelor Terestre "Nicolae Bălcescu", Sibiu, 2000, p. 46.

²² Ministerul Apărării Naționale, *Strategia de Transformare a Armatei României*, București, 2007, p. 7.

member countries of this alliance to develop the national defence industry; the provision of forces' projection capacity by air and navy means; the provision with capabilities needed to sustain the structures participant in operations with equipments, materials and personnel, in necessary quantities and in optimum time"²³.

In-between 2004-2009, the situation of defence industry was critical, in parts desperate (therefore incapable to sustain the change goals settled in the documents, a.n.) owed to the following factors: the majority of commercial societies had big debts, involved in increments, and significant penalties, some even in bankruptcy situation; the promoted restructuring showed its inefficiency in the context of financial lack of support of activities from the programs; take place the late dismissals, many of them on employees' pressure thrilled by the offered compensating payments; financial sustenance for core specialists diminished by year to year reaching to an yearly average of 1,200 employees from the total of 7,000; a series of societies were in the distress stage in the functional limit accomplishing just guard activities and the capacities maintenance; privatization actions were meant to failure in the lack of an intern delivery market; foreign strategic investors did not show interest to invest in old buildings, obsolete technology and social problems in the plants; the export of armament although offer requests were in continuous growth, did not succeed to overlap 60 millions euros; the social problems sharpened and the employees reached to disperation because of very low revenues and lack of perspective for tomorrow etc.²⁴.

Afterward, the goals put down in "*National Ministry of Defence Strategic Plan for 2010-2013*" settled the endowment's priorities at the Romanian Armed forces level regard: the endowment of contingents deployed in the operations fields with equipments and weapon systems necessary to achieve the capabilities provisioned and correlated to the requirements of force structure and the goals assumed to NATO and EU, and also to increase the level of protection and security of troops participating in missions; procurement of equipments necessary to finalize the implementation of command-control conception on the national level; the procurement of equipments for the investments contributing to the achievement of the other goals of country's security policy in the military field; the endowment with armament systems and equipments of the undeployable forces; programs of acquisition/modernization to provide the national territory protection²⁵.

Presently, from the realization of those two documents are undergoing 85 programs regarding the endowment of all forces categories²⁶. Thus, the Armament Department, 8 programs are in the operation and support phase, as follows: modernization of Romanian tanks TR-85M "Bizonul"; self-propelled air defence system 35 mm calibre - "Gepard"; towed air defence system 35 mm calibre -

²³ *Ibidem*, pp. 6-7.

²⁴ <http://www.rumaniamilitary.ro/strategia-industriei-de-aparare>

²⁵ Ministerul Apărării Naționale, *Planul strategic al Ministerului Apărării Naționale pentru perioada 2010-2013*, p. 4.

²⁶ Floarea ȘERBAN, Secretar de Stat în MApN, *Despre arme și industria de apărare*, 3 august 2012, <http://www.rumaniamilitary.ro/tag/modernizarea-armatei-romane>

“Viforul”; school and advance training airplane - IAR-99 “Șoim”; Helicopter IAR 330 modernized in SOCAT and transport models; National Air Command Control System – NACCS; The system of friend-foe identification – dialogue; system for land technical support of air navigation - LTSAN “Ghidul”²⁷, and also 5 programs are ungoing: infantry battle machine MLI-84 “Jderul”; multiple launcher of undirected missiles with system of fire leading “Larom”; radars for small and medium heights “Gap Filler”; Frigates type 22 navy helicopter; RMNC program – fix component - RTP/RMNC-²⁸.

Also, Romania’s strategic goal for the procurement of multirole apparatuses must be represented by the procurement of V generation apparatuses in the next 20-25 years²⁹. Among the features of a multirole airplane is flexibility in the missions’ execution with the possibility to change the mission along the flight, big capability of survival in hostile environment under conditions of electronic war, the increase of flight’s security, lifelong low operation and maintenance cost, supersonic speeds at any altitude or very good manoeuvring qualities.

3.4. Changes in the military structure

In this world of continuous modifications and discontinuities, the commandant should be the first to encourage change and progress, consequently, showing the way to those. He/she must understand the both important requirements attracting change: the knowledge of technical conditions of change and understanding the attitude and motivation it produces. Th both requirements are very necessary. Yet, often, when change is not produced, is because of the unsuitable or unsatisfying motivation, not because of lack of technical abilities to adapt to change of the people involved.

The commandant must have by his competence, efficient manager qualities and the quality of real leader for the organization. In order to manage or accept a changing process, commandant must be aware by the involvements of the process and to have the courage to assume inherent risks.

By all means, the XXI century leadership is one of change³⁰ that needs the commandants ability to create, develop and implement an sorounding environment and to settle a set of valus, standards, goals, priorities and other factors encouraging the adaptation, modification and the real transformation counterbalanced by continuity, moderation and good sense.

The change process is a permanent feature of military culture which must adapt to cultural change of parental society and also the changing manner of war

²⁷ Ministerul Apărării Naționale, *Programe*, http://www.dpa.ro/simapa/programe/1_ob_ft.shtml

²⁸ Idem.

²⁹ Ministerul Apărării grăbește procesul cumpărării de avioane multirol, 8 august 2012, <http://www.ziare.com/articole/schimbari+armata+romana>

³⁰ Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth H. PRITCHARD, US Army Reserve, *Competency-Based Leadership for the 21st century*, 1999, Vezi: <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/pritchard.htm>

ongoing. Today, it seems we return to the hobbesian world³¹ wherein the ethnical, religious, national and/or regional antagonisms controlled utmost 40 years by the balance of bipolar power were released³².

This is the reason of extraordinary extent, in the '90, of the operations generically called *Peace Support Operations* - PSOs. Therefore, the military instruments from the majority of countries are called in to join one with each over the traditional function of war leading with one totally different to preserve peace. This set of changes brought many other important changes into the military culture in many countries. Essentially, in conformity with the affirmation of Soeters, Winslow and Weibull, actually, different developments regards the apparition of a civilian contemporary or business-type culture in the armed forces framework³³.

This new culture the most probable will consist in a general trend to look to the armed forces as an profesion and in self-leadership practices based on the team spirit and, generally, supporting on "allowed" structures of rules and action procedures. Obviously, there exist in this direction variations related to the national culture and the structures and groups in the armed forces would not resemble from this regard. Is sure the differences are often from a national armed forces to other.

In these macro-developments framework, the janusian feature³⁴ of the armed forces also plays a role. It seems in the actual époque, of "new wars", the organization in action – the "hot organization" – becomes more dominant in the pattern and philosophy of military organizations leadership, at least compered to the starting period of the Cold War when the "cold" military organization offered the pattern for activities organizing. Such, these general developments will induce changes in the framework of organizations in uniform culture which need a more thorough analysis. In this context, we should see the "cold" organiztion as a bireucratic one (military working in ministeries, services and garrisons), and the "hot" organization as the part of militaries on the battlefield.

Conclusions

The change process of the military organization encountered many difficulties as regards the humans' mentality but also owed to the intricatd manner to approach its new configuration.

The military organization restructuring opened a wide range of opportunities for the system's personnel. Still, along the welcomed thorough changes interfered also some unadequate measures. Thus, at the beginning of changes in the military body there were fired tens of thousands of militaries, were disintegrated hundreds of military units, there were put out of use tens of tones of munitions and missiles, big

³¹ Teza hobbesiană "a războiului tuturor împotriva tuturor" este promovată de Thomas Hobbes, filosof politic materialist al secolului al XVII-lea. Detalii la: <http://faculty.history.wisc.edu/sommerville/367/367-092.htm>

³² M. ZULEAN, *Diferențe culturale dintre armată și societatea românească*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, București, 2005, p. 14.

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 15.

³⁴ <http://www.enchantedmind.com/html/creativity/techniques/paradox.html>.

amount of military technique was transformed in old iron (tanks, airplanes, stations, auto devices) and great part of armed forces's patrimony (buildings and fields) were sold out. All these changes were done for the militaries to become better trained, better paid, better endowed with military technique in order to be able to confront the new challenges appeared in the actual and future security environment.

