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COORDINATOR:

Constantin MOȘTOFLEI, PhD

MODERATORS:

Constantin MOȘTOFLEI, PhD

Mihail ORZEAȚĂ, PhD

Gheorghe VĂDUVA, PhD

Gheorghe NICOLAESCU, PhD

Nicolae DOLGHIN, PhD

Visarion NEAGOE, PhD

Alexandra SARCINSCHI, PhD

Constantin-Gheorghe BALABAN, PhD

Grigore ALEXANDRESCU, PhD

Florin DIACONU, PhD

Mihai VELEA, PhD

SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE:

Grigore ALEXANDRESCU, PhD

Nicolae DOLGHIN, PhD

SCIENTIFIC SECRETARY:

Vasile POPA

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CONTENT

THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT'S ROLE IN INCREASING THE REGIONAL STABILITY AND SECURITY

Teodor FRUNZETI, PhD5

LESSONS OF HISTORY TO BE RELEARNED – NEGOTIATION AND COOPERATION

Mihail ORZEAȚĂ, PhD19

THE EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN THE COAGULATION AND CENTRIFUGAL TENDENCIES

Georgeta CHIRLEȘAN, PhD30

DIMENSIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BORDERS – CITIZENSHIP – SECURITY

Alexandra SARCINSCHI, PhD49

EXPLORING THE FUTURE: FROM ANCIENT AUTHORS FOCUSING ON STRATEGY TO NATO (MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT OF ALLIED COMMAND TRANSFORMATION - ACT)

Florin DIACONU, PhD69

ENERGY WARS OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Andriy VOLOȘIN, PhD92

THE BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE - XVI-XX CENTURIES

Mihai VELEA, PhD105

RISKS AND VULNERABILITIES OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT WITHIN THE AREAS OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO ROMANIA

Visarion NEAGOE, PhD125

HYDROCARBONS – AN EFFICIENT “WEAPON” OF THE ECONOMIC WARFARE

Cristian BĂHNĂREANU, PhD142

TERRORIST CHALLENGES AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE ECONOMIC-SOCIAL DIMENSION

Petre DUȚU, PhD153



***CRISIS AND EMERGENCY. CONCEPTUAL DELIMITATIONS
AND CORRELATIONS***

Constantin MOȘTOFLEI, PhD168

***CONSIDERATIONS ON SECURITY SYSTEMS IN HOLISTIC
VISION***

Paul DUȚĂ, PhD181

***IMPLICATIONS OF THE BORDER CONCEPT IN
THE EUROPEAN SECURITY***

Cristina BOGZEANU199

***SOCIAL SECURITY – DIMENSION OF NATIONAL
AND COLECTIVE DEFENCE***

Mirela ATANASIU221



THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT'S ROLE IN INCREASING THE REGIONAL STABILITY AND SECURITY

*Teodor FRUNZETI, PhD,
Lieutenant General, Professor,
Commandant (rector) of National Defence University "Carol I"*

The military instrument's role in shaping nowadays' security environment is more pointed and polyvalent, having an interdisciplinary and less aggressive character.

The complementary use of military power and non-military means on solving crisis and conflicts was fully emphasized by the region our country belongs to and the neighbouring area.

Only political solutions supported by deterrent measures with military means or the effective use of such a powerful tool can lead to long lasting results, providing stability, order and security in a more secure and democratic world.

1. Introduction

The events at the beginning of this century have triggered a profound transformation process of the security's environment, generating consequences which deeply affect the international community on long term. In such a tense and complex context, the security of each country as well as the security of the international community as a whole is based not only on its ability to react and adapt but especially on its ability to anticipate and act proactively. Knowing, understanding and assessing correctly the internal processes, the degree of social cohesion and the ability of public mobilization represent a very important necessity to achieve the national projects.

In a complex, dynamic and conflictual world, in an ongoing globalization process, the profound understanding of the major evolution tendencies of international security and the way each country has the



opportunity to become an active part of this process, represents an essential condition of progress and prosperity. Knowing, understanding and assessing correctly the internal processes, the degree of social cohesion and the ability of public mobilization represent a very important necessity to achieve the national projects.

Defining a legitimate framework of proactive engagement, able to anticipate, foresee, prevent and efficiently combat the new risks and threats needs a complex combination of policies, legal tools and actions which must be achieved both through internal doctrinal, normative and organizational efforts and also the activity within the international security and cooperation structures. The efforts must aim at: objectively defining the risk, threat and danger factors and their active monitoring; establishing the ways to efficiently counteract them regardless of the distance from the borders; the borders' modern security; adequately organizing the security and defence of the territory, citizens, their rights and goods, institutions and critical infrastructure against the new risks and threats.

In order to identify the adequate ways to achieve these desiderata, Romania, as a member-state of the European and Euro-Atlantic community, must act through all its legitimate methods and means together with the allied states in accordance with the international community measures.

In developing our approach on providing regional security and stability, as part of the process of achieving the international security and stability, we have also started from the truth recognized by specialists that these are achieved through own efforts and by cooperating with the allies and partners in accordance with the provisions of the national programs, the EU security strategy and the Alliance's strategic concepts. Thus, we understand that they aim at harmonizing national efforts with international engagements and identifying the working methods able to prevent and counteract the threats. These efforts also aim at promoting democracy, peace and stability in the neighbouring areas and also other strategic areas, reducing the vulnerabilities, developing national capabilities and the profound transformation of the security institutions.



Joe Biden, the US new vice-president, also emphasized this, stating that: “The threats we face know no borders. No country, no matter how powerful it may be, can face them alone. There is no conflict between our security and ideals. They consolidate each other. We have won our independence by means of weapons and weapons have been protecting our freedom throughout history. This thing will not change.”¹ He also stated that: “However, the United States are prepared to use military force to protect their national security”², suggesting at the same time that “Our alliance must be better equipped in order to stop the trafficking of the most dangerous weapons in the world, to deal with terrorism and cybernetic security, expand their agreements regarding the energy security and work efficiently inside and outside our area.”³

2. General considerations regarding the region Romania is disposed in

The emergence and amplification of new challenges and threats to the contemporary world (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illegal migration, organized crime, drug and human trafficking) imposes the conclusion that the region our country is disposed in has become both a manifestation area and also one of the outposts for combat. The existence within this area of some “frozen conflicts” such as Trans-Dniester, Abkhazia, Chechnya, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Kosovo which could become active as proven by the recent armed conflict between Georgia, on one hand, and Russia, together with two of the so-called “separatist regions” which it supports more or less obviously, on the other hand, conflict which almost “inflamed” the whole area, completes the security physiognomy and imposes a specific attitude.

Another element characterizing the region and providing it with important values and amplifying its strategic importance for Europe and not only represents the vicinity with the Middle East and its specific problems.

All these impose the necessity of placing the region in the core of European efforts to project security and stability in a wider community



space and beyond it. All these demonstrate that the interface between the Euro-Atlantic community and the Middle East passes through the region Romania is situated. We are convinced that the challenge the current community faces, that to project a climate of stability towards the Middle East can and must be considerably supported by the long lasting stability and success in this region.

Among the risks and threats to the regional security and stability we may mention:

- the existence in Romania's proximity of low-intensity or ethnic armed conflicts in a latent post-conflict phase or on the brink of escalation;
- the increase and exacerbation of international terrorism, passing to a new evolution of this phenomenon – organizing and conducting terrorist operations at the same time with their counteracting in an organized way by military alliances at global level;
- the potential reactivation of ethnic, religious and ideological latent conflicts and also several military conflicts not solved yet;
- the intensification of the illegal weapon, strategic materials, drugs trafficking and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and unconventional lethal means;
- the need to re-establish a credible security in the Mediterranean space;
- the intensification of military activities in the Black Sea basin and a growing interest to control it;
- the prolongation of domestic economic, financial and social difficulties;
- the expansion and amplification of terrorist networks, organized crime, economic and financial criminality, real trafficking and goods and human smuggling;
- the increased probability of ecological accidents or natural calamities near the borders or on national territory;
- keeping the Romanian informational infrastructure at a low level;
- unforeseen events such as floods, earthquakes, ecological accidents, social crisis which could escalate to affect the constitutional



democracy and public order, underground economy, administrative instability;

- the expansion of clandestine immigration and, in crisis situations, and mass exodus.

These risks and threats create serious vulnerabilities both to national interests and the Romanian values and also to the Romanian Army operational and reacting ability.

The mechanisms and alliances applied and built by Europe and the USA and also those ones initiated at regional level, in order to focus the cooperation efforts in the Balkans, Caucasus or Black Sea, can prove their efficiency in dealing with the expansion of democracy in the Middle East. The economic cooperation initiatives in the area, partnerships, bilateral and multilateral relations are concrete realities of the economic policy in this area and their outcome generates a necessary security construction.

Therefore, the process must begin in the areas which, once, represented confrontation spaces and one of them is the region where our country is disposed. The effect of such a construction will be the transformation of the region into an area with a solid democracy, able to promote and propagate security and stability. That is why we need to build, in this space, pillars of economic, political and military security which, in future, should be expanded in adjacent spaces, thus contributing to diffusing the tensions and a better crisis and conflict management in the Middle East and Central Asia.

3. Guidelines to promote stability, security and peace in the region

As an EU border-state and a NATO member in this region, Romania's major interest is to be neighbour with stable, democratic and prosper countries as only they are capable to maintain peace and understanding between them, create pluralist regional communities and have a predictable behaviour regarding the security domain. Building a climate of security, stability and prosperity in the area represents a distinct guideline of this strategy. Romania, who wants to be a dynamic



vector of democratic security, stability and economic prosperity, has a fundamental strategic interest, that is this region should be stable, democratic and prosper, closely connected to the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. The strategic objective is determined by the great importance of the proximity to Europe, Middle East and Central Asia, our country's geopolitical region being a significant transit area of the energy resources and, at the same time, an important space of asymmetrical risks and conflicts with a substantial impact on Euro-Atlantic security.

Far from being just a buffer zone, this region represents a connector of strategic importance, being situated on the corridor linking the Euro-Atlantic community (security provider and energy consumer) to the Middle East, Caspian Region and Central Asia (energy provider and security consumer).

From the energy point of view, the region represents the main transit space and, very importantly, a source for the European energy. From the security challenges point of view, at the same time, it faithfully reflects the new risks and threats and a potential dangerous shooting ground to experiment them. Characterized by an important democratic deficit and an inability to plenary exercise the sovereign states' attributes, this is Europe's richest part and probably one with the most numerous conflicts, disputes and tensions. The cross-border criminality represents an emblematic reality of this region. These illegal activities take place by water and by land, have connections with the international terrorist groups and are supported by the separatist regimes and the illegal presence of foreign troops in the new democratic countries.

The cross-border criminality risks to seriously affect some countries' governments, to generate instability and anarchy, favour violent manifestations and create the danger of cutting the energy supplies. Counteracting these risks and threats is a major responsibility of the states in the region. They must be first of all aware of the existence of these dangers and are forced to develop domestic, foreign and security policies capable to neutralize the negative phenomena within own borders and abstain from supporting them while the prognosis foresee the substantial increase of their role in the following decades.



REGIONAL STABILITY AND SECURITY

These countries need to cooperate actively and effectively, promote measures destined to increase the trust in the region and fulfil the obligations regarding the reduction of conventional weapons and withdrawing the military forces illegally stationed in other states. At the same time, starting from the security indivisible character in the Euro-Atlantic space, in accordance with the globalization requirements, from the need of an equal treatment for all entities with legitimate interests in the area, including NATO and the European Union, we consider that the region is a geopolitical space open to the international democratic community where all the states in the region can manifest in a plenary way.

In accordance with this opinion, it's necessary to actively promote an European and Euro-Atlantic strategy, taking into account the experience of NATO-EU approach in the stabilization process in the South-Eastern Europe and the need of a balance capable to favour the states' democratic option, to prevent the aggravation of risks and threats and effectively contribute to solving conflicts and tensions. The expansion of the EU's responsibilities in stabilizing and rebuilding the region, the consolidation of the NATO and PfP Program presence and contribution to the processes of promoting democracy, peace and security, as well as the presence of some American operational capabilities in the region are factors capable to contribute to the implementation of such a strategy.

In this context, Romania's priorities are: harmonizing and improving the ongoing cooperation institutional processes; preventing competition or hegemonic temptations; establishing a new dialogue and cooperation framework with the participation of all the interested democratic states and organizations.

For this, Romania will have to act firmly to institutionalize The Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership, initiative mainly consecrated to promoting democracy and economic development, energy security, increasing the stability, peace and security.

In order to promote this initiative, Romania must cooperate closely with the states in the area – Bulgaria, Georgia, Russian Federation, Turkey, Ukraine, with other neighbouring states and also with other



member-states of the Euro-Atlantic community. Concomitantly, Romania must actively support the new development Euro-region in this space, capable to facilitate the cooperation with all the EU member-states, stimulate the development of the energy and transport infrastructure, promote trade, investments and mechanisms of free market economy. As for solving the separatist conflicts, Romania must use all the possible opportunities to maintain it on the main security actors' political agenda, to promote active political and diplomatic strategies and involve more effectively in the mechanisms aiming at solving these conflicts peacefully.

The inefficiency of some of the mechanisms used until now to solve conflicts imposes the necessity to reanalyze them and to actively involve the countries and organizations with a positive contribution. Within such a strategy, it's necessary to establish a set of principles, norms and unitary conduct rules in accordance with the interests of the people, communities and states within the area, with the Euro-Atlantic community security's interests and the provisions of international law, capable to adequately respond to the differences specific to each conflict.

The set of principles, norms and behaviour rules could encompass obligations regarding: not recognizing the separatist regimes and discouraging them; firmly counteracting terrorism and other activities associated to terrorism; withdrawing the foreign troops illegally stationed in different enclaves; evacuating the weapons, ammunition and explosives' depots under international control; demising the paramilitary groups of the illegal regimes on the territory of separatist regions.

In order to promote these principles, Romania seeks to be directly involved in the process of peacefully solving the conflicts and disputes in its strategic proximity, both through national and also multilateral actions, aiming at promoting democracy, supporting the efforts to draw closer to the European and Euro-Atlantic structures and the efforts aiming at building security and prosperity. Romania doesn't want the enlargement processes of the two organizations to lead to new lines of separation.

The economic dimension has an important role in building the security within the region. Thus, Romania's foreign and economic cooperation policy must be pragmatic and must effectively use the tools provided by the bilateral and multilateral formats in order to participate at major projects aiming at consolidating democracy and prosperity. The efforts must aim at the development of energy and transport corridors capable to connect both economically and commercially the Pontic region to the Euro-Atlantic community and allow an optimum capitalization of the potential provided by the maritime and river harbours in the region.

At the same time, it's necessary to pay a special attention to the environment protection, capitalizing the potential and re-establishing the multiple functions of the ecosystem in the area. Also, we are to develop special programs to increase national and regional capabilities to monitor and rapid intervene in order to prevent and counteract the security risks specific to the region. We can thus support the development of the initiatives regarding the regional capabilities to respond to crisis and the asymmetrical threats and also those which can improve the legal framework favourable to the increase of trust between the states in the area and other states interested in the regional security.

4. Military factor – component of the regional security and stability process

After the end of the “Cold War”, the security military, non-military and semi-military elements have interconnected first of all due to the fact that the traditional elements of the military security have become less obvious, being less intense, but more ample than before.

The main characteristic of this first decade of this century is the absence of the danger represented by a major conflict of high intensity between nowadays' main powers, a world war or of the type which occurred two decades ago by the transformation of the “Cold War” into a hot war.

Due to the fact that the existent threat during the “Cold War”, that of a nuclear conflict between the great world powers, following an error



to interpret or an uncontrollable escalation of a conflict wasn't replaced with a threat equally dangerous to the global security and international order, the semi-military and non-military aspects are more important nowadays. The respective threats existed before to a certain extent but the main actors didn't pay too much attention to them. However, it should be noted that some of the nowadays' threats are more recent.

All these threats, except the international terrorism, don't represent an important danger to the regional security and can generally be a part of the security psychological dimension. On the other hand, due to globalization, the security semi-military and non-military dimensions are more and more important for the whole international community, their effects expanding even though in faraway areas and not to one or another of the states concerned.

Of all these reasons, the role of the military instrument in shaping the current security environment is more nuanced and polyvalent with an interdisciplinary and less aggressive character.

The complementarity of using the military power and the non-military means to solve crisis and conflict was fully emphasized in the region our country is in and also in the close vicinity. Only the political solutions supported by measures of deterrence through military means or the effective use of this instrument of power can lead to lasting results ensuring the stability, order and security in a more democratic and safe world.

In this context, the internationalization of the region's securing process represents a mechanism with a great effective and favourable effect for ensuring the stability and peace in this area. This implies NATO and EU's political, economic and military presence to ensure an efficient management of counteracting the asymmetrical threats and achieving the conditions of a lasting development.

The process of stability and peace in the area must have in Romania and its army an engaged partner in order to improve the bilateral and multilateral relations with the purpose of preventing the conventional and unconventional risks, promoting the transatlantic values and the security standards, ensuring the interoperability in crisis management, cooperation in securing the borders, civilian emergencies management,



etc. We can also add the participation in the assistance provided to the neighbouring countries in reforming the security sector and the development of the military instrument reform programs.

At the same time, there also are the activities our army must conduct together with the armies of the other countries in the region, in order to increase the mutual trust. In this group we may mention actions conducted to implement the CFE treaty provisions regarding weapon control, contacts at all levels, the application of the “Open sky” agreements with the mutual flights over national territories in order to increase trust and transparency regarding military operations.

In the effort to achieve a viable cooperation model in the area, our country must take active part in the Reunion of ministers of defence from the South Eastern Europe which represents a combat instrument to counteract risks and asymmetrical threats, increase the political and military trust, intensify the multilateral dialogue and solve the crisis, to participate at different UN, NATO, EU and/or OSCE stability and/or support operations. Starting with February 2006, several structures have been involved in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan and Romania had an important contribution within this force.

Our army participates together the armies of the neighbouring countries at the reunions and exercises conducted within the naval forces Group, BLACKSEAFOR, regional element of developing the cooperation and interoperability between the military forces in the Pontic space. Securing the area imposes an increase of the role of the cooperation and regional security organizations – BSEC, BLACKSEAFOR, GUAM – which in cooperation with the international ones – EU, OSCE, NATO, UN – must ensure the achievement of real and effective regional security architecture, as a part of the European and world security architecture.

Our country's North, East and South-East borders represent the EU Eastern border which implies security obligations, the area being the surveillance and early warning platform for protecting Europe's security strategic interests. For this, it was necessary to implement the system for observation, surveillance and control in the Black Sea, a national integrated system of electronic and visual surveillance of the



maritime and air space at low-fly height in order to permanently know the naval, electronic and air situation of our country's seashore.

The system meets the needs of both the Ministry of National Defence and also other central administration organs for the surveillance of Romania, NATO and EU's maritime space, being at the same time an important component of the national system of fighting against terrorism. Our partners within the Alliance have shown their interest for the finalization of this system which meets the requirements to interconnect with the neighbouring states similar systems, this being one of the objectives necessary within the interstate cooperation in the region.

Conclusions

The diverse and numerous dynamics in the region and adjacent spaces, the Mediterranean Sea, the Greater Middle East and Central Asia, which cannot be always predicted, imply new solutions and actions, capable of being solved only through permanent cooperation and collaboration.

This region's specific character implies new strategic models to achieve the military cooperation. Achieving coalitions, developing a functional solidarity, revitalizing and consolidating the integrated initiatives and actions in order to create effective operational tools in the fight against terrorism and other cross-border threats represent some of these models.

The differences between the actors in the region don't represent a major impediment in the stabilization efforts as long as neither of them, state or nonstate, can control the complex processes in this region all by itself.

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NOTES:

1 <http://www.newin.ro>, 09.02.2008, “Joe Biden dezvaluie noua politica externa a Statelor Unite”.

2 Idem.

3 Idem.



LESSONS OF HISTORY TO BE RELEARNED – NEGOTIATION AND COOPERATION

*Mihail ORZEAȚĂ, PhD,
Lieutenant General (ret.), Associate Professor,
National Defence University “Carol I”*

The world seems to be greedier for confrontation in all domains, despite the fact that most of the state, governmental and non-governmental organisations leaders sustain the cooperation between states and avoidance of conflicts through negotiations.

Globalisation seems to have an important contribution, although an unintended one, to stimulating political, economic and social confrontations.

Relearning direct and honest cooperation among communities and transforming intentions into real facts represent the best solution for diminishing tensions and conflicts until their complete elimination from international relations. This will gradually lead to a world in which harmony will prevail and current communities, divided into rich and poor, developed and underdeveloped etc. will be history.

1. Do we really learn from lessons of history?

A retrospective glance at history points out people's constant concern for their own security, as well as for the one of the communities they are part of. In many situations, some community leaders, especially heads of state, had their own way of understanding and implementing the concept of security. Even if not all of them were proponents of totalitarianism, the vision on security of some of them was more oriented towards satisfying their own intentions to increase their power, fame and influence at the international level. In support of these statements came the decisions of some republicans, such as Napoleon I and Caesar,

who proclaimed themselves emperors, as well as the ones of many “communist revolutionaries” who overthrew monarchies, because they thought these were undemocratic, and then proclaimed themselves heads of state for life and began to export the revolution. The way in which some heads of state used to understand international relations and state government is encapsulated in expressions that have become famous: *“the best way to ensure the peace is to be ready for war”* [William Cohen, 2001]¹, *“I am the state”* [I. Berg, 2004]², *“diplomacy without armaments is like music without instruments”* [Frederick II]³, forgetting or neglecting the biblical dictum *“live by the sword, die by the sword”* [Mathew, 26, 51]⁴.

Assessing interpersonal and intercommunity relations, since the appearance of the human being and the first forms of social organisation, one can notice that these have developed by virtue of the “rule of force”, suggestively expressed through the dictum: *“the big fish swallow the little fish”*. This explains Karl von Clausewitz’s opinion, that *“war is a continuation of politics by other means”* [Marin Mirea, 1973]⁵ and the opinion of German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who clearly stated that *“force is beyond justice, [because] the great questions of the time are decided by iron and blood”* [François Bluche, 271]⁶.

The way the conception of security has been understood and applied throughout time has been one of the main causes for the numerous confrontations between states and groups of states, generating a huge consumption of resources in order to “produce” incalculable human losses and material damages. Bearing this conclusion in mind, anyone can assume that the solution for harmony and universal peace is not the use of force and confrontation in international relations. It is sad that, even if all people have studied history and contributed to “writing” it, the lessons of history seem not to have been properly learned and applied.

It is history again that reminds us that the penalty for the attitude of neglecting its lessons is relearning them by means of one’s own experience, with bigger consequences though, especially as far as some armed conflicts are concerned. Our ancestors were aware of these conclusions, which stated that smart people learn from other people’s



experience, while other people are incapable of learning, not even from their own experience.

2. Current issues of international security

Overall, the planet's security situation is better than the one during the *Cold War*, because the risk that a major armed conflict will occur is more diminished. However, locally and regionally, there are numerous tensions that have triggered, and they will probably continue to do so, violent confrontations between ethnic and religious communities, as well as between states. The internal and external causes of these tensions and, implicitly, of the confrontations are numerous and various, yet, most of them are political, economic, social, ethnic and religious ones.

The world we live in is more and more complex, with development tendencies that are sometimes contradictory, hence, more difficult to predict. The effects of the widening world economic and financial crisis have been the increase in the unemployment and the decrease in the living standard of many people – especially in economically developed countries – owing to the cessation or reduction of the activity of several companies. Given these circumstances, xenophobic, racist actions and discrimination on religious grounds have increased in intensity and scale – especially in Western Europe states. These actions are directed against immigrants, who come especially from underdeveloped and developing countries, with mostly Muslim population.

If, during the economic boom, foreign workers were asked to work temporarily, based on a contract, in the European Union states, currently, they are less wanted, to make it possible for local unemployed people to fill the jobs they refused before the outbreak of the crisis. This state of things tenses the interpersonal and intercommunity relations between immigrants and local populations. Many immigrants have been residents in the European Union countries for 20 to 40 years now, they have brought their families, their children are educated in schools in the host countries and now they want citizenship and all the rights that come with this new status, because they currently feel discriminated [Tufyal Choudhury, 2007]⁷.

There are approximately 15 million immigrants of Muslim religion, namely 3% of the population of the European Union (3 to 13% in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Belgium, The Netherlands, Greece and Bulgaria and 1% in Spain, Italy, Denmark, Finland and Sweden) [Samir Amghar, Amel Boubekur, Michel Emerson, 2007]⁸. Yearning for citizenship and a home in the states they work, Muslim immigrants have built over 6000 mosques, especially in Turkey, Algeria and Morocco, with the help of their states of origin, and form relatively compact communities, especially in the capitals of the respective states and in big cities. Thus, in Brussels, approximately 17% of the population is of Muslim origin, Paris has become a big Maghreb Islamic centre, London is often named Londonstan [Niță Dan-Laurențiu, 2005]⁹, and in Munich there is a big Turkish community. The involvement of some Muslim immigrants in terrorist actions and organised crime [Niță Dan-Laurențiu, 2005]¹⁰ has increased the reaction of rejection towards immigrants on the part of the extremist groups and even ordinary people from the host-countries.

While Muslim immigrants feel they are discriminated by the governments and population in host countries, their leaders, especially the religious ones, promote self-discrimination through the obligation to rigorously observe the precepts of the Koran, which, in some aspects, contravene the universal provisions of the human rights and the legislations of the states they live in. For instance, the obligation not to eat meat from Jews and Christians, under the pretext of not being cooked in accordance with the Muslim tradition, the obligation for Muslim girls and women to wear a scarf or kerchief and the interdiction of attending schools or getting a job for the Muslim women have aroused big controversies. The behaviour of some Muslim immigrants, associated with the involvement of some of them in the training of terrorists in training camps and mosques in Europe [Niță Dan-Laurențiu, 2005]¹¹, as well as with the tendency for radicalisation of their attitude in the relations with the local population have all contributed to the widening of the existing gap and the appearance of new dissensions.

Globalisation, overcrowding [Robert Shapiro, 2008]¹², computerisation and crises – in the fields of economy, finances, energy, environ-



ment, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc. – influence our lives decisively. Globalisation and computerisation push the limits of human knowledge towards new horizons; however, they also have the germs of the crises that, unless predicted and noticed in due time, can jeopardise not only the accomplishments but also the credibility of the concepts and processes that develop based on them.

In time of crisis, the behaviour of most people is dominated by the desire to survive, case in which selfishness, fear and suspicion amplify and influence the interpersonal and intercommunity relations. Consequently, the manifestations, both individual and collective ones (local communities, states, alliances, etc.), are characterised by restrictions, limitation in the interpersonal/intercommunity relations and distrust, which all lead to tensions and, finally, to conflicts.

In the circumstances of the almost explosive increase in the population in certain areas of the Earth and of the continuous reduction of the resources that are indispensable for the physical existence of human beings – drinking water and food – as well as of the ones that are necessary for a decent living standard – energy, mineral resources, arable land, etc. – the probability for conflicts to occur, both at the individual and the community level, is increasing. Adding the continuous environmental degradation – because of pollution and global warming – to the succinct picture of the physical conditions for humankind existence, we notice that there are enough factors that can stimulate confrontations, both at the conceptual (ideological) and at the physical level. A suggestive and pessimistic, at the same time, description of the world after the *Cold War* was made by the former Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency during the Clinton Administration – R. James Woolsey Jr., who stated that the United States struggled with a large dragon for 45 years, killed it and then found themselves in jungle full of poisonous snakes [Tim Weiner, 2009]¹³.

A perspective as pessimistic as Woolsey's description points out that the main actor of this world – the human being – pays a big contribution to establishing the main characteristics of the current security situation, because he/she appears to be inclined to confrontation by his/her very nature [Claude Karnoough, 1999]¹⁴. The same pessimistic perspective is



shared by Professor Buzan, who reckoned that “*states seem incapable of living together in harmony*” [Barry Buzan, 2000]¹⁵.

An argument in support of the above pessimistic perspectives is provided by the former UN Secretary General – B. B. Ghali, who appreciated: “*there is no democracy at the international level ... because states are not equal ... and there are many differences between them from the standpoint of their geographical dimensions, population, economic and military power, moral qualities, etc...*” [Boutros Boutros Ghali, 2006]¹⁶. Another argument in line with the pessimistic perspective of the tendencies of evolution of international security is the way the concept of security is understood by many political leaders and experts, who believe that security stems from power and, thus, they favour the solution of settling international relations by means of force.

3. What is the solution to eliminate confrontations?

In our opinion, tensioned states and even interpersonal conflicts will exist as long as people will exist. However, we believe that it is possible for their evolution towards physical acts of violence that destroy material and spiritual assets and produce human losses to be avoided. The solution – universal peace – is not new, it has been suggested by many thinkers, in different stages of the humankind evolution, one of the most famous and recent ones being the German philosopher Immanuel Kant. In *Perpetual Peace* [Immanuel Kant, 1795]¹⁷, he advocated for the establishment of permanent peace through a free states union in which democracy and the rule of law should have represented a link keeping them united. The interaction of the union with other states should have led to the promotion of the model and, then, to the gradual expansion of the federation and, implicitly, worldwide peace.

Kant’s ideas seemed to have stimulated some of the thinkers of our time, who suggested the gradual accomplishment of world peace through the concept of cooperative security [Richard Cohen, Michael Mihalka, 2001]¹⁸. In their vision, peace can be accomplished only if there is security, first at the national level, then at the level of the democratic states alliances. Subsequently, the democratic states alliances promote



cooperation and partnership relations with neighbouring states and sign collective defence agreements with them. The states that take part in collective defence agreements promote good neighbourhood relations with the states in which there are tensions and frozen conflicts, with the purpose of promoting stability and eliminating the causes and sources of conflict. As the number of democratic states increases and the internal and external tensions and conflicts within the groups of states participating in collective defence and, respectively, the area of promoting stability are eliminated, these states are included in the areas of collective defence and security, until collective security and, implicitly, worldwide peace are ensured.

In the past, and in the present as well, the numerous initiatives for establishing world peace have failed because of the numerous barriers that have been raised politically, economically, socially, psychologically, etc. by the beneficiaries themselves – the human beings. The causes for the unsuccessful outcome of world peace are multiple, but they have a common dominant feature – the selfish, individual or collective, interest expressed through the dictum that has governed international relations “*states have no friends, only interests*”. At the individual level, this way of thinking translated through the cynical “*Where one feels good, there is one’s homeland*”, generating the migration of people from overcrowded, underdeveloped areas, with insufficient resources, to areas that have resources and the density of the population is lower.

The migration of people has had both positive and negative influences on security at the local and international level. The positive influence consists in providing the necessary workforce for the production of assets and services in the states with a low birth rate, aged population and negative indigenous population growth. The negative influence of migration on security derives from the immigrant communities’ tendency of autonomy, which is contrary to the norms of international law regarding sovereignty. Moreover, immigrants – both legal and illegal ones – are in competition with local population for workplaces and resources necessary for survival and a better living standard. Competition has existed within human communities as well as in the relations between them, because it is a “*development engine*”, yet, at



the same time, competition divides us between winners and losers. The Olympic motto “*It is not whether you win or lose. It is how you play the game*” seems to have a more reduced audience, because more and more losers (re)discover the other side of/reason for competition – rivalry [Webster’s II New College Dictionary, 1995]¹⁹. As a consequence of this fact, the lost competition (for influence in international relations, for a position in the hierarchy of a company/organisation, etc.) leads too many times to resentment, which, in turn, triggers actions and decisions with bad consequences. Thus, people decide to take revenge on those whom they consider guilty of losing the competition in which they participated, some heads of state decide to procure weapons, weapons of mass destruction included, in order to become regional leaders and increase their influence in international relations, and some ethnic and religious communities leaders try to impose their point of view and increase their authority and fame through promoting and using extremist actions. Unfortunately, the competition understood as rivalry has led to extremism, terrorism, tensions, conflicts and even wars between states and groups of states. In this respect, the two world wars, the *Cold War* and the war on terror are the most eloquent examples.

Reassessing the causes – either declared or undeclared – of tensions, conflicts and wars between states, we have concluded that, besides the interests that separate us and generate competitions/rivalries, there is also the omission of paying proper attention to side effects that are associated with the processes of the world’s political and economic reorganisation. These processes, through their associated side effects, have produced “collateral damage” that, although unintended, gets bigger over time and nourishes individual and collective complaints and, consequently, leads to tensions, conflicts and even wars.

Globalisation and computerisation, which currently influence our existence the most, do not produce extremism, terrorism and organised crime, yet, there are people who believe they favour them [Richard Kugler, 2002]²⁰. This favouring must be understood as the indiscriminate dissemination of the products and facilities of globalisation and computerisation. In line with this conception, the access to globalisation and computerisation facilities is allowed to people who use them with the



purpose of developing the societies they are part of, as well as to terrorists, extremists and persons who have joined organised crime structures and use them for illegal purposes. The solution is not the limitation of the access to the benefits of globalisation and computerisation, because this may trigger another reason for conflict, through dividing the world between “the good” and “the bad”, respectively between “us” and “them”, etc. The solution is identifying the reason that determines some people to choose the path of extremism, terrorism and organised crime, through direct dialogue, without intermediaries, because these may distort the messages. Establishing a direct dialogue is not tantamount to the recognition of an official status for extremist (terrorist, organised crime) organisations or for their leaders. The direct dialogue is the way to identify the solution (solutions) for the existing problems and that, in order to be viable and accepted by both parts, involves **negotiations**.

*A better understanding between the parties is possible through negotiation, especially of the arguments that support their propositions. Thus, the divergent point of views can be identified and solutions can be sought in order to harmonise the positions and interests. Following the finalisation of the solutions, the treaties/agreements are signed and the ways of **cooperation** throughout implementation are established. In case new tensions or disagreements occur during the implementation of the treaties/agreements, the negotiations must be resumed so that the deadlock can be broken and the cooperation can be restarted.*

Negotiation and cooperation must be permanent, because it is only in this way that the interests of the parties are harmonised or, at least, a solid basis is established for reciprocally increasing trust, changing the attitude of hostility with the one of good neighbourhood and enduring security.

In order to determine an opponent to quit enmity (hostility, violent confrontation), one must know what determines him/her to have such an attitude and what may persuade him/her to chose the path of a peaceful cohabitation). The solution to physically exterminate the enemy, used for too many times in the past and which is still rather widely used at present is, in our opinion, one of the least recommended. By killing the enemies, it is opened the door to conflicts that generate themselves by

a desire for revenge, still existing in the tradition of some ethnic and religious communities. This tradition forces the relatives, and sometimes other persons that are close to those who are killed in battle (friends, acquaintances, coreligionists, etc.) to apply the law of retaliation to the ones that killed their relatives (friends, coreligionists). When terrorist (extremist) actions, resulting in deaths, are carried out in the name of religion, then the impact on the community of the dead ones will be even higher, because there is the risk that they may become martyrs. Martyrdom is widely used by terrorist and extremist groups in order to motivate their fighters and increase the number of proponents and followers.

