

ROMANIA
NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY „CAROL I”
CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES



STRATEGIC IMPACT

No. 1[22]/2007

68-72 Panduri Street, sector 5, Bucharest, Romania
Telephone: (021) 319.56.49; Fax: (021) 319.55.93
E-mail: cssas@unap.ro; Web address: <http://impactstrategic.unap.ro>, <http://cssas.unap.ro>

NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY „CAROL I” PRINTING HOUSE
BUCHAREST, ROMANIA



The Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies' scientific quarterly magazine acknowledged by the National University Research Council as a B+ magazine

STRATEGIC IMPACT

Editorial Board:

Marius Hanganu, Professor, Ph.D., president

Constantin Moștofleu, Senior Researcher, Ph.D., executive president, editor-in-chief

Nicolae Dolghin, Senior Researcher, Ph.D.

Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, director, Ph.D. (Institute for Compared Strategy, Paris, France)

John L. Clarke, Professor, Ph.D. (European Centre for Security Studies "George C. Marshall")

Adrian Gheorghe, Professor Eng., Ph.D. (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich, Switzerland)

Josef Procházka, Ph.D. (Institute for Strategic Studies, Defence University, Brno, Czech Republic)

Gheorghe Văduva, Senior Researcher, Ph.D.

Ion Emil, Professor, Ph.D.

Editors:

Vasile Popa, Researcher

Corina Vladu

George Răduică

Scientific Board:

Mihai Velea, Professor, Ph.D.

Grigore Alexandrescu, Senior Researcher, Ph.D.

The authors are responsible for their articles' content, respecting the provisions of the Law no. 206 from the 27th of May, 2004, regarding the conduct in scientific research.



CONTENTS

THE POLITICAL-MILITARY PRESENT

NATO transformation and expansion

Mircea MUREȘAN, PhD, Doina MUREȘAN5

Actuality and perspectives on Peace Support Operations

Gheorghe MINCULETE, PhD, Gabriel-Tiberiu BUCEAC11

GEOPOLITICS AND GEOSTRATEGIES ON THE FUTURE'S TRAJECTORY

The geopolitics of strategic energy resources. Strategic energetic resources

Silviu NEGUȚ, PhD, Marius Cristian NEACȘU, Liviu Bogdan VLAD, PhD.....18

Energy resources. Consequences in security field

Cristian BĂHNĂREANU.....27

NATO AND EU: POLITICS, STRATEGIES, AND ACTIONS

Poland vis-à-vis the West European Union and European military tools

Janusz SOLAK, PhD.....32

Security concepts - field of coordination, cooperation, competition for European security institutions

Pascu FURNICĂ.....37

Sécurité humaine et qualité de la vie dans le contexte d'intégration européenne de la Roumanie

Petre DUȚU, PhD41

SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

Security, new challenges. "Need to know" versus "Need to share"

Victor BOBOC.....50

Czech defence policy and its institutional and documentary framework

Libor FRANK, PhD, Josef PROCHÁZKA, PhD.....56

The development of the security and defence policy of the Slovak Republic

Elemir NECEJ63

From the Defence Agency to the Japanese Ministry of Defence - the (re)birth of a military power

Iulian PÎRVAN70



<i>National security management through collective security</i> Eugen SITEANU, PhD, Marian SANDU	74
<i>The military security system - present and perspective</i> Cornel CUCU.....	79

INFORMATIONAL SOCIETY. PEACE AND WAR

<i>Reasons regarding the war in the Romanian and foreign political thinking</i> Dorel BUȘE, PhD.....	86
---	----

ANALYSIS. SYNTHESIS. EVALUATIONS

<i>Iraq - after four years of war</i> Constantin-Gheorghe BALABAN, PhD.....	93
--	----

STRATEGIC EVENT

<i>EU's new energy policy</i> Vasile POPA.....	100
---	-----

POINTS OF VIEW

<i>Asymmetric shadows and umbrellas</i> Gheorghe VĂDUVA, PhD	104
---	-----

REVIEWS

<i>Military intelligence within the current security context</i> C.C.....	110
<i>The psychology of terrorism: a psychological study on terrorists</i> I.C.....	111

CDSSS' AGENDA

<i>The activities of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, January-March 2007</i> Irina CUCU.....	112
<i>Instructions for authors.....</i>	113



NATO TRANSFORMATION AND EXPANSION

*Mircea MUREȘAN, PhD
Doina MUREȘAN*

Started on the 13th of September 2006 at the Allied Transformation Headquarters in Norfolk (USA), the process of global re-examination of NATO's role and missions materialized at the Summit in Riga on 28-29 November in a rigorous analysis of the organization's transformation under the circumstances of the changing world security and of the post-bipolar era risks, as a fundament of the operational training and the efficiency of the Euro-Atlantic structures. The present paper deals with this important aspect together with that of the Alliance's "open door policy".

1. NATO's political and military transformation

In its primary coordinates, NATO's political and military transformation, discussed by the heads of states and governments of the 26 member countries, convened at Riga in November 2006, has the common vision about the harmonization of the objectives of the Alliance's and each member state's transformation, launched in Norfolk (Virginia).

This transformation was achieved following the transfer of experience, teachings and information on the best practice in the field, the interoperability problems approach, future capabilities, defence plans, joint shaping and training and the concepts setting and experimenting.

In this context, is essential the Comprehensive political guidance recently adopted at the Riga Summit¹ considered to be the foundation of NATO's future military transformation for the next 10-15 years, determining the limitations of the organization's transformation, its means and capabilities and also the restructuring of the defence planning domains. We practically realize that NATO's transformation program launched in Prague in 2002 is given thus a new impulse and a more decisive orientation. The commitment to improve the military capabilities in a series of key

fields and establishing a NATO Rapid Reaction Corps stressed NATO's imperious need to get involved in conflict prevention, crises management, peace keeping and humanitarian assistance. The rapidity of the reaction in such a crisis is a critical factor for a mission to succeed or to limit damages; this involves agility, coordination and training. At the same time, it's obvious that the Alliance's forces must be joint, used to act together, capable to be deployed in a short time and be maintained in the theatre for a long time that is to be expeditionary.

This flexibility of NATO's forces, seen at the highest level, is imperious and permits the organization to adapt its forces depending on the evolution of demands and different environment. At the same time, it confers the capability to meet the increased requirements of the political responsibility, to reduce the risks, diminish the losses and the collateral damages.

The road of the Alliance's third phase is a complex, mature and global as it redefines NATO's role in the world security architecture. The answer to the question about NATO's future role is linked to the intrinsic process of its transformation which makes it capable to fulfil new and complex missions for the 21st century, in a world globally threatened by terrorism and the mass destruction weapons and marked by unconventional and asymmetrical risks and also by a superior level of performance of the peacekeeping missions and the replacement of the US troops from the theatres (Afghanistan).

The object of the transformation must take into account, today more than ever, the security threats and the characteristics of the new environment, new missions and regions, new terrorist risks, to report directly to the tasks of the fight against domestic and international terrorism, their confrontation in the theatre, include the complex and present NBCR defence, manage the consequences of catastrophes, sustain the humanitarian crises, face unconventional and asymmetrical enemies, deploy



long operations, achieve a rapid initial entry in the theatre and prolonged combat and actions in new and varied geographical situations.

What does this transformation refer to if we analyze the process's military environment? Firstly, to that gradual reform with new weapons including the accelerated technological modernization, doctrinal reform and the reorientation and reorganization of the force structures, a culture more open to change and risk evolution. In its initial form², this imposed a redefinition of the way the force was generated and used and the new was to design and conduct the military operations, an encouragement of the perspective and common objectives which allow for the elimination of the security deficits among the Alliance's different member-states and for the consolidation of interoperability. The new vision means a new series of capabilities which ensure a rapid and accurate response to a multitude of enemies and situations covering the entire realm of operations.

On the other hand, in 2002 the transformation forced the capabilities to adjust in order to reduce the deficit between them and NATO's aspirations. This meant a new force, able to conduct expeditionary operations, with important maritime and air strategic transport capabilities. The command, control and communications must be adjustable in order to permit covering large distances between the Alliance's forces operation areas and the nations sustaining them. A complete, operational force, finalized in 2006, will cooperate with joint maritime and air capabilities important enough to cover several options: survival, transport, interdiction and intervention like the offensive and defensive capabilities. Such joint expeditionary forces are expected to pass rapidly from a fighting situation to a humanitarian support and vice-versa and also the ability to cooperate closely with different other organizations during and post conflict.

The force transformation systematic and coherent approach was achieved based on an ensemble of concepts that identified the needs and transformed them into programs allowing for the capabilities' renewal and development. The key-concept of Effect-based operations (EBAO) launched in 2004 at the Istanbul NATO Summit claimed a selection of the capabilities which can produce the effects desired and avoided the waste of efforts and a useless war of attrition. From this

perspective, the best solutions are the ones which integrate the joint military capabilities. Though a well-known and old concept, the new EBAO has new characteristics by using the new technologies and strategies and also the old ones but in a different manner. NATO military specialists see outstanding results in the synergy of modern technologies and EBAO that provides opportunities to fully achieve the concept and to the Alliance the ability to use all the tools in a fully and coherent way. In its global approach, the concept assumed by the Alliance for military and strategic reasons implies reaching some major transformation objectives³: superiority in decision, effect coherence and joint projection and support; all these mean developing predominant domains of so-called transformational objectives (TOA): information superiority (IS), NATO net capabilities (NNEC), engagement efficiency (EE), joint manoeuvre (JM), consolidated civil-military cooperation, expeditionary operations (EO) and integrated logistics (IL). Conducting net-based operations has the advantages of real time information, a correct and timely perception of situation, coordinating the actions and also the Alliance's efforts to develop new interoperable capabilities acting together in a multinational integrated environment.

In 2006, the comprehensive political guidance⁴, analyzing the medium security future and accepting the possibility of unpredictable events, gives an even greater importance to transformation for the next 10-15 years. The transformation, an Alliance's important pillar, takes into account the complexity of the changing environment, the expansion of terrorism worldwide and also the mass destruction weapons, the instability generated by the failed states, regional crises and conflicts, their causes and effects.

At the same time it reports to important factors such as: the spreading of sophisticated conventional weapons, the emerging technologies misuse, the negative influence of vital resources, probably one of the main risks and challenges to the Alliance in this period. A fundamental element of the transformation process orientation represents the possibility that the future attacks that would need the activation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty come from beyond the Euro-Atlantic region and use armed aggression non-conventional forms using asymmetrical means and the intervention of mass destruction weapons.



An adequate framework of political orientations for the continuation of NATO's transformation is established in the new Guidance of the organization by stressing the guidelines for the Alliance's needs regarding the capabilities⁵: agility and flexibility to eliminate the complex and unpredictable dangers which can occur far from the member-states borders and in short notice; efficient arrangements to share information and information sources; ability to launch and conduct simultaneously large and small joint operations, for collective defence and crises response on their territory, at the outskirts and strategic distance; conserved ability to conduct large operations; command and control structure permitting to plan and conduct a campaign and achieving a strategic or operational objective by adequately combining the air, naval and land elements; structured, equipped forces trained for expeditionary operations.

There are the following directions regarding the capabilities: the need to have sufficient land forces fully deployable and supported and also adequate air and naval elements and a sufficient resource engagement together with the investments increase in essential capabilities. The improvements to meet the requirements for the next 10-15 years include: the ability to conduct and support multinational joint expeditionary operations beyond the national territory with reduced or no support of the host-country during long periods of time; the ability to rapidly and efficiently adapt the forces disposition and military responses depending on unpredictable situations; the ability to discourage and deter any act of terrorism, to defend and protect themselves, contribute to the protection of the population, territory and essential infrastructures and forces of the Alliance and contribute to the consequence management.

We include here the ability to protect the essential information systems from cyber-attacks and the ability to conduct operations taking into account the mass-destruction weapons threats and CBRN risks and to protect NATO forces against the missile threats.

The Comprehensive Political Guidance also mentions the NATO forces ability to conduct operations in difficult geographical and climate environment; the ability based on equipment and adequate procedures to identify hostile elements including urban areas and to conduct operations with minimum involuntary losses and risk for own

forces; the ability and flexibility to conduct operations under the circumstances of different efforts of numerous authorities, institutions and countries, coordinated in a global framework and where different actors can conduct simultaneously fighting, stabilization, reconstruction, reconciliation and humanitarian aid activities.

It's very important here the focus on the Alliance's ability to military support the stabilizing operations and rebuilding activities in all the phases of a crisis and the ability to deploy allied forces whose interoperability and normality are very large and also the desired flexibility to cooperate with the partners' forces.

Such abilities mean a large opening to new in technologies, concepts, doctrines and procedures, the complete and coherent use of the Alliance's different tools in order to create global effects to permit the desired results. Thus, NATO forces will be able to conduct operations based on effects, preserving the Alliance's general security interests.

Transformation focuses firstly on the qualitative aspects that lead to the following priorities: joint expeditionary forces and ability to deploy and ensure their support, highly trained forces, the ability to face the asymmetrical threats, superiority in the field of information, the ability to better regroup the Alliance's different tools used during a crisis and to unite them and the ability to ensure the coordination with other actors.

In this context, research and technology are very important because they permit finding new and innovating solutions to satisfy the Alliance's critical needs. The harmonization of present and future capabilities is the result of a rigorous national and NATO process of defence planning regarding the forces, resources, weaponry, logistics, command and control and the nuclear and civil protection domains. The defence planning and the capability development process guarantee the capabilities established based on the present needs and providing development to a series of capabilities necessary for tomorrow's missions and unpredictable threats.

2. The perspectives of "open door policy"

NATO isn't concerned now exclusively about transformation, as an inexhaustible resource of its force but about the allied strategy efficiency regarding the Western Balkans stabilization with



a focus on promoting an open door credible policy in order for Albania, Croatia and Macedonia to join the Alliance and also to support the efforts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro to join PfP.

The Riga NATO Summit re-launched the Alliance's "open door policy", with an encouraging message for the three candidates (Albania, Croatia and Macedonia) and stressing the necessity to consolidate the dialog and partnership among member-states and with aspiring countries.

The process in itself depends on the way the candidate states meet the political and military criteria and how they transform their structures and perform their activities and in this framework, the new orientations of the Comprehensive Political Guidance are very important.

The Alliance's heads of states and government launched then the idea of Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO and also the Euro-Atlantic perspective of Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro, supporting their wish to become partners for peace, as a first institutional level with the Euro-Atlantic organization with the observation that Serbia and Bosnia are expected to fully cooperate with the International Criminal Court for the ex-Yugoslavia.

The American ambassador to NATO had the idea to transform the Alliance in a global security organization which generated protests especially from France because it considers this as a weakening of the organization. They don't agree on NATO's change of essence but they prefer instead an improvement of the practical means to fulfil the missions with the organization still as a Euro-Atlantic alliance. The French minister of defence feared that NATO's transformation into a global partnership would risk to destroy the solidarity between Europe and the USA and additionally towards the Alliance's transformation into an organization alienated to new members.

"We don't need a world NATO", stressed the Alliance's secretary general during a public conference in Brussels. "the type of NATO we need – and create successfully- is an Alliance defending its members against global threats: terrorism, spreading of mass-destruction weapons and fail countries. For this, NATO doesn't have to become a world gendarme. What we do need is a more and more global attitude towards security where the organizations including NATO have their part."⁶

Bringing into the organization states like: Australia, Brazil, Japan, India, New Zealand, South Africa and South Korea after the amendment of Article 10 of the Washington Treaty is considered a mistake by some American experts because it would lead to the disappearance of the alliance and not to its renewal. Charles Kupchan, an expert in the Council on Foreign Relations says that "rather than transforming itself into a mini-UN of democracies, NATO should have more modest and more realistic objectives: increase its influence, consolidate its present missions, finalize the plans to expand to the South Eastern Europe and adapt its institutions to the new political realities"⁷.

3. The Transformation of Romania's Army

Romania's Army will also integrate in the Alliance's transformation process applying the orientations in the Comprehensive Political Guidance, adopted at the Riga Summit, regarding the capabilities performing. Finalizing the main restructurings of 2005-2007, it will achieve the restructuring and reorganization of the command system at strategic and operational level, will complete the process to reorganize, re-subordinate and disband the units, will continue to render operational the units planned for NATO and EU and will achieve the manning level in accordance with NATO Essential Operational Capabilities.

Starting with 2008 until 2015, during the medium term phase, the Romanian Army will render the developing units operational for NATO and EU, will continue the implementation of the Force's Objectives, finalize restructuring the strategic and operational logistical system, continue acquiring new equipment and major supply programs, reorganize the military education, expand the implementation of the Force's Objectives requirements and also increase the value of the NRF forces and its contribution with forces and capabilities to the EU.

Between 2016 and 2025 the army will achieve the full technical integration in NATO and EU during the long term phase by: concentrating the financial and human resources in order to achieve all the technical capabilities stipulated by the Force's Objectives, the continuation of the modernization with new equipment and achieving the full compatibility with NATO and EU member states armies, creating the conditions for modern



military bases with complete social service, accommodation, military equipment and training facilities.

By harmonizing the national efforts with the international commitments and achieving the objectives included in Romania's Army Transformation Strategy, its military leaders carefully monitor the security environment evolution, the present risks and threats to the security of the Romanian state whose borders among national, regional and global are more and more diffuse every day, dimension the military structures in accordance with the national interests and the Alliance and the costs involved, achieves the necessary infrastructure, capabilities and forces, integrates in a unitary system the objectives on short, medium and long term for all the army's components, ensures the coherence and unity of the whole transformational approach, establishes the new organization chart which will shorten the decisional chain and increase the resource efficiency, achieving a simple and efficient chain of command, compatible and well-related to that of the Alliance, renders the planned forces operational at the same time with maintaining the operational abilities of the already operational capabilities by running these capabilities in the theatres.

The ample set of the army's transformation objectives that Romania renders operational – as a component of the transformation process of the Alliance and the European security and defence structures – improves its capabilities and implicitly the Alliance's ones and materializing the European Security and Defence Policy, making it capable to act – with the new joint operational commandments and structures, flexible and sustainable – joint, individual and within the Alliance to achieve a large spectrum of missions.

4. Conclusions

To give an adequate response to the demanding future, the Alliance is forced to increase its ability to face the dangers regardless of their nature, which threaten the members states' security. It must develop its ability to anticipate and assess the threats, risks and dangers, particularly the terrorist threats and mass destruction proliferation. The security environment shows that it will be necessary that the organization have forces capable to conduct a complete variety of military

operations and missions, to be able to deal rapidly with unpredictable situations and to use its own crisis management tools as an ensemble.

In this context, according to the Comprehensive Political Guidance, the transformation, as a process in progress, will permit preserving NATO's ability to achieve a complete spectrum of missions, from the high-intensity ones to the low-intensity ones, focusing on the most probable operations, meeting the present and future operational requirements and being able to conduct the most challenging operations.

The strategic research considers that, besides stressing NATO's capabilities relevance including Romania's Army, to adapt to the new missions and the changing world situation, that the recent Euro-Atlantic Summit represents an important phase in the continuation of the Alliance's transformation into a world political organization.

It's more and more obvious the member states concern to define more clearly the role NATO has to play in the future, to consider the Euro-Atlantic organization not just a simple tool to establish forces but an opportunity permitting the prospective exchange of views on the future threats and challenges.

The dispute of the organization's leaders on its future space limits favours a moderate expansion. Even though a few countries were named to join the Alliance, the enlargement perspectives won't go beyond the West Balkan or the Caucasian borders. This because the adaptation by supra-dimensioning to the risk globalization is a difficult process, at least from the point of view of involved costs and that of conducting and coordinating the military activities.

*Translated and abridged
by Diana DIACONESCU*

REFERENCES:

- Directiva politică globală adoptată de șefii de stat și de guvern ai NATO, la Riga, în 29 noiembrie 2006, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b061129f.htm>*
- Declarația Summit-ului de la Riga publicată de șefii de stat și de guvern participanți la reuniunea Consiliului Nord-Atlantic de la Riga,*



din 29 noiembrie 2006, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm>

·Comunicatul Summit-ului de la Istanbul publicat de șefii de stat și de guvern participanți la reuniunea Consiliului Atlanticului de Nord, Istanbul, 28 iunie 2004, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm>

·Global NATO: Overdue or Overstretch?, Speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, at the SDA Conference, Brussels, 6 November 2006, <http://nids.hq.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s061106a.htm>

·Alain de NEVE, *Les directives politiques globales et l'avenir de la transformation de l'OTAN: vers une vision commune*, în Sécurité et stratégie nr. 91, martie 2006.

·James JONES, *NATO Transformation and Challenges*, Rusi Journal, vol. 150, no. 2, April 2005, pp. 14-18.

·Edmund P. GIAMBASTIANI, Jan FORBES, *A New Day for NATO: The Allied Command Transformation (ACT)*, NATO's nations and partners for peace, vol. 50, no. 2, 2005, pp. 38-42.

·Viceamiral prof. univ. dr. Gheorghe MARIN, *Continuarea procesului de transformare a Armatei României, condiție a îndeplinirii obiectivelor de securitate în domeniul apărării asumate de țara noastră*, Revista de Știință Militară nr. 2(11), Anul VI, 2006, pp. 6-9.

·Rupert PENGELLEY, *NATO's Transformation: Moving from Uselessness to Useability*, International Defense Review, vol. 37, January 2004, pp. 34-39.

NOTES:

¹ We refer here to the Comprehensive Political Guidance, document approved at the Riga Summit on 28-29 November 2006. The comprehensive political guidance have formally entered the Alliance's program at the Istanbul NATO Summit on June, 23, 2004, paragraph 21 of the Heads of state Communiqué where this was motivated "to assist the strategic concept for the ensemble of capabilities problems, planning disciplines and Alliance's teaching activities answering the Alliance's needs in interoperable and deployable forces, capable to conduct major operations and simultaneously small ones if necessary and to operate jointly in a complex security environment."

² See Transformation OTAN in <http://www.act.nato.int/multimedia/facts/UNMT%20Booklet%20French%20Version.pdf>

³ Ibidem, p. 5-6

⁴ Directive politique globale entérinée par les chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement de l'OTAN, Riga, Latvia, 29 November 2006, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b061129f.htm>

⁵ Ibidem, points 10-18, part 3, p.3-5

⁶ Global NATO: Overdue or Overstretch? Speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, at the SDA Conference, Brussels, 6 November 2006 in <http://nids.hq.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s061106a.htm>

⁷ Apud Vlad BĂRLEANU, Riga 2006 – How much can the elastic NATO stretch? in <http://www.prezentonline.ro/article-detail.php?idarticle=2922>

General Professor Mircea MUREȘAN, PhD (muresan@unap.ro), is the commandant (rector) of National Defence University "Carol I" and has published numerous papers and articles with a multidimensional approach of the present and future conflicts in the Eurasian, Euro-Atlantic and OSCE areas.

Lieutenant-colonel Doina MUREȘAN is a lecturer in the Logistic, Finance, Accountancy Chair from the Command and Staff Faculty within the National Defence University "Carol I" and a PhD candidate in military sciences.



ACTUALITY AND PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

*Dr. Gheorghe MINCULETE
Gabriel-Tiberiu BUCEAC*

The radical changes in the world security architecture, intervened at the end of the XXth century once the menace of East-West confrontation disappeared and at the beginning of the XXIst century following the terrorist attacks on September 2001 against USA, have rapidly succeeded. The political and geographical break up of continental framework, especially the European one, continuing or reactivation of some intrastate or interstate latent tensions, including several states within wider phenomenon of globalization – all these had a solid impact on the international security environment. The occurrence of new risks and threats towards the worldwide security has definitely required a new approach of addressing and responding to emergency situation or crises wherever they are.

Conflict prevention and crises response activities have emerged as top priorities of the international community's foreign affairs policy. As a result, a closer and enhanced cooperation among the state actors within and/or with international or regional security organizations – UN, OSCE, etc. – imperatively required a general revitalization of complex peace management processes at global level.

1. Brief on Peace Support Operations

So far, the Peace Support Operations under UN umbrella have passed over by five distinct phases¹.

The 1st phase (1947-1956) is exclusively characterized by the military observers' presence. It is the so-called "pioneering period" of the involvement by the international bodies and organizations with responsibilities in major crises management, with a strong impact on the international security environment. Limited missions and few personnel deployed in the conflict area are the main characteristics of that period.

During this phase, the UN implication in crises management was mainly highlighted by the following peacekeeping missions:

- ◆ UNSCOB (1947 – 1951), in Greece;
- ◆ UNTSO, starting June 1948, in Israel;
- ◆ UNMOGIP (UN MILOBs in India and Pakistan), starting 1949.

The 2nd phase (1956-1967) was characterized by the employment of the Emergency Forces, for the first time throughout UN activity. These forces played an interposing role (creating a buffer zone) between the warring factions thus contributing or facilitating the total cessation of hostilities, while opening new opportunities to solve the conflicts in a political-diplomatic manner.

Main missions during this period:

- ◆ United Nations Emergency Force in the Near East – UNEF I (1956-1957) in Sinai Peninsula. This was the first UN peacekeeping mission;
- ◆ UN Operation in Congo - ONUC, 1960-1964;
- ◆ UN Security Force in New Guinea - UNSF, 1962-1969.

The 3rd phase (1967-1988) was a combination between the two types of multinational operations, the MILOBs' missions being corroborated with the employment of the Emergency Forces. This phase could be seen as a crucial moment of the international policymaking both by fully awareness on the necessity of involving the international community in conflicts/crises management, on one hand, and conducting more complex operations, on the other hand.

The most representatives operations were as it follows:

- ◆ UN Emergency Force in the Near East - UNEF II -, 1973-1979, in Egypt and Israel;
- ◆ United Nations Force in Cyprus – UNFCYP -, starting 1974.

The 4th phase (1988-1992) is mainly characterized by its multidimensional feature and it represented a transition period. State actors got more and more involved and some other non-state actors began to play an active role in solving conflicts on the international arena. Multidimensionality and multiculturalism of Peace Support Operations are granted by the generous number of participating



countries each of them bringing own history, customs, culture, religion and education and, not the least, the civilian component starting to have a more and more important role within operations' economy. During this period, the peace operations were usually initiated as observation missions with limited mandate and low level of forces and gradually transformed into complex operations with ambitious objectives and more visible ones.

Although it is a rather short phase, it represents a qualitative step forward especially referring to the role played by international security bodies in crises management. It is now when the concept of *peacekeeping operation* is smoothly replaced by *peace support operation (PSO)*.

The 5th phase, starting with 1992, represents an integration of PSOs in the wider context of the common fight against international terrorism, conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding.

UN-mandated military operations encompass peace support operations, but do not limit to them. PSOs represent the military component in the whole process of crises management and conflict settlement. In addition to traditional objectives, such as cease of hostilities, force disabling, refugees and replaced persons' protection - some specific objectives appear, as it follows:

- ◆ Establishing common defence capacities;
- ◆ Transition assistance, combat the terrorism actions and terrorist organizations;
- ◆ Protect the humanitarian organizations and their activities;
- ◆ SAR and NCE missions;
- ◆ Participating in the post-conflict operations, stabilization and reconstruction.

At this stage, the PSOs' amplitude has structurally, organizationally and operationally increased. At the same time, it was substantially enhanced the civilian component's role by a larger while robust participation of international humanitarian organizations, GOs, NGOs and private volunteer organizations.

Diversity of types and forms of actions conducted in PSOs emerged new terms and required reconsideration of some obsolete ones. In principle, PSOs consist of the following:

- conflict prevention;
- peacemaking;
- peacekeeping;
- peace enforcement;

- peacebuilding;
- humanitarian aid.

The level of engagement in solving different crises depends on the state actors' availability, financial support and willingness.

2. Romanian contribution to the crises management global process. Participation in peace support operations under UN, OSCE and NATO mandate

Romania's participation in peace support operations represents a political option, based on national interests and international commitments having in view the following:

- an imminent threat to international peace and security as identified by UN, OSCE or other security organizations;
- a legitimate process trying to politically solve the conflict or settle the disputes;
- a mandate by international security organizations such as UN, OSCE, etc.;
- agreement of the rivalry factions and the Host Nation request of assistance by the international security organizations;
- a comprehensive analysis and an accurate evaluation on the possible effects of Romania's participation and, in this context, its relations with the involved countries, even on a long-term perspective.

Starting 1991, based on international treaties and commitments already assumed, Romania has participated in several peace support operations being recognized by the international community as a reliable partner and a security provider definitely supporting political, social and economical return to normality in the conflict affected areas².

Whether in the first decades of '90s, the Romanian Armed Forces deployed on different Theatres Of Operations mainly medical or support units following 1996, once IFOR mission, the centre of gravity of Romanian participation in international operations was definitely changed, thus focusing on engineer units and infantry units later on. It was relatively a quick shift from humanitarian missions, based on a clear mandate under Chapter VI of UN Chart, to operational missions under Chapter VII of UN Chart.

The first mission of the Romanian Armed Forces after WW II was accomplished by the



THE POLITICAL-MILITARY PRESENT

100th Surgical Field Hospital within the Operation *Grandby*, part of *Desert Storm*.

By the 9th of February, 1991, following the negotiations between the Romanian Government and the United Kingdom Government, on logistics terms of cooperation, the Romanian contingent was deployed in the Persian Gulf.

The Romanian Military Hospital provided ROLE 3 medical assistance with 384 military and civilian personnel and 100 beds. This was one of the first real cooperation between a Romanian military unit and a NATO military structure, namely the British contingent whose logistics the Romanian unit was integrated in.

Once this first mission was completed, Romania continued to be an active presence in the international arena. There were missions in Africa under UN umbrella: UNOSOM II in Somalia, UNAVEM III, MONUA and UNMA in Angola, UNMIK at the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, UNAMIR II in Rwanda.

Besides troops contributing missions, Romania has participated in the UN peace support operations with a substantial number of military observers (MILOBs), border monitors and liaison officers (LOs) and still continues to do so. Currently, the Romanian military participates in the UN missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), Ivory Coast (ONUCI), Sudan (UNMIS), Burundi (UNOB), Liberia (UNMIL), Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE), Georgia (UNOMIG), Afghanistan (UNAMA) and Kosovo (UNMIK). The Romanian officers hold different positions both as members of the observation/surveillance-monitoring teams and staff officers in several multinational commands.

Our robust involvement in the UN multinational operations represented a necessary and very important step within the evolution of the Romanian military body towards the very active and efficient participation in NATO-led operations.

The 96th Engineer Battalion "Joseph Kruzel" participating in IFOR mission (Implementation Force) in Bosnia-Herzegovina since the 18th of February 1996 has accomplished the first Romanian mission under NATO command.

Once the IFOR mission was completed, the Romanian Battalion passed through several restructuring processes as required to meet the new mission requirements and finally continued to operate within SFOR (Stabilization Force) on the same Theatre of Operations (TOO) in Bosnia-

Herzegovina. The Romanian contribution was diversified and increased by adding military police (MP) subunits, transportation units, HUMINT, PSYOPS and staff elements.

Romanian involvement in solving the Balkans crises continued with its participation in KFOR mission in Kosovo and European Union mission ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina where it deployed infantry subunits, MP units, aviation squadron, intelligence teams, transportation subunits, PSYOPS elements, etc. The gained experience and the lessons learned from these missions added more competence while increased the professionalism of the Romanian military.

The experience from the Balkans TOOs was a prerequisite preparing the Romanian participation in Afghanistan in 2002 and Iraq in 2003.

The Romanian Armed Forces participation in the International Coalition operations in Afghanistan represents the first Romanian engagement in combat military operations after the World War II.

The Romanian initial offer to ISAF (International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan) and *Enduring Freedom* missions consisted of an infantry battalion, MP subunits, engineer subunits, medical subunits, NBC subunits, LOs and staff officers, 1 C-130 Hercules aircraft. Later on, depending on the real situation in the TOO, Romania increased its contribution with a trainers' detachment to support the establishment of the new Afghani Army, HUMINT elements and CIMIC teams to support the reconstruction process in Afghanistan.

The Romanian military participation in the operation *Iraqi Freedom* in Iraq represented a continuation of its alliance policy and solidarity with the international community efforts within the global war on terrorism.

The same as in Afghanistan case, the Romanian contribution was a solid and diversified one, tailored on the mission requirements, besides infantry units some additional engineer, MP, NBC units, reconnaissance teams gathering information to the Coalition's benefit. One infantry company was deployed for providing protection to the UN personnel within UNAMI mission.

Alongside with combat and combat service support units, the Romanian officers hold staff positions in Coalition Force Headquarters in Tampa, Florida, at the Coalition Interim Authority in Baghdad, at the Standing Joint Command in



Northwood – the United Kingdom - as well as at the Joint Operational Command in Rome.

The Romanian Armed Forces engagement in external missions is recommended by an active presence in very important missions on three continents in the hottest conflict regions worldwide, Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans included. The Romanian MILOBs are deployed from Africa to Caucasus regions. At the same time, it is obvious that the level of complexity, difficulty and even risk threats have considerably increased throughout the most current peace support operations.

3. Current developments of PSOs

The current geopolitical context imperatively required the international community to consider the possibility of using military means in settling conflicts besides the diplomatic, political and economic means already used. The present evolutions on the international political arena proved that military option could be a strong way to solve out the conflicts. The obvious trend of more and more engaging armed forces within peace support operations has thus become a key factor for creating the collective security system, consolidating peace, reorganizing the political, economic and legislative institutions.

Inevitably, this leads to **an increased role of peace support operations**. Unlikely the imminence of a big conflict to be solved by conventional means, however the military analysts do not exclude the possibility of a military option as a viable solution due to the increase of risks and the escalation of asymmetric threats to international peace and stability. Antagonisms generated by interethnic conflicts, extremist nationalism and interstate political disputes foster instability while threatening international peace process.

Because of more often high risks and the difficulty of predicted their further development, it is imperatively required a firm, effective and well controlled response. Under these circumstances, both nations and the international organizations should thoroughly consider the establishment of crisis management structures, able to be individually or collectively employed in conflict prevention activities before their possible escalation towards open disputes. The military component of these crisis management structures is based on volunteer contributions by the will of the member states and

able to participate in crisis management or settling conflicts' process.

The wider spectrum of missions to be fulfilled during the preparatory phase and while deployed on peace support operations represents another characteristic in the dynamic concept of employing military armed forces in order to solve out conflicts at worldwide level.

As at the beginning of 90s, the peace support operations were limited to surveillance of the conflict area and seldom interposition between the belligerents, the peacekeeping forces thus playing the key mediator role. After 1990, the peacekeeping missions' role and types have radically changed. This was mainly due to the changes in conflict nature which was not an interstate one only but it also started to get intrastate features, inside of a state, between some ethnic, religious or political rival groups. That reality required rethinking of the ways and modalities to solve out the conflicts by fostering the international order based on few principles such as internationalism, multilateralism and the development of a strong international society with operational institutions governed by international law's principle.

In this context, the wide cooperation among different regional security bodies arose as a necessity. The most relevant example could be that of Sudan operations where, besides the UN forces operating within UNAMIS, there are also African Union Organization troops operating within AMIS as well as NATO and European Union forces and mainly means to assist and provide logistic support.

Changing characteristics and increasing number of PSOs were more visible and relevant especially by the end of the XXth century and beginning of the XXIst. The peace support operations were transformed from strictly military operations into complex, multipurpose and multifunctional operations intended to solve a wider range of problems. On the TOOs, in addition to the conventional military structures, there are also civil police units or specialized units for economic reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, e.g.), humanitarian teams, etc.

Before launching whatever peace support operation, there are some prerequisites needed to be met, such as: exchange of information, joint strategies against risks and their common management as well as harmonization of non-proliferation strategies. The present challenge is



that of summarizing different tools and capabilities so that they can jointly operate. This determined the creation of a strategic culture meant to provide a rapid, robust and timely intervention using political, diplomatic, military and economic means and actions thus ensuring a more active and coherent crisis response.

Enhancing conflict prevention aspects resulted in moving the PSOs' centre of gravity from the military component to the political-diplomatic component. Riposte to threats or their prevention by "non-conventional" means inclusively is nowadays representing the political-military priority of the security bodies. Conflict prevention has become more and more a privilege of diplomacy able of rapid reaction and capable to repress the potential conflict even before their breaking-out. This assumption leads to newly created theories and strategic objectives of PSOs stating that none of the very actual threats against international peace and stability is essentially pure and consequently cannot be solved out only by military means. That is why a multilateral approach of responses to different security should be addressed.

Specialized forces to be employed in PSOs were deemed necessary once widening the spectrum of missions and tasks to be accomplished throughout preparatory phases and during operations.

Referring to classic peace support operations, the specialization of participating forces are relatively limited and their missions, in principle, consist of interposition between warring factions and surveillance of demilitarized zone³.

Complexity of actions and increased number of security bodies participating in the missions conducted to the establishment of combined joint task forces able to provide operational support whenever required, adequately trained and equipped for any particular type of mission and according to the operational environment and deployment area.

The specialized UN participating troops should be mobile enough for providing combat support to manoeuvre forces within an asymmetric theatre of operations. This required a new approach of troop training concept, new standard operating procedures and the stringent necessity to improve the mission coordination mechanisms.

4. Peace Support Operations' Prospects

Reforms of PSOs spread out as a necessity of modifying their temporary character as conducted within financial resources limits and scarce organization and their transformation into coherent and effective tool within the international security structures.

Although some claimed the idea of abandoning or reducing the UN forces' involvement in crisis management process in favour of regional security organizations or ad-hoc coalitions, the military analysts consider that further on, the UN will continue to play a crucial role within the crisis global resolution. The main reason is that all the states are part of the General Assembly or the Security Council and this way take part in settling the security problems of the modern world, many of them being very active contributors to peace support operations along the time.

In this context, the future possible developments can be foreseen:

PSOs' enhanced multinational and multidimensional features, determined by a large number of countries' participation that are not always parties of a security organizations. Multidimensionality is a characteristic to be generally adopted mainly in the decision-making process. At the beginning of the XXIst century we are facing with combined joint peace operations no matter the organization under umbrella they conducted.

Besides the numerous countries participating in peace operations, multidimensionality also means new criteria of organization where force sustainment, command and control become more efficient, integrated and less expensive – that is more important. The military forces collaborate with many other agencies, GOs, NGOs, PVOs and contractors to reach the mission's strategic objectives. This leads to a new "culture" where competition between different components of the missions is replaced by cooperation, thus synergy maximizing effects.

International organizations' status adapted to assume an increased role and new prerogatives in managing PSOs. There are debated issues such as enlarging the Security Council, flowing decision-making process within General Assembly as well as the possibility of some international security organizations to conduct peace support operation



under UN mandate and auspices but without a direct involvement of UN.

Increased efficiency by forces participating in peace support operations in order to rapidly create the conditions for the national democratic governments to install and take the prerogatives. Some capabilities are deemed necessary for rapid deployment, better use of resources and corroborating conventional procedures with new means and techniques for efficiently respond to asymmetric risks and threats.

Creation of rapid reaction capabilities able of immediate riposte and enabling units to be deployed in a conflict area before main forces' arrival. It is closely related to military component downsizing. Rapid reaction forces could intervene in tensioned periods of time and sometimes could even solve the crisis by themselves. However, this is quite difficult to be accomplished as high mobility and equipping of rapid reaction forces involve high costs by the contributing countries and long time self-sustainment in the theatre of operations. That is why endeavours are made to establish multinational *Battle Groups* similar to SHIRBRIG (UN Stand-By High Readiness Brigade). On short term, it is less probable to meet these requirements because of some legislative and economic constrains. On the other hand, there are huge cultural, social, political and economic discrepancies between potential contributing countries. It is crucial to achieve by diplomatic, politico-military and military efforts the necessity of creation high readiness forces ready-deployable by security organizations.

Downsizing forces participating in operations while professionalism increases, thus improving their organization, training and endowment. The obvious actual tendency in the restructuring process of modern armies, that of numerical downsizing while quality increasing is quite visible when we refer to peace support operations under UN or OSCE aegis. The logistic and financial challenges as caused by transportation and deployment of large forces, equipment and materials will impose as a vital necessity to reduce forces but increase their readiness. It is envisaged to create simple but flexible structures well equipped to meet the particularities of any specific theatre of operations duplicated by adequate logistics. Downsizing military forces could be supplemented by increasing the civil police component which could take over

some tasks and missions usually accomplished by military personnel (guard and humanitarian convoy escort, provide security to refugee camp, rehabilitation of some facilities and infrastructure, etc.).

Increasing coercive capacity of military forces deployed under chapter VII, UN Chart. The PK forces deployed have traditionally a low combative capacity, their military having light infantry equipment (MILOBs exception) only the use of self-defence is authorized. Once there is a wider spectrum of missions to be fulfilled and more complex operations conducted, it becomes necessary to extend the range of situations authorized for using personal armament. Based on article 42 of UN Chart, the use of force could be authorized depending on the mission type but some restrictions are still in force. This requires robust contingents both numerical and qualitative with adequate logistics and deterrence capacity. Forces should be authorized to intervene especially when violence against civilians or agreements occurred. However, all the UN documents highlight that use of force could be a viable option, negotiations and civil society support should be priorities for the implementation of the peace mandate and a long-lasting peace.

Changes in PSOs' doctrine and strategy required by modern society requirements. In this context a great attention will be paid to lessons learned from peace support operations, development of new strategies to counter the organized crime networks and international terrorism, cyber terrorism. Defining a new "modus operandi" for command and execution, starting peace building from below, will be the strategic priority of the security bodies. The doctrine changes envisage an increased role played by PSYOPS, as they are expected to play a more important role in the whole peace process.

PSO doctrine should state the principle of consensus and create opportunities for cooperation between peace forces and warring factions. The doctrine solutions should also refer to extending the civil military cooperation (CIMIC) within the mission. Dialogue will be the first priority and use of force as an extreme solution only.

The "White Helmets" (permanent employees and civil specialists) engagement on a wider scale is also intended and also their participation in humanitarian projects, even to supplement some



activities usually fulfilled by the “traditional Blue Helmets”⁴.

Development of logistic support, acquisitions and budget management, by increasing the IT role in planning and conducting PSOs is considered a future challenge in the field. The current UN logistic system is rather complicated, expansive and time consuming. The missions’ size, long distances between different supplying sources in the theatres, low efficiency of some field contractors as well as the need of airlift are so many elements that potentially could affect the mission’s logistic system.