The goal of NATO transformation is the organization to remain revealing among the essential actors of the present security international environment. Under these circumstances, Romanian Armed forces transformation must follow the NATO and other modern armies' transformation trend, mainly, owed to our quality as full right member in it.

Transformation represents a continuous and innovative process of change involving the development and integration of some renewed capabilities to provide the interoperability and efficacy framework for each state and for NATO as a whole.

Indifferently we discuss about reform, modernization or transformation, all these directly affects the so-called capabilities constituted essentially by: concepts – approached strategies and doctrines; organizational structure – personnel, leadership, training and education; technologies – armament, battle technique, materials. Along those, it is also changing the organization's culture. Still, there is not a dimension of the military organization which, once submitted to change, not to affect the others in the sense of change. For example, technology produces effects as regards the adopted battle strategies, how is managed the structuring, training and education of personnel and even the military organizational culture which becomes more open once with the globalization affecting all the social life dimensions, inclusively the military.

Technological capabilities represent one of its main important components necessitating changes to be adapted to the new requirements in the operational framework of NATO. In this regard, the substantial enhancement of the relation to NATO, EU and the national defence industry represents a basic condition to enhance the endowment programs with capabilities of the Romanian Armed forces on the grounds of the smart defence and pooling and sharing concepts. Also, for the products assumed to be realized in the national framework is necessary also an oriented collaboration with the potential foreign partners able to offer qualitative and quantitative imports of know-how, technologies and modern technological lines in order to reinforce the national defence industry.

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THE NECESSITY OF A NEW NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY

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Abstract: Energy security becomes more strongly a particular aspect of national, regional and global security. Its ensuring involves today, more than ever, correlations with political and military aspects of security as a whole. The state of energy security implies overcoming of some vulnerabilities and counteracting of risks, dangers and threats to meet of energy needs. Welfare and security interests of citizens cannot be achieved without ensuring economic security and thus energy security.

In this context, a national energy strategy fully in step with the geopolitical and geoeconomic realities form security environment is needed. Romania, as an EU member country and an important part of the Black Sea region, need to maximize its geostrategic advantages, energy potential and not least the possibility of becoming a major transit corridor from Eastern producers to Western consumers.

Keywords: energy security, energy strategy, energy dependence, competitiveness, sustainable development.

1. National energy balance

The energy industry has a long tradition in Romania. It was the first country in the world to officially recorded oil production. In 1857 international statistics, Romania was the only country that appears with 1977 barrels of oil (275 tons). In contrast, USA has oil production in 1859, followed by Italy in 1860, Canada in 1862 and Russia in 1863. The refinery “Lumina” from Râfov near Ploiești, was at that time (1857) the third built in the world¹. In addition, Romania is among the first countries of the world that manages to capture methane gas (in 1908, Sărmășel from Mureș County) and oil gas (in 1910, Buștenari from Prahova County)².

In 1935, Romania reached the fourth position in the ranking of world oil producers with a production of 8.4 million tons. The 14.7 million tons of crude oil extracted in 1976 and 39.37 billion m³ of natural gas extracted in 1986³ are the peaks of hydrocarbon production of domestic industry.

In the 80s, the planned economy of Romania had a strong energy sector, built to sustain socialist industry. At the end of 1989, in our country operate 2,102 companies of which 1,541 in the state industry and 561 in the cooperative one⁴. From total, 79 state enterprises operate in fuel industry, including sectors as petroleum and oil gas extraction, petroleum refining, methane gas extraction, coal, coke-chemical.

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¹ Gheorghe PREDA, Mihai MARINESCU, Gabriel NĂSTASE (eds.), *Tratat: Valorificarea resurselor naturale. Volumul I: Bazele resurselor naturale*, International University Press, Bucharest, 2004, p. 102.

² *Ibidem*, p. 129.

³ National Commission for Statistics, *Anuarul statistic al României 1991*, I.P. “Filaret”, Bucharest, pp. 448-449.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 408.

After 1989, the Romanian authorities have begun the transition to a free market economy, including the energy industry. Structural reform of the national economy meant the closing of hundreds companies, plants and industrial sites, many of them ineffective. Also, it was take measures for restructuring/privatization of some energy industry “giants”, encouraging investment, increasing competition, and improving services. However, for various reasons, the Romania’s value as energy producing and refining, with significant exports and a highly developed specific activity, decreased greatly.

However, Romania remains one of the largest hydrocarbons owners from Central and Eastern Europe, which has an almost fully integrated oil industry. Our country has diversified energy resources reserves (oil, gas, coal, uranium), but rather limited. In 2011, Romania had proven reserves of about 600 million barrels of oil and 2,000 billion m³ of natural gas⁵. In addition, significant energy reserves that were discovered quite recently in some Black Sea areas and the possible extraction of shale gas gives an optimistic outlook on Romania’s energy deficit for the future.

The data presented in the following graphs show a decrease in oil and gas production, due to the need to protect domestic energy resources and reduce the share of hydrocarbons in the national energy mix. Also, oil and gas consumption begin to decrease since 2007, likely as a consequence of the financial crisis that led to reduced funds for buying hydrocarbons, restriction of activity or failure of some industrial consummators, increasing energy efficiency and savings, etc.




Figure no.1. Romania’s oil and gas production and consumption (2006-2010)⁶

⁵ U.S. Energy Information Administration, *Country Analysis Brief - Romania*, 2012, www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=RO&trk=m.

⁶ U.S. Energy Information Administration, *International Energy Statistics*, www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm.

As we can see, Romania continues to be vulnerable in terms of energy. The dependence on external sources of oil has increased slightly from 46.6% in 2006 to 47.3% in 2008 and then fall again to 46.6% in 2009 and 39.8% in 2010 amid the economic downturn. In contrast, dependence on external sources of natural gas decreased from 28.6% in 2006 to 15.6% in 2009 and then to increase slightly to 17.8% in 2010.

All these facts lead us to conclude that although Romania is still the owner of relatively significant energy resources, it cannot satisfy, given the financial crisis, globalization and increased competition in regional and international markets, domestic consumption needs.

2. Romanian Energy Strategy

Nearly a year after joining the European Union, the Government approved a new *Energy Strategy of Romania for 2007-2020*⁷, in line with the main EU energy objectives at that time underlined in the “Lisbon Strategy”, “Green Paper - A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy” and “An Energy Policy for Europe”. The Strategy takes into account the specific needs of Romania and achieve optimal scenario for the development of the national energy system at that time.

The stated *goal* of the Strategy is to ensure so-called energy independence in the context of sustainable development of Romania and the European Union. In accordance with European energy policy, the Strategy underlines the *priorities* of Romania in this field: ensure competitiveness, diversification of energy supply, environmental protection and provide investments to increase production and development capacities.

An update of Romania’s Energy Strategy is needed amid the changes caused by global financial and economic crisis on regional and international markets and new EU energy and environmental policy given by the *2009 directives package, Energy 2020 - A Strategy for Competitive, Sustainable and Secure Energy*⁸, and *Energy Roadmap 2050*⁹. Thus, the Bucharest authorities have launched to debate a new project *Energy Strategy for 2011-2020*¹⁰.

The *general goal* of new Strategy is “to meet the energy needs both now and in the medium and long term, at a lowest price as suitable for a modern market economy

⁷ Romanian Government, *Hotărâre privind aprobarea Strategiei energetice a României pentru perioada 2007-2020 (Decision approving the Romanian Energy Strategy for 2007-2020)*, in “The Official Journal of Romania”, Part I, no. 781, 19 November 2007.

⁸ European Commission, *Energy 2020 – A Strategy for Competitive, Sustainable and Secure Energy*, COM(2010) 639 final of 10 November 2010, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2011.

⁹ European Commission, *Energy Roadmap 2050*, COM(2011) 885, Brussels, 15 December 2011.

¹⁰ Ministry of Economy, Trade and the Business Environment, *Strategia energetică a României pentru perioada 2007-2020, actualizată pentru perioada 2011-2020 (Romanian Energy Strategy for 2007-2020, updated for 2011-2020)*, version 22 August 2012, www.minind.ro/dezbateri_publice/2012/STRATEGIA_energetica_actualizata_22_august_2012.pdf.

and a decent standard of living, in terms of quality, safety, and respecting the principles of sustainable development”¹¹. Romania’s energy security will increase by achieved the *strategic objectives* subsumed to security of supply – sustainable development – competitiveness trinomial, as follows:

Security of supply:

- Increasing the security of supply by providing the necessary energy resources and reducing dependence on energy imports;
- Diversifying the import sources, energy resources and their transportation routes;
- Increasing the adequacy of national transport networks for electricity, natural gas and oil;
- Protection of critical infrastructure.

