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THE BLACK SEA, FROM COMPETITION TO COOPERATION: THE ENERGY SECURITY REGIME*

Eng. Alexandru COTOARĂ-NICOLAE

The article, based on a speech, advances the idea of a fresh approach towards the Black Sea region, based on a recognized theory of international relations, the international regimes respectively. Since 1983 the theory of international regimes provided an interesting theoretical framework that has not yet been tackled by the Black Sea littoral policy makers.

The article offers a possible implementation of the international regimes theory for the cooperation on energy security issues within the Black Sea region.

Keywords: Black Sea Region, international regimes, regional security regimes, energy security.

Introduction

We would like to express our gratitude for the people involved in organizing this activity, as it represents an opportunity to provide you, from our perspective, with what we consider significant issues related to regional cooperation and development within the Black Sea Area.

And in this respect, we would first emphasize one of the strengths of the Wider Black Sea Area: the idea that getting NATO and EU membership for some of the riparian states, or various degrees of cooperation, for all the other states, with the two organizations, provided the proper conditions for cooperation and the coordination of efforts towards reaching the common goal, that of sustainability and stability.

We will focus our approach on a subject that is both academically and politically relevant, namely addressing the incentives for building up a coherent and institutionalized energy security regime in the Black Sea region, as a prerequisite for future sustainable development.

Regional cooperation viewed from Bucharest

A vision and incentives always stand at the basis of an energy security regime for mutual gains. Romania views the regional security system and, implicitly, the energy security regime, through its status of NATO and EU member, emphasizing the importance of political tools such as diplomacy, partnership and negotiations. The principles that guide NATO's involvement in the region are also the ones that founded Romania's policies in this area: transparency, complementarity and inclusiveness.

Regional cooperation should take into account, besides the above mentioned principles, the necessity to identify profitable solutions for all parties involved. This raises a very important topic: regional ownership principle must not lead to the isolation of the region, but to connect it to a larger geopolitical concept.

Regional cooperation is both about relations between the regional actors and relations between the region and outer-region actors. Although a very good intra-regional relationship is highly desired, this should not be mistaken for a need to close that region by taking the regional ownership principle to the extreme. Nor should we allow democratic principles of cooperation to become tools for expanding areas of influence, which bring into mind old and unpleasant memories. The influence areas' policy and strategy need to be finally replaced with policies and security strategies by cooperation, collaboration and partnership.

During the last years, Wider Black Sea Area has transformed itself, in many ways, almost beyond recognition, these positive developments being clearly visible throughout the area. Three regional states are NATO members, two of these are also European Union members, while the other has started the accession negotiations. All



the other regional countries are actively engaged in processes of cooperation with both international organizations. Therefore, we appreciate that we may talk today of NATO and EU as of international actors directly interested in the area. These realities conduct to an almost natural process of assimilation not only at the individual, but also at the level of the region as a whole, of the democratic values and of a new perspective on the security concept, but not as an isolation or fragmented regional architecture, but as a link and way for a European, Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian connection, both regionally and European and globally. We've come to realize, accordingly, that our future is strictly related to wider dialogue and cooperation.

Not all the regional aspects related to security have been yet overcome. The Wider Black Sea area still retains hot security spots, as we have witnessed during the five days Russia-Georgia August 2008 war. The area still holds a conflictual complex legacy that we are all aware of. And, not less important, it is subdued to the new emerging types of risks and threats, the greatest of all being that one of becoming in itself a generator of instability. These old inheritance and new challenges that the region faces may affect not just the area as such but the European community as well.

From this point of view, we consider that a multifaceted approach is the most suitable one in order to address the security challenges in the region. This approach calls for joint efforts at national, regional but also Euro-Atlantic level, using a variety of instruments as well as attracting partners from private sector and civil society.

We don't refer to the facts we all know so well, but to the vision set within a wider context, and we would like to stress the importance of this item as for the policymakers today's vision is tomorrow's policy.

As we all are very well aware, security is no longer only about protecting the borders or ensuring internal stability. In the globalization age, the economic aspect becomes a pillar of any security system both at national-regional and global level. Having in mind the fact that among the existing economic problems the issue of energy security is, maybe, the most important, we can state without being wrong that the Black Sea and Balkan regions need on short-medium but especially on long term, an energy security regime.

Towards a Black Sea Energy Security Regime

The sight of planes flying into the Twin Towers in New York on September 11 2001 has become a terrifying image of our times. Forever burned into the public consciousness, it has profoundly affected us: we are now convinced that international terrorism is the greatest threat to world security. After the *strategic holiday* that many of us took after the end of the Cold War, the 9/11 events have made us aware again of the threats and risks with global ramifications.

Thus, in the last years, at least **two other issues** are pressing for becoming headline news in the sphere of security, namely **global warming** and **energy consumption**. In a way, these issues are somehow interconnected because the over-consumption of non-renewable sources of energy – oil and gas – is also source for pollution and climate changes, with unforeseen and unpredictable consequences.

However, this is just one side of the coin. The other pressing issue is the **access to energy sources** and its relationship with **environmental security**. Petroleum depots around the Black Sea have been known since the ancient times. As Professor Charles King noted, “the Byzantines used crude petroleum from around the Sea of Azov as basis for their secret weapon, *the sea-fire*”. Even nowadays, the Black Sea region is a critical corridor for oil transportation. Thus, around 145 million tons of oil is transported every year through the Black Sea, which means almost 3 million barrels daily. Moreover, 40% out of this oil goes to Western Europe, with an increase estimate of up to 70% by 2020. Besides, there is no doubt that the Black Sea in itself has substantial energetic resources, few of them being tested and retrieved.

These figures clearly show that energy security in the Black Sea is becoming an issue with the potential of increasing interdependence between Eastern and Western Europe. At the Istanbul, Riga and Bucharest Summits, NATO has included the energy security and the challenges of the Black Sea region on its agenda. Moreover, the recent EU initiative on the *Black Sea Synergy* denotes exactly the terms of the problem: increasing complex interdependence requires co-operation and regime building, with a strong potential for institutionalization.



Concluding remarks

We do strongly believe that the process of building sound and safe regional institutions on long term is irreversible. Unfortunately, the Soviet era has left the post-communist countries with many unhappy heritages. For instance, the old diplomatic tradition meant the avoidance of open dialogue in multilateral formats and a preference towards bilateral approaches.

This tradition has not been completely overcome since the end of the Cold War, due to the fact that most countries of the region have re-discovered their national identity, and consequently the diplomatic peculiarities of the modern nation-state. Although multilateralism and open co-operation has not become yet “the only game in town” within the Black Sea region and the Balkans, the pressure of solving issues such as energy and environmental security may create the incentives for a sound security framework in the near future. However, this difficult process needs the decisive involvement of international actors that have tradition in building and consolidating sound security regimes, such as EU, NATO and the US. The current window of opportunity should be exploited as long as the issue of energy security has become a problem of complex interdependence that has the potential for institutionalization.

We state our confidence regarding the success of this event, and we express again our gratitude to the distinguished guests for answering our invitation. We do believe that at the end of this

activity all of us will get a wider perception on the aspects regarding the security issues of the Black Sea Area and, more important, get a glimpse of what should be done in order to make this region a remarkable example for what can be reached when cooperation and common responsibility transcend and harmonize individual and national interests.

* *The paper has been presented during the international seminar on “Strategies for cooperation within the Black Sea Area” organised by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University “Carol I” on May, 27th, 2009.*

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COOPERATION VS CONFLICT IN THE REALM OF NATURAL ENERGY WITHIN THE GREATER BLACK SEA AREA*

Serban F. CIOCULESCU, PhD

Access to natural energy is an imperative for all the states in the world, as economic development and welfare of people is often directly dependent on the wealth of resources controlled. Contemporary world as a whole is dependent on the existence of energy resources, of which oil and gas are of utmost importance.

The countries within the Greater Black Sea Area are facing a real “strategic” dilemma regarding the means to gain access to energy resources and the transportation corridors. They may choose to cooperate with each other to jointly exploit the necessary resources to increase the total benefits or, on the contrary, they could prefer individual strategies, often competitive ones. The choice is up to the political and economic decision-makers, but those are influenced by factors such as the domestic political system, the sub-state actors benefiting from these policies (bureaucrats, lobbies, and interest groups), the international economic environment and the external actors. By applying some International Relations theories - neorealism, institutional neoliberalism and social constructivism - one can better understand the basic logic of the behaviors adopted by decision-makers on behalf of their states in the so sensitive field of energy resources management.

In the end we showed that the “neorealist” logic still dominates Russia’s relations with its direct neighborhood and those with the EU, but we think a greater coherence in EU foreign policy towards Moscow could lead to a translation to neoliberal logic as Russia would gradually learn the lesson of beneficial cooperation.

Keywords: natural energy resources, corridors, security, European Union, Russia, cooperation, rivalry, international relations theory.

Until the discovery of alternative resources in sufficient quantity and at competitive prices, the pressure that the consumer states put on producing ones is significant and it tends to grow in the near future. The big imported energy-consuming states have a structural vulnerability towards those ones that produce it, but between those two categories there is certain interdependence.

Of course, these resources are dispersed in many parts of the world, the best known being the Middle East, Russia-Caucasus-Central Asia, North Africa and Latin America. According to the International Energy Agency, in 2030 there will be a demand for energy by 50% higher than today. Oil, gas and coal will have a share of around 80% of total world energy consumption. The International Energy Agency predicted that by 2015 the global demand for energy will increase by one third, i.e. 240 million barrels per day. The global demand for oil could increase by 32% in 2015, reaching 93 million barrels per day. The aggregate demand for gas will also probably increase by 45%¹.

The Caucasus and Black Sea areas have a great strategic and economic importance, both because they are oil producing regions and transport corridors. Well-documented studies show that in the future there will be an increased consumption of these resources, based on the existence of major power poles, all of them advanced industrial countries. The security complex made up by the Greater Black Sea Area (GBSA) will be reshaped on the medium and long run also by the energy issues, and can become even more important than the military side of security². Given the dispersion of resources in the world and the existence of turbulent areas (Middle East, North Africa), one could expect a growing of the interest of big and regional powers for the Wider Black Sea region. Even if there will be significant progress in using



alternative energies, the dependence of large consumers on oil and natural gas remains real. Credible estimates indicate that oil and gas will cover, at the horizon of 2020, 37.9% respectively 28.5% of global demand for energy³.

As it is known, the GBSA is one of the main places from where the hydrocarbons of Russia, Central Asia and Caucasus go to Central and Western Europe⁴. In order of their importance, the states which have regional energy strategies aim especially at the first major producers of oil and gas - Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iran. In the future, the US, EU, China, Japan and India, but also Russia will compete in the global energy market to have a broad and financially benefiting access to hydrocarbons.

EU is the main economic actor, relating mainly from its position of energy consumer from the Caucasus, Central Asia and towards the energy transport corridors of GBSA. EU member states have in common the interest to have a broad access to sources of energy in the Black Sea area, the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia. Currently, about 50-60% of the necessary oil and gas are imported from outside, especially from Russia and other CIS states, primarily through Russian pipelines. Russia allows EU states to import directly 25% of their energy needs (about 130 billion cubic meters of gas), estimates indicating 40% in 2030, plus 45% of the Middle East⁵. It is possible however that the percentage of imports would reach 70-75% of the required natural energy 2025, according to some pessimistic forecasts made by *Petroleum Economist*⁶.

The overall vulnerability of the EU stems from the fact that Russia has a near monopoly on the transport corridors of hydrocarbons from the East (Central Asia, Siberia and the Caucasus) to Central Europe. Although the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline is operating at increased capacity (doubled by the gas pipeline Baku-Erzurum), only the achievement of the Nabucco gas pipeline and the extension of Odessa-Brody pipeline to Plock would significantly reduce this dependence. Moreover, since 2005, the EU has mandated a group of Western companies to do feasibility studies on implementation and financing the Odessa-Plock pipeline, especially the segment Odessa-Brody which ensures the connection to the Drujba major pipeline! Unfortunately, not all EU Member States have realized the need for the Union to negotiate

energy agreements in a uniform manner and on an equal footing with Russia. The bilateral solution was preferred for example by Germany, for the future construction of the Baltic pipeline (Nord Stream), a fact which caused irritation in Poland and the three Baltic states, which felt they remained "marginal", despite their common belonging to the EU. The opposition of these countries, which did not want to allow the transit through their exclusive economic zones, made the Russo-German project to stall, at least for a time. In 2007-2008, Poland, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Georgia, states that wants to limit the geopolitical penetration of Russia, based on energy, have negotiated the construction of the Odessa-Brody-Plock pipeline.

Since 2006, the EU has also a *European Energy Strategy* which focuses on the diversification of supply sources and on the use of alternative energy resources. Unfortunately, this document did not mention the Black Sea region as vital for the Union, but only Caspian Sea, very briefly. Subsequently, the *Black Sea Synergy* document stressed the need for cooperation in the energy field between the EU and the Black Sea bordering countries.

It is vital for the EU to avoid the exaggerate dependence of Russian infrastructures, to cultivate direct relationships with oil producing and transit-countries within the Black Sea, Caucasus and Central Asia areas.

Even if states such as Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan are not likely to enter the select European "club" (on the medium and long term), through the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership, they have to be politically and economically encouraged to ensure energy supplies to Europe. Also, they must be protected from the destabilization and negative pressures from other states. On May 22-23, 2008, the presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania gathered in Kiev and decided to create the Euro-Asian corridor for oil transport (EAOTC), thus being an upgraded version of the extension of Odessa-Brody pipeline. Countries like Azerbaijan, major energy producers and transit potential actors, are ostentatiously "courted" by both Russia and the EU.

Although the North Atlantic Alliance is mainly a political-military organization, there is also a concern for other levels of security than the military one, thus energy security figures high in NATO's strategic documents. At the North Atlantic Council



Summit in Riga (2006) and then the NAC Summit in Bucharest (2008), leaders of the allied states took into account the need to ensure the energy security of their nations, to avoid the unexpected interruption of oil flows (“critical resources”), which requires a coordinated effort for energy risk assessment, focusing on the security of the energy infrastructures⁷. It is about defending the energy-related interests of the allies, at their request, and the definition of the areas of action in which NATO could bring an “added value”⁸. Of course, this interest shown by the Alliance to oil and gas, and especially the US proposal by Senator R. Lugar in 2006 to extend Article V of the Washington Treaty to energy, have provoked Russia’s irritation, as this state wants to largely control the transit of hydrocarbons from Central Asia and Caspian basin via the GBSA.

Clearly, the proposal to allow NATO to guarantee the access to energy is directly linked to Russia’s decision to stop the flow of gas to Central and Western Europe in January 2007 (an event repeated symmetrically in January 2009). In both cases, Russia has claimed that Ukraine was “stealing” gas from the pipelines transiting its territory and stopped in the midst of the winter the gas supply of some EU countries. Although Romania has been less affected, as it has its own energy reserves and extracting areas, countries like Bulgaria, Greece, and from outside the EU (Serbia) have suffered economically and their populations were deprived of heat for a time!

EU is manifesting from some years a real concern for ensuring its energy security, given its relationship of interdependence with Russia and the “obstacles” posed by Moscow - such as the notorious refusal to ratify the European Energy Charter and the refusal to open the Russian domestic energy market to foreign competition.

Therefore, the countries within the GBSA are facing a real **“strategic” dilemma** regarding the means to gain access to energy resources and the transportation corridors. They may choose to cooperate with each other to jointly exploit the necessary resources to increase the total benefits or, on the contrary, they could prefer individual strategies, often competitive ones. Obviously, the choice is up to the political and economic decision-makers, but they are influenced by factors such as: the domestic political system, the sub-state

actors benefiting from these policies (bureaucrats, lobbies, and interest groups), the international economic environment and the external actors.

We believe that only by applying some International Relations theories one can understand the basic logic of the behaviours adopted by decision-makers on behalf of their states in the so sensitive field of energy resources management. We chose the following schools of thought: neorealism, institutional neoliberalism and social constructivism, as they are probably the best known and widely used in decision-making patterns in similar practical cases.

Neorealism is focusing on the notion of survival in an anarchic and dangerous international environment, each state-actor seeking to maximize mainly either its power or its security, and acting primarily defensively (the “defensive” neorealism) or offensively (the “offensive” neorealism)⁹.

The systemic structure, the power polarity are factors decisively influencing the behaviour of actors, while fear, mutual suspicion, rivalry are generally feeding the “security dilemma” classical behaviour (the spiral of mutual hostility which can lead to war as each actor sees himself as defensive status-quo and the others as offensive revisionist actors).

Whether we talk about defensive neorealism, offensive neorealism or neo-classical realism, this paradigm suggests that states should rely on their efforts (plus skills) and strive hard to obtain and maintain unrestricted access to energy resources. Cooperation could bring benefits but it is also the source of some higher potential drawbacks. First, one or more players could “cheat” to obtain greater benefits from the cooperation in the detriment of others¹⁰. Second, one of the actors could get an increased power capital through cooperation and in the future it could become a rival or even an enemy of the other¹¹.

If the material capabilities, the raw power are the most important, then the intentions are the variable element: one’s today ally can be tomorrow a powerful adversary and the balance of power is an inexorable mechanism, an “iron law” of international systems, above the shared values and beliefs. According to the harshest neorealist vision, cooperation is dangerous because it can help a possible enemy to prevail in case of a future war.



The institutionalist neoliberalism is more optimistic, stating that states have a rational interest to cooperate because the final common benefits will be greater than what each could produce on their own. The existence of some common institutions (IOs, international regimes, etc.) help states to get mutual confidence, to know each other better and to understand the logic of common benefits, thus reducing the so-called “transaction” costs and the information costs. If for neorealists the relative gains are the most important ones (what actor A gets, measured by referring to what actor B obtains), for the neoliberals the absolute gains (those obtained by A and B together) are crucial¹².

In this neorealist framework, one can perfectly interpret Poland, the Baltic states, and Romania’s discontent towards the excessive control exercised by Russia on gas pipelines and energy transit from the Caucasus and the CIS space in general. The cooperation between Russia and the EU should not lead to a de facto monopoly by Moscow on the strategically important energy routes, or to Russia’s purchase without any limits of many European energy infrastructures. Russia’s refusal to sign the European Energy Charter could be analyzed as a mechanism to retain power and to keep the subsequent advantages without any sharing. If the Europeans choose to cooperate, in full transparency, with an actor who does not want to comply with the same obligations (the “rules of the game”) from the beginning, they are likely to help strengthen the power position of this actor. The relative gains are more important for Russia than the absolute ones, because Russia does not have a strategic culture based on cooperation and joint pooling of sovereignty – as is the case with most of the EU states - but one based on the single-player strategy, a “zero sum” game. On the contrary, the EU would like to attract Russia into various forms of deep and balanced cooperation, in order to obtain significant absolute gains together.

EU’s willingness to cooperate with Ukraine by financing the modernization of the gas pipeline networks system in this country was perceived by the European elites as a increase of EU’s material power and of energy security but without harming Russia, while the current leadership in Moscow perceived it as a direct threat for Russian national interests. **The Eastern Partnership**, recently launched by the EU in the benefit of the GBSA states - specifically Armenia, Azerbaijan,

Georgia, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine - also with an energy dimension - has been immediately denounced by Russia as hostile to its long-term interests. It is clear that Russian policy-makers have a state of mind which could be easily labelled as “neorealist”, where cooperation stays in the second place while power calculations, fear and rivalry behaviour prevail.

The European Union put some very high expectations in the **Nabucco project**, an ambitious plan to transport gas from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, may also from Iraq and Iran¹³, to Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria. If Nabucco would be build, this would greatly reduce EU’s dependence on Russian-controlled gas. The estimated price was about 5 billion Euros in 2005, of which Romania’s contribution was 800 million Euros¹⁴, but in 2008 the initial assessment has been revised and the Nabucco cost was estimated at 7.9 - 8 billion Euros! The pipeline will be 3300 kilometres length. Romania, along with the other states involved in the project, has signed the Vienna agreement in June 2006, to start work on the pipeline. EU puts high expectations in this pipeline, whose works could have start even in 2008 and due to complete in 2011 in the most optimistic variant. Unfortunately, the lack of agreement on the full quota of investments, on the property rights and the lack of resolution of some European leaders led to the postponement of the project. Even if the building works would start in 2010, the pipeline will reach the maximum operational level only in 2020. Between 26 and 32 billion cubic meters per year (between 70 and 90 million cubic meters per day) will be transported in this way. At the beginning, Nabucco will probably rely only on the huge *off shore* gas deposit in Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz area (over 1,000 billion cubic meters). In addition, the pipeline will have a total weight estimated at two million tones of steel and will have 30 gas compressing stations.

The Russian alternative to the Nabucco project is called **Southstream**. Russia has managed to persuade several governments in the Balkans and Central Europe that they would have substantial benefits from the transit of natural gas. Thus, countries such as Serbia, with poor economic situation and diplomatically half-isolated, could not afford to refuse the proposal. Therefore, in February 2008 an agreement was signed between Moscow and Belgrade and Russia prepared to



take control on the majority of the Serbian energy infrastructures. Also, some EU countries such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Greece and Austria have shown enthusiasm for the Russian plan, although they knew that the EU has a huge strategic and economic interest in building Nabucco as quick as possible. OMV is the Austrian most visibly energy company which has an important position in both projects. Therefore one could discern a polarization among EU countries according to their economic interests and also the lack of a common strategic vision, while the energy issue allows a foreign actor like Russia to have a big leverage on the foreign policy of some important EU countries.

One should notice that among states that would host Nabucco pipeline, only Romania, and to a lesser degree Turkey, are generally recognized as unconditionally supporting this project, while Bulgaria and Hungary are willing to take into account also the Russian alternative solution, Southstream. Also in Austria, a part of the political class is interested in the Russian offer to include the Baumgarten terminal in the Russian projects which would turn it into a big central-European energy “hub”. At the same time, Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria consider the two projected pipelines as complementary ones as their major aim is to become transit countries for the natural energy flows. But no wonder, many energy experts see them as long-term rivals because they consider that gas from Caucasus and Central Asia is not enough now to fill Nabucco and South Stream at full capacity. Recently, companies OMV and MOL have agreed to jointly exploit a gas deposit in Iraqi Kurdistan to get gas for Nabucco. At the same time, they continued negotiations with Gazprom with an eye to South Stream!

Therefore, applying the neorealist paradigm of international relations theory, Russia and the EU could be seen as involved in a competitive game in which cooperation and compromise do not have a role or are simply played as “luring” strategies, in order to diminish the rival’s vigilance. On the other hand, the EU and Russia are living in a state of interdependence as economic actors, because the EU is the main buyer of Russian gas production and the virtual redirection of gas and oil supplies to China and Japan would take a lot and would leave Moscow without enormous economic resources, meaning a huge lost of European money. So, it seems logical that the neoliberal

logic of cooperation must prevail in order to reach absolute benefits via cooperation, especially since a good part of the Europeans (especially those ones from the West and South) do not generally perceive Russia as a potential threat but more as a partner which is clearly stubborn but can be possibly “educated” as to conform with the idea of fair cooperation.

The social constructivist school is focused on the notions of identity and norms, focusing on actors’ behaviour modification as a result of the process of socializing certain norms through constant interaction. These norms will probably lead to redefining the identities¹⁵. Thus, identity is not a pre-established feature related to the power or security-level of the actors or to the overall polarity of international system but an individual characteristic of the actors, based on norms socialization and mutual influence. Following this vision, elites in Moscow and in Brussels have interests which are not exogenous, immutable, but endogenous, based on values, norms and interaction mechanisms. The existence of common institutions as places of “socialization” of the desirable norms clearly facilitates the reshaping process of identities¹⁶. Anarchy becomes, in Alexander Wendt’s opinion, an empty place, which the actors will fill either with friendship or with enmity and rivalry, this being based on “culture” and perceptions. If neorealism and neoliberalism are “materialist” schools in IR theory, social constructivism is mainly sociological, “relational”, ideas-based. The intersubjective ideas and shared meanings are not generated by power or physical (material) security, but they come from the cognitive universe of the decision-makers and the population. Thus, cooperation between the EU and Russia in energy field should be based on flexible identities, coloured by trust and friendship that is what Wendt called a “Kantian” culture of anarchy¹⁷. Their leaders should feel mutual affection and a willingness to help each other through cooperation, may be even a dose of altruism. Unfortunately, one does not remark such a feature. Even within the EU, the lasting tensions between Poland plus the Baltic countries versus Germany, concerning the future route of the Nord Stream pipeline, indicates the difficulty to overcome the selfish interests in favour of European (supranational) collective solidarity. Powerful interest groups in Germany, gathered around the ex-Chancellor G. Schröder,



led to an energy foreign policy getting profit at national level but harmed the EU's cohesion as a global player.

On the contrary, a player which is external to the EU may sometimes prove the adherence to the logic of solidarity. As a reaction to fears of Europeans towards the assertive plans of Russia, Ukraine, through the voice of Prime Minister Iulia Timosenko, proposed to the European Union in January 2008 the construction of a pipeline from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to Ukraine and then to Western Europe via the Caspian Sea and Black Sea, a project called *White Stream*. Of the roughly 1000-1300 km length, at least 600 km of pipeline would pass on the seabed (even at 2000 meters depth), therefore the degree of technical difficulty and the costs are quite high. Timosenko expressed a message of solidarity to the Europeans, but her gesture seems intended mainly to increase the chances of European integration for Kiev, by convincing the EU to offer Ukraine a Stabilization and Association Agreement. Meanwhile, the democratic leaders in Kiev want to let the EU leaders understand that they make efforts to socialize the European identity norms. Similarly, Azerbaijan frequently expresses its "fidelity" to the Nabucco project, suggesting that if the EU would like to attract this state in its "sphere of influence", Baku could decisively stay apart from Moscow at least at the economic level.

On the opposite side, Russia does not leave any way for reconciliation. At the recent EU-Russia summit in May 22, held in Habarovsk, the Russian president Medvedev said regarding the Eastern Partnership: "We tried to convince ourselves that this is harmless but in the end we could not we are concerned that some countries are doing attempts to use this structure as a partnership against Russia"¹⁸. The very negative definition of the EP, the structure of cooperation proposed by Poland and Sweden and adopted by EU as a complement to the already existing European Neighbourhood Policy, indicates a serious lack of mutual understanding, feelings of fear and hostility perceived by Moscow and some European countries, and the freezing of the behaviours in a clearly neorealist mental framework. Anarchy is not one of the friends (like in EU's case), but a situation with potential enemies, thus Russia does not want to let its defensive "shield" down and cooperate. Medvedev reiterated that Russia

will not sign the European Energy Charter as this would be contrary to Russian national interests. Instead, Moscow proposed negotiating a new European treaty on energy! But the Europeans that insist for the Eastern Partnership as a guarantee for fair and balanced politics in relation to Russia, does not agree to give up the common rules and norms contained in the European Energy Charter, because these are in fact part of the EU's collective identity! They are based on fairness and transparency in the relation between buyers and producers of energy through non-discriminatory access to national energy markets. EU has proposed to Russia a mechanism of Early Warning to avoid unexpected breaks between deliveries of gas and oil as of January 2006 and 2009. Moscow has not yet given the green light to this mechanism for confidence building, probably because it does not want to renounce a geopolitical "weapon" with a strong proven effect. Thus, the neorealist logic is prevailing on the liberal and constructivist ones.

One should note that there is already from several years (2006) an **Energy Community Treaty**, which brings together the EU countries, the Western Balkans ones and also countries from GBSA (Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Turkey as observers), but not Russia!¹⁹ Internal energy market of the EU expanded to the East, thus reaching the famous "immediate" (close) neighbourhood of Russia. These countries have in common not only the common and economically "selfish" interest of welfare, but also some common values, as many of them are candidates to European integration or willing to do this step. They have socialized or are underway to socialize European standards/norms in different fields such as those within the *acquis communautaire*, but equally true one could apply to them the neoliberal logic of absolute gains from cooperation through international regimes. On the other side, Russia does not perceive these proposals for cooperation partnerships coming from the EU other than as mechanisms for zero-sum game by which its capital of power and security would be reduced for the benefit of the Europeans.

The Eastern Partnership also foresaw the inclusion of provisions of some clauses relating to "energy interdependence" within the association agreements, in accordance, inter alia, with the EU policies in the fields of trade, competition and energy, to be negotiated with the partners-countries, "in accordance, if the case arouse, with



the existing memoranda of understanding”.²⁰ The rule of interdependence and the equitable treatment of suppliers and buyers are part of the “energy” identity of the EU, while Russia is basing its identity of unilateral domination and hard-fashioned hegemony on its nearby neighbourhoods.

The giant Russian company Gazprom is a materialization of “neorealist” logic. It creates the most concerns within the EU member since benefiting a very strong position on the European energy market, while the Russian market is very restrictive towards the European investments. Although Gazprom has only 50.2% of shares in possession of Russia, its leaders are strongly linked to the political class, and especially to the circles of former President and current Prime Minister V. Putin. Medvedev was previously, as it is well-known, the director general of Gazprom. The company has the largest world reserves of gas in total over 182 billion USD. Only to the EU, Gazprom exported in 2006 about 161 billion cubic meters gas. According to credible estimates, approx. 25% of fees and taxes collected by Russia are due to Gazprom. Projects such as Blue Stream, South Stream, Nord Stream were initiated by Gazprom, so the company is one essential pawn of the security policy of Russia. The company came to control 50% of the shares of the gas transport network in Poland, over 70% in Ukraine (through RosUkrEnergo) and also holds the energy national company in Serbia’s assets after in 2008 it bought the majority of the national company NIS stocks. Gazprom is also the transmission belt for the orders of “punishment” for states like Ukraine and Georgia, decided by leadership in Moscow in times of crisis or even war.

As a **conclusion**, clearly the “neorealist” logic still dominates Russia’s relations with its direct neighbourhood and those with the EU, but a greater coherence in EU foreign policy towards Moscow could lead to a translation to neoliberal logic as Russia would gradually learn the lesson of beneficial cooperation. Thus, a model of culture of “Hobbesian” anarchy, as described by Wendt, will turn into a “Lockean” one. In turn, we think that within the EU, the dominating mechanism is mainly constructivist, with also a neoliberal strong influence, because common (shared) rules and values are a stronger binder than shared interests in a rational way. A “Kantian” culture of anarchy

tends to gradually become the norm behaviour for all the EU states. Energy is both a source of conflict as an element of power and material security, but also a support for the transmission of collective identity norms by pro-European elites.

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RUSSIA – US RELATIONS AND THE BLACK SEA SECURITY*

Nicolae DOLGHIN, PhD

Without the belligerent charge from the times of Cold War and in the absence of extent at that time, the competition between Russia and USA is going on in many places in the world. The ex-soviet space, not sufficiently settled after the empire collapsed, and inheriting many explosive issues - a usual situation after the collapse of all world empires - is the perfect scene.

Informationally, the competition is dominated by two extreme perceptions, the US one according to which Russia follows the reconstruction of the Soviet empire and the Russia's that consists in US will to eliminate it from a space where it has major interests generated by common history. There are no alternatives between the two extremes. The Black Sea Area shows that at the first glance. The situation is complex, with a long history and obvious local, regional and continental interests, enough circumstances to feed the competition.

The Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 suddenly put the two actors face to face a very dangerous situation, in which Moscow and Washington have not often been during the period of bipolarity. Every time these periods were followed by détente – a chance for the world's security. It only has to find efficient tools for managing a complex security environment whose actors are looking towards the future.

Keywords: the Black Sea, BSEC, hydrocarbons, conflicts, USA, Russia, strategies, competition, ex-Soviet space.

The twenty years that have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall were rich in decisive events, altering the political geography of the Northern hemisphere and the euro Atlantic security environment. The Cold War ideological, political, military and economic infrastructure has come down. The USSR disappeared not only as state but also as one of the architects of the world security system after the Second World War. The euro Atlantic security today is moulded on the Western

values, causing unique processes of its institution enlargement. The swiftness of geopolitical processes is also determining a perpetual need of change. Thus, the NATO alliance today is starting to look, less and less, like the one 20 years ago, is going on with its enlargement and with assuming new areas and missions, but without having a unique vision on its future. Whether it will remain a regional organization or will turn into a global one, generalizing the European experience worldwide, is yet to be seen. Another European institution, the EU, use to enlarge itself, but, at the same time has to elaborate specially design policies for neighbouring areas and to discuss opinions that would limit it, geographically speaking. There is more and more talk of an enlargement fatigue inside the organization. These institutional realities accurately reflect that deep truth belonging to the communities and individuals that politicians today prefer to leave upon those of tomorrow.

During this span of time, the relations between Washington and Moscow, the individual symbols of the bipolar clash actors, have been contradictory, from previously unimaginable reconciliations, to ordinary facts and statements a few years ago. The two capital cities give off a vague public perception on international events. Every time obvious contradictions has appeared the past few years, the public opinion quickly took up the perspective of a new cold war, though the actors involved rejected it and considered it impossible. In short, after almost two decades of political and geopolitical geography changes, the two actors give us this general picture:

The USA, missing the old opponent against that shaped and maintained their containment strategy for almost half a century have entered the phase of reshaping the security environment according to its interests, but also the resources and potentials they afforded to invest. It continues to be the world's strongest economy and, by far, the greatest military power for years to come. It



is the international political actor with the greatest direct and indirect influence in global and regional security decisions. But some forced international decisions and the downside of the coin we have come to call globalization encouraged the emergence and proliferation of new events, risks and threats that, together with those inherited from the bipolarity give the global security environment a dynamics that goes against the efforts done for stabilizing it. It was this dynamics that forced US to acknowledge the fact that economic and financial resources are exhaustible, and even more, that to its great military power one can answer in the theatre by using relatively simple means, reduced forces and obtain spectacular effects.

The temptation of easily using hard means in managing global security have led to a surprising anti-American feeling, especially in the complex Muslim world, but, at the same time, to the individualizations, dissociations and holdbacks among close allies and partners. Therefore, US today is trying to put an end to an unexpectedly long war in Iraq, but not by losing the grounds it earned here, which could mean a great defeat. The treaties signed with the Iraqi government are rather the beginning of a long process, than a definite solution.

Likewise, the end of the tiring campaign on terrorism, transformed in a true war in Afghanistan, is nowhere in sight.

The only concrete result was eliminating this threat from its own territory. With a financial and economic crisis that caused a great deal of distress, the American public opinion and then political leaders had the unpleasant opportunity to see how big is the price to make the statute of unique superpower for the US credible and how corrosive it is for the life standard.

The enthusiasm behind the chance of change Barack Obama - the candidate and then the president - stood for is groundbreaking for global security. This is probably the framework for the call addressed to Russia to reset the relations between the two states. On the 7th of May visit of the Russian Foreign Affairs minister to the White House, president Obama said: *“As I have said before, I think we have an excellent opportunity to reset the relationship between the United States and Russia on a whole host of issues”*¹. Despite the IT verb that could mean a new beginning, from a political stand things are clear, not all problems

can be erased and some of them are located in the Black Sea area or in its vicinity.

Russia, reduced now to a territory similar to the one three centuries ago, is still the largest country in the world and geographically positioned in such a place that makes impossible to ignore it in any major geopolitical games. Immediately after 1991, it took upon the status of a successor of the subject of international law that had been the USSR. In the shady times that followed the breaking up this responsibility was considered a chance for security of a Europe paralyzed in front of the bloody events on the former Yugoslav space and of the perspective to repeat them on a larger scale, on the huge post soviet space. And some warnings have been occurred. Some other issues were thus attended to, like the solution for the Soviet nuclear legacy, a major problem for the US.

