


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CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES



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CONTENTS

THE POLITICAL-MILITARY PRESENT

Peace religion versus Muslim combativeness
Anghel ANDREESCU, PhD, Nicolae RADU, PhD.....5

Terrorism and religion by the beginning of the 21st century
Mircea MUREȘAN, PhD.....16

GEOPOLITICS AND GEOSTRATEGIES ON THE FUTURE'S TRAJECTORY

The Black Sea - a potential major zone for global security
Nicolae DOLGHIN, PhD.....21

South Caucasus conflict rises EU, NATO and US concern
Constantin-Gheorghe BALABAN, PhD.....28

Space of interest security. Psycho-social representation on security and Homeland Security in the Black Sea Area
Alexandra SARCINSCHI, PhD.....35

A renewed geopolitical and geostrategic role for the Mediterranean Sea
Florin DIACONU, PhD.....43

NATO AND EU: POLITICS, STRATEGIES, AND ACTIONS

The Lisbon Treaty and the principle of states' sovereignty: a few comments
Mădălina Virginia ANTONESCU47

Main concepts development and experimentation within the North-Atlantic Alliance
Crăișor-Constantin IONIȚĂ.....56

SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

The national security and the economical development
Irina CUCU64

"Security" concept between internal and international laws
Mirela ATANASIU.....69

ANALYSIS. SYNTHESIS. EVALUATIONS

Challenges in the recruitment of professional soldiers in Europe
Tibor SZVIRCSEV TRESCH, PhD76



STRATEGIC IMPACT

Syria - Strategic objectives and military capabilities

Marina MUSCAN.....87

STRATEGIC EVENT

The EU Treaties' Reform

Vasile POPA.....93

POINT OF VIEWS

Le separatisme politique: une effet de la globalisation?

Petre DUȚU, PhD96

INFORMATIONAL SOCIETY. PEACE AND WAR

Possible coordinates for a strategic environment

Gheorghe VĂDUVA, PhD103

REVIEWS

Islamic Jihad114

CDSSS' AGENDA

The activities of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, July-September 2008

Irina CUCU.....115

Instructions for authors.....103



PEACE RELIGION VERSUS MUSLIM COMBATIVENESS

*Anghel ANDREESCU, PhD
Nicolae RADU, PhD*

Islam is not only a religion, but a law stipulating the Muslims' behaviour in any circumstances, whether it is the religious, political, social or private life.

The belief in a unique God, the world's creator, accompanied by angels, as His representatives, is one of the main Islam dogmas described in Koran.

Keywords: Islam, peace, belief, Koran, religion.

Reflections over the present edge

For centuries, before the Islam's arriving, the Arabs were separated into countless warrior factions. Bloodshed was not rare, and during the hostilities many lives were lost. Approaching the contemporary Islam, especially from the perspective of transforming this into a triggering factor for a "civilization outrage", Huntington considered that "Islamism" was from the beginning "a sword religion, glorifying military victories".

In the same view, the Koran text and all the acts of faith of the Muslim man contain to less interdiction for violence, a concept of non-violence being absent from the doctrine and practice.

Without subscribing to this point of view, Frithjof (1994) sustained that "it is very possible that Koran images are inspired especially by the battlefield ... the soul in research of God must fight (...)".

Psychologically speaking, Muslim combativeness is counterweighted by its fatalism; in the spiritual life, Jihad, "the Holy War", is first of all one "of soul against seducing soul (An-Nafs Al-'ammara) and aspires, by transfiguration, to the Absolute conscience".

No matter what the belief, Islam has decided at a way of life completely human, based on the principles of truth and justice.

This unique accomplishment, as much more

than Islam has accomplished something extremely difficult – an intellectual revolution that has changed the whole perception of people in what regards their purpose in life (Abdul A'la Mawdudi, 1963).

Is it possible to say that the contemporaneous Islamic turnaround, no matter what the manifestation form is, means that before all, the occidental influence and domination rejection over the Islamic identity and spirit?

Huntington admits that what it is universalism for the Occident means imperialism for the rest of the world, which goes apart of the occidental's democracy double standards.

As the democracy is encouraged, but not if it brings the Islamists to power, human rights constitute as a problem in China, but not in other allied countries. Possession of a nuclear arsenal is legitimate for Israel, but it becomes a problem for Iraq or Iran.

In this appreciation frame, for Islam, as Fatima Mersi appreciated, Occident is materialist, brutal, repressive, traumatic. He decides by himself if the satellites are used for educating the Arabs or for bombing them. He invades our lives. We assist, today, to a confrontation between the Orient and Occident, in which Islam becomes not just a tool of fighting back to new theses and orientation of modern social science but also a subject approached with obsession as the only cause of this confrontation?

Is this just an avalanche of speeches that have for subject not the contemporary Islamic phenomenon, as it would believe at first site, but the interest for the Arab country oil?

We say that knowing the fact that the Arab States have monopole for the global oil resources. The reserves from this region represent 60,17% from the world's confirmed oil resources, and totalize a amount of 683,5 billion barrels, oil that not once, the occidental countries showed the interest for.



| Country | Oil reserves in million barrel | Percentage of world's reserve (%) |
|----------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Iran | 92,86 | 0.92 |
| Irak | 100,00 | 10.03 |
| Libia | 22.80 | 2.29 |
| Nigeria | 17.90 | 1.8 |
| Kuweit | 94.0 | 9.43 |
| Saudi Arabia | 257.84 | 25.86 |
| United Arab Emirates | 98.1 | 9.84 |

Table no. 1 - The International Petroleum Encyclopedia (Tulsa: PennWell Publishing Company, 1993), pp. 284 - 285

No matter of the answers, whether we like it or not, we whitens an idea exchange that tries to “re-discuss” the role that Islam has or should have in contemporary times, the reasons could have been understood in different angles. Clearing out and understanding its manifestations and intentions, in a climate were the simple mention of the term “Islam” as a religion brings up with passion in close plan the report between this and extremism practiced in the name of this religion, it is just as hardly debated as the Islamic jihad concept. The approach of the place Islam has detained in successive historical contexts, from its establishment, until 9/11, represent a purpose for our approach.

How well do we know Islam?

Not once we've heard the word “fundamentalism”, which, often is accompanied by the adjective “Islamic”, and lately „terrorism”. What is Islam? What is the Islamic fundamentalism up to? The answers come by themselves. The Islam is the junction of God and man (Frithjof, 1994). Talking about religions, there is a Christian fundamentalism, as there is a Judaic one, outside religion, we talk about the materialistic-scientist fundamentalism, the Stalinist-ideological fundamentalism, communist, or about the philosophical fundamentalism, each one of the above ones pretending to be the only Absolute Truth holder, which they try to impose to others, even by force, if needed.

Closely related, there is another term that the common conscience – either because of insufficient knowledge, either because of leaded ideological

campaigns – considers Jihad as an instrument and a mean of fundamentalism, the term is usually or almost always translated , as “holly war”, which in European and Western perception means “violence” and “terrorism”. Should we consider Jihad similar to terrorism?

The discussions on Islam are more than an analyze of today's Muslim status. First of all, the word Islam is the root of the Arabic term “selam”, that means “peace”. Islam is the religion based on the belief that the peace is obtained by subjection to the holly will. Extending this way of understanding, we could perceive the Islam as an eternal reality, a way of life made by the Creator which is not altered by the time (Abul A'la Mawdudi, 1963). A short historic review reveals the fact that the Muslims have gone through three phases: the ideal period, the kingdom and its cultural consequences, the slavery and its traces, crossing the forth stage in nowadays, the liberation of the western dominations. These are perspectives that make us rethink the history.

Knowing the Islam means knowing the secret of its existence, knowing who put you on the life coat, and who will pull it out after a while (Abu Ala Al-Ghiti, 2007).

Despite the constant effort of deeply understanding the Islam and Islamists, there seem to be some people determined to paint terrorism and Islam with the same brush (Harun Yahya, 2002).

This is why we will draw some definitions for the non-experienced reader, but also for the Muslim who wants to know how a non-Muslim perceives the Islam as religion, not before making a retrospective of Islamic presence in our country.

Islamic demography

Earth population, in the 20th century, has reached an unprecedented record. It took 2 million years until the earth population reached 1 billion, in 1804. The second billion was reached in 1972, the third in 1960, the fourth in 1974, the fifth in 1987, and the sixth in the beginning of year 2000 (Kegley jr., Wittkop, 1997). It is expected that, in the next 25 years, the world's population to reach almost 8 billion, out of which 1.86 billion in the least developed countries and only 0,37 billion in the developed countries, the difference being in the intermediary countries, which may create special problems, including in the security field (Petrescu, 2005).

Under these circumstances, Islam represents the most dynamic religion, being placed on the second position, after Christians, from the adept number point of view (Merad, 2003). Today, approximately

1.3 billion people are Muslims, these ones being present on all continents, from South Asia, North and East Africa, Nordic India, and the Caucasian region to the Middle East.

A regional classification of the Islamic territories appears in the **The Cambridge History of Islam**, the editors choosing the solution of dividing the Islamic territories in central territories (Arabic, Egypt, Syria, Anatolia, Central Asia) and in far territories (Europe, Africa, South-East Asia).

According to U.S. Department of State's Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, in 2003, only in Europe there were registered over 23 million residents Muslim, in France and the United States of America, over 7 million, and in China, approx 50 million. Tajics are Sunni Muslims, just like Turkmen, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks or Kazakhs, the last one being 16.9 million Muslims. Indonesia is the country with the most Muslim population, with almost 120 million

| | State | GENERAL DATA | | | | ISLAM | | FLAG | |
|----|--------------|--------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------|--------------------------|------------|-------|
| | | Surface (thousands sqkm) | Population (mil.) | Demographic growth (%) | Gross revenue/ inhab. (USD) | Percentage(%) | Orientation (%) | Symbol | Birth |
| 1 | Saudi Arabia | 2 240 | 0,8 | 4,2 | 7000 | 98 | Sunni | Islam | 1906 |
| 2 | Bahrain | 0,62 | 0,6 | 3,2 | 7800 | 90 | Shi'a -56 Sunni -34 | Turk | 1932 |
| 3 | U.A.E. | 83, 6 | 2,4 | 5,7 | 19860 | 95 | Sunni -80 Shi'a -15 | Arab | 1971 |
| 4 | Iordania | 89, 2 | 4,5 | 4,2 | 1570 | 92 | Sunni -80 | Arab | 1916 |
| 5 | Irak | 438,3 | 21,8 | 3,9 | 2300 | 97 | Shi'a -64 Sunni -33 | Arab | 1963 |
| 6 | Kuwait | 17,8 | 2,2 | 3,6 | 22000 | 95 | Sunni -45 Shi'a -30 | Arab | 1961 |
| 7 | Liban | 10,5 | 3,5 | 1,4 | 3300 | 57 | Shi'a -35 Sunni -23 | Identitary | 1861 |
| 8 | Oman | 212,5 | 2,4 | 3,5 | 5000 | 88 | Sunni Ibadit Shi'a | Arab | 1970 |
| 9 | Qatar | 11,4 | 0,7 | 5,3 | 15900 | 95 | Sunni Wahhabis | Turk | 1949 |
| 10 | Syria | 185,2 | 16,7 | 3,8 | 1150 | 90 | Sunni -75 Shi'a -15 | Arab | 1963 |
| 11 | Yemen | 528 | 6,4 | 3,2 | 270 | 99 | Sunni -54 Shi'a -45 | Arab | 1990 |

Table no. 2 - The Arab Islamic Nucleus

Sources: Kiljunen, 2001; Smith, 1995, in, Sageatã, 2004



THE POLITICAL-MILITARY PRESENT

(World Population, 2002). Having 213 million inhabitants, Indonesia is the fourth country of the world and the biggest Islamic country (over 90% of the population practices Islamism). Eastern

spreading field of Islam overcomes the strict political environment of this country, including the most part of Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and Southern Philippines Archipelago (Mindanao).

| | State | GENERAL DATA | | | | ISLAM | | | FLAG | |
|---|--------------|--------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|---------------|-----------------|--------|-------|------|
| | | Surface (thousands sqkm) | Population (mil.) | Demographic growth (%) | Gross revenue/inhab. (USD) | Percentage(%) | Orientation (%) | Symbol | Birth | |
| 1 | Kazakhstan | 2717,3 | 16,9 | 1,2 | 2000 | 47 | Sunni | Ident. | 1992 | 1906 |
| 2 | Kirghizstan | 198,5 | 4,5 | 1,9 | 1150 | 550 | Sunni | Ident. | 1992 | 1932 |
| 3 | Tajikistan | 83, 6 | 6,0 | 3,0 | 690 | 880 | Sunni | Ident. | 1993 | 1971 |
| 4 | Turkmenistan | 89, 2 | 4,3 | 2,5 | 1450 | 887 | Sunni | Ident. | 1992 | 1916 |
| 5 | Uzbekistan | 438,3 | 23,8 | 2,6 | 1000 | 888 | Sunni | Ident. | 1991 | 1963 |

Table no. 3 - Central-Asian Islamic Core

Sources: Kiljunen, 2001; Smith, 1995, in, Sageatã, 2004

Islam represents desert and semi-desert population religion, its boundaries being given by the contact with the Negro population, with animistic religions.

Islamic African states are characterized by a remarkable dissimilarity, as surface, as demographic size and percentage of the Islamic population, and as the used nationality symbols.

In 2000, the population of the Arabic states was of 1.282 million people, representing 21% of the world's population, which is considerable, both as number and as portion.

The dimension of the problem and its interest is given by the dynamic growth in the next 50 years (according to the World Bank's forecasts, pulled out from the national reports, from the Statistics and Population division of UNO, from World Data Indicators 2003, World Bank, Washington D.C., and many other sources), reaching in 2010 1.530 million people (a growth of 19.3 % from 2000), 1.773 million in 2020 (a growth of 38.3% from 2000), 1.993 in 2030 (55.4% growth from 2000), 2.171 in 2040 (69,3% growth from 2000), and 2.340 in 2050 (82,4% growth from 2000).

Despite the digits, we have to state that the weight of the Islamic population in the world population is constantly growing, reaching 21% in 2000, 22.6% in 2010, 23% in 2020, 24.9% in 2030, 25.7 in 2040, 26.6% in 2050, which means for the next half of the century a weight growth of 26.6%.

Etymology and Islamic meaning

The Islam's origin, subject for some excellent specialty studies and monographs (Louis de Premar, 2001, Ibram, 2006), cannot be understood for good without an analysis over the word Islam. In Arabic, Islam is derived from a three consonants root (s, l, m) as the word Muslim, the one that obeys, being at the origin of the word muslim ("the one that obeys"), or salam, the equivalent of the Jewish shalom (meaning "peace"), used as a greeting. Plenty verses of Koran contain the word Muslim, invoking the submission: "Wa Nahnu Lahu Muslimuna" (Sura 2, 136) meaning: "To HIM we will obey". Word "Islam" means submission, the complete surrender to the World 's Master



THE POLITICAL-MILITARY PRESENT

and freedom of any obey and surrender to anyone else but HIM. This name "Islam" expresses, by significance, "religion" and the fact that there is

a full correspondence between the title and the dogmatic and legal truth that it contains.

| | State | GENERAL DATA | | | | ISLAM | | FLAG | |
|----|-----------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------|------------------------------|
| | | Surface (thousands sqkm) | Population (mil.) | Demographic growth (%) | Gross revenue/ inhab. (USD) | Percentage(%) | Orientation (%) | Symbol | Birth |
| 1 | Egypt | 1.001,5 | 66 | 2,3 | 1200 | 94 | Sunni | Arabic | 1952 |
| 2 | Libya | 1759,5 | 5,7 | 3,0 | 6500 | 97 | Sunni | Islamic | 1977 |
| 3 | Tunis | 154,5 | 9,4 | 2,1 | 2090 | 99 | Sunni | Turk | 1835 |
| 4 | Alger | 2381,7 | 9,4 | 2,5 | 1500 | 99 | Sunni | Islamic | 1920 |
| 5 | Morocco | 458,7 | 29,1 | 2,1 | 1250 | 99 | Sunni | Turk | 1915 |
| 6 | West Sahara | 267,0 | 0,23 | 2,6 | 320 | 100 | Sunni | Arabic | 1976 |
| 7 | Mauritania | 1030,7 | 2,5 | 3,1 | 450 | 99 | Sunni | Islamic | 1959 |
| 8 | Mali | 1240,1 | 10,1 | 2,4 | 260 | 90 | Sunni | African | 1959 |
| 9 | Niger | 1267,0 | 9,7 | 3,4 | 200 | 80 | Sunni | Ident. | 1959 |
| 10 | Guinea | 245,9 | 7,5 | 2,5 | 570 | 85 | Sunni | African | 1958 |
| 11 | Senegal | 196,7 | 9,7 | 3,1 | 550 | 91 | Sunni | African | 1960 |
| 12 | Gambia | 11,3 | 1,3 | 3,1 | 350 | 85- 90 | Sunni | Ident. | 1965 |
| 13 | Sudan | 2505,8 | 33,6 | 3,0 | 280 | 70 | Sunni | Arabic | 1969 |
| 14 | Somalia | 637,7 | 6,9 | 3,3 | 120 | 99 | Sunni | Ident. | 1960 |
| 15 | Eritrea | 117,4 | 3,8 | 3,0 | 210 | 45- 50 | Sunni | Ident. | 1955 |
| 16 | Djibouti | 21,8 | 0,24 | 2,6 | 1200 | 94 | Sunni | Ident. | 1977 |
| 17 | Ethiopia | 1104,5 | 58,4 | 3,1 | 110 | 35- 40 | Sunni | African | flag 1897 arms 1996 |
| 18 | Comore | 1,86 | 0,55 | 3,5 | 400 | 95 | Sunni | Islamic | 1996 |
| 19 | Ciad | 1284,0 | 7,4 | 2,1 | 240 | 45- 50 | Sunni | Ident. | 1980 |
| 20 | Nigeria | 923,8 | 110 | 3,0 | 260 | 45- 50 | Sunni | Islamic | 1960 |
| 21 | Burkina Faso | 274,2 | 11,3 | 3,1 | 240 | 30- 43 | Sunni | African | 1984 |
| 22 | Sierra Leone | 71,7 | 5,0 | 2,6 | 200 | 38- 40 | Sunni | Ident. | 1961 |

Table no. 4 - The Northern African Islamic Core

Sources: Kiljunen, 2001; Smith, 1995, in, Sageatã, 2004



Etymologically speaking, a good part of the Muslim researchers translate in French “Islam” by “soumission” (submission), which seems that is not the correct approach (Stoina, 2006). Muslim (sg. *Muslim*, pl. *muslimūm*) represents a person’s quality that accepts Islam, Muslim is translated by “the one that obeys” (Dominique et Janine Sourdel, 1996). A Muslim is a person that obeys God’s commands, trying consciously to live by the Koran’s morality, peace and harmony, that makes the world a better place and take it to progress. Its objective is to lead people to beauty, good and welfare (Harun, Yahya, 2002). “And make well as God makes well. And do not seek to cause corruption on earth. God does not love the ones that corrupt” (Koran, 28:77).

For religion and especially for the Muslims, the word “Islam” goes for obey to God – Allah (al-ilah) considered the World’s Creator. So, the name of the religion refers to the submission to Allah. In theory, all that a man needs to do to become Muslim is to recite the shahadatan faith declaration (two statements): “La ilaha illa-llahu. Muhammadur – rasulu-llahi” (There is no God but God; Muhammad is the messenger of God). To become a Muslim, a person must believe in these words, the declaration itself being unconfirmed by the religious authority. Islam continues the monotheist doctrine of Judaism and Christianity. The Islamic religion consists of faith (aqida) and the revealing Law (Sharia). By faith they consider the principles where the souls and the hearts believe, and where there is no doubt. By the revealing Law, that Islam calls, there are taken into consideration the practical duties (Ihsan), such as: Prayer, Bequest, Fasting, respect for parents, etc. Islamic faith consists in faith in Allah, in His angels, in His Scriptures and the Judgment Day, the faith in destiny good or bad and in life after death. Proof in this way are the words of Allah, who spoke: faith is not made of turning your faces to the East or West, pious is the one that believes in Allah and in the Day After, in angels, in the Book and in the prophets, gives away from the fortune despite love for it to the relatives, orphans, needy people, the traveller, the beggar, it fulfils the Prayer, gives Bequest, the ones that hold their word, the ones that are impatient to misfortune. They are believers in fear. (Koran, Al-Baqara:117). As for the faith, Allah has spoken: And We created all well done things/ And is not Our command just a single [word that will fulfil] in one moment. (Koran, Al-Qamar:49-50).

Holy religion

Our intention is not to analyze the Islam from the position of those ones that consider as historical illiteracy pretending that the war has nothing to do with the Islamic religion (Blond & Pabst). With no doubt, the Islam has risen in war conditions which led to Arabic expansion and to the birth of Muslim caliphate lying from the Arabic peninsula to the Pyrenees and to China’s borders. The Islamic civilization was, as all the other ones, subjected to the growth and decline law, which we reduce today to the human life cycles. Comparing to other civilizations, the Islamic one was constantly seeking to imitate the past, a care which emphasizes the oldest manifestations – source of the future guidelines and experiences.

In that direction, the first imperial civilization of Islam, the Arabic-Muslim one that lived first under Umayyads and then under Abbasies, and which grew with the profane triumph of an Islam still close to its origins, is the only one that could be called “Classical” (Sourdel, 1975).

People said and continue to say that Islam is a peace religion, that doesn’t allow killing of innocent people (Bacchiocchi, 2002), and which was spread not by the sword, but only by preaching (Rasid Jabr al-As’Ad, 2003), that Islam is the religion of freedom, of tolerance, the human soul being cherished (Yusuf al-Qaradawi, 2001). “It would be a big disaster if the terrorists would use the religion as a camouflage, as true Islam is not guilty of all these. Its learnings are above those who believe in violence as a way of action and in sabotage, as intimidating method, or in killing, as reform (Abdul-Rahman al-Sudais, 2001). However, judging the Islam as a violent religion, taking into account only Bin Laden and Al-Qaida’s actions – who try to legitimate their actions through Islam preaches, is not a good approach. According to its tradition and taking into account the innocence presumption, Islam is the religion of freedom, peace, good and clemency (Rasid, 2003), the terrorist acts being disapproved more than once. Attacking innocent people is not an act of courage, but a foolish one that will be punished on the Doomsday (Mohammed Sayyed al – Tantawi, 2000). Moreover, any reprobate act means breaching Sharia (Islamic sacred law), but the human logic as well. The Islam not only condemns terrorism and suicidal missions, but



it's also banning them. The Muslim nations, organizations and communities from all over the world condemn such attacks, hoping they will never repeat (Cherim Enghin, 2007).

Islamic faith

Islam was born in the Arabic Peninsula in the 7th century DC, area where Bedouin tribes were practicing Semitic Polytheism worshipping Allat, the feminine goddess corresponding to Allah. According to Koran, when they were worshipping idols as Wadd, Suwa, Yagut, they were watching towards Mecca, towards the black stone, a meteorite, maybe even Houbal, whose importance was so big, that it was cited as being that God: Allah.

Starting with 7th century, the Muslims believe in only one God, Allah, in Mahomed, who was a prophet sent by God to the humankind, and in Koran, which is a collection of revelations that God made to Mahomed. Koran contains God's words and in a literary approach, and it is called God's saying (kalam Allah). There are six common beliefs for all the Muslims:

- 1) Worshipping God – the only one venerable;
- 2) Belief in all prophets and God's messengers;
- 3) Belief in the books sent by God;
- 4) Belief in angels;
- 5) Belief in Doomsday (Qiyamah) and resurrection;
- 6) Belief in destiny (Qadaa and Qadar in Arabic). This doesn't mean that man is foredoomed to take some actions or to live a certain life. God gave him the freewill in order to allow him to make decisions. "I believe in God, and in His angels, and in His Holy Books; and in His messengers, and in Doomsday, and in faith, that Good and Wrong are from God, and in resurrection", this is the Muslim creed.

The Muslim and Christian beliefs have many common aspects (Harun, Yahya, 2002). The Judaism shares many aspects with Islam as well. In Koran, God reveals that Muslims share the same belief as the book men, and that they tell them "We have faith in what was sent to us and in what was sent to you. Our God and yours are one, and we are his subjects" (Koran, 29:46).

All true disciples of these three religions believe that God created the whole Universe out of

nothing and that He is dominating everything that exists with His power; they believe that God has created man and all creatures in a miraculous way, and that man has a soul given by God; they believe in Resurrection, Heaven and Hell and angels, and that God has created our lives with a certain destiny; they believe that besides Jesus, Moses or Mohamed, God has sent a lot of prophets over the history like: Noah, Abraham, Isaac and Joseph. The fact that Muslims don't make any difference between the prophets is explained by the fact that the messenger believes in what was sent to him by his Master, and the subjects do the same. We all believe in God and his angels, and his books, and his messengers. We don't make any difference between his messengers. They say: "We hear and listen. Forgive us God! You are the end of the journey" (Koran, 2:285). Muslim's prayer is made only towards God, and not towards Mahomed or other Prophet.

Islam has a history of 15 centuries on different continental areas (in 6-14th century, it has covered a third of the known world). Islam's destiny is complex (Michel, 1994), which drives to reflection of this space's destiny, but also of the whole world, that this religious doctrine is following, assuming and even imposing most of the times.

Allah's uniqueness

The fundamental concept in Islamism is God's uniqueness (al-tawhid). In Arabic, God is Allah, derivate of al-ilah, or the "only God". Allah can be translated by God. The use of the definite article underlines the divine unity.

Muslims like to describe God by the various divine attributes mentioned in Koran, but also by the 99 Allah's names. He is The all-merciful, the Hearer of all, the Seer of all, the Mighty, the Wise (Koran, As-Sura:11). The greatest Allah spoke: there is nothing like Him. He Is the Seer of all, hearer of all (Koran, As-Sutra:11).

First of all, the faith in the divine nature of Allah means that he is the only true god and that there is no other. By deity one can see worshipping exclusively Allah by all the means. We invoke only Allah, we are not afraid of Him, we surrender only to Him. It is not proper to worship anyone else than Allah the Magnificent, fulfilling the Mighty's words: we honour you, we ask you for help (Koran, Al-Fatiha:5).



The uniqueness of Allah means that Allah the Magnificent is the only master and god, and the acknowledgment of the perfection of his names and his qualities. So the expression of the faith in Allah's Uniqueness is acknowledging that he is the unique master and Allah, and that his qualities and names are uniqueness; the acknowledgement of the fact that he is the unique Master. This means that Allah the Greatest is unique in his acts, like the creation, the order of things, giving life and death, etc. There is no other Creator besides Allah, as the Greatest said: Allah is the creator of all things and he goes bail for everything! (Koran, Az-Zumar:62); no one besides Allah can't ensure the needed for living creatures, as Allah the Greatest said: there is no creature on Earth whose food is not in Allah's care (Koran, Hud:6); there is no other Maker of Order besides Allah, as the Greatest Allah said: He rules all the things in the sky and on earth (Koran, As-Sajida:5). No one besides Allah can't give life or death as the Greatest Allah said: He is the one that gives life and death and towards whom you will return (Koran, Yanus:56). Even the profanes in the times of Allah's messenger (God bless him and mercy him!) recognized this, but they didn't join Islam. Allah the Greatest said (Koran, Luqman:25). Recognizing that He is Allah the Unique means that its subjects have to accomplish only the facts that Allah has imposed. All adoration acts have to be dedicated to Allah exclusively, to whom one should never associate a human being. These are: invocation, fear, trust, need for help, seeking protection and others.

We only have to invoke only Allah, as Allah the Greatest said: Call Me and I will answer to you! (Koran, Ghafir:60); we don't have to be afraid of anything else but Allah, as Allah the Greatest said : But you don't fear them (Seitan and his partners), but be afraid of Me, if you believe! (Koran, Al-Imran:175); we don't have to rely on anyone else but Allah, as Allah the Greatest said : Trust Allah, if you believe! (Koran, AL-Maida:23); We don't have to ask for help to anyone else but to Allah, as Allah the Greatest said : we cherish you, we ask for Your help! (Koran, Al-Fatiha:5). The uniqueness of Allah has been contested by profanes in the past, but in the present as well. Allah the Greatest said: Did He do from Gods a unique God? This is amazing! (Koran, Sad:5).

The Islamic culture sees Judaism and Christianity arising from preaches of some of the

prophets – especially Abraham - and recognizes their Abrahamic roots. Islam preaches that Jesus was a prophet sent by Allah, but the Christians have distorted his message and transformed him in "God's son". "How could the sky and earth maker have a sun, when he never had a wife?" (Sura 6, 101).

According to Islamic Law, the noble Koran says: "The only religion accepted by Allah is Islam and there were no differences between the ones that received the Holy Scripture till the Science reached them, because of their envy. And the one that doesn't believe in Allah's signs should know that Allah is quick in counting! (3:19). And Allah the Greatest said: "The one that wants to have another religion than Islam, won't count, and in the Afterworld, he will be among the lost ones" (3:85).

Islam in Romania

The existence of Islam in Romania is linked to the settlement of Turk-Tatar population in our country in the 13th century. Hereby, in 1241, the tartars of Golden Horde khanate were also dominating different areas in Carpathian neighbourhood (www.muftyat.ro). The Islamic population in Romania (Turks, Tatars, Arabians, Albanese, etc.) belong to Sunni branch in majority. Practicing Islamic religion means: keeping the daily divine services (namaz); Ramadan fast of 30 days per year; visiting Kaaba of Mecca and the pilgrimage to Mohamed's grave; helping the ones in need; keeping and preaching on a daily basis the faith.

The religious activity is lead by mufti, who is chosen (by secret vote) out of imams. Besides the mufti, Surai Islam (a synodic college made of 23 members, having advisory vote rights) gathers periodically in order to solve administrative problems and to drive discipline to the cult.

The base unity of the cult is community, which contains all Muslims in a town and is lead by a 5-7 member committee chosen on 4 years (www.muftyat.ro). In Romania, there are 50 Muslim communities and 20 branches spread in Constanța county (63 units), Tulcea (4), and Brăila, Galați and Bucharest, the last three having only one unit.

Lately, despite some dissensions, mass media talks about "the promotion of Dobrogea as the space where Christians and Muslims live together



for centuries, respecting and understanding each other, should be the common goal of all people feeling and thinking as true Muslims (www.muftyat.ro)

The efforts are to be appreciated even more, as the promotion and perpetuance of Islamic culture, educating children and young Muslim in Koran spirit, ensuring the need of religious information for all the believers (www.taiba.ro) are aspects that bring knowledge and understanding. These are possible only by having a rich knowledge of specialty literature. Books like: **Ce înseamnă apartenența mea la Islam, Coranul Uimitor, Toleranța religioasă în Islam, Minuni ale civilizației islamice, Islamul - religia tuturor, Unicitatea lui Allah** and the last but not the least **Traducerea sensurilor Coranului cel Sfânt în limba română** are just few of the books translated. They all sustain the unity of divine messages and the philosophy of complementarity of Islam belief.

This is not a coincidence. Tolerance, “the key of cohabitation for hundreds of years”, “that not only the Romanians have showed to Muslims, but also the Muslims as a minority have showed towards Romanians, has been reminded by the president of Romania in a recent interview” (Băsescu, 2008). The mufti Muurat Yusuf underlines the interethnic bond stating that “here, in Romania, the resident community of Turks and Tatars has lived for more than seven centuries, has a life pattern, and it is harder to tell us we are terrorists”.

The Muslim Clerics is formed of hatips, imams, hags, muezzins. In the present the Muslim Cult has 35 imams and hags. The material base of the cult is realized by self contributions from the believers, donations and state discounts, religious services taxes, visiting taxes for historical monuments etc. Muslim Cult has in his property 108 cemeteries. (www.muftyat.ro).

Muslim Cult in Romania has good relations with the whole Islamic international community, bilateral and multilateral, acted by mutual delegation exchange, gatherings and symposiums on different themes, annual pilgrimage organizing at Mecca, etc. So, in the International Symposium “Juridical Rules of Monotheist religions in the European Union”, from July 3rd 2008, organized by the Ovidius University from Constanta, Theological College and the Religious Study and Research Center for Canonical- Juridic of the three

largest monotheist religions, under the High Priest of IPS, prof. dr. Teodosie Petrescu (Tomitanul), dean of the Theological Faculty and Archbishop of Tomis, Muftiul Murat Yusuf made known the “divine communication of Islamic and Symbolist religion”.

Lately, the relations with “World Islamic League” and “Islamic Salvation” have grown, both organizations with the head office in Saudi Arabia, and together with “Islamic Organization for the South-East Europe”, with head office in Vienna. With all these there are still voices that say, truly, sequentially, the fact that the “Muslim Brotherhood” organization acts under the cover of “Muslim and Cultural League of Romania”, of “Al Taiba” Humanist Foundation, of “Semiluna” Humanist Society and “As Salam” Association, heaving branches in all main college centers of the country (www.presa-zilei.ro).

According to the innocence presumption and in the evidence of the facts that build history, the dialog promoted by Mufti Muurat Yusuf, and also the efforts given by the Taiba Foundation for understanding the Holly Koran significance, they will know in the near future the consensus, guiding to a leisure needed for a better understanding, tolerance and peace. We are convinced about this, as much more as the joint efforts complete the historical tradition and the Islamic culture and civilization facts.

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TERRORISM AND RELIGION BY THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Mircea MUREȘAN, PhD

The action for identifying, analysing, understanding and counteracting terrorism, despite its way of manifestation, will always be difficult and very complicated, as it seems terrorism will possess the strategic initiative, in most of the cases, and the preventive efforts will be huge, difficult, risky and not always with a predictable finality.

Terrorism is not just a product of a sick world that is of a part of the world that feels hit, mad, and desperate, without any chance and without any cure. It is also a product of the world's aggressiveness, of its hidden and revengeful spirit.

And this is why we have turned our attention to the religious terrorism. Although it may seem to be absurd, nowadays, terrorism in the name of religion has become the prevalent way of the manifestation of the political violence within the contemporary world, as it is not the only one, as nationalism and ideology still remain catalysers of the extremist behaviour.

Keywords: terrorism, religion.

At present, due to the phenomenon's complexity, they have not come to a complete definition for terrorism, one that is unanimously accepted on the international level¹. However, it is commonly accepted the fact that terrorism is a threat on national and international security². A possible definition should mention the fact that terrorism is an ensemble of actions undertaken by nonstate forces, in order to influence politics, including by violent means targeted especially against the civilian population. Therefore, terrorism implies military means in order to achieve multiple purposes, most of them assuming a religious and political radicalism, by paralyzing the governments' abilities to maintain the population's safety.

The clashes between terrorist and the public order forces are sporadic, sometimes spectacular; they took place in the presence and implying the civilian population's sacrifice. The used armament

is a mixture between cybernetics, latest technologies and improvised means. The technological progress has given to some persons or groups of people destructive once meant only for governments and armies. This is a major instability source. For the time being, the international community is not capable to eradicate. It is more serious as most of the terrorist organizations act on international level in order to achieve their objectives, as most of them are reflexes of the group's anguish or claims generated by the internal problems from the originating state.

Terrorism becomes more and more a phenomenon with global implications, hard to control, to prevent and to manage. It is not anymore just a violent infringement, a criminal act, an usual reaction, sometimes a desperate one, to a certain evolution of the political and social systems, but it becomes a major problem for the society, as a whole, another extremely virulent aspect of the social life, a violent, primitive actions, meantime dynamic and complex, to a certain extent symmetric to the evolution of the social systems towards performance, balance and a relative stability³.

From the theoretical perspective, terrorism is an extension of the lethal pathology of some ill or contaminated systems, and its seeds are to be found in the huge fault lines created during centuries and aggressively stressed out during the Cold War and afterwards. In other words, terrorism appears as a fault line effect that initially consists of a negative echo or a defiance of a moving horizon and of a typical evolution for the dynamic systems, then as a mosaic of punitive, pathological, spectacular actions, meant to turn the fault line into a dominant system and to submerge to chaos the greatest civilizational and cultural platforms based on value systems and on the respect for the human being.

That is why terrorism seems an omnipresent threat or a system of chaotic actions generating a seemingly endless situation, multiplying itself



in almost all areas of the political, economical and social life, in a vicious system that cannot be broken, for the time being.

Solving out this situation implies multiple solutions, some of them direct, radical and explicit, even violent, aiming cutting the evil, some of them are indirect, consisting of well-prepared strategies for diminishing the discrepancies and the fault line effects, for harmonizing the social and international relations and for improving the human condition, as a whole.

States, security international bodies and organizations, different institutions, alliances and coalitions from the democratic societies, educational and cultural systems from the greatest civilizations area take upon themselves the obligation to build a new edifice of the political, economical, social and human relations. It is to be built on the new principles of the globalization process, in order to identify, confirm and promote entities and values to extort the humankind from the history's ghosts and to recultivate the value, the international solidarity and the respect for the humankind.