The military specialists propose new organizational models accompanied by new professional attitude and approaches based on asymmetric logistic support where phased-supplying classic system will be gradually replaced by direct supplying thus reducing financial and material efforts and saving time, as well.

5. Conclusions

13 PSOs have been organized and conducted by UN between 1945 and 1987, and more than 20 both under UN and OSCE auspices.

The type and nature of PSOs have rapidly evolved, especially in the last few years. The PSOs’ principles and procedures well established along the time, based on lessons learned and personnel experience were adapted and flexible to the new challenges but the essential terms to provide success in a mission have remained almost the same: *a clear and achievable mandate; cooperation and goodwill for the implementation of peace forces’ mandate; Security Council’s permanent support and availability of member states to contribute with military personnel, civil police and civil specialists, according to the mission’s requirements; an adequate financial and logistic support.*

Increasing expectations of the international community on the UN possibilities of managing worldwide crises are definitely requiring new decisions in order to increase the international security bodies’ operational capacity and readiness, as well. The UN Secretary General stressed out the necessity to employ UN peace forces under well defined circumstances, a clear mandate prior to the mission. These forces are to be high readiness available and on a volunteer basis. The forces will be adequately trained and equipped in accordance with each particular mission and deployment area. A special training program is also conducted as a national responsibility. The deployment on the theatre of operations is authorized by the Security Council and the command is exercised by the Secretary General.

Lessons learned after 1991 confirm that large scale peace support operations are not a viable solution anymore in terms of international crisis management. They are very complicated and expensive requiring a long planning process and their results sometimes do not meet the expectations. For all these reasons, the international security organizations should be in favour of less complicated operations, easier to plan and to conduct.

A great attention should be paid to further peace support operation in terms of their benefits and constraints as long as the international security organizations will continue to play a major role in crisis management.

NOTES:

¹ F. T. LIU, **The History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations**, The United Nations Institute for Training and Research, New York. 1998.

² Călin HENTEĂ, Cornel SCĂFEȘ, Horia ȘERBĂNESCU, **Armata Română în misiuni internaționale - 1991 -2003**, București, 2004.

³ *****, *The Blue Helmets*, New York. 2001.

⁴ Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI, *Agenda for Peace*, New York, 1992.

Lieutenant-colonel Gheorghe MINCULETE, PhD (minculetegh@yahoo.com), is a lecturer at the Command and Staff Faculty within the National Defence University “Carol I”.

Lieutenant-colonel Gabriel-Tiberiu BUCEAC (kaassaai@yahoo.com) works for the General Staff, the Operations Directorate. He is a doctoral student in military sciences within the National Defence University “Carol I”.



THE GEOPOLITICS OF STRATEGIC ENERGY RESOURCES. STRATEGIC ENERGETIC RESOURCES

*Silviu NEGUȚ, PhD
Marius Cristian NEACȘU
Liviu Bogdan VLAD, PhD*

The Strategic Energetic Resources – Geopolitical considerations. Oil is not a simple word or a resource like any others. It defines another category of resources – the geo-strategic ones. On the other hand, it defines our civilization, the civilization of 20th-21st centuries. The largest part of what we use everyday - electricity, fuel, transportation, plastics, pills, paint, clothes, even food, in a way, derives from oil. This is the resource that has launched many international conflicts. Oil is the most important geo-strategic resource.

1. From the geostrategy of fertile soils to the geostrategy of oil or from agropolitics to oilpolitics

On many occasions, specialists have attempted to see how much of humanity's history was marked by peace and how much by conflict. Such a curious endeavour also had a surprising result: since 3600 B.C. (the beginning of Antiquity) until the present only 292 years of peace¹ were recorded, the rest representing periods grinded by tensions and wars. Most of the world's conflicts had and have been triggered by the *access to resources*, unaffected by the image under which these unfold – ideological conflicts, religious, ethnic, etc., and out of these, a particular category stands out, not yet fully defined, *the strategic resources*, respectively those ones without which it is almost impossible to conceive social-economic development of a certain historical era².

For example, for a long time, this attribute has been awarded to *the fertility of the soil and natural pastures*, which allowed rich crops and animal breeding, in order to obtain products which ensured the feeding of a powerful army with the help of which other territories were conquered and ruled (that, in turn, increased the wealth). Concomitantly with the industrial revolution, raw materials used

for producing cast iron and steel became strategic resources: *iron, some non-ferrous ores, coked coal*; cast iron and steel were indispensable for producing "machines" in the most generic meaning of the word. Others were added, among which cotton, in order to provide the necessary textile products for a population with an accelerated growth. This is how it can be explained the fact that, in 1872, at the height of its development as the first economic power of the world, Great Britain ensured over half of the world's coal and iron ore productions and was also producing over half of the world's cast iron, steel and cotton threads.

In the second half of the 20th century and now, at the beginning of the third millennium, the main strategic resources have become *oil and natural gas*, aside which one may add some non-ferrous (aluminium, tin, etc.), radioactive (uranium) and precious (especially gold) metals.

Among the strategic resources, both in the 20th century as well as at the beginning of the current century, oil is taking the lead. Indispensable, due to its many qualities, oil triggered an incredible fight for possession. Our minds hold very clearly the image published in the June 2004 number of *National Geographic*³, illustrating, by means of an extremely good visual impact, why oil, hydrocarbons, gave and will give birth to conflicts on Earth. Trying to understand the role of oil in today's societies, the family of Doctor Mark Foster (polymers specialist) took out in the garden in front of their house everything proceeding from hydrocarbons. A difficult enterprise, because they had to remove almost everything... Can we define ourselves as an *oil civilization*? Even if it only has 100 years of economic existence, oil seems to define, today, the way of our civilization. Before everything else, hydrocarbons signify energy. The energy that is used in mechanical locomotion on Earth – car, bus, airplane, etc. – as well as in other forms (electric energy)



ensures the world wide stream of information at an unconceivable speed in mankind's history.

After all, life, substance, on Earth have yet to qualitatively gain ground since their progress from approximately 2 million years ago – the appearance of man, however the speed information travels has increased considerably. Without this, *globalization* wouldn't have been possible in today's accepted meaning.

The means of transportation are dependent on hydrocarbons, not only because of the power source required for movement, but also because of their components: synthetic rubber, without which movement through the cities of today's world would be unimaginable, the board, the coach trimmers, etc., the bitumen on the streets itself is nothing else than residual oxidized oil.

Most of the material components of our civilization derive directly or indirectly from oil. For example, plastic materials are indispensable in our everyday activity – the cellophane papers in which we carry our sandwiches, the plastic bags without which the presence in supermarkets would be unconceivable, pencils, glasses frames, mobile phone carcasses, computers, laptops, portfolios, clipboards, etc. – other petrochemical products (paints), drugs, synthetic fibres, etc. are products without which life is unconceivable in the *Hydrocarbons Era*.

All these grant proper "respect" to oil on any market of the world and in any society, either Western, or Asian, or Arab or African. *The access to oil resources and the security of the hydrocarbons flows are imperative for the planet's poles of power, dependent and also vulnerable to this geological "accident"*.

2. Territorial disparities: reserves – production – consumption poles⁴

The doubtless world oil reserves are estimated, today, at approximately 140 billion tons.

Apparently paradoxical, they are a lot larger than 25 years ago (approximately 87 billion tons), not to mention almost 70 years ago (4 billion tons in 1938). As oil doesn't form in historical times, we find the explanation in the fact that nowadays there are methods which allow a more correct evaluation of deposits.

Just as other resources' case, oil deposits are actually concentrated as spatial distribution. Thus:

- Approximately 70% of the planet's certain reserves are found on the Asian continent, mainly under the sand of the deserts in the Middle East (between 62 and 66% out of the world's total).

This region is also the home of the richest countries in terms of oil: Saudi Arabia (approximately 35 billion tons – almost a quarter out of the world's total), Iran (approximately 18 billion tons), Iraq (approximately 16 billion tons), Kuwait and The United Arab Emirates (each of the two countries with more than 13 billion tons);

The Middle East is the most fragile place in the world's geopolitical system; it is the place where continents meet, it is the place where the cultures and great religions of mankind meet.


- Approximately 15% is located in America (especially in the Gulf of Mexico area), out of which, the following stand out: Venezuela (approximately 11 billion tons), Mexico (depending on the source, between 2,5 and 5 billion tons) and USA. The last studies point out Canada outrunning Mexico on the list of rich hydrocarbons areas;

- There are added a few other „oil areas” like the Caspian Sea Area, which, according to recent estimates, would be the second region on the planet in this field (this is the explanation of the project “The Road of Caspian Energy to Europe”), Saharan North Africa, Equatorial West Africa, The North Sea and others.

If, generally speaking, the quantity of oil reserves, declared as certain, has risen world wide in the last couple of decades, a growth sustained by the doubling of the reserves in the Middle East (400 billion barrels in the 1980s, more than 725 billion barrels in 2000) and Africa (more than 50 billion barrels in the 1980s, more than 100 billion barrels in 2000), the slightly ascending trend of the Asia-Pacific and Eurasia regions, the only region whose doubtless oil reserves are dropping is North America, from 95 to 64 billion barrels in the same amount of time, due to the drastically diminishing of the Mexican reserves (50 billion barrels in the 1980s, only 17 billion barrels in 2000) and to the downward trend of USA, in the last case, obviously, inversely proportional with the consuming capacity.

In the case of production there are two situations:

- a) big producers, with overweight production capabilities, but also with considerable reserves; the case of the Middle East which concentrates



over 30% of the world production (out of which Saudi Arabia with 16%, followed by Iran with over 7%), also, the case of Russia with a weight of over 13% and other producers with smaller weights in the world balance (Mexico, China, Venezuela, etc.);


b) countries or regions with a high production, but mostly based on imports. It is the case, for example, of the USA which ensures half of the production of North America and 13-14% of the world balance (in 1972 had a quarter of the world balance).

Although USA concentrates only 4,6% of Earth's population, it represents the largest oil consumer in the world, with over 900 million tons/year (a quarter of the world's consumption!), considering its production of slightly above 300 million tons/year (three times less than the consumption!), unlike the second biggest world consumer, China, with a consumption of 300 million tons/year (with a production of 175 million tons/year servicing 20% of the planet's population).

Table no. 1 – The first five oil producers in the world (1972 – present)

Current no.	1972 (before the „oil shocks”)	1982 (after the „oil shocks”)	1992 (after the Gulf intervention)	At present
1	USA	USA	Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabia
2	Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabia	USA	USA
3	<i>Iran</i>	Mexico	<i>Russia</i>	<i>Russia</i>
4	Kuwait	<i>Iran</i>	<i>Iran</i>	<i>Iran</i>
5	Venezuela	Great Britain	Mexico	Mexico

Source: B.P. Statistical Review of World Energy





Starting 2000, the world's oil consumption increased with 1,5 million barrels/day, and the US and China concentrate 90% of this increase.

In the annual speech ("Address to the nation") in January 2006, the American president George Bush Jr. declared: "We have a serious problem: America is dependent on oil, which is imported from instable areas around the world".

Thus, Bush Jr. presented, on the 31st of January 2006, a project which stipulates the replacement of 75% of the oil imported from the Gulf area, until 2025, with ethanol and other energy sources; 20% of the oil imports of the USA comes from the Middle East.

In addition, Bush asked for increasing the funds allocated to scientists who study alternative energy sources.

3. The Gulf Wars – wars with oil scent

Among the armed conflicts of the last two or three decades that also had oil as a stake, the following are registered:


- 1980-1988 – Iran-Iraq;
- 1990-1991 – Iraq-Kuwait;
- 1991 – USA (anti-Iraqi coalition under the aegis of UN)-Iraq;
- 2003-present – USA-Iraq.

Here is in short, how they evolved⁵:

The Iran – Iraq war (September 15th 1980- August 20th 1988)

- September 15th, 1980. The Iraqi armed forces occupy the disputed border area (Shatt-al-Arab), revoking the Treaty of 1975, conquer the Iranian harbour of Khorramshahr and besiege the oil terminal of Abadan.

Fig. no. 3 – Oil consumption distribution in the world



That is how it began one of the longest and bloodiest conflicts of modern times that caused at least one million human casualties and material damages rather difficult to estimate (the numbers vary from over 100 to 1 000 billion \$). Some analysts claim that Saddam Hussein took this course of action under the pressure of the USA and the Saudi Arabia.

- in 1982, Iran manages to regain its lost territories. Air raids over Baghdad and, in return, Iraqi raids over oil installations on the island of

Kharq.

- October 1983. The Reagan administration begins secret talks with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt so that they will act as "mediators" of clandestine American ammunition shipments towards Iraq, including *Howitzer Choppers and missiles – opposite to the Arms Export Control Act*.

- March 30th, 1984. The UN Security Council condemns the use of chemical weapons by Iraq.
- March 1986. USA and the Great Britain block



a resolution of the UN Security Council which condemns Iraq for the use of chemical weapons. In May, the US Department of Commerce releases 70 licenses of export for biological weapons to Iraq. The weapons are to be delivered by 1989, the transport also containing 21 bacillus of anthrax. In the same month, the Department of Commerce approves the delivery of botulinum.

- March 1987. President Reagan admits the findings of the Tower Commission and admits he also sold weapons to Iran, in exchange for releasing the 52 American hostages from the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. However, the president claims, the money were used for financing the “contras” (anti-communists) forces from Nicaragua.

- April-August 1988. During three battles Iraqi massively employed American chemical weapons against the Iranians. In the confrontation from August, 65 000 Iranians were killed by chemical weapons (a violation of the *Geneva Agreement from 1925*).

Five days after the cease of the war, Saddam Hussein sends his air force to strike, with chemical weapons, the Kurd villages (that is why there were the speculation that, in fact, the ceasing of the Iraqi aggression was determined by the Kurd “hotbed”).

The Iraqi invasion in Kuwait (or The Second Gulf War) and the coalition’s attack

On July 25th, 1990, the US ambassador in Baghdad, Avril Gilespeie, meets with Saddam Hussein and assures him that president Bush “wants better and deeper relations” with Iraq. Convinced that the US will remain neutral, Saddam Hussein invades Kuwait in August 1990.

- August 2nd, 1990: 30 000 Iraqi soldiers, led by the Republican Guard, attack Kuwait, conquered it in just three days and declared the 19th Iraqi province. The UN Security Council condemns the invasion and asks for immediate withdrawal. UN imposes economical sanctions and the Security Council authorizes the allies to use force in order to enforce them. The massing of Iraqi troops at the border with Saudi Arabia determines President Bush to initiate “US Operation Desert Shield”.

- January 15th, 1991. The Security Council sets this date as a deadline for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops. The following day (local time 08.00), UN allied forces attack, composed by USA, Great Britain, France, plus 26 other countries (the

supreme commander of the UN forces – General Norman Schwarzkopf).

- On February 27th, 1991. The “Desert Storm” operation ends, and on March, 3rd, Iraq accepts the UN Resolution.

- On March 3rd, 1991, Iraq accepts the terms of cease fire and the fight ends. According to the first estimates, approximately 100 000 Iraqi soldiers were killed, but more recent estimates point out only 20 000 military casualties and approximately 2 300 civilian casualties⁶.

The democrats, who won the elections, will open the “Irangate” investigation. The democrat congressman Henry Gonzales will declare in full Congress, on July 27th 1992: “The Bush administration deliberately helped, and not by accident, the arming of Iraq, exporting American military technology (...). During the Bush administration, American and foreign companies obtained export licenses, transporting American technology straight to the Iraqi factories, even if it became obvious that those factories were, in fact, producing weapons”.

Analysts say that in both conflicts, beyond the formal purpose (in the case of the Iraq-Iran war, the recapturing of the Shatt-al-Arab area, lost by Iraq after the Agreement from 1975, and in the case of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Iraqi claim over this state which was supposedly its province), the main reason was oil, to which it was added the Western strategic interest, mainly American, in the area.

The Americans, after being forced to leave the Gulf Area in the aftermath of the events in Iran, from 1979, found a way to return.

Operation “Desert Fox”

- In September 1998, the UN Security Council voted a resolution which specified the removal of sanctions against Iraq, with one condition: Iraq must accept to resume its cooperation with UN inspectors. The USA and the Great Britain gave a harsh military response to the Iraqi regime, but they failed to make Saddam Hussein fall.

The USA intervention in Iraq (2003-present)

- 2003 began with carrying on the actions of the international community with the sole purpose of making Saddam Hussein’s regime renounce its internal totalitarianism and the defiance of international political organizations.



The isolation of the Baghdad regime from the other Arab states was possible through an informational war, exploiting the dictatorial character of the Iraqi regime.

- The Arab world along with a few other countries – France, Germany, Russia, China – opposed a one-sided military action of the US against Iraq, initiated outside a UN resolution. In the absence of a UN resolution, to explicitly authorize the use of force against the regime of Saddam Hussein, the Bush administration addressed an ultimatum to the Iraqi dictator, on March 17th, 2003, asking him to leave the country in 48 hours⁷.

- On March 20th, 2003, the *Iraqi Freedom operation is launched, led by the USA, who attacked with missiles a building in Baghdad, where Saddam Hussein was supposedly hiding.*

- At the beginning of May 2003, the allies had achieved a swift and decisive military victory, followed by a difficult process of rebuilding the country.

The end of the conflict, on May 2nd, 2003, when the American president concluded: “We and our allies prevailed”, didn’t mean, though, the cease of hostilities and the beginning of Iraqi reconstruction, but the start of a new phase of institutional, political, economical and social redefining.

- As before 2003 Iraq granted almost half of its oil to the Russian Federation, France, Germany and China, after the end of hostilities, the US didn’t acknowledge these decisions of the Saddam Hussein regime, claiming that “the oil belongs to the Iraqi people”, therefore the access must be allowed, mainly, to the coalition countries who helped in the country’s democratization.

- July 2003. The US installed a civilian administration and a transition government, gradually recognized by the Arab states as well as by the great powers. Iraqi territory is divided in three areas: the south, with its main centre at Basra, controlled by British forces, the central under Polish command, having subordinated military contingents from 23 countries, including Romania, and the most important, the north, with Baghdad, Kirkuk and Mosul, controlled by the US army.

- Resolution number 1511 of the UN Security Council, adopted unanimously on November 16th, 2003, empowers a multinational force, under

one command, to take all necessary measures to maintain safety and security in Iraq.

- In January 2005 there were held free parliamentary elections, finalized on May 6th, 2005, by electing President Jalal Talabani. After occupying the country, the radical actions of the American administration to dismantle the structures of dictatorship, favoured, however, the birth of a resistance against US forces, which reverberated on the new democratic Iraqi regime.

4. Attitude changes in the Arab world

In April 2004, a historic moment took place: the visit to Bruxelles (EU) of the Libyan leader Moamer al Khadafi (Gaddafi), in response to the invitation of Romano Prodi, the president of the European Commission. Carried by two transport airplanes, the following arrived in Bruxelles: a Bedouin tent, a huge armour plated Mercedes and a team of bodyguards formed by young women, plus Libyan groups of dancers that arrived a day earlier. As a supporter of the Arab nationalism, Gaddafi appeared at the EU headquarters transformed into an active upholder of the EU Mediterranean project, an ally of the European powers and an adept of the “New World Order”. Prodi took advantage of the fact that Gaddafi (Italian by mother) unrolls large businesses in Italy and that the leader from Tripoli, as he is on the US “black list”, was constantly seeking a diplomatic solution to exit the American imposed isolation, in order to prevent a war and to resume the diplomatic relations abandoned in the last 15 years.

The European powers reacted positively. Especially to prove the US there is always a diplomatic solution, preferable to war.

The new cordial relation between the EU and Libya is based on a key element: oil. The EU regards Libyan oil as cheap and it presents the advantage of closeness to the Mediterranean, thus, the transport costs are smaller. Libya apparently has reserves at least three times larger than what the officials from Tripoli declare (4,7 billion tons). In addition, according to EU estimates, Libya has considerable natural gas reserves, which can immediately be exploited by European companies.

In the last three years, Libya has visibly shifted its foreign affairs: offered help to the USA in the “war against terrorism” and accepted to unconditionally collaborate with the international

inspectors for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The authorities from Tripoli accepted the responsibility (paying large compensations) for the casualties of the air assault in Lockerbie (1988).

This spectacular change of Gaddafi (from terrorism leader to “guardian” of the Southern borders of the EU) is a result of European diplomacy, but also marks the twilight of Arab nationalism.

5. Natural gas – another strategic energy resource or the political “tap”?

The last years (the end of 2006 and the beginning of 2007) revealed another strategic energy resource – natural gas, which, in the “hands” of one actor, under the conditions of many beneficiaries’ dependency, can become an instrument of power in influencing foreign affairs.

The doubtless world reserves of natural gas are estimated, today, around 177 000 billion m³ and are mostly concentrated in three countries: Russia (more than a quarter of the world total), Iran and Qatar (each with approximately 15% of the total reserves).

Regarding production, we notice two important countries that rank the first places: Russia and the USA (with over 500 billion m³ each), followed at a large distance by Canada, Great Britain and Iran. The same two countries are also present in the hierarchy of consumption – the USA records the biggest consumption of natural gas in the world (more than 600 billion m³), followed by Russia. The largest producers are also the largest consumers!

However, the entire Europe is dependant on the biggest producer in the world. Energy dependency on one source is, obviously, dangerous, especially when the “supplier” has opposite interests to those

Fig. no. 4 – The distribution of proved natural gas reserves in the world





Fig. no. 5 – The distribution of production and consumption of natural gas world wide





ones of the “beneficiary” and has the power to force his hand or to “punish” him.

For example, in the night between January 21st and 22nd 2006, there were two explosions on the main section and on a secondary service pipeline of the Mozdok – Tbilisi gas pipe, the main pipeline that fuels the two ex-Soviet republics. The explosions took place on the Russian part, not far from the border with Georgia. Then, another explosion interrupted the supply of electric energy to Georgia.

The Russians accused the Georgians and the Armenians of “sabotage”! Actually, the two countries had no interest, because their reserves were enough for only 24 hours. Therefore, the Georgian president Saakashvili, denounced the “blackmail” practiced by Moscow: “I heard the threats of Russian politicians that we could be out of natural gas and light, for a long time, and now, this threat materialized”.

Some analysts go even further and see many similar scenarios:

□ After substantially increasing the price of natural gas delivered to Ukraine and Georgia, analysts considering this as reprisals to the “Orange Revolutions”, *GAZPROM* announced the increase of the price on gas delivered to Belarus (a triple price beginning with 2007). It was considered that, in fact, the Russian company wanted to take over 50% of the Belarus Beltransgaz company's shares, the owner of the gas pipeline network that fuels Europe, in order to collect the taxes directly.

□ Russia deleted Algeria's debt (of 5 billion \$) with two terms:

o first: the acquisition of weapons with a total value of 4 billion \$ (40 MIG 29 planes, 20 SU-30 planes and 40 T-90 tanks);

o second: *GAZPROM's* access to the oil and natural gas fields, Algeria being the third supplier of energy for the EU, after Russia and Norway; in addition, Algeria is also a member of the OPEC.

□ In March 2006, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, signed with the Chinese president, Hu Jintao, an agreement in which he promises to build two gas pipes to China, becoming the biggest gas supplier of this country. The agreement worried the European Union, because some of the gas that is going to be delivered to China will be extracted from Western Siberia, the same region the gas exported to the Europeans comes from. Deliveries should begin in 2011, between 60 and 80 billion

m³ each year. The Kremlin announced that Russia may also build an oil pipeline, angering Japan, because it wouldn't be capable of satisfying both demands.

In turn, Venezuela threatens to use oil as a “political tap”. It is well known that this country is the main supplier of the biggest American importer, the USA. The Venezuelan president, Hugo Chavez, recently re-elected (with the slogan: “Socialism, Homeland or Death”), has a declared antipathy towards the USA and, even more, towards president George Bush Jr., therefore Chavez's statement, that he would begin “taking the steps for cutting oil shipments to the Americans” (1,5 million barrels/day), doesn't surprise anyone!

All these elements – and more can be added (the boycott of the NABUCCO project – a gas pipe project which also includes Romania –, the recent restart of the oil pipeline Burgas – Alexandropolis and others) –, induce, according to some analysis, the idea that Russia is transforming from a “deceased military superpower – however still nuclear -, in a new energy superpower”⁸.

Blue Stream – a small pipeline, a great symbolism

This gas pipeline was inaugurated with a lot of fuss in November 17th, 2005, in the presence of Russian president, Vladimir Putin, and the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Erdogan, and also the Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi. The explanation was, apparently, simple: Russia “offered” natural gas, Turkey had to “gain” from it, and Italy participated as a co-achiever of the project, through the ENI trust (together with the Russian colossus GAZPROM).

A few pieces of information: the submarine pipeline (the deepest in the world, 2 150 m below sea level), measures 309 km and connects the harbours of Djugba (Russia) and Samsun (Turkey). It is supplemented by 373 km on Russian territory (from the gas fields of Izobilnoj), plus another 501 km on Turkish soil (from Samsun to Ankara, the country's capital). From 3,7 billion m³ of natural gas, at first, it will transport 15 billion m³ each year, and finally it will double the quantity.

Other pipelines have been inaugurated, before and after, but none stirred up so much interest. Analysts weren't late to ascertain that a long term plan is at stake, that will “open new horizons for



Russia⁹. Not accidentally, Kremlin proposed building a new pipeline to Turkey, not only for natural gas, but also for oil. These projects mean that “Moscow wants to be capable to counter-balance the influence of USA – Great Britain in this region (they were the promoters of the oil pipeline BTC, Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan) in another way besides military security¹⁰”. In other words, if the USA became the “security’s supplier” for many of the ex-communist countries, Russia wants to establish a balance by becoming the “energy’s supplier”, but not only for the South – Eastern Europe, but also for the European Union, which lacks energy resources and depends a great deal on Russia. It can be considered that, this way, Russia wants to regain its influence and protect its interests in Eastern Europe, also increasing its financial power, and why not, its political one¹¹.

An “OPEC” of natural gas?

The role of OPEC is well known on the world scene since the “oil shock” in 1973, when it managed to fully exploit the most prized and the most used strategic energy resource; there were, of course, synopses on the way, but these are not the subject of this study. However, lately, people are talking about a similar coalition in the field of natural gas. Even though, some are tempted to see the Iranian ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who proposed in January 2007 something similar, the *Financial Times* has used the expression two months before (November 2006) when, quoting a NATO report, mentioned Russia’s striving to create such an organization. The configuration of the supposed coalition, in which Russia, some Gulf countries (Iran and Qatar), North Africa (Libya and Algeria) and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and others) will take part, is extremely interesting. This would mean an extraordinary force, because only Russia and Iran control 42% of the world’s natural gas reserves!

Professor Silviu NEGUȚ, PhD (silviu.negut@biblioteca.ase.ro), is the deputy dean of the Faculty for International Economical Relations and director of the Master on Geopolitics and International Relations from the Academy for Economical Studies from Bucharest.

Marius Cristian NEACȘU (marius.neacsu@biblioteca.ase.ro) is a lecturer within the Faculty for International Economical Relations from the Academy for Economical Studies from Bucharest and a PhD candidate in Geography.

Liviu Bogdan VLAD, PhD (liviubogdan.vlad@biblioteca.ase.ro), is a lecturer within the Faculty for International Economical Relations from the Academy for Economical Studies from

The energy security is, probably, today’s most used expression in literature and talks regarding the world’s economy. Even the most powerful regional coalition in the world, the European Union, pays attention to this problem, firmly restated by Germany, who holds the presidency of the Union for the first semester of 2007 – through its foreign affairs minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who declared “energy security as a priority of this commission”. If we add the point of view, in this domain, of the world’s biggest power, the USA (together with the European Union it achieves 2/3 of the world GDP!), we will better understand how important the strategic energy resources actually are.

NOTES:

¹ Peace Pledge Union (www.ppu.org.uk).

² Silviu NEGUȚ (2006), **Introducere în geopolitică**, Editura Meteor Press, București, pp. 135-136.

³ Tim APPENZELLER (2004), Sfârșitul petrolului ieftin, National Geographic, iunie, pp. 28-29.

⁴ Several sources have been used: CIA World Factbook, BP Statistical Review of World Energy and others.

⁵ For details, see: François MASSOULIE (2003), **Conflictele din Orientul Mijlociu**, Editura All, București, Vladimir ALEXE (2005), **De la Stalin la Saddam. Secrete biografice**, Editura Orizonturi, București, Lumea magazine (2003-2006).

⁶ Desert-Storm.com: military presence allied forces

⁷ Horia C. MATEI, Silviu NEGUȚ, Ion NICOLAE, **Enciclopedia Statelor Lumii**, Editura Meronia, București, 2005, p. 233.

⁸ ***, *Russia’s Newly Found “Soft Power”*, The Globalist, August 26th, 2004.

⁹ See, for example, Federico BORDONARO, *Blue Scream opens new horizons for Russia*, Power and Interest News Report, November 21, 2005.

¹⁰ Ibidem.

¹¹ For the entire topic, see also Part IV (**Les points chauds du Globe**) from Yves LACOSTE, pp. 206-328.



ENERGY RESOURCES. CONSEQUENCES IN SECURITY FIELD

Cristian BĂHNĂREANU

From ancient times, the exploitation of energy resources has intersected with power disputes on international scene and with various forms of local, regional or world wars. In this paper we analyze the role of energy resources, especially oil and natural gases, in crises and conflicts of the beginning of the millennium based on the "game" and the interests of the actors involved in this "oil-rush".

1. Theoretical approach

The "black gold" or natural gases usually means, besides the possible significant financial incomes, difficulties and misery in societies where they are discovered. The majority of hydrocarbons producer countries, especially from East, is lead by authoritarian and corrupt regimes, marked by unsustainable economic development and violent conflicts.

The risk of disputes and conflicts based on access, control and exploitation of energy resources remains rather high. Such conflicts may consist in various forms, from a classic war which involves military forces of great powers, as Persic Gulf war, to internal fights for power between different political, ethnical or tribal factions. In several cases, the ongoing conflicts were started by complex aspects of energy resources from that area. Consequently, the approach of energy problematic with preponderant military means, especially in the case of hydrocarbon resources, is associated with:

- *Territorial disputes* – dissensions over boundary and maritime areas which suddenly became very valuable because of the discovery of important hydrocarbon resources. Examples of such areas are: Caspian Sea, peculiarly those ones claimed by Azerbaijan and Iran; South of China Sea, areas claimed by China, Vietnam, Philippines, and Malaysia; and Bakassi Peninsula from Western Africa claimed by Nigeria and Cameroon;

- *Separatists actions* – when earnings from oil production from an area mostly populated by an ethnical minority are seized by the Government. Usually, members of that minority try to separate and establish their own state in order to obtain all oil incomes. Such situations are in Indonesia (Aceh region), Iraq (Kurds region), and in the southern part of Sudan. In other cases – as Nigerian Delta – the ethnical minorities fight to obtain a broader autonomy and therefore a higher percent from oil revenues;

- *Clashes between local leading groups* – due to the fact that anyone who controls the Government of oil producer countries controls the revenues allocation, too. Thus, those ones who have that control try to maintain their power as much as possible, using any means including repression, and those ones excluded from power are interested in using any instruments, including armed rebellion, terrorism or coup d'état in order to obtain control. Saudi Arabia and Nigeria are the most known examples. In other countries, as Venezuela, the disputes over oil revenues allocation have got some political violence accents;

- The great powers that use *force actions* and methods specific to colonialism and neo-colonialism.

Accordingly, energy resources competition remains a major source of crises and conflicts in contemporary world, as long as the demand increases more quickly than offer, and significant hydrocarbon reserves are localized in areas characterized by profound political-economic unbalances and instability.

International terrorism and many local conflicts are fed by poverty, bad governance, corruption, and poor economic development, resentments toward developed states and nations and globalization.

In the future, once the hydrocarbon production will be at maximum quotas, and consumption and prices will continue to increase, we may expect that the disputes and conflicts over those draining



resources to raise and to be a constant problem on international community's security agenda.

2. Disputes and conflicts based on energy interests

The correspondences between oil and military conflicts became evident, peculiarly before and during the First World War. Even Romania's oil reserves were in those years in attention of military coalitions. That was a historic time when our country was in the top five of world oil powers. The mechanized Second World War illustrates dramatically the dependence of military winner's status by the control of oil resources and the United Nations had the absolute supremacy. During the Cold War, the oil competition and political-military conflicts continued to be in the focus of international community. Confrontations between competitors were engaged mostly indirectly, great powers being constrained to respect – more or less formal – the states' right to independent capitalization of hydrocarbons. But, between 1973 and 1974, in a new Israeli-Arabs war context, the "oil weapon" was directly used to solve out some politico-military crises¹. It was a unique moment of Arab solidarity that surprised the Occident and transformed the OPEC into a leading economic-political actor of international life.

However, after 1975 and especially after the inauguration of the first peace treaties between Israel and some Arab states (Egypt, Jordan), the superpowers USA and USSR restored their control in key-spaces that were rich in hydrocarbon resources. Superpowers cooperated in several areas. Thereby, the US influence became preponderant in Saudi Arabia and Gulf states where the major world oil fields are placed. The USSR maintained its influence in Libya and Algeria. In other regions, Western and South-West Africa, for example, the superpowers were confronting through "interposes" (Cuba and South Africa in Angola, Algeria and Morocco in Western Sahara).

The armed conflict between Iran and Iraq since '80s² brings into spotlight the political, military and oil equilibriums from the key-region of the Near and Middle East. USSR and USA alternatively supported both belligerents. In the 1988-1990, the Moscow may appear surprisingly as a winner: Islamist Iran, isolated on international level, depended much more on the diplomatic

and military support of the Soviet Union; and Iraq, disappointed by the inconsequence of the US diplomacy, moved in URSS direction, too. Even after the First Gulf War (1991), the Russian military and business groups obtained the dominant positions in oil sector, besides Germany and France. Concomitant, the Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf emirates became very dependent, under military pressure of Saddam Hussein regime, on US and Great Britain's security protection. In addition, the explicit US alliance with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait allowed Washington to conduct the oil prices on international market into a favourable direction for Occident' interests.

Several fundamental mutations happened between 20th and 21st centuries on regional and global level. Competition for oil and natural gases from Caspian Basin and Central Asia, a region that Moscow isn't able to control only thru administrative and military means, was started by the end of Cold War and USSR's dissolution that reshaped the Eurasian geopolitics. The extension of economic globalization turns the oil problematic to new issues.

The transnational companies pressure on market liberalization and free access to energy resources and raw materials that are strongly sustained by international financial organisms. The oil markets became gradually more open from Russian Federation to Libya and Algeria. In the framework of globalization we witness the energy power ascension, as "Asiatic tigers", China, India, Brazil, etc.

The world's economic picture is more dynamic and the competition increases on resources or manufactures and services markets. In the same context, it is obvious that the economic power of European Union and Japan is growing, but US still remains the main beneficiary of globalization.

Economic-political repositions generate the "usually" military collisions. Those conflicts, mainly local ones, were intrastate, usually with external interferences, or interstates.

Thus, after 1990, the conflicts from Chechnya, Dagestan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, and Uzbekistan were recorded in Caspian and Central Asiatic area. A real arms race is placed in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Iran, Uzbekistan, etc. Many of those armed conflicts were materialized in areas rich in hydrocarbons and on routes of energy resources that are alternative to the Russian ones.



Maintaining the Chechnya and Dagestan within Russian Federation explains somehow the interest for Baku-Novorossiisk pipeline³. Instead, different divisions from Georgia (South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Adjara) or Nagorno-Karabakh are close by Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan alternative pipeline. Concomitantly, the Kurds rebellion from South-East Turkey and North-West Iran threatened the ambitious Nabucco project (from Iran to Central Europe).

In the Near and Middle East, the Second Gulf War from 2003, ended with the collapse of Saddam Hussein regime, has changed the local oil geopolitics thru military means⁴. The Iraqi energy resources, controlled until 2003 by the Russians, Germans, and Frenchmen, were now managed by the democratic Government from Bagdad. On the other hand, the main local deposits tend to pass in possession of the semi-independent authorities from Iraqi Kurdistan and Basra area. The stake of oil revenues explains not only the intensification of fights between Shiite and Sunnite communities but the approval of a new law for the state's federalization.

Despite the internal disputes, inter-religious conflicts, and Al-Qaeda attacks, there are some profitable oil businesses in Iraq from which local leaders benefit, also Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and certainly transnational companies.

A forceful military, land, navy and air disposition – mainly American – protects the extraction, the process, and the export of oil and natural gases' products to Eastern Asia, European Union, and North America. Recently, UN peace forces (preponderant NATO) were deployed to South Lebanon⁵, in order to consolidate the Mediterranean flank of this strategic disposition that is vital for world's economy.

To the East of Iraq, US-Iran tensions are primarily confrontations associated to oil resources competition, too. The Teheran Islamist regime aims to discourage any US' attempt to insert Iran by force in the world's economic circuits through its nuclear program. Meantime, the Russian-American, Russian-Chinese, and American-Chinese games of interests overlap the American-Iranian tensions. Threatened by the George W. Bush's Administration, the Teheran authorities insistently appeal to Russian Federation and China protection.

The notable advances of influence's extension of Chinese economy in Central Asia are very

interesting. A strategic pipeline connects already Kazakhstan to China. Other strategic pipeline will be rapidly built from Turkistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan to Eastern China⁶. Chinese specialists are also very active in hydrocarbon areas from Iran and Pakistan. Consequently, the "Great Game" of Caspic oil will be played between USA, Russian Federation, EU, and China. Thus the contiguous states (Kazakhstan, Turkistan, Iran, and Azerbaijan) must soon take into account a new regional context.

In the near future it may be possible for these countries to be constrained to make diplomatic-economic and military choices hard to imagine in the past: to integrate in Shanghai Group or in different forms of association with NATO and EU.

Also, the various military conflicts from Southern and South-Eastern Asia are associated with the problems of the hydrocarbon resources' capitalization. There are also some speculations referring to the fact that military operations of NATO and US in Afghanistan and Pakistan may target creation of an alternative route from Central Asia to Indian Ocean. In Bangladesh, the Islamist radicals act with violence against authorities and foreign companies, and in Pakistan, the rich oil Balochistan militates for independence. The long time civil conflict from Aceh area⁷ (Western Indonesia) is associated with the distribution of the benefits resulted from hydrocarbons' capitalization between local people and central power. Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, China, and Philippines compete for region's maritime deposits. Military dictatorship from Burma is subject of the "cross-fire" of local guerrillas, China, India, Thailand, and regional and transnational companies. Eastern Timor became the scene of internal fights in the framework of hydrocarbons competition between Indonesia and Australia.

The tensions, crises, and conflicts from Africa⁸ were caused by traditional ethnic and tribal or religious causes, territorial disputes, etc. But, in the last decades it has recorded an interference of these confrontations with the amplification of international competition for resources, especially oil.

Thus, the economic competition in Africa from oil point of view is focalized on foreign companies' competition. Various forcible means are used such as: bribe of local leaders, political support for some regimes, etc. The population has a relative



profit from an economic and living standard point of view where there are powerful leaders who succeeded to converge under their influence all of the interests groups, as in Libya and Gabon. On the other hand, there are countries like Nigeria or Angola where corruption is the “password”, and state and oil companies’ lack of transparency hide almost everything in that field excepting the pollution effects: biosphere destruction, miserable living conditions of population, and high mortality rate. In that framework, the oil may be the real chance for Africa.

But, today it remains preponderant a chance for Occident. The correlation between international disputes for hydrocarbons and other resources and local conflicts is visible in: civil war from Sudan (carried out in oil areas from East, South, and West and even in Darfur); repeatedly rebellions from Chad; recent Islamist coup d’état from Mauritania; Islamists’ constant action in Algeria; rebellions of populations from Nigerian Delta; civil war from the two Congo republics, especially in the Ituri area from the Democratic Republic of the Congo frontier with Uganda and Rwanda. Angola was a long time in civil war. The dictatorships from Equatorial Guinea or Sao Tome and Principe are sustained by transnational companies. The secessionist movement survived in Eastern Nigeria due to Ibo population.

Experts consider that the powerful international companies aim at a complex strategy in Africa. This includes: the introduction of hydrocarbon resources into world economy circuits; markets’ liberalization; encouraging the stable political regimes and solving the local conflicts by negotiations in the framework of African Union and UN.

Generally, the Anglo-American companies dominate the continent. These companies are sometimes in competition with the French ones and counter the extension of Chinese influence, especially in Sudan.

3. Conclusions

Hydrocarbons competition appears to dominate the beginning of the millennium with a special focus on the states from Gulf, Caspian Basin, Eastern and Western Siberia, Western Africa, South-East Asia, etc. The fact that disputes and conflicts are concentrated in those areas is interesting.

For that matter, the closest link between energy resources and conflict derives from two of their essential characteristics: the vital importance for economic and military nations’ power and the unequal geographic distribution.

The problem of energy resources’ exhaustion and energy security prevails the agenda of international actors. The hydrocarbons competition in the contemporary world remains yet an important source of crises and conflicts. It has a peculiar role in polarization and/or catalysis of forces as long as the demand rises more quickly than the supply, and major hydrocarbon reserves are placed in areas characterized by profound political-economic unbalances and instability.

Still, if the economic competition on world oil and natural gases market will function on clear competition rules, the starting of political-military crises and conflicts will not be a matter-of-course.

Additionally, in the energy field, the major actors must take into consideration the challenges of globalization process, the numerous local or regional disputes and conflicts, any dysfunction or vulnerability from one side of the world (of a energy source) affecting the consumers from the hole world.

Probably, the most adequate solution in the actual epoch is the democratization and securitization of sources with preponderant non-military means. Also, interdependence, not energy independence, may be the most viable way to solve out the rising consumption of energy resources.

NOTES:

¹ GILPIN, Robert, **The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century**, Polirom Publishing House, Bucharest, 2004, p. 64.

² DUFOUR, Jean-Louis, **The International Crises**, Corint Publishing House, Bucharest, 2002, pp. 181-184.