It was the time when Boris Yeltzine, the leader of a shattered Russia, was being accepted to international security discussions not for what he was representing, but because excluding Russia from the position the USSR held would have made security issues even more intricate. Or maybe because of the extraordinary development potential it had. Russia was not a world economic power, but neither was USSR and history still remembers is as superpower. The nuclear arsenal saved Russia from a deeper crisis back then, allowed it to make small investments in military programs and focus on development. It was this arsenal that allowed it to remain the equal partner of the US in the field of nuclear strategic weapons. The special relations with the US during this time contributed to the establishment of direct relations to NATO. Russia contests this organization and considers it as a Western reminiscence of the Cold War. It has opposed to its enlargement and continues to do so, but this hasn't stopped Russia from keeping a constant dialogue with it and to act for entering into the G8, G20 and, in the future, in the World Trade Organization.

Within the daily dynamics of action-reaction type that informational dominated international media when is about Russia, it was unnoticed the fact that the syntagm “Occident” is so rarely used in the last political speeches of Russian representatives. The Occident, as collective political actor with common goals but whose national interests are still there, is being steadily replaced by political realities of the concrete world: NATO, the EU, US, France,



Germany, Italy, the Baltic countries, Poland, the Czech Republic etc. The list could go on but not its integrality is important. More important is the fact that this concretization suggests different approaches and allows to build individual policies and strategies despite the geopolitical associations

Speaking about Russian allegations on multipolar world, as a symbol of criticism to the US dominated world order, things are rather concluding to the rebirth of the famous triangle policy during the Kissinger's time, because nothing is suggesting a multipolar world would be safer or more stable. Some of its intentions for the immediate future suggest its preparation for this kind of world. The multipolar world will not be more stable, but only more intricate, and revitalizing the triangle is a form of multipolarity that would permit its participation to the future geopolitical dynamics as partner of today's superpower, the USA, and to the new emerging one, like China. The triangle could be also the frame for Russia to reach the goal she set out for the year 2000: - *full and equal strategic partnership with USA, based on interests overlapping and tacking into account the key influence of Russian- US relations on the general international situation*², that was already reached with China. This is the objective followed by Russia according to its national security strategy, signed by president Medvedev on May 12th, 2009.

Russian leaders followed attentively and cautiously the first statements of the US president regarding their country. This is why the meeting of the two presidents in London on April 1st was so eagerly expected. A close reading of the official documents showed the disagreements between the two states were the same, but that a dialogue was permitted. In the official press statement following the meeting, president Obama touched on the subjects on which he will be collaborating with Moscow: ... And what I believe we've begun today is a very constructive dialogue that will allow us to work on issues of mutual interest, like the reduction of nuclear weapons and the strengthening of our nonproliferation treaties; our mutual interest in dealing with terrorism and extremism that threatens both countries; our mutual interest in economic stability and restoring growth around the world; our mutual interest in promoting peace and stability in areas like the Middle East.³ And, during a meeting with the students of one of the Moscow universities, the

US Ambassador in Russia expresses his faith that we know that together we can restore growth to the world *economy and perhaps it can be a better, more sustainable growth*.⁴

Beyond the protocol statements one can see a real intention of the two states to cooperate in vital issues for world security. They will probably be no immediate change, but rather a need for time and political will. In fact, a few weeks later, the foreign affairs ministers of the two countries that means the chiefs of the two most important institutions for resetting relations, were sensibly more prudent. The Secretary of State spoke about a *reserved optimism* and the Russian counterpart of *pragmatism*. They expressed a reality, since there are numerous issues concerning which they stand on similar grounds but many disagreements have been built over time and such disagreements could affect the Black Sea security: world order, Iran and the Middle East, the competition in the former Soviet space, especially around the Ukraine and Georgia, the anti missile defence issue, the attitude to NATO etc. We can clearly see that at least for some of these the scene will be the Black Sea area.

Russia looked for the status of energy superpower, based on its immense resources, geographical position and the constant rise in demand for energy in Europe and the world. The energy games of Russia have been, for years, the focus of analysis in the field, and they will still be for a long time, due to its geographic position and large interest for this issue. We are dominated by the games in Europe and we pay little attention to those in Asia or to the Arctic region. For now, the effects of resource psychology, beyond the immediate gains and the generated effects in the world have not gone around Russian economy. They have generated processes that encouraged consumerism, discouraged alternatives and blocked economic diversification, determining a dangerous dependency of the GNP to the export of energy and resources in general. This is probably the reason why, in the same security strategy, among the main long term risks and threats to economic security, on the first place is positioned *maintaining the export model of raw materials as source for economic development*⁵.

Anyhow, today's Russia, far from the times when its leader was getting an encouraging pat on the shoulder, is in the middle of a resetting in the world, using all political, economical, military and



financial opportunities. After many years of search, it has identified an own doctrine that it observes as a model of development based with the roots in self experience. It is now part of the group of states trying to use the malfunctions generated by global crisis in the international financial system to change it since *the crisis is often the releaser for the changing process of a system organization; it motivates the change.*⁶ Its current political elite follows the European tradition in security approaches, but at the same time develops the Asian dimension as well, which will give it the possibility to alternate priorities when will decide it is according to its interest.

The relations between the US and Russia has their own history and, even more, its own deontology with specific messages, proceedings, rules and used to transmit the importance of one to the other in different periods of time. More than 20 decades after, Moscow has been getting signals the current Washington Administration intends to kick start their dialogue in order to manage a larger area of world security issues, not just strategic nuclear weapons. Of course, the reason for change could be the realities in Afghanistan where the US are carrying on the burden of the war and need Russia's support. But President Obama's and other members' of his team statements, in different occasions in Europe, South America and Asia prove that the US are thinking of another approach, a more realistic to the world's problems, and for this they admit the complexity of the security environment and their own limits in front of numerous challenges. Russia has a lot to offer to their overcoming.

Beyond these optimistic significances of statements and immediate reactions, harmonizing and institutionalizing the expected relations between the two will be a difficult and long process, since, obviously, the US will want to keep their advantages of their position in the multidimensional system of world order. Russia will pursue her own security interests, and these games are also joined by active and important other actors, larger or smaller, with their own interests and capabilities. Therefore, to catch a glimpse of the atmosphere at START negotiations – a political priority for both – we should focus on some opinions about the START treaty signed in 1991, observed by both parties, and which will expire on the end of this year. *It was an act of treason* – said the president of the Federative

Chamber of the Russian Parliament - *it was signed by a criminal*⁷ reinforces the Defence minister. The statements are tough, they refer to a treaty that, at that time, was considered a success and in whose prolongation both actors are interested, but in my opinion, are part of the usual messages that are given before important negotiations.

The Black Sea Area is a relatively recent actor of the regional geopolitical games, after the disappearance of the bipolarity. On June 25th 1992 in Istanbul the document of birth of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization that started from generous objectives of development of security through economic cooperation. It includes 12 states, among them all the countries with a sea opening. The US are observatories and today are allies or strategic partners to majority of other members of the organization. It was the first zonal initiative that raised the attention.

But it wasn't BSEC the leading actor in the zone individualization, but rather hydrocarbons. They dominate any discussions today concerning the regional security environment and all projections about its dynamics. The hydrocarbons equation, that in other areas usually mean the terms between supplier and consumer, have suddenly got more complicated in the Black Sea area, through the emergence of the third actor, the transit states. This new reality was quickly turned from an opportunity for stability and prosperity to a scene for intensifying regional geopolitical competition. Each of the actors seeks to maximize its advantages. Russia that of no competition and to manage all the advantages of monopoly, transit states that of strengthen the position between the supplier and the consumer, the consumer of not having problems with energy resources on a long term. In this equation, Russia observes all three conditions, it is a supplier, transit space and consumer at the same time. All these in a world in which global interdependencies accentuate.

Far from economic realities of demand and offer, the hydrocarbons geopolitics generated, in the Black Sea area, a crisis generating rivalry, affecting the nature of economic competition. It will survive for years to come and will start to add up political conditions. Usually, this kind of conditions should not exist in trade, but this is not the only case. There is one precedent being the trade with weapon and strategic materials as merchandise. It is the only field where, partners,



prices and the trade conditions are strong influenced by politics and everyone accepts the fact. Unfortunately, the practices are moved from there to the hydrocarbons trade. The near future investment plan - the genuine and convincing barometer of the economic actors' interest in the area – follows the lines of this competition. It is enough to analyze, even superficially, the discussions around the two projects for natural gas infrastructure, Nabucco and South Stream, crucial for Black Sea security. They both apply to Europe, but, so far, the matters are quite competitive, in terms of incompatibility, although similarities are more often than differences.

In the framework of geopolitical rivalries, the social, educational and infrastructure projects of the BSEC are rather vague. They have a real potential of modifying the zone security, since they would stimulate mutual knowledge, communication and cooperation as sources of trust and stability. They would have been real steps to a credible security. On a long term, the economic components of the stability strategies in the area could be based on this regional organization at the Black Sea Area, accepted as such by the US and the EU. US, with their financial and economic power, would play an important part in the development policies of the area where they have allies and partners. Hydrocarbons would be a real chance to strengthen Black Sea security only if they would be taken out of the geopolitical competition whose vector they are now and would be completed by other dimensions.

In the general context of direct or intermediate expectancies and rivalries between Russia and the US, the stability and security in the Black Sea area is not going to change significantly in the near future. The competition will go on. Up until now, the two actors have not modified in essence their positions in important issues concerning the security of the area: NATO enlargement, the Caucasus problems, energy etc. Likewise, the reciprocal public perception built in the last two decades is unaltered: the American one, that Russia is trying to rebuild the USSR and the Russian one that the US try to eliminate Russia from the former soviet space. These perceptions could influence future strategies. The only mutual concessions so far were acknowledging both interests in the area. It would be enough as a starting point to stability, if only both actors were interested in its security, in

means of strengthening it and balancing resources. The Eastern partnership launched not long ago by the EU for the states in the Black Sea area will be a challenge for both Russia and the US, since the EU could become a strategic alternative for the actors in the area that had, up until now, chosen between the two.

For both states, the Black Sea area belongs to that strategic competition space where interests are not symmetrical. Russia is a limitrophe state and a Caucasian country with special interests in the area. Using the US terms we could say its interests are vital ones. Last year showed this in the war with Georgia. For the US, the Black Sea area is only interesting in terms of free circulation of hydrocarbons and the responsibilities assumed for their allies. However, in an area with such asymmetrical interests, the events can become intense and destabilizing and affect the major interests of the actors in the area and thus the security environment.

On the general background of Russia – US relations three will probably issues that will be dominating the dynamics of the security environment: NATO enlargement, Caucasus and the antimissile shield.

NATO enlargement is the most constant, intense and important disagreement between the US and Russia starting with the moment of opening the alliance doors for new members. It is present in the whole of the Eurasian space. The US considers the alliance to be an association of democratic, market economy states, grouped together in order to defend themselves against an armed attack, a space of stability and security. For Russia, the alliance is rather an instance of inertia from the days of the Cold War, used by the US to support its own interests and that has become useless after the disappearance of the enemy that has generated it. The attitude of Russia concerning the alliance has not changed, even if, at the US proposal, the NATO Council – Russia was formed, where major issues of mutual security are to be discussed. Russia is represented in Bruxelles by a political and a military mission and the alliance has a similar mission and an information office in Moscow, but mistrust is still present at the both sides. In a speech at the NATO Defense College in Rome, the Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, admits there is a perception problem that has to be solved between the two in the future strategic concept of



alliance: *Russia currently appears to perceive that the West, and notably NATO, does not take fully into account its security concerns. And this is a perception that needs to be tackled – by NATO and by Russia*⁸.

The perspective of enlargement with the former soviet countries determined Russia to use an unprecedented diversification of its anti NATO strategies, using them differentiated in its relations with the US, with their main European allies and with the candidate country. At the NATO summit in Bucharest it managed to obtain the postponement of the final decision with the support of some US European allies, forced to take into account the price they would have to pay in case of a dramatic deterioration of their relations with Russia.

The candidates that have openly declared their option for joining the alliance, the Ukraine and Georgia, were those to feel Russia's strongest opposition. The Ukraine can't seem to get out of the political crisis that followed the orange revolution and is in rapid economic fall. At the same time the majority of population does not support joining NATO. After an uninspired military operation in august 2008 in South Osetia, Georgia forced the military response of Russia, moved away from the joining criteria and took into the spotlight of the Euro-Atlantic public opinion the issues of advantages and disadvantages in relations with Russia. There are numerous voices in Kiev and Tbilisi that uses to say Russia is not far from their problems and in Moscow that behind coloured revolutions were US. That means it was not Georgia that has been targeted. The war was a test for all the security institutions of the world and Russia could be satisfied with the results. This was quickly followed by events with a long term effects on the security environment at the Black Sea. Those events ended with the change of political geography: Abkhazia and South Osetia proclaimed themselves as independent states, Russia recognized them immediately and later Nicaragua did the same, also Russia assumed the task of defending the borders of self-proclaimed states. All this measures were rejected by NATO, the US and the EU.

As expected, the military defeat provoked a political crisis in Tbilisi. The former political allies of the president of Georgia contest him, accusing him, among the others, of deteriorating the relations with Russia. It is obvious that, in a peaceful

turn of the events, the perspective of Georgia to reinstall the sovereignty over its secessionist territories depends, now, only on the future of its relations with Russia. The US could change the situation only if it would reach untouched levels of cooperation with Russia, which is hard to imagine in the near future, or after a confrontation hard to imagine today in rational world. In fact, the former president of Georgia, Edvard Shevarnadze, stated that *Bringing back South Osetia and Abkhazia will be possible only in the case of a real threat to the territorial integrity of Russia itself, when it will not have a mind neither to Abkhazia nor to Tshinvali*.⁹

The Russian- Georgian war caused the most severe crisis of the last couple of years between Russia and NATO. The alliance constantly rejected any measure that would affect Georgia's rights on the rebel territories and stood on the same position as in August 2008, even if agreed to renew the work of the NATO- Russia Council. Russia, in its turn, created around Abhazia and Southern Osetia a similar status as Kosovo, Serbian territory, whose independence was recognised by the majority of Western states. In addition, it triggered a complex program of military reconsiderations. The most important are the modernization and restructuring of forces but, most of all, creating for the next 49 years two military basis in South Osetia and Abhazia, whose independence is recognised. The future basis will have 3700 soldiers each, a new technique, among which the T 90 tank, a rarity even for Russian Armed Forces inside the country¹⁰, artillery and soil to soil missiles, modern systems of antiaircraft defence, new types of aircrafts etc. At the same time, the moratorium on the CFE Treaty is still on and it has its own vision on the OSCE role at the new borders. These announced programs, that it is not going to give up even in crisis, suggests that Russia is preparing itself for the most difficult scenarios in relations with the US and indirectly, with NATO in the Black Sea area.

In the Strategy of National Security it considers that oriented regional security architecture exclusively to NATO is a threat to international security and, at the same time, underlines the ... emergence of tendency to look for the solutions to existing problems and to settle crisis situations on the regional basis without the involving of non-regional actors.¹¹ It may possibly be that this characterization aims at the acceptance of Turkey, an important member of NATO and US ally, at



the identification of solutions for the Black Sea issues. Turkey demonstrated countless times that it gives priority to promoting its own interests in achieving the stability of the security environment in the Black Sea, without neglecting its obligations to the alliance. The fact that sometimes its interests are close to the Russia's ones may very well be triggered by their common power relations, but also by its wish to create imbalances that it would be unable to manage. Strengthening security in the Black Sea are as well as in Europe is somewhere between the statement of the Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, and the challenge launched for Russia to accept the alliance as regional actor.

Caucasus continues to be another area of competition between the US and Russia. Because of its ethnic, religious and cultural characteristics, the Caucasus is a unique area of diversity density. Likewise, a long historical tradition of confrontation is usual. The collapse of the former Soviet empire was not safe from the turmoil that usually goes with these events. All areas of the former world experienced them during the process of redefinition of geographical identities that followed. Many today's problems in the Middle East or in the relations between India and Pakistan for instance have their origin in the realities of the British Empire many decades ago.

The post-soviet political geography, set by anterior steps, was respected in theory, but is not finalized in details even today. Especially these details that go unnoticed by macroanalyses fuel the energies that brought down the great empire. The great empire was fractured into smaller political entities, as complex as ever. That is enough for the unconsumed energies to be still active and their effects to go against the international law principles. The Caucasus is the best known area of the former empire where the problem of this unconsumed energies abruptly emerged with the so called frozen conflicts. Probably because of the facts that it is part of Europe and the place where the competition between Russia and the US was most intensive and fuelled local interests and hopes. But similar situations exist in all post soviet space where to day there exists states that can hardly bring up the historical argument in supporting existing borders.

In a certain way, two of the frozen conflicts in the Black Sea area, namely those that affected Georgia, were solved. They have become now cases

for international law and to solve them arguments, principles and solution will be found for every of possible course of actions. The least probable is coming back to the situation before August 8th, 2008. The moment demonstrated the rational limits of the Russian -Western confrontation and whose overcoming can lead to non linear evolutions. It seems these limits have been understood in the post Soviet space and this is obvious in the modification of accents in much behaviour. The events around the Nagorno-Karabakh province are noticeable, a conflict that affects two independent Caucasian states, subjects to international law. *De jure*, the province, inhabited mainly by Armenians, belongs to Azerbaijan, *de facto*, it does not recognize its authority, its population being oriented rather to Armenia. With the contribution of the Minsk Group, where the US and Russia are members, a relative peaceful status was assured after a ravaging war at the beginning of the last decade on the 20th century, but a definite solution to the conflict was not identified. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan has very good relations with Russia and the US. Azerbaijan is considered to be another possible candidate for NATO, while Armenia is a member of Organization for Collective Security Treaty that means military allied of Russia.

In the spring of 2009, Moscow was visited by president Aliyev and a few days later by president Sargsyan. In press statements that followed, the president of Azerbaijan declared that Russia is an important strategic ally of his country, while the president of Armenia focused on the fact that Russia has not altered its position and wishes *to solve the conflict on the basis of all and I am underlying, of all international law principles*.¹² *These statements could suggest an intensification of Russia's commitment in solving the conflict*, in a time when the US is concentrating on internal issues.

During this spring there have appeared the first information about the negotiations on a road map for Armenia and Turkey to restart relations and open the borders between the two countries, closed after the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Renewing Armenian Turkish relations would be an important step towards the stability of the security environment in the Caucasus and would contribute to solving the conflict of the province taking into consideration the special relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey. The



Russian Foreign Affairs Minister *salutes each step that leads to normal relations between any countries*, the US State Department calls Turkey and Armenia *to act according to the plans and in the agreed framework*.¹³ It's yet to be seen how the political elite in Baku will consider the possibility of breaking the Armenian blockade by Turkey, the most constant its supporter in the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. Some voices in Moscow already say the US are following, through intermediaries, the same objective of eliminating it from the Caucasus using Turkey, this time, that means a regional actor.

Launching the EU Eastern partnership in May also facilitated direct talks between the Armenian president and the Azeri president in Prague. Their results generated optimistic reactions from the international intermediaries, reserved optimism from the Armenian authorities and strong declarations about the rigid position of the Armenian president from the Baku. Some analysts in Azerbaijan's capital explain this position by *secret indications from Moscow, the situation in Georgia and the internal political crisis in Armenia*.¹⁴

Still, finding a solution for the crisis in Nagorno Karabakh province is closer than years ago. In the Muslim world the situation is being carefully evaluated. Not only Turkey, but also Iran is interested. An eventual reburying of the conflict could add up to a new intensity of misunderstandings between Muslims and Christians, already present in the area, in a moment when the US are trying to improve their image and Russia to diminish the effects of Chechnya, considered in Muslim opinion a confrontation between Christians and Muslims. It is not by chance that the recent declarations of officials in Washington and Moscow remind the fact that in their countries is living important Muslim communities. The solution would be only be an assumed compromise, because every try at solving by extreme of situation - the province would come to Azerbaijan, or unite it with Armenia – would only mean another swift war and a precedent for other hot points in the post Soviet area.

The antimissile shield could be a chance for the Black Sea security, as well as it could transform in an important destabilizing factor. The US declared the shield will be directed against Iranian missiles, a state that, one way or the other, belongs to the larger Black sea – Caspian Sea area and has great

interests in the area. The perspective of installing the elements for the third position of the US shield in Poland and in the Czech Republic provoked an unusual reaction in Russia. It considers it as a damaging element in the balances negotiated between the two in the field of strategic nuclear weapons, since this was not accounted for during negotiations. Their characteristics would permit rather using it against intercontinental Russian missiles already there and whose positions are well known, than against presumptive Iranian missiles. Russia did not have this kind of reactions when the US installed antimissile shield elements in the Pacific and Great Britain. Apart from the strong opposition and the invoking of reconsiderations in the strategic nuclear weapons field, Russia invoked the possibility of installing the soil to soil Iskander missiles in the region of Kaliningrad to fight the elements of the shield. There are declarations they would be installed in the Black sea region also. Having less than 500 km range, this type of missiles do not break the treaty that forbids euro missiles signed in the 80s between the US and the USSR. Such a perspective cannot be ignored by the states of Central Europe and the Black sea that could face other military realities than the known ones.

This possible evolution in the antimissile shield issue would be most dramatic one since it could cause response military reactions, a spiralling of the events that could provoke the gathering of dangerous tensions. Likewise, it would determine different positions of the European allies of the US on the perspective of installing the shield. Even now, there are different opinions among Europeans, and the public opinion in the Czech Republic opposes the perspective of becoming hostage in a competition between the two great actors it can influence so little. The problems some decades ago could re-emerge, when the euro missiles caused great turmoil in a Europe held hostage by the confrontation between the two nuclear superpowers.

To diminish the dissonances there were numerous negotiations rounds between Russia and the US. Various possibilities were put forward to eliminate suspicions but the main positions rested unchanged. The Obama Administration postponed only taking a definite decision regarding the efficiency of the shield and stated it was studying Russian proposals. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin



said to some Japanese newspapers that *Russia will tie the antimissile defence and wall in connection to it with the offensive strategic weapons.*¹⁵

Between the US and Russia there are intense negotiations on the subject. Russian experts consider that US determination to install elements of the shield in Europe remained the same. The US Defence minister declared, in the budget commission of the Senate that he is studying, together with Russian partners, the possibility of installing the shield on Russian territory. Supposedly, they are talking of a Southern region, near the Black sea. Moreover, the possibility of using Russian radar in Azerbaijan is not being neglected. Of course, the statements are important, but there is surely a long way to go in putting all details together.

Such a perspective could create especially favourable circumstances for stabilizing the security environment at the Black Sea.

The cooperation in such a sensitive field as high military technology is having been a rarity for the two. This would mean attaining a reciprocal trust atmosphere, adopting concrete measures to assure the security of future investments, thus an enlargement of the protection space and the acceptance of reciprocal interests. It would be a favourable framework for harmonizing other problems of the area where the two actors have different positions and interests.

Thus, the US shield in Europe could become a symbol of security in the Black Sea area.

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⁷ http://news.km.ru/snv_1_gotovili_predateli_i_prest.

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¹¹ Soviet Bezopasnosti, ..., idem, p.3.

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RESHAPING EURO-ATLANTIC AND EURASIAN DEFENCE COMPONENT OF SECURITY WITHIN THE WIDER BLACK SEA AREA*

Gheorghe MARIN, PhD

“Disposing of a significant political, economic, military and demographic potential, the Black Sea Basin is doubtless capturing the Euro-Atlantic interests in the area while representing the Mediterranean basin’s extension to the Baltic Sea and towards Central Asia and Middle East, further on. Under these circumstances, the Black Sea Basin and its adjacent area become the ‘control tower’ for the Eurasian space and the ‘moderator’ for the Middle East”¹.

Keywords: the Wider Black Sea Area, security environment, the defence component of security.

1. Geostrategic importance of the Wider Black Sea Area

The end of the Cold War, resulting into the disappearance of bi-polar worldwide order as a first consequence, has thus facilitated the occurrence and consecration of new state actors, development of political dialogue and international cooperation based on partnership relations and mutual trust concomitantly with rapid and widely spread of pluralist democratic values and market economy. Occurrence of several new states in the Black Sea area and Caucus region as a result of USSR dissolution and FR of Yugoslavia breakdown has drawn the attention on territorial and ethnic frozen conflicts such as those in Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Currently, the Black Sea and Caucasian security situation is quite complex and twice-important given the regional security architecture reaffirming process as part of the Euro-Atlantic one and an alarming potential of conflict in the region caused by existing interstate or intrastate frozen conflicts within the Community of Independent States and continuously increasing asymmetric threats, drugs

smuggling and persons trafficking, migration and terrorism not in the last.

The large amount of military equipment in the Black Sea area during the bi-polar period has increased the opportunities for illegal ammunition and light armament trafficking, which helped separatist/secessionist movement to create its own illegal and paramilitary forces. Preserving of military bases and means in the region, failing of clear rules and accurate stipulations referring to their status and size, corroborated with inobservance of CFE Treaty provisions, represents a multiplier factor for negative regional evolutions. The former Soviet Republics in the near vicinity are nowadays confronting with direct risks jeopardizing their political legitimacy, corruption deflation and fight against internal and external Mafiosi groups. Tensions arose between regional integration processes and fragmentation processes, between core power centres and peripheral ones.

The encountered ampleness of fight against terrorism and organized crime concurrent with accelerated competition for energetic resources and transportation routes has brought the Black Sea area from the boundary to the core attention of major European and Euro-Atlantic security bodies. The Black Sea area is a potential European entrance gate for migration flows from Asia towards Maghreb regions or even Africa. Illegal migrations along with expanding terrorist local groups represent a potential basis for increasing of illicit traffic and terrorist attacks. Even though there are not terrorist organizations emerged directly from the Black Sea area, the proximity to Middle East, Balkans and Asia represents a significant advantage for terrorists in these regions, as they can connect to these transit areas and launch attacks against the European continent. It is obvious that those security risks are inter-connected and conventional threats,



together with frozen conflicts are a catalyst for the emergence of asymmetric threats/challenges.

A potential solution to settle the regional problems could not be properly approached apart from considering the concept of wider security that should incorporate regional integration, democratization, economic growth and review of policies and strategies on the Black Sea area. In the context of a greater NATO involvement in crisis situation management beyond its area of responsibility, Black Sea area and its neighbouring area represent the Alliance's needed and useful outpost in designing stability and security of the entire region.

Throughout this study, the Wider Black Sea Area will also encompass the Balkans and Caspian Sea areas considering that a comprehensive approach on the matter could not ignore the political, economic and strategic role of some players like Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan or the key role of Eurasian energetic corridor interconnecting the Western large consumers with very rich energetic resources in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia regions. To be more accurate, this study will consider the Wider Black Sea Area referring to the six bordering countries: Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Georgia, the two Caucasian Republics – Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as to the former Soviet Republic of Moldova.

The Black Sea area's transformation into a pole of economic stability and economic growth aimed at extending peace and security climate over the Balkan region – the Caucus and Central Asia is thus becoming of top priority of NATO and European Union further approaches.

The evolution of West – East strategic relationship and the economic openness promoted by NATO and European Union enlargement processes are obviously requiring a clear definition on NATO and EU Eastern boundaries concept as complementary zone in relation with the other states non-integrated, for the time being.

At the same time, the Wider Black Sea Area includes a network of mineral oil transportation routes from Caspian Sea to Europe. It is well known that Caspian Sea's energetic resources become more and more important for the European allies in order to provide for stability of the petroleum prices world widely.

NATO and EU should consider an increased contribution to securing these energy transportation

routes as energetic resources are of strategic importance for the large majority of European allies. No one can afford to ignore the regional frozen conflicts of great potential to influence national and regional policies, anytime and anywhere, thus assuming multiple and long term aftermaths.

Making this area secure needs an enhancement of the role that regional security cooperation bodies (BSEC, BLACKSEAFOR, SEEBRIG, GUAM) must play in collaboration with the international ones (UE, OSCE, NATO) in order to ensure the establishing of a real and efficient regional security architecture, with the active participation of all the involved political factors, as part of the global and European security architecture. This area will become a surveillance and early warning platform for the protection of strategic security interests of the Russian Federation and the Western Europe. In this context, the control of communication lines for ensuring movement freedom in the Black Sea theatre of operations through the deployed military power will concede, in future, a great importance of this space.

2. Security environment trends in the Wider Black Sea Area

Cold War has divided the region into two semi-spheres: East and West equally contributing to regional isolation with dramatic consequences thoroughly affecting the security environment by the end of 20th century. At the end of the Cold War, the international security has been confronting different fragmentation trends in the Black Sea region and, in particular, the European security facing a geopolitical dilemma in this region: integration and stability versus disintegration and hidden conflicts.

The expansion process initiated by the end of '90 of the last millennium has permitted an ever increasing development of multilateral political dialogue and enhancement of cooperation among the states belonging to both former antagonist parties during the Cold War while emerging new cooperation mechanisms including military component. Partnership for Peace, Open Sky, regional cooperation initiatives and strategic partnerships at bilateral level concluded, have significantly contributed to a better understanding, mutual trust and confidence among the countries



in the region to the benefit of all nations involved. New platforms of close cooperation have been established on realistic bases for promoting while protecting the national interests within regional or global context at a time when asymmetric threats (terrorism, organized crime, WMD proliferation, illicit migration, drugs and hazardous material smuggling, etc.) became more and more imminent. Further on, we will briefly refer to the standpoints of major actors in the Wider Black Sea Area currently facing with new evolutions of geopolitical and security environment. The strategic objectives are aimed at restoring previous influence zones and control on energetic resources and their distribution, protecting own national interests by limiting NATO enlargement and maintain instability by periodically “feeding” several frozen conflicts.

Realizing the failure of CIS geopolitical project, **Russia** is now seeking for a new European Security Treaty, consolidating Russia – Eurasia Partnership, increasing OSCE role by creating of a rapid reaction force (16,000 military) and achieving air surveillance integrated system. At the same time, we are witnessing an increasing presence of Russia in the “hot” areas (Border Defence Agreements as recently signed with Georgian separatist regions) and its endeavours to prevent or to counter the USA enhanced presence in Central Asia.

Ukraine has continued, during the last years, its traditional political and economic oscillation between East and West, remaining captive in the gap between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community. Depending on the energy sources, Ukraine is also an important element of the western Caspian energy transport networks.

For **Georgia**, the main security challenge stays in the restoration of its sovereignty over Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia. It depends greatly on the relations between Georgia and Russia, which acknowledged the independence of the secessionist provinces (august 2008), and opposes Georgia’s aspirations to become a NATO member, conducting on its territory military actions against Chechen terrorist groups, with the excuse that Georgia cannot secure its own borders. The key mission given to Georgia by the Westerners is the securing of national part of oil pipe line Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan. The internal political instability makes quite doubtful Georgia’s capability to assume this role.

Turkey has a special status in the geopolitical architecture of the Black Sea. The new circumstances after the Cold War, NATO membership, the special relation with the USA have offered this country an opportunity to regional leadership in the Black Sea area. In spite of strategic and historical discrepancies, Turkey developed its economic and political relations with Russia, which is a very popular trend in Ankara. Turkey continues to have a very active role to play in sustaining the solving of conflicts in the area, in a regional framework (the Stability Pact in Caucasus) and in increasing its “omnipresence” in the region.

Republic of Moldova and the Caucasus states are the most complex and the most sensitive link in the geopolitical architecture of the Wider Black Sea Area. In these states, poor and autocratic governing, extreme poverty, frozen conflicts (Transdnister and Nagorno-Karabakh) and threats addressed to territorial integrity make a most unhappy combination, allowing the flourishing of corruption and organized crime, due to improper rule of law implementation mechanisms. Moreover, Daghestan and Ingushetia have become a fertile zone for development of radical Islamism, which generates religious terrorism. Communication between the state and its citizens is very poor everywhere within the area, especially in Moldova.

Romania and Bulgaria, states that are situated on the Eastern border of the Euro-Atlantic community have assumed their role as trade and energy bridges and, at the same time barriers against transnational security threats from the Black Sea area.

The Black Sea area, where the Western and Russian interests superpose, is presented as a region where two integration systems combine: the Euro-Atlantic community, represented by NATO and the European Union (EU) and Commonwealth of Independent States under Russia’s decisive influence.

We consider **NATO** one of the three most important pillars in the Wider Black Sea Area architecture, EU and Russia being the other two. In April 2008, NATO Summit in Bucharest highlighted the geo-strategic importance the Black Sea area has for the Alliance. The mechanisms for political military cooperation with states in the area have been improved in a peaceful cooperation framework. The Caucasus conflict in August



2008 demonstrated this was the borderline in what concerns the competition between Western democracy and Russian Federation.

While meeting its objectives, NATO continues to be preoccupied with the protection of the Southern flank, supports the enlargement process and gives a special attention to the development of the strategic partnerships and other forms of regional cooperation.

While talking about the relation with NATO, the following actors have an important role to play: three NATO members (Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria), three aspirants to NATO membership (Ukraine, Georgia and possibly, Azerbaijan), Armenia (PfP member, which has a strategic partnership with the Russian Federation), Russia (which has a special relation with the Alliance within NATO-Russia Council) and Ukraine (in the NATO – Ukraine Commission). Cooperation with non-NATO states is developed, especially through individual partnerships, within PfP program.

We consider EU the strength pillar within the European architecture of the Wider Black Sea Area. For EU, Black Sea area represents a distinct area for the implementation of European Neighbouring Policy, which aims at establishing a “group of friends”, as Romano Prodi named it, where EU principles, values and governing methods would be observed and promoted.

In this region, there are powerful economic interests at stake, the Wider Black Sea Area being an important market. Until the identifying of alternative solutions, EU member states continue to very much depend, on the energy resources in this area. There are similar interests in security aspects’ having in view that EU is close to an area where asymmetric threats are present (illegal trafficking, organized crime, terrorism, etc.),

From the European viewpoint, after Romania and Bulgaria joined EU the background of the extended Black Sea area is presented as follows: Greece, Romania and Bulgaria are EU members; Turkey is candidate to EU membership; five other countries, Moldavia, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are covered by European Vicinity Policy without having the certainty of an EU accession calendar; last but not least, there is one key-country- Russia, that benefits from a strategic partnership with EU. As a consequence, EU has contract based relations with all countries in the region.

3. Military cooperation in the Wider Black Sea Area

International cooperation is traditionally defined as having positive connotations, meaning deliberate policy adjusting for states that wish to solve a common problem or to obtain mutual gains. As a security source, military international cooperation must include all its forms and elements and address domains where there are risks and threats to security so as to ensure a durable development and stability in the Black Sea area.

International cooperation in the Black Sea area is even more difficult to be accomplished, as the states on the shoreline and also the countries in their vicinity have different ideas concerning the security and stability in the region.

Moreover, the historic heritage and the difficult reform process and slow evolution towards democracy and market economy made the involvement in cooperation and regional integration of Black Sea shoreline countries, even more difficult.

The events during the latest years have created the feeling of international and regional cooperation initiatives revival in the Black Sea area as well as in its extended area.

Local actors seemed to have acknowledged the fact that in order to ensure a durable development and stability in the Black Sea area, you need to improve and use regional cooperation at its maximum potential.

Institutions in the Wider Black Sea Area design and implement decisions that contribute to development of security such as: combat of terrorism, of organized crime, of armament, drugs and human trafficking, of money laundry. In spite of the differences in concepts and ways of action there is one unanimously accepted objective: the interest in creating a secure security and stability system.

The securing of the area imposes an increase of the role that regional and international cooperation and security organizations have to play in ensuring the building up of real and efficient regional security architecture, together with all the involved political structures, as part of a European and global security architecture.



Organizations and military cooperation mechanisms in the Black Sea Area

Currently, there is a large organizational infrastructure which deals with security problems in all domains and at all levels. There is need, though, for the creation, with the help of international security organizations, of certain conflict prevention and crisis management mechanisms in the Wider Black Sea Area, which could help the states in the region to overcome mutual historic distrust and to use differences among them as complementary factors.