Sustainable development:

- Increasing the energy efficiency;
- Promoting the energy production from renewable resources;
- Promoting the electricity and heat production in high efficiency cogeneration plants;
- Supporting research and development and dissemination results applicable in energy field;
- Reducing the negative impact of the energy sector on the environment;
- Rational and efficient use of primary energy resources.

Competitiveness:

- Developing the competitive markets for electricity, natural gas, oil, uranium, green certificates, greenhouse gas emission certificates trading and energy services;
- Liberalization energy transit and ensuring permanent and non-discriminatory access to transport and distribution networks and international interconnections;
- Further restructuring and privatization in the electricity, heat and natural gas sectors, especially on stock market;
- Further restructuring of the lignite sector in order to increase profitability and capital market access.

Also, the draft Energy Strategy for 2011-2020 provides *17 line of action* convergent with those of the EU energy policy. Between them very important for our analysis are:

- Improving security of supply both in terms of energy mix and network infrastructure;
- Choosing a balanced energy mix in order to increase energy sector competitiveness and security of supply, with emphasis on internal resources use, especially coal, hydropower potential, nuclear energy and renewable energy;

¹¹ *Idem*, p. 5.

- Managing efficiently and using rationally and in safe conditions of the national exhaustible primary energy resources and maintaining the primary energy imports on an acceptable level (limited/controlled dependence);

- Increasing energy efficiency throughout the energy chain: extraction - production - transport - distribution - consumption;

- Promoting use of renewable energy resources in accordance with EU practices;

- Proactive participation in EU efforts to develop an energy strategy for Europe, pursuing and promoting national interests.

The draft Strategy defines *five priority objectives* of the Romanian energy sector development:

1. Economic stability and security of supply in terms of uncertainty of international energy prices due to constantly rising of energy demand;

2. Environmental protection by implementing new technologies for energy production and consumption with reduced environmental impact and for climate change mitigation;

3. Proper functioning of the electricity and gas internal market as a guarantee for transparent and non-discriminatory competition and for regional and European market integration;

4. Development and production of new technologies for energy production and consumption and environmental protection in order to support economic development and new jobs by the energy sector;

5. Information and communication technologies play an important role in improving efficiency throughout the production - transport - consumption energy chain. These technologies offer the potential for a structural shift to processes and services with reduced consumption of resources, energy savings, smarter and more efficient transport and distribution networks.

In conclusion, Romania has proposed bold objectives – reducing dependence on imports, improving energy efficiency, increasing the country importance in the regional energy complex etc. – but their achievement is a complex issue that requires political will, time and significant financial resources. Moreover, most of these objectives are not measurable and describe rather intentions than targets that will be accomplished.

3. Landmarks for a new Romania Energy Strategy

Based on the status of exhaustible and renewable resources, their exploitation potential recovery, technical and economic capacity to exploit these resources, dynamics of national consumption growth, an appropriate energy strategy should to identify:

- Trends in energy consumption;

- Energy capacities to be rehabilitated/built in order to provide the necessary amount of energy, their transport and distribution;

- Legislative, institutional and economic measures to ensure the optimal functioning of the whole energy system;

- Measures to ensure the necessary human resource;
- Measures for compliance with environmental legislation;
- Measures to increase energy efficiency (maintain energy production with a lower consumption of resources and minimizing losses).

A forecast of national reserves of oil and gas by 2020 is presented in the new draft Energy Strategy¹². It is estimated that oil reserves will decrease from 60 million tons in 2011 to 28 million tons in 2020, while natural gas decrease from 134 billion m³ to 77 billion m³. In addition, the data shows that 2020 oil and gas production will be about 25% lower than in 2006, taking into account only known energy deposits.

In these circumstances, Romania will remain dependent on primary energy imports and the dependence level will be influenced by the discovery of new exploitable internal resources, the integration of renewable energy and increasing energy efficiency.

As main line of action in ensuring *security of supply*, the new draft Strategy aims to:

- Maintaining a balance between imports of primary energy and rational and efficient use of the national reserves on economic and commercial base;
- Diversifying and strengthening relations with energy producing and transit countries, in the framework established at European level;
- Diversification of supply sources and developing safe alternative routes;
- Participation in transcontinental hydrocarbon transport projects to Central Europe with potential route through Romania;
- Long-term contracts for imported natural gas to minimize disruption of supply;
- Stimulating investment in the exploitation of natural gas and crude oil reserves by encouraging new fields discovery and effectively turn to account the existent potential;
- Increasing the adequacy of the transport network through development and modernization under the concept of smart grid;
- Approaching together with EU Member States the issues concerning the protection of energy critical infrastructure in the fight against terrorism;
- Development of electricity generation based on renewable energy¹³.

In order to decrease the Romania's energy deficit some measures need to be put in practice: research of new energy deposits, development of transport infrastructure through cross-border interconnection projects, rehabilitation of existing pipelines and building new oil (PEOP project) and natural gas (Nabucco and AGRI) pipelines, increasing storage capacity of natural gas, oil and petroleum products.

Today, any discussion of Romania's energy security should start from one simple fact: national energy resources decrease continuously and Russia are the main energy source to cover the energy deficit of our country.

Therefore, we believe that Romanian authorities should make a serious analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each possible option to ensure energy security. In

¹² *Idem*, p. 13.

¹³ *Idem*, p. 35.

our opinion, the possible options – each with advantages and disadvantages – could be:

1. Cover needs from domestic resources

- *Advantages*: energy independence on limited term; avoid energy competition from regional and international markets; increase Romanian and European investments in modernization of national energy infrastructure, technologies and production capacities; construction of new nuclear power and hydroelectric plants; reduce production costs and energy prices; improve services quality; increase mutual interdependence between energy companies and government, between producers, suppliers and consumers; increase the share energy based on renewable energy; etc.

- *Disadvantages*: increasing exploitation of national hydrocarbon reserves and therefore their more rapid depletion; need for significant investment in new production capacities; increasing state control over energy industry; decreasing competition in the oil and gas internal markets; increase environmental impact; disturbances of traditional economic relations with other countries; etc.

2. Cover needs through direct agreements with Russia

- *Advantages*: safety cover hydrocarbon deficit; preserve national energy resources; negotiate mutually advantageous prices; increase investments; develop direct networks (pipelines, terminals, shipping) between the two countries; placing Romania as an important energy hub between the EU and Russia; enhance cooperation between national energy companies and Russian ones; development of bilateral economic relations; etc.

- *Disadvantages*: increase dependence on hydrocarbons imports; vulnerability increasing by supplying from a single source; possibility of domestic oil and natural gas production to gradually decrease; increasing Russian energy dominance in Europe; decrease of the energy share based of renewable resources; more stringent regulations for transport and distribution; any energy transactions must be approved in Brussels; possible Romania exclusion from major European energy projects; etc.

3. Cover needs through agreements with other resource-rich East countries

- *Advantages*: diversification of supply sources at national and European level; preserve national energy resources; decrease energy dependence on Russia; lower prices; increase investment in the development of energy infrastructure (pipelines, terminals, etc.); connect those countries to the regional and international economic circuits; increase competition on regional and European energy market; etc.

- *Disadvantages*: increase dependence on hydrocarbons imports; straining relations with Russia; undermining Russia's control of energy resources from Caucasus, Caspian, Central Asia; decrease share of Russian energy resources in Europe consumption; possible Romania exclusion from major Russian energy projects; etc.

4. Cover needs from energy transit

- *Advantages*: preserve national energy resources; increase investment in the development of energy infrastructure (pipelines, terminals, etc.); increase Romania's role as a transit country of Russian resources to the West; negotiate mutually

advantageous prices; diversification of supply sources at national and European level; etc.

•*Disadvantages*: increase dependence on hydrocarbons imports and transit; possibility of domestic oil and natural gas production to gradually decrease; decreasing competition in the oil and gas internal markets; increase environmental impact; disturbances of traditional economic relations with other countries; etc.