³ FRUNZETI, Teodor; Vladimir Zodian (coord.), **2005 World. Politic and Military Encyclopedia**, CTEA Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005, p. 354.

⁴ Ibidem, pp. 258-260.

⁵ UN, *United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)*, www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil.



GEOPOLITICS AND GEOSTRATEGIES ON THE FUTURE'S TRAJECTORY

⁶ Energy Information Administration, *Country Analysis Brief - China*, www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/China/Full.html.

⁷ International Crisis Group, *Crisis Watch*, www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=49.

⁸ World Factbook 2007, www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook.

Cristian BĂHNĂREANU (cristibahnareanu@gmail.com) is a research assistant at the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University „Carol I”, Romania. He is a doctoral student in Military Sciences.



POLAND VIS-À-VIS THE WEST EUROPEAN UNION AND EUROPEAN MILITARY TOOLS

Janusz SOLAK, PhD

Poland's policy towards West European Union (WEUO) and the adequate European defence tools, without taking advice from anyone, puts Poland's allies in a difficult position, rouses contradiction and amazement. After Poland, together with Spain, blocked the Union's Constitution, there were fears that in the future Poland may block the votes and counteract the European Union's plans on the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Instead of becoming an active participant of the discussion, it takes the tactic of observing the Americans and become dependent on Washington's decision that conditions the "European" policy not to be, in any case, against NATO.

The Poland's "ambivalent" strategy (on politics and security – the full orientation towards the US, on the economic aspect – waiting for a larger assistance from EU) did not bring the expected profits. On one hand, weakens Polish position on the international arena, and on the other hand – per saldo – it turns profitable both in the objective state of the Polish reasoning and in the subjective citizens' attitudes.

Poland, by its President Lech Kaczyński, showed the need to put into place an army of the European Union, "NATO-affiliated", with 100000 soldiers that "may react in critical situations everywhere in the world and may defend Europe".¹ This initiative – without taking advice from anyone – did not "land" on a fertile area and troubled Poland's allies.

The European Union distanced itself from this idea and stated that the process for creating European military forces is so advanced, that adopting the Polish assumptions in this matter would require the total modification of the actual Union's policy. Putting into place an independent army of the European Union, that should be politically subordinated to the President of the European Commission, and military led by NATO, would open a new debate on security policy issue.

This is absolutely unrealistic, as the security policy does not fall into Community's prerogatives, and the European Commission does not have the decisional power. The European Union did not consciously subordinate NATO detachments and this not because the Alliance is dominated by the US, but because it wants to have a military tool of its Common Foreign and Security Policy.

In Germany, the proposal was welcomed with scepticism. Worries were raised mainly by the idea that this units should act within NATO. That would mean the European armies to be led from Washington; regarding Germany – the approval on using the military force is given by Bundestag — this would be rather impossible. Berlin understood that "Poles perceive the national-conservatory Europe not only as a threat (...) Due to their permanent fear of Russia and Germany, they are convinced that the European integrated military forces will be useful for their country. (...) As Germany and France are perceived as unfavourable to Poland, they should be organised in a matter that will allow them a lesser influence. That is why the planned armed force should be not under the chief of governments' subordination, but the European Commission's and NATO's".²

The Polish proposal, the "NATO-fication" of the EU's detachments, aroused both opposition and astonishment, as the process of creating the EU's military capabilities is ongoing, including Poland's participation.

Ireland justified the proposal refusal for creating EU's military forces NATO-affiliated by the provision stated in the Irish Constitution. It will not participate to any solution that implies the idea of common defence. The possible participation of its military forces in the actions of the Community fighting detachments and rapid intervention forces will consist of the so-called triple assurance (the Government's decision, supported by the Parliament's approval for the mission that is authorized by UN). The position expressed by



Dublin states that any decision referring to the EU's Security and Defence Policy are adopted by the unanimity principle. In this context, the Polish policy was destructive.

The Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, warned on the danger of organising "beauty contests" between NATO and EU and excluded the introduction of the topic of the relations between EU and NATO on the agenda of the NATO Riga summit (November, 28-29, 2006).

The end of the confrontation between East and West, the unification of Germany, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the definitive breakdown of the Yalta order that split Europe in areas of interest, have made the development directions of the European security architecture to become a permanent element of the discussions within international organizations and within the institutions that were looking for the most effective solutions, the ones to be able to handle the current and the potential challenges on the European security. The new European order relies on the concept of the cooperative security system that is based on the collaboration between independent institutions: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU) and the Conference (later on the Organization) for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

NATO's expansion has become one of the priorities of the complex strategy. Within this system, the Alliance played the role of a central chain, organizing a multilateral cooperation on security. Its European pillar was the Western European Union (WEU), reactivated and especially preferred by France and Germany, supporting the actions of the future European Union on security and defence. The fact that WEU received the mission of elaborating the Union's policy on security and defence resulted from the fact that it was the only European organization having a military nature and from the fact that, at that time, 9 of its 12 members were part of the European Community (Denmark, Greece and Ireland were out of WEU).³

However, OSCE was to become a partnership forum, a way to cooperate, to find a mutual understanding and to discuss on issues related with the European security. During the debate related with the model of security in the 21st century, a larger support was allotted to the British proposal.

They stated to create a "cooperative security platform" whose purpose would be to strengthen the European security by cooperation and by common actions of NATO, EU/WEU and OSCE, however, maintaining their particularities, identities and the right to expand their own structures.

The main idea of the new European structures within WEU was the intention to develop armed forces, separate of NATO, able to achieve military tasks, on preventing and solving out armed conflicts, on humanitarian assistance and - more importantly, although not often mentioned - ready to assume "back-up functions", if the United States stops to be interested in a European military presence. The decisions on using these forces in the inflammable regions out of NATO's area of responsibility were to be taken by WEU on UN or OSCE initiative.

The EU Helsinki Declaration (1999), that requested the put in place, up to 2003, of the European Rapid Reaction Force, was just as distant as the perspective of sending this sort of troops outside Europe.⁴ A threat for the whole plan seemed to be the tendency of the European leaders to pretend they achieved certain purposes, although it was not the case. However, EU allowed the armies of third-party countries to participate in crisis operations under its flag: six NATO members that were not part of EU (the Czech Republic, Island, Norway, Poland, Hungary and Turkey) and nine countries that were not NATO members and were on their way of becoming EU ones (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia). Poland behaved ambiguously: it is true, it stated a brigade (employing only staff) that may comprise 2-4 battalions and an air group for search and rescue (three planes, out of which one is allotted for transport), a group for maritime support (two maritime dredgers and a rescue ship), and military gendarmes, but it did not specified the exact number of soldiers assigned for ERRF, justifying it by the mobility in choosing soldiers for different missions. Indeed, the above mentioned military units were to participate both at NATO and EU missions, based on the "double subordination principle".

This Polish hesitation was more obvious during the discussions on the Treaty establishing the European Constitution that almost ended with a disaster. During the Bruxelles meeting from 2003, Poland, using the absurd motto "Nice or



death”, together with Spain, blocked the European Constitution. There were serious vocal concerns in Berlin and Paris, worried that Poland may block the voting and may undermine the Community plans on the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Not without a reason. This issue has been postponed in Poland for some time, and the alternating Cabinets stepped aside for adopting a clearer position, as it has never been firmly formulated.

However, not without Europeans’ fault. When Poland signed the European Agreement (1991), establishing relations with the European Community, there was no CFSP. It was put into practice before Poland joined NATO, when being a member of the transatlantic structures was one of the main purposes of the Polish foreign policy. It was an element of a wider strategy, estimated for the integration within Western economical, political and military structures and was supported by the Polish political elites and the civil society. Joining NATO represented real and credible security guarantees, and the feeling that, if an external aggression, it will be put in place the collective defence mechanism.

Therefore, NATO was perceived as a community of states whose cooperation is based on respecting the fundamental values – democracy and market economy. Regarding WEU and the cooperation with its active members – for example, inside the Weimar triangle (Poland, Germany, France) - , Warsaw intended to collaborate for creating the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), but considered that developing this identity is an complete process, related with the reinforcement of the role played by NATO (only if based on complementarity and the respect towards the autonomy of different organizations: NATO, WEU and OSCE, in order to state clearly the limits of their competencies, creating mechanisms for cooperation).

When Poland joined these two organizations, a very important role was played by the concept of Combined Joint Task Force. Instead of being an active partner during these discussions, Warsaw (the previous experiences during IFOR operations led to the fact that Poland could bring a real and constructive contribution) preferred to chose the convenient tactic of watching the Americans and to connect its decision with Washington’s position, stressing out that the “European” policy can not be against the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Warsaw hoped that the changes made during the Nice Summit (2000) will determine a better functioning of the Common Foreign and Security Policy – as a crucial complement of the ongoing development of the European Security and Defence Policy.⁵ Poland, as a NATO and EU member, supported the building of military and civilian community capabilities that represented both the European pillar of NATO and used the Alliance’s resources. Exaggerating a little, it stated it will make efforts for making a suitable contribution, both military and civilian, to these capacities. That is why it made the assumption of the gradual harmonisation of acquisitions and the European Armament market, in a way that should ensure the use of capacities and experiences specific to all EU members. It asserted that the Community efforts on operational capacities and on Prague Capabilities Commitment, should complete and support mutually (for example, by having European forces assigned for peace operations), so that there will be ensured a total complementarity between EU and NATO actions. Therefore, Warsaw supported the initiatives aiming the structural strengthening, cooperation and common working actions of these two organizations, effectively using their resources, taking into consideration that ESDI was to make EU one of the most important partners of US. However, the American military presence in Europe was to continuously reinforce the safety feeling in its transatlantic and European dimension. For Poland, the Europe’s unifying future was a too important issue to leave it to the “grumbling” Europeans. When EU and NATO were “forced” to walk on different ways, Poland’s destiny in NATO — at least this is how it was considered by Warsaw — was more than just the passive observation of the Alliance’s gradual erosion by the assertive European Union. There were fears that ESDI will undermine NATO’s existence and, consequently, it will deteriorate the American position in Europe, and supporting such a policy means blindly “selling” the national interests to the European Union.

Once the European Union enlarged with Romania and Bulgaria (27 countries) the achievement of the Europe’s unifying project came to the moment when ESDP has become a necessity. There have also become necessary the concrete actions on building a clearer image of Poland as a country that is open to a more constructive



participation to ESDP, as the Polish implication in EU's concrete actions was inexistent, due to a rather cautious or negative rhetoric. Warsaw was aware by the fact that the pro-Atlantic policy was already an element so imprinted in the Poland's foreign perception (although not always accepted by the EU partners), that it could not represent a plan for achieving this purpose.

On one hand, Poland's image may be improved by increasing Warsaw's implications in the debates within ESDP on topics that are not directly related to NATO. It was absolutely necessary to insert the issue of the European Security Strategy on the schedule of bilateral consultations and contacts, both with EU member-states and other partners, in parallel with the promotion of strategy, as a document elaborated with Warsaw's active participation, fully reflecting the Poland interests. On the other hand, there were some practical actions, such as the contribution to EU's military and civilian capabilities.

In military field, it was reasonable our implication in planning and achieving the mission from Bosnia-Herzegovina, after overtaking SFOR from NATO and the action related with the supplementation of job vacancies, in order to support the European Military General Staff. Taking into consideration Europe's negative reactions after Poland chose the American multi-role plane F16 (derived, nota bene, from the lack of information in the existent or planned programs related to the collaboration between the Polish industry and the European producers), it was very important to coordinate the vision of developing the Polish defence industry with the Community's initiatives, aimed to build a common armament and orders market. The contribution on civilian capabilities was represented by the police forces', legal experts' and civilian office clerks' training and by the implementation of the procedures related with crisis management.

However, the most significant change had to be in the foreign policy and the rhetoric cultivated around it. There should have been stopped the use of EU and NATO by the political fractions in their internal political games. Especially Warsaw unjustifiably feared that the Community policy may "hamper" NATO.

When the cooperation at European level started being profitable, paradoxically, the Americans began to hinder it. Because of Afghanistan. The

rapid increase of military forces in that region became an utter priority for the Americans and for the Europeans. The United States wanted the military contingents to come from Europe and promised to leave behind the plans referring to NATO's involvement in Iraq, an issue that Poland strongly supported. In exchange, France and Germany were ready to involve in Afghanistan. That was the moment when the Americans presented their concept on the "Wider Middle East" (this region was an important element of the world's security, not only because of the natural resources, as its stability was also beneficial for the European partners), that was a test for NATO's unity. EU focused on Bosnia, but the Americans, despite the previous agreements, postponed too much the mission's overtake. EU was to take the responsibility in Sarajevo, maintaining there the leading structures. This actually meant the Community military forces' placement under American trusteeship. Unexpectedly, at that time, the traditional pro-US Great Britain joined the group that is sceptical regarding the US policy, formed of France and Germany. They went further: after years of dispute, they decided to strengthen their cooperation in this area.

In Warsaw, the German-French-British "triangle" produced confusing feelings. First of all, because the United States did not like it. In a practical example of this "structural collaboration", inside ESDP, it perceived a competing structure to NATO. Secondly, Poland was also achieving its European purposes in the regional dialogue (The Weimar triangle), and the creation of any "leading group" inside EU denied the idea of European integration. On the Security and Defence Policy, Warsaw was ready to join the "hard nucleus" that was implementing this policy.

Regarding the comments on Poland's position as a EU and NATO member, we stress out the fact that after the Cold War, NATO became a centre attracting the new democracies that were looking for possibilities for joining its political and military structures, they are clichéd. It was thought that by the NATO's expansion with states from the Central and Eastern Europe, the Alliance will become for them what the West Europe was for a long time – a security guarantor. However, when it comes about EU, there were some key-words stamped: lifting the Iron Curtain, opening the borders for the circulation without visas and without custom



taxes, the common monetary, economical and educational policy, or the controversial “Europe of countries” and its opposite – “The United States of Europe”.

Going back to the process for Poland to join NATO, it is worth to mention that a key-role for the whole process was played not only by the US stand, but also by the Great Britain, Germany and France, that is the EU’s “hard nucleus”. Their governments, although officially supporting the Polish aspirations to become a member of NATO and EU, they considered this issue instrumentally, mainly taking into consideration their own interests and less the real or imaginary historical merits of Poland. In exchange, they were expecting a concrete support and decisive actions. As the simple statement of assimilating the democratic values, the rules of the market economy and other things, because Poland was already put them into practice, when started the discussions regarding joining NATO and EU, was not a sufficient reason for these two organisations’ expansion. NATO is not just an organization whose main task was strengthening the democratic transformations, and EU not only a supra-national ministry of economy.

Having Poland becoming an EU member meant the need to define its place and role in the European political, security and policy institutions. Using the “double” own strategy – from political and security perspective, a fully orientation towards the United States; from economical point of view, waiting for a consistent assistance from the European Union – neither brought the expected benefits from the United States, nor stimulated the European partners’ trust. Consequently, it determined the failing of Poland’s position on the international arena.

However, despite these controversial things and the divergent opinions – the fact that Poland joined both NATO and EU proved to be (so far) beneficial, both from the objective Polish estate reasoning, and from the citizens’ subjective perspective. Both aspects were precisely defined by Leszek Kołakowski. In his book, **Mini-wyklady o maxi-sprawach**, he wrote: *From the numerous wars, big or small, that were in any part of the world after the end of the First World War, in none the combatant parts were democratic countries – tyranny gives birth to war.*⁶

NOTES:

¹ CIENSKI J., WAGSTYL S., *Poland proposes an EU army tied to NATO*, Financial Times, 5.11.2006. <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/603c955a-6d06-11db-9a4d-0000779e2340.html>. See also CIENSKI J., WAGSTYL S., *Transcript of the FT’s interview with President Kaczynski*, Financial Times, 6.11.2006, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/aca4ec46-6ceb-11db-9a4d-0000779e2340.html>

² SCHÜLLER K., *Kaczynski gegen Kaczynski*, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 07.11.2006.

³ *Deklaracja państw członkowskich UZE w sprawie roli UZE i jej stosunków z UE i NATO*. „Studia i Materiały PISM”, 1994, nr 76, t. 1, s. 52. Zob. też: *Deklaracja lizbońska Rady Ministrów UZE, Lizbona, 15 maja 1995 r.*; PARZYMIĘS S., *UZE a Europa Środkowa i Wschodnia. Dokumenty z lat 1994-1999*, Warszawa 2000.

⁴ PRZYBOROWSKA-KLIMCZAK A., *Traktaty Wspólnot Europejskich, Jednolity Akt Europejski, Traktat z Maastricht, Układ Europejski*, Dokumenty europejskie t.1, Lublin 1996.

⁵ NATO Press Release (2002)/142.

⁶ L. KOŁAKOWSKI, *Mini-wyklady o maxi-sprawach*, Znak, 2003.

Janusz SOLAK, PhD (janusz.solak@orange.pl), works for the National Defence Academy from Warsaw and Lodz Academy of International Studies. Between 1999 and 2003 he was in a diplomatic mission in Romania and the Republic of Moldova. His research area comprises the international relations, security policy, military doctrines and European states’ strategies. He published articles in scientific periodicals and some books, among we mention: Niemcy w NATO (Germany in NATO - 1998), Siedemnaście kroków do NATO (Seventeen steps to NATO - 1999), Rumunia. Narodowe i ponadnarodowe aspekty integracji ze strukturami euroatlantyckimi (Romania. National and extranational aspects of the integration within Euro-Atlantic structures - 2004).



SECURITY CONCEPTS - FIELD OF COORDINATION, COOPERATION, COMPETITION FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

Pascu FURNICĂ

In this article, the security concepts of the three major European Security Institutions, namely NATO, EU and OSCE, will be analyzed in order to identify their commonalities and distinctiveness, and to sustain the fact that European Security Institutions are able to cooperate in the field of security and defence, despite the differences between how they understand this domain.

In this respect, the documents that explain the way in which these organizations understand and apply their security concepts will be analyzed.

1. Introduction

Consideration of the issues of *war* and *peace* has played an important role in defining the schools of thoughts during the evolution of the social sciences. Despite the fact that peace and war studies could be traced back in the history from ancient Greek thinkers, the establishment of international relations as a distinctive discipline at the beginning of the twentieth century was a consequence of the attempts to understand the causes of World War I and attempts to avoid such a stalemate to happen again.

As one of the main concepts used in International Relation, security was and still is one of the most contested ones. As Hyde-Price mentions in *"Beware the Jabbewock"*, "[e]ven before the demise of the Cold War, traditional state-centric and military-focused approaches to security studies were being questioned by a growing number of scholars and practitioners¹. Hyde-Price continues by stating that at the end of the "short twentieth century"², the environment dramatically changed in Europe and the old approaches to security of Bismarck and Wilson (to contrast two of the extremes of these concepts) had to be replaced by others that fit better to the multidimensional characteristics of the European Security landscape today.

Helga Haftendorn emphasizes the ambiguity of *security*, as an international relations concept, stating that "the term security is ambiguous in content as in format: is it a goal, an issue-area, a concept, a research program, or a discipline.

There is no one concept of security; 'national security', 'international security' and 'global security' refer to different sets of issues and have their origins in different historical and philosophical contexts."³

All these difficulties in understanding security and the concepts related to it increased in the last fifteen years. The end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar balance of power in Europe and in the world made the concept of security one of the most disputed concepts in international relations.

As a result of all these changes, the European Security Institutions adapted their security concepts to the changing environment. These changes make the task of comparing these security concepts an interesting one.

In this paper, we will analyze the security concepts of the three major European Security Institutions, namely NATO, EU and OSCE in order to identify their commonalities and distinctiveness⁴, to sustain our argument from the previous research paper: the answer to the question if all the European Security Institution are able to work together is a "conditional yes".

In order to compare them, we will analyze the documents that explain the way in which these organizations understand and apply their security concepts. we have chosen the documents we considered that define the organizations' individual understanding of *security* as a concept and provide guidance for the institutions how these concepts are to be applied.



2. Security concepts in the institutions' basic documents: comparative analysis

The most important documents that should be studied in order to better identify the institutions' security concepts are the European Security Strategy, for EU, the Alliance's Strategic Concept, for NATO, and OSCE Handbook.

1. *Defining security concepts in the institutions' basic documents*

In order to understand the institutional meaning of the concepts of security, the three documents mentioned above should be scrutinized.

NATO Strategic Concept contains a chapter called "Part III - The Approach to Security in the 21st Century". In this chapter, the Alliance's understanding of security is made clear to the reader. It mentions that "The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension."⁵ NATO gives to "defence" the adjective "indispensable", stating clearly that it will keep defence as its first priority, but recognizes that adding to it other factors (political, economic, social and environmental), the value of defence is improved. NATO continues recognizing that a broader understanding of defence forms the basis to accomplish the Alliance's fundamental security task. In the same paragraph, the need to collectively build a security architecture in Europe and the fact that there are other organizations that deal with the same issue (European Security) are recognized. The paragraph ends emphasizing that the defence commitments are the basis for agreement on NATO policies.

European Security Strategy does not make a clear definition of the security concept, but analyzing *Chapter II Strategic Objectives*, the EU security concept could be clearly understood. In the first paragraph, the Strategy states that "We need both to think globally and to act locally."⁶

Then the European Security Strategy states that "Our traditional concept of self-defence – up to and including the Cold War – was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more dangerous. State failure and

organised crime spread if they are neglected – as we have seen in West Africa. This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early."⁷

The EU emphasizes the fact that it is ready to become an important actor in the field of security policy and showing that by extending its responsibilities "step by step by Treaties of Maastricht (1993), Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2001)", it can play a major role in Europe and in Europe's neighbourhood.

The OSCE Handbook presents comprehensively the organization's approach to security. "Since the beginning of the Helsinki process in 1973, the CSCE and now the OSCE, has taken a broad and comprehensive view of security. The protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, along with economic and environmental co-operation, are considered to be just as important for the maintenance of peace and stability as politico-military issues, and as such are an integral component of OSCE activities."⁸ OSCE presents security as "interconnected and interdependent – security is regarded as indivisible. A continuous effort is being made by the OSCE Participating States to enhance the complementarity of the various dimensions of security (politico-military, economic, human).

Another example of the comprehensive nature of security in the OSCE context is to be seen in the fact that the Organization is active in all phases of the conflict cycle, from early warning and conflict prevention to conflict management and post-conflict rehabilitation."⁹

The cooperative approach of security is clearly mentioned in the next paragraphs of the Handbook, stating that it is the "only security institution or organization in Europe that is considered a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, and is therefore the primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation in its region".¹⁰

From this short review of the three most important documents it could be understood that all three institutions give an important place to defining their scope in the European Security Environment.



2. *What is similar and what is different in these definitions of the European Institutions' security concepts?*

While NATO and OSCE state their security concepts very clearly, the European Union's definition of its security concept is not clearly stated, but could be understood by studying Chapter II, Strategic Objectives. The meaning of this fact is that the EU Security Strategy is the result of a long negotiation and, avoiding a clear definition, the way for compromise and flexibility is wider opened.

Stating clearly the Alliance's security strategy in its Strategic Concept, NATO shows that developing such a document which commits the Alliance as a whole to plan its future is a task that had been done before. It demonstrates the Alliance's experience in developing this type of documents and the ability of the politico-military staff to operate with these terms. Clear statement related to its first priority (defence) and its main task (safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means¹¹), coupled with the recognition of other tasks that should complement the Alliance's first priority, provide for a better accommodation of NATO with the new security environment and with the decrease in importance of the "hard security means" in exchange with the increase of the "soft security" methods to encounter some of the new risks that the member states could and should face (*crisis management* and *partnership* are added to its core tasks of *security*, *consultation* and *defence* and *deterrence*¹²).

OSCE presents in its Handbook its objectives for the next years. It clearly states the Institution's goals and the areas where it is interested to act. The "co-operative approach" and the need for co-operation are emphasized, showing the will to maintain the organization at a high level of presence in the European Security environment. OSCE also emphasizes what is considered to be its unique characteristics and capabilities: the contradiction between its legal status under the international law (its decisions are not legally binding), the fact that it possesses a permanent structure (decision making bodies, permanent staff and headquarters, resources and field offices) and its unique characteristic as the only security institution that is considered a regional arrangement, according to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. OSCE assumes that, by these unique characteristics, it is the primary institution

required to act in security issues in the region covered by its membership. These tasks and its primacy are facts that are self-assumed and not necessarily recognized by other institutions, but they show that OSCE is determined to continue to play a role in the European Security Environment.

The analysis of the security concepts defined in the Institutions' basic documents brings to the conclusion that they could be considered as compatible and that they complete each other by emphasizing different aspects of security. Meanwhile, NATO continues to place *defence* as its main idea of security, EU emphasizes the need to act before the crisis occurs. OSCE has adopted a more comprehensive concept, stating that it should be active in all phases of the conflict cycle, from early warning to post-conflict rehabilitation.

Speaking about the geographic area that each of these organizations intent to cover, there are clear differences. NATO limits its interest to Euro-Atlantic Area, and mentions surrounding areas (Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean Area) in the paragraphs related to co-operation and partnership, so not of interest for the first priority: defence.

EU expands its area of concern globally, speaking about its operations in Democratic Republic of Congo and Afghanistan, but by using the phrase "[w]e need both to think globally and act locally"¹³, limiting its area of real action to Europe and its neighbourhood. Also, by mentioning the conflicts in the proximity of Europe and giving clear guidance related to the need to broader engage with the Arab World, bring into attention the future probability to embark on the international efforts to solve these conflicts.

OSCE, as an inclusive security institution, is concerned with accomplishing its objectives in the area covered by its membership, area that anyway is wider than the ones covered by the other two organizations.

3. Conclusions

The informal hierachization of the security institutions in Europe is re-emphasized by the analysis of their security concepts. The clarity of NATO's security concept, its focus on the defence and the recognition of the value-added by the other tasks (partnership and co-operation) and organizations interest in preserving the peace



and security reinforce the Alliance's place as "the most equal among equals". EU, because of its characteristics and maybe because of the fact that one of its most important steps in the field of security and defence (the creation of the EU's Battlegroups) was not achieved and it was postponed, does not challenge the NATO's position. OSCE has a good definition of its security concept and, having its focus mainly on means other than force to solve the conflicts, continues to accomplish its assumed tasks and tries to maintain its place in the European Security environment.

Analyzing the three security concepts, we conclude that three major European security institutions are on the way to coordinate their efforts in the complex European environment and, despite the overlapping and competition that still exists, there are areas in which they could cooperate because of the complementarities that exist among their security concepts.

REFERENCES:

- Council of the European Union. European Security Strategy (Brussels, 2003).
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Alliance's Strategic Concept (Washington DC, 1999).
- Secretariat of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, *OSCE Handbook*. (Vienna, 2002).
- PETERS, Ingo, *The OSCE, NATO and the EU within the 'Network of Interlocking European Security Institutions': Hierachization, Flexibility, Marginalization*, **OSCE Yearbook 2003**, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004.
- HYDE-PRICE, Adrian. *Beware the Jabbewock*: Security Studies in the Twenty-First Century, in Heinz GAERTNER, Adrian HYDE-PRICE, Erich REITER (eds.), **Europe's New Security Challenges**, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001.
- Helga HAFTENDORN, *The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security*, *International Studies Quarterly*, 35:1 (1991).
- BORCHERT, Heiko, *Strengthening Europe's Security Architecture: Where Do We Stand? Where*

Should We Go?, **OSCE Yearbook 1999**, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000.

- BORCHERT, Heiko, MAURER, Daniel, *Cooperation, Rivalry or Insignificance? Five Scenarios for the Future of Relations between the OSCE and the EU*, **OSCE Yearbook 1999**, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000.

- TUDYKA, Kurt P, *The Quartet of European Institutions and Its Prospects*, **OSCE Yearbook 1998**, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999.

- van HAM, Peter, *EU, NATO, OSCE – Interaction, Cooperation, and Confrontation*, in Gunther HAUSER, Franz KERNIG (eds.), **Handbook for European Security**, Bern, Peter Lang, 2005.

NOTES:

¹ Adrian HYDE-PRICE, *Beware the Jabbewock: Security Studies in the Twenty-First Century*, 29.

² E. HOBSBAWN, **Age of Extremes: The Short Twenties Century 1914 – 1991**, ed. Michel JOSEPH (London 1994).

³ Helga HAFTENDORN, *The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security*, in *International Studies Quarterly*, 35:1 (March 1991), 3.

⁴ This article is meant to be a new argument for the capability of these institutions to co-operate, sustained in a previous paper, *The European security environment: coordination, cooperation, competition*, published in the previous issue of the Strategic Impact magazine.

⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, Part III, para. 25

⁶ Council of the EU, *European Security Strategy*, 6.

⁷ Council of the EU, *European Security Strategy*, 7.

⁸ Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, *OSCE Handbook*, 1.

⁹ Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, *OSCE Handbook*, 2.

¹⁰ Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, *OSCE Handbook*, 3.

¹¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, Part I, para. 6.

¹² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, Part I, para. 10.

¹³ Council of the EU, *European Security Strategy*, 6.

Colonel Pascu FURNICĂ (puiu125@gmail.com) is director of the Joint and Multinational Operations Course from the Crisis Management and Multinational Operations College within the National Defence University "Carol I". He had different ranks at tactical and operational level up to 1999, when he was appointed in different positions within the Regional Training Centre NATO/PfP. For the time being he is a student at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, the Civil-Military Relations Program. This article is the result of studies on the structure of the international security.



SECURITÉ HUMAINE ET QUALITÉ DE LA VIE DANS LE CONTEXTE D'INTEGRATION EUROPÉENNE DE LA ROUMANIE

Petre DUȚU, PhD

Sécurité humaine et la qualité de vie sont deux aspects de la réalité quotidienne. Elles sont interdépendantes et dépendante de milieu de sécurité national, régional et global. Une haute sécurité humaine demande une bonne qualité de vie. A son tour, une bonne qualité de vie demande l'assurance de la sécurité humaine. Tout le monde cherche tant une bonne qualité de vie qu'une haute sécurité humaine.

1. La sécurité humaine – bien publique

1.1. Le concept de sécurité humaine

A la fin de guerre froide, la communauté internationale a commencé de discuter sur la nécessité de définir du concept de sécurité dans le nouveau contexte mondial. Si le concept classique de sécurité se fonde sur l'Etat, de fait, sur la force armée, au présent, on donne une nouvelle interprétation de cette notion, l'accent possédant sur l'individu humaine. Autrement dite, la sécurité n'est plus associée avec la protection de l'Etat, mais elle a en vu la sécurité physique et psychique de personnes, leurs bien être économique et sociale, le respect de la dignité et de leurs valeurs, par la protection de droits et de libertés fondamentales. Par la suite, le concept de sécurité humaine se fonde ainsi sur les principes de justice sociale et de l'émancipation de l'individu, libérant de peur et de besoin.

Selon à la nouvelle conception sur "la sécurité humaine", les menaces et les défis a la sécurité transcende la défense nationale, le respect de lois et de l'ordre pour comprendre toutes les dimensions politiques, sociales, et économiques qui permet a tous les gens de vivre épargner de périls et de peur. Dans ce contexte, l'attention est passée de la sécurité de l'Etat à la sécurité à des hommes, sans qu'ainsi deux préoccupations se exclure réciproquement. La sécurité est, maintenant, vue

comme un "bien publique", qui répond à un besoin stratégique de favoriser un développement humain durable promouvant la paix, la stabilité nationales, régionales et mondiale.

Actuellement, la sécurité humaine est définie tant en sens large que le sens restreint. Dans une acception large, qui inspire la plupart des définitions du concept de sécurité humaine, celui-ci repose sur trois éléments fondamentaux: la portée de la sécurité humaine, l'importance des liens de causalité entre ses différentes composantes, et l'accent mis sur l'essentiel vital des personnes. Cette approche trouve son illustration à travers le concept de sécurité humaine préconisé par le Programme des Nations Unies pour le développement (PNUD) et par la Commission sur la sécurité humaine.

Selon le Rapport mondial sur le développement humain 1994 du PNUD 1994 intitulé: "Nouvelles dimensions de la sécurité humaine" qui est considéré comme étant la première initiative importante visant à exposer le concept de sécurité humaine, celui-ci est décrit comme ayant "deux aspects principaux: d'une part, la protection contre les menaces chroniques, telles que la famine, la maladie et la répression et, d'autre part, la protection contre tout événement brutal susceptible de perturber la vie quotidienne"¹. Dans cette définition du PNUD, la sécurité humaine est mise en relation avec sept dimensions auxquelles correspondent des types spécifiques de menaces. Ces dimensions sont les suivants: la *sécurité économique* qui recouvre l'accès à l'emploi et aux ressources, est menacée par la pauvreté; la *sécurité alimentaire*, signifiant l'accès matériel et économique à la nourriture pour tous et à tous moments, est confrontée à la menace de la faim et de la famine; la *sécurité sanitaire* et l'accès aux soins médicaux et à de meilleures conditions sanitaires faire face aux blessures et maladies; la *sécurité environnementale* affronte les menaces de pollution, de dégradation de



l'environnement mettant en danger la survie des personnes et de l'épuisement des ressources; la *sécurité personnelle* est contrariée par des menaces qui peuvent prendre plusieurs formes: des menaces exercées par l'Etat, des Etats étrangers, d'autres groupes de personnes (tensions ethniques), des menaces à l'encontre des femmes ou des enfants en raison de leur vulnérabilité et de leur dépendance; la *sécurité de la communauté* qui signifie que la plupart des personnes tirent leur sécurité de leur appartenance à un groupe social (famille, communauté, organisation, groupement politique, groupe ethnique, etc.), peut être menacée par des tensions survenant souvent entre ces groupes en raison de la concurrence pour l'accès limité aux opportunités et aux ressources; la *sécurité politique* qui doit garantir le respect des droits et libertés fondamentaux, est menacée par l'arbitraire et la répression.

Cette classification établie par le PNUD est importante en ce qu'elle fixe des limites très larges, qui tranchent par rapport aux tentatives passées de conceptualisation du concept de sécurité. Elle oblige, en outre, les autres définitions de la sécurité humaine à justifier leurs restrictions par rapport à ce point de départ. Par ailleurs, cette proposition de définition du PNUD sous-entend l'existence de sous-système interdépendant de la sécurité humaine qui entretiennent entre eux des interactions complexes dont les rapports garantissent l'équilibre et la pérennité du système lui-même. Ainsi, selon cette présentation, si la causalité du trouble l'interprétation restreinte du concept de sécurité humaine se focalise sur les menaces violentes qui pèsent sur les personnes. La conception de la sécurité humaine au sens étroit connaît elle-même trois autres variantes. La première visant uniquement à assurer l'intégrité physique de l'individu contre toute forme de violence, qu'elle résulte ou non d'un conflit. Les atteintes graves contre les droits des individus n'engendrant pas de violence, généralement incluses dans le concept de sécurité humaine au sens étroit, ne sont donc pas prises en compte. La deuxième variante consiste à lier les menaces à des situations conflictuelles.

Cette approche concerne les menaces liées aux mines anti-personnelles, à la prolifération des armes légères, à la protection des civils dans les situations de conflits armés (recrutement d'enfants soldats, personnes déplacées dans leur propre pays, sécurité des camps de réfugiés), au

respect du droit humanitaire par les acteurs non étatiques, et aux sanctions internationales ciblées afin d'éviter de faire souffrir la population civile. Enfin, la troisième variante prend en considération les menaces indépendantes à un conflit, mais qui sont pour autant déstabilisantes pour les individus. La sécurité humaine, ici, se rapporte à des menaces telles que les atteintes à la sécurité publique, le terrorisme, la cybercriminalité, le trafic d'êtres humains, les drogues illicites et le blanchiment d'argent. D'autre part, la sécurité humaine traite de la sauvegarde des libertés civiles essentielles. Il s'agit à la fois de protéger les gens contre les menaces aiguës qui pèsent sur leur sort et de leur donner les moyens de prendre leur destin en main.

Dans le même temps, la sécurité humaine concerne plusieurs types de liberté: liberté de la personne face à ces besoins, face à la peur, liberté d'agir en son propre nom.

1.2. La sécurité humaine-le fondement du développement humaine

La sécurité humaine n'est pas seulement un état mais elle représente un processus complexe dans laquelle se développent les conditions de la dignité humaine. En tant qu'état, la sécurité humaine se définit par l'ensemble de conditions sociales, économiques, psychosociales, politiques, culturelles, militaires et de l'environnement qui permettent l'existence et le développement de personnes, dans le sens qu'on ne peut pas en péril l'intégrité corporelle et psychique de ceux-ci, ainsi que de leurs biens et leurs propriétés, en permettant, en même temps, leur affirmation dans tous les aspects et sur tous les plans. De fait, les menaces sont celles qui apportent l'atteinte à la sécurité humaine. Ainsi, toute la gamme de menaces anciens ou nouvelles, depuis les pandémies et les catastrophes naturelles jusqu'aux changements climatiques et les chocs économiques, pèsent sur la sécurité humaine. C'est pourquoi on impose l'action concertée à tous les acteurs étatiques et non étatiques avec les responsabilités légales et/ou assumées en matière de la sécurité humaine pour assurer la protection des êtres humains contre tout type de menace, mais surtout à la violence.

Pratiquement, il est nécessaire de se produire "l'humanisation" de la sécurité, c'est-à-dire prendre en compte des individus humains lorsque on parle de la sécurité d'un territoire national. L'insécurité a des causes multiples qui passent



depuis épidémies jusqu'au les changements d'environnement. Par la suite, l'humanisation de la sécurité vise de protéger les personnes et les communautés humaines de violence. Elle pose l'accent prioritaire sur le manque de primordialité de droit, sur l'impossibilité de contrôler les conflits intra et interétatique, sur le manque de la transparence et l'impunité du chapitre d'affaires publiques et sur la présence du crime organisé et du terrorisme. Par la manière dans laquelle s'implique actif, l'Etat peut être autant la source que le facteur de diminuer de l'insécurité humaine.

Parmi les facteurs d'insécurité pour les êtres humaines on peut trouver: la survie et la gagner d'existence; les catastrophes naturelles; le crime et la violence; les conflits civiles et les guerres; les chocs et le stress provoquées par les facteurs macro- politiques; la vulnérabilité social.

Diminuer et/ou éliminer des facteurs d'insécurité impose qu'en toute la société humaine s'assurer: la primordialité de droit dans toutes les situations, de condition et de temps; la promotion de droits de la personne; la restriction de l'accès privilégié de les ressources économiques et financières; la garantie que sont posées en œuvre les mécanismes de résoudre non violent des conflits; l'établissement d'un niveau de stabilité politique suffisant pour encourager les individus d'investir dans un développement susceptible de mener à la diminution de pauvreté.

Parmi les domaines prioritaires dans lesquelles les organisations internationales et régionales, les gouvernements des Etats du monde et les organisations de la société civile (internationales, régionales et nationales) peuvent agir concrètement pour renforcer la sécurité humaine se trouvent: la bonne gouvernance (l'amplification d'impunité et de la transparence, surtout le renforcement des capacités humaines, dans le secteur public et dans la société civile); la transformation de la secteur de sécurité (le renforcement du contrôle démocratique de les autorités civiles élus démocratiquement sur les forces de sécurité, (s'insistant en particulier sur l'amélioration de la qualité d'appareil de justice pénale; la consolidation de la paix (l'intégration d'une perspective de la sécurité humaine dans toutes les aspects de consolidation de la paix tel que les gens désirent d'investir dans la reconstruction de leur société); partenariats (la collaboration avec des partenaires clé, y compris avec la société civile et le monde

d'affaire, non seulement avec les institutions de l'Etat ou intergouvernementales internationales et régionales); le développement des capacités au niveau local (le renforcement de la capacité d'intervention locale de participer au plan d'action pour la sécurité humaine, surtout les spécialistes civils en matière de sécurité humaine et de sécurité en général, d'une manière le plus possible). Dans ce contexte, s'impose l'augmentation du rôle de la société civile tant pour accentuer les responsabilités des institutions étatiques pour résoudre non violent les conflits sociaux, que de renforcer de liaison de l'organisations avec d'autres acteurs non gouvernementaux impliqués, dans une forme ou l'autre, dans le conflit.

En conclusion, la sécurité humaine place l'homme dans le milieu de ses préoccupations. Elle comprend le suivant ensemble: la dimension politique, (la violation de droits de l'homme et des principes démocratiques); la dimension individuelle (conflits, pauvreté, crimes liés de drogues, violence contre les femmes et les enfants, terrorisme); dimension alimentaire (en termes de disponibilité quantitative et qualitative de la nourriture); dimension sanitaire (maladies, pandémies, des maladies respiratoires résultes de la pollution de l'air); dimension économique (chômage, l'insécurité de la travaille, l'inégalité de revenus et des ressources, pauvreté et le manque du logement).

Au présent, la conception de la sécurité humaine a conquis terrain et elle est eu en vue aux tous les niveaux - international, régional et locale - envers tous les acteurs étatiques, intergouvernementaux et non étatiques impliqués actifs et responsable dans le domaine de sécurité.

La sécurité humaine contribue à la sécurité de l'Etat, donne une dimension supplémentaire au développement humaine et renforce les droits de l'homme. Elle contribue à la sécurité d'Etat parce qu'elle se concentre sur les personnes et prend en compte les risques qu'ils ne sont pas considérés par conséquent d'Etat. Elle contribue au développement humain par la croissance de l'équité sociale et de la diminution des facteurs de l'insécurité.

La sécurité humaine se propose comme objectives la libération de la personne humaine de la peur et du besoin, ainsi que le développement d'être humaine. Pour promouvoir ces libertés, la sécurité humaine propose une double protection



des personnes contre les périls: d'une part, la protection établi par les Etats et, d'autre part, la protection qu'est offerts par les agents internationaux avec le soutien de la société civile. Celui-ci demande un effort concerté et soutenu pour élaborer des normes, des procédures ainsi que la constitution des institutions (nationales, régionales, mondiales) que mettrions en œuvre. Les mesures d'habilitation sont destinées de développer les capacités humaines de résister aux adversités et de réaliser leur potentiel. L'éducation, l'information, le débat public, le tout faisant part d'un processus démocratique est essentiel pour promouvoir de la capacité individuelle et collective. La protection et l'habilité sont complémentaires et se renforcer réciproquement.