The main military cooperation organizations and mechanisms in the Black Sea area are the following:

- Collective Security Treaty Organization (1992, CSTO) has as main objectives regional and international security safeguard, peace strengthening, independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty and collective defence of participant states;

- Black Sea Naval Cooperation Group (BLACKSEAFOR), which reunites the six Black Sea shoreline countries, was officially established in 2001 for search and rescue missions, humanitarian assistance, de-mining, environment protection and good functions. In 2004, it was decided that there was a need for the establishing of a permanent operations control centre, and an information exchange MOU was elaborated. In March 2005, BLACKSEAFOR extended its mandate with combat against terrorism and mass destruction weapons proliferation;

- Black Sea Harmony (OBSh) is envisaged as the equivalent of NATO operation „Active Endeavour” in the Mediterranean Sea and aims at monitoring the coastal area and notifying to the national authorities, the presence of suspect vessels;

- Coast Guard Cooperation Agreement which is the base for cooperation among Coast Guards/Border Police. It comprises a series of bilateral agreements between shoreline countries. This document was supplemented with multilateral cooperation elements during the regional level reunions (decision making and expert level), which have been organized annually since 2000. In 2003, an Integrated coordination and information Regional Centre was established in Burgas, Bulgaria, for the improvement of communication and integration at regional multinational level

in order to maintain a direct liaison between all Border Police Centres and to coordinate the joint operations of these institutions;

- South Eastern European Brigade (31 September 1999, SEEBRIG) has as main objectives the strengthening of regional stability and security, the enhancement of political and military confidence, the development of military cooperation in the area and of good neighbouring relations among countries in the South -East of Europe;

- Multinational Peace Force in South Eastern Europe (26 September 1998, MPFSEE) has as main objective the conduct of peace missions under UN and OSCE aegis; it includes 7 nations: Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Italy, Romania and Turkey. Between February and August 2006, the brigade was deployed in ISAF, Afghanistan.

The Romanian participation in regional cooperation initiatives contributes to the growing prestige of the Romanian Armed Forces and brings a surplus of stability and security in the region.

4. Conclusions

The Russian-Georgian conflict has put the entire institutional cooperation in the Black Sea area under a big question mark, practically demonstrating the shortfalls of all the regional cooperation mechanisms, no matter who initiated them, in front of a real fluid geopolitical reality. We are witnessing the establishment of a new regional approach, focused on the geo-political factor, with Russia as key power element in the region.

The promotion of a common vision on security problems will help states in this region to concentrate their common efforts against threats and this way will diminish potential conflicts in the region.

Cooperation relations must not be limited to countries on Black Sea shore, they must be extended to countries belonging to cooperation initiatives from Balkans to the Caspian Sea and beyond it.

Therefore, the carried out activities will allow coordination so as to respond to the entire scale of threats that menace directly or indirectly the security of the Black Sea area, meaning: terrorism, drugs, human beings, conventional and non-conventional arms traffic; competition for alternative energy transport lines; on-coordinated



participation in different security and defence organizations, having diverse or even divergent interests; bilateral disputes historic animosities and mutual suspicion; divergent security agendas.

Despite the complex problems, which still characterize this area, on virtue of its long history, sometimes even unhappy but always dynamic we must highlight the fact that the same history has offered the basis and the substance for an active and successful participation in the global economy and the international security and stability.

Western Europe, through NATO, EU, but also through every other great power involved in the regional and global stability, in partnership with Russia and the countries from Central Asia and Caucasus is firmly engaged in building up a long lasting peace and security in the Western Balkans and in the Black Sea area.

In these circumstances, the Black Sea area will never be isolated, on the contrary, its role will be significantly increased. A model or a well define paradigm in what concerns the future of the security in this area is hard to be offered. It can be shaped only after we establish if we can harmonize interests, coordinate differences, and highlight the resources in order to become an extension of the Euro-Atlantic space, otherwise this area will continue to be split by contradictions, cleavages, which strictly mark the limits between United Europe and a mixture of states. No matter what would be the case, there is a minimal certitude which refers to the fact that the geopolitical importance of the Wider Black Sea Area will be

maintained and its geo-economic value will be preserved, as long as we do not find more attractive alternative energy resources.

The strategic value of the Black Sea will continue to increase, as all political regional or global actors, which have interests in this area, realize its importance and implement policies specific to the area. One of the main peace warranty mechanisms is international participation to the process of securing this region. This means NATO political and military presence for the efficient management of asymmetrical threats in the Black sea area, together with the connection of the shoreline states and of those in the extended area, in an effective regional economic, political and cultural system, within security and stability parameters.

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NOTES:

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MPFSEE – MILITARY-POLITICAL INITIATIVE OF REGIONAL COOPERATION*

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In the context of global security environment transformations, the existence of a structure or force capable to assure the conflicts prevention through international, governmental or nongovernmental organism or organisations' coordination, is a priority in the international foreign policy. The responsibility of peace and security achievement is already on the security agenda of numerous states. The regional peace and cooperation initiatives could be and really are considered efficient ways of improvement of the security environment and especially of assurance of that organized and institutional frame, necessary for achieving the projects and programs through states could think to economical, political or military stability. South-Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial is also considered such of initiative; its activity and, especially, its results have been recognized by UN and NATO.

Keywords: MFPSEE, SEEBRIG.

The way to the Euro-Atlantic integration was not quite easy for Romania. The integration criteria fulfilment in NATO and EU structures required sacrifices, adaptation efforts and undertaking some important engagement and large responsibilities. From January, 2007, the Northern and Eastern border of Romania has become the external border of EU, our country contributing to the Union's liberty, security and justice area through those borders' administration. From Romania's side are required the participation in the program of good vicinity, launched on 2004, the making up a security and prosperity area in Black Sea area, as well as the contribution brought by „Global Civil 2010” Objective.

Besides the important participation in Alliance's operations and efforts, Romania is an active factor of ESDP implementation through human and logistical resources that it already engaged separately or in the frame of two

European Tactical Battle Groups especially meant for fulfilling the Petersberg missions, our country having to dispose of separate military troops both for EU and NATO.

Together with these engagements and responsibilities, by joining these two organisations, Romania has become an important regional player, integrated in the decision-taking process at European and Euro-Atlantic level, a member of a strong confederation from the international relations' perspective, both a security beneficiary and supplier and part of the most performing politico-economic system known in the history.

Romania's wish of self-assuring the security and prosperity through integration was justified and legitimate, approaches for this integration having a role of catalyst of internal reforms, necessary for the country modernization and prosperity. As results from Romania's National Security Strategy, from The White Charter or The Transformation Strategy, Romania was permanently required the adaptation to these two organizational systems, being itself in a process of development and transformation, but the communion of values, interests and objectives was the element which conferred stability and coherence to the multidimensional development process.

SEEBRIG was founded on the base of initiative of many states from South-East of Europe, including Romania, its status, role and missions being stipulated in the Agreement regarding the Peace Task Force from South-East of Europe, signed at Skopje, in 1998.

The foundation proposal of Peace Multinational Force, as a brigade (SEEBRIG), was launched on the occasion of SEDM Meeting (Sofia, the 3rd of October, 1997). The project is developing under the auspicious of SEDM Meeting Process.

To this date, the following states are members with full rights in this initiative: Albania - Nation 1, Bulgaria – Nation 2, Greece-Nation 3, Italy-



Nation 4, FYROM-Nation 5, Romania-Nation 6, Turkey-Nation 7. The participating countries are identified with numbers from 1 to 7, in alphabetical order. Croatia, Slovenia and USA are observers in SEEBRIG's framework.

The reference documents which represent the founding base and which stipulate the activity of SEEBRIG are following:

- Agreement of Establishing the Multinational Peace Force from South-Eastern Europe (Skopje, 26.09.1998);
- First Additional Protocol to MPFSEE Agreement, regarding rotation principle in force's framework;
- Second Additional Protocol to MPFSEE Agreement, regarding Engineering Task Force (ETF) and the Crisis Informational Network (Bucharest, 30.11.1999);
- Third Additional Protocol to MPFSEE Agreement, regarding Headquarters Status (Athens, 21.06.2000);
- The Fourth Additional Protocol to MPFSEE Agreement, regarding augmentation of interoperability degree and reaching NATO standards (Constanța, 04.09.2002).

According to the Agreement of Establishing the Multinational Peace Force from the South-Eastern Europe, SEEBRIG can participate in peacekeeping operations, under UN or OSCE mandate, agreed by their resolutions. The decisions to participate to military operations and to forces' process will be subject of political and military debates between parties at PMSC proposal and will be approved by them, abiding the legal procedures from the above mentioned countries. Consensus is the main principle for the decisions taken at the level of this initiative.

The Political-Military Staff Committee (PMSC) is the politico-military body coordinating the activities within MPFSEE. Its Presidency is administered by the Member States, on a rotation bases, for two years. The Political-Military Staff Committee organizes annually two reunions in the country holding the presidency.

The consultations between members and all decisions regarding SEEBRIG are taken within the South-Eastern of Europe Defence Ministers Meeting (SEDM-CC) framework or at DCHODs.

PMSC and SEDM-CC presidency has been provided by nations as it follows:

- 1999-2001: Nation 1 – Greece;

- 2001-2003: Nation 6 – Romania;
- 2003-2005: Nation 7 – Turkey;
- 2005-2007: Nation 1 – Albania;
- 2007-2009: Nation 5 – FYROM.

Starting with 01.07.2009, the presidency will be taken over by Nation 2 (Bulgaria).

Permanent Staff Centre, as defined in the Agreement of Establishing the Peace Task Force from South-East Europe, known as SEEBRIG HQ, is built up of troops belonging to those seven full member States, in the framework of initiative and provides planning and conducting SEEBRIG activities in peacetime. In the eventuality of participating SEEBRIG in mission in theatre of operations, this general staff is augmented with forces from each nation. This force has become available starting with 01.05.2001.

According to the same document, each participating nation will host, according to the rotation principle, each four years, the SEEBRIG Headquarter. Between 2003 and 2005, Romania was the host of this headquarter, permanently located in Constanța.

Up to now, SEEBRIG HQ was also hosted by Nation 2 (Bulgaria) in Plovdiv, between 1999 and 2003. At present, SEEBRIG HQ is deployed in Nation 7 (Turkey), at Istanbul, for 2007-2011. The next location will be in Nation 3 (Greece), probably Larissa.

The commandship of brigade is provided on the same principle of rotation between nations and the brigade's staff position is occupied by Host Nation. The sequence of nations at command was as it follows:

- 1999-2001 – Nation 7 (Turkey), brigadier general Zourlu Hilmi Akin;
- 2001-2003 – Nation 3 (Greece), brigadier general Andrea Kouzelis;
- 2003-2005 – Nation 4 (Italy), brigadier general Giovanni Sulis;
- 2005-2007 – Nation 2 (Bulgaria), brigadier general Neyko Nenov;
- 2007-2009 – Nation 6 (Romania), brigadier general Virgil Bălăceanu, PhD;
- 2009-2011 – Nation 1.

In 2009, at 1st July, the command will be handed over by Nation 6 (Romania) to Nation 1 (Albania).

Colonel Gheorghe Simina, the actual commander of 1st Infantry Brigade, was the SEEBRIG chief of staff between 2003 and 2005,



and between 2005 and 2007 the commander was colonel Ionel Tâmplaru.

Romania contributes at this force with staff personnel, units and subunits from the Land Forces, 578 soldiers, hereby:

- 9 soldiers in Permanent Staff Centre;
- 1 infantry battalion in modular structures, 400 soldiers (341st Infantry Battalion from 34th Infantry Brigade – 1st Infantry Division);
- 1 reconnaissance platoon, 19 soldiers;
- 1 transport platoon, 40 soldiers.

Also, our country provides **an engineering company (119 soldiers - 353rd Company from 34th Infantry Brigade – 1st Infantry Division) in the framework of the Engineering Task Force (ETF)** which is managed by SEEBRIG HQ. Between 2007 and 2009, the Land Forces have provided the command of ETF (according to the principle mentioned in the Agreement – commander of ETF must be from the same country as brigade's commander).

Units and subunits attached to this initiative act in peace deployment garrison and participate at instruction activities organized by SEEBRIG HQ.

A special exercise is prepared each year, its type being established by headquarters, together with nations' representatives, under the generic designation of "SEVEN STARS". Moreover, representatives from SEEBRIG and other Member States participated to other exercises organized by other organizations or military structures such as: LIVEX "ADRIATIC PHIBLEX" - with Engineering Force; "COMBINED ENDEAVOUR" - signal exercise; "ALLIED ACTION" - NATO exercise with Partner countries for verifying the CJTF HQ Concept; "EURASIAN STAR"; "SEESIM" – training exercise through simulation. In 2006, this exercise was organized by Romania together with FYROM.

An important role in this initiative belongs to our country, which, during the time of tenure the presidency of PMSC, had evolved a sustained activity for popularization of initiative within Europe and outside its borders. Meantime, following to reaching a certain level of maturity and training (conceptually and actionally), at the Romanian president of PMSC's initiative there has been promoted an application for having the brigade certified by NATO and also its participation in a mission within a theatre of operation. In the fall of 2004, during exercise "SEVEN STARS

2004", deployed in Topraisar area, the brigade passed a very important exam, this structure being certified by a commission from JFC Napoli and so having the possibility to go to a mission. 2005 can be considered a preparing year for the mission, "SEVEN STARS 2005" exercise being an important training period for a real time mission participation.

During DCHODs, at Skopje, the 11st of May 2005, it has been come up to a consensus regarding the deployment of SEEBRIG in Afghanistan, within ISAF mission for insuring KMNB command (Kabul Multinational Brigade) from February to August 2006. The final decision regarding such deployment in the theatre of operations has been taken at SEDM Reunion, held in December 2005, in Washington.

The required support for the Permanent Staff Centre activity (actually SEEBRIG HQ), during its station in a permanent location, is also provided by the Host Nation. In this matter, the Land Forces Staff, during 2003-2007, assured and provided a staff company and a signal company for the brigade's headquarter.

Having in view the participation in mission in the theatre of operations from Afghanistan, the Land Forces Staff have trained and equipped the two above mentioned companies, in conformity with NATO operational standards and SEEBRIG requirements.

Between the 6th February and 6th August 2006, SEEBRIG HQ, Staff Company and the Signal Company participated in ISAF mission in Afghanistan, assuring KMNB IX command.

The main activities fulfilled by the SEEBRIG HQ were the following: the security and stability operations conducted in Kabul's area of operation; the assistance of Afghan government in providing and maintaining an environment of safety and security in area; the participation on achieving some rebuilding projects of infrastructures and facilities in area for local people; the organization and the conduct of CIMIC operations according to NATO and UN rules;

The main missions developed by Staff Company during the deployment in the theatre of operations were the following:

- providing the required conditions for carrying out SEEBRIG HQ activity in the main and reserve command point;
- providing medical assistance;



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- providing security and guard in the locations being in SEEBRIG HQ responsibility;
- providing the transport for SEEBRIG HQ personnel;
- providing vehicles and equipment maintenance.

The main missions of Signal Company were:

- providing SEEBRIG HQ connections, necessary for a good activity development in the theatre of operations;
- providing the connections during transport in/ from theatre of operations;
- providing the connections between SEEBRIG HQ with defence ministries of initiative member states and SEDM-CC secretariat.

On 11th of August 2006, in Constanța, there was organized the return ceremony from mission of SEEBRIG HQ, Staff Company and Signal Company. The responsibility of organizing the ceremony was held by the Land Forces Staff. To a good evolution of such activity, structures subordinated to the Ministry of National Defence and General Staff also contributed.

Military and civil personalities from Ministry of National Defence, national delegations of SEDM member countries, the delegation of Albanese Presidency of SEDM-CC and PMSC, ambassadors and military attachés approved in Romania, representatives of local and districts authorities from Constanța participated at the ceremony. All the military personnel have been decorated with SEEBRIG medal and a part of them have been decorated with medals offered by Nation 1 (Albania), Nation 2 (Bulgaria) and Nation 6 (Romania).

2007 has been an accounting moment for our country, as a Host Nation, when SEEBRIG HQ has been deployed from Constanța garrison to Istanbul, a succession of activities being in responsibility of Land Forces Staff. Logistic, human and financial support was a significant one, both for organization and evolving of Departure Ceremony of SEEBRIG

HQ and for preparing and displacement of equipments and techniques in common share of SEEBRIG property. Activities evolved in good conditions, superlative appreciations have been received both from Ministry of National Defence, General Staff and from this initiative's partners.

Host Nation status for SEEBRIG HQ and activities organized presumed major responsibilities and efforts which engaged financial costs and supplementary materials for Land Forces (for example, only for turning into operational and for consolidating these two companies have been assigned over five billion lei from the Land Forces Staff's budget, money which has never been initially planned for this activity).

We can appreciate this fact as a valuable accomplishment because it has been realized when SEEBRIG HQ was deployed on our territory and especially for Land Forces, having in mind that this Staff controls the entire planning, organization and logistic sustaining process which lead to such a great success. The largest contribution to SEEBRIG Mission in Afghanistan devolved on our country with 233 soldiers.

Successes obtained made that other countries from the South-Eastern part of Europe to apply for acceptance in frame of this initiative as full members (Ukraine, for example) or as observers (such as Bosnia-Herzegovina).

Having in mind the brigade's accomplishments, the participation at the Afghanistan mission, the interest proved for a future participation to missions, we consider that this political-military initiative is a successful one.

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BLACK SEA HARMONY - ATTITUDES AND PERSPECTIVES*

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As a neighbouring Black Sea country, Romania has both a national direct interest to protect and secure the harbours and maritime areas under its jurisdiction and an additional responsibility towards its allies from NATO and EU, derived from its double quality, a NATO and EU member state.

Keywords: security, the Black Sea, Black Sea Harmony.

1. General framework

Black Sea security represents an essential part of the entire Black Sea region. Main risks and threats which can be identified within maritime domain are asymmetric. The Black Sea and the region might pose as traffic zones for drugs, weapons, dangerous materials and human beings coming mainly from Central Asia, Afghanistan and non-state enclaves of the region, heading to Western Europe. The illegal maritime traffic from the Black Sea basin entering Europe especially through Turkish and Ukrainian harbours has an increasing tendency. The rise of fundamentalist movements, social and economic problems, and ethnic conflicts increase the risk of terrorist activities in this part of the world.

Even the most part of this kind of risks cross the region on land routes, the last statistics show more frequent use of maritime and riparian means of transportation under different state flags (from the small fishing boats up to big cargo ships) and also under independent sailors shipping services and companies for illegal traffic of drugs and conventional weapons but also of sensitive materials and products which can be used for both, military and civilian purposes.

At the same time, Turkish statistics highlight an accelerated increase of maritime traffic, especially oil tankers, through Turkish straits and across Black Sea, which amplifies asymmetric risks and shipping security. Transport of oil products is mainly carried out by Russian ships, 70% of this

being designated to European countries.

Along with all these issues we can add the increased interest of NATO and EU organizations to provide secure boundaries (including maritime ones) in order to stop illicit traffic of small and light weapons, drugs, sensitive materials and products which can be used for both, military and civilian purposes or human beings traffic and illegal immigration, which pose as predominant factors of nonconventional risks addressed to Euro-Atlantic area security, nourishing and supporting terrorist activities. In this context, an increased protection of maritime routes, ports and Romanian maritime interest areas is requested.

As a neighbouring Black Sea country, Romania has both a national direct interest to protect and secure the harbours and maritime areas under its jurisdiction and an additional responsibility towards its allies from NATO and EU, derived from its double quality, a NATO and EU member state. Romania has assumed the contribution to collective defence Operation „Active Endeavour” carried out in the Med Sea aiming to counter the use of maritime route for terrorist activities or other activities supporting terrorism. Black Sea security contributes also to downsizing the asymmetric risks in the Mediterranean Sea basin.

1.1. History and present status of “Black Sea Harmony Operation” (BSHO)

After joining NATO as full member of the organization, Romania has supported the idea of „Active Endeavour Operation” (AEO) extension in the Black Sea area, as a solution to increase the security in this basin. This objective was considered as an important part of strategic approach of opening and internationalization of the Black Sea through the involvement of major actors out of area, interested in its security architecture.

Continuing the strategy of Montreux Convention protection, namely control of the Turkish straits, Turkey launched in March 2004



the national maritime security operation „Black Sea Harmony”, which, from the very beginning, has initiated an information exchange with NATO about suspect vessels in the Black Sea, and an operational extension among the riparian countries on a bilateral basis with each state. Up to now, there are only three bilateral memoranda of understanding between Turkey and Russian Federation (2007), Turkey and Ukraine (2008), and Turkey and Romania (2009).

1.2. The Romanian Naval Forces' participation in BSHO has the following advantages:

- a) securing the Romanian maritime areas of interest (territorial waters, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone) as part of Eastern maritime border of NATO and EU;
- b) increased Romanian capabilities against maritime terrorist and asymmetric threats;
- c) consolidation of a regional initiative coordinated by a NATO member state, connected with a NATO similar operation, which can emphasize the NATO footprint in the region, maintaining national actions' authority;
- d) engaging and not isolating the Russian Federation in the regional maritime security efforts, without a veto right on the initiative's development;
- e) the development of cooperation with NATO and non-riparian allies in the Black Sea's security field (considering EU and other international relevant bodies' cooperation);
- f) the completion of NATO picture about the Black Sea's security in connection with the Mediterranean Sea Picture;
- g) configuring a profile and a concept regarding Romania's capacity, capability and role in consolidating the Black Sea's security.

2. The Romanian Naval Forces' contribution to BSHO

The Romanian Naval Forces can contribute to BSHO with maritime ships, Littoral Surveillance System and even with river ships. Among naval current forces which might be used in this operation we can mention frigates, corvettes, maritime minesweepers and logistic ships (281, 283) and a part of the river ships. Considering the mission essential task list, only the frigates can fully answer the requirements, corvettes, maritime

minesweepers, logistic ships (281, 283) and a part of the river ships have some limitations related to:

- a) real time data links for maritime picture compilation;
- b) crypto communications for C2 and information exchange;
- c) standard equipment for boarding teams;
- d) proper boats (RHIB) for boarding teams to conduct compliant boardings;

With the limitations indicated above, ships can carry out following tasks;

- a) surveillance from fixed positions or patrolling;
- b) visual identification and hailing/interrogation of merchant/ civilian ships;
- c) data reports about contacts/ targets using existent communication equipment;
- d) compliant boarding (frigates, corvettes and monitors) with the civilian ship's commander approval.

3. Other participants

In order to achieve the recognized maritime picture and successful task accomplishment, besides the Naval Forces, there is a need to engage other national governmental institutions and agencies based on special agreements, such as:

- a) surveillance and reconnaissance aviation (fixed wings, rotary wings) and Air Force Operational Command;
- b) structures in charge with the national border regime implementation (Ministry of Administration and Interior/with forces and means from the Naval Border Police);
- c) naval/ maritime civilian agencies responsible for monitoring naval picture and traffic safety (Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure/ Romanian Naval Authority and Constanta Harbours/ Ports Administration);
- d) national intelligence agencies;
- e) national custom authorities.

4. Operation's aim and tasks

Aim: prevent, deter and disrupt terrorist threat, illicit traffic of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery means and their associated materials, and terrorism supporting activities.

Tasks: 1. military ships presence on civilian traffic routes; 2. active surveillance and



reconnaissance actions; 3. shadowing contacts of interest/ suspect vessels; 4. compliant boarding.

Actions for task accomplishment:

a) exchange of information with NATO and Turkey about the traffic in the Black Sea or in Romanian harbours of ships suspect of terrorist activities or illicit activities related to it (Contact of Interest/ COI, or Vessels of Collection Interest/ VOCI);

b) naval units presence and active surveillance on main sea lines of communication and adjacent air space within own maritime area of responsibility, in accordance with the domestic and international law provisions;

c) shadowing, pursuing and control of suspect vessels, in accordance with the Romanian legislation;

d) interrogation of ships within own area of responsibility or interest;

e) coordination and cooperation between Romanian and Turkish naval forces under

BSHO aegis, including actions of Coast Guard/ Border Police and Naval Authorities, in accordance with the national legislation in force and with obligations assumed by each country in organizations and treaties they are part of.

5. Area of responsibility (AOR)

The Romanian BSHO AOR will be most probably stretching between Vama Veche and Cardon parallel lines of latitude in the south and north, including territorial waters, contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone (delineated very early this year with Ukraine, but not delineated with Bulgaria yet), Danube Delta and maritime part of the Danube.

Romanian territorial waters include maritime area adjacent to Romanian littoral or internal waters until 12 miles distance from the littoral base line, their limits representing practically the maritime borders of the country. Within this area the responsible authority is mainly Border Police, Naval Forces supporting them, as requested.

The contiguous zone is represented by the portion of the sea adjacent to the territorial waters expanding till 24 miles from the littoral baseline. In this area Romania impose the control for prevention and repealing of breaking its customs, fiscal, sanitation and border legislation.

Exclusive economic zone is the part of the sea adjacent to the Romanian littoral, beyond the territorial waters, where the country has sovereign rights and jurisdiction over all natural resources form water and sea bed, including their exploration, exploitation, and environmental protection and preservation. Its maximum limit might extend till 200 nautical miles from the littoral baseline, but in the Black Sea, due to its dimensions, extension of the exclusive economic zone is established through agreements between the neighbouring countries, as it is stated in the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 1982 ratified by Romania through Law number 110 from 1996.

6. Specific risk factors impacting the Naval Forces' activities

a) revival of unsolved „frozen conflicts” (Georgia, Moldova);

b) Black Sea area offers a lot of opportunities as a transit zone for energetic resources from Central Asia area to Europe, but at the same time it is a source of risk factors due to internal instability of some states in the region and due to conflicts of interest not only of the regional states, but also of some states out of the region;

c) Russian Federation opposition to NATO extension toward east;

d) support of terrorism not only by the separatist terrorist groups, but also by the governmental structures in some states;

e) organized crime might contribute significantly to regional instability. There are many examples of disputes between different criminal groups which collaterally involved innocent people or representatives of other states governmental agencies or international agencies and organizations, in this case causing potential sources of crises;

f) increased potential for weapons of mass destruction proliferation;

g) piracy and armed robbery;

h) illegal immigration and traffic of human beings;

i) containerized transport development and lack/ scarce of appropriate scanning devices for such a huge volume of goods in a short time, might increase the possibility of materials which can be used in terrorist attacks.



7. Interest objectives in the Naval Forces' area of responsibility

These objectives are important targets which can be included in critical infrastructure or social-economic categories such as:

- a) maritime drilling and/ or extraction platforms;
- b) maritime and river harbours;
- c) fishing areas;
- d) Danube mouths, especially Sulina Branch;
- e) maritime commercial traffic in coastal areas;
- f) maritime roads, traffic separation zones and navigation aids.

8. BSHO Concept of operations

Romanian Naval Forces structures under Naval Operational Command operational control carry out surveillance and monitoring naval traffic, identification, shadowing/ pursuing and compliant boarding of suspect ships in their AOR as it follows:

- a) permanent radar surveillance within radar discovery limits, timely reporting data to Naval Operational Command;
- b) maritime surveillance (radar and visual) using patrolling ships during increased suspect vessels activities in certain/ more probable maritime shipping sectors;
- c) river surveillance (radar and visual) using maritime and river ships at Danube mouths and on maritime part of the Danube;
- d) identification of contacts discovered by littoral and ships surveillance means using ships and/ or naval helicopters approaching targets at visual distance, which use radio or voice interrogation standard procedures about ships name, main characteristics call sign, cargo and destination;
- e) visits/ inspections on board to check the cargo and crew are carried out by the ships boarding team in presence of a Border Police officer, in case of an compliant boarding;
- f) results of visits/ inspections on board are reported to Naval Operational Command which forward them to appropriate Romanian authorities involved in BSHO, then to BSHO Primary Coordination Centre in Eregli/ Turkey.

Ships participating in BSHO might be in one of the following situations:

- a) Ships performing duty Navy guard tasks (intervention at sea and/or on the river)
- b) Ships specially assigned for BSHO intervention (nominated and scheduled to intervene on call for tasks related to this operation in certain periods of time).

Each ship might take action in BSHO from following positions:

- a) permanent deployment places/ home ports, on call, based on information and orders received from Naval Operational Command (NOC), in an appropriate time span which allows an effective intervention (in case of routine and low/ reduced risk degree situations);
- b) waiting positions at sea, at Danube mouths, on the river, on call, based on information and orders received from NOC (medium risk degree situations);
- c) patrolling within maritime AOR, based on mutual exchange of information between the ships and NOC (high risk degree situations and during scheduled activities at sea);
- d) execution of Navy Guard Ship duty in the areas of interest (very high risk degree situations).

Merchant and fishing vessels reconnaissance and identification might be realised using lists provided by NATO or national designated authorities.

Interrogation and pursuing/ shadowing of suspect vessels will be done using NATO procedures. Visits and inspections on board will be carried out in close cooperation with Border Police personnel and ships.

In this operation might be involved other structures, as follows:

- a) Air Force Operational Command conducting air surveillance and Reconnaissance;
- b) Romanian Naval Authority providing information about in traffic merchant and fishing vessels at sea and on the river, and in ports ships (Mangalia, Constanta, Midia, Sulina, Tulcea, Galati and Braila);
- c) Border Police carrying out specific actions within territorial and internal waters;
- d) National intelligence agencies which provides data about ships suspected of terrorist activities or illegal activities supporting terrorism;
- e) Customs authority which can provide data about potential suspect cargoes.



9. The operation's conduct

Command and Control of Romanian forces involved in BSHO is conducted by the Naval Operational Command, located in Constanta. Decision regarding interrogation, control/inspection on board suspect vessels, and applicable Rules of Engagement (ROE) is made by the appropriate Romanian military authorities. Actually, each nation participating in BSHO maintains the Command and Control of their naval assets designated to this operation.

Communications between national BSHO Coordination Centres and Principal Coordination Centre in Eregli will be maintained through telephone, internet and fax secured means.

Communications between forces participating in BSHO (including air assets) will use VHF, UHF and HF radio means (English language and special codes issued for this operation), „PC to PC” communications, visual communications (flag signals and/ or signalling lights).

A Romanian naval forces liaison officer will act in PCC BSHO/ Eregli/ Turkey as national point of contact (POC) and will be invested with the authority of coordination maritime activities between Romanian and Turkish Naval Forces. Turkish part will have a similar POC in Constanta/ Romania, place to be identified.

10. Conclusions

First steps for initiation of this operation, already started on 31 March 2009 when the Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the two Chiefs of Romanian and Turkish Naval Forces, might consist in issuing of common action plans between participating institutions and agencies and in exchanging appropriate information.

In the future, the Romanian Naval Forces participation in BSHO might consist in a periodic presence of 1 or 2 ships in maritime/ river areas of interest monitoring and surveying ships traffic. This presence of Naval Forces might contribute to:

- a) an increased contribution and influence of Romania in the Black Sea maritime security;
- b) consolidation of Romanian response capabilities to maritime asymmetric threats;
- c) securing national maritime interest and jurisdiction areas as part of Eastern border of NATO and UE;
- d) completion of NATO Black Sea maritime recognized picture related to that of the Mediterranean Sea security picture.

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CAUCASUS EVENTS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON THE WIDER BLACK SEA AREA'S SECURITY*

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The Black Sea region passed through a multitude of cloudy periods: wars, frontier revisions, ethnical conflicts, political and economic crises as well "coloured" revolutions. These events were always initiated locally but the great powers maintained their important role all the time – the Romania's and Bulgaria's adhesion to NATO and the European Union and also the negotiations launch with Turkey regarding its adhesion to EU seems changing basically into the geopolitics of the Black Sea region.

Every region's conflict, no matter its causes, objectives and means has elements of geopolitical competition as the confrontations from Georgia and Ukraine or the fights between different political parties and politicians from any region's country, these resulting into geopolitical reconstructions out of simplest visions that share the area in "pro-Occident" and "anti-Occident" or "pro-Russian" and "anti-Russian".

Keywords: The Wider Black Sea Area, Caucasus.

1. The Black Sea Area – an area of strategic interest

1.1 The Black Sea Area – one of the key-areas of the new conflictual arena. Related to the Caspian Sea, the Wider Black Sea Area (WBSA¹) became one of the key-areas from the new conflictual arena. This region extracted from the Heartland and Rimland geopolitics isn't a peripheral one, without strategic impact but, on the contrary, a core one. The Black Sea Area is not only a distinctive geographical area, wealthy in natural resources and strategically laid to the limit among Europe, Central Asia and Middle East but also an expanding market with a high potential of development and, lately, an important junction for energetic and transport flows. Nevertheless, the "rivalry" generated by

the energetic resources control from the Caspian Sea Basin², the transport lines over and around the Black Sea, the interaction with the conflicts from South Caucasus and, not lately, the international involvement³ into these conflicts could confer the region a high potential of regional and even global instability⁴.

Otherwise, the Black Sea Area remains an area of significant strategic, even vital, interest. It is the area where the events alerted us, in August 2008, confirming the Romania's predictions regarding the South Caucasus. Of course, the realities from South Ossetia are unwanted to be repeated also in Transnistria, situated very close to our frontier, but this threat exists.

1.2 Actors and strategic interests for the Trans-Caucasian region. Due to its position, vicinities and access to resources, the South Caucasus Area, area comprising Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan⁵, rose the interest of Russian Federation and United States⁶, the European Union, and recently NATO – great power polls with global influence.

1.3 The motivations' diversity of the interest manifested by different actors for the South Caucasus area. The motivations of the interest manifested by different actors for the Trans-Caucasian area are very different. Here we may mention:

- The Russian Federation worries in regard with the NATO⁷ and European Union⁸ enlargement toward East;

- The frozen conflicts and crises from the East limit of NATO and EU – some inherited from the Soviets -, continue to represent an major obstacle in the multilateral cooperation and regional stability

- To configure a peaceful vicinity area for the European Union⁹. Many from the traditional threats confronted by Europe come from this region;



- The hydrocarbon resources discovered in the Caspian Sea grew the value of the geopolitical position of Georgia¹⁰ - ex-Soviet republic -, nowadays holding a key position in the so-called Southern corridor projected to diversify the production and world provision with oil and gas.

The Russia's main interest isn't yet Georgia, but Azerbaijan, the only country from South Caucasus keeping plenty hydrocarbons stocks. The Azeri gases can be very useful for the Russian gasoduct South Stream, crossing the Black Sea from Russia in Bulgaria, where will divide in two streams – one to cross over the Mediterranean Sea to Italy, another will pass through Serbia and Hungary toward Austria¹¹;

- The Russian influence maintenance in the republics from the former Soviet Union and the trial by different means to undermine¹² the Nabucco pipeline construction, the rival of the South Stream gasoduct¹³;

- Region's advantageous geographical position near all the conflict areas involved in the fight against international terrorism from Central Asia and Middle East;

- Few aspects of ethnical-religious nature (Iran and Turkey), etc.

Nevertheless, in area's geopolitics, the influence of rivalry between the main regional powers is clearly seen. The United States' opposition against the grown Iran's responsibility in the area provoked the Azerbaijan withdrawal to the participation (10%) into the Iranian oil exploitation. The emergency of Turkey-Israel-Azerbaijan geopolitical axis leads to consultation and to a risen cooperation among Armenia, Iran and Greece. Or, the effects coming from these facts are very complex and quite unpredictable.

2. The relations between the Russian Federation and the West after the Russian-Georgian conflict. Reactions and feedback

2.1 First West's reactions and previous feedback.
The Russian military intervention in Georgia¹⁴ in August 2008 – a conflict surprising the West¹⁵ -, worried the United States, the European Union and also NATO.

Of course, the first Occident's reactions weren't expected too much. Those events and West's reactions lead to the worsening and deterioration of the relations between United States, European

Union and NATO, at one hand, and the Russian Federation, on the other hand. In that time, the American Vice-president Dick Cheney visited the Caucasus region sending messages to warn Russia for its actions.