Security of supply, more efficient use of resources, affordable prices and innovative solutions depend on the option chosen by policy-makers in Bucharest. Those options do not exclude each other but rather complement and positive results of a combination of them could provide much-needed energy security in Romania in the medium and long term.

Conclusions

In the energy security field, the most pressing problem of Romania and other Black Sea riparian countries is the security of supply, given their dependence on Russian hydrocarbons and transport networks.

Therefore, we believe that a truly national Energy Strategy, that takes into account the geopolitical and geo-economic realities on regional and international level, is needed in order to maximize the Romania's geo-strategic advantages and its great energy potential. The Strategy should clearly identify key vulnerabilities and risks in the energy sector, set strategic objectives that can be achieved and modalities to achieve them, and especially the line of action on medium and long term to ensure a higher level of energy security.

Analyze the advantages and disadvantages of Romania's options to ensure its energy security – domestic resources, direct agreements with Russia, agreements with other resource-rich countries or transit – and implementation of option/options most feasible could provide the meet of energy needs both now and in the medium and long term, at a lowest price, in terms of quality, safety, and respecting the principles of sustainable development.

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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE – EU SECURITY RESOURCE

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***Abstract:** Considering as such the progress made, both within the Common Foreign and Security Policy and within the Common Security and Defence Policy, this topic approach is pursuing to sketch out the wording of an argument.*

That is, to permanently adjust the EU security structures to better support the European foreign policy decision making process and to deal with the threats and challenges to the European security by giving it the proper importance.

Currently, the EU is fully involved in the development of its own profile at a global scale within the frame of the international security architecture. This profile is based on a strategic vision and the right tools which allow EU to assume an operational role in the crisis management process.

***Keywords:** security, intelligence, decisional process, cooperation, geo-intelligence.*

Prolegomena

A debate of ideas and principles concerning question: “*If EU increasing military forces is or not the adequate manner to face and to confront the major actual threats to the international security environment*” is extremely important, but is not the main purpose of this paper.

Considering as such the progress made, both within the Common Foreign and Security Policy and within the Common Security and Defence Policy, this topic approach is pursuing to sketch out the wording of an argument. That is, to permanently adjust the EU security structures to better support the European foreign policy decision making process and to deal with the threats and challenges to the European security by giving it the proper importance.

Currently, the EU is fully involved in the development of its own profile at a global scale within the frame of the international security architecture. This profile is based on a strategic vision and the right tools which allow EU to assume an operational role in the crisis management process.

The recent period evolutions represent majors’ stages for an ample reconfiguration process of role that EU plays in management of global security. In this framework, the development of defence, security and foreign policy dimension, sustainable by capacities’ operationalisation represents essential segment of this process.

On this first decades of 3rd millennium, international security environment suffered considerable changes, with direct effects on EU and its members, on security and individual and collective defense. In this context, for a comprehensive approach

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and scientific approach on decision makers on security field we could appreciate that it is benefic intelligence integrated structure.

That, without doubt, it will demonstrate it is an extremely important element in decision maker process at European level and in efficient promotion of foreign policy, security and European defence. More, no intelligence concerning possible apparition of eventual crises and conflicts in EU interest area it could be more expensive (at union level and at it members) than building a European integrated intelligence system.

1. Actual security environment – hybrid challenges for EU

After US 2001, September 11, Spain (Madrid) 2004, March 11 and Great Britain (London) 2006, the risks concerning the international security environment, and in the first place those which are related to the growth of terrorist activities and mass destruction weapons must be known and fight against it, more then ever through by an open, dynamic, flexible and extended co-operation between states. This co-operation must include not only the information exchange, but, also, a plan of measures for the progressive annihilation of the primary causes of risks.

From this perspective EU seems to be, in experts view, non-threatened today and in the near future, by the classical type of conflicts (large armed attacks/offensives) but, in stead, seems to be exposed to a multiple type of threatens, most of them unpredictable, hard to be defined by today paradigms of understanding, and very diffuses and very hard to be thwarted.

Still, we appreciate that the specific elements for a classical conflict must be kept due to the fact that all the States have the Armed Forces prepared to develop military actions inside the Classical Armed Battle principles as it has been defined in the last century.

Today, at the European level, we can identify a set of major threats:

- ***The international terrorism*** – a strategically menace. This new kind of violence against normal individual safety or group safety, against national, regional or global security, is related to religious fundamentalist movements with complex historical motivation.

Beyond the near risks, the phenomenon of terrorism represents a menace to the openness and the tolerance of democratic societies and to their economical and social development.

- ***The growth of the menace of mass destruction weapons*** – represent a threat of regional and global peace and security. The major risk of this menace is due to the fact that even a small terrorist group could provoke a mass genocide, which the other days it was determined by the Classical Armed Forces of a high aggressively States.

- ***The existence of the failed states structures and the growth of the organised crime actions***, not so long ago considered Arial restrained, are today analysed from regional and global perspective. In some parts of the world (like Somalia, Liberia, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, etc) the appearance of the failed states structures, the civilian conflicts and the free access of all sort of weapons have

determined a real growth of the organised crime menacing with the entire security deterioration in the local and regional civil society.

The organised crime threat Europe, mostly by drugs traffic, human beings traffic, illegal migration, illegal weapons traffic etc. Lately, the relations between international terrorism and organised crime became more and more obviously.

The regional conflicts undermines the security and stability of all societies and offers the good conditions for developing terrorism and organised crime. European Union must pay a large attention to the latent or hidden tensions/conflicts at his borders (near by).

The economical "trembling" represents another type of menace for the European security and Defence and also for every of his states members. These aspects, which could be classified by some specialists into economical crises paradigm, are elements conducting towards a horizontal development of some new forms of these asymmetrical treats that we have already spoken.

From the perspective of the continuing complexity and unpredictability of the international threats, mostly hybrid or asymmetrically, the normal purpose of a secure environment impose *to work hard on a good coordination of crises management measures* at internal or international level, and to achieve *an exchanging of strategically intelligence between the involved States in real time (in accordance with their rules and principles)*. The ordinary bureaucracy, recognised by all the specialists, which tend to be a set-back for the progress in the field of individual and collective security and defence.

From this point of view the quantum of European instruments such as, joint planning and preparing, allocated budgets/ funds, the co-operation between the Agencies, seems to be insufficient and inadequate in front of olds and news national and international security risks.

Today, we can say, in order to accentuate the security mater, that we have also environment problems with a growth of natural disasters, new tensions concerning the under-development between North and South and some disagreements on socio-economical approaches between East and West¹.

2. Geo-strategically Intelligence – to support the EU politics

In this context, we can say, that for European Union the intelligence means:

- A helpful support towards the understanding of needs for safety of the citizens of all nations and State members, of needs for the entire society and a support for communitarian politics and strategies bases;
- A resource of European power inside the evolution of international security environment, which includes all the actions regarding the defence and the promotion of EU security interests and of his membership;

¹ Liviu MUREȘAN, *Riscuri și provocări în scenariile și strategiile ante și post Praga 2002*, in "Colocviu Strategic", nr.6/iulie 2002, Academia de Înalte Studii Militare, Centrul de Studii Strategice de Securitate.

- An early, exact, equilibrate and politically correct warning on the critical situations and a factor to support the political decisions in order to prevent and to fight and to wear off the European security dangers².

The common Intelligence allow the improvement of the European capacity for activeness in defending his internal and external security and more coherency and efficiency implementing the principles of the European External Policy and Common Security and of the European Defence and Security Policy.

The new opportunities, challenges and threats call for an appropriate Intelligence processes in the common European interest. The Intelligence is the European resource of power which provides the capacity *to think globally* and to *act locally* and to maintain *the common European space of freedom, security and justice*.³

Now it is easy to see the major importance given to the Intelligence level in order to promote the European politics and common interests.

Next, we will try to explain to you the main elements demanding the improvement of the co-operation process on Intelligence level inside European Union.

2.1. The need for the improvement of the co-operation process on Intelligence level inside EU

A large serial of evolution and events which have past on last two decades, on regional level but also the perspectives of security environment evolution, allow us to identify some reasons to underlining the necessity of high co-operation on the Intelligence level.