The types of terrorism that may exist within this society are almost the same ones present in each type of society, from the primitive to nuclear times. We state there should be stressed out the following ones, according to the nature of their justification:

- reaction terrorism;
- pathogenic terrorism;
- punitive terrorism;
- fault line terrorism;
- ethnic-nationalist terrorism;
- religious terrorism;
- cyberterrorism.

There may be also added some other forms of terrorism, as it seems this sort of phenomenon is easily adjusted to any type of activity, any kind of field and any system.

In modern times, the religious terrorism has expanded the frequency, the scale of the violence and global spread. As a matter of fact, it is a form of terrorism expressed on at least two dimensions: one is the endless fight between ethnic communities and religions, between the fundamentalist parts of religions and ethnic communities, because ethnic communities and religions are products of some value systems that have to be harmonized within the world's value space, the world's unity. This

harmonization is essential for the civilization and for the world's existence. The other dimension is a terrorism generated on the fault lines between them, which has no connection with any of them. For instance, the terrorism arose in Kosovo: this was risen between the countries within the former Yugoslavia; on one hand, there were practises unimaginable cruelties by the parties, and, on the other hand, on this background, there has been manifested a terrorism specific to the fault lines within the Yugoslavian space. It is present even today and it will be hard to stop. This terrorism accompanies drugs and human trafficking, the fight for power. This ethnic and religious based terrorism is very dangerous by its mentioned dimensions, especially because it bitterly exploits these two dimensions of terrorism and the values building ethnic communities and that sometimes may confound with their fundamentalisms and on the other side the fault line effect that it is outlined within the interests' confrontation space.

The difference between the political and the religious based terrorism is given by each one's targets and purpose. The politically motivated terrorism acts are usually besieged against a specific target, a state's entity or representative structure, as the purpose is a destruction act that should determine the state to retort in a favourable manner for the terrorists. In the religious justified terrorist acts, the objective is not clearly defined, as it is only a representation of those ones who do not belong to the terrorists' belief system.

The increasing level of difficulty in predicting next objectives targeted by the terrorists whose acts are religiously based, their violence being directed on randomly chosen victims (as it was in the case of sarin gas attack in the 1995 in the Tokyo's subway network, or as in Al Qaeda's case, whose stated objective is "to hit the West", no special target, no matter when, no matter how). The fact is that acting that manner, this type of terrorists is able to target their unleashed violence on indiscriminatory chosen victims; no matter they are women, children or old people. The religious based terrorism has also less specific primary objectives, the most frequent, being stated that one of hitting „the infidels” in a way perceived enough dangerous so that it will be noticed on a large scale in the targeted society. **Bruce Hoffman**, one of the scholars that intensely focused on the terrorist phenomena, stated that religiously based



THE POLITICAL-MILITARY PRESENT

terrorists perceived their violent acts as “the first and foremost a sacramental act or divine duty executed in response to some theological demand or imperative”⁴, while the political, secular, terrorists perceive their acts of violence “as a way of instigating the correction of a flaw in a system that is basically good or as a means to foment the creation of a new system.”⁵

In this regard, the ethnic-nationalist based terrorism is eloquent: terrorist groups like

IRA (*Irish Republican Army*), ETA (*Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*), PLO (*Palestine Liberation Organization*) believe in the state system, but they try, using violent means, to get part of the system.

The religious based terrorism, on the other hand, does not perceive itself as a part of a “worthy to keep” system, but as an outsider which came and provoke fundamental changes in the existing order.”⁶

| Type | Objectives characteristics | Adepts | Attitude vs. society | Examples |
|-----------------------------|---|---|--|-------------------|
| Religious Terrorism | Undiscriminatory use of force | Members of isolated social environments, with no large mass support | Perceived as “defenders of true faith”, they want the complete replacement of the society order. | Al Qaeda |
| Political/Secular Terrorism | Clear, delimited targets There are limits in using force | Supporters of their objectives | Perceived as “liberators”, they want a reformation or a societal reconstruction. | IRA ETA PLO |

Table no. 1 - Comparative characteristics of religious and political/secular terrorism

The extremist fanatic nature of that type of terrorism leads in less authorities options in dealing with solving that kind of issues. That small number of options is in fact one of the major reason when the authorities choose to respond by opposing force to this threat. If in the case of ethnic and nationalist based terrorism there is a certain degree of moderation, the involving parts trying to reach compromise through negotiations, in the case of religiously based terrorism that is not possible, because there is an increased degree of fanaticism which frequently leads to violent actions that suggest a real “cosmic war”⁷.

Theologically speaking, a major issue in majority of religions is the issue of sacrifice, when a living being is offered to divinity. This might be the explanation why the terrorist acts are frequently perceived as “sacrifices”.

This is the case of suicide bombers, who donate themselves in the middle of large masses of people which are considered to be part of the adversary group; they are considered (and most frequently self-considered) as martyrs⁸. Jurgens-

meyer noticed that this aspect of the martyrdom leads to what many scholars consider as supreme form of religiosity: the sacrifice. “It is a destruction rite which is found in every religious tradition of the world”.

We consider that, from this point of view, we deal with a “pull-out torque” because it seems to be a transformation of the human values, as in the case of Zigal Amir, the assassin of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, which stated that he acted according to the “God’s instructions”⁹.

This way, a crime is not anymore a crime if the god’s will is accomplished, it is what we can call “an obedience or a submission crime”. Hereby, along with the removal of the individual guilt, by the religious justifications, the crime is perceived as a sacrifice.

We can also consider this process a pattern that religious terrorists use it in order to gain some kind of moral superiority needed to act in a way that for other people is inconceivable: bloodshed, attacks on civil population, taped prisoners killings and kidnapping persons.



| Name | Adepts | Adversaries |
|---------------------------|--|---|
| Aum Shinrikyo | Group members | The present social order |
| Lord's Resistance Army | Religious group members Acholis tribe members | Uganda's government and "unpurified" members of Acholis tribe |
| Palestinian Islamic Jihad | Muslim Palestinians | State of Israel |
| Hamas | Muslim Palestinians | State of Israel |
| Al Qaeda | True Muslim believers (according Al Qaeda's criteria) | Secular governments, "the infidels", The West |

Table no. 2 - Main religious terrorist groups

A major role in this values transformation is played by the terrorists' leaders who manage to transmit to their acolytes an exaggerated polarized image of the world in which we are living, using the "us vs. them" pattern, a pattern that is characteristic to every conflict's escalation.

Hereby, the conflict is getting cosmic dimensions, the parties involved in the confrontation being "the good" and "the evil", resulting a battle of the sacred against the unholy profane. Juergensmeyer also noticed that this way of committing terrorist acts is a symbolic expression of power, directed towards the oppressive forces, the person committing those acts regaining a sense of nobility which can provide his superior nature in opposition to that of the oppressors.¹⁰

The influence of that type of terrorism was a strong one and felt on the evolution of the war against terrorism. Hereby, according to the White House, the terrorists are "beyond appeal and must be hunted, captured or killed"¹¹. But we are not so sure that an issue that seemed to be rather one of a cultural policy nature may be solved through military means. Until now, it seemed that the use of the traditional warfare means was not as efficient as we desired to be, and it is time to better focus on the political means, applying long term strategies.

The international community needs time to establish a solid security environment, at the regional and also global level, considering the fact that the military presence of the international community in the regions of Iraq or Afghanistan, was not quite a factor that removed the insecurity generated by the presence of insurgent groups which are continuing to act in a terrorist manner.

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⁸ The martyrdom idea has a long religious tradition, especially during the Early Christianity. Translating it as derived from the Greek “witness”, it gets the meaning of witnessing someone’s belief. Most of the cases, it has been considered not as a belief prove, but as a manifestation of a religious act, a self-sacrifice one.

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THE BLACK SEA – A POTENTIAL MAJOR ZONE FOR GLOBAL SECURITY

Nicolae DOLGHIN, PhD

Two of the Caucasus frozen conflicts have disappeared. They were local conflicts and have changed into a situation risking generating direct global conflicts among great powers. Thus, the Black Sea could become the most explosive geopolitical zone of the world. What we were afraid of is going to be reality.

Instead of transforming into a region of prosperity through economic cooperation as BSEC has proposed, it will be the place from where Russia, with its entire tools in hand, goes again in the world's power games. Russia did it in a moment when the West is concerned of its own problems and when the world generates new realities. This is an effect of globalization, too. Unfortunately, Georgia matters only as a point of reference.

Irrespective of how the events will develop, the world will change; the security environment will witness new turbulences that could be challenges for all security architecture. On the medium term, the main scene for them will be the same Black Sea zone and what is more dangerous, I am afraid, neither NATO and EU nor Russia are really prepared to play.

Keywords: self-determination, territorial integrity, Russia, Georgia, EU, US, energy factor.

The Black Sea is in a paradoxical situation. Even if it is the place where brilliant civilizations appeared and developed since ancient times, it has never been perceived as an distinct geopolitical region like Middle East, Central Europe or its neighbour, Balkans, with their features and problems that make them distinct. As a result of common features, in the framework of geopolitical regions, common politics has sometimes been built or, for them, common strategies have been applied. Black Sea zone, deeply diversified, was rather one

of lost opportunities and unused potentials and these hindered it from becoming a geopolitical entity. We hope the activity Black Sea Defense and Aerospace Exhibition and Conference, hosted by Bucharest, will be one of the success opportunities offered by the zone.

In 1992, June 25, 11 leaders of Black Sea countries signed in Istanbul the declaration that founded Black Sea Economic Cooperation. They expressed their will to strengthen security, stability and prosperity by regional economical cooperation. There was a project based on a 20 millions km² market, a population over 330 millions inhabitants, an important skilled human potential and generous natural resources, energy ones included. All these could be circumstances for a possible geopolitical identity, generated by the reasons close to the Central Europe ones and following its model that, after a tumultuous history, means cooperation, dialogue and solutions. But it did not happen.

Very soon it was proved no subscriber state really linked its strategic options with an architecture belonging to this zone but with NATO and EU. Except Russia that permanently opposed NATO enlargement but not the same for EU with whom it built a special partnership relations. Partnership relations existed between Russia and NATO also but last events proved they were rather a kind of bilateral monitoring. No one could say when that relations would be renewed and how would they look like.

This situation had become a kind of paradigm for last years and Europe had started to get used with that. The Russian-Georgian military conflict from August year could be the end of that paradigm and the beginning of global security system entering into a spiral that if not carefully managed could provoke the loss of system. It is too early to show the final point but one of most dangerous situation



could be the isolation of Russia, the failure in its integration in international system, integration that Henry Kissinger considers “*the key task of emerging international order*”¹. It is hard to believe that the geographical isolation of Russia could be possible. It could become a reciprocal blocking, especially in the relations with Europe and none of the parts is self-sufficient to allow itself such a step. It is enough to look at the world's map. Politically, it could push Russia to less convenient for West states and an explosive break up of the global security architecture. These are also effects of the same globalization which we are tempted to see as a continuous victorious march of the West but which proved to be more complicated.

Unfortunately, in the future dynamics, Georgia's situation seems to become gradually, less important, only as a reference to non-observance of some principles. The solidarity movements and declarations towards Georgia made by NATO, US and EU that means by the entire West world, accompanied by an intensive informational war more nuanced in other places of the world, could be followed by more rigid positions of main actors, a possible escalation of the facts and preservation of the existing situation. Maybe, the way out from this situation could begin with a balanced analyze and with pointing out the responsibilities in the August 8th conflict in South Osetia where there were victims among civilians, destroyed goods and refugees. Otherwise, the West will continue to consider Russia the same USSR which has to be contained and Russia will accuse farther the West in using double standards with direct reference to the way it managed the same situation in Kosovo and in ignoring its interests. Both parts will persevere in building in the opposite the enemy and this means the favourable conditions for a long break out in a moment when the security environment stabilization needs cooperation.

From a potential platform for economic cooperation, the Black Sea zone started to collect the conditions favourable to its transformation into a geopolitical zone more dangerous one than Middle East, destabilizing global security, into a scene for unprecedented power relations between West and Russia. If we would take into account the declarations that accompanied informational war during Russian-Georgian conflict, on this scene there will be present the military component, the most dangerous dimension of that power relations.

But what individualizes the Black Sea zone among other known geopolitical regions is the emergency of the perspective for a direct confrontation, without intermediary, between USA and Russia, reminding the Caribbean crises of the seventh decade of 20th century. As usually in the power games, peripheral zones are preferred and could suffer the most damages. The presence of US battle ships in Black Sea in an unprecedented so far number and the perspective of sending Russian military ships in the Caribbean Sea for commune exercises with Venezuelan Navy could be only the first steps.

But we could hope that as the Caribbean crises has been the beginning for the long process of giving up the Cold War, the Russian-Georgian conflict could initiate the long process of building a new international order. This is necessary because in the conditions of globalization, no one can avoid interdependencies and ignoring the security indivisibility could induce chaos.

Even if it is on a favourable trend of economic develop, Russia itself is on the way to feel the effects of globalization because of a minor military conflict but followed by major international effects. A paper of the Moscow Institute for International Economy and Finances noted that apart from political price, Russia will pay expensive its rapid military victory by: getting complications in its economic relations with Western states, possible economic sanctions from US, diminishing the rate of GDP increase, reducing the foreign invests (in the first days of conflict, about 7 billion of US\$ left the Russian market), the inflation increase which will reduce in real terms the last increases of people incomes etc.² At the same time, that Pandora's box opened after the declaration and recognition of Kosovo independence and refreshed these days could hit Russia more than it is believed. All these are not optimistic circumstances for the future security of zone.

Under these circumstances, **on long term**, the security issue for Black Sea zone is broader than the region itself, and its perspectives are linked with the future US-Russia relations, the future partnerships of NATO and EU with Russia, the attitude of other global actors, but also with what will happen in the close geopolitical spaces, especially Middle East and Central Asia. **On the medium term**, the security in Black Sea zone will be dependent on its geographical location on the



East frontier of the European and Euro-Atlantic integration spaces neighbouring other spaces where there exist or are projected other kinds of integration (CIS, Shanghai Group, GUAM, Organization of the Treaty for Collective Security) having different philosophy. Overall, these will overlap the obsessing concerns of the all states for resources and free access to them, especially to the energy, essential for developing and prosperity.

The dramatic breaking into public opinion attention of Black Sea zone at the 8th of August 2008 put in evidence, more than other times, the **UN inefficiency** as organization responsible for the world's security. In that case, the Security Council did not adopt a resolution. At the same time, once again it is proved that the world needs UNO more than ever and politicians can not ignore this reality.

The precedent created by Kosovo case opened a new cycle in the international relations, **that of changing the ambiguities in UN work into vectors for attending strategic objectives**. The generosity offered by the principles of people's **self-determination** and states' **territorial integrity**, both stressed in UN Chart, but which have to work today in the conditions of globalization, could feed a **conflict of interests** accompanied by destabilizing effects on the long term.

There are no mono-ethnic states and this political reality of the world favours the globalization and feeds its chain reactions. It is the international law that could identify solutions for reducing the effects of that conflict of interests which risks to become a real mine in power relations. To invoke further the principles is not enough. After all, what are the tools if not those ones belonging to international law which could indicate that the fragmentation of Soviet empire, for example is finished when the world still witnesses the effects of conflict between self-determination and territorial integrity in the territories that once have belonged to the Habsburg, Ottoman or British empires, disappeared many years ago? That is why the majority of international law subjects preferred to be careful, according to national interests positions, when faced the recent ambiguities in the UN work.

Other organizations tried to replace the UN inefficiency that in the case of Caucasus conflict changed into a kind of shutting off. Their actions are undermined by the insufficient amplitude that

means they have not enough competences or by the interests and internal situation of each of member states.

The European Union reacted immediately to the events occurred in a space where it has long term interests and that is why has to be stable. To be credible as a global actor, the EU's rapid commitment was necessary, in order to avoid its failure in managing ex-Yugoslavia crisis burnt out due to US intervention. The quickly result was Sarkozy – Medvedev Plan for managing a situation that militarily has already been undoubtedly solved. EU offered humanitarian aid for Georgia but, at the same time, condemned disproportional Russian military operation, restated the territorial integrity of Georgia, claimed the Russian troops' withdrawal, promised economic support for Georgia and invoked possible sanctions against Russia if it will not observe assumed obligations. The only concrete measure has been to suspend the negotiations on the future document on cooperation with Moscow. US welcomed EU position but except the moving of some war ships in Black Sea and some sound public declaration on possible sanctions did not adopted painful for Russia concrete measures.

In the EU declaration, there is no word about the military violence used by Georgia to reintroduce constitutional order or about the self-determination of South Osetins or Abkhazs. As every arranged document, it was unsatisfying for everyone starting with the members who support sanctions and finishing with Russia which hoped in an aggressor nomination. Nobody believes in real sanctions and it seems this is not a question on the table, the Plan includes too many points, it has been elaborated for a situation fully controlled by Russia and there is the risk to become a tennis match and the ball will be moved from a field to another for a long time, until the world will get new reality accustomed.

If we remember, the self-proclaimed Turkish republic in Cyprus exists for more than 30 years, recognized by a single state, Turkey, and it has been enough. For the moment, Sarkozy-Medvedev Plan is the only document that includes concrete operational tools and EU and Russia are the main actors. The Russia's recognition of South Osetia and Abkhazia independence has induced a new element that makes the Plan vulnerable. The Russian part considers it is working on the



Georgian territory only, without the territories of South Osetia and Abkhazia, EU sees it working on the Georgian territory internationally recognized. NATO, another main component of Western world, is not part of negotiations and supports Georgia by humanitarian means and military *demonstrations*.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization that besides Russia includes other four states (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) and as observers, India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan has been the first international organization that introduced polyphony in the monophonic dialogue between Russia and West. In a joint declaration adopted after August 28 Summit in Dushanbe, using a sophisticated philosophical language remind us Confucius and offering place for many interpretations, the leaders of the member states stated that “...*any attempt to solve problems by merely resorting to force could not work and would only hinder a comprehensive settlement of local conflicts*” agreed that “*Any attempt to strengthen a country's own security at the expense of the others is detrimental to maintaining global security and stability*” and, in connection with South Osetia question, they expressed “*their support for Russia's positive role in promoting peace and cooperation in the region*”³. There is no word in document about the possibility to join Russia in recognizing the independence of the two that could mean a total support. Probably Russia could not expect more from China, but the public expressed approval of China for Russia's role in Caucasus is very much. Only some weeks ago China faced a secession attempt in Tibet and repressed it unhesitatingly and an eventual recognition of Abkhazia's and South Osetia's independence could provoke to it consistency problems and rarely in its history China demonstrated lack of consistency.

Shanghai Organization covering a surface more than 30 millions km² (2/3 of Eurasia territory) and more than 1455 millions population (nearly a quarter of world's population)⁴ started its way in 2001 having the aim that using political, economic, commercial, cultural, etc. tools, but not military ones, to take part to the building of new international political and economic order, based *on democracy, justice and rationality*⁵. At Dushanbe, the Shanghai Group's six member states' leaders expressed their view in a security issue with direct military implications and that could suggest in the future it will assume new responsibilities in

managing the world's security following NATO model: **new responsibilities** in managing security, **new members** (Iran is one of the states knocking insistently at its door), **new areas** (it is hard to consider Caucasus as an Eurasian space).

The Treaty Organization for Collective Security which includes Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia and Uzbekistan is the only military alliance on the post-soviet territory. Once it also included Georgia. On September, 8, 2008, foreign ministries of the organization states condemned Georgia's actions in South Osetia and supported Russia's role⁶. Next day, at the Moscow meeting of the state leaders, the Russia's allies supported also “ensuring a firm security for South Osetia and Abkhazia”⁷ but did not recognize their independence and President Medvedev said “... all our partners from TOCS will decide independently, according to their national interests”⁸ on this issue. Among the possible ways of the situation evolution that of independence recognition followed by joining the two organization was mentioned.

Probably the best argument supporting the idea the Black Sea zone could become a major one for global security and it is not advantageous for it to evaluate to such status is offered by the Turkish initiative publicly expressed in the middle of events. It could be an interesting precedent in projecting new tools, more flexible and avoiding great geopolitical competition, for security management, but surely it is an attempt to shun the escalation of situation to a dangerous one. The Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has proposed “*The Platform for Stability and Cooperation in Caucasus*”. It could be a mechanism with the participation of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Turkey for restoring peace and stability in the region, assuring economic cooperation and energetic security. The Platform is strictly delimited geographically and would be established on the OSCE principles. On September, 2, during the bilateral meeting in Ankara, after the act of recognition by Russia of independence of two secessionist provinces, the Russian foreign ministry welcomed Turkey's efforts and promised the Russian support, the Turkish one, after underlying the importance of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia said he will continue the efforts “... *to develop and finalize the initiative.*”⁹

What is drawing public attention is the individual initiative belonging to a state with a



long history and experience in zone, an important NATO member, wishing for many years to join EU and which is responsible for observing the straits' regime to the Black Sea. At the same time, it faces the Kurd unsolved problem, it is an important economic partner for Russia and beneficiary of most advantages of hosting some of the transit ways for energetic resources to the world's developed regions. Due to that initiative of local extension, Turkey shows it wants to maintain its advantages, to demonstrate its stabilizing potential and to assure itself against an unexpected evolution of Kurd risk. Under the existing circumstances, it is not in Russia's interests to oppose Turkey. The list of participants suggests there could be also discussed other problems of zone, not only the Russian-Georgian relations. It is obvious it is the only initiative that could bring at the same table Russia and Georgia, Turkey and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, that is all the Caucasus states with the problems to be solved. The Turkish initiative could be also a way for avoiding the direct confrontation between US and Russia with its possible destabilizing complications.

In a decisive manner, the future for zone security, with its reverberations for the other world's regions, is up to the relations between US and Russia in their competition for ex-soviet space. US immediately blamed the Russian Armed Forces operations, the fact of independence recognition and insisted on Georgia's territorial integrity. They also declared they are working on a list of possible sanctions against Moscow. The most probable would be to block the agreement for the US-Russia cooperation in the nuclear civilian field. *"Now is not the right time for the US to move forward on a once-celebrated deal for nuclear cooperation with Russia"*¹⁰, the US secretary of State stated on 6th of September. Russia has publicly declared to promote its security interests in zone. Some days ago, President Medvedev announced the five principles of future Russian foreign policy. One of them is refusal for monopolarity, the direct challenge for USA. This was enough for the world to start talking about a new Cold War.

US is probably the political actor with the biggest possibilities to influence the security in Black Sea zone, due to its ability to influence all the security dimensions, to their role in NATO but also due to the wish of all state in the zone to have privileged relations with it. Indirectly, Russia is

aware of this situation and during all this period did not provoke NATO war ships, even if it blamed their presence in Black Sea. For the time being, the relations between the two actors reflect reciprocal perceptions: for US, Russia feed the conflict inside Georgia during the years, for Russia, US targeted Russia by inspiring Georgian military operation against its secessionist province.

In the nearly 20 years of lack of Cold War, US and Russia have cooperated in many fields of global security and nobody will gain if they stop the cooperation. The strategic nuclear weapons field belongs strictly to them. The success in the antiterrorist war is an objective that Russia follows as all the states do, and to stabilize Afghanistan is more important for Russia than for US or NATO. It is interesting to stress no Russian high official has mentioned the possibility to cut off the cooperation in such sensitive question for US and NATO. To manage other present security risks as organized crime, drugs and persons trafficking, nuclear technology proliferation, environment problem, global warming is not possible by individual efforts. Russia has planned for itself ambitious development objectives and in reaching them is conditioned by the success in fighting against these risks. It will have to take an active part to it can not allow the US hostility. On the other hand, there is the Iran question, the Middle East situation, the US antimissile shield in Europe and US has to discuss with Russia.

If we have in mind the dimensions of global strategies, the 8th of August could be considered the day when Russia faced a major challenge for its image in the world as a power. Either it would have directly intervened against Georgia which has attacked civilian population and objectives or would have not. In the first case, Russia could become a target for accusations which can affect its image in the world. In the second, its internal political system could be compromised and its credibility could be affected in the world power's games. It was a challenge that in both cases could change the physiognomy of future power relations. It was something close to the situation US was in September 11, 2001. Russia chose the alternative of military intervention just as USA chose the global war on terror. No matter how things will evolve from now on, the global security environment will witness dramatic changes because the Russian option will accelerate some decisions essential for



security environment in the ex-soviet space and in the rest of the world. Irrespective of their essence and direction, they will generate troubles in Black Sea zone and in the world.

For the beginning, in the post soviet space Russia will deep the actions in order to draw the support of its partners from CIS, TOCS, Eurasian initiatives in its competition with US. I don't Russia will use soon military operations. It would assume too many vain risks and it already told to the world what it had to say by its intervention in South Osetia. Probably from the political and economic pressure will suffer first of all Ukraine for whom Russia is an important economic partner and where there exist a serious fracture between NATO oriented part of its political government and population majority with an anti-NATO attitude. From the reality of the Ukrainian society, probably both NATO and Russia will start developing their future strategies.

EU has realized it is time for its intervention between the two in order to assert itself as an important security actor. It opposed Russia in Caucasus situation, but some nuances have appeared in its relation with US also. At the informal meeting of EU states foreign ministries in Avignon, 5-6 September, the European commissioner for foreign relations said "...it is right time for the EU to raise its level of ambition in transatlantic relations"¹ and the French foreign ministry "...EU needs to renew the transatlantic relationship in a changing world"². At the same time, the German foreign ministry has supported the necessity for "an independent investigation of what led to the conflict between Russia and Georgia"³ suggesting to give up the informational war categories and to analyze rationally the case.

After the USSR disappearance, the **energy factor** has introduced for a long time Black Sea zone in geopolitical global games, because the nature of actors has increased and got diverse. On the one hand, there are more states possessing energetic resources, on the other, there have appeared states with no resources but their territory offers ways of access to them that means transit spaces. Thus, interdependences have been created that offer advantages but at the same time more dynamics for geopolitics. Caucasus has been considered a sure alternative, resistant to the Russian energetic blackmail, for Caspian oil. The Russian-Georgian conflict stressed the vulnerabilities of the way. The

Baku – Ceyhan pipeline, for instance, has been out of work because an explosion occurred on the Turkey territory and during the conflict it has been preventive closed for some days. At the same time, Russia is building new pipes to the Pacific Ocean, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to China, Iran opposes pipes building Caspian Sea ground the law status of the last is uncertain etc. In such a situation, the future could become complicated first of all for European countries. For them the need for energy resources is yearly increasing. Other great consumers obtain energy from different zones and will compete with Europe due to the new openings. US anyway monitor all ways of World Ocean.

The energy factor will solicit the military potentials of many states in the zone but also the political abilities of the individual or collective actors in managing this reality. It has the capacity to generate original associations among states based on concrete interests, goals of developing and prosperity beyond the recognized alliances and organizations. The globalization has offered the conditions to achieve these goals on the broad spaces and the opportunities have been noticed.

Beyond the oil, natural gas or electricity the energy factor suppose complex infrastructure, huge invests on the long term and their finalization is linked to the stability and global security. The energy factor creates interdependencies not dependencies. The supplier of energy resources depends on consumer in the same amount as consumer on supplier. The interdependencies have the chance to be guarantor of the stability. It is another alternative suggested by the latest events in Black Sea zone.

NOTES:

¹ Henry KISSINGER, **Diplomacy**, Paperback edition, 1995, Simon and Schuster ed., 1995, p. 818

² *Posledstvia avgusta 2008 goda: vesnoi rossianam grozit massovïe uvolnenia I sokrašenie zarplat*, <http://www.newsru.com/finance/02sep.2008/zarplata.html>

³ <http://english.cri.cn/2947/2008/08/28/1821s399913.htm>

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⁵ Idem.

⁶ <http://lenta.ru/news/2008/09/04/mid/>

⁷ http://www.ng.ru/cis/2008-09-06/100_odkb.html?mthree=1

⁸ Idem.



GEOPOLITICS AND GEOSTRATEGIES ON THE FUTURE'S TRAJECTORY

⁹<http://www.byegm.gov.tr/yayinlarimiz/chr/ing2008/09/08x09x03.htm>

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¹¹http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-09/06/content_9804841.htm

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SOUTH CAUCASUS CONFLICT RISES EU, NATO AND US CONCERN

Constantin-Gheorghe BALABAN, PhD

Frozen or not, the crises and conflicts from the Romania's and, consequently, for European Union area of interest have unpredictable configuration and development. There's a possibility for some frozen conflicts to burst again and others to finish dramatically because the Euro-Asian confluences space isn't appropriate managed.

An unsolved conflict that, presently, leads the South Caucasus almost to war is the Russian-Georgian one. A conflict provoking "tensions" into the transatlantic relations and although a colder and tensed atmosphere on the continent, admitted by the Moscow commissioner to Brussels which believes "the tensed atmosphere on the continent is similar with the 1914th one"¹.

Georgia, ally of the United States, is crossed by the oil pipeline² that tides Baku and the Turkish Mediterranean port, Ceyhan, but also sustains after the Peace Agreement signing that it is "occupied" by the Russian forces. A situation about which the American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declares that the Russian troops should withdraw immediately from the conflict area and their place should be taken by the neutral international peacekeeping forces.

Experts estimated one day-conflict costs Russia about 100 million dollars and Georgia's one-day battles against South Ossetia forces and Russian army almost 200 million dollars³.

There were also voices accusing militaries of "vandalism and theft"⁴ and the tones of human aids sent by Georgia couldn't be distributed because of lack of security.

One thing is sure: the stability in this area should become a "seriously international concern". As usual in the past, United States, NATO and EU stated to be very worried and persistently asked for a faster nonviolent solution.

Keywords: South Caucasus, Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, crisis, frozen conflict.

1. Preliminaries

Before the Caucasus violence to transform into a real war, the Kremlin ex-leader and the Russian Federation actual prime-minister, Vladimir Putin, stated that "Georgia's eventually actions can't remain unpunished"⁵. They were. The object of the conflict: the South Ossetia, a territory about 4.000 square kilometres, 100 kilometres to north near Tbilisi. A Georgian army offensive into this separatist region got to the Russia's force response.

Russia is worried not only by this incident but also by the entire Georgian policy practices, a militarization policy, as the Moscow officials sustain.

At its turn, Georgia accuses Moscow using the cold war practices.

Moreover, *Financial Times* wrote Georgia wasn't expected a military reaction from Russia when "attacked" South Ossetia⁶.

The Peace Plan negotiated to Moscow, by presidents Nicolas Sarkozy and Dmitri Medvedev, was signed by president Saakashvili, too, but the Georgia's situation is still tensioned, even the shootings and killings stopped. The Russian president Dmitri Medvedev affirmed that "no matter how much we respect the borders' inviolability principle, it is hard to believe that after the things happened with them, the Ossetians and Abkhazians would like to remain into the same state with Georgia. We will respect their decision and this will be seen into the Russian Federation foreign policy"⁷ - one of the Moscow intentions being to strengthen the peacekeeping forces in the South Ossetia province.

President Saakashvili states that, now, in the region "viable solutions" are needed and "impartial peacekeeping forces wouldn't pretending they are doing this".

Moreover, Mihail Saakashvili wants for the reconciliation to take place in a long-termed



process, with renegotiations, but won't trade in the little countries' detriment in front of the bigger ones⁸.

There are just two positions determining the Russian stators to remain "sceptical about a durable peace" in Caucasus when the conflict parties "agreed on paper". Therefore, as long as the Ossetians won't let Georgians to get back to their homes and the Russian military present in many Georgian's territory regions is less probable to withdraw from South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

2. The entire international community puts together to find a "solution"

The international press agencies showed that Moscow warned the Tbilisi's officials that if they don't accept the peace plan convened by Medvedev and Sarkozy, Russia will have to adopt a series of measures to stand for the "repetition" of the bloody events from South Ossetia. Also, the Russian foreign minister Serghei Lavrov declared that the elected Georgian president Mihail Saakashvili "isn't no longer a partner" and "he will better leave".

The stability in this area must become a very serious international issue, too, because the Georgian army is blamed for the South Ossetia's attacks while the Russian forces for Gori's bombardment.

The US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice asked for a teleconference of G-8, the most industrialized countries, and Russia wasn't invited. Condoleezza Rice considers "urgent" the "Russian troops' withdrawal from Georgia. Consequently, with the Georgian president signature on the peace agreement, all the Russian troops and the paramilitary troops should withdraw immediately from the Georgian territory".

Alsh, the American Secretary of State said that the peacekeeping in this conflict area must be a continuous concern on international plan. There's needed an "international discussion", comprised in the peace agreement, about "a future arrangement of this conflict area" with measures to safeguard the area's order and security keeping ensured by international neutral forces.

To cease the hostilities and begin the peace discussions pronounced, also UN and OSCE – the UN Security Council urgently meeting, by Russia's request to examine the situation from

Ossetia without adopting a declaration about South Ossetia¹⁰.

Similarly, NATO, by the United States' request, convoked at 19th of August the North-Atlantic Council as a normal reaction to the disproportioned answer given by Russia "to the hasted trial of Georgia to re-establish constitutional order on its own territory"¹¹. But, the project of a decisive action misses.

If the situation won't be changed – declared the German chancellor Angela Merkel stated – we could say "we are dealing with the Russian distrust of the actual agreements". So, EU should take all the possible measures to come over Moscow to change its attitude if not by dialogue but by "the adoption of peculiar resolutions in regard of this issue"/.../ for both sides, Russia's and Europe's, interest. There must be credibility".

3. The Supreme Council for Country's Defence decides to involve into the Caucasus conflict resolution

As expected, the SCCD met twice in four days to examine, at one side, the situation of Romanians from the conflict area¹², but also the possible consequences for the regional plan if the situation will become uncontrolled.

CCD decided that Romania will involve into Caucasus conflict resolution by its regional expertise and, consequently, will send medicines and medical equipments in response to the Georgian affairs commissioner to Bucharest¹³.

4. The prompt reactions to the raised conflict continue in the international policy centres

The United States sustains that the Russians want to "take down" the power from Tbilisi being among the first reactions to the conflict provoking "tensions" in the transatlantic relations.

The White House requested to Moscow, in very "harsh terms", "to respect the sovereignty of an independent state" and considered that Russia "exaggerated in its military reaction" to the burst conflict.

Moreover, on the conflict theme speech, President George W. Bush mentioned "Russia invaded a neighbour state and threatens a democratic and legitimate state, unacceptable thing for the 21st century"¹⁴.



Is there a remark regarding the Cold War era and a sustainment of accuses¹⁵ brought against Russia by the Tbilisi power?

The French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, appealed, on August, 27 for the Russian Federation to withdraw “immediately” the forces from Georgia “on their positions before the hostilities launch”. Moreover, the international discussions, as prescribed to the 6th point of the peace agreement¹⁶, was negotiated to Moscow by Presidents Nicolas Sarkozy and Dmitri Medvedev and signed by president Saakashvili. The Caucasus situation debated afterwards in an EU special summit framework¹⁷.

EU tried a normal reaction to the Brussels September, 1, extraordinary summit to show a common and firm position against the Russian Federation and decide if Moscow should be sanctioned for its actions in the conflict with Georgia. The sanctions idea was blocked in the pre-summit negotiations peculiarly by France and Germany¹⁸, with Italy, having the most developed economic relations with Russia.

Countries expressing constantly, in the late years, “the adversity against Russia”, Poland and the Baltic states with Sweden pleaded for the suspension of the EU - Russia negotiations regarding a strategic partnership agreement.

These negotiations started in July should continue at the middle of September. The Russian ambassador aside the European Union, Vladimir Chizov, declared for the *Financial Times* that Moscow is still interested to continue the negotiation as much as Brussels is – “not more or less”.

The European states wait a change of attitude from the Russians.

On the other side, as *Ria Novosti* notes, Serghei Lavrov sustains “the plan’s text”, regarding the Georgian conflict resolution, signed by president Saakashvili “isn’t authentic”: the last prescription from document regarding the basic principle of conflict regulation that presidents Dmitri Medvedev and Nicolas Sarkozy approved on August, 12 underlines the beginning of an “international dialogue concerning the measures needed to be taken to preserve the Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s security and stability”.

Or, the text signed afterwards refers to “security and stability in Abkhazia and South Ossetia”¹⁹.

5. A first signal of the spoiled relations between Washington and Moscow

Poland and USA signed during the South Caucasus crisis “the agreement” regarding the settlement of some American anti-rocket shield elements. On this document basis, US will deploy in Poland a unit of air rockets with medium action range served commonly by American and Polish militaries. Consequently, Russia’s “fierce” reaction appeared: Poland becomes a “main target” if an attack over the American shield will occur. In fact, a threat confirmed also by the Russian Chief of the General Staff, General Iuri Baluevski, unhesitatingly, declared that the Russia’s military “allows, sometimes, the use of the nuclear armament”²⁰.

Together with the hard tensions with Moscow, the American vice-president Dick Cheney’s presence to Tbilisi irritated the Russians more²¹. Peculiarly, the analysts note, because the American vice-president’s tour includes countries the United States consider to be “key-allies into the region” – Azerbaijan (September, 3), Georgia (September, 4) and Ukraine – there’s “a proof” of the White House’s support for Georgia.