The Russian Federation had the same kind of reactions using its role of „energetic super-power” continuing to provoke new fears and tensions peculiarly into the relations with the European Union which after the summit from 1st of September 2008¹⁶ decided to suspend the negotiation with the Russian Federation regarding a new Agreement for Partnership and Cooperation¹⁷.

2008 was “difficult” as regards Russia – EU relations. This situation couldn't remain in this phase but, moreover, we can say the events from August intensified the negotiations. Is the time for some “key decision” adoption for the future of Russia – EU collaboration's strategic development in the political, economic-financial and energetic security sphere¹⁸.

The Nice Summit from 14th of November 2008, finally, proved that the strategic partnership between Russia and EU has a strong potential to resolute problems of global interest.

We also remind that:

- The Alliance suspended the NATO-Russia Council activity after the Russian intervention in Georgia but, consequently, decided a gradient retaken of relations underlining is important for the global security to exist a dialogue with this main actor. Still, NATO and Russia don't succeed to fully regain the dialogue interrupted when the Russian-Georgian conflict occurred in August 2008 preferring to reaffirm their rights then to make mutual concessions to deal the issue¹⁹.

- The relations with the United States were stopped last year also because of the Bush administration plans to develop an antimissile shield in the centre of Europe²⁰ and Georgia. Russia disagree Washington to encourage Georgia and Ukraine in the relations with NATO. Today, these situations are on president's Obama and on president's Medvedev agendas.

- To the Munich conference, where the United States and Russia traces the strategic relations future where still seen “disagreements regarding Georgia”²¹. Still, the Russian president Dmitri Medvedev considered Russia and the United States must rebuilt relations and co-work to find solutions for the global problems.



- Even the European Union strived to offer a unitary position; Europe proved that in the foreign policy main problems, older or newer, still can't be a common position and a unique and firm voice²².

- The Russian Federation actual policy is clear shaped by Kremlin's leader, Dmitri Medvedev on „five positions”²³, as:

1. The supremacy of the basis principals of the international law stressing over the relations among the civilized peoples;

2. The world's multipolarity, in conditions where the unipolarity and domination are unthinkable²⁴;

3. The desire to avoid the confrontation and isolation;

4. Russian citizens life and dignity protection “no matter where they are”, and also the Russian businessmen community protection abroad;

5. The recognition of Russia's right to have “privileged interests”.

Moreover, the new Russian foreign policy conception, approved at 12th of July 2008 by the Russian president Dimitri Medvedev, contains few remarkable elements concerning the European and ex-soviet space security. And, as much as it seems, Russia really wants to demonstrate to the Occident, United States of America and European Union, how efficient are its instruments in the “European vicinity”, in Caucasus and Central Asia.

The European Union relations with the Russian Federation were intensified owed to the many problems generated by Bush administration's intention to build a part of the American anti-missile shield in the Czech Republic and Poland.

2.2 Will Russia do anything possible to prevent new tensions in Caucasus? The new administration from Washington DC wants tides with Moscow at another level. The American State Secretary Hillary Clinton denied the existence of tensions with Russia owed to Georgia and also stated the discussion related to the ammunition diminution won't be damaged. In the Russian chief of diplomacy opinion, the mission of supplementary diminution of strategic offensive weapons is “too important for Russia, USA and the entire world to make it hostage of a certain regime”²⁵. And, still, despite these official declarations, the efforts to restart the American-Russian relations, very worse into the Bush mandate, are hurt, presently, by BATO decision to exercise in Georgia – country wishing

to adhere to the Alliance. Even if, previously, into a press conference with his Russian homologue Serghei Lavrov, Hillary Clinton declared “peoples from the same family are in contradiction sometime”, but they don't want to have a fight on the theme of Georgia or on the stronger Moscow opposition against NATO's military exercises from May, in Georgia²⁶.

Perceived by Moscow as “a signal showing a wrong direction”, the actual NATO military exercises in Georgia can represent “a step backward” in American-Russian relations, Russia threatening also with the freezing of relations with NATO²⁷. Even Obama administration asked for a “restarting” of the relations with Russia. Moreover, when Vladimir Putin ex-president and actual president of Russian Federation affirm these exercises regard Saaskaşvili²⁸ sustenance which from the 9th of April are confronting with the opposition's demonstratives asking his demission²⁹.

2.3 Russia can't be ignored. Its interests must be considered. We speak about a new Russia³⁰, a stronger Russia³¹ looking for the recognition of the past day prestige³². This is also the opinion of the field's analysts: “Any major progress, very significant for a final regulation of this hard conflicts and crises will suppose the Russian Federation positive engagement which legitimate interests – economic, political and security can't be omitted from any Occident's regional political project”³³, also, as regards the strengthen cooperation and the good vicinity relations between EU and Russia for the entire Europe and its neighbours stability, security and prosperity. Nevertheless, Russia threats it is able to “revise” also its relations with the Union if “its energetic interests aren't taken into account”³⁴ – Russia being, presently, the biggest provider³⁵ of natural gases and energy for the European Union.

2.4 Russia doesn't represent a military threat either for EU or for NATO. In regard with Moscow's statements, the Foreign Minister Serghei Lavrov and his American homologue Hillary Clinton “agreed to co-work tighter in strategic” in economic issues and on current international ones, as Afghanistan situation³⁶.

Not even the French president Nicolas Sarkozy believes that the nowadays Russia is a military



threat for EU and NATO. As Reuters and NewsIn show, the French president declared at Munich, to the Security Conference³⁷, 6-8 of February 2009: “I don’t think that nowadays’ Russia represents a military threat for NATO or European Union” and, moreover, to “rebuild the trust” into the partnership with Russia³⁸.

3. Other effects over the Wider Black Sea Area’s security

3.1 The maintenance, further, some disagreements between Russia and the North-Atlantic Organization. Although prepared to help NATO to touch its objectives in Afghanistan to infringe the terrorism to extend in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan, Russia – as Dimitri Rogozin, the Russian ambassador to NATO, considers the Ukraine and Georgia adherence to the Alliance “an hostile action” which will mean “the cooperation suspension” with NATO and, also, compared the Ukraine and Georgia integration with “a red line” shouldn’t be crossed.

After eight months of silence, NATO and Russia restarted the dialogue but still exist disagreements regarding those actions³⁹. The cancelation, by the Russian party of the NATO-Russia ministerial Council forecasted to the end of May this year is only the last episode. Or, the event would state the restarted relation among the Alliance and Russia after times of strong tensions provoked by the Russian-Georgian conflict from August 2008.

3.2 The failure of the fifth round or Russian-Georgian discussion from Geneva in May this year. A reunion where Abkhazia wasn’t represented⁴⁰ - the Abkhazian absence from this reunion was the main reason for the Russian delegation leaving the negotiations table from Geneva, with Georgia because Russia sustains in Abkhazians absence the discussions would lack their sense. Are there any relations with NATO military exercises from May in Georgia? If the negotiations would be continued, the reunion in Geneva from May would have been the fifth reunion under the European Union and OSCE aegis regarding the Caucasus security after the armed conflict occurred in August last year.

The previous rounds⁴¹ can be characterized as an important step to assure security in Caucasus, even there were tough discussions and the

divergences are especially consistent⁴² because, for the first time, to the workshop papers attended representatives of all the interested parties– Russia, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Georgia and USA, and also representatives of UN, European Union and OSCE.

3.3. EU– Russia Summit, from May, in Habarovsk, in the Far East, few kilometres to the border with China, ended without a conclusion over major themes. Into the relations between the European Union and Russia remain differences owed to the Europe’s security interests overlapping its near vicinity therefore: “the dialogue and cooperation should continue moreover with the grown EU’s interest to enlarge stability and security in its proximity by the promotion of a circle of stable, well-governed states in the Eastern part of the Union (Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus) and in South Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan)”⁴³ because the European Union security and stability are still damaged by the events taking place into the Eastern Europe and South Caucasus⁴⁴. Or, the European Union policy about these states should be more “firm, proactive and unambiguous”, as also stated the European Commissioner for Foreign Relations and Vicinity Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner⁴⁵.

In Habarovsk, the Russian officials condemned the EU tentative to strengthen relations with the former Soviet republics through the Eastern Partnership⁴⁶. Consequently, requested to the European Union to determine Romania to cease exercising pressures over the Moldova Republic⁴⁷. Energy remains the thorny problem between the two parties – Russia unwilling to apply the Charter with the same name but an updated version of it or a connected agreement.

Briefly, this would be, the EU – Russia summit conclusion held in May 2009, at Habarovsk, in the Far East. This summit emphasized many divergences than convergences but, still, the European Union considers Russia “is strategic partner” so that this “to become a reality and not a simple declaration” must be done something⁴⁸.

4. Instead of a conclusion

The Black Sea Enlarged Area still remains a region with „unsolved” frozen conflicts, with many problems and disagreement owed to the last



year conflict between Russia and Georgia⁴⁹ and the American project to install elements for the anti-missile shield in the Central Europe and not only.

Russia should remain in future an important partner to accomplish a strategic cooperation with because nevertheless European Union and another occidental actors share economic and commercial interests but the objective of strong cooperation on the international scene and also the common vicinity. In the context, the strengthened cooperation and good vicinity relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation and also the USA – Russia and NATO – Russia relations will have a crucial importance for the entire Europe and its neighbour states stability, security and prosperity.

By the more “diluted” position to request the conflicts’ regulation and even if the interests of the main actors related to the Black Sea – South Caucasus region grew, we think, is avoided to damage the relations with the Russian Federation⁵⁰ - an actor with a „increasing role in world’s security preservation” as is underlined in the final declaration of Strasbourg and Kehl NATO Summit in-between the 3rd-4th of April 2009.

According to the Romanian vision, the diverse problems the Black Sea region is confronting with can’t be approached without the constructive involvement of Russia⁵¹ and Turkey. Consequently, MFA will follow to gain partners from the both states in political initiatives and practices of cooperation in the Black Sea region.

** The paper has been presented during the international seminar on “Strategies for cooperation within the Black Sea Area” organised by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University “Carol I” on May, 27th, 2009.*

NOTES:

¹ The Wider Black Sea Area comprises the riparian states and the Republic of Moldova and states from the South Caucasus, Armenia and Azerbaijan area.

² In regard with some studies, there are estimations in the Caspian Sea will be extracted 25% from the entire quantity of oil exploited from the countries non-member of OPEC.

³ See, C.G.BALABAN, *Politica Europeană de Vecinătate*, Lecture notes, Editura Universitară, București, 2009, pp. 86-88.

⁴ Mustafa AYDIN, *Europe’s next Shore :the Black Sea Region after EU Enlargement*, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2004.

⁵ The main international problem for Azerbaijan was the conflict with Armenia from Nagorno-Karabakh area. Despite an unofficial meeting among the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan from June 2007, the progresses in the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were, still, limited. For details, see *Uniunea Europeană și Caucazul de Sud*, Report of political analysis, „Ovidiu Șincai” Institute, Bucharest, July 2008, available at www.fisd.ro

⁶ The American Under Secretary of State Matthew BRYZA declared the United States won’t allow Russia’s domination into the energetic projects from South Caucasus and neighbour territory. The American official declared, into an interview for the radio post Eho Moskvâ, at 11th of May 2009: “We don’t wish for this company (Gazprom) that already built the Northern corridor to also control the Southern corridor otherwise won’t be any concurrence and the market won’t function normally”. See, BURSA, *Ziarul oamenilor de afaceri*, Internațional, edition from 11.05.2009.

⁷ NATO enlargement to include Georgia and Ukraine would become, next year, the dangerous negative factor for the Russia and Occident relations argued into an article published in *Financial Times*, August 2008, Maurizio Massari, the chief of Department of policy planning in the Italian Foreign Ministry. See, <http://www.financiarul.ro/2008/08/08/rusia-poate-juca-un-rol-vital-in-securitatea-occidentului/>

⁸ The successive enlargements contributed to a wider Union’s geographical proximity with its Eastern neighbours while the reforms supported by ENP permitted these countries political and economic closeness to EU. The European Union encourages the reforms into the political, economic and social fields, the bilateral disputes resolution through negotiations and with the respect of the international law (especially the United Nation Charter), the trans-frontier cooperation (inclusive by the creation of Euro-regions) and the implementation of the European standards in the democratic institutions, law state and human rights (emphasizing over the minorities rights).



⁹ In regard with the EU Security Strategy, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, Union's security begins beyond its borders.

¹⁰ Georgia – a country where the internal conflicts have not ended yet and the situation is far from being solved out. A country with European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

¹¹http://www.ziare.com/Caucazul_de_Sud_de_la_intersectia_civilizatiilor_la_intersectia_rutelor_-736285.html

¹² The radio station Eho Moskvâ, quoted by BURSA, Ziarul oamenilor de afaceri, Internațional, edition from 11.05.2009.

¹³ The Nabucco and South Stream projects, designed to increase Europe's energetic security, encounter difficulties in application because of the geopolitical tensions, around their construction, but also because of the financial difficulties due to the crisis.

¹⁴ At 7th of August 2008, Georgia started a military offensive on the territory of the separatist region South Ossetia to "neutralize the separatist positions". The Georgians actions induced Russia's riposte of force. See <http://www.revista22.ro/mizele-conflictului-din-caucazul-de-sud-4749.html>

¹⁵ The former Soviet leader Michail Gorbaciov stated in an article published in *Washington Post* that the United States committed "a big error" leaving Georgia to believe it can deploy a military action in South Ossetia without any risk (AFP, <http://www.infomondo.ro/extern/2929-conflict-militar-in-caucazul-de-sud-vi.html>)

¹⁶ As regards the Russian Federation position, before the Summit from 1st, September, 2008, the spokesman of the Russian diplomacy expressed Moscow hope "reason will dominate emotion", also warning: "The confrontation mean isn't advantageous for neither party" and also Russian ambassador for EU asked to the 27 member-countries not to unleash the emotion consequently appreciating those won't enforce sanctions Russia because this measure will damage their economies more than the Russian one.

¹⁷ The basis of the relations between EU and Russia is represented by the Agreements of Partnership and cooperation signed at 1st of December 1997 for an initial period of ten years that expired by the end of 2007 and was based upon common principles and objectives promoting international peace and security and being support

for the democratic norms and for political and economic liberties. This agreement's prescriptions covered a wide spectre of policies: political dialogue, commerce with goods and services, business and investments, financial and legislative cooperation, science and technology, education and research, nuclear, energetic and spatial cooperation, the environment, transports, culture, cooperation for combating illegal activities.

¹⁸ See the Russian delegation position to the meeting of the Committee for Russia – EU Parliamentary Collaboration, Brussels, in February 2009, available at <http://www.ruvr.ru/main.php?lng=rom&q=2803&cid=355&p=17.02.2009>

¹⁹ www.newsin.ro

²⁰ Last year, on the 5th of November, the Russian president Dmitri Medvedev stated that Russia will deploy missiles in the Kaliningrad region, the Russian enclave surrounded by EU states, to "neutralize" the elements of the American shield following to be installed in Europe.

²¹ NATO spokesman James Appathurai stated that they were in disagreement in concern with Georgia and the Russian ambassador, Dimitri Rogozin, stated their views are, for now, in contradiction. For details, see: http://www.realitatea.net/sua-si-rusia-isi-traseaza-la-munchen-viitorul-relatiilor-strategice_452942.html

²² For example, between Poland and Germany, between Italia and the Baltic countries existed many differences in visions and nor just this. See, Alexandru MACOVEICIUC, George RĂDULESCU, Marius VULPE, *Putea Europa fi mai dură față de Rusia?*, the 3rd of September 2008, <http://www.adevarul.ro/articole/putea-europa-fi-mai-dura-fata-de-rusia.html>

²³ The actual policy of the Russian Federation continues Vladimir Putin's, its predecessor and actual Prime Minister. See C.G.BALABAN, *Războiul din Caucaz – finele războiului rece sau un nou război rece?*, in IMPACT STRATEGIC, no. 4/ 2008, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, București, 2008.

²⁴ One first signal was from the former president Vladimir Putin, to the international conference of security organised in Munich, from 2007, by the harsh criticisms against Washington and a unipolar world, with "a single centre of authority, a centre of force, a decisional centre, otherwise, a single master, a single sovereign".

²⁵ <http://www.antena3.ro/stiri/externe/sua-si>



rusia-promit-ca-georgia-nu-le-strica-relatiile_7...

²⁶ The military manoeuvres Russia refer to are forecasted for the 6th of May – 1st of July 2009 and involve 1.300 soldiers. There are 19 participating countries, among them Moldova, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and United Arab Emirates.

²⁷ The Moscow officials threatened that Russia won't restart contacts with NATO if the Alliance doesn't cancel the military exercises from Georgia. After Georgian war in September 2008, NATO suspended, unilaterally the cooperation with Russia. Only in March NATO announced a restart of the cooperation with the Russian Federation. See, *Financiarul*, 22nd of April 2009, available at http://www.financiarul.com/articol_25269/rusia-ameninta-cu-inghetarea-relatiilor-cu-nato-.html

²⁸ It was not an accident that the NATO General Secretary criticized the Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili, that presented the Alliance's military exercises from Georgia as "manoeuvres exclusively made by the Alliance", AFP, *www.newsin.ro*.

²⁹ <http://www.antena3.ro/stiri/externe/putin-relansarea-relatiilor-sua-rusia-este-lezata-de-nat...>

³⁰ Since 7th of May 2008, the chief of the State is Dmitri Medvedev, and Vladimir Putin is the chief of the Government, the latter having two mandates as the president of the Russian Federation.

³¹ Since 1998, Russia has improved its international financial position succeeding by the use of the Stabilization Fund resources, to pay the debts from the soviet period to the Paris Club and IMF. The oil exports allowed Russia a growth of its currency, since 1999-2008, from 12 to 512 milliards 3rd world's place). In regard with the statistical data, at the end of 2007, the economic growth of the Russian Federation was about 7% and a growth in the GDP about 7,6% - GDP value being 2.076 milliards USD, meaning 14.600 USD per inhabitant (world's 55th place). – See also <http://moscova.mae.ro/index.php?lang=ro&id=13699>

³² See dr. C.G.BALABAN, *Războiul din Caucaz – finele războiului rece sau un nou război rece?*, in *IMPACT STRATEGIC*, nr. 4/ 2008, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, București, 2008.

³³ See dr. C.G. BALABAN, *Conflicte înghețate și crize la limita de est a Uniunii Europene*, *Impact Strategic* nr. 1/2007, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, București, 2007; C.G.BALABAN, *Politica Europeană de*

Vecinătate, Lecture notes, Editura Universitară, București, 2009, pp. 53-61.

³⁴ The Russian prime minister, Vladimir Putin's speech, on the 20th of March 2009, <http://www.ziare.com/articole/relatii+UE+Rusia>.

³⁵ The crisis with Ukraine about gas from 2006 and 2009 and the oil crisis with Belarus, from 2007, worried EU, Brussels being ready to examine with Moscow the Old Europe's energetic security issue for a new energetic agreement.

³⁶ <http://www.europalibera.org/news/ro/archives/2009/02/03.ASP>

³⁷ The conference is an annual traditional event, gathering chief of states, foreign and defence ministers as well as representatives from the academic field. In this year, the Munich Conference for security seems to be the most important annual forum for international decisions in the area of foreign and security policy, fact stated also by the participation of the French president Nicolas Sarkozy, the German chancellor Angela Merkel and the most important American delegation led by the Vice-president Joseph Biden, whose intervention was considered "the first great White House's speech on foreign policy".

³⁸ This last part of the French president declaration comes on 8th of February 2009, the second day of the security Conference in Munich after an exchange of hard speeches between the president of the European Commission and the Russian prime minister and after a NATO – Russia reunion ended with the single result of recording the disagreements among the parties, http://www.ziare.com/Sarkozy__Rusia_nu_reprezinta_o_amenintare_militara_pentru_UE_si_NATO-663112.html

³⁹ The coldness between Moscow and the North-Atlantic Alliance persists especially that Russia intends to place a permanent military basis in Abkhazia, Georgian separatist region recognized by Russia as independent state after the last year's August war.

⁴⁰ The Geneva discussions are in conformity with the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan elaborated last August, right after the end of the operation in Georgia, after the aggression against South Ossetia. The discussions take place under UN, EU and OSCE aegis, there shall participate representatives from Russia, Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The first round took place last October was "torpedoed" by the Tbilisi officials unsatisfied by the presence



of South Ossetia and Abkhazia representatives, republics self-proclaiming their independence. See <http://www.ruvr.ru/main.php?lng=rom&q=2153&cid=405&p=19.11.2008&pn=1>

⁴¹ See <http://www.ruvr.ru/main.php?lng=rom&q=2158&cid=405&p=20.11.2008&pn=1>

⁴² Grigori Karasin, deputy of the Russian Foreign Minister, leader of the Russian delegation to the Geneva negotiations, stated that the approaches to regulate the Caucasus area presume the adoption of some compulsory juridical documents by Georgia regarding the renouncement to the use of force and the introduction of international interdiction over the sale of offensive and hard ammunitions to Tbilisi. Or, the Russian official sustains that Tbilisi authorities aren't ready to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia independency. Therefore, they wish for these republics territories to be placed international police and peace-keeping forces. See <http://www.ruvr.ru/main.php?lng=rom&q=2158&cid=405&p=20.11.2008&pn=1>

⁴³ See also the European Security Strategy, „A Secure Europe in a Better World”, December 2003.

⁴⁴ The new European Initiative “The Eastern Partnership” was advanced in the negotiations between the European states after the South Caucasus events, from 7th -12th August 2008, being proposed to EU's Eastern neighbours, in order to stimulate their European aspirations but also to compensate the lack of real offers regarding the graphic of the future EU enlargements but also from other security reasons with geopolitical meaning.

⁴⁵ http://www.euractiv.ro/uniunea-europeana/articles%7CdisplayArticle/articleID_15688/Parteneriatul-estic-un-nou-capitol-in-relatiile-UE-cu-partenerii-sai-rasariteni.html

⁴⁶ There are “many suspicions” concerning the real motivation of this partnership. The Russian president Dmitri Medvedev warned that the EU's Eastern Partnership launched in Prague at 7th of May 2009 could become an anti-Russian alliance. “Any partnership is better than a conflict, but we are discomforted because some countries try to use this structure as a partnership against Russia”. See Cotidianul.ro International, the 10th of June 2009.

⁴⁷ A subject the Russian Foreign Vice-Minister Aleksandr Rujko referred to, drawing the attention that EU stringed over the necessity to work more intense with Romania, so that “the Romanian party gives up to its mixture into the intern affairs of Republic of Moldova, to cease from exercising political pressures over it and to recognize definitively the Moldova independence” (TVR, Foreign News, the 22nd May 2009).

⁴⁸ The Czech president Vaclav Klaus, the EU actual president (1st of January – 30th of June 2009).

⁴⁹ The war with Georgia from the 2008 summer proved once again that Russia can't be given away so easily, even if the former republics declared their independence and continued the energetic exchange on their own.

⁵⁰ Vladimir Socor, Senior Fellow to the Jamestown Foundation.

⁵¹ The Georgia conflict, from August 2008, proves the risks created by regions instability but

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CONSEQUENCES OF NATO AND EU EXPANSION ON THE WIDER BLACK SEA AREA'S SECURITY*

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NATO and EU expansion to the East is both a consolidation of the Euro-Atlantic dimension of the European and Eurasian security and a way to reconfigure some geostrategic confluence and partnership areas. One of them is the Wider Black Sea Area, which becomes more and more both one of the main beneficiary and responsible for the Eurasian effects of the European and Euro-Atlantic expansion.

Keywords: WBSA, energy, geopolitics, NATO, EU, expansion, security.

Argument

People, communities and the geographical regions they live in permanently create structures, actions and functions which draw them near the ideal state – that of a perfect identity of the ontology, gnoseology and the logic of their own existence. Everything belonging to the organization of the people's life bears the mark of a major political and strategic objective, urgent and omnipresent: *conflict management*. More precisely, it's about creating abilities and capabilities allowing for the achievement of such an objective or generating the conditions for its potential achievement. For now, the vital core of such developments doesn't represent just ideas but also the ensemble of ideas, types of reasoning and concepts regarding the geographic regions. In a certain way, man is dominated by environment. Throughout their existence, they do nothing but organize the environment, both the endogenous one, belonging to their own earthly beings and also the exogenous environment which is more and more identified with the Universe.

Organizing the environment is always limitative and, at the same time, expansive. Man defines, thus limits his own environment or what he considers his own environment to represent, and, at the same time, consolidates and expands this environment.

Man lives in a dynamics of borders. His entire life represents in a way a continuous battle to delimit, limit, consolidate and expand the existent borders and, at the same time, conquer new frontiers.

The determinations of such a limitative, delimitative and extensive philosophy exist in the geographical conditions of the human existence, in the collective memory and people's ability to create and manage connections.

The Black Sea countries are not maritime countries. They have not participated at the fight for power between maritime and continental powers. Although some of them have been here since the beginning of time and others have been formed through the populations' more or less chaotic movement, none of them has yet had the historic time necessary to consolidate its own borders. Almost all the borders in the area are conflictual. The explosion in Western Balkans, the situation in the Caucasus, the relations between Turkey and some of its Black Sea neighbours, the problems between Russia and Ukraine regarding Crimea and the Black Sea fleet, the conflictual situation in the Trans-Dniester area, the Euro-Asia battle with European and global implications for the routes of the oil and gas pipes and many others are expressions of a reality which involves the geographic space in the most dynamic way. More precisely, these are realities of the battle for space. In this huge battle are involved countries and at the same time, their forms of connection and collaboration, partnership and power.

The European and Asian countries in the area, the great powers with interests in the area and all the great powers of the world have their interests here – and also NATO, EU, OSCE, regional organizations and structures, bilateral agreements and structures.

For a while, nobody was interested in such an area. For many years, we have thought that the great geopolitical battles of the world aren't fought



for the Black Sea or for the Wider Black Sea Area (WBSA) – a concept not accepted or needed by everybody – but for the Pacific and Indian Ocean, for the Middle East, Arctic Ocean (with its huge hydrocarbon resources). Despite all the discoveries, planet Earth is still a big mystery for people and the future may still hold many surprises.

And yet, the Black Sea area starts to be more and more known with all its profoundness and very complex implications. The Black Sea, although in the centre of Eurasia and very present in legends, is less known than the Himalaya for instance.

A lot of people, governments, states – particularly European states – and also NATO, EU, United States, China, countries in the Middle East, large corporations, financial organizations, international organizations and structures of all types (economic, political, social, humanitarian, ecological, scientific, cultural etc) begin to be interested at least in knowing this region. Since always, humankind has been concerned with knowing regions they considered important and will probably continue to do so as long as there are people on this planet. There will always be something to know, to use, change, transform, humanize.

However, the Black Sea area, as a natural environment referring strictly to this aquatic “peninsula” in the middle of the European continent, this perhaps due to the overflowing of the remains of the Tethys Sea by the Mediterranean Sea, over seven thousand years ago, and also in its simple civilisation form on the first circle which includes the six Black Sea states (Turkey, Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria) and also in its expanded area which should include also the second circle (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Republic of Moldova, Hungary, Serbia, Macedonia, Greece) and all the Danube countries including Slovenia, Austria and Germany, has many problems to be solved.

NATO and EU expansion and the inclusion of an important part of the Black Sea in the European and Euro-Atlantic realm creates a very special situation which could transform this region into an intrinsic security area (for the countries on the first and second circle and for the Danube countries) and Eurasian (for the confluence area between the two continents).

There are many questions about this region. Two of them seem very important to us:

➤ *Why is it necessary to delimitate, analyze and know such an area and why is it important for the security of the region, European continent and Eurasian space?*

➤ *Is WBSA a potential security generating centre with Eurasian effects?*

1. The Eurasian geopolitical and geostrategic reconfigurations

The battles for the geographical spaces have never stopped and never will. Some of them will get out of the vital spaces theories and join those of vital interests, others will deny the terms of conquest and domination and will focus on other sort of vitalities, such as those of control, network, globalization or managing crises and conflicts in order to prevent devastating wars. Beyond all this and through all this, a new realism emerges which imposes getting away from the Munich pragmatism which caused the failure of the second world war and also from the Vietnamese and, more recently, the Afghan and Iraqi ones, which generates today’s and maybe tomorrow’s pillars of insecurity and instability. This effect-based reality generates a new conflictual situation. It imposes the turning, more or less discrete or strident to the old geopolitical realism and based on this, formulating a new tempestuous and categorical demand: the reconfiguration with the help of values which cannot be denied or neglected, of a new geopolitical realism which we call emergency epistemological geopolitical realism. This new type of realism rewrites the classics in the new formulas of space, time and vital interest. Not by ignoring or deforming them but by updating them.

Realism means today admitting and accepting the existence of other forces beyond what you can control, with their own identity, of evolutions and realities with their own determinations. Perhaps, some of them were much accelerated, or becoming less important in the name of a new revolution, but reality has never been identical to desire or will. That is why, the current geopolitical realism we refer to is a conflictual one, with significant disproportionate and asymmetrical evolutions. For this reason, we consider that the current geopolitical realism is an epistemological geopolitical realism made up of fractals, difficult to gather in a unique and comprehensive dimension with clear directions and around several proven concepts.



Such realism embodies contradictory realities, numerous manipulations and false images, bizarre architectures with unpredictable evolutions, occurring in a too fast globalization characterized by the deep discrepancies and strategic faults and the excessive fragmentation of a space which tends to reach a critical infrastructural supersaturating, to maximum vulnerability and extreme risk.

1.1. The evolution from yesterday's geopolitical theories to today's geopolitical realities

In a very consistent essay on the revenge of geography¹, Robert D. Kaplan² states that people and ideas influence events to a great extent but in fact, geography is what determines them. It's very important that people concentrate on what divides the humanity than on what it unites. Ideas unite it, fragment it, build, destroy and regenerate it in the universe of knowledge; geography individualizes it, territorializes it, divides, opposes and reunites it in its space. Thus, it seems that all the important battles were battles for space and spaces. All the battles will be battles for spaces and territories, even if the borders between countries will disappear and the great geopolitical, geoeconomic, geo-energy and geostrategic areas will be reconfigured. Thomas Hobbes emphasized that fear and anarchy are the world's main threats. The threats are also generated by the imposed order, forced reconfigurations which always generate fear, insecurity and conflict, by the fact that people are reluctant to the imposed new things and very sensitive about collective memory.

That is why, people turn back to geography, to the realism once created by the great geopolitical schools, realism rewritten in today's words with the success and dramas of frozen or ongoing conflicts, with the consequences and effects of NATO and EU expansion, of the consolidation of regional organizations and the success or failure of the effort to place under people's control through force or geopolitical reconfigurations their own state of conflict.

In 1897, Friederich Ratzel, the father of geopolitics, in *Politische Geographie*, states that space is the natural limits between which the peoples' expansion takes place, the realm they tend to occupy. Thus, he uses only two notions: anthropo-geographical concordances and discrepancies. Concordance means internal colonization, redistribution of population within

the state's space. External colonization means emigrating from the suprapopulated territory to the unpopulated or sub populated territory. In Ratzel's opinion, large populations represent culture. In order to be powerful, one must have culture. In order to have culture, there must be large populations able to generate it. When they are too large, they emigrate. Emigrating, they take the culture of the initial space to the new countries.

Two Hungarian authors – Andrei Korponay and Paul Vida – observe, too, the importance of population supremacy. They state that Hungary lost its supremacy and political status because of the decrease of its status and of the Hungarian people importance. Andrei Karponay states that 20 million Hungarians are necessary to achieve the supremacy on the territories they have lost. At present, Romania, too, has a serious problem about its population. The country's population is estimated to decrease by 6 or 7 million people over the next 50 years, reaching just 14-15 millions inhabitants. The dramatic decrease of the population leads to the gradual loss of cultural identity and ultimately to disappearance. Simion Mehedinți formulates even a demographic saying according to which the power of nations increases or decreases with their population.

Friederich Ratzel uses the word geospaces, referring to the expansion of a country's civilizing power to a whole continent (he refers to the American geospace). The objective of Pangermania was to gather the German population within the same borders. In 1841, Friederich Liszt talked about Germany's mission to reach the Black Sea. There always was a German obsession in those times to achieve an empire from the North Sea to the Adriatic Sea and Liszt considered even an axis Hamburg-Baghdad, creating thus a Eurasian German space. He stated that the laws of space expansion refer to the fact that a state grows with its culture and its economic development. Germany succeeded that only after two disastrous world wars which it didn't generate by itself but was left to hold the sack and was considered the main responsible for them.

The idea of an oceanic cycle belongs to Ratzel too. The value of the seas and oceans depends on the importance of the countries bordering them. During the Roman Empire, the Mediterranean Sea was the centre of the world, the Atlantic Ocean was the first during the British Empire and now during



the American, Japan and China ascension the centre of global geopolitical construction moves to the Pacific Ocean. If we were to believe Ratzel, the future confrontation between the maritime and continental states should take place in the Pacific. Nobody denies that today, quite the contrary, the geopoliticians and even the politicians observe and even support it.

Hence a series of questions, among which the following are the most important: *What happens with the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Caspian Sea and other closed or semi-closed seas in this situation of re-centring the world geopolitics around the Pacific? Could they have any geopolitical importance anymore?*

Ratzel has the answer to that, at least as a first support. He claims that, in fact, the place gives value to the space. A very large country with sea opening will have a good position.

That is the reason why, among the four European strategic corridors, three are water (the Baltic strategic corridor, the Danube strategic corridor and the Black Sea, Gorges, the Mediterranean Sea strategic corridor). However, most European or Eurasian wars were fought on the land strategic corridor, on the axis Eastern Galicia, Berlin, Paris, Normandy. This confirms Gérard Chaliand's³ statement according to which the main battles weren't fought between the continental and the maritime countries, but between the warring migratory populations and the sedentary ones, the confrontation being won by the sedentary populations. This thing happened at the level of each continent and also at global level with the European expansion in the American, African, Australian and South Asian space. However all the powerful empires and countries always wanted to have not only a vast territory but also open seas and, directly or indirectly, to the planetary Ocean because, as admiral Alfred Mahan stated, sea is power.

Karl Haushofer, emblematic personality of German geopolitics, was concerned with forming a continental block encompassing Europe, northern and eastern Asia based not on political affinities but on geographical and geopolitical determinations.

He considered that the UK and United States, following Halford J. Mackinder's heartland geopolitics and particularly Nicolas Spykman's *rimland* geopolitics, according to which dominating and strangling the continental pillar (heartland)

is achieved by conquering the land, rimland, by building and consolidating force-nucleus on the shores and also embanking or suffocating the continent. Haushofer calls this policy *anaconda*.

Mackinder states that who will dominate the Eurasian heartland will dominate the world. Starting from this, Haushofer stated that none of the two powerful countries must confront the other one. He uses the word *troika* of Goto, a Japanese political leader, according to which, Germany and Japan must hold in the third skittish horse, Russia, in order for the three countries to have access to the Baltic Sea, Adriatic Sea and Japan Sea, achieving thus an expansion from north to south. In Haushofer's opinion, the fourth expansion area was that of the United States to South America.

But Hitler attacked Russia and the chances of a Eurasia formed of Germany, Russia and Japan were destroyed. However, there emerged important coalitions against Germany of the oceanic powers who felt threatened. Hitler also ignored Bismark's warning according to which Germany mustn't display its wish to become a great power, because the other great powers would immediately band together against it. That's why Karl Haushofer said that "*geopolitics replaces political passion and tries to bank on natural connections*".

Haushofer developed a fundamental concept, vital space, which he defines as the space necessary for a people's existence and development. This theory was applied by Hitler, even if it wasn't Haushofer who invented it.

One of Haushofer's pan-ideas – for instance pan-Europe – tends to be achieved. He said that a free Europe can exist only within the Soviet, Mediterranean basin and the north seas borders. However the acceptance by the EU of the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Cyprus and Malta and also the acceptance of the candidature of Turkey, Ukraine and the Caucasian countries already confirm the achievement of the pan-European idea. He emphasized the idea of European Union will be viable only if its members' national rights are observed, and each state will speak the language of its people.