2.2. European dependency on the US capabilities

Once the Bosnia and Herzegovina conflict started, the European Union realised, due to the measures taken in that moment - only peace keeping mission - his minimal role, which hold back from a major contribution for finding a crisis solution. Also, the involvement in the crisis has showed again the excessive dependency of the European forces on US partner. The US capabilities of communication, surveillance and intelligence have been major factors on the success for the peace involvement force (IFOR) in Bosnia.

The fact that, sometimes, US have refused to provide Intelligence for the Allies has generated major frustrations inside European Command, along with their inefficiency to provide, on their own intelligence, independent analyses and evaluations on the Balkans situation⁴.

These experience has been repeated during the Kosovo conflict, when the Europeans have been incapables to properly respond on stopping crisis because,

² Aurel V. DAVID, *Informația – resursa de putere a Uniunii Europene în actualul mediu de securitate. Un punct de vedere*, p. 2, volume *Repere ale securității europene, A XII-a Sesiune de comunicări științifice cu participare internațională*, București, 16-18 martie 2006.

³ *Idem*, p 10.

⁴ Ole R. VILLADSEN, 2007.

mainly, due to their lack of intervention capabilities, the lack of C2 elements and the Intelligence Support.

Regarding this situation, the Italian analyst Alessandro Politi, has wrote: “...each crisis faced by the countries of EU demonstrates not only that effective intelligence is a pre-requisite for devising and implementing appropriate solutions, but that, when intelligence efforts have been uncoordinated, these countries have often faced the prospect of utter impotence”⁵..

We can appreciate that the experience of being US dependent and commanded in the same time, to play the role of American military power assistant has lead to the conclusion of the need to have intelligence capabilities at European level. This fundamental base will allow to the European States to participate during the decision-making process on the strategically and operational level inside the common military operations.

The 2003 Rapport of the EUO underlines that” the recent experience of military airborne operations in KOSOVO (1999, March-June), along with the difficult mater of targets selection, have determined the European States to look for the Intelligence autonomy”⁶.

2.3. Geo-Intelligence – the support for European Defence

Nevertheless, the Intelligence activity it is strongly related with the Defence concept. Briefly, the Defence Policy changes imply changes inside the Intelligence levels. The Military superiority must be supported by the efficient Intelligence capabilities, in order to prevent the conflict and to gain the battle.

The major military powers are dependents of Intelligence. That’s why the Intelligence activity, has become more and more integrated inside the Defence system, whether for the security needs or for military supply or for possible threats discover.

In the last decade, inside European defence field has been occurred 2 major events implying a lot in the evolution of the European Intelligence structure: on July 2000, the setting up of *European Aeronautic and Defence Company* and the *establishing of Multinational Force for Rapid Reaction*. The main purpose for the two entities is to support the European concept of unifying and consolidation. This purpose leads to intensify and to consolidate the co-operation in the intelligence field in order to act efficient in a super-national system

The intelligence support during the military operations is indispensable. Andrei Raevski said that the military operations without the Intelligence support are “blind, deaf and brainless”⁷.

The Intelligence provide for the troupes data concerning the environment for the military operations, allow to the combatants to optimize the disposal tools, direct

⁵ Alessandro POLITI, *Why is European Intelligence Policy Necessary*, in *Towards a European Intelligence Policy*. Chaillot Paper, 34, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 1998, p. 3.

⁶ WEU Assembly Document A/1775: “*The Challenges Facing European Intelligence – Reply to the Annual Report of the Council*”, June 4, 2002.

⁷ Andrei RAEVSKY: *Managing arms in peace processes: aspects of psychological [operations] and intelligence*, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, 1996.

the common effort and anticipate the near evolution of the conflict. The European desire to make efficient this multinational force will emphasize the *intelligence* co-operation process.

3. The evolution of the international security environment

Another major factor to drive on the intelligence co-operation at the European level, it is *the new security environment* or *the new multidimensional security approach* – a new concept after the Cold War⁸. This new environment is very complex. First of all, there are no clear threats (such Warsaw Pact). Instead, there are new complex risks like terrorism, organised crime, economical and social underdeveloped societies, the failure of the policies in some States, ecological, religious and mentality problems etc. Inside this environment the concept of security gain new definitions, became multi-contextual, without a clear limitation between the threats. Secondly, the new security concept it is no more only for the State level. There are security actors/providers on the State level but also above or under it.

The wars are not between the different States, not necessarily. In the third place, the new security challenges are trans-nationals, due to their places of action and effects. The Intelligence specialist Robert Steele resume the impact of this new security context impact on the activity of intelligence underlying the exchange of paradigm in the intelligence collection filed from “*just-in case*” to “*just in time*”⁹.

If, in the past, from the Western perspective a constant threat like the Soviet system, has imposed the step by step collection in order to have all the puzzle, today the new risks and menaces are more diffuses, from different unexpected places, suddenly and the response must be firm, adequate and rapid. And the last but not the list challenge, comes from the global revolution of Information –Internet. Data could be transmitted / accessed anywhere on the Globe, fast and free.

Conclusions, assessments

As a geographical, political and economic union, Europe ought to benefit of a formula designed to provide a common intelligence activity as well. The integration culture should also be extended to the level of an intelligence policy as in the current security environment the bilateral relations between national intelligence structures seem insufficient to support the effort of indentifying the appropriate answers to the new challenges to security. Even more, a common European intelligence policy should be developed and implemented as an integrant part of the security and defence policy for a more effective promotion of the Common Foreign and Security Policy – CFSP.

⁸ Sven BISCOP, *The European Security Strategy – Implementing a distinctive approach to security*. Brussels, Royal Defence College, 2004.

⁹ Robert Steele is a former CIA official, one of the initiators of OSINT revolution in USA. The terms used in the text were quoted by Alessandro Politi in *Towards a European Intelligence Policy*.

The development of such policy and within it of a European intelligence structure represents an important current issue and moreover, a perspective one. The phenomenon of cooperation in the intelligence field is visibly progressing with regards both to the quality and the quantity of intelligence. It is highly likely that the European cooperation will continue to intensify despite a series of major difficulties such are the aspects related to sovereignty, lack of trust, interoperability or even “privileged” relations of some states with US.

The current analysis confirms the supposition that common intelligence assessments facilitate a common perception of the threats and implicit common points of view and perspectives related to actions and measures that should be implied. This benefit is mainly due to the favourable position of being able “to see” a certain situation or event through “the same window” that the intelligence sharing process puts each member in. Additionally, the competition (by its positive outcomes) between the national intelligence services will contribute to an increased quality of the intelligence products.

With regards to the type of organization or structure to serve best EU need of effective and opportune intelligence products, our study reaches the conclusion that the establishment of an intelligence agency at the European level (EIA) may represent an essential element within the process of Common Foreign and Security Policy – CFSP implementation, the central pillar required to accomplish the European Security Strategy.

To “assemble” such a structure within EU may encounter certain difficulties against the background of previous criticism towards the mechanism of the Union related to the lack of clarity in the decision-making process and even of transparency. EIA is supposed to be an independent institution (with the activity conducted in the most objective manner possible) subordinated to an institution or to a person. A possibility of the kind may be the European Commission and the president of the Commission. Due to its role of EU executive body assigned to elaborate law initiatives and to monitor their implementation, the Commission has indeed a supranational nature (as it is independent of the member states) and its members represent the interests of the Union (and not those of the originating countries). Consequently, the European Commission should be the first to benefit of the intelligence products. In the circumstance of EIA identifying a direct and immediate threat to EU, the EU Council (the Ministers’ Council) will be instantly provided with intelligence. Ordinarily, the Council, which is the main law body of the Union, would receive reports, analyses and estimations on areas of interest. By its prerogatives, the European Parliament might be the body responsible for EIA budget and the exertion of the democratic control over the agency’s activity.

As far as EIA activity is concerned, initially it may resume to the collection of intelligence provided mainly by the intelligence services of the EU member states but also from other sources (for example, the current sources of Joint Situation Centre - SITCEN). In long term, the agency may develop into a self-sufficient institution with its own resources and hardly dependent on the national services.

