

ROMANIA
NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY "CAROL I"
CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES



STRATEGIC IMPACT

No. 3[32]/2009

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NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY "CAROL I" PRINTING HOUSE
BUCHAREST, ROMANIA



The Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies' scientific quarterly magazine acknowledged by the National University Research Council as a B+ magazine

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ISSN 1842-9904 (online edition)



CONTENTS

THE POLITICAL-MILITARY PRESENT

Crisis effect, security and defence

Teodor FRUNZETI, PhD.....5

GEOPOLITICS AND GEOSTRATEGIES ON THE FUTURE'S TRAJECTORY

The financial crisis' strategic impact

Gheorghe VĂDUVA, PhD11

Considérations sur le lien entre l'intérêt national et patriotisme

Petre DUȚU, PhD.....21

NATO AND EU: POLITICS, STRATEGIES, AND ACTIONS

The originality of the European Union Council reported to a similar entity from an international integration organization

Mădălina Virginia ANTONESCU, PhD.....26

SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

Defence resources management in crisis situations

Mihail ORZEAȚĂ, PhD.....39

Economic security and global economical crisis and financial crisis challenges

Gheorghe MINCULETE, PhD, Maria-Magdalena POPESCU, PhD.....46

Economic security, organic dimension of national security

Marius-Petre ROTARU52

ANALYSIS. SYNTHESIS. EVALUATIONS

The role of cooperation between public affairs officers and journalists during peace support operations

Anna ANTCZAK, PhD.....57

Cultural ideal or geopolitical project? Eurasianism's paradoxes

Emanuel COPILAȘ65



STRATEGIC EVENT

Abandoning a strategic missile system for a more convenient and performant missile system

Vasile POPA81

POINT OF VIEWS

The Medusa myth and the technologies of the future war

Sorin TOPOR, PhD.....84

Definitive elements, advantages and disadvantages of globalization

Iulia Frasină TĂNASE92

REVIEWS

War and Chaos.....96

CDSSS' AGENDA

The activities of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, July-September 2009

Irina CUCU.....98

Instructions for authors.....99



CRISIS EFFECT, SECURITY AND DEFENCE

Teodor FRUNZETI, PhD

“The commerce’s natural effect is to bring peace” (Montesquieu)

The crisis effect is not only what immediately results from a crisis, it is not only its “purposefulness”. The crisis effect consists of a dynamic and, most of the times, hard to be predicted enchainment of developments, destructions and reconstructions, deliquescence, reconfigurations, appearances, re-appearances, or simple renewals on economic, political, social, informational and military field. Crisis may be perceived as the highest level of conflictuality of some systems and processes, as a critical threshold of the dysfunctions accumulated in time, which need a solution. From the mathematical perspective, a society’s development is shaped by non-linear equations, where unpredictable or the impossibility of absolute predictions and absolute certainties dominate. Therefore, it results that the crisis effect is just as complex and complicated as any other limit-situations, as any other threshold determining radical changes within the system. We are all afraid of crisis, but we all want the world to change itself, to transform, to move towards evolutions and better, safer and more prosperous stages. Everything related with the society – from small family communities to professional organisations, from informal structures to state, from state to alliances and coalitions – projects policies and strategies in order to get out of conflictuality, some evolutions to the normal state, peace and prosperity. But policies and strategies make sense only in a dynamic world – therefore, contradictory and even conflictual –, and their calling is controlling, or, more precisely, using conflictuality for stability and security. This is one – and, maybe, the most important – paradoxes of this world.

Keywords: effect, crisis, security, procesuality, synergy, safety, consonance, dissonance, repercussion.

From effect to cause

The director of the National Intelligence of the United States asserted, in front of the Congress, that the actual economic crisis has replaced terrorism, as it has become the most important security concern on short term. It seems strange to associate the recent financial crisis phenomenon to the terrorist one. Because crisis is one thing – generally speaking, defined as a limit-situation or as an evolution to a limit-situation in and from the contradictory and conflictual evolution of systems and processes, generating a threshold stage, a breach (mutation, conflict, war) to a new state, whether by their dissolution, or by radical changes and transformations, regenerating, renewing everything – and terrorism is completely other thing, defined as a random, disorderly, mosaic shape system, comprising attacks on life, human, organisation and institution’s security, destructive actions against infrastructures, with strange, asymmetric justifications, unacceptable for the civilisation. However, terrorism, just as crisis, conflict or war, is a by-product of the human society, it is part of it.

The apposition of these two phenomena is not an accident. Basically, terrorism is an expression of the society’s crisis, just as crisis is, to a certain extent, an expression of a political, economical and financial “terrorism”. In order to destabilise states – François Melese writes¹, terrorists use limited attacks against people and goods which generate huge economical and social costs, not only by the action in itself, but especially by its effects. Because, under the terrorist threat, amplify sometimes exaggerated by the political interest, the individual, family, organisation, company, state and the international community have to draft and apply very expensive security measures, which are absolutely necessary. Moreover, just as in the case of the economical and financial crisis, the terrified consumers abandon markets, determining the



braking of the economical development, increasing the unemployment and the political instability.²

Is there a real similarity between the effect of the terrorist attacks and the effects of the financial crisis started triggered during 2007-2008 and by the beginning of 2009 on Wall Street? It is a stirring question which places under the same umbrella two completely different phenomena when it comes to philosophy, configuration and means of expression, but very similar when it comes to effects. The terrorist attacks from September 11 on World Trade Centre and Pentagon – centres and symbols of America's financial, economical, military power, and, generally speaking, Western World's – had about the same effect as the financial disturbances following the banks' collapse and the Wall Street's stock market, another financial centre of America and the World. Both have produced chained action systems that have affected the whole world. In the latter, what has started as a sort of "*financial flu* within the United States has rapidly turned into an international epidemic. The economic and financial repercussions for NATO and its partners are huge."³

François Melese considers that NATO, in the conditions of the current economic and financial crisis, confronts with two types of major challenges: *the immediate and the long term effects of the drastically decrease of the defence budgets and the difficulty to draw specific lessons from this crisis*. The Alliance's member states or partners confront with the same challenges, as well as other countries, because, nowadays, the world is almost completely interdependent.

Following *Wall Street effect*, the American government, just as many other governments, has intervened by huge rescue plans, granting bankrupted banks and insurance companies huge funds. The ongoing declines of the consumption expenses and the moratoria on loans have destroyed even the most powerful companies. This has required states to continue with new interventions, new plans and huge and unbearable expenses tranches. But exactly the high risk consumption credits – generally speaking, imposed by the measures for encouraging the consumption credits, most of them as most of them are subprimes⁴, with a high risk degree, taken, supported and even guaranteed by the state in the favour of poor people – determined the impossibility to be reimbursed and the bankruptcy of some of the world's greatest

banks and insurance companies. "My studies – John B. Taylor writes – underline the fact that the government's actions and interventions – I do not know what other systematic weakness or instability of the private sector – has radically provoked, prolonged the crisis."⁵ There are many requiring an investigation committee to be founded, similar to the one analysing the events from 9/11.

The classical explanation of the financial crisis resides in the monetary excesses, determining an unavoidable boom and bankruptcy. This is what has happened. The real estate bubble and then the crash have caused the explosion of the housing loans and the assets based on them, then the fall has followed.

Of course, there are other opinions related with this crisis philosophy and physiognomy, with its causes and effects. For instance, some say that not only the unelaborated and even rushed state's intervention for supporting the poor people and the non-performing credits, but the banks' greedy, the fact that they unlimitedly offered credits, and the inadequacy of the current financial system to the requirements of the real economy, market, and life, is the real cause of this disaster. According to them state did nothing but to intervene in order to protect the system that obviously it has created.

Moreover, it seems that, following this awful crisis, the American economy gives up on the Milton Friedman's pattern⁶ and begins to flirt with the interventionism.⁷ James Tobin's interventionist ideas, a recipient of the Nobel Prize, become to gain support. In other words, John Maynard Keynes is more than actual at present. The American President Barak Obama signed a 787 billion \$ Stimulus Economic Bill.

Once again, this crisis proves that in troubled times, the rigid doctrines are not the best ones. It requires flexibility. When the reference rate is close to zero, some specialists think there are required the options of the US Federal Reserve (Fed) to stimulate the economy. The optimal unemployment rate, James Tobin asserts, is null. Just as John Maynard Keynes, he thinks it is necessary for the government to intervene in the economy, in order to maintain to a higher level the employment rate. Friedman considered that taxes should be dropped, the marked liberalised and a stricter control on the money injected in the economy. The ones supporting Tobin's idea think the government should intervene in the economy, including by



the stimulus packages. Obviously, Tobin's ideas influence is very large at Washington, but not as large as his advocates would have liked. Richard Levin, the president of Yale University, states that, within Obama's administration fiscal stimulus package, it would be more acceptable to have less tax deductions and a stronger involvement in creating new places of work. That is exactly the reverse of what John. B. Taylor supports.

However, in our opinion, crisis has proved once again that the financial speculations, the enforcement of some rigid theories, the chaotic market liberalization, the excessive increase of consumption, the lack of some balanced economical and social policies may determine dramatic developments, spectacular crashes of economical and financial power and hard to manage imbalances, with multiple, complex and hard to remove or manage effects, both on national and international security.

Obviously, the cause of this boom is in the excess of the monetary policies. The US Federal Reserve maintained the rate of interest, especially between 2003 and 2005, under the limit of the known monetary recommendations showing which policy has to be adopted, considering the precedents and the historical experience. Researchers from OCDE showed that the larger the fiscal relaxation is, the more important the real estate bubble becomes. The effects of the boom and the financial crash have been amplified by different factors, having among them the use of subprimes and the variable interests which have amplified the risk degree. In the United States, there have been encouraged bodies as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to buy financial products based on real estate loans, including risky subprimes.

The financial crisis has become violent in August, 9 and 10, 2007, when the interest on the financial market increased. The rate on short term (three months) and the interbank loans have reached unbelievable levels. Obviously, this phenomenon needs to be researched. Rushing, the political actors misinterpreted this crisis as being one related with cash. In December 2007, in order to get more cash and diminish the deviations on the monetary market and to increase the credit volumes, Fed created the Term Action Facility (TAF). This has not changed many things. Not even the Economic Stimulus Act, voted for in February 2008, which injected 100 billion \$ on the market, in order to

stimulate the economy and consumption, as it has not increased the consumption. The third policy was to diminish the interest rate⁸, from 5,25% to 2%. The effect was a significant devaluation of the dollar and an increase of the oil price (in July 2008, the oil barrel price was 140 dollars). In September and October 2008, the crisis has amplified. There are many voices sustaining that the reason beyond this degradation lays in the American government decision not to stop the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, from September 13-14. However, the problem is very complex and cannot be reduced to a simple statement. The fundamental analysis is to confirm or inform about such a statement.

Some specialists sustain that the rushed, even impetuous state's intervention, without a solid analysis of the situation and its possible effects may trigger panic and chaotic evolutions. The panic may be amplified both by the political decisions to assist certain financial institutions and not others, and the confusing anti-crisis programs, elaborated in a rush, under fear and pressure. However, in these circumstances, nobody can effectively intervene. But it depends on how and when it does.

The crisis has widely expanded all over the world. A large part of the developing states, taking advantage of the low price of loans and foreign investments, has increased the public loan. For the time being, refinancing the government debt and the current deficits has become very difficult, almost impossible. If the foreign banks refuse these states' access to loans, bankruptcy and unemployment may explode.

Under these circumstances, IMF, World Bank and the European Central Bank intervene in order to avoid the political chaos. This does not mean that the chained insecurity effects generated by the crisis are diminished or that the threats amplified by the chaotic situations from finance and economies disappear.

The double effects' connection on security area

Therefore, there are few sharp questions: *Besides the very serious and huge economical and social effects, how does this crisis continue to affect the national, European, Euro-Atlantic security? What are the concerns? What are the perspectives? What solutions seem to be seen on the way?*



The crisis has complex effects on all areas, structures and functions, including or especially the ones related with security and defence.

Moreover, we may say that this type of structures is most affected by the current crisis. Certainly, the main effects of crisis seem to be the unemployment increase, the drastic decrease of people's incomes, the economic and social insecurity, and, based on that, the recrudescence of some serious insecurity phenomena, as losing jobs, criminality, organised crime, illegal trafficking, illegal migration, underground economy, the individual and social uncertainty, the prominence of the poor countries' poverty, the social anomy, the increase of conflictuality, etc.

Obviously, all of them are real effect which have produced and still produce, in a shape or another, in all the countries affected by crisis, despite the protection measures undertaken by governments.

That is exactly the reason why there are exercised two huge pressures on the security and defence fields and structures: one coming from the governments' impossibility to provide the required budget for these areas, from the drastic decrease of the military expenses, as the priorities, during crisis, are usually others; the second one is generated by the increase of the population's, institutions', state's insecurity degree, and the possible emergence of some major, violent conflicts, where force structures are to intervene, even if they are already weakened by the fact they do not receive the financial resources they need in order to maintain and develop their action and reaction capacity.

It is likely that many NATO member states and especially the Alliance's partners will continue to significantly reduce their already modest defence expenses and to substantially base more on NATO. Moreover, crisis makes simply impossible to maintain some independent security and defence forces – they will become a real luxury for the few countries which may be able to continue to afford it – and increases the dependency on NATO and collective defence and security systems.

Despite article 3 from the Washington Treaty from 1949, which shows the parties will maintain and increase their individual and collective resistance to an armed attack, the accent will move to the collective component, as the individual one significantly diminishes. This is one of the substantial mutations determined by the crisis

effect on NATO's and national's philosophy and physiognomy, which will be probably mentioned in the Alliance's new strategic concept, as well as in the national security and defence policies and strategies. Moving the accent to the collective defence and to collective security impose the increase of the Alliance's integrality, and, obviously, the degree of national dependence on this security and collective defence structure. However, there is a paradox: if all the Alliance's member and partner states diminish their security and defence expenses and become more and more strictly dependent on NATO, where from and how will NATO build the required capacity for supplying these reductions, considering that even the great contributors, especially US, will significantly diminish these expenses?

NATO is a strong politico-military alliance which may easily bear with the crisis effect, at least from two reasons: *the system of values* the Alliance's synthesis architecture is based on provides individuality, stability, perenniality and a substantial emerging capacity, expressed in an ascending synergic function of generating a larger force than integrating its members' and partners' forces and capacities; *the vital interest* – which is usually national – becomes more and more *a common vital interest*, expressed in NATO's synergic function as a *vital centre of the political and military power of the democratic civilization*. Today, the Alliance is the force-core of a network (28 members) that develops itself, plays and may play a very good role as a power multiplier, offering each partner “a complete collection of defence means in exchange to its contribution”.⁹

There are many ways to provide Alliance's force and required resources, without the substantial augmentation of each country's security and defence national expenses. We expect all these elements, together with the Alliance's new missions– such as, for example, NATO's involvement, together with EU, in the energetic security –, to be formulated and added within the new strategic concept strategic which will be debated and approved during the next year's summit. One of these was – also underlined by professor François Melese, is, for example, *the cross-border integration of the defence industries*, creating a unified and consistent network of productive entities, able to generate performing weapon systems, according to the Alliance's



intervention requirements, considering a dynamic and complex security environment, with random and sometimes unpredictable evolutions.

This does not assume subduing the competition, on the contrary, its transformation into a cross-border and transatlantic competition through which the access to the new technologies is facilitated and the generation of some innovations providing consistency and increased efficiency for investments. Moreover, the military industrial integration within NATO may determine the increase of the political and economical cohesion of the Euro-Atlantic space, its transformation into a dynamic entity, one that can be easily adjusted to the unexpected and sometimes chaotic variations (due to the unpredictable and chaotic effects of the economical and financial crisis) of the international security environment.

It does not mean that the states' responsibility and effort for their own security will disappear, because the Alliance may take over, and it should, according to some voices, these functions *in integrum*, but just a higher flexibility and a more substantial safety degree given by the countries' integration into a security and defence system which puts into practice, in a modern and effective way, Virgil's famous verses from *Moretum*. This is a motto that has been famous as "*E pluribus unum*" and has been engraved on the United States of America's seal since 1776. On the contrary, the responsibility of the member and partner states will be better nuanced and it will be rebuilt on at least two complementary coordinates: *consolidating their own integrity and increasing the action and reaction capacity in case of a crisis and conflict; increasing the intrinsic, organic contribution at consolidating the Alliance's status and functions, as an emerging power; security and stability support for the Euro-Atlantic area and for each of the member states.*

The national economical policy and the national security policy are more and more related and mutually consolidate each other. However, today, these policies – related with the competence of the state – need a substantial network support, a real and effective connection with other states' economic-financial, security and defence policies, and also with the common security and defence policies, reshaped in the Alliance's emerging power.

We would like to stress out that there is no country able to remain alone on managing the

crisis effect. All the international structures, created by the states for their own security (economical, political, social and military), including the North Atlantic Alliance, intervene in these situations, and, eventually, together with the affected states, find a saviour solution. As a matter of fact, this is the world's interdependency, the new philosophy of the network configuration, the internationalisation and globalisation of the sovereign entities.

In the current NATO strategic concept, elaborated in Washington, in 1999, it is stipulated that the Alliance is attached to a *global security concept*, which acknowledges the *importance of the economical factors within the defence dimension*. The economical and financial factors are not only resources generators, but also real and required supports for configuring and applying some national security and defence policies and strategies, allied and global. That is why, both Alliance, as a whole, and each country – NATO member or partner – must take into consideration the emergence of some crisis and post-crisis policies and strategies, and, especially, for managing the crisis effect, both in the chaotic and destructive chain, and also in the emergent and constructive one.

The double connection of the crisis effects in security area are expressed, on one hand, by creating and amplifying, for the force structures, some of the adjustment difficulties and the ones for managing the crisis curves and the induced effects – the decrease of the military expenses, postponing significantly diminishing the endowment programs, generating some conflicts which may need the intervention for stabilization and stability, etc. – and, on the other hand, *re-updating some policies and strategies for redefining the vital interest*, by synthesised reconfigurations, centred on its common dimensions, expressed in what we may call *common vital interest*.

Therefore, Romania is not alone on managing this crisis effect which creates so much trouble. At least within and by the security support provided by NATO and EU membership it substantially and sensibly benefits from the *Euro-Atlantic integrality effect*, from the solidarity of the Alliance's members and the genuine construct of the common vital interest. Probably this common vital interest will be a new *modus vivendi*, based on a network, on an intrinsic and beneficial connection, which, obviously, after the crisis we are facing, will get a more realistic, lasting configuration, and,



probably, it will be mentioned, in a way or another, better defined and expressed in the new Alliance's strategic concept.

To be a beneficiary of this new *modus vivendi* – which can be a very good security and defence screen even against the crisis effects – presumes an active national attitude, a significant participation on consolidating the Alliance's present and reconfiguring the future of a common, integrated security and defence space.

NOTES:

¹ François Melese teaches economy at Defence Resources Management Institute (DRMI) from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey.

² François Melese, *La crise financière : un effet similaire a celui d'un attentat terroriste?*, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/FinancialCrisis/Financial-terrorist-attack/FR/index.htm>, accessed on September 12, 2009.

³ Ibidem.

⁴ *Subprimes* are risk loans with high interest (in order to cover the risk rate).

⁵ <http://www.contrepoints.org/Comment-le-gouvernement-a-cree-la.html>, accessed on September 12, 2009.

⁶ Milton Friedman elaborated a theory of the permanent income, asserting that, despite the permanent increases, the temporary incomes increase does not determine the consumption's significant increase.

⁷ <http://www.zf.ro/business-international/sfarsitul-pietei-libere-economia-americana-renunta-la-milton-friedman-cochetand-cu-interventionismul-4051488/>, accessed on September 10, 2009.

⁸ The interest rate is a percentage, calculated according to pre-defined conventions, synthetically measuring, on a given period of time, the lender's rentability or the borrower's cost considering the deadline of the financial flow. When the interest rate increases in a country, that country's currency becomes stronger in the relation with other currencies. When the interest rate increases, many investors withdraw money from the stocks, determining a shock on that country's currency. That is why it is very difficult to manage the interest rate's effect.

⁹ Ibidem, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/FinancialCrisis/Financial-terrorist-attack/FR/index.htm>.

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THE FINANCIAL CRISIS' STRATEGIC IMPACT

Gheorghe VĂDUVA, PhD

When finances stagger, everything does. Moreover, we are witnessing the effects' chained tumbling, tending to multiply themselves in uncontrolled developments, becoming radical and exploding, determining economical, social and military avalanches, multiplying the challenges, defiances, dangers and threats, therefore amplifying the vulnerabilities and significantly in creasing the risk level, passing over the strategic safety level. Under these circumstances, the security policies and strategies focus on getting out of the crisis, "repairing" what has been deteriorated, all the other fields being actually suffocated for a long period of time. Sometimes, this sort of crisis develop to a conflictual maximum called war, just as it happened with the crisis from 1929-1933, which has partly generated the World War II. As a matter of fact, the current crisis, transcending in volume the above mentioned one, affects the whole humankind. Even if some of the big powers, world's states, NATO, the European Union and the other international and regional organizations will do their best in order to prevent this sort of dangerous developments, the strategic mutations are present. The crisis impact on the security policies and strategies is revealed not only by the significant decrease of the expenses allotted to this field, but also by imposing some new rigors. One of them is the fastest exit from the philosophy, physiognomy and effects of the World War II and the Cold War and the focus of the security and defence effort on counteracting challenges, defiances, dangers and threats concerning the whole world, on diminishing the common vulnerabilities on handling them and a better management of the risk level. As, nowadays, risk comes closer to its maximum level, due to the intense destruction means, which, if used, would be able to completely destroy the humankind and the planet.

Keywords: crisis, systemic crisis, strategic impact, weapon systems, missile systems.

Crisis and the military power

The United States of America is the vital centre of the world's military power. Its main pillar is represented by the Air Power. We start analysing the crisis' strategic impact on Air Power, as we consider this is the place of the nucleus generating power, forces, and strategic dynamics, within this vital component of the American military power. Air Power is built of a system of forces and means providing the domination of the airspace, and, therefore, the planet's American strategic interest space. The American Air Power comprises USAF, US Navy, the Marine Corps, the Air component of the US Army, adding important elements of the American systems (satellites, networks, reconnaissance, sensor systems, etc.) and other elements providing the fast action and the force's projection. But, basically, the Air Power's main pillar is USAF (3542 fighters, 180 bombers¹ and a lot of transport, air-refuelling aircrafts, fighting and transport choppers, etc.), the 13 aircraft carriers, dominating the world's oceans, and the Marine Corps, built as an expeditionary corp. We consider there should be also included the strategic nuclear forces.

Which were or which may be the current crisis effects on this huge air power? And why is it necessary to analyse them? *Revue Militaire Suisse*² makes an interesting analysis, resuming a very hard-working study elaborated on November 21st by Karim Lakjaa³. It is necessary to carefully look at the American Air Power, because it is not only the vital centre of the greatest military power, but also the hardest and the most responsible nucleus for the world's strategic stability.

As it is natural, the crisis will seriously affect this huge air force, too, even if it has an aircraft fleet twice larger than all the other countries of the world. The crisis limits or stops the modernization programs of the US Air Force, it determines the aging of the aircraft fleet and increases the



maintenance costs. It is about a huge price, for such an Air Power and for the role it plays in the world. Unless this role requires be exchanging or at least rectifying, updated to the new conditions imposed by the evolution of the strategic environment and the current crisis.

In order to stop or to absorb the crisis' effects, the US have injected almost 700 billion dollars in banks, even if the Congress has initially opposed this measure. This amount is closer to the costs of *the global war on terror*, launched after 9/11, around 824 billion dollars (653 for the Iraqi war and 171 for the one from Afghanistan)⁴. As a matter of fact, these two costs – the war and the exit from the financial crisis – are to a total of 1584 billion dollars! And the American budget deficit is around 2000 billion dollars.

The place the United States holds today, in the world, is mainly due to their Air Power doctrine. It is not only about an air power, but also about a power generating power, power of the power. And this quality is associated with a special, huge responsibility.

Crisis affect the US air power by at least three complementary effects: the impossibility to maintain an air capacity at a constant level, the significant depreciation of the current air capacity, the creation of a too big space between the scientific and technological research, the mean to achieve aircrafts belonging to the last generation and the effective reality of the air power.

The first effect is materialised by the age of the aircraft fleet, the significant increase of the maintenance costs and the reduction of the operational potential. USAF, US Navy, Marine Corps and US Army's aircrafts are significantly affected by the crisis' chain effects. The cost of a flight hour on a F-15 and other 14 types of aircrafts – *Revue Militaire Suisse* notices – doubled in the last ten years. Also, there have increased and still do the production costs. The cost of a B-2B bomber increased with 300%. For a F-22 Raptor, conceived for providing the dominance of the air space, USAF has to pay 200 million dollars. This type of plane was very expensive even before the crisis (around 120 million dollars). That is why a competition has started within the US, between the main plane producers in order to make a cheaper plane, with vertical take-off. USAF and US Navy should be endowed with this sort of plane as soon as possible. Two main producers have been still

in competition – Lockheed Martin and Boeing. Lockheed Martin won, the company producing F-35. This plane already costs around 90 million dollars. F-22 Raptor and F-35 should have been replacing almost the whole fighter fleet, but the crisis does not allow paying these huge prices, amounting to the sum spent by the Americans in order to stop the crisis' effects.

The significant depreciation of the air capacity is one of the hardest strategic effects of the crisis. Initially, USAF had to buy 750 F-22s. The very high prices of this sort of plane have determined the decrease to 183. Moreover, USAF will not be able to buy more than 20 per year. That means USAF will have a complete capacity (diminished from 750 to 183) in nine years. If this plane is to replace all the 441 F-15s from USAF, then 26 years will e needed. Which means 177 F-15s should be kept in service up to 2025.

This is a double-faceted reality. While militaries notice the difficulties (some of the F-15s are already exhausted), the Secretary of Defence states, "F-22 has no role to play in the war against terrorism". Can USAF dispense with this plane, or a similar one, able to achieve the domination of the airspace? Will the Americans give up on this concept, of dominating the airspace? Will they accept that such a dominance – which is a must from strategic point of view – is to be achieved following the cooperation with Air Forces from the European Union's countries, Russia's, China's and other countries', for the World's benefit, in order to achieve the World's security and air defence, against any air dangers and threats, no matter from where they come from? It seems new premises are open to a positive answer. However, we are very far from those times....

F-35 is to equip both USAF, and especially the 10 carriers belonging to US Navy and the 3 ones belonging to the Marine Corps. However, there are not enough money for buying them and the production is quite slow. That is why, the F-18's resource will be prolonged with 6.000 more hours (in order to cover the time limit for introducing F-35 into service).

V-22 Osprey (a hybrid between a transporter and a helicopter) is not viable enough in order to replace the old CH-46. But that plane is very important in what is called *the global war against terrorism*. Probably, following this crisis, this concept, too, will go through some consistent and



more realistic analysis, and some transformations.

These realities – very complex in their dynamics, as it is about replacing the aircraft fleet of a superpower, in a new strategic context – are amplified by the crisis, and according to some voices (Anthony Cordesman and Karl Ulrich Kaeser) are “a danger for the US and its armed forces”.⁵ What sort of danger? The one that may be generated by other big powers which may become enemies of the US?! But US develops strategic partnerships with all the world. Probably, in future, the military conflictuality between the nuclear powers will become just a memory, as, rationally, it will be no longer possible, at least in its extreme limit, called *war*. There are still many other dangers generated by the existing fault lines, which, unfortunately, become more profound and more dangerous.

In Afghanistan, USAF did 12600 exits, 7000 tons of bombs and other ammunitions have been casted. In the two theatres of operations – Iraq and Afghanistan –, USAF has planned and carried out 130000 missions of air support, meaning 375000 hours. In Iraq, there are 300 reconnaissance, surveillance aircrafts, air transport for troops, fight and other utilities. The US net domination of the airspace is one of the characteristics of these two theatres of operations. Without this air and informational domination it would not be possible to accomplish the missions within those areas. These missions will continue up to 2017 or even 2020, even though the land forces will be withdrawn, as these zones are considered as very dangerous.

Meantime, in the United States, due to the crisis, there have been lost around 600000 places of work. This is a larger dangerous and a more serious and complex situation than the one from the theatres of operations, which, however, do not represent a direct threat to the US, especially after some of the US oil companies have seriously implemented in Iraq on long term.

Keeping the proportions, almost the same thing happens with our Air Forces. Even if there has been achieved an integrated system for airspace surveillance, and a part of the current aircrafts have been modernised. The fact that the endowment programs have been postponed (for the whole army, and not only for the Romanian Air Forces), due to the crisis, generates worrisome effects. MiG 21 Lancer – a solution for two decades – is close

to the resource's exhaustion, and the new plane has not been acquired. It would be wonderful if the Romanian Aeronautical Industry would contribute, at least partially, on achieving the new plane the Romanian Air Forces need, but these are the things. Probably the Romanian political and strategic decision makers will also analyse the possibility to revive, in a way or another – and also for the benefit of the Romanian Army – of the aeronautic industry, as it used to be once, or still may be someday ... Crisis goes, but projects, achievements and realities remain. On long term.

Crisis and the emerging Chinese power

Professor Jing Men, one of the Chinese experts in the Chinese-American relations, deals with the issue of configuring and reconfiguring the Chinese-American relations, including in the current crisis.⁶ There is no doubt, the 20th century belonged to the United States. What about the 21st century? Who will it belong to? Will this century belong to China, or to nobody? Before the crisis, we could get a clear answer to this question. Any country around the world – the more China's – would need at least a century in order to catch up with the United States. But crisis has already given us some arguments to doubt this statement. Moreover, China is boosting. Starting 1970, the average growth annual rate was around 9%. At this moment, the Chinese economy is on the third place in the world. In 2004, China became the main partner of Japan, India in 2008 and Brazil in 2009. Regarding the US trade, China marked a surplus of 266,3 billion dollars in 2008.

The financial crisis increased China's importance for the world's economy. The country's reserves in foreign currency about 2000 billion dollars. Therefore, there is a contrast with the United States, whose budgetary deficit is around 2000 billion dollars this year.

In order to prevent the crisis, the Chinese government elaborated a re-launching plan, about 586 billion dollars. Probably there will be drafted a second plan for managing this crisis. If, in the capitalist economy, there are two large groups of theoreticians and policies and strategies – some of them neo-Keynesist, sustaining the state's intervention in the economy, others, liberal or neo-liberal, supporting the free market, with no state's involvement are part of the society's philosophy



and physiognomy, as state is everything.

China does not only try to prevent or manage the crisis, but to find its roots. The director of the People's Bank of China considers the fault lines of the international monetary system could be remedied, to some extent, by *creating a new world's reserve currency*. It is a controversial ideal, which created lots of concerns for the Americans, but also favourable attitudes in different European and Asian countries. The idea, even if it does not aim the dollar's depreciation, it could generate a real revolution in the international monetary system.

Every year China develops its economic power meantime increasing its military expenses. For the coming years, China will endow with its first carrier. It is the first time after Ming dynasty⁷, when China sends warships in order to protect commercial lines. Therefore, recently, there have been sent two destroyers and a supply ship in a sector located within the Somalis coasts. Moreover, China has participated at some military exercises together with some states members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) have recently organized their first summit. China is a sort of this organization's pillar which is a good platform for discussions with the US and the European Union on the world's major problems, as peace, stability, lasting development, environment changes and the global warming. This is another huge strategic mutation able to create structures and potentials for ameliorating conflictuality, for dialogue and international balance. China's priority is not the battle for the world's leadership, but finding and applying the best solutions for its own lasting development and for the regional stability. As a matter of fact, this competition for the world's supremacy cannot be beneficial for everybody, as the advantages are minimal in relation with the huge responsibilities any candidate to the supremacy should undertake.

China's relations with US are becoming closer. Nolens-volens, China will continue to "buy" the American debt, meaning it has to help US in order to help itself. Even if China is looking for other currencies, too, for the time being, neither yen nor Euro are able to replace the dollar. The exports are China's development engine, and the main markets for the Chinese products are in the United States, Japan and the European Union.

Weakening these markets, because of the crisis, would have a serious impact on the Chinese trade. Following the crisis, in May 2009, China's foreign trade has diminished with 25,9 %, comparing with the same period within last year. That is why over 20 million people have lost their jobs.

The three fundamental questions China asked in this period are related with three important fields: stimulating the internal consumption, creating new jobs for the unemployed, supporting the lasting development, within the 8% of the GDP. On short term, the problems seem to be solved out. Not also on long term, therefore, at strategic level. Today, the strategic level is not only determined by the dominance levels, but also by the interdependencies ones. And these interdependencies, although countered by a lot of identity and separatist movements, tend to a maximum, to the integrality of a very diverse and conflictual world.

These are China's current and future problems. It does not intend either to depose US or to doubt its leadership, because it has neither the interest nor the capacity to do that. China is a regional power. China does not intend to involve itself in conflicts as Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, etc. it has a new life, lasting development philosophy, even if there cannot be avoided the strategic interdependencies. And it is not willing to assume responsibilities on international level, even if the Chinese think they are the centre of the world. Of course, not the conflictual centre of the world, but the one generating culture, force and stability. Broadly, this is China's vision on the current situation. The crisis, even if it cannot affect, it does not succeed on crashing it.

Crisis, new Russia's national security strategy and the need to connect

Russians state they are not affected by the crisis that they are ready to handle. However, the reality seems to be more complex. Recently, the Russian stock markets are at their lowest levels. Since May, they have lost half of their values. Moreover, considering that the Russian economy is still dependent on the hydrocarbons' export, the decrease of the oil barrel price will determine serious problems.

The foreign investors are not encouraged by the war from Georgia, the instability elements as well as the way they are treated. Even if some



people will avoid investing in Russia because of the Caucasus' instability, Russia's intervention for expressing and imposing its strategic interest, we consider that the big, strategic investors will not avoid Russia, on the contrary, they will look after it. Because Russia remains one of the pillars of a regional and international strategic construct, which cannot be achieved without it, without its philosophy, physiognomy and its resources. The intervention from Georgia, as well as the firm attitude during the gas crisis from January 2009, the reaction just as firm as the implementation within Europe of some American antimissile system, the trenchant conception and the active position, the offensive regarding the exploitation of the Arctic energetic resources, the straight opposition expressed regarding NATO's and European Union's enlargements, the competition, and, meantime, the complementary solutions regarding the new European architecture of the energetic resources – that is about North Stream and South Stream project, but also the other European ones, trying to reduce the dependency on Russia against which obviously, Russia reacts consistently – all of them are elements of a firm, measured, but net, and, generally speaking, justified sort of implication. NATO-Russia Council, the strategic partnerships from Russia and the United States, between Russia and China, Russia and India, etc., and the one building these days, between Russia and the European Union, are part of a new construction meant to ease the relations' conflictuality and to emphasize collaboration and cooperation.