This is in fact what the EU is doing nowadays, despite adopting common currency, the liberalization of borders and other measures. The states aren't too happy about such measures and thus some decisions were adopted only by 51% of the votes.



The EU projects are within a geopolitical concept which, in fact, rewrites with current means, what the 20th century European geopoliticians created, generated and suggested. That is because today there are the means and conditions necessary for their ideas, updated or rewritten, to be applied. However, some of the effects of applying these ideas can be arguable. In the logic of defragmenting the fault areas, of essential Eurasian geopolitical ruptures, is also the Black Sea geopolitics. It doesn't oppose the great Eurasian ideas of the 20th century, passing through all phases, from applying to denial and rehabilitation, but it builds inside it and generates a geopolitical effect of synergy and synapse.

Admiral Alfred Mahan, the most important representative of the American geopolitical school, was a teacher at Naval War College. He offers solutions to the US to become a world power; that was at the beginning of the 20th century when the US weren't a great power. His theories were applied by President Roosevelt. Acquiring the Panama channel is due to his convictions according to which the isthmus between the two Americas must be controlled by the US and Hawaii becomes the strategic defence point against a potential invasion.

Mahan's theory – that of maritime power, as an essential power to dominate the world – is similar to the one of Nicolas Spykman, an American journalist of Dutch origin, about the importance of shores for an offshore state. Spykman considers that, in order to rule the world, one must dominate the Eurasian coast, Eurasia. Controlling the shores is decisive. Heartland is too vast to be dominated and dissolved directly. That is why, the shore is much more vulnerable and hospitable especially that two thirds of the world population live here, on the Eurasian rimland. Rimland is nothing else than the entrance gate to heartland or the best way to embank and strangle heartland.

Also, Saul Cohen's theory, that of global realms is in accordance with Spykman. He considers that there are only two global realms: the maritime and continental one. The maritime realm is open to commercial trade and the powers here never had any contradictions having no common territory to share. The continental realm is a conflictual realm. In fact, all the world battles are for it.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, a very good connoisseur of geopolitical theories, endeavoured to use

these theories in the advantage of the US. In his study, *A Geostrategy for Eurasia*, he presents this area emphasizing its geopolitical importance. In Brzezinski's opinion, the most powerful regional powers (China and India) are situated in Eurasia. From here come to America the most important economic challengers. Eurasia is the area with the world richest natural resources (75% of the world energy resources). Most of the world's population lives here (75%) and 60% of the global Gross Domestic Product are achieved here.

Brzezinski warns the US about Eurasia potential power which, in his opinion, surpasses that of the US. In his opinion, whoever dominates Eurasia, dominates almost automatically the Middle East and Africa. That is, the geoenergy areas. That is why, in his opinion, America mustn't elaborate two separate policies for Europe and Asia because, from the geopolitical point of view, these form a whole.

Brzezinski suspects a possible closeness between Russia and China on one hand and between Russia and Germany on the other. Reality confirms what Haushofer said at the beginning of the century regarding the powers of a potential "troika team". This seems to come true given the relations between Russia and Germany on the one hand and the strategic partnership between Russia and China on the other, the North-East Asia Forum made up of China, Japan, South Korea and Russia, on energy geopolitics, Russia's relations with Iran and generally, Russia's geopolitics.

Even if Russia and China won't be able to compete with America, Brzezinski considers that it's essential to establish cooperation relations with these countries. The US already have strategic partnerships with Russia, India and obviously, with the European Union.

These are some of the biggest geopolitical games. But what can be, in this context, the geopolitical significance of the wider Black Sea region?

The US strategic partnership with Romania, the US special relationship with Turkey, the American interest for the Caucasus area are in accordance with Brzezinski's logic and aim at the Black Sea geopolitics. The United States have realized the strategic importance of the Black Sea, not only from the military and geo-energy point of view but as a vital space, a Eurasian strategic synapse. But it can be very easily transformed into in a



maintenance area of a strategic fault. The situation in the Caucasus and Russia's position regarding the EU and NATO expansion in this area represent a geopolitical realism much too sensitive to sudden variations.

That is why, it's very important for Romania to go back to its traditional geopolitics, but not to contemplate it but to rewrite it in current terms within the limits of the moderated realism of today when our country is poor and, despite the most substantial guarantees of security and lasting economic development for Romania, as NATO and EU member, the economic and social insecurity is more and more present and worrying.

There is a Romanian personality very important for the argumentation of our approach to go back to the geopolitical classics: the Romanian geographer Ion Conea. He has two contributions extremely important for shaping the geopolitics study object. His opinion about geopolitics is linked to that of Kjellen's on neighbourhood and neighbourhood study. Thus, in Ion Conea's opinion, geopolitics will not study each state but the political game between them. In this context, "geopolitics will be the science of relations – or better – of tensions

between states"²⁴. Do we have enough power and the necessary ability to perceive and assess these tensions today?

In order to identify and assess these tensions, he uses the word *druckquotient*. This word belongs to Alexandru Supan and is used to assess the tension a state is subjected to. As Kjellen emphasized, any state must consider itself to be in a way besieged. The formula for *druckquotient* is very simple. *Druckquotient* is obtained by totalizing the neighbouring populations and by dividing this sum to the number of own state inhabitants.

$$D = \frac{P_{v1} + P_{v2} + \dots + P_n}{P_p} = \frac{\sum_1^n P_v}{P_p}$$

D_k is *druckquotient*, $P_{v1} \dots P_{vn}$, countries' population and P_p is own population. In that time, the *druckquotient* calculated by Supan was 11.7 for Holland, 14.7 for Belgium, 30.8 for Romania and 50.9 for Switzerland.

If we were to calculate this coefficient and

Countries		Total population	Demo-military potential (16-49 years old)		GDP value	Military expenses % from GDP
			Men	Women		
Neighbours	Bulgaria	7,204,687	1,351,312	1,381,017	49,43	2.6
	R. Moldova	4,320,748	877,665	987,356	6.197	0.4
	Serbia	7,379,339	1,415,007	1,379,541	52.18	1.75
	Ukraine	45,700,395	7,056,742	9,234,717	198	1,4
	Hungary	9,907,596	1,887,755	1,934,019	131,4	2
Romania	Romania	3,354	2,771	2,861	2,044	6,26

expand this method to other components (demo-military potential, GDP value, military expenses) we get the following results:

Now that each state in the area wants to integrate in the EU and NATO and cultivates good relations with the neighbours, it seems that such tension coefficients are obsolete.

However, the *druckquotient* reveals a reality, very modern and true as the states don't want the consolidation of their neighbours' demographic, economic, political and financial power; they only

want to keep them to a level which doesn't allow tensions. These tensions exist though and they even grow. They can be understood, more or less metaphorically, as a support or an argument for what Kjellen called a siege. It doesn't seem right to talk about besieging a state by its neighbours in this time when states joined the EU. It seems that these tensions don't exist, that they are senseless. And yet, they do exist and manifest themselves through economic, financial and even demographic means.



The questions we can ask are not rhetoric but they are about remarkable geopolitical reconfigurations, new geopolitical concepts on the European and Eurasian space. If we go on consider extension as an expansion, in terms of power and influence, we will understand that, in fact, nothing has changed. And, *if such tensions exist, how can they be identified, assessed and diminished, what is and what can be NATO and EU role in reducing and managing these tensions? Are these organizations able to do that? Can they overlook the states' cultural, historic, economic and social characteristics and transform these tensions into partnership and collaboration relations? More precisely, can NATO and EU together with the regional organizations and the respective states create mechanisms to control and manage such tensions?*

From the new geopolitical realism point of view, the tensions Kjellen was talking about continue. Some of them take the form of energy interest, others are competitions for resources, markets, power and influence or simply advantages including the advantage to say NO, through referendum, to European documents of vital importance to the community architecture.

That is why we shouldn't neglect the level of tensions at the states' borders regardless of their geographic place and role in the region or within the EU or NATO. These tensions don't represent a result of aggressive or conflictual policies, but *a geopolitical effect of the complex dynamics of the neighbourhood relations*. The sources generating this effect are very numerous.

A lot of today's conflicts and tensions derive from these very tensions. The tensions derive from the respective states' domestic dynamics, political game and also from the foreign confrontation of interests.

That is why we consider that NATO, EU and other international organizations can diminish or manage these tensions only by their contribution to improve the domestic environment of each state in the area, if not by directives but by knowing this phenomenon and ensure the domestic conditions necessary to create and apply a domestic tension regulator, a "manometer" called *tension generator domestic control mechanism*. But this also means tensions.

Generally, a state, no matter which or how it may be, is not interested in managing or reducing

its tension on other states but diminishing their tensions on itself. There are three main ways to reduce these tensions and also create the conditions to intensify own tensions on neighbours or other states:

- increase the power of the respective state by integrating own political, economic, social, informational and military space;
- diminish the neighbours' power or shaping it so that it doesn't become dangerous;
- create international or regional power control mechanisms by improving the relations between neighbouring countries (for instance the European neighbourhood policy).

In Conea's opinion, geopolitics is a science of the planetary political state which "*must explain and present the political map*"⁵.

Peter the Great stated that he didn't want land but water and Friederich Liszt stated that Germany's expansion direction was the Danube's flow. Moreover, during the three great empires – Czarist, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian – there were so many tensions at Romania's borders that there couldn't be a unity of this realm.

The Romanian territory was divided among the three powers, either as strategic safety areas or strategic railways or manoeuvre spaces on domestic or foreign lines, absolutely necessary in the military campaigns in that time, in the geopolitical reconfigurations of contact and influence areas.

After 1918, the achievement of the unitary national state, Romania significantly reduced tensions at the borders but not enough to be strategically safe. That's why, the Romanian geopolitician Ion Conea considered that the duty of the Romanian state is to be always prepared for what it may do, not to "stay behind in a world it has to live in but with no tasks and responsibilities worthy of what it may have been".

Emphasizing the Black Sea importance for Romania and the countries in the area, Nicolae Titulescu stated that "*gorges are Turkey's heart and Romania's lungs*". He speaks about the importance of the Danube which, through the Rhine-Maine-Danube channel, linked this river to the North Sea. Pamfil Seicaru also wrote a study "Danube – five-seas river" where he talked about the importance of the Danube-Black Sea channel, in a modern economic conception, before 1989.

Simion Mehedinti considered that any politician must have three concerns: *that of the mountains,*



Danube's and the Black Sea and Gheoghe I. Brătianu, starting from the Eurasian heartland theory, suggestively remarked that “who has Crimea has the Black Sea”, a sort of premonition of today’s battle between Russia and Ukraine for Crimea and not necessarily an extension of the Romanian territory to those territories, as it is said at times. Out of the 4047 km long Black Sea shore, Turkey has 34%, 1374 km⁶ and Romania only 224 km, 6%. In spite of all the initiatives and approaches in order to increase the role of the Black Sea in the Eurasian geopolitical environment, as a potential synthesis space, transformed from confrontation and strategic fault into a space of strategic confluence, this space geopolitics is still reconfiguring.

The Black Sea has never been considered Romania’s launching point to potential conquests. Through our behaviour, we have been and still are a continental country, concerned with the defence against the invaders, the territorial defence of the Romanian space and implicitly, the strategic safety for the European space.

Nicolae Iorga said that “we are a state of European necessity”.

Unfortunately, not only our neighbours forget about that but also we don’t remember it anymore.

In the end of this geopolitical approach, we can ask the following questions:

Are these theories still current? Do we witness vast geopolitical and geostrategic metamorphoses in the sense of giving up the pivotal theory, the embanking policies and strategies, policies and strategies of power, force and influence in favour of a global and regional policy generated and applied by security organizations with control attributions and diminishing the conflicts and generate stability?

Or on the contrary, they gain other forms and contents from a global perspective of power amplified by alliances and coalitions? Is this power philosophy a way of thinking, designing and generating security and stability are doe we just witness a new reorganization this time global of the old power?

Can we talk in this new context, from a geopolitical and geostrategic perspective, about security or security-generating regions? Is or can the Black Sea be such a region?

1.2. The Black Sea – synergic and strategic geopolitical realm

Which are the new determinations of the current and future geopolitical and geostrategic reconfigurations? Does NATO and EU expansion represent an effect of these new reconfigurations or a cause? What is expected from them? Is WBSA a consequence of the new geopolitical and geostrategic reconfigurations? In other words, is WBSA an effect and at the same time a potential support of the new Eurasian geopolitical and geostrategic reconfigurations? In this waiting horizon, is or can WBSA be a potential geostrategic synapse?

The battle between heartland and the offshore countries was usually fought in the rimland realm. However, the big Eurasian confrontations have been fought within the continent. They generally occurred on the axis of the *disturbing foyer* (the Caspian Sea, Manchuria – the Balkans) with the Baltic Sea – Persian Gulf axis. The intersecting point of these axes is the Black Sea area.

From the northern Black Sea, start three of the four big strategic corridors where the West and the East confronted in the European and Eurasian space and the first important strategic railway on the space between Dniester and Prut.

The warring migrating peoples in the disturbing foyer followed this axis on their way to Europe. Also, on this axis, combined with the north-south axis, were the crusades and most of the Eurasian wars, including the world wars. Numerous authors, such as Samuel P. Huntington⁷, talk in their books about these faults and confluences.

The Black Sea is expected to play a very important role in the strategy of the Eurasian space reconfiguration, in European and Euro-Atlantic vision even if, officially it hasn’t been offered this role yet and the geopolitical studies and papers just start to approach this subject. Generally, geopolitics deals with the geographic policy or the political geography of vast spaces, in terms of power and influence. The Black Sea doesn’t seem to be part of these geopolitical games of power and influence.

That is why, in our opinion, it must be considered from a different perspective. The Black Sea has no importance in itself, military, geopolitical or geostrategic. Here cannot be brought aircraft



carriers or large forces which generate power and domination. Also, the Black Sea mustn't be considered just a space of confluence and contrast, although it is one, but especially through its synergic effect on a vast region, materialized by the establishment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization in April 1999, which has been launched as initiative on 25th June 1992 and also through the directions of strategic value. From this point of view, the Black Sea is a real strategic binder in the Eurasian space. Besides the three large corridors which, in a way, are connected to the Black Sea, a series of Asian corridors have emerged and also the energy strategic corridor (Caucasus, Caspian Sea, Central Asia); South-West Asian strategic corridor (Black Sea, Turkey, Iraq, Persian Gulf through the Mesopotamian Plain); the strategic corridor Don, Volga, Western Siberia; the Ukrainian-Polish strategic corridor.

Perhaps, among the most important geopolitical and geostrategic determinations which will reconfigure the Black Sea geopolitical space, as an area of strategic synergy and synapse, will be the following:

- the space east of the Black Sea – Caucasus, Caspian Sea, Central Asia – is very active and corresponds with an important segment of the old Silk Road, which expresses an historic continuity or a revival of a road blocked by the Soviet power, disturbed by the Caucasus tensions and obstructed by regional geopolitical interests;

- the Black Sea area is at the same time an area of fault, confluence and confrontation, hence the importance of the characteristics of the Eurasian security environment and system, in a troubled region, with numerous ambiguities and unsolved border problems;

- it's closely connected to the Islamic corridor, although Turkey's pro-European orientation fractures this neighbourhood and represents a potential security space for the Black Sea area⁸;

- by the fact that WBSA is in the close vicinity of the old disturbing foyer, currently reactivated by drug trafficking, illegal migration and the battle for the Caspian energy resources, can be induced, through the created synergy effect, a policy and a strategy to fracture this corridor;

- as it is close to several chronic conflict areas, with lots of problems, it's expected that, supported by NATO and EU, there will be an effective growth of the region's contribution to managing

the conflicts on the first and second circles of strategic safety around WBSA, which would lead to creating the conditions for the achievement of a real and beneficial Eurasian entity.

The process to achieve such an entity is still at the beginning but it's no doubt it exists and will be continued as, in our opinion, such a regional geopolitical construction represents one of the few chances to remove the effects generating wars and conflicts for over three millenniums of tumultuous history, of empires, invasions, migrations and wars.

Because of this long and troubled history, the populations in the area are mixed, the political borders are not sure, the level of life is low and insecurity degree is high.

The interest for the Black Sea – such as it was and how it was – aimed, in the modern age, after the end of the Cold War, two fundamental security objectives:

- the demise or defuse of the disturbing foyer;
- the control over the energy resources.

These two objectives are still of priority for the space Black Sea⁹, Caspian Sea and Central Asia.

The Black Sea has never fully played its important role of synergic geopolitical and de-compensation space in and through which the confluence policies and strategies could be achieved, launched and materialized. Such a role wasn't fully cultivated and stimulated for at least two reasons:

- the demise of the Ottoman Empire and removing Turkey from the great Eurasian geopolitical games¹⁰;

- centering and concentrating the political and strategic effort of the two military alliances during the Cold War – NATO and the Warsaw Treaty – on other areas (Central Europe, the Atlantic, the Baltic Sea and the Pacific).

That is why many of the problems generated here are still unsolved. In the Black Sea shores proximity are grouped some of the most serious tensions in the Eurasian space. Areas such as the Caucasus, Trans-Dniester, Balkans, Kurdish area and even the Aegean Sea are still hot and represent potential conflict outbreaks.

This has always existed and still will until the river states, the great heartland, rimland and offshore centres of power, central European, Balkan, East-European and south-west Asian countries will cooperate within NATO, EU, regional



organizations and partnerships, NATO-Russia and NATO-Ukraine councils, UN, OSCE and other security organizations in order to manage realities still generating tensions, crises and conflicts¹¹.

2. The dynamics of NATO and EU expansion effects on WBSA

The end of the Cold War didn't automatically mean the termination of the conflict and generation of a stable and safe European, Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security environment. On the contrary, at least in the past two decades from the implosion of communism and the demise of the Warsaw Treaty, the conflicts in the Black Sea area and close vicinity have increased. The Yugoslavian wars, conflict in Trans-Dniester and the Caucasus, the amplification of the organized crime, the cross-border illegal drug, weapon, dangerous substances and human trafficking, the recrudescence of illegal migration and the development of terrorism are realities confirming this statement. These could be called the resettlement or de-compensation conflicts, specific to the emergence from dictatorship, a strategic conflictual bipolarity and passing to the state of freedom. In such moments, the history repressions and ghosts, passions, frustrations and separatism emerge and destroy what is bad and good at the same time in the name of ideals never achieved.

2.1. Consequences of NATO and EU expansion

The increase of the degree of insecurity for all the countries in the areas – at least until the inclusion of the former socialist countries in the European and Euro-Atlantic security systems – can be considered as a direct or mediated effect of the de-compensation conflicts, some already finished, frozen or ongoing.

But, in our opinion, they don't represent the most important support for this new geopolitical construction called the Wider Black Sea Area.

This construction results from the European and Euro-Atlantic security architecture, is an effect of the security and defence policy and of NATO's strategic concept.

But, above all, it represents the river countries' ability and capability to create a security and stability space, in an area neglected by the large security systems and by the great powers of the

world, forgotten by the big geopolitical actors, not included on the map of technological and informational expansions and left by the westerners to Turkey which owns the gorges and the largest part of the shore. There was perhaps a reason for that, like "Russia is there, we don't interfere, but Turkey represents our strategic interest". In other words, Turkey and Russia should share the responsibilities and dangers, only these two great powers, successors of two great empires, fought for the Black Sea.

That was then. However, things have changes since then, and the Black Sea has entered or will enter the great Eurasian geopolitical architecture.

Very few have really understood or understand the potential importance of the Black Sea region within a Eurasian security and stability architecture. Very few people understand that the world's security and stability don't depend only on the Atlantic and Pacific areas but mostly on the region with huge energy, material and human resources. The platform owing and generating resources of global importance is Eurasia.

On the quality, stability and security of the Eurasian construction depend and will depend the quality, stability and security of the whole world.

One of the ways to achieve this is building and maintaining vast security and stability regions and their connection by the states in the area with the support or authority given by the main international and continental security organizations, especially NATO and the EU but also by the strategic partnerships between different countries, by organizations specialized on different domains, nongovernmental organizations.

Achieving such areas is like the powerful centres on rimland that Spykman suggested in view of embanking the continental power and its domination by the maritime powers.

Only these regions, in our opinion, mustn't be centres projecting domination or pillars of domination but they should generate stability and security. NATO and EU expansion facilitates the creation of such regions in the sense of European policy regarding the regional development but with political and strategic objectives aiming at security and stability as a support for a lasting development.

We consider that among the main consequences for the Wider Black Sea Area of NATO and EU expansion are the following:



Consequences of NATO's expansion	Consequences of the EU expansion
Extension of the Euro-Atlantic security space to important countries, with a role of regional pillar in the Balkan security and the Black Sea area (Romania and Bulgaria).	Extension of the economic, financial and security space and also the creation of significant economic vulnerabilities because the included countries don't have enough economic and financial potential to withstand the tensions in crises and strong competitions.
The creation of regional supports for the process of managing the crises and conflicts on the 1 st circle, West Balkans, the Aegean Sea, Caucasus, Trans-Dniester), 2 nd circle (the Near East, Central Asia, Middle East) .	The creation of regional supports allowing for the EU political, economic and even military intervention to manage the conflicts in European or neighbouring sensitive areas.
Ensuring security guarantees as a support for a future regional conflict management system, controlled by NATO, made up of all of the Alliance's countries and partners.	Implementation of a lasting development policy (region policy).
Ensuring the allied control in West Balkan area, but the impossibility of controlling conflicts in Trans-Dniester and the Caucasus.	Ensuring the economic and financial control on regions with economic problems (West Balkans, Black Sea).
The creation of problems for Russia which, although there is NATO-Russia Council, considers NATO expansion as a threat. The action against Georgia can represent Russia's answer to NATO and EU intention to include Ukraine and the Caucasus countries in the Alliance.	The creation of economic problems for Russia, because the inclusion of Ukraine and the Caucasus countries in the EU could lead to diminishing or even losing Russia's monopoly over the infrastructures of energy resources shipping and especially gas shipping.

For now, NATO and EU expansion hasn't succeeded in solving the conflicts in the area. However the NATO and EU countries have sufficient security guarantees. These guarantees don't solve the crises and conflicts in the area but the EU prompt intervention and NATO presence represent a factor of power which imposes a reasonable behaviour for all the actors in the region.

The pillars' geopolitics is again in the pipeline. There are many questions resulting from this new reconfiguration of the Black Sea area. The most important, in our opinion, are the following:

Has the current expansion of NATO and EU led to the decrease of the Eurasian conflict in the Black Sea area? Has this expansion led to the elimination or decrease of the strategic fault effect in the Black Sea area or, on the contrary, it will emphasize this effect even more? Which is NATO and EU effective contribution to the security of Wider Black Sea Area? What kinds of security (economic, energy, social, military etc) are aimed at in this area? What is the role of NATO and EU

member-states in transforming WBSA into an area generating Eurasian security? What about the other NATO and EU European countries? What about Turkey? What about NATO and EU as global security entities? What is Russia's role in the reconfiguration of the Eurasian security? How is it present in the relations between NATO and Russia, EU and Russia, USA and Russia, China and Russia?

2.2. Potential short, medium and long term effects of NATO and EU in a global, Eurasian, European and Asian context

The Black Sea geopolitics – as an analysis with solutions for the political decision-makers regarding the future of the region – apply to this region almost all the former geopolitical theories.

The most important effect of this region, on short, medium and long term (that is, permanently) could be one of Eurasian synergy. However, taking into account the conflictual situation on the first circle and the numerous interests here (energy,



economic, manipulative and of influence, of maintaining tensions which deflects attention from other areas etc), it's hard to say that all the countries in this area – especially Russia, Ukraine and Georgia will cooperate to transform the region into a Eurasian pillar or a space generating a non-conflictual synergy. The former fault effects will probably be reinvigorated. It is possible though that following NATO expansion and Turkey's inclusion in the EU, other effect may emerge or, on the contrary, the existent ones may be diminished. It will be very difficult to elude or diminish realities which have been here for thousands of years. That is because it will be very difficult to diffuse the so complex and lasting tensions and mentalities manifesting in adjacent spaces, between the Azerbaijani and Armenians, between Georgia's provinces, between Armenia and Turkey, Russia and Ukraine on the problem of Crimea, the Black Sea fleet, etc.

Even if the first economic cooperation organizations have emerged in the area, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and also regional security and collaboration structures, among which military structures, such as BLACKSEAFOR (Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine) and SEEBRIG (Albania, Bulgaria, former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, Greece, Italy, Romania and Turkey; Croatia, Slovenia and the US are observers) and other structures such as GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and the Republic of Moldova), it's hard to assume that, on short term, there will be effects of the economic development and, especially, of the increase of the security degree in the conflictual areas.

However, the current security environment in the region we consider to be extremely important to the future of Eurasia includes supports of a remarkable guarantee. We speak about the current partnership policies, European and Euro-Atlantic energy shipping projects and NATO and EU expansion projects. The battle and, at the same time, partnership for the energy resources in the Caspian Sea, Central Asia and the Black Sea represent tensions exercised by all the centres of power and entities in the area.

The Russian Federation has the monopoly over the energy shipping infrastructure, endeavours to face the competition launched by the European and Euro-Atlantic projects (the Kaki, Tbilisi,

Ceyhan pipeline crosses Turkey, the Nabucco project foresees a route avoiding Russia etc) but this competition doesn't guarantee energy security or the region's security.

The United States want on one hand, to control the area with energy resources and securing the American companies presence in the area and, on the other hand, in the context of the strategy to manage crises and fight terrorism, a security environment characterized by political, economic, strategic, religious and cultural stability preventing major conflicts and join the fight against terrorism.

NATO must ensure the strategic control of the situation in the area, the prevention of asymmetrical threats and major conflicts and also the protection of European and Euro-Atlantic interests, but in a partnership with Russia and Ukraine.

The EU needs the energy resources in the area, especially the gas resources, and also the configuration of a Eurasian dimension which, in fact, is a come-back to the *heartland* promoted by Mackinder and the pan-European theory formulated by Haushofer. This objective can be reached only by expanding to the continental area and even to the Eurasian area of confluence, by solving the conflict in the Caucasus, major access to the Caspian energy resources and using this corridor in the relations with China and South-East Asia.

China is interested in the Central Asian resources and also in the ongoing development of very good relations with the EU (after Japan, the EU has the most numerous investments for China), because its impetuous development doesn't need geopolitical fractures but geopolitical confluences. Japan wishes a Eurasian energy pipeline with terminals accessible to Japan, stability in the area, good relations with Russia and the EU.

Turkey is a Eurasian pillar and promotes a very careful policy regarding the Black Sea area, in accordance with the EU interest and in very close relations with the US, Russia, Romania and Bulgaria. Obviously, Turkey needs energy resources, conditions to fight against terrorism prevent conflicts and ethnic and religious disputes, especially in the Caucasus and Kurd area but also in the Black Sea space where it has a very portent role and also in the Mediterranean one.

Iran and other countries in the Islamic corridor aren't directly interested in the Wider Black Sea Area. However, the stability of such an area could



represent an area of strategic safety for the Middle East, even with the American military bases here, ready to intervene in the unstable, conflictual, divided and confused Middle East.

The tensions resulting from strategic partnerships are generally stabilizing and the confrontations among the great powers, centres of power and external factors interested in the area, although visible enough, are focused more on the Caspian space and gradually begin to cooperate with the Russian Federation, European Union, United States and China and also with all the countries in this real area of strategic synergy the Black Sea generates, represents and develops.

The numerous foreign tensions are very dangerous. They come from terrorist networks, drug dealers, organized crime, other Mafia and the subterranean economy circles of interests, they seek to maintain contrasts, tensions and insecure situation necessary for illegal activities, to produce and sell the raw materials for drug trafficking, connecting to the raw materials resources for drugs in South-East Asia and the continuous activation of the disturbing foyer flanked by Afghanistan and Iran. For this type of tensions, the Black Sea is also a space of infiltration and transit and also of filtration and stopping, which can contribute to a major destabilization of the area if it's not controlled strictly by the countries in the area, by NATO, EU, OSCE and strategic partnerships. Establishing a NATO-Russia-Ukraine mission in the Black Sea of the Mediterranean type would be most welcomed. It could be extended through the adequate use of the river countries maritime ports. These will have an essential role in reconfiguring the Black Sea strategic confluence based on the new criteria of partnerships and collaboration.

There are still numerous worrying internal tensions, specific to this space. They put into question the stability in this area hence the process to annihilate the disturbing process in the Black Sea too, hasn't ended yet.

Tensions are thus numerous and diversified. Some are inherited, others carry the imprint of strategic mutations at the end of the 20th century by the demise of the USSR and also by the successful embanking strategy, suggested by the geopolitician Nicolas Spykman and applied by the US during the Cold War. However, most of them result from the intersection of serious economic and social problems of the countries in the area, which have

numerous contrasts and the external subterranean tensions exercised by regional and international terrorist networks and other circles of interest.

It's expected that NATO presence in this space, through the inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria and in the future, of Ukraine's and the Caucasus countries, including American bases or the Alliance's presence and also that of the partnership actions of NATO-Russia and NATO-Ukraine councils, the EU direct involvement and also that of other security organizations diffuse or diminish these tensions and create conditions for the consolidation of a stable and lasting security environment. Or, on the contrary, to create a new strategic fault, a new curtain and new conflicts by offending Russia and the Middle East.

What is in fact expected in the future from the dynamics of the strategic partnerships in the area, from the NATO-Russia council, from the EU-Russia relationship, Turkey and the Caucasus countries? What are the types of security that could be generated or developed by WBSA and within WBSA by the ongoing expansion of NATO and EU?

These are questions we have tried to answer through several elements of the new geopolitical realism but which necessitate appropriate approaches.

2.3. EU initiatives and Romania's official position

The EU initiatives regarding the areas of strategic security sometimes called quiet or friendly neighbourhood, are part of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Policy (ENPP). They aim at materializing a European security concept and also achieving a strong and secure Eurasian entity by means of which is applied the old Eurasian heartland geopolitics of Hartfold J. Mackinder.

The European Union needs such a geopolitical reconfiguration of the Eurasian space due to, on one hand, the necessity to re-establish the continental power but not necessarily to fight against maritime power (EU itself is a maritime power), but in a very different political and strategic dimension closely connected to a lasting economic development and the modern conflict management which is more and more difficult in the current geopolitical formulas, much too fluid and tense,



unsolved problems, open or frozen wars and conflicts.

There are four such initiatives through which the European neighbourhood and partnership policy is materialized:

- the Euro-Mediterranean partnership;
- the North Dimension;
- the Black Sea Synergy;
- the Eastern Partnership.

Thus, ENPP creates in fact nucleus or geopolitical bases of impact which aim at creating solid cooperation and partnership bridges with the East and South, of a circle or semi-circle of strategic security and, at the same time, increasing the EU influence and implementing several mechanisms of controlling and diminishing conflicts.

2.3.1. The Black Sea Synergy

This is not the most suitable name but it represents the essence of what is expected from such a geopolitical configuration in a Eurasian consistency space. "The Black Sea Synergy" is a EU cooperation initiative for the Black Sea Region within ENPP. When Romania and Bulgaria joined the European community, the European Union became part of the Black Sea region. The Wider Black Sea Area encompasses in fact the whole EU, Turkey, states who wish to be part of the EU (Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, the Caucasus countries) and a great power – Russia – which is about to achieve a strategic partnership with the EU.

Through the unity synergic effect, the entire EU becomes interested in this region and has attributions and competences for its managing.

WBSA synergic effect manifests on two significant directions simultaneously:

- centring and focusing the efforts of the limitary countries and of those included in the wider area on matters of cooperation, lasting development and security;
- achieving a synergy within ENPP, between the EU countries and the countries in the pre-adherence phase (Turkey) or preparing for adherence;
- achieving a special synergy between EU and Russia, as a potential support for a lasting partnership, with effects throughout the Eurasian geopolitical architecture.

This initiative, based on Romania's proposal, joins the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and the

northern dimension and it should harmonize with the Eastern partnership.

The strategic objective of the Black Sea synergy is the implementation of the EU policy in a very sensitive area, of a strategic fault, in order to transform it into an area of confluence and even of Eurasian connection and to harmonize the relations with Russia.

The aimed programs are the usual ones: good governance, people circulation, transportation, environment, education, employment, social and technological affairs, labour force, science.

This new initiative joins those already existent here on different levels (OCEMN, BLACKSEAFOR, SEEBRIG), but it aims at generating a synergic effect, the accumulation of all effects in order to achieve here, in this heterogeneous and conflictual space, a stable area, generating security and cooperation.

Through this initiative, are achieved the following:

- recognizing the strategic importance of the area for the EU and establishing appropriate measures;
- as part and beneficiary of this region, the EU is involved or will be involved significantly in ZMN or WBSA political and strategic reconfiguration in order to manage, together with Russia and the countries not EU members but WBSA members, of the situation here, reducing and even eliminating the conflictuality, emphasizing the cooperation and lasting development of the entire region;
- stabilizing and preparing the area in order to implement important Eurasian programs to consolidate some infrastructures, including the energy shipping, reducing the geopolitical tensions and cultivating trust, respect for values and the harmonization of interests.

For 2007-2013, within ENPP, an important financial component is foreseen (for instance, for Romania-Republic of Moldova-Ukraine Program, 126 million Euros are allotted).

There are other programs, some already established, other in progress, such as the program of cross-border cooperation for the entire region of the Black Sea and The Joint Operational Program drafted by national and regional authorities in 10 states. 29 environmental organizations met in Odessa in February 2008 and adopted a document entitled "Greening the Black Sea Energy". There also is an educational program ERASMUS



MUNDUS implemented in the Black Sea region as well.

Russia doesn't seem too interested in this initiative, its effort focusing mostly on its direct relationship with Germany, in the areas of the Arctic Ocean, Far East and Central Asia, but the EU has numerous ways not only to stimulate Russia's interest for this region but also to create a synergic effect in the field of stability, security and cooperation which this great Eurasian nuclear power with energy resources can't discard. Unlike NATO expansion in the Black Sea area which Russia considers a threat, the EU initiative regarding the Black Sea may bring about economic, geopolitical and geostrategic advantages for all the countries in the area including Russia.

2.3.2. *The Eastern Partnership*

On the 3rd of October 2008, the European Commission presented a communiqué regarding the Eastern Partnership. It's an initiative belonging to Poland, Check Republic and Sweden established during the EU Check presidency. Through this new initiative, they aim at re-dimensioning the EU relations with six former Soviet states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Five of them – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – are part of the Wider Black Sea Area.

This initiative seems to compete with that of "the Black Sea Synergy". That is why, Romania considered it with surprise because overlapping two regions of European interest within ENPP is not a good thing, it's even redundant. Most programs of a lasting economic development will overlap and the effects may not be beneficial. Moreover, when the EU will discuss the policies and initiatives regarding the two regions intersecting on five countries, confusion may arise. It's little probable that the five countries – Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – enjoy double attention and thus, more substantial funds than the others. Furthermore, the Eastern Partnership is not complementary to "the Black Sea Synergy"; in a way, it competes with it and, from this point of view, the geopolitical impact of the two may be substantially diminished. If the initiative of the "Black Sea Synergy", beyond its metaphorical title, could have a synergic effect of geopolitical value, through its major connections with Turkey

and, especially with Russia, both of them Eurasian countries, then the Eastern Partnership would have more limited objectives and the effects could even be contrary to what it is desired.

On the other hand, the Eastern Partnership may be structured and developed in a way that it won't compete with the one referring to "the Black Sea Synergy", but will be complementary and even beneficial.

In our opinion, the partnership doesn't have major geopolitical significances. It aims at intensifying the bilateral relations between EU and each of the six countries and also a more dynamic multilateral cooperation in hope that it would create more positive connections among the former Soviet states.