CEIA's main role would be the collection of intelligence data from all sources available and independent analysis of them in order to prepare intelligence products for directing European decision-makers for security, defence and foreign policy issues. It is impossible to imagine more efficient intelligence capabilities without closing of the "informational cycle" inside a single unified system. The system's success is influenced by all constituent elements, which are acting together. The efficiency of the European intelligence activity will be limited without capability and necessary tools for coordinating national intelligence services activity. The lack of directing competence of super state level determines the European intelligence community to lose an important opportunity to optimize the using of intelligence data and the benefits of this activity. Briefly, an intelligence system should be "full-service" to be efficient.

It seems to be obvious that, together with more complex requirements and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) tools, the intelligence activity (generally speaking), as informational base of decision-making process, should become more advanced. This assumption is validated by the approach from the systemic theory perspective which goes from "the more complex system, the more complex the system control" theory¹⁰.

We could say that Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN) inherits the intelligence system ambition which is acting in a similar context, in the same time. The standard is offered by the American system, whose services are used to solve similar matters as the action against terrorism or the leading of civil-military operations¹¹.

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COMPUTER VIRUSES AS ESPIONAGE INSTRUMENTS. THE CASE OF FLAME VIRUS

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***Abstract:** Modern espionage uses classical instruments, whose efficiency was proved over time, but also modern means, as malware. A complex computer virus, called Flame, discovered in May of 2012, acted clandestinely on numerous computers around the globe, obtaining confidential information for its controllers.*

***Keywords:** virus, flame, espionage, cyberspace, Iran.*

Cyber espionage, how everybody can guess, consists of usage of cyberspace by intelligence services to obtain secret information. For instant, in April of 2009 security barriers of one of the companies involved in designing the F-35 aircraft were breached by hackers, who downloaded terabytes of information regarding the plans of new airplane. Security experts' checks showed that the theft have the mark of Chinese hackers, but it is difficult to say with certainty that the operation was carried out by Chinese government, although it is hard to believe that other entities from China could have been interested in such an information, like a new combat aircraft.

This method of practicing espionage seems obsolete, in the light of the information provided by experts in cyber security after discovering Flame, a virus whose presence in the cyber realm was made public on 28th of May 2012 by Iran CERT, following an investigation of a Russian security company, Kaspersky Lab. This company was the one who gave the name of the virus, based on part of a file title. The discovery of the virus was somehow accidental, because Kasperky specialists were looking in fact for a different malware, responsible for infecting hundreds of computers in Middle East and deleting their hard-disks. In the frontline of the investigations on Flame was also a Hungarian IT laboratory, Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security. The surprising preliminary result of the investigations was that Flame and Stuxnet (a famous malware, discovered in June of 2010, created, supposedly, to sabotage the Iranian nuclear program) were created by the same team. Flame seems to be anterior to Stuxnet, even if it was discovered later.

Flame, according to Iranian officials, affected to some extent oil export facilities of Iran. We don't know much and we don't even can make estimations of the information gathered by Flame in the years of clandestine operation.

1. Infection capabilities

The initial information provided by security companies regarding Flame capabilities seemed science-fiction. The virus operated, undetected, for a long time, activating microphones, recording conversations, making screen-prints, copying files, recording keystrokes and transferring information to command and control centers.

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Experts from notorious security companies, like Symantec, Kaspersky showed that Flame was written to spread inside a LAN through a memory stick. It can replicate even inside a well-protected network; then it takes control of the each infected computer.

Flame can secretly turn on the microphone and the video camera of the computer, recording users' conversations and images. It also can take screenshots, especially when software like Yahoo Messenger were used, can extract location information from computer's images and can send messages using Bluetooth technology. The virus scans the area around the computer, looking for devices using Bluetooth and when one such device is discovered, identifies them and record any information available. The entire activity of the virus is materialized in a secret convey of the recorded data toward those 80 command and control centers around the world.

Flame has access to documents, e-mails and any other messages stored on infected computer. All this information is transmitted by SSH (Secure Shell / cryptographic network protocol) and HTTPS (Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure) protocols to command and control centers, without computer owner having any idea. Those centers can provide further instructions for virus.

Although the code complexity suggests Flame was created for strategic purposes, most probably targeting the Iranian nuclear program, there were many usual users between targets. So, it can be that the virus creators saw the benefits of using Flame beyond the preliminary scope. It is also possible that Flame escaped from destined area, exactly the same thing that happened with Stuxnet, created for nuclear facilities, but who somehow leaked outside, going online on the Internet, probably through flash memory sticks.

Flame complexity and code dimensions (around 20 MB, based on configuration), targeted geographical area (Middle East, especially Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, West Bank, Liban etc.) and behavior – all of them show that Flame is a cyber-weapon. This is not a tool for illegal financial crimes, but for intelligence gathering, using for this all the possibilities of the target computer.

As said above, Flame was created for espionage. After infecting a computer, the virus open a backdoor, subsequently used to add new options, based on attacker's interest. Flame has *sniffer* add-on (a piece of software specialized in the analysis of data transmitted in the network) to collect usernames and passwords used on the infected computer. The virus identifies if there is an Internet connection available and gathers users' data: execution logs, processes list, hardware configuration on the machine. Interestingly, not all the operating systems were affected: Windows 7 on 32 bits – 50% of the total number of infections, Windows XP – 45% and Windows Vista – 5%. Windows 7 on 64 bits was not affected by Flame.

2. Propagation mechanism

As propagation mechanism Flame uses Microsoft Windows Update service. Why this service? Because this is used by the majority of Windows users and

Windows is the most spread operation system today; the usage of such a service doesn't draw attention to a possible unauthorized activity ongoing on a computer. In fact, the virus cheats the computer, making it to "believe" that, in fact, it is only a mundane update operation taking place.

Taking control of Windows Update is not a job for everybody, every update requiring a specific Microsoft signature. According to Microsoft technicians there was an exploit of an old cryptographic algorithm. Flame avoids restrictions, using a security certificate that seems to belong to Microsoft. When the operating system verifies the existence of a Windows update, Flame takes control, showing as a valid code, recognized and validated by the system.

Although other viruses have as their purpose to gather secret data from computers, Flame overcomes in complexity any other known malware. The simple fact that it has such a large palette of possibilities regarding data collection makes Flame a genuine espionage agent.

3. Suicide capability

An advanced capability of Flame is that of disappearing without trace from any infected computer, when required. Those controlling the virus have the possibility to activate certain routines responsible with suicide. StarBrowser is the component in charge with localizing every files of the virus, removing them and over-writing the hard-disk.

As a result, when there are serious reasons to cease the activity on a computer (for instant, when the discovery of the virus is imminent or it finished its job), command and control servers are used to send orders to the virus and start the suicide process. In seconds, Flame will disappear from the computer, leaving no trace behind.

4. How Flame infiltrates a target-computer

We have to state that antivirus applications were without reaction to Flame presence on Internet. The virus has the capability to identify dangerous software for him, like an antivirus, and to act clandestinely, without any suspicion regarding its activity. Being able to dissimulate its activity as a regular operating system update process, as we mentioned before, Flame succeeded in operating invisibly for many years.

The discovery of Flame gave birth to intense arguments regarding the role of antivirus software in a new era of strategic, military viruses, created from dedicated programmers, working in teams, having an excellent knowledge of the virus propagation medium and of the security protocols and software assuring the basic functions of the global network and much more. Should antivirus software have as purpose to detect sophisticated malware as Flame or its role was and continues to be that of "smashing" ordinary viruses, created and spread by hackers? Will it be necessary to launch a new products line specialized in super-viruses, to protect

critical cyber infrastructure? Or maybe security companies should offer only security solutions as they did until now, and the risks associated with military viruses stay with security administrators of each company having important assets to protect. All these questions have no definitive answer, but they suggest the transition to a new phase of cyber protection, a phase when the limits of tradition security solutions were exposed, being necessary a rethinking of the way of carrying out cyber defense, especially of those systems that store or exchange sensible information.

5. Who is the creator of Flame?

An exact identification of Flame creators is a difficult task even for security companies that can provide only partial and probable answers. But they were helped by officials from American secret services, who leaked some information in press.