Choosing the way of action in order to achieve the purpose – **universal peace** – depends on very numerous factors, whose importance is different and which must be carefully assessed before a decision is made, in order to avoid compromising the success. At the same time, more courage is needed for giving up the solutions that have proved to be unfeasible but are still applied in the regulation of the relations between states.

Successful negotiation can be achieved only if negotiators are consistent and firm in the pursuit of the desired purpose, as well as receptive to the proposals coming from the other party/the other parties. The achieved peace will be enduring only if states and communities will permanently cooperate and the relations between them will be characterised by mutual respect.

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2 I. Berg, *Dicționar de cuvinte, expresii, citate celebre*, Editura Vestala, București, 2004, p. 198.

3 Expression attributed to Frederick II, the Great, King of Prussia.

4 xxx, *The Gospel of Matthew*, 26, 51-52.

5 Marin Mirea, *Maxime Militare*, Editura Militară, București, 1973, p. 77.

6 Francois Bluche, *De la Cezar la Churchill*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1995, p. 271.



7 Tufyal Choudhury, *Muslims and Discrimination*, in *European Islam – Challenges for Public Policy and Society*, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2007, pp. 77-107.

8 Samir Amghar, Amel Boubekur, Michael Emerson, *Introduction to European Islam – Challenges for Public Policy and Society*, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2007, pp. 1-3.

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10 Niță Dan-Laurențiu, *op.cit.*, pp. 115-116.

11 *Ibidem*.

12 Robert Shapiro, *Futurecast. How Superpowers, Populations and Globalization Will Change the Way We Live and Work*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2008.

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THE EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN THE COAGULATION AND CENTRIFUGAL TENDENCIES

*Georgeta CHIRLEȘAN, PhD,
Senior Lecturer, University of Pitești*

A summary of the evolutions of the European foreign and security policy is presented, focusing on the latest tendencies of “turbine driven effect” triggered by the actions of some of the Member States, performed on their own behalf.

The initiatives which have led to the CFSP coagulation, the critical moments and the current challenges are succinctly rendered. Two case studies exemplifying the centrifugal impact of some actions which do not converge with the CFSP are presented in the last part.

I. EU’s Foreign Policy – historical becoming. Materialization in CFSP

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union is one of the European Union’s foreign affairs instruments. The legislative basis of CFSP on a European level is laid by the Treaty of Maastricht on the European Union.

Along the European integration history, the concepts of political union, common foreign and security policy have been periodically debated, a gradual transfer of powers and competencies acting on them, starting with 1970. Since then, two important acts have been adopted, which gave a boost to the CFSP’s development: Treaty on European Union¹ and Treaty of Amsterdam². New changes were subsequently brought by the Treaty of Nice (2001).

We cannot analyze the historical becoming of the EU’s foreign policy and its materialization in CFSP without discussing the “Maastricht



moment's" previous evolution, i.e., from the period since Pleven Plan (1950) to the Single European Act (1987). The importance of the period lies in its favouring the appearance of the coagulation centres, thus initiating the formation process of what subsequently became CFSP. The important moments which marked this period were:

1950: Pleven Plan – whose aim was the creation of a single European army³.

1961: Fouchet Plan – which aimed at setting up a common foreign and security policy⁴.

1970: Davignon Report – considered the starting point of the European Political Community⁵.

1974: Setting up the European Council – which contributed to a better coordination of the European Political Community (EPC), thanks to the role which was conferred to the Heads of States or Governments in the general orientation of community policy.

1981: Report from London – which consecrated the presence to the commission on all the levels of political cooperation and established a crisis procedure.

1985: Dooge Commission Report – which contained a number of proposals referring to the foreign policy.

1987: Single European Act.

The provisions of the Single European Act established the institutional basis of EPC. The EPC's objectives were extended to all the aspects of foreign policy of general interest, and with the coming into force of the Single European Act in 1987, after 17 years after its launching, EPC obtained the legal running basis.

The Treaty on European Union – Maastricht 1992

The moment of CFSP's appearance is the beginning of the 90s, when against the background of the end of Cold War, the Germany reunification and of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, the Member States finally decided to make this step. The Treaty on EU introduced CFSP through Title V, as the second pillar of the EU, which involves the inter-governmental cooperation among the Member States. CFSP



is constituted on a separate pillar, due to its way of operating, its inter-governmental nature and its consensus' need in the co-decision procedures.

Article 11 of the Treaty of Maastricht stipulates five great objectives:

- to defend the common values and the fundamental interests of the Union;
- to consolidate the Union's security;
- to maintain peace and to consolidate the international security;
- to promote the international cooperation;
- to develop the democracy and the state of law, the Human Rights included.

These objectives are to be accomplished through the specific legal instruments:

- common position*: which requires the Member States to implement the national policies so that to respect the position defined by EU on a specific issue;
- common actions*: which are operational operations of the Member States under the auspices of the CFSP.

According to the Treaty of Maastricht, CFSP “will include all the issues related to the Union's security, inclusively the progressive conceiving of a common defence framework” (Article J.4).

The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997)

CFSP reform in the Treaty of Amsterdam represented a special emergency case, as the result of the desegregation of the former Yugoslavia, of the tragic conditions over there, which rendered obvious how vital was for the Union to rather be able to act and to prevent than to react only.

The Treaty of Amsterdam added a new instrument of foreign policy to the already existing ones (common actions and common positions), i.e. *common strategies*.



The European Council defines by consensus common strategies in the fields in which the Member States have common important interests. *A common strategy* states the objectives, the duration and the available means for the Union and Member States. It forms the general action framework under those three pillars, which assures the consistency in the foreign affairs and qualifies the Council to implement common strategies through common actions and positions.

The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced the role of *the High Representative for the CFSP*, who occupies the position of Secretary-General of the Council. This one assists the Council in the issues related to CFSP contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of the decisions.

A new element of the Treaty is represented by *the policy planning and early warning unit* which is under the authority of the High Representative for CFSP, whose role is to support the EU in having efficient and more synergic reactions. This new element makes the Member States work together on the logistic level and therefore having a more prominent role on the international arena.

The Treaty of Nice (2001)

Through this treaty, *the increased cooperation* became possible in implementing the common actions and positions related to issues but which lack any sort of military or defence involvements.

On institutional level, the Treaty of Nice consolidates the role of the *Political and Security Committee* (PSC – the new name given by the Treaty to the political committee), which represents a political and military committee permanently responsible for the autonomous and operational policy of Union's defence.

The Treaty of Nice decided the setting up of the:

- European Union Military Committee (EUMC) – charged with advising the Political and Security Committee and giving military recommendations on the military issues within EU⁶.
- EU Military Cadres – implements the decisions and the



policies of the Military Committee and becomes thus the EU source for military expertise.

II. European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – complement of CFSP

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has as objective to allow the Union to develop its civil and military capacities of crisis management and preventing the conflicts on international level.

ESDP has two distinct features: it is *collective* and constitutes a *process*.

The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) was the first one to comprise provisions regarding the EU's responsibility in terms of security and the eventuality of a common defence policy. As a consequence of the Treaty of Amsterdam's coming into force (1999), new missions were included in the Treaty on EU (Title V): humanitarian and evacuation, peacekeeping, as well as the battle forces for crisis management, inclusively the mission of peace reestablishment⁷. Putting into practice the ESDP is done with the help of some CFSP actors and instruments⁸.

The European Constitution, non-ratified, clearly indicates the objective of putting into practice a real common European. It stipulates the application of Petersberg missions and the establishment of two provisions: a provision of mutual defence and another one of solidarity in case of a terrorist attack or a natural and human disaster. Formally, the missions ascribed to ESDP are defined through the three tasks from Petersberg which were adopted in 1992 by OEU and introduced in the EU Treaty:

- humanitarian and hostage evacuation missions;
- peacekeeping missions;
- crisis management and peacemaking operations.

European Council's adopting in December 2003 the European Security Strategy (ESS) contributed even more to the clarification of the ESDP objectives and of its role. The Petersberg missions were better defined in the Constitutional Treaty. Thus, the Constitution announces that ESDP must provide "*peacekeeping, conflict prevention, strengthening*



the international security”⁹. Consequently, the Constitution adds to the three Petersberg missions already stated in the present treaty (the constitutional one) other four. Thus, ESDP includes the following seven fields:

- humanitarian and evacuation missions;
- peacekeeping missions;
- battle force missions for crisis management;
- disarmament missions;
- military assistance and counselling missions;
- conflict prevention missions;
- stabilization operations at the end of the conflicts.

The articles of the Treaty on EU that refer to CFSP (which includes ESDP) stipulate as a foreign action of the European Union, besides the fact that it defends the European interests and values, the promotion of *Human Rights, international cooperation, development and democracy in the world*. Therefore, one can conclude that the ESDP missions should always be accomplished from this perspective.

III. CFSP – specificities and forms of implementation

With the enlargement of the EU, it intensified the efforts regarding its international role as a diplomatic actor and the security according to its present economic power. The conflicts which occurred in the south-east of Europe in '90s after the Yugoslavia's disintegration convinced the EU leaders of the need of efficient common actions. Recently, the fight against international terrorism has consolidated this belief.

The CFSP's ways of implementation are complex, including actions that aim not only the diplomatic, strategic and military relations scope but also the economic, humanitarian, financial field. These ways of implementation are succinctly presented:

- Reducing human and economic costs through anticipation and prevention of conflicts¹⁰.
- Increasing the level of the poor countries through offering them technical and financial assistance¹¹, eradicating poverty in the context of the sustainable development, by improving the basic physical and social



infrastructures, the productive potential, as well as the consolidation of the states' democratic institutions.

- Offering humanitarian unconditioned assistance, through its specialized department called ECHO (over 700 billion euro annually).

- Using Euro as a currency in commercial transactions and as reserve currency of the countries around the world.

- Participating to globalization and interdependence.

- Taking over the international leadership within the limits of the global heating effects through Kyoto protocol (with the objective of reducing during 2008-2012 the values of carbon emission with 8% out of those ones existing in 1990, and those of the green warehouse effect with 20%).

- Reducing energetic consumptions, promoting renewable energy sources and the extension of the relations with the energy suppliers to the common benefit as commercial partners.

- Continuing the enlargement process of EU.

- Maintaining EU's close relations with the neighbours (Island, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland), openness towards the candidate and potentially candidate countries to the member status of the EU (Croatia, Turkey, Macedonia and Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia).

- Adopting in 2004 the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP¹²).

- Placing the connections with the USA in the centre of EU's foreign relations, sharing common values and, conjecturally, common interests.

- Intensifying the EU relations with international organizations (UN, NATO, Council of Europe) and with regional groups all over the world.

IV. Present stage and perspectives on short term

The last 15 years have been marked by the EU's efforts of adapting its political and security role to its increased economic and commercial power. The regional conflicts after 1989 and the fight against the



international terrorism made EU create diplomatic formal instruments and also instruments of intervention.

In this context, the issue was to convene on the level of authority regarding the vital aspects of the foreign and security policy which to be conferred on one side to the EU and to its institutions, and on the other side to the Member States. There has been established that the essential authority should remain in the power of the Member States, although the European Commission and, to a lesser extent, the European Parliament are associated to this process. The formula one agreed on still needs that the key decisions be taken by unanimous vote – which is very hard to accomplish in a Union with 27 members.

When formalizing the principles for a Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) through the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), the war has already started in the former Yugoslavia. The Union tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a diplomatic arrangement. Without a capacity of European intervention, the EU countries could only intervene as part of the ONU forces for peace maintaining and subsequently, under the USA command, as part of the NATO¹³. From the lesson learnt once with the conflicts in Balkans, the Union acted both on the diplomatic and security front.

In order to obtain a greater diplomatic visibility but also with the view to consolidate CFSP, EU made specific demarches such as:

- setting up the position of High Representative for CFSP;
- creating the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP);
- adopting the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003.

Other important aspects in this context are:

- Since 2005, the EU detains the command of the stabilization military forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR).

- In 2006, the Union took over the initiative when the NATO member states sent 7500 men, led by France and Italy, together with German naval units, in order to support NATO forces in the south of Lebanon after the fights between Hezbollah and the Israeli army.

- In May 2007, the EU decided to send a 3 years police mission in Afghanistan.

In order to offer credibility for the intervention capability, the EU identified a number of tasks that a military force can undertake,



including: humanitarian and rescue missions, peace maintaining, crisis management and even peacemaking missions. In order to implement these tasks, EU created a rapid reaction force whose military power will be gradually built along in some years.

In order to increase the promptitude of the EU's answer capacity to actions on short term, the Union implemented the concept of intervention groups made up of about 1500 man each. Two such intervention groups are permanently prepared and ready to intervene at any moment. Each of them can be mobilized in ten days after the European Union Council's request.

With CFSP and ESDF, the Union creates a political dimension which is added to its international role as a major commercial and economic power, but there is still a long way until the scale of these political dimensions will become clear. Despite the devotion to make CFSP a success, the member governments find sometimes difficult to change the national policies referring to a certain country or region on behalf of the EU's solidarity¹⁴. Although there is flexibility in the voting procedures on the decisions which aim CFSP, the unanimity is still necessary when decisions with military or defence involvements are taken.

V. Centrifugal Tendencies – risks for CFSP

V.1. The EU's foreign policy upset by national initiatives

Following the example of France and of president Sarkozy with EuroMed¹⁵ proposal, Poland and Sweden achieved an "Eastern Initiative" within a reunion on 26 May 2008, in a step the diplomats warned that it could ruin EU's efforts to build a common foreign policy.

Context:

ENP was launched in 2004, after the EU's largest wave of enlargement and it is applied to Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia at east, and it aims Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Jordan, Israel, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Lebanon at south. The European framework of the ENP is known under the name of Barcelona¹⁶ Process.



The Commission's attempt to consolidate the relations with the countries from the east and south through ENP has recently suffered a blow, when, on 26th of May 2008, Poland and Sweden¹⁷ presented the proposal "Eastern Initiative" within the reunion of the foreign affairs ministers.

Recently, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the European commissioner responsible with ENP, strove to bring EuroMed French proposal back within the Barcelona Process. "*Stupid examples are always contagious*", a diplomatic source stated, while a broadcaster from EurActiv disclosed that Ferrero-Waldner intended to take steps after the presentation of the initiative by Poland.

Positions and reactions:

Professor Jean-Michel de Waele, from Université Libre de Bruxelles, responsible of Centre d'études de la vie politique (CEVIPOL) stated for EurActiv that "*ENP has always been an empty cover*", as EU cannot develop an adequate policy with its neighbours before answering some basic questions related to its own future, its institutions and its geographical limits. He described the Polish initiative as "interesting", but he added that, as Sarkozy's Mediterranean initiative, it is "*empty, without necessary means, without contents and it rather cannot satisfy the countries which aim at becoming members than other partnerships*". De Waele also added that this kind of initiatives "*weak EU, because they are introduced by certain countries in a very selfish way*".

Amanda Akcakoca, a political analyst at European Policy Centre, stated for EurActiv that although the details of the Polish-Swedish initiatives are not known yet, and it is not a surprise that Poland has tried to lay greater stress on the Eastern dimension. There had previously been other Polish initiatives, when Jacek Sariusz-Wolski (now member of the European Parliament) was the Foreign Affairs Minister Akcakoca stated that the new Polish initiative seemed similar to Sarkozy's EuroMed initial similar proposal, though the latter was slowed down. She stated that these developments were "*bad news for ENP*" although the prospects for the new initiatives remain unclear.

Ukraine, for example, was not in the favour of this initiative, not wanting the EU perspective "*to be substituted by something else*".

V.2. Turkey – the permanent “hot egg”

Related to the Turkey’s way to reach the status of acceding country, we have drawn up some important landmarks.

In the ruling of the European Council dated 17th of December 2004, it:

- admits the significant legislative progress of Turkey in many fields, mentioning they must be consolidated and extended;
- takes note of the improvement in the stability and economic predictability of the country;
- admits increased independence and efficiency of the juridical system;
- mentions Turkey’s access to the most relevant international and European conventions in what regards human rights and fundamental liberties exercise.

On 29 June 2005, EC establishes the framework for Turkey’s adherence, and establishes the beginning date of these negotiations – 3rd of October 2005.

The negotiation background relies on the following elements:

- the objective of the negotiation discussions will be constituted by Turkey’s adherence, but the negotiations will be “*open*”, meaning that their results cannot be previously guaranteed;
- if, by the end of discussions, Turkey fails to fully accomplish all the obligations associated to the member quality according to criteria Copenhagen, EU Member States will further make sure that Ankara “*is completely anchored in the European structures through the strongest connection*”.
- the adherence negotiations will be achieved within an Inter-governmental Conference with the participation of Turkey and all the Member States. The policies will be divided into 35 *political areas*¹⁸ (or *chapters*) and the decisions will be taken by unanimity.
- EU may include *long periods of transition*, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent provisions of safeguarding in its proposals for each negotiation background.
- the negotiation discussions with the candidate countries whose



adherence could have substantial financial consequences (the case of Turkey) *can be signed only after 2014*, date which represents the deadline for establishing the new EU financial framework.

- the adherence negotiations can be suspended in case of a “*serious and persistent breach [...] of the principles of democracy, of the human rights respect, of the fundamental liberties and of the law state on which the Union is founded*”.

- under a formula of compromise accepted in December 2004 by the EU Council, until 3rd of October 2005 Turkey should have signed a protocol, in order to adapt the Treaty of Ankara from 1963 to the 10 new member states of the EU, inclusively to the *Greek Cypriot Government*. From a practical point of view, this would have meant an implicit recognition of this Government for the first time since the segregation of the island in 1974¹⁹.

Regarding the other key condition, Turkey adopted, on 1 June 2005, the new national reviewed penal code.

In Europe, the arguments related to Turkey’s possible adherence, grouped around all sorts of aspects, starting from the demographic to the geographical and political ones:

1. A common point very frequently rendered obvious is the following: when and if Turkey joins the EU, it will become *the most populated member State of the Union*²⁰.

2. Another argument with roots anchored in history is whether one can establish some *geographical borders* for Europe and if Turkey “enters” in these borders.

3. The most sensitive argument is that of *cultural and religious differences*. Since EU identifies itself as a cultural and religious mosaic which acknowledges and respects diversity, the supporters of Turkey’s adherence to EU consider that, as long as Turkey and EU Member States maintain this common vision, the religious and cultural differences are irrelevant.

4. The Member States’ concerns on the issues related to the *Turkey’s observance of the human rights* and of the regional and global security aspects constituted the key factors which were behind a prolonged process of negotiation.

5. *The future of the divided island of Cyprus* was also a major blocking point. Cyprus is a decisive factor in the negotiation process. Cyprus requests official recognition by Turkey and access to the Turkish harbours and airports. Turkey asks for an end to the isolation of Northern Cyprus and stresses out that the Greek part of the island was the one which had rejected the UN plan in 2004.

The results of the Referendum on EU's Constitution during the first half of 2005, especially the negative votes of France and the Netherlands, proved to be to the *Turkey's offer detriment to become a member state*.

The subsequent studies could not reveal that enlargement in general and Turkey's candidature in particular were the factors behind the public rejection of the European Constitution, in the summer of 2005 there has been noticed *an increase of skepticism* along Europe related to *Turkey's European perspectives*.

Turkey further needs progress in the freedom of expression field. More precisely, EU requests a reform of Turkey's Penal Code and of the controversial article 301²¹ which served as a basis for the so-called cases of *turkishness* against writers and journalists.

With the parliamentary elections in Turkey in 2007 and with the decline of the internal support for Turkey's adherence, the issues seem to become more and more difficult to be settled. Turkey's citizens are more and more tired with the negotiation process. A Eurobarometer survey has recently shown that only 44% of the Turks still consider the becoming an EU member represents a good thing, comparatively with 66% in 2005. Also, the study carried by the German Marshall Fund of the USA, published in June 2007, confirms this tendency. The Turkish politicians make more and more use of this feeling, especially regarding the next elections. An expression of this fact is the criticism expressed by the public related to the Pope Benedict's comments on Islam in September 2006.

Germany, the one that detained the presidency of the EU starting with 01.01.2007, is extremely critical on the Turkey's adherence. The Christian-Democrat Leader, Angela Merkel, said: "*Turkey's adherence – it's one way street*". Turkey must accomplish criteria. The Christian-Democrat Party in Germany (which is governing) rejects Turkey's



adherence and prefers to offer it a “*privileged partnership*” instead of a partnership with EU. However, Turkey remains the most important economic and commercial partner of the EU. The volume of the bilateral commercial exchanges reaches 14 billion euro annually, doubled in the last ten years. Almost 14% of the Turkey’s exports go to Germany while 17% of Germany’s exports go to Turkey. There are 1100 German companies that operate in Turkey at present and over 3 million German tourists who visit Turkey every year. There are estimates that 2,5 million of Turks live in Germany, out of which 600.000 have already become German citizens.

Great Britain remains a strong supporter of Turkey’s adherence. The British Secretary for foreign policy, David Miliband, said in September 2007 that the EU “*needs, as a well-defined purpose, Turkey’s inclusion as a full member*”. Turkey is an important commercial partner for Great Britain. In 2002, Great Britain was on the third place as volume of Turkey’s exports and on the sixth place as a source of imports. The total bilateral commercial balance reached a level of 3,7 billion pounds.

France, which together with Austria, requested the initiation of a referendum regarding Turkey’s adherence, becomes more and more skeptical on this issue. While Jacques Chirac manifested himself verbally as a supporter of Ankara’s ambitions, the referendum on the EU Constitution revealed the reserves of the French public related to this issue. The new elected president, Nicholas Sarkozy, opposes firmly to Turkey’s adherence. He said that the European Union was not only an idea but it must also be seen as a geographical entity, ending the discussions related to Turkey’s adherence. Sarkozy also added that the EU had better suspend negotiations with Turkey and offer a “*privileged partnership*”. In 1998, France and Turkey signed a plan of action which introduces a strategic dimension of the French-Turkish relationships. The French companies are listed as the largest investors in Turkey, even if France is only on the fifth place as the total volume of foreign investments in Turkey. In 2002, Turkey exported to France a value of 2,12 billion USD while it imported from France a total value of 1,76 billion USD. France is considered the fourth tourists provider for Turkey. Meanwhile, the strong anti-Islamic right wing strongly advanced on

the French political scene – in concordance with the public's increase reluctance to admitting new members in the EU club of those 15.

The European Commission's president, Jose Manuel Barroso answered Sarkozy's remarks saying: *"The adherence negotiations with Turkey take place on the basis of a mandate attributed unanimously by the EU's member states"*. He added: *"If one – or more – member states want to modify this mandate, it's up to them to try to modify it but at the same time to accept the consequences"*. Barroso mentioned that these negotiations must continue: *"it's the Commission's opinion that we must continue the negotiations, and that is why we recommend to the member states that they shouldn't take any final decision until the end of negotiations"*.

Greece, Turkey's traditional enemy, became actually a flag holder for Turkey's adherence. According to Athens, it's better to have Turkey inside the club than outside. *"We simply believe that if and especially when Turkey becomes EU member, it will be obliged to observe its rules and values. This will solve by itself most of our problems"*, stated the Greek's former Minister of Defence - Yannis Papantoniou. The governing of the Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis continues with the same graceful approach.

Poland is worried that as soon as Turkey becomes an EU member, it will use massive financing, as it is a too big country to be "swollen" by EU. However, Warsaw expresses continuously its support for Turkey's adherence.

The Prime Minister of Luxemburg, Jean-Claude Juncker, said that *"It should be possible for us (EU) to introduce different adherence treaties for the new members"*. He added: *"Not all the member states must go together and incorporate, with the same intensity, EU's policies. I think that if we go towards 35 – 40 member states, EU should define a new intensity form of partnerships"*.

Turkey counts as key-ally for the USA, and Washington believes that EU should accept this Mediterranean Muslim big nation as a full member.

For the USA, Turkey's adherence will generate a stable model established for the whole Islamic world.

The president of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, said clearly that the EU remains connected to its commitments regarding Turkey, but it also rendered obvious the fact that the large European public's concerns about the partnership with Turkey could not be ignored. *"The signals sent by the electorate must be seriously discussed"*, he said. Finally, the European Commission announced its intention of starting a dialogue of the civil society in the member states about the EU enlargement in general and about Turkey's adherence in particular. In 2006, about 40 million euros were used for financing this project. On the 25th of September 2006, the President of the Commission claimed a "break of enlargement" after Romania and Bulgaria joined EU. He stated: *"I do not think it would be wise to continue with the enlargement before solving Europe's constitutional problem"*.

VI. Conclusions

Given the diversity and complexity of European construction, more than 50 years needed to pass for the European Union to get to a coherent and pragmatic approach on foreign policy plan.

However, the situation is far to be completely defined, a series of disturbing factors acting centrifugally on CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy). Among them, the most important is that of the constitutionality crisis crossed over by EU at present, adding the individual initiatives of some Member States in the foreign policy field, not always coherent and completely in harmony with CFSP.

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3) *Traite établissant une Constitution pour l'Europe*, art.I-16, I-17



and I-18, <http://constitution-europeenne.info/texte.htm>

4) *The EU in the world - The foreign policy of the European Union*, European Commission - Directorate-General for Communication, Manuscript completed in June 2007

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6) Joëlle le MORZELLE, *Defense européenne*, <http://www.cremoc.org/articles/defense-euro2001.pdf>

7) *La politique européenne de sécurité et de défense* (PESD), <http://www.euractiv.com/fr/securite/politique-europeenne-securite-defense-pesd/article-120304>

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9) *Working together: The European Neighbourhood Policy*, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, ISBN 92-894-8346-6, 2007

10) Key institutional decisions in the field of external energy policy, European Communities, Printed in Belgium, 2007

11) Common Foreign & Security Policy (CFSP), http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm

NOTES:

1 Treaty on European Union (1992), with Title V: Provisions regarding CFSP (second pillar of EU).

2 Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), which consolidates the decision procedures and instruments.

3 The Plan was a negotiation issue among the six members of the European Coal and Steel Community starting with 1950 to 1952 and led to the signing of the Treaty of European Defence Community. The project was ratified in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. In France, it was deleted from the agenda of the National Meeting in 1954. Transmitting the rights of military decision to a supranational authority and treating Germany as equal partner were the reasons brought by France to justify the ratification failure. Corollary to this, the European Defence Community was a political project, presented in 1953, through which one proposed the creation of a Political European Community, it was to have powers and responsibilities extremely extended and to absorb the



European Defence Community. The project has never become reality.

4 At the beginning of 1961, the Heads of States or Governments from the member states of the European Community agreed on creating a framework of political cooperation on a community level. In order to outline this ambitious project, there was set up a committee of experts presided over by Christian Fouchet, charged with elaborating a plan on this purpose. In April 1962, the project was abandoned because of the blocking of the first negotiations regarding the creation of a European political union, challenged by the lack of an agreement on Fouchet Plan.

5 On the occasion of the Luxemburg summit, organised in December 1969, the Heads of States or Government decided “to study the best way of achieving the progress in the political unification field”. The mission was trusted to a Belgian High Clerk E. Davignon, in order to draw up a report. Davignon report was adopted by the Foreign Affairs Ministers in October 1970 and it was completed by other reports. It constituted the basis of the European Political Community (EPC) till the coming into force of the Single European Act.

6 EUMC represents the highest military forum established within the Council.

7 The missions called from Petersburg.

8 We refer here to military bodies in EU such as Eurocorps, Eurofor & Euromarfor, European Air Group (AEG), Occidental Europe Union (OEU) and the tactic groups in EU.

9 *See Traite établissant une Constitution pour l'Europe, art.I-16, I-17, and I-18, on <http://constitution-europeenne.info/texte.htm>*

10 According to statistics, since 1990, over 4 million people died in conflicts all over the world (90% of the victims being civil ones). The costs of international community for managing the biggest seven conflicts which appeared in 1990 till today have reached 200 billion euro, a sum which could have been used on peaceful purposes.

11 Over 1 billion people live with 1 euro a day or less. One third of them live in sub-Saharan Africa. EU provides at present 56% out of the assistance for official development offered by the big industrialized countries. In 2006, the value was 47 billion euro – almost 100 euro per citizen, comparatively with 53 euro per citizen on the part of the USA and 69 euro per citizen on the part of Japan. For 2006, the ONU target was 0,7% out of GDP, but one reached a value of only 0,42%. Only four EU countries – Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden reached (and even exceeded) this target. EU established a deadline for reaching this common target of 0,7% in 2015, with an intermediary target of 0,6% for 2010. The African countries receive 15 billion euro annually, the highest percentage of the whole development assistance given by EU.



REGIONAL STABILITY AND SECURITY

12 ENP covers all the Mediterranean and East-European countries, plus Caucasus, but not Russia.

13 How they proceeded in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

14 This difficulty has already been remarked and can be exemplified through the division of the EU Member States on the issue of granting or not support to the war led by Americans in Iraq.

15 EuroMed or Mediterranean Union: union of countries aiming the economic development, political stability, social prosperity and cultural flourishing. Although this one will include members of EU, it will be a separate body – which will have a special relation with EU, and possibly a similar structure, but different and interdependent.

16 Launched in 1995, this one is applied to England, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.

17 Poland and Sweden intend to intensify the relations with Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and possibly Belarus.

18 More than ever.

19 The Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that *“the adaptation of this protocol doesn’t mean at all the recognition, and I have mentioned it in written form”*. The agreement didn’t include Ankara’s promise that the protocol could be ratified by the Turkish Parliament before October 2005.

20 Having a population of 71 million inhabitants which is foreseen to increase to 80-85 millions during the next 20 years, Turkey becomes comparable with the present member state which has the largest population – Germany (83 million inhabitants at present) but the estimations show a decrease of population to 80 million until 2010.

21 Controversial article of Turkey’s Penal Code, came into force on 1 June 2005, it was introduced as part of a package of criminal laws in the reform process which preceded the opening of the adherence negotiations with Turkey, with the view to its meeting the EU standards. Before the article amending on 30 April 2008, one used for “crime” any insult to the *“turkishness” address*.

DIMENSIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BORDERS – CITIZENSHIP – SECURITY

*Alexandra SARCINSCHI, PhD,
Senior Researcher, Center for Defence and Security Strategic Studies,
National Defence University “Carol I”*

Security is a concept that can not be analyzed outside of a system including geographical, legal and psychosocial boundaries. Each person is part of a group that delimits itself from others by real or symbolic boundaries. Thus, we can not argue on security without referring, even briefly, to the issues of borders and citizenship. The relationship between these three concepts is very complex due to the fact that borders and citizenship are parts of the dichotomy between objective and subjective security; they are elements of a social reality aimed to enhance the degree of perceived security. In the same time, the objective conditions change together with the evolution of the national and international security environment, making more difficult the correlation between individual, group, states and groups of states' security needs with existing policies.

The psychosocial dimension of the relationship between borders, citizenship and security

The border control is a basic activity of the states. They have the monopoly on establishing the categories of persons and goods allowed to enter their territory. Still, the issue of frontiers as delimitation of a nation's mental map is more profound. Unlike the borders between states, frontiers are in fact intermediary zones of contact between different cultures or political systems. They have mainly a symbolic meaning and they are not legally defined.

The systematization and the itemization of these two concepts occurred during the 20th century, when the distinction between

linear concept of border and the frontier as a continuum process was introduced. Also, there are some other similar concepts, especially in the Romanian language, such as social border/frontier, symbolic border/frontier, mental geography, etc. Still, regardless the chosen concept, it represents an expression of the fundamental human needs to define a security and stability collective identity.

This paper will use the concept of *borders* in its most comprehensive approach by including a psychosocial dimension that is similar to the one belonging to the concept of *frontier*. We choose this approach due to the fact that each line of demarcation, both legal or geographical and symbolic or imaginary, creates different status and roles both in the objective and subjective dimensions of existence.

The process of theoretically defining borders/frontiers is very difficult. One of the main reasons is that the European scientific community uses different meanings than the American one (in Europe, border and frontier are synonyms, but in USA, the border designates the delimitation between American states)¹. Another reason is the




Fig. no. 1: Defining borders/frontiers



complexity of history. The first historically attested states had vague borders/frontiers without a firm political control; if the law removed this imprecision, the theory perpetuated it.

We argue that the definition of border/frontier, regardless the historical context and the theoretical approach we choose, is made according to the distinction between “us” and “the others” whether or not we are talking about states or individuals. This idea is possible to be illustrated by the figure no. 1.

The definition based on alterity is the direct result of group based humane existence. Since the individual is part of a group, he or she is creating specific images of both the group of affiliation and the other groups. The social comparison is achieved by socialization and social influence and the image on himself/herself is not possible without having an attitude on what is different. There is a new element of interference – the stereotype. The process of creating stereotypes determines the perception on a person and his/her psychosocial representation to carry the attributes specific to the category to which him/her belongs: sex, race, nationality, ethnicity, etc.²

We have individual strategies regarding the group of affiliation (us) and the other groups (the others), but they are not always possible especially when we are dealing with relatively fixed borders/frontiers. This is the case for many ethnic, religious and even national groups where possible strategies are the one based on social comparisons from which results a favourable image on the group of belonging and a negative image on “the others”.

The implications of this theory on security are obvious. Ethnical, religious and national differences are the sources of many security challenges. For instance, the issue of migrants as actors of security and borders/frontiers processes is to be studied in the framework of the alterity theory. The negative image, which citizens of the destination country (us) have on new arrived (the others) who “invade” and “threat” their communities, is often a source of tensions between people and they might extend to the level of governments and states.

Theory of alterity is to be used not only in the study of borders/frontiers, but also in the study of citizenship. Citizenship is the result

of defining borders/frontiers and finds its meanings in the law. As a juridical concept, it creates a community that includes and protects all the individuals belonging to the same normative system, often inside specific borders/frontiers. The creation of a community involves an antithetical mechanism that defines the cluster of the excluded ones, of “the others”.³

The last decades recorded an obvious gap between theory of citizenship and the practice of citizenship even if we are arguing on formal and fundamental citizenship or political discourse based citizenship and legal based one. As the debates on citizenship are developing, the social, economic and political processes related to it are being restrained. Citizenship is being eroded as the result of the profound global insecurity, but this is also a catalyst for insecurity at all of its levels and dimensions. Thus, citizenship becomes a subject for security analysis both in its national form, which creates premises for social exclusion, and in its European form, which formally promotes social inclusion. This is another dimension of the distinction between “us” and “the others”, in-group and out-group, inside and outside borders/frontiers, as framework for defining our existence and perceiving and psychosocial representing security.