2. La qualité de la vie -une notion complexe

La qualité de la vie représente une notion complexe. Elle se caractérise par: la pluridimensionnelle (regarde tous les domaines importants de la vie); la dépendance non plus des conditions objectives de la vie mais de la perçu subjective que les individus ont (bien-être, satisfaction); ses lies avec les valeurs comme sont l'égalité de chance et la cohésion sociale. Pour son évaluation, on utilise des indicateurs qui représentent les aspects les plus importants de la vie d'une personne (le logement, l'éducation, l'activité et la finance du ménage). Les indicateurs servis à mesurer des phénomènes complexe et ils fournissent seulement une indication relative de la qualité de la vie réelle. Les divers indicateurs ont été divisées en: milieu sociale, milieu économique, environnement physique. Pratiquement, ils offrissent des informations sur: une bonne santé physique et psychique, des droits démocratiques équitables, une participation civique valable, des niveaux d'éducatons élevées, des conditions d'environnementales supérieurs, des services sociaux accessibles et un forte sentiment de sécurité². Dans le même temps, la qualité de vie est reflétée aussi par: la participation civique valable, la tolérance face de diversité, l'enseignement continu et l'accessibilité aux services sociaux.

Depuis les années 90, la notion de "qualité de vie" s'est démarquée comme étant une mesure nouvelle et essentielle de la santé et de la réussite du chaque pays du monde. S'inspirant de l'Indicateur du développement humain (IDH) élaboré dans les

années 90 par le Programme des Nations Unies pour le développement (PNUD), les indicateurs nationaux de qualité de vie mettent en évidence l'évaluation de la production en mesurant non seulement la productivité économique, mais aussi la santé, l'aide sociale, le bien-être et le capital social des citoyens. Le but de ces mesures de la qualité de vie est de fournir une évaluation du succès des villes qui soit plus détaillée et globale.

De fait, en 1990, l'ONU publiait son premier Rapport mondial sur le développement humain qui depuis, inclut chaque année le classement comparatif des pays selon l'indice du développement humain (IDH). L'IDH fournit un indice agrégatif du bien-être humain et classe les États selon la qualité de vie de leurs citoyens, ne se limitant plus aux strictes données économiques traditionnelles de chaque pays. Le premier Index IDH mesurait la qualité de vie selon trois composantes principales: le niveau de vie (PIB par habitant et revenu au dessus du seuil de pauvreté), le niveau de scolarité (alphabétisation des adultes et années de scolarité) et la longévité ou l'espérance de vie³.

Depuis la préparation de son premier rapport, l'ONU a élaboré quatre nouveaux indices: l'indicateur du développement humain, l'indicateur sexospécifique du développement humain, l'indicateur de la participation des femmes et l'indicateur de la pauvreté humaine.

Les indicateurs du développement humain sont profondément constructifs. Ils offrent non seulement un moyen approfondi de mesurer le bien-être d'un pays, mais ils servent aussi d'inciter la population à participer, à s'engager dans le dialogue civique et le débat. Les modèles nationaux d'IDH offrent un outil sur mesure pour cerner des données qui autrement sont rarement diffusées - telles des statistiques selon la répartition géographique, les groupes ethniques ou la division entre milieux ruraux et urbains - qui aident à identifier les écarts au titre du développement, à mesurer le progrès et à identifier les premiers signes de conflits potentiels en matière de politique de stratégie de développement.

Chaque année, depuis 1992, ont été publiés plus beaucoup de 400 des rapports sur le développement humaine régionale ou mondiale, ceux nationaux se referant au 135 de pays. D'habitude, les rapports nationaux sont axes sur l'analyse des facteurs clés, d'actualité a une moment donnée, dans le développement humaine de chaque pays.



Pratiquement, l'IDH sintérise trois dimensions du développement humain: les chances de vivre une vie long en santé, la valorisation de l'accès à l'éducation et l'atteint d'un standard décent de vie. Autrement dite, l'IDH se fonde sur la mesure de l'enseignement et de l'alphabétisation, et du niveau du revenu. Ultérieurement, a cet indicateur on ajouter d'autres indices supplémentaires qui ont le rôle de permettre une décrier adéquate de la qualité de vie, comme support du développement humain.

3. La qualité de la vie et la sécurité humaine en Roumanie

Les éléments définitoires sur la qualité de la vie et la sécurité humaine antérieur présentées restent également valables pour la Roumanie, avec l'amendement qu'ils doivent analysées et interprétées de la perspective du spécifique national, du niveau de développement économique du pays, de la consolidation de l'Etat de droit et de la démocratie.

La corrélation entre la qualité de la vie et la sécurité humaine existe et elle se peut poser en évidence par la mentionne de l'interdépendance et de l'interaction qui se manifeste entre les deux entités. A partir de la réalité que le bien-être générale des individus, c'est-à-dire la qualité de la vie, couvert tant la part matérielle (le niveau de vie) que les éléments immatériels (la qualité d'environnement, la sécurité nationale, les libertés économiques et politiques) se peut parvenir à la conclusion que ces composantes, dans un certain façon, se retrouvent dans la structure de la sécurité humaine. Celle-ci, possède les suivant dimensions:

- la sécurité économique (recouvre l'accès à l'emploi et aux ressources). Dans ce domaine, la Roumanie se confronte avec une série de difficultés. Ainsi, il y a de chômage, des revenus minimes et seulement un nombre réduit de firmes privées qui se permettent payer de salaries similaires ces de pays de l'Union européenne.

D'ici, la tendance de migrer d'un nombre significatif de personnes qui cherchent un lieu de travail mieux paye que dans notre pays. Le désavantage est important pour la Roumanie parce que, d'habitude, migrent des personnes qui appartiennent au groupe d'age 26-40 années. Ceux-ci plusieurs fois s'établissent dans étrangers

avec leurs enfants. Une première conséquence de ce fait, avec des effets tant économiques négative que de nature démographique, le représente le vieillissement et la diminution de la population;

- la *sécurité alimentaire*, signifiant l'accès matériel et économique à la nourriture pour tous et à tous moments, est confrontée à la menace de la faim et de la famine. Le manque des revenus constants et permanentes a une part significative de la population de notre pays fait que ces gens vivent sous le seuil de pauvreté;

- la *sécurité sanitaire* et l'accès aux soins médicaux et à de meilleures conditions sanitaires a à faire face aux blessures et maladies. Du fait de la transition par laquelle est passée la Roumanie a partir de l'année 1989, le system sanitaire se trouve dans un continu réforme, réorganisation et transformation qui fait mal tant aux malades qu'à la population;

- la *sécurité environnementale* affronte les menaces de pollution, de dégradation de l'environnement mettant en danger la survie des personnes et de l'épuisement des ressources. Du fait de l'exploitation irrationnelle de la terre, en général, on assiste aujourd'hui, dans la Roumanie aux phénomènes qu'affectent l'environnement, comme sont: éboulements, pollution du sol, de l'air et de l'eau de rivers. Tels phénomènes ont des effets négatives sur la population de tous les districts (voir les inondations des années 2005 et 2006, les tornades, les plues torrentielles);

- la *sécurité personnelle* est contrariée par des menaces qui peuvent prendre plusieurs formes: des menaces exercées par l'Etat, des Etats étrangers, d'autres groupes de personnes (tensions ethniques), des menaces à l'encontre des femmes ou des enfants en raison de leur vulnérabilité et de leur dépendance. Pratiquement, ce type de sécurité s'assure tant par le respect de droits humains que par la garantie réelle d'un lieu sure de travail et bien paye, par les chances égales dans l'évolution sociale et professionnelle, par l'accès libre à l'éducation et l'assistance médicale;

- la *sécurité de la communauté* qui signifie que la plupart des personnes tirent leur sécurité de leur appartenance à un groupe social (famille, communauté, organisation, groupement politique, groupe ethnique, etc.), peut être menacée par des tensions survenant souvent entre ces groupes en raison de la concurrence pour l'accès limité aux opportunités et aux ressources;



• la *sécurité politique* qui doit garantir le respect des droits et libertés fondamentaux, est menacée par l'arbitraire et la répression. Dans la Roumanie il y a tant la législation adéquate que le climat propice d'existence et de manifestation de la sécurité politique.

Par la suite, la présence de la sécurité humaine est une garantie de réaliser de la qualité de vie désire. A son tour, la qualité de vie, comme un bien réalise, représente un appui suffisant pour les membres de la société d'actionner conséquent et concerté dans la réalisation d'une sécurité humaine adéquate, tant au niveau individuel que au niveau de groupe (communauté humaine).

A présent, pour la Roumanie sont nécessaire des grand efforts tant des institutions de l'état que de la société civile pour implémenter des valeurs, des principes, des normes et des exigences qui gouvernement la vie et l'activité des états membres de l'Union européenne. Par la réalisation de cette objective sera un premier pas vers l'intégration européenne et ouvreraient des voies pour assurer une qualité de vie supérieure pour tous les citoyens Roumains, de la première janvier 2007 et des citoyens européens, ainsi que une sécurité humaine selon de la nouveau statut de notre pays.

4. Sécurité humaine - le fondement de la qualité de vie

L'analyse comparée des composants de la qualité de vie et de la sécurité humaine mène à la conclusion de l'existence de l'interdépendance et de l'interaction de ceux entités.

De fait, la qualité de vie exprime existence de la sécurité humaine dans une communauté. Il est vrais que fréquent, dans la littérature de spécialité, on fait la liaison entre la qualité de vie et la sécurité humaine seulement de la perspective de conflits violents et la destitution économique et sociale qui se produit en communauté humaine, soit dans l'intérieur d'un Etat, soit entre des Etats différents.

La réalisation de la qualité de vie suppose obligatoirement l'existence de la sécurité humaine. On ne peut pas parler d'atteint d'un haut niveau de la valeur d'indicateurs qui mesure la qualité de vie sans faire de références amples et complets à l'état de sécurité ou de l'insécurité qui règne dans une communauté soit au niveau local, national, régional or mondial.

C'est pourquoi les organisations internationales, régionales, les Etats du monde, les organisations civiles régionales et internationales sont préoccupés et agissent vers la direction de l'amélioration de la sécurité de personnes⁴. Ce dernière, en principale, concerne à: protection de personnes dans les situations de conflit; protection et habilitation de personnes en mouvement; protection des personnes issue des conflits; insécurité économique-le pouvoir de choisir; service de santé de base pour tous; connaissance, compétence et valeurs pour la sécurité humaine.

a) *Protection des personnes dans des situations de conflit.* Les civils, et non combattants sont les principales victimes, et parfois les cibles, des conflits violents. Le cadre juridique et les mécanismes qui sont censés protéger les civils pendant les conflits doivent être renforcés et, dans le même temps, trouver les moyens adéquates d'imposer leurs respecte par tous les acteurs étatiques et non étatiques impliqués dans un conflit ou l'autre. Avant tous, ceci demande de mis en œuvre de stratégies intégrées les aspects politiques, militaires, humanitaires et sociaux dans une même approche. Dans ce sens, la Commission pour sécurité de l'ONU a proposée de placer formellement la sécurité humaine sur l'agenda des questions de sécurité au niveau international, régional et avec les divers acteurs concernés au niveau national. Le respect des droits fondamentaux de l'homme, notamment l'accès à la citoyenneté et l'observation stricte du droit humanitaire dans les situations de conflit a deux aspects essentiels pour la sécurité de personnes. Il est également important de mettre fin à l'impunité des auteurs de violations massives des droits de l'homme. Ces efforts, fondés sur le droit international et les institutions habilités par le lois, doivent être complétés par des initiatives émanant des communautés et concernées et visant à promouvoir la coexistence et la réconciliation. Dans le même temps, il est urgent de subvenir aux besoins vitaux des personnes affectées par le biais de l'aide humanitaire. Le désarmement ainsi que la lutte contre la criminalité, notamment le trafic des êtres humains, de la drogue et autres échanges illégaux sont également essentiels pour la sécurité humaine dans le contexte de la globalisation et de l'intégration régionale.

b) *Protection et habilitation des personnes en mouvement.* Pour le plus grand nombre émigrer représente une chance d'améliorer les conditions



de vie. Pour d'autres, émigrer est le seul moyen pour préserver leur sécurité. C'est le cas des personnes qui sont obligées de fuir car leur vie et leurs biens sont menacés par la guerre, les conflits ou les violations massives de droits de l'homme dans le pays natal. Aussi, il existe ceux qui sont forcés de partir pour échapper de pauvreté extrême, une destitution chronique ou une crise soudaine. Aujourd'hui, il n'existe pas de cadre juridique internationalement accepté de tous les Etats et des autres acteurs non Etatiques intéressés pour réguler les migrations et de protéger les migrants. Annuellement des millions des gens migrent tant en intérieur de propre pays que en dehors de pays, soit dans les pays voisins, soit dans les Etats plus loin, mais développés économiquement⁵.

c) *Protection et habilitation des personnes issue des conflits.* Les accords de paix et cessez-le-feu peuvent signaler la fin des combats, mais ils n'impliquent pas nécessairement la paix et la sécurité humaine. La responsabilité de protéger les personnes dans les conflits doit être complétée par celle de reconstruire. Pour assurer la sécurité, il faut démobiliser les éléments armés et renforcer la police civile, il faut subvenir aux besoins essentiels des personnes déplacées, mener de front reconstruction et développement, promouvoir coexistence et la réconciliation, créer de conditions spécifiques d'une bonne gouvernance. La combinaison harmonieuse de ces éléments requiert une structure unifiée intégrant le politique, le militaire, le développement et l'humanitaire, qui est viable et fonctionnel, dans les conditions existantes.

d) *Insécurité économique - le pouvoir de choisir.* L'extrême pauvreté continue à faire des ravages. La réforme des marchés et le renforcement d'institutions sociales d'aide des personnes en besoin sont essentielles à son éradication. L'existence d'accords commerciaux équitables et une croissance économique qui profite aussi aux plus pauvres est très importante. La sécurité humaine ne se préoccupe pas seulement de la misère extrême. Aussi, elle impose d'être vue, par les effets des crises économiques soudaines et les effets désastreux des catastrophes naturelles. La perte et les risques à laquelle s'expose dans les crises les gens, surtout les plus pauvres, appellent à l'établissement des mesures sociales destinées couvrir les besoins essentiels assurant ainsi un minimum social qui permet à la population affectée de crise

ou de pauvreté de défendre leur intégrité et leur dignité. Les trois-quarts de la population mondiale ne bénéficient d'aucune sécurité sociale ni d'un emploi fixe⁶. Les efforts visant à établir des conditions de vie raisonnables et l'accès à un travail rémunéré doivent être intensifiés. L'accès à la terre, au crédit, à l'éducation et au logement, spécialement pour les femmes démunies, est de la plus haute importance. Une juste distribution des ressources est essentielle pour la sécurité des conditions de vie. Elle peut également permettre de libérer les capacités des personnes qui deviennent les acteurs de leur propre développement. Des mesures de protection sociale appropriées peuvent permettre de développer un minimum économique et social. Les états, avec le soutien du système international, devraient établir des systèmes d'alerte et de prévention pour les catastrophes naturelles, les crises économiques et financières.

e) *Services de santé de base pour tous.* En dépit des progrès de la médecine, 22 millions de personnes sont mortes en 2001 de maladies curables⁷. Le SIDA sera bientôt la plus grande catastrophe épidémiologique connue. L'impact de la destitution et des conflits sur la santé est particulièrement dramatique. Les services de santé constituent un 'bien public qui doit être soutenu et renforcé. Il est essentiel d'entreprendre une action de mobilisation et d'investir au niveau social pour permettre l'accès à l'information, pour assurer les soins de santé primaires, pour développer des systèmes d'alerte et pour limiter les conséquences lorsqu'une crise éclate. L'accès aux médicaments essentiels, qui peuvent sauver des vies, est crucial, surtout dans les pays en développement. Un système équitable réglementant la propriété intellectuelle doit être établi, tenant compte à la fois des impératifs économiques et des besoins urgents des populations concernées. La communauté internationale doit également encourager la création d'un partenariat mondial pour la santé, qui pourrait inclure notamment un système global d'observation et de contrôle des maladies transmissibles.

f) *Savoir, compétences et valeurs pour la sécurité humaine.* L'enseignement de base, l'information qui donne accès à la connaissance, les compétences à caractère vital et le respect de la diversité sont des notions particulièrement importantes dans l'optique de la sécurité humaine. La Commission insiste sur la nécessité d'assurer



l'éducation primaire pour tous, particulièrement pour les filles. Les écoles ne doivent pas être des lieux d'insécurité, mais au contraire, protéger les étudiants de la violence, y compris la violence sexuelle, et fournir la nourriture pour ceux et celles qui en ont besoin.

L'éducation doit encourager le respect pour la diversité en aménageant le contenu des études et les méthodes d'enseignement. L'éducation doit également s'étendre à ceux qui détiennent la force publique pour leur inculquer notamment le respect de la loi et les droits de l'homme. Les médias ont un rôle essentiel à jouer dans la diffusion de l'information mais aussi des connaissances. L'éducation et les médias ont la double responsabilité de diffuser l'information, ainsi que de faciliter l'exercice des droits et des responsabilités du public en général en favorisant le débat public.

Le tableau présenté pour être complet il doit avoir en vue que le domaine de la qualité de vie comprendre l'ensemble des éléments se referant à la situation physique, économique. Sociale, culturel, politique, de santé, etc. dans lesquelles vivent les gens, le content et la nature d'activités qu'ils déploient, les caractéristiques de relations et processus sociaux à lesquelles ils participent, les biens et les services dont ils ont accès, les modèles de consume adoptées, le mode et le style de vie, l'évaluation de circonstances et les résultats d'activités qui correspondent à les atteints de la population, ainsi que les états subjectives de satisfaction/insatisfaction, heureuse, frustration.

C'est pourquoi, la qualité de vie peut devenir réalité tant pour l'individu humaine que pour toutes les communautés humaines, si dans leur milieu de existence la sécurité humaine est une présence concret et permanent. Pratiquement, l'individu et le groupe humain ne peuvent organiser leur vie et leur activité, dans les conditions normales, que si leur milieu de vie este caractérisée par la sécurité. Ce dernier ne signifie pas l'absence des risques, des périls et des menaces, mais leurs control par ceux qui sont habilités par le lois (les institutions de l'Etat) et par l'assumée volontaire des responsabilités par les acteurs non étatique (organisations internationales, régionales et des société civiles de tous les niveaux d'existence. D'autre parte, on ne peut pas assurer les éléments définissant la sécurité humaine si les individus et les groupes humains dont se refera vivre en

pauvreté, sans l'assignation décente de satisfaire leurs besoins alimentaires, de santé, d'éducation et avec la peur qu'ils peuvent perdre leur vie et leurs biens, du fait de conflits sociaux et armés dans lesquels sont impliqués, souvent non volontaire.

5. Conclusions

Naturellement les gens doivent sentir en surette dans tous les lieux ils se trouvent: dans leurs maisons, à leurs lieux de travail, sur la rue, dans les communautés dont appartient et dans l'environnement. En réalité, les choses se présent différent. Parmi les causes de cette situation se trouvent: *la croissance démographique*. La population du monde augment dans un rythme enivrant. Si dans l'année 1800 sur la planète étaient un milliard de personnes dans l'année 2006 étaient plus de 6 milliards d'habitants⁸; *la dégradation d'environnement* (défriche de forêts, augmentation de surface agricoles, pollution de l'air, de la sol et des eaux); *le trafic de drogues*; *le terrorisme international et intérieur*; *l'instabilité financière*; *l'instabilité économique*; *les inégalités du monde (entre les pays riches et les pays pauvres, entre les gens riches et les gens pauvres de la même pays)*.

L'édification de la sécurité humaine, car elle a représente, représente et représentera un produit de l'activité concertée des acteurs étatiques et non étatiques, supposent prendre en compte des facteurs de l'insécurité humaine.

PNUD a établi neuf aspects de la sécurité humaine, qui sont reflètes dans le plan de développement humaine, et la liste des causes de l'insécurité humaine: sécurité économique, sécurité financière, sécurité personnelle, sécurité sexuelle sécurité en matière d'environnement, sécurité communautaire, sécurité politique⁹. Prise en compte, dans le sens de renforcer ces dimensions, conduire à l'assurance de la sécurité humaine et implicite de la qualité de vie désirée pour tous les habitants de la Terre.

REFERENCES:

1. Petre DUȚU, **Populație mondială și securitate internațională**, București, Editura UNAp, 2005.
2. *Indicateur du développement humain et autres indicateurs sociaux*, <http://www.aic-inac.gc.ca/pr/mwb.f.html>



3. *Rapport d'un colloque organisé par le Programme d'études stratégiques et de sécurité internationale de l'Institut de hautes études internationales de l'Université de Genève*, <http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/htm>

4. *Rapport de la Commission sur la Sécurité Humaine. Un Aperçu*, <http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/activities/index.html>

5. *Sécurité humaine: Clarification du concept et approches par les organisations internationales. Quelques repères*, <http://www.francophonie.org/>

NOTES:

¹ Cf. *Sécurité humaine: Clarification du concept et approches par les organisations internationales. Quelques repères*, <http://www.Francophonie.org/p.7>.

² Voir *Indicateur du développement humain et autres indicateurs sociaux*, <http://www.aic-inac.gc.ca/pr/mwb.f.html>

³ *Indicateurs de la qualité de vie*, http://www.creativecity.ca/ressources/plaidoyer_culture/index.html

⁴ Voir *Rapport de la Commission sur la Sécurité Humaine. Un Aperçu*, <http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/activities/index.html>

⁵ Voir Petre DUȚU, **Populație mondială și securitate internațională**, București, Editura UNAp, 2005, pp.95-117.

⁶ Cf. *Rapport de la Commission sur la Sécurité Humaine. Un Aperçu*, <http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/activities/index.html>, p.5

⁷ Ibidem, p.6

⁸ Voir Petre DUȚU, **op. cit.**, pp.80-126.

⁹ Voir *Rapport d'un colloque organisé par le Programme d'études stratégiques et de sécurité internationale de l'Institut de hautes études internationales de l'Université de Genève*, <http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/htm>

Petre DUȚU (dutupetre@yahoo.com), PhD, est chercheur de grade deux au CSSAS, sociologue militaire, auteur de livres et des nombreux articles sur la sécurité nationale, régionale et globale, ainsi que sur le moral des militaires et d'armée, etc.



SECURITY, NEW CHALLENGES. “NEED TO KNOW” VERSUS “NEED TO SHARE”

Victor BOBOC

The article tries to provide a short description for a new issue revealed in common use of the intelligence products in theatres or in support of some NATO missions, in which there also participate PfP countries or even the ones with which there are only bilateral agreements for accomplishing some missions. Beside the issues related to some gaps concerning the applicability of some new principles regarding the common use of intelligence in theatres, the article tries to be a short description of the situation from a doctrinal point of view and also from the perspective of the negative effects that can be induced, due to the lack of some clear statements on the subject. Also, the author tries to propose some solutions in order to pass those impediments especially by inputting some new evaluating criteria for the intelligence supporting structure belonging to the echelons dislocated in different NATO missions. The conception of common use of some sources of information is used by the author in order to stress out not only some aspects related to this process, insufficient adapted to the operational reality of the theatres, but also some implications related to the structures for coordinating and conducting the intelligence operations in different areas and, therefore, the implications upon military structures security.

The last conclusions resulted from all the areas in which NATO was involved in the last five years show that there are a lot of things to be done in order to develop and optimize the inputs and outputs for the CJ2 structures. Developed either on a major national base or in a composite way, these structures are still confronted with a lot of challenges deriving from national factors or, more importantly, from the international military and political environment.

As it is well known, some nations have already become so-called “leading nations” in developing

and coordinating new Joint Publications, drafted or even already implemented in order to face the operational reality NATO is confronting now in different places in the world. Related and following the ongoing trends of intelligence supporting efforts, there is one question pending that cannot be answered by a 100% standardized solution: In order to have a successful campaign, what is the balance between “need to know”¹ and “need to share”² principles?

The first one was developed as a result of the security needs for any military environment and for any environment that needs a real security framework. By this, many specialists declared six, seven years ago that: “*everybody should know only what he needs to know in order to take a decision*”. Everybody was allowed to know just what was considered to be necessary for him, in order to take a decision.

The principle that was good six or seven years ago was considered as the main functional principle in developing the flow of information in military structures. But beside its’ undoubtedly value, it is better to have a closer look and see some more details about it.

Starting from bottom to upper levels, it is simple to say that on the tactical floor of decisions there is a quite well controlled environment. A battalion commander will always have a well defined level of knowledge and it will be related to a well defined list of tasks. Starting with the needs related to his decisions, he will always task his staff with basic critical information requests.

They will be related to issues as:

- opposing forces’ or opposing entities’ courses of action, centres of gravity;
- his opponents’ vulnerabilities;
- his own forces’ vulnerabilities;
- his centres of gravity;
- the situations and intentions of other forces deployed in the same area with his battalion.



The list can be more and more developed but the identified intelligence needs, even more developed in details, will always be characterized by one word: homogeneity of the intelligence requirements. They will always refer to a national military capability, deployed in a specific area, under a clear memorandum. The ones related with other friendly forces deployed in the area are also homogenous. They refer to other national military capabilities that are deployed more or less in the vicinity of our battalion.

Of course, the tasks for the respective battalion S2 component will be homogenous. Those tasks will include mainly Operational Security issues (OPSEC) and Force Protection issues, based on a simply Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The intelligence needs regarding the neighbouring military entities will be provided via the respective in theatre framework defined for exchanging such products. Beside this, the respective requests have a low sensitiveness profile and by non major challenges should be encountered.

More or less for our example, of an infantry battalion deployed in a specific area, it is obvious that the S2 component of the battalion staff will focus just on few functions of the respective staff branch and those will deal more with current operations security and force protection goals.

But it is not the same if, for example, we change the battalion's components or even more if we change the infantry battalion with a Special Forces battalion or with a battalion included into an air mobile brigade.

Changing these factors is not only a matter of changing the tasks or the assignment, but it is also a change that has to be done in our principles, in order to accomplish the tasks resulting from such a situation.

It has to be stressed that the "need to know" principle has, if not an old shape, at least a classical one. This principle, easy to use in a mono-coloured environment, seems to induce some gaps or even lack of timely tailored intelligence products for the military environment developed in a joint or combined manner. Moreover, it is enough to consider the example of an infantry brigade deployed in an operational area under a mandate that includes tasks related to other brigades deployed in the same area or combined joint tasks that are to be accomplished in coordination with other categories of forces deployed in theatre.

The "need to know" principle seems to impede sometimes from this point of view an optimal flow of intelligence products, at least for the fact that some information are not delivered to all the commanders, due to some limitations imposed either by some national caveats or by procedures.

The main concern related to the "need to know" applicability seems to have the origin in the all NATO nations' will, to optimize and get the maximum efficiency from any investment in their national military assets deployed in support of NATO missions. The reality shows that finances, besides some political-military goals, are important criteria for any investment in military structures. One example could be the ongoing ISAF mission. After developing the new NATO Force Response structure with six High Readiness Corp Headquarters and three Low Readiness Corp Headquarters, there was a short period in which some nations did not enjoy the idea to send those Headquarters in theatre, in order to contribute to the normal Rotational Cycle of these Headquarters in Afghanistan. It was needed to adopt the new ISAF Composite framework, in order to have real national contributions to ISAF. Another ongoing issue, related to the same idea of having a high efficiency of funds used for military capabilities, or Headquarters deployed in support of NATO, is the ongoing process related to the idea of having a new Command and Control structure for NATO from June, July 2007. All those issues are of course related to efficiency, seen as a major criterion posed by all the nations when talking about military assets projected, generated and deployed in support of NATO.

Things are going to be solved at the higher levels of NATO Alliance. The question that still stands is: What about our commander and his decisions? The "need to know" principle seems not to be too useful all the times and it seems to generate some gaps, due to the limits resulted from the national ones. Talking now about some other missions in which NATO is involved and in which there are also involved PfP Countries, the ones belonging to the Mediterranean Partnership program and forces from countries which are not related in any way with NATO, the accomplishment of the respective forces' mission has to be done by using an intelligence cycle based not only on a "need to know" principle, but also on something more suitable is to satisfy the respective demands and



SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

developed under such consideration of efficient use of any military capability.

One example that shows how fast the military environment is developing and changing could be considered the 2006 NATO's task related to the NATO Rapid Force Final Operational Capabilities – NRF FOC - evaluation. One of the lessons learned was that the manning availabilities of Corp Headquarter are not always sufficient to satisfy all the needs. Manning with trained personnel simultaneous of a Home Base Headquarter and a Forward Land Component Command Headquarter in a Joint Military environment with the specific restrictions imposed by the NRF status – 5 to 30 days ready to move -, was not only a real challenge, but also a reason for some gaps' overcome only by using ad-hoc solutions and not pre-defined procedures. One of the main conclusions was also related to the capability that has to be created in the preparations phase of NRF deployments, in order to have a proper intelligence cycle and to have proper answers, timely tailored for the decisional processes.

Of course, this determines the conclusion some specialists from NATO Allied Command for Transformation (ACT) has already stated: now the need is to use a new principle like “need to share” based on “need to know” or just “need to share”. The implications are huge.

First, it is a change of the principles used to define the security procedures and standards. In order to share, it will be compulsory to control the flow of information within a military structure. The control, of course, has to be defined in accordance with principles as necessity and sufficiency and we turn to what SHAPE stated in the last Security Conference: “It is an obvious need to revise not only our Allied Publications, but also our way of thinking about security”. Some lessons learned in ISAF, after NATO has taken over the responsibility, stress out the same idea. Those lessons learned linked to issues like “*how to share information between NATO, non-NATO countries obeying NATO standards and simultaneously some lateral agreements*” are milestones that can be passed only by reshaping and adapting the NATO Security procedures and standards to the new realities of the operational environment.

There is a more and more pregnant question: “Which should be the future definition of CJ2? Should be a structure whose functions will be

related to an exclusive NATO environment or some new tools have to be developed for its use and in same time integrated into CJ2 procedures and standards?”

Latest developments show that, more and more, all the Commanders are in a deep need of having an integrated picture of the area under their responsibility. That is why it is necessary not only to assimilate some new concepts, but also to review the security procedures in these new capabilities placed under CJ2 responsibility.

Taking into account a standard structure for a J2 branch, as defined by the latest edition of Allied Joint Publication 2.1 – September 2006 – Intelligence Procedures in Allied Command Operational, we can easily assess that this was created thinking about functional issues. As a result, there have been defined just four components of the branch: Plans, Operations, Admin and J2X. Due to its high contribution in CRO or PSO, J2X is defined as the designated coordinative, conductive branch section, able to eliminate any potential or existing conflict between HUMINT operations and CI ones. On this overall task, the J2X will also have the ability to integrate the security tasks.

Although this J2 structure is just a recommendation, it has inside some functional considerations minimal for a proper J2 or CJ2 branch. The definitions for the respective sections are as it follows:

- *Plan* – will have to focus and support the current operations and the general planning of the respective Headquarter – being the link with J3, J5 and Joint Operational Centre JOC.

- *Operations* – will focus on production management, the management of the collection efforts and management of the tasks received by all ISTAR assets deployed in support or under the respective Headquarter command.

The J2X will also have some minimal analytical and supporting capabilities mainly related to the needs imposed by some operational criteria and not by the consideration that J2X has to be a closed area, due to the sensitivity of the HUMINT and CI operations.

This is the recommended structure for J2. The challenge that persists is not related to this updated structure, seen as a functional one, but to the fact that beside this structure it is also recommended to create some so-called working groups, based on inter-functional criteria. One of those recommendations



is related to the need to create an All Sources Cell or Joint Intelligence Centre. Besides that, in many cases, the establishment of such an operational structure has to face some obstacles, lies the fact that the procedures, instructions or job descriptions for such working groups are related to some lack of consistency regarding the doctrinal environment in order to state clearly how to make those groups work and even more how to use them in the operational planning, in order to have a proper defined intelligence cycle.

In fact, the existence of such recommendations proves that excepting the classical principle of “need to know” there should be something more like “need to share”. This could be followed by another identified need in all NATO operations - “need to integrate”. If the latter is just defined as a functional criteria for a successful Intelligence Preparation of Battlespace –IPB, the “need to share” has been already identified as a principle that has to be targeted, in order to optimize the flow of information inside CJ2 components and also in any intelligence coordination cycle initiated between all the agencies and intelligence in theatre providers.

So, if the “need to know” principle was established as a fundamental requirement for having a secure flow of information, the “need to share” has been already identified as a principle that has to be followed in order to make CJ2 and other intelligence communities existing in theatre work properly, due to the major changes of the nowadays operational environment.

One example that follows this idea can be considered the evolution that has occurred in Afghanistan from the intelligence point of view. The expansion of ISAF mission and the establishment of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams – PRTs – showed that the national caveats or other national limitations can impede, slower or even deny the possibility to accomplish some goals as planned in advance. During the transition phase, when ISAF took over the responsibility of the entire area, the gaps that have been encountered for sharing timely and proper tailored intelligence products made the respective tasks quite hard to accomplish.

Also, as it was already admitted during the last Security Conference organised by SHAPE in November 2006, there are still gaps to be filled and challenges to be passed in order to improve ISAF capabilities on intelligence issue. There are still

gaps related to transportation, use of the languages, interoperability between national assets like PRTs and ISAF HQ, or even more gaps related to the vetting procedures of military personnel deployed in ISAF.

Those issues that are under a permanent debate are related to the overlay of those two principles - “need to know” and “need to share”.

It is for sure that six, seven years ago the principle “need to know” was a very good solution in order to protect NATO information. After the Alliance’s expansion and after new programs and concepts have been adopted, in order to improve the overall political and military NATO capabilities, like non-article 5 operations, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the special status given to Russia and Ukraine or even by taking into account other countries or organizations in order to have a solution for some of the crises in the world, this principle - which is good enough - became insufficient to ensure a real optimal flow of information inside the Alliance or between NATO or NATO countries and other partners.

As a result for improving the functional area of the Alliance, the “need to share” principle was identified as a solution that properly used can overcome the challenges posed to NATO Security concepts by the new strategic and operational environment defined and reshaped especially after 9/11.

One of the first effects upon the intelligence support of all NATO operations was identified to be the need to have good intelligence products before something happens or, specifically, in the incipient moments before crises occurs. This can not be acquired by NATO alone, because NATO does not have these assets and has to ask for them from the nations. According to all the Intelligence Doctrines and Policies issued by NATO, “*the Alliance is based on National contribution*”. That is why a great importance has been always given to create connections from peacetime in order to create, maintain and optimize a permanent flow of information from NATO nations or other partners to NATO HQs in order to create timely intelligence products, well-tailored for decisions.

If this is the overall request, at strategic level, the same issue happened at the operational one. As a result, the joint intelligence centres got a larger importance in the decision making process all over the areas in which NATO was and still is



involved. The big challenge occurs when those mixed working groups try to apply the “need to share” principle in conjunction with the “need to know” one. In such groups, in theatre, everybody is asked to bring his own inputs in order to share, at joint combined level, all the intelligence products for having better products and also to improve the commanders’ decisions. Everything, at least at a theoretical level, shows that this could be a solution in order to use optimally the available resource in theatre, avoiding the duplication of effort or the extensive use of the forces deployed. Sometimes it works, but also due to factors like linguistic barrier between some collecting assets and NATO capabilities, the lack of interoperability reflected in incompatibility of the networks or software used, this process can be a real challenge.

Inside CJ2, the Joint Intelligence Centre is, from an internal point of view, functional restricted due to some national caveats. The tasks accepted by a HUMINT team could be an example for this. Some nations accept to perform the entire spectrum of HUMINT missions as defined by NATO documents. Some nations do not accept all of them because of their national laws. Taking into account that the Alliance is based on national contribution, it is obvious that sometimes, when generating a NATO HQ for a specific mission, the national caveats could be considered a real impediment to accomplish a specific mission.

On the other side, all NATO countries are more or less very concerned to contribute to any NATO operation. Therefore, a firm negative answer could not be given to any contributing nation, especially nowadays when any contribution in theatre is more or less very important.

What has been done so far? It is obvious that the “need to know” principle, used to generate security procedures and instructions for a NATO military structure, is working as long as we are talking about no more than the battalion level, generated by only one nation. It is very easy for the higher echelons to define what it can generate from an intelligence point of view and even more up to what “level of share”³ they can go, according to their specific limitations on the subject. That is why a specific military asset, national generated and given in support of a NATO military structure, can use the “need to know” principle for internal issues and, of course, has to define, for interacting on intelligence matters with same echelons,

lower or higher, a specific level for “sharing” its intelligence products.

So, it is to be defined, for intelligence issues, a specific level of “sharing” capabilities. The limits for “sharing” could be solved by the higher echelons of the respective battalion, by using systems like “Request for Information” addressed to the respective nation or other nations and NATO agencies.

Starting with this echelon, up to the combined joint the “sharing” level should be increased. A good solution to define this level should be to apply the criteria when such NATO structures are generated and by this to quantify it in a way or another. Although national contributions are always welcomes, something else has to be taken into account. There are times when a contribution could hamper more than expected, especially when it is not well defined during the generation process and especially during the evaluation phase. In this area it should be more important for all NATO structures what could be done with a specific asset when deployed for intelligence issues in a theatre.

More or less talking about the developments regarding the applicability of the principle “need to share”, it is obvious that is better to apply gradually this functional criterion. Scales to evaluate have to be defined for this reason. This could be a criteria to define the respective echelon capability to share or not intelligence products. Just as interoperability is defined for any military capability, sharing level should be defined prior to any deployment of the respective asset in *operations*.

This spots a specific light on the CJ2 structure, according to latest NATO Doctrines and Policies. The respective statements encourage “the need to know” principle. Taking into account the respective desired end-state for a specific mission, the level of sharing that has to be achieved must be also defined. If not, the forces’ generation process should be also taken into account for reshaping the force or at least for reviewing the principles this process is based on. The overall implications upon the intelligence staff structures like CJ2 are huge. Those considerations to define the needed sharing level are related to the respective CJ2 structure functionality and to the capabilities deployed under its coordination.

A major concern should be given to project and implement a good balance between operational section in a CJ2 and the CJ2X one. This deals with



the necessity to have a proper way in defining each section tasks, procedures and capabilities. This could be done easily by taking into account the desired output of the respective CJ2.

The sharing level of each military NATO capability could be also considered as a time based criteria. This deals with the fact that any change in a CJ2 structure, due to national contributions evolution, affects also the sharing capability which could be smaller or bigger depending on the new components received. Furthermore, the sharing level varies, due to the evolution of the operational situation. A decrease of the need to share will involve a decrease for the needed sharing level.

This new principle, for the moment under Allied Command for Transformation specialists' consideration, in order to be defined from a doctrinal point of view, could be considered as a functional solution of the future intelligence capabilities belonging to NATO or military assets deployed in support of the Alliance. This principle can not stand alone without a proper statement how the "need to know" principle will be used. From a theoretical perspective if it is to extend the security definition, there could be considered that "need to share" is the propeller of a healthy framework of security inside a military capability. If the "need to know" creates the structure, the "need to share" fills it.

Applying the "need to share" is a matter of defining the sharing needs and the levels of confidentiality. This could be followed by a detailed analysis regarding the subjects that could be shared. Any issue identified about the decrease

of the sharing level has to be considered a potential factor that could impede the overall intelligence cycle in terms of inducing a specific inconsistency for the respective intelligence products and an extensive way to use the resources available in theatre, that does not deal with any criterion as the optimization or the improvement, but with considerations related to solving the tasks by any means, resources or procedures.

Better future links between these two principles - "need to know" and "need to share" - should be considered a potential solution for the present challenges that are standing in front of NATO and all the countries belonging to the Alliance on intelligence issues.

The future of the sharing principle, applied already but not enough defined and standardized, has to be considered as a beneficial development of the intelligence support that has to be not only secure but also efficient, able to provide both necessary and sufficient support for any NATO operations.

NOTES:

¹ "Need to know" – refers to the need to be aware about something, in order to act properly.

² Need to share" – refers to the need to be aware of something that it is known by someone else; it is a process characterized by a permanent exchange of knowledge between some partners following specific pre-established rules.

³ "Share", "Sharing" – refers to the common use of some information products.

Lieutenant-commander Victor BOBOC (boboc_victor@yahoo.co.uk) graduated the Advanced Joint Operations Staff Officers Course organised by the National Defence University "Carol I" in 2003. Since 2005, he has been assigned to a Deployable Corp Headquarter established under Hellenic State initiative.



CZECH DEFENCE POLICY AND ITS INSTITUTIONAL AND DOCUMENTARY FRAMEWORK

Libor FRANK, PhD
Josef PROCHÁZKA, PhD

This article reflects discussion outputs of a bilateral workshop between members of the Institute for Strategic Studies of Defence University in Brno (Czech Republic) and the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies of the National Defence University "Carol I" in Bucharest (Romania), held in Bucharest on November 9, 2006. The discussed topic was focused on current defence policy definition of both countries and its reflection in strategic and conceptual documents. This article aims at explaining of the documentary framework of the Czech defence and security policy as well as roles, relations, rights and obligations of the highest-level constitutional bodies in the process of creation and carrying out these policies (especially positions of the President, the Parliament, the Government and other important institutions).

group of the former Communist states to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which happened in 1999, and the European Union (EU), in 2004. This period remarkably influenced and speeded up the legislative process. So called defence law and crises management law was adopted. Also, new strategic and conceptual documents were elaborated, institutional changes of the security system were carried out and wide-ranging reform of Armed Forces was launched. This approach allowed the optimization of a complex state security and defence system. It set up presumptions for conception and execution of a long-term security and defence policy reflecting vital and strategic state interests, changing security and defence needs, new international obligations and available recourses.