Of course it is. Dick Cheney clearly confirmed that the United States support “this young and courageous democracy” – Georgia, with a territory crossed over by a strategic oil pipeline connecting Baku and the Mediterranean harbour Ceyhan, from Turkey, and transporting hydrocarbons from the Caspian Sea²².

After Dick Cheney’s meeting with president Saakashvili, the first one stated that “America firmly sustains Georgia’s adhesion program to NATO and, lastly, joining the Atlantic Alliance”²³. Consequently, with the accuse against Russia “of illegitimate unilateral attempt to change Georgia’s borders by force”²⁴, reminds the US “deep and constant interest” for “their Caucasus allies prosperity” – while visiting Azerbaijan insisted on the collaboration between the United States and Azerbaijan to create, detouring Russia, fuel supply corridors for the Occident.

6. The NATO Declaration regarding the Georgian conflict

Normally, the Caucasus situation was also under NATO debate and the Alliance’s “adopted



position” made the Russian Chief of Diplomacy Sergei Lavrov to comment that the president Saakashvili seems to be under Alliance’s wing.

In this regard, Lavrov considers “un-objective” the Declaration adopted by the Organization and, moreover, sustains “NATO continues to arm Georgia” and the present Tbilisi administration “doesn’t give up the war plans against the South Ossetia and Abkhazia”.

One similar position is adopted by Russia’s representative to NATO, Dmitri Rogozin, appreciating “it won’t be another Cold War” but the Russian Federation relations with NATO will suffer “changes” on “volume, quality and political meetings graphic”.

Also, certain “contracts” at least regarding the Russian-American cooperation were “cancelled”²⁵. Moreover, on 25th of August, the president Medvedev himself, the new Kremlin leader, said there is no offence if NATO ceases the cooperation with Moscow because “only the allied states are interested in better relations with Russia”²⁶. Consequently, Moscow could cancel the agreement allowing the Alliance to use the Russian air space to transport equipment and supplies to Afghanistan²⁷ - Dmitri Rogozin reproached NATO that send armaments to Mihail Saakashvili regime for a new invasion of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Also, Rogozin explained why Moscow decided last month to maintain the Afghanistan partnership with NATO, even Russian responsible announced on 28th of August that “they have frozen for six months the peacekeeping cooperation with the Alliance as feedback to the NATO “quarrelling” launched against Russia after the Georgia’s military operation start.

So, Russia’s actions – as NATO General Secretary emphasized – doubt Russia’s engagement in Caucasus peace and security.

NATO firmly sustains Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and asks Russia to respect these principles sustaining Georgia into this conflict.

7. Russia defies United States and the Western countries. Harder reactions in the West after Moscow announcement

The South Caucasus conflict provoked hard tensions between West and the Russian Federation relations. Even the European states seemed divided

on the position against Moscow, now, Russia doesn’t consider Mihail Saakashvili the Georgia’s president²⁸ and accuses the United States that supports the Georgia and South Ossetia actions and send, by sea, guns to the Georgians. The Russia’s reactions are better felt.

On 25th of August, the Russian Parliament decided unanimously²⁹ to sustain the independency³⁰ of the both separatist regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia.

Initially, there wasn’t any answer from president Medvedev³¹, there was an official reaction. A official reaction came from the Russian foreign minister: Moscow “doesn’t intend to annex another territories” but “will make all possible to safeguard its citizens interests and security from Abkhazia and South Ossetia”³².

Afterwards, Russia will announce that both separatist regions from Georgia have the right to choose their future after the Georgian attacks³³ and the new Kremlin leader, Dmitri Medvedev, will sign on August, 26, the decree of recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. A gesture that provoked a bigger strain of the European relations because the occidental chancelleries reacted immediately to the Moscow decision, qualified as “regrettable”. Also, the EU French presidency begins consultations with its partners to adopt a “common condemnation declaration” against Russia’s recognition of independence for the two separatist regions from Georgia. Later, the European Union announced “the negotiations’ postponement” for a new agreement of partnership and cooperation with Russia³⁴ until the Russian forces will withdraw from Georgia³⁵ - negotiations started in July and should continue to the middle of September 2008.

The West reactions after the Moscow announcement are stronger and vice versa.

Russia can decide, at its turn, to adopt sanctions against other states although it doesn’t want this. The Russian president, Dmitri Medvedev, shaped “five positions” to build the Moscow foreign policy as: “the international law basic principles supremacy, appointing the relations among the civilized people”; the world’s multi-polarity when the uni-polarity and domination “are not admitted”; the will to avoid confrontation and isolation; Russian citizens life defence and dignity “no matter where they are” and also “our affairs community abroad” defence and, not lately, the



Russia's rights recognition to have "privileged interests", as *Kommersant* journal resumes.

Still, before the Brussels EU Summit, from September, 1, Moscow clearly underlined "its main concession": the Russia's accord with the OSCE's role increasing and even EU's in the security zones around Abkhazia and South Ossetia. So, after the Russian troops' withdrawal, the control could pass into the European structures hands. There a signal heard in the European diplomatic circles and could become "one of the key arguments" for the ones pronouncing against sanctions and confrontation with Russia.

Still, we must keep in mind that not even the Dushanbe reunion, from August, 28, of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization the Kremlin's leader, Dmitri Medvedev, succeeded to convince other states to recognize the two Georgian separatist regions independency even obtained the recognition of the role the Russian Federation continues to play in the ex-soviet space.

8. Romania's position to the Moscow announcement

Romania appreciates that the recognition by the Russian Federation of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia independency represents a 'regrettable and unlawful unilateral act being able to stronger damage the situation in the area'³⁶. The subsequent hearings at the Romanian Senate's special commissions underlined the need for information and knowledge, if and how much Romania can have a daring attitude on the international scene and if Georgia's situation affects our foreign policy goals.

It is sure one fact: Romania's voice was heard to all the international reunions and our country's position remains unchanged: Romania's respect the Georgia's territorial integrity and asks EU for a better involvement to solve the region's frozen conflicts.

9. Georgia went off from CIS. How will Russia react?

The Georgian president Mihail Saakashvili declared, in front of thousands of people gathered at Tbilisi, that the country will withdraw from CIS – organization that groups the ex-soviet republics excepting the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and

Lithuania) – and other countries are expected to follow "its gesture".

Russia can't stop a country to quit this structure but as stated Serghei Referenko, representative from the foreign minister, Georgia "hasn't shown an official paper in this sense yet". Moreover, the CIS part also supposes a long legal procedure. However, concludes the Russian official, leaving CIS can have "consequences for that country's people" because in the organization framework "there was a very close cooperation concerning humanitarian, economic and cultural issues"³⁷.

Conclusion

In regard with its position, vulnerabilities and access to resources, the South Caucasus incited not only the Russian Federation's interest but also the United States, European Union and, recently, NATO – great power poles with global influence this translating into different strategic interests: European, Euro-Asian and Euro-Atlantic.

The Georgia's geopolitical value raised due to the great oil and gases reserves around the Caspian Sea, a potential alternative energy source for the West. Or, Georgia – a transit country for the energetic products from Caspian Sea toward the Black Sea and to Europe has a wide opening to the Black Sea where it have two harbours, Suhumi and Batumi. Simultaneously, Georgia has an advantageous geographic position nearby all the conflict areas against the international terrorism from Central Asia and Middle East and not only.

Now, the West pressures against Russia intensified especially after Moscow recognized at August, 26, the independency of the both separatist zones from Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. A decision amended fairly by the American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the NATO General Secretary Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and labelled the "direct violation of the Security Council's resolutions regarding the Georgia's territorial integrity" where Russia also contributed.

Still, the confrontation mean isn't advantageous. Russia can't be ignored and the sanctions' application and its isolation isn't a benefit. The favourable relations with Russia remain essential for EU too, more and more interested to raise security in its vicinity. Moreover, this will affect the European countries' economies more than the



Russian one³⁸. Russia should remain a “strategic partner” and not a “hostile country”. The premier Vladimir Putin recently declared that Russia isn’t afraid of the eventual economic sanctions of the international community and the lesson learned by the majority of the Russian elite is “nobody can take seriously Russia as long as it is weak”³⁹.

So, we are asking what has Georgia against Russia. Is Georgia’s attitude against Russia justified? Is Russia behaving as a discretionary power using all sorts of stratagems? Moreover, is it real the “accusation” that Russia uses Cold War practices⁴⁰ as stated by the new elected Georgian president Mihail Saakashvili?

The interest motivations for the trans-Caucasian area showed by different actors are diverse and we believe they were understood correctly, including the Russian Federation’s position to regain its influence in the area and, why not, even some Occident’s restrains to the Tbilisi leadership requests⁴¹.

The Black Sea and the South Caucasus region, including Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are nearer to the Europe’s security problems, are intrinsic part of it. Consequently, area’s stability must become a “very serious international preoccupation” and a “absolute priority” for the European Union, too.

The Europeans security and the future of the old continent and as well the Euro-Asian configuration, basic for world’s future, depends on these issues’ solutions.

NOTES:

¹ TVR, Foreign News, August, 26, 2008.

² This is about the strategic oil pipeline transporting hydrocarbons from the Caspian Sea. This pipeline will be accompanied by a gas one and a railway with crucial role for the Asian and European commerce.

³ On the estimated numbers estimated by the experts mentioned in the Evening Journal, Europa FM, August, 15, 2008.

⁴ Manuela Nicolescu, correspondent, Evening Journal, Europa FM, August, 15, 2008.

⁵ Beijing, to the meeting with George W. Bush at the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games.

⁶ News broadcasted by Romania FM, August, 22, 2008.

⁷ Liviu Iurea, our correspondent to Moscow (TVR Journal, August, 15, 2008).

⁸ Three days after the peace agreement, Georgia, US ally, still sustained is “occupied” by the Russian forces.

⁹ Of course, certain discussions at international level have been on for ten years. Also, Condoleezza Rice hopes this time these discussions will have a resolution because in this area now are there are enforced new international peacekeeping forces.

¹⁰ Also, in the UN Security Council – where there was tried to reach a “consensus” to go out from the crises with a resolution proposal made by France prescribing “the immediately operations’ cessation and the withdrawal of all militaries from South Ossetia to the positions before the conflict’s start – there were said “rough words”. There were from accuses as “Russia comes back again to the cold war practices”, until the rhetorical question of the Russian ambassador addressed to the UN Security Council members “if the country can ignore the Russians fate from South Ossetia and Abkhazia for the good sake of the relations with the United States?”

¹¹ For details, see Mihail RICINSCHI, *Summit de criză*, Observatorul militar No. 34 (August, 27 – September, 2, 2008), p.14.

¹² According to the FAM spokesman, Cosmin Boiangiu, a part was evacuated with the Romanian Embassy from Tbilisi assistance and another group chose to leave Georgia on their own.

¹³ According to media, the Georgian Affairs commissioner to Bucharest asked for “humanitarian aid” both from our country and also from other Georgia’s friend countries.

¹⁴ Nicolae Melinescu, New York correspondent, August, 12, 2008. Still, an important part of our allies infringed the international principles and rules in another part.

¹⁵ The Georgian govern put down a complaint against Russia for “acts of ethnical cleansing”.

¹⁶ The Russian troops’ withdrawal from Georgia represents one of the main issues of the six-point plan negotiated by the European Union presidency with the belligerents and the German Chancellor Angela Merkel criticized in an interview at the public ZDF TV station “the Moscow’s disrespect of promises”.

¹⁷ There’s about an extraordinary summit for the chief of state and govern dedicated to the discussion of Georgia crises and Russian Federation relations with the EU. At the summit there also participated the Georgian foreign affairs minister. At this summit, president Saakashvili waits for a “unanimous sustenance” of its country’s territorial integrity although Georgians won’t ever recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia independencies.

¹⁸ The analysts and officials recognize that the possibilities to impose sanctions against the bigger provider of oil and gases are limited and every



action could make more damage against Europe than Moscow. The German foreign affairs minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier even asked journalists: "What kind of sanctions can adopt EU against Russia then won't sanction itself?"

¹⁹ The Russian Foreign Minister, Serghei Lavrov, September, 3, 2008.

²⁰ TVR Journal, August, 15, 2008.

²¹ As the American press states, Moscow irritation is normal. Dick Cheney is one of the "hardest critics of Moscow from the American political scene".

²² This oil pipeline will be accompanied, in the future, by a natural gas pipeline and a railway with crucial role for Asia and Europe commerce.

²³ The American Vice-president, Dick Cheney, in-between his visit made in Georgia and Azerbaijan.

²⁴ Idem.

²⁵ Details in the correspondence broadcasted by Liviu Iurea, from Moscow, for TVR Journal, August, 19, 2008.

²⁶ From the correspondence broadcasted by Liviu Iurea for the TVR Journal, August, 25, 2008.

²⁷ The agreement between Moscow and NATO that permits the Alliance's states to use the Russia's air space to transport equipments and supplies in Afghanistan signed into the Alliance's Bucharest Summit from April 2008.

²⁸ In an interview broadcasted by the Russian television, the Kremlin leader, Dmitri Medvedev, declared, September, 2 "For us, president Saakashvili doesn't exist anymore. He is a political corps". (TVR Foreign News, September, 3, 2008).

²⁹ The unanimously vote was expressed by the Federation's Council (the High Chamber of legislative) and although in State's Duma (the Low Parliament's chamber).

³⁰ "The final decision" belongs to President Dmitri Medvedev that, for now, "keeps silence". Liviu Iurea, TVR correspondent at Moscow, TVR Journal, August, 25, 2008.

³¹ There are ideas that he won't probably give an affirmative answer to the request formulated by the Russian Parliament – its vote having more a consultative character.

³² The Russian Foreign Deputy Minister, Grigori Karafil, quoted by our TVR correspondent to Moscow, Liviu Iurea, TVR Journal, August, 25, 2008.

³³ TVR, Foreign News, August, 26, 2008.

³⁴ The Russian ambassador to Brussels, Vladimir Chijov, considers EU "self-punished", Russia does not need these negotiations or a new agreement with the Union.

³⁵ States express constantly in the last years their "adversity against Russia", Poland and the Baltic states and also Sweden pleaded at their turn for the EU-Russia negotiations suspension regarding a new strategic partnership.

³⁶ The Romanian foreign affairs minister Lazăr Comănescu's statement for the TVR Journal, August, 26, 2008. Afterwards, on August, 27, our diplomacy chief with the defence minister Teodor Meleşcanu reported in front of the senators from the special commissions in regard to Romania's reaction and actions meantime the Georgia's war.

³⁷ Quoted by Liviu Iurea, our correspondent to Moscow (Europa FM, August, 12, 2008).

³⁸ Russia's position before the 1st September Summit expressed by the Russia's ambassador to EU.

³⁹ Nadejda Konstantinovna, *This lesson burden*, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, April, 6, 1999 (Apud Mr. Gl. (r) Mihaiu MĂRGĂRIT, *Miza Rusiei în Caucazul de Sud*, Observatorul militar No. 34 (August, 27 – September, 2, 2008), p. 15.

⁴⁰ We also remember that the Russian defence former minister Serghei Ivanov stated a year ago that the Georgia happenings "reminds of the Stalinist extinction climate from the '30" years. The ex-official accused Georgia it wants "to solve by force" the secessionist territory issue from South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Moreover, Serghei Ivanov sustained "some NATO countries interferes the understandings regarding the armaments commerce". This issue is put up again presently and although Romania is accused.

⁴¹ For example, a spread point of view into the political and European environments: sanctions against the Russian "political elite" as relates AFP; Georgia sustenance "not only by speech but although by actions" as declared the minister for Georgian separatist territories reintegration, Temur Iakobasvili; strength in front of Moscow sustained by the Georgian ambassador to Paris by warnings as: "This is the true time for Europe" (...), "If Europe doesn't answer today will follow a strengthening of the Russian policy as happened after the Sudetes occupation, in 1938, by the Nazis Germany", the Georgian diplomat being afraid of "a new Yalta and a new Munich".

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SPACE OF INTEREST SECURITY. PSYCHO-SOCIAL REPRESENTATION ON SECURITY AND HOMELAND SECURITY IN THE BLACK SEA AREA*

Alexandra SARCINSCHI, PhD

Contemporary challenges - such as terrorism, organized crime, proliferation of WMD, illegal migration - are different in their nature, but still similar in the type of threat they pose to the security. By Homeland Security, the actors of international community try to harmonize various sectors' actions on both national and international level, especially in areas of instability such as Black Sea' Eastern shore, in order to make possible a common approach of the challenges that affect an entire world.

Keywords: Homeland Security, psycho-social representation on security, space of interest, Black Sea.

The psycho-social representation on security has been changed by the terrorist attacks of 9/11. For instance, the North-American population, who thought that the communist block is the most important enemy of democracy, has suddenly confronted a new enemy – terrorism – that is more perfidious and more powerful at the beginning of 21st Century. Since 1993, USA has been the target for bomb attacks: first on the World Trade Center, then in Oklahoma (April, 1995), Atlanta (Olympic Games, June, 1996), Nairobi (the US Embassy in Kenya, August, 1998) and Dar-Es-Salaam (the US Embassy in Tanzania, August, 1998). Also, other parts of the world were stricken by terrorist attacks: Tokyo subway (12 deaths and 5,000 wounded in March, 1995) and Saudi Arabia (19 deaths and 300 wounded in June, 1996).

This trend of amplifying the terrorist acts in number and effects has reached a maximum in 9/11 and was continued by the attacks in Spain (Madrid, March, 2004) and Great Britain (London, July, 2005).

The international community has reacted differently to these events. USA developed immediately the necessary instruments to protect their space's security and engaged in a systematic effort to reduce vulnerabilities and to create a special capability for protection. The Europeans' reaction was a little bit different due to the fact that part of the continental countries already had experienced terrorism even if at a smaller scale. Thereby, Europe reacted 9/11 by strengthening the existing instruments in the fight against terrorism, especially in the counter-terrorist area, such as intelligence, law and justice.

From this angle, the Black Sea area was the subject of complex transformations of the security environment. First of all, it had become a subject for flaming debates due to its reconnection with the continental and regional geopolitical transformations and to the crystallization of a new approach that states its existence as a distinct and diversified area. The international community focuses on the Black Sea countries due to the existing link between their security and the international security environment caused by the proximity to the NATO and EU borders and states' close relations with these organizations. That is why, conferences such as Black Sea Defense & Aerospace or research programs such as Harvard Black Sea Security Program closely analyze the changes in the area's security.

Homeland Security or the space of interest security

We argue that Homeland Security (HS) must be translated into Romanian as space of interest security due to concept's definition and the Romanian language's peculiarity¹. It was launched



by the American security experts as a reaction to the challenges of the 21st Century security environment. Still, due to the fact that this paper is held in English, we will not use the explained translated collocation as we did in the Romanian version of this quarterly. Thus, Homeland Security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that occur², and the American officials have build the necessary instruments and mechanisms to do it.

The vision of the Black Sea countries on the HS divides them in three categories:

1. NATO/EU member countries – Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey – that build their security strategies regarding the international status and role;
2. The Russian Federation, that has a distinct vision on security based on its position in the international relations;
3. Aspiring countries to the NATO/EU membership - Georgia and Ukraine – that have started a complex process of adapting to the requirements of these organizations.

Therefore, the first group of countries is tributary to their status on the international arena. NATO did not clearly define a HS strategy, but the concept is not new for the Alliance. Since the years of the Cold War, it has clear plans to counteract the Soviet Special Forces in the case of their deployment in the Western societies. Also, the allied military forces have always been ready to support civilian authorities even in case of natural disasters, sealing borders or protecting critical infrastructure³. Still, NATO is not the only organization that coordinates West's counter-terrorist efforts as required by HS. If it wants an active and efficient role in achieving HS, the Alliance must change the strategic concept and the organizational culture by developing new concepts and training special operational units⁴.

Regarding EU, the European Commission has started years ago to develop a series of policies in areas such as protection of critical infrastructure, environment and civilians. The terrorist attacks have given a new impulse for changing the security field, but the European transformation has not been as fast as the American one. Neither the spirit of change match the American one: the European

Security Strategy⁵ (2003) promotes another vision. A similar European concept of HS emphasizes three dimensions: political, economic, and social one. The political dimension is about European national communities' responsibility to secure and protect the lives of their citizens. The economic one is about securitizing the European markets that are competing with world powers' markets. The social dimension refers to the citizens who must be aware of the dangers posed by present-day threats with impact on security, trust and liberty. In order to achieve HS, the European governments have available four instruments: civil protection, security forces, armed forces, and intelligence community⁶.

The second category of countries is composed only by the Russian Federation. From a Russian point of view, the HS means "national security". The Director of Political Programs, the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, Andrei Fedorov, the HS, as national security, and the fight against terrorism are the most important aspects of the Russian security agenda⁷. It argues this idea by a quotation from the 2000 National Security Concept⁸: "A vital component of Russia's national interests is protection of the individual, society and state from terrorism, including international terrorism, and also from extraordinary situations, both natural and man-made, and their consequences, and in times of war from the dangers arising from the conduct and consequences of military action. (...) Terrorism represents a serious threat to the national security of the Russian Federation. International terrorism is waging an open campaign to destabilize Russia." Unlike the American case, the Russian Federation has no exclusively HS institution, the responsibility of achieving HS belonging to the following: Internal Affairs Ministry, Federal Security Service, Ministry for Emergency Situations, Ministry of Defense, and Security Council. The present Constitution stipulates that all of these institutions are directly subordinated to the President, who uses to meet twice monthly the chiefs of these structures to debate an agenda that also comprises HS issues. Even if the HS seems to be almost regulated, Fedorov argues that achieving HS is hampered by some obstacles: the Chechnya conflict; the radicalization of the Islamic groups from Caucasus; the migration from CIS to the Western society; the lack of efficient cooperation between security forces of the CIS countries and



GEOPOLITICS AND GEOSTRATEGIES ON THE FUTURE'S TRAJECTORY

Western ones; the high degree of corruption; the high degree of criminality; the lack of control on the military logistics; the existence in the ex-soviet space of many ethnical/political crises and conflicts.

Georgia and Ukraine are part of the third category of countries.

Georgia is engaged in an Intensified Dialogue with NATO, but it received only a promise for becoming a member during the Bucharest Summit. Still, since August 2008, its relations with the Alliance have become stronger due to a new NATO – Georgia Commission. Its conflict with Russia forces NATO to adopt a pro-Georgian position, but without “closing the door” of cooperation with the Federation⁹. Regarding the relation with EU, Georgia benefits from a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and a European Neighborhood Policy Action Plan. The same conflict made EU to help the affected population with a 6 million euro aid. Excepting the conflict aspects of its security, the Georgian national security concept includes some issue similar with the one of the HS concept,

such as: ensuring territorial integrity, regional stability, strengthening freedom and democracy in neighbouring states and regions¹⁰.

For that matter, Georgia is involved in fighting against terrorism and in managing crises by participating in six multilateral peace missions, including KFOR, ISAF, and MNF-I.

Ukraine is in a similar situation with Georgia regarding NATO membership after Bucharest Summit, but its relations with the Alliance are more developed by the 10 years old NATO – Ukraine Commission and the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defense Reform. Also, Ukraine is one of the most important partners in the European Neighbourhood Policy and a beneficiary of an Action Plan based on Partnership and Co-operation Agreement. The Ukrainian Security Strategy establishes the adaptation of the national military policy to the international realities and the integration into NATO as the main objective of the military doctrine¹¹. Ukraine contributes in 20 multilateral peace missions led by UN, NATO, EU and OSCE, including EUPM, KFOR, ISAF, NTM-I, and MNF-I.




Figure 1: How important do you think that are for your country the following issues? Favorable opinions, PEW Global Attitudes Project 2007

It is obvious that both countries of the last category prepare to be able to answer the challenges of the international security environment, despite their powerful soviet legacy, in concordance with the most important international organizations with the purpose of obtaining the membership and adopt and implement their bases concepts, such as Homeland Security.

Psycho-social representation on security in the Black Sea area

From the above issues we observe the existence of some important differences between European, American and ex-soviet security approaches. These differences are not only at political level, but also at the level of individual psycho-social representation on security.

Outside political debates, intentions and actions, the psycho-social representations of the population regarding their country's security are most important. The importance is based from the

fact that national and international security should not be analyzed only in terms of states and their interests, but in terms of individuals and their interests. It is necessary to analyze individuals' representations, opinions and attitudes due to the fact that the causes of individual insecurity affect every level of society, produce international reactions, including the use of armed forces.

The Black Sea populations have similar psycho-social representations on the most important threats to national security. The data provided by the PEW Research Center regarding four of the six Black Sea countries show that Russian and Turkish citizens are most worried about terrorism and the Bulgarian and Ukrainian citizens – about crime, illegal drugs and pollution¹².

In all of the four countries, the problems that affect the day-to-day life, such as crime, corruption of the political leaders, infectious diseases, illegal drugs and pollution, are most important even than the issues of potential ethnic, racial, religious or tribal conflicts that international community are interested in when analyzing Black Sea area.




Figure 2: How important do you think that are for your country the following issues?, Romania, Eurobarometer 69, 2008




Figure 3: Do you want Georgia to become a member of NATO?, Georgian NATO membership referendum 2008

For 2007, data on Romania are available on the Eurobarometer published by the European Commission¹³. Even if the scaling technique is different than the previous one, the psycho-social representation of Romanian population on national security is obvious. The European poll shows that Romanians are most preoccupied by problems that might affect directly and immediately the quality of their life, such as taxation, inflation and educational system.

The differences between psycho-social representations on security in these countries originate both in the approach of the political agenda and mass-media and the problems of the day-to-day life.

Unfortunately, the type of above data is not available for Georgia, but we argue that Georgian public opinion is oriented towards Euro-Atlantic integration and values.




Figure 4: Please tell me if you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of NATO?, PEW Global Attitudes Project 2007




Figure 5: Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country's security. Others say it is no longer essential. Which of these views is closer to your own?, Romania, Transatlantic Trends 2007

Thus, a January 2008 poll by Central Elective Commission shows that 77% of the Georgians agree their country to become a NATO member (Figure 3)¹⁴. But Russian and Ukrainian populations are not favorable to the Alliance (Figure 4)¹⁵. In Romania, the public opinion agree (62%) with the fact that NATO is essential for country's security

(Figure 5)¹⁶.

In Turkey, a PEW poll shows a very interesting situation: even if the country is a NATO member, the public opinion represents USA, the main ally in the organization, as the most important future threat to Turkey (64%) and over 80% of the responders are not favorable to Americans and




Figure 6: Please tell me if you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of Americans? What about USA?, PEW Global Attitudes Project 2007



USA (Figure 6)¹⁷.

The psycho-social representation on security in most of the Black Sea countries is in concordance with the national security strategies and, of course, with official approaches on HS. Still, in Russia, Turkey and Ukraine, the public opinion is against security model promoted by NATO, even if the official politics affirm their partnership with international security organizations. Causes are preponderantly historical (soviet legacy), but also situational (for instance, the postponing of inviting Ukraine to join NATO).

This type of opinions is probable to create security problems, affecting both HS of the respective countries and the security of state and non-state neighbors. Achieving HS depends on a certain vision towards threats to security. Events force the inclusion of some issues on the security agenda not in a direct manner, but as result of a classification process. Thus, initially, a certain issue is introduced in the security field by transforming a scientific definition, which is produced by the elite, in a social accepted definition, a psycho-social representation. Still, the politicians are not always the ones who mould the definition of that security issue as we might think initially, but expert-sources they often quote in their discourses, playing the role of mediator during this process of transforming scientific knowledge into common knowledge.

Also, the scientific definitions are not always the base of the security policy, but studies based on psycho-social representation on security of policy makers and experts. Thus, the factors that influence the construction of HS instruments are both objective and subjective, are both scientific studies and psycho-social representations of various actors.

It is obvious that Black Sea countries remain connected to the international security environment and each major transformation of it will be transmitted in this area. The reverse is also true. The differences between the psycho-social representations of security and the security policy and strategies might create problems in achieving HS. The internal stability of state is an essential factor for its capability to cooperate at international level and the domestic security is a causative factor for the quality of regional security. From this point of view it is obvious that achieving HS is a very delicate problem for Black Sea area.

The issues that derive focus on a security deficit on the Northern and Eastern coasts of the Black Sea, the international community must always be prepared for.

NOTE:

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REFERENCE NOTES:

¹ The ad-litteram translation of Homeland Security is "mother-country's security", but it does not encompass the whole original concept. The Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language defines the "mother-country" as "a territory that historically belongs to a nation and where it lives; the country in which someone is born, lives and is a citizen". Still Homeland Security is not only about protecting one country's citizens and their goods, but also about conserving a peculiar way of living that transcends borders. The existing theories prove that such an area of defining is too narrow to reflect concept's complexity. There is what we might call "home" in globalization even it is the national, EU or Transatlantic territory. A suggested approach of Homeland Security is the space of interest security, meaning the security of state's and national or international organization's interests, in the circumscribed space, but also outside it.

² JP 1-02, **Department of Defence Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**, April 12, 2001 (updated on July 12, 2007), p. 241.

³ Rafael L. BARDAJI and Daniel KEOHANE, *Debate. Should homeland security be a fundamental NATO mission?*, NATO Review 2/2006, On-line edition <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue2/english/debate.html>.

⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵ <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.

⁶ Paolo BRITO, *Developing Interoperability between European Security Agencies in order to Maximize Capabilities and Avoid the Duplication of Resources*, Paper held during the Conference *Homeland Security Europe. Interoperability Focus Day*, organized by



World Bussines Research, Bruxelles, June 27, 2006, <http://www.presentation.wbr.co.uk>.

⁷ Andrei FEDOROV, *Homeland Security: Russia's Challenges. A Russian Perspective*, in Readings in European Security, Vol. 3/2005, pp. 67-74.

⁸ <http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/russiastrat2000.html>.

⁹ According to NATO Secretary General, <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/08-august/e0819a.html>.

¹⁰ *The National Security Concept of Georgia*, http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=24.

¹¹ Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, White Book 2007. Defence Policy of Ukraine, Kiev, 2008, p. 3.

¹² PEW Research Center, Pew Global Attitudes Project: Spring 2007 Survey, Survey of 47 Publics,

Final 2007 Trends Topline, <http://pewresearch.org/>.

¹³ European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 69. Public Opinion in the European Union, 2008.

¹⁴ *Georgian NATO membership referendum 2008*, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgian_NATO_membership_referendum_2008.

¹⁵ PEW Research Center, *Pew Global Attitudes Project: Spring 2007 Survey, Survey of 47 Publics, Final 2007 Trends Topline*, <http://pewresearch.org/>.

¹⁶ German Marshall Fund of the United States și Compagnia di San Paolo (Italia), *Transatlantic Trends 2007*, 2008.

¹⁷ Apud World Public Opinion, *Why Turks Feel Threatened by the US, 5 septembrie 2007*, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/home_page/393.php?nid=&id=&pnt=393&lb=hmpg1.

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A RENEWED GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC ROLE FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA

Florin DIACONU, PhD

The Mediterranean Sea is one of the important geopolitical and geostrategic pivots in the world history. The concept of geopolitical pivot is used in the way Zbigniew Brzezinski did, in his Great Chessboard. The geopolitical and geostrategic significance of the Mediterranean is not the same along the entire history. From Ancient Times to Early Modern Times, the relevance of this sea is enormous. Then it decreases, because the "centre" of the world gradually glides to the Atlantic. But, starting with the opening stages of the Cold War, the geostrategic importance of the Mediterranean grows again, a trend which quickly goes on today, as well, in the context of the clash of civilizations and of the global war against terror.

Keywords: Mediterranean Sea, geopolitics, geostrategy.

Along several millennia, the Mediterranean Sea obviously was the most important geopolitical and geostrategic pivot of the world. The way in which this text uses the concept of "geopolitical pivot" is decisively influenced by Zbigniew Brzezinski, who operated an interesting and enormously useful distinction between "geopolitical players" (states which are active actors of the international arena, aiming to expand as much as possible their power and influence and aiming to control the resources and the geopolitically important position of the pivots) and "geopolitical pivots" (regions or states whose position is important and whose control, if and when accomplished, enables a geopolitical player to either get easier access to vital strategic resources or to block the access of its competitor(s) to the same strategically significant resources)¹.

When the very "centre of the world" was in the Mediterranean Sea

Only very recently, roughly 500 years ago, the commercial centre of the world gradually moved

itself from the Mediterranean Sea to the Atlantic Ocean². Until then, the geostrategic significance of the sea separating (but also connecting) Europe, North Africa and a part of the Western rim of Asia was enormous. In order to better understand this, let's take into account several realities:

a. *Most of the really great powers of Ancient times and Middle Ages (with only a few exceptions – China, India, the Aztec and Inca empires in Central and South America and the Mongols in Eurasia) were concentrated on the shores this geopolitical pivot. All the rest of the early great powers of the world were placed either on the very shores of this sea (Egypt, Persia in later stages of its imperial evolution, all the great powers – city-states or political and military alliances – of the Greek World, the Macedonian Empire, the Hellenistic states, Rome, Carthage, the Byzantine Empire, the Arabs, and later on the potent and ambitious states in Christian Spain, the Italian republics of Venice and Genoa and the Ottomans), or not too far away (all the great powers in Mesopotamia, then Persia and Macedonia in their early stages of imperial expansion, and later on the emerging great powers of the European Middle Ages – France and the German Empire).*

b. *The structure of (and the hierarchy within) the international system of the region were shaped by major naval wars (or at least by wars in which naval operations of all sorts played an important role). As in many other occasions along the entire world history, major wars and significant changes of the way in which political power was distributed were deeply correlated³. Many major military conflicts in the Mediterranean area either confirmed and made even stronger the great power status of the winners, or seriously boosted the chances of medium-sized powers to reach great power status. When we speak about military conflicts fought on the shores or on the waters of the Mediterranean Sea (or in any other sea or ocean, any time along the world history), the natural goal was, of course,*



the elimination of all serious competitors and threats (plus the complete control of sea trade plus the enlargement of the political sphere of influence). How large the geopolitical importance of the Mediterranean Sea was is clearly proved by the very fact that, for many centuries, many of the most important sea battles of the entire world history were fought here. Starting with the opening stages of the 5th century B.C. (when the major battle at Lade took place), exactly 35 major sea battles influenced a lot the history of mankind until the end of the 16th century (when the British squadrons managed to utterly defeat the mighty Spanish Armada). Almost all these sea battles were fought in the Mediterranean Sea: all the 21 major naval engagements in Ancient Times and 9 of the 14 important sea battles of the Middle Ages and Early Modern Times⁴.

c. Evolutions of political and military power distribution in the region of the Mediterranean Sea generated immensely important consequences in other regions of the world as well. To offer only two really significant examples, let us remember the fact that the Athenian naval power was strong enough to transform almost all the city-states on the shores of the Black Sea in minor partners (and obedient taxpayers) of the large imperial⁵ structure led by city of Pericles. Such a result was accomplished by means of diplomacy, but also by direct political and military pressure. In several occasions, large naval squadrons of the mighty Athenian Navy sailed to the Black Sea, forcing the local decision makers to better understand that they have no chance other than strictly obeying the Athenian rule⁶. Later on, the imperial expansion of Rome targeting large territories in Gaul, Germany, Britannia, Greece, the Balkans, Egypt and Asia became a feasible solution only after the moment when Carthage was finally defeated and completely destroyed. Even the trans-regional hegemonic status of Rome – quite clearly the most important “superpower” of Ancient Times in the entire Western part of Eurasia – was also a direct and major consequence of the strategic victory against Carthage⁷.

**For several centuries,
a severely diminished role**

After several millennia, what I called “the very centre of the world” shifted to the Atlantic

Ocean. At least in the opening stages of this long-term trend, the failure of the Crusades played an important role. Unable to defeat the Arabs and unable to reopen the trade routes connecting on land Far East and Europe, the Europeans decided to find alternate routes. Immensely geographic discoveries were made along a few centuries, the two Americas and almost the entire Africa became annexes of European Powers and the main geopolitical pivot of the world gradually shifted to the ocean connecting Europe and the New World and Africa and the profit-generating markets of the Far East. From 1600 to 1944, a total number of 61 major naval battles took place in the entire world. In sharp contrast with the situation already presented, only a few of these major engagements with major (or at least significant) military and political consequences were fought in the Mediterranean Sea. According to the evaluation made by an already quoted author, only the important battles off Palermo (1676), off Malaga (August 1704), at Cape Passaro (August 1718), at Toulon (1744), Aboukir (1798), Navarino (1827), Lissa (1866) and off Cape Matapan (1941) took place in the Mediterranean Sea⁸. If we use percentages, approximately 75% of the really major naval battles in Ancient Times, Middle Ages and Early Modern Times took place in the Mediterranean Sea, while only 8 out of 61 major naval engagements in the past four centuries took place in the same pivotal area (which means only 13,1%, a percentage almost 6 times smaller than the previous one).