II. Political, economic, social and military dimensions

State is the most important and the first generator of borders/frontiers and citizenship in the form that exists in our days. Also, state is a central element of the political dimension of security. The most important imperative of the state to achieve and preserve national security is dependent both on maintaining integrity of its borders/frontiers and on fulfilling its citizens’ security. Thus, we can not analyze the impact of borders/frontiers and citizenship on political dimension of security without studying the role of the state in this equation.

The neorealist approach on security is based on the premise of existing similarities between state’s interests and individual’s interests, assimilating security with citizenship. Security is ensured by the status of citizen and insecurity is generated by “the others”, by the citizens

of other states.⁴ Still, this approach is not that comprehensive. The individual centered analysis shows that in many cases the individual interests are in contradiction with state's security policy and the simply belonging to a space between specific borders/frontiers does not answer to the entire suite of human security needs.

The political dimension of the relationship between borders, citizenship and security refers especially to the migration policies of the various states. They allow after a short or long term the integration of immigrants as citizens, facilitate or not their involvement in the local decision making process and offer or not facilities related to the right to work.

A 2008 Foreign Policy analysis identifies the developed states that support integration of immigrants who seek for better working and living conditions.⁵ This analysis is published in a time of strengthened border security and rougher rules and regulation on obtaining citizenship.




Fig. no. 2: Rate of immigrants from total population⁶



Instead, those five countries studied by FP experts – Ireland, Spain, Canada, Israel and New Zealand – are the best examples of supporters of the free movement, even if three of them are not members of the most important organization that argues for the freedom of movement – EU.

A similar situation is recorded in the USA where the economy seems to become more and more dependent on foreign labour force in the next 10 or 20 years. According to American statistics, there is a birth every 7 seconds, a death every 12 seconds and an immigrant arrival every 33 seconds.⁷

The Pew Center for Research for the People and the Press argues that the foreign labour force will rise from 15% from total in 2005 to 23% in 2050.⁸ Also, in 2050, 19% of the Americans will be born abroad; the number of Hispanic residents will reach 29% from total population (from 14% in 2005), and the number of Asian-Americans will rise from 5% in 2005 to 9%. Immigration will trigger a rise of 82% of the USA population, meaning 117 millions inhabitants out of which 67 millions new immigrants and 50 millions inhabitants of second and third generation. Regarding US Government policy on immigration, at the beginning of 2009, the Pentagon announced a new direction for the human resources policy: temporary immigrants who enroll in the military will receive American citizenship in six months.⁹ Until now, only the immigrants with permanent residence rights were eligible for enrolment, but the new policy will open the military to temporary immigrants who have lived in USA for at least 2 years. The American military experts expect temporary immigrants to have a higher degree of education, including foreign languages, and a better professional training than the largest part of the American citizens being recruited. They will fill in the gaps existing in medical assistance, translation and analysis of information.¹⁰

It is obvious that these trends in the political dimension of security influence both the *economic and social dimensions*; the issues of borders/frontiers and citizenship are also influencing these two dimensions. From the cases above appears that states might have economic and social advantages by opening their borders to the foreign labour force.



The economic advantages are expressed through increased productivity and higher gross domestic product in the destination countries, but also through entries into countries of origin of capital flows that increase, to some extent, the gross domestic product and the standard of living of migrants' families and communities they originate. Unfortunately, the same phenomenon might have negative economic consequences in that the immigrants, in some cases, unwittingly contribute to the development of black and grey economy and reduce the access to employment for certain categories of citizens from countries of destination (unskilled labour force that wishes to achieve some higher revenue than those offered by employers and accepted by the immigrants). Also, in the home country there is growth in magnitude of events with negative impact on its development, such as "brain drain" (emigration of highly qualified labour force) and the lack of employment in certain sectors of the national economy (the result is decrease of productivity, revenues, but also quality of life of home country's citizens).

At the same time, closing the borders to immigrants might create special economic problems in those countries where the population is aging. Here, the pressure on social security system, especially on pensions is increasing, meaning that the active labour force can not financially sustain the large number of children and pensioners.

This phenomenon is specific to European developed countries that have understood that the phenomenon of "replacement migration" is a potential solution to compensate the economic costs of demographic aging. There are arising two problems that have a negative impact on the social dimension of security both in the country of destination and the country of origin.

On the one hand, policies that support the replacement migration cause the transformation of society in the country of destination in a multiracial, multiethnic, multilingual and multi-religious mixture that, if it is not balanced by policies and strategies to increase the degree of cultural tolerance, will lead to social unrest and civil violence. Also, the lack of control over the quality of people entering a country might have the effect of increasing crime and criminality, as has happened in the past two years in Italy.




Fig. no. 3: Number of immigrants who obtained citizenship in the EU-27 countries during 2001-2006¹³

On the other hand, in the countries of origin, the lack of control over emigration might result in the population's aging and decreasing quality of human resource. Problems faced by countries of origin are even more obvious when the immigrants are people with criminal records or people who perform criminal activities in countries of destination. Image capital of the home country is affected worldwide, and the possible return of expelled migrants will determine, as in the destination countries through which they passed, the rise of a massive wave of crime.

EU estimates that the total of illegal immigrants living in Europe is between 8 and 12 million, and receiving citizenship is problematic for such a number. Moreover, obtaining citizenship is often seen as a key-indicator of successful integration in countries of destination, because it involves often a good knowledge of that country's language, culture and society, and a certain level of contribution to economic activity here, still, unfortunately, most illegal immigrants do not meet these conditions. However, the number of persons who have acquired citizenship in one of the EU-27¹¹ countries continues to grow, but at a smaller rate than in the previous decade¹².

In the 90s, the number of new citizens in the EU-15 nearly tripled from the previous decade. After that, the number of people who have




Fig. no. 4: Number of immigrants who obtained citizenship in each EU country during 2001-2006¹⁴

obtained citizenship in the EU-27 in the first half of the current decade has been relatively decreasing.

We notice that countries that have given the greatest number of citizenships are Germany (844,593), Britain (805,000) and France (704,011), for a total of nearly four million new EU citizens in just six years.

There must be specified that the four million new EU citizens in the period 2001-2006 do not come entirely from outside the Union, but the migratory movement takes place also within EU's borders from one Member State to another.

Data collected from the EUROSTAT show that the main EU countries of origin for immigrants who received citizenship in other states of the Union in 2006 are Poland (7,584), Romania (6,526), Portugal (3,098) and Italy (2,709) (Figure no. 6). The remaining citizenships were granted to immigrants from outside the EU, especially from countries on the African and Asian continents. Figure no. 7 presents the distribution by origin of those who received citizenship in one of the EU countries in 2006.

Out of 3.5 million immigrants entered the EU-27 in 2006, only 735,033 people have obtained citizenship in one of the Member




Fig. no. 5: Obtaining citizenship by European and Non-European immigrants in 2006¹⁵

States. This represents less than one quarter of the total number of immigrants.

Therefore, it is noted that the difference between those who have obtained citizenship in one of the Member States and those who have not obtained it is very large, especially in the case of those ones from countries which are already in the Union. The reasons are diverse. One of them is that of labour force's mobility within a political-economic entity: the existence of European citizenship, which transcends national boundaries, decreases the interest of immigrants from EU countries to obtain citizenship of the EU destination country. Another reason might be the one of the human quality that migrates from one EU country to another: the last years have shown that among immigrants are a large number of people with a criminal record or who commit crimes in the country of destination; they are not eligible to receive citizenship in the new state.




Fig. no. 6: Main EU countries of origin for immigrants who received citizenship in another Member State in 2006¹⁶

The above data analysis proves the hypothesis set out at the beginning of this chapter, namely that the political, economic and social dimensions of security are influenced by the issues of boundaries/borders and citizenship in many aspects that exist both in the country of origin and the country of destination: economic development; population development; psychosocial climate of the concerned communities; evolution of crime and organized crime; policies of border control; policies for social integration; economic policies, etc.

Another element of the relationship borders - citizens - security is related to the issues of refugees and asylum seekers.

In the case of European Union, according to statistics provided by the UN Refugee Agency, none of the Member States are among the main destinations for refugees, but for asylum seekers, many of them are a target.¹⁹ According to the statistics of the UN Refugee Agency, the main countries of destination for refugees are Germany, Britain and France,




Fig. no. 7: Distribution by origin of those who received citizenship in one of the EU Member States in 2006¹⁷

and for asylum - Germany, France and Sweden, while none of the EU countries shows itself as home country with numbers higher than 1% of all refugees and asylum throughout the continent.²⁰ In this context, it is clear that refugees and asylum seekers in Europe are coming mainly from other continents where the military and political problems pushed them to move to more secure areas (Figures no. 9 and 10).

Refugee and asylum-seeking flows are also influenced by state's policy regarding welcoming them inside its borders and granting them the desired status. EU policies in this area are intended to create a space in which, without prejudice to the right of free movement of persons, migration flows can be managed through a coordinated approach, based on economic and demographic status of the Union. Despite the restrictive policies on immigration developed since '70s by most Member States, the above data proves that a large number of illegal immigrants and asylum seekers still continue to enter the boundaries of the EU. The reaction of Europeans to this situation is shown in the analysis of data provided by the European Commission through public opinion polls EUROBAROMETER.²³




Fig. no. 8: Immigrants who entered EU-27 in 2006 by two criteria: country of origin and obtaining citizenship in the country of destination¹⁸

Thus, asked what is the most important problem facing their country, citizens of Member States have responded by choosing immigration from a provided list of issues, as it follows:

By correlating these data with those on the number of immigrants in EU countries, it is shown that citizens of the main European countries of destination consider that immigrants are an important problem that their country faces. Also, regarding citizens' concern over EU borders control and immigration and asylum policies, their interest is high in the same countries listed above.

Therefore, Malta, Spain, Britain, Denmark, Greece and France are countries in which immigration is psychosocial represented by citizens as a problem their country is facing, and their interest with regard to EU policies on borders, immigration and asylum is higher compared to that of citizens of other countries of the Union. The explanation for this difference is that in these six countries, unlike the rest of EU members, the net migration rate is highly positive, and the number of asylum seekers is also high. It is obvious that people react to these flows of migrants often in a negative way, causing that the implications of migration




Fig. no. 9: Distribution by destination continents of refugees and asylum seekers in 2007²¹

on the political dimension of security to easily become effects on the military dimension of security; tensions between the country of origin and the destination one, and terrorist actions networks reorganized at their destination might develop manifest military features.

Military dimension of the relationship borders - citizens - security mainly concerns the existence of national armies, the possibility of creating a European Armed Force, and the civil and military violence in terms of refugees and asylum seekers.

The EU has no Armed Force of its own. Member States are most of them NATO members. They have dedicated part of the national forces to participation in various operations of the EU in the ESDP. However, in early 2009, the European Parliament voted for the creation of SAFE (Synchronized Armed Forces Europe), as a first step in achieving a proper armed force of the Union. SAFE will be led by an EU directorship and will have its own standards of training and operational doctrine. SAFE will reflect synchronous and close cooperation between national armed




Fig. no. 10: Distribution by areas of origin of the refugees and asylum seekers in 2007²²

forces and will create a European status for the participant military. EU seeks for the future to create a Council of Ministers of Defence.

This is a very important step in defining a European Security and Defence entity, and in developing the Union's strategic autonomy. Strategic autonomy will allow EU to achieve the purposes already set out, namely the promotion of international peace and security, the protection of its interests in the world, and the protection of its citizens.

Regarding participation in military life of the Member States, each of them has chosen on a form, such as volunteering or conscription. Out of the 27 countries, 8 are based on conscription, and 19 on volunteers. Conscription refers to the obligation of citizens of a state to serve in the armed forces into two types: mandatory service for young people from a given age group (18-30 years) with duration of 1-2 years (for example, in UK it is called the "national service") or service required for an indefinite period of time, in the context of war mobilization, for men from a group of larger age range (18-55 years).




Fig. no. 11: What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment? Answer: Immigration (% of total)²⁴

At the national level, conscription was the subject of debates based on issues of gender and those related to the requirements of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is believed that the military obligation of citizens of a country is contrary to Articles 2, 3, 4, 18, 20 and 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; it violates the right to life, liberty and security, irrespective of the person's status or gender (Article 2 and 3), the right not to be held in slavery or servitude (Article 4), the right to freedom of conscience and religious expressions




Fig. no. 12: Please tell me for each of the following areas if you feel concerned about it or not: asylum policies; immigration policies; EU border control policies²⁵

(Article 18), the right not to be compelled to associate (Article 20) and the right to freely choose the occupation (Article 23).²⁶ The other side of the barricade advocates military service on the basis of conscription's training benefits as education for survival, rite of passage for young people or expression of democracy in the sense of discouraging military coup d'état. Although the decision is strictly national, the renunciation of obligatory military service in Europe is related to the accession

to NATO of those countries, as a guaranty of security. This decision has economic and social causes and is related to the post-Cold War needs of the Alliance. From an economic point of view, to dispense the conscription ensure effectiveness and reduce training costs; in terms of social, it answers to the demographic trends manifested in many European countries. Through the Alliance needs, volunteer soldiers are much better suited in current missions that are characterized by modern, highly technological and expeditionary capabilities.

Accordingly, citizenship is linked to a specific type of participation in the military life of the country. Its impact on security is visible only to the extent in which the country is facing dangers and threats that require a military response within or outside an alliance of this type.

Some conclusions

Addressing the relationship between borders, citizenship and security through the psychosocial representation of security, we might open new horizons to both the objective dimension of reality and to the subjective one (theory of alterity, pre-existing mental schemes, self-fulfilling prophecy, social comparisons, etc.). The political, economic and social dimensions of the relationship between these concepts is related to the issues of borders/frontiers and citizenship, mainly through migration policies adopted by the states concerned and the strategies of assimilation or rejection of migrants; the results are obvious both in the country of destination and country of origin of the involved actors, through the evolution of the development, the number of population, crime and organized crime. Regarding the military dimension, borders/frontiers, citizenship and security are closely linked to such issues as the existence of national army against the forms of regional defence or causes and effects of civil or military violence on the countries concerned.

Therefore, the existence of significant differences between simultaneous trends of opening borders/frontiers and the ones of controlling them, and between theory and practice of citizenship, brings into the attention of the security studies the issues of relations



between these concepts and the individual, group, national and regional security. At the national level, all three concepts involve a discourse of exclusion, of promoting membership in a group or community, while at the regional level the discourse is a post-national one of inclusion and opening of borders/frontiers for citizens of other countries.

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11 The 2006 EUROSTAT statistics takes also into account the countries that entered the EU in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania). That is why, even if the data covers the year of 2006, UE-27 includes all of the present member countries.

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EXPLORING THE FUTURE: FROM ANCIENT AUTHORS FOCUSING ON STRATEGY TO NATO (MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT OF ALLIED COMMAND TRANSFORMATION - ACT)

*Florin DIACONU, PhD,
Senior Researcher, Romanian Diplomatic Institute*

For all political actors really interested in designing and implementing security and defence strategies, a serious effort aiming to properly explore the future is an almost compulsory activity. Such an evaluation is based on the fact that designing and using future scenarios (of all sorts and levels of complexity) is a sound and flexible foundation for strategic decisions connected with resource mobilization, long-term planning, preparing contingency plans. This study starts by listing and commenting some really significant moments of the history of exploring the strategic future (with different methods and goals) and goes on with a brief presentation (accompanied by some comments) of the Multiple Futures Project (MFP) of the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) of NATO. This part of the study focuses the attention mainly on two significant topics: the concept of “drivers” and potentially important differences within NATO when speaking about ways in which different parts of the Alliance evaluate the main threats and risks shaping potential future(s).

Along the entire world history, future was explored in very different ways, with vastly different methods and means and with clearly different goals (and degrees of accuracy). This study will focus the reader’s attention mainly on the analysis of some vastly significant attempts to



explore the future, attempts aiming what we can call today *political and military strategic goals* (mainly security and defence at state, regional or alliance levels).

1. Some important moments of the history of attempts to explore the future: from Ancient Times to Early Modern Times

One of the earliest authors deliberately coping with the effort to explore the future because of major strategic reasons was Sun Tzu. The ancient Chinese author was convinced that a proper and complete understanding of war “is of vital importance to the state”. Along the opening chapters of his notorious work, *Art of War*, Sun Tzu clearly stated that a careful and extensive study of “five main factors” and “seven elements”¹ enables the commanding general – and the political decision maker as well – to accurately predict the final military (and political) result of future confrontations. He stated that *if the available amount of intelligence is large and accurate enough, he will be able to accurately predict who will be victorious and who will be defeated*². “I can forecast victory or defeat” and “I can foresee who is likely to win or lose”³, wrote Sun Tzu. The same author was aware of some *major risks* associated with strategic predictions. When he wrote about planning and implementing mainly military war strategies of all sorts (or maybe even what B.H. Liddell Hart called great – or grand – strategy⁴, an intellectual effort mixing military and political issues, the political ones being the central/prevaling ones), Sun Tzu warned the reader that “it not possible to set everything, with all details, in advance”⁵.

In Europe, several thousand miles away, the effort to explore the future because of significant strategic reasons was born almost at the same time as in China. The first really notorious and influential Greek historian, Herodotus, clearly stated from the very beginning that he started to write his *Histories* aiming to avoid great and brave deeds of both Greeks and Persians to be forgotten by future generations⁶. Herodotus wrote that his intention was that of “preserving from decay” what great men “have done”, and that “of preserving the great and wonderful actions”⁷ of so many really extraordinary heroes. This very



idea proves that *the work of Herodotus is not only an extraordinary piece of historical account, but a tool of predicting (and forging) the future as well: according to what Herodotus suggests, future victories will be won either by simply and deliberately imitating (and upgrading) really effective decisions and actions in the past, or by avoiding mistakes (or non-effective decisions and actions) of the ancestors.*

Almost the same basic idea – that future is to shaped either by imitating (or improving) successes in the past or by avoiding mistakes made in the past by other decision-makers – is present in the even more notorious and more influential *Peloponnesian War* of Thucydides. This author, formerly one of the ten commanding generals of Athenian land and sea forces, stated from the very beginning that he was aware of the fact that the war of Athens against Sparta was to be a very large one (and probably even “the most important” of all conflicts in the entire world history)⁸. Such an evaluation was based on the fact that the power resources and the war potential of the both major competitors were enormous. Both states also led large and potent political and military alliances, so that a conflict of the two states was to quickly become “the greatest movement yet knew in history”⁹. In the same way as Herodotus, *Thucydides thought that political and military experience of his age has to be preserved with all necessary details, so that future generations might use it according to their needs.* The opening lines of the work of Thucydides are also directly focusing the attention on an *astonishingly accurate prediction*: the one clearly stating that the Peloponnesian War was to be a really major conflict, that it was going to quickly escalate and to generate, in the end, immensely important consequences for the entire world (which means that he accurately predicted the exact nature of the conflict which was just starting – a “war of hegemony” or “hegemonic war”, to quote a concept used by Raymond Aron and later on by Robert Gilpin¹⁰).

The possibility to use history as a potent tool to explore and shape the future is even stronger in the works of some Latin (Roman) authors. Plutarch, for example, wrote clearly that he tried a lot to organize his own life according to the positive examples offered by several virtuous historical heroes. His idea was to use history in a way enabling both the

major political or military decision-maker and the most humble citizen to easily see what they have to do. To quote the translation of the text made by John Dryden, history, a collection of “virtues of great men”, is to be regarded as “a sort of looking-glass, in which I may see how to adjust and adorn my own life”¹¹. But the past was not to be integrally imitated by (in) the future.

On the contrary, the future, wrote Plutarch, was to be shaped in a way deliberately using and reinforcing only the best parts of the past, while completely eliminating less attractive elements of historical experience¹². In Dryden’s translation, when trying to shape the future we are to “free” ourselves “from any ignoble, base or vicious impressions”, avoiding in this way “contagion of ill company” and taking into account only the “noble examples”¹³.

At the beginning of Early Modern Times, *The Prince* of Niccolo Machiavelli uses again the basic ideas of the ancient Latin classics, who thought – and taught us all – that “historia magistra vitae est”¹⁴. This idea is the very foundation of way in which the political and strategic future is explored by Machiavelli. History is to be one of the most important elements of know-how a prince has to master: “the prince should read histories, and study there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne themselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and defeat, so as to avoid the latter and imitate the former”¹⁵. *With other words, if you know a lot of history, you can use this knowledge to design and build an effective and successful future.* One of the best examples to prove this is chapter XII, in which the author compares mercenaries with “citizen armies”. “The ruin of Italy – wrote Machiavelli – has been caused by nothing else than by resting all her hopes for many years on mercenaries”, who are in most (or at least in many) occasions “disunited, ambitious, without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies”. The only solution to solve such a problem is make the prince “go in person” to war and to make him “perform the duty of captain”, while “the republic has to send its citizens”¹⁶ to the battlefield. Such a vision is not at all a new invention; nothing new was suddenly discovered by the skilful and experienced author; on the contrary, he just revived – or re-discovered



– the ancient Greek and Roman military model. This thinking pattern is to be coped with in many other works of other authors, and *its core idea is that future has to be nothing else but an improved version of the past*.

The same basic idea is present in chapter XXV, where Machiavelli wrote about the role of fate. That was compared with a “raging river”, sometimes “sweeping away trees and buildings”. But clever leaders can learn a lot in the context of such disasters. “When the weather becomes fair”, men “shall make provision”, so that even if waters “rise again”, they “may pass away”¹⁷ not harming anymore those on the shores. The lesson is clear: *even disasters (natural or man-made) along the history can be useful, because they teach us to better prepare for similar situations in the future*.

But in the case of Machiavelli it is also useful to strongly underline the fact that two of the most important ideas of *The Prince* proved themselves to be, *in the long run, very accurate predictions*: First of all, *in the next 250 years, the idea of national armies became more and more potent*, and in the American War of Independence an emerging national army managed to defeat (it is true, with a lot of help offered by France) the British armies, in which massive contingents of German mercenaries were present¹⁸. *The second idea which proved itself, in the long run, an accurate prediction is that of national unification of Italy*. 300 years after the moment when *The Prince* was written, Italy still lacked political unity.

Only 70 years later, Italy already was a successfully united country, led by some clearly charismatic political leaders, some of them strongly embodying one or more of the basic features of the ideal prince imagined by Machiavelli (see, for example, the case of Francesco Crispi, who embodied – even if with mixed results – the Machiavellian idea of boosting national destiny by means of territorial expansion/conquest¹⁹).

Both examples briefly presented along the previous lines seem to indicate that, at least sometimes, long-term predictions can be more accurate and/or can be more easily made than short-term ones.

2. Exploring the strategic future in the 19th-21st centuries: brief presentation and evaluation of some really important attempts

In the second half of the 19th century, strategically significant features of the future were explored, with some very interesting results, using as main tool the novel or the short story (mainly belonging to literary genres we could call today science fiction, political fiction and, up to a certain point, heroic fantasy). The most notorious authors of this quite large group were a French one, Jules Verne and a British one, Herbert George Wells.

One of the best known almost direct predictions made by Jules Verne – within the framework of a novel in which exceptional characters are involved in exceptional adventures and deeds – was that *war at sea will soon be dominated by a new type of conflict: that in which the submarine will prove itself to be more effective than most modern and most potent surface combat vessels*. The American frigate described with a lot of details in *20,000 Leagues Under The Sea* was a “very fast ship”, able to reach the speed of “18 miles per hour” (a very impressive feature at that very moment, when the most powerful combat ships were usually able to reach only more moderate speeds – in 1860, the French Navy commissioned the first operational armoured frigate in the World, *Gloire*, able to reach only 12.5 knots; in the same year, the British commissioned the large frigate *Warrior*, also an ironclad; it was able to reach no more than 14 knots; even later, major combat ships were not very fast, so that the American capital ship USS *Oregon*, commissioned in 1893 and armed with four 330 mm guns could reach only 16.7 knots²⁰), armed with modern guns with a range of 16 kilometers and with smaller caliber arms firing “explosive shells”. But its direct opponent, *Nautilus*, was vastly superior in *all* respects: made up entirely of metal, with double hull, with many water-tight sections, put in motion by enormously powerful electric engines able to easily reach 50 knots, the submarine could dive to 1,000 meters²¹ (several times more than modern nuclear submarines built at the end of the 20th century). The way in which clashes of *Nautilus* with American and British major surface combat vessels are described may have been regarded as simple – even if attractive – fantasy in the



years of the third quarter of the 19th century; only a few decades later, the very intense use of submarine war (both the *limited* and *total* types) between 1914 and 1918 generated major consequences. The submarine of the Central Powers (mainly the German ones) managed to sink 431 trade ships with a total displacement of 792,000 tons between August 1914 and the end of September 1915; then other 359 commercial ships of all sorts (900,000 tons) between October 1, 1915 and April 30, 1916; then other 1,152 ships of all sorts (2,1 million tons) between May 1, 1916 and January 31, 1917; then a staggering figure – 2,566 ships (with a total displacement of 5,75 million tons) from February 1, 1917 to December 31, 1918; then other 1,046 trade ships (with a total displacement of 2,65 million tons) from January 1, 1918 to the end of the war, in November 1918²².

I preferred to discuss with a lot of details of Jules Verne's prediction concerning war at sea and the strategic results of use of submarines mainly because *20,000 Leagues Under The Sea* is very significant for a type of mistake predictions are many times contaminated with. I am speaking about the fact that, *very often, we tend to think that future will have inside its basic structure some elements of the present time, elements mistakenly regarded as being perennial*. Such a thinking pattern makes us imagine a future full not only of new elements, but of elements of our own times as well, mixing in this way more or less accurate elements of prediction with more or less significant mistakes of evaluation (when we speak about element of our time we imagine that are going to survive in the future, even if they will not). Let me explain in which way Verne's novel makes us all to better understand this important risk predictions (including those in the area of national or regional defence and security) are confronted with. In Verne's novel, many of the features of *Nautilus* were really revolutionary. In an era when the only real submarines were very slow, very vulnerable and not at all too effective weapons²³, Captain Nemo's submarine embodied many features we can find in real ships only many decades later: astonishing speed, a single propulsion system able to operate both when the ship is surfaced and when the submarine is submerged, her general shape (like a cigar, strongly resembling nuclear-powered submarines operational nowadays, but not those extensively

used in both World Wars). But, when we speak about the way in which *Nautilus* fought, Jules Verne simply imagined that ramming – very fashionable in the 1860s – will be used in the future as well, just because it might be a perennial tactic. Verne simply overemphasized the long-term significance of some notorious episodes in real history: the fact that both *Monitor* and *Virginia* (ex-*Merrimac*) used ramming in their duel fought in March 1862, and the fact that four years later, in 1866, *Ferdinand Maximilian*, the flagship of the Austrian admiral Tegetthof, successfully rammed three Italian warships at Lissa (damaging two of them and quickly sinking *Re d'Italia*)²⁴. Such episodes made Verne to imagine *Nautilus* ramming enemy ships (while in real history, the self-propelled torpedo will be the main weapon used by submarines, while ramming will be a both rare and very dangerous method for the attacker himself).

Herbert George Wells also used literary means to extensively explore the future (including some long-term future scenarios). I selected for this very brief presentation two examples proving how potent – and accurate – were his predictive capabilities in the general area of strategic issues. In 1899, Wells published a novel called *When the sleeper wakes*, in which he described the way in which war will be fought in a very distant future: *large armies are quickly transported many thousand kilometres by large numbers of huge planes, escorted by smaller ones* (strongly resembling, in the end, the fighters of the 20th century)²⁵. In another piece of anticipative literature, a short story published several decades before the moment when the earliest armoured fighting vehicles were designed, manufactured and used, Wells described, with a lot of details, *large terrestrial ironclads, 80 to 100 feet long, put in motion by powerful engines, attacking in large groups and easily defeating huge masses of infantry, cavalry and artillery*²⁶.

In the 20th century, the more we advance to our days, the larger grows the number, the quality (accuracy) and above all the significance of various attempts to explore the future. It is almost compulsory, in such a context, to briefly present and evaluate at least some major works whose obvious common denominator is that they try to explore the future of different elements of military strategy or of grand strategy.



One of the most significant texts in the opening stages of the 20th century is called *The Fourteen Points*. It is the set of ideas presented by the President Woodrow Wilson in front of the US Congress in January 1918²⁷. The very nature of the text – obviously *a blueprint for the political future of the entire world at the end of the war* – represents an important instrument able to both explore and shape the future of USA and of many other nations. This effort to explore the immediate future of the world was done according to *several priorities* (not necessarily very compatible ones): a set of major geo-strategic and economic interests of USA, but also a set of basic values of the liberal and democratic political thought. It is important to underline that *some of the core ideas of Wilson's speech are even nowadays major issues of international relations* (free trade at global level, self-determination rights, freedom for all people, special responsibilities of great powers acting as protectors of the weak and the oppressed, the effort to limit or even to completely prohibit war of aggression, an increasingly transparent diplomacy more and more replacing secret treaties of all sorts). It is also useful to clearly state that implementing *The Fourteen Points* was – and still is – a tool able to consolidate, in different ways, the exceptional global power status of USA.

In the 1920s an entire collection of works (called *Today and Tomorrow*) aiming to explore the future was published in USA and Great Britain. A total number of almost 80 volumes, most of them quite short, offered interesting images of the way in which different elements of civilization might evolve in the long run. The most interesting element of this collection is the fact that the authors were some of the “most outstanding minds” of those years. Some of these volumes presented topics important for the *strategic studies* (the way in which peace and war, science, some regions and/or nations and global balance of power might evolve in the long run)²⁸.

In 1964, *New Scientist* published an impressive set of essays written by almost 100 major authors, “distinguished in learning and practical affairs”, concentrating the attention “on the likely developments of the next twenty years”. An year later, in 1965, Nigel Calder selected several dozen articles and published a two volume work called *The World in*

1984. Some of the essays were, more or less directly, connected with what we call *strategic studies*: those concentrating to attention on the use of oceans, on the problem of natural resources, on fuel and power, on evolution of telecommunications, on aviation and surface transport (all these in the first volume), but also on government, education, evolution and role of cities, on trade, on international relations and on the evolution of some major actors and regions of the world arena (volume two)²⁹.

In 1967, Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, together with a quite large group of the members of the Hudson Institute, published a book called *The Year 2000*, aiming to seriously explore several scenarios for the next more than 30 years. Some of these scenarios are almost linear developments of already existing trends (what the authors themselves called “standard world” or “surprise-free projections”)³⁰: other ones, on the contrary, are based on the idea that future might be something completely different (the authors even wrote about the possibility of completely “unexpected developments” and surprising changes and evolutions). *Many of the variables listed and analyzed by Kahn and Wiener are very significant for strategic studies*: types of elites, “accumulation of scientific and technological knowledge” (potentially with major strategic/military consequences), and growth of global industrial output, “population growth” (potentially leading to an increased competition for resources) and “increasing capability of mass destruction”³¹. It is also important to underline the fact that Kahn and Wiener tried to imagine a *very complex set* of possible/probable future scenarios, evaluating the possible evolution of several major realities (more than a dozen variables in some occasions).

A year later, in 1968, Andrew Wilson published *The Bomb and the Computer*. This volume presented with a lot of details how war games of all sorts can be used as tools facilitating not only the exploration of possible future scenarios, but also the political (and strategic) decision-making process. He also described long-term future scenarios used in the 1950s and 1960s by some American strategic planners, who took into account at least six types of possible future worlds for 1985³².

Less than 15 year ago, in 1996, Caspar Weinberger, a notorious and influential American politician and Peter Schweizer wrote a

book (published with an Introduction written by Margaret Thatcher) describing, in a way strongly resembling political fiction novels, five potential future scenarios. Their strong, interesting and important common denominator obviously is the fact that USA are more and more facing the risk to become less and less politically and militarily significant on the world arena (while the clearly partisan opinion of the authors, who think – and present a lot of facts and figures to support such a vision – that the Clinton Administration bears the main responsibility for the serious, continuous and immensely dangerous erosion of the military might of America is irrelevant for this research project). The five scenarios are: a defensive war of USA against an alliance of China and North Korea; a major conflict, quickly escalated, of USA with Iran; a major crisis of the bilateral relations USA-Mexico; a major conflict of USA and Russia (an expansionist and aggressive Russia, to be more accurate); and a new war for the Pacific Ocean, fought by USA against an aggressive Japan³³.

Three years later, in 1999, the Prospective Studies Unit of the European Commission published a volume called *European Futures: five possible scenarios for 2010*. We are speaking about five vastly different possibilities of evolution for both the EU and the rest of the world. Some of the scenarios are more optimistic. Others are, on the contrary, more (or even very) pessimistic. A third group is that of scenarios mixing some optimistic and some pessimistic predictions. In many occasions, the scenarios are dealing with problems clearly belonging to the set of topics professionally and systematically explored by *strategic studies*: a possible balance of power on the international arena, generated by quick economic growth not only in Europe, but in Russia and China as well; or the quick enlargement of the EU, which integrates even some parts of the Middle East; or a lot of efforts to preserve security, both at home and on the international arena; or major differences separating the great European powers; or an increased set of risks and threats on the international arena³⁴, to list only a few such strategically significant topics.

Finally, only a few months ago, an ambitious publishing house in Bucharest printed the first Romanian edition of an already notorious and

influential work: *Mapping the Global Future. Report of the CNI 2020 Project*, published in USA in 2005. This work – the most recent briefly presented and analyzed here – is also concentrating the attention of the reader on *major strategic problems of all sorts* (economic evolutions, both positive and negative, associated with globalization; geopolitical changes – mainly the decrease of strategic capabilities of some traditional great powers, accompanied by a sharp increase of the strategic relevance of some emerging powers; new challenges governmental elites are confronted with; a more and more obvious lack of global security. To better and more credibly present all these risks and threats, the authors elaborated four major scenarios (two mainly optimistic, two very pessimistic). It is important to underline the fact that attempting to predict at least some of the broad lines along which the future might evolve, *the authors took into account both some certainties and some uncertainties* (all of them together represent a number of 26 variables shaping the possible/probable futures we are operating with)³⁵.

3. *Multiple Futures Project* of ACT and its direct predecessors; significant results and significant challenges

It is both normal and useful to start the final part of this study by clearly stating that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has a long and solid tradition of exploring (prospecting) the future. The North Atlantic Treaty itself (adopted in 1949, exactly 60 years ago) represents (in a way strongly resembling the spirit of The Fourteen Points, already briefly presented in the previous chapter) not only a major political and strategic document, but also a blueprint for a certain future strategic scenario the signatory powers agreed to assume common responsibility for. The same can be said about the two Strategic Concepts (officially adopted by the NATO Summits in Rome and Washington, D.C., in 1991 and 1999). Both Strategic Concepts are the embodiment of a certain vision of the geo-strategic future of mainly Eurasia and of the North Atlantic region, but of the other regions of the world as well.