Introduction

The current institutional architecture of the Czech Republic (CR) responsible for definition and execution of its defence policy is as a result of the long historical development going back to time immediately after World War One, when the Czechoslovak Republic declared its independence on October 28, 1918 after three centuries under Austrian and then Austro-Hungarian rule. This development was shaped by permanent changes of political system, culture, values and priorities throughout the period. During the last nearly two decades of democratic development, the Czech's administration had to struggle among others problems with adapting its defence policy to the new security environment, which changed significantly after the end of the Cold War. Since this time the defence safeguarding of the CR has always had to compete for politicians' interest predominantly occupied by the problems of economic, political and social transformation of the whole society. Despite this development, the CR was in the first

Constitutional Institutions

The state security and defence system is institutionally conceived in concordance with constitutional order of the CR. Its basic elements are mainly the constitutional institutions and functionaries, i.e. the President, the Parliament, and the Government and further on the National Security Council and its regular working bodies. However, this whole system is not limited to the above mentioned elements. It is formed in its entire scope, i.e. also on the level of regional, district and local authorities utilizing security and emergency councils newly formed with these organs. Also, the part of physical and legal entities should not be neglected. The basic feature and intention of the complex conception of security of the CR is the interconnection and mutual dependence of political, military, economic, social and internal security levels while respecting international contractual and political principles and bonds of the CR, the constitution, The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and the legal system of the CR.



The fundamental institutional framework and relationships among state institutions in the area of security and defence policy are set by the highest legal norm – The Constitution of the CR. Among its parts, there are the Constitutional Act No. 110/1998 Coll., on Security of the CR and Constitutional Act No. 300/2000 Coll. According to this law, securing the sovereignty and integrity of the CR, protection of its democratic foundations and protection of lives, health and material values are the fundamental obligations of the country.

These regulations are further elaborated in a series of so-called military acts. (One of them is e.g. Act No. 222/1999 Coll., on Securing Defence of the CR, which states the obligations of state organs, regional governing bodies and physical and legal entities to ensure the defence of the CR or Act No. 240/2000 Coll., on crisis management.)

The President

The second summit of the executive power in the CR beside the Government is the President. The role of the President in the constitutional system of the CR is relatively weak. From the point of view of security and defence policy, the President has the only significant authority – he is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and his competence covers commanding the Military Office and the Castle Guard.

The Military Office ensures the performing of administrative tasks connected with executing the function of the commander-in-chief and the Castle Guard is an autonomous unit, in fact independent on the Army of the CR, and its obligation is defence of the president and ceremonial functions. The President is bound to respect the decisions of the Government and the Parliament in the security and defence area, still, his role as a representative of the country is irreplaceable. For instance, the personal popularity of Václav Havel abroad contributed towards the incorporation of the CR into NATO much more than his authorities of the president of the country.

The Parliament

The controlling role and decisive power in security issues of high importance is entrusted with the two-chamber Parliament of the CR. The Government is obliged to inform both chambers of

the Parliament about all important decisions. The Parliament can rule out the Government's decision in case of disapproval.

The Parliament decides to declare the state of war if the CR is attacked or if it is necessary to fulfil international bonds of common defence against aggression.

Further on, it decides on participation of the CR in defence systems of international organizations of which the CR is a member and passes consent with sending out armed forces the CR outside the territory of the CR and deployment of other countries' armed forces on the territory of the CR unless such decision is exclusive to the Government.

Both chambers of the Parliament have specialized organs dealing with the security and defence policy and their main task is assuming standpoints towards discussed legislation, defence budget, significant acquisition programs, strategic and conceptual documents.

From the point of view of constitutional delimitation, bigger importance lies with the Chamber of Deputies, which has more members and can rule out prospective veto of the Senate. The members of the Senate are elected in a different manner; the Senate has a different structure and less authority. Its role is still irreplaceable, especially in emergency situations.

Due to different manner of voting into the Senate when only one third of members are replaced at a time, the upper chamber is actually never dissolved and hence plays the role of a safeguard for such occasions when it is necessary to pass important decisions and the lower chamber is dissolved or defunct.

The Government

According to the Constitution and its amendments, the primary responsibility for security and defence of the country is entrusted with the Government as a supreme executive organ. The Government is responsible for preparation and securing the defence of the country.

In order to secure the defence of the country in peace time, the Government:

a) Assesses the risks of threat to the country, which might be a cause for armed conflict and takes necessary measures to reduce and possibly eliminate such risks,



SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

b) Passes strategic concept of the country's defence (in the form of documents, which will be treated of later),

c) Directs the process of defensive planning,

d) Decides on basic measures for preparation for defence,

e) Decides on basic directions of construction, preparation and use of armed forces and securing the defence of the country,

f) Passes the concept of mobilization of armed forces,

g) Passes the concept of preparation of citizens for defence of the country,

h) Assigns tasks to ministers and heads of other administrative offices and municipalities to carry out its decisions,

i) Decides on other unforeseeable tasks necessary to secure the defence of the country.

In order to secure the defence of the country in emergency or war time, the Government:

a) Draws conclusions from military-political assessment of international relations and decides on realization of necessary measures to avoid armed conflict and increase the country's preparedness for defence,

b) Decides on measures to ensure effective functioning of the defence system,

c) Decides on priorities in performing tasks connected with ensuring the defence of the country,

d) Decides on measures necessary to wage war.

The Government also decides on sending out armed forces of the CR outside the territory of the CR and deployment of other countries' armed forces on the territory of the CR for maximum period of 60 days in the following cases:

a) Fulfilling the bonds of international contracts of common defence against aggression,

b) Participation in peace operations according to decision of an international organization, of which the CR is a member with the agreement of the receiving country,

c) Participation in rescue operations during natural disasters and industrial or environmental emergencies.

Likewise, it decides on other countries' armed forces transport across the territory of the CR and on participation of armed forces of the CR in military trainings outside the territory of the CR

and on participation of other countries' armed forces in military trainings on the territory of the CR.

The National Security Council

An important institution from the point of view of creating and carrying out security and defence policy is the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC was established by Act No. 110/1998 Coll., on security of the CR as a regular working body of the Government for the coordination of activities related to ensuring security and defence of the CR.

The chairman of the NSC is the Prime Minister, the vice-chairman is the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the members are the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Minister of Defence, Minister of the Interior, Minister and the Chairman of the Office of the Government, Minister for Industry and Trade and Minister of Transport and Communications. The NSC's agenda needs to involve the Governor of the Czech National Bank and the Chairman of the Administration of the State Material Reserves, too. The Chief of the General Staff – General of the Armed Forces and the Police President are also regularly invitees. The President of the CR has the right to participate on the meetings, too. The council meets at least once in three months. Within the council, there are four permanent committees:

The Committee for Foreign Security Policy Coordination – for internal coordination of the foreign security policy of the CR, within the sphere of control of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs;

The Defence Planning Committee – for the coordination of the planning of measures to safeguard the defence of the CR, within the sphere of control of the Minister of Defence;

The Civil Emergency Planning Committee – for the coordination and planning of measures to safeguard the internal security of the country, the population and economy and co-ordination of the requirements for civil resources, which are necessary to safeguard the security of the CR, within the sphere of control of the Minister of the Interior;

The Intelligence Activity Committee – for the coordination of the activities of the intelligence services of the CR and planning measures



to secure intelligence activities and co-operation with the state bodies that gather and evaluate information necessary to safeguard the security of the CR, within the sphere of control of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Committee does not pursue any intelligence activities on its own.

And further on, the **Central Crisis Staff** – as a working body of the NSC for providing solutions to crisis situations or other serious situations concerning the security interests of the CR (within the sphere of control of the Minister of Defence - in the event of an external military threat to the CR, in fulfilling allied obligations abroad and in the participation of Czech armed forces in international operations for the restoration and maintenance of peace, within the sphere of control of the Minister of the Interior - in the event of other types of threat to the CR, in the provision of large scale humanitarian aid abroad and in engaging the CR in international rescue operations in the event of major accidents and natural disasters).

The fundamental obligation of the NSC is to participate in creating a reliable security and defence system, to ensure coordination and control of measures to safeguard the security and defence of the CR and international bonds. The NSC coordinates and evaluates the issue of security and defence of the CR and prepares propositions of measures to safeguard it for the Government. NSC is also a body that proposes basic security and defence policy documents to the Government.

Security and Defence Policy Tools

Security and defence of the CR are secured by the armed forces (i.e. Army of the CR, Military Office of the President and the Castle Guard) and rescue corps and services (the most important of which is the Fire Rescue Service as the backbone of the Integrated Rescue System of the CR). Army of the CR is managed by the Ministry of Defence, Military Office and Prague Castle Guard are subordinated to the president, and rescue corps and services are under the authority of the Ministry of Interior.

The use of these tools is connected with the declaration of the state of emergency, state of security threat or state of war. Such states are declared if the sovereignty, territorial integrity, democratic foundations of the CR or to a large extent internal

order and security, lives and health, material values or environment are in danger or if it is necessary to fulfil international bonds of common defence.

The **state of emergency** is declared by the Government of the CR in cases of natural disasters, environmental or industrial emergencies, accidents, or other danger to lives, health or material values of internal order and security. It is declared for a limited area or the entire territory of the country. If there is a danger of delay, state of emergency can be declared by the Prime Minister.

The Government confirms or rules out its decision within 24 hours since issue. The Government immediately informs the House of Deputies, which can withdraw the declaration. If the House of Deputies is in a dissolved state, the decision of prospective prolongation or lifting the state of emergency is passed over to the Senate. The state of emergency can be declared only for a certain period of time (for the maximum of 30 days) and for certain area. It can be extended after prior consent of the House of Deputies or Senate, respectively.

The state of emergency ends after the expiration of the period for which it was declared unless the Government or the Parliament decides on lifting it before this period expires. The last case of declaring the state of emergency was in mid August of last year in several regions stricken with the catastrophic floods.

The Parliament (both chambers) can declare the **state of security threat** to the state on the basis of a proposal by the Government, if the sovereignty or territorial integrity or the democratic foundations of the country are in danger. It is declared for a certain area or the entire territory of the country.

The **state of war** is decided by the Parliament in case of aggression against the CR or if it is necessary to fulfil contractual bonds of common defence against aggression.

To pass a resolution of declaration of the state of war and to pass a resolution of consent with sending out the armed forces of the CR outside the territory of the CR or with the deployment of other countries' armed forces on the territory of the CR as well as to pass a resolution of participation of the CR in defence systems of international organizations of which the CR is a member, the consent of clear majority of the deputies and of clear majority of the senators is necessary. It is declared for the entire territory of the country.



For the period of the state of security threat or the state of war, the Government can demand that the Parliament discusses the Government law propositions in short proceedings. Resolution of such a proposition is passed by the House of Deputies within 72 hours and by the Senate within 24 hours since being passed on by the House.

If the Senate does not pass the resolution within this period, it holds that the proposition is passed. For the period of the state of security threat or the state of war, the President is not allowed to return the acts passed in short proceedings (in other words, the President is left out of the legislative process in order to accelerate the passing of acts) nor can he propose constitutional acts (i.e. amend the Constitution).

The decisions of state of emergency, state of security threat or state of war are published in mass media and are declared in the same way as acts.

The declaration of state of emergency, state of security threat or state of war allows temporary partial or bodily limiting of human rights and freedoms of the citizens (e.g. restricting freedom of movement, forced evacuation, work engagement of citizens, temporary confiscation of technical equipment, etc.).

Basic Documents of the Security and Defence Policy

The Government of the CR passed two fundamental documents defining its intentions in the area of security and defence policy (Security Strategy and Military Strategy).

Security Strategy of the CR defines fundamental starting points of security policy and specifies national interests, which include securing the sovereignty of the country, its democratic character, human rights protection and solving international conflicts in a peaceful way. It also specifies the security environment in which it appears. It describes threats, which are important from the point of view of the security of the country.

This involves above all the threat of international terrorism, the consequences of the conflicts in the Balkans and the unstable situation in the Middle East; there are recognized problems with illegal migration, international crime and arms trafficking, including weapons of mass destruction.

Security Strategy is, above all, a general concept document and therefore it suggests the way the CR intends to proceed. Safeguarding national security is chiefly seen in further intensification of the co-operation with the NATO member states and in activities in organizations of collective security. It also presumes joining the Common Security and Defence Policy following joining the EU.

The CR wants to attain its objectives through active participation in bilateral relations as well as in international organizations and also to improve its security and defence system.

As the Security Strategy is, above all, a document of security policy it is very extensive as to enumeration of areas it deals with. It also pays attention to the area of the interior, economy policy, foreign policy, defence policy and many other issues.

Security Strategy presents specific and clear program of the CR in the area of security and defence policy and it serves not only as a concept framework for decision making in the subordinate bodies of the system, but it also explains the situation and intentions to the citizens and allies or partners abroad.

Military Strategy of the CR is based on Security Strategy. It sums up the complex of principles and policies connected with safeguarding the defence of the country avoiding prospective military threat or armed aggression.

It declares the fundamental task of the Czech armed forces: to defend the country at all circumstances as well as the part of the CR in securing the collective defence of the Alliance and safeguarding international security.

Military Strategy defines the principles of preparation of the armed forces for activities in emergency situations.

On the basis of the analysis of military-political situation, existing security risks, historical experience, defence priorities, evaluation of the objectives and time horizon of prospective military threat, technological progress in the area of new means of combat and prospective ways of waging the war, regulations by international contracts, agreements and acts and economical faculties of the country, it states the fundamental tasks and ways of using the armed forces of the CR and priorities of their building and preparation with regard to joint operating with armed forces of the NATO allies.



It specifies the security risks for the country focusing on anticipating, monitoring and preventing threats to the security of the country and the part of the armed forces in their elimination. It develops fundamental measures to attain the preparedness of the country to face armed attack. Fulfilling the Military Strategy allows the CR to participate in creating new strategic environment in the Euro-Atlantic area, to react to new scope of emergency situations and to prepare for future challenges.

Military Strategy sums up the main procedures and principles necessary to fulfil the basic obligations of the armed forces of the CR and it is a starting point for elaborating particular resort documents.

Both Strategies are furthermore elaborated in other lower-level documents such as the Reform of the Czech Armed Forces, the Conception of Czech Foreign Policy, the Medium-Term Conception of the Social and Economic Development, etc.

Conclusion

The Czech security system went through significant changes after the end of Cold War, accompanied by the fall of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989. From the beginning of the '90s to 1997, marginal attention was paid to problems of security and defence. These problems were lying in shadow of the deep political, social and economic transformation of the CR.

New challenges, upcoming membership in NATO and the European Union entailed rapid redress of the appalling state in this area. The flexible legislative framework and operational institutional security and defence system were created.

Nowadays, this system is able to react to the bulk of military and non-military perils, to keep security and needs of citizens in emergency situations and prevent possible negative impacts of mentioned risks.

Mutual relations and remits of peak constitutional bodies were clarified, the Constitution was amended, a special governmental body (the National Security Council) was built, a part of responsibility was assigned to the lower administrative districts, the Integrated Rescue System was interconnected, armed forces began the process of its fundamental transformation in

order to become a more effective tool of defence policy.

More flexible command and force structure, full professionalization and large modernization are the most significant features of this process. Since the end of last decade, the Security Strategy of the CR and the Military Strategy of the CR have been adopted regularly. These documents create an important framework for an effective security and defence policy formulation and its efficient implementation in accordance with the new challenges of rapidly changing security environment.

REFERENCES:

- Constitutional Act No. 110/1998 Coll., on Security of the Czech Republic, dated April 22, 1998, Ministry of Defence, Prague, 2002.
- Constitutional Act No. 1/1993 Coll. (Constitution of the Czech Republic). Parliament of the Czech Republic. [Prague (Czech Republic), 1992, <http://www.psp.cz/docs/laws/constitution.html>]
- FRANK, Libor, *Security Environment of the Czech Republic*, *Obrana a strategie*. (Defence and Strategy Journal). 2003, vol. 3, no. 1, s. 7-14. Dostupný z, http://www.army.cz/mo/obrana_a_strategie/1-2003eng/frank.pdf.
- Act No. 219/1999 Coll., on the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, dated September 14, 1999, Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, Prague, 2002.
- Act No. 222/1999 Coll., on the Defence Safeguarding of the Czech Republic, dated September 14, 1999, Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, Prague, 2002.
- Act No. 240/1999 Coll., on the Crises Management, dated June 28, 2000, Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic, [Prague (Czech Republic)], Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic, 2000, <http://www.mvcr.cz/sbirka>
- Military Strategy of the Czech Republic, The Czech Republic Government, [Prague (Czech Republic)], National Security Council, 1999, <http://www.vlada.cz/>
- Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, The Czech Republic Government, [Prague (Czech Republic)], National Security Council, 1999, <http://www.vlada.cz>



SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

- STOJAR, Richard. Czech Security Strategy in a Light of the European Security Strategy, NEČEJ, Elemír (ed.), *The Security Strategies of the Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia in the Context of the European Security Strategy*, 1st edition, Bratislava, Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic, 2005, s. 10-25.

Libor FRANK, PhD (libor.frank@unob.cz), is the Head of the Political and Social Studies Group from the Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Defence, Brno, Czech Republic. His research is focused on threat assessment and security policy of the Czech Republic. He is mostly engaged in security-risk analysis and development of the security environment of the Czech Republic. He frequently publishes in scientific journals and newspapers in the Czech Republic and abroad.

Lieutenant-colonel Josef PROCHÁZKA, PhD (josef.prochazka@unob.cz), is the Deputy Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Defence, Brno, Czech Republic. His research is focused on military logistics, acquisition management and defence policy of the Czech Republic. He is mostly engaged in defence resource development analysis and its strategic impact on the Czech Republic defence policy formulation. He frequently publishes in scientific journals and newspapers in the Czech Republic and abroad.



THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Elemir NECEJ

The thinking of the Slovak elite in area of military, defence and especially security policy passed over quite development during the Slovak Republic's existence. In the first years it was a fact that the attitudes towards NATO and European Union were not clarified. After 1994, foreign and accordingly security and defence policy of the Slovak Republic (SR) became more or less speculative and, consequently, Slovakia found itself out of a main stream of integration processes. Parliamentary elections in 1998 brought a change that signified a consolidation of internal policy situation and changes in characters of foreign and security policy of the Slovak Republic.

Pursuant to a realistic assessment of international position of the Slovak Republic an integration strategy with two main aims was formulated. The first aim was to rebuild a confidence and to strengthen the co-operation with the NATO and European Union members and the second one was to acquire a membership of both structures. The first aim was achieved in 2002, when the Slovak Republic obtained an invitation to the NATO entry talks and was asked to join the European Union, the other one when the Slovak Republic joined NATO on the 29th March, 2004 and EU on the 1st May, 2004.

1. The development of conceptual security documents of the Slovak Republic – reflection of a security way of thinking

1.1. The period before joining the NATO and the European Union

The integration of the Slovak Republic into the NATO represented a process which required a change of security thought first. The most important conceptual documents, that were elaborated, reflected a state and development of this thought.

In the first period (1994-1998) the first open documents were approved - *Defence doctrine of the Slovak Republic - 1994* and *Main aims and*

principles of the national security - 1996. These documents signified a progress because they were the first security-political documents of a strategic purport and, for the first time since the Slovak Republic's constitution, they endeavoured after more complex view on the security and defence problems. In terms of current political development, they did not exceed certain narrow context of understanding the problems of security and defence. We could briefly say that these principal security-political documents substituted a strategy for tactics with emphasis on territorial defence.

The Defence Doctrine of the Slovak Republic - 1994 was, in accordance with present theory, rather a document, which was approaching the Western understanding of the defence strategy. The relation to the integration processes to the EU and the NATO was characterized rather generally. Despite the full membership in NATO, that was considered the basic orientation of security policy, it was prepared for the period of SR participation at the program of Partnership for Peace. From the view of use of the army, it was aimed only to the homeland defence and the participation at peace missions were mentioned partially only in Chapter IV as the activity within the framework of missions of international peace forces (not NATO).

Main principles and aims of the national security - 1996 were prepared during that period, when the democratic deficits of SR were deepened. In comparison with the Defence Doctrine, it was less concrete at the expression of relation of Slovakia with the NATO and the European Union. Concrete measures towards the accession process both to the NATO as well as to the European Union have disappeared.

Only in the aims of national security, third task in the order was characterised as the "creation of conditions of gradual integration of the Slovak Republic into the transatlantic and European collective political, security, economic structures



and institutions“, at which none of the institutions was mentioned by its name.

1998-2001 signified a qualitative progress in forming the security and defence policy of the Slovak Republic. Then a requirement for exact description of the Slovak Republic's position in new security environment and definition of the Slovak Republic's interests arose. The Action Plan of Membership in NATO, adopted at the Washington summit, has expected in the field of defence military questions that the aspiring countries shall identify themselves with the strategy of Alliance in the way as it is expressed in the Strategic conception, and at the accession to NATO they shall accept the approach to security described in the Strategic conception, they shall be able to provide forces and means for collective defence and the other tasks of Alliance and an adequate participation in its structures.

The Slovak Republic was criticised by the Alliance because of the state of the armed forces, for their slow and lengthy reform, as well as for the absence of security planning. Criticism was aimed at an absence of defence planning, but especially in terms of defence reform, the absence of key strategic „roof documents“ - security strategy and military strategy.

The approval of three strategic documents (Security strategy of the Slovak Republic, Defence strategy of the Slovak Republic and Military strategy of the Slovak Republic) in 2001 signified an improvement in forming our security and defence policy.

On their grounds it was possible to continue with legislative and conceptual changes. According to the military strategy, **“The armed forces of the Slovak Republic – model 2010” and consequently “The long-term plan of a structure and a development of armed forces of the Slovak Republic“** were elaborated. This long-term plan represented a milestone of a radical change in the armed forces' reform.

The security strategy of the Slovak Republic - 2001 aroused as a first complex „covering“ document and was followed by the defence strategy and the military strategy.

Its approach in assessing the security environment, originated from the NATO Strategic concept and, in comparison to the prior documents, the strategy signified the progress in a definition of the Slovak Republic interests. The NATO and

European Union membership was a part of a vital interest. For the first time, this strategy defined the security policy of the Slovak Republic and its security system requirements.

The Defence strategy - 2001 specified the military-political aspects of the security strategy. The aim of the defence policy was to set up an efficient defence of the Slovak Republic and consequently the tendency to meet the NATO criteria for joining the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization. Mostly, the document dealt with the definition of the defence strategy, its elements, defence planning system and the reform of the armed forces. Individual definitions of this system markedly embedded the principle of integration into NATO.

The military strategy - 2001 described the armed forces' designation, mission and tasks. The strategic aim was to provide relatively small, very well trained and suitably equipped forces, able to integrate into the defence mechanism of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization. The document confirmed that the armed forces' reform has to be done according to the purpose of joining the NATO and it elaborated the main sub-systems of the Slovak armed forces.

The passing of the above mentioned documents made the security and the defence policy of the Slovak Republic comprehensive and consistent. Another two laws were adopted and the armed forces long-term planning process has been initiated. In 2002 -2004 they were implemented into practice. It contributed to the Slovak Republic's enhancement of readiness, in order to meet the NATO membership standards.

1.2. The period after joining the NATO and European Union

During 2001-2005 the Slovak Republic's process of integration into the NATO was completed. It raised a necessity to make a new strategic, conceptual and legislative scope. However, the defence sector was under permanent pressure due to NATO requirements, especially after receiving new tasks – Force Goals 2004.

Consequently, the necessity of revision of long-term plan of structure and the development of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic 2010 aroused. It again required a step ahead –to process the strategic document responding to the mentioned changes.



A certain starting point there was the preparation of the “Defence Policy Guidance“, approved by the government in June 2004. The Guidance was “to bridge” the deficit that there were not elaborated and approved new strategic documents for the field of security and defence of the Slovak Republic, which would respond to the changed security environment and new tasks from the membership in the NATO and the EU.¹ This document assumed a re-evaluation of strategic documents in security and defence field, a way to respond to changes of the security environment, and, in concordance with NATO’s and EU’s strategic security documents, and they shall enable the fulfilment of commitments, which for the SR result from the membership status.

The preparation of new documents was initiated in 2004 and in 2005 the new security and defence strategy of the Slovak Republic was adopted. In comparison to the former period, it is possible to notice more specific attitudes in security and defence policy towards NATO and European Union, remaining the long-term orientation known as “*NATO first*“. In terms of the defence changing nature, it signified a transition from a model of territorial defence to a defence of interests where a territory defence takes into consideration an advantage of joint defence by the article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This philosophy has also been reflected in the documents resolving the reforms of the Armed forces.

The security strategy of the Slovak Republic - 2005² takes into account the essential changes of security environment and new commitments of the Slovak Republic after the accession to the NATO and the EU. In comparison with the Security Strategy of the SR 2001, this shift is visible in the defined interests of the SR. The support of the transatlantic alliance and the support for NATO and EU expansion remains the basic matter³. The position in the security environment is understood in connection with the Euro-Atlantic space, where, as the part of the collective system of the NATO, the safety and stability of the SR is guaranteed by the allied commitments. By joining EU, the SR acquires the guarantees of political and economic stabilization and the possibility of a shared European security and defence policy⁴. In comparison with the Security Strategy SR 2001, active attitudes of security policy against

the NATO and the EU are formulated in more concrete terms. NATO remains for the SR the main platform for development of cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic space, and the Strategy underlines the need to preserve its internal unity, and the need of transformation and adaptation to new security threats. Meantime, the Strategy expresses an active approach to further development in the NATO.⁵ In the relation with EU, there is expressed an active attitude to jointly create and implement the CFSP and building capacities of the European security and defence policy, while maintaining the complementarity with the NATO.⁶ In comparison with previous strategic documents, two elements become evident in the strategic orientation, which were not mentioned before. It concerns a special position of the relations between SR and the USA, where the USA is characterised as the strategic ally, and the formulation of attitude to “ad-hoc coalitions“. Although the Security Strategy of the SR 2001 “did not consider ad-hoc coalitions“, Slovakia has sent an engineer unit of armed forces of the Slovak Republic for Enduring Freedom operation in Afghanistan and for the Iraqi Freedom one.

However, the Manifesto of new government (august 2006)⁷ is more careful in this area. According to the Manifesto, “The Government considers NATO to be the main guarantor of the Euro-Atlantic security and it shall respect and fulfil obligations following from Slovakia’s membership in NATO. It shall continue in strengthening the transatlantic links and partnership between the member states of the Alliance, and to develop its relations with the USA”.⁸ It is assumed that, by the end of 2010, SR will contribute adequately to NATO’s defence capabilities and to EU’s military capabilities, with the objective of a full-fledged contribution in the period thereafter. Ad-hoc coalitions are not mentioned, a larger stress is put on the definition of the mandate of forces.⁹

The defence strategy 2005¹⁰ has replaced the security and military strategy of that period of transition from individual to joint defence and has concentrated on the Slovak Republic as a NATO and European Union member.

The main aim of the Slovak Republic’s defence policy should be proceeded from the Euro-Atlantic position. Building the armed forces capability is based on this aim. It respects a set of obligations



towards NATO. These priorities are also regarded as the intention of using the armed forces:

- In full extent, for high intensity operations for defending the Slovak Republic, including mobilization;
- In great extent, ad-hoc, for high intensity allied operations under NATO collective defence, by providing one-time contribution of land forces and other necessary elements for combat support and combat service support up to the size of a brigade group;
- In a large extent, ad-hoc, for geographically unlimited NATO-led multinational joint operations, by providing one-time contribution of land forces and other necessary elements for combat support and combat service support up to the size of a battalion group;
- In a medium extent, for NATO or EU-led multinational peace-support operations, by providing and sustaining a contribution of land forces or its cost equivalent up to the size of a mechanized battalion;
- In small extent, for peace-support and humanitarian operations under the leadership of the UN, EU, or international coalitions, by providing land forces or its cost equivalent of long-term sustainability up to the size of a company.

The political-military ambition of the Slovak Republic by the end of 2010 is to prepare its armed forces for participation at least in two simultaneous operations with intention to achieve a readiness for participation in operation under the NATO command. This ambition is further elaborated in our model 2015 – Long-term plan of Ministry of defence development by 2015.

The strategy banks on the change of armed forces mission. Armed forces of the Slovak Republic, now designated especially for territorial defence of a country, will expand their activity, so they will also contribute to the defence of allies and all together they should be able to prevent the conflicts and to settle crisis situation in the world. From this perspective, the strategy defines the tasks of armed forces as:

- strategic tasks (national defence, contribution to joint defence, air defence and participation in NATINADS, acceptance of allied forces on its own territory);
- the other tasks arising from passed international obligations (participation in the NATO, Eu-

ropean Union, UN and OSCE operations);

- assistance tasks for public authority support.

The armed forces within defence strategy are categorized by operational readiness as it follows:

- high-readiness force – available for employment at short notice for wide scale of operations, forces of immediate reaction being included;
- low-readiness forces – available for employment in relatively short notice, one part of them will be able to execute tasks after reinforcement;
- long-term deployment forces – able to provide a suitable support to the employed forces after the reinforcement with reservists.

2. The security and defence policy and the reform of armed forces

2.1. Attempts to reform the armed forces until 1998

After the Slovak Republic constitution, the Slovak army which emerged from splitting out a former Federal army, needed to be reformed. In 1994, they commenced to elaborate the Conception of the Slovak Republic's Armed Forces building by 2000. It represented a programme for generating relatively small, well trained and suitably equipped army, similar to those ones from the developed democratic countries. The lack of co-ordination between military and political parameters was a reason why a performance of Slovak army reform process has been complicated and stopped after 1995. A serious problem was that failed effort to harmonize armed forces transformation process with process of integration into the NATO. Accordingly, a re-evaluation of armed forces transformation was done after 1998.

2.2. Reform of the armed forces after 1998

2.2.1. Intensifying of the Slovak Republic's armed forces reform before joining the NATO

In this period, both political and military garnitures were brought into two complementary processes, initiating the reform of the new army and providing a preparation of the Slovak Republic for the NATO membership. In October 1999 a new document was issued - **Conception (design) of defence sector reform by 2002 (with a perspective to 2010)**. Its aim was to renew a



SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

balance of army needs and economic possibilities of country and at the same time to initiate a process of creating the compatibility of armed forces with the NATO standards. The problem was that the preparation and application of army reform were not based on conceptual security documents. The 2002 Conception had a quite general character, despite certain positive influence. It did not deal with reform exactly but with a certain “vision” of reform. Therefore, in March 2001 a special commission dealing with armed forces reform was created. Consequently, several conceptual materials, including the document **Armed forces of the Slovak Republic – Model 2010** were elaborated. The paper was approved by government in October 2001 and then it was open in Parliament. It is different from previous documents in its prior intention of Slovak’s Republic army and it treats the priorities of preparation for the NATO membership. In accordance with the Model 2010, a **Long-term plan of structure and development of armed forces of the Slovak Republic** was prepared and approved in 2002.

3. The development after joining the NATO – amendment of Model 2010


Due to the changes of security position of the Slovak Republic, a process of strategic re-evaluation of the Slovak Republic’s defence was initiated in 2004. In 2005, the top strategic documents were approved. That created conditions for a modification of long-term defence planning cycle. Regarding the new conditions and also new NATO Force Goals 2004, it was necessary to amend a long-term plan of development of armed forces – Model 2010. **In December 2005, the government approved Long-term plan of ministry of defence development with prospect to 2015. The review of Model 2010 has 2 aspects:**

EXTERNAL:

NATO TRANSFORMATION:

- changes in political-military strategy
- requirements on force structure and capabilities
- emphasis on deployable units
- expeditionary force

The SR Force 2010: Process and Products



In 2002 and 2003 the first application steps to achieve the aims of model 2010 were made. Primary tasks of the first stage were:

- to reorganize the command structures of general staff and the commands of the land forces, air force and forces of training and support;
- to reduce the infrastructure and the number of garrisons;
- to reduce the staff of higher ranks and make steps towards full professionalization (conscript service was abolished on the 1st January, 2006).

EU MILITARY POLICY:

- NATO-EU relation
- EU security/military policy
- EU vs. NATO requirements

INTERNAL:

- Results and experience from the current Long-Term Plan implementation
- System of Defence Planning
- Availability of resources
- **NATO/EU Accession**
- **Implementation of Force Goals 2004.**



SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

Model 2015 is not a new conception, but only an amendment of Model 2010. Model 2010 was based on individual defence and at the same time it offered a ground for integration into NATO. At present, a joint defence and security system membership affords promissory security warranty to us based on joint principle. These reasons have influenced the advancement in the armed forces requirements. There is shift from forces for individual defence towards for common defence, from the orientation to Article 5 operations towards a wider engagement and better interoperability. The requirements of supplementing CS/CSS units have represented a significant change. In other words, the philosophy of approach has changed.

Model 2010	Model 2015
Strategic goal: defend national strategic interests independently, ensure readiness to access NATO and modernization in long term framework	Strategic goal: restructure the Armed Forces for full spectrum of Alliance operations /while able to defend national strategic interests/ in line with the NATO and EU requirements and commitments to other international organizations or coalitions
Balanced Force for Self-Defence	C o n t r i b u t o r for Collective Defence
Less Deployable: Article 5-Focused	More Deployable: No restrictions
Lower capability/Interoperability	Higher capability/Interoperability
Predominantly Combat Forces	Combat Forces with fully deployable supporting CS/CSS
(No Corps-level CSS Contributions to NATO)	Corps-level CSS contributions to NATO

The changes defined in new long-term plan should guarantee that in medium-long-time perspective to 2010 the armed forces will dispose of abilities specified in Force Goals 2004. They should allow a suitable contribution to the NATO joint defence and the participation in international crisis management.

The next step will be the implementation of 2006 Force Goals, so that the Slovak Republic could adequately carry out the obligations arising from North-Atlantic treaty by 2015.

Military-political ambitions mentioned in connection with defence strategy are particularized in model 2015, such as the ability to keep 8% of army (land forces) in operations (40% of force has to meet the requirement of deployment availability. The rotation of units in operations, at battalion and battalion group level is expected). The plan does not state the ability for rotating a brigade group provided by itself. Also, according to the defence strategy, a selection of aircrafts MIG-29 for the system NATINADS is planned. The other NATO employment requirements are intended to be fulfilled according to mentioned ability of 40% and 8%.

In the second half of 2006, the Slovak Republic has engaged in NRF-7 with its contribution and finalized the preparation for contributing to NRF-8. But these contributions are relatively small. The preparation for contributing to NRF-10 with a mechanized battalion size, having a national support element, is an important task for this year. In the area of European security and defence policy, we will prepare a contribution to the combat group with the Czech Republic in the second half of 2009 to the combat group with Poland, Germany, Lithuania and Latvia in the first half of 2010.

NOTES:

¹ The purpose of Guidance is “*In connection with changes of security environment and qualitatively new tasks, which result for the Slovak Republic from the NATO and EU membership, to specify the political-defence framework for a strategic revaluation of the defence of state, including the definition of key fields and requirements of defence policy to the creation of new strategic, conceptual and planning documents in the field of defence of state*“, http://www.mosr.sk/dokumenty/smernica_ob_pol.pdf

² <http://www.mosr.sk/dokumenty/eng/sk-security-strategy-2005.pdf>

³ SS SR 2005, Ch 1, point 6 states among the interests: “to strengthen the TA strategic partnership, to be a joint guarantor of security of the allies; to improve the efficiency of international organisations, and to support the extension of NATO and EU“.

⁴ Ibid A 10 and 11.

⁵ Ibid A 68: “*SR shall support the transformation and adaptation of the NATO to new kinds of threats and challenges. It shall reform and build its security system in such a way, which enables the SR to contribute to the development of required capabilities of the NATO, including the participation in the missions and*



SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

operations of the Alliance outside the territory of its member countries. . . . NATO's expansion as the way of strengthening of the zone of security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic space. . . . The SR shall support common meetings of the NATO and the EU at high level, as well as day-to-day working meetings as the expression of their key strategic partnership."

⁶ Ibid., article 69: *"SR shall actively jointly form and implement the CFSP. The SR shall contribute to the realisation of aims of European integration and the creation of civilisation, civil, legal, internal-security and economic space. . . . enforce the fulfilment of aims stipulated in the European Security Strategy and it shall strengthen the capacities of CM with the aim to contribute to the operations and missions led by the EU. It shall support the building of operating capacities of ESDP. . . complementary to NATO's capacities. In accordance with the EU clause of solidarity, the SR shall help the countries attacked or threatened by terrorist attacks and hit by natural disasters. The SR shall support the development of activities of the*

European Defence Agency".

⁷ *The Manifesto of the Government of the Slovak Republic*, <http://www8.vlada.gov.sk/index.php?ID=1672>

⁸ There is not mention of "strategic partnership". The Manifesto states that "utmost attention to its relations with neighbouring countries, especially V-4 and ascribes specific significance to the strategic partnership with the Czech Republic and to its implementation in the form of multi-faceted specific cooperation", *Manifesto*. Ch. 9.

⁹ *"The Government will assess the involvement of armed forces in operations of international crisis management, including the operation Iraqi Freedom. For the future, the Government will ensure that any decision on deploying forces includes a clear definition of a mandate containing criteria for their continuation or withdrawal"*, Ibid, Ch. 8.

¹⁰ <http://www.mosr.sk/dokumenty/eng/sk-defence-strategy-2005.pdf>

Elemir NECEJ (necej@nao.sk) is a researcher within the Institute for Strategic Studies from the National Defence Academy of the Slovak Republic from Liptovský Mikuláš. His researches focus on topics related with ESDP, reform on security area, peacekeeping operations, CIMIC, West Balkans.



FROM THE DEFENCE AGENCY TO THE JAPANESE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE -THE (RE)BIRTH OF A MILITARY POWER

Iulian PÎRVAN

The end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the persistence of the asymmetric threats, the globalization or the irresistible rise of China do not represent the only “strategically surprises” of the latest years.

After 60 years of penance and lethargy, the Japanese military giant wakes up and looks to the future with a very changed approach, despite its neighbour's reticence.

The specialists consider that the impact of such a re-orientation, along with the re-evaluation of Japan's foreign policy and the reconsideration of the country's international status, will be spectacular and it will change the grid of geopolitical analysis of Asia.

At the 15th of December 2006, the Japanese Parliament ended the endorsement procedures to convert the Defence Agency into the Ministry of Defence, therefore from the 9th of January 2007 it will be officially working.¹

There are enough arguments to consider that beyond the formal aspect, this decision consecrates not only the end of a half century stage of Japan's history, but especially the desertion of one of the most particular paradigm of reference to the international system and the transformation of a great (exclusive) economic power into a military power, with a regionally relevance at least.

It is to be expected that the resurgence of its military traditions and the translation, larger than in present, of the legendary Nippon economic and financial potential into defensive capabilities and into definition the frames of a new politics in this domain is to added a new parameter, with a “hard” profile, to more complicated equation that is drawn by the most important players of the security environment of Asia.

An equation in which the strategically triangle defined by USA, China, Russia circumscribes the pentagon drawn by North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, India and Pakistan.

Apparently, the changed vision of the Japanese government is a matter of conjuncture, being determined especially by the continually, straightforwardly increased nuclear threat represented by the autarchic regime of North Korea.

Indeed, in August 1998 and July 2006, North Korea launched ballistic missiles over Japan, and directly demonstrated its capabilities and probably even its intentions in a certain context but especially the Japanese vulnerabilities in matters of antiballistic defence.

This fact increased the public opinion's sensibility related to the national security issues and allowed the acceleration of the military programs taken into account by the Japanese authorities, including those ones which have been developed in cooperation with the USA, as Japan's traditional ally. The official change of attitude towards the defensive pillar occurred against the background of the mutations on the Japanese political situation, which is marked by the substantial advance of the conservative political trends. If the initial debates related to the Japanese antiballistic program were vigorous, gradually the vehemently opposition to this program conducted to the decline of the political left and the debate is today considerably more muted. In October 2005, a comprehensive Japan/USA agreement was endorsed and it underlined the unprecedented extension of the bilateral cooperation in matters of defence against ballistic missiles. In addition to the installation of an X-band radar in Japan, the agreement comprises liberal exchange of sensor data and the development of an advanced version of the antiballistic missile SM-3.

Meanwhile, during 2007, the Nippon authorities intend to install SM-3 sea-based missiles and PATRIOT PAC-3 land-based systems and to purchase Aegis systems for their Kongo-class guided missile destroyers and THAAD - Terminal High Altitude Area Defence systems.



At the same time, Japan is independently developing a new generation of radar FPS-XX which will have significant antiballistic capabilities (launch detection and tracking) and intends to upgrade a number of existing radars.

The total amount of these programs exceeds \$ 9 billion over the next five years including the cost of maintenance and operation.²

Although in public opinion the threat represented by North Korea is the decisive factor of the new Japanese defence politics, it is officially affirmed that these politics are not influenced by a particular threat, being based on existing capabilities and on the evolution of the security environment.

However, in the American military environment is it alleged that in order to substantiate the new defensive strategy and to select adequate defensive programs, primarily, Japanese authorities considers the potential threat of China. Operational plans emphasize the impossibility of an adequate defence against a full-scale Chinese ballistic missiles attack, but Nippon officials stress out the importance of the antiballistic systems in defending Japan's critical infrastructure for a short time at least, until the United States responds more comprehensively to the attack.

Therefore, the US commitment to extended deterrent of a ballistic missiles attack against Japan is still the basic element, which articulates the Japanese defensive strategy, but meanwhile it raised doubts that China believes US would put its cities at risk to deter attack on Japan. The expressed doubts produced uncertainties related to the utility of the US commitment and it seems to be one of the real reasons of the new Japanese defensive approach, generally, but emphasizing the acquisition of antiballistic self-defence capabilities.

These uncertainties generated a challenge of which arguments begin to insinuate themselves in the Japanese environments as well as in the American ones.

Actually, it is appreciated that Japan has the technical capability and the financial resources to create a strong offensive nuclear deterrence. Although the Japanese history and current politics argue against such a development, nuclear deterrence could be seen as a more efficient way to avert the effect of a full-scale attack on Japan.

The argumentation of those who appeal to such an assumption, unbelievable several years ago, but

today more and more pregnant and spread, refers to two proportions:

1. The ratio of the Chinese offensive ballistic systems and the Japanese defensive systems, undeniably in China's favour.

2. The ratio of the cost of a nuclear deterrent force and the cost of a comprehensive defensive system, undeniably in the favour of the nuclear option.

For the time being, Japanese government deems a national antiballistic system might be more "moral" than the alternative of a nuclear deterrent capability and meantime considers spending of self-defence comparatively easy to justify to the public. However, the polls reveal that in Japanese society the cleavages related to the national security issues divide along the generations, not partisan lines and thus Japanese born after the Second World War and its immediate aftermath tend to support the enhancement of Japan's military power.