Along these more recent centuries, the clearly diminished role of the Mediterranean Sea in global affairs (and global conflict) can be even more properly understood if we carefully evaluate significant figures correlated with military power and with major international conflicts. Let us take into account, for example, some of the results of the wars fought by Great Britain against France in the final stages of the 18th century and in the opening stages of the 19th century. It is perfectly true that *some* episodes of those wars were fought in the Mediterranean. But the number of ships used (and the losses) in the battle at Aboukir, the final defeat of the French attempt to transform Egypt in an advanced strategic base, were really small for both competitors, if compared with those at Trafalgar (battle fought in the Atlantic). At Aboukir, in August 1798, the French had some 13 ships of the line, and 4 frigates, with 1,200 guns.



The British squadron led by Horatio Nelson had 14 ships of the line, with more than 1,000 guns. The combat losses of the French were large: 11 ships of the line, 2 frigates, 1,700 sailors and gunners killed in action (KIA), more than 1,500 wounded and 3,000 captured by the British; the winners lost less than 1,000 KIA and wounded⁹. At Trafalgar, in 1805, the French had 18 ships of the line (plus 15 of Spain) and 5 frigates, with 3,000 guns. The British had 27 ships of the line and four frigates, with a total number of 2,500 guns. At the end of a battle more than 7 hours long, the French and the Spaniards lost 18 ships (17 of these being captured by the British), 2,600 KIA and wounded and more than 7,000 sailors and gunners captured by the British together with their ships; the winners, on the contrary, did not lose a single ship (but many of them were severely damaged), but only some 1,700 KIA and wounded.

A major role again: from the opening stages of the Cold War to the present days

In the past 60 years, the global role of the Mediterranean Sea started to grow again. Such an evolution was generated, first of all, by the very logic of the Cold War. We have to remember that one of the earliest elements of what was to become later on the containment policy was the so-called Truman Doctrine, which offered direct help (mainly financial and economic, but also military) and strategic protection to Greece and Turkey in order to help these two Mediterranean countries face the Soviet threat and “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation”¹⁰. Later on, the strategic competition of the two superpowers quickly grew in the entire area of the Mediterranean Sea. The region was regarded by the Soviets as being *vitally* important for the success of potential major strategic offensive operations along several major directions (and in several theatres of operation – TOE)¹¹. Starting with the late 1960s, Mediterranean Sea became a region of *almost* open confrontation of the two superpowers. Soviet Union offered a lot of help and military advisers to Syria and Egypt, while USA strongly supported Israel¹².

Nowadays, the geostrategic role of the Mediterranean Sea is growing even larger. And this happens because of several reasons. First of all, long-term stability and prosperity of both EU and

NATO are correlated with stability in the Middle East and North Africa. A second reason is that if we accept the broad lines of the “clash of civilizations” paradigm presented 15 years ago by Samuel P. Huntington, it suddenly becomes very clear that Mediterranean Sea and many of its surrounding countries are an area of direct confrontation of the Western civilization with the Muslim one. This reality is significantly enhanced by the trend we call now global war against terror (a concept in which the last word, “terror”, can easily be replaced by “radical/extremist Muslim fundamentalists”). And, in August 2008, Mediterranean Sea became again an area of almost direct confrontation of Moscow and Washington, DC. When the Russians massively invaded Georgia, a potential NATO member, USA decided to send several Navy ships belonging to the 6th Fleet from the Mediterranean Sea to the Black Sea, in order to both stabilize the strategic situation and to transport important amounts of help badly needed by the Georgians. The American decision generated new irritated reactions in Moscow, but it also proved the enormous geostrategic value of the Mediterranean Sea controlled by Western Powers.

NOTES:

¹ For these two definitions see Zbigniew BRZEZINSKI, *Marea tablă de șah. Supremația Americană și imperatiile sale geostrategice*, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, București, 2000, p. 53

² John NAISBITT, Patricia ABURDENE, *Anul 2000 – Megatendințe. Zece noi direcții pentru anii '90*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1993, p. 189.

³ For the role of major wars in shaping (or changing) the international arena see Robert GILPIN, *Război și schimbare în politica mondială*, Editura Scrisul Românesc, Craiova, 2000, pp. 254-258.

⁴ For all these figures see Helmut PEMSEL, *Von Salamis bis Okinawa. Eine Chronik zur Seekriegsgeschichte*, J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, München, 1975, p. 320.

⁵ For the fact that we can really – and legitimately – speak about an Athenian *Empire* see Russell MEIGGS, *The Athenian Empire*, Oxford University Press, 1972.

⁶ Pericles himself led such an expedition to the Black Sea area, directly influencing the outcome of political conflicts in some city-states and consolidating Athenian domination by means of establishing a continuous naval presence – 13 triremes – in this region. For all these see E. WILL, *Le Monde grec et l'Orient*, Paris, 1972, vol. 1, p. 288 and PLUTARCH, *Pericles*, 20.



⁷ B.H. LIDDELL HART, **Strategia. Acțiunile indirecte**, Ed. Militară, București, 1973, p. 35 clearly states that the victory at Zama was the moment which made Rome the “dominant power” of the entire region.

⁸ See Helmut PEMSEL, **op. cit.**, p. 320.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 154. Same figures in Jacques MORDAL, **Twenty-five centuries of sea warfare**, Abbey Library, 1973, starting with p. 175.

¹⁰ For the context and the basic ideas of the Truman Doctrine and for the irritated Soviet reactions generated by this strategy and by the Marshall Plan see Jeffrey PORRO, Paul DOTY, Carl KAYSEN and Jack RUINA (editors), **The Nuclear Age Reader**, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1989, pp. 41-44.

¹¹ See Ghulam Dastagir WARDAK, Graham Hall TURBVILLE, JR. (editors), **The Voroshilov Lectures. Materials from the Soviet Staff Academy, Volume I: Issues of Soviet Military Strategy**, National Defense University Press, Washington, DC, 1989, pp. 103-130 (at least 4 of the 12 major “Theatres of Strategic Military Action” listed by the Soviet strategic planners included parts of the Mediterranean Sea and/or countries on its shores).

¹² See the massive Soviet and (three days later) the US airlift operations in 1973, in Abraham RABINOVICH, **The Yom Kippur War. The epic encounter that transformed the Middle East**, Shocken Books, New York, 2004, p. 324.

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THE LISBON TREATY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF STATES' SOVEREIGNTY: A FEW COMMENTS

Mădălina Virginia ANTONESCU

The principles of international law must be regarded as a whole, the violation or the restriction of one principle leading to the implicit violation of the whole body of ius cogens. The European law principles and legal norms, in our opinion, even if they belong to a legal order of integration, mustn't be considered as isolated or outside from the international law. European law is a regional legal order, specific to the European project but it is still a legal order penetrated by the international law. EU member states are preserving within EU their sovereign character, because EU is not yet a federation.

Thus, due to their double quality, as European law subjects, but also, as international law subjects, EU member states find themselves in a complex legal situation. In our opinion, international law and the principle of sovereignty, as ius cogens, stay at the top of the legal hierarchy of incident legal norms. Therefore, EU member states must respect, above all, ius cogens, as a body of law protecting the state on international field and by extension, on the legal relations inside the EU, between EU member states. The obligation of EU member states to comply with ius cogens irrespective to the legal order (European law, international law) wherever they act, is an obligation derived from their sovereign character. Sovereignty of a state is the essential quality that demands protection both within legal orders of cooperation and of integration.

Keywords: sovereignty, state, European Union, Lisbon treaty, ius cogens

1. The compatibility between the principle of states' sovereignty and the principles of tributariness (subsidiarity) and proportionality, according to the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty

Art. 3.b, paragraph 3/TEU, in the formulation of the Lisbon Treaty devotes another **principle of**

community law (as in paragraph 4 of the same article, regarding the principle of proportionality): **the tributariness.**

This is a principle of federal inspiration (as it allows a conditioned intervention of the Union, in the meaning of performing on European level an action whose objectives cannot be satisfactorily performed by the member states neither on central or regional and local level). The tributariness is a community law principle strongly related to the problem of the Union's democratic deficit, which tries to reduce through a strict delimitation of the competences between the Union and the member states; in order to avoid the excesses of the European bureaucracy but also to follow the fulfilment of the Union's objective, of "taking the decisions on a level as close as possible to the European citizen".

Taking the definition of the tributariness, from the Maastricht Treaty, art. 3.b, paragraph 3/TUE, in the modification of the Lisbon Treaty, forbids the application of this principles in the fields that are in the exclusive EU's competence (thus avoiding endangering the community *acquis*). **Only in the fields where there is a partial attribution of competences by EU** (competences **partitioned** between the member states and the Union), it may be applied.

Another contribution of the Lisbon Treaty for strengthening the democratic control of the application of this principle consists of the attribution of the national parliaments to insure its observance, under the procedural conditions mentioned in the Protocol regarding the application of the principles of tributariness and proportionality, annexed to the Lisbon Treaty.

According to paragraph 4 of art. 3.b/TEU, in the modification operated by the Lisbon Treaty, based on another principle of community law (complementary to the principle of tributariness), that is **the proportionality**, the action of the Union must not exceed, in its form but also in content,



what is necessary for the performance of the treaties' objective.

Or, from the perspective of the principle of states' sovereignty, as international law principle in close relation to other international law fundamental principles (especially the non-implication in the states' internal affairs), **these two legal principles "of integration"** specific to a law order "autonomic, distinct, new" (as it is characterized by CJCE in its jurisprudence), **the tributariness and the proportionality clearly represent limitations on regional level** (for EU member states) of its legal content.

But the international law doctrine warns that the international law principles must not be given an *absolute* value (the states' sovereignty), as the state's sovereignty **does not exclude, but on the contrary, is compatible with the undertaking of international obligations and with each state's duty of fulfilling in good faith the obligations freely undertaken by the international treaties.** From this point of view, the conclusion of the Lisbon Treaty by the EU member states represents a manifestation of their sovereign will, freely expressed. But this treaty has a *special* legal character, integrationist, as, besides the contractual obligations of the states, they undertake to **create an Union by competences designations and a new legal, autonomic order.** Under these circumstances, of the participation of the signatory states to **the forming of an original legal entity, with a clear integration side**, the reports between the principle of states' sovereignty and the principle of tributariness and proportionality, that grant **the Union the right to involve in fields that are not its exclusive competence** (an express conditions, intended to protect the performances of the community construction, not endanger the European integration) must be analyzed. Although it is a *limited, conditioned* intervention of the Union in report to the states, the principle of states' sovereignty, as formulated in the international law, *affected and limited* in its legal content, as soon as we report it to these two principles specific to an *integration* legal order.

First of all, we must consider all the legal analysis performed above concerning the *compatibility* of the principle of competence attribution, but also the principle of loyal cooperation, as *community law* principles with conventional basis (art. 3.b/ TEU, in the modification of the Lisbon treaty)

with the fundamental principles of international law, especially the principle of sovereign equality of states. As the international law principles must be regarded **in interdependence, as an unitary ensemble**, the affectation or limitation of one of them **leading to the relativization of the entire ensemble**, we believe that **the same is valid (the interdependent character) and concerning the principles of community law.** All of them participate to the realization of a legal *integration, new, autonomic* order through report with the international law and national law of the EU member states.

The limitation of such a principle (regardless the form of its consecration, conventionally or jurisprudentially) **leads to the limitation of the entire body of community law principles** on which the community law order is based. This is why the analysis regarding the question of compatibility between a *ius cogens* principle and a community law principle must be solved in the meaning of **expressing the priority ius cogens regarding any community law principle** (therefore, regarding the principles of tributariness and proportionality, specific to an integrationist law order).

Through the principle of tributariness and proportionality, in a hypothesis, the principle of ius cogens, would not affect as the Union intervenes only *with the agreement of the member states*, only in fields of *partitioned* competences sphere between the Union and the member states (but not in the fields reserved to the member states) and only in the measure in which the objectives of the envisaged action cannot be performed satisfactorily by the member states neither on central or regional and local level; additionally, the application of the principle of tributariness is made only under the control of the national parliaments, aspect intended to counteract the eventual accusation of "lesion" or "relativization" of the principle of sovereignty, through the direct implication of a national political institution holder of democratic legitimacy.

2. The compatibility of art. 3a, paragraph 2/ TEU with the principle of states' sovereignty

The Union, as a legal *integration* entity, formed by the member states by *competences attribution* (according to the provisions of some international



treaties), has a **special, unique juridical – political relation regarding the member states**. This comes out especially from the paragraph 2, art. 3a/TEU, in the modification operated by the Lisbon treaty.

In its ensemble, **the entire article 3 a/TEU is an article of integrationist inspiration**; composed of three paragraphs (first, regarding the principle of competences attribution; the second, regarding the EU's obligations towards the member states; third, regarding the dedication of the principle of loyal cooperation between the Union and the member states), this article dedicates these principles as *basic* ones for understanding the legal – political relation between the Union and the member states.

If we have analyzed in the previous sections the compatibility of the provisions of this article with *ius cogens*, all we have to clear out is **the compatibility of paragraph 2** with the principle of states' sovereignty, as fundamental principles of international law.

First of all, we observe that, nowhere in the contents of this key-article (3a/TEU) for the relation EU – member states, **the principle of states' sovereignty is mentioned implicitly, and no obligation of the Union to respect it**. Or, this seems at least strange, if we consider that **the Union employed expressly to respect the international law principles in its relation with the rest of the international community** (art. 2, paragraph 5/TUE) and **that the member states did not alienate the exercise of sovereignty to the Union**, as the sovereignty theory affirms, **but only some competences**, in limited domains, provided in the treaties.

As a result, art. 3a, as *frame-article* (together with art. 3b/TEU) for the regulation of the relation between the Union and the member states, not only it does not legally obliges the Union to an observation of the principle of states' sovereignty **in report to the treaties** (so, including in the law order of the Union) but **it confers to a specific legal principle (of the competences attribution) that does not have the value of *ius cogens* of the principle of sovereignty, the pre-eminent place in the legal construction of the Union** (art. 3a. *paragraph 1* dedicates the principle of competences attribution, *already enounced* in art. 1, first paragraph/TEU and *resumed* in art. 3b/TEU).

Paragraph 2 art. 3a/TEU, in the modification operated by the Lisbon treaty, **creates a special legal obligation for the Union**, in its relation to the member states: thus, the Union **“respects the essential functions of the state** and, *especially*, the ones that have as object the insurance of its territorial integration, the maintenance of public order and the defence of national security”

At first sight, this disposition could be interpreted as **one that makes implicitly** reference to the observation, by the Union, of the *principle of sovereignty, as *ius cogens**, principle evoked by *its legal content*. But if we compare what the Union understands by “the state's essential functions” with the legal content of the principle of states' sovereignty in the international law (state's full independence; its right to bring an internal and external independent policy; to settle and develop by its free appreciation, without any implication from the exterior, the social – economic and politic organization, cultural life in the interior of the state territory, its external relations with other states; the right to settle freely the political, social, economic and cultural system; to enjoy the full equality in rights and equal protection from the international law; the right of the state to an international personality, territorial integrity and independence; the equal right to participate to organizations, conferences, international multilateral treaties and other forms of international cooperation, that refer to its legitimate interests) comes out a clear limitation of the legal content of the principle of sovereignty through this article.

From the international law point of view, as it has been highlighted in the doctrine, the states must have the possibility **to exert fully all the rights that arise from their sovereignty** (or, in the case of the Union as *integration* entity, we notice that the organization and functioning of **this based on the principle of competences attribution** by the member states **represent exactly a concrete case in which these states freely enclosed the possibility of full exertion of all the rights that are related to their sovereignty**). As this *“auto-enclosure of the sovereignty”* by the state *cannot be accepted in the international law* (in the meaning of a *transfer of sovereign rights* to the Union's institutions) as it would injure the sovereign character and their quality of subjects of international law, it results that **the Lisbon Treaty avoids the use** (in art. 3a/TEU) **of the term “sovereign/sovereignty”**



exactly not to open such a discussion risking to situate outside the international law that protects the principle of sovereignty in report to *all* the states.

From “the theory of competence” perspective (that *denies* the states’ sovereignty, as we have showed above), the states *attribute competences* (and not “sovereignty”) to the Union, by treaties concluded exactly in the virtue of their sovereignty. Secondly, this transfer of competences from the states to the Union actually represent **a legal content depletion of the member states’ sovereignty**, these not remaining, as *sovereign* subjects of law, than a *strict “reserved field”*, specified in art. 3a, paragraph 2/TEU: national security, maintaining the public order, insuring its territorial integrity. “The firm nucleus” of this “reserved domain” of the member states is constituted by *the national security* that “remains *the exclusive responsibility of each member state*” (art. 3a, paragraph 2/TEU). But this entire article leaves for understanding that a *larger* sphere of contents of the “essential functions of the state” than the one enumerated *as example*. So it is not about a restrictive enumeration of the essential functions of the state that the Union has the obligation to respect, **but it is not about a dedication of the principle of sovereignty, in the completeness of its legal content.**

It is clear, from the elaboration and settlement of the dispositions of art. 3a/TEU, that the Union is an *original* entity whose legal nature of *integration* confers by itself, but also on the level of the treaty, **a central place to the principle of competences attribution in report to the principle of sovereignty.** This is actually, **the dilemma of the Lisbon Treaty: not recognizing the principle of sovereignty as *ius cogens* means being rightfully void and so, the Union could not legally exist; to recognize it means relativizing the idea or European integration and in consequence, the principle of competences attribution.**

To *oppose* the two principles and to consider that the principle of competences attribution is a priority one towards the one of states’ sovereignty (that is *ius cogens*) is a *wrong* solving of this dilemma, as shown in the previous sections. This is why it is preferable to consider that the principle of competences attribution has a *complementary* character to the principle of sovereignty, as the states remain hereinafter *sovereign* subjects of international law; CFSP is neither integrated, nor

partitioned with the Union (although the domain of external and security policy, as well as the defence, constitute, traditionally, a regal domain of the sovereign state); *the states* are the ones that attribute competences to the Union and settle its limits and principles of exertion; *the states* may review the treaties and not the Union; *the states* may withdraw anytime from the Union, as an effect of their sovereign will and *not* as a sanction applied by the Union (expulsion).

From all these aspects it comes out the fact that the **member states do not abandon their sovereignty for the Union’s benefit but we can neither say that it would exert it of a full, exclusive manner, within the Union, such as a classic multilateral cooperation form.** From this the special character, of art. 3a/TEU, within which the principle of sovereignty, in the relation between the Union and the member states, is not affirmed, or explicitly denied. The reference to “the essential functions of the state” is a reference to the legal content of the state’s sovereignty, representing a legal guarantee for the existence of the member states as sovereign states, within the Union as *integration* entity, but also *the originality* of the Union in report to an inter-governmental international organization.

This obligation, “to respect the state’s essential functions”, *the Union* has, based on art. 3a, paragraph 2/TUE, but the member states do not have it and they are obliged *towards each other* based on the international law, as international law subjects, to respect *the principle of states’ sovereignty*, in its *entire* legal content, as *ius cogens* principle and not to limit to each other the sovereignty, by breaching this principle, under the pretext of the quality of “member of EU”, so of “participant to an integrationist entity”.

Between the EU member states, the principle of sovereignty remains a principle of *ius cogens*, opposable to *erga omnes* (including *the Union*, as a subject of international law, in the relation to *the member states*), so any state, including a third state, has the right to request the resettling of this principle, in case an EU member state breaches it, even in relation to another EU member state.

In our opinion, exactly due to its character of *ius cogens* of the principle of states’ sovereignty, *not only “the victim state”* (EU member, that is considered injured, by a community legal obligation or by a community legal provision of



original law or *derived* law, from the perspective of the principle of sovereignty), but also *any state* of the international community, may request to an *international* judiciary or arbitrary court of law (UN International Court of Justice, for example), the resettlement of this fundamental principle of international law (breached inclusively by an action of an *EU member state* in a relation with a *third state*).

Here comes the question: is **ECJC, as a regional court of law**, competent in community law, with *specific and limited* attributions (in EU institutions, in *EU member states to judge litigations with international law elements* (between EU member states and third states, between EU institutions and third states), **including to judge litigations having as object the injure of an international law principle of *ius cogens*** in relation of EU member states or in relation member states – EU? This problem opens other controversies, but we will limit, from the perspective offered by the Lisbon Treaty, to underline only some aspects:

- according to art. 9F/TEU (in the modification operated by the Lisbon treaty), ECJC expressly represents a *regional* court of law, as, among other elements, its competence area is limited to the member states, EU institutions or particulars (natural or legal persons on the territory of the member states);

- ECJC competences expressly regards the *insurance of respecting the law* (here, the community law) in the interpretation and application of treaties (paragraph 1, art. 9F/TUE); in addition, according to paragraph 3, art. 9F/TEU, the Court *decides*: regarding the actions introduced by a member state, by an institution or by natural or legal persons; with preliminary title, at the request of the national court of law, regarding the interpretation of the Union's law or the validation of the documents adopted by the institutions; in the other cases *provided by treaties*;

- according to paragraph 3 of article 9F/TUE, the legal report of the Court, when it judges a litigation deducted in front of it, "*according to the treaties*", so it is a *compulsory* reporting to the original law (the Unions treaties) of the Union's law. Paragraph 3 of article 9F/TEU **does not specify that it will be decided, by the Court, in the judgment of the litigation deducted in front of it, and according to "the fundamental principles of the international law"**, what shows

that the Lisbon Treaty imposes **implicitly a supra-national character for ECJC as internal jurisdiction of the Union**, since it **does not expressly dedicate its character of international jurisdictional court of law** (at least what concerns some aspects, including its competence to judge litigation *between EU member states* or *between member states and Union* or between member states or Union on one side and *third states*, on the other side). **It results that the report of the Court to the international law** (from the expression of paragraph 3, article 9F/TEU) **is removed, due to the Union's integration character**, so also the ECJC's *integration* character (as *supra-national* court of law, following the observation of *the Union's treaties* in their interpretation and application, treaties that have a *special* character, through them forming a "*new, distinct* legal order than the international law one and the national law orders of the member states"). Letter c, paragraph 3, article 9F/TUE underlines the specific and exclusive *union* competence (of integration) of the Court ("ECJC decides... in the other cases *provided by the treaties*") since an extension of the Court's jurisdictional competences cannot be possible *on the land o international law* but only on the one of the Union's law (*treaties*, as original law of the Union, provide *also other cases* of competence for the Court). As a result, from the formulation of article 9F comes out clearly a main fact: **the competence of the Court is conferred only through the Union's treaties (specialized, limited competence) and not by other international treaties** it would conclude with other EU member states, treaties that would not have an union character (of integration) or by other international law acts.

Only the *Union's treaties* have value of *original* law for the community law order, not other international law acts which the EU member states concluded (that are not dedicated to the European integration process, not having the *special* legal character of the Union's treaties). Therefore, it is interesting to observe that, *in the legal hierarchy of community law* (a union law, after the Lisbon Treaty), on top or, as original and supreme law, **only the Union's treaties (mentioned in the Lisbon treaty), not other international law acts, even if they have a fundamental or important character for the entire international law order** (UN Chart; The Final Act of Helsinki; The Chart



of Paris for a New Europe, for example) – this aspect underlines **the opened breach between the community law order (as *integration* legal order) and the international law one** (but to which *all the states*, members of EU or not, are obliged to report, as sovereign subjects of international law).

- in the formulation of art. 9F paragraph 1/TEU, ECJC is competent in insuring the respecting of the law in the interpretation and application of treaties (speaking only about the treaties of the Union, mentioned in the Lisbon treaty) **not of any treaty as international law acts**. Secondly, **the Court does not legally undertake through this paragraph to respect the international law “in the interpretation and application of the treaties”, so it is not reported to the international law norms** (especially to *ius cogens*, to the principle of states’ sovereignty) but only to the community law. The small and middle states of the Union would have all the interest to **expressly request, through a statement, the specification that, as regional legal court of law, ECJC cannot set aside, in the exertion of competences in art. 9F/TEU, the observation of *ius cogens*, as imperative international law and opposable to *erga omnes* regardless of the law order to which it is reported, as long as the *state* remains the main subject of law in these legal orders and the unique sovereign entity**.

- ***ius cogens* must become the fundamental norm in the law order of the Union**, as the original law (the Union’s treaties) cannot be legally valid, from the international law point of view, if they are issued with the breaching of *ius cogens* (leading therefore, to the cancellation of the entire law order of the Union).

- the *third* states (that are not EU members), from the formulation of art. 9F/TEU, cannot be parties to the litigations brought in front of ECJC, although some of their rights (on international plan) arising from the principles of *ius cogens* (states’ sovereignty) might be breached through the action of the Union or the EU member states or through the community law. It remains, thus, in our opinion, **opened the way of the attack to the third state, on the land of the international law, according to the international law norms** (what is normal, as one cannot oblige a third state, which did not participate to the creation of the Union and which did not attribute competences – including the case of a *candidate* state – to submit to a

decision taken by a regional *supra-national* court of law such as ECJC and to apply to it the legal rules of a law order for integration in which it has not rights like an EU member state; the submission, **on the land of the Union’s law**, of a third state, to a ECJC decision or bringing it in front of ECJC would be **a breaching of that state’s sovereignty**, as the law order of the Union cannot produce legal effects except in report to the *member* states and not with the third states). The observation of *ius cogens* by the *states* could be insured, for example, by an action in front of IJC– UN.

To this point, there is *another inconvenient* (from the perspective of the active and passive procedural quality): according to art. 34, chapter II of the statute of the International Justice Court, paragraph 1, only *the states* may be parties in the causes submitted to the Court (not the European Union, although it has legal the personality). So, although it has the same capacity of international law subject, **the Union is not liable on the territory of the international law, in front of IJC-UN, neither for the breaching of a legal norm of *ius cogens* in the relations with third parties or in the relation with EU member states (which remain subjects of international law nor in the vision of the Lisbon Treaty)**. The only ones that are legally liable in front of IJC-UN for the breaching *ius cogens* norm in community law order (in the relation between the EU member states but also in the relation EU member states – Union) but also for breaching *ius cogens* by the Union or by an EU member state in the relation with *other third states*, **are the EU member states** (which must, according to art. 35, paragraph 1/the Statute of IJC, to be party states to the International Justice Court Statute).

What concerns the *interpretation* of the Union’s treaties (which remain *international law* acts, despite their *special* character) and opposable to this interpretation (monopolized by ECJC, through art. 9F/TEU) *of the third states* (which *are not obliged to respect* nor the interpretations of the Court nor the Union’s treaties, nor the community law order, *as they are not EU member states*), becomes incident, in our opinion, the provision of art. 36, points 1 and 2/CIJ Statute: that is, **The International Justice Court will be the one competent to interpret the Union’s treaties, as international law acts and to evaluate their compatibility to the international law norms**



(including to *ius cogens*), under the condition that the parties (*EU member states which concluded the Union's treaties* or *EU member state whose action/inaction led to the reaching of an *ius cogens* norm*, on one side and *third state*, on the other side) to be parties to the IJC statute (art. 35/Statute).

We evaluate that neither the legal *integration* nature of *EU* nor the *specific character* of the Union's treaty **can remove the CIJ-UN competence on art. 36/Statute for the evaluation of the treaties' conformity with *ius cogens***. Although IJC does not have a compulsory competence (such as ECJC in the Union's law order), because of the *coordinator* character of the international law, it is necessary that the states parties to the Statute (in this case, EU member states and third states) to *declare* that they recognize as compulsory the competence of the Court in the respective cause, in report to the other state which undertakes the same obligation.

From art. 36, paragraph 2/Statute comes out that **IJC is competent to solve**, based on the recognition by the parties state as compulsory, of its jurisdiction **and differences having as object: the interpretation of a treaty, as well as any international law problem**. According to art. 38/IJC Statute, the Court has the express mission "to solve out, **according to the international law**, the differences that are submitted to it". As a result, **IJC is not obliged to respect the integrationist jurisprudence of ECJC, neither the legal characters of the Union's law in report to the national order of the member states, neither "the autonomy of the community law order"** settled by ECJC in report to the international law, but it will solve the difference (between an EU member state and a third state; between *two EU member states*, on *international* legal territory) deduced by the parties, **according to the international law and not with the community law**, IJC is not a supra-national court of law as ECJC but **it must insure the observation of the *ius cogens* norms in the international legal order**, despite the existence of some integration legal orders.

If ECJC does not recognize, according to the Union's treaties, competent to solve the differences *between the EU member states* related to the interpretation of the treaties and the acts of the Union **according to *ius cogens* (not with community law, where it has an interpretation monopoly)**, then it comes (not compulsory but

facultative, based on art. 36/IJC Statute) the competence of interpretation of *the Union's treaties*, as *international law acts* (and not as acts of the Union's law) **by IJC** (based on point 1 or point 2, letter a of art. 36/IJC Statute).

As one can observe, from the formulation of art. 9F, paragraph 3, point b/TEU, in the modification of the Lisbon Treaty, ECJC decides regarding *the interpretation of the Union's law or the validation of the acts adopted by the EU institutions* (but it is an evaluation of the validity of these acts from the *exclusive* perspective of the norms of *law of the Union*, especially of the provisions from the treaties, as original law of EU). In these cases, ECJC decides with *preliminary* title, *at the request* of the *national* courts of law (from the EU member states), so it is about **a legal report between the Union's law order as integration order and the national legal order of the member states; on the contrary, ECJC would not be competent to deliver "with preliminary title", on "the request" of an international legal court of law (ECJC, for example) regarding the interpretation of the Union's law and the validation of the EU institutions acts, from the perspective of *ius cogens* and not by reporting to the EU law** (IJC as international legal court of law, *does not have* any obligations to report to an integrationist law such as the one of the Union and neither to confer it priority in report to *ius cogens*, even of the parties that submitted the difference (at least one of the parties) have the capacity of *EU members*).

For IJC, the compatibility of the Union's treaties **with the fundamental documents for international law** (UN Chart) and with the conventions internationally incident (Convention of Vienna regarding the law of the treaties/1969) is important and *not* the reporting of EU treaties *about the community law* (that constitutes the monopoly of ECJC, based on art. 9F/TEU).

We can say in the end of this section that, if ECJC as regional, supra-national legal court of law interprets "monopolistically" the law of the Union and will deliver its decision regarding the validity of the acts of EU institutions from the perspective of the Union's law as integration law ("according to the treaties"), that it has in the same time, the legal obligation to verify the compatibility of the treaties and the entire law of the Union, including of the acts adopted by the EU institutions, from the perspective of the international law, as EU is not a



federal state and the EU member states did not lose their capacity of sovereign subjects of international law. The verification of the compatibility of the Union's law with *ius cogens* especially, comes out, according to the internationalist vision we encourage here, from the supreme position of *ius cogens* in the community law order, exactly because of the character of "international law acts" which the Union's treaties have as original law" for the entire legal order of the Union. These treaties cannot come into conflict with *ius cogens*, as otherwise, besides their rightful nullity, would intervene the nullity of *the entire* legal order of the Union, based on it.

In exchange, if IJC-UN is not an *international* legal court of law with *facultative* competence, this can be delivered **only concerning the compatibility of the Union's treaties as international law acts with *ius cogens***, but *not* regarding the interpretation of the Union's treaties *in report to the Union's law* (ECJC monopoly).

IJC-UN, with the agreement of the EU member states that recognized as *compulsory* its jurisdiction *in this international law problem* (the compatibility of the EU treaties with *ius cogens* and the EU law, including the one of *EU institutions acts* with *ius cogens*) **may impose, through its decision, as legal precedent, the observance with priority, as fundamental, of *ius cogens* in the Union's law**, without ECJC to be allowed to invoke art. 9F and its monopoly in the interpretation of the Union's law.

This *internationalist position of the priority *ius cogens* in report to any norm of law* (international or regional), which we support here, *does not* consider the *regional, integrationist* character of the Union's law as an obstacle in the affirmation of the *opposable erga omnes* character *and not compulsory* legally for *all* the states, of *ius cogens*.

It is another controversy problem if **the verification by ECJC** of the compatibility of the **Union's law with *ius cogens* has compulsory or facultative character**. For the small and middle states of the Union would be recommendable to support a position within EU of *compulsoriness* of the *interpretation* of the Union's law, of the evaluation of the *validity* of the EU institutional acts from the perspective of the compatibility with *ius cogens*, of insurance by ECJC **of the observance of international law** in the interpretation and

application of the treaties. ECJC cannot be, on the other side, obliged to extend its competence (so, to delivery a decision regarding this aspect) if *the Union's treaties* do not expressly provide this.

Secondly, the ECJC competence is *limited* by its integrationist nature (art. 9F/TEU), to decide according to *the treaties*, so exclusively by reporting to the Union's law, and not to the international law. ECJC cannot be obliged by the member states to deliver a decision regarding the aspects that are not of its competence (argument favourable to the integrationist thesis) but we consider that *ius cogens implicitly enters* in the law order of the Union, by its legal nature of *international law acts* of the EU treaties, being positioned *above the Union's treaties* and so, triggering the ECJC competence of international law (argument favourable to the internationalist thesis).

What concerns the small and middle states of the Union, and on their turn the new-comers, we recommend the *internationalist variant* which imposes **concrete legal guarantees (on the territory of the international law, through UN Chart and other legal documents that dedicate *ius cogens*)** in the favour of the observance of the statute of "sovereign state", with everything it implies, within the EU.

On the contrary, integrationist thesis, could deny at a certain moment (through the jurisprudence "that creates law" of ECJC) the right of EU member states to defend their sovereign quality before any judicial court (regional court, as ECJC or international court, as UN International Court of Justice) on the field of communitarian law (the obligation to comply with *ius cogens*) and on international law field, as well.

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MAIN CONCEPTS DEVELOPMENT AND EXPERIMENTATION WITHIN THE NORTH-ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Crăișor-Constantin IONIȚĂ

The developments that have occurred in the Information Domain create a Revolution in the Military Affairs, which will fundamentally change the way in which the Military Forces will fight, supported by new operational concepts and a “system-of-systems” that will bring a superior cognition to those forces. In order to fight the future war, the Military Forces must change dramatically or they will become obsolete. This transformation has, as foundation, a new philosophy to conduct future operations, “Effect Based Approach to Operations”, which, together with “Manoeuvrist Approach” and “Mission Command”, will define the new approach to Joint Operations led by NATO.

Keywords: EBAO, manoeuvrist, decentralized, joint

The beginning of the 3rd millennium has brought important changes inside the military thinking. Moreover, it seems to appear and continues to be an idea regarding a new „Revolution in the Military Affairs (RMA)”, being generated, as military experts stipulated, by the 21st century’s Information Age.¹

At present, we can affirm that there was achieved an unbelievable development, from the great technological discoveries of the 19th century (plane, tank, submarine, etc.), to the new technology of future conflicts, as a result of digitization, nanotechnology, spatial technology, robotics, cybernetics and biology of the multidimensional battlespace. This means that the technological component of a RMA is almost achieved.

At the same time, we read about measures being undertaken by all modern Armed Forces, including the Romanian ones, to achieve a profound organizational and structural transformation (NATO Response Force, EU Battle Groups, US

Expeditionary Forces, and ROU Transformation Strategy). There were elaborated strategies and visions to mix together new technologies with capable forces, able to work and operate at the most efficient way. To realize such super-technicised forces is an aim for the second decade of this century.

Still, there is a last component to be addressed to – the doctrinal one. Even if we can talk about the development, into an incipient phase, of new concepts, like: globalization, cyberwar, special operations, INFO OPS, Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Information and Intelligence System (C4I2), etc., an exhaustive evaluation of future doctrinal concepts for the conduct of the 3rd millennium wars is considered to be a beneficial one for analyzing the approach to a new RMA. Because we presume that putting those concepts into a new doctrine, together with the new technology, already operational and with the final act of redimensioning the military structure of NATO, EU, and Romania, they will radically change the way of preparing and conducting future joint operations. This is why the article will analyze new tendencies regarding the physiognomy of future conflicts, being represented by the operational Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) at strategic level, which will reflect the adaptation of those conflicts at the permanent environmental changes and will present some ways and possibilities to implement those concepts already approved by the Alliance within the Romanian Armed Forces.

During the different discussions with NATO and EU experts and presentations attended during some specific international activities that I have participated to, it was underlined the necessity for the whole Armed Forces’ transformation to have, as a basis, a new philosophy of conducting

military operations – the Effect Based Approach to Operations. This philosophy, together with the Manoeuvrist Approach (expeditionary forces and operations) and Mission Command (a new approach to planning and Command and Control) will redefine the way the Joint Operations will be planned and conducted by NATO, EU and member states. To transform those concepts, future forces, and capabilities able to effectively use the new existing technology, NATO issued “Strategic Vision - the Military Challenge”. This document, using the American model is meant to prospectively present the planning and conduct of future NATO-led operations and includes political and military guidance for transforming future forces, capabilities and concepts in next decades.

Allied transformation final product is to realise more capable Allied Forces able to conduct full range of military actions for both area of responsibility and out of area, in order to protect member states’ national interests, democratic values, maintain and restore peace and finally achieve a close cooperation with partners and friends. Also, these forces will include Allied defence planning and capabilities management systems.

The transformation will comprise three distinct aims: obtaining coherent effects; decision superiority; and deployment and joint sustainment. These aims will be achieved through six transformation domains (see fig.1).