Both *Strategic Concepts* list and evaluate several major *strategically significant* elements of the so complex global realities and, above all,



the most important of the recent (and very recent) evolutions on the world arena and also the types of risks and threats associated both with ongoing evolutions and with clearly predictable short-term future. But both documents of NATO offer us something else, too: *they explicitly forge and promote a manner in which regional, hemispheric and global future can and have to be managed, in order to allow the North Atlantic Alliance to successfully cope with multiple risks and threats of all sorts* (both traditional/classic and new/non-traditional ones).

*Multiple Futures Project (MFP)*³⁶ is, in such an institutional context, one the very important multi-annual activities of the *Allied Command Transformation (ACT)*. The NATO Summit in Prague (2002) was that which decided that ACT is to be established. At that very moment, political decision-makers of NATO member countries decided that the command structures of the Alliance is to be reshaped, in order to allow them to become “leaner and more efficient”. In such a situation, a dual structure was implemented. “One Strategic Command would be focused on NATO’s operations – Allied Command Operations (ACO/SHAPE) and the other would be focused on transforming NATO – Allied Command Transformation (ACT)”. Such a reform was necessary mainly because “NATO has become a global entity”. In such a context, confronted with an increased number of traditional and non-traditional challenges, threats and risks of very different types and magnitudes, NATO has to adapt itself to cope both with new responsibilities and with an increased pace of changes on the world arena. That is why “ACT will be NATO’s agent for change; enabling, facilitating and advocating continuous improvement of military capabilities to enhance the military interoperability, relevance and effectiveness of the Alliance”. In order *to better prepare the Alliance to successfully face any type of future*, ACT – which has “to reflect NATO as a whole” – “focuses on areas such as training and education, concept development, comprehensive approach, experimentation, and research and technology and using NATO’s ongoing operations and work with NATO Response Force (NRF) to improve the military effectiveness of the Alliance”³⁷.

It is important to properly understand that NATO, attempting to successfully face – using large, but obviously *limited resources* – the



challenges of the future, did not fall an easy prey to what political scientists call sometimes wishful thinking. This means that, *in spite* of immensely important geo-strategic successes (such as winning the Cold War), at least some of NATO's political decision-makers and military technocrats *did not* have the illusion that the Alliance can accomplish anything, anytime, in any set of conditions.

On the contrary, clearly indicates the *Multiple Futures Project Initiation Document (PID)*, some events on the world arena let ACT to think that “the future offers challenges that NATO may not currently be equipped to deal with”.

As a result of such an evaluation, “a growing concern about the need to properly identify and prioritize security challenges that the Alliance may face and the corresponding implications” (at military level, but also at political / grand strategic level) appeared and quickly evolved. This “growing concern” is clearly proved is the fact that the NATO Secretary General himself felt the need to state that the Alliance can continue “to perform its twin role” (to offer immediate protection but also to shape the future global strategic environment) *only if and when* it will be able use, in case of need, “what is required” (in terms of manpower, know-how and military hardware of all sorts. As a direct result of this episode – which took place in March 2008 – ACT decided “to identify and prioritize the type and scale of future capability and interoperability requirements and to inform the Defence Planning Process”. In the same month, March 2008, it became clear – at least for the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation and for his target groups (the Military Committee and the North Atlantic Council) – that “using our different views of future worlds will strengthen our endeavor to develop a more holistic appreciation for future security challenges and implications for the Alliance”³⁸.

It is also important to underline that *MFP was not at all a completely new type of intellectual effort for NATO as a whole and for ACT*. On the contrary, a solid foundation for MFP can easily be identified in previous activities, such as “the evolving Defence Requirement Review (DDR) Process, the 2007 Future Security Environment (FSE) Study and the Long Term Requirements Study (LTRS).



It is also important that exploring the future is not a main goal of MFP and ACT. On the contrary, exploring the future is just a very sophisticated, flexible and effective intellectual tool. It is true, clearly stated PID in early spring of 2008, “through broad engagement, the MF Project will postulate a series of ‘futures’”, but this was to be done only as an instrument able to act as a catalytic agent fit “to promote strategic dialogue and common understanding of key drivers and their possible implications for the Alliance”. In the next stage of NATO’s effort to adapt itself to the challenges of the future, “these implications can then be used to align existing programs to address the most important emerging challenges”. This means that future is explored not for the sake of exploring future, but for a less fancy and more cautious goal, that of quickly generating sound inputs for long-term and “forward looking” strategic decisions and policies to be adopted as soon as possible³⁹.

MFP had from the very beginning *four main complementary operational goals*: 1. to engage member states, relevant national institutions, relevant world experts and NATO Leadership in a “productive forward looking dialogue”; 2. to create a Multiple Futures Intellectual Framework able to support strategic dialogue; 3. to use the above mentioned strategic dialogue to generate “questions and ideas from which credible deductions, assessments and implications can be drawn”; and 4. to use all these to get “the best possible military advice”), all of them leading “to a common understanding of key strategic trends, their drivers and a series of possible futures from which potential challenges facing NATO and implications can be discussed”⁴⁰. It was also clear from the very beginning that *MFP was to produce “two quantifiable benefits”*: 1. an enhanced and useful “strategic dialogue” involving not only member states, but also important partners of NATO; and 2. “a credible context (document), usable for the benefit of LTRS which has a 17-22 year view, which in turn provides context for the ongoing DRR process which works on a 10-12 year timeframe”⁴¹.

Exactly as in the case of the very sophisticated analysis and prediction thinking pattern used by Sun Tzu almost 2,500 years ago (and strongly resembling, up to a certain point, the way in which Kahn and Wiener worked in the 1960s), possible/probable *future is regarded*

by MFP as a complex and dynamic sum of several variables. These variables which shape the multiple futures are called *drivers*. They are segments of the geo-strategically, geopolitically or militarily significant global environment which, by means of their own dynamics, can influence a lot (sometimes decisively) the way in which future will be shaped. In November 2008, an important ACT report stated that drivers are “fundamental causes of change” and a sound “common basis for the strategic dialogue”, enabling the participants involved in several ACT activities “to build Preliminary Futures”. The same document stated that “a periodic review to re-adjust & re-assess Drivers is necessary” and that “there is a broad agreement on the Drivers” (a clearly optimistic evaluation, based on the fact that “cohesion of NATO is an important aspect that must be addressed by the MFP”)⁴².

The very concept of “drivers” is not at all new for NATO. Before the moment when MFP started, the so-called Long Term Requirements Study (LTRS) identified, in April 2006, seven major “driving parameters” able to configure future scenarios focusing on the evolution of the international security environment. These seven drivers were: 1. *power distribution on the world arena* (with three possible situations: uni-polar, bi-polar and multi-polar worlds); stability of the global environment (also with three possibilities: low, medium and high); 3. *technology balance* (again with three major possibilities: superiority of NATO, a balanced situation and NATO inferior / which means that “opponents have a technological advantage over” the Alliance); 4. *resources* (a parameter indicating “which world powers tent to control” strategically significant resources; also with three possibilities: West controls the resources, or a balanced distribution of resource control, or the opponents of NATO control vital resources); 5. *world governance* (indicating “whether there exists a functional system of international governance”; also three possibilities are taken into account: weak, medium or strong world governance); 6. *demography* (parameter focusing “on the level of growth and movement of world population”; also three possibilities: low, or medium, or high); and 7. *global economic situation* (parameter measuring or indicating “the state of the world economy”; also three possible situations: decline, or steady, or growth)⁴³. These seven major variables

(configuring 21 sub-variables) led the authors to imagine several future scenarios, called *Future Security Environments* (FSE). In the end, four such FSEs were selected, mainly as a result of their long-term strategic relevance: 1. *Return to World Order* (an optimistic view of the future, with “greater cooperation between Euro-Atlantic states”); 2. *Resurgent Middle East* (a pessimistic scenario focusing the attention on the possibility of a ‘hostile’ world, in which several “superpowers and/or regionally dominant powers” are in open competition, with a large amount of “particular hostility” between a new major geo-strategic actor – the New Islamic Council – and the Euro-Atlantic nations); 3. *Pro-Active China* (a scenario less pessimistic than the previous one; its main features are that USA remain a superpower and China becomes almost “an economic, technological and military peer of the Alliance”); 4. *Globalization and Terror* (also a pessimistic scenario, where the major strategic interest of the West are challenged both by an ‘economically resurgent Russia’ and by “a greater global threat from terrorist groups”)⁴⁴.

The Multiple Futures Project (MFP) started by using nine drivers (an increase of more than 25% if we compare MFP with the supporting paper to LTRS already presented above. These early drivers were: 1. *Globalisation* (with four possible situations: acceleration, or remains constant, or slows, or reverses); 2. *Governance* (four main possibilities, including “ardent nationalism”); 3. *Energy and Resources* (four main possibilities too, ranging from “demand increases not met” to “future global resources glut”); 4. *Urbanisation* (four different possibilities, including “move to cities increases” and “population flight from cities”); 5. *Demographics* (four major possibilities again, ranging from “old West young East no migration” to “young East population bulge”); 6. *Terrorism* (four major possibilities: “attacks increase”, “attacks more ‘unconventional’”, “attacks decline” and even “NBC attack”); 7. *Technology* (four possible evolutions, ranging from “tech solutions accelerate” to “tech advances stop”); 8. *Environment* (also four possible trends, from “global warming” to the very optimistic “environmental quality improves”); and 9. *Networks & Communications* (this driver also has four very different possible evolutions, ranging from very optimistic to clearly pessimistic visions of the future)⁴⁵.

This list of nine drivers used in the opening stages by MFP, together with that of the 36 sub-variables it generates, is a *significantly more complex tool* than the 21 sub-variables previously used by LTRS. More than this, several persons and bodies involved in different quite early activities of MFP expressed the need to use some extra drivers (10, if we count them all⁴⁶). If all of these new drivers are imagined to also have four possible evolutions, a total list of 76 sub-variables could have been used. Within the brief presentation I am operating now, if we compare the two intellectual frameworks (LTRS and MFP), a *clear and difficult dilemma* becomes visible: The more complex any research instrument is (in our case, the more complex the set of variables shaping possible future is), the more accurate the final result of the research effort might become. But at the same time, the more complex any instrument is, the more difficult is the effort necessary to handle it. *Those directly involved in MFP activities decided to solve this dilemma simply by attempting to both diminish (goal not at all successfully accomplished) and significantly restructure (goal successfully accomplished), in more advanced stages of the project, the total number of the drivers (variables shaping the future).* All these changes clearly prove, beyond any doubt, that *the persons and structures involved in MFP tried a lot to improve their own ability to properly explore possible and/or probable futures.*

When we speak about what MFP calls *drivers*, two final comments might be useful (at least from the academic point of view). Firstly, all (or almost all) causes of change identified and used by MFP are mainly acting beyond the borders of NATO (outside NATO). I mean by this that the drivers selected by MFP are describing and evaluating major features of the *global* environment. But *it is easy to understand that all the futures we can imagine when we speak about NATO are going to be immensely influenced not mainly by trends operating outside the Alliance, but by trends and realities acting mainly (or even only) within NATO.* A potent example is that focusing the attention on the problem of coherent political will. At this very moment, in Afghanistan, the ability of the Alliance to reach and to maintain its major strategic goals is not diminished by any of the nine drivers identified by MFP, but by the fact that some member states make more efforts, while other ones



do not seem to prioritize in the same way requirements, threats and risks of the Afghan theatre of operations. This is *an important gap we can not ignore* (a gap at least as damaging for the effectiveness, long-term strategic relevance and international prestige of the Alliance as the well-known “capability gap”). *If* my hypothesis briefly presented here is to be accepted, future has all the chances to be more influenced by the political will inside the Alliance than by what MFP calls globalisation, or terrorism, or technology. *Of course, an explanation for this potentially important weakness of MFP exists (and it can easily be identified)*. We do not have to forget that the Project we are speaking about belongs to one of the *command structures* of the Alliance. As *any* mainly military body, ACT is supposed to *obey and implement* political decisions, not to criticize them. Anyhow, the very legitimate – and completely politically correct – attitude of those involved in MFP can not properly solve the fact that, *at least sometimes, NATO seems to lack an adequate amount of resolute and really coherent political will* (see not only the present situation in Afghanistan, but also the fact that at the Bucharest Summit in 2008 some NATO members strongly supported the idea of integrating Ukraine and Georgia, while other member states were, on the contrary, not at all interested to quickly accomplish such a goal).

A second final comment is one focusing the attention on potentially important differences within NATO in the area of listing (and evaluating the significance of) main drivers of possible/probable future(s). I mean by this that some of the MFP activities seem to prove that actors of all sorts in different regions of the Alliance do not have the same – or at least a completely homogenous – vision of the common future. The best possible proof able to support such a very blunt statement is an evaluation belonging to the MF Core Team itself. In a report made public in August 2008, after several Round Tables and Workshops, MFP Core Team stated that the results of the Budapest Workshop were different if compared with those which had taken place in Western Europe (London, Den Hague and Berlin). The Team’s cautious (but interesting) professional opinion was: “whether this is attributable to the Eastern European composition (vs. Western European composition of the other workshops) or to the smaller sample size of the workshop can not be

determined”⁴⁷. At this very moment it is almost impossible to accurately evaluate how large and how important such differences are; it is also not possible (or at least not very easy) to precisely forecast how such intra-Alliance differences of perception might develop. They might increase or, on the contrary, if what MFP calls “strategic dialogue” successfully goes on, they might decrease, reaching in the end a moment when all member states will evaluate in almost the same way the highest ranking drivers, acting accordingly when identifying and mobilizing resources for common operations of all sorts. Anyhow, a more homogenous way of exploring the strategic possible/probable futures might be a very important positive asset, at least in the long run, for NATO as a whole and for each of the member states.

NOTES:

1 The translation of Sun TZU operated by Lionel Giles uses “five constant factors” and “seven considerations” – see the complete text of the translation at <http://classics.mit.edu/Tzu/artwar.html>.

2 For all these, see Sun TZU, *Arta războiului* [*Art of War*], Ed. Militară, București, 1976, I, 1-I,5 (pp. 31-32).

3 See the translation of Sun TZU by Lionel Giles, at <http://classics.mit.edu/Tzu/artwar.html>.

4 For the concept of “military strategy” and “grand strategy” (or “superior strategy”) see B.H. LIDDELL HART, *Strategia. Acțiunile indirecte* [*Strategy: The Indirect Approach*], Ed. Militară, București, 1973, pp. 334-335.

5 Sun TZU, *Arta războiului* [*Art of War*], Ed. Militară, București, 1976, I, 9 (p. 33).

6 HERODOTUS, *Istorii* [*Histories*], Ed. Științifică, București, 1961, opening lines of Book 1, called *Clio* (vol. 1, p. 15, Romanian edition).

7 The quotations used are from the translation of Herodotus operated by George Rawlinson. The part of the text I used here can be found at <http://classics.mit.edu/Herodotus/history.1.i.html>.

8 THUCYDIDES, *Războiul peloponesiac* [*The Peloponnesian War*], Ed. Științifică, București, 1966, I,1.

9 See the translation made by Richard Crawley, at <http://classics.mit.edu/Thucydides/pelopwar.html>.

10 Gilpin wrote that when we speak about such a war, “immediate reasons” and “explicit goals” are less important than “its extension” and “the interests



involved”. For all these see Robert GILPIN, *Război și schimbare în politica mondială* [*War and Change in World Politics*], Ed. Scrisul Românesc, Craiova, 2000, p. 254.

11 See the text translated by John Dryden at <http://classics.mit.edu/Plutarch/timoleon.html>.

12 „Timoleon”, in PLUTARH, *Vieți paralele* [PLUTARCH, *Parallel Lives*], vol. II, Ed. Științifică, București, 1963, p. 131 (the brief introduction before chapter I of the biography).

13 See again the text translated by John Dryden at <http://classics.mit.edu/Plutarch/timoleon.html>.

14 For this major obsession of many classic Latin (Roman) authors see, among other works, Lucian BOIA, *Mari istorici ai lumii* [*Great historians of mankind*], Universitatea din București, București, 1978, p. 200.

15 Niccolo MACHIAVELLI, *The Prince*, at www.constitution.org/mac/prince... (translation by W. K. Marriott, 1908), chapter XIV.

16 For these quotations, see Niccolo MACHIAVELLI, *The Prince*, at www.constitution.org/mac/prince... (translation by W. K. Marriott, 1908), chapter XII.

17 Niccolo MACHIAVELLI, *The Prince*, at www.constitution.org/mac/prince... (translation by W. K. Marriott, 1908), chapter XXV.

18 See, for example, the case of the Battle at Trenton, in which *all* the “British” attacked by the Continental Army were Hessians, led by colonel Johan Rall. The Americans lost two men (“frozen to death” while marching to Trenton), while the Hessians fled, leaving 948 prisoners, 1.000 muskets and six cannon in the hands of the Americans – Geoffrey PERRET, *A Country Made by War. From the Revolution to Vietnam – The Story of America’s Rise to Power*, Random House, New York, 1989, p. 35

19 For a brief, but accurate evaluation of Crispi’s foreign policy, see Felix GILBERT, *The End of the European Era, 1890 to the Present*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 1984, pp. 73-74.

20 Tony GIBBONS (editor), *The Encyclopedia of Ships*, Silverdale Books, 2001, pp. 252, 289 and 272.

21 For all these elements, Jules VERNE, *20000 de leghe sub mări* [*20,000 Leagues Under The Sea*], Ed. Tineretului, București, 1968, pp. 28-33, 106-107, 110, 113, 115, 117.

22 For these figures enabling us to better understand how effective submarine warfare was, see Helmut PEMSEL, *Von Salamis bis Okinawa. Eine Chronik zur Seekriegsgeschichte*, J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, München, 1975, pp. 214-216.

23 See the case of the Confederate submarine *Hunley*: 20 of her crew members died along several disastrous trials of this “frail, cigar-shaped iron boiler” and then the submarine was lost – together with other 9 crew members – in the attack



against the Union sloop *Housatonic* – Bruce CATTON, *The Civil War*, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1987, p. 73.

24 For these both episodes see Jacques MORDAL, *Twenty-five Centuries of Sea Warfare*, Abbey Library, London, 1973, pp. 218-222 and 224-231

25 An attack of one of the lighter, smaller and very fast planes against the huge transport ones is described in H.G. WELLS, “Când se va trezi cel-care-doarme” [When the Sleeper Wakes], in H.G. WELLS, *Opere Alese [Selected Works]*, vol. II, Ed. Tineretului, București, 1963, pp. 439-467.

26 H.G. WELLS, “Cuirasatele terestre”, in H.G. WELLS, *Opere Alese [Selected Works]*, vol. IV, Ed. Tineretului, București, pp. 25-51.

27 For the political and military context of this presidential speech see John TOLLAND, *No Man's Land. The Last Year of the Great War*, Doubleday & Co., Inc., Garden city, New York, 1980, pp. 119-130.

28 For all these see Daniel BELL, “Introduction”, in Herman KAKN, Anthony J. WIENER, *The Year 2000. A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years*, Macmillan Company, New York, 1967, pp. XXI-XXIV.

29 Nigel CALDER (editor), *The World in 1984*, vol. I-II, Penguin Books, Baltimore, 1965.

30 Herman KAKN, Anthony J. WIENER, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.

31 *Ibidem*, p. 7.

32 Andrew WILSON, *Războiul și ordinatorul [The Bomb and the Computer]*, Ed. Militară, București, 1974, pp. 181-183.

33 Caspar WEINBERGER, Peter SCHWEIZER, *Următorul război mondial [The Next War]*, Ed. Antet, București, 1997.

34 Comisia Europeană. Unitatea de Studii Prospective, *Scenarii: Europa în 2010. O Europă, cinci destine [European Futures: five possible scenarios for 2010]*, Ed. Institutul de Economie Mondială, București, 2000, pp. 20, 23, 27, 39, 40.

35 Lumea în 2020. O schiță a viitorului global prezentată de Consiliul Național de Informații al SUA [Mapping the Global Future. Report of the CNI 2020 Project], Ed. Cartier, București, ediția I, februarie 2008.

36 An important number of Reports from *all* stages of MFP (including all those extensively quoted along the next pages) can be found at <http://www.act.nato.int/MultipleFutures> and also at an older Internet address - <http://www.transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/TNCC/2008/COTC/MultipleFu>.

37 For all these basic elements, important for better understanding what ACT is, see the text *History of Allied Command Transformation*, at <http://www.act.nato.int/content.asp?pageid=240>.

38 For all these initial steps and elements of MFP see *Multiple Futures Project Initiation Document (PID) (version 1.5, 23 April 2008)*, prepared by the Multiple



Futures Core Project Team, pp. 3-4.

39 The brief quotations used in these two paragraphs can be found in *Ibidem*, p. 4.

40 *Ibidem*, pp. 4-5.

41 *Ibidem*, pp. 7-8.

42 Strategic Military Partner Conference, Tirana, Albania, 3-5 November 2008, *NATO and partners: Exploring Multiple futures. Analysis report*, 14 November 2008, pp. 9-10.

43 For these seven “driving parameters”, see *Future World Scenarios. Supporting Paper to the Long Term Requirements Study*, April 2006, p. 3-3 (17th page of the document, 70 pages long).

44 *Ibidem*, p. 3-5 (the 19th page of the report).

45 For all these see ACT’s *Multiple Futures Phase 1. Analysis Report*, August 2008, pp. 12-16, but also the earlier *Multiple Futures Project Discussion Paper (version 1.5, 30 April 2008)*, pp. 6-9.

46 1. Geopolitical Restructuring; 2. WMD Proliferation; 3. Social Values; 4. Pandemic; 5. Education; 6. Technology Shift; 7. Organized Crime/Drug Trafficking; 8. Complexity; 9. NATO role and cohesion; and 10. Media/Strategic Communication/Influence – all these are listed and briefly explained and evaluated by a special (even if brief) chapter of ACT’s *Multiple Futures Phase 1. Analysis Report*, August 2008, p. 5.

47 ACT’s *Multiple Futures Phase 1. Analysis Report*, August 2008, pp. 6 and 7-10 (for more details see pp. 18-19 and 22-51).

ENERGY WARS OF THE 21ST CENTURY

*Andriy VOLOŠIN, PhD,
Deputy Director, Institute for International Economic Researches,
Expert, National Institute for Strategic Researches, Ukraine*

It doesn't matter in which side the oil is flowing now. It is important who decides the direction to flow.

In geopolitics, the decisive fact is the gnome: "intentions say nothing, opportunities are everything." (Oswald Spengler).

The increasing demand for energy resources has exacerbated competition within the global energy market, leading to a state of war between the main participants. Each strives most to secure its own energy future by imposing its own rules of the game, using their own advantages in competition, by checking if it is not entirely possible, then at least part of the global energy market.

According to forecasts, the demand for primary energy will grow in 2008 - 2030 by 55%. The average annual growth is 1.8%. Demand will reach 17.7 billion tons of oil, compared with 11.4 billion tons in 2007. And in this century, fossil fuels remain the main source of primary energy. Oil and gas will maintain their role as the main fuel type.

In developing countries, whose economy and population has a fast rhythm of growth there will require an increase of 74% of world primary energy. In China and India, 45% of this growth in OECD countries - the fifth part, the countries with transition economies - the remaining 6%.

In general, developing countries will provide 47% of global demand in 2015 and more than half, in 2030, compared with 41%, the today's demand¹.

The transfer of energy resources in the area of the new war strategy allows understanding of many difficult explanations legitimately at first sight: why the routes of oil and gas pipelines go up there, where,

apparently (economically), they shouldn't go, why "suddenly" begin to develop deposits located in "economically unprofitable areas", and leave without attention, more prospective (in terms of production cost)? What is the relationship between potential energy resources of the country and its geopolitical status in the modern world?

The nature of the currently energy confrontation can not be viewed only in economic terms, breaking it from the global inter-state competition and geopolitics. In the international statistics, the ocean of energy consumption hides the most profound trends of international antagonism.

During the last decade, the composition of players has been significantly changed together with the correlation of forces within the global energy resources. If since the last century the market remained largely bipolar², now the situation is radically different and there is a strong multipolar tendency.

Most analysts consider that the reasons which determined a radically change situation are:

First, Russia now has enough power and instruments to build its own energy policy, internal and external, based on its own interests' security, which by definition may not coincide with what the competitors meet. Today, Russia is the architect of the Eurasian energy complex new model. The fact that this model can be achieved in the shortest time is no longer a question for anyone. To achieve this, Russia needs not only material and technological resources, more important - political will and policy continuity.

Secondly, today's completely United Europe demonstrates its intention to resign from the USA "services" ensuring its own energy security. In Brussels, it is understood that in order to strength the energetic security, this is the first condition required for the dominant geopolitical status of the EU. In this sense, it is difficult not to agree with the opinion of some experts, that Europe is fundamentally interested by direct interaction with the Middle East regions and by implementing their own policies, independently of US, for the extraction of resources, the development of Eurasian deposits and transport resources on the most secure routes from its point of view. Following the recent

diversification of energy sources, Europe can make that energetic jump, both geopolitically and strategically, to which she tends as a new potential subject, to obtain a wider freedom in implementing of her own geopolitical strategy “³.

Thirdly, both Russia and European Union are united as never before by common desire to ensure the transnational mechanism of exploitation of energy resources in the entire Eurasian continent. The US, which is itself understandable and rational from their point of view, on the contrary, is interested in maintaining the status quo.

Fourth, China and India are the giants of world economy and international energy market, in training. The energy development in China and India led to the transformation of the global energy system, due to the large size of these countries and their increasing role in international trade with fossil fuels. Meanwhile, both countries are more and more vulnerable to world's energy markets changes. The rate of impressive growth in China and India in recent years surpassed the increases of other countries' economies. Rapid economic development has led to a sudden increase in their energy needs, which are conditioned by the imports of energy resources.

Fifth, in the Far Eastern sector of the Eurasian energy market, the volume of consumers' demand is fully compatible with the needs of EU consumption, as Japan and South Korea. Clearly, energy prospects of these countries can not be achieved without Russia's participation.

War tactics energy in regard to regional particularities

1. Central Asia

US and the West are extremely interested in the Russian companies' activity in natural gas and oil in Central Asia. A very negative attitude showed the Americans at the initiative of Russia, regarding the establishment of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, analogue of a gas OPEC. Russia is not the first who supports this idea. Several years ago, Moscow had already made a proposal to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to create something similar. But now, it seems the idea may find real contours, as in OCS from which the



biggest countries are part of - exporters and importers of blue fuel. Apart from Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are already actively involved in order to build a gas pipeline to China. It is expected that in the second half of this year China and Russia will start the project – the construction of the gas transportation “Altai”. This system will link the deposits in Yamalo-Nenetz and Syntzyan-autonomous region of China Uyгурsc. The “Altai” system is profitable for Russia, because includes a diversification of national export of gas and reduces its dependence from transit countries, which in early 2009 tried to implement their own plans to blackmail using gas.

One of the main rivals of the Russian market for oil and gas in Central Asia is Kazakhstan. By repeatedly avoiding Kazakhstan, the West has managed to capture the desire of these republics to have more alternative transport routes for energetic resources, sometimes not even taking into consideration the close strategic partnership between Russia and Astana.

The fact that Kazakhstan has started to cooperate more with China in this direction, and also the fact that signed the agreement for participation to Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan has brought new hopes to EU and the US, which started to realize more clearly the importance of Kazakhstan’s energy.

Americans have strongly suggested to the country’s government the need to continue its own energy policy. And in this regard they are ready to help Astana, according to the declaration for partnership on energy, which has been signed by US and Kazakhstan in December 2001.

If currently, for US, in the region, Kazakhstan is the largest object of interest, then for the EU such an object is Turkmenistan, which is even less loyal to Russia than Kazakhstan. The idea of building a major Transcaspian base line doesn’t belong to EU, but to US who proposed it more than ten years ago. But at that time the project was undermined by the leadership of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.

If everything would have been according to plan, then the Transcaspian base line construction would have been finalized in 2010.

2. The Caspian Region

The Caspian region is often considered second as importance after the Gulf. The volumes of oil production can be compared to the volumes of oil extracted in countries like Iraq and Kuwait. Areas bordering Caspian Sea and Caspian bottom are rich in hydrocarbons.

Currently, there are more than twenty exploitations of oil and gas and have been identified other potentially three hundred. The forecasts of oil reserves, according to some reports are about 26 billion tons, equivalent to almost 10% of world reserves (250-300 billion tons). Equally impressive are the volumes in the reserves of natural gas - from 8 to 12 trillion cubic meters. The Russian companies (with European capital) have a share of over 10% oil and approximately 8% of gas. Most exploitations and developments of oil fields, also the largest oil projects accomplished in the region (not without the participation of US firms), are in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Experts estimate that Kazakhstan will be the first oil producer in 2012 - about 55%, second place will be occupied by Azerbaijan with 32%, Russian Federation and Turkmenistan approximately 13%⁴.

US intends to strengthen itself deeply in the Caspian zone and Kazakhstan in particular. It is assumed that in the next ten years, the volume of US investments in the sphere of production, processing and transport Kazakh oil will be of 190 billion dollars. Slightly smaller but no less impressive is likely an infusion of dollars in oil industry of Azerbaijan.

The American side makes considerable efforts to bring oil and gas by transit pipelines, near Russia, bypassing the Russian territory. This position is an element of Eurasian geo-energy strategy of US to minimize the Russian influence in the Caspian area and removing Russia from reserves of oil and gas. Worldwide, as a result of such strategy, there can be easily explained the causes of Washington for the project of the four capitals, Moscow, Ashgabat, Astana and Tashkent regarding the achievement of a Caspian corridor for oil and gas towards Western Europe which will transit the territory of Russia.

The problems of Iran and Iraq, due to the desire to protect the resources of oil and gas in the Middle East, are the reason of penetration



for many types of agents of influence - from charitable organizations to political alliances - and military organizations of the countries that have not declared this region a zone of their own national interests. In accordance with the *Independent Military Review*, in the Caspian region, except the US, Britain and Turkey, countries such as Germany, China, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Japan become visibly present. Notable is that at present the international companies control approximately 27% of oil reserves and almost 40% of the gas, but they don't intend to stop here⁵.

In the Caspian Guard program, the US intends to invest 135 million dollars for the development of Military Naval Forces of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. "The essence of this program, according to the experts from Independent Military Review, is to create an integrated control of air, water and land borders of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and a quick response in case of emergency, including threats of terrorist attack on oil installations. In fact, the US actively sets up around Iran, pro-American territories of resistance with military infrastructure"⁶.

3. The Balkans

Over the Balkans countries goes the shortest way from Europe to the resources of South-Western Asia and the Middle East, therefore there is the biggest regional density of transnational pipelines per unit area of the entire Eurasian continent. This largely explains the modern confliction from Balkans.

Highlighting the main strategic transnational oil pipelines crossing the peninsula:

- initiated and built with the active participation of Germany, which started from Constanța harbour (Romania) and further following Bucharest, the Danube line at Belgrade and Budapest, then to Austria and Germany;
- former Soviet pipeline "Friendship", which carried oil to the former socialist countries of Central Europe, already today by supporting the EU, increased the length of pipelines in West up to Trieste;
- base line from the Black Sea harbour of Burgas (Bulgaria)

through Skopje (Macedonia) to the Adriatic harbour of Durres (Albania), then through Otranto straits at Brindizi Bari (Italy), where oil supply countries from the Western and Northern Europe; from a strategically meaning, this is the most important line for Europe;

- oil pipeline, which is a previous arm of base line of Tetovo (Northern Macedonia), then passes through Kosovo, Belgrade, Zagreb to Ljubljana; EU has already elaborated one project orientated to this line to Germany, France, Belgium and Holland (at present, this base line is second as importance for Europe's energy supply).

The energy corridor of Balkans remains a source of geopolitical conflict in the territory of Europe today. And it is quite clear that "here can be guessed the bases of Europe's old and new alliances with Washington and the West politics in relation with Russia"⁷.

US, linking Kosovo independence to the neck of Europe, tried to create a base from where the trade in the Mediterranean Sea can be blocked and to accomplish peace-keeping operations in the Mediterranean countries, but also to obtain a strong action in the United Europe.

4. The North

Arctic also, becomes a scene of energy war, so that rival countries include it to the race for controlling resources of the North Pole and those ones from the ocean. According to some data obtained as a result of scientists research from different countries, only in the Arctic continental shelf depth are concentrated at least 113 billion tonnes hydrocarbon fuels - oil and natural gas. For comparison, one of the most rich countries in resources - Saudi Arabia - has about 43 billion tons of such resources, Russia - 51 billion (mainly gas), Iran - 33 billion tons. The total basement of leading countries that have oil reserves is not more than 160 billion tons. However, it is difficult to estimate the size resources of Arctic.

Russia, USA, Canada, Denmark and Norway express claims for the right to consider Arctic their own territory. The dispute between them was exacerbated after the end of July 2007, when the Russian science and research expedition that was sent from Murmansk to the North Pole has proved that the underwater ridges Lomonosov and Mendeleev



which are extended towards Greenland are an extension of the Siberian platform in a geological sense.

Canada and Denmark have also sent a research expedition to the Arctic, trying to prove that the Lomonosov ridge, which Russia claims, is linked to Canadian Ellesmere Island and by Greenland, which is Danish-controlled.

Canada is waiting to connect to its land 310 thousand square miles of arctic marine territory with hydrocarbons and other minerals reserves. Denmark claims 62 thousand square miles. Norway has also made a sonar study and hopes to obtain 96 thousand square miles of Arctic and reserved itself the right to extend this territory later on.

In the Arctic Ocean, Russia, outside its economic zone of two hundred miles, could claim 1.2 million km² continental plateau, where potential reserves of hydrocarbons would be around 10 billion tons of fuel, according to some estimations.

The problem is that according to UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the economic zone limit of a state is defined as being up to two hundred miles. The area's expansion is possible only if national continental plateau passes after the limit of two hundred miles. So, in the battle for energy resources of Arctic area, scientifically based evidences should be more powerful within all countries, regarding the fact that the plateau of the Arctic Ocean is an extension of their continental platforms.

“Pliers of gas” for Europe

Russia is looking for special partners in Europe for organizing large centres for supplying natural gas, the so-called gas hubs. As tactical allies in European theatre gas war were elected Germany (North stream project) and Italy (South stream project). In a figurative sense, Russia catches Europe in “pliers of gas”, formed from these two projects. Today in the US, this “gas pliers” is considered as a Russian instrument of monopole of supplying energy to Europe.