Ultimately, it is Russia's duty, just any other country's, whether large or small, to contribute at diminishing conflictuality, preventing war and managing crisis and conflicts. Big powers must support each other, and meantime, to impose reason, by their strategic partnerships, and by the international organizations and bodies they are part of. This one of the few chances for the international situation not to degrade more and the side-slippings to get to war. Because a war involving the world's big nuclear powers will probably be the last one on Earth. The motives of the conflictuality's exacerbation reside in financial crisis, like the one we are facing, in energetic crisis and in the new battle for energetic resources. Therefore, within this financial crisis, the big powers try to cooperate. If they achieved it too in their competition for energetic markets and

resources, then the humankind would have one more chance for peace and lasting development.

In the middle of a crisis, Russia published its new *national security strategy* where all these elements are included. Often presented as a *hard power*, Russia takes care to provide its security, as a *soft power*, that it wants to develop and which is a strategic priority. Russia understands security in its complex, interdependent, internal and external dimensions, for connection, information, economical, medical, environmental and even cultural, and not only military. The informational security, for instance, is understood not only as a need to protect networks against cyberspace attacks, but also as a fight against contents reclaiming separatism, inter-ethnic, inter-confessional hatred, that is different types of extremisms. It is underlined that the current dangers and threats have to determine the West, the North-Atlantic Alliance, the European Union and the cross-border states to reflect on the reasons Russia perceives their political and military decision, whether objective or subjective, as a "threat". Russia's objective is to provide its own domestic security by strengthening the state, but also to improve its international image. What is interesting at Russia's new national security strategy, published on May, 12, 2009, is their openness to connection, to cooperation. The call on reflection comprises a support to cooperation and collaboration. The same tone is met at Russia's political and strategic partners. That is why the NATO's Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, made three concrete proposals for consolidating the partnership between NATO and Russia, seriously affected after the war from Georgia (August 2008). The three proposals are: examining the possibilities for consolidating the cooperation in all common interest areas (fight against terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the stabilization of Afghanistan), re-establishing the deteriorated trust due to the serious divisions regarding NATO's enlargement and revitalising the "NATO-Russia Council", an advisory body between the North-Atlantic Alliance and Russia, for approaching all the topics, without any preconceived idea, reviewing the new security challenges for 21st century. Also, NATO's Secretary General, thinks this is the right time for Moscow, Washington and European allies to reunite their antimissile systems. The old American project of the defence system against long range missiles



forecasted the installation of some strong radars and some interceptor missile systems in California, Alaska, Poland and the Czech Republic, forcing the security strategic environment – already torn by numerous crisis and armed conflicts – and looking for achieving a fulfilled fact.

On July, 23, 1999, Clinton accepts to sign the *National Missile Defense Act*, almost unanimously approved by the House and Senate. That law shows that US intention, at that time, was to build an antimissile system in concordance with what the technology can afford, and also to take advantage of the technological progress and the conditions created by the unstable international environment, in order to change the strategic balance in its advantage. Therefore, *National Missile Defense (NMD)* was conceived as a program similar to the previous ones, especially with the Star Wars, but with a less ambitious objective: defence against a minor attack, consisting of a wave of 20 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and one hundred nuclear warheads, and not against a massive attack. This last mention was meant to elude the previous treaties' provisions, which stated that none of the parties (Russia and USA) is allowed to take any measures which may deteriorate the strategic balance. Despite the previous project, during Reagan's times, the arsenal was not to be placed in space, but on ground.

The following attempts were not very conclusive, and the project was pending. The 9/11 attacks determined President George W. Bush to withdraw from ABM treaty, forbidding the deployment of a global antimissile system on American soil. On December 17, 2002, the Federal Government re-launched NMD under the control of *Missile Defence Agency*.

The program stipulated that, up to 2008, there would be achieved one hundred missiles able to intercept concomitantly 20 ballistic missile, which would have been launched from Asia by "failed states", as Iran and North Korea. In the end, there were only 30 antimissiles, which were supposed to be in service by the end of this year. Here is the brief history of this system:

- In November 2004, six *Ground Based Interceptors* (GBIs) were placed in Alaska.
- In 2005, 14 Patriots were placed in Alaska, and 20 short and medium range interceptors are placed on US Navy battleships endowed with *Aegis* systems.

- US Army use *Cobra Dane* radars on Shemya island, in Alaska, at the American base from Beale, California, and the British base Fylingdales, the United Kingdom.

- There have been initiated discussions with the Czech Republic, for placing there powerful radar, and with Poland, for placing 3 *GBIs*.


- In August 2008, there are placed 21 *GBIs* in Alaska, and 3 in California.

- It was supposed that up to 2012 to introduce more *Aegis* endowed with SPY-1 radars, *COIL* lasers installed on a Boeing *YAL-1* and other detection satellites.

Not only the "failed states" felt targeted (and offended) but also Russia and China. On September, 10, 2008, Russia transfers two bombers TU-160 in Venezuela and, on the 2nd of November, signs a bilateral agreement with Belarus in order to create a common antimissile system. On the 5th of November 2008, the Russian President Medvedev labelled Caucasus conflict as an excuse to place NATO's warships in the Black Sea and to impose antimissile system defence in Europe. Right after that, Russia alerted its Strategic Rocket Forces from Kozelsk, South-East of Moscow, equipped with SS-19 *Stiletto*, with a range up to 10.000 km and announced it it possible to install *Iskander* missiles, with a range up to 300 km, in Kaliningrad, at the Baltic Sea, as a respond to the American antimissile system. The general working scheme of these antimissile defence system, in their initial version, is presented below.

In February 2009, President Obama tells President Medvedev that he intends to give up on that program, in the exchange of Russia's cooperation for stopping the Iranian nuclear program. Something similar to the "missile crisis" from Caraibe in 1962. Then, the Russians turned back their missiles which were to be placed in Cuba, only if the Americans were about to do the same with the missiles from Turkey. And so it was.

But, after this new turn in the relations between Washington and Moscow, it seems that the exit from the effects of the Cold War and the reconfiguration of a strategic environment where the World's Power to become a World's Power for its protection and security is the only way to get out of conflictuality and completely change the philosophy and physiognomy of security and defence.



The systemic crisis generating strategic mutations

On March 18th, the US Federal Reserve bought treasury bonds from the market. Gilles Bonafi compares this day with Black Thursday (stock market crash from 1929), as it marks the end of the dollar.⁸ Paul Jorion announced “the end of capitalism”, and the analysts from the Standard Chartered bank defined that day as “the day when dollar died”. This big crisis with strategic implications was defined by Alan Ruskin, analyst from RBS, as “the decline of Rome”. Many of the ones having analyzed or analyzing this phenomenon of crisis, by the beginning of 2009, were promoting the idea that Europe and the United States risk to implode. Meantime, Bonafi asserts the big continental poles (ASEAN, CEI, North American Union) are expanding. Even if this sort of phenomena seem to be contradictory or even paradoxical, it seems we are coming close to the end of nations, or, at least, of the era of nations. We witness the emergence of some “huge ensembles which will have, as administrative echelons, the regions.”⁹ In 1997, Herbert Marshall Mc Luhan published **War and Peace in the Global Village**, proposing a new concept: *glocal*¹⁰. That is an

amazed world due to the new technologies. The strategic mutation is obvious. The city disengages more and more if its productive function, the trade one or considering information (which is sent in the cyberspace) and focuses more on new forms of organisation at level local, giving the impression that it does not need other structures to manage, guard and exploit.

Information has an essential role and a huge responsibility on launching and developing the current crisis, as it has contributed at the acceleration of the financial flow at worldwide level. The reversed reaction was to put this information under control, trying to solve out the crisis, including by consolidating IMF’s role. But nobody likes IMF, because it imposes conditions and restrictions. The network turned this flow into dynamic, the economies got out of the rigid national systems and became a sort of a system of systems, accelerating and metamorphosing the exchange of substance, energy and information, in an over-saturated environment, one that is intoxicated and very fragile and vulnerable, where a new dimension is disengaged, one cultivated and courted today in Europe - the regional one.

Bernard Lietaer and Margrit Kennedy published a book, **Regionalwährungen: Neue Wege zu nachhaltigen Wohlstand**¹¹ which speaks about



such a very delicate and controversial subject. Even in the *Introduction*, authors underline: "The financial crisis started in 2008 has an unprecedented amplitude and complexity. The coming recession promise to be a long, hard one, the most difficult since 1930s. In those times, we have ineffectively managed the economical situation and the socio-political degradations. This has entailed a wave of fascism, culminating with World War II."

The current crisis emphasises a regional dimension and somehow an end of the national states' absolute sovereignty. There is a sort of European consensus regarding the regions' importance in the development policies. This is stressed out by Eduard Balladur's report, "*Here comes the time to decide*", during *The Committee for reforming the local colectivities* from France, which made 20 proposals, most of them being unanimously adopted. It is almost the same think as the constitution of those eight regions from Romania.

The Balladur report states that "The regional echelon is considered by the Committee as being the best adjusted to the new conditions of competitiveness, ascertaining there is a European consensus on the importance of the regional level within the development policies." Articles 2 and 3 from the *European Charter of Local Self-Government* stresses out that "the local autonomy must be acknowledged in the domestic legislation", this autonomy being defined as "the right and the effective capacity of local colectivities to regulate and manage, within the legal framework, under its own responsibility and for their populations' benefit, an effective part of the public problems". Unfortunately, some local communities understand this regional policy as a support for the ethnic separatism. As a matter of fact, the *European Charter of Local Self-Government* aims completely other objectives. It is about a new architecture providing both the regions to catch up with the European level and creating a larger flexibility which would allow a better resistance to crisis and conflicts. That is exactly opposing to what the ethnic separatists promote.

Bernard Lietaer, former member of the Club of Rome, has a very interesting proposal: "An important decision undertaken by governments would be to allow cities and local authorities to chose themselves the complementary currencies they consider interesting in order to encourage

and accept them for paying the city's or the state's taxes" (White Papers, p.28)¹².

Therefore, according to this vision, cities and regions could choose the more suitable currencies and even could create complementary currencies. Even if this seems impossible, for some people, there have been similar experiences during history. Moreover, this sort of practices is even today in Switzerland (WIR) and in Germany (Chiemgauer). Gilles Bonafi gives such an example outside the European continent. The mayor from Curitiba (Brazil) created a token-coin the citizens may gain if they clean the city's dirt. That is how Curitiba became one of the cleanest and the most prosperous cities from Brazil, and citizens enjoy the benefits of such a currency. There is the also the example of the cooperative activities, as the ones used for drafting popular encyclopaedias on the Internet.

Starting from these examples and many others, Lietaer proposes the creation of *B2B* (Business-to-Business) *systems* on companies' level. A Russian businessman – German Sterligov – invested millions of dollars in London, Paris, Brussels and Hong Kong in order to achieve some anti-crisis centres, allowing companies to make payments based on barters. He mentioned that it is not about a barter, but about a new payment system, a new compatibility, where there is no money, no credit, no interests... Of course, he is right, because it seems capitalism has reached its own limits, getting to an incompetence level, and cannot face the new network philosophy and physiognomy, mitigating the hard competition and promoting the collaboration and the cooperation. It is true that more and more specialists ask or suggest the radical reform of the financial system, giving up on financial speculations and operations as money-money and going back to the real economy, to the requirements of the lasting development.

Some specialists state that the mutations produced during these possible reconfigurations may generate armed conflicts and even wars. Generally speaking, the reorganization of territories is supported and the reduction of the regions' number, together with their increased autonomy. The first proposal from Balladur report agreed on by the members of the Committee for reform of local collectivises from France refers to "favouring the volunteer regions' regrouping and the modification of their territorial limits, in order to reduce their number to fifteen." For the



time being, France is a unitary state, comprising 26 administrative regions, which have no legislative autonomy or any other type. The type of proposals, similar to the 20 comprised in Balladur report, is met almost all over the Europe. Are they a solution in order to get out of conflictuality or, on the contrary, they will generate a new type of conflictuality that the world will not be able to get out of, will it be withered or torn or disintegrated? Hard to answer! The European Policy for Euro-regions becomes more spread, or it should it become beneficial for developing some regiuni fallen behind, but as can be imagined, it may have more complex effects, even contradictory to the initial purpose.

Crises are interdependent. The economic crisis is strictly related with the financial, social, ecological, energetic, raw materials, food crisis and even with the political and military crisis. One cannot be analysed without the other, as one's effects are or may be causes for the others and even for its own evolution, that is why Gilles Bonafi, as many other authors, considers that the crisis issue must be analysed both globally and on different levels. The most important are the following: financial; coinage, whose pillar is the dollar (considered as crashing, even during and after the crisis); adapting the economical system to the new information technologies destroying millions of places of work (the notion of labour should be re-analysed¹³); energy (it is considered that the traditional energy sources are about to be depleted and there have not been found available alternatives yet).

As a matter of fact, according to a theory confirming more and more – the abiotic theory of oil –, petroleum was formed from deep carbon deposits, in the depth, at very high temperatures and at very high pressures and comes to the surface as cold eruptions, developing, therefore, the nuclear technologies which bring back the world in the inexhaustible universe of the atomic energy, the energy of Universe); the danger stalks democracies and freedom, due to the fact that the real power is held by a group of people by accumulating stocks (therefore, it is confirmed the warning of Kenneth Galbraith who underlined, in an interview published by *Nouvel Observateur* in November, 04, 2005, that “only a few sellers are needed, strong and convincing enough, in order to determine what people buy, eat and drink”; ecocide (any large-scale destruction of the natural

environment, especially by excessive exploitation) determined by the current economic system.

These levels condition, intertwined themselves and try to put in order the identification of vulnerabilities and managing the risk, especially the extreme one. The reality shows that this does not consist only in the danger represented by the nuclear weapon, that is out of control, it may destroy the world, or in the terrorists' unpredictable, bloody, horrible acts, but also in the disastrous effects generated by the financial crisis, as it is, as a matter of fact, an effect of effects, that is a disaster produced by disasters, generating, on its turn, other disasters.

Beyond its disastrous effects – which, unfortunately, have not been exhausted –, the current crisis determines the strategic thinking to be rational and imposes new reflections in order to find new solutions able to face the huge mutations, keeping the man's, environment's, and World's security in the foreground.

NOTES:

¹ In 1992, USAF had 5783 fighters, 3985 in 2000 and 3542 in 2008, while the number of bombers decreased from 276 in 1992, to 208 in 2000 and 80 in 2008.

² <http://www.revuemilitairesuisse.ch/node/503> (accessed on September 19, 2009).

³ Karim LAKJAA, *L'Air Power américaine, entre crise financière et opérationnelle*, www.robinwoodward.eu/spip.php?article474 (accessed on September 20, 2009).

⁴ Amy BELASCO, “*The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11*”, Congressional Research Service, RL33110, 14 juillet 2008, pages 16 et 19 (citat după <http://www.robinwoodard.eu/spip.php?article474&lang=fr>, accesat la 16.09.2008).

⁵ Karim LAKJAA, *art. cit.*

⁶ <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/FinancialCrisis/Financial-Crisis-China/FR/index.htm> (accessed on September 15, 2009).

⁷ Ming dynasty (1368-1644) dismissed the Mongolese dynasty Yuan (1279-1368), founded by a Gingis Han's nephew, made the Great Wall and brought prosperity and stability to China.

⁸ Gilles BONAFI, *Crise systemique – Les solutions (nr. 4: regions et monnaies complementaires)*, Mondialisation, 30 avril 2009, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB890.pdf (accesat la 17.09.2009).

⁹ Ibidem.

¹⁰ Glocal – a sort of a mixture between global and



local, the base of an architecture of a new world order, having on one side the continents, and the regions and the other urban agglomerations on the other. Then the continents will not matter anymore.

¹¹ Bernard Lietaer and Margrit KENNEDY, **Regionalwährungen: Neue Wege zu nachhaltigen Wohlstand**, Charles Leopold Mayer, Paris, 2008, ISBN: 978-2-84377-144-6.

¹² Gilles BONAFI, Ibidem.

¹³ It seems that the despise of work is more and more promoted, especially the physical labour, but also the intellectual one. In the Ancient Greece, the physical

work was considered absolutely inferior and had to be performed by slaves, animals and foreigners. The citizens were only doing physical exercises, they were thinking, drafting laws and watching their obiding. In most of the modern Europe countries, not, labour but property is considered the most important. Only in a few of them, especially in the United States, property is nothing but the condition for exercising and organising labour, as the sole source producing added value. Less people speak today about labour. Most of them consider the human resource as a human or intellectual capital, the only inexhaustible resource producing value.

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CONSIDÉRATIONS SUR LE LIEN ENTRE L'INTÉRÊT NATIONAL ET PATRIOTISME

Petre DUȚU, PhD

Aujourd'hui, le monde est dominé par deux processus fondamentaux et contradictoires: l'un d'association représenté par la globalisation et l'intégration régionale; l'autre de dissociation représenté par le séparatisme politique. Dans ce contexte complexe et dynamique, l'intérêt national ne perd pas son actualité et son importance en relations entre les acteurs étatiques et non étatiques. Son affirmation plénière et constante est une preuve d'existence et manifestation active du patriotisme, en tant que sentiment et attitude individuelle et collective.

Mots clés: attitude, dimensions de l'intérêt national, globalisation, intégration régionale, intérêt national, patriotisme, sentiment, séparatisme politique.

1. Processus définitoire du monde contemporain

Aujourd'hui, la globalisation et l'intégration régionale constituent deux processus interdépendante caractérisées par complexité, pluridimensionnel et omniprésence. Les deux ont des effets tant bénéfiques que négatives pour les États du monde et pour leurs citoyens. Pendant que les uns d'entre les États, de règles, ces qui sont développés économique et puissants, par leur force militaire, politique et démographique, par leurs ressources humaines, naturelles, financières et territoriales bénéficient, complètement, des conséquences favorables de la globalisation et de l'intégration, les autres, surtout, les pays en développement, qui ont un puissant économique, militaire, démographique modeste, ils connaissent les effets non désirées des deux processus mentionnées.

Ainsi, les États en développement cherchent, insistant, de s'intégrer dans les différentes organisations économiques, politico-économiques,

politico-militaires régionaux en espérant qu'ils limiteront les conséquences négatives de la globalisation, en préservant et en promut leur intérêt national. Dans cette façon, ils offrent des conditions optimales pour les investissements étrangers, la main d'œuvre bon marché et plusieurs fois et très qualifiées, des taxes petites en espérant qu'ils auront un développement socio-économique durable.

Un autre processus qu'il semble prendre ampleur dans le dernier temps le représente le séparatisme politique. Ce dernier constitue un mouvement social par lequel un segment de la population d'un État souverain, indépendant et unitaire territorial veut, par les moyens démocratiques ou violents, d'obtenir le statut comme entité étatique autonome et indépendant. Tels tendances séparatistes sont présentes presque dans tout le monde. Par exemple, des mouvements séparatistes il y a dans l'Europe, l'Asie, l'Amérique du Nord¹. Les unes d'entre eux se déroulent par la voie du „combat” démocratique, c'est-à-dire en utilisant le système démocratique qu'il y a dans le pays respectif (voir le cas de la Belgique ou du Canada), les autres ont choisi la voie violente, c'est-à-dire la lutte arme (par exemple, l'ETA en Espagne).

Les dernières ont fait d'apparaître des entités étatiques ne reconnu par la communauté internationale, c'est-à-dire les conflits gelés, qui, de fait, représente une source permanente d'insécurité².

A mon avis, la globalisation, l'intégration régionale et le séparatisme politique ont *un impact significatif, systématique et continu* sur l'intérêt national. *L'attribut* significatif de l'impact réside dans le fait que volens-nolens tous les États du monde sont impliqués dans les processus de globalisation et d'intégration régionale, et ils souffrent les effets génèrent par ces processus. D'autre part, les uns d'entre les États sont affectés



directement de séparatisme politique, mais les autres indirectement. *Le caractère systématique* de l'impact est donné par le pluridimensionnelle de la globalisation et de l'intégration régionale. Dans ce contexte, le séparatisme politique peut amplifier or diminuer les effets de la globalisation et de l'intégration régionale sur la déroulement normale de la vie et de l'activité des États du monde. L'impact est *continu* parce que l'activité des États en ce qui concerne la défense et la promotion de l'intérêt national sont ininterrompues.

2. Dimensions de l'intérêt national

L'intérêt national est un concept très actuel, complexe et encore insuffisamment étudié. C'est pourquoi, par la suite, nous l'aborderons dans une perspective sociologique, c'est-à-dire nous le décomposons en ses dimensions. Dans le même temps, l'intérêt national représente la finalité vers laquelle tendent tous les gouvernements des États et elle est posée en œuvre par les institutions étatiques habilitées et par les citoyens systématiquement, continu, tant dans le pays que dans l'étranger.

Il y a de documents officiels qui parlent des intérêts nationaux d'un État. Ainsi, pour la Roumanie, „Les intérêts nationaux reflètent la perception dominante, relative constante et institutionnalisée en ce qui concerne les valeurs nationales³”.

L'intérêt national doit être représenté à la fois comme prioritaire et supérieur en rapport de tous les types d'intérêts, soit individuels, groupales ou locale. Autrement dit, cette supériorité signifie que pour n'importe quel fonctionnaire étatique, personne publique ou simple citoyen l'intérêt national est prioritaire, n'importe quelle conditions, lieu ou temps, face de tous les autres types d'intérêts.

Dans le même temps, comme la suite de la dynamique alerte de la réalité contemporaine, intérieure et extérieure, la sphère de contenu de ce concept s'impose d'être périodiquement revu et redimensionnée.

Le concept “l'intérêt national”, à mon avis, peut être compris correctement de tous les mondes s'il est nettement exprimé, par l'opérationnalisation, c'est-à-dire lui sont établies les principales dimensions, par le moyen de ses caractéristiques définitives. Je pense que chaque dimension doit être représentée par deux paliers et à savoir: le présent et l'avenir. Le premier palier définit la dimension comme elle

est vue et conçoit par le chaque État. Le second palier décrit comme montrait celui-ci en temps, comme suite de l'évolution de la situation interne et internationale. Autrement dit, *le présent* indique *comme est une dimension maintenant et ici*, mais *le futur* vise les attentes, les idéaux, les aspirations de quels l'État respective pour une dimension ou autre de l'intérêt national.

À mon avis, l'intérêt national peut avoir les suivantes dimensions: *sociale, humaine, économique, politique, culturelle, psychosociale, écologique*. Je mentionne que ces dimensions sont interdépendantes et interactions continues. De fait, elles peuvent être considérées comme un système ouvert, ayant un lien direct et permanent de communication avec le contexte interne et international dont l'intérêt national se manifeste.

Il faut souligner que n'importe quelle de ces dimensions a une variable externe et une variable interne. La variable externe désigne, en principal, les préoccupations de l'État pour préserver, promouvoir et diffuser en dehors du pays du contenu de toutes les dimensions. La variable interne met en évidence les préoccupations de l'État, de la société civile et du secteur privé de garantir, promouvoir et de défendre, dans l'intérieur du pays, du contenu de toutes les dimensions.

La dimension sociale désigne les préoccupations de la société humaine, organisée comme État nation pour assurer, garantir et défendre pour tous ses membres des droits comme sont: développement sociale durable; protection sociale continue et complète; soins médicaux; accès libre à l'éducation; vie décente et sans peur pour le demain; traitement égal devant la loi; libre circulation en pays et en dehors de celui-ci; les droits civils⁴.

La dimension humaine se réfère à l'ensemble des activités, des actions et des actes conscientes, volontaires et responsables entreprennent dans la société par les institutions habilitées de l'État et par les organisations de la société civile pour assurer, garantir, promouvoir et préserver le développement durable de chaque citoyen. En essence, ici, on peut mentionner: L'augmentation de l'espérance de vie; la réduction de la mortalité infantile; la lutte contre les maladies infectieuses; l'assurance de l'éducation primaire pour tous les citoyens; l'égalité devant la loi; les droits égaux⁵.

La dimension économique concerne les orientations et les efforts de la société (institutions étatiques; organisations de la société civile et le



secteur privé) parmi lesquelles s'assurer, se garantir et se promouvoir le développement économique durable du pays. C'est ici qu'on a en vue les suivants aspects: le développement économique du pays entière; la création de lieux de travail pour les citoyens; la diminution du chômage; l'implication active dans l'économie mondiale⁶.

La dimension politique désigne l'ensemble des actions et des activités de nature politique parmi lesquelles les institutions de l'État, les organisations de la société civile et les partis politiques promeuvent et préservent les valeurs politiques spécifique pour la nation respective, en pays et d'hors de celui-ci. Caractéristique pour cette dimension est la contribution que doit avoir la classe politique, les gouvernants à promouvoir les valeurs et les traditions politiques nationales tant en intérieur et qu'en extérieur du pays.

Si on parle de la société roumaine, alors le double statut du pays de membre de l'OTAN et de l'Union Européenne ajoute des nouveaux paramètres à cette dimension de l'intérêt national. D'abord, il s'agit de garder et de promouvoir des éléments identitaires roumains en sein de membres des organisations mentionnées, afin de connaissance mutuelle. Puis, il s'agit d'adapter les éléments identitaires définitoires roumains au contexte multiculturel existant en sein de l'OTAN et de l'UE. En fine, il s'agit de la contribution de ces deux organisations dans le domaine politique.

La dimension militaire concerne la totalité des efforts humaines, matériels, économiques, financiers que la société fait pour avoir un outil capable de défendre, par les moyens armes, au besoin, son intérêt national. Biens sur, dans le cas de la Roumanie, son appartenance à l'OTAN donne une nouvelle valence cette dimension de l'intérêt national, par la garantie offre de système de défense et de sécurité mène par cette organisation politico-militaire. La participation de la Roumanie, avec les troupes militaires, aux opérations de maintenir la paix, a la lutte contre le terrorisme international ou aux actions humanitaires, sous le mandat des Nations Unis, joue un rôle significatif en ce qui concerne la défense de l'intérêt national, au-delà de frontières nationales.

La dimension culturelle définie les éléments propres pour la culture nationale qui s'impose d'être promus et développés, pour les connus tant le pays que au-delà de ses frontières. Dans ce contexte, il s'agit de relever la contribution de

la culture nationale à la culture universelle, d'un part, et les interactions actuelles avec la dernière, d'autre part. il ne faut aucune moment oublie le fait que le monde actuel est marqué par les processus de globalisation et d'intégration régionale, qui permettent le contacte entre les différentes cultures et les civilisations, en offrant l'occasion d'une connaissance mutuelle avantageuse. A son tour, le progrès immense des technologies de communications et des informationnelles a un impact sur la culture nationale et la culture universelle. D'ici, la nécessité de promouvoir, par tous les moyens et les méthodes licites et légitimes, aux produits et aux valeurs de la culture nationale, en tant que des éléments identitaires définitoires.

La dimension psychosociale relève les composantes qui décrivent le consensus national, la cohésion et la solidarité sociale, le climat psychosocial optimal pour la vie et l'activité humaine dans un pays. L'intérêt national se met en œuvre seulement s'il est soutenu par le consensus national, si existe la cohésion et la solidarité sociale en sein de la société, s'il y a une climat psychosocial capable de renforcer les manifestations quotidiennes des citoyens. La confiance dans un avenir plus sur comme la suite du développement économique, sociale et humaine durable représente un autre aspect de cette dimension.

La dimension écologique concerne la protection du milieu naturel et artificiel tant au niveau national, comme un bonne des générations actuelles et futures qu'au niveau international. Le contexte dont le monde évolue, sous tous les aspects – politique, social, économique, culturel etc. – impose une large coopération régionale et mondiale entre les acteurs étatiques et les acteurs non étatiques aussi quant à l'utilisation et la protection du milieu naturel. Par exemple, la pollution par un État riverain des eaux de un fleuve qui passe par le territoire de plusieurs pays, dans son parcours naturel, affecte tous les États situent en aval de source de pollution.

On doit préciser que ces dimensions constituent un système, c'est-à-dire ses composantes sont dans une étroite interdépendance et une interaction permanente. Autrement dite, cette chose indique le fait que ce système est ouverte et disponible pour communiquer avec le milieu ambiant, afin de l'échange d'informations dans les deux sens. Dans le même temps, la présentation succincte de ces dimensions permet de relever le caractère



dynamique de l'intérêt national, sa nécessité de s'adapter flexible à la transformation et la mutation produisent dans le milieu national, régional et mondial.

3. Le double statut du patriotisme: sentiment et attitude

Le patriotisme peut être représenté à la fois comme sentiment et attitude. En tant que sentiment, le patriotisme relève l'appartenance d'une personne à un pays, son amour face de ses habitants, de ses riches, de ses valeurs, de ses traditions, de ses habitudes et de ses mentalités. Ainsi défini, ce sentiment se manifeste par cela qu'il est le ressort qui détermine quelqu'un de sentir la fierté qu'il est le citoyen de ce pays et de défendre ses intérêts. Pratiquement, le patriotisme comme sentiment, exprime dans une façon concentrée la conscience d'appartenance à un certain peuple, à un certain milieu spécifique économique social, politique, culturel, linguistique et il se manifeste par l'amour, respect, dévouement, esprit de sacrifice, abnégation, responsabilité face des intérêts de la patrie, par l'effort conscient de assurer son progrès, indépendance et dignité⁷.

Dans ce contexte, on peut se rappeler la manière dans laquelle, en Roumanie, après l'année 1989 s'est parlé et s'est écrit sur le patriotisme. En réalité, il s'est refusé d'utiliser les termes de patriotisme, de patrie ou de patriote dans tous les messages qui se sont transmises par le mass media, les livres, les films ou par une autre modalité de communication. A mon avis, cette attitude vis-à-vis de patriotisme est complètement erronée à la cause de suivants raisons. D'abord, un sentiment tel comme est le patriotisme ne disparaît pas en temps s'il n'est pas utilisé, il reste en traditions, habitudes et mentalités qui ne peuvent pas être interdites de quelqu'un. Puis, le sentiment patriotique se forme et se développe en temps par les actes conscients et responsables, individuels et groupal, dans un contexte informel avec l'influence significatif sur l'affectivité humaine. En fin, le patriotisme comme sentiment constitue une composante identitaire définitoire pour tous les nations ou peuple, indifférent comme on appelle l'entité qui veut continuer son existence dans les coordonnées territoriales héritées de leurs anciens et de garder les caractéristiques nationales.

Le patriotisme, comme attitude, relève la

manière particulière d'une personne de se rapporter à son pays et à son peuple de son appartenance, par la naissance ou par l'adoption. En tant qu'attitude, le patriotisme se manifeste par les opinions, les actes, les actions et les activités volontaires et conscientes exprimées/effectuées pendant que quelqu'un désire d'apporter leurs une atteinte, sous une forme ou l'autre. Dans ce dernière cas, n'importe quelle atteinte apporte verbale ou non verbale à celui qui constitue un symbole nationale doit générer à tous les citoyens patriotes une attitude de rejette de cet acte.

Il y a un large palette des situations dont un citoyen peut exprimer, verbal et/ou non verbal, son sentiment et son attitude patriotiques. Les sessions de communications scientifiques nationales et internationales, les compétitions sportifs (concours internes, olympiques et mondiales), la coopération et la collaboration dans tous les domaines culturel, social, politique, économique et militaire, la participation par les troupes militaires aux accomplir de divers missions en différents théâtres d'opérations etc. sont des occasions dans lequel le sentiment patriotique se manifeste et s'affiche distinctement comme attitude.

L'affirmation du patriotisme, tant comme sentiment que comme attitude, ne signifie jamais nationalisme ni chauvinisme. La promotion et la défense des valeurs nationales, sous toutes leurs formes d'existence et de manifestation, ne signifient pas la négation des valeurs des autres pays ni instiguer à la haine. Les deux, c'est-à-dire la promotion et la défense des valeurs nationales représentent un droit et une obligation morale de chaque citoyen qui a un sentiment de l'amour pour son pays d'appartenance.

4. Conclusion

L'intérêt national représente un concept qui s'impose approfondi sans interruption pour le comprendre dans sa complexité, sa pluridimensionnelle et son omniprésence par tous les citoyens, par la classe politique, et par les organisations de la société civile d'un pays ou d'autre. A mon avis, dans cette façon est la seule voie par laquelle l'intérêt national peut être en valeur efficacement.

Le patriotisme, tant comme sentiment que comme attitude, est lié étroit de manière dans laquelle l'intérêt national est mis en œuvre.



Autrement dite, la défense et la promotion de l'intérêt national constituent une mesure du patriotisme.

L'action consciente, volontaire et responsable de chaque citoyen, des institutions publiques et des organisations de la société civile de tous les pays de mettent en œuvre l'intérêt national, sur toutes ses dimensions, est et sera toujours une preuve de patriotisme.

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² Idem, Conflictelor înghețate și securitatea națională a statelor de proximitate, dans **Politici și strategii în gestionarea conflictualității**, București, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, 2008, pp.87-97.

³ *Strategia de securitate națională a României*, București, 2006, p.11, <http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/SSNR/SSNR.pdf>.

⁴ Voir *Les indicateurs de développement durable: Pour qui? Pourquoi? Le point de vue d'IEW*, http://www.iewonline.be/IMG/pdf/349_avis-indicateursdd09-2005.pdf

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THE ORIGINALITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION COUNCIL REPORTED TO A SIMILAR ENTITY FROM AN INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION ORGANIZATION

Mădălina Virginia ANTONESCU, PhD

This article tries to analyze some legal differences between one of the most important EU institutions (EU Council or the Ministerial Council), and several bodies from the structure of international organizations of regional integration. There are many of these organizations holding in their institutional structure a body allowing a legal comparison with EU Council. From the beginning, we must say that European Union is representing an original entity that cannot be assimilated with an intergovernmental international organization, even if this has an integrationist nature. Nevertheless, in many of international organizations of integration, it is an intergovernmental body having integrationist objectives, like EU Council. But, as the analyze is trying to show, between these two entities (EU Council and a body of an organization of regional integration) there are many differences regarding their political and legal nature of the entity to which each party belongs, the components, the attributions given in their constitutive act, the types of acts emitted by this body and by EU Council or the decisional process to which there are participating.

Keywords: EU Council, European Union, MERCOSUR Council of Common Market, Protocol of Tegucigalpa SICA, Pan/ African Parliament, COMESA Ministerial Council, AFTA, ASEAN, SAFTA Ministerial Council, Agadir Agreement, SADC, UMA, Guatemala protocol, SAARC, SICA, EURAsEC, Marrakech Agreement, Lisbon treaty, Executive Council of African Union, Constitutive Act of Lomé, ALADI Council, Andean Presidential Council, Cartagena Agreement, Montevideo treaty,

SAI Andean Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers, CFSP, SACU Council of Ministers, Union of Arab Maghreb, UMA Presidential Council.

Numerous international integration organizations hold in their institutional structure a “Council of Ministers” or an entity, somehow similar to “The EU Council” from the political system of the European Union: for example, “The Ministerial Commission” formed of ministers of foreign affairs of the member states (Agadir Agreement/2004 which institutes a free trade area between the “Mediterranean Arabian Nations”); The Intergovernmental Council within EURAsEC (Euro-Asian Economic Community/2000); The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs within the Union of the Arabian Maghreb (the Marrakech Treaty, 1989); The Council of Ministers of Foreign Relations (political entity within ALADI or the Latin-American Integration Association, incorporated through the Montevideo Treaty/1980); the Executive Council within the African Union (incorporated through the Constitutive Act of Lomé/2000).

The intergovernmental character of this type of entity¹ combines with the integration objectives of the organization in the structure of which this entity is part.