The EU doesn't want the continent's polarization, like Moscow is believed to want, but wants to intensify the cooperation and the achievement of a Eurasian entity allowing the access to resources and conflict management.

The Eastern Partnership may also be favourable to the Republic of Moldova which, through a direct cooperation with the EU, should benefit from a more substantial assistance in its efforts to join the EU. Romania's support to Moldova's integration in the EU (considered decisive by 41% of the Moldova population) could be much more substantial, ensuring the acceleration of the reforms favouring a remarkable supplementation of the geographical criteria (Art. 49 of the Treaty) with the functional ones (Copenhagen criteria).

The EU two initiatives aiming at the Black Sea area and the states on the EU eastern border, materialize the European neighbourhood and partnership policy and, at the same time, implies the creation of premises for Eurasian geopolitical reconfigurations very beneficial for the future of the European continent, for the security environment and also for conflict management.

Conclusions

1. In this phase of reconfiguring the security environment in its national, regional, the European, Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian dimensions, the Black Sea represents a strategic binder for the liminary countries, with a synergic effect in maintaining a stable security environment, favourable to the economic and social development and regional cooperation. This environment can have positive



influences on the chronic conflictual areas in the Caucasus, Trans-Dniester and even Near East.

2. The locations, corridors and actions of the drug and human traffickers, illegal migration and the cross-border crimes, on the Black Sea northern and southern shores, are active and dangerous. They represent direct or indirect threats for the security of the region and can favour the proliferation of terrorist organizations, groups and networks. NATO and EU expansion represents a guarantee of establishing and applying effective policies and strategies to fight against the trafficker networks and also to create a protection and security environment by reducing the vulnerabilities of the states in the area on asymmetrical threats and generate active and reactive mechanisms.

3. The economic cooperation and security organizations in the region (OCEMN, BLACKSEAFOR, SEEBRIG) or adjacent to the region (GUAM) represent the will of peace, cooperation, security and stability of the nations on the former Eurasian strategic fault, and, at the same time, on the area of confluence of the European continent with the Asian one. NATO and EU presence here creates, together with the regional organizations, another effect of strategic consonance through which security is induced in the Eurasian space. The process is only at the beginning and that is why, it needs to be encouraged and developed by all the methods and tools of European, Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security.

4. NATO and EU expansion and the American and maybe NATO bases, more subtle and mobile, colder to the conflictual areas increase the Black Sea role as a space of security and strategic safety and based on this, of confluence, cooperation and diminishing the strategic fault effects, manifested here for hundreds of years.

5. Romania, together with Bulgaria and Turkey, NATO countries, owing more than half of the Black Sea shores, in cooperation with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and the liminary Caucasus countries, owing the Danube's mouths, thus entering the Danube's strategic corridor, whose economic importance is growing significantly (mostly regarding the European river network), has an active and extremely important role, becoming a sort of key-country or pillar-country in the new South-Eastern European regional construction. This position need to be assumed in consensus with the other countries in the areas, especially Russia,

Ukraine and Turkey – because Romania is a big country, with an important potential in the region, even if it owns the smallest part of the shores – and its behaviour can imprint a European and Euro-Atlantic style to design and achieve a Eurasian confluence architecture based on the strategic synapse effect generated by the Black Sea.

6. The EU two initiatives – the Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership – in consonance with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Northern Dimension, can represent major contributions to the geopolitical reconfiguration from European, Euro-Atlantic and, especially, Eurasian perspective, in the vision of a pragmatic geopolitical and geostrategic realism and, at the same time, being well aware of the political, economic, social and military processes in the area.

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² Robert D. Kaplan is a national correspondent

for The Atlantic and senior fellow at the Centre for a New American Security.

³ Gérard Chaliand, *Anthologie mondiale de la stratégie des origins au nucléaire*, Editions Robert Laffont, S.A., Paris, 1990.

⁴ *Geopolitica. O știință nouă*, vol. „Geopolitica”, p.78.

⁵ Ion Conea, *Geopolitica. O știință nouă*, extract, p. 31.

⁶ The 4047 (or 4040 depending on the water level) km of the Black Sea shores are divided as follows: Turkey – 34%; Ukraine – 31%, Russia – 15%; Georgia – 14% and Romania – 6%. Thus, Gheoghe I. Brătianu's statement comes true: “who has Crimea can also have the Black Sea” but this doesn't mean that they necessarily have it.

⁷ Samuel P. HUNTINGTON, *Ciocnirea civilizațiilor*, Editura ANTET, 1997.

⁸ It's possible that, once integrated in the EU, Turkey won't be considered as the Islamism entrance gate to Europe, but as a modern connection between the two worlds and civilizations (at least they hope so although it's hard to suggest that the Islamic disturbances in this part of the world could ever be solved in any other way but its own metamorphosis).

⁹ Through the hydrocarbon resources it has and will have and also through its role in the hydrocarbon shipping, we consider that the Black Sea is part of the great Eurasian energy corridor (Central Asia, Caspian Sea, Black Sea).

¹⁰ It's an apparent elimination because Turkey continued to act efficiently along the new force-lines within NATO, in order to manage the area; in 1962, the Russian missiles were launched from the Black Sea to Cuba and the price of the compromise to avoid a major conflict between the USSR and

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THE FUTURE OF OUR NEIGHBOURS: EU'S EASTERN PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE*

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While debates are on regarding the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, the future of Europe is also called into question, although in different terms, in the region to its East.

The present article points to some of the aspects associated with the new EU initiative towards its East while trying to catch a glimpse at the (Eastern) future.

Keywords: Eastern Partnership, European Neighbourhood Policy, free trade area, visa liberalisation, Association Agreement, frozen conflicts, Russia, Black Sea Synergy.

An Eastern Quagmire

If there are still voices who question the need for yet another European policy initiative covering the Eastern dimension, all one has to do in order to silence them is to point out to several episodes of European strategic significance. One such episode is the conflict in Georgia in August 2008, when the EU had to strive to remain diplomatically unbent between the hammering out of Georgian pleas for help and the Russian anvil. Again, as recently as April this year, the EU, directly involved by means of one of its Member States- Romania, faced the Moldovan parliamentary elections' turmoil. Changes occurred even in the dynamic of bilateral relations between the various countries which are an EU point of interest via its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), such as the relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan.¹

In brief, things are in motion to the East of Europe. And the only realistic way in which the EU can aspire to capitalise on this quasi-Brownian motion to its East is by adjusting its policies in order to suit and ever-complicated Eastern mesh of relationships. The new European Partnership (EaP) initiative seems to be precisely this type of endeavour.

Member States are now aware that whatever happens in the countries to the East of the EU and, further on, in the South Caucasus, ripples all the way to the capitals of Europe, and some Member States even act on this insight, just like Poland and Sweden have. Proactive elements combined with traditional ENP tools make up the recipe for a new regional approach- the Eastern Partnership.

Its novelty though, be it genuine or just a matter of interpretation, has yet to stand the test of policy coherence (how does the EaP fit in the broader picture of the ENP, and how does it stand against other regional initiatives such as the Black Sea Synergy) and policy implementation (how will the EaP projects become operational and what concrete results will they yield in the region).

The Eastern Partnership Offer

As specified in the Joint Declaration drafted on the occasion of its launching, the offer on the table, i.e. the main goal of the EaP, is to "accelerate political association and further economic integration between the European Union and interested partner countries"², a goal to which both bilateral and multilateral cooperation elements are pledged.

On the bilateral side, the Association Agreements with partner countries who acted on their commitments are the linchpin for the establishment of "comprehensive free trade areas"³. In order to help partner countries meet the standards of the needed reforms, especially on the institutional side, each country will be engaged in comprehensive "Institution-Building Programmes". Full visa liberalisation is a long term goal for partner countries, to be judged on a case by case basis, while the more general goal of mobility of citizens will be promoted by visa facilitation. Last but not least, energy security is



strengthened⁴ by cooperation as regards energy supply and transit, better regulation and energy efficiency.

On the multilateral side, the EaP provides a new framework which enables common challenges to be overcome, while facilitating the development of common positions and joint activities.⁵

The four axes of engaging discussion, the four political platforms (Democracy, good governance and stability; Economic integration and convergence with sectoral EU policies; Energy security; Contacts between people⁶) correspond to the four main areas of cooperation. “Flagship initiatives” can act as an EaP trademark by bestowing “additional momentum, concrete substance and visibility” while drawing funding from international financial institutions and the private sector.

The EaP seems to be the most pragmatic EU neighbourhood initiative so far, to the extent that “mutual interests and commitments” take precedence in the wording of the Joint Declaration over “commitments to the principles of international law and to fundamental values”. Pragmatism also comes to mind if one takes a look at the EaP target states.

The offer is intended for six EU Eastern neighbours, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, addressees which express quite diverging priorities and loyalties. Their interest in the EU also varies, from being vocal about their desire to join the EU- Ukraine, to being bound to side with the Union due to the circumstances- Belarus. All six EU “partner countries” are members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)⁷, a regional organisation set up in the wake of USSR’s dissolution, while four of them (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) are also members of an seemingly anti-CIS initiative, GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development. In such an Eastern quagmire context, laden with so many regional structures and initiatives⁸, any message from Brussels is prone to be subjected to both a harsh cost-benefit analysis and to interpretations and distortions. Such an example is Moldova’s president reaction to the EaP- “this [Eastern Partnership] is similar to the CIS-2. Why should we create another CIS under the control of the EU? It looks like a ring around Russia”⁹ and his perception that the financial assistance coming

from the EU via the EaP is “is candy, which in such cases is distributed”.

The common denominator of the partner countries, in the words of the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Radoslaw Sikorski, is the fact that they are not what one would generally refer to as “Athenian democracies”, thus needing to learn about Western values, the benefits of democracy and the free market.¹⁰ In this respect, the one that stands out in the crowd is the Republic of Belarus, generally considered as the least democratic state in Europe, a country which on account of its very poor record as regards the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms remains to this day outside the bound of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Nevertheless, the administration in Minsk was also presented with the EaP offer, in light of the strategic window of opportunity perceived in Brussels: Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime is currently seeking a rapprochement with Europe as a result of the global financial crisis biting hard into the Belarusian economy and of the fact that relations with Russia are currently at a low ebb.

The establishment of “comprehensive free trade areas” and ultimately of a “Neighbourhood Economic Community” is the strongest economic carrot that the EU can offer the EaP target states. In the same time, economic integration is one of the key dimensions of the EU policy in its Eastern neighbourhood because it can provide tangible results for the states in question, the lack thereof being one of the plights usually associated with the ENP. The downside of the “comprehensive free trade areas” incentive is nevertheless the fact that the six target countries of the EaP have different economic profiles and their trade with each other is relatively limited¹¹, which may represent an obstacle in the path towards the “Neighbourhood Economic Community” envisaged by the European Commission.

On the issue of free trade areas, the Commission conducted studies concerning the general economic impact of a free trade agreement between the EU and Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine¹² respectively, which basically revealed that even though it would take much more than the removal of tariffs to bring about an increase in economic growth in the targeted states, and despite the fact that questions remain as to the institutional capacity of the states to undertake harmonisation with EU legislation in the field, free trade agreements with these countries



are feasible, especially if corroborated with reforms in other priorities specified in the Action Plans.

In respect of the bilateral dimension of the offer, Brussels' move to put forward the possibility for the target states to get into Association Agreements (AAs) with the EU is hardly surprising, since the previously concluded Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) expired in 2008 or are bound to expire in 2009.¹³ But the new form of association, as progressive as it may appear, will certainly garner different interpretations in Baku and Yerevan, for instance, as opposed to Kiev and Chişinău. This is because the two favourites of the ENP, Moldova and Ukraine, have already been offered the AA carrot, albeit in different terms—negotiations with Ukraine have been underway since 2008 for a “New Enhanced Agreement”, a basis for the text of an AA¹⁴, while in June 2008, Moldova signed a “Mobility Partnership” with the EU— which might make this particular incentive less appealing.

Supporting mobility of citizens and visa liberalisation is one of the aspects of the EaP which again may be qualified as yielding tangible results in the targeted states, inasmuch as it has an important impact at the social level. However, as in the case of Moldova's “Mobility Partnership”, visa facilitation is contingent upon the conclusion of readmission agreements, which also imply strong migration policy reforms and EU support for the targeted states to abide by anti-trafficking commitments. Further on, the partner countries will need to prove that they are able to manage their borders effectively: “And we can only offer visa facilitation to countries which have secure travel documents, properly run borders and arrangements for readmission of returnees. But if we want to protect our security, we need to be willing to move on these key desires of our neighbours. We are asking a lot, and we have to be willing to give in return”¹⁵.

The Eastern Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy

The EaP remains faithful to the ENP principles of differentiation and conditionality. The principle of conditionality, as understood in the framework of the ENP, regards positive conditionality, namely the mechanism by which the EU is in the position to reward partner countries upon the achievement

of various reform elements and the adoption of good governance practices, especially in the area of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The approach is meant to encourage progress in partner countries by the use of various incentives, while the result of non-compliance with the demands is generally limited to cutting back funding when that is a case.

The Eastern Partnership seems to keep in line with the same combination of goals that we can find with the ENP, which largely corresponds to the trans-national (i.e. post-Westphalian)- national dichotomy in terms of promoted goals. On the one hand, the EU exerts “transformative power”, i.e. aims to bring about structural changes in its countries of interest by means of better governance export, and on the other hand it pursues issue, or sector specific goals, such as those related to a certain country or even economic field. While the Joint Declaration of the Prague EaP Summit advocates such “milieu” goals as democracy, the rule of law, sustainable development and good governance in the context of the very broad and generous four dimensions of cooperation, the Commission is more explicit on formulating “possession” goals¹⁶, referred to as “flagship initiatives”: an Integrated Border Management Programme; an SME Facility; promotion of Regional electricity markets, energy efficiency and renewable energy source; cooperation on Prevention of, preparedness for, and response to natural and man-made disasters.¹⁷

The new multilateral framework offered by the EaP largely overlaps the ENP Plus key elements: enhancing the economic and trade component, facilitating mobility and managing migration, promoting people-to-people exchanges, enhancing regional cooperation, strengthening financial cooperation.¹⁸

The partner countries, as designated under the EaP, make up the bulk of ENP Eastern target states. This observation would entitle us to say that we are currently facing the creation of a specific Eastern dimension inside the ENP, as opposite to (or complementary to) the Southern one, embodied by the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), which would account for a virtual division of the ENP. Thus, we can think of the EaP as a balancing initiative to the UfM, bearing in mind the argument that opening up towards the neighbours to the South has to be complemented



by an opening up towards the Eastern neighbours. However, the two policy initiatives are moulded differently, so as to suit the needs of the states in the respective regions: whereas the UfM focuses more on the economic development of the states in the Southern dimension, the EaP advocates a comprehensive “harmonisation”- political, economic and legislative- of the partner states with the Union. In addition to this, the novelty of EaP consists of its regional approach, as opposed to the country specific framework under which the ENP works. Thus, EaP can be further interpreted as an ENP upgrade which builds on multilateral as well as bilateral elements.

Still in relation to regional initiatives, the Joint Declaration specifies that “complementarity with regional initiatives between the European Union and relevant partner countries, in particular the Black Sea Synergy, will be ensured”¹⁹. The clarification may be present in the document to ease the concerns of Member States like Romania and Bulgaria - strong supporters of the Black Sea Synergy, a particular project that includes two key-actors which are not explicitly among the EaP target countries- Turkey and Russia- while not making any reference to Belarus. From this perspective, the approach may prove frustrating for Turkey, an increasingly important geo-strategic actor both for Brussels and for Washington.

Alternatively to regarding the EaP as an upgrade to ENP, the EaP may be considered to represent a “«soft» enlargement policy, aiming for the progressive integration of the Eastern countries to the EU”²⁰. On the issue of enlargement, the Polish position seems to include towards this interpretation. The Polish argument draws on the experience of the Visegrad Four, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia being the object of EU’s transformative power while in the same time being given the chance to better integrate before accession proper. In the same line of thought, the countries to the East may undergo preparations for the *de jure* integration to arrive once the various obstacles (ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, enlargement fatigue) have been defeated.

Still on the topic of enlargement, it has been noted that the new European initiative elegantly bypasses any reference to accession (or the establishment of any causal link between the EaP and enlargement), simply noting that the

EaP “will be developed without prejudice to the individual partner countries’ aspiration for their future relationship with the European Union”²¹. Furthermore, keeping in mind the addresses of the EaP offer, it must be observed that most of the six partner countries never went as far as to directly voice out their desire to join the EU.

The word on everyone’s lips when speaking about the EU’s neighbours to its East is Russia. By means of the EaP initiative, the Union is going from reactive to proactive in a region traditionally under Russian influence, but increasingly important for the EU on account of the strategic positioning of its energy-significant constituents. In the region, Russia and the EU are basically two opposing poles exerting attraction to the best of their abilities upon the states in the region, a perspective which seems to be true if we only think about the events surrounding the so-called “colour revolutions” in Georgia, Kyrgystan and Ukraine. The optics of the two poles is fundamentally different: what the EU refers at as bringing about positive change in its neighbourhood environment by means of its normative influence, Russia perceives as tampering with its “near abroad”. Whichever the eye of the beholder, Russia’s interpretation of the current situation in terms of a zero-sum game for influence only leads to the imposition of “corrective” measures on the countries in the region which befriend the EU- virtual gas wars led with Belarus and Ukraine, restriction of imports of wines from Moldova etc.

While the EU officials have signalled on numerous occasions that the new EaP is a benign initiative as far as Russia is concerned, the administration in Moscow remains unconvinced.²² In the region, Russia’s perception of threat was primarily related to NATO enlargement. In the past decade through, EU enlargement, together with the development of the ENP, have also started being perceived as a threat, in the light of the growing EU influence. Ultimately, as long as the Europeans’ position on Russia remains divided, the prospects of various EU policies and regional initiatives may be seriously undermined.

The EaP does not pay particular attention to the issue of frozen conflicts, noting only that “conflicts impede cooperation activities”, and thus there is the need for “peaceful settlement on the basis of principles and norms of international law”²³. Four of the six partner countries are involved in such



conflicts and in each of the cases, either directly or by proxy, Russia is involved. While the fact that the initiative refers only briefly to the issue of these conflicts may be regarded as constructive vis-à-vis EU's relationship to Russia, the difficult truth remains: no EU "soft" policy will be able to bring about democratic transformation in the region in the absence of a solution to the "hard" aspects of the frozen conflicts.

The question of energy, addressed by one of the four platforms of cooperation under the EaP is vital to the EU. The countries that make up the object of EaP are important both to the EU and to Russia, to the extent that they are part of transit routes for energy supply. Moreover, the area of the South Caucasus has significant strategic importance because it has the potential to directly connect the Union to the energy reserves in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. And just like the EU Member States, most of the EaP target states are dependent on Russian energy supplies, in varying degrees, thus proving that working together on energy security in the framework of one of the four EaP multilateral platforms is a question of mutual benefit.

Furthermore, it seems that the EaP energy security platform is just a piece of a larger puzzle: just one day after the EaP launching summit, Prague hosted a meeting over the Southern Corridor – "the New Silk Road", a project aimed at securing European energy and transport links to the Middle East and Central Asia. The initiative brought together supplier and transit states, among which supplier state Azerbaijan and transit state Georgia.

Peering into an (Eastern) Future

The EaP initiative is otherwise a splendid example of how an older EU Member State and a new one have managed to build up a European diplomatic critical mass in support of their common initiative. The future of this project, as well as its success, will further depend on the political will in Brussels, Yerevan, Baku, Chişinău, Tbilisi, Kiev and Minsk, as well as on the realism of the projects to be implemented in its name. Apparently its initiators are coming hard though, as one month away from the launch of the project a series of first meetings will be held throughout the month of June in Brussels regarding the EaP multilateral platforms

of cooperation, with two flagship projects already underway, possibly launched before the end of 2009 ("Integrated Border Management" program and "Prevention of, preparedness for, and response to natural and man-made disasters").²⁴

As regards the disputed nature of the relationship between the EaP and the ENP, some light may still be shed in the process, since the mechanism of the EU rotating presidency (2009- Czech and Swedish, 2010- Spanish and Belgian) will ensure a balanced mix of Southern and Eastern interest.²⁵

Otherwise, regardless of the framework of cooperation between the Union and its neighbours to the East, one Ukrainian official's opinion regarding the EaP may be valid both for all EU regional initiatives to its East and for all the states in the region: the EaP will be good if it combines "confidence, resources and policies"²⁶.

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NOTES:

¹ The relationship between Azerbaijan and Armenia is currently under strain as a result of Armenia's intentions to normalise its relations to yet another country of particular European concern, Turkey. While the eventual reopening of the Turkish-Armenian border is commended in Brussels, European officials must not remain oblivious to the Azeri warning that talking about the normalisation of relations is premature as long as the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has not been solved.

² "Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit", 7 May 2009, Prague, p. 6, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/107589.pdf

³ *Idem*, p. 7.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 8.

⁵ "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Eastern Partnership", 3 December 2008, Brussels, p. 9,



available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0823:FIN:EN:PDF>

⁶ “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Eastern Partnership”, 3 December 2008, Brussels, p. 11-13.

⁷ Ukraine has not ratified the CIS Charter but is an active financial contributor to the organization.

⁸ In addition to the CIS and GUAM, other initiatives worth mentioning are the Eurasian Economic Community and the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

⁹ Vladimir VORONIN, President of the Republic of Moldova, quoted in “Voronin: Eastern Partnership is encircling Russia like a ring”, 27 February 2009, available at <http://politicom.moldova.org/news/voronin-eastern-partnership-is-encircling-russia-like-a-ring-186084-eng.html>

¹⁰ Radoslaw SIKORSKI, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, quoted in *The Eastern Partnership: how far, how deep, how fast?*, Policy Dialogue, 19 March 2009, European Policy Centre, available at <http://www.epc.eu/en/iwp.asp?TYP=TEWN&LV=187&see=y&PG=ER/EN/detail&AI=898&t=15>

¹¹ Maria SADOWSKA, Paweł ŚWIEBODA, *Eastern Partnership-Good Start, Hard Labour to Come*, Warsaw, 2009, Centre for European Strategy, available at <http://przegladsd.pl/english-texts/foreign-policy/eastern-partnership-good-start-hard-labour-to-come/>

¹² See “Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment of the Free Trade Area in the framework of the Enhanced Agreement between the EU and Ukraine”, Ecorys, Rotterdam, 5 April 2007, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/june/tradoc_135055.pdf, “Economic Feasibility, General Economic Impact and Implications of a Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and Georgia”, Center for Social and Economic Research, 8 May 2008, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/october/tradoc_141169.pdf, “Economic Feasibility, General Economic Impact and Implications of a Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and Armenia”, Center for Social and Economic Research, 8 May 2008, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/october/tradoc_141170.pdf

¹³ Concluded for a period of 10 years, the PCAs expired in 2008 for Moldova and Ukraine, and

will expire in 2009 for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Please refer to Article 94 of the PCAs concluded between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia respectively, of the other part, documents to be found in the Council of the European Union Agreements Database, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/Applications/accords/search.asp?lang=EN

¹⁴ “2nd Joint Progress Report on Negotiations on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement”, 2008, available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ukraine/docs/joint_progress_report2_en.pdf

¹⁵ Benita FERRERO-WALDNER, European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, 12 February 2009, speech available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/eastern/docs/eastern_partnership_article_bfw_en.pdf

¹⁶ For an explanatory discussion on “milieu” and “possession” goals, please refer to Arnold WOLFERS, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, 1962.

¹⁷ “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Eastern Partnership”, 3 December 2008, Brussels, p. 13.

¹⁸ “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy”, Brussels, 4 December 2006, available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com06_726_en.pdf

¹⁹ “Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit”, 7 May 2009, Prague, p. 9.

²⁰ Deniz DEVRIM, Evelina SCHULZ, *The Eastern Partnership: An Interim Step Towards Enlargement?*, 10 February 2009, Real Instituto Elcano, p. 4, available at http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/Europe/ARI22-2009

²¹ “Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit”, 7 May 2009, Prague, p. 5.

²² See for instance Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s declaration regarding the EaP as “European sphere of influence” – “Russia’s Lavrov lashes EU over new ‘Eastern Partnership’”, 22 March 2009, Eubusiness, available at <http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1237635122.1>



²³ “Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit”, 7 May 2009, Prague, p. 9.

²⁴ “The Eastern Partnership: getting down to work”, 4 June 2009, available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>

²⁵ Deniz DEVRIM, Evelina SCHULZ, *The Eastern Partnership: An Interim Step Towards Enlargement?*, 10 February 2009, Real Instituto Elcano, p. 7

²⁶ Hryhoriy NEMYRIA, Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine, quoted in *The Eastern Partnership: how far, how deep, how fast?*, Policy Dialogue, 19 March 2009, European Policy Centre.

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THE FUTURE OF SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN THE BLACK SEA AREA FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF SOLVING DISPUTES BETWEEN RIPARIANS*

Marius HANGANU, PhD

During its existence, up to now, the Black Sea area was not the host of some naval sounding conflicts. The most famous confrontation was between 1853 and 1856, known as the Crimea War, when the belligerents were the Russian Empire on the one hand, and the alliance between England, France, Sardinia, Turkey, on the other hand, the stake being the Crimean Peninsula and the stopping of the Russian expansion tendencies.

The naval confrontations during the period of the two World Wars happened in the context of the land actions and were not characterized by vast naval actions, able to influence significantly the land actions.

The previous periods of the 19th century were marked by the domination within the Black Sea of the some states' navies, ones that were great continental powers (Russia, Turkey, and during the Middle Ages and Ancient History, the Byzantine Empire or Greece), and that used sea for transport, the problem of domination within the maritime area being out of question.

In other words, the disputes within the Black Sea were tightly bound to the land space. At present, the situation has not been changed too much. The whole activity inside the Black Sea area is tightly bound to the troubles and problems from the land.

Keywords: security, cooperation, Black Sea, EU, NATO.

What are the actual problems that can influence the future of security and cooperation within the Black Sea?

Most of the actual problems or those ones that can become crisis sources, or constitute

vulnerabilities of the Black Sea region have their spring on the land space and less on the sea.

We will name only the ones we consider to be the most peculiar, according to the risk degree, and to the importance regarding security inside the Black Sea area, and then we will try to argue their presentation. Therefore, we consider the future crisis sources within the Black Sea may be:

1. the Crimean Peninsula and its status;
2. the Caucasian and Transnistrian areas;
3. NATO's expansion and, especially, its influence within the Black Sea area;
4. the harsh promotion, insistent and constant of some states' interests within the Black Sea area inside various side areas, especially inside the Caucasian one;
5. the limitation of important maritime areas (exclusive economic area, the continental plateau);
6. The European Union's interests in the area;
7. The juridical, economical and political status of Bosphorus and Dardanelle straits.

There can also be added other sources of instability, but we will limit to analyzing briefly these aspects.

The Crimean Peninsula is a hot spot, as it belongs to Ukraine, but wanted by Russia on the ground of at least two reasons: the existent infrastructure that assures the foundation of the Russian Black Sea Navy and the fact that the peninsula represents an area climatically favourable to tourism and leisure, an advantage that Russia does not have anymore.

Whether we add the strategic position given



by the neighbourhood with the Turkish seashore (the distance between Turkey and Crimea is about 132 miles), but also given by the dominant heights of the peninsula, we will have reasons to believe that this space will keep on being disputed on. The dispute will be between Ukraine, the owner of this territory, and Russia, its former owner, the one that invested a lot in improving and arranging this area.

Neither the variant of Crimea's independence can be excluded, taking into account that its history has been quite troubled.¹

Analysing briefly, the situation, without trying to give definitive sentences, we could say that, there are, at least three future scenarios on the Crimean Peninsula:

a) the inhabitants' request for independence (most of them are Russians, and those ones who are not Russians are Russian language speakers), and later on, the creation of a dependence, in fact a normal one, on Russia;

b) the extension of the renting contract of the Sevastopol base for the Russian navy in the Black Sea, a "sine die" contract;

c) the separation of more regions from Ukraine, including Crimea, as well, with an initial dependence on Ukraine.

About the Caucasian and Transnistrian areas

The analysis does not take into account the geographical area; the Caucasian and Transnistrian areas are geographically distant, but geopolitically they have the same characteristics, and they can give the essential elements for a future evolution.

The mentioned areas are crisis "centres". First of all, they are wanted to be in this state by those that ones who want to keep or to impose their military and economic policies.

Secondly, although they are situated within strategic areas and they should be given more chances for their development, they are not wanted or there is not a wish for them to be independent, at least economically speaking.

At a formal level, there is independence, democracy, the things seem to make for a good direction. In fact, a certain guardianship of these states will be kept, from certain directions, namely:

a) from Russia's direction, probably with the strongest influence;

b) from NATO's direction, a less noisy but deeper influence;

c) from Islamic States' (Iran, Turkey) direction, with a quite strong influence on some states (Azerbaijan).

The enclaves from the border of the states belonging to these areas (Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Chechnya, Transnistria and others), are kept into a state of turbulence (at least politically and militarily, as well), and whether they will be brought under a state rule, probably other conflicts areas will be made up, ones able to reason different measures taken by the third parties in order to impose their policy.

Why is it wanted? Probably the core of the problem is the hydrocarbons corridor from the Caspian Sea towards the Black Sea and Europe, what will compete with the main Russian "currency", on which ground Russia has lately developed and with which can anytime threaten Europe, respectively the energetic sources like: gas, oil and coal.

But not only the economic side is important for the area. The desire for power, to dominate, besides the tendency to have military bases all over the world, especially in the neighbourhood of the borders, makes Russia more intransigent in the future with the centrifugal tendencies of these states.

NATO cannot exclude from its strategy the display of some bases within such a favourable area (the Caucasian one), that could provide it a quick access towards the "hot" spots from Asia, but also a security inside an area oscillatory from the political point of view, near the areas with high potential of hydrocarbons (Russia and the former Soviet states from Asia).

On NATO's extension and its influence in the Wider Black Sea Area

First of all, the Wider Black Sea Area is geographically represented by the Black Sea space (with the riparian countries), adding both the space between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, just like Moldavia, as well (namely, those areas that are influenced by the events from the Black Sea).

At present, NATO includes 50% of the Black Sea riparian countries (namely, three states: Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania), and from the other three, two of them (Ukraine and Georgia) want to become a



part of the alliance.

Russia is the only opponent of NATO's extension within the area, holding 17% from the Black Sea littoral.

However, it considers the Black Sea as being a "nașe more", that is a "Russian lake". Why is that? Because of the heritage, mentality, but also because it detains the strongest force inside the area (the Black Sea Navy).

Probably there must be also added the fact that, deep down in the political thinking, there is, also, the idea that "the Russian bear" is still sleeping and the idea that it can anytime impose by force the strategy it wants inside the area.

The countries in the Caucasian area, and Moldavia, as well, want to progress and have a better life. For them, NATO means a first step towards such a progress. NATO has won, and with a justified meaning, the respect of these states. To belong to such an organisation means for those ones having enough realistic information ways belonging to the civilised world.

On the other hand, NATO, as a military organisation, makes its extension to be struggled against and undesired inside the area.

NATO's policy in crisis management crises can be considered as the most coherent one, meaning it has coordinated actions, initiated in order to avoid a crisis, to prevent the escalation into an armed conflict and stopping hostilities, in case they show up.

On the so-called frozen conflicts from the Black Sea region, the organisation has not involved directly. NATO promotes, by the Partnership for Peace, the increase of stability, the decrease of threats on peace and the consolidation of the relations regarding the security field and the interoperability between the partner states and the North-Atlantic organisation.

At the Riga summit, 28-29 November, 2006, the NATO officials declared, for the first time, that the Alliance supports the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Moldavia and of the South Caucasus' states.

But the temporary refusal to give Georgia the inclusion into the Membership Action Plan, with the opportunity of the summit in Bucharest, on 2-4 of April, 2008, tensioned even more the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

In future, probably Georgia will be part of the Alliance that will mean that NATO's extension

will be a normal process, in spite of Russia's opposition.

On harsh, insistent and constant promotion of some the Black Sea states' interests in different side areas, especially in the Caucasus space

After the political resettlement inside the former Soviet space, new promoting tendencies of the interests of some Black Sea area states have appeared. We concretely speak of Turkey that develops a very active policy inside various fields, starting from zone security problems and to the environment matters. Having many initiatives in the regional cooperation field and sustaining them with strong reasons, Turkey has gathered the outstanding position inside the Black Sea area. By abiding the principles of the policy Turkey promotes, it has gathered the consideration of the states from the Black Sea area. Turkey's interest is both economic (achieved by remaking the "silk road", namely by transiting the territory by the hydrocarbons pipelines from Asia to Europe), and strategic, by the influence that it has upon the Muslim world, especially inside the Caucasus space.

Turkey is the main initiator and supporter of some organisms or actions, developed in common by the Black Sea riparian states, with the declared purpose to strengthen the trust between the states in the region, just like the achievement of the cooperation between them in order to combat criminality, terrorism, illegal weapons trafficking, drugs, the fight against pollution, etc.

The main initiatives regarding the organisations of cooperation between the Black Sea riparian states are the following:

- the Black Sea Economic Cooperation;
- the Agreement to set up the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Group, activated since 2001 (Blackseafor);
- Black Sea Harmony Operation, initiated by Turkey on March, 2004 (Romania signed the participation memorandum on April, 2009). It is an operation developed in accordance with Endeavour Active Operation in the Mediterranean Sea, which aims to supervise the maritime routes and to follow/escort the suspected ships, in order to combat the maritime risks in the Black Sea. One can clearly observe that Turkey will continue its



extremely incisive policy within the Black Sea area and within the Asian Muslim one, in order to promote its interests and especially in order to fuel its ambitions as a regional power.

On delimitation of interest maritime areas (exclusive economic area, continental plateau)

An important step to reduce the vulnerabilities inside the Black Sea area is the settlement and the international recognition of important maritime areas delimitation.

As a result of USSR's disappearance, the delimitations of the exclusive economic areas and those of the continental plateau are unsolved, this happening at least inside the Romanian area.

The dispute with the former USSR, in order to delimitate the continental plateau kept on perpetuating after this empire's dismantle, Ukraine being the partner this time, and the delimitation hinted at the exclusive economic area. "The Apple of Discord" was the Snake Island and its state.

Excepting the fact that the Snake Island status determination, as belonging to Ukraine, was done only after 2000, by signing - by the President of Romania (Emil Constantinescu) at that time - the treaty with Ukraine, one must say that this piece of rock, with same origin as Dobrogea Mountains, has 12 Mms territorial waters, and Romania has only 9 Mms territorial waters of its own.

The Ukrainian pretensions that this island should have the economic area, as well (contrary to the United Nations Organisation's Convention regarding the sea law in the island's regime), just like the attempt to show that the island has its own life, all these have been destroyed by the International Court of Justice from Hague. As a result of the Romanian request and of a long-lasting analysis, the area in question was, in a percent of 70%, adjudicated to our country.

Is the problem of continental plateau and exclusive economic area one actual interest? What about the determination of such limits? For the time being, the Hague decision regarding the solving of the Romanian - Ukrainian dispute regarding the exclusive economic area rises up in Kiev's temptations and can be considered a problem that is still a source of crisis.

One adds the problem of the Bastroe canal, just like the more intensive exploitation of the Black Sea hydrocarbons (from the part of sea given to Romania).

We are sure that, at least on a short term, the problem of exclusive economic area delimitation and of the continental plateau, especially in the North - West of the Black Sea, will be one of the area's vulnerabilities and a periodical straining reason of the relations between the two countries.

This delimitation has not been finished yet, or at least it is vague, and between the other states in the Black Sea area the problems of the exclusive economic areas are not considered in the same manner we don't deal with the same stake, namely hydrocarbons.

However, one could state that the limited space of the Black Sea and the small distances between the face to face lands will be a reason for dispute regarding the sea law ruling inside the area.

On European Union's interests in the area

As a result of Romania and Bulgaria's joining the European Union, its border has been prolonged up to the Black Sea.