US and Poland accused Germany of a selfish policy and by not taking into consideration the European solidarity. By their position,

Sweden, Lithuania and Estonia have expressed their consent (it is right, the latter has its claims for Nordstream project). The Russian - German pipeline construction, bypassing Poland, has been compared at Warsaw neither more nor less but with Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. As an opposition to the Russian - German gas alliance, Poland advanced with a very aggressive idea of forming an “energy NATO”.

Russia understands that to fill the pipelines from north and south it is necessary an important source of raw materials. In this sense, Moscow’ geopolitics goes to the former Soviet republics - Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan. However, there are developments in other far countries, particularly in Iran, where the Russians will develop Parse South deposit - one of the largest in the world, which has been taken into consideration by US and EU for the Nabucco project. Nabucco gas pipeline, which must pass through Georgia and Turkey to Central Europe - is the most economical way to transport natural gas from Azerbaijan to Europe than the competitor project of Gazprom “South stream”. Nevertheless, Russia’s alliance with Iran puts a cross to the possibility of realization the Nabucco project. In addition - again - not without effort from the Russian - the project was officially joined by the French company Gaz de France. At this point, its competitive position in relation with South stream which is made by Russia in cooperation with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary and Serbia became remarkable weaker⁸. Therefore, Russia appeared as having the possibility to consolidate itself within the Balkans. Thereby, co-optating Iran to its economic interests and not offering to competitors from Europe and the US the possibility to develop there, there must be taken into consideration the fact that Iran is unpredictable and develops a nuclear program with military character. Therefore, Russia is currently taking the risk to obtain a neighbour difficult to control and with serious weapons. This will destabilize the whole situation in the Middle East and not only there. It means that Russia is going to a huge geopolitical risk.

The Eurasian perspectives of energy market

The European energy sector market of Eurasia will remain for Russia one of the most important in the next 20-25 years. Currently,



Russia has a lucrative energy dialogue with EU and other European countries.

It is improbable that the current liberalization process of European gas market not to influence the Russian gas export to EU. The traditional system of bilateral contracts and the “take and pay” system is under threat. There is a tendency of reducing the gas market by fixing prices in the traditional basis of long-term contracts, and increasing trade with spot prices on the exchange. As mention most Russian analysts, creating new conditions for competition of gas suppliers are targeted to compel manufacturers to Russians substantial concessions and cause a decrease in exports of Russian oil products.

In the liberalization of gas market in Europe and taking into account the prospects of forming a single energy space, the volume of exports of oil and gas supply from Russia to Europe may reach in 2010 to 140-150 million tons oil and 200-210 billion cubic meters of gas.

Another reason for a possible reduction on the medium term, the exports of the Russian oil to Europe is the low quality of petroleum products, high costs of transit, and also a decrease in export of energy volume due to increasing domestic demand. In 2020, the external supplies of petroleum products may fall to 50 million tons from 85 million tons in 2007.

The demand, which increases over time, of gas from national economies of the countries from the Asia-Pacific, could evolve into promising route for diversification of gas supply to the Asian - Pacific market energy resources. If, on short-term, a year and a half or two - the US overcomes the economic recession, then in this case there may be expected an increased energy needs. For Russia, North America may become a stable market for selling oil and liquefied gas.

China, Japan, Korea, India are the most promising markets for gas, oil, technology and cyclical production of nuclear fuel from South Asia and Pacific sectors of the Eurasian energy market. It is anticipated that by 2020, only a fraction of the Asia-Pacific exports of Russian oil could increase from current 3% to 30% and natural gas - up to 15%.

Regarding the Middle East energy market sector of the Eurasian energy resources and foreign markets, in its relation to the Eurasian

market, in North Africa and Latin America, where the movement on the political scene and the social-economic allow us to expect increases in imports of equipment for Teka and the rising demand for technology services by Russian energy companies.

The technology of the geo-energetic expansion

Given the increasing needs of developed countries energy and attempts to achieve energy independence, the current strategy of competition in any part of the international market of energy resources is done in the following key-directions:

- control of energy resources;
- market access;
- control of transport routes;
- dominating competition.

In order to achieve this goal using traditional methods (export corruption, opaque ways of doing business, financial transfers in the background) and new - the crotch - of induction methods of struggle in the competition based on the philosophy of instability and chaos.

The technology to competitors' actions to promote their projects on the energy market looks about as it follows. At first, information is collected, a survey of staff is done, organize the lobby and the channels, then make a project proposal with diplomatic support. There is organized a system of businesses, depending on the individual interests of those responsible for adopting the necessary decisions. A network of joint venture companies - as intermediate structures. The political level is opened, massive supporting information (possession of information, especially for participants in the negotiation process, allowing more efficient management of the situation) is made, a political coverage and visibility of the project according to national interests. To implement the scheme, they use a "tough package" standard pressing political corruption, blackmail, crime to the extent required under the patronage of special services.

One distinctive feature of modern technology is the access to a high level of government, which responsibly approves the political and



economic decisions with their suggestion schemes that take account of their interests, namely by “proposal which can not be refused”. Official and unofficial channels, organized as formal and informal business meetings, phone calls with political figures and the public in order to cancel or to take decisions necessary for the project’s success by taking decisions and future actions. The best results are given by this technology in the ex-Soviet space, as corruption is a specific practice for all areas affecting the political elites regardless their colour, in particular those ones that come to power or will come to power.

In order to achieve long-term projects a political system is created for ensuring diversified interests in order to minimize possible losses in case of a regime change or political groups coming to power.

In 999 cases out of 1,000 firms that appear in intermediate energy transactions, they are more than simple intermediary agents. Intermediate firms represent various interests of mechanisms, mechanisms of sharing profits from black, hidden mechanisms of funding of different political parties, politicians or funds. This was very clearly highlighted during the recent gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

The leadership of national energy assets is done by attracting legal cooptation or in parallel to active service sector, the so-called sector’s clusters by providing them subsidized loans in order to achieve a mechanism to cover credit and bankruptcy, based on the assets of the branches service.

Thus, in the recent years, there has increased the worldwide concern tendency to retain stable and fully developed and the developing countries energy resources, these being the basis for economic independence and welfare. Unfortunately, peaceful energies are mostly converted into wars and real military conflict. There has emerged a trend of creating their own areas of influence of both the supplier countries and from countries consuming. This trend could not be solved by any attempts to move to alternative energy technologies as effective in this area, as there are no current ones. Starting from here, the international society should develop urgently and necessarily new rules of the game on the energy market for all players, in order to ensure the avoidance methods of force both political and military power to solve problems.



NOTES:

1 Олеарник П. Растущие аппетиты молодых гигантов (Oleiarnyk P. The growing appetite of young giants), http://www.rsppenergy.ru/main/content.asp?art_id=3999

2 Основними покупцями енергоресурсів є США та країни ЄС.

3 Дугин А. Метафизика и геополитика // Наша власть: дела и лица. 10 (45). Октябрь 2004. (Dugin A. Metaphysics and geopolitics / / Our power: business and individuals. 10 (45). October 2004.)

4 Oil-and-gas resources of the Caspian region, US Energy Information Administration, 2006; US Western Geophysical.

5 Цыганок А.Д. Прикаспийский регион вчера и сегодня // Независимое военное обозрение. 18 мая 2007. (Tsyganok AD Caspian Sea region yesterday and today / / Independent Military Review. May 18, 2007.)

6 In the plans of Washington - was the inclusion in the medium term in such areas and Abkhazia, although the unrecognized republic of geographically does not belong to the Caspian region, but the geopolitical space is not always the same as geographical.

7 Андреев П. Коридоры смерти (P. Andreev Corridors of death), <http://www.novopol.ru/phorum-list6-theme997.html>.

8 Support governments of transit countries does not guarantee the timely construction of 'Southern stream'. 'Gazprom' repeating the mistakes it has made in establishing the Northern 'flow'. For the construction of the pipeline will require the consent of Ukraine and Romania. But to ban it either Romania or the Ukraine may not be - they can only delay the start of construction.



THE BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE - XVI-XX CENTURIES

*Mihai VELEA, PhD,
Professor, National Defence College*

Introduction

As stated by the power relations theory, the idea of balancing against the influences of more or less potent states will appear more and more in the specialists' analysis. Any scientific intercession in this field is based, firstly, on a wide range of experience and documentation. The older the analyzed events, the more evident become the balancing in the relations between powers, at the zonal, continental or worldwide level.

Most of the studies regarding this field are concentrated on the important wars and on the question whether states balance against the most powerful state or they line with it¹. Balancing analysis post-factum wouldn't solve the problem, because concentrating only on them and evaluating how wide the balancing is, bring about a serious problem. It is, also, necessary to dwell on the wars that were avoided and to ask ourselves whether their absence results from the aggressor's anticipation of a balancing tendency. The balancing, which often has a causal impact, appears to be "outside the equilibrium way" and unobserved (Levy, 2002 b)².

The examination of the non-war periods, as well as of the war periods, may lead to interesting conclusions. The potential aggressors are more inclined to start the war when they anticipate that the possible opponents aren't balancing, so, if we look just on the wars, we can see that, in this kind of situations, the non-balancing phenomenon, or an underestimation of the counterbalancing causal impact, intervened. This is a form of selecting an obvious variable. This logic seems unfit,

if we take into account the causal connection “if...., then” of the counterbalancing declaration: if there are extreme concentrations of power, the balancing intervenes. The implication of this phenomenon is the fact that some extreme concentrations of power are a sufficient condition for balancing, this making imperative the selection of the cases based on an independent variable - a certain measure of power concentration as a hegemonic threat.

Work hypotheses

The general opinion that great powers counterbalance against hegemonic threats leads to a large number of implications. Although these hypotheses apply, regularly, to any continental system where the military capacity based on land troops is the basis of power in the system, in this essay we limit our analysis area to the European system, following the most probable situation's logical plan.

Speaking about balancing, we consider that it is not universal, it is delimited by the purposes' conditions and it appears as an answer to the hegemonic threats, not only to the smaller ones.

It appears the idea that we don't expect to find evident counterbalancing patterns against *any* dominant state in that particular system, but only against those who represent hegemonic threats, based on capabilities. Similarly, we mustn't expect to find clear prototypes of counterbalancing against the most powerful state in the system growth of power, but only against those who are already more powerful than other states. These considerations lead to our first two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: It can't be traced a clear pattern of counterbalancing against the most powerful state in the system, no matter the proportions of this fact's advantages;

Hypothesis 2: There isn't a clear pattern of balancing against the most powerful state in the system, when its power grows continuously;

The bigger the advantage of the most powerful states in the system in the field of capability, the larger the probability for other states to counterbalance against it or to create an ampler coalition.

Therefore,

Hypothesis 3: The stronger the capability of the most powerful state, the more likely is for the other powers to ally against it;

Hypothesis 4: The stronger the capability of the most powerful state, the more likely is for more than two powers to resist to its threat, by means of an alliance against this state;

Hypothesis 5: The high military capabilities of a state, along with their important growth, will cause, very likely, balancing alliances.

We have analyzed counterbalancing in terms of alliances formation, as an answer to the military power concentrations. This phenomenon is known as “*external balancing*”³. Other possible reaction to the power concentrations is strengthening the personal military capabilities, of the military potential economic basis, which is often referred to in terms of “*internal balancing*” (Waltz, 1979). Thus, the internal balancing appears to be a problem that deserves a separate discussion, although the verification of such a statement is not an easy thing to do. A problem would be the way in which the distinction between the balancing coalitions and those based on official politics, military interests, or national pressures, can be made. A similar analysis is represented by that which makes a distinction between the strategies for the growth of economic productivity and wellbeing, in order to strengthen the military potential, similar strategies, based on the promotion of the social welfare, of the private interest and the natural economic growth.

The limitation of the counterbalancing analysis to alliance formation, as an answer to power concentrations, as well as the exclusion of other possible answers to external threats, leads to a conservatory idea of the balancing hypothesis, because a behaviour that others might interpret as balancing we wouldn't classify as being so, at least in this research.

The evaluation

Our analysis begins in 1495, an year that can be seen as the origin of the modern European power system, and we end our analysis in the year 1999. The great European powers (from Levy, 1983) include The Ottoman Empire (1495-1699), Spain (1495-1808), Austria (1495-

1918)⁴, France (1495), England/Great Britain (1495), the Netherlands (1609-1713), Sweden (1617-1721), Russia (1721), Prussia/ Germany (1740) and Italy (1861-1943). There weren't identified major problems in the power system until 1945. We can divide this whole time into a two-period European system: before and after 1945. The roles played by the European actors weren't identical in these two systems. Before 1945, Europe, especially Western Europe, was the main region in the world's system. At the end of World War II, this supremacy ended. That is when the United States and the Soviet Union raised, simultaneously with the decline of Great Britain's, France's and Germany's relative status. The basic political problem that had affected Europe since 1495 - how to refrain a state from obtaining the regional hegemony- persisted. Consequently, we ask ourselves the same logical question, after 1945, as before - whether the European states counterbalance or not against possible hegemonic threats coming from the most powerful states in the continent⁵.

We start our analysis from individual power and its behaviour towards alliances (alliance/non-alliance) as an answer to the power concentrations, throughout a five year's period⁶. A drawback of this theory it's the fact that it doesn't control great powers' variation in number, from one period to another. It comes into sight the idea that, the larger the number of great powers, the more likely it is for a counterbalancing alliance to be formed. Another problem of the theory refers to the failure of the system levels orientation, in order for a distinction to be made between the situations when there is only one alliance against the dominant state, from those in which several bilateral alliances appear. Counterbalancing is more evident in the second case than in the first one. Taking into account the great individual powers and their behaviour towards alliances, we discover a more discriminating dimension of the balancing behaviour.

The identification of the most powerful state, of its capacity, as well as of its power evolution, presupposes, as well, the measurement of its military capacities, for the same period of time. It would be useful for an indicator of all situations when the most powerful European state had hegemonic ambitions, or when the others thought that it has them,

to be identified. The evaluation of all the events during times of peace or war, for the last five centuries, would be an extremely complex task. Since our hypotheses refer to hegemonic threats in the European system, where the balance of power theory and the theory of threatening are combined, the analysis of the degree of one state's power represents an appropriate measure for the success of our scientific research.

The most frequent power indicator of a state, for the last half of millennium, used by the political leaders and by the analysts, are: population size, national wealth and army (Morgenthau, 1967). We possess quantitative information about population and army. The relative wealth has been occasionally estimated, in the course of time, but there is little information regarding the evaluation of the national product, if we look back in the last five centuries.

If we consider the predominant agricultural nature of the first modern European economy, the estimations of the relative wealth before the Industrial Revolution would be difficult to make⁷. In addition to that, the calculations related to the balance of power were made for short periods of time, while the economic power was relevant on long term, as we can see in the fact that some of the wealthiest states became bankrupt with several occasions, while, in the field of military activity, there were less situations of this kind (Rasler and Thompson, 1989: 90-97). Thus, the absence of the wealth indicators isn't a serious impediment in estimating the capabilities related to the balance of power⁸.

The population estimations for the past 500 years can be extracted from the data of major European states. The main problem is that there are few variations of the relative population number, when we speak about great European powers, so this indicator can't show a substantial variation of the relative power in the course of time⁹.

A problem related to this thing is the fact that the population indicators don't count in establishing the status as a great power, when talking about little states, like the United Provinces of The Netherlands, which successfully competed, for a long period of time, with countries like Spain and France, countries with a greater number of population. Population size mattered, but it was a secondary quality of relative power.

When analyzing the balance of power, this situation causes the reduction of everything to army power. While the states had lost their trust in mercenaries (Howard, 1976), armies developed, whose fight was based on infantry, in the context of the new type of European international relations (Thompson and Rasler, 1999). Unlike population, army's size and influence vary a lot from one state to another. The smaller, poorer and least determined states tend to possess smaller armies than those of the bigger, wealthier and more determined countries, the territorial expansion efforts in Europe being, mostly, accompanied by an increase of the army's size. From the general total of the population, the most prominent aspirants to hegemony in Europe, usually, created the greatest armies of their times, with the purpose of achieving the military and territorial conquest goals¹⁰. Thus, army's relative size is a viable and useful indicator of power distribution in continental Europe during the last five centuries.

The data related to army's size, available in every five years, are taken from Rasler and Thompson (1994), with two modifications. Firstly, the data were updated, including the last half decade of the 20th century, using the same sources as in the original data collection. Secondly, there was estimated an Ottoman army statistics for the 16th and 17th centuries which was missing from the Rasler and Thompson's data and which has been added to the European study.

The estimation of the Ottoman army's size is a difficult thing to do, from many points of view. Firstly, the literature offers few estimations of number. Murphey (1999) delivers a limited number of data during a period of 200 years, supposing that there weren't major changes between different periods. The first modern Ottoman army was heterogeneous. It had a nucleus, made from an impressive number of people, the cavalries from the conquered states. Anyway, these cavalries weren't the least disciplined and they could be used only for several months, when they were needed for gathering in the crop. The third problem is the fact that Eastern Europe was only one of the threats that the Ottoman troops faced.

That's why we limited our estimation at the permanent nucleus of the Ottoman army and we didn't evaluate the potentially auxiliary

cavalleries, which were coming and going, according to the circumstances. Although this calculation rule is relative, it provides a much better means of estimating the size of the Ottoman army in European context than that which helps calculating its value in Europe, South-West Asia and North Africa¹¹.

If we take into account the capability of each great European power during the last five centuries, it is clear that the domination on land, most of the time, was held by France, The Hapsburg Empire, Germany or Russia. For the purpose of this analysis, the leading continental power, in any five years' period, was the state with the biggest army, in the European group of great powers.

A problem is the fact the number of Russian armies always was relatively large, bigger than their actual influence. The main reason is that Russian armies, just as the first Ottoman armies, were the furthest frontiers from the West-European battle-fronts. As the Russian Empire

PERIOD	DOMINANT POWER	PERIOD	DOMINANT POWER
1495-1500	France	1790-1814	France
1500-1504	England	1815-1819	Austria
1505-1514	France	1820-1830	France
1515-1524	The Ottoman Empire	1830-1834	Austria
1525-1609	The Hapsburg Empire, Spain	1835-1839	France
1610-1619	The Ottoman Empire	1840-1849	Austria
1620-1644	Spain	1850-1864	France
1645-1650	France	1865-1869	Austria
1660-1664	Austria	1870-1874	Germany
1665-1714	France	1875-1909	France
1715-1729	Austria	1910-1914	Germany
1730-1764	France	1915-1934	France
1765-1774	Austria	1935-1944	Germany
1775-1779	France	1945-1999	USSR (Russia)
1780-1789	Austria		

Table 1 - Dominant power in time

was extending in Eurasia, the need for garrison troops was growing. In the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century, the Russian army grew larger, exceeding state's capacity of offering food and weapons. The Russian armies who fought in Central Europe were, most of the time, larger, in number, than those of their European opponents. They were also very slow when it came to mobilization. Since we are interested in the European system in this study, and the European leaders, generally speaking, they underestimated the power of the Russian army (Fuller, 1998), we need a scheme for weighing the role of the Russian army, in order to reflect more accurately its relative influence¹².

The problem is that any evaluation scheme should display a greater dimension at that time and inconstant during the three centuries of Russian implication in the modern European power system. Our proposal is to use the size of Russian armies in order to calculate the European totals, and not for their acceptance as an indicator of "the most powerful" state before 1945. We often agree with the fact that it was the second state in size during the 8th century, 9th and the beginning of the 20th century. Another consequence is the fact that some of the supremacies maintained by the first two powers can't be compared to the previous, pre-Russian, supremacies. Such an example is the French supremacy during the decade after 1800. In this scheme, without Russia, the French army would have had the proportion of 0.516. But, Russia being in the scheme, the French proportion was 0.38.

Since this element of non-comparison isn't a realistic one, it would be better to accept it as a part of the necessary compromises for measuring of the capabilities' distribution and for the efficiency of the balancing problem. The alternative is to designate Russia as being the dominant continental power for the last 200 years - an unreal position. Since the problem of the Russian "deformation" tends to even the supremacies obtained after the beginning of the 18th century, the theory about balancing should be contradicted. As we preferred not to incline our analysis in a certain direction, an inclination towards a disadvantageous result for our theory is preferred to one that favours it¹³. The table below makes a summary of the states that are granted continental supremacy, according to our rules.



The greatest power isn't necessarily a threat for other great powers in the system, especially if its superiority level is a modest one. The beginning period, as shown in Table 1, reveals the superiority of the French and Spanish assortments, as being the ones who possess continental power (associated with Carol the Fifth, Philip the Second, Louis the Fourteenth and Napoleon), which interferes with their continental domination period. Between the domination periods, naturally, other states appear as being the greatest powers, mostly because the anterior leader was exhausted and/or demobilized, temporarily or permanently. Between Napoleon's period and 1945, there was an obvious different pattern of the absence of a clear numerical domination. We need certain standards to evaluate and to identify the dominant state, which functions in old situations, as well as in new ones, to distinguish a dominant state who determines perceptions of hegemony threat and a balancing behaviour.

A possible threshold is the possession of a 50% of the system's capabilities¹⁴, which is an interesting point of view, but not very useful for our purposes. Firstly, it is a very rare situation for a state to achieve such relative military power percentage. If we exclude the power of the great Russian armies during the 20th century, for the reasons mentioned above, the only great power that exceeded 50% of the system's capabilities is The Habsburg Empire, during 1560-1640. This period of time is, obviously, too short to test the balancing theory. Secondly, we would expect for the power concentrations below 50% to generate perceptions of hegemony threat, determining balancing behaviours.

In conclusion, a capability of 33% in the system represents a more reasonable percentage of a domination position, sufficient to generate perceptions of hegemonic threat. Undoubtedly, any proportion below 50% is arbitrary, but we want a single threshold, useful in the context of the variation in number of the great powers in the European system during time, taking into account the usage of different thresholds for the variable numbers of great powers. Only in a three actors' system, a proportion of 33% of the capabilities would be unimportant, but there were always more than three powers in the system. The number of great powers decreased to four, but only for several years, during mid 1500



- mid 1940, and, even then, a threshold of 33% represented a capability proportion 50% bigger than the average of the other actors' in the system capability. In a six or seven powers' system, the possession of a third of the terrestrial capability would represent a remarkable concentration of power. So, we believe that the 33% threshold serves to our purposes well enough, as regards to our scientific investigation.

We can't state that the army size is a good indicator of power outside Europe, especially if there are significant asymmetries in the field of technology. The army size indicator points out the quantitative dimension, ignoring the qualitative one. Big armies can be badly prepared, led or/and equipped. Small armies can have a superior motivation, better tactics, longer spears and faster loading arms. Although the missing of an access to clear information about the quality of the European armies during a 500 years' period is an excuse to omit this important dimension, it represents, in the same time, an important limitation of the army's size interpretation.

Army's size is one of the few indicators in the international politics that has kept the same meaning during the last half of millennium. Also, it is recommended that we concentrate on the regional politics and on the territorial expansion - both of them implying the same military power during the 16th century and the 20th century. Besides, the technological asymmetries that may weaken the validity of the indicator regarding army's size are minimized by our concentration on the European system of great powers, which was defined by a relatively fast technological diffusion.

We defined our variable in terms of the counterbalancing extension, by means of coalitions, as an answer to power concentrations. We focus, from this point forward, on the military alliances, based on official agreements, which stipulate that, in case one of the states is attacked, the other gives it military help. Taking into account our interest in balancing against the dominant state, we limit our analysis to "alliances with a precise target" (Walker, 2001), which identify the dominant state in the system as being the specific threat. We also limit our attention on the alliance treaties. While not all official alliance treaties are respected and, since some unwritten agreements reflect a serious intention to



invoke the alliance in case of an attack, the first are better than the last, from the point of view of the engagement indicators in a great number of cases, because a written engagement implies a “precious signal” of the state’s availability to honour the treaty (Morrow, 2000)¹⁵. Recent evidences suggest that the states have respected their engagements in the alliances in 75% of the cases, during the last two centuries (Leeds, 2000), together with the selectivity effects that explain why we don’t see this all the time (Smith, 1995).

Focusing on the written alliances treaties, we exclude the alignment cases which were never formalized, but who contributed to common reactions against an aggressor. Through the exclusion of these cases, our institutionalization initiative is a conservatory influence for our balancing test. A possible mistake that we do, related to this idea, is the fact that we exclude the military interventions that don’t imply a written treaty. For example, we don’t include the United States among the members of the coalition during the First World War (because it wasn’t a European actor and because its military role wasn’t accompanied by a formal treaty). We can’t include the United States because, obviously, it was making a counterbalance against Germany¹⁶, if we don’t make an indicator of the state’s intention of counterbalancing and apply it, systematically, to all the wars during the last 500 years. However, when speaking about intervention, the problem only refers to the size of the balancing coalition during the war, not also to the question whether it appears or not.

In order to realize an inventory of the formal alliances during the last 500 years, we used four data sets, already created (Small and Singer, 1969; Levy, 1981; The correlatives of the War Alliances Lists, 1993; Gibler, 1999) and 29 general or particular diplomatic histories¹⁷. It is necessary an analysis of multiple sources (and other older ones) until we feel that other sources couldn’t offer us any new information¹⁸.

As a conclusion, it can be stated that there is an ambiguity in the field of the exact duration of alliances in early modern Europe. Apart from the cases when an alliance persisted, we supposed that many of the alliances in that period lasted for a short time, only during the year of their creation or until the end of the war that followed their creation.

These modalities led to the identification of 223 alliances, although this number can be modified according to those ones who entered later in the alliance and according to these alliances' renewals which we treated from case to case. Not all these alliances are relevant for this study, because our hypotheses imply the concentration on the alliances that are explicitly oriented against the most powerful military power¹⁹. So, we are left with only 84 alliances.

Since there are surely errors in the data that we have, we want to point out the fact that we limited our balancing definition, referring to it only when we talk about alliances. Additionally, as regards the written treaties of alliance formation, specifying that the target is the most powerful state in the system, many of the data problems oppose to the confirmation of the balancing hypotheses, when speaking about the European system.

Data analysis

We start by taking into consideration two general ideas from the specialized literature about counterbalancing, ideas that we expect to have the minimum support: the fact that great powers tend to balance against the most powerful state in the system, no matter its superiority; great powers tend to balance against the most powerful state in the system if its military power increases significantly (here defined as a 10% growth, compared with the last period). We are sceptical as regards the success of these assumptions and we formulated hypotheses 1 and 2 in order to demonstrate that there aren't two patterns, established by the previous mentioned ideas.

The relevant information for the idea of the balancing against the most powerful state, no matter the size of its advantage, can be found in few cases, on the right side of table 2. Some of the great powers' alliances were formed against the most powerful state only in 202 cases, from a total of 451 possible occasions, a percentage of 45% of the situations, in contrast with 209 cases of answers without an alliance (55%). This comes to support the idea that hypothesis 1 doesn't give us a valid balancing pattern against any most powerful state.



REGIONAL STABILITY AND SECURITY

	An under 10% change of the capability	An above 10% or more change of capability
There is no alliance response	151 (0.570) occasions	98 (0.527) occasions
Alliance response	114 (0.430) occasions	88 (0.473) occasions
N=451 (Total)	265 (1.000)	186 (1.000)

Table 2 - Changing the capability and the answer of the alliances against the dominant power - 1495-1999

Our expectation from the second hypothesis is that there shouldn't be fixed patterns of balancing against the most powerful state, which is increasing its capabilities significantly (10% more as compared to the anterior period)²⁰. Table 2 compares the forming and the non-forming of alliances, associated with changes of under 10% of the most powerful state capabilities. We can observe that, while the alliance forming reaction against the most powerful state is more likely when its capabilities are growing, the observed relation ($p=0.18$) hasn't a statistical significance. This absence of a balancing support confirms the second hypothesis.

As expected, there isn't an identification typology of any great powers' tendency to counterbalance against the most powerful state in the system, no matter the level of its superiority. This conclusion contradicts many of the ideas mentioned in the traditional literature regarding counterbalancing and it is a basis for our initial hypotheses' analysis, hypotheses that point out the idea of balancing against the most powerful state in the system only if it represents a hegemonic threat, based on a great concentration of terrestrial military power within the system.

Hypothesis 3 suggests that, the stronger the relative capability position of the most powerful state, the more likely for the other great powers to balance against it, by means of forming military alliances. Table 3 compares the alliances forming answer, against the most powerful states, which possess a third or more of the military power in the system, with the answers against the states that possess less than

	The relative weak position (less than 33%)	The relative strong position (33% or more)
No alliance answer	184 (0.637)	65 (10.401)
Alliance answer	105 (0.363)	97 (0.599)
N=451 (Total)	289 (1.000)	162 (1.000)

Table 3- The dominance (33% or more) and the alliance answer against any dominant power - 1495-1999

one third of the military power in the system. We discover a strong and significant tendency ($p=0.000$) of the states with a more powerful position to cause an alliance reaction of the states holding weaker positions. These conclusions support the idea that great powers tend to balance against hegemonic threats.

This conclusion becomes more important if it is judged in the context of alliance formation of the great powers in general, not only the forming of alliances which have as a precise target the great power in the system. This leads to the information that doesn't appear in table 3. If we move the dependent variable from the alliances/ non-alliances which have as a precise target the most powerful state to the alliances the great powers' alliances against any other great power, we see that there isn't a significant relation between the power concentration at a level of 33% or more and the alliances formation in general. Great European powers were predisposed to forming alliances in periods when a state was holding more than a third of the capabilities in the system (68%), as well as in the periods without such a dominant actor (70%). This fact suggests that our analysis in table 3 includes the balancing against the most powerful state, with hegemonic potential, and not other alliance forming situations, as those who are based on traditional rivalries.

Hypothesis 4 brings about another dimension of the counterbalancing behaviour - the size of the counterbalancing coalition, here defined by the number of great powers in the alliance. Many theories related to power balance imply the idea that hegemonic threats, derived from great power concentrations, should generate not only a balancing coalition, but also a coalition that includes several great powers, not just two.

The number of great powers allied against the dominant power	There is a dominant leader with a percentage of 33% or more)	There isn't any dominant leader (with a percentage of 33% or more)
0	11 (0.275)	28 (0.4459)
2	6 (0.150)	20 (0.328)
3	8 (0.200)	10 (0.164)
4	14 (0.350)	2 (0.033)
5	1 (0.025)	1 (0.016)
TOTAL	40 (1.000)	61 (1.000)

Table 4 - The dominance and the coalition size

The multilateral coalitions are also important for another reason. The greater the number of states in the alliance, the more likely is to state that they were determined to do this out of balancing considerations, for the collective good or for hegemony avoidance, in opposition with other personal reasons. The table below makes a summary of all relevant information related to hypothesis 4, that a larger coalition is more likely to form against the most powerful states, holding a greater proportion of the capabilities in the system, rather than against the states that hold supremacy, but which are less threatening and possess fewer capabilities.

There are two ways of interpreting table 4, both of them leading to the same result. If one would include the situations of non-alliance answers, 57.5% of the answers against the dominant leaders (which hold 33% or more of the capabilities in the system) imply coalitions formed of three or more actors, as compared to 21.3% answers against the non-dominant leaders. Focusing only on the cases when the actors actually responded (putting aside the zero cell) the proportion between the situations when a dominant leader was present and those when it was absent is 79:39 or 2:1. So, the great power concentrations not only encourage alliance answers, but also stimulate the greater coalitions which are oftenly similar to the coalitions which have as their purpose the balance of power.

	The relatively weak position (under 33%) or a growth of under 10% of the capabilities	The relatively strong position (33% or more) or a capability growth of over 10%
There is no alliance response	227 (0.585)	22 (0.349)
Alliance response	388 (1.000)	63 (1.000)
N=451 (Total)	289 (1.000)	162 (1.000)

P=0.000

Table 5 - The dominant position (33% or more)/ Growing capabilities and alliance response against the dominant power

The balance of power theory implies the idea that great power concentrations should be perceived as being even more threatening if they are growing, if the dominant leader increases its power. Table 5 compares the position of 33% or more with a 10% growth of the capabilities, supporting substantially and significantly ($p=0.000$) the hypothesis that the situations when very powerful states become more powerful are more likely to generate a balancing behaviour than other situations.

Still, we have to mention the fact that many effects derive from the level of the capabilities, and not from their growth rate. A 33% capability leads to balancing coalitions in 60% of the cases (see table 3), and the combination between the 33% capability and the growth of 10% leads to a balancing coalition in 65% of the situations.

All these results suggest that great military power concentrations tend to generate, systematically, a counterbalancing behaviour, and that the situations when these strong states become even stronger are more predisposed to determine counterbalancing coalitions formation.

While table 4 sustains these conclusions, by referring to the size of the involved coalitions, we add that the tendency towards balancing is not automatic. The number of great powers in the European system varied between 4 and 7, while the number of members in the coalitions (excluding line 0 from the middle column) is, on an average, 3.34. So,



while a balancing coalition usually forms itself as an answer to a great concentration of capabilities, just some of the great powers enter that coalition, while some of them don't or they even ally with the dominant state²¹. The counterbalancing against the power concentrations is a probable tendency, not a behaviour "law" in international politics.

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NOTES:

1 See the essays from the *APSR* symposium about balancing, 1997, in Vasquez and Elman (2002).

2 This is the first way towards the counter-balancing results, which are mentioned above: the anticipation of the counter-balancing leads to an absence of the domination desire. While the study of the unobserved counter-balancing implies a serious problem in the field of identifying cases of populations that we want to use for exemplification and generalization, we could identify few relevant cases for our purposes and for a close examination. Such an example is Russia's failure in playing a more important role in the Turkish crisis during late 1820s and 1830s because of the fear that it might cause a counter-balancing coalition (Rendall, 2000, 2002). Another example is the Soviet Union's restraint during the Cold War (Gaddis, 1998).

3 Other possible forms of external balancing may include territorial divisions and compensations (Gulick, 1955).

4 Spain and Austria were united under the lead of Charles the Fifth, during 1519-1556, and we refer to the United Hapsburgs as to a single great power of that time.

5 The United States were criticizing in many aspects the NATO coalition,



formed after 1945; the alliances between European states went before NATO. We don't feel the need to include the United States among European states, after 1945. The United States became a strong actor in Europe, although never being an European state. Treating it otherwise would mean not focusing anymore on this region. We admit that great European powers, before 1939, weren't great powers anymore after 1945, but the most important states before 1939 were: Russia, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy.