This point is just the formal reflex of a silent process including successive achievements and re-evaluations, which brought a quite "critical mass", requiring debates, institutional approaches, strategies and programs.

Gradually, it has began to be eluded those constitutional demands related to a timorous, less perspective self-defence force through a morality sense that seems to be rejected by post-war generations.

Even from 1976, the Japanese authorities have reinterpreted the pacifist Constitution endorsed in 1947, especially Article 9 which affirms that Japanese people give up war forever, as a sovereign right of nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

The aim was to allow the Self-Defence Forces to repel an attack on limited scale.³ According to the mentioned basic law, the US exclusively represented and still represents the "anchor" of Japan's foreign security, through the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States, endorsed on the 19th of January 1960, together with the abrogation of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951⁴. Therefore, Japan was known as "the USA's non-submersible aircraft carrier".⁵

Then there was the 1980s re-evaluation that concluded Japan could not rely absolutely on US' support in the event of a wider conflict. The catalyst



for this review was the Soviet spread, through the military intervention against Afghanistan and the installation of SS 20 missiles in Siberia, shifting Japan's attention upon the vulnerabilities of the disputed islands placed to the North of Hokkaido. These islands are still claimed by the Japanese leadership but till now the US did not showed the willing to support Japan by using their diplomatic and military trumps.

At that time Japan began a broad fleet modernization program that turned into the most formidable Pacific naval force outside the US, equipped with an advanced air defence capability and anti-submarine systems.

The end of the Cold War brought a significant shift of public opinion against the background of a re-emergence of domestic terrorism, paralleled a heightened sense of vulnerability over Japan's ailing economy, determined a more spectacular decrease of the pacifism, which dominated the post-war politics, and security problems were firmly back on the national agenda.

Japan joined the US defence shield project but took into account the creation of its own anti-ballistic satellite-based early warning system that could provide real time intelligence on incoming enemies missiles, without having to wait for filtered US information to come through the Treaty system. Although they do not constitute an offensive capability, some of these initiatives technically violate the spirit of Article 9.

Otherwise, *The Japan Defence White Paper-2006*⁶ clearly stipulates that Article 9 does not exclude the right to self-defence in order to maintain Japan's sovereignty. According to the government's interpretation, that means Japan is allowed to maintain a minimum of military forces for operational use and the limit of these forces depends on the international situation at one time.

Also, the document which included the pillars of the Japan-US cooperation in the defensive domain (*The Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation*) in the chapter "Concept of Operation", mentioned that Japanese Self-Defence Forces will have the primary responsibility for conducting operation for air defence, in the contingency of an air attack against Japan.⁷

Moreover, through 2004 deploy of 600 military personnel in Iraq and the logistics support of the US operation in Afghanistan provided by Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force, in addition to the

commitment for logistics support of the US troops in the contingency of a crisis in the Asian region, Japan passed into an active partner of the American superpower.⁸

The 240,000-strong SDF gets an annual budget of about US \$50 billion, although it is only around 1 percent of GNP⁹ ranking Japan among the six top military powers worldwide. The experts emphasize especially its naval forces for their high level of technical complexity, despite their lack of operational experience. Also, it is carefully evaluated an extensive program meant to enhance the naval forces, which foresees the increase of the submarines number from 16 to 20 and the destroyers number from 30 to 31, until 2010.¹⁰

Concluding, Japan's weight in Asia and as a global actor is going to increase significantly alongside with the re-evaluation of the military dimension of its power. There are already signs of the implications of its new aspirations: from the silent changes of the traditional Japan-USA partnership to the neighbour's anxiety related to the resurrection of the Japanese nationalism and militarism. But the typical Japanese tenacity that has developed the strategic and tactical guidelines of its new status is indubitable. The process is irreversible.

We will see how the Japanese political-military elites will match the strategically ambition with the diplomatic realism as required in the existing regional and international context.

NOTES:

¹ Official page of the Japanese Defence Agency, http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index_.htm.

² Jeremiah GERTLER, *The Paths Ahead: Missile Defense in Asia*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2006, Washington, D.C., p. 10.

³ Alan BOYD, *Awakening Japan's sleeping defense giant*, *Asia Times on-line*, May, 28 2003, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/EE28Dh01.html>

⁴ The document is available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html>

⁵ *The World as it is seen from Tokio*, in *Le Monde Diplomatique Atlas*, Romanian edition, Bucharest, 2006, p.216.

⁶ The document is available at http://www.jda.go.jp/e/publications/wp2006/pdf/2_1_1.pdf



SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

⁷ The document is available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html>

⁸ *The Change of the Japan-US Partnership*, in *Le Monde Diplomatique Atlas*, Romanian edition, Bucharest, 2006, p.219.

⁹ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/budget.htm>.

¹⁰ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/jasdf.htm>

Lieutenant-colonel Iulian PÎRVAN (iulian964@yahoo.com) works for the Operations Directorate within the General Staff.



NATIONAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT THROUGH COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Eugen SITEANU, PhD

Marian SANDU

National security is ensured either directly, through collective security, or indirectly, through the security management. In the present paper, we explain the way in which the security management can contribute substantially to the achievement of national security through collective security.

Today, in the context of globalisation, all the democratic states are confronted with terrorist threats and actions and that is why we aimed our researches on optimizing the management of the national security by collective security, in order to assist governments to understand and combat the changing structure of the terrorist organizations, that is expressed as it follows: “Understanding the changing nature of terrorist organizations and how governments and industries can best adapt to confront these challenges”¹. Additionally, in our approach, we intend to find a solution for the fusion of the quality management, risk management and opportunities management with EU efforts to integrate the security resources: “they [the Europeans] are working steadily and deliberately to pool and integrate their resources and to fashion a more effective Europe – wide military force”². But “of course, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) faces many obstacles, as European analysts recognize”³. We think the national security is advantaged as “ESDP remains entirely intergovernmental, not supranational”⁴. Accordingly, we will start by analyzing the risks of the terrorist attacks and risks, in general, as they are diverse.

Recent approaches treats risk as being a function associating to each event, some indicators linked to the threats and vulnerabilities specific to a certain interest/objective. Thus the economic risk is linked to the efficiency of the warfare actions economic information on which depends the perturbation of food, raw materials and medicine supplies, losing or gaining trade markets, etc.

The security management purpose is to

identify and use the EU, NATO, OSCE and UN opportunities in order to increase the national security operational capabilities and to diminish the risks and losses to a minimum in order to ensure the increase of people’s quality of life. In Annex 1 we present the national security integration into the collective security.

This is similar to the risk management fundamental purpose (increases the operational capabilities and improves the security missions and also maintains the losses at a minimum accepted level) but it also has the opportunity management and quality management. Details in Annex 1, fig. 1 and 2.

The security management process has six phases: 1) opportunities identification; 2) risks identification; 3) unforeseen events, opportunities and risks identification and assessment; 4) making the decision to use the opportunities, manage the risks and set up the monitoring and control plan; 5) implementing the opportunities plan and risks monitoring; 6) control and assess the measures and the whole situation. These are ongoing, concurrent and iterative functions of each risk and opportunity and they are cyclical, according to the quality management.

Each phase of the security management process has some very necessary activities which ensure a sufficient base for the assessment process and maintaining the risks and opportunities within acceptable limitations.

Five essential databases must be achieved in order to support these processes: the national and collective interests and objectives map; opportunities map; vulnerabilities map; risks map and the threat matrix. Setting up the interests and objectives map is a process to establish the conditions and circumstances to reach the level desired in every field: economic, military, social, political, scientific, etc.

The vulnerabilities map identifies the weak points inside the systems, institutions and



processes leading to the established interests and objectives. The opportunities map is the ensemble of systems and processes supporting the national interests, their contribution and efficiency.

Establishing the threats matrix is the process to determine the capabilities and abilities of friends and foes respectively countries and non-state entities to harm certain national and collective interests. For this, a lot of information must be gathered about each friend and foe/enemy and their capabilities and reasons to oppose the national interests and objectives. This information is vital today when any state can be the victim of an informational warfare of different forms: psychological warfare, economic information warfare, cyber warfare, financial warfare, cultural warfare, religious warfare, etc. Information is a strategic resource because those controlling it have the advantage in the struggle to ensure security by making efficient security decisions in all fields (financial, economic, political, military, cultural).

The risks map is built taking into account the functional processes and contains both the risks indicators (probability, priority, impact, etc.) and the aspects of the threats matrix and vulnerabilities map connected to the respective risk and interest.

Building the opportunities map has in view all the national security dimensions and must identify as accurately as possible all internal and external opportunities (particularly the oil, gas and rare metals reserves and the European funds the respective state can get). The power of a state can be expressed through violence, wealth and knowledge, the last one being inexhaustible; its substance is information that has a systemic and process character. Information has four coordinates: metrical, semantic, structured and of course pragmatic.

The information component has a main role in the security management process and implies: identifying, assessing and establishing the options regarding the national and collective opportunities and risks (identifying, monitoring, reducing, eliminating, etc). Planning and conducting the information operations are very important as they are an action tool of the security and risk management because the world faces today an informational warfare. "The information warfare focuses on structures belonging to the political, economic and social fields (the military field is

included in the social one) not only to destroy or paralyze them but above all to influence the decisional processes"⁵.

In order to assess the informational advantage, it is necessary to know not only the informational status but also the informational situation. The informational status of a state or organization represents that state or organization at a given moment (the information quality and the interactions achievement). The informational situation shows, through contrast, the difference between the informational status and the necessary information at a given moment. The informational superiority represents the informational advantage relatively compared to the enemy. It belongs to the military field where there has always been a preoccupation to have a decisive informational advantage.

The security management means, first of all, identifying, assessing and generating options/decisions regarding the national and collective opportunities and reducing, monitoring and eliminating the risks that helps to achieve the security goals/objectives.

The informational operations are a tool to manage the national security opportunities and risks as a practical action of risks and opportunities management. The informational superiority is achieved and maintained through these operations, in order to protect and achieve the national interests. Passing from providing information to providing knowledge is a step forward from the informational superiority to the decisional superiority⁶.

The informational operations are used as strategies for peace and also stability and support operations, as an element of the national power⁷, in order to prevent the enemy from knowing and making him get wrong information, manipulating and influencing him.

Given the importance of the security management and informational operations, we consider useful to establish an Integrated Decision Centre (IDC), as a permanent management structure of national security through collective security which should integrate the national security institutions (through their representatives) and based upon a quality management system.

In order to systemically approach the processes, a system of national security processes qualities management will be implemented within IDC



through the following phases: 1) identifying the quality management processes and applying this system in an efficient way; 2) determining the security processes phases and establishing the interactions between them; 3) choosing the best criteria and methods to verify the processes' efficient functioning and controlling; 4) ensure the time, financial, technical, human and material resources and the information/knowledge necessary to the respective processes; 5) these processes' exact measuring, ongoing monitoring and quick analyzing; 6) execute these actions/activities in order to achieve the planned objectives and improve the IDC quality management system processes.

In order to have a just coordination regarding the transformation of input variables into output data to achieve the national security, the process must be permanently under control. As shown in Annex 2, the security management (management responsibility), ways (resources) and exact measuring are needed to control the processes.

The PDCS periodically/ongoing cycle (Plan – Do – Check – Act) to ensure the national security through collective security is presented in Annex 2. The Integrated Decision Centre (IDC) we propose integrates the problems of opportunity management process, risk management process and that of quality management representing a concrete way to apply them and ensuring a new perspective to solve the national security problems through collective security by:

- achieving an integrating image about the economic, political and military power and capabilities of the state, Alliance and the EU;
- national security opportunities and risks ongoing, coherent/unitary management;
- rapid planning of all the national security actions, in total agreement with the national and collective capabilities;
- ensuring an efficient interface between the security's information structures and all the decisional factors in the national and collective security field.
- generating a proactive decisional behaviour through the process-based approach and the processes systemic approach.

The development of informational structures associated to the national security from the quality management perspective is an important source of the national power.

IDC is the structure that configures and proposes alternatives for optimum actions in the field of national security and is also a strategic tool to plan and conduct the security actions at national level based upon a quality management system and a command-control system integrated in a C4ISR system that can ensure the ongoing monitoring and assessment of the opportunities and risks associated with the national and collective interests.

IDC is destined to reduce the distances between the national and collective security structures, develop the competences, policies and procedures, in order to obtain the strategic advantage and informational superiority in the policy of national security through collective security. IDC represents also a tool ensuring the integration of the national actions/reactions by defining and adapting the processes, techniques and procedures specific to the quality management by all domestic and collective actors, with responsibilities in the national and collective security. Additionally, IDC offers tools to establish the strategic decisions, the action scenarios and alternatives in accordance with national, NATO and EU interests.

IDC ensures solving the following security problems:

- projecting the national security interests and objectives according to the national and collective capabilities;
- developing strategic scenarios on certain fields (economic, political, military, ecological, energetic, cultural, scientific, etc.) in order to alter human perceptions, attitudes and behaviours so that they support our goals (interests) through psychological actions and also through subtle informational actions including cultural ones;
- establishing a system of indicators associated to scenarios as a base for the management activities of national security through collective security;
- the efficient and effective protection of national security information and informational systems (national and collective);
- identifying and assessing the opportunities and risks to the national security interests and objectives;
- the ongoing monitoring of situations through the integrated risk, opportunity and process quality management;
- ensuring the integrated and operational data required by NATO, EU, OSCE and UN.



The general concept of IDC structure and use is based upon the security management role in solving the national security problems and considering the national security system a non-linear complex and adaptive system. In this context, IDC implements a very important model for the national security management through collective security. There is a series of concepts and approaches about the integration, in special rooms, of some informational, command-control and decisional support management and visualization; at present Situation Room, Show Room, Briefing Room, War Room, Command & Control Room are being implementing. Recently, V. Păun has suggested a Merge Centre – War Room (MC – WR).

War Room is a command-control system with decisional and simulation electronic facilities superior to the former conference rooms. MC

– WR purpose is to capture and transforming the decision-making process into a logical one.⁸

The MC-WR model mentioned here is based upon a relational database management system with strict rules to interrogate, share, replicate and recover data.⁹

MC-WR integrates the effort to gather and analyze the multi-source information ensuring the intelligence support in conducting the informational and intelligence operations relevant for the risk and opportunity assessment...”. Additionally, the security management system we propose integrates also the quality management into IDC and achieves the merge among the risk, opportunity and quality management through the MC-WR War Room, giving consistency to the process of ensuring the national security through collective security.

Annex 1




Fig. 2: The national security management through collective security presented in the view of the concept of EXCELLENCE based upon positive results (“the full side of the glass”) and, of course, upon the quality management which is the base of the security processes.






Fig. 3: The schematic presentation of the national security integration in the collective security (UN, NATO, EU and OSCE).

THE MODEL OF SECURITY QUALITY SYSTEM BASED ON PROCESS



NOTES:

¹ International Security, Winter 2005/2006, Vol. 30, No. 3, p. 197.

² Ibidem, p. 182.

³ Ibidem, p. 187.

⁴ Ibidem. P. 188

⁵ Sorin TOPOR, **Terorism informațional**, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, București,

2006, p. 23.

⁶ Vasile PĂUN, **Aspecte metodologice și informaționale privind managementul riscurilor în structurile militare**, Editura U.N.Ap. “Carol I”, București, 2005, p. 22.

⁷ Ibidem, p. 24.

⁸ Ibidem, p. 22.

⁹ Ibidem, p. 22.

Colonel (ret) prof. eng. Eugen SITEANU, PhD (esiteanu@yahoo.com), has graduated the National Defence College and the Technical Military Academy. He is a professor at the Commercial Academy in Satu Mare and professor associated with National Defence University “Carol I”. He has published numerous papers in the fields of: management, logistics, feasibility, maintenance, national security, military strategy, military art, etc.

Commander Marian SANDU (myownstuff21@yahoo.com) has graduated the National Defence College and the University of Bucharest – The Faculty of Law. He is a PhD candidate in military sciences and works for the General Staff.



THE MILITARY SECURITY SYSTEM - PRESENT AND PERSPECTIVE

Cornel CUCU

Within the actual geopolitical context, while the war has taken new forms, the necessity of developing the Military Security System is inextricably related to the course of Romanian Army transformation and its participation to the Alliance's international missions.

The information has become nowadays the main tool of production and product of the society. Modern society relies entirely on knowledge, on ideas' generation and confrontation. The information – in the context of the dynamic and complex society – represents the main resource in political, diplomatic, economic, social and not lastly military fields.

The emergence of new risks and threats, the complex evolutions of domestic and especially international security environment impose an overall, systemic and comprehensive approach of the military security goals.

The military security entails activities of preventing leaks of information and attacks against the national and military security. In fact, military security requires specific tasks of *counterintelligence activities* in order to identify and counteract the threats posed by espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorism and organized crime, as well as by *military security activities* regarding national and NATO¹ military forces.

The risks and threats to the military bodies generate the increase of the military security system's importance, which represents the constituent of the national security guarantee mechanisms in the military field.

Following the military system transformation – during the fall of 2006 – the new military security body has changed its name in *counterintelligence and military security*, according to its core missions. However, changing the name or the organization of the intelligence structures is not enough; hence, we believe that we should enhance the efforts in order to promote a real *security culture*. This generic concept – forwarded on the Alliance's

working table by the former General Secretary of NATO, Lord George Robertson, - embraces a new approach of the institutions having responsibilities in security field towards promoting the dialogue with public actors and acknowledging the social mission of those institutions.

In the current phase, ensuring analytical and operational capabilities of the counterintelligence bodies, - in order to enable them to anticipate the threats to the national and military security - represents an important goal. In order to acknowledge the new security environment, it would be required the promotion of a counterintelligence and security plan, as well as implementing an organizational and institutional Euro-Atlantic security culture².

Presently, Romania – member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization -, acts according to NATO's joint intelligence, counterintelligence and security doctrine. This doctrine offers the conceptual basis of systematic cooperation between the national security structures of the member states, regarding the information, values and resources that require protection, as well as common defence standards.

NATO's joint intelligence, counterintelligence and security doctrine represents the theoretical base of the national security, achieved by gathering and re-evaluating information, as well as informing the governments about threats and protection means against them³. In July 2004, according to CSAT Decision, it has been adopted the security information national doctrine. National doctrine represents the theoretical basis of the activities related to national security system and intelligence, counterintelligence and security structures.

According to NATO papers, the counterintelligence doctrine shows that these institutions undergo activities related to countering the main risks: asymmetric, espionage, sabotage, subversion (misinforming, white, black or gray propaganda), terrorism, organized crime (corruption, in-



fluence trafficking). Although, in reality, we can't talk about pure networks and cases, all the aspects related to those risks strictly refer to the military field⁴.

Romania's NATO membership entails that the Ministry of Defence, as well as counterintelligence and Military Security Department, should undertake a range of measures regarding the protection of NATO classified information. Hence, it requires organizing and ensuring data and information security, personnel's security, physical security of the institutions managing classified data, documents security, informatics, communications and cryptographic security (INFOSEC), industrial security⁵.

Counterintelligence assesses possible threats posed by hostile security services and other structures – organized crime, terrorist groups, and drug smuggling. Counterintelligence analysis includes all information sources and the outcomes of the undertaken actions⁶.

Not so long ago, the actions of the counterintelligence officers aimed strictly a national activity. Following NATO accession and increase of participation to important missions in various operation theatres, military counterintelligence officers have become advisers of the commander in counterintelligence matters; they have the task of ensuring the putting into practice of military counterintelligence regulations, in the military training framework.

Furthermore, they are responsible for training different units or structures/teams assigned in missions abroad.

Obtaining the information and assessment of the vulnerabilities are pre-conditions in planning preemptive measures. A well-planned program, comprising all rigorously systematized data, is essential in order to acknowledge the nature of any potential threat, regardless the area of action. Counterintelligence responsibility zones and interest zones related to the operation areas are set, in order to allow the commander and counterintelligence officers to focus the intelligence efforts.

Intelligence and counterintelligence are major factors in winning the war. According to NATO doctrine, these are the assembly of data and information that are the subject of an analytical process, as well as the outcome of the processing, materialized in facts, phenomena, actions and inactions, hostile or potentially hostile forces.

Following the phases of gathering, the quantification and the assessment of information, the intelligence services disseminate the warnings regarding potential threats or risks and the targets at national decisional levels.

Military counterintelligence activity related to stability operations involves a set of issues, different from those normally existent in a combat scenario or national normal conditions. Strong reliance on HUMINT, extremely assorted information requests, as well as unpredictable and volatile operational situation, its geopolitical, social and economic dimensions give us the real environment in which the intelligence process has to be driven. During this kind of operations, marked by unpredictability, the counterintelligence officers must have the capacity to foresee imminent events. Planning and conducting counterintelligence in stabilizing operations has an equally or even greater importance as the classic war.

In such a context, during the procedure of force deployment, theatre security authority will supervise all counterintelligence and military security aspects and will be the main adviser in counterintelligence matters of the commander in chief. Once the troops are deployed in operation theatres in stabilization missions, the main focus – except for conducting the mission - is placed especially on personnel, equipment and important resources protection, as well as on protection of the host country supporters. The assembly of these actions is generically known as Force Protection.

Regardless its past or present name, a military security or military counterintelligence structure will have the task to acknowledge, prevent and counter domestic and international threats to the military bodies and national security, to counter the intelligence services and hostile group's actions, as well as the facts and state of facts potentially generators of risks and threats to material and human values of our armed forces, in order to guarantee their stability and their combat or action capabilities.

All actions must be assessed in connection with the current informative situation, in order to allow the identification of hostile intentions or possibilities.

The necessity and utility of counterintelligence structures are tied to the persistence of risk factors derived from the international or domestic environment. Those risk factors – both external



and domestic – are of political, psychological, ecological, technological, military, economic, socio-cultural, informational-communicational or other nature.

All these counterintelligence actions will be present and active during a new kind of conflict, *the informational war*. At the same time with the present technological boom, the states and political-military alliances have already begun to take actions in order to protect national or regional interests. *Informational war* assembles informational operations launched in order to protect its own information and informational systems, by affecting the opponent's information and information systems⁷. Reaching *the informational supremacy* will require defensive informational war, as well as offensive informational war.

Within such a context, some transformations have emerged within C4I integrated system (command, control, communications, computers and information), generating a robust integrated system C4I2SR (command, control, communications, computers, information, intelligence, surveillance, research) and a C4I2SRPGM multisystem (command, control, communications, computers, information, intelligence, surveillance, research, precision guided ammunition) and an assembly of integrated systems able to provide a superior military capability.

During the Persian Gulf conflicts, as well as those one in former Yugoslavia, all components of informational war have been used, an important part being assigned to military counterintelligence structures.

Military counterintelligence structures have approached both an offensive and defensive attitude, were equipped with capabilities for collection, processing, analysis and dissemination of great amount of information, noticing that the conflict of the future is a great information consumer.

The remark made by Clausewitz more than a century and a half ago: "There is seldom peace everywhere in Europe, and there is never an end to war in the other parts of the world. *A state that had known peace for a long time should always be preoccupied to provide officers for war theatres, or to sent its officers to be initiated in war*"⁸ would have to stimulate the desire and necessity for training the Military Security System staff in various international missions, following the

implementations of "*lessons learned*" experience.

The war in Iraq has used the highest level of informational war, using misleading in information field. The amount of information sent and received on the informational chain hasn't given any moment of hiatus to coalition members. James Adams stated that "many lessons were and will be learned from this war. Some of them are not new, others are. Though, one is fundamental: the nature of war changed dramatically. The combatant that wins the information campaign prevails, [...], the information is the key to modern war – strategically, operative, tactically and technically speaking."⁹ The achievement of informational supremacy consists of two equally important components – information capability's assembling and protection and affecting the opponent's information capability.

Developing a competitive intelligence, counterintelligence and military security structure is a political-military option and decision, with significant consequences in sustainable development of military and national security. Such an action drives a pro-active behaviour, informational operations differentiation capabilities (defensive and offensive) and maximizing the military potential in order to achieve informational supremacy.

Romania's presence in international missions is based on Constitution and national security legislation's provisions, as well as on agreements, conventions and international treaties Romania is a signatory part. This presence determines the expansion of defence diplomacy in the actual security environment and creates the opportunity of a more active promotion of regional and global security and stability.

The Romanian Army participation to international missions has gathered a wide range of forces comprised in infantry, military police, aerial transport, campaign hospitals, military observatory units or subunits, which have given their contribution to the armed forces' interoperability achievement.

In this context, the presence of counterintelligence structures was necessary, in order to contribute to the protection of forces deployed in operation theatres. We assess that during the participation to international missions, informative defense's limitations were not only expanded, but specific action systems were also improved.



Military counterintelligence structure's participation to international missions increases the effectiveness of decision making process, allowing the increase of intelligence's flows, based on a high level of acknowledgement of the risks and threats to the forces deployed in multinational operations, granting the access to new information areas, characterized by a higher level of complexity.

The effectiveness of military counterintelligence system, focused on information's specific processing capabilities and on cooperation with similar structures belonging to allied armies have as final outcome the increase of system's ability to provide to the decision-makers, both information and assessments with an elevated level of accuracy and precision, as well as to induce the most appropriate and optimal actions in operations theatre.

The counterintelligence elements which participate to international missions must be aware of the disposal and activity of all forces in the area of responsibility, understand and be an expert in evaluating the opponent or third parties capacity to collect information about the other's forces, identify the means to respond to enemy's efforts of information collection, have access to all information which allow the conception of relevant risk analyses.

The complexity of the missions in which the Romanian armed forces take part has required the Military Security System to operate transformations and reconfigurations of specific activities - both at domestic and external levels - according to short term capabilities requirements. The participation to international missions with troops requires, from the counterintelligence structures part, tangible measures of force and operations' protection, which could be tackled exclusively in cooperation with similar military structures of the Alliance's, acting in theatres of operation.

The national informative component in the theatres of operation consists of information cells, which should comprise a balanced proportion of intelligence and counterintelligence elements, based on the status of each theatre of operation. These information cells have the capacity of informative issues' effective management incumbent in areas where Romanian troops were deployed.

During military operations, the counterintelligence elements will assign teams - part of information cells - which will advise the commanders in counterintelligence and security matters.

The counterintelligence elements in operation theatre are responsible for:

- strictly respecting the restrictions, interdictions and general legal and informative limitations imposed by NATO, multinational forces and Alliance's members during planning and leading the missions assigned by Counterintelligence and Security;

- guarantee the overall coordination with the Allied Commandment assigned for issues, activities and unplanned counterintelligence missions, general informative and legislative issues in which the command, units and staff are involved;

- full support to gathering self, collective, theatre's effort, by guaranteeing unique approach and adjustments for each issue, by request;

- coordinate, monitor and integrate informative counterintelligence and external security's requests, according to coordination of information request's gathering and crises management demanded by the commander in chief and the effort of managing the HUMINT collection;

- guarantee the connection with intelligence staff in theatre operation, organizations and intelligence, counterintelligence, law enforcement and security services of the host-state (if any);

- correlate technical, operational and procedural counterintelligence requirements, HUMINT, security and lessons learned in order to apply it during future missions;

- contribute to Force Protection, Security Operations (OPSEC), Electronic Warfare (EW), Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) and Intelligence Operations (INFO OPS).

The functions of counterintelligence elements in operation theatres involve activities of: establishing and maintaining the connection with national military/civil services, intelligence, counterintelligence and security required to obtain reliable counterintelligence information; exploitation of counterintelligence's sources; refugees, prisoners of war and detainees' monitoring in counterintelligence purposes; local staff's verifying in pre-employment procedures; warning briefings about dangers and travel; inspecting the implementation of Technical Surveillance Countermeasures; assuring the Force Protection Special Expertise, including following the Security Operations; executing security operations against threats and assuring operations security; executing inspections, visits and training surveillance,



technical countermeasures and assistance, in order to protect and ameliorate security status.

The functions of counterintelligence could include counterintelligence operations such as offensive, defensive and non-routine investigative actions. All range of non-routine investigative actions involving the commander's staff of information must be coordinate with counterintelligence activity of the Allied Commandment. The functions of non-routine counterintelligence, executed during operations under Article 5, must bear the approval of the Commander in chief of the theatres of operations or its legal representatives. All non-routine operational activities must be coordinated with counterintelligence activities of Allied Commandment.

In order to guarantee military security required for the fulfilment of the goals undertaken by Romanian forces in operations theatres, the following steps are required:

- Counterintelligence training of military staff which participates at external missions under UN, NATO, OSCE flag;
- counterintelligence guarantee the military staff and specific actions in theatres of operation in cooperation with partner states' counterintelligence representatives;
- advising commanding factors on force and operation protection issues.

Counterintelligence training and assuring as well as advising military contingents commanders which participate in international missions acts for:

- identify, understand, document, prevent and counter any threats against staff and its actions;
- advise military authority which establishes and puts in practice concrete measures required to force protection and force's operation protection.

The Military Security System's management in peacekeeping missions involves risk management in forces pre-employment phase, force-deploying phase, force-engagement, force disengagement and force restoration. The main goal of Military Security System's activity is achieving the required military security level.

The guarantee of the success of international missions' participation could be reached by the effectiveness of own informative actions and the level of integrating it in the frame of main partner or Alliance's specific operations. In this sense, we believe that it's necessary that the

whole range of structures involved in international missions comprise counterintelligence elements or structures, able to effectively manage informative issues, which inevitably appear in theatres of operation.

The main task of the states within a military alliance engaged in a peacekeeping mission is to monitor the military situation in theatre of operation. In this context, counterintelligence elements should actively monitor local's actions, as well as and non-military, non-governmental and volunteer organizations. Counterintelligence elements should pay a distinctive attention to informative breaches emerged in theatres of operation and should use special teams for intelligence collection tasks.

The extensive use of information capacities inside intelligence services and agencies, the improvement of sharing intelligence inside commanding levels of the coalition and participation of coalition partners' counterintelligence elements are, also, essential for the mission fulfilment.

The counterintelligence capabilities transformation for international missions involves the shift from counterintelligence activity based on military capabilities monitoring to counterintelligence activity which provides current and forecast information related to threats and risks present in theatres of operation.

The intelligence requirements in international missions could differ in concordance with various operation phases. To tackle this, it is necessary that the staff involved in informative activity in theatres of operation should have experience in military, political, cultural and economic intelligence assessment.

In theatres of operation, intelligence analysis will be developed with difficulty, because of an impulsive reaction and of assessing what happens instead of what could happen. The whole range of activities in a theatre of operation requires more flexibility and constant intelligence effort from informative structures of coalition member states.

A special attention should be paid to cooperation between civil intelligence structures and military intelligence structures participating in operations in action zone. These services have access to regional infrastructure of the area in conflict and more awareness of political and economical influences. The cooperation could respond to intelligence requirements of the joint informative activity, following the proper acknowledgement



of strengths and weaknesses of hostile elements acting in areas of operations.

If the information is accurate and opportune, the odds for the decision makers to promptly react are increased, and some threats could easily be eliminated.

The recent mutations in military body transformation process are based on the new national and international challenges, exceeding the military boundary. Transformations “involves a simultaneously renewal of direct strategy, in which the army plays the leading role, and of indirect strategy which, without excluding the armed force, is placed in a secondary plan¹⁰.” As a result, beside the interrelation with the other components of National Security System and similar North-Atlantic Alliance’s services, it is also necessary a permanent internal audit of Military Security System (information, counterintelligence and military security). That is why there are aimed new principles and specific work rules for achieving a real and effective control of the current security environment in Military Security System, according to new NATO security requirements and standards. At present, the National Security System has improved the conceptual framework, acting upon new doctrines, regulations and specialised guidebooks compatible with Alliance’s members similar structures.

In the transformation process of the Military Security System it is remarked a new vision, opened with an offensive character and omni directional oriented¹¹. This set of measures will contribute to improving the forecast capacity in integrated management of risks and threats in order to avoid surprise in informational field and, also, including the Military Security System in Early Warning System is needed. The conclusions of a risk analysis must substantiate possible means of unwanted events’ development (dysfunctions, vulnerabilities and dangers), so the decisions should be based upon rational assessment of those. The recommendations should contain the clarifications related to the logical succession of implementation in a certain methodology. Risk management could be considered a tool for decisions support and foundation, optimizing the knowledge management and processes, implementing certain strategies for reducing the effects of vulnerability and threats.

The information assessment aims to uncover the truth and not to provide evidences in support of a

hypothesis or to consolidate an opinion. Following the phase of processing the collected data, focused on events, we shift to a phase imposed by current requirements, focused on forecasting the events.

The adjustment in information field aims to effectively conduct processes and capabilities in order to combat new threats which affect the security environment, supporting the decision making process according to the tasks undertaken and appropriate operational requests.

Currently, the states monitor and control “*informative market*” with an interest equally to monitor the financial market. In perspective, military operations will be increasingly influenced by technological boom, because they will depend on a more rapid and strong informational flow. Because the general armed defence missions have not changed, military intelligence services will continue to provide political-military decision makers, commanders, other decision factors data and information required for permanently acknowledgement of situation in order to achieve success. The art and power of information become increasingly obvious from a conflict to another.

REFERENCES:

- *** Legea privind siguranța națională a României, nr. 51/1991, Monitorul Oficial nr. 163/1991
- *** Legea privind protecția informațiilor clasificate, nr. 182/ 2002, Monitorul Oficial nr.248/2002
- *** Strategia de securitate națională a României, Monitorul Oficial nr. 822/2001
- *** Doctrina națională a informațiilor pentru securitate, Consiliul Suprem de Apărare a Țării, București, 2004
- *** Doctrina pentru operații întrunite ale Forțelor Armate, S.M.G./P.F.-3, București, 2003
- *** Doctrina pentru planificarea operațiilor întrunite, S.M.G./P.F.-5, București, 2003
- *** FM 34-60, Counterintelligence, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1995
- *** FM100-23, Peace Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1994
- *** FM 7-100.3, Opposing force. Paramilitary and nonmilitary organizations and tactics,



Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 2002

*** F.M. 34-8, Combat commander's handbook on intelligence, Headquarters, Department of the Army Washington, DC, 1992

*
* *

ADAMS, James, **Următorul – ultimul război mondial. Arme inteligente și front pretutindeni**, Editura Antet, Oradea, 1998

HERMAN, Michael, **Intelligence Power in Peace and War**, Cambridge University Press, Frank Cass Publishers, Cambridge, 1996

NICOLAESCU, Gheorghe, **Gestionarea crizelor politico-militare**, Editura Top Form, București, 2003

NICOLAESCU, Gheorghe, **Intelligence Services and crises at the beginning of the millennium – monitoring and management**, Glycon & Fortuna Publishing House, Bucharest, 2003

NICOLAESCU, Gheorghe dr., SIMILEANU, Vasile drd., **Informație, management, putere. Războiul informațional**, Editura TOP FORM, București, 2004

PETRESCU, Stan, **Arta și puterea informațiilor**, Editura Militară, București, 2003

PIVARIU, Corneliu, **Lumea secretelor – o modalitate de a înțelege informațiile strategice**, Editura Pastel, Brașov, 2005

PĂUN, Vasile, **Puterea informațională**, Editura Tritonic, București, 2005

RĂDOI, Mireille, **Serviciile de informații și decizia politică**, Editura Tritonic, București, 2003

VLĂDOIU, Nasty, **Protecția Informațiilor**, Editura Tritonic, București, 2005.

NOTES:

¹ Gl. bg. dr. Gheorghe NICOLAESCU, *O viziune modernă despre contrainformațiile militare*, Observatorul Militar, nr. 5/2005, pp. 14-15.

² Gl.bg. dr. Gheorghe NICOLAESCU, „*Implicații ale dinamicii surselor de insecuritate asupra siguranței militare*”, **Sesiunea de comunicări științifice a C.S.S.A.S. cu tema „Surse de instabilitate la nivel global și regional. Implicații pentru România**”, Editura U.N.Ap., 2004, p. 77.

³ www.sri.ro/presa.com_040701.html

⁴ Gl. bg. dr. Gheorghe NICOLAESCU, „*O viziune modernă despre contrainformațiile militare*”, Observatorul Militar, nr. 5/2005, pp.14-15.

⁵ Cdr. Aurel STANCIU, „*Priorități post-Praga privind protecția informațiilor NATO clasificate în Ministerul Apărării Naționale*”, **Integrarea Euroatlantică. Priorități post-Praga**, Editura A.Î.S.M., București, 2002, p. 185.

⁶ *** Doctrina pentru sprijinul cu informații al operațiilor întrunite, București, 2003, p. 32.

⁷ Dr. Gheorghe NICOLAESCU, drd. Vasile SIMILEANU, **Informație, management, putere. Războiul informațional**, Editura Top Form, București, 2004, pp. 11-12.

⁸ Carl von CLAUSEWITZ, **Despre război**, București, p. 108.

⁹ James ADAMS, **Următorul – Ultimul război mondial**, Editura Antet, București, 1998, p. 109.

¹⁰ Lt. col. ing. Vasile PĂUN, „*Importanța operațiilor informaționale strategice în strategia de securitate națională*”, Impact Strategic magazine, nr 1/2004, p. 82.

¹¹ Gl.bg. dr. Gheorghe NICOLAESCU, „*Implicații ale dinamicii surselor de insecuritate asupra siguranței militare*”, **Sesiunea de comunicări științifice a C.S.S.A.S. cu tema „Surse de instabilitate la nivel global și regional. Implicații pentru România**”, Editura U.N.Ap., 2004, p. 80.

Major Cornel CUCU (cornel.bucur@email.ro) is an officer within the Ministry of Defence. He holds a degree in military sciences, leading joint land forces specialization. He also holds a Master Degree in International Relations and he is a PhD candidate within the National Defence University „Carol I”.



REASONS REGARDING THE WAR IN THE ROMANIAN AND FOREIGN POLITICAL THINKING

Dorel BUȘE, PhD

As the famous American military-political theorist, John Mearsheimer has said, within the international policy "the relations between states are relations of forces" and "the history of international relations is the history of the struggle for hegemony". The realistic paradigm concerning the theory of international relations is strengthened by the genuine material given to analysis by the history of mankind. This shows war as a persistent and important constant of history.

Starting from this cruel truth, all of the representative political thinkers, Romanian or foreigners, have tried to put into words a logical explanation and the prevention, when applied, of this controversial social phenomenon. In their philosophies, they described war using an extremely wide range of means, from Hegel's "force of reason" to Nicolae Iorga's "tragedy of life".

Concurrently with the evolution of science and the accelerated development of last hour technology, the global society, the forms of manifestation and the ways of fighting a war have changed and diversified; yet, this continues to represent a reality of nowadays and world peace remains a significant desideratum.

The war represents one of the most important factors that have had a decisive contribution to the formation and the definition of the international society as a whole, of the state as a unitary actor and even of man as a "political animal".

The war, "the most dignifying and pleasant pre-occupation of the sovereigns", as it was considered throughout the history, "belongs to a totality of human experiences, whose parts can be understood only in relationship with each other"¹, as the specialist in the history of wars Michael Howard noticed. As a matter of fact, as R. A. Brown appreciated, "the origins of Europe were forged on the anvil of war"², and the term "war" is too soft to describe the condition of the European continent

after the disintegration of the precarious Pax Romana, and later on, in time, with the expansion of the geographical area of the Europeans, the condition of the entire world, nowadays.

The major effect that the war had, as an imminent, restless and implacable engine in the whipped movement imposed to the history of international relations, in space and time, was apprehended by all the great thinkers of mankind even from early beginning. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Polybius, Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Hobbes, Hugo Grotius, Montesquieu, J. J. Rousseau, H. von Treischke, Clausewitz, G. Trade, M. Scheler, Marx, Hegel, Kant, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Bodin, Proudhon, Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz – are only a small fraction of the theorists that have tried to comprise in words the logical explanation and the prevention in practice of this controversial social phenomenon.

Criticized by the picturesque and romantic figures due to all the horrors, fears and sufferance produced on earth or appreciated by the voluntary and insensitive pragmatists due to its contribution to the development of science and technology (gunpowder, tank, airplane, helicopter, submarine, spaceships, satellites, rockets and all the nuclear technology are just few of the examples), the war played an undeniable role in the evolution of human society. And yet, it is very difficult to give a unequivocal answer to an entire set of rhetorical questions such as: Can the importance of the Roman Empire compensate by a union of various populations under the imperial eagle in order to be later Christianized in a unitary manner, all that meant the irrecoverable loss of many unique civilizations destroyed under the banner of the cross? Or can it be considered less regrettable than the destruction of the Roman cities of Pompei and Herculaneum by a natural disaster provoked by the volcano on mount Vesuvius, the destruction of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by



the cataclysm provoked by man through the experimentation of the atomic bomb?

The polemologic conceptions, from the early beginning to present, as Karl Popper noticed in his work **Open society and its enemies**, are only making topical again, more or less detailed, of Heraclitus' ideas. If for the dialectician of the Antiquity "the war was the father of all things", to the modern one, for Hegel, the phenomenon becomes "a form of reason... a law of the soul... a condition of our existence"³. The phenomenon must not be understood, as Rousseau had drawn attention, as a "person to person relation but between state to state"⁴. It doesn't attack the existence of the states, but especially their independence – Hegel added – and it implies antinomic relations, the conflicts between states being unable to be decided other than through war. The state of war doesn't express anything else than force relations, power relations between competitors. This makes Treitschke regard war as a "practical" and "theoretical" necessity. "The concept of state – the Prussian historian noticed – implies the war one". It is an idea later reiterated in a formulation similar in essence of M. Sechler (1915): "war means the state in its most real growth and its affirmation means politics". The institution of the state, Fryer added (in 1935), "from the first moment of its existence, has its base in the sphere of war... War is not just the most perfect form of the state activity, it is the element itself in which the state embodies".

Carl von Clausewitz, the most important theorist of war, substantiated the thesis according to which the war is an external, but natural, expansion of politics – the last instrument of diplomacy.

Through the statement "war is nothing else but the continuation of policy by other means" it accentuated the priority of politics in determining the purpose of war and the fact that it has a dual nature, being possibly both with limits and dual.

The war manifests itself, claims its immanence and long duration only in the area of politics, of the power realities between states.