Altogether, there are differences between the EU Council and the similar entities of the international integration organizations, regarding the nature of the entity to which each party belongs (first of all, the one of the EU Council, considering an original and complex political entity; secondly, considering an agreement incorporating a free trade



area; of an agreement incorporating an economic-political community or an international integration organization or an organization of states with integration objectives)². Other differences refer to the legal nature of the constitutive document in which the EU Council is mentioned, respectively the similar entity of the international integration organizations (“constitutional charters”³, for the community and modification treaties, in the case of the EU Council; in the second case, international treaties; regional agreements incorporating different forms of economic or political integration⁴, without being consecrated on the level of the law jurisprudence “constitutional charters” for the lawful order of that association or regional union).

The legal differences also regard other institutional aspects:

a) under the aspect of components⁵, we must observe the fact that, according to the new art. 203/TCE, the EU Council may have a supple formation (not being compulsorily and exclusively formed of ministers of foreign affairs of the member states, as in the case of ALADI Council). The EU Council may have a flexible and varied form (including the representatives on ministerial level). Secondly, the EU Council is not formed only of EU’s ministers of foreign affairs, but may also convene in different ministerial formations to discuss different problems, from agriculture to the Union’s foreign relations, the conclusion of international agreements or external policy and common security.

The meetings on ministerial level, with different degrees of periodicity (annually or any time it is necessary) without assuming a formation exclusively of ministers of foreign affairs, also appear in the case of the Executive Council of the African Union (rule 3/Procedure Regulation of the Executive Council which settles the fact that, in its formation ministers of foreign affairs or other ministers or representatives with full powers of the governments of the member states enter) but also in the case of other types of ministerial meetings in the specialized sectors, as well as the Commission of Ministers of Exterior Commerce (within the Agadir Agreement, fifth part, art. 24, paragraph 2).

As in the case of the EU Council, the Presidency of the Commission of Ministers of Exterior Commerce/Agadir Agreement⁶ is held by rotation,

by each member state, in alphabetical order (art. 203/TCE mentions, on the same lines, the use of the rotation system in insuring the Presidency of the EU Council, for six months, by each member state of the EU Council⁷).

But the Agadir Agreement/2004 does not provide (due to its legal nature of “economic agreement for integration”, which does not create a political union needing external representation) the fact that the state which holds the Presidency of such a Commission (for External Commerce or Ministers of Foreign Affairs) is also the President of the political entity. If this is normal in the case of the Agadir Agreement, the African Union (which is a political entity for integration, similar to EU) does not provide in the Constitutive Document of Lomé/2000 that the Presidency of the Executive Committee is also “the Presidency of the African Union” (actually, there is no prevision regarding the existence of a “Presidency of the Executive Council”, unlike the case of EU Council).

b) under the aspect of functioning⁸, we must mention that, regarding the deliberation within the EU Council, the agenda is settled by the President, provisionally and approved through its adoption by the EU Council. The agenda is structured in two parts, the first including articles which do not need debates, as the approval from the entities of EU Council has been previously obtained. The second part includes matters which impose deliberations, debates and their approval through the vote of the participants⁹. Based on the treaties in force, the EU Council is a political institution scanty transparent, in our opinion, as its reunions are held with the doors closed, only the members of the European Commission having the right to speak. The decisions of the EU Council can be made only by ministers, as members of this institution¹⁰. To accentuate the scanty transparent character of the EU Council (main source of the democratic deficit of the Union, in our opinion), the community or modifying treaties do not provide a concrete possibility of political liability of the EU Council in front of the European Parliament. The EU Council, as institution with intergovernmental composition, is the main European legislator, through the procedure of co-decision associating itself to the European Parliament, which does not create a specific situation in the decision making process within UE reported to an international organization. All these aspects differentiate the



EU Council from the other Ministerial Councils or Commissions in the integration agreements and integration organization¹¹ (which act as intergovernmental entities and not as *de facto* parliaments which are due to the legal incapacity of these entities to adopt supranational legislative documents). The exception in this meaning is represented by the supranational character of the “norms” and “directives” adopted by the Executive Committee within the African Union, which form a supranational legislator profile to this entity (together with the Assembly, the other legislator of the African Union).

Secondly, on European plan, regarding the general rules of meeting of the UE Council (being convened by its President on its initiative, on the initiative of one of its members or on the initiative of the European Commission. One can observe the fact that the European Parliament cannot convoke this institution (possibly in virtue of the fact it has an European legislator position equal to the one of the Council, fact which excludes this prerogative of the European Parliament).

Probably in order to illustrate a specific political relation on institutional plan between an intergovernmental entity (the AU Executive Council) and a regional parliament (the Pan-African Parliament), the rules for convening of the AU Executive Council in the working session do not provide its convocation by the Pan-African Parliament (for the ordinary sessions, rule 8 settles that the meetings of the AU Executive Council will be twice per year or in exceptional cases, on other convened dates, on the initiative of the Commission, after consulting with the President of the Executive Council and member states). In the case of the extraordinary sessions, rule 12 admits the right to address such a request to the President of the Council, of any member state or the President of the Commission in consultation with the President of the Assembly (the session being held after the approval with the majority of 2/3 of the member states).

We could say that, in the present development stage of the African Union on legislative plan, only the couple “Assembly-Executive Council” has the legal capacity to issued supranational legal norms (regulations, directives)¹² while the Pan-African Parliament is only an entity with consultative and recommendation attributions (so, it is not a co-legislator such as the European Parliament

reported to the UE Council). This leads in the case of the African Union to a concentration of the supranational legislative prerogatives within two intergovernmental entities, whose members are not elected by the African people but have the capacity of national ministers (thing which is avoided within the EU institutional environment, in which the European Parliament as well holds the role of European legislator).

Unlike the EU Council (which is not responsible in front of the European Parliament or in front of the European Council), in the African Union the Executive Council engages its political responsibility in front of the Assembly (entity similar to the European Council) and not in front of the Pan-African Parliament.

Regarding the sessions of Trade Minister’s Commission/Agadir Agreement, they will have a frequency of at least once per year, as well as every time it is necessary (on the request of a member state). According to art. 31 and 32/Montevideo Treaty, the ALADI Council meets in session on the convocation of the Representatives Committee (the only permanent entity of the Association). The Montevideo Treaty does not provide the function of “ALADI President” or “President of the Council” that holds, by extension, the Presidency of the Association¹³. Also, this treaty does not settle a way of political responsibility of the Council (which is the supreme entity of the Association) in front of another political entity of the Association, hence the specific supra-nationality (on decision making plan and regarding the inexistence of the political responsibility) of this intergovernmental entity (which brings it closer to the situation of the EU Council). Although all these entities are plenary (including competent ministers of each member state), only some of them occupy exclusively the position of supreme entity in the institutional structure of the organization/entity/agreement, respectively, in other cases sharing the supreme position with the Parliament (for example, the couple EU Council – European Parliament, on legislative plan, within the EU), or with another intergovernmental entity (the pair EU Council – European Council, on decision making plan within the EU; Executive Council – Assembly, within the African Union), thus reflecting a diversity of the institutional structures of the political systems for integration and other international organizations for integration.



c) regarding the attributions¹⁴ these entities have to fulfil according to the constitutive documents, again, a great diversity of competencies is registered, depending on the type of institutional structure where the respective entity is part. Thus, according to art. 8/the treaty incorporating the Union of the Arabian Maghreb, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs has a technical role, auxiliary to the Presidential Council (which is the supreme entity of UMA) through the attribution to prepare its session, as well as a pretty general competence (but which is not decisional, in order not to affect the monopoly which the UMA Presidential Council has in this field). This competence regards the examination of matters which come from the Committee for the Pursuance of the Unions' Affairs (true supranational entity) as well as the Specialized Ministerial Commissions. We find normative attributions in the case of the Commission of Ministers of Exterior Trade within the Agadir Agreement (art. 24 regarding the elaboration of legal norms in different general interest areas) or in the case of the ALADI Council (the competencies conferred by art. 30/Montevideo Treaty to adopt decisions¹⁵ regarding the superior political management of the economic integration process) or in the case of the Executive Council of the African Union (the competence, according to art. 13/Lomé Constitutive Document, to make decisions on common interest policies).

As noticed, the international organizations for integration or the agreements for integration do not specify any type of legislative competencies which are entrusted to the Councils in cause, which does not mean that such competencies do not exist ("regulations" and "directives" which the Executive Council of the African Union adopts having a legal nature similar to the one of the legal community law documents for the EU Council). Also, a review of the decisional attributions of the ALADI Council actually illustrates a real normative supranational competence, through the legal nature of the documents which the Council adopts (art. 30/Montevideo Treaty): enforcing the general norms for the fulfilment of the Associations' objectives and the integration process; settling basic norms for the regulation of the relationships between the Association and other regional associations, entities or international entities; the review and update of the basic norms in certain economic integration fields; settling the directives

to which the papers of the remaining entities of the Association must be adapted. Regarding these attributions, through the extensive interpretation of the new art. 202/TCE, the EU Council not only has decisional attributions in the community pillar¹⁶ but also in the other two intergovernmental pillars (ESDP; CPJP)¹⁷, which proves a constant extension of its decisional competencies, based on the treaties in force.

Through the Lisbon Treaty, this omnipresent decisional role of the EU Council is consolidated, illustrating a real primacy of this institution with intergovernmental nature but with supranational role, regarding all the other EU institutions.

Regarding the other types of competencies¹⁸ which the intergovernmental "Councils" (of the international integration organizations or incorporated through economic integration agreements) hold, we must mention their supervision attributions (the ALADI Council has, for example, the competence to examine the results of the tasks fulfilled for the Association, the AU Executive Council monitors the implementation of the decisional policies and agreements adopted by the Assembly, it has the task to insure that all the actions and initiatives regarding Africa are according to the Union's objectives, to examine the reports, decisions, projects and programs of the AU Committees, to approve the rules of the Committees, to supervise, monitor and lead their activities).

Through the Political and Security Committee (art. 25/TUE, modified through the Nice Treaty), which prepares the reports addressed to the UE Council on request or by its own initiative, the UE Council monitors the international situation in the ESDP field as well as the implementation of the policies convened by the member states. The EU Council may authorize the European Commission during a crisis management operation to take adequate decisions regarding the political control and strategic management of the operation. The EU Council confers the authorization to begin certain forms of cooperation strengthened within the EU, by the member states (art. 27C/TUE, in the modification of the Nice Treaty); the EU Council is the one who authorizes the European Commission to open negotiations in the field of closing the agreements regarding the common commercial policy (art. 133, paragraph 3/TCE, modified by the Nice Treaty). All these competencies granted



to an institution with intergovernmental legal nature reflect the occupation of a supreme function in *de facto* institutional hierarchy of EU, by the EU Council, against the European Parliament as institution directly chosen by the European citizens. On the other side, it is about decisional competencies, supervision and authorization which the EU Council holds within the EU as a political system already consolidated, in a superior stage of evolution of the political-economic integration process, reported to the other analyzed “Councils”.

Regarding the budgetary competencies¹⁹ of the analyzed “Councils”, we must notice that, unlike the EU Council (which has important attributions based on the treaties in force as well as according to the Lisbon Treaty²⁰, the one to settle the budget project with qualified majority, the attribution to adopt the budget project with the amendments settled by the European Parliament or to modify these amendments, according to art. 272/TCE, to adopt the dispositions regarding the own resources system of the Community – the new art. 269/TCE), other “Councils” of the international organizations for integration do not have budgetary attributions. For example, not the ALADI Council but the Committee of Permanent Representatives (another decisional entity of ALADI structure) has the role to settle the contributions of the member states to the Association’s budget (not being a co-decisional procedure for the adoption of ALADI budget, budget which is not financed from the own resources of the organization, despite its integration character).

The Executive Council of the African Union is another example of intergovernmental Council which does not yet have the predominant role of the EU Council in adopting the Union’s budget. Thus, in virtue of rule 5, paragraph 1, letter h/Procedure Regulation of the AU Executive Council, it may only examine the budget project of the Union and to send it to the Assembly for debate (the Assembly being the one which will adopt the AU budget, according to art. 9/Lomé Constitutive Document).

In the plan of external relations²¹, the Executive Council of AU, according to rule 5, paragraph 1, letters i) and j) has certain specific attributions, with the purpose to impel the integration process on the African continent, such as: promoting the cooperation and coordination with the African Development Bank, with other African institutions,

with the UNO Commission for Africa but also with the Regional Economic Communities, settling the cooperation policies between the Union and the African partners, insuring the conformity of all the activities and initiatives regarding Africa, with the objectives of the African Union. The ALADI Council disposes, in exchange, of other specific decisional competences, that are in the matter of settling relationships between the Association and other regional associations, entities or international entities (but does not represent the Association in the relations with third states, this attribution belonging to the Committee of Permanent Representatives, another political and decisional entity specific to ALADI).

This situation reflects a usually modest role of the “intergovernmental Councils” of the international organization for integration, due, in our opinion, to the insufficient degree of political evolution of the integration of the respective political entity. In the case of such an integration agreement, the accent is either on the economic integration, either the political union will be organized in detail through ulterior agreements, which consider the field of external relations of the respective states union.

Despite this fact, the EU Council plays a primordial role in the field of signing international agreements with third state or with international organizations²² (authorizes the Presidency, assisted by the European Commission, if it is the case, to begin the negotiations, signs the international agreements, on the recommendation of the Presidency (art. 24/TUE, in the modification of the Nice Treaty), takes the decisions necessary for the defining and implementation of the external policy and common security, recommends the European Councils common strategies and applies them by adopting common actions and common positions, ensures the unity, coherence and efficiency of the Union’s action (art. 13/TUE); adopts common actions in the ESDP field which engages the member states in taking a stand and managing their actions (art. 14/TUE), adopts common positions defining the EU position in special problems of geographic or thematic nature (art. 15/TUE), names a special representative with mandate related to certain special political problems (art. 18/TUE).²³ All these decisional competences reflect the high level of evolution of the European integration process regarding other integration processes which did not know an external policy yet and common



security which did not form a political union yet but express, in the same time the complexity and originality of EU, as an entity which affects an integration purpose (“the more tight union without intermission”), as the doctrine affirmed, both its dimensions (the intergovernmental one and the community one).²⁴

However, we must see the other entities/agreements for integration from a dynamic perspective, being processes in full evolution; thus, art. 24/Agadir Agreement, regarding the competencies of the Commission of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, specifies that it will be responsible for the support of the political frame of the Agreement and it will settle the political measures necessary to the impulse and extension of the structure of this Agreement. Also, the Commission of Ministers of Exterior Trade will be responsible for the supervision of the supplementing of the Agreement and the obligation to search solutions to exceed the possible difficulties which might appear in the implementation of the Agreement. Also, the Commission has the obligation to deepen the “level of cooperation and assimilation between the members”, which corresponds, undoubtedly, to an integration purpose, reached through gradual actions. The EU Council may also have, reporting to this situation, initiative or impelling competences for the community action, competences that have their origin in political agreements between the member states for the advancement of the European integration and not in the competences which are granted to it by the community treaties and the modification documents as EU institution²⁵.

Another type of competences recognized by the EU Council based on the agreements in force but also based on art. 49/TUE, in the modification of the Amsterdam Treaty is the one regarding the procedure for the admission of the EU state (art. 49/TUE, which confers the EU Council the main decisional competence and only secondarily a competence in this matter also to the European Parliament)²⁶.

A completely special procedure (different, in our opinion, of the procedure of admission, within EU) appears in art. 29/Agadir Agreement (through which a free trade area is instituted between the Mediterranean Arabian states). Called “Annexation”, art. 29 provides decisional competences to the Commission of Ministers of External Relations including all the member

states, competences in the matter of approval of the request of another Arabian state to “be annexed to this Agreement”. “The Annexation” of this state to the Agadir Agreement will have as effect the obligation of the new member state to implement all the decisions taken within the Agreement before its “annexation”. We consider it is about, in this case, a terminology specific to an integration agreement, which reflects its originality towards the EU (where the neutral legal term, “adhesion” is used, as well as in the case of a legal relation governed by the international law between a candidate state and an international organization).

Art. 30/Agadir Agreement underlines the integration nature of the Agreement (signed on undetermined period), but expressly allowing any member to withdraw from the Agreement through the simple informing of the Ministerial Commission. As mentioned before, this aspect is not regulated in any way in the case of EU (based on the treaties in force) and which, based on the Lisbon Treaty (art. 49A/TUE), concerns a complex procedure²⁷ reported to art. 30/Agadir Agreement, implicitly proving the complexity of the entire institutional environment of EU.

In exchange, art. 29/Lomé Constitutive Document of the African Union uses a neutral expression, met in the case of admission to the international organizations for cooperation (“obtaining the capacity of member”) but does not confer the Executive Council (but to the Union’s Secretary Office, “the Commission”) competences in this perspective. The Executive Council does not have competences regarding the procedure of terminating the capacity of member state (art. 31), which radically distinguishes it from the EU Council. Unlike this situation, the ALADI Council (through art. 30 letter i of the Montevideo Treaty) is the political entity which “accepts the admission of the new member states” (decisional monopoly).

“The intergovernmental councils” within such agreements/entities for integration also benefit from the prerogatives to name²⁸ other entities (technical or political) or High Representatives: thus, the AU Executive Council chooses the commissaries in order to be named by the Assembly, chooses the members of the African Commission for Human and People Rights (similar to the naming by mutual agreement by the governments of the member states, judges of the Court of Justice within EU). The ALADI Council names the General Secretary



of the Association but, in order to highlight the originality of the institutional environment of EU, we must notice that none of these Councils has such an important attribution as the one of the EU Council to **name** after the approval of the European Parliament, the entire European Commission, real “supranational government”, based on art. 214 (2)/TCE, modified by the Nice Treaty (competence which, in the variant of art. 9D/TUE, in the modification of the Lisbon Treaty, will belong to the European Council).

d) under the aspect of the adopted legal documents²⁹ and the decision making process³⁰, we can notice other differences between the EU Council and the “Councils” within the agreements for integration or the international organizations for integration. Based on the treaties in force (art. 249/TCE), the EU Council, together with the European Parliament, but also alone, may adopt regulations, directives, may take decisions and may formulate recommendations and approvals. The first three types of legal documents have compulsory value and legal characters specific to the European community law as integration law, reported to the legal documents issued by the entities of other regional OI for integration.

According to art. 249/TFUE, the EU Council adopts in common with the European Parliament legislative documents, being an original supranational legislator which cannot be “dissolved” “like a “parliament” by none of the EU institutions, either by the governments of the member states or national parliaments.

Based on the treaties in force, the normative competences of the EU Council are concretized through the adoption of regulations (general normative documents) and directives and decisions (normative documents as addressees member states). Secondly, as a materialization of the function of coordinating the policies of the member states, the EU Council may adopt legal documents without compulsory value (recommendations, designated to the member states)³¹. Due to the fact that the political institution of EU in discussion, that is the EU Council, has a pre-eminent role in the implementation of the European integration process, we must mention the fact that, in virtue of its executive competences (of applying the legal norms which it adopted, through administrative documents), the EU Council may adopt such documents (execution directives, execution

regulations, decisions) in the field of transports policy, of public helps, etc.

Regarding all this palette of supranational legal documents which the EU Council may adopt, as documents belonging to the community law, the other types of similar entities within the international organizations for integration or the integration agreements are not on the same level of evolution as, with some exceptions, they cannot adopt such legal documents.

Therefore, art. 24/Agadir Agreement does not specify the legal nature of the “rules” which the Ministerial Commission of Exterior Commerce may issue in the fields belonging to the implementation of the Agreement, despite the integration character of this Commission.

The ALADI Council, in exchange, may adopt a type of legal documents for integration (compulsory for the member states or other political entities in the ALADI structure, having as objective the impelling of the political and economic integration process): decisions (art. 30/Montevideo Treaty), general norms, recommendations (as special legal documents, for integration, within ALADI), directives, basic norms, all these legal documents begin designated to the regulation of the process of Latin-American integration under the ALADI aegis.

A type of legal documents (adopted by an intergovernmental Council from an integration entity created after the EU model) close to the supranational legal documents of the community law (issued by the EU Council) is represented by the legal documents adopted by the Executive Council of the African Union. Thus, according to rule 34 of the Procedure Regulation of the AU Council, the basis of a real African supranational legal body are put, formed of: regulations (compulsory and applicable in all the member states, the national laws having to be modified to conform to them); directives (legal documents issued by the Executive Council and addressed either to all the member states either to some member states, either to private persons; compulsory regarding the objectives to be reached and leaving the national authorities the power to decide the form and means which must be used for their implementation).

These types of legislative legal documents, which may be adopted by an entity with the name of “Executive Council” and not by the Pan-African Parliament illustrates the existence of a pattern



of the preeminence of the intergovernmental type entity (Council of Ministers) in front of the regional parliament, both being entities belonging to a political entity for integration (the African Union). Of course, in virtue of the executive competences it has, the AU Council may adopt execution directives (rule 5 paragraph 1 letter g conferring the prerogative to adopt any action in fields brought to its attention by the Assembly). Rule 34 allows it to adopt non-compulsory documents, legal or political (recommendations, statements, resolutions, opinions) which would get it close to an intergovernmental entity from an international cooperation organization, if it would not be designated to harmonize and orient (for an integrationist purpose) the points of view of the member states.

The supranational character of the regulations and directives³² issued by the Assembly and by the AU Council is strengthened by the sanctioning attribution exerted over the states which do not respect the AU decisions and policies, competence recognized to the Assembly as well as the Executive Council, after the approval of the Assembly): the interruption of transport and communication connections with other member states, other economic or political measures decided by the Assembly (art. 23, paragraph 2/ Lomé Constitutive Document; rule 34, paragraph 2/Procedure Regulation of the Executive Council). Also, Rule 25 provides the automatic applicability of the regulations and directives issued by the AU Executive Council, after 30 days since their publication in the Official Journal of the African Union or on the date specified in the decisions; the compulsory legal value of these legal documents will be manifested towards the member states as well as towards the AU entities and towards the Regional Economic Communities, which accentuates the supranational law character of some such legal documents.

Similar provisions, regarding the sanctioning competence of the EU Council³³ for the non-observance by the EU member states of the obligations in the compulsory normative documents issued by them (regulations, decisions, directives) do not appear in the Maastricht, Amsterdam or Nice Treaties (except the case in which the EU Council decides to suspend the right to vote of the representative of the government of the member state in the Council). But this has no

effect regarding the fulfilment by the state thus sanctioned, of other obligations which belong to it as member state. However, there is a sanctioning competence of the EU Council but not for the non-observance of the obligations from a normative legal document issued by it (as in the case of the AU Executive Council) but for the non-observance of the principles in art. 6(1)/TUE.

The mean of decision making within the analyzed Councils is different; thus, according to the rule 19 of the Procedure Regulations of the Executive Council of the African Union, this adopts its decisions by consensus (in the lack of which the decisions will be adopted by vote with qualified majority); in the case of procedure decisions, this are adopted with the rule of simple majority. According to rule 27, each member state in this Council has the right to vote, which represents an important difference regarding the mean of decision making within the EU Council (in which three types of votes are used: qualified majority, in continuous extension, simple majority, unanimity as a counter-balance of the supranational tendency, through the intergovernmental tendency). Thus, in the EU Council, based on the Nice Treaty, the vote with qualified majority is extended to new fields (legal cooperation in civil matter; concluding international agreements in the fields of intellectual property and services), in the detriment of humanity.

For an agreement to be concluded, according to the Nice Treaty, the favorable note of 14 state of 27 members is necessary, a decision being taken if minimum 14 state voted in its favour or if it represents at least 62% of the European population.

The rule of qualified majority (which proves a supranational mean to adopt some integration decisions)³⁴ is settled also in art. 43/Montevidéo Treaty, regarding the ALADI Council. By exception to this rule, the Council may adopt decisions with a majority of 2/3, without a negative vote intervening, in fields such as: modifications brought to the treaty, taking decisions corresponding to the political management, superior to the integration process, taking decisions which formalize the result of the multilateral negotiations by settling and advancing the regional tariff preferences, accepting the admission of the new members, determining the contribution shares of the member states to the Association's budget, settling minimum norms of



regulating the ALADI relations with other regional associations.

As noticed, the international organizations for integration follow specific organization and functioning rules, including concerning the intergovernmental Council from their institutional structure, which does not allow us to speak, not even in the case of organization and functioning model taking over of the EU Council, of an imitation of this model, but an adoption of it, depending on the specific needs and original profile of the respective entity (we consider here, especially, the Executive Council of the African Union).

NOTES:

¹ In the meaning of its internal composition (usually of ministers of the member states governments).

² As different forms of regional integration, in which, in our opinion, enter not only the “regional international organizations” or “the supranational or immediate organizations” (which edict directly applicable rules on the territory of the member state and with immediate effect) – in the classification offered by Daniel DORMOY, **Droit des organisations internationales**, Dalloz, Paris, pp. 6-7. Often, the states form free trade areas, based on regional economic agreements but which do not have institutional structure or the legal personality of an international organization (organization which elaborates “its own internal law”, through the legal norms issued by its entities).

³ Anthony ARNULL, Alan DASHWOOD, Malcolm ROSS, Denick WYATT, **Wyatt and Daswood’s European Union Law**, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2000, pp. 64-65, Augustin FUEREA, **Drept comunitar european. Partea generală**, Ed. All Beck, București, 2003, p. 54.

⁴ Lately, the conclusion of interregional association agreements is envisaged, for example between EU and MERCOSUR or between EU and CAN – Andean Community, which includes the creation of the free trade areas. See the 4th Reunion of EU-ALC, Vienna/ May 12th 2006, the Vienna Declaration. See the previous Communicates of the European Commission: COM(99)105 – *Un nouveau partenariat Union Européenne – Amérique Latine à l’aube du 21^{ème} siècle*; COM(00)670 – *Suivi du 1^{er} sommet organise entre l’Amérique Latine, les Caraïbes et l’Union Européenne*, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/la/chrono.html.

⁵ For example, the Guatemala Protocol (protocol to the general treaty of economic central-American integration) within SICA (the Central-American Integration System created through the Tegucigalpa Treaty/1991), provides

the creation of a sub-system, called “The Economic Central-American Integration Sus-System”. This sub-system, according to art 7/Guatemala Protocol includes as main entities, the three intergovernmental Councils (The Council of Ministers for Economic Integration, formed of ministers of finances and presidents of the Central Banks of the member states; the Sector Council of the Ministers for Economic Integration, including the reunions of the resort ministers but also the Central-American Agricultural-Fish Council, the Central-American Monetary Council, the Councils of Ministers of Finances, Economics, Trading, Industry, Infrastructure, Tourism and Services (art. 41). The third intergovernmental Council mentioned in art. 37 paragraph 2 is the Inter-sector Council of the Ministers of Economic Integration. On the African continent, according to the Final SACU Agreement/2002, art. 8 mentions the institutional structure of the Customs Union of South Africa, the Councils of Ministers composed of at least one minister for each member state, entity which becomes the supreme decision making authority in matters regarding SACU. Also, on the African continent, according to the treaty instituting COMESA (art. 9), the Council of Ministers is formed of “those ministers which can be designated by each member state”. Within SAI (The Andean Integration System), according to the Cartagena Agreement, section B (The Andean Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs), art. 15 provides that it is formed of ministry representatives of the field of foreign affairs, of the governments of the states party to the Cartagena Agreement. Regarding MERCOSUR, the Asuncion Treaty, in chapter II, art. 10-11 provides a “Council of the Common Market” as superior entity of the Common Market, charged with the administration and execution of the treaty and legal norms subsequently adopted within MERCOSUR. It is composed of the ministers of foreign affairs and ministers of economy of the party states. According to the Tegucigalpa Protocol (incorporating SICA), in this central-American integration system there is included (art. 16) “a Council of Ministers” composed of competent ministers and, extraordinarily, a deputy minister. Also, we must mention the Ministerial Council (composed of ministers of foreign affairs, reuniting at least two times per year) within SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) created in 1985 and reformed in 1993 (when an agreement regarding the progressive reduction of the tariffs in the region has been signed). As a result of the reunion of the SAARC states from Islamabad (January 2004), the agreement regarding a South-Asian free trade area has been signed (SAFTA), which comes into force in January 2006. According to art. 10/SAFTA, a “SAFTA Ministerial Committee” (SMC) is created, supreme and decisional entity which is responsible for the administration and application of the Agreement, as



well as all the decisions and arrangements performed within its legal frame. This Committee is formed of ministers of commerce of the party states. Another integration organization, but an African one (SADC/Southern African Development Community), created in 1992 (its predecessor being SADDC/Southern African Development Coordinating Conference, of 1980), includes in its institutional structure a supreme entity, called “the Council of Ministers” (formed of ministers of each member state, usually the ones responsible for the finances and national economy). As we notice, starting from a common pattern (an “intergovernmental council” usually formed of ministers), there is a great diversity of “Councils”, with a composition depending on the objectives and the legal nature of the integration agreement (competent ministers).

⁶ It is highlighted in the doctrine that, since its creation, UMA did not succeed in progressing, nor has it been capable to exceed the closing of the border between Algeria and Morocco, in 1994, the blockage of the Maghreb integration being a “Gordian Knot” of the economic dynamics in Maghreb. Secondly, we must notice “a real puzzle” of commercial agreements and association in the area, difficult to understand, with a reduced degree of contact, synergy. See Ivan MARTIN, *Universitatea Carlos III din Madrid, Le puzzle de l'intégration sous-régionale dans le sud de la Méditerranée*, *Annuaire de la Méditerranée/2003*, European Institut of the Méditerranéan, www.mafhoum.com/press7/224E13.htm

⁷ Through art. 9C/TUC, in the modification of the Lisbon Treaty, the Presidency of the formations of the EU Council, except the one of the Council of Foreign Affairs, is ensured by the representatives of the member states, within the EU Council, after an equal rotation system.

⁸ For example, the Council of Ministers of the treaty instituting COMESA (on the African continent), in art. 9 of the constitutive document is provided that it will convene once per the year immediately preceding a meeting of “the Authority” (supreme political entity). The extraordinary meetings of this Council may be held on the request of a member state, sustained by at least 1/3 of the member states. The Council of Ministers/SACU Final Agreement, according to art. 8, will convene at least once per each trimester of a financial year only if it is not agreed otherwise. The SADC Ministerial Council meets at least once per year, in order to evaluate the progress and actions of its subordinated entities. The SMC or SAFTA Ministerial Council meets at least once every year or more often, anytime it is considered necessary by the party states. According to art. 13/Ouro Preto Protocol/1994 regarding MERCOSUR, the Council of the Common Market convenes every time it is necessary (but at least once per semester) and Presidents of the member states must take part to the

semester meetings of this Council of Common Market. According to art. 21/Tegucigalpa Protocol regarding the Council of Ministers within SICA, it will convene in different sector, ordinary, inter-sector formations every time it is necessary or on the request of one of its members or on the request of the Presidents’ Reunion. Within SAI (Cartagena Agreement, art. 18), the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs will convene in periodical session two times per year, preferably in the country which holds the Presidency; the Council may convene in special session as well, as needed, on the request of any of its members. According to art. 20 of the same agreement, the Council may be convened in “extended sessions” as well, with the participation of the chief delegated within the Commission, at least once per year.

⁹ Augustin FUEREA, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-55, 62-63.

¹⁰ *Idem*, p. 55.

¹¹ We must notice the tendency of the regional organizations to develop, at the beginning of the 21st century, an economic integration side and to form together with other member states, free trade areas or other sub-regional initiatives of economic cooperation. For example, ADB (Asian Development Bank) played the role of catalyst in promoting the regional cooperation ever since 1994, initiating sub-regional programs designed to promote the cooperation in different geographical areas: GMS program (Greater Mekong Subregion, through which the new ASEAN members – Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam, The People’s Democratic Republic of Lao – are invited to join AFTA or the ASEAN free trade area); ASEAN Eastern Development Area – Brunei Darussalem – Indonesia – Malaysia – Philippines (BIMP – EAGA); the Regional Economic Cooperation Initiative of Central Asia/CAREC); the Sub-regional Economic Cooperation Initiative of Southern Asia (SASEC); SAARC; The Forum of South Pacific, etc. Although this regional cooperation area remains “a consolidated one between sovereign nations” (that is without creating integration institutions such as the ones in EU), the integration, elimination of physical obstacles in trade side, which such types of cooperation assume cannot be ignored. See *Moving Regional Cooperation Forward, Summary of Proceedings of the ADB – sponsored Session at the 2002 Bo’ao Forum for Asia and Directions for Future Promote Regional Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region*, October 2002.

¹² Not only within the African Union we find supranational legal norms similar to the European community law, but also within MERCOSUR (which is a common market and not a political union). Thus, according to the working program 2004-2006, designated to the advancement of the integration process (political and institutional, among others), as well as after the 26th Reunion of the Council of the Common Market (Puerto



Iguazú, Argentina, July 7th-8th 2004), procedures and mechanisms designated to the incorporation and fast application of the MERCOSUR norms which do not legislative transposition have been provided in the national legal orders. See *Evolución de la integración regional 2004-2005*, Informe Parcial Enero-Junio de 2005, SP/Di no. 7-05, SELA, Julio 2005, Secretaría Permanente del SELA, Caracas, Venezuela, www.sela.org. In the case of the COMESA treaty (art. 10) a legal classification of the documents issued by the Council of Ministers is operated, similar to the documents of European community law. Thus, the issuance by the Council of the regulations (entirely compulsory for all member states) is provided; of directives (compulsory only for the member states to whom they are addressed, regarding the results that must be reached); of decisions (compulsory for the ones to whom they are addressed); of recommendations and opinions (without compulsory legal force). According to art. 19 of this treaty, only the Council may adopt such documents (a normative monopoly), without specifying if these documents have “legislative” character or direct, immediate and priority effect reported to the internal law of the member states (possibly, these legal characters are subsequently settled, through the jurisprudence of the COMESA Court of Justice).

¹³ In the case of the Tagucigalpa Protocol (SICA), art. 16 provides that the competent ministry of the member state who will be the spokesman of Central America, will preside in that semester and Council of Ministers as well. In the case of the Council of Common Market/MERCOSUR, the member states will hold the Presidency of this Council by rotation, in alphabetical order, for a period of six months. Art. 10/SAFTA provides that each state which is party to the Agreement, regarding the Presidency of SAFTA Ministerial Council, will hold this Presidency for a year, in alphabetical order. According to art. 8/SACU Final Agreement, the Presidency of the Council of Ministers will be held through rotation, by each member state, for a period of 12 months, in the order decided by the Council. Regarding SAI, the Andean Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, art. 19/ Cartagena Agreement provides that it will be presided by the minister of foreign affairs of the state which holds the Presidency of the Presidential Andean Council, for a year.

¹⁴ For example, SACU Council of Ministers supervise the implementation of the SACU policies and approves the customs tariffs. The SADC Council approves the SADC strategies and working programs, grants council to the Summit of the State and Government Chiefs, over general policies of SADC. In the case of the Council of Common Market/MERCOSUR, the following are among other attributions: pronouncing on the proposals addressed by the Group of Common Market (which is the executive entity of MERCOSUR, similar to

the European Commission), formulating policies and promote the actions necessary for the conformation with the exigencies of the Common Market, clarifying, when necessary, the content and meaning of its decisions, creating ministerial reunions and pronouncing on the agreements handed over by them. Within SICA, the Tegucigalpa Protocol provides the role of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, as “main coordination entity”, which prepares the Reunions of the Presidents, which insures the representation of the region within the international community, the execution of the Presidents’ decisions on “international regional policies”.