Transformation is finalised through the establishment of additional programmes and applications, which put in practice each domain’s requirements and objectives. These applications and programmes could be very vast and strict for each objective, national or multinational, giving them real transparency and synergetic effects.

Manoeuvrist Approach represents a continuation of the “**Assault-Breaker System**” concept, which was experimented, for the first time, in 1982 by Brits during the Falkland War, being adapted by Americans and used in 1990 during the First Gulf War, when concurrent air and land strikes were used. Nowadays this concept is developed in almost all NATO member states.

By itself, the concept is not new. It takes ideas and principles from the Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu (approx. 500 B.C.) and starts from the idea that an approach in which it is envisaged the neutralisation of enemy’s will and cohesion is much more advantageous than its physical destruction.




Figure no. 1. The transformation aims and domains



This might happen by avoiding enemy's strength and applying, at the same time, own strength against its weaknesses.²

Combining fire with manoeuvre, a fast tempo and using the advantage of surprise on the entire battlefield are essential elements for this new approach to operations, in which using physical force is not paramount, but the psychological effect created through sustained rhythm and simultaneously strike upon multiple objectives, which, in turns, modify the effect of surprise.

In the British Military Doctrine, the Manoeuvrist Approach is defined as "*that approach to operation in which shaping adversary's cohesion and will to fight is paramount. It requires an attitude of mind in which doing unpredictability, using initiative and searching originality are combined with a strong wish to obtain the victory*".³ It means that the concept does not apply to a physical activity only, but an idea or a philosophy of how to operate on the battlefield.

Manoeuvrist Approach is based on the decisional cycle's tempo, or so called OODA-LOOP (see fig.2) and is characterised through: applying own military strength against enemy's weaknesses, after prior identifying them; focussing on enemy and not on his terrain; speed of action/reaction during the decision/making process; breaking enemy's will to continue the fight; shaping adversary's fighting cohesion; personal qualities of the commander.

Between types of operation highlighted by this doctrinarian concept, the *pre-emptive operation* is described, together with preventive and protection, takes place to break enemy's will to continue the battle. At the beginning, this type of operation has had as main aim to exploit an opportunity occurred on the battlefield, seldom predicted, before the adversary might do it, in order to deny his attempt to follow an advantageous course of action. The intention was to modify, in a unpredictable manner, adversary's operational plan, winning the initiative. This is what Sun Tzu has earlier defined as "a victory before crystallising the situation".⁴

The pre-emptive operation was developed by the US National Security Strategy which, between all measures that have been taken to counter the global terrorism, one was: "...we will not hesitate to act independently, if it is necessary, to practice our self-defence right through pre-emptive actions against...terrorists, in order to contain any hostile action against our citizens or country...We must be prepared to stop destabilised states and their terrorist clients to threaten or even use WMD against the US, our allies and friends."⁵

Manoeuvrist Approach has represented the first doctrinarian concept that brings to bear the importance of an intended effect to operation and the Commander's Intent. Later on, these two ideas have been developed inside new doctrinarian concepts: Effect Based Approach to Operation and Mission Command.




Figure no 2. Col. Boyd's Decision-Making Cycle



Mission Command is a doctrinarian concept that is met in the UK only, being taken and developed after a German one (Mission Orientated Order) used during the Second World War.

This concept is strictly linked with the previous one, assuring the command ethos necessary to increase the speed of decision-making cycle and train the Commander and his staff to exploit opportunities. Such a command ethos promotes decentralised command, freedom and speed of action and initiative, too.

The British command philosophy⁶ is characterised by: importance of rapid decision taking; understanding commander's general and specified intention, through which is directed the subordinates' initiative and intuition to accomplish the general aim; responsibility to fulfil the commander's intent with the following principles: unity of effort – coordination of all activities to accomplish the Commander's Intent; decentralised command – delegating the authority to increase the speed of decision-making process; trust – based on professionalism and personal qualities; mutual understanding – based on same organisation, trust and common doctrine; rapid decision taking.

The essence of this philosophy is based on decentralised command, maintaining unity of effort through sending to subordinates **“what to do, not how to do it”** only. This command style can be realised using common doctrine, adequate training, standard operating procedures (SOP), standardised transmission of orders, only one Main Effort and clear establishment of command relationship.

One working procedure inside an operational Headquarters is the so-called “1/3 - 2/3 rule”. It assures the necessary time for subordinates to accomplish the Commander's Intent and puts into practice the decentralised command principle.

The newest philosophy of managing future wars is called the Effect Based Approach to Operations, changing totally the way of solving problems. We don't speak on classical Force – on - Force confrontation anymore, but a totally new way of fighting: Force – on - Effects.

The concept is developed both in NATO, using the Allied Command for Transformation (ACT) as a centrepiece and in the US Armed Forces through the Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) and Army TRADOC. It is defined as *“operations that are planned, executed, assessed, and adapted based on a holistic understanding of the operational*

environment, in order to influence or change system behaviour or capabilities using the integrated application of selected instruments of power to achieve directed policy aims”.⁷

This philosophy implies the integrated coordinated application of all power instruments of a nation or alliance, both military and non-military, in order to create those campaign effects that lead to the accomplishment of desired objectives. That means the new philosophy implies national governments, non-governmental and international organisations, where the consultation process will become the masterpiece of sustaining the desired success. We can affirm that some effects were exploited during past conflicts, but only temporary, without the intension to use the advantages offered by modern technology. This new approach has not the aim to replace attritionist or manoeuvrist warfare, but it represents another way of planning and conducting military actions.

For a better understanding of this concept, we will use the OENAR Method (see fig. no. 3): it starts with the establishment of the End State and friendly objectives; then the desired or undesired effects (direct, indirect, intended or unintended) would lead to the accomplishment of those objectives and against what nodes (Decisive Points, Centres of Gravity, etc.) to act; next step is to establish what type of action will be directed against each node and what tasks will have each element of the national or Allied power (political, military, economical, social, information and infrastructure/PMESII); last step is represented by providing the necessary resources to accomplish those tasks. In short terms, during the Effect Based Planning, it is started from the *application of resources (capabilities) to conduct actions (tasks) against key nodes (Decisive Points, Centres of Gravity) in order to create such effects which can lead to achievement of desired objectives.*

In such conditions, this concept is considered to be the model which better reflects the way of conducting military actions in the Information Era. The essence of EBAO stands along with the permanent knowledge of the battlefield and its adjacent areas. This principle was well defined by Sun Tzu 2500 years ago: *“Knowing your enemy and yourself and the result of battle will be certain; Knowing yourself and not the enemy will lead to an unclear result; Not knowing your enemy or yourself, you will loose the battle”*.




Figure no 3. The OENAR Method

As the Allied Strategic Vision reveals, all future operations will be effect based, implying all allied power tools, used in such manner to create the desired effect in order to realise the strategic objective. Because to realise this concept means to utilise member states' power, together with international and non-governmental organisations, it looks like paramount to develop a coordination process and the necessary structure to control it.

After the tragic events of September 2001, the US Armed Forces started to experience a new military-civilian structure inside the Strategic Central Command (CENTCOM), known as the Joint Integrated Inter-Agencies Group (JIAG), comprising besides military representatives, civilian personnel from CIA, FBI, State Department, Justice Department and, maybe, Treasure Department.

„The first challenge of inter-agencies operations is to achieve unity of effort, besides cultural differences, competitive interests and different priorities of participant organisations.”⁸

The JIAG's aims are to support the strategic military commander and his staff during planning through information exchange between military and civilian governmental structures with role in security and defence and to advise the military commander on specific issues of each organisation.

As a result, the establishment of a collaborative environment, both national and international, based on information exchange, is the prerequisite to approach an Effect Based Operations. This is relatively true for planning, conducting and analysing those effects achieved during the conduct of operation (see fig. no. 4).

As previously affirmed, EBAO concept represents the development of the Manoeuvrist Approach, using a new philosophy to plan and conduct operations. The strategic objective of such operation is achieved by integrating all Allied capabilities which may generate those effects against an adversary that would minimise his operational coherence, neutralise his capabilities, modify his perception about the reality of the battlefield and break his will to continue the campaign.

The implementation of the new doctrinarian concepts and the accomplishment of the final precondition necessary for a RMA will require new modalities of thinking, planning and acting. Due to political constraints, juridical influences and the access to new technological capabilities, the accent will be placed on the effects which should be created in order to achieve the strategic objectives of the campaign, as well as on the commander's ability to attain these effects. After introducing and

generalizing the specific components of the EBAO, the operational field of planning and conducting the operations will know corresponding adjustments.

The future concepts will require the realization of a number of systems and processes which can be characterized by the ability to attain decision-making superiority, coherent effects and joint dislocation and support.

The Mission Command will be achievable through the accomplishment of decision-making superiority, superiority which implies adopting and implementing decisions faster than the enemy could react, thus allowing the commander of the force structure to adjust the environment in order to better suit his needs and objectives. Decision-making superiority depends most of




Figure no 4. EBAO's Phases

all on establishing and maintaining a dominant position in informing and opportune spreading of the knowledge related to the situation during all the phases of an operation. This allows a complete and more exact understanding of the operational situation than that of the opponent, going through the elaboration phases of the decision in a short period of time, which ensures its fast and discrete implementation. Therefore, certain conditions are achieved which offer the possibility that the rhythm, the coherence and the efficiency of the operations can be radically improved.

Obtaining coherent objectives is the base of the EBAO and requires that the military forces can be capable of coordinating their actions with all the power instruments in order to produce the desired effects a lot faster. A greater operational coherence will be wanted through a better harmonization of the military efforts with those of the international, national and non-governmental agencies which operate in the arena. The coherent military effects depend on the ability to locate, observe, separate

and efficiently follow the objectives or the targets, evaluate the results and proceed to reengagement with decisional rapidity.

A more efficient engagement in the incipient phases of a crisis will require a better knowledge of the situation which can be achieved through a continuous analysis, dialogue and advising with the states and armies in the areas of possible conflicts.

The Manoeuvrist Approach will be accomplished through joint deployment and support. It requires abilities to dislocate military forces wherever it is needed and that these forces should execute continuous operations distributed not only in the vicinity, but throughout the whole operational area. The dimensional forces, prepared and properly equipped for the mission, they must have real abilities to support themselves and also to have battle and logistic support throughout all the operation, for the entire spectrum of missions.

The new concepts have already been included in the programmes for experimenting and



development (CD&E) at ACT, USJFCOM and TRADOC. They have been promoted in the member states, under the form of a document named “Allied Concepts for Future Joint Military Operations (CAFJMO)”, in order to be analysed and to propose development, experimental and then implementation measures within the nations. After discussing with the national representatives, the approved concepts were transposed into working programmes for their development and experimenting programmes (CD&E POW), which are discussed biannually and which include a planning every two years.

Furthermore, a part of the most important concepts of the future operations, among them also being the above mentioned, were introduced in the main joint allied doctrines (AJP-01 (C) Allied Joint Doctrine, AJP-3 Allied Joint Operations and AJP-5 Allied Planning for Joint Operations), leaving the nations to implement them in their own doctrinarian documents.

So, we are now in the period of conceptual development, followed by experimentation. In some cases this experimentation is executed in parallel with the development of the concepts, through multinational experimenting groups (MNE), during joint multinational exercises (CMX), as well as the use of the national Centres of Excellency (COE). But the most difficult part will consist of their implementation, as every nation develops its own concepts or participates, with different quotas, in the development and experimentation of the joint concepts.

As one of the new member states which have joined the North-Atlantic Alliance, the Romanian Armed Forces are only beginning their transformation, in order to achieve the three pre-conditions of the RMA. If the armies of the modern states can pride themselves for having developed at least one technological pre-condition, we have started the parallel transformation of at least two of the three elements of the war of the future. Therefore, the time of achievement of the objectives of organizational and structural transformation is predicted for 2012-2015, according to the Transformation Strategy, and the implementation of the modernization programmes is stipulated for 2015-2025. And it is not about the actual advanced technology of a RMA.

It results that the development of new doctrinarian concepts was not foreseen in the

Transformation Strategy and neither discussed in the Romanian political and military structures. And this is because the doctrinarian side of the transformation was not considered important enough in order to be developed during the next period and therefore there were not allocated the necessary funds for the participation of Romania to the development and experimentation of the joint concepts.

The appearance of these new concepts took by surprise the military leadership of the Romanian army, leaders who were instructed to fight by German, French and Russian concepts and principles and who had not studied Sun Tzu or Mao Tze Tung. Not even the lack of experience of the Romanian military officers in the involvement in unconventional military operations (such as insurgents support, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, special operations, interdiction operations and air and maritime embargo, evacuation of the non-combatants, saving-evacuating, post-conflict operations) did not help to give up a planning and leading the operations as in the Second World War.

That is why we consider the development of the third pre-condition of a RMA is as important as the other two and is preferable that the Romanian Armed Forces get involved entirely at least in the participation, together with other NATO member states, in the development and experimentation of the new doctrinarian concepts related to future conflicts. This involvement might be materialized through: participation with specialists in working groups or in the organized conferences; manning with staff officers the Integration of Capacity Teams or the different agencies of the Alliance involved in CD&E; the use of national forces placed at NATO's disposal, with the occasion of the participation in different exercises or operations; placing certain utilities at NATO's disposal; participating with funds.

Moreover, we consider it would be a positive measure to do some strategic studies for the national development of the new concepts. We have very well trained people in the field, centres for strategic and experimenting studies that should have the responsibility of studying and experiment these concepts, also taking into consideration the attained level by the ACT, USJFCOM, TRADOC and the other member states participating in CD&E.



An important step was achieved through the attempt to harmonize the national doctrinarian architecture to that of the Alliance. Furthermore, by implementing the joint STANAGs in the doctrinarian documents field, the prevision of these new concepts was started in the Romanian military doctrines.

But this is only an enumeration and not a profound analysis of the way these concepts will influence, in the future, the planning and leading the operations.

The second important step was the attainment of a new structure of command and control (C2), structure proposed within the Transformation Strategy of the Romanian Armed Forces and transposed in practice through the Law of organization and functioning of the Ministry of Defence no. 346 from July, 21, 2006.

We consider that by a new structural organization of command, the political and military leadership will dispose of the links necessary to the development of the new doctrinarian concepts. But this will happen only after the operationalization of the respective C2 structures.

There are still a lot of things to do. Especially for analyzing the implications that these new doctrinarian concepts impose to the planning and conducting the future military operations. We have decided to dispose expeditionary forces, to participate, through interoperability, in NRF and the EU concept concerning Battle Groups (EUBG), but their constitution and use without a proper doctrine and instruction will lead to useless human loss, as well as a great financial effort.

And this because, since the date of the decision concerning the implementation of the new doctrinarian concepts within the North-Atlantic Alliance, we will have to review the whole Transformation Strategy of the Romanian Armed Forces and start a new transformation.

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THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE ECONOMICAL DEVELOPMENT

Irina CUCU

On analysing the security environment, one of the main indicators of its evolution is the economical one. A state with a big economic power can afford to sustain a strong army, to sign advantageous alliances, to maintain a high living standard, to secure its borders.

Keywords: resources, economic, security, energy, the environment's protection.

The lack of resources or the differentiated access affect the relationships between states with the most destructive consequences. The natural disasters raised frequently, but also intensively, energetic resources are almost finished, demographical growth is manifesting in the areas with little resources of food and water, climate changes from the last period.

All influence the stability and security, but meantime, the stagnation of economical development of a certain country. Bad government, social problems, ethnical-religious conflicts, international relationships' inconstancy have gone to big economical destructions, and finally, to the breakdown of some countries. This is the reality of security environment which impose the creation of same partnerships, new forms of regional and global cooperation. Unfortunately, global economy depends a lot on energetic resources, as oil is the main resource.

Nowadays, its deficit is the cause of the most global wars, the fight for resources determining the 21st century geopolitics. At a closer look, it can be observed that conflictual areas are the same ones with the most important resources, but with a bad economical development.

Meantime, economy has an ascending trend, into a country where security environment is stable. First of all, it allows to conclude good alliances and partnerships, attracts foreign investments, it can develop economical infrastructure, it can use its touristic potential, it has stable commodity

markets, the rate of unemployment is reduced and the living standard is high.

Simultaneously, a country economical developed, affords to negotiate advantageous conditions for make economical exchanges, attracts foreign investment, has a high the gross domestic product - GDP (which goes, implicitly, to a big defensive), a high life style level, so a stable security environment.

There is a close dependence between the two components, more a country is economically developed, the more stable is the security environment. And the reciprocal is available: the more stable security environment is, the more accentuated is the economical development of the state. This can be noticed to a careful analysis of developed countries. If you observe the first global powers of this decade, you can easily see that these are states with a stable security environment. The only majors threats to security are terrorism and natural disasters, but even they succeed to be controlled in a bigger measure than in the others countries.

Economical security

It is one of the most important components of a state, being the main problem with which the humanity is confronting. It represents "*that economics' fact position which allows that these function relative normal, not only is peace and war conditions*"¹.

In **Globalisation and economical security**, Lavinia Florea presents more definitions of this term, one of them being the one of Stephen D. Krasner: "economical security suppose group's prosperity from one country, elective perspectives of parties, freedom of action of the governmental policymakers, stability of a specific regime, or aggregate economical prosperity and growing perspective of one some country"².



The factors which provide economical security both micro and macro social levels are: the assurance of house; the work place assurance; the minimum salaries assurance; the sovereignty and food security (on one side, the assurance's necessity access to each man to food, eventually to agricultural production self-sufficient, on the other side the quality of food); the social global protection (for the most disadvantaged categories, in the first place), which presume assistance from the state, the assurance of annuity; the access for education and medical services³.

The economical security represents a complex and dynamic concept. Its complexity derives from the multitude of economical, social, financial phenomena. On the other side, here, globalization interposed, there have been both process and phenomena which act systematically and permanently over national economies. Its dynamism is given by the alert rhythm to the process and economical phenomena which are produced both at national and worldwide level.

The economical security is an essential factor to the national security, providing resources and a dynamic balance of the other components of the security national system; it is one of its dimension, both on national and regional level⁴; it is a man's dimension, human community, national state, etc. It is one of the main objectives of the government, regional and international organizations whose main role is to provide and guarantee security. It is the source and fundament of poor's eradication, hunger, social and economical organization both between individuals and some few areas. Providing economical security is the result of interaction between internal and external factors which intensify, or no, the whole production process, distribution of goods and services consume realised in a national economy. State and non-state actors play a special role, significant in achieving the economical security both national and regional global level⁵. The resources are the main problem, of any nature, the food security and the water problems, the energetic security, the environment problems and commodity markets we will try to treat them in the next chapters.

The security of resources

The intensification of competition for strategic resources is a condition of continuous industrial

performance, so a legitimate matter of security. Sources of potential conflicts may constitute the mineral resources from Centre and South of Africa, from Andes, Amazonia and from the East of Asia. Two thirds from metal cobalt with strategic importance may be found in the mines from Central Africa. China has a big part from the worldwide resources of tungsten.

The resource's problem of any nature is a very serious one and lately more frequently discussed. They are looking for solutions not only for energetic resources, but also for the food and water ones. Uncontrollable exploitation of the soil and subsoil of the planet led, among other, to significant environment changes, in the last instance.

The global warming is one of the future problems, the diminution of the potable water's volume and rising ocean's and sea's water's level will be a problem which should be resolved in the shortest time. That is why the migration of population from the low littoral areas will create a very big pressure over the other areas. In the same time, agricultural areas will be smaller and smaller, so the food production will be more reduced.

Until now, first of all, the problem of energetic resources has been taken in consideration. It seems that the next resources which will be disputed on global level are water and food.

If oil has been the economical "engine" of 20th century, which created financial empires and generated wars and comp d'état, water will be the "engine" of 21st century, more precisely, global hydrological resources. According to experts, around 2025 - that means in only two decades - water resources of the planet moving will subtract, water's global crises will install, leading to what we today denominate "hydrological poorness". The ones ruling Earth's water resources will rule the planet and will dictate in this way their policy to the ones with hydrological deficit. The role played by "petroleum-dollars" in 20th century will be "hydro-dollars" in 21st century⁶.

The main solutions for resolving these grave problems and which may be conflict generating, are, in our opinion, the population's conscientiousness in what which concern environment pollution and the new scientific and techniques discoveries what may determine the reduction of these phenomena.

From all these reasons, we will try a succinct analysis of these problems.



Food security

It represents “the guarantee of each individual permanently in every place or moment of the access to a sufficient and healthy alimentation what may permit so have a satisfied diet for a healthy and active life”, according to FAO⁷.

The main global organisms implied in the security's monitors are: FAO, CE, USDA. In the last years there were problems of food insecurity in 86 countries from Africa, Asia, Latin America and Caraibe, Oceania and even from Europe. 35 states got emergency assistance because of food crises in 2004. Causes: military and civilian conflicts, post/conflicts situations, areas with natural disasters.

One important factor in starting conflict is the one due to compulsions for protecting environment. Natural disasters increased in intensity and frequency owned to man's uncontrollable intervention in the nature, with the desire to obtain bigger productions is accentuating, due to the demographical increase (and this thing is observing both in poor areas of resources, and underdeveloped areas especially).

In the same time, the pressure of using products (like corn and rice) for obtaining energy is bigger and bigger. These things gone to uncontrollable using of lands, trying emerging sown areas through clearings and drowning to planetary level. At the same time, the use of chemical compounds (pesticides) led to the soil's degradations, implicitly to lower and lower productions.

Water is a serious problem, due to the chaotically intervention of the man in the nature and what will generate new crises and conflicts in the future. Bigger pollution, climatically changes and expansion desertifications from the last period will lead to an accentuated scarcity of potable water and vast areas. Desalination solution of marine water is expensive for the time being, and quality is very poor.

A variant what have been tried for neutralizing these problems was the one of genetically modified bodies. After recent studies in this field, it has been observed that consuming such food goes to the apparition of numerous diseases, and implicitly to rising mortality at the worldwide level.

Another problem concerns modified genetically organism, as it seems to be the fact that these products may be a “genetically trap”, it may introduce “viruses, producing disease what may appear after many years.

The same viruses and maladies may be activated for punishing incorrectly countries after the political aspect” (F Gruhier)⁸. Genetically modified foods may became a new threat in the end.

In June 2008, within UNO, there have been adopted Measures Plans (MP) by GLNI set up and presided by UNO General Secretary. The group is composed by special agency's leaders, programs and UNO foundations, Global Bank, International Monetary Found, Commerce Global Organization and relevant departments within the UN framework.

The pursued objective is to stimulate a coordinating reaction of agencies, governments, donors, civil society and private sector as against global alimentary crises, and to elaborate on action strategy. Measures plan identify two types of actions through what alimentary crises may be set in the first line, it shows that the way in what may be helped now vulnerable groups formed both from consumers and producers; secondly, is announced the may in what may structurally intervene for presume the repercussions and to contribute to notable improving to alimentary security in the context of Developing Millennium Objectives⁹.

For the time being, all these problems have risen the food price, affecting, first of all, the undeveloped countries with a big human density, where the majority of the population lives in poverty.

These will only lead to the apparition of new regional conflicts and to the population which will exercise a big pressure on the very developed areas.

The energetic security

It has been security and there will be written a lot of works about this problem, maybe the most acute one at this moment. Unfortunately, in the same time, it is the one that caused and will continue to cause more conflicts, both at regional and global level. Controlling these resources, together with their transport, may be the key of global economical success. Almost all the areas resources are grinding of conflicts (the Middle East, the Caspian Sea).

Regarding energy, in the national security strategy, it mentions that “an important role in guaranteeing national security-through the



economical/social conditions prism-returns to energetic security assurance through operative adaptation and optimizing structure of consume by primary energetically resource and growing energetic efficiency”¹⁰.

It resorts to these objectives: “the reduction of providing dependency from instable countries or from the state that use energy like a mean of political pressure, the acceleration of energy producer programs in nuclear programs; the raise of concerns aiming to rise hydro-energetic production and of energy based on modern using carburetted technologies.

An important role must be to remake energetically production from regenerable or alternative sources and rising energetic efficiency in industrial and homely environment. Measures program from this field will be correlated with the EU strategies concerning energetic security”¹¹.

There is a correlation between international security environment and security, they influence each other. We cannot talk about a stable security environment without an energetic security nevertheless on energetic security if energetic environment is not stable.

The lack of energetic resources, supplied by instability from Persian Gulf, embargoes over Irak and Iran, diminution of oil production from the North Sea, may be in the some time generating and products of some wars for delimitating influence sphere, on oil resources and natural gases. The third from global petroleum resources are controlled by the states from Persic Golf. Another area with huge resources is the Caspian one, where the political-economical fight is also given for the control of transport pipelines.

The USA Forces intervention in the area was motivated, first of all, for independence consolidation and economical development of region’s states, through concluding regional conflicts and establishing economical links what may lead to the prosperity of this country, but also of USA, for the capitalization of international companies’ opportunities to invest in the area. Russian forces motivated their intervention in Chechnya through the need of securing oil pipelines, but also of petroleum industry¹².

A coherent external energetic policy aim at: the diversification of sources and network transport for energy; the exportation of the model and the principles of European internal market; the

promoting EU policies and technologies (energetic efficiency, development of regenerable sources, facility of technological and industrial cooperation, promoting the Kyoto protocol)¹³.

The problem of resources may be resolved, maybe, through using alternative resources. The using of aeolian, solar and hydrological energy tries to be put in practice to a higher scale. Even frequently, science man made it to discover new sources of energy and fortunately, less polluting (electrics car, or, more new, what use water like combustible).

Unfortunately, very big costs of production and maintenance don’t allow their using to a large scale for the moment. Probably it will be found solution for reducing these costs in a close future and to use then to a planetary scale.

The “Energetic security” is the last phrase that stirred discussions in media and internal and international political circles. A veritable psychosis released in the ranks of European governments, from the temporary interruption of gas delivery to Ukraine and other few European states by Russian Gazprom group, by the end of end of 2005 and the beginning of 2006.

And, as a consequence of this restlessness at high level, the sinuous process of energetic market liberalization in EU has been put seriously in discussion, has slowed down and even tends to be abandoned in exchange of a “European security strategy”, meant to reduce – of course, through concerted interventions of European Governments on the energetic market, already suffocated by the omnipresence of the state - dependency on the Russian resources of natural gas and oil¹⁴.

Even if the resources problem, of any nature, is, maybe, the most important one for maintaining a stable security environment, finally, but also owing the control over a viable commodity market, it is a problem the important for economical development.

For a stable security environment, an economic security is needed. The economical security is threatened both by internal and external factors. Among internal factors we may mention: the poverty, the unemployment, the financial crises, the low social protection, the lack of economical competition, the delocalization and externalizations¹⁵, the protection of environment.



NOTES:

¹ Alexandru MANAFU, *Securitatea națională și războaiele economice*, "Gândirea Militară Românească", nr. 2/1998.

² Lavinia FLOREA, **Globalizare și securitate economică**, Editura Lumen, Iași, 2007, p. 33.

³ Ibidem, p. 35.

⁴ <http://www.studiidesecuritate.ro>

⁵ http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_publicatii/cs10-04.pdf

⁶ <http://www.atac-online.ro/22-02-2008/Hidro-dolarii-I.html>

⁷ http://www.uasm.md/library/cid-fao/cid-fao_01.html

⁸ http://www.actrus.ro/buletin/2_2000/articol8.html

⁹ http://www.onuinfo.ro/mass_media/comunicate_de_presa/420/

¹⁰ *Strategia de securitate națională*, p. 46.

¹¹ *Strategia de securitate națională*, p. 47.

¹² http://www.actrus.ro/buletin/2_2000/articol8.html

¹³ www.minind.ro/foaie/Cartea_Verde_context.doc

¹⁴ http://www.cised.ro/web-content/pdf/Enache_Securitatea%20energetica.pdf

¹⁵ Lavinia FLOREA, **op.cit.**, p. 39.

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“SECURITY” CONCEPT BETWEEN INTERNAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAWS

Mirela ATANASIU

Today, there are fewer people denying that security is a main problem the humanity is confronting with. Security occupies a central place among the actual preoccupation of the philosophical thinking because the humankind being unable to a harmonized coexistence prevails many of the conditions deterring this state on different social-organizational levels: individual, group, national, regional or global.

You can't see the security state without establishing the threats, dangers, risks and vulnerabilities stressing it. Even so, is hard to predict all because, all the time, appear some new ones spoiling the created balance and changing the whole scenario of the needed actions, inclusive in the norm and reform field.

Therefore, the new developments in the security field make necessary the measures of redefinition, reconfiguration and reconstruction on new pillars of the right to individual, national or collective security and regulations of the new cooperation forms. Although, the right to security seems to be an intrinsic right part of all the international treaties and agreements, still, world is developing and the reality shows that the yesterday regulations aren't available today being able to become even unsuitable for tomorrow.

Keywords: security, individual security, human security, societal security, group security, national security, collective security, European security, global security, security by cooperation, vulnerability, risk, threat, danger.

Security represents the essential condition to feel protected against the danger or damages. Generally, at personal level, security is a concept similar to the “safety” one. The difference among them consists in the accent over the endogen dangers. The general meaning of the „security” is similar with the „safety” one but, technically, “security” doesn't refer just to a safe thing for present but also for future time.

Certain new concepts derive from the different security fields. So, to be able to deepen the „security” concept we must put into discussion others as „risk”, „threat”, „vulnerability”, „exploitation”, „countermeasures”, „deep defence”, „assurance”.

In this context, *risk* represents a possible event that can produce a damage, *threat* represents a method to initiate an risky dangerous event, *vulnerability* is a weakness, a „security breach” to exploit and put into menace, the *exploited risk* represents a vulnerability transformed into threat, the *countermeasures* are ways to stop threats coming from a risky event, the *deep defence* concerns the fact that nobody should count only one security measure, the *assurance* is the guarantee level that the security system will act as it was expected.

1. Security – conceptualization and interdependences

The security concept wasn't enough developed to the end of the '70s and because of the idealists rejecting the realist pattern as being to „welcoming” with the nuclear weapons proliferation. In spite orienting to the security concept, the idealists directed toward the peace concept. The peace policy, disarmament and international cooperation, from the inter-bellum time, had priority in front of security¹.

The security concept became, after 1989, one of the most used concepts to the international elites' level among the globalization, mondialization and occidentalization ones. This concept seems to get more appreciation. Until '80 years, this will have a subsidiary role because into analyses will be rather used in the military field into the strategic studies framework.

To get a correct understanding of the security issue from philosophical point of view we must get with the security concept. A simple security concept is a barrier in front of progress. By the expression „simplest concept” we regard such



understanding of security perceiving inadequately the latent contradiction of the concept itself and/or into one of its significances reduced to the contextual understanding of a message or part of it living the fact that the logical security expression involves almost every time high levels of actors' interdependences trying to maintain secure.

The humanity security is affected by 5 types of factors: political, military, economic, social and environmental. Widely, the political security concerns the states' organizational stability, governing systems and ideologies that legitimates them. The military security regards the double interaction of the offensive and defensive state instruments capabilities and states' perception over ones intentions against the others. The economic security regards the access needed to resources, finances and markets to sustain an acceptable level of state's wellness and power. The social security is preoccupied by the sustenance capacity into the limits of some acceptable evolutionary conditions of the traditional identity elements: language, culture, cultural and religious habits. The environmental security refers to the local and planetary biosphere maintenance as vital support for human lives. These security's five dimensions don't operate isolated one from another. Security, conceptually, needs obviously a reference object because without an answer to: Whose security? the idea itself doesn't have sense.

2. The security definition between the person and individual interest

There are more definitions of the security term but here all depends of its studied aspect and the branch we want to expose to it. Therefore, we need to elaborate some criteria to be able to formulate a security definition. Into our vision, in this regard, is logically to underline the criteria of „individual or community interest” and „persons” as a whole.

Into the first variable, the security constitutes the situation to protect the person's, states or societies vital interests against the intern and extern dangers or threats. The object to protect isn't the human (individual), citizen, people or state but their interests that can't be always objectively evaluated by the social practice and science.

Moreover, this definition excerpts the denial threat moment. So, in the most generally picture, security is a situation where somebody isn't under

a danger or threatened with it. Otherwise, the notion of security shows a situation where is lack of danger. This, in our vision, is a possibility (with objective existence) to act negatively over the social body causing prejudices or damages.

So, thinking about the notion of security is necessary to mention the systemic character taking into consideration some objects faculty to threat (to create dangers) and others capacity – to protect or avoid such dangers. Robert Jervis² compelled an interesting idea regarding the security regimes redirecting specialists' attention from state to security approach with the help of the systemic analysis.

Some Romanian specialists consider „security means a nation capacity to stop a war to happen or, if this doesn't succeeds, to win a war to keep its national integrity and independence”³.

The deep analysis of the global issue coming from security put us into the situation to classify dangers. There could be underlined some dangers' classifications. One considers four types of dangers: a) danger provoked by mistakes (errors) coming from the regarded goal; b) extern dangers, coming from other systems; c) intern dangers regarding the interior system's elements; d) natural dangers.

The security concept is contested so is imposed a rigorous analysis to precisely identify the limits to applicability and contradictions that exist inner side. Although, is useful to classify security in practical goals. So, there are a multitude of security types as: economic, social, political, of state, military, cultural, spiritual, human, of production, energetic, technical, food, informational, ecological, demographical, nuclear, physical, of language, environment, soul, etc.

Brandt Commission required the specialists to elaborate a new concept of security to overcome the expression of national defence and to get to the wider interdependence logic⁴. From the contradiction between the logics' anarchy and idealism adepts had born a synthesis product, the idea of common security (1982) that underlined the security relations interdependency.

3. Security levels perceived and analyzed into the speciality literature and internal and international legislation

As regards security, the discussion is around the absence of threat. When the discussion is in



the international system context the security regards the states and societies capacity and their functional integrity. In searching security, state and society are sometimes in opposition. The baseline regards the survival but also include reasonably a consistent range of preoccupations related by the life conditions. Into the classical concept, the security referred firstly to the humankind faith and then to the personal security of the individual human beings.

Into the context of conflicts resolution the security definition depends by the perspective from its regarded. At the less complex level we can adhere to define as „quality or state to be sheltered by any danger” or „feeling of trust and peace given to somebody by any danger absence”.

There is necessary the delimitation between danger, threat, at one side, and vulnerability, risk, on the other. If danger and threat are elements affecting by somebody or something one state’s security, for example, vulnerability and risk are associated to those state and its decision factors.

Coming from the security object the most relevant levels seem to be:

- the individual level, where the goal is the wellness and survival;
- the societal level, where must be preserved the cultural identity, ideology and civilization;
- the national (state) level, where are protected territory and sovereignty;
- the regional level, where are protected the common values of some neighbour-states for example: the European security regarding the European community values;
- Global level, where are protected the main values of humanity, the general human rights, collective security and, newer, the security by cooperation.

3.1. The individual security into the internal and international legislation

At the individual’s level we can speak about individual security. At this level, as we already showed, security is understood frequently, *stricto sensu*, as safety. This safety means to the lack of physical or psychological dangers. The threats against one individual’s security can produce such fears. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms/declares that all the people have the right to “person’s security”. This declaration strengthens the concept “to be safe from physical

and psychological dangers”. In this situation, what measures can be taken to protect the individual from these dangers. The most met forms of protection are the legal structures protecting the person from the threats against his security. Here is about laws against crimes, body damages, theft and constraints, oppressions or harassment. State is the one assuming the responsibility to emit, implement and apply these legal regulations. Moreover, at this level, security can refer also to somebody’s capacity to satisfy the basically needs as: food, shelter/home and socio-economic needs as a workplace.

Into the Romanian Constitution is seen to 20 articles, 1st line: “The constitutional disposals regarding the citizens’ rights and liberties can be interpreted and applied in concordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with the agreements and another treaties Romania is part of”. From here, and the following line⁵ results the fact that the individual security of the Romanian citizens is assured by the international laws prescriptions that prevail to the national ones.

The Romanian National Security Strategy, on the other side, “answers to the need and obligation of legitimate protection against risks and threats endangering the human’s fundamental rights and liberties, vital national values and interests, the Romanian state’s existence base”.

The concept of individual security is therefore directly related to the way of perception of the living level. In this context, consequently with the diminution or elimination of the direct threats against the individual safety, the security is assured by a high or decent level of living getting new connotations.

3.2. Societal security of group/community

In our demarche to define group/community’s security we must mention that at this level exist many similarities with the individual security level. As the individual expects to have assured his security as person, similarly, there are expectations at group/community level.

Regarding the group, still, we consider as major to assure a security state the fact of being sheltered by any discrimination being into a group sharing common values. While to a person can be applied bad treatments because of his partnership to an ethnical, religious, national group or community, if is applied the same treatment to a group or com-



munity the implications are more obvious and with more complex followings.

Legislation can help to assure the group's security as well in the individual security although laws can be discriminatory, this being a major source of conflict.

3.3. National security

Perhaps, the frequently analysed security level, the national security one was attributed different definitions generating fervent discussions. Frequently, the role of individual and group security guardant is the nation-state.