The idea according to which violence and war are intrinsic parts of the international system is the distinctive feature of realism. The forms of violence can change under the influence of technology and its sphere of action can vary as the actors from the system are changing.

The realism acknowledged that the war was and is a persistent systemic variable, which resulted in

the search of a possibility of amelioration. The realists identified these searches in the mechanism of the power equilibrium, the balance of power, considering that this is not a fundamental mean of war prevention but rather a mean of structural stability that, in certain circumstances, could imply the use of the entire range of forces. The appearance in the functions of the war of the era of nuclear weapons of mass destruction forced the realists to modify their structural models in accordance with the ideas concerning polarization and the bipolar or even multi-polar configurations.

War and violence have been recognized for a long time as frequent consequences of the world system, and lately, their intensity has grown; for instance, the two World Wars (1914-1918 and 1939-1945) when over sixty million people from the main belligerent countries were killed.

The Romanian thinkers were no exception from the rule regarding the approach of the war. The paradigms of the century influenced their speech. The influences, mainly French and German, are obvious for the well-informed reader. The war, as a social, political and military phenomenon, couldn't be denied or ignored. The frequency and a certain cyclicity imposed it without any possibility of denial as a "real, natural, objective, fact, which has the character of a law"⁵ issued from the "structure of time"⁶, "an innate form of life"⁷ and a permanent threat, impossible to erase or avoid.

The formation of the society cannot be conceived outside these states of belligerence, as they represent – as Emil Cioran underlined – the natural in life, the periodical breath of history, the catalyst of the life and creation rhythm. "The war being connected to the life of the nations in an essential manner, people can only intervene in order to postpone it, but in no way to avoid it"⁸. Process belongs not only to morality and even to a certain fatality, extrapolated to genetic structures of cosmic dimensions. "He who cannot accept the war as a fatal condition of humanity – peremptory concluded the philosopher – has only the choice of killing himself"⁹. The conflicts, in the conditions of the disappearance of the nations, would probably expand their preferential area to races, planetary civilizations and, why not, even to the galactic ones.

The representatives of the Romanian spirituality from the first half of the last century – Petre Andrei, Dimitrie Gusti, P. P. Negulescu, V. Pârvan, C. Rădulescu-Motru, N. Ionescu, Emil Cioran,



Camil Petrescu, E. Russu, D. D. Roșca, Tudor Vi-anu, Nicolae Iorga, Al. Claudian, etc. – have set on going further than the formal level of the phenomenon and to reach directly the essence and concept. Their works were not rich in formulations, elaborated definitions, but they offered enough theoretical elements that would elaborate upon the cognitive, axiological and praxiologic connotations.

There are various approach perspectives: political, psychological, philosophical, judicial or ethical. The conceptions of Grotius, Hegel, H. von Treitschke, Clausewitz, G. Trade, M. Scheler, Wundt come back obsessively as reference and confrontation sources. The trinitarian definition of the phenomenon, formulated by Clausewitz in his book **Despre război [On War]**, through the logical relation of war with politics and violent means¹⁰ had profound echoes in the local thinking. So, for Petre Andrei, war was “the extreme form of manifestation of the political antagonism”, an act of violence.

Between politics and war – according to Emil Cioran – there is not a relation of interdependence, like in Clausewitz, but one of inclusion, like the one from species to gender. The conflictual state is immanent to the structure of politics, and the war “becomes a simple paroxysmic exercise of re-evaluation and assertion of the desire of great power of a nation, an aggression, a way temporary solving the divergences between states”¹¹. Dimitrie Gusti overbids the psychological factors, the war expressing “a clash between two collective and sovereign wills”, its purpose being the imposition of the will of a community against another, “in order to kneel and destroy it”.¹²

The causal ground has interested particularly all those ones who have studied the phenomenon of war, for explanatory and especially for predictive reasons. That is how they could elaborate appreciations regarding the genesis, evolution, issue and prevention possibilities of the conflagrations in the life of communities.

The transcendence and the human seem to be both responsible for the emergence of these tragedies. At Ancients, the divine origin (N. Iorga) was completed by the biological one (the anthropophagical impulses of the primitive human being – P. P. Negulescu). In the Middle Ages, the war equated with the duel, the chivalrous competition of power and virtues (physical, psychological and moral – N. Iorga, D. Gusti). With the modern age

appears in the motivational area the true pretexts: economical and political interests, religious fanaticism¹³, cultural and ideological conflicts, “diplomatic mistakes”, “irrational expansionism”, “belligerent psychosis sustained by an irresponsible press” or the “pressure of a hysterical and bellicose crowd”¹⁴, “the objectives and the finality of civilizations”¹⁵. The reverberations of Malthus are felt. The economic (the satisfaction of the population needs in the presence of the tension resources – needs), P. P. Negulescu stated in **Destinul omenirii**, tends to play a fundamental role.

In a visionary manner, P. P. Negulescu, V. Pârvan and C. Petrescu considered that the future will produce value mutations able to propel on the foreground the ideological, cultural and religious causes. Resuming Hegel’s thesis of the “war as form of support of the national self-prides”, V. Pârvan signalled the danger of the exacerbation of the nationalism and of its degeneration – the chauvinism¹⁶. Additionally, according to some perspectives, the imperialistic tendencies had both external determinations, socially immanent, and internal determinations, characteristics to the human soul, psychic or intelligence. They were originated in the “crisis of the social human and of the society” (D. Gusti), “psychological requirements of the modern military” (C. Rădulescu-Motru), “hate and desire for hegemony” (Petre Andrei and Emil Cioran), “aggressive ethos” and “frustration feeling” (according to Emil Cioran), “political naivety and soul brutality” of some people (Al. Claudian) or by the “errors of intelligence and the wrong ideas of people” (according to C. Petrescu).

A comparative analysis renders evident the fact that for both Cioran and Er. Fromm the aggressiveness gene characterizes only the collectivity and not the individual. This explains why the power always generates violence, why “the number and the intensity of wars reach the maximum level in the powerful states and the minimum level at the primitive human, without permanent chiefs”¹⁷.

The irrational, punishable at individual level, becomes tolerable when it is in the service of the nation. Cioran’s conclusion leaves no room for equivoque: each people or nation wants to be a great power, that cannot be otherwise capitalized but by domination and conquests. Obligation and right – a behavioural imperative. An idea otherwise close to the one supported even nowadays by a series of political scientists such as Fr. Chatelet



and Ev. Pisier (in **Conceptiile politice ale secolului XX**) or Raymond Aron (in **Penser la guerre**) that explains this natural imperialism by the three passions that dominate the individuals and the nations: interest (the desire of wealth), fear (of being poor, submissive and destroyed) and the taste of glory. Corroborated, these passions determined the logic of the sequential expression of power: armament, in order to resist to a potential enemy, the desire to test your strength to become aware of the fact that the best way for not being humiliated is to win the war.

Along to the same line, C. Petrescu and Al. Claudian, even if they don't minimize the importance of the economical factor, in a manner specific to Hegel, accredit the idea of the existence of people predestined to be warlike, with a direct mention to the German people, guilty of starting two World Wars.

Dimitrie Gusti and Petre Andrei advance, in the same time, a teleological explanation. The causes and purposes confound themselves. Although the belligerence phenomenon, as a manifestation, has remained the same "scene of violence", the objectives followed, in relation with the general interests of the society, have changed continuously, incorporating the dominant ideas of the time, from the national ideal (in the modern period) to the imperialist one (in the contemporary period), characteristic to big and powerful states. The war, far from being a purpose in itself, is a method to accomplish some close goals (victory) or distant ones (liberation, territorial, economical, geostrategic gains, etc.).

In the same time, the antiwar attitude is an exemplary one. Only the reactions to defend the independence and the sovereignty of their own countries are justified. For all the rest – labelled as "a scene of the absurd" (V. Pârvan), "robbery on a grand scale" (P. P. Negulescu), "tragedy of life" (N. Iorga) or "historical murder" (Emil Cioran) – the phenomenon of war receives a unanimous condemnation, both for its ways of expression but also for its intended purposes.

Paradoxically, there are also some attempts to confer to the analyzed phenomenon some positive values. Starting from the sociological point of view, the war is not considered automatically dysfunctional. The war in the international system cannot be synonymous with what is a disease for the biological system. The conflict and fear of war

were often used for the integration of some states. An eloquent example is that of the 19th century when the unification of Germany was achieved through the defeat of neighbouring states such as Denmark, Austria and France.

Without exaggerating and rendering absolute, like their predecessors: Spencer (the war – formative matrix of society types), Hegel, Nietzsche, Proudhon (the war – method of natural selection and of cultivation of some authentically moral qualities) or Xenopol (the war – factor of progress and selection), some representatives of the Romanian thought grant the war, in a certain measure, with biological, cultural, ethical, educational and even founding valences.

Beyond the social evil caused, wars have also a curative values (leading to the disappearance of subcultures or minor cultures – C. Petrescu), an educational value and a moral amelioration of the human nature (P. P. Negulescu) or of moral regeneration of the defeated peoples (C. Petrescu, N. Iorga). Sometimes, D. Gusti admitted, war asserts its beneficial, regenerating effects, cultivating noble virtues such as heroism, patriotism, social solidarity, etc. "From the book of war – Vasile Pârvan underlined – the mankind learns... what is the sacrifice, the ideal, what is the homeland... Until defeat we had no idea what to love your homeland meant! And neither the fighters had known"¹⁸. And Tudor Vianu entertains the belief that "the value of bravery"¹⁹ is formed in battle. Metaphorically, D. Gusti compared the war with "an exam that a state or a nation maintains in front of history"²⁰, and Cioran, completing him, appreciated it as "a sign of vitality" that "structurally establishes a new world", "an exam to which all nations are subjected to in front of the world"²¹, a project impossible to achieve during peace time (N. Ionescu).

If the above mentioned assertions are partially amendable, as proven by C. Petrescu (the war operates a reverse selection), V. Pârvan (the war cannot be a "a value criteria in history"), D. D. Roșca (war implies "waste and destruction of spiritual values") or P. P. Negulescu (the war is "damaging for the free development"), we can only subscribe to Gusti's argument – taken from Ratzenhofer and Kautsky, that the war "is the demiurge of the autonomy of modern nations".

The right to a free existence, independence and sovereignty was always gained by the help of weapons.



Even since Antiquity, at the request of the Greek philosopher Plato, the Roman orator Cicero tried to limit the warlike actions by defining a first principle according to which a war must be declared by a state only after an official satisfaction request was submitted or a warning has been given and an adequate statement was presented. Later on, the theologians Saint Augustine (a just war is the one that can be described as one who corrects the evil) and Saint Tomas Aquinas (a war must have a just cause, to be declared by a proper authority, to be carried out with correct intentions and the means used to be proportional with the envisaged purpose) have brought new amendments to the laws of war.

But the one who created the modern frame of the mentality on international relations on war and peace is the great Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius (in *De jure belli ac pacis*, 1625) who gave substance to the concepts of *jus ad bellum* (the justness of war) or *jus in bello* (the justice in war); as he wrote: "I have seen that in the entire Christian world predominates a levity in starting a war of which even the barbarian nations would feel ashamed; they resort to weapons for some petty motives or without any reason; and, once the armies are gathered, any respect for the divine or the human law is abandoned; as if the people would be therefore authorized to commit any crime without any restraint"²².

Grotius and his successors kept alive the medieval tradition of the just war, including the idea that the states must be able to intervene in order to stop the oppressions and maltreatments that take place in other states. But, as the tradition of the natural law was replaced by the modern tradition of the positive international law, the thinkers have become more preoccupied by the elaboration of the concept of justness of combat – *jus in bello* – in the war between the European sovereigns rather than that of *jus ad bellum* – the condition that the war itself to be just²³.

The value of purposes permanently arguments the taxonomic analysis of conflicts. D. Gusti, P. Andrei and P.P. Negulescu, from the perspective of the conceptions professed by the representatives of the natural law, especially those ones of Hugo Grotius – distinguish between legitimate wars (just) for the defence of the national essence and the illegitimate (unjust), that follow abstruse benefits. Heraclitus had postulated "war is just" and

Hegel had supported him in all the aspects contaminating also Clausewitz that claimed that "the attack is the best defence". In this context, we cannot distinguish the attacker from the attacked.

Machiavelli stated that only the states alone could judge their interests, in his formulation "war is just when it is necessary" and that no other higher authority could judge this necessity: "Salus principis suprema lex" (the wellbeing of its princes to be the supreme law). This point of view was steadily assimilated by all the important jurists of Europe – Bodin in France, Gentili in Italy, Victoria in Spain. Even if, as they accepted, were just and unjust wars, sufficient or insufficient causes for hostilities, eventually the prince (or the state as an unitary actor) was the only judge; and usually each of the belligerent parties thought that justice was on its side²⁴.

The moral criteria become non-operational; worthy of being taken into consideration are only the utilitarian ones: success and expansion. The imperialism represented nothing else than the transposition of pragmatism in the political action. Sharing this point of view, Emil Cioran rejects the above mentioned classification, considering it as unreal and inadequate. Beyond causes and purposes, the Romanian philosopher noticed there are only lost and won wars, winners and losers. The glory smiles exclusively to the first ones, blurs and justifies the excess of force²⁵.

So if for Grotius war was equivalent with "the bankruptcy of law", for Cioran the law of the force has always prevailed, pragmatically and realistically, in front of the force of the law. This being the situation of normality, he concluded: "There is... only aggressive war... as long as a people hadn't fought any aggression war, it doesn't exist as an active factor of history"²⁶. The defensive wars have no typological value, as they are only the attribute of minor people. The defensive ideals empty the army of any content, institution that finds its true meaning only in the states with imperialistic vocation. That is why "a lost war, but started from one's own initiative, is more glorious than one won through defence". A debatable assertion, given as a pretext for the reprimand of the Romanian people, proud of that having ever wage conquest wars.

Camil Petrescu offers us a typology based especially on the factors engendering conflictual situations. The classical hypostasis, the military



one, was enriched with new forms: political, diplomatic, cultural. According to the author, as if he had anticipated S. Huntington, the wars between cultures are “the most graves and disastrous, because they have a religious character”²⁷ and imply fanaticism. The approach of the conflict between Christianity and Islamism, today more than ever, seems to be predominant to some western thinkers. S. Huntington, after a careful analysis of the first civilisational wars, that between USSR and Afghanistan and the Gulf war, noticed that “since religion has become the main defining characteristic of civilizations, the wars of the fault lines take place between different people and religions”²⁸. For him “the clash of civilizations” represents one of the greatest threats for the world peace. The events from Kosovo and those ones from September 11, 2001 have come to confirm the provisions of the above mentioned thinkers.

V. Pârvan also had in view the legal aspects. For instance, the aggressions can be surprising (of invasion) or notified (announced) in accordance with the diplomatic customs. A paradox would be that the wars are not always started by the stronger nations, but often, in the course of history, by the weakest. The example of Germany in the Second World War or that one of Argentina in Falkland Islands conflict is eloquent for that matter.

The world peace, D. Gusti believed, can be accomplished on two ways: universal monarchy (done by Assyrians, Macedonians, Greeks and Romans) and the creation of a federal society that would reunite all the states. None had real chances of success in that historical moment, due to the interests of big states in maintaining the privilege of the position of imposing their will in the international relations.

If the first variant is about to be historically compromised, the other one could become reality only through the transformation of the UN in a world parliament, with representatives from all the sovereign, independent and equal in rights states, with a fundamental objective: the defence of peace. The process supposed some preparatory conditions: the elimination of discrepancies, the rapprochement between nations, the affirmation of rationalism in politics, the observance of the principles of international law, the introduction of the arbitrage and sanctions, the education of people in the spirit of peaceful coexistence, the affirmation of a new type of nationalism. The time will come,

the Romanian sociologist stated, when the states will understand, due to reasons of political logic, that wars bring more losses than gains and they will choose other means of collective confrontation, transferring the competition from the military plan to the cultural one and of the relations with the natural and economical environment.

Reiterating an idea enunciated by Kant and Grotius, D. Gusti and P. P. Negulescu noticed the role of the increased political, economical and cultural interdependences between states in the contemporary era, process that sets the ground for the foundation of an atmosphere of peace and an ease in international relations. P. P. Negulescu invoked the impact generated in the international public opinion by the “Declaration for the condemnation of war” adopted by the League of Nations on September, 27, 1927, which stipulated in Article 1: “Any war of aggression is and remains forbidden”. It wasn’t naivety but hope deceived by the subsequent evolution of events.

Nicolae Iorga and Al. Claudiu considered the moralization of men, the reeducation of mankind from the moral point of view, as the true chance of peace. The constraint, through the use of military means, gives no results. Education must be doubled by the concentrated activity of the community to raise the living standard of the individuals. “Let’s see – Al. Claudiu noted – what is left from the aggressive wickedness of men when... he would be able to secure a more civilized life”²⁹.

Those who are powerful menace and use the violence as a persuasion procedure, sometimes ignoring without any hesitation the rules and international agreements as it was the case of the Iraqi war started by the USA without the agreement of the UN Security Council. In the name of some generous ideals such as “the human rights”, “the elimination of the sources of tension” or “the reestablishment of peace”, in the military practice a new type of war has been introduced: “preemptive”, “punishment”, “defence of the world order”, “defence of the minorities rights”, “fight against terrorism”, etc.

The speech of the American president George W. Bush, “The war against terrorism shall not be won through a defensive position” actually represents an American action declaration, with a change of approach that will have long term consequences. The situation was proven by the attack on March, 19, 2003 at 4:35 AM – Bucharest time,



in which it was not taken into account the Article 51 of the United Nations Chart – that authorizes the use of force only for self-defence. US goes to military actions in the Iraqis theatres of operations disregarding the legitimate power of the United Nations.

The interventions from Panama, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Irak and possibly anywhere, after the “adaptation to the new conditions” of the NATO doctrine, in Madrid, make actual once more one of La Rouchefoucauld quotes: “The big powers... find the most disinterested methods to justify these wars. Such as... the defence of smaller nations and states, the liberation of the oppressed nations, and even the defence of the law over force”.

The war remains a reality, and the universal peace a desideratum, a project almost utopian. “The art of war is of vital importance for the state” Sun-Tzu had shown, the world’s first military theorists approximately 2500 years ago, and he considered that although “is best to win without a fight” however the war is “a matter of life and death, the path either toward safety or toward ruin”³⁰. The polemologists were also interested of the irenology, for the creation a climate of peace and collective security. The famous projects of eternal peace created by the abbot Saint-Pierre and Kant at the end of the XVIII century haven’t convinced but they have stimulated the fantasy and the creativity of thinkers.

NOTES:

¹ Michael HOWARD, **Războiul în istoria Europei**, Timișoara, Editura Sedona, 1997, p. 8.

² R. A. Brown, **The origins of Modern Europe**, London, 1972, p. 93.

³ G. W. HEGEL, **Filosofia dreptului**, București, Editura Academiei, 1969, p. 259.

⁴ J. J. ROUSSEAU, **Contractul social**, vol. II, București, Editura All, 1993, p. 342.

⁵ Petre ANDREI, **Opere sociologice**, vol. III, București, Editura Academiei, 1978, p. 435.

⁶ Nae IONESCU, **Roza vânturilor**, București, Editura Roza Vânturilor, 1990, p. 275.

⁷ E. RUSSU, **Note despre om**, București, Editura Cugetarea, 1950, p. 64.

⁸ Emil CIORAN, **Schimbarea la față a României**, București, Editura Humanitas, 1990, p. 129.

⁹ **Ibidem**, p. 158.

¹⁰ C. CLAUSEWITZ, **Despre război**, București, Editura Militară, 1982, p. 613.

¹¹ Emil CIORAN, **op. cit.**, pp. 54-56.

¹² Dimitrie GUSTI, **Sociologia războiului în Opere**, vol. IV, București, Editura Academiei, 1970, p. 143.

¹³ P. P. NEGULESCU, **Destinul omenirii**, vol. III, București, Editura Cugetarea, 1959, p. 90.

¹⁴ Nicolae IORGA, **Chestiunea Dunării**, București, Editura „Societății Neamului Românesc”, 1943, p. 292.

¹⁵ D.D. ROȘCA, **Existența tragică**, București, Editura Științifică, 1968, pp. 123-138.

¹⁶ V. PÂRVAN, **Scrieri**, București, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1981, p. 363.

¹⁷ Er. FROMM, **Anatomia distructivității umane**, în **Texte alese**, București, Editura Politică, 1983, p. 484.

¹⁸ V. PÂRVAN, **op. cit.**, p. 458.

¹⁹ T. VIANU, **Opere**, vol. VIII, Editura Minerva, București, 1979, p. 67.

²⁰ D. GUSTI, **op. cit.**, p. 146.

²¹ E. CIORAN, **op. cit.**, pp. 68-72.

²² Hugo GROTIUS, **De jure Belli ac Pacis**, Editura William Whewel, Cambridge, 1853, vol. I, p. LIX.

²³ James MAYALL, **Politica mondială: evoluția și limitele ei**, București, Editura Antet, 2000, pp. 91-92.

²⁴ Ian BROWNLIE, **International Law and the Use of Force by States**, Oxford, 1963, pp. 8-12.

²⁵ Emil CIORAN, **op. cit.**, p. 132.

²⁶ **Ibidem**, p. 131.

²⁷ S. HUNTINGTON, **Ciocnirea civilizațiilor**, Oradea, Editura Antet, 1998, p. 68.

²⁸ **Ibidem**, p. 378.

²⁹ Al. CLAUDIAN, **Reflecții asupra războiului actual**, București, Editura Tinerimea, 1952, p. 5.

³⁰ Sun-TZU, **Arta războiului**, f.e., f.a., p. 4.

Captain Dorel BUȘE (dorel_buse@yahoo.com), PhD, works for the Scientific Research and Doctoral Studies Section from the National Defence University “Carol I” and he is a lecturer within the Faculty for International Relations and European Studies from the “Spiru Haret” University.



IRAQ – AFTER FOUR YEARS OF WAR

Constantin-Gheorghe BALABAN, PhD

Although the dictator Saddam Hussein was removed from power, the international mass-media registered (more than three years after the military intervention unleashed in Iraq) the situation has not improved yet. There were invested over 700 millions dollars and, in the field, near the Iraqi capital, almost 36,000 military personnel, policemen, special troops and security agents act. Nevertheless, the security situation in Baghdad seems to be out of control. Submissively to new pressures, Iraq continues to be the scene of bloody attacks, in spite of increased security measures endorsed in the Iraqi capital. More and more people, also Iraqi military personnel and policemen, lose their lives not only in Baghdad, but also in different cities of the country. Attacks, kidnappings and assassinations against the American army increased significantly, and the interconfessional violence between the Shi'a community and the Sunni community intensified, after the bombing (on 22nd February) of a Shi'a mausoleum in Famarra¹.

It has been said that, after Saddam Hussein's execution, Iraq is already on the brink of civil war. In fact, Iraq was already affected by the civil war, on the background of inter-religious violence scale in this country², the nuances are different.

Despite the fact that part of media³ adopted the "civil war" syntagm regarding Iraq, the White House doesn't allow it. Moreover, the American President sent – from Riga – where he participated to the NATO Summit, on November 28-29, 2006 – the message that he will not withdraw the troops from Iraq till he obtains the victory.

On November 28th, 2006, the Washington Post released an American Navy's Report⁴ that admitted the American troops loose the control over the West side of Iraq, an area overwhelmed by rioters and terrorists affiliated to Al-Qaeda, but, at that time, the officials minimized the gravity of the evaluations. A shocking declaration came from the future chief of Pentagon, Robert Gates⁵,

stating that the USA doesn't win the Iraqi war and, during the next two years, the American presence in region will bring either a stabilization of Middle East, or a conflict of international proportion.

Sentenced to death, the former Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, was hanged at Baghdad, on December 30th, 2006. Related to the event, the Iraqi television transmitted a text, written in red, according to which "Starting the death of Saddam Hussein, there was reversed a black page of Iraqi history"⁶.

On January 10th 2007, the president George W. Bush presented a new strategy for Iraq in front of a skeptic Congress, dominated by democrats and, in the same time, in front of a population who expressed its opposition to the assignment of supplementary troops in this country⁷.

1. The international media at three years after the beginning of the military intervention.

Three years after the beginning of the military intervention, the international media suggested that USA should let Iraq to Iraqi people and retreat as soon as possible from this country.

But, in the American Defence Secretary's vision – quoted by the Spanish newspaper *El Pais* (who published, three years after the Iraqi occupation, a photo of the demonstration in Madrid) – "the withdrawal of the American troops in Iraq is equivalent to let the Germany in the Nazi's hands".

Moreover, on the background of the crisis who goes deeper and deeper, *The Guardian* wrote about new attacks on the former American Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, while from USA it was announced that many retired generals requested the resignation of the American Secretary of Defence, who they blamed for errors made in Iraq, even if president Bush appreciated the energetic and firm conduct of Secretary Rumsfeld as being "exactly what we need at this time", because – as he underlines in his Address to the Nation –



“USA must preserve its determinant policy in the world”.

Of course, in his weekly speech, the American president George W. Bush – quoted by the British newspaper *The Independent* – admitted there are still necessary new and many sacrifices but the American goal in Iraq is no other than “victory”. Yet, although the Washington Administration rejected the pessimistic statement of the former Iraqi temporary prime-minister Iadar Al Ui, who said that country is at the brink of a civil war, the American public opinion became more and more sceptical regarding a success in Iraq.

According to the polls from that time, only 13% from Americans still believe in victory and over 50% were convinced that Iraq goes inevitably to a civil war.

Also, in a pole by CBS, with the contribution of Reuters, the popularity of the president George W. Bush was going down till 34%⁸. As a result, the White House demands the Iraqi leaders to make more efforts in order to reach to an agreement and Donald Rumsfeld, quoted by *Washington Post*, alleged that “the general view will be determined by history and not by the daily headlines and news from Internet or by the recent sensational attack”⁹.

On October 9th, 2006, Reuters noted that tens of people fall victims to the Shi’a and Sunni “death squadrons” every day in Iraq, worried that violence could block the national reconciliation dialogue and could degenerate in civil war.

Furthermore, according to a UN official statement, almost 1000 Iraqi people daily abandon their houses due to the violence.

On November 3rd, 2006, Sheik Nahab Omran, the Shiite leader of Bani Hassan Tribe, was assassinated, near by Hilla, South to Baghdad.

2. Mandate prolongation or troops’ withdrawal? With all the progresses achieved, regarding the establishment of a national unity government, the Iraqi Foreign Affairs minister announced, according to Reuters, that Baghdad requested UN to prolong its mission with one year.

Yet, Italy withdrew its troops from Iraq. The military operations *Ancient Babilonia* should end its progressive mandate during 2006, and the mission should be considered finalized by the end of the year¹⁰. The last Italian soldiers left Iraq on December 8th, 2006, after they handed over the

control of the base from Nassiriyah (South of the country) to the Iraqi security forces.¹¹

On June 25th, 2006, Japan also announced the withdrawal of 550 Japanese soldiers who participated to the monitoring and reconstruction efforts in the south of the country, that determined the Iraqi premier, Nuri Al-Maliki, to publish a plan for the national reconciliation which foreseen amnesty for the mavericks who didn’t committ assassinations or terrorist acts.¹²

On September 7th, the Iraqi Premier and the American general George Casey signed an agreement¹³ according to which Baghdad will take over, gradually, the command of the Iraqi Armed Forces, which was assured before by the Multinational Forces. “From now on –the American General George Casey said, quoted by AFP and AP – the Iraqi military responsibilities will be conceived and led, more and more, by Iraqi people”.

On September 27th, 2006, the Iraqi president considered that the American military presence gums up possible foreign attacks against the country, and later, on September 9th, Reuters noted that American army plans its forces taking into consideration the hypothesis that the military forces in Iraq will be maintained, at the same level, till 2010. It is also surprising that the chief of the British Armed Forces, General Richard Dannatt foresaw, on October 13th, an urgent withdrawal of the British troops from Iraq. His statement: “The London cabinet should withdraw its military personnel from Iraq [...] the British military presence worsens the situation in the field “staggered entire world”¹⁴. Still, the British troops will be maintained in Iraq for a period of 10 to 16 months and the withdrawal will be conditioned, according to further statements of Tony Blair, to the security level.

For the moment, the international media agencies announce the reduction of British military personnel from Iraq, with few thousands, till the end of 2007 and according to a British official’s statements, a number of 13 Iraqi battalions can fight independently against the insurgents.

The Danish people don’t want more troops in Iraq. A poll by the Ramboell Institute, and published in Copenhagen on November 14th, 2006, showed the highest level of rejection of Danish troops’ presence in Iraq since 2003 and till the poll¹⁵. The same situation is in South Korea¹⁶ and Poland, that



announced the troops' withdrawal from Iraq till the end of 2007.

Henry Kissinger, former State Secretary of USA, considers that the military victory in Iraq it is not possible anymore but an urgent withdrawal of the Coalition troops' may have disastrous consequences. He proposed an international conference for Iraq, sustained by the former UN General Secretary, Kofi Annan, but the Iraqi president rejected such an idea.

A similar point of view was to be expressed later on by the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, who engrossed that such an immediate departure of the American forces will worsen the situation in Iraq. Now that the Iraqi insurgency is capable to self-sustain financially¹⁷.

The idea of the troops' withdrawal from Iraq is, more and more, sustained and, in the case of American soldiers' withdrawal¹⁸ (according to an adviser from Riyad and also to the *Washington Post*), Saudi Arabia could step in Iraq to assist Sunnis as Iran handles, for many years, the Shi'a groups. But Saudi Arabia announced that it will not interfere in Iraq.

However, Bulgaria announced that it will continue to contribute to the Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction¹⁹. *The Daily Mail* stated the Great Britain will not increase the number of the military personnel in Iraq.

On January 10th, 2007, the President George W. Bush presented a "*New strategy for Iraq*" in front of a sceptical Congress, dominated by Democrats, and also in front of a population who opposes sending more troops in this country²⁰. The White House leader announced the deployment of 21,500 soldiers in Iraq and requested relieving 6.8 millions dollars for the new strategy in Iraq.

3. The American State Secretary Condoleezza Rice in a surprise-visit in Iraq. As it seems, there was setting up a state of political passivity in Iraq and there are efforts to determine the Iraqi government to surpass this "state" it immersed lately²¹. Although there were invested over 700 million dollars and in the field there are almost 36,000 military personnel, policemen, special troops and security agents, the security situation in Baghdad seems to be out of control.²² At the end of the week, there are imposed restrictions on the street traffic in order to decrease the frequency of the exploded bomb-cars and a new security plan

foresaw the total closing of tens access roads to the capital in order to decrease the insurgents' number that may infiltrate from exterior as much as the population of almost 7 millions people of Baghdad could not support the insurrection and the armed groups. The only secure area in Baghdad is the Green Area, but it is also attacked with more and more performing reactive armament. The situation is under control, of course, but under a relative control, as the other regions.

If the Western province Alambar, with the cities Fallujah and Raman continues to rise problems to the American Army, few days before the Iraqi Army baffled a plan of turning the Eastern province of Diala²³ (having Bacuba as the capital city) into an Emirate. The independence of region was to be proclaimed by the end of Ramadan.

While Diala wants its independence, the parliamentary discussions regarding the country's federalization was postponed again. Statistics show that 100 persons die every day during the armed confrontation or in bombs explosions.

In spite of these, the security structures are taking over, step by step, the control over the provinces. Three Southern provinces were handed by the Multinational Coalition, including Dicar – where Romanian soldiers are acting. And, in order to have a clear picture, the Iraqi High Tribunal Judge – who was judging the former leader from Baghdad – was changed. Why? Because he told Saddam Hussein, in an open meeting: "Weren't you, Mr. President, a dictator?" Now, this statement seems to have no value. What about tomorrow?

4. Political tensions in Iraq and the position of the White House's leader. Last events developed in Iraq²⁴ could overturn the American president's plan, at NATO Summit from Riga, where he hoped to convince the Europeans to involve more in combating the violence from Afganistan. Yet, the plans succeeded. However, there is a question. Could the growth of the victims and political tensions in Iraq affect the American leader's position?

The former UN General Secretary, Kofi Annan, who, in the past, stirred up things after he said that the American invasion in Iraq was illegal and not approved by the UN Security Council, states that it must intervene seriously and urgently in order to prevent the deterioration of the Iraqi situation, where we could face a civil war. In fact, as the UN



high official stated, it already has been come to that²⁵, and the UN played a minor role in the Iraqi conflict.²⁶

So far, the clashes between Sunni insurgents, Shi'a militias and the Al-Qaeda terrorist squeezes cost the lives of over 100,000 Iraqi civilians and 3000 American soldiers, the Iraqi war being "one of the worst mistakes made by an American leader".²⁷

For the time being, not even the Democrats – who took over, in January 2007, the control over the American Congress, didn't show an alternative strategy to the president George W. Bush's policy and the Donald Rumsfeld's replacement didn't bring, till now, any significant change.

Nevertheless, the Iraqi Study Group, the commission co-presided by the former Secretary of State James Baker, officially published a report, on December 6th, 2006. According to AFP, Reuters and AP, the report takes into consideration the withdrawal of the largest part of the fighting troops from Iraq till the first semester of year 2008²⁸, "depending on the security situation from the field" and recommends the Administration "to increase, as fast as possible, the number of the joint forces in Iraqi units as trainers".²⁹

5. Do we need Syria and Iran for the Iraqi peace process? According to a poll, over 2/3 from Americans consider that there is a civil war in Iraq. The presence, in the hottest areas of Iraq, of over 140,000 American soldiers did not succeed to end the violence wave between Sunni and Shiite people, fighting for supremacy. Moreover, Saudi Arabia (with a Sunni majority population) warned on any misbalance of the social equilibrium in Iraq where the Sunni Arabs (who led before the collapse of Saddam's regime) complain for being marginalized and forgotten by the actual regime dominated by Shiites, on a background of increased interconfessional violence. According to a recent report, published by Oxford Research Group, the war in Iraq could last 30 years.

Concrete, Iraq is already affected by a civil war, by the escalation of the inter-religious violence in this country³⁰, even if the nuances are different. While the American Democrats state it is necessary to have Syria and Iran involved in the peace process in Iraq, the US Vice-President Dick Cheney asked³¹ the Saudi ruler, king Abdallah, to use all his influence over the Iraqi Sunni leaders in order

to obtain the reconciliation in the neighbouring country and to keep the promises of helping the reconstruction of Iraq. Also, some of the proposals regarding the talks' initiation with Syria and Iran for solving the situation in Iraq - and the American troops' withdrawal from Iraq till the beginning of 2008 – come from ISG.

On the other hand, from Iran, the president Ahmadinejad stated that the Americans should withdraw from Iraq, in order to save their remaining reputation, Iraqi people being able to manage the situation and to restore security³², opinion contradicted by the Shiite leader Abdullah di al-Zakim and shared by the government from Baghdad, that still opposed the American troops' withdrawal from Iraq.

6. The Saddam's trial for crimes against humanity. On November 5th, 2006, Saddam Hussein was sentenced³³ to death by hanging by the Iraqi High Criminal Court, who founded him guilty of execution of 148 Shiite habitants from Doujail, in 1980, as retaliations to an assault upon a presidential convoy. He was already hanged at the end of December.

The verdict in Saddam's case, the former Iraqi president between 1979 and 2003³⁴, came two days before the US Congress³⁵ elections, on September 2006, elections perceived as a referendum about the presidential Bush policy in Iraq, a verdict that can mean good news for the White House and for the Republicans³⁶. Iraqi conducted the process³⁷ and, as the White House spokesman added, the "Iraqi Judges were the ones who examined all the evidences".

The international reactions regarding the conviction of the former Iraqi dictator came out immediately.

For the Americans, the sentence to death of Saddam – welcomed by White House – is the "*perfect proof* that an independent judicial system is working in Iraq".³⁸ On their turn, the Europeans seem to be satisfied by the verdict, but they expressed their doubts regarding the death penalty.

The end of the process was saluted by the Finnish presidency of EU, but, called up for no application of death penalty, stated in the same day by the Iraqi High Criminal Court against the former president Saddam Hussein and against two other main collaborators. "*The Presidency reaffirms the*



*EU position against the death penalty, EU opposes to death penalty in any case and any circumstances and calls to no application of this verdict in this case*³⁹. Moreover, Paris warned: “Let’s hope that the verdict will not generate new tensions in Iraq”, while Moscow was sure that the Saddam’s hanging will have “catastrophic consequences for Iraq”.⁴⁰

There were also other reactions, some of them contradictory. For example, even in the Arab world – which is divided, depending on the former relations with Saddam Hussein and by the present policy of the alliances made by these countries – the reactions were different.

If Hamas regrets the conviction to death of former Iraqi leader and states that USA combats all the ones supporting the Palestine people, Iran – who was at war with Saddam Hussein – saluted the verdict by an official of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and, in the absence of an official reaction, the news was celebrated on the Kuwait’s streets.

On the other hand, Amnesty International – organization who opposes to death penalty – reacted rapidly, doubting the trial’s correctness and dooming the death penalty declared by judges, while the Executive Director of the International Bar Association, Mark Colis, presumed that although the judges and the public prosecutors acted correctly, there was, still, a strong case for appeal. There were, also, some mistakes, especially procedural. These mistakes could be, without doubts, the base for the appeal. Moreover, the Human Rights Watch (HRW), quoted by AP, estimated that “the legal proceedings in the Dujail case were unequitable”⁴¹.

Additionally, the Court missed the “important occasion” to do a “credible justice” to Iraqi people and the death penalty would have been based on strong arguments, facts for which it should be cancelled. With other words, the Saddam’s trial was one marked by numerous disorders.

The process in which Saddam Hussein was judged for genocide against Kurds was resumed and delayed only after three weeks. According to some Iraqi governmental sources, the former Iraqi leader and two of its collaborators followed to be executed immediately⁴² after the Court of Appeal (formed by nine judges) will confirm the death penalty but, in the case that the appeal will be considered well-founded, the process should be continued. If not, the sentence should be applied in

one month after the delivery of the final decision in the appeal’s case.

On December 26th, 2006, Mowaffaq al-Rubaie, the adviser on national security, quoted by Reuters, stated: “The Court of Appeal from Iraq confirms the verdict and death penalty for Saddam.”

The Iraqi High Criminal Court announced the final decision of sentencing to death the former dictator. The American officials stated that the execution is imminent⁴³ and should take place till the end of December 2006 but nobody knew when the execution will be held.⁴⁴ In reality, Saddam was hanged up at Baghdad, on December 30th, 2006. AFP, who noted some important security measures at Baghdad for the execution, reported that the former Iraqi leader was already hanged up. This announcement was made by the national TV station.

7. The conclusion of a report made by the American Congress. Saddam Hussein didn’t have any kind of relations either with Al-Qaeda, or with Abu al-Zargawi, the leader of this movement in Iraq. The Commission for Secret Services from the American Senate confirmed, for the first time, what everybody knew already: Saddam Hussein didn’t have connections with Abu al-Zargawi and Al-Qaeda.

The document quotes a report prepared by CIA in October 2005. Bush stated before that the presence of Abu al-Zargawi in Iraq proves exactly “the cooperation between Saddam and the Jordanian terrorists”.

The Republicans blamed the Democrats that they wanted to use the Commission’s report during the campaign for the middle mandate elections from November 2006.

All these controversies, revelations, switch revelations have no role but to confirm the dramatic situation from the Middle East, the complexity of Iraqi problems, the peace process’ fragility in the area and the danger of starting a chain reaction and actions, which could seriously affect the security of the whole world.

But, especially from this development, there results an unprecedented fluidity of the geopolitical situation, the great variety of the dangers and even of the threats against the international security.

The beginning of 2007 can not be either optimistic, or reassuring as the end of 2006.



NOTES:

¹ The American military officials believe that the Sunni people from the region are responsible for the dynamiting a Shiite mosque from Samarra, on February 22nd, 2006. The attempt launched a wave of interconfessional violence ended with hundred of dead people and tens ravaged mosques.

² According to the international press agencies, since the beginning of the hostilities in Iraq, October 2006 was the bloodiest one. Over 3700 persons were killed in terrorist attacks, making many victims daily.

³ For example, *Los Angeles Times*. NBC News Network refers to the Iraqi situation as a civil war.

⁴ According to the TVR correspondent to Washington D.C., Mihai Constantin, the American Navy Report published by *Washington Post* on November 26th, 2006, is dated August.

⁵ Robert Gates successfully passed the hearings from American Senate and his confirmation as chief of Pentagon was to be done by the Joint Senate in plenary session on December 13th, 2006.

⁶ TVR, Foreign News, December 30th, 2006.

⁷ According to a Gallup poll published by *USA Today*, over 60% of Americans are hostile to the troops' supplementation (TVR, Foreign News, January 10th, 2007).

⁸ Details in *Jurnalul Național*, Ben Laden este "toiagul" lui Bush, March 1st, 2006, p. 14.

⁹ Source - International Press of the Day, news spot made by Rodezia Costea.

¹⁰ Statement of Italian Minister of Defence, Antonio Martino, in front of Italian Special Commission of Senate and Deputies Room, from January 19th, 2007, quoted by AFP and confirmed by new Prime Minister Romano Prodi. According to the Press Agencies, the last Italian military personnel will be withdrawn in December 2006.

¹¹ British Spokesman of the International Coalition, quoted by AFP.

¹² It is about a document with 24 points, the most important of them foresees abiding the human rights, the terrorists' punishment, granting indemnities to the victims. According to the Iraqi chancellor for national security, Monaffak al-Roubaie, during June there were released almost 2500 persons, who were hold in American and Iraqi detention centres.

¹³ This agreement foresees the establishment of a unique Iraqi General Staff with authority over different components of Army, Navy and Air Forces, that represent a total of 115,000 soldiers.

¹⁴ According to TVR, the statements astonished whole world, it is unusual like a chief of General Staff to make such appreciations that contradict the Government's strategy.

¹⁵ According to AFP, the percentage of those ones

who are against the Danish military presence in Iraq rises from 42% - in August 2003 - to 48% in August 2005, and by the end of November 2006 reached 60%.

¹⁶ South Korea is the third foreign military force in Iraq with 2300 military personnel.

¹⁷ N24 -News, November 26th, 2006.

¹⁸ According to the recent statements of US President George W. Bush, USA will maintain its troops in Iraq as long as the Baghdad Government will request.