¹⁵ Through “decisions” we do not necessary understand legal documents belonging to an “integration right” (similar to the European “decisions” adopted by the EU institutions), but also a kind of legal documents without compulsory value, with recommendation character, which may be adopted by the entities of an organization, with different names: resolutions, decisions, recommendations, etc.). Generally speaking, there is no direct connection between the name of these documents and their legal value (according to Raluca MIGA-BEȘTELIU, **Organizații internaționale interguvernamentale**, Ed. All Beck, București, 2000, p. 110). But we must observe that in case of the EU (regarding the ESDP pillar), the European Council adopts “common decisions” (which are political documents and not community law documents): see Iordan Gheorghe BĂRBULESCU, **Uniunea Europeană. Aprofundare și extindere**. Cartea I - *De la Comunitățile Europene la Uniunea Europeană*, Ed. Trei, București, 2001, p. 140 (it is about an EU institution different from the EU Council). Besides the community pillar, in the ESDP and CPJP fields, the EU Council may adopt “common positions” or “common actions”, which are “agreements between states” and not community law acts (as it is about the performance of some EU objectives).

¹⁶ For example, art. 18/TCE, in the modification of the Nice Treaty, through which the EU Council can adopt dispositions for the facilitation of the exertion of the rights to travel and to temporarily settle freely on the territory of the member states, of the EU citizens. The EU Council may decide the measures corresponding to the economic situation, if severe difficulties intervene in the supply with certain products (art. 100/TCE, in the modification of the Nice Treaty); the EU Council may decide to grant community financial assistance under certain conditions to the member state in difficulty or seriously threatened by severe difficulties caused by natural catastrophes or exceptional events above its control (art. 100, paragraph 2/TCE, in the modification of the Nice Treaty); decisional competencies of the UE Council based on art. 133/TCE, in the modification of the Nice Treaty, regarding the common commercial policies, etc.



¹⁷ Jordan Gheorghe BĂRBULESCU, *op. cit.*, p. 144, John FAIRHURST, *Law of the European Union*, Pearson Education limited, Pearson and Longman, Essex, UK., 2006, p. 16.

¹⁸ For example, according to art. 17/Tegucigalpa Protocol, within SICA, in the competence of the Council of Ministers of External Relations is also included the competence to grant recommendations regarding the receipt of new members into SICA or regarding the admission of observers. The attributions of the Andean Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs/SAI, the Cartagena Agreement foresee, among others, the formulation of regional policies of the member states in the regional interest matters; the orientation and coordination of the external actions of different entities and institutions of SAI; the formulation and evaluation, in coordination with the Commission, of the general policy of SAI process. Other attributions are added to this, such as: to follow the fulfilment of the general orientations of the Andean Presidential Council; to ensure the conformity with the obligations in the Cartagena Agreement and the Montevideo Treaty/1980; to debate and solve any other common interest matters, outside its responsibility area, etc. (attributions which can be found, in a certain measure, in the case of the EU Council).

¹⁹ The Council of the Common Market/MERCOSUR has the attribution to adopt financial and budgetary decisions (art. 8/Ouro Preto Protocol). The Council of SACU Ministers approves the budget of the Secretary's Office, of the Committee for Tariffs and of the Tribunal (art. 8/SACU Final Agreement). The Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (art. 17/Tegucigalpa Protocol) within SICA has as attribution the approval of the organization's budget.

²⁰ In the new art. 272/TFUE, in the modification of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU Council and PE Council, through the special legislative procedure, are the institutions which adopt the annual budget of EU. Also according to the Lisbon Treaty, the new art. 269/TFUE provides the competence of the EU Council to adopt, after consulting PE, a decision which provides the dispositions applicable to the own resources system of the EU. The EU Council also settles the application measures for the own resources system of EU, after the PE approval.

²¹ Regarding the Andean Community, we mention the existence of "a common policy of external relations". Ever since 1979, the member states' ministers of foreign affairs started to act collectively on the international stage, giving birth to a common political action. In November 1979, in Lima, the legal instrument creating the Council of Ministers of the Andean Group was signed, whose first function was to draft a common foreign affairs policy for the Community. The Trujillo Protocol/1996 incorporated in the institutional structure

of the Cartagena Agreement and the Andean Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Through the Sucre Protocol/June 1997, the common foreign affairs policy of the Andean Community was definitively confirmed, which points out an intergovernmental cooperation dimension attached to a political system for integration (such as SAI), similar to EU'S ESDP pillar, in which the decisional entity ("the Council") fulfils, in both cases, attributions related to the common policy of foreign affairs of the political entity to which it belongs to.

²² For example, the Andean Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs within SAI fulfils different attributions related to the external relations of the system: to represent the Andean Community in matters and activities of common interest, to coordinate the common position of the member states in the international forums and negotiations, to sign conventions and agreements with third states and with country groups or with international organizations, regarding the external cooperation and policy. The Council of the Common Market/MERCOSUR may negotiate and sign agreements, on behalf of MERCOSUR with third states, groups of countries and international organizations (attribution which may be delegated to the Group of the Common Market as well).

²³ According to the Lisbon Treaty, in the matter of signing international agreements (the new art. 188N/TFUE) the EU Council authorizes starting the negotiations, adopts the negotiations directives, authorizes the signing of the agreement, signs the agreements.

²⁴ Jean-Louis QUERMONNE, *Le système politique de l'Union Européenne*, Ed. Montchrestien, Paris, 2001, pp. 8-9.

²⁵ Jordan Gheorghe BĂRBULESCU, *op.cit.*, p. 145.

²⁶ According to this article, the applicant state addresses the request to the EU Council who delivers its decision after consulting the European Commission and after the approval according of the European Parliament. In the variant of the Lisbon Treaty, the new art. 49/TUE is modified, meaning that the requested state addresses its request to the EU Council who delivers its decision after consulting the Commission and after obtaining the approval of the European Parliament. The European Parliament, and also the national parliaments are previously informed (before the EU Council's decision regarding the request), related to the request of the applicant state.

²⁷ The member state which wants to withdraw must notify its intention to the European Council, which issues certain orientations. Based on them, EU negotiates and signs an agreement with this state, which settles the withdrawal conditions, the agreement being negotiated based on art. 188N, paragraph 3/TFUE and being signed by the EU Council, after the approval of the European Parliament.



²⁸ For example, the Council of the Common Market / MERCOSUR names the Manager of the Administrative Secretariat of the organization. The Council of Ministers (art. 8/SACU Final Agreement) names the Executive SACU Secretary and also names the members of the Tariff Committee.

²⁹ The Council of Ministers within SICA (Tegucigalpa Protocol) adopts decisions whose application is compulsory for all member states (their executory character cannot be limited except through legal character dispositions); but such decisions can be executed by the member states which did not object to them. According to art. 17/Cartagena Agreement, the Andean Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs adopts decisions and statements. According to art. 17/SACU Final Agreement, the SACU institutions can adopt “decisions” (using the consensus rule, if it is not provided otherwise). According to art. 9, the Council of the Common Market/MERCOSUR pronounces through “decisions”, compulsory for all the party states.

³⁰ According to chapter III, art. 37/Ouru Preto Protocol, regarding the mean of decision making within MERCOSUR, the consensus rule is instituted, with the presence of all the party states. Within SACU, the quorum for the meetings of the SACU institutions will need all the member states (if it is not provided otherwise in the Agreement). According to art. 17/Cartagena Agreement, the Andean Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs within SAI adopts decisions and directives through consensus (but the decisions will be part of the Andean community law). According to art. 21/Tegucigalpa Protocol, the quorum in the Council of Ministers needs the presence of all the competent ministers and extraordinarily, of a deputy minister. Each member state is entitled to vote in the Council, the decisions regarding the fund matters being made through consensus and when doubt over the legal notion of a decision is involved (fund/procedure), the majority vote will be used. COMESA Council of Ministers adopts decisions through consensus, in the lack of which they will be adopted with the majority of 2/3 of the Council’s members.

³¹ Jordan Gh. BĂRBULESCU, **op. cit.**, p. 142.

³² We must notice that we meet the legal documents with a certain integration character after the EU model in other international organizations for integration on other continents as well. For example, we must mention the competence of the Council of Ministers and the Ministerial Committee within CEMAC (the Economic and Monetary Community of the Central Africa) to adopt: regulations which are compulsory in all their elements and directly applicable in all the member states, having a general designation, the frame-regulations which have a direct applicability only regarding certain elements; the directives which relate all the member states regarding the result or decisions, which have a compulsory character in all their elements reported to their addressees.

³³ Against the measures imposed by the EU Council (institution which represents the will of the states) and which regards the private persons, the persons under political asylum of the member state may directly attack in front of the Court of Justice within EU these measures (by “appeal against the sanctions given to private persons”), where from the supranational character of the Court of Justice. According to Augustin FUEREA, **op. cit.**, p. 146. Concerning the appeal in front of the Court of Justice, “in ascertaining the non-fulfilment by the state of the obligations arising from the institutive treaties”, this is a type of recourse through which only one decision of the European Commission can be attacked (regarding the non-observance, by the respective state of the obligation arising from a certain institutive treaty), as “executive institution”. The Decision of the European Commission (and not of the EU Council) can be attacked through contentious in full jurisdiction, the Court of Justice following to decide.

³⁴ Some authors notice the omnipotence of the EU Council, considering that it belongs to a supranational organization and not to a cooperation organization such as the UNO Security Council in which each state has equal vote. See Jean Louis BURBAN, *Les institutions européennes*, Collection fondée par Josette Peyrard, Librairie Vuibert, Paris, 2002, p. 18. See also Augustin FUEREA, **op. cit.**, p. 58.

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DEFENCE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN CRISIS SITUATIONS

Mihail ORZEȚĂ, PhD

Defence resources management should be a matter of interest for everybody and not only for experts and decision-makers as long as the effects of any decision in this domain can be perceived by the entire society.

NATO's umbrella should not be the only way of thinking security because any member nation of the organization has the obligation to be both a security provider and consumer.

Global security environment is now safer than during the Cold War but there are still many risks and threats at regional and local level.

Every crisis encompasses a hope and we all have the responsibility to search for and discover as soon as possible, the turning point between the decline and progress and then to proceed for recovery.

The best way for managing defence resources during economic and financial crisis is to think and act considering the future and therefore by investing especially in research and development, in order to find new ways of protecting and developing society through active participation of all the citizens.

Keywords: defence resources; global security environment; risks; threats; defence planning.

The direct connection between resources and combat capabilities of armed forces is, or at least should be, well understood not only by the military and politico-military experts but also by the political and military decision-makers; and this because the responsibilities of each of us will increase gradually in direct proportion to our level of social hierarchy.

As everybody knows, all the citizens have the obligation to pay taxes for ensuring state's good functioning, including the structures whose key responsibility is national defence and security. In conclusion, all the citizens should be well-informed on the effects upon them as a result of the decisions

made with reference to the state resources and the way the government chooses to distribute them in different fields of activity. Nation's defence and security are common responsibilities for all of us – and we refer to all adult citizens – and not only for those ones working within the state's structures involved in defending and securing the nation. As a result, all adult citizens of this country should know and acknowledge the short, medium and long term effects of any decision which may exist upon its defence and security capability and even its credibility among all the allied and partner countries.

As a rule, all the decisions related to the defence resource allocation have both an immediate and long term impact on state's structures, especially on those ones with direct responsibilities for defending and securing the country. The majority of the effects will play upon the entire country on medium and long term and that is why less informed people may think that any postponement of a certain program of acquisition and modernization for defence and security field could be easily recovered next time (year, decade, and so on) and country's defence capabilities might not suffer. The same decision must have a different interpretation for an expert and a respected decision-maker who will be able to see the medium and long term negative consequences from loosing credibility as a partner for defence trade to diminishing military personnel and other state employee's moral.

On the other hand, any program or activity postponement will certainly increase the burden for the next fiscal years in order to introduce the delayed programs and activities. Most probably, this situation might generate a review or even the restarting of the entire defence planning process. In other words, to review and reassess all the objectives, guidelines, priorities and deadlines in order to correlate them with the actual allotted resources.



The effects of any change in defence resource allocation will affect the entire society, because any downsizing or increasing the one's budget has to be balanced with all the others' budgets. At the same time, the effects of a defence budget reduction will affect the relations with the allies and partners because they need, in their turn, to review postponed common activities with Romania, and then the credibility of our country might be negatively affected.

Romania's NATO and EU membership is a strong argument for discouraging any potential aggressor, if it exists. On the other side, this is not enough and normal to cover country's security deficit using only NATO's umbrella. Some American politico-military experts consider that burden sharing among allies is not equitable¹. If we add differences in attitude between USA and its European allies related to security environment requirements, then it is possible to discover that all those facts may contribute to deep the existing gap between America and Europe.

In the essence, some politico-military experts and even a part of American public opinion are tempted to become radical and withdraw their support for keeping an extended military contingent in Europe.² This attitude is caused by the dimension of EU's GDP, which is greater than the US's and the EU's defence expenditures which are less than America's with about 60%³ and risk and threats against Europe which are considered less dangerous than the ones against US and less even than the ones during the Cold War.

According to NATO's basic documents, any member state has to be both a provider and benefactor of the Alliance's defence capabilities. It means that all member nations have to build their own defence for ensuring their national sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as the Alliance's. It is important to mention that if any NATO member is attacked, then all the other allies will sustain it in a period of time that lasts from days to months, pending on the situation the Alliance is at that moment. In conclusion, in the uncovered period of time, the aggressed state has to have enough combat capabilities to defend its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

All these elements that describe international security environment and its mechanisms to ensure security at NATO and EU level should be enough both for public opinion and decision-makers

in order to start searching for solutions to avoid those decisions which must cause downsizing of country's defence capabilities and even its credibility among its allies and partners. In order to fulfill this objective, it will be necessary that political decision-makers and the adult citizens also to acknowledge that a credible defence and security cannot be achieved with less than necessary budget.

At the same time, all the political decision-makers and the adult citizens have to understand that there are certain limits under which the defence expenditure cannot fall unless they deliberately assume the negative effects which might become catastrophic in case of an armed aggression against our country.

1. A brief analysis of the regional security situation

Although it is considered that *"territorial integrity of the most European states is not questionable and Europe defence is in Hindu Kush [mountains], the security of most of the European states is threatened."*⁴

Having these considerations in mind and assessing the current effects of the existing world's economic and financial crisis that affects all fields of activities, we need to see that some of the risks and threats against world's security, such as terrorism, organized crime and tendency not to recognize the existing state's borders, have been amplified by crisis.

Normally, this prognosis has to lead to initiation of the appropriate measures in order to prevent risks to become threats and threats to become conflicts, because it is well known that preventing is more profitable than countering.

Unfortunately, some of the measures, such as defence budget downsizing, cannot contribute to preventing risks and threats and, of course, cannot discourage any potential aggressor to make its plans come true.

According to some international security experts, the greater threat against European citizens' security is *"not terrorism, not organized crime, not drug trafficking, not even political blackmail, based on energy, utilized by Russia. The most important threat is the question: **The European Security Defence Initiative or NATO or a pro or anti-American Europe.**"*⁵ This way of thinking is



close to the one belonging to lord Palmerton who stated that “*Great Britain never had permanent friends, but only permanent interests.*”⁶ Also, there are some American experts who believe that “*the existence of a trans-Atlantic schism could be lethal to the Alliance in case of a conflict with WMD... [but – a.n.] the long term danger represented by the differences [between USA and its European allies considering WMD utilization during the war - a.n.] have not to be underestimated.*”⁷

It seems to me that as long as we are going far from the events dated September, 11, 2001, the public opinion tends to forget all the dangers and threats to national and collective defence and security, until some other undesirable events happen, having similar effects or even worse ones. If such an event will happen, then ***all the assumed responsibilities and unaccomplished promises*** will become “hot potatoes” and we could assist to a new “witches hunting,” in order to discover “the scapegoats” and to diminish anger, disappointment, protests and dissatisfaction of the public opinion. The people have the right to ask but, at the same time, they have the obligation to understand that a country’s defence and security cannot be build only with good intentions and promises. Also, the people have to acknowledge that any country needs security in order to build a more developed and prosperous society and a better life for its citizens.

The investments in security could be compared with the investment in a **house**. If we decide to build a house then we may need to make some sacrifices until the house is completed. The house is the most important objective, because it protects us both against Mother Nature’s extreme events and against some bad people who desire to attempt to our goods or even to our life.

The similar way of thinking has to be applied to defence and security building, because security has the role of protecting all of us against any risk and threat caused by the Nature or by some human beings, no matter who they are, and **offers us the right shelter** in case of a conflict. Like any house, security needs investments to keep it in very good conditions in order to accomplish its missions. If we do not invest in security, then it will be eroded and will not offer the shelter and support we need.

Most probably there are many citizens from all NATO and EU member states who must ask themselves: Who could dare to attack us, once

we belong to the most powerful politico-military organization in the world? Why do we need to insist for developing defence and security capabilities as long as the Cold War has been ended? How could the requests for increasing the defence and security budget be sustained whilst long term prognosis estimates that the risk for a major armed conflict is reduced to a minimum?

The answers are easy to be given but for now, the most important is the way the public opinion think, and this is shaped by some patterns such as: “*The Enemy (USSR) has been destroyed*”; “*There is no major threat against NATO and EU security*”; “*A major armed conflict is less likely for the next decades*” and so on.

As a result of this way of thinking about security, most of the people would like to live in normal conditions without risks, threats and conflicts and some events related to those threats and conflicts such as gunfire, bombs and car bombs, and blows have to belong to a history that have not be resurrected. Unfortunately, desires cannot solve problems; they can only initiate the process of solutions’ identification.

Therefore, in order to find a solution for a better and safer world it is necessary to better study the one we live. After that we may understand its evolution’s mechanisms and the horizons it is heading to.

As a result of the analysis, we have to estimate our own capabilities to influence the security environment’s evolution for accomplishing our objectives.

If our capabilities are insignificant or even null, then we need to adjust our nation and international organizations’ evolution we belong to, to the international security environment trends, in order to avoid or to minimize the negative effects.

The world, as a whole, seems to be safer and the recent agreement signed between USA and Russia for reducing their nuclear weapons is a new hope. Unfortunately, there are still some other matters of concern such as:

- many ongoing conflicts and also many dormant/freezing conflicts that could be easily reactivated;
- current economic and financial crisis did not amplify international cooperation in order to find viable solutions for everybody;
- some country political leaders try to throw their own responsibility for inefficient governance



SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

on the others' shoulders by blaming them for interfering into their internal affairs with bad intentions;

- the fight for power in some countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Sri Lanka look more like a civil war than a democratic fight.

Focusing our attention on security in the region Romania belongs to, there is a conclusion that needs to be drawn: there are some risks which need to be solved timely and in an appropriate manner; otherwise, they may create conflicts and their consequences are hard to be estimated. Some of the most important risks are the following:

- unjustified rising tensions between Ukraine and Romania after The International Court of Justice decision to approve Romania's request to consider the Snake Island a rock and to share accordingly the Black Sea continental plateau between the two countries;

- political instability and social riots from Ukraine, caused by political fight for power between pro-NATO and pro-Russia parts, on the economic, financial and energy crisis amplified by the disappointment of not having received the NATO's MAP (Membership Action Plan) for its accession during the 2008 Bucharest Summit;

- some tensions between Ukraine and Romania, on the one side, and Moldova and Romania, on the other side, generated by "ethnic Moldavian... multiple citizenship... illegal immigration, and the allegation of political discrimination... frustrations in borders regime because of the visas required for Ukrainian citizens;"⁷⁸

- after spring elections in Moldova, and massive street protests violently reprimanded by the communist regime, and tensions raised unjustified between Moldova and Romania as a result of allegations formulated by President Voronin who blamed Romania for interfering in his country's internal affairs, and followed by expelling the Romanian ambassador and military attaché;

- allegations against Romania made by some Russian politico-military analysts for the so-called interferences in Moldova's internal affairs, with the most probable objective to blame NATO and EU using one of their member because of their support for Georgia during Russian-Georgian conflict in August 2008;

- Kosovo's self-proclaimed independence from Serbia is not satisfactorily solved since Romania did not recognize it as an independent country;

- the existing freezing conflicts from Transnistria, Caucasus, Balkans and Middle East could be activated and extended at any time and may include Romania;

- transborder organized crime has intensified its activity in Romania⁹ and in some of its neighbouring countries;

- the existing ethnic-religious tensions from some of Romania's neighbouring countries have been amplified.

The existence of the risks and threats already presented here and others, too - less dangerous for the national defence and security - should not be interpreted as a sign of a coming war, although history says that major crisis were followed by major conflicts (The World War II is one the most obvious examples to confirm this assertion). Our intention, within this risk analysis to our national defence and security, is to make each citizen aware of the security situation and to motivate political decision-makers to take cautious but firm and discouraging measures to prevent any aggression against our country, even if it is not so likely.

2. The effects of a less than required budget on the country's defence capabilities

The most significant consequences of a less than required budget are the following:

a) In human resource domain:

- the possible reduction in number and quality – from education level and personal competence point of view – of the candidates for military education institutions, and even of the volunteer because of uncertain carrier perspectives such as: job stability and market existing jobs; professional development; less attractive salary than in another organizations; high risks of the jobs, etc.;

- the intensification of potential exodus from Armed Forces – especially the high qualified ones – towards other governmental structures and private sector that offer better salaries and benefits than Department of Defence (DoD), whilst the DoD keeps the same restrictions for its employees and risks that they have to face remain higher than the ones from private sector and other government's entities;

- the partial reduction of the professional competence, both at individual as well as at the



organization level, as a result of the high qualified people's exodus and because of scarce resources for performing training exercises in an appropriate number and complexity;

- the rising level of insecurity as well as incidents and accident likelihood rising during live exercises and activities with a high pace, risk and complexity because of reducing in number and complexity of the training activities which, at their turn, generate partial reduction of the personnel's skills, especially the leading and combatant one;

- potential rising risk for not accomplishing live missions and the ones assumed within NATO - such as Air Policy, which is a part of NATINADS; Operation Active Endeavour; Operation Enduring Freedom, etc.- as a result of diminished skills of military personnel;

- increasing risk for diminishing the Armed Forces credibility as a whole, because of: the high likelihood not to accomplish NATO and EU standards and even minimum military requirements for personnel, equipment and infrastructure; reduced level of readiness for many military units; possible failure to affirm military units committed to NATO and EU missions; possible failing for not being able to fulfil obligations assumed to NATO and EU;

- the possible reduction in winning chance during live and simulated fights and firings because of partial reduction of the personnel's skills and because of physical and moral degradation of the most equipment which may not function at desired performances or may not function at all;

- potential rising risk for failing to participate in Alliance's live exercises as a result of personnel's training level and skills which might be under the safety standards required by the organizers.

b) In the field of material resource:

- the rapid physical and moral degradation of the weapon systems, fighting and logistics equipment because of the postponed or downsizing of the acquisition and modernization programs, that could lead to a more intense utilization of operational equipment, in order to fulfil training standards and missions requirements;

- more advanced moral degradation of the major equipment belonging to all the services, as a result of the postponement or even cancellation of the acquisition, modernization and repairing

programs, and from bad to worse, because there are not enough possibilities to replace the old and obsolete equipment;

- the ongoing expenses increase for maintaining and keeping operational all the equipment because of their physical degradation and intense utilization that cause an increased likelihood for incidents, accidents and any kind of troubles;

- the continuous reduction of fighting and other types of performances of all types of equipment as a result of their physical degradation;

- the continuous reduction of equipments' effectiveness and precision because of their physical degradation.

c) In the field of financial resources:

- a potential increased risk for getting into the impossibility to pay all the debts to the services and products' providers, situation that may cause extra payments as penalties and even potential reducing of the DoD's credibility as a trade partner;

- the ongoing infrastructure's degradation because of the postponement, downsizing or even cancellation of the investment, modernization and repairing programs with direct consequences consisting of reduced or even null possibilities to use it during training process and in live operations;

- possible reduction of the interoperability level with the allies and partners which may cause an amplified risk for failing to achieve the assumed commitments to UN, NATO, EU OSCE and other international organizations because of less than necessary funds for taxes, annual contributions, training, acquisitions, modernizations and investments;

- possible reduction of living and working standards for the personnel.

3. Possible solutions for minimizing the negative effects

Any reduction of the defence resources' quality and quantity requires reviewing the entire defence resources management process, from the risk and threat evaluation against nation's defence and security till the defence planning and programs implementation.

The experts and decision makers have to consider conclusions related to risks and threats



– types, domains of activity, level of danger, magnitude, prognosis for evolution, etc. – and then to create scenarios and to play them in order to identify the best courses of action for making decisions which have to:

- keep the objectives of the defence and security and level of ambition at the initial level, or to adjust (formulate other ones) them in accordance with the allotted resources;

- keep the availability of the strategies, concepts, plans and programs for acquisition, modernization, investment, training through transforming nation's entities responsible for its defence and security or to recommend other defence planning documents to address the challenges and to effectively manage the security situation;

- establish new guidelines for maintaining nation's defence and security capabilities as high as possible;

- reassess and reschedule deadlines for plans and programs in such a manner that can allow nation to get an acceptable level of risk for its defence and security in case of a conflict or even aggression;

- identify new priorities for nation's defence and security;

- fructify the existent experience and lessons learned with greater efficiency and to create the appropriate conditions for involving all the political and military leaders who lead governmental entities with responsibilities for nation's defence and security, into the process of defence resources management;

- identify new and more efficient ways to perform daily and long term activities, considering: resources consumption; quality of the products – material and intellectual ones; reassessment of the proportion between live and simulated activities; reviewing the methods, standards, tactics, techniques and procedures in order to optimize them to be more cost-effective; the intensification of scientific research, in order to fructify nation's creative potential, etc.

4. Conclusions

Defence budget reduction has important negative effects that will be more intense in the future.

The best solution to overcome any crisis it is to concentrate all the nation's efforts for identifying new ways to transform the society as a whole,

because the solutions we have followed led us to the economic and financial crisis.

On the other side, any crisis encompasses the nucleus of opportunity and chance to:

- search and find out new and more efficient solutions to the problems we face;

- rethink the existing objectives, plans and programs in order to optimize them;

- push the known limits of human being creativity toward new horizons;

- promote people who prove competence, professional skills and performance;

- discourage promotion of the people who display bad behaviours;

- increase speed of adapting people's mentality to the new reality, which is characterized by often and sometimes sudden modifications of the situation; risks and threats' amplification both at individual as well as at nation and Euro-Atlantic organizations level, etc.

Our ancestors' heritage consists of many wise proverbs such as "*Nice weather comes after bad one.*" This proverb has to be connected to another one, "*the need teaches us.*" Both of them have to make up our mind to find out solutions for helping ourselves because there is a divine help but we need to involve not only physically but also mentally and emotionally, otherwise the result may not be as planned.

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SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

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ECONOMIC SECURITY AND GLOBAL ECONOMICAL AND FINANCIAL CRISIS CHALLENGES

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For a lot of people, the current economical crisis has come like an arrow from above. Yet, it is from the 1970s when the experts had started giving warnings that the global economy was heading for a huge crisis. It was in 1960s when the western countries concluded that oil drilling, mining exploitation and placing oil drillings in different areas (which have undoubtedly been polluted) are too high a price for mass production.

A handful of industrialists, along with politicians and scientists who had enough funds to perform studies and apply computerized tests which could virtually reveal the economical disasters that we are currently facing, were able to set up the Rome Club and their first report - "The limits to growth" has shocked authorities and media institutions all over the world.

The report is basically focused on studies over five global processes: too fast industrialization, raising the consumer products stocks, ending the non-recycling resources and the environment degradation.

Our analysis, focused on present day sober realities, tries to give introspection within the correlation between the current global economical-financial crisis and the economical security.

Keywords: economical security, global economical-financial crisis, international market turbulences, interventionist measures, global economy recover, new global economical order.

Community Europe has been founded in order to consolidate political and economical security for each European nation, the intention of wiping off the French-German rivalry being well-known, by joining common strategic economic branches. A political aim has been accomplished with an economic mean, at a high level, where national security and interest are debated.

The economical security is a dynamic and complex issue. Its complexity comes out of the inordinate processes and economical, social, financial phenomena it involves. On the other hand, globalization cuts through, seen both as a process and as a phenomenon which acts systematically and permanently over national economy. Its dynamics is given by the alertness of the processes and economical phenomena performed both nationally and world-wide.

Within the global economical-financial crisis, the economic security should be understood as a basic factor of national security, i.e. : the one ensuring resources and dynamic equilibrium for the other components in the system; one of the national, regional and worldwide security dimensions; a life desideratum for each individual, human community, national state, etc.; main objective for governments, regional and international organizations which have to ensure and guarantee global human security; national economy status quo seen as a source and base for eradicating poverty, hunger, social and economical inequities among individuals and among different regions in a country.

Ensuring economical security within the actual crisis is the result of an interaction between internal and external factors that may or may not calm down the whole production process, the provision and the use of goods and services made within a national economy.

The state and non-state actors play a very important part in achieving economical security, both at national, regional and global level.¹ At large, it is considered that a country's economical security is given by the resources stock and the development level. We could actually say this is a narrow perception. The economic security cannot be seen just statically, almost from an accounting



perspective; it has to be perceived in a close connection to the other aspects of the national security and interest. In the same calculus the promoted economic policy is included, medium and long term goals, and the involvement degree not only for international trade but also for the entire international economic life.

The correlation between economic security and the economic integration degree is given by the economic vulnerability, seen as a relationship between the advantages and disadvantages of national economy, international economic environment respectively, along with social and political internal environment and its capacity to deal with own forces to face internal and external challenges. In other words, vulnerability is related with the possibilities of the national economy capacity to achieve national interest specific objectives.²

As we all know, we are in the middle of a global economic crisis. Nothing is easier now, under such circumstances, than the global economic corpus drop on the dismantling slope by means of a collapse. We can thus speak of the free market in the given frame.

After all, everything in this crisis seems to suggest that a free market can bring disasters. There is no general solution to it. On the contrary, each nation seeks for its own key. Therefore, the global crisis is pragmatically interpreted as a sum of local crisis. This fact is surprising and full of consequences. If the general strategy for this period of time was something like "local solutions to global crisis", we are rather dealing with a de-globalization trend.³

The force relationship between multinationals and local markets is thus changed favouring the latter. The fact that big US corporations have been asking for money from the US Department of the Treasury it does not mean they have taken a liking to socialism; it only means they are renegotiating the credit lines where these have only become local. The crisis will be over when this readjusting process becomes functional.

In such a context, nations have been competing with each other in order to attract non-local companies on their side. This state and national market's vulnerability, compared to multinational corporations, has been considered unavoidable before the crisis. The multinationals have been the globalizing agents to their own benefit while

the social model promoted and supported - the behaviour oriented towards quick self-satisfaction - has been the only rational human model.⁴

The economic crisis dominates world leaders' agenda, and their main solutions are turning the state into a financing agent for national economies and the coordination of efforts on an international scale.

The credit crisis that emerged in the US in August 2007 led some of the biggest banks in the world to bankruptcy, while their effects are still being felt today on the European financial market. After the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy, Bank of America taking over Merrill Lynch and AIG nationalization, the US government has adopted "the economic stabilization act" meant to save the US financial system from collapse.

On his first press conference as a president, the US leader Barack Obama asked the Congress to adopt the re-booming plan for the national economy, as soon as possible, warning that the US will otherwise face a catastrophe. "The private sector is so weak that the federal government is the only entity that has the necessary resources to revive the economy", Obama argued, mentioning a "lost decade" without any economic boom, similar to the one Japan faced in the '90s"⁵.

The US president has also stated that the current financial crisis in the US will last years, not just months. The White House leader has also given some good news to his fellow citizens: The Administration is working on a revival strategy for the financial system, to enable getting credits to the common citizens and companies.

As a result of the President's procedures, the US legislature has approved the economical revival plan proposed by the Administration, 787 billion \$. The, the US Federal Reserve has announced it extends the support program for the banking field up to 1000 billion \$, money meant to support the consumer's credit and the mortgage ones. The US Administration program might thus go up to 1500 billion \$ as the US Department of the Treasury announced a public - private partnership program of about 500 billion \$ meant for the toxic bank assets.⁶ Also, in Europe more governments have announced plans to save the banking system which mean a provision of 1.500 billion euro to recapitalize banks or guarantee financing. This measure came after the moment when more European banks faced liquidity problems.⁷



Russia's reaction to the world's economic crisis risks an augmentation of the state control over economy and diminishes country's competitiveness, according to one of Dmitri Medvedev's counselor, quoted by Bloomberg. "The fundamental balance" between the government and the private sector might be affected, Igor Yurgens stated within a report, showing that state's ownership of shares within Russian companies might grow with another 10% from 45% at the end of last year.

Last December, the Prime Minister Vladimir Putin declared that the state could acquire participations within important companies, in order to help them survive the crisis. The government allotted 50 billion \$ for helping companies honor their external debts, these offering a part of shares as guarantee, in exchange.⁸

Russia is not protected yet against the warning signs in the future. The Russian president Dmitri Medvedev has recently declared that the national economy has to prepare itself for a "tough year", the first improving signs to be seen in 2010, as *The International Herald Tribune* stated.⁹

However, the Kremlin leader's estimation is contradicted by business experts. "We have to prepare for a three-year crisis", Gref German said, the leader of the largest bank in Russia, Sberbank.

An economic report recently forwarded to the Russian president and quoted by the *RBK Daily* warned over Russian economy vulnerability, as it is dependent on the raw materials export and with a fragile financial system. According to Nikita Maslennikov, an expert on economical issues, a three year-crisis will turn Russia into a "completely different country"¹⁰.

The whole region of Central and Eastern Europe has met serious depreciation of national currency. If the first effects have already been seen with people both by higher credit instalments and by increasing the rest of payment, the implications on companies have already been seen in Poland. In this country, the financial market is more developed than in other Central and East-European states. Yet, there are disputes on contracts with options on currency rate between commercial banks and huge corporations. Now the credit institutions have to make provisions (accounting conventions to hinder the spread of certain amount from the plant's profit to some share-holders) of about 200 million euros as a result of the loss the customers have suffered after the options.¹¹ Recently, the

Polish government has promoted a law project by means of which corporations may withdraw themselves from contracts with loss options. The Czech analysts from Wood considered that banks and companies might reach consensus so that neither corporations can assume the loss nor the banks be fully affected by the negative effects.

The world's financial crisis gives huge problems to the Western European credit institutions which have opened subsidiaries across the borders. Austria is the most recent case among the states whose banking system is on the verge of collapse because of huge debt of the subsidiaries from the Community East. Also, because peace, just like war, has its own weapons, Russia stepped in as a great saving spirit.