The national security category represents the basic notion designating the essence, the nucleus of different types of safety. It can be seen as capacity of the state territorial community to satisfy despite the objective dangers existence, those requests needed to its self-preservation. Main objectives can be person's, society's, state's or citizens' interests. Consequently, the national security or country's security is related directly to the economic, political, and technical-scientific, demographical aspects of society's development, to the development state of the medical culture, training and education, etc.

At this level, security is defined as the fully conditions: political, economic, military, social and cultural – needed to guarantee the sovereignty, independence and national interest promotion. Any threat at the five dimensions level is perceived as threat against national security.

From military and economic point of view, security can be clearly defined but for the political, socio-economic and cultural security the opinions are divergent. There can be cases where the measures taken to protect culture can be interpreted as discriminatory, ethnocentric or racial. The chosen example is compulsory, the cultural security being especially difficult to define and protect into the democratic societies characterized by a risen degree of heterogeneity.

To the socio-economic security can be attributed controversial definitions and interpretations. For example, a population with a high older people rate is a threat coming from the socio-economic field. If the state takes measures to blame a certain group can appear tensions with a grown complexity degree. Is underlined the contradictory aspect of this approach, while the state is assuring its own security threatening certain group security.

Things become more sensitive where we put into discussion the political field of security that can be defined in very wide senses. A nation can react in front of the political threats similar with the cases of the cultural, economic-social and economic ones.

In the late years, the security concept was extended to the military field to others fields but there were no generally accepted definition because of the security nature. Therefore, Charles Schultz appreciates that: „*The concept of national security doesn't lead to a clear and precise formulation. He refers to a wide range of risks, with unknown probability and to some contingencies which nature can perceive only now*”⁶.

As regards the security issue, into the United Kingdom National Security Strategy is prescribed from the beginning that: „*the nation's and its citizens' security is the most important duty of the Government*”⁷.

Consequently, the US National Strategy for Homeland Security underlines the terrorist threat combating and intends to unify the security efforts aiming four goals: the terrorist attacks prevention; the citizens, critical infrastructure and vital resources protection; crises response and to strengthen the base to assure a long term success.

3.4. Regional security

Regional security became a necessity imposed by multiple determinations coexisting into complementarities with other security types.

The simple approach of the regional security can be the economic one involving the reason to protect the regional interests. There can be cases of regional association owed to an important resource that can lead to the need of security apparition, the responsibility for this being to the region. Certain associations can appear also when is protected a certain level of living. So, the members of a regional group can protect in front on some massive immigration's values coming from the poverty of the others regions resources. We can see, from the offered examples that, usually, threats against security at this level directly relates with the aspects from the living level.

The White Chart of national security and defence underlines the need to act regionally and globally to promote Romania's security interests this revealing a clear understanding of the major involvements of the regional and global security



over national security, the request to offer realist models of the new threats against its own security, formulation, into the regional alliances where is part, of possible types of answer to the new emergent threats.

On the European plan, the EU states realise the European Security and Defence Policy, the objectives of the Stability Pact in the South-Eastern Europe, maintain the stability in Balkans and into the Caucasus-Caspian space of the Black Sea, fight with terrorism, and the NATO member-states participate to the collective defence effort and to the EU military dimension building as well to the partnership and cooperation engagements with other world's states fulfilment, to the strengthen of trust and cooperation on regional and continental plan⁸.

Into the European Security Strategy are emphasized the security global provocation and main threats which, consequently with the grown interdependencies among the states gets new values. Security is seen as a precondition for development, insecurity being associated with poverty and conflict.

3.5. International/global security

A concept relatively new that supposes to take into consideration some organizations as UN. The same with the other security levels also at this level are systemic and functional un-clarifications meaning that the global security can be negatively influenced by aspects appearing as defining the national security. So, the international security can be negatively influenced by the negative opinions of some govern related to the philosophy of other government.

The regional integration and globalization are two interconnected tendencies also by a special complexity of the security environment that exercises a significant impact over the national interests of the national states.

Every state actor reacts to the regional globalization and integration by a series of intern factors: the economic development level, quantity and quality of the material, financial, material and informational resources owned, good or bad government but also by a series of extern factors: the participation into a economic or politico-military organization, relations with the regional or global organizations depending, consequently, by the regional and global security environment.

The national security of the states can by assured by their integration into collective security systems by harmonizing the intern security with the extern one and also by the regional and international security arrangements. As a trend, the stability and security projection on regional and zone plan will depend increasingly by the dynamic of the use of the security by cooperation framework as superior step of the collective security shaped into the regional security arrangements. Today is consolidated moreover the formula of interconnected security structures and organizations as UN, NATO, OSCE and EU, adopting together a certain type of security; UN decided to pass to its basic principles reform and its organizational structure following the radical change of the international relations system, as well as NATO, passing toward a new security concept. Neither OSCE remains unchanged and opted to develop some new mechanisms to assure the national, sub-regional, regional and global security, based upon the conflict prevention, the growth of the diplomatic instrument role and the capabilities of crises management.

Regarding the Report presented into the UN Program for Development, there are seven dimensions of the international security (collective security) and national security: the economic security, the food security, environment security, personal security, community security, political security and individual security where can be added demographical security and military security.

Because of the diversity of collective security and national security conceptions and the amplification of the states' efforts to integrate into the collective security organizations and into the dialogue and cooperation process, the concept of national security by collective security is complex and much diversified. But, as a common number, this concept has on its base, as subject, human with its moral and spiritual wealth that goes over the borders and determines the national security by collective security.

Conclusions

At the beginning of the 3rd millennium, the state's, person's and whole human culture security assurance depends not only and also by the objective and subjective in ensemble. Otherwise, process to assure security for every object



inclusive of the entire planet must be globalized, so the globalization must become a major factor in the security's accomplishment. The global, regional, national-territorial and local aspects are united into a whole system but on the basis of the planetary imperative. Security is conceived by the mirror of risks, threats and provocation against it on assurance levels: individual, group, national, European and global.

Regarding the person's security, we realize that is easier to assure security of things than human beings because this involves factors as: life, health, statute, material state or even the liberty between some can't be replaced with nothing. There isn't the possibility to assure the general, total security for all the individuals of a society and not even the integral society for a certain individual or certain categories of individuals because permanently appear new unpredictable risks not taken into consideration initially at the security measures establishment or appear even new facets of the human security needed to be protected (psychological security, emotional, of imagine etc.).

Also, there exist contradictory discussions in the juridical field related to the protection against crime and the civil liberties infringement. In theory, there is a distinction between the objective security (existent in reality) and the subjective one (perceived by the individual).

The majority of threats against individuals appear from the fact that peoples are caught into a human environment generating inevitable social, economic and political pressures.

The social threats are four typed: physical (pain, hurt, death); economic (theft or property destruction, the interdicted access to work resources); as regards rights (denial of the normal civil liberties) or concerning the position or statute (elimination, public humiliation). The threats don't mutually exclude their self but on the contrary, ones apparition can bring also others.

These individual threats existence into the society underlines the great dilemma being basis of a spread political philosophy: how to equilibrate the individual liberty of action with the individual and potential threats this liberty brings to the others? The pregnancy of the state's image offered by Hobbes⁹, in fact, derives from the one that expresses very clear this dilemma. The individuals or the collective human entities as are the states

and nations coexisting together with others into an anarchy relation discover their risen liberty just by their security mirror.

Or, newer, until where can reach some state actors with the invocation of theirs security interests until the infringement of international laws? How legal and legitimate are their actions? How much relevance represents the territorial sovereignty and also the national security of some states stipulated in the international treaties in front of such actions? These dilemmas still search for answers to demonstrate one more time the difference between the expressions "the force law" or "law's force".

NOTES:

¹ Ion IRIMIA, Emil ION, Scientific research paperwork, Tema: **Securitatea între real și virtual**, Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, Bucharest, 2002, p.7.

² Robert JERVIS, **Perception and Misperception in International Politics**, Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, 1976.

³ Constantin Gheorghe BALABAN, **Changes into the global security architecture**, Strategic Impact Magazine, no.1/2005, National Defence University "Carol I", p. 19.

⁴ North-South, **A programme for survival**, Brandt Commission Report, London, Pan, 1980.

⁵ **Romanian Constitution**, 20 Article, (2) line, modified and completed by the Law of revision of the Romanian Constitution no. 429/2003, republished by the Legislative Council with the reactualization of the names and numbers, "If there are neconcordances between the agreements and treaties regarding the fundamental human rights where Romania is part in and the intern laws, the international prescriptions prevail with the exception of the situation when the intern laws contain more favorable disposals".

⁶ Charles SCHULTZ, *The economic content of the national security policy*, Foreign Affairs, 1973.

⁷ **The National Strategy of the United Kingdom – Security in an interdependent world**, March 2008, Chapter One: Introduction, 1.1.

⁸ Vasile POPA, **Implicațiile globalizării asupra securității naționale**, Editura Universității



SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, Bucharest, 2005, p. 40.

⁹ Thomas, Hobbes, English philosopher, well-known for its treaty, **Leviathan**, being considered

the modern creator of the social contract tradition and the idea that “life in natural state is solitary, poor, ugly, hard and short”.

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CHALLENGES IN THE RECRUITMENT OF PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS IN EUROPE

Tibor SZVIRCSEV TRESCH, PhD

After switching to an all-volunteer force there were significant problems in recruiting enough and capable personnel for the military in the U.S. With an enormous effort these problems have been solved for a while in the States.

But in the last years – with the commitments in different operations abroad and the changing values in civil society – the recruitment is less successful and it is more and more difficult filling all positions.

The problem of recruiting people of the right quality seems to be more or less universal and is not just a problem in the U.S. In Europe the militaries face difficulties in the recruitment and retention of military personnel too.

The reasons are multifaceted: The new pressure seems to be generated from changed values in civil society.

Interest and motivation to join the military is declining, especially among young people. The competition between the private market and the military is increasing because of higher educational level of the young generation and a low unemployment rate.

Against this background, this paper discusses the success and challenges in the recruitment of professional military personnel in Europe.

The main question of this paper is how the military can recruit personnel in sufficient numbers and of sufficient quality.

The data is based on expert questionnaires, which were sent to scientists and military personal all over Europe. Additionally, expert interviews have been conducted in Belgium, Slovenia, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

Keywords: professional soldiers, conscripts, recruiting, volunteers, incentives.

Introduction

“Britain almost out of troops” was the headline of the *Daily Telegraph* on Tuesday 24 July 2007. Thomas Harding described that the head of the army had issued a dire warning that Britain had almost run out of troops to defend the country or fight abroad. There were concerns about a negative impact on the level of operations, equipment and future operational capability. The German magazine “Der Spiegel” reported about a lack of professionals in the “Bundeswehr”. The reasons are the strong economical situation in Germany and the competition on the labour market between private firms and the armed forces (Der Spiegel, 2007).

A new field of threat has developed since the end of the Cold War and the European armed forces had to take on additional tasks. Apart from these responsibilities a new way of acquiring personnel evolved relying on voluntary basis: The amount of armed forces depending mainly on conscripts has been reduced and voluntary service has been introduced. Armed forces based on conscription recruit male citizens belonging to a determined age cohort.

Through this method of compulsory recruitment armed forces can obtain personnel largely avoiding recruitment via employment markets. The conscripted recruits are used as personnel-pool for the filling of professional military positions as volunteer-servicemen, as for example in the armed forces in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland.

This compulsory military service of young men has, however, lost its social and political legitimation due to the loss of the classical military threat in Europe at the end of the Cold War. The demand for professional, flexible and technological well equipped forces, competent



for crisis intervention or peace support operations abroad, is gradually increasing.

1. Recruiting and retention in armed forces and the resulting difficulties

As compulsory military service was abolished in Belgium in 1993 and the Netherlands in 1996 the aspect of voluntary service in Europe became increasingly recognised. Through this European armed forces have faced new challenges in the field of recruitment. These can be described on a social and economical level. Socially, the demographic change of the European society is a major factor. The rise of the average age of society and the resulting decline of the population in the age group for conscription (18 till 26 years old) implements a pressure on the demand of human resources of the armed forces. Furthermore the change of values in society is influencing the way on how the armed forces are accepted and on how the gap between existing social values and military culture is increasing. The changed values in society generate additional pressure on the armed forces. The interest in the armed forces is declining, especially among young people (Klein/Mackewitsch, 2000). Generally it can be stated that the interest in becoming a soldier is higher under the male than the female population and that it declines with age and higher education.¹

On the economic level the armed forces are confronted with the present employment situation. They have to face the free market and compete with private industry for suitable human resources. Hereby they can often only offer inadequate financial and non monetary incentives. This competition is enhanced through low unemployment and strong economy and makes successful recruitment even more difficult (Cohn, 2007, 322). Problems in recruitment of volunteers due to economic development are not a new phenomenon. The US armed forces already had difficulties in recruitment in the seventies of the last century when changing to a voluntary system in 1973 (Gilroy et al., 1990).

At the beginning of the eighties other NATO members also had the difficulties of employment policy in the armed forces on their agenda (North Atlantic Assembly Papers, 1983). These challenges, recognised in the seventies and eighties, are still challenging today (Ministry of Defence, 2006;

Harding, 2007; NATO Research and Technology Organisation, 2007).

As the amount of personnel was reduced after the Cold War the problem of recruitment was not obvious in European states (Jehn/Selden, 2002; Malešič, 2002; Szvircev Tresch, 2005). The last conscripts served as recruiting supply for the developing voluntary forces at the same time. After the completion of the structural change recruiting volunteers became more difficult in Europe. The recruiting difficulties or successes in the various states are mostly well documented. However, an international comparative analysis has not been done so far. This article will try to provide a European overview and will focus on recruitment under various aspects. The following questions will be guiding: How successful is the recruitment of new professional military personnel in European armed forces? What are the reasons for joining the armed forces? What incentives have to be provided to provide an adequate number of volunteers for the military profession?

The first part of this article will look deeper on the success of the recruitment and the reason for joining the armed forces. Additionally, economic aspects and incentives will also be analysed. The related topics of retention and attrition will also be commented on. Concrete instructions for a successful recruiting will be suggested in the conclusion.

2. Method

For this study the author sent a semi-standardised questionnaire to 127 selected contacts in 40 states in the winter of 2007/08. All 59 experts from 27 countries returned the questionnaire.²

Furthermore, 19 people answered that they are not competent enough for filling in the questionnaire. 27 of the valid 59 experts are members of their countries armed forces and 12 are civil employees of the Ministries of Defence (MOD). 15 people are employed by a non-military institution such as a university or research institution. Nevertheless, these people have had to do with the armed forces of their country. 5 people could not be allocated or have multiple functions. Interviews with experts were conducted in selected states at the same time on the basis of a semi-open questionnaire.³ The main topics of the interviews were recruitment and retention. These interviews took place with

social scientists from the academic environment of the military academies or universities, people responsible for recruiting as well as employees of the MoD's, who work in the field of recruiting or human resource marketing or are professional officers. These interview partners will not be named as anonymity was guaranteed. Much more important is the presentation of the quantitative and qualitative evaluation and combination of the expert opinions.

Due to the small sample of experts the research has more an explorative character. Not the opinion of the military personnel has been asked but the subjective perceptions of the experts have been in the centre. These perceptions are based on empirical researches of the experts in the respective nations; this means that the results of the research have high significance.

3. Success of recruitment for different categories


The armed forces prefer to recruit high quality youth because they perform better and have lower attrition rates. However, the competition is increasing because of better possibilities on the labour market for these youths (Asch/Kilburn/Klerman, 1999). Recruitment is affected by the size of the youth population. Also the recruiting resources affect the success of recruitment for the armed forces. These include recruiters, advertising, and the various enlistment incentives that the armed forces offer. Thereby differences exist among armed forces which have switched to all-volunteer forces several years ago and those states and their military, in which the reform process is

not yet over. In this latter group of countries, the recruitment targets can be met for all categories in most cases, as they still have to reduce their military personnel in the transition phase of a conscript army to all-volunteer forces.


The different military branches are similar in the field of concerning the success of recruitment of new personnel. For each a third of the experts is of the opinion that the Army, the Navy and the Air Force are able to recruit enough personnel without any difficulty (Graph 1). Approximately 40% share the view that enough personnel can be recruited. They do, however, see some difficulties. 20% of the experts are of the opinion that recruitment was not successful in their country. Thereby the Air Force seems to have the least difficulties. This first general view shows that overall there are minor recruiting problems in the analysed countries.

Apart from these observations the answers of the experts showed that the different parts of the armed forces vary in their recruiting methods. Therefore the Army recruits more people with a social deprived background and from areas with high unemployment rates as the other two branches. To summarize it can be observed that some countries are facing difficulties; in most cases they do, however, just about meet their recruitment targets.

As officers enjoy a higher prestige and have a better salary than other ranks no recruiting problems are visible here (Graph 2). For one officer position there are up to ten applicants. In the most countries, the main problem is on the level of the enlisted personnel. One third of all experts share the opinion that the recruitment of enlisted personnel was not successful in the last two years. These



Graph 1: Success of recruitment for Army, Air Force and Navy



Graph 2: Success of recruitment for officers, NCOs and soldiers

are more experts than those who declared that the general recruitment went without any problems. They are struggling to recruit enough enlisted personnel and the most difficulty soldiers to recruit are the normal combat forces (infantry soldiers) of the army. In half of the countries there are merely one to two applicants for each open position. That matches closely with the economic situation. If the unemployment rate is low then the armed forces have difficulties in recruiting enough people. The recruitment problem of enlisted personnel can be seen as a long term predictable outcome of the low unemployment.


The recruitment of NCOs does not seem a large problem at the moment. According to the statements of the experts this situation could, however, get worse, as NCOs are often recruited from the reservoir of enlisted personnel. If there are less qualified enlisted personnel in the future it could become more difficult to find middle cadre.

When split to individual functions the recruitment of military personnel varies. Special Forces have the least recruiting problems. The problem with Special Forces is not the amount of applicants but the high entry requirements for these units. As Special Forces are of the most prestigious units in the armed forces there are many applicants. The selection for these positions is very hard. This is also the reason that Special Forces have never been recruited on the basis of economical difficulties outside. Other special units in the armed forces, however, could not find enough personnel according the experts. In only half of the cases recruitments were successful, and only with difficulties. Especially with recruiting

computer experts and medical personnel a lack of applicants can be observed. One fourth of the experts state that there are far too few volunteers for these functions.

Armed forces are facing two challenges in the recruiting of personnel. On the one hand they are finding it difficult to employ enough infantry soldiers. As the infantry makes out a large part of the armed forces it therefore has to rely on numerous volunteers. On the other hand specialised functions cannot be staffed. Although they only need a small amount of personnel these have to be of a very high quality. The drying out of the market of specialists is making the recruitment of these for the armed forces even more difficult.

In three categories, army, officers and soldiers, there are significant differences between conscript armed forces and all-volunteer forces (Graph 3). For conscript armed forces it is easier to find people because the conscripts are a potential pool for recruitment. In many cases half of the volunteers come from conscripted soldiers. 93% of the experts from countries with conscript armed forces state that the recruitment was successful in contrast to 64% from all- volunteer forces. While conscript armed forces rarely have any problems in recruiting officers, all-volunteer forces will have difficulties in roughly half of the cases. All-volunteer forces have the largest recruiting problems with the enlisted personnel. Only few experts state that the recruitment takes place without any difficulties. This is where the strong point of the conscript armed forces is. In most cases there are enough enlisted personnel for the



Graph 3: Success of recruitment for conscript armed forces and all volunteer forces

forces. It is clearly visible that there is a correlation between the recruiting difficulties of the army and the enlisted personnel. This is not surprising as the army is the largest branch of the armed forces and therefore is most dependent on a great number of enlisted personnel.

The time frame of the recruitment also has to be taken into consideration. There is a specific problem as there are often several weeks between the signing of the contract and the incorporation into the services. In this time interested people in a military job can find another job or they can change their mind. The best solution for the armed forces will be to take the interested persons as soon as possible or directly to the basic training.

Four factors can be generated out of the answers of the experts to 'what the most important reasons for a positive development in the recruiting of volunteers are'. At first, the situation on the civilian labour market is rated as very important. A relatively high income is also seen as economically important as well as job security. Missions abroad are rated as second most important positive factor for a successful recruitment. This includes adventure and getting to know foreign countries and cultures. An important factor is also the possibility of a career for the cadre. This gives them the opportunity to practice their leading skills or to pass them on. Further the good reputation of the armed forces is seen as a positive factor for successful recruiting.

When society supports the armed forces the prestige of the profession rises and can intensify the propensity of young people for the armed forces.

The experts identified the unemployment rate as the main factor. "It is always difficult to recruit people when the economy is doing well." In the most countries the unemployment rate is very low at the moment and competition for qualified applicants is fierce. Split down to the individual countries it becomes clear that this has a large or slight influence in all states. Within the individual states the economical situation is also recognisable. This is, for instance, the case in Belgium where there is a wide gap between unemployment figures of the North and the South. As a consequence recruitment is much easier in the South. Recruiting in the economically less developed parts of Hungary is more successful than in others. In Slovakia the recruitment is the most successful in regions with the biggest unemployment rate. In Bulgaria, according to a survey within soldiers, the main reason to join the military for 60% was that they could not be able to find another job on the civilian job market.

However, there are also voices that do not consider the unemployment rate that important. A high unemployment rate is not always crucial for a positive development of recruiting due to the fact that not every person who is unemployed is also interested in and suitable for a military career. An alternative method to solve unemployment is, for example, by trying to find a job abroad and not within the country. Therefore unemployment does not necessarily determine a direct increase of the recruitment rate.

When inquiring about factors which have a negative influence on successful recruiting the experts mention foremost a good economical

situation. Their opinion is that the economical situation in each individual state has a direct influence on successful recruiting. They also criticise a not sufficient budget to compete within the open market and to pay adequate salaries. This has an influence on support programmes. When the armed forces do not offer an attractive level of social support programme and family programme for military personnel, it is difficult to gain people for a military career. The demographic situation with a steadily decreasing amount of young people is another negative factor as well as the change of values in society. Therefore highly educated young people often prefer to stay in civil life and go to university. This can be in conjunction with the lower reputation of the military profession in society.


An overwhelming majority of the experts is of the opinion that missions abroad have a positive impact on the recruitment of new personnel. Only the experts from Germany, Slovakia, and Spain see in the overstretching of the armed forces and the resulting long absence from the families a negative influence of PSO. The evaluation of the effect of missions abroad is rated diverse. While some people enlist to go abroad others leave the forces because they went too often. For a relatively high percentage of young people missions abroad is a very strong factor of motivation. They are attracted by the prospects of receiving a much higher payment than what they would have within the country. However, the risks of these missions also prevent many from joining the forces. The geographical location of a mission also has an

influence on recruiting according to the experts. For example the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: gatekeepers like parents are worried. Nevertheless, the wars also have a positive influence on the young people as they are brought in connection with risk and adventure. So mixed messages come from the missions in different geographical areas.

4. Reasons for joining the armed forces

Working for the armed forces was, considered in accordance with the term “institution” by Moskos (1977), generally seen as a vocation. A military of institutional format holds up high the values of obedience, order, hierarchy, authority, discipline and comradeship. However, employment by the military is increasingly seen as a job like any other as the occupation model shows (Moskos, 1977). This is legitimized through the concept of market place. Mainly monetary incentives are offered to the available competences and abilities of the employees. But there are still two different views of employment in the post-modern military. On the one hand the recruiting of a part of officers who have a distinct concept of class and intrinsic motivation and act according to the classic perception of the profession of a soldier. On the other hand the enlisted soldier who saw a military assignment as a normal job which he or she is prepared to do for a while but not, however, as a lifelong mission (Caforio, 1991, 31).

The motivation for choosing a military career depends either on the rank and function or varies according the countries concerned. In a research



Graph 4: Reasons to join the armed forces



conducted in the middle of the 1990s throughout Europe on the attitude of professional officers it was made clear that in most countries the service for the country, the interest in the military in general as well as the leading of people were of vital importance. These three aspects seemed to be preconditions for officers when joining the armed forces. A good education, a solid employment and adventure, however, also await the service men and women (Caforio/Nuciari, 1996; Sarvas/Hodny, 1998).

Are the motivating factors still the same at the beginning of the 21st century? Monetary benefits such as salary, enlistment bonus, etc. are clearly mentioned as the most important incentives for military personnel in general (Graph 4). 92% of the experts rated these as very or rather important. Missions abroad follow on second place. In 78% economical reasons (unemployment, no other job, job security, etc.) are considered the main incentives for young people to choose a military career. Enlisted personnel in particular seem to rate these three mentioned factors stronger than average. In the eyes of the experts educational benefits are a reason for future officers to enlist. Typical occupational reasons as tradition, prestige or patriotism are considered as significantly less important. Insofar tradition is of importance when the father or the mother was involved in the armed forces then the children can also have a stronger attachment to the military. The expressed opinions clearly induce that the military is losing its character as a special institution and that it is becoming similar to a normal, civil enterprise. Further to the mentioned reasons the positive experience as a conscript was also pointed out, which is also a driving factor for joining the armed forces. In Spain, which also recruits foreigners, the possibility to acquire the Spanish nationality is rated as very important.

5. Military salary in comparison to civilian salaries

Monetary incentives are the most important reasons for joining the armed forces. This raises the question on how competitive the forces are compared with the civil labour market. Research shows clearly that there is a pay gap. This means for instance that between 1982-1999 in the USA civil salaries have risen higher and faster than

comparable military wages. However, one has to differentiate. Whereas officers have a negative pay gap (nearly 20%), enlisted personnel do not. In the 1990s there was even a positive gap for enlisted personnel of 5-10% (Asch/Hosek, 1999).

The question "Is the military salary comparable to an equivalent job in the civilian job market?" shows a diverse reception. 38% of the experts are of the opinion that the average salary is the same. 33% believe that service personnel earn less than people on the civilian labour market. Only 24% stated that in their eyes military personnel earns more. It was also stated that the salary depends on the rank (5%). An Infantryman earns more than an equivalent person on the civilian market, but specialists (computer etc.) earn more on the civilian market.

In many countries service personnel receives reductions on commodities like food or fuel. Therefore the experts also noted that most likely the answers given by the military personnel would be that military personnel earns less than personnel in the civil sector. However, taken everything into account, the differences are not that large. Nevertheless, the salary is about the same as in the public sector in general, but compared to the private sector it is lower.

6. Incentives

In the situation discussed above the question arises what incentives the armed forces can offer to make a career in the armed forces more attractive and more interesting. The armed forces are trying to offer incentives on two different levels. On the monetary side they are increasing salaries especially for soldiers and supplementary payment for operations abroad as well as bonuses to narrow the financial gap to the civil labour market.

On the non-monetary side the forces are trying to offer a large choice of non-monetary incentives to create beneficial conditions for the military personnel. First of all these are education opportunities which are paid for by the military. Furthermore outplacement and transition procedures to public sector and adequate programs of integration in civil society are also part of these non-monetary incentives. An attractive career is also offered within the armed forces. They try to acquire better service conditions and better family support through offering free medical assistance,

good material resources, holiday facilitations, and financial support for accommodation.

The improvement and development of the prestige of the military profession and armed forces are seen as primary tasks. The experts are of the opinion that when the military is perceived in a positive way by society recruiting becomes easier.

7. Retention and Attrition


Apart from the recruitment of personnel the armed forces are facing the problem that more and more service personnel are not extending their contracts. The retention of personnel is becoming increasingly difficult (Graph 5) and is often seen as a larger problem than the recruiting itself. Retention is a key issue in many countries, as about half of the experts state that there are not enough military personnel willing to prolong their service beyond their first term of duty.

The problem is obvious: the armed forces can train soldiers very quickly but it takes ten years to make a senior NCO and ten years to make a major. The military cannot run an operation without them. They are absolute vital for the tactical level. The fear is that the armed forces cannot retain that expertise. They will not have enough personnel able to do high intensity operations. It is also obvious that it is becoming a problem to prevent qualified personnel in leaving the armed forces as soon as they get an opportunity on the private market. With the salary structure and retirement benefits the armed forces are trying to encourage

the military personnel in staying longer with the armed forces. The prospect of a coherent career and the opportunity to develop their education can be incentives for retention for qualified personnel.

Apart from retaining personnel the armed forces are also fighting with an increasing attrition rate. This can be up to 40% or more in certain forces. One of the most important reasons for attrition is the long duration of the instruction period. This is connected with high costs in personnel and administration. Armed forces which have recently switched to all-volunteer forces have hardly any or no difficulties in recruiting personnel at all. However, for these forces the attrition rate is a problem as officers and professionals are very high valued in the private market, especially people with computer or other specialised skills. „Two major reasons lead people to leave the military prematurely: The attractiveness of alternatives outside the military and the dissatisfaction about the circumstances inside the military. Of course, most decisions to leave are based on a combination of both reasons.” (Lescreve/Schreurs, 2007, 2A-6).

Attrition is strongly connected with recruitment and retention. If the armed forces have a strong recruitment procedure then more people will stay in the armed forces because they are intrinsically motivated. But if the recruitment is very aggressive, people, who are also less motivated, will join the organisation. For example, Belgium has attracted quite a lot of people in 2005 but the persons in charge haven’t listened enough to the motivations



Graph 5: Retention



and wishes of the recruits and as a consequence the attrition rate was quite high.

Conclusion

According to the questioned experts from 27 countries the successful recruitment of volunteers for European armed forces is difficult. There are two main points which play an important role in the recruitment of professional military personnel: the social change and economical developments. On the one hand the change of values in society has changed the perception of work and employment and, on the other hand, it has led to a more critical view on the armed forces. Traditional values, such as discipline, subordination and obedience, are experiencing a loss in significance in modern society and are being replaced by the demand of possibilities to participate.

Economically, the armed forces rely on the situation on the labour market. In times of economic prosperity and a low unemployment rate for young people it is rather difficult to find enough qualified personnel for the armed forces. As a result of the demographic change in society there are a decreasing number of young people joining the working community. The analysis of the questionnaires filled in by the experts as well as the conducted interviews show that; in general, the recruiting of officers is not too difficult. Officers still enjoy a high prestige in society. Further the good prospects for long term contracts, good salaries and training possibilities are incentives to sign up for this profession. However, many states are finding it hard to encourage enough people to join the armed forces as enlisted or specialised personnel.

This is linked with the economical situation and can only be resolved when paying adequate salaries. Conscript forces seem to have less difficulty in recruiting enlisted personnel than all-volunteer forces as the conscripted soldiers form a natural reservoir for recruiting.

The high attrition rates as well as the difficulty in retention are increasingly becoming difficult and have been mentioned as more problematic as the challenges in the recruitment by several experts. The problem of retention is that the middle management (Sergeants, Majors) are leaving the armed forces. It is difficult to replace them because it takes years to train people with the same expert

knowledge.

Apart from the social and economical factors, which form the main conditions for success or failure in recruiting personnel, the armed forces can take measures on operational level to narrow down the problems in recruiting. However, these can only be implemented when there are enough financial resources available.

- The clearer the task, the easier the recruitment of personnel: Clear initial situations, clear missions. This enables military personnel to perform identity forming tasks.

- Armed forces have to offer competitive salaries. The introduction of performance-related salaries would also be an additional motivation for committed personnel.

- Ideally, the military service is a part of a professional career after which a (re-) entry into the civil labour market takes place. This will work against the over aging of the forces and will motivate service personnel to do continuing education. The armed forces have to provide numerous further training courses which are recognised on the civil labour market. A cooperation with regional job-centres is also important.

- The field of potential recruits should be enlarged. Volunteer-forces should concentrate on 15 to 35 year old candidates. However, women and ethnic minorities should also be taken much more into consideration.

- The recruiting process has to be clearly structured and efficient. The candidate has to be informed as quickly as possible about his or her suitability for the armed forces. This will prevent the candidate from considering other opportunities in the meantime.

- Apart from the economical aspects career management is a central point for officers. The military has to develop adequate plans for their cadre.

One thing is clear: A whole selection of measures have to be taken to be able to recruit and hold enough service personnel. Especially all-volunteer forces have to face the open market and find creative solutions to recruitment issues.

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NOTES:

¹ See also the study of “Enlistment Propensity” in the USA. (Wilson et al., 1999). New Germany research proves this data (Bulmahn, 2007).

² Albania (Conscript Armed Forces), Austria (Conscript Armed Forces), Belarus (Conscript Armed Forces), Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark (Conscript Armed Forces), Finland (Conscript Armed Forces), France, Germany (Conscript Armed Forces), Greece



ANALYSIS. SYNTHESIS. EVALUATIONS

(Conscript Armed Forces), Hungary, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Russia (Conscript Armed Forces), Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden (Conscript Armed Forces), Turkey (Conscript Armed Forces), U.K., Ukraine (Conscript Armed Forces), U.S.

³ Belgium, Netherlands, Slovenia, UK. Additionally, at the IUS conference in Chicago in autumn 2007 the author had also the opportunity conducting interviews with scientists from France, Italy, Romania, Sweden, and the US.

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SYRIA – STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Marina MUSCAN

Syria is a quite important regional actor and it often can be a quite irritant presence for its neighbors. Syrian state has a significant military force, which allows it to maintain its influence in the area. This article aims to point out, however, some weaknesses taking into account that military modernization is done slowly because this state has an army which is much larger than the army it can support effectively. Syria has come in limelight after 2003, because it seems that it owns weapons of mass destruction which they can use in an eventual conflict.

In addition to conventional military forces, Syria has paramilitary forces to help maintain the internal control and pressure on Lebanon. Syrian political regime leaned on the military during time in order to maintain the integrity of state and international order. If at the end of the '80 a change in the foreign policy of this state could be seen, a change that permitted Syria to come closer to the U.S. now a totally opposite direction can be seen. This observation can be sustained by the fact that Bashar's regime is based on paramilitary forces to maintain domestic order and, in addition, according to Israeli reports Syria supports insurgent groups.

The continuous support that Syria gives to the terrorist groups and the fact that it still relies on the paramilitary forces for maintaining internal control support the question if Syria is evolving towards a militarized state.

Keywords: military capabilities, paramilitary forces, weapons of mass destruction.

External relations and security policy

Overview

Syria is a relatively big country that holds a significant strategic position, which makes it a quite important actor in the region and it often can become a quite irritant presence for with all its neighbors although, since 1982 Syria was not

involved in any major armed conflict, nor was an important military presence in the Gulf War, in 1991.

“Syria” as it was mentioned by Toynbee, represented not only the territory that holds this designation today, but a wider area, - covering “a territory bordered by the North Arabian Steppe, the Mediterranean and Anatolian and Armenian Heights” – this territory has been the scene on which successive meetings took place, in various era, between the Sumerian civilization and the Egyptian civilization; between the Egyptian civilization and Hittite and Minoic civilization; between Syrian civilization and the Babylonian civilization; Christian Orthodox and Western Christian, and, in the last stage of contacts, between Arabic civilization, western civilization and Iranian civilization. Many historians designate the generic name of “Greater Syria” to the entire region from eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea, in it including Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel. This generic designation is valid only for the pre-state period.

Syria is officially known as Al Jumhuriyah al Arabiyah, as Syriyah, or the Syrian Arab Republic, it can be traced back to approximately 2500 to 2400 BC. The capital, Damascus, was founded in 2500 BC.

Syria had a turbulent past and was consecutively occupied by Canaanites, Phoenicians, Hebrews, Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs and Crusaders and finally by the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Possession lasted from 1516 until in 1920 when Syria came under French domination following the Sykes-Picot agreement by which the spheres of influence in the Middle East were divided between France and Britain. French occupation in Syria ended in April 1946 when the last French soldier left the Syrian territory and thus Syria has won its independence. In 1958 Syria and Egypt formed the United Arabic Republic which lasted three years. After this period, Syria has again proclaimed

independence and the United Arab Republic ceased to exist.

Then a time of political instability started, including several military coups; in 1960, 1961, 1963 and 1966. General Hafez al-Assad seized power in 1970 through a bloodless military coup and established an authoritarian regime. Hafez al-Assad remained in power until his death in 2000, and was succeeded by his son Bashar al-Assad a month later.

Hafez al-Assad's main strategic objective was to maintain Ba'ath regime in power. Thus, he laid the foundations of a strong army and a security system loyal to the president in order for him to be able to fulfill this objective.

Another security objective has been the recovery of the Golan Heights. This strategic goal was the basis of the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. After 1990 Hafez al-Assad has abandoned the idea of a military solution to the Golan Heights problem for a diplomatic alternative. This alternative consisted in an attempt "normalizing" the relations with Israel, offering a cease of hostilities in exchange for

a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. On the other hand, Hafez al-Assad began a long process of influencing Lebanon in order to use this state against Israel.

Strategic objectives in the long term the Ba'ath are represented by the ideological need to obtain Arabic unity. However, this strategic objective has been in the shadow of the security objectives of Hafez al-Assad who made some political movements that may seem to be in total contradiction with the ideological objective mentioned above.