As a result, according to some people having a good knowledge of US cyber operations and who offered details to important journals (New York Times or Washington Post) under protection of anonymity, Flame was written 5 years ago, part of a program called Olympic Games, developed by USA and Israel, having the purpose to slow down the Iranian nuclear program and to reduce in this way the pressure regarding a conventional military attack, allowing diplomatic measures to be prevalent. Cyber operations have the role to help other sabotage actions of those two countries above mentioned, like the introduction of defective components for centrifuges in the Iranian acquisition chain.

The operation that had the purpose to delay as much as possible the Iranian nuclear program started in 2000. In 2008 it moved from Armed Forces to CIA. Flame was created to map Iranian computer networks, monitor them and acquire information that was meant to be sent to the command and control centers.

Stuxnet was discovered 2 years ago. This malware, specialized in sabotage, had as target a certain type of industrial controller present in Natanz uranium enrichment facilities, affecting around 1000 centrifuges, from 6000. The malfunctions took place for a long period, Iranian officials believing for a while that it was about functional errors. National Security Agency (NSA) and CIA would be involved in development and usage of cyber weapons. If NSA has very good programmers, CIA has the means to spread the virus, as infiltrated agents capable to introduce it through a memory stick into a target computer. CIA, through Information Operations Center, carries out cyber espionage operations, like information extraction from specific computers, as those of persons involved in terrorist acts against US. The cyber assault against Iran, according to an anonymous American official, is a more ample and a continuous operation than imagined. Even if Stuxnet and Flame were discovered, there are other cyber weapons acting undercover.

6. What is “safe” in cyber space?

The mere existence of viruses with capabilities like those of Flame’s gives birth to serious concerns regarding the communications security between different

entities who want to talk secretly. Nothing is sure now, except if completely isolated from any infected network. This fact is worth to be mentioned because it seems that it is not anymore enough to have good cryptographic software for exchanging information. Because the keyboard can be recorded, there are needed special measures to assure a secret communication.

On the other hand, the opportunities that come with viruses as Flame, that permit to access confidential information without user awareness, offer exceptional advantages, making possible efficient intelligence operations for those in control of adversary communications. It's useful maybe to mention here the decisive advantage gained by Great Britain during the Second World War through breaking the German codification code of the famous Enigma machine. The access to German communications permitted the identification of all German agents operating on Britain soil. Part of them were recruited by Britain intelligence officers and used, as double agents, in a very efficient disinformation operation, hiding the real location of Europe invasion, planned by generals of Great Britain and US. The capability to intercept and decipher messages permitted a full understanding of actions and beliefs of Germans. More than that, probably this cryptography breakthrough played an important role in the victory of allied powers. In the same way, current espionage weapons could provide a strategic advantage for those who control them.

Flame became famous immediately after its discovery. It generated discussions and drew attention of many international actors regarding the real possibilities and potential benefits of using a sophisticate cyber instrument. On the other hand, some governments are involved in developing complex cyber weapons, like Stuxnet or Flame that could be useful to reach certain goals, otherwise very difficult to fulfill. Probably it's safe to say that currently there is an ongoing cyber arms race. But the usage of cyber weapons is more silent than that of classical weapons, so it could be possible to find out of the technology developed and used today after a long time, as we found about Flame. A great advantage for small and not so wealthy states is that a great cyber weapon doesn't require so much money as a classical weapon, so it's affordable with small quantities of money and dedicated people.

Conclusions

Even if an important part of our planet is accustomed to Internet, this medium is poorly understood and protected. Cyber space is a new domain of battle, where specific weapons, like computer viruses, could be used to fulfill national security objectives. Intelligence services are – or should be – in the front line of national security system in terms of cyber defense but also cyber reaction (cyber-attack).

Flame, having an amazing capacity to dissimulate, spread and collect information from target computers is a new milestone regarding the real capabilities of cyber weapons, showing that classical antivirus software is inefficient against military viruses, created by elite programmers. More than that, together with classical methods of intelligence services, a virus like Flame can penetrate almost any network, even not connected to Internet.

The discovery of Flame poses in a stringent way the problem of information security on networks and computers. To ignore it means, most probably, to risk to compromise confidential information. Flame is somehow history now, but it is possible that similar malware or even better one to act right now in a clandestine manner on our classified computers.

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THE RUSSIAN CYBER CAMPAIGN AGAINST GEORGIA (2008)

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Abstract: In the context of conflict between Georgia and rebels from South Ossetia, Georgian military responded with rocket to rebels attack. Russian troops, stationed in the area, intervened and pushed back Georgian soldiers. Interestingly, the kinetic Russian aggression was preceded by a series of cyber-attacks that affected communication infrastructure, financial system, governmental and news websites.

Keywords: Cyber, attack, cyberspace, computer, Georgia, Russia.

In just two years after Georgia gained its independence, 1991, it lost control of two of its territories, South Ossetia and Abkhazia that, following a short conflict with Georgian armed forces, were able to consolidate their position as autonomous territories, setting up their own governments.

In 2008 rebels from South Ossetia provoked a new conflict, carrying out several rocket attacks on Georgian villages. In response, Georgian military also used rockets and in short time invaded the region, on 7th of August, 2008. In the following day, Russian troops located in the area start fighting Georgians, pushing them back.

Before the physical aggression, a series of cyber-attacks affected Georgian governmental web-sites. The site of the presidency was vandalized, the attackers publishing on it anti-Georgian messages.

Georgian banks disconnected from Internet, trying this way to avoid intrusions in their systems. But hackers simulated in exchange attacks on foreign banks, having origins on Georgian territories, an operation that had as result the decoupling of Georgia from international banking system. The ATM system and, later on, the mobile phone networks were paralyzed. In order to block access of Georgian people to recent news on battle campaign mass-media sites were attacked. Even important foreign news sites, like BBC or CNN become unavailable, because hackers pointed Georgian Internet exchange points.

The method largely used by attackers was the same as against Estonia one year before: a DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service¹) attack, using 6 botnets. A new element was introduced: a free software, made available by hackers to anyone eager to install it could be used to enroll in cyber campaign by unleashing numerous requests and giving in this way a huge dimension to the attack on Georgian servers².

In the same way it did in case of Estonia, Russian government declined any involvement in cyber-attack, invoking Russian patriots helping voluntarily war effort

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¹ See explanations on DDoS on page 4.

² John BUMGARNER and Scott BORG, Overview by the US-CCU of the cyber campaign against georgia in august of 2008, <http://www.registan.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/US-CCU-Georgia-Cyber-Campaign-Overview.pdf>, accesat la 07.10.2012

of Russian troops³. Security experts analyzed origin of the attacks and suggested they were coordinated from computers known to belong to Russian intelligence.

As we said before, cyber conflict against Georgia is not a singular case. Before is the notorious cyber-attack against Estonia in 2007. But cyber aggression against Georgia is of most relevance to military leadership because it went along with a real conflict. Cyber-attacks in this conflict are well-documented by security experts and could be a model of future wars in cyberspace.

Some IT specialists⁴ believe cyber-attacks against Georgia were really executed by civilians, and there was no governmental or military involvement, since no proof exists in this sense. On the other hand it is to be mentioned that cyber-attacks preceded kinetic intervention, indicating coordination between hackers and Russian military vectors. Attacks in cyberspace, once unleashed, were oriented to targets without hesitation, showing a preparation of mission; targets were pre-selected, Internet domains registered and software used written well before the attacks started. This coordination raises natural questions regarding a possible capability of Russian intelligence / military to camouflage their cyber activities and to create an image of disorganized activities taking place, but no involvement of the state.

Servers used to coordinate attacks are, in many cases, those of Russian organized crime that, previously and probably after the conflict, was involved in many crimes in cyberspace. There were speculations regarding a desire of organized crime to be seen as heroic and pro-Russian. But this hypothesis is questionable, because organized crime acting in cyberspace has no known leaders who needed sympathy of the public. On the other hand it is difficult to understand why organized crime would offer its services to the government.

1. Attack methods

First wave of cyber-attacks was carried out with the help of botnets. A botnet (robot network) is a computer network whose control is taken by hackers, without the knowledge of computer owner. Botnets is formed by infecting computers with different methods and taking remote control of the infected computer. Stations incorporated in botnet, called zombie computers, could be localized anywhere on the planet and are used, for various purposes in the majority of situations without any notice from users' part. So, a user could be involved in illegal activities having no idea about it. At best, an infected computer owner can detect, if he is an advanced user, an unjustified usage of computer resources.