To guarantee its own security, the European Union must become much more active in its efforts to carry out the conflicts in the neighbourhood.

For the European Union, the Black Sea represents "a distinct geographical area, rich in natural resources, getting a strategic position at the intersection of the Europe with the Central Asia and the Middle East"², but also "an expanding market with a high developing potential".

The European Commission considers that the regional cooperation strategy must not be separated from the European Union's general policy inside the region and that it must be analysed in the *context* with Turkey's pre-adhesion policy, with the European Union neighbourhood policy and also with the Union's strategic partnership with Russia.

One of the most important European Union's objectives is the Union's energetic security by developing the delivery and transport projects of gas and oil from the Caspian Sea through the Black Sea and the creation of a new energetic corridor.

Other objectives the European Union aims in the region are: promoting the human rights, democracy, the good governance, stopping the illegal immigration, human trafficking and smuggling, the development of the maritime and river transports. Regarding the energetic corridor, the European Union will have to impose its interests



by developing the gas and oil pipelines towards Europe, by developing the projects at Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan, the Baku – Tbilisi – Erzerum pipelines. Other projects taken into account and disputed on at present are Constanta – Trieste, Burgess – Vlare and Burgess – Alexandropoulos pipelines. Also, there are debates about a pipeline between Turkey and Greece that it could be extended up to Italy.

The European Union's interest in the Black Sea region was put into practice by including Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldavia into the European Neighbourhood Policy.

The European Neighbourhood Policy is considered a key element for a lasting carrying out of the conflicts from the Wider Black Sea region, that, in 2007 the European Union advanced a new initiative "the Black Sea Synergy", having as a purpose the development of the cooperation inside the aimed region.

"The Black Sea synergy" will be built on the ground of some sectorial programmes and some initiatives already in place such as: free movement of people and their security, energy, transport, environment, maritime policy, fishing, trade, research, education, unemployment, social problems, science and technology.

The European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner said: *"Once Bulgaria and Romania have become members, European Union has become a part of the Black Sea region. Nowadays we fulfil the promise of developing a regional dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Here has come the time to focus our political attention on a regional level and to stimulate the existing cooperation processes, by opening a space for cooperation with Russia, Turkey and the Eastern neighbours."*

On Bosphorus and Dardanelles' Straits juridical status

The Convention from Montreux, 1936, the one that is still valid, has established the juridical state of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, as it follows:

- it was accepted the remilitarization of the strait area;
- the passage right for the commercial ships is given to all the states. At war time, this right is accepted, but only if Turkey is a belligerent

country. Whether Turkey is involved into a military conflict, Turkey has the right to forbid the passage of the commercial ships of the enemy states, and the commercial ships of the neutral states have the right to pass, but without helping the enemy;

- the war ships, at peace time, have the right to pass through the straits, but with certain conditions regarding the tonnage for the war ships of the riparian states;

- at war time and in cases when Turkey is not a belligerent power, the war ships of other states have the right to pass through the straits, but only whether between these states and Turkey there are special agreements.

Nicolae Titulescu, with the occasion of the Montreux diplomatic conference, supported Turkey in the straits' problem, stating that "Turkey will be a warrant of the Convention rules".

This was proved during the Second World War, when Turkey was "purposely" kept neutral, limiting therefore the proportion of the conflicts inside the Black Sea. Nowadays, as well, Turkey has an important part regarding the limitation of the powers belonging to some alliances inside the Black Sea.

However, owing to some geopolitical changes, it is obvious the need to review some stipulations of the straits state because the European Union, by Romania and Bulgaria's adhesion, has become riparian to the Black Sea.

Therefore, the European Union has the right to have its own forces within the area, in order to protect its interests and to assure security for its new frontiers.

As a conclusion, we may state that the problems from the Black Sea area will continue for a long period of time, as the sources of conflict can anytime break off and influence other international events.

The benefits of the riparian states to the Black Sea and the regional stability may be gathered in time, with hard work and by developing a continuous activity of the democratic states from Europe and America.

Russia has been the main actor in the area. Its influences on the area are not among the best ones.

For the time being, NATO is the only power which can oppose them, and in future the European Union. The great Asian powers seem to be less interested in this area.



* *The paper has been presented during the international seminar on “Strategies for cooperation within the Black Sea Area” organised by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University “Carol I” on May, 27th, 2009.*

NOTES:

¹ In 1954, Crimea region was transferred from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, on the ground of the Supreme Soviet of the Socialist Soviet Republic Union, without the agreement of the local population. During the last years of the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republic, a part of the old deported Tatars came back to the area. According to the Ukrainian census in 2001, Crimea had 2,033,700 inhabitants, out of which 58.32% were Russians, 24.32% Ukrainians, 12.1% Tatars, 1.44% Byelorussians. Russian language was declared the mother language for 77% of population, 11.4% considered the Tatar language as the mother language and 10.1%

the Ukrainian language. In accordance with the Treaty from 1997, the Russian naval basis was declared to be “laid in Sevastopol”, on the base of an agreement established for twenty years and that can be prolonged. At the beginning, Moscow refused to accept the Ukrainian sovereignty for Sevastopol, considering that, in fact, the city had never been included into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic because of the military base state. Moscow gave up this request as a result of the “Peace and friendship” Treaty, by which it was confirmed that Sevastopol belonged to Ukraine. A separate treaty establishes the terms of a long-term agreement regarding the lands and resources from Sevastopol, resources that will be used by Russia. As a result of a poll, achieved in 2004, 72% from the Sevastopol citizens made their choice for the state of independency of the Crimean Peninsula. Also, 95% from the respondents support the permanent stand of the Black Sea Russian Navy, even after 2017. Moreover, 100% from the respondents agreed to have a double citizenship, the Russian and the Ukrainian one, as a right of the citizens from Sevastopol.

² The Black Sea Synergy.

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HOW IMPORTANT IS THE BLACK SEA AREA (BSA) FOR THE CONTINENTAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY? AN ESSAY ON GEO-STRATEGIC PLAYERS AND PIVOTS, AND ON THE BROADER MEANING OF HISTORY

Florin DIACONU, PhD

The study explores two different answers to the question “how important Black Sea Area (BSA) is?” The first answer is based on the ideas and concepts of Zbigniew Brzezinski: BSA is an area where 60% of the really significant geostrategic players and pivots in Eurasia, plus USA are clearly present (by means of either geographic presence or major interests of all sorts).

This very feature makes BSA really significant for continental and global security. The second answer is based on history: BSA is significant because in several occasions it was a target/goal of great powers in the context of major conflicts and/or wars.

Keywords: Black Sea Area (BSA); geostrategic pivots; geostrategic players; history; national interests; NATO; international conflict; war.

The basic problem this study tries to explore is “how important Black Sea Area (BSA) is for the continental and global security?” Such a question can be answered in several ways.

One of them is to formulate an evaluation of the significance of BSA connected mainly (or even only) with the interests of all sorts (both short-term ones and long-term ones) of one of the countries in the region (it might be Romania, but as well any other one). But if we adopt such a solution, we might easily fall in a large and very dangerous trap.

Such a thing might happen because of at least one very serious reason: any country in the Black Sea Area (BSA), exactly as any other country in the world, mostly has particular (or quite narrow)

interests of all sorts, while the question we are speaking about obviously refers to some more general (or less narrow, less particular) problems. That is why an answer as “we think BSA is very important because that country has major interests there” is not academically fully acceptable (even if it might be more than acceptable when we speak about the perspective offered – and about constraints generated – by some of the elements of the foreign policy the very country we are speaking about has to design and implement).

Moreover, an answer stating that “we think BSA is important simply because that country thinks so” embodies another major weakness as well: most of the political actors on the shores of the Black Sea never were great powers, are not great powers at this very moment, and will never be really great powers in any future scenario.

In such a situation, any of the foreign policy interests of Romania (or Bulgaria, Moldavia, Georgia), together with any attitude and evaluation belonging to (or used by) these countries do have only an obviously limited importance for the continental or global arena.

It is importance directly correlated with the limited role such countries plays on the international arena (and, in the special case of Romania, with the real power status of our country).

In the best possible case Romania is a medium-sized power with some significant ambitions – not too much supported by adequate resources – aiming a more influential and prestigious international status, that of sub-regional leader).



An answer with strong theoretical roots

Identifying what type of answers we might avoid is, quite clearly, a very useful step. But it is not at all a really sufficient one. One of the potent tools we might use in the attempt to properly solve the already mentioned question is a significant set of strong concepts. We deliberately decided to work within the framework of the classic realist theory of international relations, using three solid concepts. The first such concept is that of “great power” (or “dominant power”), with special attention paid to the interests of these actors on the world arena. According to such a vision, a geographic (geo-strategic) region is really important as long as several great powers have significant interests in that area.

Moreover, the larger the number of great powers with significant interests in one region is, the more important that region becomes. But our intention is to use other two major concepts - “geo-strategic player” and geo-strategic pivot¹. The first of these two concepts designates states really able (because of their power potential but also as a direct result of a strong political will) to pursue their interests in large regions of the world, including areas far away – geographically – from the borders of the states we are speaking about. The results of the way in which such players act are significant changes on the world arena, directly influencing the interests of other major international actors. On the contrary, pivots are those areas (or states) clearly not able (or, more accurately, not powerful enough) to accomplish the same goals as the players. In such a situation, the pivots are forced to accept a clearly more passive condition – that of areas whose control is a matter of conflict or strategic compromise for the players already listed above. The geo-strategic pivots are those countries where many of the most changes generated by the actions of the players take place. When we speak about geo-strategic players and geo-strategic pivots, we can easily use the lists of such actors presented and discussed with a lot of details, some years ago, by Z. Brzezinski. This serious, experienced, notorious and very influential author clearly stated that in Eurasia five really important geo-strategic players are present in our days, while the significant geo-strategic pivots are also five². The really significant geo-strategic players are, in Brzezinski’s vision, France, Germany, Russia,

China and India. A sixth major geo-strategic player is the USA, but America is an actor with global capabilities and interests (present, as a direct result of these features, not only in Eurasia, but almost anywhere in the world). The five significant pivots in Eurasia are, according to the same author, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, South Korea, Turkey and Iran. Brzezinski thinks that two of these pivots, Turkey and Iran, can also play – even if not in a fully developed way – the role of regional geo-strategic players.

If we analyze these two lists it is easy to see that many of both the major Eurasian geo-strategic players and pivots have direct geographic connection with, and significant political and strategic interests in the Black Sea Area (BSA).

Russia (with a total population of over 140 million persons and a GDP of approx. 2.225 trillion USD in 2008³) controls a significant part of the shores of the Black Sea, including (as a result of a very complex and unstable set of agreements with Ukraine) the Crimean Peninsula with the major naval base at Sevastopol. It was, for several centuries, in open competition with Turkey (in the era of the Ottoman Empire) for the mastery of BSA.

Turkey is another major player in the BSA (total population of more than 76 million persons and a GDP of 906 billion USD in 2008; Ankara also absorbs more than 17% of the exports of Azerbaijan and offers 10% of the goods imported by Azerbaijan). Its geo-strategic role is enhanced by both the fact that Ankara controls the Straits connecting BSA with the Mediterranean Sea and by the fact that Turkey is a key NATO member.

Ukraine (total population of more than 45 million persons and a GDP of approx. 337 billion USD in 2008) is also a great regional power, the *de jure* owner of the Crimean Peninsula and also a country whose political elites are deeply divided: some of the leaders in Kiev almost openly support a long-term strategic deal with Russia, while others clearly wish a quick integration in the Western World. Russia’s political and strategic influence in Ukraine is deeply enhanced by the fact that Moscow absorbs almost 24 % of the Ukrainian exports and also produces almost 24% of the goods Kiev imports. Ukraine was supposed to get NATO membership, but several great European powers effectively blocked an early admission, even if such a solution was directly supported by USA.



According to various open sources, these great powers with major interests in the BSA are

Germany (the mightiest actor within the EU and the strongest pillar of the European part of NATO, with a population of more than 82 million persons and a GDP of approx. 3.8 trillion USD in 2008, which means a GDP/capita of almost 35,000 USD), *France* (smaller demographic resources and GDP than Germany – a population of 64 million people and a GDP of approx. 2.1 trillion USD in 2008 –, but with strong traditional strategic and cultural ties in the BSA and sometimes more active than Berlin on the international arena) and possibly *Great Britain* (not a major geo-strategic player, according to Brzezinski, but clearly a great power, in many occasions a reliable strategic partner of USA).

Azerbaijan (total population of 8.23 million persons and a GDP of approx. 73 billion USD in 2008), one of the important geo-strategic pivots in Eurasia, lies only a few hundred kilometres away from the Black Sea shores and naturally belongs to the larger BSA.

USA (total population of 307 million, GDP of approx. 14,3 trillion USD in 2008), the only superpower of the world nowadays, has also significant economic and strategic interests in the BSA. USA absorbs 4.8% of the products exported by Azerbaijan and produces 4.7% of the goods Baku imports. USA had also a significant role in the final decision to enlarge NATO by granting membership to Romania and Bulgaria. USA also attempted to enlarge NATO even more, by quickly integrating Ukraine and Georgia, but this geo-strategic goal failed at the Bucharest Summit in 2008. All these mean that one major player and two major pivots of Eurasia as a whole are concentrated on the very shores of the Black Sea. A third pivot, Azerbaijan, is geographically and geo-strategically belonging to BSA, while other two major geo-strategic Eurasian players have significant interests in the same region. This means that *6 out of 10 (60% of the total number) major players and pivots in Eurasia have either geographic presence or at least major interests of all sorts in the Black Sea Area (BSA), together with the US. The natural conclusion of such an evaluation is obvious: BSA really is an important geo-strategic region, just because so many significant actors of the international arena are deeply involved in the evolutions of all sorts in the area.*

Another answer, one with strong roots in history

Another very strong answer to the question about the global significance of Black Sea Area (BSA) is one properly using some important episodes of world history. The attention will naturally be focused on episodes able to prove, in a way or another, how important a region is and above all if its significance is a perennial feature of world politics.

Some geographic regions are clearly very important. Atlantic Ocean, for example, was the major goal/target of several strategic competitions fought along several centuries: the multi-century clash of Spain and England, the multi-century clash of France and England and, in more recent times, the huge, quite long and enormously significant conflicts we call World War I and World War II. Cold War also was a serious competition of the political will of USSR, continuously attempting to reach the Atlantic (at least in order to sever strategic transports from USA to Western Europe), with the political will of USA, which successfully attempted (using different instruments, NATO being one of them) to maintain control of both the Atlantic shores and of the main trans-Atlantic routes.

A strongly resembling thinking pattern can be used when we evaluate the importance of BSA. *In several occasions, this quite small strategic theatre was the main goal/target of either great power competition (sometimes quickly escalating to open war) or of other actions by means of which great powers attempted to project their military might (and political influence) in the region, in order to enhance their trans-regional power status.* The first significant episode able to prove how important BSA is (and how perennial this feature is to be regarded) is the cruise of a “large and wonderfully equipped” Athenian squadron, led by Pericles himself, in the Black Sea Area (BSA)⁴. Almost two millennia later, the Ottomans and the Genoese were in direct competition for the BSA.

Several centuries later, Russia and the Ottomans clashed along many large wars for the mastery of BSA. The relative balance of power in the same region was directly threatened by Russia in the 1850s, and its expansionist policies generated a massive and immediate response: large French and British armies and naval squadrons were deployed



in the BSA, successfully containing Russian expansion⁵. In the opening stages of World War I, Germany presented Turkey an irresistibly attractive gift, two major surface combat ships (the light cruiser *Breslau* and the battle-cruiser *Goeben*, both of them commissioned in 1911). Like in a complex domino game, this was the final piece placed to trigger a major strategic decision – that of joining the Central Powers, quickly adopted by the Ottoman Empire (in early November 1914, less than three months after the moment when *Goeben* and *Breslau* entered the Dardanelles)⁶. Along the years of World War II, BSA was again a major theater of military operations and of political manoeuvres of all sorts, directly involving Germany⁷, Soviet Russia, Great Britain, Italy and USA. In the opening stages of the Cold War, the earliest really significant experiment proving that what was to be called *containment* is an effective grand strategic design took place in the larger BSA (the Truman Doctrine implemented both in Turkey and in Greece). And nowadays another significant event proves that Black Sea Area still is an important target/goal of the political will and of the geo-strategic interests of major powers. We are speaking about the brief but very significant Russo-Georgian war in 2008, more or less accurately compared by some journalists “to Leonid Brezhnev’s crushing of the Prague Spring or Hitler’s invasion of the Sudetenland”⁸.

The briefest conclusion of this study has something to do not with the really important players of the international arena, which have serious – and in many occasions perennial – interests in BSA, but with the fate of medium-sized or small powers of the region (countries as Bulgaria, Romania, Moldavia, Georgia). *They have to properly understand that great power involvement in BSA is a fact; that great power involvement is a huge window of opportunity (if and when it properly used); and that great power presence and interests in BSA are also a huge constraint generator and risk generator (and we are speaking here mainly about immensely significant geo-strategic constraints and risks). Small and medium-sized powers in the Black Sea*

Area (BSA) have to properly understand all these, but above all they have also to resolutely and wisely act accordingly.

NOTES:

¹ See Zbigniew BRZEZINSKI, *Marea tablă de șah. Supremația americană și imperatiile sale geostrategice*, Ed. Univers Enciclopedic, București, 2000, p. 53.

² For these two lists see, *Ibidem*, p. 54.

³ For most of the figures quoted below see mainly the CIA’s *The World Factbook*, country pages last updated on May 14, 2009, at www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/.....

⁴ PLUTARCH, *Parallel Lives, Pericles*, XX.

⁵ For some basic elements of the geo-strategic interests and behaviour of the great powers involved in the Crimean War, see Henry KISSINGER, *Diplomația*, Ed. All, București, 1998, pp. 82-84 and 88.

⁶ For the way in which Turkey was step by step attracted by Germany, along several decades of increasing political, military and economic influence, see William CARR, *A history of Germany, 1815-1945*, Edward Arnold, 1969, pp. 227-228 and 238. For the Turkish decision to join the Central Powers, see Pierre RENOUVIN, *Primul Război Mondial*, Ed. Corint, București, p. 21. For a brief description of both *Goeben* and *Breslau* and their role in World War I, see Tony GIBBONS (general editor), *The Encyclopedia of Ships*, Silverdale Books, 2001, pp. 300, 318-319.

⁷ For German geo-strategic plans and political/military actions in the BSA and Crimeea, see H.R. TREVOR-ROPER (editor), *Hitler’s War Directives, 1939-1945*, Pan Books, London and Sydney, pp. 179, 183, 188, 190, 194-196, 203, 215 (for the Black Sea) and 143, 149, 151, 153, 179, 186-187, 197 and 237 (for Crimeea).

⁸ Charles KING, “The Five-Day War. Managing Moscow after the Georgia Crisis”, in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 87, no. 6, November/December 2008, p. 3.

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COOPERATION TOWARDS AND AGAINST SECURITY IN THE BLACK SEA AREA

Alexandra SARCINSCHI, PhD

Black Sea area is an area in which cooperation takes many forms. However, possibilities of cooperation are not fully turned into good account. The reasons cover an extended range: from the different approaches of the six coastal countries on security and stability in the region, to the historical legacy and difficult process of reform towards democracy and market economy that have generated disturbances in harmonization of the coastal countries' interests. In addition, states are faced here with a form of cooperation that tends to frustrate the efforts to enhance security cooperation, namely the "cooperation that generates insecurity" among outside law actors.

Keywords: Black Sea, cooperation, security, insecurity, regional mentality.

For over a decade, we have witnessed the trends of increased fragmentation of the Black Sea region. These, correlated with the move of the European Union and NATO towards integration and creation of stability, create geopolitical dilemmas to the actors in the region that seek to assert their distinct economic, political and military strategic interests. In this context, the main challenges to coastal states and those in the region are to harmonize the various interests of area's state and non-state actors and to improve numerous existing cooperation initiatives. It seems that the answer to these challenges is a new "regional mentality" based on four main elements: spirit of partnership, mutual support and respect, cooperation on specific issues, and positive and constructive relations between governments in the region.

However, what is needed to stabilize such efforts and to develop the Black Sea region? Black Sea is a bridge between two "worlds": the developed, crowded and consumerist West and the developing, vast and rich in natural resources

East. In this area meet the interests of the former main state actors of the Cold War, but also those of international organizations. Black Sea is an area of competition for power, which still continues, even in the conditions of global financial and economic crisis and recrudescence of positive messages towards world peace and security. Thus, cooperation for stabilization and development of this area is a difficult task for state and non-state actors, which should allocate more resources to achieve the desired output.

Forms of cooperation

By its classic definition, international cooperation has positive connotations. It is the deliberate adjustment of policies by countries trying to solve a common problem or to obtain mutual gains.¹ However, new features of the security environment have shown that in these processes not only the countries might be stakeholders, but different organizations and groups of interests, and that the outputs might have negative effects. In the last decade, theories regarding international cooperation were focused on three elements²:

1. Non-state actors, which increasingly play important roles in all forms of international cooperation (from international organizations to private companies). This trend signifies the erosion of the authority of nation-states as the primary unit of analysis at international level.

2. Rules and ideas shared at the transnational level, which constitute a source of sustainable cooperation. By introducing this element of analysis, it is recognized that the traditional model based on economic and military factors is no longer sufficient to determine the nature and the extent of international cooperation processes.

3. Effectiveness of cooperation, as a topic



of maximum interest, which concerns both the manner in which the agreements and the measures are taken jointly by states, and the degree to which these agreements resolve problems which they are addressed to.

Looking from this perspective at the processes of cooperation around the Black Sea, we can talk about two main forms of international cooperation:

1. International cooperation that creates enhanced zonal stability and security – “*international cooperation that generates security*”.

2. International cooperation that erodes zonal stability and security – “*international cooperation that generates insecurity*”.

To recognize the concomitant existence of these two categories is a crucial point in establishing a methodology for analyzing the forms of enhancing cooperation in a specific area or region.

International cooperation that generates security

As a generator of security, international cooperation must address all areas where there are risks, dangers and threats to security, at any levels of manifestation.

These forms of cooperation are aimed to solve problems that have increased in intensity in the recent decades. The need for expansion and intensification of cooperation in this region can be substantiated by some affirmation from discussions held between the experts in the field³:

- *Threats grow in magnitude, especially cross-border crime, and can be controlled only through forms of regional cooperation;*

- *Opportunities for economic development in many countries of the region could benefit from some cooperative efforts, such as the ones on transport infrastructure or flight connections;*

- *Such forms of cooperation also creates identities, build mutual trust among the regional actors and promote the achievement and preservation of peace, particularly between the former rivals;*

- *European Union, whose borders are in the Black Sea, is interested in achieving and maintaining stability in the region, which motivates the creation of new initiatives for regional cooperation;*

- *Those actors in the region - be they governments or formations from opposition or civil soci-*

ety - , which struggle for consolidating democracy and the rule of law, are especially concerned in cooperation with other actors in other parts of the world, in order to promote their regional interests.

Cooperation in the Black Sea area is imposed, on the one hand, by external pressures - NATO and EU enlargement; energy resources exploitation in the area of Caspian Sea and their transportation to the West; the international drug, arms and persons trafficking; combating organized crime, etc. - and, on the other hand, by many internal pressures on two levels: state one - modernizing economies; democratization; access to energy resources, etc. - and regional one - the ideal of transforming the region from a zone of confrontation in an area of confluence.

First of all, the enlargement of NATO and EU to the East has transformed the Black Sea region in a space of various international partnerships, programs, and projects that are aimed both to strengthen regional stability and to prepare this region for integration. In this regard, the relations between coastal states and these organizations are as follows:

1. NATO/EU member countries – Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey (no EU membership, but Accession Partnership and participation to Black Sea Synergy) – that created their security strategies with regard to the present and desired international status and roles;

2. The Russian Federation, that has a distinct vision on security based on its position in the international relations and as an important partner for NATO (PfP, NATO-Russia Council and NATO Military Liaison Mission Moscow) and EU (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and participation into Black Sea Synergy);

3. Aspiring countries to the NATO/EU membership - Georgia (Intensified Dialogue with NATO; NATO – Georgia Commission; EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement; Action Plan on European Neighbourhood Policy <ENP>; Black Sea Synergy; Eastern Partnership; European financial support, etc.) and Ukraine (NATO Partnership for Peace; NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform; NATO-Ukraine Commission; EU Action Plan; main partner in ENP; Black Sea Synergy; Eastern Partnership, etc.) – that have started a complex process of adapting to the requirements of these organizations.



Secondly, the other types of external pressures have increased the number of instruments for cooperation in the economic, political and military field. At regional level, there are organizations and initiatives such as EU and NATO, OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), SECI (Southeast European Cooperation Initiative), SEECP (South East European Cooperation Process), SPSEE (Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe), BSEC (Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation), BLACKSEAFOR (Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group), SEEBRIG (Southeast European Brigade), Black Sea Harmony, etc.

EU, whose borders reach the Black Sea, has developed four main policies and initiatives to address the countries of the region:

1. *European Neighbourhood Policy (2004)* - countries in the region included: Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine;

2. *Black Sea Synergy (2007)* - countries in the region included: Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Turkey, and Russia;

3. *Eastern Partnership (2008)* - countries in the region included: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine;

4. *Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (1999)*, reorganized in 2008 as the *Regional Cooperation Council*, comprising all the countries of Southeastern Europe.

Also, NATO has developed five instruments to promote cooperation in the region:

1. *Partnership for Peace (1994)* - participants of the Black Sea region: Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine;

2. *South East Europe Initiative (2000)* - programs and initiatives to promote regional cooperation and long-term stability in the Balkans;

3. *NATO - Russia Council (2002)* and *NATO Military Liaison Mission Moscow (2002)*;

4. *NATO-Georgia Commission (2008)*;

5. *NATO-Ukraine Commission (1997)*.

Equally important to the development of the region are organizations and initiatives such as:

- Council of Europe through the *Black Sea Euroregion* (September 2008), which is a forum for cooperation of local authorities in the Black Sea basin (signatories to 26th of September, 2008: Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania; invited to join: Turkey, Greece,

Azerbaijan, and Ukraine). Its objectives are: to stimulate interregional cooperation and border cooperation in the region bordering the Black Sea; to strengthen good governance practices, economic development, social solidarity and the development of interethnic harmony; cross-border cooperation through the European Group for Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) and European Policy Neighbourhood (ENP).

- Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), which operates officially from 1st of May, 1999 (countries: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, and Ukraine). Among its main objectives includes: achieving a zone of security, stability and prosperity through regional economic cooperation; to cooperate on the following issues: agriculture, banking and finance, fighting against crime, culture, customs, emergency assistance, education, energy, environmental protection, health, data and statistical information exchange, communication and good governance, science and technology, small and medium enterprises, tourism, trade and economic development, transportation; projects up to 2013-2014: ring freeway bus and rail of the Black Sea.

- Organization for Democracy and Economic Development - GUAM (ODED-GUAM), which was founded in 1996 in Vienna, and became operational by signing the Charter, on 6-7 June 2001 (Yalta). Originally called GGUAM, the acronym of the Member States (Georgia, Uzbekistan, who retired in the early 2005, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova), acquires a new name in May 2006. Its objectives are: cooperation for promotion of democratic values and sustainable development; enhancing international and regional integration; European integration. ODED-GUAM is associated with the competition between the two transport corridors connecting Europe and Asia. Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan negotiate North-South International Transport Corridor (along the border between Russia and the Baltic states of EU, then South through Ukraine), but the U.S. would prefer to avoid Iran and Russia via the Black Sea and Sea Caspian.

- Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), founded on 8th of December, 1991, has the following Member States: Belarus, Russia, Georgia, Ukraine (not a full member because it



has not ratified the Charter), Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan (not ratified the Charter and, since 2005, is an associate member), and Uzbekistan. CSI has two main components that impact the Black Sea region: the Common Economic Space and the Collective Security Treaty (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Georgia and Belarus). Its declared objectives are: protection of the CIS borders; separating areas with problems of the CIS; establishing a joint system of air defense and coordinating military planning process; prevention and combating terrorism. It is important to notice that Russia recognized in 2008 the separatist regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia, that belong to one of the CIS Member States, namely Georgia.

Moreover, in addition to these institutions and organizations, the region's states has initiated bi- and trilateral agreements intended to counteract the dangers and threats specific to our Century and the associated risks: Romania - Bulgaria - Turkey ("Cooperation Agreement between the governments of three countries on combating terrorism, corruption, illicit trafficking and money laundering", 17th of April, 1998), Romania - Moldova - Ukraine ("Protocol of trilateral cooperation between the governments of Romania, Moldova and Ukraine" and "Declaration of Presidents of Romania, Moldova and Ukraine on cooperation in combating organized crime" signed on 3-4 July 1997), etc. These agreements have initiated new forms of cooperation such as those through "Upper Prut" and "Lower Danube" Euroregions or cooperation in the free economic zones (eg. free economic zone Galati-Reni-Giurgiulesti).

In addition to these methods of enhancing economic cooperation, in recent years have been intensified several forms of *multilateral and interdependent cooperation* that are widely open to all fields, including the ecologic one. Moreover, the issue that has become particularly important in the security agendas of region's states is related to the conservation of the natural environment, whereas the Black Sea is facing serious problems of environmental degradation, habitat loss of the endangered species and excessive exploitation. There is a direct causal link between Black Sea and Central Europe, explained by the passage Danube - Black Sea. To this end, initiatives have been

institutionalized such as the EU Commission for Communication on Environmental Cooperation in the Danube - Black Sea Region and the Black Sea Commission, which are intended to substantially change the environmental policy and to align it to the European Union.

There were created some initiatives in the cultural sector, whose purpose is to counteract the increasing number of acts of intolerance, violence, xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, marginalization and discrimination directed against ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, refugees, immigrants and other vulnerable social groups. Cooperation does not stop only to counter the actions of this type, but is meant to lead and, in short term, to achieve an extensive network of universities, which must identify and improve intellectual resources necessary for sustainable development of Members in the region and, on this basis, to reduce most part of the phenomena and processes generating crises and conflicts. The most important examples are the Black Sea University Foundation, the Regional Network for Tolerance in the Mediterranean and Black Sea initiated by UNESCO, the Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership, and the International Foundation for the Black Sea and Caspian Sea, etc.

At regional level, there are forms of cooperation aimed not only at addressing specific issues of environmental security at the beginning of 21st Century, but also at addressing some older dispute, even historical ones, such as those related to establishing maritime boundaries of the continental shelf and economic exclusive areas between coastal states.⁴ During the Cold War, multilateral cooperation was a concept almost foreign to the countries here, since the region was divided between communist countries on the one hand and Turkey on the other.

However, cooperation attempts have been made since the period that followed the Second World War trying to initiate some forms of cooperation between Romania, Bulgaria and the USSR by the Varna Convention (1959), but also between Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and the General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean. Specialists say, however, that these initiatives have been ephemeral and have not any real effect.

Another attempt to cooperate, this time in the field of environmental protection, was the Marpol Convention (1973). Although all the



coastal countries have ratified the agreement by which the Black Sea became a protected area, the implementation was a failure because of the lack of financial support and willingness to clearly delimit the exclusive economic zones of those states.

Finally, on international cooperation as a generator of security, one can say that it is not only the attribute of governments and international organizations, but this issue falls also under concerns of civil society, particularly the private sector of society. It aims to intensify cooperation in specific areas such as infrastructure, transport and communications, manufacturing sector, energy and services.

Unfortunately, the opportunities and possibilities for cooperation in the Black Sea region are not fully covered. One reason is the different concepts of security and stability in the region that the six coastal states have. Moreover, historical heritage and difficult process of reform towards democracy and market economy have generated factors that hinder the harmonization of their interests.

International cooperation that generates insecurity

Most forms of cooperation set out above were born in response to present or forecasted factors of uncertainty, themselves a result of cooperation in various fields between the actors of the security environment. It is about terrorist groups and organized crime that activate in the Black Sea region or that use it as a bridge for expanding their activities in other areas of the globe.

Black Sea may facilitate the involvement of international terrorist organizations, allowing the following actions⁵:

- *Location of bases, organizations' headquarters and elements of terrorist networks, of drugs, arms and human dealers, into a state or in an area that allows this, and deployment of insurgent and terrorist activities in other states;*

- Recruitment of members for terrorist organizations and organized crime networks among low economically developed countries, which face poverty;

- Institutional cooperation of various actors from the Wider Black Sea Area, which are different from terrorist organizations, but finance their actions;

- Marketing and transportation of arms, which are purchased from countries that were broken

after the destruction of the Iron Curtain and are used in armed confrontations in different parts of the world, etc.

Another form of international cooperation that can generate insecurity is the one that refers to placement of the region in various spheres of influence. NATO and EU enlargement to the Black Sea has created many debates on the role the Russian Federation will hold here. Also, the Kremlin has expressed concern on settling the U.S. military bases in some Black Sea neighboring and bordering countries.⁶ Even in its new National Security Strategy⁷ of May 2009, Russia made reference to these issues, establishing precisely the landmarks regarding the dangers and threats to the country: NATO enlargement, as a representative of the failed global and regional architecture; the U.S. antimissile shield project in Europe; economic and financial crisis; terrorism; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc. However, Russia does not exclude the strengthening of cooperation with U.S. and NATO in order to enhance security in the world.

In addition, Professor Charles King (Georgetown University) has identified a novel form of cooperation that generates insecurity between Transnistria, Abkhazia, Karabakh and South Ossetia, which he calls TAKO. According to King, TAKO seems to be more active than ODED - GUAM, the organization of the states which these provinces are part of.⁸ In 1994, these four unrecognized republics have been associated to sign an Agreement for coordination of their policy initiatives and provide mutual assistance in several sectors, especially in the military one, in case of an armed conflict.⁹ Six years later, in 2000, they tried to revive the Agreement, in a Conference of Foreign Ministers of the unrecognized republics. Thus, under the Agreement, was created the Parliamentary Assembly of Unrecognized States, based in Moscow. Even if the stated objectives of this cooperation are positively oriented towards economic development and trade and education, an important activity of these provinces seeks illicit trafficking of weapons, drugs and humans. These unrecognized republics became authoritarian and militarize entities that are led by the same persons who triggered the armed conflict in the '90s.¹⁰

It is noted that although the Black Sea region is characterized by a large organizational infrastructure, which deals with security problems



in all fields and at all levels, the forms of cooperation that generate insecurity are sometimes more active than those aimed to counteract the dangers and threats.

However, it is still in need of new areas, ways and possibilities for multilateral international cooperation both the Black Sea and its wider region, which will harmonize divergent interests and will neutralize trends generating insecurity.

Conclusions

In over a decade after the social movements of the 90s, the Black Sea region still faces a deficit of stability and security. One of the ways in which this situation can be remedied is obviously not only the enhancement of cooperation at regional level but also the one globally.

The region must place its specific security issues on the international agenda and take advantage of any opportunity to make its voices heard in the world. Promoting a common vision on security will help the states concerting their efforts to act together against threats to the region and their interdependence will reduce the conflict potential in the area.

Analysts say that the important geostrategic position of the Black Sea at the crossroads of three continents, three civilizations and two great religions confer it an importance that Central Europe has during the Cold War. It provides NATO and the EU a unique opportunity to join efforts and bring the coastal states into more closely contact with Europe. To these efforts could join Russia, which already is involved in various forms of cooperation with major international organizations.

It is necessary that the relations of cooperation not to be limited to the Black Sea coastal actors, but to be extended to the concept of Wider Black Sea Area, from the Balkans to the Caspian Sea and beyond it. Such actions will be addressed to a wide range of issues that directly or indirectly threaten the security of the Black Sea region: terrorism; drug trafficking; human trafficking; trafficking in conventional and unconventional weapons; competition for transportation routes of energy resources; the uncoordinated participation in various defence and security organizations with various and even divergent interests; bilateral disputes; historical animosities and mutual suspicions; divergent security agendas.