¹⁹ Bulgarian Prime Minister, Serghei Stanisev.

²⁰ According to the Gallup pole published by *USA Today*, over 60% of Americans are hostile to the troops' supplementation (TVR, Foreign News, January 10th, 2007).

²¹ Friday, October 5th, Show "24 hours".

²² Mario Balint, corresponding member in Nassiriyah, makes a recall of the last days and tensions that rule over Iraq, Show "24 hours", October 5th, 2006.

²³ Diala is a province with mixed population (Shiite and Sunni) where the theory of interconfession war is not confirming. In an Internet news and signed by many armed groups, it was specified that the province's population is tired of "foreign occupation, exploitation of natural resources in Iraqi population's detriment, corruption and stealing from Baghdad". These are sufficient reasons for declaring the independence and returning to the "fundamental advice of Islam".

²⁴ For example, the collapse, near Baghdad, of an American F-16, involved in the fight, the pilot losing his life. Two Iraqi Islamic groups sustain that they crashed down this American F-16.

²⁵ Some analysts consider that in Iraq started a conflict that may last tens of years.

²⁶ After an attack that killed 22 persons in 2003, among them being the chief of UN mission in Iraq.

²⁷ Jimmy Carter, former president of the USA.

²⁸ Before the official publishing of the report, the Iraqi Study Group was expected to recommend the American troops to pass from their role as fighting force to the role of supporting force and the American soldiers to be maintained in Iraq as it was announced by the President George W. Bush, as long as the Government from Baghdad requested.

²⁹ Rompres, TVR, Foreign News, December 6th, 2006.

³⁰ According to the international press agencies, from the warfare beginning in Iraq, the October 2006 was considered to be the bloodiest, over 3700 persons were killed in terrorists attacks that daily make victims.

³¹ In the official statement given by Saudi Government, the American forces were called to end the external intervention in Iraqi's business, alluding to the rising influence of Shiite Iran.

³² A British official stated that 13 Iraqi battalions can fight (independently) with insurgents.

³³ Before passing the verdict, Saddam Hussein



ANALYSIS. SYNTHESIS. EVALUATIONS

affirmed – according to his lawyers and quoted by Rompres – that he will die without fear and the American forces will be forced to leave Iraq, as it happened in Vietnam.

³⁴ And Prime Minister in 1979-1991, 1994-2003.

³⁵ All 435 members of the Representative Chamber, 33 from 100 Senators and 36 Governors.

³⁶ Although the American Congress is dominated now by the Republic Party, according to the polls, the Democrats have chances to gain control in Congress. Now, after the announcement and the execution of the sentence in the trial of former Iraqi dictator, once again, the Republicans can remind to the public that their Republican Party is stronger in the matter of national security and only Republic Party can defend them.

³⁷ Comments made by Snow, the spokesman for President George W. Bush, quoted by *The New York Times*.

³⁸ The spokesman for President George W. Bush.

³⁹ Official statement made at Helsinki.

⁴⁰ TVR News, Sunday, November 5th, 2006.

⁴¹ Nehal Bhuta, author of a 97 pages report for HRW about this process. Source: TVR, Foreign News, November 20th, 2006.

⁴² According to the Status of the Special Court Tribunal who judged Saddam, no authority, not even the President, can invoke the pardonation right and can not change the passed sentence.

⁴³ The execution had to be taped but it was not known when it will be released to public. At the execution there were supposed to assist a judge, a prosecutor, a representative of the Ministry of Interior, the prison's manager and a doctor. Antena 3, Foreign News, December 29th, 2006.

⁴⁴ The Iraqi authorities requested the observance of the legal period of 30 days after rejecting the appeal to the Supreme Court.

Professor Constantin-Gheorghe BALABAN, PhD (cgbalaban@yahoo.com), is a doctorate consultant within the National Defence University "Carol I".



EU'S NEW ENERGY POLICY

Vasile POPA

Lately, EU got more and more concerned of assuring its energetic security. Therefore, it proceeded to measures and actions that aim to decrease the multiple vulnerabilities, risks and dangers rising at this century and millennium beginning.

From the European Commission's perspective, the energetic security represents the capability to ensure the future essential energetic requests by the adequate homeland resources obtained in acceptable economical conditions or maintained as strategic reserves and, also, by resorting to accessible and stable external sources, completed, only when needed, by strategic reserve.

The European Commission elaborated the organization's new energetic policy from this issue's understanding that was presented to this January's reunion and comprises proposals to grow the alternative fuel use and to reduce the energy consumption due to the environment modifications and, also, to encourage the competition between the big energy producers.

The reach of the proposed target may limit the organization's exposure to the oil and gas prices' growth and consequently its vulnerabilities. Also, it can lead to a more competitive European energy market and stimulate the development of technology and jobs.

The reconsideration of the EU's energetic policy caught the interest of the member states since 2005, when the European Council at Hampton Court recorded a growth of challenges because of the energetic security space and the environment changes. Concerning this issue, the European Council from 15-16 December 2005 revealed the importance of an integrated approach of the goals regarding the environmental change – energy – competition triad.

As the process's previous stages can be considered: the French Memorandum's proposals presented to the Ecofin Council reunion from January 2006, the document presented by the

Austrian presidency to the European Council from 13 February 2006, "A New Energy Policy for Europe" and the common position stated by the European Commission's Green Paper, from 8th of March, "A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy" that includes the general guiding lines of a common energy policy, the meeting of the Extraordinary Council of energy ministries from the member states and the adhering ones from March, 14, 2006, as well as the European Council meeting between 23-24 March 2006.

The energetic plan proposed by the European Commission at the reunion from January 2007 foresees the organization engagement, until 2020, the diminution of the gas emissions' greenhouse effects with 20% in comparison with the 1990's level, this diminution being considered very low by the ecologist organizations (Greenpeace sustains a 30% diminution for the same period).

According to the Commission's appreciation, the developed countries should diminish their emissions by 30% until 2020, in the framework of a new international agreement that will replace the Kyoto Protocol that expires in 2012.

In this agreement framework, the developed countries will commit themselves to reduce, until 2012, the noxious gas emissions with 5% from the 1990's level, while EU assumes 8%.

The developing countries as China and India will be aimed by an eventual agreement post-Kyoto which comes into force after 2012. Another very important issue is the proposal to grow the energy obtained from regenerative sources (hydra-electric power station on bio-fuel, solar, aeolian, etc.) up to 20% in 2020, comparing with 7% as it is at present and 12% as predicted for 2010.

The bio-fuels should constitute 10% from the road vehicle consume. It's predicted the rapid introduction of the vehicles' with fuel-reduced consume and improving the energetic efficiency for buildings and house devices as well as generating,



transmitting and distributing the thermic and electric agent.

The presented document also aims the liberalization of the energetic sector. In order to stimulate the competition and to diminish the prices, especially in the natural gases field, it is foreseen a separation between the production activities and the distribution ones. At this point, *New York Times*¹ appreciates that there is a hard resistance from France and Germany, that can't agree with the breaking-up of the groups that consequently owe power stations and distribution networks (EDF or E.ON and RWE, societies that produce and distribute, dictating the prices on the market).

There are expected close negotiations between the ember states but also EU's with Russia for the new collaboration and partnership agreement, document which, from the both crises perspectives - the one of interrupting the gas and oil provisions from Russia to Ukraine, and Belarus - were a prolonged alarm signal for Europe, should comprise firm guaranties regarding the energetic resources deliveries toward EU.

Although the European Commission's actual energetic approach inevitably leads to some close negotiations with Russia and its commitment to sign the European Energetic Chart. Thus, the accomplishment of EU's intern consensus regarding energy comes before the negotiations with Moscow, that will took place at G8 Summit, with the main industrialized states.

In this context, Romania, as a EU member state, suggests a diminution of dependency on the Russian oil and gas reserves by reducing the energy consumption and by exploiting alternative resources. To create a competition in the field signifies to create the freedom of decision in the field. Hence, the importance of developing the Nabucco project, that aims bringing the Caspian natural gas in Central Europe, but also a common energetic policy designed to avoid some future blockings. All the Union's states understood that the dependency on a single external energetic provider is both damaging and dangerous.

Therefore, by their new energetic policy, the Europeans ease the trans-border energetic transactions.

That is why the European Commission appreciates a European body is needed and also its involvement in a European network of the national

independent authorities' settlement. The fact that EU's experts inventoried the existent breeches, in the international transport networks of the natural gas and electric power is beneficial because it points out the actual dangers on the Union's energy provision. The connections' lacks from electric power networks from Germany, Poland and Latvia but also Spain and France as well as the marine or aeolian ones from the Northern part of the continent and the ones of natural gas that came from the Caspian zone toward Central Europe show the importance of the Nabucco project revitalization and Constanta – Trieste pipeline building for Europeans.

In other words, if the European Plan for energetic efficiency anticipated that in 2020 the EU's economic growth will be accomplished with a 13% energy consumption diminution, saving 100 billions euro and also with annual noxious emissions diminished with 780 millions tones carbon dioxide equivalent is obvious that it should be created an attractive environment for economic actors, in order to accomplish the goal to reduce the greenhouse effects gases and also a wide technological innovation.

In the future 10-20 years, among the technologies that will permit the greenhouse emissions limitation are: for industries with a high energetic intensity, the carbon's collecting and hoarding; for transports, hybrid engines, counting on hydrogen use at the engine, and, on long term, for the environment, the solar energy coupled with nanotechnologies will be able to become the future's energy.

The European Staff appreciates that are based on the new energetic policy, EU may globally detain the main role in launching the new industrial revolution that would bring benefits both to the developed countries and to the developing ones and will determine EU to become, until 2050, "a economy with a great energetic efficiency and with low carbon dioxide emissions".

Hereby, there will be accomplished not only the reorientation toward an economic growth with a low emissions' noxious level, but also the significant augmentation of the less noxious, produced and used local energy quantity.

This aim is attainable if we keep in mind the Commission's measures in this field: the improvement of the energetic efficiency; the growth of the regenerative energies weight into the energy



STRATEGIC EVENT

sources and also new measures is to guarantee the fact that the energy internal market advantages are perceived at global level; the consolidation of the solidarity between the member states through a long-term vision approach for the development of the energetic technologies.

Among the stipulated measures we found supporting a common foreign energetic policy, for “speaking with a single voice” with third-party countries and to develop relations with the suppliers, based on transparency and mutuality.

The option to use nuclear electricity, which presently represents 14% in the EU’s energetic consumption and 30% in its electric power, was left at the member states’ will. Where the nuclear energy level is low, the Commission recommends its compensation by introducing another low carbon dioxide emissions energetic source. Otherwise, the goal to diminish the greenhouse effect emissions’ gas will become tougher to reach.

The Commission’s caution regarding a trenchant option formula over the nuclear energy use is justified by the fact that it offers advantages as costs, carbon dioxide emissions and independency. That is why the nuclear energy is present in 15 out of 27 EU’s member states.

The Commission underlines that if the nuclear production level decreased in Europe, it would be essential that diminution to be compensated by introducing another energy source, which emits a low level carbonic gas.

Structuring the new energetic policy involved the elaboration of an action plan regarding the energy and also planning the necessary measures for EU’s orientation to attaining the new strategic objective.

Together with the action plan, there was elaborated a package of first measures referring to: a report concerning the appliance, by the member states, of the internal gas and electric energy market, as well as the results of an investigation regarding the existing competition within these sectors; a plan for prioritised interconnections into the electric energy and gas member states’ networks, in order to create a European one; proposals to develop the lasting energy production from fossil fuels; a road map and another initiatives to promote the regenerative sources, especially the bio-fuels designed to transport; an analysis of the nuclear energetic stage in Europe; a working document for a future strategic technologic plan

regarding the European energy.

The Action Plan discussed at the European Council’s summit this March will be approved with the modifications imposed by the member states’ chiefs of state and government and then transformed, by the European Commission, in legislative concrete proposals for the energy field.

If we shortly refer to Romania’s energetic policy – an EU member – for the next period, we must show that this takes into account the development of the national plans and programs, the assumed engagements in the negotiations for joining EU, but also relevant elements on internal level comprised in Lisbon Strategy, in the Green Paper “A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy” and in the field’s new political strategy recently presented by the European Commission.

Compulsorily, Romania’s energetic policy will be correlated with the future European strategic evolutions, being able to offer proficient solutions in the import dependency growth and strengthening the tendencies of the markets’ consolidation.

Also, this will refer to the energetic equation’s new faces and energy provisions difficulties that damage the provision’s security: the provider countries’ instability, the nationalism refreshment, the geopolitical rivalry and the terrorist threat.

These elements enforce: a diversity of the energetic mix by increasing the weight of the competitive indigenous and regenerative energy and the energy sources’ import and provision routes’ diversifying; the creation of a necessary framework stimulating the investments in order to cover the demand; the growth of the crises situations’ response capability; the assurance of the citizens’ and business environment’s access to energy, etc.

The document regarding Romania’s energetic policy between 2006-2009, elaborated by the Ministry of Economy and Commerce, reveals the fact that our country disposes of important coal reserves, an important economic manageable hydro-energetic potential and also a technical manageable potential of regenerative resources.

In the forecasted increase of hydro-carbonates prices in the coming years and the actual dependence on a unique source supplying with imported natural gases, the coal and nuclear based energy production represents – as the chief of state underlined during the “Energy – cooperation



STRATEGIC EVENT

development” conference, organized in last October by George C. Marshall Association, US and German Embassies in Bucharest –Romania’s main future option.

NOTES:

¹ James Kanter, *European Union Proposes Cleaner, More Competitive Energy Market*, in New York Times, 11 January 2007, Section A, p. 5.

Colonel (ret.) Vasile POPA (vspopa9@yahoo.fr) is a scientific researcher within the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University “Carol I”.



ASYMMETRIC SHADOWS AND UMBRELLAS

Gheorghe VĂDUVA, PhD

In a circumstance where, among others, the asymmetrical warfare was also discussed, somebody had a very sharp intervention: "What asymmetrical war? What's this? How many types of war will you find in our world? Which is the meaning of asymmetrical?" Of course, nowadays, everything can be denied or affirmed. But this kind of question that, in fact, denies the asymmetrical war suggesting that it can't be anything else but a violent armed confrontation which embodies a political decision, can't get an equal trenchant answer as they are, firstly, because, in a way or another, almost all the world's wars were asymmetrical or had profound asymmetrical stages.

From ancient times, the asymmetry has been searched or even cultivated. The entire work "Art of War" of Sun Tzi, as well as "Arthashastra" of the Indian Kautyilia, is nothing more than a coherent and convincing system to apply a principles' philosophy or, more exactly, the asymmetry's realities in the confrontations between the entities. These works, available and applicable even today, develop an intelligent and complex way to think and do war; to pull out the maximum advantages after it, with lesser damages and lower costs, to use war as an instrument and not as a goal and the latter as a goal in itself.

There is very advantageous to find the suitable method to convince the enemy to leave without fight, to accept the done fact, to be put on the situation not to react or, more, to be convinced that war (even the defensive one) would be an error and that the crises could have other ways to solve them despite the opening of some hostilities with huge human lives and values wastages and except that, it will enter the collective memory as a fact necessary to be revenged in the future.

Even today, for example, in the Chinese doctrine, the political solution is preferable to the military one, wisdom being considered more precious and efficient than force, the treaties are

more important than the violent conflict. The dialogue costs lesser than the armed conflict and also offers more. Lately, the war is also ended by an agreement or a dialogue.

Subtleties and priorities

The entire world – states and international organizations – prefer the negotiations instead of hostilities, discouragement instead of confrontation or as a way to confront, the negotiations instead of war. Some of the theorists sustain very seriously that the war is the end of policy not its continuation. We can't automatically draw up from here that we should renounce to Clausewitz's war concept or is preferable to do it for a less war likely one. No matter how it is defined and understood – as a policy continuation by using violent means or as a policy end in the sense of passing from dialogue and negotiations, specific to policy, to the use of force, that seems to differ from policy, pertaining to a field situated in the non-political area -, the war is the result of a political decision. It is thoroughly thought, rigorously planned, multilaterally sustained (politically, economically, technologically, informationally, spiritually, psychologically and even culturally).

Nolens, volens, war is part of human beings' life. We must accept it, not for destroying each other – although it seems we can't definitely escape from this cruel reality -, but for lying it between the parentheses, transforming it in a strategic reserve by finding a better utility, to use it (itself or its potentials) against the evil inside us or for counteracting many threats that exist or appear in the future horizon. If the things are as they are – all the wars are effects of policy -, we can draw up the conclusion that a favourable asymmetry is searched and cultivated, by every belligerent, for him and for other's detriment.

Regardless the perspective we look for and the thoughts for or against it, war remains and always



will probably remain limit-situation behaviour for the human, a paradoxical *modus vivendi*. Before being a *modus vivendi*, war should be thought as a *modus cognoscendi*, because we can't appeal to it without knowing well its causes, philosophy and physiognomy, involvements, and, moreover, effects.

War is just a mean. And it isn't a very effective one, although it is and it will be always among the terrible ones. This isn't because "fear guards the vineyard" but because violence – the one producing death, pain and fear – seems the easiest, direct and efficient way to get quickly anything you wish for. There is one condition for you to succeed: to be stronger than the one you attack, to ally with all the ones that could be your friends or your enemy's enemy. In order to have the respective attack legitimate, your enemy must be denigrated, transformed, with media's help and many other "supports", into the public enemy of humankind, into the gravest danger that menaces the entire world, etc. In this regard, you must spend money, very much money, to elaborate credible policies and strategies, to become the champion of humankind salvation and happiness, to operate with clear, indubitably terms, for people to understand the way you want and, more, to be or to seem very sincere into this very "responsible" approach, to stop the evil and to cultivate the good. The enemy, of course, will use all the means to prove the opposite. World will understand the game rapidly, but won't care too much. It will say that these are our times, as they were during the Mongol Empire, the Roman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman ones and in bipolar period ... American policy and strategy in the complex East-West confrontation, named Cold War, fully succeeded strengthened by direct or indirect effects produced in the socialist countries, by economic system's inefficiency and non-liberty effect, defined in a comical way as an understood necessity. In Europe, the socialist system collapsed rapidly and unexpectedly. The means will always be different and the results will also remain undefined. The asymmetry starts from here, the asymmetric war unleashes through this mutual denigration, each with its own means, and, unfortunately, it transfers in the armed conflict space, also developed with means the belligerents dispose of. They are many times disproportioned and this means non-asymmetry or, as a fashionable term, dissymmetry. Forces and means used in the

conflict have almost nothing in common – some of them are ultra-sophisticated, rule and oversee the whole conflict's area, others are just untrained mobs disposing of primitive weapons or what they could get from others – and, therefore, in the combat space, the latter don't know when die. That happened with Saddam Hussein's army in the wars from 1991 and 2003. Completely overwhelmed technologically and informationally, it reacted just by little ambushes and classical harassment actions, although, as a 12 years psychological war effect, the weapons' terrible embargo, as well as a dictatorial leadership, the will to fight couldn't be in normal parameters. We are talking about a huge disproportion, not just about bigger or lesser differences. For example, while the tanks from Saddam Hussein's army didn't have radio-locators and the direct strike distance was one thousand meters, the old American Abrams disposed of radio-locator and thermo-locator, the capability to connect immediately to an information network, and the direct strike distance assured by the arrow-projectile was four thousands meters. The Iraqi tank could act just from the shelter, by dagger-fire at law distance but even this thing wasn't possible because the shelter couldn't be named shelter when thousands of sensors were upon it and looked for even in the "snake's hole". In the 1991 war, the Tawakalna Division, one of the largest elite units of the Republican Guard, was able to produce some law damages to the American Corp that attacked on its direction (it is fair, with its complete crushing price in the battlefield by the American forces), but now, anything wasn't possible. This huge disproportion isn't just tactical, but also political, military, strategic and media. Saddam Hussein once encouraged in the war against Iran and even to attack Kuwait, became "persona non grata" in the Middle East, a sort of a huge danger for democracy, human rights, for sky and land. Further on, after he was captured, as it is known, he was judged, condemned to death and hanged not because he lost a disproportioned war but for killing an entire village ...

Time passes by. Saddam ceased to exist, the accusations against him reduced to the use of chemical weapon against the Iraqi people. On the Iraqi territory there weren't found proves of the nuclear weapons, the Iraqi guerrillas give much trouble to the rule of law from this country and Coalition's forces. The American Congress is



hostile to the military presence in Iraq, soon the Great Britain will retreat 1.500 soldiers while Iran develops a nuclear program that sets on fire a certain part of the world, especially after it refused to apply the UN Security Council Resolution 1737 from December, 23, 2006 that asked the suspension of the activity of improving uranium until February, 21, 2007. This date passed and the Iran's president announced that his country doesn't give up its right to obtain nuclear energy for peaceful goals. Nobody believes him and some people guess that, in fact, he wants to prepare the field in order to get the nuclear weapon, because almost all the states in the area – Russia, India, Pakistan, China and Israel – have it ...

Israel started, probably, its F-16 aircrafts that are ready to bomb, even unilaterally, the Iranian nuclear outfits, as it did at on June, 7, 1981, against the installations from Osirak, in Baghdad's vicinity, with eight F-16, six F-15 and sixteen one-tone bomb, in the "Opera" operation. For this, the Israeli aircrafts covered, at low height, a thousand kilometres. Both reactors of Osirak, near Baghdad, were made in France, and the decision to help Iraqis to accede to the nuclear technology was assumed by the former prime-minister, the actual president of France, Jacques Chirac. After that raid, a Frenchman lost his life. Iraq was, as we know, in war with Iran.

This issue of attacking or not Iran was also very debated in the United States. A part of the congressmen consider that an attack against this country will be a disaster for the Middle East, for the entire world, and also for the United States' credibility. The diverse war of words, images, speeches continues. The Iran's president plays with fire and the international community, especially UN Security Council, doesn't know what to do. Some of them want new resolutions, others ask for sanctions, and Israel is ready to pass to attack because, as its leadership sustains, Teheran supports Hezbollah and, for this reason and the one of the possible Iran's endowment with nuclear weapon (although this thing seems to be enough hard, even impossible, to accomplish in short term), the state's security is gravely threatened.

We aren't sure that things are as they seem or about, but we surely know that the nuclear "tsunami", using an euphemism (especially after for sophisticated and extremely sufficient weapons production was used also nano-technology) if it

started, it can't be stopped or at least slowed down. It should be known the fact that with the apparition and use of the first nuclear weapon, sooner or later, the quasi-totality of countries and entities that wish to access to power and to gain battle power, influence, markets and resources, will get this type of weapons and even with more effective and sophisticated ones. This thing is probably known by Israel, too. Since Israel disposes of nuclear weapons, these weapons will be afforded also by some Arabian states which oppose their existence, or at least, Israeli hegemony. It isn't known for how long this process will be stopped.

Until then, the road map prolongs its route and the Palestinian population continues to be the same, without rights and country. The Palestinian and Arabian terrorist type actions cause mourn to the Jewish population that succeeded to transform a desert to a garden but the riposte or the preemptive and preventive action of Tsahal increased dangerously the number of deaths from the Palestinian population that acts or reacts using terrorist means.

What's this? Symmetry? Asymmetry? Disproportion?

In the end, it doesn't matter what it is. The important thing is what produces, how cheap and what are the effects, because it doesn't count what would be or how it would be made, led, explained and justified, war is still war.

Shadows' war, war's shadows ...

Today, there are many discussions about asymmetric war that seems to be a shadows' war. There are many studies on this topic, there were written few books and magazines containing articles, opinions and all kind of assertions regarding this type of war.

The Brazilian philosopher Olavo de Carvalho, for example, states in an article¹ published in English on FrontPageMag. that after the Algerian war (1954-1962), "the asymmetric war" became the base principle of anti-Occident strategy. This type of war is inspired from "indirect war" contained in the fundamental work of Sun Tzi, *The art of war*, which, starting with 1950s, was released in the Soviet space and in many other countries. The Brazilian philosopher defines this concept as being the one of the armed confrontation where the protagonists don't accept and respect any rule



or any form of restriction regarding their actions. Everybody does what he likes and agrees using maximum of constraints, morals, laws and habits that tie the other's hands and legs. There is quoted Callot D'Herbois¹, delegate of French Convention who stated, two centuries and a half ago, that "all is permitted to the one that act in revolution's favour".

During the Algerian war, a Canadian analyst, Hugues Letourneau, officer from Naval Forces, remarked that the Algerian Front of Liberation refers to "*strikes, ambushes, terrorism against its own population and other Algerian organizations for freedom, murders, torture, mutilation, large amount of money extortion from the civil population, industrial and agricultural sabotages, public goods destructions, intimidation and execution of some presumed collaborators, disinformation campaigns, etc.*".

Concurrently, Olavo de Carvalho states that "*the smallest illegal act of the French occupational forces was exploited by the intellectual militants from Paris, that exerted a moral blackmail condemning govern to inactivity threatened with a scandal*".

This is, according to many analysts' opinion, the asymmetric war. Is this really the truth?

Some authors show that, in fact, the asymmetric war is just a primitive war (many times unjustified) of the weak against the powerful, one that owed to the fact the strong always respects the war's rules and principles, the rule of law and the entire international legislation being tided by hands and legs, he, the weak one, has, alike strategic initiative and all the means for defeating the powerful because he doesn't respect anything. That is, the asymmetric war's victims are the great technological and informational powers, the great armies (that can't use tactical filching, ambushes, terrorist attacks, etc.), the civilized world and democracy.

Thus, the asymmetric war is compared with guerrilla, terrorism, armed revolution as well with other forms when parts of population or parts of the world's countries fight for the things they consider being theirs. So far, everything seems to be all right. All the people have the right to fight, by all means, for their right under the condition that respective means and actions to be legal. The "legal" term is understood in a different way by one and another. Some people consider that legal is

obeying the elaborate laws and the international or national agreements imposed – the laws elaborated by parliaments and the agreements constituted in norms of international law -, while others think that the laws express just some interests and repress others and, therefore, they can't be applicable for the whole world.

Under these circumstances, can be the war a policy continuation or its expression? Some authors agree that, today, war becomes a continuation of neoliberalism by other means, violent means and dissuasive actions. But, not all the world's people agree the neoliberal ideas and therefore, fight, by all means against them. In other words, war is just a business. Neoliberals use it for imposing their doctrine, the others being against this doctrine, use it for stopping the neo-liberals. War remains a business as it has always been, one with violent means.

However, it seems that nowadays war isn't just a simple policy's continuation by violent means, but becomes a policy in itself. An imposing policy, by threat, discouragement, forces groups, certain interests creation, in the ongoing battle for power, influence, markets, resources and ... stability. In these conditions, war becomes, as a paradox, a peace's instrument, a smallest war that prevents a bigger one, a catastrophic one. Humanity put itself over the head the nuclear weapon, the very precise weapons' systems, perhaps also the climatic or geo-physical weapon, and also few hundreds of arsenals that escaped from control could produce a great disaster.

The terrorist war and the war against terrorism are perfect types of asymmetric wars. Both of them – if we accept that are real wars and not something else, for instance, confrontations in the space of criminality, revenge, harsh battles for power and influence, etc. – are ongoing wars with unpredictable developments, from big actions as it was, for example, the Afghanistan's bombardment, considered to be a terrorist base, to the Iraqi guerrilla or the suicide Palestinians and Islamic fundamentalists actions.

The terrorist war and the war against terrorism will surely request urgently, new forces, new means and new types of actions. Some will lead inevitably, to the big entities and big strategic actions fragmentation, others, on the contrary, will amplify and, perhaps, will unify. Hence, a troubling question: will the world unite against the



terrorist phenomenon, or will continue to fight, by the means it disposes of, against the terrorism and, consequently, to produce terrorism?

As far as the strategic fissure between the rich and the poor world deepens in scaring proportions (according to the European Security Strategy, each year 45 million people die because of hunger or malnutrition), the resources and markets constitute a sufficient strong reason to create adversities and coalitions, world will continue to be a powder barrel (atomic, nano-technological, waves and psycho-waves, etc., but also people-powder), with narrow staves into circles more and more rusted by the clear effects of globalization's fluid efforts. One of the terrorist attacks' objectives, for example, is the democratic state and its institutions power discreditation and erosion, in the sense that will remain powerless in front of such attacks and can't protect its population, infrastructures and values. On long term, such a discreditation can have effects hard to be imagined.

The asymmetric actions are complex ripostes, with long-termed effects – some calculated, planned, others apparently just improvised, but surely induced – that can erode gravely the modern societies' institutions and values. Critical infrastructures, of transport and communication and the ones of public services related to the security systems and consequent forces are especially regarded for direct goals' accomplishment, in the confrontation, discouragement and fear's inducement space, and also indirect in the way of creating the conditions necessary underground economy proliferation and some illegal financial interests' accomplishment.

Or, this kind of objectives can be accomplished only by the erosion of the state's authority, institutions for citizen's protection and security, the property and law and the accomplishment of a direct or indirect control, by all possible means – from terrorism to corruption -, of some key-areas, plundered and used for illegal and dangerous goals³.

Asymmetric war isn't asymmetric just for some and for the others disproportioned or normal. It is asymmetric for everybody. On a side of the axis, we have high-tech, the info technology, policies, doctrines and strategies that ground the centric network warfare, the preemptive war⁴, the preventive war (which is illegal), to strike the enemy's vital centres, to achieve alliances

and coalitions, market and resources control, not anyway, but by creating a favourable environment and, on the other side, there are policies, doctrines and strategies for adequate, riposte stratagems with available means or that can be procured for the maximum use of the high-tech societies' vulnerabilities and the ones that can be created or induced.

This type of asymmetric accentuated confrontation is dramatic. It induces in all the environments, uncertainty, restlessness, revolt, and also aggressiveness, violence, and even terrorism.

This type of asymmetric war – in its very concrete form, terrorist war – war against terrorism but not only – became very dangerous, because of the extremely diverse, sophisticated means and their spread in all the environments, starting with the terrestrial and continuing with the cosmic and cyber ones.

The broadcasted appearances of Osama bin Laden, George Bush's secure smile, Tony Blair's sardonic smile, the Putin's suggestive certainty, Jacques Chirac's multi-sense words, Mahmud Ahmadinejad's arrogance, sober or embarrassing appearances of different spokesmen aren't able to relax nobody.

The chaos and insecurity state, despite NATO and EU enlargement, deepens and amplifies. The parties from almost all the democratic countries fight for the power both during the election campaigns and outside them, the Islamic countries react virulently each time they feel offended, the fundamentalisms increase, the violence gets massive in the daily life and also in culture, especially in the market's culture, the planet gets warmer and some people seem to get insane ...

The humans' optimism isn't very robust, the restrictions grow, the occidental civilization countries confront with serious demographic problems and the East's emigration produces shadows, dark and, moreover, headaches. Criminality, drugs, weapons, human beings and influence trafficking, corruption and enforcement of a globalization process that isn't very clear defined induce a chaos state in all the countries but especially into the ones still torn or rummaged, humiliated and ... forgotten.

The war's shadow seem to lead all the world, under all the possible and impossible forms, from the informational and cosmic ones – is already put into shape the satellites hunt or just their



POINTS OF VIEW

“blindness” – until the psychological, media and ... cultural ones.

And, you are right to ask, without a trace of rhetoric: Do we live in a gorgeous warrior peace or in an incommensurable war of peace, completely asymmetric, in a total and clean-dirty war, as Caragiale would have stated, that is gets dirtier and dirtier by our peace of all our white nights and all the dark days?

NOTES:

¹ Olavo de CARVALHO, *L'arme de la 'guerre assymétrique*, *Folha de S. Paulo*, October, 6, 2004, <http://www.olavodecarvalho.org/traducoes/assymetrique.htm>.


² French politician (born in Paris, at 19 June 1750 – dead at Sinnamary, Guyana, on June, 8, 1796). He repressed violently the Royal insurrection from Lyon (1793) and opposed to Robespierre. Terror's organizer. He was deported in Guyana, where he died.

³ <http://revuemilitairesuisse.ch/node/45>.

⁴ The preemptive war is accepted by the UN Chart, because it aims counteracting an imminent strike, it is part of the defensive war; the preventive war is considered an aggression war, as it doesn't aim counteracting an imminent strike, but performing some preventive strikes.

Brigadier General (ret.) Gheorghe VĂDUVA, PhD (vaduvageorge@yahoo.fr), is a fellow researcher within the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University "Carol I". He wrote numerous strategy papers, among which we mention "The Rapid Actions Strategy", AISM Publishing House, 2003, "Military Strategy for the Future", Paideia Publishing House, 2003, "Military Art During Millenia", CTEA Publishing House, 2004, co-author of "The Future's War, the War's Future", NDU Publishing House, 2004, "Essay on Strategic Art", Military Publishing House, 2005, "Partnership Strategy, the Strategic Partnership", NDU Publishing House, 2006. He also wrote studies, article, essays on the military art and the strategic culture, issued by the NDU Publishing House and by specialty papers.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE CURRENT SECURITY CONTEXT



Recently, Army's Editorial Technical Centre Publishing House has published **MILITARY INTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE CURRENT SECURITY CONTEXT**, under the coordination of General (ret.) Eng. PhD Sergiu T. MEDAR, a personality well-known in the field.

The readers interested in the topic will discover reflections, explanatory judgments and predictions over the interdependency regarding present and perspectives of military intelligence, as a system of projection, in the security context on new coordinates, an update of the strategy-information ratio and other interdependencies that emerge at political-military and strategic levels.

The work is, in fact, an assembly of studies and researches conducted by senior experts in military intelligence field. It is an actual and interesting, comprehensive book, structured in 16 studies, spread on 238 pages. For the common reader, but especially for the specialists in this field, it is of great interest to receive, as it has been achieved in this paper, an easy understanding of the intelligence analysis rigors.

Among the titles submitted to reader's attention we can mention: *Intelligence services in a democratic society*, *The role and missions of military intelligence services*, *Military information revolution*, *Geo-information between geopolitics and geo-strategy*, *Reforming the military intelligence service as a response to new international security environment challenges*, *Professional competence of military attachés of the Romanian Army*, *Civilian control over military intelligence structures*, *NATO's transformation – intelligence*, *Information architecture in EU*, *Intelligence military personnel's psy-*

chological adaptation to the requirements of the missions in operations theatres, *Tele-medicine – utility in operation theatres*, etc.

As it is already known, the powerful people are those ones who can effectively obtain information, and those who can process them have the flexibility and ability to adapt to continuously changing reality. Information is a multiplying force in action field, strengthening the decision of commanders, and the need for information is motivated by prevention of surprise and protecting the military body.


The correctness, respect, trust, sincerity and loyalty are universal values in the relations between the military personnel as well as between the intelligence communities involved in many partnership systems. Nowadays, strategic partnerships aim, firstly, the creation of a proper environment for economic, political, social, cultural, military and informational cooperation, in order to fight against terrorism and a proper crises and conflicts management. There are strategic partnerships within alliances, in intelligence field, within the intelligence communities, within strategy generating and asymmetric threats combat's nuclei.

The information, just as the economy, under the pressure of expanding nuclei, become global, while human entities compete for updating or maintaining the identity. The support of its emergence and dissemination consists of a very complex network, serving for the actions undertaken in information field, for information, aiming informational supremacy.

An effective functioning of the intelligence services requires a balance between their activities and their reflection in political conscience. Intelligence services work for national and citizen's interest.

The paper intends and fully succeeds to make a synthetic presentation of military intelligence structures within the actual international security environment. The authors give to the readers the elements that enable them to discover the advantages of military intelligence services' effectively existence and function. They argue the necessity of knowing the military intelligence services' activity, in order to create an intelligence culture, admitting the legitimate role of intelligence services in a democracy and in 21st century security, defined as the risk society security. (C.C.)

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY ON TERRORISTS



Who is likely to become a terrorist and why? How does they succeed in achieving their established goal(s)? How can terrorists remain faithful to their mission for so long? How is it that they reach maximum capacity to cope with stress and what defensive mechanisms do they employ to overcome distress when committing an anti-social act? What is the know-how of their successful coping with cognitive ambiguity and flexibility, or with 'neutral' psycho-physiological stimuli? Why is it that in their case, during maximal psycho-physiological activity and in unpredicted moments, the cognitive plans are adaptative primarily to stimuli which are either ambiguous or inadvertent and non-representative? What supports the decisional process when they plan to reach their goal by sacrificing their own life?

Cristian Delcea, the president of the Institute of Research and Study on Terrorism,

tries to find answers to all these questions. **The Psychology of Terrorism: A Psychological Study on Terrorists (2nd edition, revised), Diversitas Publishing House, Braşov, 393p**, is divided into nine chapters, sustained by over 200 bibliographical notes, in which the author, with scientific rigor doubled by intelligent insight of the psychology of terrorists, develops a wide range of theories and psycho-social models.

The study focuses predominantly on the terrorist's psychological profile with the intention to highlight his psycho-socio-cultural representation.

The book also includes a great number of case studies which examine the psycho-social representations of various terrorist groups, with a careful depiction of the most dangerous of these.

Hence, with thoroughness, technique and perfect applicability to the security system, the author makes a real contribution to the Romanian specialized literature.

Addressed to readers belonging predominantly to specialized domains (such as national security, army, police, secret services and research), the book wishes to presents in a concise and scientific manner, the causes that lead to the use of violence by human subjects with antisocial purposes on one hand, and the identification prevention of their forms of manifestation on the other.(I.C.)



THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES

JANUARY-MARCH 2007

In "Military Guide 2007", the magazine issued by The Hellenic Institute of Strategic Studies, there was published a page presenting CDSSS/NDU "Carol I". HEL.I.S.S. is an old collaborator of our Centre, as between our institutions there is a constant exchange of publications and researchers

On January, 22, researchers from CDSSS met a delegation from the US Army International Technology Centre and there were discussed the future partnership possibilities. The guests offered themselves to mediate possible connections between the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies and similar institutions from the United States.

On February, 10, Brigadier General (ret.) Gheorghe Văduva was invited as a guest to the TV show "Terrorism today", presented by Axa TV channel from Baia Mare, and there were debated issues related with the international terrorism.

Following the invitation received from the President of the Economic Council of the Foundation of the Institute for Eastern Studies from Poland, on February, 22-24, the Scientific Director of the Centre participated to the "Forumul 2007 Europa - Ucraina". At this forum there were invited members of the Parliament, researchers, businessmen and officials from European countries, US, Canada and there was debated the future of the relations between EU and Ukraine.

There were also published the following studies: "2006-strategic evaluation", "The relations between army and society in the context of Romania's integration in NATO and accession in EU", "Perspectives in the national armies' evolution" and "Expeditionary military operations".

Within this year there will be organised some scientific gatherings. The annual scientific session organised by the National Defence University "Carol I", STRATEGIES XXI, on "The South-Eastern European space in the context of globalization transformations" will take place in April, 12-13. The Centre will be responsible for the section on security and defence. There will also take place a seminar organised by CDSSS, "ESDP exigencies on security and national defence" (May, 24) and the annual international session on "The Dynamic of the European security environment" (November, 22-23).

Irina CUCU



INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

On selecting the articles there are taken into consideration: the area of the subjects presented in the magazine, the actuality of the topic, its novelty and originality, its scientific content and the adequacy to the editorial norms adopted by the magazine.

The paper sent to be published should not have been published (print or online) or simultaneously submitted to another publication. The article should not contain any party political connotations.

The papers' scientific evaluation is done by two scientific experts that are either professors or senior fellow researchers.

The article, written both in Romanian and other foreign language (English, French) may have maximum 10-12 pages (6.000 – 7.000 words) and has to be sent both in print and paper, using Times New Roman font, size 12, one line, and the tables and schemes have to be printed separately.

The text has to be preceded by an abstract which is not to exceed 250 words, both in Romanian and English. The papers have to be signed adding the authors's scientific degree, name, first name, name and have to end with a short curriculum vitae, 60 words maximum, specifying the professional qualification, the institution he comes from and other information considered necessary, including the e-mail address.

The footnotes are to be included by the end of the article and have to respect the international regulations. Authors can publish only one article by issue.

The text has to present an easy structure, using titles (subtitles). The abbreviations will be marked on the text only at their first mention on the text. It is likely to end the papers with some important conclusions regarding the importance of the research.

The articles will not use classified information.

As the magazine does not have a profitable purpose, the articles cannot be paid.

Our address is: National Defence University "Carol I", the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, 68-72 Panduri Street, sector 5, Bucharest, Romania, telephone: (021) 319.56.49; Fax: (021) 319.55.93, e-mail: cssas@unap.ro, web address: <http://cssas.unap.ro>, <http://impactstrategic.unap.ro>



After six years since its first edition, STRATEGIC IMPACT magazine, edited by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies from the National Defence University “Carol I” is a quarterly scientific magazine acknowledged locally and internationally for the wide area of topics - the political-military present, security strategy and military security, NATO and EU actions, informational society, strategic synthesis and evaluations, a special column “Strategic Event” that studies the strategic impact of the dynamics of the actions undertaken nationally, regionally and globally.

STRATEGIC IMPACT has as collaborators important researchers and personalities within the scientific research area and from the civilian and military university system, both national and international, from the Romanian Ministry of Defence, General Staff, services’ staffs, the Ministry of Administration and Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, military units and other state’s organizations, NGOs, companies, etc.

The international acknowledgement of the magazine’s quality is confirmed by its editions presented on sites belonging to prestigious foreign institutions (The International Relations and Security Network of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zürich; Defence Guide, in collaboration with the Hellenic Institute of Strategic Studies – HEL.I.S.S.), The Institute for Development and Social Initiatives – IDIS from the Republic of Moldova – the virtual library for political and security studies, etc.

The magazine is accredited by the National University Research Council and acknowledged as a B+ magazine that demonstrates the potential to become an international acknowledged magazine.

STRATEGIC IMPACT is a representative forum for reflection and debates on topics related to strategy and security for the scientific, academic, national and international community.

At present, STRATEGIC IMPACT magazine is issued separately in two editions, Romanian and English, and disseminated in the domestic and international scientific environment and also to the main institutions involved in security and defence.

Issue organizer: Corina VLADU
Designer: Corina VLADU
Masterproof: Corina VLADU
The National Defence University “Carol I” Printing House