Thus, in order to insure the security of the state Hafez al-Assad involved Syria in intervention in Lebanon against the Palestinians in 1976. This movement has enabled Syria to gain influence on Lebanon. At the time Hafez al-Assad concluded that he needed alliances to ensure the state security therefore he involved the country in the conflict between Iran and Iraq aiding Iran. The same idea led to participation of Syria to the First Gulf War in 1991 supporting the United States. In a classification regarding the number of people who




Figure 1: The evolution of security objectives under the leadership of Syria's Hafez al-Assad (1970 - 1980)

Source: Magnus NORMARK, Anders LINDBLAD, Anders NORQVIST, Björn SANDSTRÖM, Louise WALDENSTRÖM, *Syria and WMD Incentives and Capabilities*, Swedish Defence Research Agency, NBC Defence, SE-901 82 Umeå, FOI-R-SE 1290, June 2004, ISSN 1650-1942



took part in the First Gulf War Syria is situated on the sixth place with 4,500 soldiers¹.

Bashar has continued the policy imposed by his father stating that he is willing to find a diplomatic solution to the problem represented by Golan Heights with the U.S. as a mediator.

From the EU point of view Syria has been politically and economically stable since President Bashar al-Assad took office in 2000. And the EU wants to support Syrian efforts to carry out reforms proposed by the president.

Syria has dispute with Turkey concerning navigation on the river Euphrates, a conflict with Iraq, fuelled by Kurdish problem and delicate relations with the Muslim Central Asia.

Syria may be a rather irritant actor for regional stability despite the fact that its military force may not be a very efficient one, but it still has quite a lot of influence on Lebanon and it could use Hezbollah as a strategic weapon against Israel.

Relations with Israel are not of the most cordiale, especially because of Hezbollah's actions. According to Israeli, Hezbollah began to reform its arsenal, especially with Syria and Iran's support, which has led to relations between Israel and these two countries to remain tense.

Iran and Syria see Hezbollah as a strategic tool against Israel and, therefore, support this movement with arms. According to data presented by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, there is a network of smuggling arms that introduces weapons in southern Lebanon from Syria.

Therefore, Syria and has assumed the position of "transit country" for shipments of arms which support Hezbollah.

However, the possibly of an open conflict between Israel and Syria would be very costly for Israel.

Therefore, we can say that such a situation can be qualified as a "null sum game" in which both sides lose.

Syria continues to strongly influence the political system in Lebanon and it also supports insurgent groups working in Iraq.

Syrian Armed Forces - Capabilities and Weaknesses

According to the estimates made by the U.S. secret services in 2003 Syrian armed forces were

not well equipped and in terms of the quality of human resources they were not so proficient.

According to observations, after 1982 Syria tried to have a military force equal to that of Israel. This attitude may be the basis of Syrian –Israeli conflict in Lebanon in 1982, during which although they lost people and equipment the Syrians managed to win a few confrontations which increased the confidence in their own combative capabilities.

A second reason for which Syria continued trying to maintain its military strength to a level approaching that of Israel was given by President Hafez al-Assad who in a speech in 1986 stated that Syria will try to integrate the Golan Heights inside its borders.

However, lately a slight change can be observed regarding this approach related to the military capability.

Israel is still seen as the main opponent of Syria but the Syrian state began to distance itself from the idea of having a military force equal to that of Israel.

We can see a slight reduction in ground forces numbers starting with 2000. This may be the result of the new orientation of Syria towards supporting the insurgent groups which may be used as a weapon against potential threats from other states.

Other observation regarding Syrian armed forces is related to their quality. With the fall of the USSR Syria had reduced the loans that allowed it to support its army in terms of weapons and human resources.

But with the outbreak of the First Gulf War Syria has received aid for its armed forces, which was used to purchase combat aircrafts and armored vehicles and less for human resources training which would have contributed to the enhancement of the overall quality of Syrian armed forces.

The modernization process of Syrian armed forces went and it is still going very slowly because this state has a large army.

According to some estimates, Syria has an army three times larger than is capable sustain.

According to data from 2003 Syria had 319,000 people under arms and disposed of 354,000 reserves of whom 215,000 - 280,000 in the army, 4000 in navy and 70,000 in air forces.

The evolution of Syrian military forces can be observed in the table below:



ANALYSIS. SYNTHESIS. EVALUATIONS

| | 1990 | 2000 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|---------------------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Personnel | 704000 | ~820000 | 758000 | 769000 | 769000 |
| Active | 404000 | ~316000 | 296800 | 307600 | 307600 |
| Land Forces | 300000 | ~215000 | 200000 | 200000 | 200000 |
| Navy | 4000 | ~6000 | 7600 | 7600 | 7600 |
| Air Force | 40000 | 40000 | 40000 | 40000 | 40000 |
| Air Defense Command | ~60000 | ~55000 | ~54000 | ~60000 | ~60000 |
| Paramilitary Forces | 243000 | ~108000 | ~108000 | ~108000 | ~108000 |
| Reserves | 400000 | 396000 | 354000 | 354000 | 354000 |
| Land Forces | 392000 | 300000 | 280000 | 280000 | 280000 |
| Navy | 8000 | 4000 | 4000 | 4000 | 4000 |
| Air Force | - | 92000 | 70000 | 70000 | 70000 |

Sources: Anthony H. CORDESMAN, *Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and Prospects of War*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, U.S., August 2007 and Anthony H. CORDESMAN, *If Its Syria: Syrian Military Forces and Capabilities*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, U.S., August 2003.

In 2006 Syrian land-forces have about 200,000 people organized in 7 divisions equipped with armored vehicles. The Syrian divisions differ in size. Majority are composed of three brigades with tanks and / or armored vehicles, 2 of brigades and a mechanized regiment. The division has around 8000 people; a brigade generally holds 93 of the 30 tanks and other armored vehicles.

Nowadays Syria holds about 4950 tanks but 1200 are embedded in static defensive positions and half of those still operating are small capacity. Only 1600 are relatively modern T-72 model.

These tanks do not have heat detectors, fire control system or appropriate armor that could allow them to stand a face to face confrontation with the tanks held by Israel.

Besides Syria has tanks and 4600 armored vehicles of which only 100 can be considered modern.

Syrian air forces have 584 fighting aircrafts and 106 fighting helicopters, and the number of people who serve in Syrian air forces is around 40,000.

The only Syrian ships that deserve to be retained are 2 frigates type Petya III, they are outdated, however. They were transferred from Russia to Syria at the mid of the '70s. The amount of the military expenditure of Syria in 2005 places it on

55th position in world according to the CIA World Factbook.

If we take into account military expenditures, the weapons held and the people under arms we have a general index of Syrian militarization which is as below.


As can be seen evaluative trend for the militarization index of Syria is ascending.

As Egypt and Syria has paramilitary forces which have no military value but which can be very important for Syria in the process of maintaining internal control and pressure on Lebanon. These forces can take very high risks, especially in operations supporting terrorist groups and operations for maintaining internal control. They had also a very important role in the murder of Prime Minister Hariri in 2005.

Syrian Weapons of Mass Destruction

The changing situation of the Middle East after the fall of Saddam Hussein in March 2003 brought Syria in the limelight, regarding the holding of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

There is little reliable information on weapons of mass destruction for the period before 1970 when Hafiz al-Assad came to power in Syria



Sources: Bonn International Center for Conversion (www.bicc.de) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (www.sipri.org)

and set up the long term security strategy which included weapons of mass destruction.

This idea of purchasing weapons of mass destruction was due to Syria's security aims in the '70s when they wanted to obtain parity between Syrian military forces to that of Israel. Such, the development program of weapons of mass destruction in Syria dates back from the '70s.

Syria has four brigades that control missile launchers each one equipped with different types of launchers as it follows: a brigade equipped with missile launchers for a FROG, a brigade equipped with missile launchers for Scud-B, a brigade equipped with missile launchers for Scud-C and a brigade equipped with missile launchers for the SS-21.

Syrian state owns between 50 to 100 ballistic missile and several hundred ground-air projectiles that can be equipped with nerve gas (Sarin).

For these missiles Syria may use chemical or biological agents. Syria is believed to hold between 500 - 1000 tons of chemical agents.

In general, the percentage between the launchers and the number of missiles is 10 missiles to a launcher but in Syria's case of this percentage does not apply fully taking into account that the state owns around 24 to 36 of Scud launchers and approximately 260 to 300 missiles of various types. Thus, one can say that Syria has tried to increase their chances to launch a strong preemptive strike against any threats.

| Launcher | Missiles | Range |
|------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 18 for SS-21 missiles | 36 SS-21 | 80 - 100 km |
| 12 for Scud B missiles | 200 Scud B | 310 km |
| 36 for Scud C missiles | 150 Scud C | 550-600 km |

Source: Anthony H. CORDESMAN, *If It's Syria: Syrian Military Forces and Capabilities*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, U.S., August 2003.



Conclusions

During his inaugural speech Bashar spoke of the need for Syria to center on the economic development he also emphasized, the need of bureaucratic reform and the necessity of creating democratic values from Syrian customs.

However, the fact that in 2001 leaders of organizations representing civil society were imprisoned and their organizations terminated their activities after their leaders tried to form two parties without the approval of the government questions the “change” announced by Bashar.

EU may consider Syria as a stable state along with the coming of the new president, but the fact that Bashar’s regime is leaning on paramilitary forces to maintain domestic order and, the continuous support that Syria gives to the terrorist groups and the fact that it still relies on the paramilitary forces for maintaining internal control support the question if Syria is evolving towards a militarized state.

If at the end of the ‘80 a change in the foreign policy of this state could be seen, a change that permitted Syria to come closer to the U.S. now a totally opposite direction can be seen.

This observation can be sustained by the fact that Bashar’s regime is based on paramilitary forces to maintain domestic order and, in addition, according to Israeli reports Syria supports insurgent groups that can be used as power vector in the region.

It can be said that Syria has a retrograde development taking into account that turned from a state that has been promoting culture in the area in a state which is based on paramilitary power to maintain internal order and position in the area.

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NOTE:

- ¹ Lyla M. HERNANDEZ, Jane S. DURCH, Dan G. BLAZER II, Isabel V. HOVERMAN, editors, Committee on Measuring the Health of Gulf War Veterans, Institute of Medicine, *Gulf War Veterans: Measuring Health*, published by The National Academies Press, 1999.

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THE EU TREATIES' REFORM

Vasile POPA

The Lisbon Treaty, a simplified form of the European Constitution, brought into attention of the 27 EU member states electors, seemed won't suffer the same harsh failure. Most of the countries ratified it and the low number of that had to vote, it did not give reasons for concerns.

The Treaty history is short: a year ago, during the European Council from Brussels, 21st – 22nd June 2007, the issue of continuation the reform process for the Union's treaties was strongly put on the table and convened to urgently choose an option, upon the Council's report after the mandate received in 2006. The new European presidency (Portuguese) called the governmental conference that drafted the Treaty's text, afterwards put to the October Lisbon Summit's approval. The toughest phase, the treaty's ratification that will get the name of the Summit's location, was to be finished before the elections for the European Parliament in June 2009.

But, Ireland, the only country that had to pass the Treaty by referendum, paralysed the process because some fears related with a possible threat against the population's jobs, investments and state sovereignty. This was a reason for the other countries populations' dissatisfaction because of this "no-escape" situation, legally right – in regard with the Union's treaties prescriptions -, but unethically: an one percent minority from Europe's population ends the road for the other 99%, depriving them from their right to reform the EU institutionally.

As well as France and Holland regarding the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, Ireland widely open the gate for incensed discussions on the Lisbon document perspective, after a peaceful short period of time, after the big community disagreements related to the recognition of Kosovo's independence. After taking over the Union's presidency, in January, Slovenia considered the Lisbon Treaty its main priorities, sustaining its benefits for the Community citizens and by the new prescriptions

over the participatory democracy. Nobody foresaw a negative vote at that time.

Reunited in Brussels, one week after the Treaty was rejected by the Irish electors, as this is the main point of the EU's enlargement institutional reform, the Community's leaders tried to impulse the document's ratification. The international media suggested reapplying the strategy practiced in 2001 after the Nice Treaty rejection, also by the Irish people, forecasting the introduction of some "explanatory protocols" to assure Ireland that the draft doesn't prejudice its military neutrality and fiscal policy. It was also advanced the solution to guarantee the Irish presence within the European Commission, insecure because the Lisbon Treaty prescribed the diminution starting 2014 of the Community portfolios until equal with 2/3 from the member states number.

The Irish decision, without being considered "a drama or an earthquake", according to the appreciation of the foreign French ministry Bernard Kouchner, put into discussion the Treaty's content. Therefore, the other 26 decided to give Ireland time until November in order to analyze this "No", to understand its reasons and offer to the other Europeans some explanations. The member states reaffirmed their will to continue the ratification process into the other eight countries that have not approved yet the Treaty. It is clear that Europe needs this Treaty in order "to be able to work and expand" as German chancellor Angela Merkel underlined. Therefore, Ireland was asked to present its analysis over its vote and to propose some solutions during the Brussels summit.

The hope for a viable solution found before the French EU presidency ends, by December 31st, seemed to be embraced by all. France, at least, stated that haste makes waste because it can lead to wrong judgements and such conviction from the country that, in 2005, threw Europe into a profound institutional crisis is very credible. The president Nicolas Sarkozy insisted during the Prague



STRATEGIC EVENT

discussions, where he met the Visegrad Group states' leaders – Czech, Hungarian, Slovakian and Polish –, to keep their calm and “cold blood” and to avoid the pressure over the Czechs into this difficult ratification. He also considered there's no need to dramatize this situation but, consequently, it shouldn't be minimized as it is a serious matter.

On the other hand, he excluded an EU enlargement without Lisbon Treaty. The fear that also another country, mainly the Czech Republic (where a positive position from the Constitutional Court is expected in October, that will show the convenience between the Treaty and the Czech constitutional order), could reject the Treaty determined him to intensify his demarches with the undecided. This attitude tides the Treaty pole by the Croatia's perspective of accession and the other Western Balkans' states but also others from East. This relation isn't accidental because, in regard with the Nice Treaty, a new state's accession into the Union must have the vote of the all 27, so there should be modified the rules (the number of deputies, Council of Ministers, and the Commission's composition) and this will require, as the specialists say, to engage some constitutional negotiations.

This is the idea the Croats are convinced of and also the other aspirants to the EU member status that perceive themselves thrown into a grey area whereof they don't know when and if they will escape, in order to join the so much wanted organization. Their uncertainty is confirmed by the European Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn who stated, in an interview for Reuters, that the Irish electors' rejection of the Lisbon Treaty doesn't stimulate the EU determination to enlarge with some Balkan states and Turkey. His opinion seems to be a reply to the President of the European Parliament, the German Hans-Gert Pöttering, that “despite the actual difficulties related to the Lisbon Treaty, EU will keep its word regarding the European perspectives for the South-East Europe, that is for the Western Balkans and Turkey”.

The French insistences have also other explanation. In the first part of the next year, the European presidency will be taken over by the Czech Republic, one of the Euro-sceptical countries. But a Czechs' negative vote regarding the Treaty will mean the diminution of the new presidency's determination will to finalise in time the ratification process and this will damage the

Union's future. The phenomenon analysts although focus their attention only on the Dublin moment, asserting that it will be hard to impose a second poll on Ireland regarding the Treaty, understand that a change of attitude from them would be possible if the countries that have not ratified the Treaty yet will vote for it.

Le Monde considers that the ratification process in the other countries has a corollary: to invite the Irish people to vote a second time, after some eventual amendments to the Treaty. There is a precedent: the 2001 Irish negative vote regarding the Nice Treaty, repeated and approved in 2002. Then it was invoked the population's lack of presence to the referendum (65,2%) but now the presence to the referendum was 52% and this changes the whole picture.

There are not known the amendments will be acceptable to the Irish people, in order to convince them to turn back to voting. For now, media sources stated that the Irish “Libertas” association president opposes categorically to the idea of bringing again the same draft Treaty to the electorate. He said that “we want a total re-negotiation of this antidemocratic treaty”.

Moreover, an Irish opposition party, although agreeing a positive vote, doesn't admit the referendum retaking, sustaining that if this happens, the party will campaign for the people to vote “No”. The Irish press analyzes the Irish vote boomerang effect that could take it off the member states to switch to a “bi-speed” Europe. The opinion to exclude Ireland is also embraced by some analysts that consider Ireland can't find its place into a Union giving all and receiving only refusals. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, the former Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, considers the EU enlargement can't go on without all the practical and pragmatcal elements included into the Lisbon Treaty.

As the exclusion decision becomes necessary, because the enlargement must be regarded as a main element of the European security policy helping the new democratic states to consolidate their stability and to offer them the power to confront the external pressures. But, from the legal perspective, as the *Le Monde* special correspondent to Dublin stated, this country's exclusion from the European large family isn't possible and can be just politically marginalized and its European commissioner won't get an influent portfolio.



STRATEGIC EVENT

After Ireland and the Czech Republic, Poland also appeared. Nobody expected it when the Irish people said “No”, the Polish Foreign Affairs minister declared for *Le Figaro* the ratification process should go on. “We are already into a ‘bi-speed’ Europe, some states adopted Euro and another didn’t”. The same thing is with the Schengen zone and CFSP. The same official stated “as regards the Irish refusal, thousands of Euro-sceptical exploit the situation”. Poland seemed to be on the good way after its Polish Parliament voted positively. The Treaty was to be promulgated by the president but he announced at the beginning of July that he won’t sign that document appreciated to be “for the time being without object”. He declared that “The unanimity principle is compulsory in this situation (...). If once broken, then it will cease to exist for ever”.

So, before the Brussels meeting, the Europe leaders found out within the United Kingdom, the

House of Lords ratified the Treaty, the UK being the first important Euro-sceptic state that took a positive option over a vital issue for the future of the Europe’s enlargement, the Czech’s president firm opinion that “The Treaty is dead and buried”, expressed in regard with the negative option of the Irish people, appeared to have a real basis. In July, also, the president Horst Kohler announced that he won’t accept the draft approved in May by the German legislative until it get the Constitutional Court avis. Under these circumstances, if the refusals to the Treaty are growing, the affirmation of the French prime-minister Francois Fillon that the first “No” stated by the Irish people must be analysed, respected and considered as a supplementary appeal to action and certitude seemed to be a correct suggestion. He also stated that “we should learn to make Europe different” and “we should see how to gain this ratification undisputable for all, a process that may take time”.

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LE SEPARATISME POLITIQUE: UNE EFFET DE LA GLOBALISATION?

Petre DUȚU, PhD

L'évolution du monde connaît deux tendances: la globalisation et le séparatisme politique. Tous les deux sont des phénomènes caractérisés par complexité et multidimensionnelle et trouvent dans une interdépendance et une interaction significatifs. Leurs effets peuvent être bénéfiques pour les acteurs étatiques (par exemple, les gouvernements des grands puissances du monde) et pour les acteurs non étatiques (par exemple, les sociétés transnationales), mais néfastes pour les autres (de règle, les Etats dont le territoire on déroulent les événements et pour les groupes humains impliqués directement dans celui-ci).

Mots-clés: séparatisme, politique, globalisation, effet, nationalisme, indépendance.

Le monde se dirige fermement, par les pas significatifs, vers la société de connaissance dans laquelle l'information jouera un rôle primordial. Ce processus de passage vers un nouveau type de société se produit dans le contexte de deux tendances d'évolution – **la globalisation et le séparatisme politique** – des phénomènes trouvent dans une interaction continue et une interdépendance. Si, la globalisation, comme phénomène complexe, multidimensionnel et omniprésent, tend vers de réaliser une communauté humaine internationale sans frontières physiques entre les entités qui le composent, tel le dit „village planétaire”, le deuxième tendance, c'est-à-dire le séparatisme politique apparemment s'oppose au première.

1. Caractéristiques de la globalisation actuelle

La globalisation actuelle, dans une certaine mesure, constitue la continuateur ses anciennes formes de manifestation. De fait, elle représente une réalité sociale, économique, politique et culturelle qui possède une série des caractéristiques spécifiques.

L'une d'entre ces traits propres, la constitue le fait que bien que la dimension économique

financière de la globalisation ne diminue pas son importance, cependant, un rôle spécifique revient, à présent, les **dimensions politique, sociale et culturelle**. Ces dimensions sont interdépendantes et interactions systématique et permanent. Le rôle de ces dimensions est croissant, parmi laquelle que dans l'édification du nouvel ordre mondial, après les années 1990, les acteurs internationaux de la globalisation ont appelés à la dissémination des valeurs propres de la société de type occidental, à l'implémentation du modèle socio-économique et politique néolibéral à l'échelon planétaire. Il semble que le fait d'absolutiser le modèle de vie occidentale n'est pas bon parce que celui-ci a aussi des défauts, parmi lesquels se trouve: le drogue, l'alcoolisme, la banqueroute habituelle, le désordre civil des bidonvilles urbaines, la détérioration d'environnement, parce que celui-ci fait partie dans un phénomène naturel inévitable, propre d'une économie saine de développement et progrès.

Sur le plan social, la globalisation est pour le moins équivoque en deux directions: elle est certes un outil de développement économique, mais elle provoque, en même temps, une plus grande polarisation dans les relations sociales; elle rend les économies nationales faibles encore plus vulnérables aux mouvements de capitaux¹. D'autre part, la limitation de la souveraineté des Etats se manifeste d'une manière dramatique dans le domaine de la protection sociale parce qu'on cherche avant de tout d'obtenir un profit plus grand et une mobilité accrue des capitaux qui ne sont pas accompagnés – ni au plan national ni au plan international – par des mesures adéquates de protections des travailleurs. La globalisation suppose aussi le déplacement des gens du village vers la ville pour chercher de travail et des conditions mieux de vie au niveau national. A ce mouvement interne de la population, maintenant, s'ajoute, sur une grande échelle, des mouvements transnationaux vers des pôles économiques: le

nombre de migrants dits économiques est constant augmentation, alors même que les pays d'accueil sont souvent loin de leur accorder la sécurité sociale et économique recherchée, ou même un traitement respectueux de leur dignité et de leur santé².

De point de vue *culturel*, on assiste à la tendance de uniformiser culturel comme effet de la diffusion des produits de ce type d'origine occidentale, surtout nord-américaine et de la généralisation à la langue anglais comme moyen de communication entre les gens en appartenants des unes cultures et des civilisation différents. Aujourd'hui, on parle la langue anglais tous ce qui participent aux activités économiques, politiques, sociales, scientifiques régionaux et/ou mondiales. D'autre part, le paradigme de la société libérale, parmi d'autre, promouvais l'idée d'une culture globale qu'il semble plutôt une idéologie destinée de contrôler tout, de la programme d'éducation jusqu'aux progrès scientifiques et techniques. La globalisation socioculturelle peut affectée négative l'organisation social existante et implicite ces membres. Mais, ainsi, ses partisans contribuent à l'édification d'un nouvel ordre mondial et d'une société de la pensée unique.

Dans une certaine mesure, la conception selon la marche résoudre tout dans une société est pourtant limitative et unilatérale en absolutisant ce model d'organisation et de fonctionnement socio-économique et politique. Il ne faut pas omettre que, en réalité, la marche est une construction sociale qui a apparu dans une certaine étape de développement de la société humaine, et c'est pourquoi elle aurait l'empreinte de l'époque où elle fonctionne. Dans le même temps, il ne faut pas oublier que la marche ne représente pas le seul model d'organisation socio-économique. Bien sur, il peut exister aussi d'autres modèles. Une société civilisée peut édifier des marches qui privilège des valeurs comme la liberté, la justice, la solidarité, la dignité humaine, la démocratie.

Dans la globalisation actuelle, **les facteurs technologiques** jouent aussi un rôle très important. Ces-ci agissent principalement sur la réduction de coûts de transports et de communication. La distance entre deux locations sur le globe, théoriquement ne constitue plus un problème maintenant quand il y a tant des moyens de transport rapide que des possibilités de communication continu par les dispositifs modernes. Les nouvelles technologies font en même temps possible une réorganisation de

l'entreprise, efficacement des opérations jusqu'à l'intégration sur la verticale et une redéfinition au contrôle des opérations délocalisées ou de la sous-traitance grâce à l'informatique. D'ailleurs, aujourd'hui, il y a la pratique de choisir par les grandes firmes transnationales des locations où elles réalisent leur production là dont le profit est plus grand tant à la cause de l'existence de la main d'œuvre relativement à bon marché que des unes taxes et impôts petites. Ainsi, on peut expliquer la pratique des grandes firmes transnationales de changer fréquent leurs locations dont elles réalisent leur production. Par exemple, le firme Nokia a changé une usine de l'Allemagne dans la Roumanie, dans l'année 2008, parce que les condition d'ici l'avantage en ce qui concerne le profit obtenu.

Une **caractéristique dominante** de la globalisation actuelle le constitue la tendance des pays riches de développer prioritairement la **production intellectuelle**. Les actifs intellectuels représentent des facteurs stratégiques de la création de valeur par les entreprises. L'expansion du secteur des services, la globalisation, la déréglementation et l'émergence des nouvelles technologies de l'information imposent de résoudre des aspects comme sont: la création, la diffusion, la préservation et l'utilisation des actifs intellectuelles en vue d'un revenu économique.

Dans ce sens, les investissements en matière de recherche-développement, dans la réalisation des brevets, en ressources humaines et dans une nouvelle structure organisationnelle sont bénéfiques. Ces dernières années, dans la zone OCDE, les dépenses consacrées aux actifs intellectuels ont progressé plus rapidement que celles destinées aux machines et aux équipements. En 2002, les dépenses totales consacrées au recherche-développement, aux logiciels et à l'enseignement supérieur ont dépassé l'investissement en machines et équipements aux Etats-Unis et en Finlande³.

À mesure que les dépenses en actifs intellectuels augmentent, leur impact économique s'amplifie. Selon de nombreuses études, les actifs intellectuels (le capital humain, l'investissement dans la recherche-développement, les brevets, l'investissement dans les logiciels) contribuent d'une manière substantielle à la croissance économique⁴. C'est pourquoi, à présent, les pays riches semblent abandonner de fabriquer leurs produits dans les pays pauvres pour se spécialiser

uniquement en conception à la production intellectuelle qui s'est montrée particulièrement rentable et d'avenir.

La communication constitue une autre marque significative de la globalisation actuelle, certainement forte influencée par les nouvelles dans le domaine aux communications et à l'informatique, de l'existence de l'Internet. Aujourd'hui, la communication est une autre marque significative de la globalisation: la rapidité de la communication et multitude des informations disponibles dans une "bibliothèque" telle que le réseau Internet favorisent les échanges académiques, la recherche scientifique, la formation: Dans ce contexte, la globalisation représente, certainement un facteur positif d'innovation. Mais cette même rapidité et la disponibilité sans contrôle efficace d'informations sensibles, permettent aussi à des réseaux maffieux ou terroristes de communiquer, de mettre à la disposition de criminels des modes de fabrication d'armes, de poisons, etc.

L'apparition et la manifestation des nouveaux acteurs sur la scène mondiale constitue un autre caractéristique majeure de la globalisation actuelle. Parmi ces acteurs, deux semblent être significatifs, par leur force d'implication active et volontaire dans le déroulement de la globalisation. L'un d'entre ces acteurs est représenté par les *entreprises multinationales* ou les *sociétés transnationales*. Les transnationales se réorganisent de plus en plus en formant des alliances et des réseaux transfrontaliers. Donc, c'est difficile de déterminer leurs frontières et leur nationalité. De plus, ces sociétés recourent aux nouvelles technologies en domaine des communications et d'informatique pour effectuer leurs opérations transfrontalières, que les gouvernements peuvent difficilement contrôler. Elles sont répandues dans tout le monde et la production internationale se repose de plus en plus sur eux. Par exemple, en 2002, étaient environ 65 000 de telles sociétés, contrôlant directement 850 000 filiales étrangères réparties sur l'ensemble du globe et produisant environ 10% du PIB mondial⁵. Pratiquement, les sociétés transnationales accélèrent les processus d'internationalisation en créant des réseaux mondiaux de productions de plus en plus ouverts sur le plan géographique mais dont la coordination est assurée d'un façon plus concentrée. Ces mutations ont des grandes conséquences sur l'évolution des échanges internationales de biens

et de services. Dans ce sens, un exemple le peut constituer l'industrie pharmaceutique. Autrefois dispersée, parce que les produits sont multiples, elle est aujourd'hui réunie sous l'égide d'une douzaine firmes qui contrôlent 60% des ventes mondiales⁶.

Le deuxième acteur important issu sur la scène mondiale est représenté de *société civile internationale*, plus précise des ses organisations intéressées du domaine de promotion des droits des hommes, de la justice, de l'équité et de la dignité humaine. Pratiquement, ces organisations agissent pour diminuer les effets négatifs de la globalisation sur les personnes de tout le monde, mais surtout des pays en développement.

Une caractéristique de la globalisation qui joue un rôle important dans son évolution le constitue l'apparition et la manifestation des mouvements sociaux anti-globalisation. Après plusieurs années dédiées à la simple critique et à la protestation contre la globalisation menée par le monde des affaires, le mouvement antimondialisation (plus précisément décrit par le terme „**Mouvement pour une justice globale**”) a atteint sa majorité à Porto Alegre⁷.

Les manifestations antimondialisation de Seattle, Washington, Melbourne, Prague, Québec et Gênes contre le Fonds Monétaire International, l'Organisation Mondiale du Commerce, la Banque mondiale, le G8 (est un groupe informel de huit pays : le Canada, la France, l'Allemagne, l'Italie, le Japon, la Russie, le Royaume-Uni et les États-Unis d'Amérique) et les autres sommets ont captivé l'imagination de millions de gens à travers la planète grâce aux principaux médias.

Dynamisé par le puissant slogan „**Un autre monde est possible**”, le **Second Forum Social Mondial** (il a eu lieu à la Porto Alegre en Brasilia) est allé au-delà de la protestation et a agi de façon très structurée en explorant des voies alternatives, des stratégies et des structures concrètes. Ainsi, au sein du Forum se sont avancées des idées pour transformer l'actuel système mondial économique, etc. Les trois propositions sont illustratives pour cette démarche constructive. A partir du fait que il ne s'agit pas la reformation des actuelles institutions (c'est-à-dire, OMC et les institutions issues de Bretton Woods inspirées par le commerce) mais on ont en vue les suivants buts: les mettre hors service, 2) les neutraliser (par exemple en transformant le FMI en un pur institut de recherche observant les



taux d'échange des flux mondiaux de capitaux), ou bien encore 3) réduire radicalement leurs pouvoirs et les transformer simplement en un autre ensemble d'acteurs coexistant avec et surveillés par d'autres organisations internationales, accords et regroupements régionaux⁸.

Les mouvements „alter mondialiste” sont ainsi un produit de la globalisation et elles agissent à l'échelon mondial. Dans un certain sens, elles représentent au niveau planétaire un sort de société civile de résistance, qui propose des valeurs alternatives (ou présentées par conséquence) à la domination économique des groupes restreints. Ces mouvements jouent en même temps des avocats des droits de l'homme, de la démocratie, de la participation des peuples au propre destin.

Des organisations avec la rase d'actions mondiales, gouvernementales ou non, elles contribuent à la diffusion des idées et des valeurs démocratiques, du sens de la justice et elles s'utilisent pour promouvoir plus ouvert de la tolérance et de la communication entre cultures.

2. Le séparatisme politique: une réalité inévitable?

L'évolution de la communauté internationale connait, à côté de la globalisation, aussi le phénomène dit le séparatisme politique. Cette tendance est relativement omniprésente, il est rencontré tant aux Etats développés et démocratiques (voir les cas de l'Espagne, de la France, du Canada, de l'Italie ou de la Belgique) que dans les Etats en développement ou en transition (par exemple les Etats de l'ex-Jugoslavija, de l'ex-Union Soviétique, de la Chine, de l'Indonésie).

Dans un sens large, par le séparatisme politique on comprend le mouvement politique organisé ayant le but déclaré de sortir de la composante d'un Etat reconnu international pour devenir, à son tour, un Etat indépendant.

Les causes, les sources et les modalités utilisées par les séparatistes pour atteindre son but sont d'une grande diversité. Ce fait on a fait se parler, dans la littérature de spécialité, de différents types de séparatisme.

Ainsi, dans l'Europe on distingue deux grands types de séparatisme: l'un ouest-européen et l'autre est européen⁹. En ce qui concerne *le séparatisme ouest-européen*, celui-ci connaît deux formes principales de manifestation:

a) *le séparatisme rencontrés dans les Etats de type fédéral*. Ce type suppose, de règle, que un province - partie composante d'un Etat fédéral, ou confédéral – cherche se détacher de cet Etat, total ou partiel, pour se constituer, ultérieurement, comme entité étatique autonome, indépendant, souveraine. En ce sens, on peut donner comme exemple la Belgique, l'Espagne. En Belgique, Flandre, portée par une vague de sympathie envers les idées du parti séparatiste flamand Vlaams Belang, montre clairement cette tendance. Transformer cette tendance dans un fait accompli aurait comme conséquence la disparition de la Belgique en tant qu'entité étatique. Dans l'Espagne, la situation est différente de celle de la Belgique, parce que le séparatisme promu ici est multiforme. Le Pays Basque possède à la fois des mouvements séparatistes politiques modérés de exemple le Parti Nationaliste Basque - PNV, et un mouvement radical avec une branche politique (parti Batasuna, désormais interdit) et une branche armée (ETA).

Les provinces la Galicie et la Catalogne manifestent aussi des tendances séparatistes mais elles sont moins radicales que en pays Basque. Et dans l'Espagne, petit à petit, si le séparatisme deviendra une réalité alors il y a un péril pour l'unité et l'intégrité actuelles de cet Etat;

b) *le séparatisme anti-centralisme*. Un exemple de ce type de séparatisme on trouvé en France, où une région plus ou moins périphérique, souhaite quitter un giron national dans lequel elle ne se reconnaît pas comme partie intégrante. C'est le cas, dans des proportions très variables de la population, de la Nouvelle Calédonie, de la Polynésie Française, de la Corse, des Antilles.

En général, les séparatistes profitent du fondement démocratique du régime politique de l'Etat, demandant initialement l'autonomie culturelle, par le biais d'une reconnaissance linguistique et folklorique, afin que, ultérieurement, obtenir des puissances politiques, allant jusqu'à l'obtention de l'indépendance politique. D'habitude, les revendications des séparatistes qui apportent atteinte à l'unité et à l'intégrité territoriales à l'Etat d'appartenance ne sont jamais accomplies par le gouvernement en fonction, au contraire on agit afin de maintenir la province ou les provinces dans l'ensemble national indivisible.

Une situation similaire il y a en Canada, où existe un mouvement séparatiste assez d'active significatif polarisée autour du Québec¹⁰.



En ce qui concerne *le séparatisme est européen*, il faut mentionner qu'ici un rôle plus grand que dans le ouest du continent l'a idée de minorité. Dans l'Europe centrale et d'est il y a des Etats qui ont des régions où vit une minorité nationale. Pratiquement, dans cet espace géographique, la minorité nationale, de point de vue du nombre de habitants, est majoritaire et les personnes qui appartiennent à la majorité nationale sont minoritaires. C'est exactement le cas du Kosovo, une province du sud de la Serbie qui habite par une forte majorité de population albanaise. Cette province, après 8 années de tutelle internationale, qui n'a pas résolu les divergences entre les Serbes et les Kosovars, a demandé en février 2008 de reconnaître son indépendance. Le Serbie a refusé cette demande le considéré comme illégale. A son tour, la Roumanie, aussi n'a pas reconnue l'indépendance de cette province qui a seulement 2 millions des habitants. En échange, les Etat- Unis, l'Allemagne, la France, l'Italie, le Royaume Unit ont acceptées un Kosovo indépendant.

Dans le même temps, le séparatisme européen est souvent associé avec l'éclatement de l'Union Soviétique, phénomène qui a eu comme effet, d'activer les mouvements séparatistes au sein d'unes républiques ex-soviétiques¹¹.

Dans ce contexte, on fait généralement référence aux mouvements séparatistes qui ont eu lieu dans l'espace post-soviétique dans les années 1990. Ainsi, les conflits comme le Nagorny Karabakh en Azerbaïdjan, l'Ossétie du Sud et l'Abkhazie en Géorgie et la Transnistrie en Moldavie, ne sont toujours pas résolus et il n'y pas vraiment de plans de leur résolution.

Aujourd'hui, dans ces régions, il existe des Pseudo Etats qui, malgré leur isolement politique sur le plan international, ont un contrôle effectif sur leur territoire ainsi que des institutions tout à fait viables. Spécifique aux mouvements séparatistes sont apparus dans l'espace post-soviétique est leurs raison et savoir: le nationalisme. Le cas le plus médiatisé a été la guerre en Tchétchénie. C'est ici que le conflit a commencé en 1994 et il s'est vite transformé en une guerre civile sanglante. Les autorités russes ont su discréditer le mouvement séparatiste de cette province caucasienne aux yeux de la communauté internationale en l'associant avec le terrorisme. Mais, en Transnistrie les autorités de Chisinau n'ont pas pu rétablir le contrôle effectif sur la région séparatiste. Ainsi, depuis 1992, la

République Moldave de Transnistrie (RMT) est un Etat à part entière, même si elle n'est pas reconnue par la communauté internationale. La RMT possède ses propres institutions, armée, police, monnaie et même des services secrets. Se surcroît, malgré le blocus politique, la Transnistrie arrive à surmonter ses difficultés économiques, grâce à ses industries héritées de l'Union Soviétique, mais aussi grâce aux aides de la part de la Russie.