EU Observer was stressing out the fact that Austria has tuned in all its diplomatic devices to convince Brussels' bureaucratic machine to adopt a financial saving plan for the Eastern Europe countries for an amount going up to about 150 billion euros. The Vienna officials' approach is not accidental: Austria hosts banks with a massive monetary exposure in countries like Croatia, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Romania.¹²

Their would-be collapse would bring a huge breakdown of the mother-institutions, considering that the Austrian banks have to "get" over 200 billion euros, that is about three quarters of the country's GDP. Italy, Sweden, Holland, France, Belgium are other possible names on a problematic list of the states which have sent important amounts of money to the East-European countries, via the banking system.

In order to prevent a disastrous scenario that would be a threat for its own existence, Austria has been trying to determine EU to accept a safeguarding plan for the Eastern countries, at about 100 billion euros. Moreover, the Central Bank of Austria has estimated that Austrian banks could well face loses of up to 31 billion euros from Eastern Europe investments in the near future.¹³ The responsible officials from Vienna try to impose a certain financial support given to Ukraine and to the Balkan countries, of about 50 billion euros.

When the European finance ministers met in Brussels, in February, they debated the issue for a long time, but have not reached any clear conclusion.

Germany, the most important contributor to the community budget, opposes Austria's financial



support plan, fearing it will have to finance other people's interests with own money. Although the Austrian officials warned it is not just a matter required by the Austrian legitimate needs but – in a broader way- it is about a possible and non-desirable collapse of the Eastern-Europe countries.

The last decade's economic growth of the Eastern-European countries fed by a cheap and accessible crediting has been replaced by rapid decrease of export needs, by an investment diminishing and by an ever-growing incapacity to access financing on business market.

Moreover, the lowering trend of the national currency in the region threatens the areas which have massively got loans in euros. *EU Observer* speaks about an alarming downsizing of the economies in the region, warning that Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria “follow the lead “of an Ukraine which is about to collapse.

The recent report issued by Marsh, the most important brokerage company in insurance and risk-consulting in the world, and World Economic Forum on the 2009 risks, underline the fact that economic crisis implications manifest themselves in all economical sectors. Also, risks at crisis time are changing, while the interventionist measures of the governments are not always welcomed. The report warns over the fact that any crisis countermeasures can have long-lasting effects, not only over the financial sector, but also on the over-regulation risks as well as the lack of resources to face other risks, such as the infrastructure risks.

The main risks that came up in the 2009 report are related to the continuous downfall of the assets worldwide, a rise in the fiscal pressure due to recession, supporting plans and budget deficit, the potential moderate improvement of the Chinese economy. The report's authors stress out the importance of a global governance. The financing regulations that come to life now have to keep a balance between solving today's problem and not hindering the novelty which is a must for the future.¹⁴

Free trade with an access to credit for the projects developed inside local markets only: this seems to be the structure for the new capitalism. The local credit control can successfully replace old protectionist practices, guaranteeing the development of local markets without any deeply harmful effects generated by protectionism - that is why especially we were stating that the stress laid

on local market will no longer lead to isolationism and autarchy, like in the past. More than that, a market will be as dynamic and prosperous as the crediting local system is well-developed. That is why the investing banks have not been allowed to collapse. On the other hand, we have to mention that a summit on economic crisis has already been organized at the beginning of March, at the European level, having as a target a complex put together of the member states' efforts to “avoid protectionism” and “strengthen the coordination of the anti-crisis measures”.

The International Labour Organization's (ILO) representatives have warned over the fact that the world's economic crisis major consequence is possible to appear, which may mean unemployment for a number of up to 51 million people, if the situation keeps deteriorating. According to the ILO chief, the countries member of the informal G20 group - the group of the most developed states in the world (Germany, Canada, US, France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan) as well as South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, South Korea, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Turkey and the European Union, whose representatives gathered in London on April, 2nd, to agree “on the financial measures as well as on the urgent ones to be taken in order to promote productive investment, decent labour objectives and social protection.”¹⁵

The G8 leaders who gathered in July, 8th, in L'Aquila, Italy, consider that the world economy still faces “significant risks” and it might still need help for the coming period of time, according to the summit's declaration draft. The presidents of US, Germany, Japan, France, Italy, Russia, UK and Canada have debated over the economic crisis without having traced any important initiatives, as the G20 is to design a legislative reaction to be presented in Pittsburgh, in September, after the initial summit in London.¹⁶

Also, the G8 leaders have promised 20 billion \$ to develop agriculture in less economically developed countries. This promise made within the above mentioned summit brings a new perspective on the way food deficit countries are being helped. Instead of food products aid, they will mainly gain agricultural investments, in order to get their own food.



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The new vulnerabilities, risks and threats the humankind has been facing today impose the concept of security to be mandatory articulated around international security principles, at the beginning of this century, as well as national security. This relationship will allow a simultaneous performance of the global and state needs, for people and persons. The link of this relationship is to be found in economic security, in its intrinsic quality as a state and international security dimension, as well as a human security resource.

The global financial crisis has evolved to a world's recession, while the annalists say that the difficult current economic state is more serious than the previous ones. The real-estates trade explosion and the loss of trust on financial markets have not been caused by a sole decision.

However, economy specialists have solutions. For instance, the World's Bank Chief Economist, Justin Yifu Lin, has suggested a draft of a "Marshall plan" on a global scale, to give funds to less economically developed countries so that they can re-start their national economy: "I suggest that huge income countries led by the US and countries with important reserves, like China and countries which export oil, gather 2000 billion \$ in the next five years, as this would mean 1% of the rich countries GDP, to help less economically developed countries and support a budget re-start plan coordinated on a global scale."¹⁷

The new global economic order, "more accurate, fair and balanced", as the World Economic Forum has stated in Davos, 2009, relied on accepting emerging powers at the global decision meeting table, no matter how hard this would be for US and Europe. The German chancellor suggested thus organizing an Economic Council of UN, similar to the Security one.

More and more economists and even politicians agree that a new economic age is required: an age of coordinated fiscal answers, of an international control over all savings, of giving away from the national sovereignty to multilateral authorities to approach multilateral issues - the result being a more balanced global economic growth, so as to be responsive to any challenge.

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SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

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ECONOMIC SECURITY, ORGANIC DIMENSION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Marius-Petre ROTARU

Initially an attribute of the state, carrying a single meaning, namely the lack of military conflict, the notion of "security" has evolved in time from its traditional significance, where the emphasis was on the military dimension, to the conflict arising among countries and threats against state borders, up to the modern sense, where several other dimensions, namely economic, social, political, environmental, etc., are taken into consideration. The problematic concerning security is not to be mistaken with the state's normal functioning along these dimensions, but it exclusively refers to those threats which, within the limits of the above-mentioned dimensions, jeopardize the existence of the state itself. The connections between economy and security, in the context of a multicultural international background, generate important, significant aspects.

The complexity of economic security comes from the implications of a multitude of processes and economic, social and financial phenomena, and as a result of globalization, seen both as a process, as well as a phenomenon, which interacts systematically and continuously on national economy. Its dynamics owes to the frantic rhythm of economic processes and phenomena which appear at national and global levels alike.

Keywords: economic security, globalization, economic dimension of security, inflation, unemployment.

From the plenary point of view of national security, approached systematically in sense and meaning, the economic security represents a complex concept which, essentially, refers to the ability of a state, of a society, to timely, cursively, plentifully and effectively ensure the material resources, which are needed by the other dimensions of national security, in order to reach their ultimate level of their operational preservation. If applicably defined, the most sensitive dimension of national security represents

the organic pillar of the other components of the fundamental preservation of the existence of the Romanian state, in case of threats to its fundamentals, territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty, when the economic security ensures not only the safeguarding of resources for the state and national vitality, but also the development potential, under estrangement circumstances for sovereignty and independence. In the procedural context of globalization, the credible safeguard of economic security is even more difficult, as the dominant effect of interdependencies imposes servitudes, to which not any economic system is able to resist, keeping with its stipulated national interests.

From the perspective of this reality, it can be asserted that the economic field of national security shares a dependence relation with the global economic procession, and, implicitly, it emphasizes a certain degree of dependence of the national security to the international economic system. Under these circumstances, it becomes obvious the virtues of the national economic security consist exactly of its ability and potential to ensure the best resource needs, in order to maintain the vitality of the other systemic fields. This explains why, during the management process of the national economic society, the decisionmakers always take into account the following: cultivating a certain ability to maintain independent capabilities of military production within a global market; the likelihood of using economic dependence on the global market in order to reach some political purposes; the possibility that the evolutions on the global market may lead to the increase of the economic inequalities among states; the risk the economic globalization may lead to the diminishing of state economic functions, hence generate vicious effects, such as underground economies, illegal trade, technology traffic, environment altering; chances the global economy might enter a crisis, due to a mildly generalized political leadership, to the decline of international institutions, to



certain uninspired protectionist reactions, or to the financial instability.

From the operational perspective, generally speaking, the economic dimension of national security can be projected, analysed, evaluated and designed or remodelled in a systemic manner, taking into account indicators as: *the state's capability to manage issues like inflation, unemployment, quality of life, unhinged balance of payments, lack of economic opportunities, increased level of protectionism, dependence on foreign natural resources, etc.*: *the states' ability to economically preserve the independence of military production, thus reflecting the relation between the economic and the military power; the continuous knowledge of relationship intimacies between those who win and those who lose on the global market, aiming to analytically emphasize the conditions which induce the deepening of economic inequities; the proliferation of humans, drugs, light weapons, mass-destruction weapons illegal trafficking, and so on.* At present, without getting into a profile specific analysis, it can be assessed as the most important issue, regarding the economic dimension of security, *the persistent and widespread poverty*, as attested in significant countries within the global area.

The economic security is ultimately the direct consequence of the state's economic power, being caused by factors as: the country's size, the political system's stability, relationships with the international economic environment and the institutionalization of external contacts, the ability to institutionally and socially adapt to the changes occurring in the internal and external conditions, etc.

It appears as a truism to assert that the economic power, under functioning parameters of positively preserving national security, generates security, while its organic flaws lead to uncertainty, anxiety and insecurity. Nevertheless, generically, security does not refer only to a protection system against threats, dangers or hazard risks, as insecurity cannot be simply reduced to the lack of such a protection system. Security represents a significant system and process function, a systems' functioning condition, as well as maintaining a dynamic equilibrium, needed to cohabit in a complex environment, continuously changing, tensed, competitive, undergoing intricate evolutions, most often unpredictable.

In the context of this approach, one can perform a certain difference, conceptually modified, between *economic security and economic dimension of security*. The first concept relates to the functioning of an economy, to the economic security of the individual, family, community, state, of financial and economic conditions for life; the second one refers to the functioning, in the quantum of the specificities for organizing and running the society, of the social and political systems, of the state, public institutions, national organizations and authorities, and, as part of these, international alliances and coalitions, and so on. In its essence, economic security aims at ensuring the conditions for maintaining the economic activity between normal parameters, as well as counteracting the various types of attacks, out of which the most important are the following: financial fraud, strategic dependence, cyber-crimes, industrial espionage, corruption, underground economy.

At the same time, we may talk about *the territorial economic security*, understood as a protection system for resources, markets, enterprises, jobs, as well as we may talk about *economic security* in terms of preserving national strategic assets, namely those sectors of strategic importance, such as major infrastructure elements, energy, military industry and information technology.

In the view of this approach, it is important to add that some states are less preoccupied with such a protectionism of economic security, while others have never given up – nor have the intention to do so – their levers of economic security, in order to protect, defend and preserve crucial economic infrastructure elements, private enterprises, resources and markets, and so on. On the other hand, the economic dimension of security is proved by the fact that without a strong modern economy, there does not exist, or there cannot truly exist, safety, prosperity and stability, neither at individual or family level, nor at state, or international community level. Security and defence represent those components which put into practice means of fulfilling vital interests for states and communities. Economy and political neo-liberal currents existing in some states do not prejudice, or they fail to succeed in doing so, or to significantly diminish the security or the defence concepts. Even in those states where they intensively cultivate the market economy philosophy, namely freedom of action for certain



economic factors related to economic dynamics, economic measures to secure, protect and defend the enterprises' interests, as national interests are the most drastic. Many times, the insistence involved in suggesting or imposing means of coming out of Keynesianism, more or less direct, that is eliminating any form of state interference in economy, does not refer to the natural tendencies to make the economy more dynamic, to implement some new modern and effective methods for economic growth, by rapidly adapting to the real and concrete economic situation, but this insistence represents simply another facet – somewhat more subtle – of economic war.

Several national economies have also faced disaster due to economy fractioning and to the introduction of economic chaos, under the form of the necessity to liberate economy. The fall of a national economy leads to extremely grave effects, on all fields, starting with the individual's economic security and its family's, and continuing with the diminishing of the state's economic security, its potential to act and react in case of conflict, and magnifying the political, economical, social and military vulnerabilities of that specific state.

As it has been argued above, there is no security if there is no power. And there lacks any kind of power if there is no economic power. The economy represents a generating factor of power and well-being. Even if security, from the perspective of national definition and approach, consists of other components, also extremely important, like demographic potential, systems of values (that is a certain culture, including a security and defence culture, a culture of alliances and coalitions), diplomatic potential, and others, economy has always been present as a power resistance structure, as an architecture generating power, security and stability.

An economically powerful state is a stable one, affording political and strategic initiatives, always to be credited and obeyed. This is the case of Japan, which, practically, does not have almost any natural resources (90% of raw material is imported), of Switzerland, located in an area without resources, as is the case for other countries as well. Therefore, it can be stated the economic dimension of security fits the pattern of being synergic and essential, as it is surrounded by and integrates in the same power concept all the other dimensions - human, cultural, social,

informational, military -, lending them with force and consistency. Among the main characteristics of the security economic dimension, actually of economic security, and, like it or not, implicitly, of defence, are to be found the following pieces of evidence: *it is a generating factor of material and financial resources; it represents a support for all types of security (economic, financial, individual, collective, institutional, governmental, etc.); it is a dissuasive factor for intrinsic and indirect security; it encompasses an architecture both stable in its resistance structure, and dynamic and complex in its evolution; it represents a powerful globalization factor (together with the information), which, in future, will probably diminish the disputes among states, thus generating other types of relationships; it stands as the foundation pillar for strategic partnerships, alliances and coalitions; it changes gradually from central material and financial pillar of the state of right into a new configuration, as support for cooperation among states of right, and for improving their relationships.*

All these characteristics, to which others may be added, show how economy, without diminishing its powerful role of generator and support of the state's power, and, implicitly, of the national security systems, passes on to a new dimension, where the power supports are getting more international and global.

For the time being, this feature of internationalization is discontinuous and fractured, but there prefigures already a reconfiguration, not quite comforting, of new pillars and new power areas, implicitly of economic power.

It must be emphasized that the security problematic, the economic security, does not mix into the normal functioning of the state in these dimensions, but it solely refers to the threats which, through the above-mentioned dimensions, endanger the existence of the state itself.

As for us, concretely speaking, the operational optimization of the economic dimension of the national security can essentially take form through the agency of: the consolidation of macroeconomic stability and implementation of coherent fiscal policies, while promoting a stimulating, firm, constructive type of law-making system; the improvement of business environment; bureaucracy diminishing; favourable laws for investors and constant stimulation of economic growth, through notable production, as required



by the market; encouraging the small and medium sized enterprises through effective laws; strategic continuation of long-lasting restructuring and modernization of the national economic system; promoting applicable economic policies, in accordance with the market's ever changing social needs and requirements; the development of international economic relations, focused on active, stimulating, mutually beneficial forms; the reinforcement of the banking and insurance system, as well as control over capital markets, where major actors from the social environment are involved; the agricultural and forestry rebirth, as significant fields of state's economic power; the optimal territory planning and rehabilitation of transport infrastructure; the widespread promotion, within all fields of the economic spectrum of the social system, of new technologies, essential for the society's post-modern development; attracting significant foreign investments, mainly those belonging to the united European and North-Atlantic areas, similar to the collective security systems to which Romania is a member; the development of activities subordinated to internal trade, and encouraging consumers' protection, and, none the least, guaranteeing a free, fair, honest competitive system.

The theoretical approach incorporated in this issue highlights the essential role, if not vital, of the economic security, in the frame of the national security dynamic complex, standing for a reality which allows us to consider economic security as the pillar of the current vitality of the national security.

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SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

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THE ROLE OF COOPERATION BETWEEN PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS AND JOURNALISTS DURING PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Anna ANTCZAK, PhD

In the XXI century, the role of the media and their influence on social awareness in most of political, economic, cultural and social aspects is gradually rising. The aim of the article is to present research results which was conducted among public affairs officers and war correspondents in Polish military contingents participating in peace support operations. It deals with detailed analysis of the interdependences, relations between the two groups and other units operating during missions and the contribution of the public affairs area to the success or failure of the mission. It discusses the role of public affairs officers in the process as well the importance of various factors determining the quality of the PA activity.

Keywords: public affairs officer; war correspondent; public affairs strategy.

During the last few years, operations and missions conducted by NATO, EU, OSCE as well operations of coalition character, have become more complex and more dangerous. Because of that, also approach towards spreading information about tasks and activities of military contingents had to evolve. The main goal of conducting efficient social communication in international organization is promotion of its activities, aims and goals. With reference to missions outside the country, it is supposed to lead towards raising social awareness in terms of reasons and goals of the initiative¹.

Public affairs services acting during operation are not a new element, but due to changing reality and growing role of the media in social life, their tasks are continuously evolving to adapt to new conditions. Public information area is an integral part of all actions conducted during contemporary conflicts. The EU, NATO, OSCE, or *ad hoc* coalition as well as particular countries taking

part in missions, have to consider media relations, thus information strategy for every mission should contain a “recipe” to win the “information/media war”. It requires appropriate training in many fields – it is necessary to gain media trust and be able to draw their attention (not only to negative and emotional events), which on the other hand, requires an appropriate public affairs offices (PAOs) structure and organization, doctrine, training of the personnel and strategy in the field of public affairs (PA) as well as understanding the difference between the press (public affairs) officer and the “information warrior”². Success in information war depends on many factors, i.e. information campaign before mission, selection of information during mission, relations with local society, and the media as well as national and international media. Appropriate strategy and information policy coordination that will allow for gaining dominance over the enemy is equally important.

In Poland (and probably it is similar elsewhere), news from peace support missions are generally limited to reports from VIPs visits or when there are acts of terror and people killed or seriously injured. Such situation causes creating a following image that may come out in society about the mission: pictures of peaceful life of mission participants, whose source is in the above mentioned reports contrasted with violent terrorist attacks which are the reason of soldiers’ being killed. Society might then not understand the discrepancy between one message and the other.

It is also extremely important to gain understanding and trust of local population, so that the people are aware of the aims and intentions of the mission, which allows for acceptance of foreign armies presence and makes them fulfill their tasks easier as well as influences the security level in



a positive way. It is crucial to emphasize effects of the humanitarian aid and other positive results of the actions. Success of the mission outside the country depends significantly on the attitude of local population and social support from the country and on the international arena³.

In order to gain the best results from the whole operation aims' point of view, cooperation between the PA, INFOPS⁴ and PSYOPS⁵ is indispensable and most often also with CIMIC. This evokes the synergy effect – mainly in the area of sharing information, agreeing upon the action plan not to duplicate activities.

Termination of the Polish participation in the mission in Iraq became a good occasion to conduct research and analysis in the field of PA functioning outside the country. It was worth to ask several questions: What is the evaluation of PA actions during the mission? What is the type and quality of relations between journalists and PAOs? What should be improved? Research conducted among Polish spokesmen, press officers and PAO staff⁶ as well as journalists participating in peace support operations allowed to draw many interesting conclusions concerning their tasks and role they play during mission as well as their level of preparation and relations with other elements of the contingent.

In the XXI century, the role of the media and their influence on social awareness in most of political, economic, cultural and social aspects is gradually rising. The “picture” of the reality created by the media and processed to the society on events that most of the audience can possess only through such means is sometimes one-dimensional or not complete, which is not always an effect of journalists' unreliability or lack of specialist knowledge. Such events are e.g. armed conflicts and peace support operations. Region of the conflict is often hardly accessible thus, information on the situation can be delivered almost only by the war correspondents. It is then worth to consider the role of journalists during the armed conflict. It is obvious to say that it should be searching the truth and justice aiming at objective presentation of the facts. The information should be reliable, neutral and lack manipulation. Unfortunately, such situation being an ideal one, has little in common with reality, and the reasons are very different. Sometimes, journalists do not have access to some part of information (classified or even censored)

which is hidden for political, security or propaganda reasons. In other cases, media are subordinated to political propaganda of the country they represent (it is the case of the media which stay in close relation with the government) or the will to create a “bestseller” in the form of an information (it is the case of the “Western” media), which will contain a well-prepared piece of emotions, not necessarily sourced in facts. There are functioning general rules with objectiveness and definite prohibition of journalist's personal involvement in the events being the priorities. Nevertheless, the conflict between the necessity of subordination to international regulations (aiming at overriding the goal of reliable social communication) and emotions of a human being reporting on other human being's tragedy is in many cases an unsolvable dilemma⁷. Every journalist has to make a decision at a definite moment which may affect not only his/her life, but also the life of other participants of a given event. On the other hand, it is crucial to remember that war correspondents are placed in the middle of two worlds – chaotic and liberal life of a journalist, and hierarchical and closed world of the armed forces which requires obeying concrete rules that are sometimes contradictory to the rules of the media world. Journalists are also trained by soldiers before participating in the operation, which allows them prepare and better understand the environment they are going to work in. Both, journalists and PAOs, have to learn how to respect and recognize the specificity of the tasks they perform.

PAOs were directly subordinated to the commander of the MND CS, which allowed the spokesman, as well as the PAO staff, to have direct access to the commander. It is a very important element making the cooperation of the spokesperson with the commander much easier, which is reflected in the quality of relations. Many officers noticed that the commander's understanding for the role of the media in the XXI century, the specificity of their rules and expectations as well as the essence of tasks and challenges of the PA officers was of significant importance.

PA officers were also inquired on main tasks and specific elements of cooperation with different social groups. PAO's main duties were as follows:

- issuing press communiqués;
- informing local population about undertaken actions;
- organizing press conferences;



ANALYSIS. SYNTHESIS. EVALUATIONS

- information meetings with journalists;
- daily media monitoring.

Other important duties included:

- informing the Press and Information Department about undertaken actions;
- explaining the commander's position;
- informing the Operational Command about undertaken actions;
- helping in opinion polls organized among local society.

PA officers were also dealing with journalists visits organization, preparation of press materials about contingent's activities and edited the MND CS website. Elements of the performed tasks are presented in fig. 1. All tasks performed by the PA officers aimed at helping to achieve the mission's goals through raising social awareness in the country concerning the mission's mandate and soldiers' activity as well as gaining local society's support for the contingent's activity and helping in internal communication organization. These activities also aimed at raising soldiers' morale and maintaining a positive image of the whole mission, which transferred into social attitude towards the mission, and consequently, in an indirect way – into political decisions towards this and other operations outside the country and Polish Armed Forces participation (without social support it could be impossible).

57% of officers, within their duties, had no contact with Iraqi government. Those who had claimed that it was based on official meetings

during press conferences or meetings with the division's command to discuss the situation in the area of responsibility, or they were limited to cooperation with the government's PAOs. With reference to cooperation with local government, PA officers had contact with them during press conferences and meetings with the commander or while organizing various events. PA officers had little contact with local society in Iraq. If they did, they worked mainly with interpreters, which were an indispensable element of everyday activities, especially in media monitoring and cooperation with journalists who did not speak any foreign languages and so-called "white days" when Polish field hospital helped Iraqi people – it was an activity which influenced positively the Polish Military Contingent's image among local society.

Contacts with local media were based on everyday cooperation – sharing information, press materials and communiqués, there were also meetings aiming at developing relationships or during press conferences, briefings and crisis situations. The cooperation also aimed at local media aid projects realization as well as help for journalists and their families in emergency situations. During informal meetings, local journalists were helpful in informing about local government and people attitude and popularized such events as "white days" or CIMIC projects. Contacts with international media was quite limited and referred mainly to press conferences during VIP visits and organization of their stay in bases, accreditation and help in preparing information

No.	Task	%
1.	Issuing press communiqués	100
2.	Informing local population about undertaken actions	85
3.	Organizing press conferences	85
4.	Information meetings with journalists	85
5.	Daily media monitoring	85
6.	Informing the Press and Information Department about undertaken actions	57
7.	Explaining the commander's position	57
8.	Informing the Operational Command about undertaken actions	42
9.	Helping in opinion polls organized in local society	42
10.	Others	40

Fig. 1. Tasks performed by the PA staff during the mission in Iraq⁸



ANALYSIS. SYNTHESIS. EVALUATIONS

about the MND CS activities or concrete event. PA officers also answered the questions coming from the international media or were sending out press communiqués.

As far as the media activities desired by the contingent are concerned, PA officers gave the priority to cooperation with local media staying at the area of operation, in the second place they mentioned civilian media in the home country and in the third – internal communication, meaning MOD and Military Publishing House websites, which is illustrated in fig. 2.

Such opinions may suggest that cooperation with local media and building a positive image of the contingent and its activity among local society through the media is of greatest importance, as it is directly connected with soldiers' security. Nevertheless, all three aspects of media activity are important and none of them should be omitted. Realized together, they give a synergy effect and possibility of gaining success in public affairs area, and experienced PA officers are perfectly aware of this. PA officers claim that there are a few




Fig. 2. Media activity desired by the contingent

Note: the percentage does not give the total of 100, as respondents had the right to make a multiple choice.

elements which could influence PAO functioning improvement. It is closer cooperation with INFOPS and PSYOPS, which is a key element to increase information policy effectiveness, which was mentioned in the introduction. They also think that changes in the PAO organization and/or structure are necessary (it deals mainly with increasing the number of PA officers on mission; it is essential to gain and develop local society's understanding for the mission's objectives, which influences the level of soldiers' security. Elements possibly influencing the improvement of PAO functioning are illustrated in fig. 3.

PA officers highly valued effective cooperation and relations with the commander. Their opinions on the quality of cooperation with INFOPS and PSYOPS varied, but it is visible that there are many

elements in the field requiring improvement, so that the relations are effective (this is a confirmation of earlier postulates of closer cooperation with both sections). Cooperation with the Command, INFOPS and PSYOPS evaluation is presented in fig. 4. Dominance of non-positive evaluations for relations with INFOPS and PSYOPS may come out not necessarily of bad experience, but also of lack of closer relations.

The awareness of this fact should become an impulse for establishing better system enabling such cooperation and stimulating the need of such contacts, e.g. during common exercises (also international ones). PA officers complained on lack of appropriate training and understanding of their role by INFOPS officers, which limited or even made the cooperation impossible.




Fig. 3. Elements possibly influencing the improvement of PAO functioning

Note: the percentage does not give the total of 100, as respondents had the right to make a multiple choice.

In general, officers evaluated positively the interest of the command and soldiers in PAO activities (this is an opinion of more than 85% of respondents). It revealed through reading communiqués presented on the website, assistance in editing press materials about contingent's activities (delivering information and photographs), kindness and understanding for PA officers work. They were invited to participate in patrols and convoys, and soldiers shared with them opinions and wanted to be informed on every press release. Many soldiers showed awareness on the media role in the XXI century and the influence of positive presence in the media on success of the whole mission.

Commanders understood that positive image and acceptance for the contingent's presence among local people has a direct impact on soldiers' security. There were however, situations of lack of acceptance for the PA officers' activity (43% of such opinions) expressed in unkind commentaries, angriness, disappointment and raillery – usually when there appeared unpleasant press materials. PA officers also noted distance towards media which was caused by conviction they report falsehood or not the whole truth.

Satisfying journalists' needs during high activity periods (crisis situations or VIP visits)

were perceived as the most difficult task. There appeared a fear that reported information will not be full and checked, as there was no possibility to explain everything to everybody at that time and for media, it was more important to "catch the news" than to double-check it. PA officers also noticed great dependence of the media on the parties of the conflict and political parties in the region, which made a reliable report difficult to obtain.

They complained on the lack of professional equipment and low effectiveness of internal information system and some (20%) – on lack of understanding for PAO functioning by the command⁹ as well as by other soldiers and necessity of explaining the role of the PAO. It means that it is necessary to introduce elements of public affairs training for all soldiers with no respect to their specialization, in order to propagate media awareness and PAO tasks as well as media training.

PA officers claimed that their greatest success during mission was establishing and developing positive image of the contingent and the whole mission, especially among local society and in the home country. They highly appreciated positive relations with local media and the command as well as aid for journalists in the area of responsibility. Equally important was the continuous presence



ANALYSIS. SYNTHESIS. EVALUATIONS

in local media which concerned humanitarian activities and CIMIC projects, as well as in Polish and international media and editing the website which was visited very often.




Fig. 4. Cooperation with the Command, INFOPS and PSYOPS evaluation [in %]

In order to analyze the overall problem from the other perspective, it is worth to take a closer look at journalists' opinions. They appreciate reliability and promptness of action as well as professional competences. Some value organizational skills and disposition. Communication is quite important, and coherence of speech and quality of prepared material are perceived as less valuable among the most required features of the PAO's character and skills (fig. 5).

Cooperation between journalists and PAOs during operations deals mainly with aid in contacts with soldiers and command as well as local society or enabling visits outside the military base. PAOs were a main source of information about the situation in the contingent, journalists could also verify the possessed information. Spokesmen also chose other soldiers – experts in given fields. It means that PAO is the first point of contact for the journalist, which is why mutual reliability and understanding of priorities is crucial.

All journalists confirmed that they had a direct access and possibility to talk freely with soldiers on mission. Thus, this neglects the myth that armed forces limit journalists with respect to contacts with "ordinary soldiers" and do not let them talk in public. Journalists also noticed that soldiers presented openness towards the media and did not fear to speak about issues within the area of their responsibility. Many correspondents emphasized that lack of barriers in communication with soldiers was the best proof of trust.

The PAOs' role during missions aiming at helping correspondents in making necessary contacts with various interlocutors is significant, however, in many cases journalists organized them on their own. It happened whenever they had already possessed such contacts and did not need help, or PAOs were not prepared sufficiently to deliver such help efficiently. That is the reason for the PAOs to possess as many contacts as possible among soldiers from the contingent as well as within the local society, administration and the media. In crisis situations or whenever there appears the need to use a given contact in case of a concrete event, previously established cooperation is a crucial element for gaining success. The PAOs' role in creating so called "media awareness" among soldiers is also of great importance.

To sum up, it is worth noticing that appropriate selection of PA officers to serve in missions is essential, and it should include their education as well as training, experience, and media sensitivity. The research showed that PA officers' effectiveness depends mainly on support they have on the commander's side, PAO offices in the home country and other soldiers participating in the operation. It is very important to establish and develop cooperation with local media due to the need of gaining their understanding and maintaining contact with the media in the home country, which influences creating a positive image of the mission among own society, which in turn has a great impact on soldiers' morale improvement. The best



ANALYSIS. SYNTHESIS. EVALUATIONS

way of PAO effectiveness evaluation is the level of social awareness (in the home country and in the area of responsibility) concerning activities

performed by the troops during the mission. It is also worth to make use of the research to improve PAO functioning during operations outside the country.




Fig. 5. Most valued features of character and skills of the PAOs according to journalists [in %]

Journalists' and PAOs' goals are different in their nature. Journalists seek information which can be easily "sold", while soldiers concentrate on national interest and fulfilling the aims of the operation stated by the government. Representatives of military institutions show exceptional suspicion towards the media, but they are also aware of the fact that the media possess great power especially important when there appears a need to gain understanding and support for the military operation, which is sometimes crucial for its success in the social aspect. This is the reason for gradual growth of importance and role of public affairs office during contemporary military operations. It is also worth to remember about low credibility of official military spokespersons. Specific selection of delivered information may evoke criticism or even reluctance towards such activity, and it is common knowledge that social support for military operations outside the country is crucial. Cultural clash between military environment and journalists deals mainly with interests conflict – gaining information versus security of operation (it is the case when tactical information includes strategic importance). Nevertheless, the lack

of proper information in society on conducted actions may result in negative approach and make reaching the mission's goals impossible¹⁰. It is then a key element for the public affairs office to establish and develop effective cooperation with the media which has to be coordinated with other activities on various levels of command. In NATO environment, cooperation with the media has to be supervised by the Chief Public Affairs Officer. During NATO operations, the Alliance's strategy in the field of public affairs is superior to the national ones. Adequate information strategy planning, separate for each mission, is a key to success. Sometimes, specific activities within the military operation are classified due to security reasons, and commanders disregard the media, being afraid that the journalist will treat them with pressure as on a hearing.

It is equally important for the PAOs to work out credibility among war correspondents. The idea of joining public affairs offices with INFOPS and PSYOPS in one organizational structure does not support the process. All attempts of manipulation are treated very negatively by the media, and reestablishing reliability and credibility is rather



ANALYSIS. SYNTHESIS. EVALUATIONS

impossible. Honesty and mutual respect gained through frequent contacts causes understanding between the PAOs and journalists, and even support in crisis situations, which is crucial taking into consideration specificity of soldiers' service during missions.

It can often have a significant impact on their security and image of the armed forces, which directly influences social support for a given operation. The ability to work out rules of cooperation based on respect and reliability, which are acceptable for the journalists and PAOs, is one of the most important issues.

Only combining all the above elements may cause success in the field of public affairs. This, in turn, due to gaining wide social support, makes the realization of the mission's goals easier. This thesis can be confirmed by this research as well as experience and analyses conducted in other countries after termination of previous missions.

NOTES:

¹ See: *NATO Military Policy on Public Affairs*, MC 0457/1, September 2007, and *Allied Joined Doctrine*, AJP-01 (C), March, 2007.

² This expression was used by Maj Gary Pounder in his article *Opportunity Lost*. *Public Affairs, Information Operations, and the Air War against Serbia*, "Aerospace Power Journal", summer 2000, and earlier „info-

warrior" – by Alvin Toffler in *PowerShift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence at the Edge of the 21st Century*, Bantam Books, New York, 1990.

³ See: *Allied Joined Doctrine*, AJP-01 (C), March, 2007.

⁴ Information Operations.

⁵ Psychological Operations.

⁶ All respondents are male, aged between 25 and 30 (almost 43%) and 31 and 35 (47%). Nowadays, most of them have the rank of a major and higher. All possess academic education, many have additionally graduated from civilian universities, but not many graduated from postgraduate studies on public affairs. Almost 90% gained the 3rd level in the English language according to STANAG 6001 standards. Over 50% of officers speaks another foreign language (most often it is Russian, but also French and German) at the 1st or 2nd level.

⁷ H. Evans, *War Stories, Reporting in the Time of Conflict*, Bunker Hill Publishing, Charlestown, 2003.

⁸ Officers marked in the form all tasks they performed, thus e.g. 100% means that all officers performed the given task.

⁹ It is worth reminding that most officers highly appreciated the relations with the commander.

¹⁰ NATO operations in the Balkans may serve as a good example of such situation. Limited and selective information that reached public opinion, caused by specific information blockade on behalf of NATO, resulted in one-dimensional perception of little specificity of the reasons of the conflict in the region as well as the role and activities of the international society in solving it.