6 The analysis made for a period of five years is arbitrary. The data referring to armies are available on average every five years, thus being excluded the annual analyses. A ten year period would allow for a delay between the perception of the balancing need and the effective creation of an alliance, but it also contains a long period of time, within which wars can begin and end, and the partners in an alliance can switch sides. The shortest period of time possible is preferable, in order to avoid a potential change, along with a representative situation for a period of time within which many types of behavior can be observed.

7 The wealthiest European state, starting 16th century, has oriented the power of its war capability towards the American silver, rather than towards its wool crop. On the other hand, the agricultural wealth of France was difficult to mobilize for the use of the state (Rasler and Thompson, 1989: 94-97).

8 Few little states (The Netherlands, for example) were capable to develop enough in the exchange sector to compete and to outrun the great agricultural powers, at least for a while.

9 In Western Europe, for example, France was the permanent leader from the population size point of view, starting mid of 19th century, until it was equalled by the unified Germany, after 1871.

10 An important exception is the 20th century's Germany.

11 In some years, the auxiliary cavalries were doubling the size of the Ottoman army for short periods of time (Murphey, 1999).

12 See Wohlforth (1987), regarding the estimation problems of Russian capabilities before the First World War.

13 We also experimented a situation of reducing the size of the Russian army at 50% of its capacity, but this didn't affect our conclusions.

14 Many of the formal patterns imply the idea that a proportion of over 50% means, essentially, hegemony. Niou, Ordeshook and Rose (1989:76), for example, it is stated that *"If one state controls the majority of the available resources for all the states in the system, than that particular state will eliminate the others and it will expropriate all the available resources"*.

15 The causal relation between the alliance's behavior oriented towards alliances and the war that follows is complex and contested (Wagner, 1986, 1994; Smith, 1995; Maoz, 2000; Morrow, 2000).



16 There are other interpretations which state that there wasn't a counter-balancing (Bass, 1864).

17 Here, are also included Hassall (1905), Barker (1906), Hill (1906, 1914), the most comprehensive, Atkinson (1908), Turner (1908), Mowat (1924), Reddaway (1936), Petrie (1947, 1949), Marriott (1950), Taylor (1954), Spooner (1958), Langer (1968), Wolf (1968), Beller (1970), Livet (1970), Ward and Gooch (1970), Fernandez Alvarez (1975), Dmytryshyn (1977), Hillgarth (1978), Jones (1980), Stradling (1981), McKay and Scott (2002).

18 Older sources are preferred to the contemporary ones, that concentrate more on interpretation than on description. The contemporary approaches tend to concentrate on major alliances, while older studies don't discriminate the alliances, by reason of historical importance.

19 We excluded the alliances that hadn't a clear purpose or orientation against somebody.

20 The 10% or more calculation is based on the changing of the basis of the absolute capability of the state, not on the changes in its relative proportion in the system. A 10% growth of the relative capabilities would be a threshold too high to establish the minimum signification. Most of our analyses are based on an N 451, which represents the sum of the possible number of great powers' alliances answers, minus the alliance answer of the most powerful state, during half of century (the most powerful state can't ally against itself).

21 Since we have established the existence of an alliance against a state or against a non-alliance, our data don't discriminate between aligning with a state and being at its side when that particular state undertakes some actions.



RISKS AND VULNERABILITIES OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT WITHIN THE AREAS OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO ROMANIA

*Visarion NEAGOE, PhD,
Brigadier General, Professor, General Staff*

The study focuses on the present and future risks and vulnerabilities within Romania's area of strategic interests, on implications on national and regional security and on the main directions for the actions related to this.

The war moved its area of interest towards new domains (informational, economic etc.), therefore, the deepest threats to security are in non-military areas. In this context, notions like peace, crisis, war changed their meaning in accordance with and simultaneously with the evolution of the security environment.

Romania's neighbourhood is likely to face a number of different new threats regarding the security, interests and way of life.

An early identification of these threats provides an opportunity to react timely and to avoid the negative evolution of events.

1. Sources of instability within the areas of strategic importance to Romania: limits, causes, enumeration, details

The beginning of the new century and millennium coincided with that of a new era in the international policy, where the economy and security will be the main factors in determining the future evolution of the world and international order.

Security is seen as a dynamic process with variable geometry, which asks for a continuous reference to the new types of threats within the external environment: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illegal migration, ethnic and religious conflicts, and more.

Most of these have a high degree of unpredictability, they are more and more interdependent, and, depending on the particularities of each area, they tend to adjust themselves to certain vulnerabilities or impossibilities of taking local action, increasing the risk to security.

The risks, threats and danger to states' security, and, implicitly, to Romania's, can be amplified by vulnerabilities and malfunctions, among which the following phenomena lead to preoccupations and dangers: high dependency on some difficult to get vital resources; negative tendencies persistent at demographic level and mass migration; a high level of social insecurity, the persistency of chronic poverty and the aggravation of social differences; the reduced proportion, fragmentation and insufficient role of the middle class in organizing the economical and social life; the fragility of the civic spirit and solidarity; weak and not very well protected infrastructure; the precarious state and the low efficiency of the health insurance system; the deficiencies in organization, the insufficiency of the resources and the difficulties in adapting the educational system to society needs; the inadequate organization and small amount of resources allotted to the crisis situation management; the insufficient participation of the civil society in debating and solving the security issues.

In the contemporary reality, war has moved its area of interest towards the new domains in which supremacy is disputed: economic, informational, commodity markets, political centres, infrastructure networks.

Currently, the most interesting phenomenon is the evolution of the meaning of war, which no longer coincides at all times with that of conflict, which, in its turn, no longer automatically coincides with that of military action.

Thus, one may state that the deepest threats to national security appear in the non-military field, such as: political, diplomatic and technological pressures, informational aggressions, hostile information



actions, economic and financial aggressions, psychological actions, information gathering and misinformation, destabilizing migration, cultural influence.

Generally, at the level of all security strategies among the areas of interest for Romania, one might identify approximately the same risks:

- regional instability, due to regional crises and conflicts, and to the possible activation of some “frozen” conflicts;
- spread of weapons of mass destruction and technologies for producing them;
- high availability of new types of conventional weapons;
- transnational dangers: terrorism, drug and weapon trafficking, the interruption of the vital resource flow, illegal migration, smuggling networks, money laundering networks, religious sects, organized crime networks.

The intensification and increase of these risk factors take place while some countries that undergo a transition process struggle with a real power dissolution, with a structure incapacity, together with a feeling of mistrust of its population in the reaction capability of the state’s institutions, leading to suspicion, to the image of an uncontrollable state, on the background of a classic system of misleading and psychological demotivation used by the professionals in informational warfare.

The characteristics of interstate relationships are often characterized by conflicts of various proportions and spheres of manifestation (economy, politics, ideology, diplomacy, etc.). The main categories of state destabilizing factors are: political conflicts, actions taken by criminal elements or groups, legal void in most of the problems related to ensuring the informational security, intended or unintended violation of the existing laws concerning the informational security issues. These phenomena will increase on the background of the economic crisis that affects the entire world.

While examining the contemporary world outside the borders of Europe, we find a mixed image, with Russia and China – two major powers of the Euro-Asian area – as key factors for the NATO members.

Russia is reshaping its strategic disposal of forces. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), designed for the members of the



Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), is reactivated at the same time with the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

CSTO, which groups the former Soviet countries Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan, develops, just like NATO, a rapid reaction force able to take immediate action in any corner of the ISC space.

China and Russia, together with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tadjikistan and Uzbekistan, founded the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001.

As Russia has been pleading for a long time for the great importance of CSTO and SCO, both groups seem to enhance their connections.

The reform in Russia is threatened both by the economy status and by the actions of some powerful former communist elements.

China plays a major role in the international economic system. However, its large and growing market is in opposition with its relatively closed political system which, as claimed, denies the human rights which are intrinsic to Western democracies.

The states in the Caucasus and Central Asia resulted from the disintegration of the Soviet Union are still a potential source of instability and incertitude.

Even if the states in this area are able to reform and to become democratic, the process could be slow, and the instability could cause problems that might generate tension in Europe.

The recent conflict in Georgia sustains the previous statement. It is a conflict in which Russia succeeded in showing its regional power and strategic interests in the Caucasus, it defeated an ally of Washington, took its revenge for the recognition of Kosovo's independence and, for the first time in 18 years, it could enlarge its territory by taking over the separatist provinces South Osetia and Abkhazia. Georgia misses the prospects of joining NATO and it could lose, maybe forever, the separatist territories.

No matter if Ukraine chooses an independent and democratic development or not, it is and it will still remain a critical factor for the European security relationship. The instability from Ukraine or the



limitation of its sovereignty could bring back the topic of the security and interests of all the states in the area.

The Middle East is a hot spot. The sources generating tension have not been eliminated yet. They are not only in the Gulf and within this space, but also, unfortunately, outside its perimeter.

The Near East is under similar conditions. Arabic countries and Israel are far from living together in a complete state of security.

The recent conflict from Gaza Strip, the different attitudes of the international community and the dramatic consequences for the local population clearly reflect the complexity of the situation.

The radical regimes from Libya and Iran could endanger the regional stability and the international access to vital sources of energy.

If we analyze the Middle East over the last years, we can easily notice how its dynamics are influenced by the competition between Iran and the United States for the power in the region. In this context, the perspective of Iran becoming a nuclear power and being able to transfer this capability to the Middle East terrorist groups becomes unacceptable not only for the vital interests of the USA, but also for the international peace and stability.

Attracted by the growing importance of SCO in Central Asia, Iran requested to become full members in 2002. Its acceptance would render complicated the relationships among members, as well as their connections to the United States, and the SCO would be seen as a being more anti-American and even Anti-Western.

In spite of its misunderstandings with Russia on continuing building the nuclear reactor, Iran expects to be successful, possibly being supported by China, indeed because of Iran hydrocarbons. Only that Beijing wants, indeed, to consolidate its relationships with all the energy providers, but not to the detriment of profitable relations with Washington.

The tensions in the Korean Peninsula, as well as those in one of the new centres of power at regional level, such as India and Pakistan, lead to unpredictable evolutions and uncertain endings.

The formula for generating the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO aims at reconciling a new great European



autonomy on security and defence, maintaining the transatlantic connection. In this context, the expansion of the two great integrating bodies – NATO and the EU – completes the physiognomy of the current security environment, rendering credible the efforts of building the security architecture under regional stability, trust and safety.

From the security point of view, Central Europe is a coherent space. History proved, especially during World War II followed by the Cold War, that any time the coherence of security in this area was affected the seeds of a new future conflict are set. It is not by chance that the fragmentation of Central Europe led to major tensions and conflicts in Europe.

The Balkan Peninsula, bordered by the Black Sea, the Marmara Sea, the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, including Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, together with Romania and the European Turkey, represents a borderline between cultures, religions, mentalities, ideologies and areas of influence which are multiple, individualized, on the one hand, and varied and interrelated on the other hand.

Here we find the junction, on the one hand of state entities at different stages of their transition to democracy and market economy, with varied levels of development and different position towards the integration within the Euro-Atlantic institutions, and, on the other hand, of spaces and regions still unstable and unsafe, subjected to ongoing or latent crises and conflicts, that are not fully resolved, ready any time to be reactivated, able to generate new threats and challenges to the regional and global security.

The Black Sea basin, a continuation of the Mediterranean basin to the Baltic Sea and, further, to Central Asia and the Middle East, has its main political and security characteristics similar to the Balkans area, and also its own characteristics, such as the interests of the riparian countries, as those of the main actors that want to be at the top of world hierarchy (USA, Russia, China, Japan, India, EU countries, the huge economic, military and demographic potential, as well as the role of this area as an element connecting Central Asia and the Middle East in the game of global political and economic interests.



Starting from these elements, we consider that peace, stability and security, so separate and desired, have not generalized yet in these areas, but, on the contrary, some latent conflicts reactivated and other conflicts emerged at the same time, thus generating new spots of tension and insecurity all over the Balkans area, the Black Sea basin and in its vicinity: Georgia, The Republic of Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, etc.

These spots complete the unsafe areas in Europe represented by the Caucasus and the Balkans, that directly influence area and regional security and stability.

The analysis of conflicts and tensions highlights the fact that most of them have almost common historical premises and the entire area is faced with great economic, political and social problems, generated by the transition process in those countries. Contrary to the general evolutions favourable to the relaxation and international cooperation, in the areas of strategic importance to Romania, there are, based on the presence of some specific vulnerabilities, military or non-military threats and challenges that could endanger the security and stability of the entire region. According to their nature, the causes of these threats are:

- political problems:
 - the presence of an unstable and sensitive political environment, that leads to the reduction of the state authority and to the proliferation of some phenomena specific to the organized crime;
 - the involvement of some political and military personalities in illegal actions;
 - the amplification and generalization of the corruption.
- security problems:
 - the persistence of some latent tensed situations determined by separatist movements or territorial disputes;
 - the incapacity of a lot of states to secure their borders efficiently, thus allowing the proliferation of the illegal traffic networks;
 - the existence of an impressive quantity of armament which is illegally owned.
- economic and social problems:



- the existence of the discrepancies among states, as a result of the economic crises, of the reforms, of the privatizations with political implications and of the uncontrolled prices;
- the decline of the population's standard of living;
- the mass migration, as a result of the internal and external conflicting situation.

As a consequence of these causes in particular, the main threats and challenges in the areas of strategic importance for Romania are the following:

- the internal instability in numerous states and regions springing after the break-up of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia;
- the increase or the maintenance of the ethnic separatist conflicts;
- the attempts to disintegrate and constitute some independent state entities (Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Transdnier, Abkhazia, Adjara);
- the increase in the number of Islamic proselytes, especially among the intellectuals and young people;
- the export of instability, by promoting the Islamic fundamentalism and the interests of the Islamic states towards the South-Eastern Europe and by the existence of some compact ethnic groups in these areas (Turkish in the South-East of Bulgaria, Bosnian, Albanian in the Balkan Peninsula, Turkish-Tatar in Crimean Peninsula, Orthodox Turks in the Republic of Moldova);
- the interests and actions of the organized crime networks;
- ensuring the financing sources for the terrorist groups;
- maintaining an instability climate;
- providing armament and facilitating its illegal traffic;
- the economic competition triggered by the exploitation and transport of the petroleum in the Caspian Sea;
- the increasing pollution of the Black Sea basin;
- the endangering of the environment;
- the building of some high risk objectives in the vicinity of the national borders (the project of the atomic power plant from Belene – Bulgaria);

- the expansion of the terrorist networks and activities and of the trans-national organized crime (the economic and financial crime, transborder human drugs, radioactive and strategic materials, armament and ammunition trafficking);
- the proliferation and uncontrolled dissemination of the nuclear technologies and materials, of the weapons of mass destruction, armament and other unconventional lethal means.

The implementation of the security informational dimension and the achievement of an adequate risk management at Romania's level supposes taking into consideration the following realities, which also represent management risk factors:

- reluctance to novelty, changes, together with improper information, results in not understanding the dimension of the security in the current context;
- political analyses do not use an "intelligence" approach, they are directed, focused on the event;
- failure to understand that, on one hand, the introduction of technology and its proliferation are inevitable, and, on the other hand, they amplify the security environment.

a) External factors:

- increasing the interest towards the informational warfare as a "political warfare" as part of the state policy, manifested within the geopolitical interest space of Romania;
- awareness and consideration of the need to establish in some countries the adequate informational warfare structures at national level, designed to protect the information and able to develop offensive informational operations as well;
- tendencies to establish and centralize some powerful informational communities designed to support informational warfare;
- Romania's lack of participation in the effort to issue an international legislation regarding the informational warfare, as well as its weak connection to the North-Atlantic and European informational flow;
- the increase of the competition regarding the economical information, by means specific to informational warfare;
- proliferation of the information terrorism (cyber-mafia), which

can affect the national informational infrastructure, in spite of its incipient level of development;

- using at a larger scale the satellite telecommunication system, which the Romanian state cannot control;
- the rapid development of the mobile communication system, controlled at national level by a small number of service providers.

b) Internal factors:

- the lack of awareness and understanding of the complex aspects regarding the informational warfare phenomenon, both at decision making level, and at public opinion level;
- the absence of a unitary vision and strategy which leads to sectorial approaches at department level;
- fragmentary reflections of the real nature of the informational warfare phenomenon which appear at the level of the mass information means;
- the attempt to control the information support and even the information itself through the information technology offer;
- the existence of an internal “information communication”, well-organized, acting in university environments and international lobby groups, from the perspective of surfing the internet, spread within ethnical areas;
- the lack of a national system of informational offer – an informational system open to anybody who wishes to check Romania’s pulse through information networks;
- the lack of an offensive drive at image level, integrated in an informational warfare, materialized through actions carried out by professionals;
- the low percentage of staff specialized in informatics, communication, image campaigns;
- the migration of the young people trained in the field related to informational warfare;
- the low degree of general and specific training in the field of informational culture;
- the difficult access to open informational sources due to reduced number of computers and internet access point;

- the possibility of increasing the number of “virtual terrorists”, Romanian citizens who alter the public image and affect the interests of Romanian government through their actions. This is encouraged by the lack of an adequate legal framework;
- the low level of providing high-tech equipment for decisional structures – the low informatization of military and civilian systems;
- the early stage of learning and using the techniques and instruments in the area of economic information, having noticeable consequences upon the privatization process, upon the functioning of capital market, and upon the perception of the country’s risk;
- the lack of a coherent policy and strategy on the acquisition, the implementation and development of C4I systems for all security structures.

2. The consequences and implications of the risks and challenges in the security environment at national level. Forms and ways of action

No matter if we talk about South Eastern Europe, Caucasus, Central Asia, Northern Africa, or the Middle East, the unitary characteristic of security imposes a common exercise to manage efficiently the main threat vectors. Nowadays, this exercise is equivalent to the Allied consensus of “projecting stability”, one of the reasons for NATO’s involvement in many “hot spots” worldwide.

Romania, as a NATO and EU member, has a role of connecting the two structures. The military and political experience has imposed our country as an important strategic element in the Balkan and Black Sea area. Then, as a border country for both NATO and EU, Romania’s role in securing the common borders is a vital one, and the common experience will be required to face present and future challenges.

Only if Romania is permanently connected to the developments on the European continent, the meaning of border will act in our interest. The border may become a space of positive interference, also favoring the compatibility of theoretically separated cultures, intensifying the force of spreading the values of democracy and freedom. If we take



into account the experience in the West Balkans, we can identify the importance of dominating the process for the national security.

The presence of risks and challenges in these areas can have the following important consequences for both NATO and EU, and for Romania, as it follows:

- maintaining the insecurity in areas of strategic interest for the countries involved;
- nurturing some instability hotbeds;
- intensifying the activities of organized crime;
- losing some of the traditional markets;
- affecting the access to the hydrocarbon resources in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea;
- affecting the capitalization of river and sea communication line (Rhine, Danube, Black Sea);
- establishing some preferential areas of commercial and financial influence;
- creating difficulties in balancing the trade;
- emerging and aggravating the open conflicts.

A priority for NATO and EU's future activity is to change the Balkans and the Black Sea into a pole of political stability and economic development, having the purpose of extending the peace and security climate in the Balkans, and further on, towards the Caucasus and Central Asia.

The increasing importance of the Southern flank is an element that adds new values to this area, shaping it as a region in which the alliance will conduct multinational exercises.

The source of the new challenges brought by the terrorist phenomenon could be located both in the south of NATO's borders, as well as on the axis of the new energy flow: Central Asia – Caspian Sea – Southern Caucasus – Black Sea.

The partial thaw of the political relations between Greece and Turkey, as well as the reasonable solution in the case of Cyprus accession to European Union, represent a beneficial and dynamic factor for the regional collaboration.

Under the circumstances of strengthening NATO southern flank,



Romania and Bulgaria's accession not only achieves a strategic balance, but also encourages regional cooperation, due to the part that the two members can play in the normalization of the relation between Greece and Turkey.

NATO's enlargement to the East places, for the first time, the six Black Sea riparian countries in a parity: there are three NATO member countries (Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria) and three non-member countries (Georgia, Russia, Ukraine). As a result, the Black Sea is no longer under the exclusive influence of former Soviet countries.

The existence of the initiative for Military Cooperation in South-Eastern Europe is a valuable premise for the regional cooperation.

The establishment of BLACKSEAFOR, a naval cooperation body that comprises all six Black Sea riparian countries, has as objective the mutual information on the navy forces of the participating countries, and is capable to jointly conduct humanitarian, search and rescue, mine sweeping and anti-pollution operations.

Within this context, the development of the collaboration in the Danube area will result into the revival of the river communication and the transformation of the Danube into a European navigation water main, that contributes to the capitalization of river and maritime transport lines in the entire area of the Black Sea, including the connection to the Caspian Sea area, through the Volga-Don system.

The Romanian Armed Forces, as a main instrument of insuring the national security, contributes to achieving this aim even at peacetime, by:

- protecting the integrity of national maritime territory, and of the economic exclusive areas;
- controlling and securing the air space;
- collecting, processing, analyzing and disseminating military intelligence;
- extracting and evacuating the Romanian citizens abroad whose lives are in danger;
- ensuring the security of facilities, transport, and military communication.



In order to defend Romania and its allies, the Armed Forces take action to:

- reject armed aggressions within NATO collective defence;
- provide support to the well functioning of the government institutions.

In order to promote the regional and global stability, using the defence diplomacy as well, the actions of the Armed Forces are meant to:

- participate in crisis response operations;
- participate in humanitarian operations outside Romania's territory;
- participate in military operations within ad-hoc coalitions;
- participate in cooperation initiatives regarding defense and in implementing measures to increase stability and trust;
- offer military assistance and support for other states;
- contribute to national and international efforts to control armament and to fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In order to support the state institutions and local authorities in case of civil emergencies, the missions of the armed forces consist in:

- participating with forces and logistic support in order to limit and remove the effects of disasters;
- offering support in case of chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological accident;
- supporting search and rescue actions.

3. Measures and courses of action for a new security dynamic at national and regional level

The current security environment is influenced by the continuous changes and transformations that generate new risks and threats. The future security agenda must be based on new approaches of symmetric and non-conventional risks, leading to new types of international solidarity.

Within this context, it becomes more and more obvious that the states' security interest and objectives can only be accomplished by



international cooperation. This comprises types of joint action of the states that share common interests and values.

Europe evolves towards a security environment through cooperation, whose defining trait resides in political and economic integrity and in the extension of the community of the states which share and promote the democratic values. The risks of a major military confrontation on the continent have significantly decreased. Yet, there still are phenomena of instability and crisis at sub-regional level, as well as tendencies of fragmentation, marginalization or isolation among certain states. A serious challenge for the international system is represented by the increasing number of “fragile societies” and, implicitly, by their inability to control the evolutions on their own territories. Thus, we witness the development of new mechanisms of ensuring the continental and global security, based on the conflict prevention and on the increasing role of the diplomatic means and of the civil crisis management capabilities.

The interest in the strategic areas of importance to Romania is represented by the limitation of the number of hostile regimes, unstable and difficult to predict, as well as the number of unfavorable economic situations which make them vulnerable to extremism and terrorism.

Generally speaking, the states in the areas neighboring Romania share the democratic values and principles and have a common regional history.

These states want to cooperate, but they lack a common political military action. That is why it is necessary to establish new institutions and to develop new common projects which should be concrete and specific. At regional level, the courses of action meant to give security a new dynamic can be:

- strengthening the collaboration with the countries within the close geographic area and the participation in multinational military structures constituted at regional level;
- providing complementarities with the security initiatives of the European Union, especially towards the related threats: organized crime, illegal immigration, human trafficking. There must be signed conventions regarding risk evaluation, unconventional threats and common counteracting measures;



- consolidating and completing measures regarding the enhancement of trust, specific to these areas, including formulae of regional military cooperation;

- preventing asymmetric threats by enhancing the reaction capabilities and by adapting the solving mechanisms to the objectives of the security common to the Euro-Atlantic area;

- reshaping the armed forces, the enhancement of the civil control on the armed forces and the cooperation among the fields of security.

Romania gives a great importance to the political military commitment into supporting the stabilization and democratization processes within the adjacent areas, as it considers this fact as an intrinsic part of its national security.

At regional level, Romania promotes stability by:

- developing the complementary initiatives within the SE of Europe;

- participating in multinational peace support operations;
- bilateral and multilateral military cooperation;
- fulfilling international commitments and obligations regarding armament control, disarmament and prevention of mass destruction weapon proliferation.

Our country's consecration as a strong pillar in redefining the stable subregional environment certifies the commitment to managing the security matter within the SE of Europe.

Starting from the historically proved fact that nations, even the very powerful ones, cannot counteract alone the trans-national threats, we can state that Romania's joining NATO does not mean defending only its fundamental interests, but also the historically consecrated democratic values, freedom, security and general prosperity.

Judging from the situation within the presented areas, one may state that they will remain active from the perspective of political, economic and even military events, and the potential conflict in the area, together with the existence of some terrorist groups and organized crime elements, and also with the increasing interest in strategic resources and the need to control access to all these will lead to a massive concentration of forces and means.



Rendering the states in the region responsible through their direct involvement in managing their own issues will lead to transforming the area from a security consumer into a pole of economic growth and stability.

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HYDROCARBONS – AN EFFICIENT “WEAPON” OF THE ECONOMIC WARFARE

*Cristian BĂHNĂREANU, PhD,
Researcher, Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies,
National Defence University “Carol I”*

The energy resources, especially oil and natural gas, were and continue to be the reason for both cooperation and confrontation between actors of any historic period. At present, the state's positioning and role on international hierarchy and power equations is not based only on its armed force, but mainly on its available economic resources. Thereby, the 20th century great military conflicts were replaced by less violent “warfares” carried out for economic, technological and informational domination.

The economic warfare is now a constant of the relationship between states and constitutes a more efficient tool for achieving some strategic goals. In that framework, the intensity of competition for access, control and distribution of hydrocarbons did not lower; in fact, it is more acerb and the exhaustion spectre intensifies the battle. Moreover, in the last years, the so-called “energy weapon” has got more importance in policy and international economic relations.

I. Economic warfare and its tools

Generally, the economic warfare includes the use of economic tools in order to coerce the adversary to change its policy/behaviour or to undermine the capacity of that state to maintain normal relations with other states. Such warfare may be defined as “the aggressive use of economic means to achieve national objectives”¹. To this definition we may add the threat of using these means for weakening the adversary's



economy which will affect its politic and military power. In fact, the economic warfare is a post-concurrence phase where loyal concurrence changes in disloyal concurrence, then in crisis and finally in the framework of conquering the markets and dominating the resources process might degenerate into a conflict.

It is no doubt that the efficacy of economic warfare depends on the trade necessity of a target-country. The states that need the living means for their citizens (water, food, etc.), raw materials, or those which survive from specific resources selling are vulnerable to economic warfare. Those states, that from ideological or geographical reasons can renounce to trade, are hardly to be affected and economic intrusion have less chances to succeed.

At present, the economic confrontation is mainly focused on owning, demand, supplying and using raw materials and energy resources – a competition intensified by the actual economic-financial crisis.

In the middle of this global economic competition there are placed the great political-economic actors (the USA, the European Union, China, the Russian Federation, Japan, India), the international economic-financial organizations and the transnational corporations that seek to control sources of raw materials and hydrocarbons, technologies, markets and prices, which make international relations more dynamic and complicate. World markets, international commercial balances, national status and wealth and last but not the least the living standard and security of present and future generations depend on their success or failure.

The actors of the actual economic confrontation use various means in order to influence strategies and policies of certain governments. These tools and methods are by exigency of applying and their effects: public appeals, political-diplomatic interventions, jurisdictional measures, non-economic sanctions, economic sanctions and the military action as a last instance.

In our opinion, economic sanctions are restrictions enforced or threat with enforcing restrictions from a country in the current commercial relations framework to a target country in order to pursue that government to change its policy. Their bringing into force can



be unilateral or concerted with other countries through UN Security Council or other international organizations.

The best known forms of economic sanctions and measures, based on coercion, for peacefully pursuing a state to end infringement of international law norms or some economic policy principles, to revert some unjust measures and undo the created prejudice or to make certain concessions, are: boycott, blockade, embargo, negative linkage, retorsion, and manoeuvres and methods used normally in economic warfare (production quotas, import/export quotas, dumping and monopoly policies, alliances, etc.).

Against a “delinquent” state/states which can’t peacefully solve its disputes there may be adopted other constraining economic measures such as: withdrawing economic and financial support from the international community; limitation or restriction of investments; freezing and sequestering accounts and external possessions; impeding free development of bi- and multilateral economic exchanges; declaring as null and inoperative the bi- and multilateral economic-financial agreements and treaties which imply that state; violation of contractual rights and obligations; exclusion from regional and international economic-financial organizations, etc.

All these forms of action have as the main objective the exclusion of the aimed state from international economic circles and exchanges, the interdiction of its access on certain markets and its privation from some goods, products and services and even the total economic isolation in order to force it to respect several rules, to end some practices or to comply with particular will. However, classical methods of economic sanction mean high costs that often have not been reflected in the results. Their use presume a judicious and objective prognosis of consequent effects on own companies, suppliers and consumers, generally on economic activity.

II. The use of hydrocarbons as a tool of influence

In the context of increased competition for power and influence on world arena, the economic resources, especially energy ones, play

a more and more important role in positioning a state and establishing its role in the international relations system. The unequal distribution and possible exhaustion of hydrocarbons resources that are still the engine of world's economy led to amplification of the energy games and permitted some "monopolies" regarding sources and routes, prices and markets control.

Walter S. Jones' definition of power – the capacity of an international actor to use its tangible and intangible resources in order to influence the results of international relations to its own benefit² - illustrates the fact that any state will use all available resources, including energy ones, to work its will and influence the behaviour of other actors in order to achieve its own interests.

Classical methods of economic sanction proved to be inefficient, with a success rate of only 24%³, reality that conducted to identification and use of new economic tools to influence the decisions and behaviour of a target state. Among them, the use of hydrocarbons as a tool of influence or so-called "energy weapon" was seriously taken into account by some actors.

In our acceptation, the use of hydrocarbons as a tool of influence or "energy weapon" is closely linked to the exertion of the economic power – major component in state power complex – and can be defined as *any action or inaction of an actor from owner-exploiter-producer-transporter-distributor-consumer chain that is directly or indirectly linked by energy resource in order to influence or control other actors*. Accordingly, the "energy weapon" can be used on the entire chain by any "link" implied in that process.

Still, may hydrocarbons be indeed an effective "weapon"? If energy resources are used in the free economic competition and concurrence as pressure means, then they represent only an accepted manner to promote or win something, as well as financial resources, imports, etc.

On the market characterized by free concurrence, any transaction is a positive sum game where each part win, thus being adjusted the harmonious distribution of resources between economic agents. On that market, private energy producer, even monopoly one, can't exist if it doesn't obtain profit by satisfying the final consumer, which may waive

and replace the producer if not satisfied. Even in these conditions, as a result of increasing demand of energy resources, some producers, transporters, and distribution economic agents may indirectly affect other actors which are strong dependent from them in their rush for profits.

If state interferes in that equation, then we can say that hydrocarbons became a “weapon” of political power used in international relations in order to achieve their own interests. Economic agents controlled by the state are less motivated to satisfy the final consumer, especially when they own the monopoly in certain fields of energy industry. For that matter, the sector defined by monopoly concurrence is dominated by a single company or only few companies, which means that competition lacks or is limited. Generally, a monopoly market is characterized by high prices, as core objective of a monopoly firm is to maximize its profit. Companies that own the monopoly on some markets might raise their profits by several practices as price discrimination (more precisely, the price on a product differs on one client to another or one market to another).

The governments have always on their agenda strategic goals regarding power positions and domination in the international relations system.

The direct or indirect control of energy resources can be a blackmail tool and really an efficient “weapon” only in government’s “hands”. If at a certain moment the decision factor considers that it’s political profitable to use this “weapon”, even if that may be financially expensive, it can’t be stopped to do so.

In these conditions, the use of “energy weapon” in international relations represents rather a form of blackmail, an action which can fall into the category of techniques less accepted by international standards in order to achieve political, economic, military goals. This subversive tool is used to weaken the economic, political or military power of a nation by undermining the citizens’ moral, loyalty or trust. Consequently, we think that “energy weapon” is an additional tool of political pressures exerted by some states against a country which is guilty of serious misconduct.

III. The “energy weapon” – from theory to practice

The control of energy resources generates political power and influence everywhere in the world. The situation is inevitable, so that, over time, there were numerous cases in which different actors involved in these games on the resources trigger energy disputes and crises which often has disastrous economic and political effects on local, regional and even global level.

The entire industrialized world may collapse without energy and, accordingly, the agrarian infrastructure, transports, information technology, communications and other vital sectors must be sustained with constant energy deliveries. Any “shortage” of market and world energy networks constitutes a serious danger and therefore the energy security represents a major component of national security strategy and foreign policy of any state.

Energy has been and continues to be often used as a tool of political, economic, military influence, in order to obtain some strategic advantages on the more complex and dynamic scene of international relations. In many cases, the confrontations between competitors were indirectly engaged and great actors must respect more or less formal the states’ right to independent capitalization of hydrocarbons.

The most important state and non-state actors that have the energy potential and means to use the hydrocarbons as an influence tool are:

- the states with significant reserves of energy resources (oil, natural gas, coal), such as: Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia;
- the states with important production and export capacities and transport and distribution networks, such as: Saudi Arabia, Russia, USA, Norway;
- the transit states between producer and consumer, such as: Turkey, Ukraine;
- the regional and international economic organizations, such as: ***Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, World Trade Organization, Shanghai Cooperation Organization***;
- the stock-exchanges and markets where the international prices are set, such as: New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), Singapore



International Monetary Exchange (SYMEX), Intercontinental Exchange (ICE Futures Europe) from London;

- the great energy national and transnational companies, as: Gazprom OAO (Russia), ExxonMobil Corp. (USA), Royal Dutch Shell (Great Britain), BP p.l.c. (Great Britain), Chevron Corp. (USA), Petrochina (China), etc.

Russia represents a country that controls a large part of world's energy resources and pipelines and uses that advantage in order to get influence in power policy in ex-Soviet and European spaces or at international level, more precisely it supplies cheap energy to allies and expensive energy to "adversaries". The Russian state was repeatedly accused that uses the energy for increasing its political and economic influence on Baltic States and Poland. Moreover, Moscow has stopped or threatened often to stop gas deliveries to several ex-sovietic states as a result of bilateral disputes that had implied political (independence movements, pro-Western attitudes), economic (prices, debts, energy control transfer) or even military (Russian troops retirement) aspects.