A leur tour, l'Ossétie du Sud et l'Abkhazie vivent aussi dans une quasi-indépendance par rapport à la Géorgie après des violents combats qui ont eu lieu au début des années 90, et évoquent souvent, tout comme les Kosovars, „l'impossibilité de vivre ensemble” avec Tbilissi.

La manière dans laquelle la communauté internationale s'est impliquée en Kosovo, ainsi que la reconnaissance de l'indépendance de cette province serbe en février 2008 par les unes de pays du monde (par exemple les Etats-Unis, l'Allemagne, l'Italie, la France) ont réveillées des espoirs en sein aux séparatistes des républiques ex-soviétiques.

A mon avis, il est faux de penser qu'il y a des tendances séparatistes évidentes seulement l'Ancien Continent. En réalité, tel phénomènes sont aussi présents sur le Continent Américain, par exemple en Canada, ou en Asie (par exemple, le Tibet en Chine, le Timor en Indonésie).

Ainsi, la Chine se confronte à deux types de séparatisme celui du Tibet animée du sentiment nationaliste et celui de la région Xinjiang génère par le raison religieuse¹². Les séparatistes musulmans de la région autonome du Xinjiang-Ouïgour, en ouest de la Chine, ont de plus en plus contesté l'autorité centrale de Beijing ces dernières années.

Le conflit discret qui couve en Xinjiang depuis la fin 1980 est moins connu que la lutte menée au Tibet contre la Chine, mais il a occasionnée des pertes des vie importantes et des violations des droits de la personne corroborées par des sources fiables¹³. Il semble que, l'extrémisme musulman actuel dans le Xinjiang a été inspiré par les énormes changements qui ont transformé l'Asie centrale au cours de la dernière décennie.

L'indépendance à laquelle ont accédé les républiques musulmanes voisines depuis l'effondrement de l'Union soviétique a sans aucun doute accru les espoirs des séparatistes du Xinjiang de parvenir à l'autonomie territoriale et l'indépendance politique eux aussi.



Dans l'Asie, les manifestations séparatistes sont aussi en Sri Lanka et en Indonésie. Ces derniers mois, la reprise des combats entre gouvernement et les séparatistes tamouls a jeté sur les routes du Sri Lanka des dizaines de milliers de civils terrorisés.

Le caractère apparemment insoluble d'un conflit trentenaire ne met guère en jeu les intérêts des grandes puissances et ne s'alimente pas aux grands alignements idéologiques du début du XXI^e siècle¹⁴. Après l'Inde, qui est intervenue à la fin des années 1980, la Norvège ne connaît guère plus de succès dans ses tentatives de médiation.

Trente ans de lutte: c'est ce qu'a derrière lui le mouvement séparatiste tamoul. Facteur-clé de l'histoire du Sri Lanka, il est à la fois l'expression de la mobilisation spontanée d'une minorité autochtone autour de revendications politiques et linguistiques, et le fruit d'une entreprise politico-militaire de grande envergure fondée sur une puissante organisation transnationale, les Tigres de libération de l'Eelam [*pays*] tamoul (LTTE), les Tigres¹⁵. Selon les séparatistes, le cadre institutionnel démocratique actuel n'offre aucune garantie aux minorités linguistiques et religieuses, et seule la création d'un Etat séparé (peut répondre à cette attente. Ils revendiquent un territoire continu appelé Tamil Eelam, formé de la province nord-est, comprenant le port de Trincomalee, et des régions du sud-est de l'île où les musulmans sont plus nombreux que les autres populations.

La tension entre les gouvernements, où domine la majorité de langue cinghalaise (74% des habitants), et la minorité tamoule (environ 15 %) remonte à 1956 – le Sri Lanka s'appelle encore Ceylan –, lors de l'arrivée au pouvoir du Parti de la liberté (Sri Lanka Freedom Party, SLFP) créé par Solomon Bandaranaike¹⁶.

Ce conflit est aussi loin d'être résolu. Le séparatisme qui affecte l'Indonésie possède sa base d'action en province Aceh située dans l'extrémité du nord de l'île Sumatra. Celui-ci a été la première région atteinte et le plus sévèrement par le tsunami qui a dévasté plusieurs pays autour de l'océan. Environ 170 000 personnes en Aceh ont perdu leur vie et la perte économique a été équivalente au PIB annuel de la province¹⁷.

Pendant trois décennies avant le désastre, affirme la source mentionnée, la région a souffert du conflit entre un mouvement séparatiste — le Mouvement pour l'Aceh libre (GAM) — et le gouvernement indonésien qui a mené une vaste

répression marquée par les violations des droits de l'homme par l'armée indonésienne (TNI). À la suite de la dévastation massive du tsunami, tous espéraient que le sauvetage et les efforts de relèvement contribueraient à faire cesser les hostilités; cela aurait pu rétablir la dignité et l'autonomie perdues d'abord aux mains des anciens dirigeants coloniaux hollandais au début du XX^e siècle.

Conclusions

La globalisation actuelle et le séparatisme politique représentent deux phénomènes significatifs de la réalité de nos jours. Ces phénomènes, par leurs effets surtout négatifs, sollicitaient forte les efforts concertés de la communauté internationale dans la direction de leur résolution durable et convenable pour toutes les parties impliquées.

Dans une certaine sorte, le séparatisme politique peut être apprécié comme un effet de la globalisation actuelle. Celui-ci si on a en vue les caractéristiques de ce phénomène, d'un part, et les objectifs suivis par les acteurs de la globalisation actuelle, d'autre parte.

Le séparatisme politique ne représente pas une réalité inévitable si tout le monde – les acteurs étatiques et non étatiques - respecte les droits de l'homme dans les toutes situations et assure le développement durable de tous les pays.

D'autre parte, les mouvements séparatistes, n'importe quel est leur raison, sont agréés par les grands puissances du monde parce qu'elles les servent les intérêts stratégiques.

Pratiquement, les mouvements séparatistes se sont produits, se maintiennent et se produisent dans les zones du monde qui ont une importance stratégique significative pour une ou autre d'entre les grandes puissances mondiales.

De plus, une série des acteurs non étatiques par exemple les sociétés transnationales sont avantagées par l'existence de ces „conflits gelés”, parce que elles y peuvent développer, dans les conditions leur favorables, une multitude d'activités qui apportent de profit.

NOTES:

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POSSIBLE COORDINATES FOR A STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Gheorghe VĂDUVA, PhD

The contemporary military phenomenon evolves on uncertain and even chaotic coordinates, as the whole human society does. As a matter of fact, this phenomenon is a contrasting reality, situated somewhere between the attempts to keep a military or political-military status quo – the one after the big worldwide conflagration –, a stage that has been completely overcome, except one aspect – the history and the collective memory, the intentions of building a fragile strategic balance, not based on denials and a total trust (that is unlikely on Earth), but maintaining and even stressing out the differences.

Unfortunately, the differences are not optional and benevolent constructs, but effects of millennia of inequalities, distortions, tensions, crisis, conflicts and wars. This is how our world is tailored, and the change does not consist of averting differences, but in their fair and effective management.

The contemporary military phenomenon cannot escape from the history, economical, financial determinations, or the ones specific to the conflict security architecture (insecurity) that the powerful operate with and the ones who have to bear it feel powerless. Therefore, beyond the fact that such a phenomenon cannot be but complex, complicated, contradictory and very dangerous, it has and will always have unpredictable evolutions, that turns it into something dreadfully, difficult to understand and hard to manage.

Even if it is generated and somehow managed by politics, as the military phenomenon is always related to the political one, as it is its military expression – in a way, it will have to adapt on its coordinates, exigencies and requirements, as the power of force is not in the political arena, but in the military one, while the force of power is always in the politics' service.

Keywords: strategic environment, the dynamics of the military system, RMA, transformation, professionalization, strategic expertise, strategic security areas.

The structure of the contemporary military phenomenon

The contemporary military phenomenon seems to be a hybrid between the political phenomenon, the economical, the technological and the informational ones. As a matter of fact, there is no longer a pure military phenomenon, although the military men continue to build and rebuild themselves in a sort of a caste that also has a civilian dimension. However, it remains where it has always been – that is in barracks. The barracks are still open to the democratic control, to the political one. In order to have access within this special field, that it has created, it has to “sign” a certain “loyalty” commitment, and it will definitely have no access ever to the privacy of this “phenomenon”, just as it will have no access to the “privacy” of labs where they prepare materials for the nuclear fission and fusion, where they make laser, quantum, nanotechnologies experiments, etc., etc.

The contemporary military phenomenon is carried on three important levels:

- insight and exigencies specific to parliaments, governments, international organizations and bodies;
- in the dynamics of specific systems and processes, specific to the military institution;
- in a dynamic and wide spread synthesis space, a civil-military one, one of interdisciplinarity and confluences.

On the first level, the political control is exercised, the resources are stipulated, the employment limits, the political purposes and objectives that generate and regenerate this phenomenon.

For the military phenomenon, the politics is a sort of a cyclone's nucleus, but not a unified one, but disseminated on nations, states, organizations and bodies, different interest, therefore, in a multidimensional large space, one that generates differences, tensions and conflicts. The politics



rules. It has bridles and resources. Sometimes, it acts like a dictator, an authoritarian or a bailiff, otherwise it pays attention on using properly the expertise provided by the strategic, in order to assist on understanding the development, implications and follow-ups, that is, to determine it not to play with the fire. For the time being, the military field acts differently with the politics that generates and manages it, from servility and non-protests, up to prudence and even arrogance and defiance. However, it is a delusion to imagine that the military field becomes or may become independent of the political one, as the military field is useless without the political one. As a matter of fact, the political field is the one generating the military one. Armies are tools of the political state, submit to the political decision maker, the one creating and establishing and using their competences. The autonomy of the military field is strictly a functional, professional one. Military men are experts in military actions in order to achieve some political purposes and some strategic objectives. But strategy is nothing but science, experience, practice and art of putting a required political decision into operation in order to solve a conflict. There is no strategy where there is no need to take a political decision in order to resolve a conflict.

The political dimensions of the contemporary military phenomenon are numerous. They are related with the new dialectics of interests and conflicts. After breaking the bipolarity and after the end of the Cold War, it has been turned into new conflict architecture, resulted from a new reconfiguration of interests, policies and strategies. The new dynamic of crisis, conflicts and wars includes this metamorphosis. Following the fundamental geopolitical and geostrategic mutations derived from the "Iron Curtain's" rise, there have been changed lots of things on the power relations, markets, access to primary resources, the technological and informational market, the infrastructures, the communications, the policies and the coalition strategies, the geopolitical regional reconfigurations, etc.

The disappearance of the communist power pole and the reconfiguration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the USSR's implosion and the re-creation of a new Russian strategic entity – the Russian Federation –, with a huge energetic and synergic potential, the China's political and strategic reconfiguration, building-up some

partnership (China-Russia, US-Russia, US-India, Russia-India, US-The European Union, The European Union-India, The European Union-Russia, The European Union-The Middle East, the bilateral strategic partnership, fan-displaced, of the United States, The European Union and Russia with lots of countries that are no longer big powers, etc.), all of them outline a flexible, even fluid geopolitics, with a variable geometry but also with complex evolutions, hard to predict and manage.

The main political dimensions of the contemporary military phenomenon stand out to be the following ones:

- imposing a certain status quo, in the international relations and in the states' foreign policy, one specific to the post-Cold War period and freezing major conflicts, for preventing the creation and the development of any favourable conditions for escalating the existing hostilities and showing up some new ones;

- maintaining the states' inequality, by providing security warranties;

- the states' policy to be situated in a better place or a more secure one, to be sheltered or to reduce, as much as possible, the vulnerabilities in case of a war or armed conflict that may be lost under control;

- some states' policy, especially from the nowadays and future conflict areas (Near East, Middle East, Latin America, South-East Asia, Caucasus, etc.), of not accepting huge discrepancies on the endowment, especially with WMD, and elaborating some programs (more or less camouflaged) in order to endow with these means that should allow them to guarantee their own security (by their own means) or achieving the strategic purposes and objectives for the interests they consider as vital or important;

- developing some disproportionate policies and strategies, for influencing, dominate and info-dominate, by the use of technology, information and faulting the dangerous areas;

- developing some asymmetric policies, conflict generators, unpredictable and chaotic ones;

- the uncontrolled expansion or under some obscure forces of some globalization policies, without a realistic assessment of the complete effect;

- developing some identity policies, totally or partially opposing to the globalization policies and



achieving the military means to sustain them for that matter;

- developing some prominent antinational policies, especially against small states or worst governed;

- the persistence and consistence of some arming policies and strategies, for improving the armed forces, the fight means, the strategies and doctrines;

- the ongoing development of some NATO and EU enlargement policies and strategies;

- developing some policies and strategies for NATO's transformation and for modernizing the military forces of the European Union member countries;

- developing certain policies for excluding parallelisms and conflicts between NATO and EU and achieving the required complementarities;

- developing some forces' and means' coalition, partnership, both political and military;

- fault line policies, for disarming the ones regarded as dangerous, those terrorism generating countries, and for arming the ones considered partners or allies, in a way or another;

- military ambiguity policies.

All these policies, part or managing the contemporary military phenomenon, are put into practice by adequate strategies. They have certain stable and lasting components defining those policies and also other variable components adjusting to the circumstances, creating or influencing a favourable environment. All the policies referring to the military phenomenon are policies aiming the power, force, influence or achieving and protecting, by military means, the vital interest.

It is true, some countries – Romania included – do not have clear, coherent and explicit policies on the military phenomenon, but, with a greater or lower success, adapt themselves to the circumstances, joining some alliances or coalitions. Or simply doing whatever the others do and hardly resisting to an irresponsible question: *“Why do we need an army when others have nuclear weapons and forces that if employed may destroy partially or entirely the world?!”*

The level of the *dynamics of systems, specific processes to the military institution* aim the specific processuality to the dynamics of the military system. As it is known, the military institutions are almost

the same everywhere. Generally speaking, they comprise armed forces but also their generating systems, infrastructures and other components that individualise themselves and establish during time. The military institution has strong components and structures that have not changed for ages and flexible structures and components always adjusting to different circumstances. Some of them, as weapon systems, research and impact elements for the human behaviour in limit situations, preventive and preemptive action, etc. – are way further than circumstances, they become avant-garde elements, not only for the military institution, for the military phenomenon, but also for the society and even for the civilization. The Internet network, the GPS, the modern communications, etc. has developed first of all within the military institution.

Most of the dynamic and military transformation elements answer to a political command, a political imperative, but the way they are achieved, the strategies and tactics for putting them into practice belong to the military institution, they are integrated within the military phenomenon.

Based on the purposes and objectives established by the political leadership – when it knows what is to be done and when it is really entitled to identify and serve the state's vital interests, because states are subjects of the international law–, the military institution elaborates the corresponding transformation, development strategies, the one for consolidating the military institution's structures and functions, its transformation and development horizons, offers the required resources and approves its strategies and plans.

Based on the security and defence policy, of the political decision elaborate for that matter by the entitled structures – Parliament, Presidential Administration, Government –, therefore, the security and defence policy's expressed by the security and defence strategy (national security strategy or the national security strategy), the military institution explains the military strategy. It is stated as a far-reaching concept, and also a very useful and required support for the strategic planning.


Above of all, from the military perspective, the military strategy has to stand out, assess and forecast the challenges, the dangers and the threats comprised in the security and defence strategy, the system and process vulnerabilities, to calculate the risks that may be undertaken, and also the implicit,

imposed or random ones, to configure their dynamics and to monitor and to close permanently watch by own means, together with the Alliance's forces, other internal and international forces and structures their interactions. As a result, we have an *interaction effect* that contributes to the calculation of the threat degree, the risk degree, whether imposed or assumed.

Schematically, this first function of the military strategy – shaping the interaction effect within the synthesis of challenges, dangers, threats, vulnerabilities and the assumption of risk is as in the chart below (CDAVR):

This function of strategy is very important. It is not limited to *the translation* into a military language of the challenges, dangers and threats defined in the national security strategy or in the alliance and coalition ones. In order to identify the political, economical, informational, social, ecological, geophysical and military challenges, dangers and threats, the political leadership appeal to the military strategic expertise prepared in the military field. Such an expertise is useful for certain reasons:

- it is always prepared considering the challenges, dangers and threats (CDT), and also the



NSDP – National Security and Defence Policy; NSDS – National Security and Defence

system and process vulnerabilities affecting from the military perspective the country's security, NATO's, EU's;

- clearly and obviously formulates the capacity for actions and reactions in given situations, the existing potential and the requisite in forces, means, resources and actions;

- it provides an adequate assessment of the situations, makes predictions on the short, average and long term evolutions;

- it proposes responsible solutions for all the predictable variants;

- it draws attention on limits and vulnerabilities.

The strategic expertise assists the political level to take a suitable decision, far from voluntarism,

closer to the real situation and the own possibilities. And this is one of the very important functions of the strategic level.

In concordance with these distributions and obviously the allotted resources, the operational military strategy may be differently structured. Basically, it has the following components:


- identifying the challenges, dangers, threats, vulnerabilities and determining (assessing) the military risk, whether assumed, imposed or implicit;

- the forces' strategy (land, air and navy);

- the means' strategy;

- the actions' strategy;

- the resources' strategy.



An analysis of an operational strategy



A more distinctive analysis of an operational strategy (that puts into practice a political decision, therefore, the national security and defence strategy, as the document should have been entitled, as it puts into practice the national security and defence policy) is presented above:

The level of *dynamic and wide spread synthesis space, a civil-military one, one of interdisciplinarity and confluences* adapts the military institution to the new requirements of the informational high-tech society. In this period of time, the military institution cannot exist in itself, cannot be closed in barracks but it has to accept and achieve a civil-military dimension. It should make it able to effectively involve in managing and solving crisis and wide conflicts.

However, there is the danger that overestimating this dimension may remove the military institution from its own mission, to assign police competences and attributions – therefore, to turn it somehow in an armed police that the states participate with on solving out different crisis and conflicts around the world – forcing it to neglect its essential quality, the defence one, by military means, of a state against some external military attacks, or, in case of the big powers and strong states, by arms' imposing, their vital interests.

Even in this case, that generates the aggression war, armies are meant to serve, by military means, the state's vital interests, therefore, to put into practice the state's policy, by force.

In time, even if the things have changed, and the international, cooperation, partnership dimension has become essential for maintaining security and preventing the destructive war, there is no state willing to give up, at any rate, to its real sovereignty and the capacity to defend against any aggressor.

The contemporary military phenomenon is still very complex and contradictory, but its characteristics are not and cannot be reassuring for anyone, not even for the countries protected by the nuclear weapon. The civil-military dimension is just a soothing and also a way for expanding the military field to civil-military competences and not "turning" the weapons into civilian.

We may consider as the main characteristics of the contemporary military phenomenon the following ones:

- the unprecedented complexity of the political and strategic environment;

- the international globalised nature and the conflict fragmentation;

- the recrudescence of the conflictual asymmetry, very active on all the levels (political, economical, financial, informational, cultural, military, etc.);

- the huge, undeniable military discrepancies, generated by the huge economical, financial, technological and informational differences;

- the development of the nuclear power and its relative monopoly by a limited number of countries (those five "legal" nuclear powers – the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom and China – are UN Security Council permanent members and the other three unofficial and "illegal" nuclear powers – India, Pakistan, Israel – are already a fait accompli. Therefore, they are accepted as such and nobody has anything to say and do, as there is nothing to be done. There are also several countries knocking on the nuclear military powers' door – North Korea and Iran – and maybe tomorrow, when all the countries will be able to solve out the issue of the access to nuclear technologies, there will be others that will resort to the nuclear weapon, in a way or another);

- the creation and the application of I2SRSTAR, a system for informational surveillance and dominance, by any means, from agents to spy-satellites, having complex purposes: supervising the nuclear and strategic armament; seizing any preparing of a nuclear attack or of any other nature; the timely collection of the required data and information that are necessary for managing crisis and conflicts, preventing the terrorist attacks and combating terrorism, etc.;

- NATO's and EU's enlargement and widening the European and Euro-Atlantic security space;

- improving the nuclear weapon, moving on lab nuclear experiments and the unexpected and wide development of the tactical nuclear weapons (while the strategic nuclear weapons – SNW – seem to be just a threat and a mutual discouragement, the tactical nuclear weapons TNW- may be easily used within the battle space and it has already been used, in an insignificant percentage and only experimentally);

- developing the long range or high precision weapon systems (the radius of action for Tomahawk is 2500 km), able to change completely the configuration of the battle space and allow the effective materialization of the high-tech war, especially the network centric warfare;



- developing some undetectable very dangerous vectors;

- developing some unconventional weapon systems (based on amplifying the waves, lasers, psycho energy, nanotechnologies, geophysical effects, etc.);

- developing and putting into practice some concepts related with the symmetrical, dissymmetric asymmetric war, etc.

These are just few characteristics of the contemporary military phenomenon. Obviously, they are dynamic, interactive characteristics, expressed in a complex world that has unpredictable and chaotic evolutions. Although there is a high degree of technological and informational civilization, the infrastructures and the network should offer a certain unprecedented civilization and security comfort – that actually takes place –, beyond the navigation safety offered by GPS, the modern systems for controlling the car's safety driving, generally speaking, the level of vulnerability and insecurity, as whole, increases.

Revolution in Military Affairs

The Revolution in Military Affairs – RMA – as entitled by the Americans, does not solve the conflict matters, does not contribute at all on diminishing the world's insecurity or the state's or states' using it. It rather offers a new form and content to the contemporary military phenomenon particularised to a certain geographical area or to a group of states with global competencies and responsibilities – assumed or implicit – regarding the crisis, the conflict and the war. The Revolution in Military Affairs aims all these components, connects to the scientific, technological, informational and cognitive revolutions and gives this field a forwarded, avant-garde role.

For ages, the military phenomenon has been an advanced one, both on its organization, its human entities' efficiency, and also on information, techniques and technology. The military phenomenon has always stimulated the advanced technological research, acquiring some new weapons and elaborating some effective ways for using it. The first use of the nuclear energy has been in the military field (achieving the nuclear weapon) and this is where there have been developed the lasers, the global positioning systems (GPS), thermo location and radiolocation, night vision

systems, communication and wide band television, etc.

The military field will always be an important part of the applicative scientific research but also of stimulating the fundamental scientific research, in social sciences, in pedagogy, in the ongoing learning system, in the social psychology, in its applications in complex, conflictual situations.

Also, the Revolution in Military Affairs aims the following levels, too:

- politico-military (the politico-military decision level);

- strategic (the level of formulation, planning, forces' generation, organization and regeneration, means and actions);

- operational (the level of putting strategy into practice by achieving the forces', means', resources manoeuvre, and setting up the dispositions required for action);

- tactical (the level of action within the battle space).

It also aims other components that endow these levels as for example:

- information;

- forces;

- means;

- resources;

- logistics.

RMA is a way to change and radically transform policies, concepts, strategy, tactics, technology, information, logistics, other components specific to the military field or related to, imposing a new vision on the battle space and the adjacent ones, a new way of action and another mentality.

This revolution is also an informational, technological, managerial and action one. It implies:

- new political purposes and objectives determined for the military or civil-military action;

- new engagement's coordinates

- new strategic, operational and tactical concepts;

- new resources;

- a new system for military and civil-military actions for counteracting the new challenges, dangers and threats (CDT), diminishing the new vulnerabilities and a more precise reckoning of imposed, induced or assumed new risks.

Therefore, the new revolution in the military field – to the extend we accept and assimilate this



term – is also:

- philosophical (in the way to think, elaborate concepts and operate with them);
- informational (conceives and applies a new system for collecting, analysing, transmitting and using data and information – I2SR system–, a networked real time one);
- managerial (new C2 systems, turned into C4 ones, new systems for the battle space’s management, the additional, integrated spaces, the networks and the systems);
- technological (the complex technological revolution, inserting some new performing high-precision weapons systems, connected to I2SR, C4, the network of fighting platforms, networked database and logistics);
- logistics (the networked logistics, integrated within the battle space).

Obviously, no one – not even the United States – has completely achieved these objectives, but everyone admits, in a way or another, these tendencies and coordinates, acknowledging or not the RMA term.

Such a revolution, complex and with major implications on the world’s conflict state, requires and imposes complex processes, lasting, interdependent ones, giving this concept consistency and value. In our opinion, we may consider as processes the following:

- transformation;
- professionalization;
- displacement to strategic security (insecurity) area;
- the endowment with high-precision weapon systems;
- miniaturisation of the nuclear weapons;
- the creation and the diversification of nonlethal weapons.

These processes are permanent.

They may increase in intensity in certain periods of time.

However, the permanence is not given by linear evolutions, but spectacular and dangerous escalations, philosophical, informational, technological, logistic leaps, completely changing the configuration of the strategic environment, the world’s dynamics and conflict physiognomy.

The leap represented by the use of the nuclear weapon within the battle space (during the Second World War) is revealing. Such a leap takes place even nowadays, first of all due to information,

network and the new weapons’ cosmic and geophysical impact.

Transformation

Transformation may be an evolutionary linear process, resulted from accumulations and evolutions. It can also be a process of radical changes, some of them sudden that sends the system to a new state, giving it a new identity and even new functions and abilities. The changes that determine and define the transformation process are radical, essential. These statements are also available for the military transformation.

The transformation of the military institution is not a process in itself, but a complex, conditioned one. Among the determinations of the military transformation there may be considered the following:

- significant geopolitical mutations;
- radical changes in the security environment (new CDTs, new vulnerabilities, new configurations of the implicit risks, imposed or assumed);
- new exigencies on the fight space, in their symmetric dimensions and implications, dissymmetric (disproportionate) and asymmetric;
- new management coordinates in the field of security and defence, at national and international level;
- re-dimensioning the resources;
- NATO’s and the European Union’s enlargement and their more and more involvement both in the process for crisis and armed conflict management, and for stability and peacekeeping operations;
- asymmetric actions and reactions on behalf of the forces hostile to globalization or to the expansion of the Western-type democracy;
- reconfiguration and reconstruction of centres of power, of influence and the configuration of the political and security strategic environment;
- economical, political, financial or any other sort of crisis;
- globalization process;
- redimensioning the power and influence architectures.

These determinations directly or indirectly act on the military type transformation, established the main coordinates for the radical, qualitative and adaptative changes, significantly reconfigures the military systems and processes, the entities’ structures and functions, the political and strategic



concepts, and even the action procedures within the battle space or in the process for modernizing the military, civil-military structures, the systems for training, generating, using and regenerating the force, in a complex, flexible and even fluid environment. The dynamics of the strategic environment is very complex, with more or less predictable evolutions, more or less chaotic, but always worrisome and even surprising.

Professionalization

Not all the world's armies are turned into professional ones, but the military institution's professionalization is a main tendency within the contemporary military phenomenon. The determinations of the armies' professionalization are part of a very large range of objective necessities and subjective options, some of them conjectural, some of them deliberate, but too hasty, too persistent, sometimes even impulsive, creating many confusions and generating certain questions. The military institution's triumphant age was during the nations' era. Nations, including the American one, love and respect the national armies, the ones contributing to the national states' creation and defence, generating the winners' infusion of glory and joy, especially the ones who defended their country and succeeded to save it and keep it. But the defeats' bitterness, tragedy and pain, too. Defeat meant slavery. We have not got rid of slavery. We have not got rid of that philosophy, because we have not got rid of the aggressing state's era. Therefore, the professional armies come on a insufficient prepared field, maybe too soon. But the conditions that allow and also generate professional armies are to be more and more favourable. Among them, we may mention:

- the world's geopolitical reconfiguration;
- the low probability of a conflagration as the Second World War;
- the creation of some requirements for managing crisis on political-military level, even military, for crisis and armed conflicts, by having involved real professionals;
- the establishment and the development of high-precision weapon systems, leading to a reduction of personnel and increasing the requirement of military professionalism;
- the increasing responsibilities for the big powers and for the states grouped in alliances and

coalitions, in order to prevent war and maintain peace;

- developing the expeditionary character;
- the formation and the development of network, the C2 and C4 systems, the complex, permanent, large band networks, for collecting and processing data and information as I2SR, and the high-tech's unprecedented development.

There are also other favourable and required conditions for implementing the professionalization, but this is not a general tendency. It is just presented as an avant-garde tendency, specific to the high-tech world, with armies accomplishing complex missions, related with crisis management, war prevention, peace imposing, combating terrorism, offering support for certain countries which want to join the Western democratic concept, to combat terrorism, to ensure a democratic development, on new civilisation coordinates. However, there are few countries which turned their armies into professional. Most of the world's countries cannot afford to maintain professional armies. Additionally, they do not consider professional armies are necessary for achieving their military objectives which are reduced to defending that state's borders and territory, if attacked.

This reality divides the world into four groups:

- the group of states with fully professionalized armies (to which Romania belongs to);
- the group of states with partially professionalized armies;
- the group of states with national non-professionalized armies (excepting the officers);
- the group of states with no national armies.

Each group has its arguments in the adopted policies and strategies, but especially its limits and restrictions imposed by resources, by international agreements, circumstances, the level of CDTV and the real possibilities.

This reality makes the world different from the military perspective. The discrepancies are huge, the pledges can be hardly respected, and the certainties are few. That is why it is absolutely necessary to study deeply the security environment and the ways to optimise it.

The shift to strategic security (insecurity) areas

The general nature of the contemporary military phenomenon is a subtle, complex and oscillating one. The world's big powers continue



INFORMATIONAL SOCIETY. PEACE AND WAR

to arm themselves, directly proportional (to) the progresses from the scientific research, especially from *high-tech* and *IT*. The nuclear and classical weapon systems made by the United States of America, but also by Russia, China, Israel, some countries from the European Union are of a large value on quality, precision and power. On what purpose? Obviously, each big power and all the other countries stating that they own this sort of weapon systems will state that these developments aim their own security, in a conflicting and unstable world, and also the active involvement

in managing the world's security environment. That is so true. But all these developments create huge discrepancies, expanding the conflictuality and generating reactions, hostile and asymmetric attitudes and behaviours.

The nuclear umbrella threatens and discourages, but does not diminish at all the ongoing existence of CDTV systems that maintain to high quotas the insecurity degree. The resulting challenges, dangers, threats, vulnerabilities concern everyone, including those countries having the most sophisticated weapon systems.

| CDT | Nuclear countries | Countries having high precision weapon systems | Other countries |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------|---|------------------------|
| Nuclear CDTV | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Terrorist CDTV | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Border actions | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Separatist actions | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Ethnic-extremist actions | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Religious – extremist actions | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Guerrilla wars | Partially, indirectly | Partially, indirectly | Partially, indirectly |
| Illegal migration | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Drugs trafficking | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Weapons trafficking | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Trafficking in human beings | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Trans-border organised crime | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Economic CDT | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Financial CDTV | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Energetic CDTV | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Social CDTV | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Cyberspatial CDTV | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Other CDTVs | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Challenges, Dangers, Threats



INFORMATIONAL SOCIETY. PEACE AND WAR

Ipsa facto, they do not guarantee the security, on the contrary, they increase their vulnerabilities to asymmetric attacks and actions. As always, the strong will be targeted both by the strong ones and the ones feeling threatened by the power of the strong one.


Therefore, security by threat and discouragement is relative and may be easily turned into insecurity. As seen, all types of countries, no matter

the group belonging to, are affected, in a form or another, in an extent or another, by all the challenges, dangers and threats, they are vulnerable in front of them and have to assume the resulting risks, *nolens, volens*.

Concluding, during modern times, the border between security and insecurity is hard to establish. Actually, we cannot state there is such a border. Or, in any case, if one, it is a fluid, instable and uncertain one.

Brigadier General (ret) Gheorghe VĂDUVA (vaduvageorge@yahoo.fr.), PhD, is a researcher within the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University "Carol I". In this issue he debates a topic that was widely developed within a scientific research program he manages, carried on by a consortium comprising the NDU "Carol I" – the project leader, the Military Technical Academy, the Bucharest University of Economics and "Ștefan cel Mare" University from Suceava – as partners.

THE ISLAMIC JIHAD



The volume **Islamic Jihad** was recently published by the Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reform's Publishing House and presented during a symposium, "Effects-based war", organised by the Romanian Scientists Academy, Military Department, in a partnership with the Land Forces Staff and the National Defence University "Carol I".

The paper was elaborated by General questor professor Anghel ANDREESCU, PhD, Secretary of State, head of the Public Order and Safety Department within the Ministry of Interior and Administration Reform and chief inspector lecturer Nicolae RADU, PhD, counsellor within the Ministry of Interior and Administration Reform.

The book is structured in four chapters, eight annexes, a glossary for Jihad terms, it is based on a large reference and it has a foreword signed by the rector of the National Defence University "Carol I". He recommends it as a "*paper dedicated to a better understanding of Islam, but also to the cultural differences originating the conflict state between countries, civilizations, it is an both an unexpected and complex authors' approach*".

The whole volume stresses out the idea that "Islam is the religion based on getting the peace by submission to God's will".

Even from the very beginning, that is the first chapter, *Why Islam on understanding Jihad*, the authors define Islam as the most dynamic religion from the demographic perspective (second place, after Christianity), stressing that the share is represented by the Arabic ones.

The second chapter, *The terror's encyclopaedia. The way to Emir and the White Al-Qaida*, makes a dissertation from the genesis and the beginning of terrorism up to the contemporary one. There are depicted the main Islamist terrorist organizations, especially the one responsible for the most and gravest attacks, Al-Qaida, and its leader.

Probably the most exciting chapter is the third one, *Jihad on the Internet. Cyber-terrorism, Cyber-espionage, Mass-media și Al-Qaida "Brand"*. It presents the terrorist attack forms on the Internet and the ways the terrorists use the network in order to communicate and propagandize, and also the way they use mass-media in order to promote their image. According to the authors, "together with super-terrorism, the cyber-terrorism has become the most dangerous and hard to detect form the terrorism has embraced in the 21st century".

The last chapter, *Jihadist organizations and international terrorist groups* presents terrorist organizations, structured on influence or development areas, and not only the Islamic ones. Unfortunately, the authors underline that what we witness for the time being, by the actions undertaken on international level against terrorism, takes us to the final conclusion that these are actions targeted against the effects, and not the causes.

With a detailed bibliography and footnotes on each chapter, **Islamic Jihad** is a well-documented paper that may be used both for courses and as an important source for scientific research.



THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES

JULY-SEPTEMBER 2008

Researchers from the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, within the National Defence University "Carol I" participated at different scientific activities, both in Romania and abroad. In Hungary, at Budapest, in July, 01 – 03, the National Defence University from Budapest, to the initiative of the NATO's Allied Command for Transformation organised a workshop on "Future challenges on the security. The Central and Eastern Europe's vision". The Centre was represented by its scientific director. The workshop's purpose was to identify the mega-tendencies within the security environment for the following decades that is an attempt to identify NATO's place and role in managing stability and security in a world of the remote future.

In July, 15-20, there was paid a visit to the Romanian Military Representation to NATO and the EU, in Brussels, Belgium, for a research project called "The military and civil-military systems' and actions' security in crises and armed conflicts". The research done at NATO HQ from Brussels and the SHAPE one was consistent and useful for the researchers from the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University "Carol I", both for finalising the research project and for the current scientific activities within the institution. The interlocutors were interested in the scientific research topics debated, the Centre's published products and they proposed the intensification of our cooperation.

In July, 3-4, there were presented papers during the International conference organised by "Ovidius" University from Constanța on "The Legal Status of the Monotheist Religions Within the European Union".

The Centre's most important scientific activity is the Annual International Scientific, "Policies and strategies for managing conflictuality", organised in November, 20-21. More information about the event and registration may be found on <http://cssas.unap.ro>.



INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

On selecting the articles there are taken into consideration: the area of the subjects presented in the magazine, the actuality of the topic, its novelty and originality, its scientific content and the adequacy to the editorial norms adopted by the magazine. The article should not contain any party political connotations.

The papers' scientific evaluation is done by two scientific experts that are either professors or senior fellow researchers.

The article, written in a foreign language (English, French) may have maximum 10-12 pages (6.000 – 7.000 words) and has to be sent both in print and paper, using Times New Roman font, size 12, one line, and the tables and schemes have to be printed separately. The translation into Romanian will be provided by the editor.

The text has to be preceded by an abstract which is not to exceed 250 words, both in Romanian and English and not more than 10-12 keywords. The papers have to be signed adding the authors's scientific degree, name, first name, name and have to end with a short curriculum vitae, 60 words maximum, specifying the professional qualification, the institution he comes from and other information considered necessary, including the e-mail address.

The footnotes are to be included by the end of the article and have to respect the international regulations. Authors can publish only one article by issue.

The text has to present an easy structure, using titles (subtitles). The abbreviations will be marked on the text only at their first mention on the text. It is likely to end the papers with some important conclusions regarding the importance of the research.

The articles will not use classified information.

As the magazine does not have a profitable purpose, the articles cannot be paid.

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