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CULTURAL IDEAL OR GEOPOLITICAL PROJECT? EURASIANISM'S PARADOXES*

Emanuel COPILAȘ

Both in its classical variant, based on primarily cultural coordinates, and in the neo-one, predominantly geopolitical, Eurasianism proves its ideocratic character, and therefore ideological, despite its advocates' rejection to any form of ideology in favor of geopolitical concepts. Advancing concepts as pro-Soviet neo-Eurasianism, respectively post-Soviet neo-Eurasianism, the article proposes a review of the Eurasianist phenomenon in 20th century Russia, and the way it was resorbed, after the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, in the Russian Federation's foreign policy.

Keywords: Eurasianism, pro-Soviet neo-Eurasianism, post-Soviet neo-Eurasianism, foreign policy, ideocracy.

Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism: Eurasianism's intellectual premises

The process through which Russia had become receptive to Western modernity, integrating it in its specific way, is complex and contradictory. Complex, because of Western ideas' diversity that were grafted on the local cultural background and helped enrich and refresh its semantics, which has brought ample economic and political reforms. Contradictory, because many of these ideas, taken in fragmentarily and insufficiently assimilated led, once infused by the Russian mysticism and messianism, to a reaction of vehement rejection of Western world itself. In other words, beginning with the 19th century, but especially in the 20th century, Russia has used as a theoretical foundation its differentiation from the European culture and political organization concepts of Western origin.

Moreover, giving them their own value support, it tried to justify on their basis their uniqueness and superiority in relation to the European civilization.

The intelligentsia represented, for 19th century imperial Russia, the depository of the aforementioned ideas. Besides the intellectuals, they had a reduced social impact, if not even nonexistent. Deeply hostile to the czarist absolutism, and therefore marginalized and even persecuted, the intelligentsia and its message went beyond the power of understanding of the most numerous Russian social category, the peasants. Incomprehensible, rejected, disavowed, the intelligentsia would gradually radicalize, as it would withdraw itself in the only accessible area to them, that of ideas. As a consequence, intellectuals would develop an "intolerant dogmatism"¹, a sectarian feeling which would draw its legitimacy from the opprobrium and persecution to which it was subjected; equating the 'reality' and the 'present' with an 'incarnation of evil'², intelligentsia's legacy will leave an poisonous mark on what would become both the Leninist ideology and the missionarism and typically to Eurasianism intransigency.

The Enlightenment articulated within the Russian culture two opposing reactions from a means point of view, but convergent in purpose. The first, based on the incorporation of rationalism and of European political and social model, and on the rejection of Orthodoxy as a restraint on the country's progress, was represented by the *Occidentalists*. For them, Russia could develop, or could fulfill its destiny as Third Rome, only by giving up the religious mysticism and political conservatism in favor to the Western model³. The second valued, by contrast, precisely Orthodoxy as a constituent factor of both spirituality and of Russian society. For the *Slavophiles*, "Russia's mission was completely different from that of the Western peoples", and "Keeping Orthodoxy in a pure state, untainted by any internal or external influence was the main idea that they sought"⁴.



Although both fought against the czarist autocracy, the Slavophiles believed that Russia must fulfill its destiny of leading mankind, exclusively reporting to its own culture and spirituality, unattained by the interference of Western values. The rationalism and individualism specific to the European Enlightenment have a disintegrating effect on the Russian community, just as the petty idea of social contract; what is the entirety of the community, and the individual's identifying plenitude. Starting with this, the Slavophiles advanced the idea of two types of civilization, the Western one and the Orthodox one. If the first is structured by science and technology, therefore of visible material successes at an outer level, the second is characterized by internal spiritual purity, whose absence irremediably affects the European civilization. Thus, even though "the West seems to have surpassed Russia in science and technology", its insignificant success is due to the fact "it has opted for the easy path of purely external development, while Russia has chosen the narrow path of inner development, namely moral and profound, superior in the absolute"⁵.

In counterweight to Western rationalism, based on Contractualism, i.e. on negotiation and compromise between the political power and civil ambit, the Slavophiles postulated love and the faith community as foundations of social life. The moral perversion which had involved Western decadence could not reverberate within the borders of Russia. Here, the Orthodox Church rejected the corrupting influences of the West, and cast the foundation of "ecclesiologic democracies", of a "faith community" rooted in the profound and authentic Christianity of the Russian people. Russia does not need – it was claimed – logical deductions and demonstrations characteristic to the Western mentality; faith and will, "inner immediate knowledge" is sufficient to affirm its moral superiority⁶. Therefore, only the social unity provided by Orthodox spirituality can and must successfully tackle the Western origin tough threatening the being of the Russian people.⁷

For the Slavophiles, the greatest threats to Russian spirituality were czar Peter the Great's reforms⁸. As a matter of fact, political power on the whole was perceived with susceptibility and even hostility. "To the Russian people" – argued the Slavophiles – "no earthly command corresponds. Any domination destroys its spiritual forces",

but only the people are "the sole keeper of the true faith, of Christ's image". As a consequence, the political-economic model proposed was that of "collectivity", in which leadership and management of public affairs are made locally⁹. How it is then that Slavophilism was recovered and successfully integrated into the propagandistic texture of czarism?

First, the Slavophiles did not like private property, perceived as an unfair violation of unity and integrality of the Russian society, a position that served the purpose of the Russian autocracy, always concerned to boost the economic and political centralization it exercised¹⁰. Another similarity between the Slavophilism and czarism is the common aversion towards the Occidental current and its exponents. Blamed culturally and morally by Slavophiles, Occidentalism jeopardized the czar's political position, which made a common front with everyone who could limit the influence of liberal ideas in Russia. Last but not least, Slavophile conservatism opposed the violent elimination of the existing political order. A revolution did not offer the context of improving the political and economic situation, as it was an eminently Western concept, whose function was limited solely to that space. The Russian society was not encompassed by the Western Contractualism, but by harmony, love and faith; consequently, any revolution would have destabilized the feeling of communion between Russians and their czar, and, moreover, it would have meant that there was only hate between the two parties.¹¹

However, the greatest measure of Slavophilism politicization is given on its founding on the German nationalism socle. A Western reaction to Enlightenment, the German Romanticism has represented the intellectual core of the Slavophile philosophy¹². However, the Slavophiles have eluded the European origin of their ideas; it would have contrasted impermissibly to much with their claim to revitalize the Russian spiritual being on exclusively endogenous coordinates. "Their problem is, therefore, to import nationalism while blurring the import tags. It is to nationalize the German nationalism to such an extent that it appears to spring from the depths of Russian nation, as an indigenous formation, carrying values. It is about endowing this cultural novelty with an ancient tradition. Because nationalism opposes itself by opposing another, Russia must



be able to be opposed to Germany and Western Europe, using German and Western arguments, but turned against the West and with no reference to their real source”.¹³

Once politicized, the Slavophilism metamorphosizes in *Pan-Slavism*, which only represents the first’s expansion at czarist Moscow’s foreign policy level and its geopolitical claims.

Sometimes being mistaken for Russian nationalism, Pan-Slavism emphasized, based on Russian messianism, Russia’s protective mission on all the Slavs, thus contributing to the imperial project of the 19th century czars. Moscow’s opponents, from the Ottoman Empire to the great European powers, were sentenced either due to their godlessness, in the first case, or because of the alleged decadence that reverberated negatively on Russia itself, in the second case. Eurasianists will take over from the Pan-Slavists the idea of Russia’s uniqueness and special mission, but will orient it more towards Asia rather than towards Europe. Moreover, Eurasianism showed a greater religious tolerance, giving up Orthodoxy as a Russian central spiritual dimension, but has maintained the almost religious fervour which articulates its beliefs.

Counterrevolutionary exile and the emergence of Eurasianism

The Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917 caused a massive exodus of Russian intellectuals and aristocracy. Their number is estimated somewhere between one and two million¹⁴. At this time, and in approximately the next ten or fifteen years the Eurasianist movement will crystallize, whose members come from very different cultural backgrounds: economics, geography, musicology, theology, etc.¹⁵

Eurasianism held in the subsidiary both cultural and geopolitical premises. Thus, the endless debates about Russian identity, divided between the European and Asian influences, were opposed by a synthetic conception: Russia, it was argued, is neither European, nor Asian, but a cultural *mélange* at the intersection of the two aforementioned civilizations. The Eurasian civilization took over both from the European heritage, but especially from the Asian one, and from their mixture a superior culture has resulted, the best able to provide this unique space with an appropriate identity matrix.¹⁶

Unlike the Pan-Slavist precursors, who did

not conceive Russia otherwise than anchored exclusively in “its Slavic identity”, for the Eurasianists it was rather part of the “Turkish-Mongolian world”¹⁷. As a consequence, “Eurasists (the term used by authors to designate Eurasianists, n.b.) developed thinking on the Central-Asian inheritance, Turanian (the Turan being equivalent to Russian Turkistan region in Central Asia). Moreover, they attempted to revise the traditional Russian representation concerning the “Tatar yoke”, proposing a more positive understanding (sic!) of the contribution of the world of steppes to the national identity (...)”. Even if “the Mongol’s presence forced the Russian state into isolation”, it also urged “the invention of its own structures and original organization forms, extra-European, as well as the country’s transformation into a etatized society, politically consolidated and centralized”, and “this isolation largely influenced the state formation (...)”.¹⁸ In conclusion, the political impact and the Golden Hoard’s cultural and religious tolerance have contributed more to the configurations of the Eurasiatic “super-ethnos” than European cultural influences.¹⁹ On the contrary, to Nikolai Trubetskoy, Georgii Vernadski, Piotr Savitsky or George Florovsky²⁰, the main exponents of Eurasianism, Europe and its “«Roman-German»”²¹ culture has poisonously influenced Russia. Its Bolshevization, operated on the ideological coordinates of German Marxism, illustrates the perniciousness of Western ideas’ immixture with the local cultural background. Communism would not have been possible in Russia without an intense “Europeanization”, initiated by czar Peter the Great, who helped progressively at “distorting the Russian mentality” and the political elite’ distancing – very receptive to the ideas coming from the West – in relation to the society. The intellectuals were also not effectively protected from these influences²², where the cases of Lenin, Trotsky and those who preceded them speak for themselves.

Although permissive under a religious aspect, the Eurasianist spirituality did not tolerate atheism. The Soviet regime had made from fighting against religion one of the angular stones of its ideology. If we add to this feature the fact that Bolshevism was a philosophy was encompassed by a European philosophy, the hostility with which it has been treated, at least initially, by Eurasianists becomes comprehensible.²³ But gradually, as the possibility



that the Soviet Union might geopolitical reorient itself towards Asia to the detriment of Europe pans out more clearly, the mistrust and aversion of some of the Eurasianists towards the Bolshevik Revolution is being vanished. "That is why, despite the opposition of certain members, Eurasism progressively drew nearer to Bolshevism, perceived as a form of national Communism." In order to gain its legitimacy, the regime had to restore "a religious authority, to stop the productivist drift and abandon the cult dedicated to the West." As optics on Russian Communism change, the 1917 Revolution begins to be interpreted "as a saviour cataclysm, like a powerful wave, rather than a coup d'état carried out by a minority." Thus, Eurasianists "try to give a philosophical and cultural meaning to the event and feel that Stalin is preaching a more anti-European nationalism than Lenin's, therefore more in accordance with their expectations."²⁴ The Bolshevik Revolution becomes a mere step in Russian history, to whose development it could make a significant contribution.

Because of the affinities that some of the members begin to develop towards the Soviet Union's political regime, the Eurasianist movement is divided: the ones hostile to the Soviet regime, having mainly philosophical and religious concerns, challenge militancy and the political involvement of the second party, which saw in Stalin the potential successor of the Slavic-Muslim cultural synthesis in the Eurasiatic space and of the blocking of harmful effects of European influences on it. The division is identifiable also with the post-Soviet neo-Eurasianism, noting that the activist dimension, political, is more pronounced in the latter.

From a geopolitical point of view, Eurasianism takes its inspiration from three major authors: Alfred Mahan, Halford Mackinder and Karl Haushofer.

The first, of American origin, understood by geopolitics a permanent confrontation between maritime powers (thalassocracies) and the continental ones (tellurocracies), the maritime powers having a considerable advantage.²⁵ Identifying itself as emblematic for the category of continental powers, the main Russian geopolitical desideratum consisted of counterbalancing, through a system of flexible alliances, the thalassocrats' threat, whose main exponent was represented by the United States.

For the British geographer Halford Mackinder, the concept of *heartland*, "the geographical pivot of history" as it was called, meant nothing other than the geographical region from which one could imagine an imperial project with the ultimate purpose of world domination. The heartland was approximately located on the European territory of Russia.²⁶ At the beginning of the 20th century (when the theory was developed), Moscow could fructify this geographical advantage superimposing it with a logistic and a matching economic infrastructure. Further, Eastern Europe would be included in the heartland's sphere of influence, then the entire Eurasia, the Island-World (Europe, Asia and Africa, which are, despite the Suez Canal, in a geographical continuity) and, finally, the whole world.²⁷

The German General Karl Haushofer's posterity derives mainly from two concepts that have been subject to his theories. The first one, *Lebensraum* (living space), was resorbed in the ideological-propagandistic texture of National Socialism for the legitimation of territorial annexations made by the Third Reich. The territorial expansion thus became a corollary of demographic expansion, accompanied by the spiritual vitality, of the German people. Regarding *the Anaconda policy*, it was perceived as an alliance of the thalassocratic powers (The United States, the United Kingdom) against the continental ones (Germany, Russia). The latter, considered the most powerful European states, must not repeat the mistake committed in the First World War, namely that of not being on the same side of the barricade; on the contrary, they had to work together in order to eliminate the thalassocratic supremacy. This is why Haushofer opposed, although it seems that not frontal, despite claims made after the war, the Nazi invasion in the USSR²⁸, which pushed his transformation from an outstanding collaborator of the regime into a pariah. In another train of thoughts, the creation of the German-Russian "continental block" implied, as a third partner, Japan, in order to balance any potential claims coming from Moscow. In order to enhance the feasibility of this project, Russia had to abandon the Communist ideology. Otherwise, it would have been divided between Germany (which would have dominated the whole of Europe and, later, Africa), in whose sphere of influence European Russia and Siberia would have entered, and Japan, which would have received



the Russian Far East. The United States, whose control would have been extended over the two American continents, would have rounded global the Haushoferian geopolitical scheme.²⁹

All three theories (thalassocracies versus tellurocracies, “geographical pivot of history” and “the Anaconda policy”) could be and were applied to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Another common feature is found in their global amplitude: each one proposes its own version of neutralizing threats as a preamble to world domination. This is however missing in the case of Eurasianism. Its geopolitical aim is not global, but rather regional. In its classical version, Eurasianism does nothing else but *react* to Western hegemony, instead of proposing an alternative. The desideratum of a multi-polar world, in which Eurasia would have a well defined place, maybe balancing through a system of elastic alliances the intrusion of Western influences into its sphere of interest, does not want to be a substitute for Western supremacy: the Eurasian project does not aspire to replace the Western one, but only to conserve the cultural and geopolitical integrality of a space whose binder and central pole is considers itself to be. In other words, Eurasianism presents a *defensive* approach to global problems, while classical geopolitical projects are, at least those which inspired it, *offensive*. Which means that the geopolitical substance which most analysts attribute it should, at least to some extent, be reconsidered.

In order not to omit the political component of Eurasianism, it should be added that its followers believed in “«the selection of government»“, in which the only ones to be included were “«the individuals suitable for public and state activities», united by the same kind of thinking, and recognizing a «citizenship of the idea» [at this point, Eurasianism’ appurtenance to the category of “ideocracies”, dictatorships imposed via ideas, where both communism and fascism fall, becomes very visible].” The government was to be refreshed and constantly reinforced by its citizens “in the interest in «the continuity and stability of the social system».”³⁰ From an ideological point of view, Eurasianism wanted to be a summary of capitalism and socialism, but the side-slips to the extreme left and the extreme right are more appropriate to the definition of its ideological identity. After the 1930s, the movement knows a gradual decline, from which it will never recover.

With the Second World War, “the signal of the Eurasism movement extinction is given, its main representatives not having any more contacts between them (some leaving for the United States to pursue an academic career, others returning to the USSR at their own risk), while Trubetskoy and many other great personalities die during the conflict.”³¹

“Marxism involution”³² and the resurgence of Russian nationalism in the last decades of the USSR. “Neo-Eurasi[ani]sm’s gestation”³³

The reforms made by Nikita Khrushchev (1955-1964) created a breach within the Soviet system. By formalizing and somehow minimizing the importance of the official ideology, hoping to improve the functionality of the economy and the huge bureaucratic apparatus, Khrushchev allowed the emergence of ideas and attitudes separate from the official ones, and shortly dissident. They have constituted the premises of Russian nationalism recovery, although at the beginning it has gained its existential reason by opposing the system, reaching by the end of the ‘80s to ply itself on Soviet power, substituting the greatness of “holy Russia”. The nationalists, together with some Communist academics will take over and develop the themes of classic Eurasism, which they will vehemently oppose to the Gorbachev’s reformism. The latter will be accused of trying to disintegrate the Soviet Union, the political-historical form that Russia garbed at that stage of its development. At this time appears what we will call *the pro-Soviet neo-Eurasianism*, an unusual mixture of pro-Russian nationalism, Communism and proto-Fascism, oriented towards safeguarding the power and prestige of the Soviet Union, whose central pole was represented by Russia.

In its embryonic form, the pro-Soviet neo-Eurasianism can be found in the writings of authors like Viktor Chalmaev. At the end of the ‘60s, he “interpreted Bolshevism as simply one of many forms of manifestation of the Russian national spirit.” Chalmaev and those who were thinking like him were concerned about the necessity of restoring the grandness of Russia (USSR) which, although weakened and disoriented, could still win the confrontation with “the decadent and materialistic West”. A confrontation between the two cultural and geopolitical poles was inevitable



for the new nationalists, who tried on this basis to increase the popular support. Another parallel with the classic Eurasianism consisted of a “progressive rehabilitation of the Orthodox Christianity”. Moreover, the romantic idea of “Homeland”, no matter in which form of politics it is wrapped, is brought back into discussion.³⁴

For Sergey Kurginian, a communist intellectual, very active in last years of the Soviet Union, saving the “Homeland” was not feasible if the values which encompassed it were of Enlightenment provenance. Gorbachev and his reformist program based on Western ideas could only potentate the Union’s crisis, being in no way helpful; the only solution was a return to the “Eastern” autochthonous values. To implement this goal, a strong state was essential, but one to inspire the Russian values and traditions, not to import and copy the Western model without discernment. The Communism Kurginian professed injected a massive dose of nationalism in a Soviet system in which the ideology did not count as much, as its etatism and mobilizing call. “«The white Communism» for which Kurginian advocated was an authoritarian and elitist national socialism which had found that the «religious roots» of the Russian state. It was a non-Marxist communism which encouraged citizens «to aspire towards a life full of satisfactions and bringer of riches in a spiritual sense rather than material one.» It was a communist which saw Bolshevism not as a «proletarian revolution», but as a step in the evolution of Great Russia.”³⁵ In consonance with the Eurasianist ideas, the corrupting influence of the West that threatens to morally and spiritually disintegrate “the Homeland” was opposed by an elitist and etatist conception: a strong state, based on the assurance of economic, spiritual, and, when needed, even military safety of its people, in which the ideology does not occupy a central position. It is received in a pragmatic manner, and is useful as long as it contributes to the national and state interests.³⁶ To be noted is the fact that Sergey Kurginian influenced to a large extent Alexander Prokhanov who, together with Alexander Dugin, is one of the most influential representatives of what will be called *the post-Soviet neo-Eurasianism*.

On the other hand, as the system proved its bankruptcy from all points of view, nationalism started to be tacitly accepted by the leadership in Moscow, as a way to remove the society’s attention from the real problems of the Soviet

Union.³⁷ Anti-Semitism, a major component of the Russian nationalism, recurs now with an alarming vehemence.³⁸

The perestroika and glasnost years have witnessed the emergence of many nationalist groups, each of them concerned with the possibilities of restoring the “Greater Russia” strength and greatness and of mitigation, even elimination of Occidentalism from the local culture, which it pursued to maim and finally destroy. The National Social Union led by Viktor Iakushev, the Russian National Union having Alexander Barkashov as leader, or the Russian Republican People’s Party with Nikolai Lisenko in charge are just a few of them.³⁹ The most significant, however, is the Pamiat (Memory) Association. Established in 1985, the organization, which considers itself “national-Bolshevik”, while being impregnated by a deep anti-Semitism, adopts a very critical position towards Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms, leading to its prohibition. Pamiat, however, had a consistent support in the conservative wing of the PCUS. Renamed the Russian Popular Front (or the National Patriotic Russian Front) Pamiat, the movement “organizes readings of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, makes an apology to czar Nicholas II, slanders the «satanic» West”, while assigning the communist system errors exclusively to “«the Bronstain Jew»”, the former Soviet leader Lev Davidovich Trotsky.⁴⁰ From the official documents of the movement we find out that it considers to be “a voluntary union of patriotic forces from Russia and all over the country” that “does not constitute a political opposition against the existing Soviet administration”, but “which reserves the right to publicly criticize any governmental antinational and anti-Russian decision”, considering “the Soviet government policy should be national and should have more consideration for the concrete needs of the peoples.”⁴¹

Post-Soviet Neo-Eurasianism

The ideological vacuum that emerged as a consequence of the Soviet Union dismemberment in December 1991 boosted the emergence and development of a broad palette of nationalisms. The Communists disappointed by the trail of Gorbachev’s reforms, sympathizers of the extreme right, Slavophile nationalists and religious fanatics, all have felt united by the ideal of a Greater Russia,



with a strong culture, able to recover as quickly as possible from the decay of the post-imperial slough to successfully face the challenges of the West.⁴² This was the ideological reservoir which inspired and helped the post-Soviet neo-Eurasianism crystallization. As Stanislav Secieru writes, “neo-Eurasianism as a geopolitical vision is a weird post-modern combination between communist ideology, nationalism and orthodox fundamentalism in post-Soviet Russia. Although the principles of these three ideologies are contradictory, once incorporated into the neo-Eurasianist vision, they constitute «the third way» for many Russians, bringing together the extreme left and the extreme right.”⁴³ In fact, the consistent parallels between Marxism-Leninism and fascism should not surprise too much. Mussolini himself categorized his ideology as a “socialist heresy”. What fascism rejects in the orthodox Marx-Leninism are neither the means, nor the purpose, but its magnitude. Socialism should not have international aspirations, say the fascists, but should concentrate on a single people. In other words, to maintain vitality and to fulfil its promises, the revolution must be national, not international.⁴⁴ Otherwise, the differences between the two political extremes are only of nuance.

From the parties and personalities which have influence to the greatest extent the post-Soviet neo-Eurasianism, the Liberal Democrat Party of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, namely the Communist Party of the Russian Federation lead by Gennady Zyuganov, should be reminded. For the first, it was imperative that Russia regained its status of a great power lost in the confrontation with the West. The centralized economy imposed by the communist regime, combined with its internationalism, are denounced by Zhirinovskiy and accused of perverting the Russian national spirit, the only vital force which can substantiate the rebirth of the “Homeland”. Russia’s traditional sphere of influence must be recreated, but the states and regions which are part of it will not have a political status equal to that of Moscow’s, but will be treated as “protectorates”⁴⁵. At this point, Zhirinovskiy parts from the neo-Eurasianism theorized by Alexander Dugin, for whom Eurasia failed just because the Russians have imposed their domination on other peoples in this area; the feasibility of the Eurasian project lies in the equality for all its members. Zhirinovskiy distances himself further from neo-Eurasianism when he claims that the biggest threat

to Russia can be found in Muslim fundamentalism (Islam being a central element in defining Eurasian identity) and in China’s concerning expansion. As with Gennady Zyuganov, Zhirinovskiy’s popularity, which met an ascending tone in the first years after the Soviet Union’s implosion, is now in decline.

Paradoxically, the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation is closer in ideological terms of Eurasianism than communism. “Zyuganov almost never appeals to the ideological Marxist-Leninist Orthodoxy. Rather, he often speaks about the «dogmatic teachings» of those times, which were «clearly overcome» and which contributed to «national shame and the humiliation of the Russian state.» He seems surprisingly indifferent to the Marxist-Leninist Orthodoxy. His clear purpose was the rehabilitation of the Russian empire, at the basis of which lay «that ethno-political and spiritual-ideological community that is known to the world as the “Russian people”»⁴⁶. Moreover, Russia’s mission of “«countries’ reunifier” must at any costs be recovered, while fighting against the US and other Western countries. The Western “«global dictatorship””, whose geography is represented by “«the Great Atlantic Space””, can only be combated by Russia. Only it “can assure a «balanced world» in «the geopolitical balance of ... the Great Spaces, civilizations and ethno-religious “centers of power”»”⁴⁷. Thus, “Zyuganov speaks of Russia as «the core and foundation of the main Eurasiatic block», meant to occupy the «Big Space» between Murmansk and Vladivostok. This «Eurasiatic» block will serve as a defense line against Western hegemony.”⁴⁸

Gennady Zyuganov has contact with Eurasianist ideas through Alexander Prokhanov, in turn inspired by classic Eurasianism. He also manifested his concern for the future of Russia and its permanent confrontation with the West; moreover, a strong state able to help Russia’s economic and political restructuring was indispensable for its comeback on the global geopolitics stage and for the conservation of the Euro-Asiatic area.⁴⁹ The last goal could not be achieved in the absence of an “alliance[s] with the Muslim world.”⁵⁰ The West, which affirmed “the Athenian concept of democracy” – says Zyuganov – divides the world between “citizens” (members of the industrialized states who support the “bourgeois” values) and “slaves”, peoples who have chosen to assert their spiritual continuity on the basis of their traditional



values and which are perceived only as “simple suppliers of raw materials.”⁵¹ Only through a sustainable cultural and geopolitical alliance could peoples preserve their traditional way of life, their respect and dignity in front of the Western “roller”.

In July 1991, Prokhanov, Zyuganov and eleven other “patriots”, disappointed by the Soviet Union’s derive, have published a manifesto entitled “A Word to the People”, where they call for the safeguarding of the country from an imminent “catastrophe”. The Soviet Union, it was stated, one of the military and cultural leaders of twentieth century, Hitler’s defeater in the Second World War, was now being destroyed by the irresponsibility and inability of the new political elite (Gorbachevist) which, rapacious and selfish, had befooled the hopes and expectations of the “people”. “«Word to the People» signatories required the military, as «glorious defenders» of the state, not to allow «the destruction of the Homeland». The Russian Orthodox Church and the Communist Party were appealed in order to defend the Homeland. «Russia, unique and most beloved», had to be defended by those prepared to put themselves in the service of a «national ideal».”⁵²

Outlined by Alexander Prokhanov, “Word to the People” can be considered as the first scale manifestation of what was to become post-Soviet neo-Eurasianism. Under the ideological aspect, there are included the constitutive elements of neo-Eurasianism: Communism’s reconciliation with Orthodoxy, the call for a strong state, all laying at the base of the Eurasiatic civilization rebirth, opposite to the Western one, or the Atlantic one.

Certainly, the best known and most important representative of post-Soviet neo-Eurasianism⁵³ is Alexander Dugin. For reasons related primarily to proselytism, Dugin considerably simplified Eurasianist ideas, keeping however their essence⁵⁴. Former member of the Pamiat, he founded in 1991 the magazine *Elementy*, where he largely expose ideas from the intellectual range of fascism, paganism and Russian mysticism. Influenced by theorists like Carl Schmitt, he will be, together with Eduard Limonov, one of the founders of the National Bolshevik Party, “whose symbol is a black sickle and hammer, on the Nazi flag background”. At the end of ‘90s, he will draw near politicians such as Yevgeny Primakov and Vladimir Putin, from whose geopolitical orientation he sought

reifying his own ideas about the role of Russia in the Eurasiatic cultural and geopolitical areal.⁵⁵

Resuming the division of Atlantism, based on liberal values, and Eurasianism, based on respect of values and traditions, Dugin postulates the antagonism between the two parts as primarily being cultural in nature, its geopolitical dimension being a relatively secondary one. “«The new Eurasiatic Empire – Dugin claims – will be built on the fundamental principle regarding the common enemy: the rejection of Atlantism, the strategic supervision of the United States and the refusal to let us be dominated by liberal values. This impulse starting from a common civilization will be the basis of a political and strategic union»”.⁵⁶ One must note that Dugin updates the Eurasianist classical perspective, in which the West was represented by the European states, namely the “Roman-German” culture: today Atlantism and its promoter, the United States, occupy the place held at the beginning of twentieth century by Europe.⁵⁷

In 2001, the Eurasia movement is set up around the personality of Alexander Dugin. Stating their distance from the classical doctrinal patterns right or left, neo-Eurasianists affirm their opposition towards globalization, a concept that in their view perpetuates and increases the Western dominance over the rest of the world. The state-nation, materialism and superficiality typical to the dominant civilization must cede place to conservative empires, based on their own values and traditions, and not least on patriotism.⁵⁸ Dugin’s neo-Eurasianism is separated, like the classic Eurasianism, from the Russian-centric nationalism of the nineteenth century. Eurasia is more a cultural and ideological construct rather than a geographical reality. Its purpose is to confront “Atlantism” and the outcome of this conflict “«will define the historic profile of the 21st century».”⁵⁹ Dugin’s neo-Eurasianist vision approximately overlaps over the post-Soviet space, whose political integration in one form or another he perceives as being imminent.⁶⁰

The new Eurasianism guru’s aversion towards the Western civilization is almost irrational. The Western model can only contaminate the other civilizations it comes in contact with, and in no way it could provide new creative perspectives. In order for Eurasia to resist this threat, it must avoid the errors of the former Soviet Union. In



other words, the Russian element should not be stressed to a point where other Eurasian peoples feel oppressed and enslaved by it. The political and economic decentralization should be at a maximum level: the areas with a predominantly Muslim population could govern themselves based on Islamic laws, the areas in which there is an affinity for the Communist ideology could return to the economic centralization and the mono-party dictatorship, etc.⁶¹

Certainly, eclecticism and the lack of feasibility of such a project are obvious; on the other hand, radicalism, determination and the conviction of its protagonists are real, which gives it an ideological character.

Unlike their Eurasianist predecessors' vision, focused on a closed geography, the post-Soviet neo-Eurasianism is a genuine geopolitical project, because it proposes an alternative to "Atlantism" and has a truly global magnitude. Dugin proposes reorganizing the world starting from four "«geo-economic belts»": Eurasia, Euro-Africa, America and Asia-Pacific. Each would consist of some "«Large Spaces»." In each "belt", hegemony would operate as an ordinate principle; in relations between them, however, hegemony would be replaced by equality based on mutual recognition. The desire for a polycentric world being thus achieved, against the US' preeminence the other three geo-cultural spaces would coalesce. Eurasia's geographical and cultural semantics knows a profound metamorphosis, including virtually any country that shows an anti-American orientation. As a consequence, Eurasia, whose central pole remains Russia, becomes the whole world, except the West, to whose geopolitical position it aspires.⁶² From this comes the greatest resort of post-Soviet neo-Eurasianism, namely anti-Americanism. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, Dugin has very much simplified Eurasianism's classical assumptions in order to obtain anti-Americanism adhesion, the main driver of post-Soviet neo-Eurasianism. Thus, unlike classical Eurasianism, whose substance was mainly cultural and ideological, the new type of Eurasianism is based on rather geopolitical coordinates, from which ideology is not missing. As we will demonstrate, despite its disavowal from Dugin and his followers, the ideology remains a major component of any type of Eurasianism.

Although closer in concept to classic Eurasia-

nism, Lev Gumilev's work falls chronologically within neo-Eurasianism parameters. Considering himself the "last of the Eurasianists", Gumilev's original contribution to this idea current is recognizable primarily through the concept of "ethnos", specific to each nation, and its uniqueness in the Russians' case. In Gumilev's sense, "Eurasia is the natural geographic setting of the «ethnos» characteristic to the Russian people, following a historical symbiosis between it and the non-Russian inhabitants of the vast steppes, from which a unique spiritual and cultural Eurasiatic identity was created." In this context, "adapting to the West would mean nothing but the loss of the Russian people's own «ethnos and soul»."⁶³ On the other hand, the ideas outlined in *Ethno-genesis and Biosphere* suggest an organicist and Fascist building approach of human communities and relationships between them, leading to the reaffirmation of the ideological share within Eurasianism.

In short, "Gumilev's efforts are aimed at the development of ethnic communities which, over time, stabilize as nations and civilizations – not just as some and socio-economic and political communities, but also as «bio-physic realities... surrounded by a certain social coat»."⁶⁴ Each ethnic group is territorially hostile to all the others, and within them group interests are supreme in relation to the individual ones. Following the ethno-genesis laws, each ethnic group is guided by "«an irrational thirst (...) for power»"⁶⁵

Didier Chaudet, Florent Parmentier and Benoît Pélodidas group the neo-Eurasianism devotees in "«Democrats»", respectively "«Slavophiles»". The first would have a more developed political sense, being found, consequently, among the leading elite. Their neo-Eurasianism is of a pragmatic nature, which seeks to counterbalance the US hegemony by alliances with the Asian civilizations, from the Arab-Muslim ones to the Sinic or Japanese ones, and the recourse to force is generally disapproved.

Ultimately, if it serves Russia's interests, a temporary partnership with the United States is not excluded. «The Slavophile» neo-Eurasianists, besides the fact that agree with the use of force to protect Russophone minorities from the post-Soviet space, condemn any kind of Eurasia's alliance with the West. We can find here Alexander Dugin's concepts, i.e. what we called post-Soviet neo-Eurasianism. The object of the next section



will be the “«democratic»“ neo-Eurasianists, respectively the political extrapolation of neo-Eurasianist concepts.

“The Primakov Doctrine”. The political articulation of Neo-Eurasianism

After the pro-Western euphoria was consumed, post-communist Russia’s political elite was directed towards the geopolitical and economic reintegration of former Soviet republics, which were now the “close proximity” of the former imperial center. The Commonwealth of Independent States, a primarily military organization founded in 1991, would substantially contribute to the implementation of this goal. Its failure (which does not mean that post-Soviet space is eminently fragmented, lacking any form of integration) due to the attraction towards the Western model in the peripheral regions of the former USSR, and Moscow’s inability to build a functioning economy to weaken this process⁶⁶ - led to a reorientation of Russian foreign policy. At this time, it was attempted, with the help of some Asian powers, to balance the US’ hegemony and to limit its influence in the Eurasiatic space. Geopolitical triangles, such as Russia-China-India or Russia-China-Iran had become, despite their low feasibility, prevalent on Moscow’s foreign policy agenda.⁶⁷

Yevgeny Primakov was the architect of Moscow’s geopolitical reorientation from the West to the Eurasiatic space. Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation from 1996 and Prime Minister in the short period of 1998-1999, Primakov “supports a policy based on multipolarity, dismissing Washington’s hegemony, and stressing the role of international institutions in resolving conflicts.”⁶⁸ Familiar with the Arab world, he developed a flexible foreign policy, based on complex alliances, all intended to limit the global power of the US and its interference in the Eurasiatic space.