The most severe crisis occurred in December 2005, when Ukraine refused to pay the price demanded by Gazprom that was more expensive than Russia practices at home. The same reason was invoked in the January 2006 dispute with the Republic of Moldova. In 2007, also, Russia did not hesitate to use the "energy weapon". In October, Gazprom threatened with stopping gas deliveries to Ukraine as result of a \$1.3 billion unpaid debt. Also, Belarus and Georgia were threatened for some dissensions regarding prices and hydrocarbons transit. The last crisis occurred in January 2009, when Russia stopped again the deliveries to Ukraine, due to disputes regarding the price of Russian gas supplied to Kiev authorities and the price paid by Russians for gas transit through Ukraine to Europe. By all these actions, Russia has affected the Western consumers and triggered a serious European debate on energy dependence of the EU on Moscow.

Gazprom is the adequate tool for Russian energy "manoeuvres". Established in 1989, the Russian company controls about 90% from gas production of the Russian Federation and 17% from the world's natural gas resources. Gazprom is a usual economic agent, but represents a




Fig. no. 1

Source: The data were taken from Gazprom (www.gazprom.com) and Energy Information Administration (www.eia.doe.gov)

strong tool of political pressure⁴. In 2006, the company delivered important quantities of natural gas in Ukraine, Germany, Italy, Belarus, Turkey, France, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria, Romania, Finland, the Baltic States, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro, Georgia, Croatia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Macedonia⁵. In the next graph we detailed in percents the dependence degree of main European and CIS beneficiaries from Russian natural gas exports.

While Moscow claims that its price policy is strictly influenced by the market's conditions, there are big differences between prices for domestic market or allied states, such as Armenia, and those ones for states that tried to get out from Russia's influence, such as Georgia. Accordingly, the natural gas supplier – Gazprom – is the Russian state (owns 50,002% of the company⁶), so we may say that the price setting system is politically influenced.

In the Fig. no.2, we showed, in different moments, the prices practiced by Russia on domestic market and those ones for its natural gas exports (the data are those presented in the public sources of information).

States	Price (\$/1000 cubic meters)				
	At the beginning of 2000	2005	2006	2007	2008
<i>Russia</i>	27	32	40-45	52	52
<i>Armenia</i>	45-100	56	110	110	110
<i>Azerbaijan</i>		60	110	230	230
<i>Belarus</i>		46,7	46,7	100	119
<i>Georgia</i>		68	110	230	230
<i>Moldova Republic</i>		80	160	170	191,25
<i>Ukraine</i>		50	95	130	179,50
<i>Baltic States</i>		85-95	120-125	230	280
<i>Bulgaria</i>	120-130	120-130	120-130	170-175	240
<i>Romania</i>	120	190-195	250-255	280-285	370
<i>Turkey</i>	75	100	243	243	300
<i>Western Europe (average price)</i>	200-240	240	240	265	370

Fig. no. 2

The difference between prices for internal market, for allies, and those for Baltic and European states is obvious. Russia raises or threatens to raise the price of natural gas supplied in some CIS, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe countries in order to maintain at least its economic influence in those spaces. Although this measure seems to be a response to the attitude of different capitals towards Russia, the political impact is far to have the expected results. By its actions, Moscow contributes now to the development of a uniform concurrence environment in the region. Moreover, Russia destroys its external markets and business partners and in the same time favours the reorientation of those countries to other hydrocarbons suppliers and even developing of alternative energy

and transport routes. However, Russia cannot afford to raise price more than one at which other natural gas suppliers become profitable. Finally, the result may be opposite to Moscow's interests and those countries will be increasingly less dependent on Russian natural gas.

To counteract these possible effects, Russia acts in order to:

- cover the entire demand of energy importers by long-term bilateral contracts;
- consolidate oil and natural gas deliveries by long-term contracts signed with Central Asia producers;
- control the strategic energy infrastructure from Europe and Eurasia by acquiring pipelines, refineries, power networks, ports;
- extend the Gazprom monopoly.

Consequently, Russia will use all its political and diplomatic ability to develop its economy and, ultimately, will not hesitate to use the "energy weapon" as a tool of pressure and influence. But the Europe's dependence to the Russian gas has as reverse the Russia's dependence on incomes from oil and natural gas sales on European market. In that context, the uncertain situation regarding the regularity of energy supply flows should end in the near future by a mutually beneficial compromise in the framework of a strategic partnership, taking into account that the resources belong to Russia and the money to Europe.

Conclusions

The entire debate on energy security or battle for energy from present and probably future is nothing but a consequence of governments' involvement in exploitation and control of natural resources. On one hand, there are transnational companies and global cooperation and, on the other hand, inequitable relationships and dangerous energy dependencies. The limitation or obstruction of free and competitive access to hydrocarbons threatens the good functioning of economies and puts states and nations in the face of serious dangers.

Ideally, energy should not be considered but only a commodity traded without any political interference. Oil and natural gas should be considered goods with international public utility. Accordingly, the



actors of energy chain should not use the energy as a political tool and understand that interdependence represents the key of achieving at a large scale the energy security and economic development. But, considering the fact that the world's demand of hydrocarbons is permanently increasing, we think that the “energy weapon” will continue to be the preferred future action tool for some actors, in order to enforce their strategic objectives.

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TERRORIST CHALLENGES AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE ECONOMIC-SOCIAL DIMENSION

*Petre DUȚU, PhD,
Senior Researcher, Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies,
National Defence University "Carol I"*

Terrorism is a conscious human activity, voluntarily, motivated and violent, organized and performed in order to achieve a well-defined purpose. It has many different consequences at all levels, i.e. the social, economic, political, military and psychosocial. Therefore, it must be studied by the methods and techniques of sociology.

Also, terrorism has met and will globally meet, in the future, an upward trend in the world, especially in countries viewed as enemy by the terrorist organizations.

Therefore, the fight against global terrorism is an obligation and a mission for the entire democratic world.

1. The terrorism – a human activity with many social representations

Terrorism is a *conscious human activity, voluntary, motivated and violent*, pursuing a well-defined purpose. "Today, terrorism is everywhere. It forms one of the major components of the war - after slowly but surely infected during the last three decades"¹. The terrorism - a terrorist attack or attempt- is conceived, organized and conducted by an individual or group specialized in such activities.

Terrorism is a *conscious activity* whereas those who plan, organize and conduct it know what they do, realize the consequences of their acts. They are not under hypnosis or in another state that may alter in any way the possibility to realize the effects of their actions. The

ways the terrorist actions are designed, organized, led and carried out prove that those ones who do so are in their full mental capacities. They know what they do, how to do it and why and, most importantly, they estimate the effects in both the targeted population, and terrorist groups. Basically, any terrorist act or action has a clear and carefully defined objective. Nothing is left to chance, everything is organized, the results are estimated and impact, especially the psychological one, thoroughly calculated.

Meanwhile, terrorism is a *voluntary activity*, in the sense that the terrorist or terrorist group is doing so because they want to take such action. For example, terrorists who have acted in July 2005 in London did it voluntarily, because logically, they might have had other options. Thus, they would might surrender to police or simply throw the explosive in a place where they would not cause loss of life and destruction of property. However, they preferred to accomplish their “holy mission” drawn from their leaders.

Terrorism is also seen as a *motivated action*, sustained by individual or group reasons, interests, ideals and aspirations. A terrorist act is not without reason, in any case, without pursuing to achieve some ideals or aspirations, even though, in many cases, the motivation is of spiritual and ethical nature and not a material one.

Finally, terrorism is defined by *violence*. Probably, this is its most obvious feature, basically the violence is the element that increases the effect of terrorist attempts, regardless the means by which they were performed. Violence gives the severity of terrorist attacks since the loss of life occurring in a manner, which is intended to create panic among the population in the targeted country, to induce a deep sense of fear, insecurity, and helplessness among those hit and mistrust in the authorities, who seem not to be able to ensure security of citizens.

It is possible that all these characteristics of terrorism, viewed as a human activity, have led to the appreciation that it is in a sense an ideology, when in reality it is a strategy with coherent and concerted actions, with a specific evolution in time. As such, terrorism is a phenomenon with specific dynamics. Therefore, what applies to a terrorist organization data in one country and at a certain time is not necessarily valid for



another type of terrorism on another time or continent. In order to understand terrorism in a given situation, all the political, social and cultural factors that generate it must be known, together with the space they are evolving.

Terrorism lost when it was enrolled in a political movement or was supported by forces hostile to democracy. Therefore, as a weapon, it cannot be used effectively against democratic regimes, which possess the means to adequately defend against it.

Terrorist challenges, dangers and threats can be represented as separated items or as a whole in which each component can be transformed in another one under certain conditions. Thus, the very existence of international terrorist organizations may be considered a challenge to human security, as well as to national or global one. They can make various attacks, worldwide, it often becomes reality, and in this case, there is a terrorist threat. In fact, ultimately, any terrorist threat and challenge can become a terrorist threat. Starting from this statement, we briefly present the most well known types of terrorist threats.

There is a coherent set of rules by which a person or human group, perform a terrorist act. They include the following: *attacks with bombs, kidnapping and taking hostages, the chemical threat, hijacking aircraft or air attacks.*

Challenges, dangers and threats of terrorism, seen as a whole, can be emphasized by a number of indicators. In our opinion, we may mention the following among them:

- *Intensified terrorist attacks in member countries of the multinational military coalition that fight against international terrorism;*
- *Increased frequency of audio-visual messages broadcasted by international terrorist organizations, through media and Internet;*
- *Increased number of individuals, suspected members of terrorist organizations moving to states that are viewed as possible “targets” of terrorist attacks;*
- *Increased frequency of terrorist organizations verbal threats in the states participating or supporting the fight against terrorism;*
- *The warning, in accordance to the alarm codes set for imminent terrorist attack, issued by domestic information services, with*

responsibilities in this area;

- *Increased number of news and material disseminated by local and global media about terrorist activities that took place in the world;*

- *Intensifying the spread of rumours about future terrorist attempts in certain countries;*

- *Announcements of certain states' officials related to discovering people or companies who directed money towards international terrorist organizations;*

- *Increased activity of organizations of foreigners in the country chosen as the "target", or organizations suspected of moral and material support for some terrorist groups in countries of origin.*

2. The status and role of sociological investigation of terrorism

Given the magnitude and complexity of terrorist challenges, dangers and threats and the multitude of effects that they generate in society, the study of this phenomenon with the sociological methods and techniques is a necessity. We present as arguments the following:

- *The sociological knowledge is a scientific one, being carried out with scientific methods, techniques, processes and tools, by teams of qualified researchers in the field of social investigations;*

- *Any sociological field research ends with proposals of measures regarding studied issues.* These measures are of great diversity. Thus, they may refer to: the adoption of laws to regulate the conduct of persons in different situations and environments, initiating further organizational measures for the purposes of creating institutions for countering terrorism, improving communication between public authorities and public media in terms of terrorist challenges, dangers and threats that lead to restrictions of citizenship rights in certain situations and places, etc.

- *Terrorist actions are carried out by people and concern all human beings, as individuals or grouped in different areas such as jobs, markets, stations, means of transport, hospitals, schools, etc. Therefore, studying the motivation of terrorists' activities and the effects of this activity induced in the 'targeted' population can be effective and*



suitable only through sociological investigation; human society, as a whole, is vulnerable to terrorist challenges, threats as it should work best for its members to ensure favourable conditions of life. In other words, society must ensure its members safety conditions in respect with unanimously recognized civil and human rights, through the institutions created for this purpose. The appropriate manner to ensure this balance is the study of social reality through sociological research, in order to provide reliable solutions for terrorist challenges, dangers and threats;

➤ *Social representations, attitudes, individual and collective behaviour regarding the terrorist dangers, challenges and threats are very different from country to country and even from one locality to another within the same state, according to a number of objective and subjective factors. Using sociological methods and techniques, we acknowledge more data about their determinants, and, on this basis, we can adopt social, psychosocial, economic, cultural, measures that would avoid psychological (fear, panic, terror) and psychosocial (social cohesion decrease, increased confidence in the ability of institutions to manage the phenomenon of terrorism, low individual and group morale, tensed climate in society, a drastic reduction of national consensus, etc.) effects.*

➤ *Sociological investigation let us find the motivation of those individuals who choose to support terrorists in some countries. For example, terrorist attacks in the U.S. (September 2001), Spain (March 2004), England (July 2005) and Iraq (since 2003 until today) have been committed by international terrorist groups but with the support of citizens from the states in which they took place;*

➤ *Effective management of the counter terrorism activity requires deep knowledge of the phenomenon, its social, political, military, cultural, ethnic, religious, economic, psychological and psychosocial implications. All the terrorist or similar groups or organizations are ignoring the international law and particularly the humanitarian one. Typically, they exist in symbiosis with the underground economy in the well-known triangle of narcotics-weapons-black money, and posses a great capacity of movement. Basically, they are nomadic or implanted*

in areas difficult to reach and transnational. Their objectives are either criminal or fanatic, and the used means are always extremely violent, always producing human casualties and immense material damage². However, preventing all these is possible only through a sociological research of the phenomenon, at both domestic and global level.

3. Possible evolutions of terrorist challenges

Today, terrorism represents a complex phenomenon, not easy to understand or to explore. The 9/11 attacks revealed the existence of a more flexible, non-state and transnational threat. It proved that the enemy has no settled down residence and takes advantage of the benefits of globalization - especially the permeability of borders and state sovereignty weaknesses - to hit the chosen targeted states. Despite these developments, governments continue to use their old reflexes of territorial and military security against the terrorists. The overcome is a quantitative and qualitative growth of the armed forces and the defence budgets. This is a consequence of the impact of terrorist challenges, dangers and threats on the military level of any state targeted by terrorist groups or organizations.

The fight against terrorism, particularly after 9/11, recorded a number of notable successes. However, in spite of these advances, 14,338 terrorist acts resulted in 74,543 victims among the civilian population in 2006 and caused the death of 20,498 of them, meaning a 25% increase in the numbers of terrorist attempts with 40% in victims who died in terrorist attacks in 2005³.

More than a half of these terrorist attempts were committed in Iraq and Afghanistan. In other regions of the world there was a decrease in terrorism, with 15% in Europe and Eurasia, with 20% in Southern and

Global	2005	2004
Number of incidents	266	393
Number of deaths	443	733

Table 1. The evolution of global terrorism in 2005⁴

Global	2005	2004	2003	2002
Total number of deceases	443	733	470	970
In Middle East/Gulf, especially Iraq	394	405	327	375
	321	352	172	
Southern Asia	35	74	30	105
Southern Asia and Oceania	0	10	42	214
North America	0	-	-	3
Western Europe	0	192	1	0

Table 2. Deceases resulted from terrorist acts

Central Asia and 5% on the American continent, as the cited source mentioned.

In 2005, according to the source quoted, marked a general decline of international terrorism such as the number of victims as well as attacks, respectively 40% and 30%. The perception of international terrorism is as a major external threat and is not combined with the mortality figures.

According to regional distribution of the number of dead victims in the attacks of international terrorism threat, which was formerly distributed in the whole world would become regional, the Middle East is the most reach. Thus, in 2005, almost nine of 10 fatal victims due to the international terrorism were from Iraq and in Jordan⁵.

The data from tables 1 and 2 show the evolution of international terrorism after 9/11. The figures indicate that terrorist acts have been decreasing, but have not completely disappeared. Therefore, there must not be excluded the possibility of a different evolution in the future years. In this regard, the following analysis on the terrorist challenges and threats to the military, social and economical level emphasizes some of the probable evolutions of this phenomenon.

On the *military level*, we can talk about another effect of terrorist activity, at domestic and international level: the war against terrorism initiated after 9/11 by a coalition led by the USA. The opening of the Afghanistan “front”, as a part of the war against terrorism lead to a decrease in number of terrorist acts, but to an increase of the military



spending from the states engaged in Afghanistan. As a direct consequence, we can mention the life expenses, soldiers and civilians, too. Also, the Iraq war generated an increased activity of the national terrorist organizations. The terrorist attempts in this country ended with losses of the civilian population but also of soldiers from the international military coalition against terrorism.

In addition, the various costs are added to the human lives. Thus, some estimates the total cost of the Iraq war somewhere over 700 billion dollars and, comparatively, the Vietnam war was situated somewhere around 600 billion dollars⁶. The same source mentions that the monthly costs of the USA operations in Iraq is about 5.6 billion dollars, and every American citizen contributed with approximately 727 dollars, which means a major effort for the American people. According to the cited source, from 3/19 2003 until august 2005, 2060. Coalition soldiers were killed, 1866 being Americans. The US forces also recorded 14.065 wounded soldiers. The civilian loses, estimated to 23.589–26.705, added to the killings of 66 journalists in only three years (comparatively, in the Vietnam War only 63 journalists were killed) and the 155 deaths from the Iraq Security Forces, did not lead to a safer world than before the war. Thus, in 2004 there were recorded 655 terrorist attempts, relatively to 2003 when only 175 attempts were recorded⁷.

In the Afghanistan war, also, there were recorded 1.002 loses, from which the American soldiers represents more than a half: 624. Counting on, we add 121 British soldiers, 97 Canadians, 30 Germans, 23 French soldiers, 16 Dutch soldiers, 13 Italians and 8 Polish soldiers⁸, most of them had been killed in hand bomb explosions. It is expected that the Afghanistan war will exceed the Iraq one as the most dangerous battlefield of the global war against terrorism.

We must add that some mutations are possible regarding the danger from the use of WMD by the terrorists, especially the chemical and biological ones, these two types being relatively easily to supply, transport and place in “target”. We think that terrorists will not renounce to their classic ways of attack: hand made bombs, booby traps and suicide attacks. Hostage taking, plane or ship hijackings will not disappear, but it is possible to decrease their frequency, in part as a result of increased

<i>Bangladesh</i>	<i>India</i>	<i>Somalia</i>
<i>Canada</i>	<i>Iran</i>	<i>Sri Lanka</i>
<i>Central African Republic</i>	<i>Libya</i>	<i>Sudan</i>
<i>Chad</i>	<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Thailand</i>
<i>Columbia</i>	<i>Nepal</i>	<i>Tunis</i>
<i>Eritrea</i>	<i>Nigeria</i>	<i>U.A.E.</i>
<i>Ethiopia</i>	<i>Norway</i>	<i>U.K.</i>
<i>France</i>		

Table 3. Countries where the level of terrorist threat was raised in 2007

security measures taken by the states. Moreover, the immediate effects, with an impressive impact on population, are reducing and diminish in time because of the negotiations that are taking place in such cases. Also, the kidnappings of the journalists will not completely disappear, but the expected effects will be more and more insignificant regarding the impact on the population level. The journalists will be more and more assimilated to armed forces, in the sense of the assumed risks from the conflict area where they are located, and being kidnapped by the terrorists constitutes one of these risks. The terrorist challenges and threats to the ***social level*** is directly related to the military level through the effects generated by the latter in the society. The human and financial efforts made by the states engaged in the global war against terrorism are negatively reflected at the population that support the costs required by this war.

Thus, terrorism remains a real threat, as clearly proved the cases of Madrid and London attacks, and not only. The jihadist movements can be a source of conflict between countries as it can be inflicted on their own nation, influencing, this way, the level of terrorist risk, as illustrated in the tables 3 and 4⁹.

The data from the table considers not only the threat coming from the international terrorist groups or organizations, but also from the domestic groups or organizations.

Also, on the social level, we must emphasize the fact that the terrorism is feeding on democracy because not only the former one provides the necessary freedom for elaboration of its plans but the democracy also provides an advertising vehicle developed by mass media. It is well known that in order to fulfil its objectives, terrorism must disseminate its taken actions. And the mass media is the best way to accomplish this goal¹⁰.

The existence of the terrorist threat in the social realm can constrain the states in such manner that they will limit some of the civil rights and freedom of their citizens. That is why most of the states engaged in the war against the terrorism changed their security strategy, by organizing and implementing a series of measures in order to counter the terrorist actions: severe procedures regarding circulation of persons, strict rules related to airports and frontiers. Those measures lead to an increase need of men and new technological assets in those institutions responsible in the state security system. This need of increased security lead also to the appearance of new private security companies. That is how it was possible some kind of discrimination between the citizens of a country because of the possibility to contract the services of those companies because of the costs involved. Moreover, the idea that terrorist attempts destroy human live and material assets, fuels a sense of fear at the personal level. This feeling can be spread through the entire community, resulting anomic phenomenon, indifference and estranged states. In time, those feelings affect the national consensus and social cohesion.

The economic level is a level of great importance, being in an interdependent relationship with the military and social ones. Thus, the terrorist threats can affect this level in many ways:

Cambodia	Jordan	Venezuela
Cyprus	Liberia	
Estonia	Uganda	
Ireland	Uzbekistan	
Israel	Sierra Leone	

Table 4. 23 countries had a low terrorist level, among them



- Directing a big part of the economic resources towards the armed forces as they are responsible of national defence and security and directly involved in the fight against terrorism;
- Major spending needed to increase the security measures, due to the increase of the quantitative and qualitative state of the personnel in the state's institutions, which have security attributions. The detection devices and other technological assets have a great importance, as they can help to a rapid identification of terrorist activities or related activities;
- Directing a major part of the country's financial resources for strengthening the national and collective defence and security, in the disadvantage of the economic development and the standards of living of their citizens. The health, public transportation, social protection sectors can be affected by the diminish of their budgetary limits;
- Severe control measures at the border can lead, by systematization and continuity, especially in the case of food industry, not only to material and financial losses, but to the damages to economic cooperation between different states;
- The possibility that terrorist groups or organizations to target major oil or gas, provoking an energetic crises. Such attempts can be easily performed not only because of the classic devices that may be use to destroy such pipelines, but also because of the poor surveillance and guarding;
- International and national terrorist groups and/or organizations can also easily act on the control centres for transportation at national, regional or international level, as well as to the control centres for energy, water or communications, or nuclear energy sites. It would result human live loses, radioactive contamination of soil, water and air. Although such types of attempts never happened, the risk to take place still exists;
- According to the terrorist risks map published by Aon¹¹ in 2007, the nature and forms of global terrorism are in a perpetual transformation. Accordingly, the economic vulnerability is affected. In this regard, a constant evaluation of the level and nature of terrorist risks is needed.



The analysis of this map shows a certain destabilization of Al Qaeda network and of the groups under its coordination. According to Aon experts, the counter terrorist war, especially the Afghanistan one, seems to affect the leadership and functioning of Al Qaeda.

Concluding, in the coming years, the evolution of terrorist threats to the economic, social and military sectors will be *spectacular*, because of a series of internal (related to the terrorist groups and organizations) and external (independent from terrorism and terrorists) factors.

The internal factors with a major impact will be, in our view, the improvement of the terrorist groups' organization and planning, the increase of the number of new members from the targeted states, the increasing rate for religious fervour in order to sympathize with the terrorist proposed way of dealing with cultural conflicts, etc.

The external factors are referring to the increased use of high-tech informatics and communications by terrorists. Thus, for spreading their ideas and plans, terrorist groups and organizations will intensify their presence on the Internet and other mass media. Although cyber attacks are possible, those kinds of attacks never happened¹². However, given the fact that terrorist organizations have sufficient financial resources and people able to bypass the informatics security, the possibility should not be eliminated by the responsible state structures in their fight against terrorism. So, in other words, we should fear about cyber terrorism. Thus, according to the source quoted in June 2002, *Washington Post* related about suspected infiltration of Islamic countries via the Internet



informatics systems for water distribution, electricity, gas or other vital infrastructure. We can talk about a “cyber academy of terror” in Pakistan, where Al-Qaida followers would be trained in cybernetic sabotage. There are views stating that the cyber terrorism would be on the same plan with the use of weapons of mass destruction (biological, nuclear or chemical).

The real cyber terrorism limit is what separates *hacktivism* of attacks that generates death and chaos. “*Hacktivism*”: the word is formed by mixing activism with *hacker*, the information pirate. Therefore, this term designates the use of electronic means of disruption against the websites of organizations or administrations of ideological enemies: stealing or changing data, infection by viruses or to simply unable a certain website. This range of actions also includes damages in terms of financial or organizational disarray.

Conflicts in Timor, the Zapatista action from Chiapas, the 1999 war in Kosovo or the second Intifada generated systematically cyber attacks to the embassies of Sri Lanka or Indonesia, NATO, etc.

The real cyber terrorism that kills or causes serious damage to property remains hypothetical, as cited source noted, although there are arguments supporting the efficacy of cyber terrorism: low cost, long distance action. But nobody has ever tried a concerted attack, which would simultaneously hit financial circuits, transport and public networks. Nobody knows the level of chaos resulting from such a concerted attack or the ability to repair the damage produced. In addition, a financial panic or the loss of archives of any financial institution would not bring their perpetrators the same spectacular or satisfying results as a symbolic suicide attempt whose images would literally spread terror. Paradoxically, a kamikaze is perhaps more “profitable” and less expensive for a terrorist, than a cyber attack.

Conclusions

Terrorist challenges have been and will remain an undeniable reality in our world. Globalization facilitates terrorist acts by the inner conditions - the free movement of people and money, the development

of informatics and communication, by the extent, the Internet use in almost all states.

Global terrorism is socially perceived and represented in different ways. Some consider it a battle of the weak against the strong, others a type of just war. Hence, the necessity of analyzing this complex phenomenon, of terrorism, through the sociological methods and techniques.

Terrorist act has a significant impact on economic and social processes, affects the sustainable development of states and security of its citizens. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary a concerted effort of democratic and civil society organizations, at national, regional and international level in order to meet, with success, the challenges of global terrorism.

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CRISIS AND EMERGENCY. CONCEPTUAL DELIMITATIONS AND CORRELATIONS

*Constantin MOȘTOFLEI, PhD,
Senior Researcher, Director of the Center for Defence and Security Studies,
National Defence University „Carol I”*

Crisis is a frequent term met into speciality literature and mass-media especially after the financial crisis starting and its effects multiplication into the economic, political, social or other fields. The anti-crisis measures sent to the emergency presumption imposing an enhancement of the legal and operational frameworks, core components for the process of resolving crisis. The correlations necessarily imposed among the terms, crisis and emergency; determine an deepening of the existent conceptual limits to eliminate the confusions appeared to the rushed problems approach, problems we confront into the last period of time.

1. Aspects of crisis concept definition

Among the two concepts, the crisis one is met oftener, becoming a cliché, and word used abusively, even in the same paper, in contexts with different senses without trying any conceptual clarifications.

Emergency represents, at its turn, another concept used in different fields and with distinct senses.

Starting from the middle of 1970s, into the studies determined by Cuba missiles crisis, militaries and civilians became concerned to define crisis phenomenon.

Wishing to accomplish some conceptual delimitation, we remind only few of crisis definitions.

Charles Hermann defined crisis as a situation that:

- a) *threats main objectives of the decision unit;*
- b) *reduces the response time in useful time before the decision to be transformed into action;*
- c) *surprises the members of the decision unit through its apparition¹.*

Karl W. Deutsch defines crisis as *an event with four main characteristics:*

- a) *the constitution of a development point in the event' flow;*
- b) *the imposing of necessity to take a decision;*
- c) *the placement into the game of fundamental values of at least one actor;*
- d) *taking decision in very short time².*

The politologists interpret crisis as *a sudden change because of a strong deregulation in the social life, characterized by the special sharpening of the existent contradictions and by the clash of antagonist forces³.*

In **sociology** crisis is defined as:

- a) *the period from a system's dynamic, characterized through the accentuated accumulation of difficulties, the conflictual burst of tensions with disorganizing consequences on system's plan, inevitably leading to launch some strong pressures to change;*
- b) *the manifestation of some temporary or chronic difficulties of one's system organization way expressing its incapacity to function in the existent way⁴.*

Other definitions, longer and more detailed, with the associated reflections, have different interesting regards, eventually common, but have as subjects, in exclusivity, states. On purpose, we omitted these definitions because, presently, is undoubtedly a crisis can't remain just interstate. A crisis subjects are, mainly, individuals, groups, institutions, states etc., grouped in, at least, two parties on the basis of the common interests for each of them but being in contrariety relations one from another and that can pass from the different phases to the conflict, inclusive armed.

We remember also a definition, appreciated as synthetically, of Jean-Christophe Romer, professor to Strasbourg University and Special

Military School from Saint-Cyr⁵:

Crisis is a breaking moment into an organized system. It involves the obligation of the decisional factors to define a position in favour of conservation or transformation of the given system, in the perspective of its turning to equilibrium.

If the reference is made to the international system, crisis can be, in a manner more or less predictable, the result of a tension situation, similar to deliberate intention of offensive from one actor.

In all these cases, crisis – carrier of risks for national and international security – pertains adequate rapid decisions taking and adopted means needed for its resolution. Etymologically, the “crisis” term comes from Greek – *krisis* – “judgement” or “decision” – took from Latin – *crisis* – and in French – *crise*. The essential etymology of “crisis” word resides in **decision** notion. In every definition core, and useful and rigorous understanding of crisis phenomenon, resides this obligation to decide. Without the need to take a decision and, consequently, a previous judgement, crisis doesn’t exist⁶. In the same time, we should mention a crisis exists just in the presence of more than two protagonists, which at least one is obliged to take decisions to solve the situation it created.

2. Crises classification

Crises classification can be done from the perspective of many separator criteria, as:

- *The position of the one analysing the phenomenon: pertains to one part from all involved/affected; could be afterwards, direct and indirect, by crisis escalation; has a neutral position that supposes the absence of crisis effects over its own interests;*

- *Manifestation area: into one single state (national level or a region of the state); international level (regional, continental, global);*

- *Manifestation field: financial; economic; political; social; environment protection etc.;*

- *The nature of generator causes: natural (earthquake, flows, dry, land movements etc.); errors/malfunctions (humane, technical, technological etc.);*



- *Way of production: accidentally (natural disasters, professional incapacity of execution or decisional factors etc.); on purpose provocation (to detour the attention from another crisis, to launch crises in other fields, to involve other social, groups, institutions etc. in the already being crisis etc.);*

- *The way of crisis escalation: local - national – international – global; global – international – national - local;*

- *The decisional competency in crisis resolution: only an actor, the both actors, a third actor with/without the role of director;*

- *The evolution in time: with a sudden apparition; with a pre-crises period; with a rapid or progressive escalation; with evolution freezing; with peaceful resolution; transformed into an armed conflict (war).*

It is hard to accept a crisis definition after only one criterion because will be expelled characteristic elements of the contextual ensemble.

Crisis launch is owed to the apparition of some critical situations which disarming isn't possible because of the decisional factors incapacity or their interest to maintain or emphasize the generated misunderstandings.

The main role in crisis development comes to the decisional factor no matter he is or not the crisis generator. Its intervention into crisis stands for its statute of crisis manager/administrator. This role, into international crises, of security, comes to the nuclear powers, to the states considered great regional powers; even they don't have nuclear ammunition. Into the national security crises manifesting on national territory and also with influences abroad, the role of manager/administrator comes to political decision-makers.

Frequently, into the specialty literature, when a crisis is analyzed, are omitted, more or less on purpose, the aspects related to the „cause – effect” chain starting from an original moment are detoured the relations among the true crisis „actors”, among them and process „directors” with their role of launchers or managers/administrators in its development.

In all the stated situations, will be rare the cases when a great power will explicitly assume the manager role for avoiding the attribution by the public opinion of the generator of the respective crisis or having



the intention to manoeuvre in its own interests. In the national security field, the managing role will be excerpted because nobody will assume the responsibility to produce destabilization perturbation for the nation as social organization.

3. Peace – crisis – war?

This is the environment where all the states exist and function in a period of time of the existent relations among its compound elements as well the ones from the reference state and other states or international bodies. Usually, in the states' fundamental legislative texts, peace state is understood and direct relations are made to the possibility of war state existence as well as some exceptional states (siege, emergency, necessity, alert, etc.).

Peace state represents the normal stage of a state, characterized as the situation when a country isn't involved in any armed conflict or war, internally or externally. State's functionality bases on an ensemble of laws specific for the mentioned stage and structures acting for their application.

War state reflects, generally, the situation of some belligerent states from the moment of declaration's notification or hostilities start, until peace assessment.

The juridical order existent in peacetime is replaced, in the wartime, at least partially, with another, corresponding to a new system of norms applicable into states' relations and also the ones accomplished into the homeland.

On the national territory, the war stage supposes a juridical order based on legal prescriptions adopted from peacetime, known and applied when is considered needed, permanent, amplified – quantitatively and qualitatively – as the moment of its launching is nearer, to eliminate the discontinuities and malfunctions. The solution to include in every legislative document some express prescriptions for the wartime isn't available, the resolution can be offered only by a series of laws referring to the military field (the defence law, the military service law, the requisitions law etc.).

The exceptional stages (siege, emergency, necessity etc.) are associated to some situations when the states are confronted, on the entire national territory, on a portion of it into a certain activity field, with dangers and phenomena needed rapid legislative and execution measures to come back to the initial stage.

In Romania, by the fundamental law, are prescribed the siege and emergency stages, ruled by organic law. The both stages regard crisis situations stressing out exceptional measures instituted in certain cases determined by some grave dangers apparition against country's defence and national security, constitutional democracy or for the prevention, limitation or exclusion of some disasters' traces⁷.

Siege stage represents the ensemble of exceptional measures of political, military, economic, social or different natured applicable all over the country's territory or in certain administrative-territorial units, instituted to adapt country's defence capacity to the grave, actual or imminent threats menacing state's sovereignty, independency, unity or territorial integrity. When the siege state is instituted, there can be taken exceptional measures applicable on entire country's territory or in some administrative-territorial units.⁸.

Emergency state represents the ensemble of exceptional measures of political, economic and public order natures, applicable on the entire country's territory or in some administrative-territorial units, instituted in the following situations:

- a) the existence of some actual or imminent grave dangers regarding the national security or constitutional democracy function;*
- b) the imminence to produce or the production of some calamities making necessary the prevention, limitation or excerpption, just in case, of some disasters' traces⁹.*

The beginning of the nuclear era needed a reconsideration of peace – war dichotomy. Crisis, with the states of peace and war, gains an unrecognized its own identity, considered as the period of passing from peace to war (nuclear). By extension, the peace-crisis-war triangle imposed also in the conflicts carried aut with conventional (classic) ammunition. The intermediate moment from the peace to war became harder to be seen when the traditional war statement is missing. The term



of conflict is moreover accepted than the one of war. This determines the crisis phenomenon became something amorphous that follows the peace period. In many situations, crisis is assembled with an armed conflict even if for some actors represent a true war. Otherwise, the peace-crisis-war cliché, heard especially to militaries, but also politicians, persists even in its intimacy contains a serious error: crisis can be in peace and also war times.

All these remarks, determine us to appreciate that the crisis phenomenon into the national security field can be associated to the peacetime, the times of application to the exceptional states (siege and emergency) or to the wartime (armed conflict).