Botnets are part of the Russian organized crime arsenal and this is probably one of the reasons that generated the idea that cyber criminals could be involved in

³ Tom ESPINER, Georgia accuses Russia of coordinated cyberattack, http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-10014150-83.html, accessed on 22.06.2012.

⁴ Overview by the US-CCU of the Cyber campaign against Georgia in August of 2008, p. 2, <http://www.registan.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/US-CCU-Georgia-Cyber-Campaign-Overview.pdf>, accessed on June 29, 2012.

cyber-attacks against Georgia. The systems used to control those botnets were, in part, known to security experts, and in part new. These controlled computers, hacked and controlled as part of botnets, were used to attack a limited number of targets (around 11 websites⁵). The fact that these networks existed at the beginning of the cyber aggression is a good cover for attacks coordinators.

Initially, the targets of the cyber-attacks were governmental and news websites. The lack of power to maintain these sites up was a source of demoralization for Georgian population that tried to access news regarding the evolution of the Georgian-Russian conflict, waiting for a desired occidental involvement. After Russian troops occupied positions inside Georgia, it was noticed a diversification of selected targets, including more governmental websites, the biggest two banks, education institutions, science and medicine websites⁶.

During the second phase of the cyber war not-skilled Russophiles were invited to give a hand to the war efforts. They were provided with cyber instruments available on certain web pages destined to overload selected targeted servers (DDoS attacks). This new tactics facilitated a new set of 43 websites to be made unavailable⁷.

DDoS attacks are not sophisticated. They have a simple philosophy: any server has a limited capacity to answer connecting requests from its clients. If the number of requests overcomes this capacity, then the server gets incapable to provide required information to all of those solicitations. In numerous occasions, if the server is not well protected, it becomes unavailable. But even if the manner of attack execution was not sophisticated part of the software used was complex. There were instruments based on HTTP⁸ (not on ICMP⁹, as in Estonia case), requesting from servers inexistent webpages, aspect that turned up to be more devastating, blocking the servers faster than a classical DDoS attack based on ICMP protocol.

An interesting fact, communication and mass-media centers were not hit kinetically¹⁰. This seems to be a surprise, because they are usually strategic targets. But a site lending gas power generators was blocked, probably to complete the work in terms of hitting Georgian power networks. Nevertheless cyber-attacks were a good substitute for rockets or bombs, succeeding in blocking Georgian communications, fulfilling in this way at least two purposes:

- Russians avoided a negative illustration of their actions in Western media;
- The real cyber capabilities of Russia were tested and Georgian defense capabilities, also, put to test.

⁵ Overview by the US-CCU of the Cyber campaign against Georgia in August of 2008, p. 4, <http://www.registan.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/US-CCU-Georgia-Cyber-Campaign-Overview.pdf>, accessed on June 29, 2012.

⁶ *Idem*, p. 5.

⁷ *Idem*.

⁸ Hypertext Transfer Protocol.

⁹ Internet Control Message Protocol.

¹⁰ Overview by the US-CCU of the Cyber campaign against Georgia in August of 2008, p. 6, <http://www.registan.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/US-CCU-Georgia-Cyber-Campaign-Overview.pdf>, accesat la 29 iunie 2012.

Moreover, the avoidance of physical destruction of the above mentioned centers drew attention to a sensitive aspect of informational society: much equipment can be made unavailable through cyber means. Although the efficiency of a cyber-attack is, in this case, the same as that of a kinetic attack, the costs are clearly in favor of the first one. Russian military new that international reaction is less powerful to a cyber-aggression. And reality proved right this position, because international media reactions were moderate.

On the other hand – and this is an important aspect that validates the usage of cyber-attacks before or concomitantly with regular attacks – cyberspace provides a good cover for activities carried out inside it. It is possible at any time to say that you, as government or military, have no connection with certain activities executed in forms of various cyber-attacks. In cyberspace is difficult to say with certainty, especially if there is a skilled perpetrator involved, who is behind of a cyber-attack.

Although cyber war makes news titles, this is a technical domain and it is therefore difficult for mass-media to provide successful reportages based on cyber actions. We can add here a weak understanding of cyber phenomena by press and general public, facts that establish supplementary limits to cyber-aggressions promotion against a certain country, like in Georgia in 2008.

An argument regarding the coordination of cyber-aggression by Russian military is based on the fact that cyber-attacks avoided part of critical infrastructure of Georgia, available on Internet. According to a former CIA official, cyber-attacks coordinators didn't want to affect oil facilities, a political decision being made in this respect. The West was interested to have Baku-Ceyhan transportation line unaffected. As a result, kinetic and cyber-attacks were carried out in such a way in order not to affect the hydrocarbon facilities¹¹.

If not a Russian unique command, including kinetic and cyber hits, probably disparate attackers would have used all available opportunities to produce as much damage as possible to Georgian infrastructure. In this way the cyber war would have crossed the line of virtual domain, generating damages in the physical world.

Another supportive element for the theory saying that Russian military was behind the cyber-attacks is the fact that the cyber-attack was coordinated with kinetic attack. For instant, official and news sites of Georgian city Gori were targeted by hackers short before the Russian aircrafts attack. A legitimate question is: how did the civilian cyber attackers know, not coordinated by some Russian officials, the next target of bombardment aircrafts? How did they know that is was Gori, not Georgian capital, Tbilisi?

2. Foreign help for Georgia

Georgian security specialists tried, without a real success to block cyber aggression. They contacted their partners from Estonia, but Estonians just put them in contact with an informal group of security experts. The installation of filters to block

¹¹ <http://stevelevine.info/2009/08/cyber-attack-strategy-part-of-russian-attack-on-georgian-pipelines-report-finds-2/>

messages from Russian IPs didn't work, because they used servers from other countries, servers under control of Russian hackers. Certain Georgian websites were moved on foreign servers, Estonian or from US, but this undertaking was a full success because even the new servers were attacked by DDoS and eventually blocked.

Foreign cyber help for Georgia came also from renowned companies or other governments. For instance, Google offered to help Georgian government, protecting Foreign Minister website and online news service from civil.ge. The president of Poland offered to host press messages regarding Georgian conflict on its own official website¹².

Conclusions

The effects of cyber-attacks on Georgia were huge. With communications down and many websites unavailable, the actions of Georgian government were impeded. Georgian government was not able to communicate with population and, important aspect, was not able to tell the world what really happened in Georgia. National Bank of Georgia didn't work for 10 days on Internet. E-mail servers, fixed and mobile networks were severely obstructed¹³.

Probably the most important lesson of the cyber conflict talks about the necessity for each country to prepare to be able to protect itself in case of cyber war. Beyond classical preparations for war, involving personnel training and equipment acquisitions, the cyber capabilities should be in attention of all dedicated institutions involved in national security. It could be a good idea to have large cyber exercises simulating complex cyber-attacks in order to determine the weakness and become aware of the real status in terms of cyber defense capabilities. On the other hand, this kind of exercise could lead to fruitful collaborations between diverse national and international entities in time of peace and, possible, at war.

Most probably cyber-aggression against Georgia was a necessary step for Russian to test its real cyber capabilities. They could test their cyber instruments, the willingness of different voluntaries to be part in a warfare scenario and the international reaction to cyber aggression. At this moment a cyber-attack is not associated to a physical aggression. But there are progressive discussions between experts and probably in a short time some countries will state that a cyber-attack could be considered a physical attack and could be responded with kinetic attacks.

Cyber-attack against Georgia pointed to a behavior that could be seen in the future: countries in the proximity of Russia, in case of disobedience could be forced through usual methods but also through cyber means to conform to certain directions desired by Russian government.

Proved to be efficient in strict coordination with kinetic strikes, most probably the future conflicts will have a cyber-component. This component will have the role

¹² http://www.bdccl.ee/files/files/documents/Research/BSDR2009/1_ashmore-impact-of-alleged-russian-cyber-attacks.pdf.

¹³ *Ibidem*.

to support war effort through different types of operations, from informational operations to sabotage.

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