Therefore, stability and lasting security in the Black Sea area and beyond can only be achieved through a multidimensional approach, including a wide variety of tools, with emphasis on the non-military ones. They should aim especially on strengthening democracy and sustainable development of countries in the region, whereas the risks, dangers and threats mentioned above can not be offset in a framework of domestic instability and lack of confidence in their own institutions.

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ECONOMIC AND ENERGY INTERDEPENDENCIES IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

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In the international system, economic and political-military subsystems are interdependent and no doubt that there is a link, not only correlative, but also causal, between detaining, supplying, demanding and using energy resources, their geographical spread and access, and regional security.

All recent oil games are carried on spaces with geopolitical importance, in context of new local, regional and global changes. Pontus space is placed on the main stage of energy issues and it is crossing a period of geopolitical and geoeconomic reshaping, which is amplified by power competition between major regional and international actors.

Among these actors, the European Union and the Russian Federation are in relations of both concurrence and cooperation in order to dominate the Black Sea energy complex thru control of hydrocarbons and transport routes. In addition, the importance of Pontus basin rises in economic field taking into account the fact that Black Sea is the shortest route from Central Asia-Caspian-Caucasus to Europe. In that context, the energy security doesn't constitute only an objective of economic policy, but it became a constant concern for riparian states with direct impact on economy, society and environment.

Keywords: financial-economic crisis, energy security, economic cooperation.

The impact of financial crisis in the regional economy

The US financial crisis has rapidly propagated across the Ocean and hit European economy, situation which was sustained by the dynamic of transatlantic economic relations and a certain financial and commercial interdependence. Russia and other states from the Black Sea region were gradually affected by the effects of global crisis

by four channels that successively manifested – informational, financial, commercial, and foreign exchange –, and growth recorded a significant regression. Moreover, beginning with the second half of 2008, the riparian states have faced the most serious financial-economic crisis from the Second World War up to present, crisis that can be transformed rapidly into recession in the next period without a set of prompt and effective measures.

In the recent years, the economic development of region's states has been due to foreign capital. Thus, real wage growth and overexpansion of credit has resulted in increasing current account deficits, the increased indebtedness of the private sector especially in foreign currency and, not least, the extent of real estate sector development.

Turbulences on worldwide financial markets have made more difficult to maintain the level of external indebtedness of banks and business resulting in diminishing domestic credit. Therefore, dependence on capital and investments of developed Western countries, and they are also in difficulty, has a major impact on the financial stability of the states from analyzed region.

In the Black Sea region we can say that there is no main leader of economic development. But at 2008 level, taking into account the value of GDP and GDP per capita, Russia can be considered the most developed economy in the region even its economy is based mainly on incomes from hydrocarbon exports.

Riparian countries, maybe excepting Russia, were generally resistant to the effects of financial crisis. Contagion effect of global financial crisis on Black Sea economies was initially quite limited, due both to the less developed financial system and less degree of financial integration with developed economies. In addition, growth in most states from region was based primarily



on strengthening national currencies, increasing domestic consumption and foreign investments. In the second half of 2008, the situation has changed

radically and economic indicators have recorded significant depreciation.

Indicators States	GDP (billion dollars)		GDP annual percent change		GDP per capita (dollars)	
	2008	2009	2008	2009	2008	2009
Bulgaria	51,99	51,35	6,02	-2,00	6.857	6.823
Georgia	12,87	11,27	2,04	1,00	2.925	2.562
Romania	199,67	166,47	7,10	-4,14	9.292	7.774
Russia	1.676,59	1.163,65	5,60	-5,98	11.807	8.230
Turkey	729,44	552,18	1,06	-5,10	10.472	7.840
Ukraine	179,73	114,71	2,10	-8,01	3.920	2.521

Figure no. 1: GDP situation in the riparian states

Source: International Monetary Fund, *World Economic Outlook Database*, April 2009

Russia's economy recorded in 2008 the lowest growth rate in the last 7 years, mainly because of the crisis that prejudiced Russian exports and of the ruble decline that affected consumers' demand. Russian currency is in a continuous depreciation against European and U.S. dollar currencies, thereby Ruble depreciated by 35% compared with the latter.

Moreover, the Russian economy has been seriously hit by the decrease in production and energy prices and the exodus of foreign capital. Ural crude oil price, the main export product of Russia has decreased by 63% from the record 147.50 dollars per barrel recorded in July 2008.

GDP registered a growth of 5.6% in 2008 compared with 8.1% in 2007. According to specialists of the Russian Ministry of Economy, Russia will have in 2009 a growth of only 2.4%, if the selling price per barrel of Ural oil will be around 50 dollars. Industry will decrease by 3.2%, while activity in the manufacturing sector will be 4.3% lower than in 2008. The agriculture is a basic component of the economy taking into account that the grain harvest reached a record level of the past 15 years. The volume of Russian exports stagnated, but revenues have increased especially in the first half of last year due to increasing international prices of oil and natural gas. Also, the volume of imports continued to increase and was above the one of exports, which raises the trade deficit.

Moreover, Russia has recorded budget deficit for the first time in the last ten years.

The trend of nationalization the debt and privatize the profits emphasizes image implosion in the economy . Government has allocated 50 billion dollars to help the companies to honour the foreign debt, which in turn offered a part of shares as guaranty. Measures taken by the Moscow administration to counter effects of the global economic crisis are likely to increase state control over the economy and diminish the country's competitiveness.

The other countries in the Pontus space – Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine – are not recording a better economic situation. Lack of financial funds and drastic decrease of the inputs to the budget have a major impact on economic activities. They will face further difficulties in terms of reducing domestic consumption and increasing the credit cost. Thus, the two members of the European Union are close to recession, growth rates falling to a negative trend: Bulgaria from 6% in 2008 to 2% in 2009 and Romania from 7% in 2008 to -4% in 2009. Turkey's economy recorded last year a serious decline in economic activity in context of weak external and internal demand and GDP growth rate has reached the lowest value from 2001 onwards (1%). Georgia and Ukraine are also in economic and financial distress as a result of declined prices



on goods, reduced foreign direct investment and remittances.

Given the economic situation more and more difficult, some countries from the Black Sea area have appealed to assistance of international specialized bodies : Romania has concluded a loan amounting to 19.95 billion euro with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Union, World Bank (WB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and other financial institutions; Ukraine – 16.5 billion dollars with the IMF, Georgia – 750 million dollars with the IMF. Also, Turkey and the IMF reached a principle agreement on 45 billion dollars new loan, money for alleviating the effects of global economic crisis.

Forecasts for 2009 of the most important international organizations such as UN, IMF, World Bank and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development remain pessimistic and probably the economic situation in these countries will depend more on further evolution of developed European economies, external loans, investments and foreign capital. This dependence has a negative impact on the process of establishing a solid economic base which is absolutely necessary to achieve multilateral cooperation in the region.

Regional energy potential

In our days, the energy potential of the Black Sea region is constituted from hydrocarbon flows that transit this area (between Occident and states from Caucasus, Central Asia and Middle East, especially knowing the fact that the Pontus basin is the shortest route to Europe) and from many maritime areas rich in energy resources. Black Sea area has become in the last period a significant importance in the light of reserves that would hide in the depths, comparable with those from the Caspian basin. According to some surveys, the Black Sea has energy reserves about 10 billion barrels of oil and 1.5 thousand billion m³ of natural gas. However, the depth where these resources are, makes them hard to be exploited. The offshore reserves discovered up to present in the Romanian, Ukrainian, Bulgarian and Turkish coastline are not so important.

From energy point of view, Russia is by far the most important reservoir, producer and exporting country from this region. The other riparian states depend mainly on external energy imports, especially on oil and natural gas delivers from Russian Federation and its transportation network. This is an important vulnerability.

Country	Oil			Natural gas		
	Reserves (billion barrels)	Production (thousand barrels/day)	Consumption (thousand barrels/day)	Reserves (thousand billion m ³)	Production (thousand billion m ³ /year)	Consumption (thousand billion m ³ /year)
Bulgaria	0.015	3.36	121.00	0.200	0.000	0.198 (since 2006)
Georgia	0.035	0.98	14.00	0.300	0.0004	0.053
Romania	0.600	114.15	219.00	2.225	0.441	0.660 (since 2006)
Russia	60.000	9,874.03	2.820.00	1,680.000	23.064	16.746
Turkey	0.300	45.53	690.55	0.300	0.032	1.292
Ukraine	0.395	102.89	351.00	39.000	0.689	2.998

Figure no. 2: Energy resources in the riparian states

Source: PennWell Corporation, *Oil & Gas Journal*, Vol. 106, No. 48, 22 December 2008, www.eia.doe.gov



States from the Black Sea region can be grouped in three categories, such as:

- *states which are independent of energy resources* that have significant oil and natural gas reserves on their territory. The category may be extended to: states that have resources only for internal use; states that provide their own needs and export too; states that are exporters, but the volume of their resources is different, etc. Only Russian Federation can be included in that category, because it is a hydrocarbon rich country and one of major world exporters;

- *states which are partially dependent* that have limited energy resources and cover their necessary by imports or preserve their resources for political or environmental reasons. The countries with low rates of dependency, sustain by their reserves of energy resources, are Ukraine, Romania and Turkey;

- *states which are totally dependent from energy resources* that need resources for running and developing their economies. Bulgaria and Georgia are the states which are almost totally dependent on external hydrocarbons.

As is known, the energy mix of the modern economy is increasingly based on oil and natural gas, even some analysis show that gas will soon replace “black gold” in consumer preferences. Consequence of these phenomena is the emergence of a transnational system of resources, with many ramifications. The Black Sea space became a strategic area, so the regional economy is influenced by “energy routes competition” between Russia and Occident. Several pipelines are already in operation in the Pontus area, such as:

- Blue Stream gas pipeline: connects Russia (Djugba) with Turkey (Samsun) thru Black Sea; length - 1213 km; capacity - 16 bn. m³/an; operating from February 2003;

- BTC oil pipeline: links Baku (Azerbaijan) – Tbilisi (Georgia) – Ceyhan (Turkey); length - 1768 km; capacity - 1 million barrels/day; operating from May 2005;

- Baku-Supsa oil pipeline: connects Baku (Azerbaijan) – Supsa (Georgia) with Black Sea; length - 830 km; capacity - 145000 barrels/day which can be increased to 600000 barrels/day; operating from April 1999;

- BTE gas pipeline: links Baku (Azerbaijan) – Tbilisi (Georgia) – Erzurum (Turkey); length - 692 km; capacity - 8.8 bn. m³/year which can be

increased to 30 bn. m³/year; operating from May 2006.

In addition to these pipelines, there have been proposed numerous other projects and alternative routes of hydrocarbons transportation from the East to the Western developed countries, such as:

- Nabucco gas pipeline: connects Turkey (border with Georgia and Iran) with Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria (gas collection node at Baumgarten), thru Black Sea; length - 3282 km; capacity - 31 million m³/year; estimated costs - 7.9 bn. euro; supported by EU;

- Pan-European Oil Pipeline (PEOP): links Constanta (Romania) with Pancevo (Serbia), Omisalj (Croatia), thru Slovenia, to Trieste (Italy); length - 1360 km (649 km on Romanian territory); capacity - 40-90 million tons/year; estimated costs - 2.4 bn. dollars; supported by EU;

- Burgas-Alexandropolis oil pipeline: connects Russia with Bulgaria and Greece, thru Black Sea; length - 285 km; capacity - 35-50 million tons/year; estimated costs - 800-900 million dollars; supported by Russia;

- South Stream gas pipeline: links Russia with Bulgaria, thru Black Sea, with Greece and Southern Italy; another possible route is Russia – Bulgaria – Serbia – Hungary – Austria; length - 900 km to Bulgaria; capacity - 31-47 bn. m³/year; estimated costs - 19-24 bn. euro; supported by Russia and in competition with Nabucco project.

The competition for hydrocarbons transportation has resulted with the breaking of an old Russian monopoly in the years 2005-2006. The oil pipelines Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa compete with the Russian Caspian pipeline with terminals in Novorossiisk and Tuapse.

Turkey tries to develop the Kirkuk (Iraq) – Ceyhan and Nabucco projects. EU, Romania and Azerbaijan plan to launch the alternative maritime energy route with base in Constanta.

After 2005, Moscow has multiplied its pressures to control the energy routes and now is trying to double Blue Stream and construct Burgas-Alexandropolis, Burgas-Serbia-Croatia-Adriatic Sea and Samsun-Ceyhan pipelines. These pipelines thru Balkans and Anatolia are planned to block the Nabucco and Constanta-Trieste projects.

The transport network of the oil and gas pipelines from Caspian Sea and Middle East to Europe depend mainly on the accept and capacity

of producers from these areas to supply resources that will fill the existent or projected pipelines.

Also, they depend on Ukraine and Turkey, states that control the oil and gas transit between Russia and Occident. In this game, Ukraine has an advantageous position and uses the Odessa-Brody pipeline in order to obtain benefits from Russia and EU, and became the so-called regional “oil dispatcher”. Turkey, which is interested in management of oil and gas transit from Middle East, Caucasus and Black Sea, insists on Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline that offers an alternative energy source and avoids the pressures and ecologic problems from the straits.

In these conditions, a distinct place in the producer-consumer relation is to be occupied by intermediary, namely the state on which territory

the energy vector transits. The intermediary seeks to consolidate its economic advantages offered by transit and, in the same time, to consecrate these advantages in the political system of international relations.

With the exception of Russia, the other riparian countries are already or have the potential to become significant energy intermediaries between East and West.

On the one hand, in an optimistic perspective, the producer-intermediary-consumer relations might generate interdependencies that can constitute a solid base for solutions to enforce security. On the other hand, each part of holder – exploiter – producer – transporter – distributor – consumer chain is interested to defend and promote its own interests in order to maximize the results.




Figure no. 3: Energy infrastructure in the Black Sea region

Source: Philippe Rekacewicz, UNEP/GRID-Arendal, http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/black_sea_pipelines_giwa

Energy interests of the EU and the Russian Federation

The Black Sea region represents an intersection area of the major world actors’ interests, especially cooperation-competition in the energy field between European Union and Russian Federation.

In our days, the energy basis of European Union is composed by fossil fuels representing 78.7% of consumption and 53.8% of imports . The consumption is distributed as follows: 36.9% oil (almost 15 million barrels/day in 2006); 24%

natural gas; 17.8% coal; 14% nuclear energy, etc. The dependence of external energy sources will reach in 2030 the level of 70% with 90% of the oil consumption and 80% of the gas consumption covered from imports.

EU imports 33.5% of its oil and 42% of the necessary natural gas (60% in 2030) from Russian Federation. In fact, the EU access to oil and gas resources are controlled by USA, Russian Federation and Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.



Origin	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2006 (%)
<i>EU-27 oil imports (million tons)</i>								
Russia	112,4	136,8	154,7	170,8	188,9	188,0	189,0	33,5
Total imports	515,8	514,9	515,3	542,9	569,5	573,3	564,6	100,0
<i>EU-27 gas imports (terajoules)</i>								
Russia	4539709	4421515	4554744	4895252	4951044	4952879	4927552	42,0
Total imports	9095064	9015628	9764705	10301649	10726388	11364494	11729309	100,0

Figure no. 4: EU energy imports

Source: European Commission, EU Energy and Transport in figures: Statistical Pocketbook 2009

In this framework, in order to reduce its energy dependence, EU has concentrated its attention on rich regions of Caspian Sea, Caucasus and CIS states and tries to strengthen its status in the region by promoting the policy of extended neighbourhood. Also, it has elaborated the “Black Sea Synergy – a new regional cooperation initiative” and Eastern Partnership, strategies dedicated to consolidate cooperation with the region’s states in various fields such as the energy one. EU, which has the support of the states from the Western coast of the Black Sea, seeks to open the access to the energy sources from the Caspian Sea, Near and Middle East. This will reduce on medium term the EU members’ dependence on Russia.

Thereby, the Occident has focused on constructing pipelines in Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Turkish shore of the Black Sea (such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) in order to elude Russian monopoly on oil and gas transports to West. Also, EU insists on project of Nabucco gas pipeline, project of Azerbaijan-Georgia-Ukraine-Poland pipeline, project of Trieste-Constanta-Georgia-Azerbaijan pipeline, etc.

In theory, the Western consumption might be covered by some other sources and, thus, Russia will become a “deposit” of energy resources that is too big to satisfy only the domestic and allies’ demand. Practically, the Russia’s interest can not be ignored and its influence in the adjacent areas (Caucasus, Eastern shore of the Black Sea and a part of Central Asia) hinders the projects of energy transport that are by-passing it. Moreover, the Russian infrastructure for European distribution and the offensive of Russian energy companies, which are holding key positions on the South-East European market, would make easier supplying the West. It seems that the entire issue is just a benefits

and opportunities negotiation, so that NATO and EU to penetrate the space of the former soviet republics and Russia to hold an advantageous position on the European market.

This situation requires EU to rapidly find answers and even to create and implement a common energy policy and a reliable energy partnership with Russian Federation.

Still, we notice that: Germany has a special energy partnership with Russia; South-East European states are willing to create an energy community; Great Britain has energy resources in the Northern Sea; other states are insisting on developing partnerships with energy rich counties from Africa.

The Black Sea region is an important energy source for Europe. That is why EU must perform the following actions:

- to take the opportunity shaped by the completion of BTC and BTE pipelines to develop an European energy infrastructure across Caspian Sea and Black Sea and help the East Caspian producers to channel their hydrocarbons to Europe;
- to provide financial and technical support to the states in the region to develop Nabucco pipeline and other energy projects that by-pass Russian territory;
- to encourage Russia to perform liberalization of its economy and energy sector.

It is no doubt that Russian Federation dominates the region from the energy point of view. Moscow controls the energy sector by state companies (especially Gazprom) and activates the strategy of „energy diplomacy” which consists in delivering cheap energy to allies and expensive energy to adversaries.

Frequently, the energy exports have been stopped until the bilateral disputes are solved



(examples are disputes with Ukraine from 2005-2009 period or with Republic of Moldova from 2006).

In Black Sea region, Russia tries to block or compete with the alternative energy routes from Caspian Basin and Central Asia and, in generally, to increase the EU dependency on hydrocarbon deliveries. But, Kremlin administration must take into account that its main oil and gas pipelines transit Belarus, Lithuania, Ukraine, and Poland.

The energy transport to EU is practically controlled by local actors. In these conditions, Russia pressures to buy the natural gas transporters from Belarus and Ukraine.

In the energy field, Russia acts in order to:

- cover the entire demand of some energy importers by long term bilateral contracts;
- consolidate the oil and gas supplying by long term contracts signed with Central Asia producers;
- control strategic energy infrastructure from Europe and Eurasia by buying pipelines, refineries, electric grids, ports;
- extend the Gazprom monopoly.

Russian state consciously uses the energy resources control in order to ensure its influence

in power politics from ex-soviet and European space. Russia was often accused that uses energy to increase its politic and economic influence over Baltic states and Poland. In that sense, Moscow stopped or threatens to stop the gas deliveries to some ex-soviet states as a result of political aspects (independence movements, pro-occidental attitudes), economic aspects (prices, debts, cede the energy control) or even military aspects. On all these actions, Russia affected the Western consumers. Moscow argues that its price policy is strictly influenced by the conditions on the market . But, there are major differences between prices from domestic market and ally states, such as Armenia, and the prices set for states which tried to escape from the Russian influence, such as Georgia. In the below figure we present the prices practiced by Russia on internal market and for its natural gas exports in different moments (data are those that circulate in the public sources of information).

Russia raises or threats to raise the price of natural gas supplied in some CIS, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe countries in order to maintain at least its economic influence in those spaces.

States	Price (dollars/1000 cubic meters)				
	Beginning of 2000	2005	2006	2007	2008
Russia	27	32	40-45	52	52
Armenia	45-100	56	110	110	110
Azerbaijan		60	110	230	230
Belarus		46.7	46.7	100	119
Georgia		68	110	230	230
Moldova Republic		80	160	170	191.25
Ukraine		50	95	130	179.50
Baltic states		85-95	120-125	230	280
Bulgaria		120-130	120-130	120-130	170-175
Romania	120	190-195	250-255	280-285	370
Turkey	75	100	243	243	300
Western Europe (average price)	200-240	240	240	265	370

Figure no. 5: Russian natural gas prices



Although this measure seems to be a response to the attitude of different capitals towards Russia, the political impact is far to have the expected results.

The most recent gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine demonstrates the fact that the Black Sea area is a very important region for Moscow, taking into account that the shortest route to the heart of Europe passes this area. Thereby, Russia may concede some energy facilities to states from the region because many pipelines to West pass or will pass thru the Black Sea basin.

However, the Russian economy dependence on EU's capital, technology and trade – and finally on revenues from hydrocarbons exports – is at least at the same level with the EU dependence from Russian gas. If it is hard for Europeans to find alternative gas sources, it is also difficult for Russia to find other export markets, despite the economic expansion of some Asia-Pacific states (China, India). In these conditions, actual situation, which is characterized by incertitude regarding the bilateral relations and continuous energy deliveries, must end in the near future with an advantageous compromise for both parts taking into account that resources are to Russians and the money to Europeans.

Consultations between the EU and Russia, inaugurated in 2008 after the expiry of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement, although hindered by the crisis in Georgia, show the fact that parties don't want to trigger a new East-West competition.

Conversely, the goal is probably the re-launch of economic cooperation. Only if we take into account the commercial relations of the two sides, we find that the value of EU's economic exchanges with the Russian Federation has tripled in the period 2000-2008. Exports increased from 23 billion euro in 2000 to 105 billion euro in 2008, while imports from 64 billion in 2000 to 173 billion euro in 2008. Under these circumstances, the EU has become the main trading partner of the Russian Federation, while the Russian Federation is the third partner of the Union.

Moreover, the EU's direct investments in Russia grew from around 11 billion euro in 2006 to over 21.5 billion euro in 2008. The economic reality demonstrates that the economies from the European Union and Russian Federation are however complementary and even interdependent.

Therefore, we believe that the EU and the Russian Federation will soon develop a set of common rules to regulate the trade, investment, property rights, etc. The current financial-economic crisis will likely strengthen bilateral cooperation and will accelerate the negotiations for the adoption of a new agreement covering all areas, including energy issues.

Moving the focus of EU – Russian Federation relations from political-propagandistic disputes to economic cooperation and a solid strategic and energy partnership might be the scenario for the next decade in this geopolitical space where Black Sea region is a part. Implementing this scenario will represent a clear chance for economic recovery of the Black Sea countries and for the energy program. In this case will be provided resources absolutely necessary and will be opened some markets less used today.

Conclusions

In order to achieve a higher degree of stability, prosperity and security, the decision-makers of the Black Sea countries must share a common vision on regional problems that might be solved by bilateral and multilateral agreements, by direct negotiations between involved actors. Also, the Black Sea region and its states can be the bind that strengthen and develop the relations between EU and Russia at political, economic and other levels.

In the near future, the Black Sea region must strengthen its status as a strategic corridor for resources transit from East to West and maximize the economic advantages offered by the transit, but also as a possible source for energy that is consumed in Europe.

In that sense, the region answers in great extent to Occident requirements regarding the access to Eastern energy resources: shorter distance from source to final user; transportation capacity of the pipeline; chipper production costs; lower transportation costs; stable transit area; harbour, maritime and river facilities, etc.

Not least, we must underline that the energy future of the Black Sea countries largely depends on the concrete results of the partnership, by dialogue and mutual cooperation, between EU and Russian Federation, on achieving a cooperative economic and energy security.



NOTES:

¹ See Arkady OSTROVSKY, *S-a întors norocul*, in Foreign Policy - Romania, March-April 2009, pp. 36-40.

² For more details, see *IMF Lending Arrangements as of May 31, 2009*, www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/extarr11.aspx?memberKey1=ZZZ&date1key=2020-02-28.

³ Saban KARDAS, *Turkey and Brazil to Explore Oil in the Black Sea*, in Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume: 6 Issue: 100, May 26, 2009, www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35037&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=13&cHash=dc5ef67399.

⁴ See Sorin IOAN, *Securitatea energiei – prioritate pe agenda NATO și a UE*, in Gândirea Militară Românească, nr. 3, mai-iunie 2008, p. 19.

⁵ European Commission, *EU Energy and Transport in figures: Statistical Pocketbook 2009*, p. 27 and 30.

⁶ Commission of the European Communities, *Black Sea Synergy - A New Regional Cooperation Initiative*, Brussels, 11.04.2007, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com07_160_en.pdf.

⁷ Commission of the European Communities, *Eastern Partnership*, Brussels, 3.12.2008, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0823:FIN:EN:PDF>.

⁸ The starting price of natural gas is that from gasser wellhead (proper cost of gas), price which is then increased by the transport cost over a certain distance and local distribution cost. In distribution phase, gas prices are classified according to the type of end-user: residential, commercial, industrial or for electricity.


⁹ The Agreement was into force during the period December 1997 – December 2007 and was automatically extended until December 2008.

¹⁰ *EU27 deficit in trade in goods with Russia of 70 bn euro in 2008*, in Eurostat News Release, no. 74/2009, 19 May 2009.

¹¹ Idem.

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THE TERRORISM PSYCHOLOGY IN THE GLOBALISATION ERA



Terrorism – the dominant in the chain of threats, the most brutal nowadays' ones, is one of the hottest topics within our society – it still captures the interest of the scientific research community on security.

As globalisation and terrorism interfere, we can expect this intersection area to be attentively studied and add new pages on studying the terror's matters. Such an example is the book on **THE TERRORISM PSYCHOLOGY IN THE GLOBALISATION ERA** recently published by the Military Technical-Editorial Centre Publishing House, with a remarkable infusion brought by two specialists involved in the development of this field, **Lieutenant General Professor Teodor Frunzeti, PhD**, and **colonel (ret) Gabriel Dulea**, who project in these pages a perspective ... "from different perspectives", as noticed by the foreword's author, on terrorism, a phenomenon with a global extension, which has continuously amplified and diversified and whose essence, connections with the politics, military actions or religious beliefs make it harder to work out and harder to explain.

In its multiple types, nationalist terrorism, fundamentalist Islamic terrorism, state-sponsored terrorism, left terrorism, cyber-terrorism, narcoterrorism, bioterrorism, ad-terrorisms and air-terrorism, the book's authors find a complex picture which has even an obscure area, the one related to the "invisible terrorism", the biological weapons of mass destruction, the biological agents, the viruses, bacteria, toxins, the most unpredictable and the most dangerous area because it threatens the humanity as a whole.

Without ignoring the huge opportunities created by globalisation, the authors comprehensively analyze, in the first chapter, a very consistent one, the wide spectrum of negative effects having a strong impact on national and international security and stability: the weapons', weapons of mass destruction's proliferation, the organised crime, the ethnic and religious violence and especially the terrorism, as a violent, brutal action against the state of law, developed outside and against the international norms.

Using a large information basis, the fundament of some thorough studies within this field, these two distinguished researchers recompose, as in an identity puzzle, the real image of the world's most dangerous flagella and propose a correct understanding of the ways to ideologically support terrorism, by revealing the characteristics of this very complex phenomenon's typology, the generic organization of the terrorist groups and the influence of their relations with the states' leadership, the action's motivation, the adopted ideology and their geographical location.

On structuring their own conclusions assumed from the multidirectional scientific approach of the controversial aspects of globalisation, the authors do not hesitate to add the corollary of some ideas launched by other specialists in important international publications, about the economical difficulties and the frustration generated by them, especially among young people, as they have an easier access to the new informational technologies, and they become radicals, stirring violent reactions



and, in some cases, it represents the main mass of manoeuvre and a recruiting source for the terrorist organizations with different orientations and regimentations.

A profound introspection is achieved on building terrorism as a social and psychological phenomenon, as an effort to induce fear by the strategy of “killing a man in order to terrify one thousand”, sustained by psychopath-fanatic personality patterns, whether frustrated or marginal, on pathological components or character typologies prevalently choleric or sanguineous, radicalism, extremism, religious, ideological or political fanaticism, or fundamentalism, but also on a specific devotion towards the organisation’s ideas and aims, sacrifice, discipline, conspiracy, submission, in a chapter ending with an inventory of the psycho-physiological qualities and professional competences required for the specialists in antiterrorist psychology field, as well as the antiterrorist training principles required for the army.

Of a greater interest for specialists, as well as for the less informed ones, but willing to improve their knowledge, is the psychological analysis made by the authors of the profile of the suicidal terrorist, using the socio-cognitive studies and the theories revealing a cognitive development from the perspective of culture, religion and concepts inoculated by parents or tutors, from young ages, and also a constant indoctrination, a “brainwash” preparing him for a crime by suicide with no hesitation, under the impact idea that “the evil has to be removed“. More interesting, if not in the same extent, is the presentation of the indoctrination which precedes the suicidal attack, the submission engagement in front of death and renewing the intention - a genuine algorithm to be studied, obedience and submission, “spiritual washing-up”, actually a mental one and an optimistic perspective to the happy life after which will succeed to the self-destruction.

Shaping terrorist behaviour has hidden mechanisms the authors reveal in the book – the observational learning and the terrorists’ self-regulation, with the consecutive phases of acquisition and performance, gaining or assimilating the controlled and uncontrolled aggressiveness behaviour, and achieving the aggressiveness in itself.

The brief history about the psychological terror, presenting the Soviet torture model from Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag, whose main purpose was to determine and use fear as a dominating tool, but also from other areas, from the past and recent, and moreover, presenting in details the most frequent types of psychological tortures applied in the centres for detention of the terrorism suspected persons, revealed by the organisation “Doctors for Human Rights”, assessing the short, medium and long term consequences of these inhuman treatments applied to the human being, all of them show a painful and degrading reality. Even if it seems to be necessary, it cannot be but a moral answer to what it has been practising today in the terrorist manifestation.

In the end, the book presents the achievements of the Institute for Studies and Research on Terrorism from Cluj Napoca, led with competence and practice by dr. Cristian Delcea, a psychologist and a professional researcher. He has also presented his latest achievements in the Strategic Impact magazine, bringing into light some ambitious projects related with the terrorism prevention by education and training.

As a whole, the book is a demonstration of remarkable analysis and synthesis of this world, populated with monsters of the terrorist phenomenon, a complex study of “The terrorism psychology in the globalisation era”, as shown by the title, as a part of the contribution to the knowledge of terror’s mechanisms, as a warning on the unlimited danger of such a destructive threat and also a support for increasing the public awareness on the extreme risks represented by terrorism. (V.P.)



THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES

APRIL-JUNE 2009

Being already a tradition, the Annual International Scientific Session STRATEGIES XXI, organised by "Carol I" National Defence University (April, 9-10) was about "Regional stability and security" and was organised in 14 sections. There participated decision makers from the Government, the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Education, Research and Innovation, Ministry of Administration and Interiors, rectors from military and civilian higher education institutions, other important figures from the Romanian and international scientific community. There were also invited guests from Italy, Germany and Ukraine, as well as military diplomats accredited to Bucharest and mass-media representatives. CDSSS was responsible for organizing and managing the section on "Security and defence".

*The proposed topic allowed some debates on some problems of the actual security environment. There were presented analysis, **opinions and evaluations on the future security environment, the evolutions of risks and threats, the projection of challenges in the conditions of increasing the complexity of exigencies towards the security and defence architecture, as well as their impact on military theory and art.***

On May, 7th, within the "Carol I" National Defence University's premises, there was organised a meeting between researchers from the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies and dr. Susanne Nies, a researcher from the French Institute for International Relations (Ifri). There were established cooperation relations between these institutions. She has also launched the Romanian version of her book, "Oil and gas delivery to Europe. An Overview of Existing and Planned Infrastructures". The paper is part of a larger study from the series called "European governance and the geopolitics of energy". This study wants to contribute at the emergence of a coherent vision for a lasting energetic and climatic policy. "The European Union's hydrocarbon energy supply depends heavily on imports. While the European Commission has recommended diversifying and increasing domestic resources, notably with renewable resources which should grow to 20% by 2020, dependence on hydrocarbon imports will remain not only important, but will increase", as it is underlined by the author.

*On May, 27th, at "Carol I" National Defence University's premises there was organised the international seminar on "**Strategies for Cooperation within the Black Sea Area**", organised by The Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies. There were debated major issues for the security environment within the Black Sea Area: the role played by state and non-state, regional and continental actors for achieving stability, the convergences and divergences at the Black Sea and the ways to overcome them, the hydrocarbons' geopolitics and the multidimensional cooperation of the actors, the present security environment and its perspectives.*

The discussions proved the participants' interest for the Black Sea Area and allowed the identification of some new forms for deepening the cooperation, the opportunities provided by NATO and EU for overcoming the challenges and the forms other initiatives related with the Black Sea may strengthen the security environment.



CDSSS' AGENDA

The event was honoured by the presence of many specialists from military and civilian field, the deputy director of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, some military diplomats accredited to Bucharest.

Within this period of time, there were published the following studies: "The role played by the religion in building the future Europe", "Capabilities facilitated by the network", and "Europe: Borders, Citizenship, Security".

The Centre's most important scientific activity, within this year, is the Annual International Scientific Session, organised in November, 19 – 20, on "Security and defence perspectives in Europe". More information about the enrolment will be posted on the Centre's website, <http://cssas.unap.ro>.



INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

On selecting the articles there are taken into consideration: the area of the subjects presented in the magazine, the actuality of the topic, its novelty and originality, its scientific content and the adequacy to the editorial norms adopted by the magazine. The article should not contain any party political connotations.

The papers' scientific evaluation is done by two scientific experts that are either professors or senior fellow researchers.

The article, written in a foreign language (English, French) may have maximum 10-12 pages (6.000 – 7.000 words) and has to be sent both in print and paper, using Times New Roman font, size 12, one line, and the tables and schemes have to be printed separately. The translation into Romanian will be provided by the editor.

The text has to be preceded by an abstract which is not to exceed 250 words, both in Romanian and English and not more than 10-12 keywords. The papers have to be signed adding the authors's scientific degree, name, first name, the institution he comes from and have to end with a curriculum vitae, which should include the following elements: a short bio, a list of personal papers, birthyear, birthplace, address, city, postal code, country, telephone, fax, e-mail address, photo in jpeg format.

The footnotes are to be included by the end of the article and have to respect the international regulations. Authors can publish only one article by issue.

The text has to present an easy structure, using titles (subtitles). The abbreviations will be marked on the text only at their first mention on the text. It is likely to end the papers with some important conclusions regarding the importance of the research.

The articles will not use classified information.

As the magazine does not have a profitable purpose, the articles cannot be paid.

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After eight years since its first edition, STRATEGIC IMPACT magazine, edited by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University “Carol I” is a quarterly scientific magazine acknowledged locally and internationally for the wide area of topics - the political-military present, security strategy and military security, NATO and EU actions, informational society, strategic synthesis and evaluations, a special column “Strategic Event” that studies the strategic impact of the dynamics of the actions undertaken nationally, regionally and globally.

STRATEGIC IMPACT has as collaborators important researchers and personalities within the scientific research area and from the civilian and military university system, both national and international, from the Ministry of National Defence, General Staff, services’ staffs, the Ministry of Administration and Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, military units and other state’s organizations, NGOs, companies, etc.

The international acknowledgement of the magazine’s quality is confirmed by its editions presented on sites belonging to prestigious foreign institutions (The International Relations and Security Network of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zürich; Defence Guide, in collaboration with the Hellenic Institute of Strategic Studies – HEL. I.S.S.), The Institute for Development and Social Initiatives – IDIS from the Republic of Moldova – the virtual library for political and security studies. Also, the magazine is included in international databases: CEEOL - Central and Eastern European Online Library, Germany, IndexCopernicus International, Poland.

The magazine is accredited by the National University Research Council and acknowledged as a B+ magazine that demonstrates the potential to become an international acknowledged magazine.

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