The neo-Eurasianist inspiration of Primakov’s geopolitical concept is undeniable. However, although he accepts the neo-Eurasianist variant of USSR’s disintegration, based on the Western “plot” and on the Soviet political elite inability and “decadence”⁶⁹, agreeing to some extent with the simplistic, dichotomic vision of “a world divided into two antagonistic camps“, where the thalassocracies and tellurocracies are in an ongoing

conflict,⁷⁰ Primakov however recognizes that the desire for a multi-polar world was far from being actually put into practice in the second half of ‘90s. In addition, he supports, if it serves the interests of Moscow, a temporary alliance with Washington, which “the Slavophile” neo-Eurasianists grouped around Dugin probably would never accept.

In short, “the Primakov doctrine” can be expressed through the following geopolitical principles: the United States refuse to accept a multi-polar order, acting unilaterally whenever it can. NATO’s expansion towards East is intended to weaken one of the poles of the prospective multi-polar world, the Russian Federation.

In order to play this role, Moscow must reconquer its authority in the former Soviet space, but the Americans are proving to be very consistent in undermining the efforts of the Commonwealth of Independent States in this respect. Although Washington assigns it a secondary role on the contemporary international scene, Russia should, by multi-vectorial alliances and “strategic triangles“, invalidate the American perception on its share in the international system. In its actual conditions, Russia can not afford a direct confrontation with the United States, therefore, at least for the time being, a “limited cooperation” with it, “based on mutual equality”, is indicated. Finally, multiplying the opportunities of a world truly multi-polar, “Russia must speculate the conflictive potential that exists between the West and the Muslim world, the West and the Asian powers, and, last but not least, even amidst the West, between the United States and Europe.”⁷¹

Yevgeny Primakov summarizes three lines of action of the Russian foreign policy in order to counterbalance the American hegemony. The first one aims the European continent. The controversy among members of the European Union (France, Germany) with the United States can be used – Primakov argues – for the fragmentation of the West as a geopolitical entity and the creation of an axis which includes Paris, Berlin and Moscow. Second, Russia should not lose sight of the tense relations that both China and India have with the American superpower, as a consequence, the cooperation to set a Moscow-Beijing-New Delphi axis is in order. Finally, “the last direction is rather functional, and not geographical, and it implies clotting the states which have suffered historically because of the “oceanic” powers. The Middle East



and even Latin America countries: Cuba, Iraq, Iran and Syria are included in this category.⁷²

In order to bring into practice the “Eurasian counterbalancing”, Primakov has conducted an intensive diplomatic campaign. It seemed that even President Boris Yeltsin’s successor, Vladimir Putin, would continue to base his foreign policy on neo-Eurasianism. Although less visible during his first term, Putin’s neo-Eurasianist inclination is seen mainly after 2004, when, disappointed by his collaboration with Washington in the global fight against terrorism and by the initiation the latter’s second Gulf War, despite the firm veto of the United Nations’ Security Council, he will build the “multi-vectorial” diplomacy, thus intensifying the relations with the major Asian powers, Europe and the Middle East. But unlike the neo-Eurasianism expressed by politicians during Boris Yeltsin’s time, the new millennium neo-Eurasianism has a more pragmatic component, which somewhat alienates it from the post-Soviet or Slavophile neo-Eurasianism (more conceptual and radical), like Didier Chaudet, Florent Parmentier and Benoît Pélopidas call it. Unlike the ideocratic character, and therefore, ideological, the “Slavophile” neo-Eurasianism, for which the theoretical Orthodoxy matters more than the practical reality, to Vladimir Putin, the ideas should serve Russia, and not vice versa.

Neo-Eurasianism pinpointing in Putin’s Russia foreign policy

Although strengthening the relations between Moscow and the Muslim world or Asia has as main objective countering Washington’s unilateralism, it is not the only one. Vladimir Putin has seized upon Asia’s rising economic potential and the Middle East’s energetic one, and attempts to integrate Russia as a stable and important partner in the geo-economic texture of these areas. In other words, Moscow’s reorientation of foreign policy towards Eurasia is not only a reaction against Washington, but also an independent initiative aimed at strengthening Russia’s commercial role in what are to be the new poles of world economy.⁷³

Advised on matters of foreign policy by Yevgeny Primakov⁷⁴, Vladimir Putin has however disappointed the expectations of “Slavophile” neo-Eurasianists when he made a common front with George W. Bush in the war against global

terrorism. He had but consistent reasons for proceeding in this way: first, the legitimization of the Russo-Chechen war, but also the opportunity of reducing the cost of Russian state security, taken over in part by the United States, who was even allowed to open military bases in Central Asia. To the reasons mentioned above the improvement of economic relations with Washington shall be added, at all negligible for the Russia’s economic development, but also the fear regarding the destabilizing potential of Islamic fundamentalism in the South-Eastern part of the post-Soviet area.⁷⁵ Indeed, in this respect, as in the brutal war led against Chechnya, Putin’s neo-Eurasianism is totally absent, despite the weight it assigns Islam in shaping the Russian identity and in the foreign policy of the state’s whose prime minister he became the last year.

During its Presidency, Vladimir Putin has strengthened the Russian-Chinese cooperation on economic tap, but especially in terms of geopolitics. He has not hesitated to affirm, from the first year of his Presidency, the Asian dimension of the Russian identity. “Russia has always been perceived as a Euro-Asiatic country. We have never forgotten that the largest part of the Russian territory is in Asia. Of course, we must admit we have not always exploited this advantage. I think the time has come for us and the countries of Asian-Pacific region to move from words to deeds and to enhance our economic, political and otherwise relations.”⁷⁶ Although the approach began in 2001 – by signing the Treaty on Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) creation, an economic partnership in which Moscow has not been involved too much because of the, justified, fear of not being subordinated to Beijing – it becomes visible especially after 2003, when Russian-American relations deteriorate considerably after the outbreak of the Second Gulf War. Now, Russia and China will use any possible occasion to denounce the American unilateralism and to stress the role of institutions in world politics.⁷⁷

Regarding the Middle East, Putin claims that, in addition to the Islamic spirituality having made a massive contribution to the creation of Russian identity, the large numbers of Muslims living in Russia for centuries give it, besides a rich intercultural experience, “opportunities”, also devolving “responsibilities”. Thus, the new



international context, Russia is assuming the role of mediator between civilizations, wanting to contribute to the development of dialogue between them.⁷⁸

Neither the Asian, nor the Muslim components have a share comparable to the European one in explaining the Russian identity. The amplification of xenophobia and racial hatred in recent years proves this fully. But they have an important “role to play: they allow [Russia] to present itself as part of Asia”, respectively the Muslim world, and to extract the benefits arising from such a positioning.⁷⁹ This shows that multi-vectoriality and pragmatism are the main driving forces Putin’s Russia foreign policy⁸⁰, despite the more or less consistent overlaps they have with the neo-Eurasianist project. Besides, Putin acknowledged unequivocally Russia’s Europeaness, which leads to the conclusion that the neo-Eurasianism noticeable in the foreign policy of his second term is rather circumstantiated by the new international conjuncture than by any special intellectual affinity with this ideation current. In a book of interviews published in 2000, the former president trenchantly stated that “Russia is a country more than varied, but *we are part of the Western European culture* (our underl.). And this is, in fact, our value. Wherever our people live, in the Far East or in the South, we are Europeans.” But if Europe will not be responsive to the “geographical” and “spiritual” bonds that they share with the Russian people, “then we will be forced to seek alliances, to strengthen ourselves. How else? Necessarily like so.”⁸¹

In the post-Soviet space, Putin sought to reaffirm Moscow’s role as a central pole and to blur the centrifugal tendencies of some former republics of the union.⁸² In this respect, in 2002, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation was founded, which aims to duplicate the Commonwealth of Independent States, an organization which proved its failure as the time passed, to lead to a genuine security community in the territory of the departed Soviet Union.⁸³ Economically, the emergence of Eurasiatic Economic Community, two years earlier, was backed up by the same objective: to strengthen and reintegrate the former Soviet space around Moscow.

Although Putin’s neo-Eurasianism was more economic than ideatic, relating to “Eurasia as more than [of a] a space, rather than [an] idea”⁸⁴, “the Slavophile” neo-Eurasianists grouped around

Alexander Dugin appreciated the results obtained by him as the President of the Russian Federation, although they reproach him with his collaboration with the United States during his first mandate, a gesture that allowed, in their view, the penetration of the Eurasiatic space by undesirable Western influences. Thus, Dugin welcomes the stopping of Russia’s “decomposition” in the Caucasian region by the suffocation of Chechen separatist tendencies; in the administrative plan, he values the reinforcement of government power and the drastic limiting of the oligarchic share in domestic policy decisions, and, in the geo-politic plan, approve the strengthening of Moscow’s role in the post-Soviet space, together with the elimination of lack of discrimination tendency of plying the Russian foreign policy solely on Western interests and objectives.⁸⁵

Conclusions: Eurasianism, a *sui generis* combination of geopolitics and ideology

Analyzing post-Communist Russia’s foreign policy and the role of values in it, Paul Goble reaches some very interesting and judicious conclusions. Thus, the dismantlement of the Soviet Union “discredited” both the Russian ideology and practice of politics during most of the twentieth century. As a consequence, the Russians have used values and concepts, mostly pre-revolutionary, in order to justify their place and role in the world after the Cold War. Being theorized by the 19th century intelligentsia, persecuted by the political elite and not understood by the rural stratum, which was the subject of their social message, these values were and have remained inevitably impregnated by radicalism. Another issue contributes to explaining the intransigence of the new Russian intelligentsia. In the case of modern national states, the intensity of underwriting certain “cultural values” was mitigated by the existence of a middle class, which “moderated” (even democratize, we might say), by their own needs and the inclination to compromise and negotiation, the nationalist radicalism. Czarist Russia has never developed a middle class, and the Soviet Union fought explicitly against such a possibility. Thus, values and culture have remained an intellectual elite privilege. Not “negotiated” with a middle class, whose penchant for wealth and stability would certainly have alleviated their incision, “cultural



values” remain, largely, in the “possession” of an intelligentsia more or less radical.⁸⁶ In addition, the new and non-compromising Russian nationalism, which has influenced to a large extent neo-Eurasianism, is also powered by the fact that Russia has developed an imperial identity before having a national one. Thus, “the Russians have never had to define precisely who they were and which should have been their state borders”.⁸⁷ So, USSR’s disintegration was a painful experience for both ethnic Russians, who, now part of the new independent states, have seen themselves separated from the mother-country, and for those remaining inside it; in the Russian’s mental geography, the Soviet Union is still perceived, largely, as their own country.⁸⁸

Goble distinguishes between three types of cultural “tensions” which nourish the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. The first is the “isolation”, namely the “involvement”. If today Moscow opts clearly for involvement, in the second half of the ‘90s, its position in this regard was more than ambiguous. For neo-Eurasianists, the ambiguity perpetuates in that that, by proposing a geopolitical project, they opted for clear involvement; on the other hand, the substance of Eurasianism is undoubtedly a isolationist. Further we are dealing with the opposition between East and West, which I also reviewed in this article, and in which neo-Eurasianism is oriented, unequivocally, to the East. Finally, Russia must decide whether it wishes to become a “normal” country or to regain its status as a global power. Neo-Eurasianists clearly opt for the second variant, despite the fact that Russia can not yet be any of them.⁸⁹

Post-Soviet, or “Slavophile”, neo-Eurasianism is considered (and to a certain point it is) an intellectual construct based on geopolitical grounds. Unlike ideologies, these are supposed to be invested with “a constant character and can not be amended over time by historical developments.”⁹⁰ But just here lies the ideological character of neo-Eurasianism, in postulating ideas it has about itself and about the world around as being permanent and unchanging in time and space. Stressing the primacy of the Eurasian idea, neo-Eurasianism reveals, as its precursor, its ideocratic character. Or any ideocracy, any enslavement and any distortion of reality in order to make it compatible with a certain idea or set of ideas is ultimately an ideology. Moreover, the messianism specific

to neo-Eurasianism, its radicalism, its irrational belief in an imminent confrontation between the “Great Atlantic Area and Eurasia (a reminiscence of the Leninist dogma regarding the inevitability of a fight between the “imperialist camp” and the “socialist” one), all these lead to the identification of an ideological substrate within the neo-Eurasianist project, despite the declared aversion of its adherents to any form of ideology.

We should not loose out of sight the rather fascistic character of neo-Eurasianism, despite its pro-Islamic propensity and the so-called tolerance of all Eurasian peoples. The main pole of the neo-Eurasian project remains the Russian Federation, which reminds all nations and ethnic groups in the post-Soviet area Moscow’s imperial ambitions and the essentially imperialist nature of neo-Eurasianism. Lacking feasibility, resentful and intolerant, neo-Eurasianism plies on the cultural coordinates of the ‘20s’ Eurasianism, borrowing from it the ideocratic character, but injecting it with a massive dose of geopolitics. Claiming resistance to Western culture, until it will be able to destroy it, neo-Eurasianism forgets that each culture is a product of the interaction of other cultures, and the opening to otherness permanently enriches its own identity, reducing prejudices, suspicions and fear towards the other. Closed in an autarchic cultural and geographical conception, even hermetic, Eurasianism’s success is based precisely on the ignorance, prejudice and fear of those who claim that are trying to protect them against the bad influence of the “materialistic and decadent” West.

Finally, Eurasianism and neo-Eurasianism represent only a manifestation of what the famous Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdiaev named ‘the religious energy of the Russian soul’, which is often orientated towards ‘goals which have nothing religious in them’.⁹¹ Just like their Slavophile, Narodnic, Nihilist, Anarchist or Communist predecessors, intelligentsia’s representants in the 19th century and in the beginning of the 20th, Eurasianists and especially neo-Eurasianists extract their philosophy from Western ideas (in this case, residual-comunist and ultraconservative towards fascistic) insufficient and dogmatic assimilated (not that Fascism or Communism would not be themselves dogmatic), which they credit as being universal and eternally valid. The Russian civil society it’s just beginning



to emerge, therefore an authentic social dialogue upon the ideas from the public sphere is still to be expected. As a consequence, the ideas which underlie Eurasianism did not benefit from debates to polish them, confirm or infirm their validity or generalizability and to attenuate their radical tendencies developed, to a great extent as in the case of the predecessor ideatic currents, due to the isolation and rejection from and by the society. They are still surrounded by an aura of ‘holiness’ and any attempt to critically approach them, not necessarily hostile, are disregarded from the start. As long as in Russia liberal ideas will remain ‘anemic’⁹², the civil society and the social dialogue insufficiently developed and ‘the religious energy of the Russian soul’ oriented towards dogmatic and intolerant directions, not towards the possibility of creating a mobilizing ideal indispensable to any type of political organization, especially to the democratic ones – these kind of movements will sadly maintain a certain strong position and hope for a better future.

* *The documentation for this article was partially facilitated by an AMPOSDRU scholarship, obtained through the following grant: Investește în oameni! FONDUL SOCIAL EUROPEAN, Programul Operațional Sectorial pentru Dezvoltarea Resurselor Umane 2007-2013, proiectul „STUDIILE DOCTORALE FACTOR MAJOR DE DEZVOLTARE AL CERCETĂRILOR SOCIO-ECONOMICE ȘI UMANISTE”*

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¹ Bogdan SILION, *Rusia și Ispita Mesianică. Religie și Ideologie*, Vremea XXI, București, 2004, p. 44.

² Nicolai BERDIAEV, **Originile și sensul comunismului rus**, Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 1994, p. 42.

³ Ibidem, p. 45.

⁴ Ibidem, p. 51.

⁵ Alain BESANÇON, **Originile intelectuale ale leninismului**, Humanitas, București, 1993, p. 64.

⁶ Ibidem, pp. 65-66.

⁷ Russell SHERMAN, **Rusia, 1815-1881**, Bic All, București, 2001, p. 55.

⁸ Idem. See also Nicholas V. RIASANOVSKY, **O istorie a Rusiei**, Institutul European, Iași, 2001, p. 377.

⁹ Bogdan SILION, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-52.

¹⁰ Ibidem, p. 52. Another point of convergence between Slavophiles and the Leninist revolutionaries is represented by the hostility towards “the religion of

money” and market economy, Western “anomalies” which should not be allowed to dissolve the Russian economy and society. See Alain BESANÇON, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

¹¹ Bogdan SILION, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

¹² Nicholas V. RIASANOVSKY, *op. cit.*, p. 377.

¹³ Alain Besançon, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

¹⁴ Didier CHAUDET, Florent PARMENTIER, Benoît PÉLOPIDAS, **Imperiul în oglindă. Strategii de mare putere în Statele Unite și în Rusia**, Cartier, Chișinău, 2008, p. 83.

¹⁵ Vladimir MAXIMENKO, „The Russia-Eurasian Idea (Pax Rossica)”, în *Russian Analytica*, nr. 6, 2005, p. 6, Paul DOBRESCU, Alina BÂRGĂOANU, *Geopolitica*, Facultatea de Comunicare și Relații Publice „David Ogilvy”, SNSPA, București, 2001, p. 132.

¹⁶ Idem, Mark BASSIN, *Eurasianism, „Classical” and „Neo”: the Lines of Continuity*, document available online, src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no17_ses/14bassin.pdf, Pierre LORRAIN, **Incredibila Alianță Rusia- Statele Unite**, Editura Științelor Sociale și Politice, București, 2002, p. 121.

¹⁷ Didier Chaudet, Florent Parmentier, Benoît Pélopidas, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

¹⁸ Ibidem, p. 80.

¹⁹ Stanislav SECRIERU, **Rusia După Imperiu: între putere regională și custode global**, Institutul European, Iași, 2008, p. 85. See also și Sanjay Kumar PANDEY, „Asia in the Debate on Russian Identity”, în *International Studies*, nr. 44, 2007, pp. 325-327.

²⁰ Paul DOBRESCU, Alina BÂRGĂOANU, *op. cit.*, p. 132; Stanislav SECRIERU, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

²¹ Didier CHAUDET, Florent PARMENTIER, Benoît PÉLOPIDAS, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

²² Vladimir MAXIMENKO, *art. cit.*, p. 10.

²³ Didier CHAUDET, Florent PARMENTIER, Benoît PÉLOPIDAS, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

²⁴ Ibidem, p. 85.

²⁵ Jon SUMIDA, „Alfred Thayer Mahan, Geopolitician”, în Collin S. GRAY, Geoffrey SLOAN (ed.), **Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy**, Frank Cass Publishers, Londra, 1999, pp. 39-62.

²⁶ Halford J. MACKINDER, „The Geographical Pivot of History”, in Gearóid Ó TUATHAIL, Simon DALBY, Paul ROUTLEDGE, **The Geopolitics Reader**, Routledge, Glasgow, 2006, p. 37.

²⁷ Paul DOBRESCU, Alina BÂRGĂOANU, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

²⁸ Holger H. HERWIG, „Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum”, in Collin S. GRAY, Geoffrey SLOAN (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 236. For a tardily justification of the collaboration with the Nazis, see Karl HAUSHOFER, „Defense of German Geopolitics”, în Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, Paul Routledge, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-56.



- ²⁹ Paul DOBRESCU, Alina BĂRGĂOANU, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
- ³⁰ Vladimir MAXIMENKO, *art. cit.*, p. 7.
- ³¹ Didier CHAUDET, Florent PARMENTIER, Benoît PÉLOPIDAS, *op. cit.*, p. 89.
- ³² The expression was borrowed from James GREGOR, **Fețele lui Ianus. Marxism și fascism în secolul XX**, Univers, București, 2002, p. 113.
- ³³ The syntagm was borrowed from Didier CHAUDET, Florent PARMENTIER, Benoît PÉLOPIDAS, *op. cit.*, p. 89.
- ³⁴ James GREGOR, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-121.
- ³⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 129.
- ³⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 130-131.
- ³⁷ Emanuel COPILAȘ, „Between continuity and change: the resurgence of nationalism in post-Soviet Russia”, în *Revista Română de Geografie Politică*, nr. 2, 2008, pp. 62-64.
- ³⁸ Thierry WOLTON, **Roșu-Brun. Răul Secolului**, Fundația Academia Civică, București, 2001, pp. 319-320.
- ³⁹ James GREGOR, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-140.
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- ⁴¹ Official document of the Pamiat organization, in Aldo FERRARI, **A treia Romă. Renașterea Naționalismului Rus**, Anastasia, București, 1999, pp. 79-80. A concise and pertinent analysis of the movement can be found at the pages 59-79.
- ⁴² Ilya PRIZEL, „Naționalismul în Rusia postcomunistă: de la resemnare la furie”, in Sorin ANTOHI, Vladimir TISMĂNEANU (coord.), **De la utopie la istorie. Revoluțiile din 1989 și urmările lor**, Curtea Veche, București, 2006, pp. 511-520.
- ⁴³ Stanislav SECRIERU, *op. cit.*, p. 86.
- ⁴⁴ Joshua MURAVCHIK, **Raiul pe Pământ. Mărirea și Decăderea Socialismului**, Brumar, Timișoara, 2004, pp. 161-191.
- ⁴⁵ James GREGOR, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-143.
- ⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 150.
- ⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 151.
- ⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 152.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 144-146.
- ⁵⁰ Didier CHAUDET, Florent PARMENTIER, Benoît PÉLOPIDAS, *op. cit.*, p. 95.
- ⁵¹ Pierre LORRAIN, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-213.
- ⁵² James GREGOR, *op. cit.*, p. 144.
- ⁵³ In this article, post-Soviet neo-Eurasianism is applied exclusively to Alexander Dugin's ideas.
- ⁵⁴ Stanislav SECRIERU, *op. cit.*, p. 86.
- ⁵⁵ Didier Chaudet, Florent PARMENTIER, Benoît PÉLOPIDAS, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-98.
- ⁵⁶ Alexandr Dughin, apud. Pierre LORRAIN, *op. cit.*, p. 211.
- ⁵⁷ Mark BASSIN, *art. cit.*, p. 290.
- ⁵⁸ The Eurasia Directive, http://www.geocities.com/eurasia_uk/directive.html
- ⁵⁹ Mark BASSIN, *art. cit.*, p. 286.
- ⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 286-288.
- ⁶¹ Dmitry SHLAPENTOKH, „Russian Nationalism Today: the Views of Alexander Dugin”, in *Contemporary Review*, July 2001.
- ⁶² Mark BASSIN, *art. cit.*, pp. 291-294.
- ⁶³ Zbigniew BREZINSKI, **Marea tablă de șah. Supremația americană și imperativele sale geostrategice**, Univers Enciclopedic, București, 2000, p. 126.
- ⁶⁴ James GREGOR, *op. cit.*, p. 182.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 183.
- ⁶⁶ Martha OLCOTT, Anders ÅSLUND, Sherman GARNETT, **Getting It Wrong. Regional Cooperation and the Commonwealth of Independent States**, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., 1999.
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- ⁶⁸ Didier CHAUDET, Florent PARMENTIER, Benoît PÉLOPIDAS, *op. cit.*, p. 104.
- ⁶⁹ Stanislav SECRIERU, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
- ⁷⁰ Françoise THOM, „Naționalismul rusesc”, in *Alteră*, nr. 5, 1996, p. 24.
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ABANDONING A STRATEGIC MISSILE SYSTEM FOR A MORE CONVENIENT AND PERFORMANT MISSILE SYSTEM

Vasile POPA

In our opinion, the event with the most important strategic impact of the year is the US abandon, a very wise one, of the missile shield system, in its previous version, the defence against long range missiles and the passing to a new one, more flexible and faster, aiming short and medium range missiles. This option seems not to be connected with the current financial crisis, although the dramatic clash of some strong American banks and the rather complicated economical problems have imposed the renouncement on many programs for modernizing and replacement the older weapon systems – especially in USAF and US Navy – and less expensive and less offensive solutions. There is a close relation with the strategic crisis generated by the way Russia reacted at the system for combating the long range missiles, considering it a threat, as it could counterbalance the nuclear strategic balance achieved in time, by SALT treaties. There were announced consequent measures, that is deploying some missiles in Kaliningrad enclave. Or, as it is already known, Russia and the United States have signed a strategic partnership, and nobody wants their relations to be tensioned, not even themselves, especially during those hard times, full of geopolitical reconfigurations on financial, economic support, in order to control and provide access to markets and energetic resources, the ones which have already determined the more or less visible battles, for the Middle East, Caspian area, for Central Asia, for the resources within the Arctic Ocean, etc. Any revival of the relations between the big nuclear powers may be beneficial for everybody.

The Russians welcomed this initiative and offered themselves to cooperate with the Americans for setting the new antimissile system. It may be beneficial for all the countries, as it aims the defence against short and medium range missile

systems, which become more and more numerous and dangerous, and elements of them may be easily accessed by terrorists.

The new system is to be developed in four stages. Therefore, up to 2020, the stages will be as it follows:

Stage 1 – Up to 2010, the deployment of the AEGIS systems, in the South and North of Europe, which are already placed on battleships and SM-3s (the systems have been tested in February 2008 on an American drifted satellite).

Stage 2 – Up to 2015, the deployment, on land and at sea, the new modernized SM-3 systems, probably in Poland and the Czech Republic.

Stage 3 – The deployment of new SM-3 systems, in a new configuration, with substantially improved parameters.

Stage 4 – Up to 2020, the deployment of improved SM-3 systems, able to intercept any any type of missile, with any range of action.

We are in a stage of a more and more dangerous reality of the humankind, where world has to take firm defence measures against own threats. Beyond these aspects, the new antimissile American system has already been tested and may be achieved with smaller costs. The stowage of weapons and tensions on different reasons and games of interests are and should be considered the greatest danger and the greatest threats on the whole world.

If there have been built huge missile arsenals, with more than 12.000 active nuclear heads, it is compulsory, vital especially for the ones owning this sort of weapons, to achieve a sufficient number of common defence systems, able to protect everybody and not just ones against others.

Obviously, the motivation that laid beyond the missile system to be put into practice since Bush administration (which actually was a lower



component of the Star Wars program) was the fact that Iran was building some missile which may hit the European continent. And in order to prevent an attack with Shahab-3 missiles, whose range was said to be around 3000 kilometres, there was necessary to build a defence missile system, endowed with very powerful radars, located in California, in Alaska and the Czech Republic, and very complex powerful missiles in California and Poland... How to accept that?! In order to protect yourself against some missiles which may be launched by Iran, you deploy missile defence systems all over the world, with huge costs, suspicions and even objections from some allies and strategic partners (Russia)?!

Deploying US military bases almost all over the world, Pacific fleet, NATO and other security and defence constructs have generated Russia's reactions.

It seemed that the Cold War did not end, it will start again, in completely different conditions, a thousand times more dangerous than the ones after World War II, that is, in a strategic environment with thousands of active nuclear warheads and huge programs for developing high precision weapons, weapons based on nanotechnologies, biotechnologies and amplifying waves, with effects inclined to generate a chaos state... Even if the actual motivation according to which the new missile systems aim defence against Iranian vectors, it is not necessarily enough for explaining and justifying this effort. But, probably, in time, there will be brought into discussion all required arguments and explanations, meaning that achieving some missile systems must aim the world's defence (and not only a part of it) against all the missiles around the world.

Of course, things may be differently considered: If the missiles are indeed a threat for the whole world, wouldn't be easier if the World forces the ones owning them to give them up, destroy their arsenals and not build others? Yes, it would. But nobody has ever given up on any weapon, before making a better one, one that is more performing.

And even if the American President, Barak Obama, a wise and responsible man, has declared that the process of treaties on reducing the missiles will be continued, it is hard to imagine that everybody will give up on missiles, as long as nothing better can replace them. Moreover, we all know that the weapons replacing these

destructive missiles have already come out, to a large extent, from the designers' panoplies and some of them are still to be tested (see HAARP as well as some of the latest weapon systems with climatic and geophysical effects). Let's just hope that the new weapons – based, as mentioned, on waves, lasers, nanotechnologies, biotechnologies, etc. – will be not only less lethal, less destructive (because they will not be!), but also, in a way, more “constructive”, that is, useful for people, meaning they will defend the human being against some new dangers and threats from the future...

“The best way to responsibly improve our own security and our allies’ – Barak Obama stated, at the White House – is to deploy a missile system able to better handle the current threats we have to deal with and which uses verified technologies, at a reasonable price.”

However, the leader from the White House said that US will continue to consider the missile Iranian activities as “an important threat”, and that George W. Bush was right, in this matter.¹

Also, NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, saluting the event, underlined, in his turn, that there has come the time the missile systems of the United States, NATO's and Russia's to be connected. Another wise say which deserves all the consideration. “Our countries and our armies will become more and more vulnerable to missile attacks, and NATO and Russia's fundamental interest is, when time comes, to connect US, NATO's and Russia's missile defence systems”. Here the time has come. We just hope it will not be missed.

A year ago, during different debates following the Bucharest NATO summit and published by some newspapers, we stated (and we still do) that we need to get out of the narrow frame of the direct confrontations, as all the countries' missiles are a threat for everybody and not just for some, including the countries owning them. An antiballistic missile defence has, as the main vocation – as the only vocation – to protect the world against missiles which have been created by the world, too, and, sooner or later, it will be achieved and accepted. It is an awkward situation. Just as in the situation of the Oltenian and the hat. When he feels really really alone, and he has nothing to do, he takes off his hat and guards it. So he is sure he is not going to steal it, as nobody is around. But the danger is there...



STRATEGIC EVENT

The same thing applies to the world we live in. All alone, it makes missiles that can destroy it a few times, and, when it realizes that, instead of giving up on them, makes systems able to defend it against them... For the time being, we can't get out of this circle, this paradox. States will not give up either on their short, medium or long range action missiles or their missile defence systems, but they can cooperate in order to achieve and deploy common missile systems, able not to threaten anybody, but to protect everybody. It will probably get to a configuration of the strategic environment where any missile which does not have a recognition code has to be brought down or annihilated by

these missile systems, a sort of "watchdogs" of countries, cities and even the World, against the World's missiles, and also against other dangers and threats. We think there is the time when there can really be established an order in the airspace and even in the cosmic space, in order to avoid catastrophes and to provide a viable protective shield for the planet's civilization, for the people's lives.

NOTES:

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THE MEDUSA MYTH AND THE TECHNOLOGIES OF THE FUTURE WAR

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In Greek mythology, Medusa was one of the Gorgons who could turn any mortal to stone with its look. Perseus killed it while it was sleeping. Assimilating this myth to contemporary military technologies, we can assume that the energy strike, regardless of its nature and form of manifestation, impulses or continuous waves, has as main objective taking any contemporary informational system back to the Stone Age. We intend to present those aspects which will determine revising the doctrinal principles because of the danger of using direct energy weapons by a potential aggressor and at the same time emphasizing the advantages of the controlled use of such weapons during military operations in this informational era and the fight against terrorism.

Keywords: Direct Energy Weapons.

The root of the word “energy” is found in Latin and Greek, meaning “activity”. Subsequently, due to the system study, energy defined an increase in state reflecting an object’s ability to produce a mechanical work during its passing from one state to another. In short, energy represents a resource used to change a certain state, position or to record a development within a monitored trajectory. Energy is used also to stay in an unchanged state in time. Energy is also used for a system’s involution, especially if this accelerates its erosion processes to self-destruction.

If we accept the fact that human society is an amount of social systems, we can state that there is a huge amount of energy, particularly during conflicts between structures, reaching maximum values during wars, as a maximum form of conflict’s development. Let us think about the amount of energy used to identify and apply strategies meant to determine an enemy to accept the other party’s objectives. On the other hand, let’s think about the amount of energy used by both parties to counteract the enemy’s actions (regardless of its form) and its

supporters without limiting to the energy required for executing the forces and means maneuvers. We refer to the energy used to ensure specific supplies, ammunition, food, to the effort to achieve the informational support, to maintain the life and health standards of the personnel and population still in the area of operation, etc.

Thus, it’s natural to ask: *What is direct energy? What are direct energy weapons?*

Generally speaking, weapons are those devices used by the military which transform energy into an object’s propulsion force (projectile). When hitting the target, it transfers its energy with a devastating effect for the target. Depending on the amount of energy transferred, there are several events such as: 1). the absorption of the entire amount of energy thus achieving the transformation in mechanical work or the shift to another state and 2). When the projectile hits the target, due to the big level to the impact surface, we may witness a lack of the architectural harmony (minor effect) or the destruction of the whole structure (major effect).

The people’s capacity of innovation and invention has determined the so-called direct energy weapons made to convince the enemy that his effort is useless and that negotiations would be the best solution. This type of weapons is considered non-lethal, due to the controlled effect on the target. Moreover, some writers’ imagination, corroborated with the information control policies about these devices and their use by the military structures, have allowed emergence of myths and legends which were the basis of the futuristic models and toys used in sci-fi movies, computer games or stories of contemporary writers. The arrows, howitzers and even wire communications are replaced with the energy of electric arrows. It’s well-known that in Star Trek spaceship each member of the Enterprise had and used phasers, devices that could be set to stun or kill any enemy, by launching energy spheres, similar to globular



lightning or by “electrocution”, a kind of “energy bullets”.

The collective conscience has achieved the first delimitation of weapons depending on the way they protect life, as it follows: classical weapons destined to kill and direct energy weapons which provide a new alternative, that is they let you live, the wounds don't affect the human body for a long period of time.

Throughout history, humankind has used energy as a mean of hitting. Analyzing the myths and legends, we can notice that even Zeus used a light strike to punish his enemy. The most representative legend is that one of the Medusa, the only mortal among the three mythological Gorgons whose eyes could turn any mortal to stone. It seems that even after its death, the Medusa eyes kept terrorizing humanity due to the unaltered ability to execute energy strikes. Thus, the Medusa's Head becomes an important symbol of the fighter's protection being often present on aegis, breastplates and shields.

While these stories don't have a scientific base as they are only myths, the first data in world's history present “the burning ray” or the “killing wave” as the first device using solar energy for a destructive purpose. This was achieved by Archimedes and was used by the Greeks against Roman ships in the battle of Syracuse (214 B.C.). The weapon worked by means of huge copper lens on the shore. The historians called this device “the burning mirror”¹. Although there aren't relevant data about the role and the increase of the combat power in defeating the Romans, the creation of this device proves that the world's armies searched for something to be used in battles and which uses the destructive characteristics of energy in order to reduce own forces' efforts and the rapid neutralization of the enemy.

In fact, energy was used for domestic purposes as well. Several ancient writings state that the Athenians and Aztecs could light the sacred fires directly from the sun by means of concave mirrors. Also, the trippers lit their fires with devices made up from convex mirrors. In the 18th century, Horace-Benedict de Saussure, the Swiss physicist, seems to have boiled his soup in an oven achieved by means of a system of lenses which focused the sun rays. The first solar oven recognized by historians was achieved in 1772 by the famous alchemist Antoine Lavoisier who used two lenses placed on

a wooden chariot. With the help of this device he could create temperature of over 1,500°C.

However, the first plans to use the direct energy weapons appeared during and after WWI. In 1923, Henry Grindell Matthews claimed that, by using his device to focus electromagnetic energy, he could stop a running engine, by magnetic induction². He claimed that if he created enough energy power and could place the device on a plane, he would be able to bring down enemy airplanes, could make ammunition explode, could stop maritime ships or could neutralize the land forces within a 4-mile distance³.

Even though he wasn't convincing, his demonstrations in England and France emphasized the idea that “a death ray” could be achieved. This theory aroused the scientists' interests and fed many stories grouped under the generic name “The Conspiracy Theory”⁴.

In 1935, Sir Robert Watson-Watt made studies about building such devices after a project of the UK Air Minister. Following his research, Watson, who activated within the Radio Research Centre and had physicist Arnold Wilkins as his collaborator, concluded that that theory wasn't feasible but, by using waves, we can determine an object's position in space. His observations were at the basis of what we call today radar.

Another moment, before the achievement of direct weapons energy, was in 1938, in Germany. It also was the subject of many stories circulating in England in that time. In short, a tourist's car stops suddenly with no plausible cause. The tourist's efforts to start the car are noticed by a German soldier in the area. He went away for a few minutes and when he came back, he told the tourist that his car's engine would start then, which it did. The reason for this fortuitous malfunction was the Feldberg TV station, whose signal could create a force field stopping any engine running nearby. The event led to the idea that the emission of an electromagnetic wave, with a great amount of energy, could stop a running engine⁵.

The most famous inventor who focused his efforts in studying the effects of concentrating the electromagnetic waves is the Croatian engineer Nikola Tesla (1856-1943). In 1937, he published the thesis entitled *The Art of Projecting Concentrating Non-dispersive Energy through the Natural Media* in which he approached the achievement of particle waves. Tesla stated that he could achieve a device



he later called “teleforce” weapon or “the death ray” by means of which he could concentrate in airspace, waves with extremely big energy load which could bring down an air fleet of 10,000 planes within 400 km (250 miles), with millions of enemy casualties on the ground⁶.

Another important moment in the research on direct energy was WWII and, in particular, the Nazi researchers’ achievements in the field of sonic weapons. The Nazi researchers seem to have achieved sonic weapons by means of which they could concentrate acoustic waves in fascicles with a destructive effect.

We are certain that there were other concerns to develop the field of direct energy weapons. All these achievements may have been known by a limited number of specialists if it hadn’t been for the sci-fi literature which presented different energy weapons. Among the sci-fi writers, the most famous was H.G. Wells, the author of *War of the Worlds* where he described the effect of using the “death wave” by the Martians in order to exterminate the people from Earth. Although mere fiction, it seems that Wells’ “death wave” model is already successfully used in the form of laser weapons during several contemporary military operations in theatres in Israel, Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, the American program “The Strategic Defense Initiative” or “Star War”, initiated in 1980 by President Ronald Reagan, was based on such achievements. The program suggested the use of lasers, probably X wave’s gamma, in order to destroy the striking vectors over the US and their allies.

At present, there is a great amount of interest for this subject and the media approached this subject many times. An example is the ABC TV show on the 10th of February 1999, hosted by Diane Sawyer, on “New direct energy weapons”. That show showed that the fire in the US Embassy in Moscow in the ’80s wasn’t an accident but it was caused by the KGB. According to Victor Saimov, former chief-IT engineer at KGB, who later fled the country, the Soviets focused a fascicle of powerful microwaves on the American Embassy until the building caught fire. The purpose was to create a diversion for the KGB agents to go into the embassy and plant listening devices throughout the building.

The first separation of weapons in two categories, lethal and non-lethal, was achieved in

1998 based on their effects on the human body. At the same time, they are allowed to be used on the population like other non-lethal devices. In 1997, during the TECOM Technology symposium, non-lethal weapons were considered the biggest challenge for the whole scientific community and their classification is established depending on their effects on the target and the assessment of the potential wounds of the personnel. An argument against their indiscriminatory use was the fact that direct energy weapons aim at the central neuronal system and can cause neuropsychological disturbances condemned by the 1980 Convention regarding conventional weapons.⁷ It’s well-known that non-lethal weapons can cause wounds or useless sufferings and they are subject to Protocol I of Geneva Convention in 1977.

The main effects of exposing living creatures and the electromagnetic radiation are perceived at the level of central neuronal system as physical pain, difficulty in breathing, vertigo, and nausea, lack of orientation, epilepsy or discomfort. Difficulty in breathing can represent the most dangerous effect on human body due to the fact that it can lead to suffocation and ultimately, kill.

Major effects on human health can be caused by the uncontrolled use of sound waves. Some of the applications with this type of waves can cause the phenomenon of cavitation, the formation of very small gas bubbles, resulting from vibrations followed by the violent collapse of the gas bubbles leading to the removal of particles from the texture or composition of the organic matter. The lab studies on mice demonstrated that the exposure to high intensity ultrasounds with frequencies between 0.7 and 3.6 MHz can affect mice’s lungs and intestines.

Moreover, the cardiac rhythm can alter through vibro-acoustic simulations with serious consequences on a living body, leading to the disruption of the blood flow and to tachycardia.

Other researches demonstrated that the use of high-intensity sounds can induce pain at the level of audio system and, in some cases, determining loss of hearing for long periods of time. Even though they may have not been used on human subjects, there are tendencies to develop experiments on them too, especially with high-intensity sounds from the audible frequencies. The biological effects at the limit of the audible wave spectrum, generally unheard by human ear, can affect the



internal organs and central neuronal system by altering the internal ear, the sensitivity limits, muscular contractions, cardiovascular functions, different effects on the central nervous system, other effects on the skin's texture (hardening or softening), etc.

Furthermore, the association of "energy" with "direct" makes us think about the evolution control in a certain direction. Thus, it's natural to be afraid of these devices which can control a certain process of human activity or a certain evolution. That is why, this thesis justifies the terror of informational societies presented with the situation where a group of persons driven by personal ambitions can possess such weapons and use them as they wish.

At present, the devices using direct energy can be classified according to two criteria:

- the way energy is used (audio, electromagnetic, light, particles, plasma, etc.);
- the effects on the target (physical destructions, influences on the sensitivity of the direct and conduct systems, lack of orientation, decoupling the electromagnetic equipment, human incapacity).

Regarding the physical destruction weapons, with electromagnetic waves and particles, we can achieve the following classification:

- communications jamming devices, known in literature as radio jamming;
- devices for blocking the information collecting ability or sensors' "blinding". These are blinding devices or disorientation of both the optic sensors systems from the weapon and force research equipments and also the personnel in observation, monitoring and recon missions (scouts, observers, etc.);
- devices for achieving destructions as an effect of conducting energy strikes. They are characteristic for the acoustic waves and high energy lasers.

The devices generating laser fascicles usually work with frequencies from the infrared wave spectrum and are destined for the selective target illumination in order to direct vectors on the flight trajectory. The high power laser is able to penetrate a solid object and break it. The efficiency of using these weapons is given not only by their extremely direct ability but also by the wave propagation speed, faster by 300,000 than that of a bullet. Therefore, laser weapons are to destroy by the effect of their target penetration.

At present, some armed forces, especially in urban combat missions characterized by rapid reaction on very small distances, use weapons with another type of laser. The most general scenario which permits the role of direct energy weapons for a specific action can be achieved during a scenario of releasing hostages by a group of Special Forces in a building controlled by terrorists. In this circumstance, any member of the special force group is afraid not to kill a hostage under the pressure of specific psychological tension. This group's classical equipment is formed of pistols and assault weapons.

No matter how modern these may be, they cannot be stopped if fired. That is why the target's selection must be very accurate. If terrorists use hostages as human shield, shooting is almost impossible, given the very high risk of hitting the innocents. Moreover, securing corridors, doors and other potential ways of exit for terrorists makes the mission even harder, as a large number of special force members are needed. Depending on the terrorists' reaction, it's more than possible that a hostage be hit, no matter how well trained the shooter may be.

In these circumstances, the extreme laser rifle can be used. This represents a photon disrupting system with green light laser wave of small power but three times more powerful than the usual laser. The system can be installed on a rifle or a gun. XLR can burn or cause temporary blindness thus ensuring enough time for the shooter to annihilate a confused and disoriented target without killing it. The adjusting power of the laser wave allows for different missions, from cutting a solid obstacle to incapacitating a human target for a few minutes by distracting its attention, disorientating it and the incapacity to focus on target. At present, the laser rifle is found in the US army and is used in contemporary peace operations, generally in missions such as Check Point.

Another direct energy weapon, this time in the testing labs from Anderson (USA) under the control of the inventor Peter Bitar, is known under the name StunStrike. This device induces the target's paralysis by hitting the human body with electrical strikes. The form of the device is similar to that of a suitcase and can stun any person with a static discharge over 200,000 V.

Thus, we may say that the device has a double effect: it paralyzes the person and intimidates any



POINT OF VIEWS

person in front of the “natural lightning”. The second effect is of a psychological nature.

Regarding the former potential scenario, if a terrorist tries to leave the perimeter, even accompanied by a hostage, using these devices wouldn't endanger anyone's life. The advantage for the Special Forces in such a scenario would be gaining control rapidly and the certainty that nobody would die.

But the most “feared” direct energy weapon is the high power laser. It concentrates very high energy values in one point thus being able to set any kind of target on fire, human body, striking vector along the trajectory, ammunition, piece of artillery, tank, aircraft, etc., in fact, the psychological effect is unbearable due to the fact that one realizes there is no enemy nearby and yet there is something that causes combustions without any logic. It is a terrifying scenario. This laser can be of thousands or millions watts and can be launched in any direction with accuracy.

At present, the US is able to achieve three laser systems, capable to destroy everything in their way.

The first system is an airborne laser installed on Jumbo Jets. Their purpose is to destroy intercontinental missiles. The second is the advanced tactical laser destined for air combat. This can be installed on much smaller aircrafts with the same deadly effect on the targets in the air and also on the ground. The third category is destined for ground combat and is tested by the Marine Corps (USA) and destroys any enemy missiles.

Some of the presentations have relevant data about the tests with one of the most powerful lasers in the world within Kirtland Air Base (New Mexico), called the secret headquarters of the latest laser technologies. Its achievement is based on a mixture of gases: helium, oxygen and carbon monoxide, producing high energy photons, the wave power reaching 45 KW.

The disadvantage of these devices is the fact that the laser needs a big amount of equipment, gas tanks, evacuation systems and many more components to be functional. Also, the platform such a device is installed on must be very large.

Even so, it seems that combat lasers were possible, due to the fact that by the end of the '90s, the Israeli army tested and used the tactical high energy laser (THEL) against the Katiusa missiles launched by Hezbollah. This action seems to

have been the only and most effective protection measure against such types of tactical missiles. Some reports said that Katiusa missiles were destroyed at a 16 km limit⁸.

The Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) is another direct energy weapon, extremely powerful, used particularly for peace and anti-terrorism missions⁹. This is based on prior actions during the Gulf War (1991) with phonic signal amplification stations. These signals used, besides propaganda messages and instructions for surrender, heavy metal concerts. It's not a joke. The research results showed that this type of music determines confusion and disorientation among human subjects. If sounds specific to armored vehicles or aircrafts were broadcast against this background or during the breaks between “concerts”, the fighters' confusion was increased by creating the effect of “ghost battalions”. Even our army was subjected to a similar effect, during the Revolution in 1989, by creating the image of “ghost terrorists” both in Bucharest and in other towns. To create these psychological effects, very powerful speakers are needed, which will send very high energy waves.

LRAD was created by the American researcher Elwood Norris in America Technology Corp labs and is already used in different military or civilian exercises. Norris managed to concentrate the sound wave in a very narrow fascicle similar to laser wave process. The resulted hypersonic sound is within the ultrasounds limits and ensures the support for another ordinary audio signal. Thus, it's possible to substantially reduce wave dissipation and volume even on long distances, keeping unaltered the ability to reflect on different objects. We can say that there is sonar which doesn't need a homogenous propagation environment like water or solid metal. The device can be used as a radio locator with acoustic waves perceived by the human ear. There is a multitude of opportunities for psychological manipulation. Let's imagine the emotional effect on a person who would see a tree talking to him and which knows what bothers the subject. Or the results on a group of people if LRAD emissions would be completed by projecting suggestive images on clouds. We are convinced that even the most pessimistic people would be confused until they identify landmarks which bring them back to reality.

The device is sold both in the US and also in many countries in Asia and Europe, in different



POINT OF VIEWS

versions, larger or smaller, being often used for selective announcements depending on the surfaces (spaces, departments, cash desks) or persons, in supermarkets, fast-food courts and generally in places with very loud background noise. There, the boss's orders must be sent quickly without being heard by all customers or other uninterested persons. An audio commercial or TV broadcast can also be sent without disturbing the people sitting at tables. On the battlefield, the ability to concentrate sound waves can be exploited in order to send clear messages on incredible distances.

However, the meaning of direct energy weapon is given by the ability of this device to amplify sound to values 10,000 times higher than the normal ones. A LRAD used in combat can send a 160 dB signal which can lead to ear drums damages. It's well-known the fact that a signal of 40-50 dB can cause discomfort for a person. The fascicle becomes painful at a level of about 120dB. The device can send painful sounds at 450-730 meters away. The sensation is unbearable, similar to a blow in the head. This would impose leaving that place at once, no matter how motivated the respective target would be to remain there. Moreover, the vibrations at the level of the head will cause dizziness, thus being impossible for a body to keep its balance. If the sound emission continues after the person falls down, no internal or external antiphons are useful to protect the ears. Tests have proved that not even the toughest individual can withstand "painful acoustic radiation" for more than a few seconds.

The advantage of such a device is that it doesn't kill the target even if the pain can last a few days. In Iraq, LRAD proved to be very effective, preventing terrorist attacks before the beginning of the combat.

The Active Denial system is also a non-lethal direct energy weapon¹⁰. This sends electromagnetic waves emitting a concentrated invisible fascicle on long distance being destined to non-lethal fights against human targets (individuals or groups of people). The system is called "the painful fascicle" because it temporarily paralyses the target due to the sensation of pain. The tested people stated that the sensation is similar to hitting a wall of fire which cannot be seen or heard but which surrounds you. The brain will order an immediate reaction of leaving that place no matter how much you want to resist it.

The system is fix and mobile and can hit a

target 750 meters away with millimeter waves; the impulse can be pulse, continuous or atypical. This goes through clothes with an impact on the skin only by warming the superficial stratum. Thus it causes an unbearable pain leading to an uncontrolled reaction of the human body before causing permanent damages. The principle is similar to the grilling effect in a microwave oven. Radiations heat water molecules by inducing vibrations. The human skin receptors perceive the heat and the brain realizes it's something hot and takes over. Pain is known to be a defence mechanism creating involuntary reactions. The painful fascicle can control a crowd. The system is used in peacekeeping operations, police actions, to maintain public order, etc.

On the other hand, the risk of the uncontrolled use of this system is that it can cause burns if exposed for a long period of time. Such events are avoided by training and control both the operators and the system.

The most known direct energy weapon is the electromagnetic bomb (e-bomb) and is based on the electromagnetic impulse characteristic to burn any device that has copper in its composition.

For the first time, the electromagnetic impulse was seen as an effect of the Hiroshima atomic bomb. The huge force of the nuclear explosion determined that, in the 50's, the effect of the electromagnetic impulse wasn't taken into consideration, even if the energy of the tests prior to the attack on Japan made the street light in Hawaii go out and affected radio communications in Australia. This invisible impulse can destroy on long distances, totally and permanently, the unprotected electronic equipment, no matter who uses it. Thus, there is a state of uncertainty for any informational society depending on electronic equipment. All sorts of transportation (land, air and naval), finances, electricity, communications are fields where electronic devices are vital for processing, storing, sending and exchanging information. The most eloquent example to understand the chaos due to the lack of electricity is the blackout on the East Coast of the US and Canada in August 2003. The effects were terrible, big cities like New York were paralyzed, thousands of people were stuck in elevators or car jams. However, mobile phones and radio communications were still working, also the emergency services, police, fire department, cars, etc. an attack with electromagnetic impulse



would stop everything. In other words, it would turn that informational society to the Stone Age by destroying the whole electric and electronic infrastructure.

Numerous modern armies which studied the hypothetical dangers of this kind realized the huge danger it represents to them no matter how well-trained they may be. The use of sophisticated electronic devices, sensors, modern communication systems, computers, etc., increases the degree of vulnerability to the electromagnetic impulse. If today's military equipment was suddenly destroyed, the only form of defence would be going back to paper maps, compasses and other empirical armed combat theories. Furthermore, due to the fact that the electromagnetic impulse doesn't affect human body and cannot be perceived by it, this situation increases the fighters' insecurity. You can be on a plane or helicopter which suddenly begins to fall, with all its electronic equipment burnt.

Technologically speaking, there are several ways to achieve an electromagnetic impulse, the most known ones are based on non-nuclear technologies. The burning of electronic components takes place in any device which can take the magnetic field around an antenna, cable, long conductor and induce an electrical current in it. The induced voltage variation would create a peak in potential, as during an electrical storm, with the risk of producing small electrical arcs which could easily burn any inflammable material. The defence scenario against such an attack is a real nightmare for many governments especially that there are more and more information that the realized destruction ray can be controlled from several meters to several hundreds of meters.

We add the impossibility to detect a person who has such equipment. While nuclear material can be detected by several sensors (in airport terminals, customs and other key places), at present there is no sensor determining the presence of electromagnetic bombs.

In the end, if we accept that direct energy weapons prototypes are already operational and tested, we also accept that their main mission is to ensure the protection of human life. If their targets will be only informational systems and not people, victory can be easily gained and without bloodshed.

On the other hand, we can notice that, during modern wars, a large number of people can

die due to the lack of modern life services and comfort. If we accept that, without electricity and communications, the enemy would be blind, deaf and unable to retaliate, what makes us believe that we couldn't be the victims, the enemy being able to strike first. Our dependency on modern technologies could be the vulnerable point of any modern society. At present, in order to hit an informational structure, you don't need a missile to destroy an architectural component but a small device, strategically placed near the target, interrupting the informational flow. Destroying the system would be the result of an ineffective exploration of its structure. Let's imagine the damages, at national and international levels, if, for instance, there will be an attack with a briefcase whose device would erase the memory of all the computers within a stock exchange, The National Trade Register Office or a bank or will stop an electrical plant. As we can see, the mere idea of temporarily interrupting an activity is terrible, no matter how soon data can be restored.

That is why the existence of such weapons in the arsenal of world's armies should be a concern for the whole community by analyzing the consequences of their exploitation by unauthorized persons. It's obvious that "the Medusa's look" would ensure the advantage for that that has the Gorgon's head on his shield. But what if we were to be on the other side? What if the target would be our informational system? Would we think the same about the advantages of using direct energy weapons when we were the hunted and not the hunter?

Thus, it's obvious that the US won't be the only power possessing high power microwave weapons. Other countries make also experiments and researches. These weapons could be bought or made at any time by terrorist organizations or organized crime structures, given their high financial power. Thus, hostile powers, very well organized and equipped, with a personal belief which is not in accordance with the laws of war, could use these weapons as they wish.

This is the big paradox of the development of military technologies, that modern states can be attacked with modern weapons. We are certain that one of the major objectives of the development of humankind is to eliminate the terrorist threat and create a safe democratic and social environment. Destroying terrorist structures, neutralizing their



POINT OF VIEWS

support sources and their ability to move freely and judging the chiefs of the terrorist organizations can represent main objectives to make this phenomenon impossible. This can be achieved only by armed forces' operations and adequate educational programs.

We are convinced that the use of direct energy weapons could be better controlled by eliminating the risks of destroying contemporary informational infrastructures. This technology is not only new but it represents a new development environment in which we are learning how to act, an environment which will determine profound mutations regarding military action as a whole. That is why we consider it's absolutely necessary to present the danger of the uncontrolled use of these weapons, even if their purpose is to ensure the security of an informational structure, as this will be the object of future thorough studies.

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DEFINITIVE ELEMENTS, ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF GLOBALIZATION

Iulia Frasină TĂNASE

Globalization is a reality of the contemporary world with implications on all levels of human activity: economical, political, military, social, cultural, scientific, technological or environmental. During time, the approach on the globalization has been made from different points of view, often subject of controversy and never defined. Everybody wants to take advantage from the globalization opportunities, meantime avoiding its vulnerabilities, but nobody has succeeded yet.

Keywords: globalization, multinational companies, industrial groups, migration.

Globalization can't be seen, touched, measured and it's difficult to be conceptualized. Yet, it seems to be present everywhere around us, manifesting itself actively with its advantages and disadvantages.

Globalization may be perceived "as a process (or a sum of processes) which consists in a transformation in the spatial organization of relations and social transactions analyzed in the terms of their extensions, intensity, velocity and impact, generating fluctuations and transcontinental or interregional networks of activities, as interaction and exertion of power"¹. Consequently, globalization is a dynamic and long lasting process, involving the entire world. The future evolution of human society is closely linked to the development of globalization.

Globalization represents a sum of facts, operations and phenomena, in a permanent extension, which acts in all domains of life, having as final goal the interlinking of economies and cultures, resulting a new world as an indestructible and indivisible whole. It refers to a set of changes in the scale of human society organization which links communities from great distances and extends the power and influence upon all world regions.

The globalization process has mainly been facilitated in the contemporary world by the fall of communism and the Iron Curtain. The differences

between the former socialist countries, where the poverty, mediocrity and insignificant profits were in great contrast with the western countries, based on the market economy characterized by abundance and efficiency, have created a role model for the western economical pattern and the desire of each eastern country to integrate itself within the global market environment.

The amplifying factors of globalization

The first factor results from the pronounced tendency of most countries to open them to the world, leading to a sustained economical, informational, cultural and social progress at global level.

During the Cold War, when the social and economical relations between the western and eastern countries were very poor, no one wanted foreign influences in his country. Nowadays, when people are aware of all novelties in the world, every person has the desire for more and better. At a certain point, these desires overcome the normal limits, and the reactions in such situations are the most dangerous and unexpected. Groups of persons are capable to sacrifice their own lives in order to show to the entire world that is not fair for a nation to have everything it wants, and, on the opposite side, another nation is striving to survive.

The second factor is based on the countries' economical development. Thus, the emergence of a large capital market allowed to the economical and financial agents to overcome the legal obstacles of their own market in order to find the necessary funds for their international expansion.

The international trade has reached such high levels, that it cannot be controlled, nor the implied benefits. It became not only the source of existence or profit of humankind, but also the fuel for the globalization process. Any product from everywhere in the world is affordable for the right price. Consequently, the illegal weapons, drugs



and human trafficking escalate, especially with children and women.

The third factor concerns the world's states will to actively and responsibly involve themselves in the whole area of international relations.

The international cooperation increased as the numerous agreements and the foundation of institutions with the goal of coordinating the transnational reports proves, mediating between countries the complex and complicated process of giving up to their sovereignty specific attributes.

The fourth factor is based on a more efficient international and institutional regulation.

The globalization succeeds not only through the states' and multinational organizations' efforts, but also through those of the world institutions with estimable financial force's ones, as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and The World Bank. These two institutions represent a transparent international regulation for the goods and services market activities, as well as for the financial support.

Migration in a global world

The needs of people in the globalization era, when the means of persuasion have reached an incredible level of perfection, are determined by a series of external factors. The globalization transcends the individual and his needs, having a component of objectivity and determination. It "serves to connect people and groups previously separated by time and space"².

In the globalization context, migration refers to the movement of people between regions and continents in the search for welfare, meaning "happiness, harmony, equality, freedom, peace, lack of concerns and difficulties by any kind"³. Reading this phrase for the first time, we could say that people, through migration, find what they miss in their native country, and this is a good thing, although we cannot ignore the planet disequilibrium, which generate migration or are generated by it.

The migratory tendencies are oriented towards regions with a high standard of living (North America, Western Europe, the rich countries from the Middle East) and to countries from Asia with fast development. The opportunity to find a wage up to 30-40 times bigger than the one from their native country motivates the citizens from the low

developed countries to migrate with the risk of losing their lives. The migration of these illegal workers forces the government of the destination countries to take restrictive measures, especially in the periods of unfavourable economical environment and increased level of unemployment. The number of migrants is hard to be controlled, and the business environment from the rich countries takes advantage of this situation, paying low wages to migrants, under their expectation.

This phenomenon started long time ago, but nowadays, it has been amplified due to the development of the infrastructure of communications and transportation.

The main causes of migration are the following: the lack of jobs, economical underdevelopment and better economical perspectives, low level of wages, lack of logistics, employment discrimination, the desire for recognition, foreign education prestige, etc. On the other hand, they find advantages, specific to the countries chosen for migration, such as: better economical perspectives, bigger wages, higher interest in research, superior work conditions, the western society's mirage, etc.

The so-called "brain drain" is specific to the globalization at the beginning of the third millennium. This concept refers to the migration of people with a high level of qualification and superior studies. In the Romanian language, the term has been translated in different ways by different authors and in different political periods such as: brain drain, brain exodus, migration of brains, even the theft of brains, theft of intelligence, specialized personnel recruitment, exodus of competence"⁴.

The adoption countries gain specialists with a higher training, without spending a dime on their education. Thus, the poorest loose and the richest win and the gaps between them gain ground. The beneficiary countries from the intelligence exodus encourage the phenomenon, facilitating the migration of the educated people in spite of those with low degree of education.

It is true that there are also negative aspects regarding these countries, foreigners accepting wages lower than the natives' ones.

Consequently, this leads to social tensions, unbalancing the work places environment. All in all, the disadvantages are much more significant in the origin countries.



Multinational companies, actors of globalization

The big corporations implanted in numerous countries participate very actively at the development of world trade and organize the production process in concordance with the world market, taking significant advantages from different countries. We have chosen to speak about these global entities because, through their transnational activity, they have the power to influence the economy of the countries they are part of, but also to influence the life of millions of people from different parts of the world.

The mother societies are displayed in the well developed countries and their range of activity are diverse and spread in the remote corners of the world, usually in less developed countries. If their activities are developed by respecting the rules regarding production development, work standards, environment protection, ethic codes and employees rights, we can say that these companies have a positive effect upon the societies generally and upon people especially. If people have jobs they can also have a decent way of living, they can pay their health securities, they can socialize and develop more and more.

In some less developed countries the globalization has introduced high-tech elements, skipping some stages of development. We may say that countries that didn't even have landlines of communication skipped directly to mobile phones, laptops and internet. A good example is the program "One laptop per child" supported by UN as an impulse for education in the less developed countries, by offering laptops to every child and teacher from the educational system.

We must not forget that all the multinational countries have as main goal the material profit. Creating subsidiaries abroad, the international companies have the tendency, traditionally speaking, to control the natural resources, to find cheap work labour and to ensure the expansion of their activities.

Furthermore, there are some specific conjunctive factors (a more relaxed fiscal policy, breaches in legislation which favour actions forbidden in their native countries, a vacuum regarding some technologies, etc.).

Dislocating abroad a part of its activity, a society may bring prejudices to the economy of the native

country, if this dislocation results in a considerable reduction of jobs and exports.

The big industrial groups from the well developed countries that have subsidiaries in the less developed countries are often accused of exploiting them, their main goal being to obtain maximum profits with no consideration for the real interests of the specific country. These firms decrease the development process in the countries where they created their subsidiaries by orienting their activities through exports with instable prices and low incomes to the national budget and capturing the material and human resources used in their development. Furthermore, they are accused to take advantage more or less of the cheap and unprotected labour work.

Another negative aspect of the multinational companies' activities is the devastating competition for the local producers (with social implications), monopolizing in this way the market.

On the other hand, the multinational companies say that they bring intelligence and technology, replace the lack of capital and mediate the power of consumption which generates a compensation for a development process. The reality shows that an increasing number of less developed or transition countries looked for attracting foreign capital, especially when their governments decided to decentralize all or just a part of the national production.

Synthesizing the previously presented data, the existence of the multinational companies as the main actors of globalization presents the following advantages:

- Increase the global trade;
- Support the scientific research and technological development;
- Introduce the advanced technology in less developed countries;
- Reduce the prices by encouraging production;
- Disseminate experience in marketing and advertising all over the world;
- Encourage the increase of economy and development;
- Generates incomes;
- Promotes peaceful relations between states, in order to provide a favourable business climate;
- Accelerates the globalization of economy and culture.



The negative aspects generated by the multinational companies are the following:

- Give birth to some economical conglomerates which reduce the competition and the free initiative;
- Collect capitals from the host country but export profits to originating countries, therefore creating dependency on loans;
- Export eroded technology in less developed countries;
- Inhibit the economical growth and technical competence in the under developed countries, therefore maintaining the dependency of poor countries on rich ones;
- Cut the competition in the labour environment;
- Limit employees' salaries;
- Erode the traditional civilization, replacing it with one oriented to consumerism;
- Enlarge and deepen the differences between rich and poor countries;
- Increase the wealth of local elites and increase the cost of living;
- Support the repressive regimes in the name of stability and order.

Concluding, the globalization includes more dynamic processes, which gear the activity of entire society. This is how the analysis of implications in the economical, political and socio-cultural field becomes more important in order to understand the phenomenon.

Looking on the contrasting characteristics, we may say that the globalization is unique. It presents enough advantages to be praised and contested. One thing is certain: who doesn't integrate in the globalization mechanism, can't survive.

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
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WAR AND CHAOS



The new volume, **War and chaos**, signed by Teodor Frunzeti, Mircea Mureșan and Gheorghe Văduva (Teodor Frunzeti, Mircea Mureșan, Gheorghe Văduva, *Război și Haos*, Editura CTEA, București, 2009), is a profound study – the first one from our military literature –, dealing with a fundamental question related with the armed conflictuality of our times: Is it possible for the war – one of the most rigorous and best organised human activities – to escape from its own principles and to wander around in the huge chains for bifurcations of the chaotic developments?

Starting from the *Argument*, the authors ask some trenchant questions: It seems that nowadays the war's management has reached the most daring and the most effective forms, almost perfect, of the relation conduct-action and planning – execution. Will this management become a management of chaos, therefore a chaotic management? From the perspective of the tendencies of systems and processes evolving to unpredictable, even chaotic evolutions and developments, what will the war consist of? Will it consist of the exit from the confronting volitions? Of its exit from principles? Of the impossibility of forecasting the effects? Of the causes, determinations and developments? evolution to chaos? Of interests and policies?

chaos that the war expresses and puts into practice? Therefore, in the humankind's chaos? Or all of them?

In order to express possible answers to these questions, the authors use the complex knowledge processes. They say that, generally speaking, there is a disruption between the knowledge universe and the war one, even if war is part of the human activity, and the latter, without a profound knowledge of the intervention field, means nothing but hazard, adventure, irresponsibility, most of the times. War is not defined as irresponsibility, but as a way of putting into practice a certain policy by violent means, as a mean for unlocking a strategic situation, but also as a human form of the planet's conflictuality, the Universe one. Because, undoubtedly, the Universe is, by its essence, conflictual.

According to the authors, knowledge process clarifies many things. It removes many indeterminations, creates many certainties, but also stresses out lots of different and wide uncertainties, things that cannot be totally known, especially related with the war's policy and strategy, its complex and contradictory philosophy, its bizarre reason, which is rigorous most of the times, but sometimes incomprehensible, unpredictable and even absurd. The larger is the number of the questions regarding war, questions receiving an answer, or answers, the larger will be the number of the questions regarding war, older or more recent, not yet receiving answers. And unlikely an answer.

That is why war, as most of the violent actions, is both known and unknown phenomenon. The ordinary man, concerned of his daily work, in order to earn his living, does not have time to analyse and understand this phenomenon. If such an idea crosses their minds, most of them will say that this is how it used to be, and will always be, as long as humankind has always armed and has never given up on its weapons, even if they bring nothing but death and troubles.

Knowledge has a direct and consistent connection with the war's philosophy and physiognomy. Its



REVIEWS

results are materialised in the new types of war we already call knowledge war, wars involving a superior, scientific, epistemological knowledge. According to the authors, three of them are more important: Network Centric Warfare, Asymmetric War, Knowledge War.

Even if they seem to be simple tricks for the confrontation nuances or forms assumed by a war – as war is a very complex phenomenon, with vast expressing forms -, the authors think the era we are about to enter become an era of knowledge, generating a knowledge society, meaning that every person becomes a small knowledge node, acting both as a recipient and user of information, integrating it in the labelled knowledge system.

Even if it may look like an oxymoron to connect terms as war and chaos and even the term of

“chaotic war” as war is one of the best-organised human activity, there is no doubt that reconfiguring this ancient phenomenon of conflictuality on new coordinates, which are flexible, fluent and hard to determine – to some extent, indeterminable, determine reflection. Once again, it is the high time for the trenchant question: Is it possible for the war to get out of its own principles? And, if it likely, then there are two more: Under these circumstances, will war be still war, or will it become something else? What else?

The authors ask these questions and try to find some answers. This is actually the study’s merit and value, as it is the first one trying to approach such a topic within the Romanian military literature.



THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES

JULY - SEPTEMBER 2009

On July, 1st, 2009, celebrating the United States' Independence Day, the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies organised in the National Defence University "Carol I" a roundtable on "The Romanian-American military relations - past, present, future". There were invited professors from University, researchers from CDSSS and US diplomatic staff accredited to Bucharest. There were presented aspects regarding the evolution of the military relations and the Romanian-American cooperation in the theatres of operations from Iraq and Afganistan.

By the end of September, a researcher from the Centre will attend a PfP Conference on "Defence Strategy and Policy" organised by the Romanian Embassy from Baku. The activity will be a good opportunity to establish some cooperation relations with similar institutions from Azerbaijan.

Within this period of time, the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies published the following studies: "The administrative military's management during crisis and war" and "The consequences management" .

The most important scientific activity organised by the Centre is the Annual international scientific sessiuon, November 19 -20, on "Perspectives of security and defence in Europe". More information about the enrollment are posted on the Centre's website, <http://cssas.unap.ro>.

Irina CUCU



INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

On selecting the articles there are taken into consideration: the area of the subjects presented in the magazine, the actuality of the topic, its novelty and originality, its scientific content and the adequacy to the editorial norms adopted by the magazine. The article should not contain any party political connotations.

The papers' scientific evaluation is done by two scientific experts that are either professors or senior fellow researchers.

The article, written in a foreign language (English, French) may have maximum 10-12 pages (6.000 – 7.000 words) and has to be sent both in print and paper, using Times New Roman font, size 12, one line, and the tables and schemes have to be printed separately. The translation into Romanian will be provided by the editor.

The text has to be preceded by an abstract which is not to exceed 250 words, both in Romanian and English and not more than 10-12 keywords. The papers have to be signed adding the authors's scientific degree, name, first name, the institution he comes from and have to end with a curriculum vitae, which should include the following elements: a short bio, a list of personal papers, birthyear, birthplace, address, city, postal code, country, telephone, fax, e-mail address, photo in jpeg format.

The footnotes are to be included by the end of the article and have to respect the international regulations. Authors can publish only one article by issue.

The text has to present an easy structure, using titles (subtitles). The abbreviations will be marked on the text only at their first mention on the text. It is likely to end the papers with some important conclusions regarding the importance of the research.

The articles will not use classified information.

As the magazine does not have a profitable purpose, the articles cannot be paid.

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After eight years since its first edition, STRATEGIC IMPACT magazine, edited by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University “Carol I” is a quarterly scientific magazine acknowledged locally and internationally for the wide area of topics - the political-military present, security strategy and military security, NATO and EU actions, informational society, strategic synthesis and evaluations, a special column “Strategic Event” that studies the strategic impact of the dynamics of the actions undertaken nationally, regionally and globally.

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Issue organizer: Corina VLADU
Designer: Corina VLADU
Masterproof: Corina VLADU
The National Defence University “Carol I” Printing House