We appreciate is needed to renounce to the syntagm peace, crisis, war, especially in the specific normative acts, doctrines, rules and military manuals, to eliminate the false interpretation that the armed forces and the concurrent to the national security and defence have missions/obligations distinct for crisis period, uncorrelated with the legal prescriptions expressed for peacetime, wartime or the stages associated to the exceptional times.

Another solution needed to be taken into consideration is the one determined by states' participation to the peace-keeping operations, multinational operations developed in different war theatres. Crisis specific elements can appear also on the period of their participation to such missions, crises manifesting into the country (among the representative state's bodies or in front of the public opinion), and also among the reference state and other states or international bodies.

The three terms of the mentioned trynom are found among the keywords of many scientific materials from the fields of the international relations, security and defence, military science and art etc. We pay attention, into a brief analysis, to their use recurrence, in the last decades, is marked by the increase of the *crisis* notion apparition in regard with the other two: *peace* and *war*.

The crisis state manifesting in the peace period and war period beginning is peculiarly complex, especially because of the known contradictions sharpening among the involved parties and the emergence of others. The numeric growth of the contradictory aspects between

the potential belligerents induces the growth of frequency for the problems needed to be solved by the respective political leaderships. The interference of the cause – effect determination being able to appear following the actions' perception, more or less real, taken by the adversary party, but also by the third parties, especially the greatest military powers, the international politico-military alliances, neighbours etc., but also the one launch into its own system (in/in-between the military, political, economic components) imposes necessary projection and constitution of a mechanism to manage the mentioned crises. Into its framework, the military sub-system has important role because of the opportunity of the given reaction, its intensity, the physiognomy can depend and even the result of the future armed conflict (war).

4. Crisis in the security and defence field

At present, it is unanimously accepted the fact that security and defence are multi-dimensional where the military dimension has a special but not exclusive role. Because the military option, to solve some conflict situations, is considered, quasi-unanimously, as being exceptional, doesn't mean that in concern with the military factors involvement (here we refer to all the national security and defence structures) to skip from the analysis all the conflictions situations, intern and international, their evolution and the possibility to participate, until the armed forces use, to crisis management and even resolution.

If we refer strictly to the national security coordinates, is inevitable the report among ideologies and crisis to skip from analyse. There are appreciations that the ideologies aren't able to define a „social crisis” because their role is to protect and promote group's interests in conflict with another ideologies. Every ideology confounds the social necessities with its own necessities recognizing the reality evidence just when this can serve to its political interests and objectives. Every ideology imposes its own truth, so interprets „crisis” in its own manners having the ability to develop symbolic violence, to censure or dissimulate the facts. Consequently, every ideology justifies the power into an unreasonable manner and considers a „crisis” an attack against the political power.

The ideologies incapacity to define a „crisis” is revealed by the fact that every ideology is always one’s power employee, trying to legitimate its existence¹⁰.

5. Crisis management or administration?

Into the Romanian speciality literature, edited after 1990, the terms of manager or management got a very rare recurrence. Still, in many cases, its association with other terms produces confusions and even errors. Collocations as “organisational management”, “phenomenon management” are examples of approach generator of conceptual confusions. If we will accept that management represents “the art and science to value the human, financial or material resources of some enterprises, institutions”¹¹, is observed the mentioned syntagms contain pleonastic expressions or induce the idea that can be lead activities into structures that aren’t part of its own system or that some phenomena production can be controlled. Simultaneously, we must considerate also the statement “activity management” imposing increasingly in the specialty literature following the participation of some execution structures to some actions development coming from independent organizational systems but respective process efficiency asks for their coordination by an unique decision factor.

The correct term used in crisis situations, understood as a sudden and unpredicted apparition of an important event to one party initiative or by natural causes indulging the other party to rebuild its own strategy, if it wants to protect the mentioned interests is, in our opinion, “crisis administrator”.

Crisis administration will stand as main goal:

- *to put the adversary into a crisis situation;*
- *to avoid the bearing of a crisis provoked by the adversary;*
- *to try, if is confronted with a crisis situation, to displace its effect by a corrector action.*

Finally, crisis administration can be defined as a permanent and evolving process into a dispute or conflict throughout, if is needed, are done all the stages of conflictual situation escalation and this must

lead at least to the defence of the initially contested interests and values provoking the dispute.

The reality proved in certain situations the conflict existence itself or even conflict's threat can have an influence over third parties interests that aren't directly involved into the dispute. Therefore, they also should develop their own strategies to defend their interests being caught into a process of crisis management but from different positions.

The final intention of crisis management is to propose to the decisional factors a strategy composed from a coherent ensemble of action forms, grouped in the following phases:

- the initial analysis;*
- the permanent evaluation of crisis;*
- the settlement of some action forms.*

Another argument to hesitate from using "crisis management" expression is the fact we should act in conformity with NATO specific membership issues approaching means, at least in regard with the processes where Romania is participant or strictly regarding national security field.

From the study of the official documents of Alliance, especially NATO Handbook, results that is used exclusively the expression of "crisis management".

The crisis concept, associated to the situations specific to the national security field must be approached from the perspective of different facets given by phenomenon complexity. Even there are common elements in the means of crises manifestations at international security level, but also at the national security level, the conceptual approach must avoid the forced generalizations lacking of rigorous argumentations. The correct perception of crisis concepts and crisis management, the elimination of any confusion permit the creation of a theoretical basis to sustain the practical process of managing crises for the purpose of solving the conflictual situations, crises. Although, we believe a good "crisis manager" needs two essential elements:

1. A methodology to allow him to systematically approach crisis to comprise all the factors and to reach to a series of correct and efficient action forms and tactics.

2. *An encyclopaedic acknowledgement of the context the crisis is undergone. This knowledge isn't always enough and should be completed, at one hand, by specialists, experts' participation and, on the other hand, the adequate information collecting.*

6. Aspects of defining the emergency concept

It is unanimously accepted *time* is one of the basic compounds of human and socio-organizations security, whoever the member is, whatever his statute and role into society because their existential routine are disposed to rebuilt everything was ever made or done, they adopt an attitude involving an immobility tendency, difficulties in confronting the unforeseen, a very long period of adapting to the rhythm changes¹². Every person or human group has his own “time” therefore one of the difficulties to lead a group, inclusive one nation, is to find a global tempo to allow the ensemble harmony flowing.

In conformity with the Romanian Explanatory Dictionary, the emergency is seen as “the feature, character of what is urgent, situation needing an urgent resolution; the necessity to immediately solve a problem”¹³.

We mention that the presumption of emergency should necessary be associated to any process to resolute a crisis. A crisis effects, if they are unseen and proper eradicated, can lead to the absence of its signalling and management by the decisional factors in that peculiar process and if there are applied retarded counteracting measures can be associated malfunctions in the decisional factors' activity with legal attributions in the respective field.

The emergency state is the following of one declaration of state's authority in feedback to an exceptional situation which present fundamental threat against the country.

The declaration can suspend certain normal functions of government, can determine the citizens to change their normal behaviour or can authorize the governmental institutions to apply preparation plans for emergency state and also to restrict or to suspend some civil liberties or human rights.

The necessity to declare the emergency state can come from very different situations as the enterprise of an armed action targeted against the state by intern or extern elements, natural calamities, intern turbulences, epidemics, financial or economic crisis or general stroke.

Here, we emphasize our disagreement regarding the definition given to the emergency state by the Big dictionary of neologism: emergency state = situation imposing the application by the state of a measures system with political, military, economic and social character to allow its entrance into war in a very short time (< Fr. *urgence*), because the emergency state declaration doesn't regard exclusively the preparation for state's entering into war. Although, we agree with the regard that the regime of exceptional states, siege and emergency must be ruled by distinctive laws.

7. Conclusions

Crisis, in term's use evolution, gained a phony connotation especially in the political-military field being dissociated from the decisional act and assembled with the period existent between the peacetime and wartime. The deepening of the crisis definition delimitation, into a conceptual scheme where are included terms as peace, war, siege is needed to precise the mean of their use in the normative acts, in doctrines, rules, manuals, in the specialty literature and mass-media.

Emergency, the emergency state in fact, are concepts needed to be correlated with the crisis term regarding as finality to create the legal and operational frameworks, needed to be regarded to settle and implement efficiently all the measures needed to solve crises.

NOTES:

1 Conf. Jean-Louis DUFOUR, *Crizele internaționale. De la Beijing (1900) la Kosovo (1999)*, Editura Corint, București, 2002, p.14.

2 Apud Gheorghe NICOLAESCU, *Gestionarea crizelor politico-militare*, Editura Top Form, București, 2003, p.81.

3 *Dicționar politic*, Editura Politică, București, 1975, p.176.

4 *Dicționar de sociologie*, Editura Babel, București, 1993, pp.145-146.



5 Apud, Jean-Louis Dufour, *op. cit.*, p.16.

6 Jean-Louis Dufour, *op.cit.*, p.13.

7 *Legea nr. 453/2004 pentru aprobarea Ordonanței de urgență a Guvernului nr. 1/1999 privind regimul stării de asediu și regimul stării de urgență*, art. 1.

8 Ibidem, art. 2.

9 Ibidem, art. 3.

10 Apud, Aurel V. David, *Națiunea. Între “starea de securitate” și “criza politico-militară”*, Editura LICORNA, București, 2000, pp.191-192.

11 Florin Marcu, *Dicționar uzual de neologisme*, Editura SAECULUM I.O., București, 1997, p.224.

12 See Laboureie, G., *Des principes de la guerre*, în *Defense Nationale*, Franța, vol. 48, apr. 1992, pp. 9-18.

13 www.webdex.ro/online/marele_dictionar_de_neologisme/urgență



CONSIDERATIONS ON SECURITY SYSTEMS IN HOLISTIC VISION

*Paul DUȚĂ, PhD,
Senior Researcher, Romanian Diplomatic Institute*

The future of the security system in holistic and comprehensive vision is essentially dependent on the concept of legitimacy that can come “only from the United Nations”.

There are many criticisms addressed to the Security Council for the unconsciousness of many political judgments. An intense judgment and a careful calibration of the operations that will be needed for what you might call the future “mechanism of global-regional security” is proposed.

Two major determinative directions could be defined, the flexibility and pragmatism on the one hand and fairness and consistency, on the other hand, they will need to be summarized dialectically in intelligent constructed and developed projections. Only by combining flexibility with fairness and pragmatism with consistency, steady solidity and occasional tensions between the global body responsible for peace and international security and regional agencies that intend to play a supporting role in favour of the global body.

A re-evaluation of the history and potential future of the regional-global mechanism for maintaining international peace and security could be based on recognition in line with the international community of the potential involvement of regional agencies in preventing conflicts and sustainable development in all regions in cooperation with the United Nations.

The analysis of the role and actions of regional organizations require a comparison of threats with their appropriate responses. Namely, threats



to international peace and security are covered by traditional challenges (interstate aggression), modern challenges (national complex and regional threats) and future challenges (global systematic failure), while the response involves early warning, conflict prevention, understanding through a peaceful way, coercion and peace-building.

It is not the subject of this study to analyze the entire role and actions of regional organizations. Thus, they are not systematically examined, in depth the regional organizations perceptions towards future challenges such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and transnational crime. They are interested in modern and traditional threats - interstate aggression, national complex and regional threats.

The policies of regional organizations in preventing conflict and building peace are not examined in detail, even if they are the main concerns of the United Nations.

They are interested in exploring the relations between members of the Security Council and regional organizations in the field of modern and traditional threats as well as the political methods response in accordance with the peaceful settlement and the application of coercive measures.

Peace is perceived as a perquisite of human security dimensions and the will of the regional organizations in the nineteenth century has a fundamental role. In other words, it is interested in the purpose of interaction between members of the United Nations Security Council and regional organizations in various conflict scenarios.

It requires some clarification.

First of all, there is a fundamental distinction between regional cooperation and regional integration, especially in the economic dimension toward the security dimension. Regional integration was not achieved in any region with full guarantees regarding the security of the countries involved. One phenomenon of truly integrated evolution takes place in Europe, but increasing the number of member states to 27 has slowed down the integration process. Other regional attempts through various innovations, in Africa and in the Pacific, despite the valuable European experiences, have enhanced different forms of cooperation¹.



The European Community is the most internationalized community which indeed may aspire to sustainable development.

Secondly, regionalism - drawing a so-called “new regionalism” of past decades - is superior through the symbiosis of security aspects with the “ordered world” from a political point of view.

The present and the previous people arrange the global systems - early multipolarity (1919-1939); bipolarity (1948-1990); unipolarity (1990-2004).

If the global system of XXI century will promote regionalism as an alternative to unipolarity or a component of multilateralism remains to be seen, ultimately it is likely to be happening. The international community supports an enhanced development of regionalism as a component of multilateralism.

Enhancing the role of regionalism is what it detaches from the state vision of the General Secretariat of the United Nations as a mutual reinforcement of global-regional mechanism for peace and security². Regionalization is an objective feature of our time - a phenomenon that continuously varies that nation states and the United Nations should respond and adapt themselves to the global-regional binomial requirements. The security dimension in the procedures and structures of the United Nations Security Council will prove to be critical in XXI Century.

Thirdly, as a corollary, regionalism is required to fill the existing gap in the international system for half a century. The constitutional order offered by the United Nations Charter of the middle of XX century is dependent on the universal-national axis, despite the host of some provisions relating to regionalism. Regionalism of this period is a simple concept that orbits around the nation state. It might seem natural that from the nation-state entity to “jump in height” - towards a central global body.

But although centralized and global, the system is not universal; nation states were few in number - 51 founder members of the Charter. Today's reality - 191 nation-states cannot be compared to a “club” because it is an assembly. Such a big number of decision makers become a barrier for the formation of global policies, and thus the malfunction



of the General Assembly in recent years is obvious.

The smallest “executive body” for peace, the Security Council, noted problems of unrepresentative leaders and associated short entries in global legitimacy. This explains the interests and initiatives taken in favour of regionalism - as an approach to the policy that seeks to drive a race between illegitimacy and failure that might justify a brilliant global authority. Regionalism and even sub-regionalism could be the right “executive measure” for today’s global policies and thus become the new “club” for international politics.

Fourth, one question is inevitable: is there a need for the adaptation of the Charter to the realities of XXI century? There is a temptation for those ones who return to the Charter - insisting on a strict and literary interpretation of resources. These positions force the realities of XXI century to relate to a specific constitutional pattern of XX century. An alternative is possible and justified. “The dynamic interpretation” of the United Nations Charter is recognized by the Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld in early 1960; Kofi Annan says that “they should enable the adaptation of the Charter to today’s realities”. This requires creativity and political courage. Increased importance of regionalism and the renaissance of Chapter VIII of the Charter will be proven to be a crucial component of future dynamism, requiring courage and creativity on a comparable scale. The option between the literal and liberal interpretation are found at the base of the debates mechanisms of the contemporary security.

Fifth, the metamorphosis nature of regionalism - from its dimensions almost exclusively economic and defence from 1940 until 1980, is moving to a comprehensive multisectorial movement in the 1990s, involving political, cultural, economical and security results in the largest contemporary purpose - leading to the transformation of the international organizations into developed regions, as an integration of mutual interests of the member states. Moreover, particularly in the areas of security, transformations were made *ad-hoc*.

The challenge of this century is to replace this improvised propinquity, politically selective, and without resources towards regionalism with a better planned style, consistent yet flexible and balanced “regional



and global governance” - especially from the United Nations Security Council.

Sixth, one of the most contested concepts of international relations theory - the definition of “region” and shaping regions - cannot be avoided in any study which has as subject regionalism. Theoretical considerations regarding conceptual and defining elements of regionalism aim at shaping the authentic security regions, associated agencies on the one hand, and other groups of states, on the other hand.³

The nature of this study is theoretical, analytical and prescriptive, empirical and inductive in the method used. The work is evident in interdisciplinary nature. In different degrees there are combined elements of history, public administration, political science, sociology, international and constitutional law and also philosophy and ethics. They do not fall into one particular academic discipline or in a single disciplinary method. While part of the study makes a comparative analysis of regional experience, this is not exclusively limited to the comparative method.

The main idea of the study is determined by the following considerations: Reviewing the historical development of the “architecture of peace” of XX century (and beyond), especially in recent decades. Highlighting the “moment of crisis” today, the fundamental principles of contemporary thought are subject to change without any support on principles and rules in international law, the work of the Security Council must be analyzed. The relationship between the Security Council of United Nations and regional agencies is very important in the management of a conflict - as the first model of mechanism of the regional-global security.

Today’s mechanism is determined by the ambiguous nature of the concept of “region” and the complex regional arrangements in the modern world - especially their extended mandates and partnerships areas.

There are many contradictory effects on unit design and operating standards. It is necessary to find order and clarity on the stunning complex mosaic of regional structures from the entire world by developing a suggestive typology for “security regionalism”.



An empirical review of the regional and sub-regional agencies and also cross-regional organizations and transnational is necessary, even in the absence of unitary criteria sets.

From the historical, analytical and empirical perspective is necessary to explore three main dimensions of regional security - cultural, political and legal - to sketch sub-structures in the global and regional security in the contemporary world.

The assumption must be clarified - regionalism in collective security can develop an operational model as a future mechanism of global and regional security, based on the new concepts of “regional security” and on the provisions of “Chapter VIII regarding regional agencies”. Constitutional clarity, functional cooperation and doctrinal reform must be realized for the success of such mechanism.

Throughout history human society of any size and type is a matter of ensuring the safety and security of its own construction of what became known as “an architecture of peace.” It is an institutional aspiration through which humanity can avoid conflict and cohabit. In the modern era, Westphalia of last four centuries, nation states have seen in different ways the construction such architectures. In that context, the relationship between “global” and “regional” security perspectives has proven to be rather ignored.

In Westphalian era three major phases are distinguished in building the “architecture of peace”: cooperation based on national sovereignty (between XVII century until XIX century) and the first two experiments into a gradually integrated order (in XX century).⁴

Before XX century, regional security was the top political and diplomatic strategy. Global security - the notion that acts as a whole for its own safety and redemption – it is an already born concept, at least in the philosophical field of Kantian idealism. The XIX century faces efforts in achieving continental peace in state policies in two regions: Europe and America.

In Europe, the evolutionary development in the regional security architecture which leads the international community to the current state may be related to the efforts of the XVII century. But progress in limiting and reducing conflict between human societies has been



slow and tortuous. The Westphalian Peace has seen the transition from medieval empires and spheres of influence to the nation-states. Despite provisions for maintaining “public peace” by “the perpetual law” with arbitrary application, security architecture has not been able to establish a functional mechanism to avoid conflict.⁵

During XVIII century and early XIX century, “legal wars” between states have continued on the European continent, because of imperial ambitions, until the Congress of Vienna (1815), when a conjugate attempt was able to maintain peace and regional security through a system of balance of power. The great powers of Europe are the subjects of a series of “temporary alliances” by seeking to maintain the continental order. “European concern”, however, took only four decades and the second half of XIX century witnessed periodic wars between great powers culminating with the devastating World War.

In the American continent, XIX century meets the first continental security arrangements. In 1823, the United States proclaims a sphere of influence in America.⁶ The Monroe Doctrine is regarded by the United States as a genuine mechanism of regional security although other countries, including its neighbours, have reservations about this doctrine. In XIX century, pan-Americanism becomes a movement to secure freedom in Latin America versus Europe. Towards the end of the century, however, it has metamorphosed into a system to ensure stability on the continent and thus can be considered as the first genuine arrangement for regional security in America. In 1890, the first pan-American conference has been held in the United States in order to preserve “peace on the territory of America.” In 1910, the Pan American Union is established in a conference with the aim of promoting friendship and cooperation activities in the U.S. In Africa, Asia and the Pacific, traditional policies are subordinated to the imperial domination of European powers in the last part of the Westphalian era.

Collective security: League of Nations (1921-1945)

Since the beginning of XVII century a theory emerged, in accordance with the changing in structure in the international system by



the formation of an international organization can become an important strategy for peace. The role of such international organizations should continue to maintain relations between its members and influencing the policy carried by them. The international organization creates the necessary frame and tools to maintain continuity of normal flow of international cooperation at all levels, providing the most appropriate means to harmonize the positions of the participating parties to this feed. Solutions which are found within these organizations should be the result of the accustomed interests of the member states, ensuring thereby the availability of their action.⁷

It is difficult to estimate to what extent the formation of an international organization has influenced the conflictual behaviour in international relations. Certainly, it has not led to total elimination of conflicts. However, what is changing is how these conflicts arise in human consciousness. In the absence of an international organization, they would seem absolute; they separate them from adversaries, each of them wishing to destroy the other. A conflict between countries that are members of an international organization, which cooperates within the framework and is trying to resolve disputes under its roof, is taking important and effective incentives to reduce the degree of violence.

The theory about the transformation of the interaction context between states by creating a confederation was first articulated by the Abbé de Saint-Pierre (1658-1743), who drafted an international organization in which cooperation was the basis for ensuring ownership by the sovereign. The idea was that the union would bring security, allowing the deployment of another type of foreign policy by eliminating wars. Abbe's plan was very modern with 12 articles which could be amended only by unanimous vote of the members.

In case of a mediation conducted by a special committee, failed, the decision would have to be taken by the Senate with a two-thirds majority. This decision had a compulsory character. Whoever used any weapons before a decision was taken or would not take into account this, would be subject to a military intervention. The plan for the establishment of the international organization clearly stipulates the prohibition for the use of force.⁸



In XX century, almost 200 years after Abbe's development plan, the League of Nations and the United Nation Organization have been established, both respecting the broad pattern. All these organizations are actually variations on the same topic. Each of them involves the organization of states in confederations by integrating potential enemies in their own structure becomes the real act of peace. Such an organization is able to change the international system liberating it from anarchy and setting a climate for communication, cooperation and transparency.

Even if the idea of forming an organization aimed to help maintain peace in the world is very old, knowing different approaches depending on the historical stage in which we relate, the true consecration is unknown at the beginning of XX century, after the end of First World War, with the establishment of the League of Nations. ...the nature of the new security risks and threats facing the international community exceeded the framework of the global community provided by the Second World War ... regional organizations are increasingly recognized as instrumental mechanisms in the new system of collective security...⁹

In 1919, the first attempt to prevent war and maintain peace at the global level is recorded by the League of Nations, based on four fundamental principles: non-aggression, peaceful movement, collective security, low level of arms and self-determination.¹⁰

Non-aggression and pacifist movement are partial and non-absolute. Member States of the League intend to comply and to protest against foreign aggressiveness, territorial integrity and political independence of others.

States agree that whenever any dispute breaks out between them, as they deem appropriate for resolution by judiciary means and which can not be solved by diplomatic means, they can call the legal way¹¹. In any case, they will not resort to war prior to the expiration of three months from adoption of a legal decision or the publication of the council law, once exhausted these procedures a state can initiate war operations.

Based on the principles of this organization, any war or threat of war that affects one of its members is considered a matter for the whole League. The League may take "any decision which seems to be wise and effective for the security and peace of the nations."



The low level of arms was the first global attempt to reduce arms. The League believes that peacekeeping requires a reduction of national armament to the lowest level at which national security is not affected.

The principle of self-determination is also innovative. At the beginning of XX century, there were many colonies and metropolitan areas considered by the League's members unable to be governed yet in the modern world. However, many have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the defeated states which they formally governed. The League postponed granting a certain warrant to victorious states, to take on the "fire" of their governance. Such people require guidance from an "advanced nation" which, according to the resources, experience and their geographical position, they are in a better position to assume this responsibility. This tutelage is exercised as a warrant for the benefit of the League. Anyway, this is consonant with the principle of self-determination - until they will be able to govern themselves.

The main limitations of the League were threefold. The right of a state to resort to war allows a state to resort to arms again. Secondly, another limitation was the right of universal veto in decisions-making by consensus in a crisis situation. Thirdly, the voluntary nature of the military contribution weakened the collective security mechanism.

Even if the idea of forming an organization aimed to help maintain peace in the world is an old idea, facing different approaches depending on the historical stage in which we relate, the real consecration is known at the beginning of XX century, after consuming the First World War, with the establishment of the League of Nations.

On January 10th 1920, by entering into force the Pact of the League of Nations, the first international organization has been created with the intention to become a universal forum to ensure the necessary framework to conduct peaceful relations between states.¹²

Keeping the possibility of using war to solve some disputes between states, allowing it in the practice of international relations is constituted in a large draw-back of the Pact, which unfortunately included other major gaps¹³. In these circumstances, the regulations of the pact could not prevent the ascension of the tensions at the end of the third decade and the new outbreak of a devastating war. The Permanent Court of



Justice had to stop its activity at seventeen years of its establishment (1939).¹⁴

As stated in the preamble of the Pact, the League of Nations was intended “to develop cooperation between nations and to guarantee peace and security.”¹⁵

The Pact of the League of Nations¹⁶, composed and adopted at the Peace Conference at Versailles in 1919, was included as first part in the peace treaties.

A rearrangement of borders within the framework of the international system was for the first the topic which can be described as “peacekeeping operation” The League of Nations was involved in such operations. It is interesting to note that although these operations have been largely excluded from contemporary peacekeeping operations, they formed a part of an institutional memory and legacy of the United Nations. It was the case of Schleswig, the situation of the east Prussian territories of Allenstein (Olsztyn) and Marienwerder, the Klagenfurt basin territory and the situation of the German-Polish land frontiers.

The operation of the League of Nations from the Saar territory is, in our opinion, a great architectural contribution to peace in the interwar period.

The Saar territory is situated from the Western borders of Germany and Northern France to the Eastern part of Luxembourg. Because of its large resources in iron and coal, this territory was very attractive to France which had to face the opposition from the United Kingdom and Germany. Germany was about to give up its political control on the territory in favour of the League of Nations for a period of 15 years after that “people should be called to indicate the sovereignty under which they wish to be placed”. Over the period of 15 years being under tutelage, Saar was about to be administered by an International Commission appointed by the League’s Council. It would have been Saar’s government who had the power to raise taxes and control the legal system. The political and social calm in Saar during the period of international administration has left a good observer to describe as “one of the most quiet and prosperous places in Europe.” But this situation did not last long and began to degrade as a consequence of the growth



of Nazism in Germany. At the end of 1934, the Council continued to pressure with its plan to form an international force for the opposition of Germany who wanted to have maximum freedom of action in the territory. It was also an opposition from Great Britain, worried about expansion costs and liabilities. Rumours about the preparation of France for a military intervention have created tension in the territory. In these circumstances, Britain had no choice but to resign the plans of the League and later the British government has confirmed to the League Council in December 1934 that it will provide troops if France and Germany agreed. With its ally Italy, which also offered a squad now, and against a possible French military intervention, Germany was forced to accept the agreement. Meanwhile, France has accepted that Germany will not raise objections to the deployment of this force; there will not be a question of French intervention. The force was composed of British and Italians under a British general. The conduct was proved to be effective and was well received by the local population. Saar territory was reincorporated in March 1935.

The Saar operation was the largest operation of peacekeeping undertaken by the League of Nations and it has brought to light the importance of an issue mainly in peacekeeping, namely, the selection of the collaborator. The composition of forces, British, Italian, Danish and Swedish was made to match the diplomatic demands of a highly sensitive situation.

The development of peacekeeping in XX century has a particular significance. One concerns the city of Danzing and the other one took place in a remote part of South America, on the border situated in the jungle between Peru and Colombia.

The changes the German territory has undergone, mainly in the East for the benefit of Poland, were very important. First, Germany had to abandon Posnania and part of West Prussia, with Torun. This constituted a “corridor” which granted Poland with access to the sea and to break Eastern Prussia from the rest of Germany. During the Peace Conference there was decided that Danzing and the neighbouring region to form a free city controlled by the League of Nations. The agreement was quickly transformed into a conflict between Germany who felt offended



because the city was moved from the nation and Poland who saw the agreement as a refusal of a natural right of sovereignty over the entire corridor. The international operations of peacekeeping in the territory have been successfully undertaken during most of 1920, in the previous period of the establishment of the Free City. After the Nazi invasion of Poland in 1939, Danzing and the Corridor were fully reintegrated into the German territory.

Thirty years later, in a remote part of the Amazon tropical forests, the League has engaged itself into another unusual exercise of international security. The lack of the League's engagements was keenly illustrated during the so-called Chaco War of 1932-1935 between Bolivia and Paraguay. Boreal Chaco where war took place was a vast unpopulated place whose national status was not well defined but in which both Paraguay and Bolivia maintained their military presence. They wanted control over the Bolivian land which was seen as part of a geographical strategy that could provide an opening to the Atlantic. The extended war caused great damages for the two antagonistic. Given that this war was one of the most destructive in the world, the League of Nations proved unable to intervene significantly.

During the Chaco War, in a border clash took place in Latin America in which the League, due to its inefficiency in the war between Bolivia and Paraguay, this time was determined to find itself a mediator place. The long lasting conflict between Colombia and Peru over the Amazon borders has been resolved mainly in 1932 by a general agreement on borders. Part of this involved the transfer from Peru of an area around the river town of Leticia. This dispute for Leticia was able to turn itself into an international war of vast proportions. Brazil, which was the dominant military power, has made a mediation attempt. In a rapidly deteriorating situation with Peruvian air force attacking Colombian ships in Amazon, Brazil announced its withdrawal. This established the League of Nations with the opportunity to intervene in the crisis. The League Council has made a plan to replace the role that originally had to be played by Brazil. The League had to administer the territory for one year, supported by an "international force" which in practice was made up of Colombian troops under League of Nations. This was



accepted by Columbia but not by Peru. In response, the League Council has invoked Article 15 of the Convention which gave it authority in case of a conflict between States. Its Determination adopted unanimously was that Peru had to withdraw from Leticia in order to allow further negotiations. In April 1933, Peruvian president was assassinated and his radical nationalist government was replaced by one which proved to be subject to more international pressure. The plan was implemented and in 1933 a government Commission of League of Nations was installed. It was composed of representatives of Brazil, Spain and USA. This “international force” was now implemented. In the same line with the League’s plan, altercations between parties have led to the return of Leticia under Colombian sovereignty in 1933.

Although at certain times of its existence the League of Nations has counted 61 states, the universal character has never been achieved. Through its work, which lasted formally until April 1946, but in reality it has stopped at the outbreak of the Second World War, the League of Nations has not demonstrated its capacity to manage situations for which it has been created.¹⁷

Global Security: the United Nations (1945)

Global collective security is reinforced in the next experiment, at the middle of XX century with the United Nations, whose Charter was thought that it would repair the weakness of the League. The Charter’s construction is based on the fundamental principles by which the “security architecture” of the international community continued to lag behind half a century. The term “peace” is used in the United Nations Charter in different ways, without being explained clearly in any place¹⁸. In the system of “classic” international law, “peace” was understood - in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century - especially as the lack of war.

The United Nations have proclaimed four purposes: to maintain international peace and security, self-determination of nations, solving international problems and the harmonization of national actions for those common goals¹⁹. Achieving the proposed goals is governed by



seven principles that have shaped international relations in the era of the United Nations²⁰. The meaning that the United Nations gave to peace, however, is much wider, it creates a wider semantic range and formulating peace in the sense of a global and dynamic system, ensuring social justice, the respect and enforcement of human rights and good neighbourhood relations in all countries. The Charter does not oblige Member States just to give up threat with the exercise of acts of violence in order to impose political objectives. The Charter asks all the states to settle conflicts by peaceful means and to develop cooperation at all levels.²¹

The progress registered in comparison with the League of Nations in the “security architecture” acquired through the United Nations system is threefold. First of all, the war is completely abolished by the Charter; it is provided an effective mechanism to respect this - at least in theory. Second of all, the right to veto to 5 major powers, members of the Security Council over decisions to intervene in support of international peace and security. Thirdly, the military contribution from member states for actions in support of international peace and security which is compulsive and voluntary.

In the United Nations era, collective security has not worked in the manner provided by Articles of the Charter. The reasons are threefold: the existence of nuclear weapons which made the size of multilateral collective security to be asymmetrical, the ideological division between the U.S. and the USSR has polarized the international community and paralyzed the Security Council for over 40 years; in part, because of regulatory progress in international relations, international conflicts decreased, but interstates conflicts have increased as a result of exacerbated post-colonial tensions. In order to preserve peace, there was created in the UN Charter a system of collective security; the Security Council is its central organ. Only the Security Council has the right, under Chapter VII of the Charter, to adopt force measures against states that threaten world peace²². Member States may provide to the UN forces, under Article 43 of the United Nations Charter.

During this period, global strategic stability is ensured effectively, sometimes risky, by nuclear threat. The United Nations contributes

to the global stability, by adapting conflict resolutions techniques in innovative, creative, practical ways and politically feasible.

In January 1992, the Security Council invites the General Secretary to undertake analysis and recommendations on the “strategic ways of achieving more effectively, the provisions and purposes of the Charter regarding the capacity of the United Nations for diplomacy prevention, peacekeeping and peace implementation”.

The United Nations has developed a “peace plan” that reflects a more sophisticated approach to testing the complex security of the modern world, namely the “collective security” in response to interstate aggression referred in the Charter. By the end of the Cold War, interstate conflicts expansion and the United Nations intervention has brought another experience in peace operations. The concepts used are not precisely formulated in academic terms, but considered to be sufficient for the clarity of the operations.²³

Dr. Paul Duță is a Senior Scientific Researcher Fellow within the Romanian Diplomatic Institute.

NOTES:

1 The relationship between integration and security is examined in detail in this study. While the European experiences represent an excellent example of the integration process through the systematic and rational planning, the stake of the sovereignty is more important than military intervention in the European vision, in contrast with the African vision in which the headquarters of the integration are the last criterion.

2 Benjamin Rivlin noted in the *“Schlesinger, the act of birth: finding the United Nations”* that “in general regional authorities lack credibility, operational capacity and therefore have a lack of potency to act effectively as an agent for collective security and peaceful understanding”.

3 In terms of terminology, the use of the term “region” in this study concerns a particular group of nation states.

4 For this reason, many concepts remain with persistent question marks: “regional security” and “regional agencies of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter”.

5 The Treaty of Westphalia - the peace treaty between the Roman Empire and King of France and their allies, 24 October 1648, Articles 120-125.

6 The recent independence from the European colonialism gained by the



Latin American states makes the United States to believe that any attempt by the European powers to expand their system in any way to American hemisphere is a threat to peace and security to the continent.

7 Ionel Cloșcă, *Reglementarea prin mijloace pașnice a diferendelor dintre state*, Editura Politică, București, 1985, p. 97.

8 *Ibid.*

9 S/2004/546. Thematic Debate of the Security Council, July 20th 2004.

10 *Ibid.*, article 10.

11 *Ibid.*, article 13.

12 Although the Pact continues to maintain as legal process of resolving disputes between states the war, the use of peaceful means is required as a priority. Article 12 stipulates that in case of a conflict outbreak between members of the League of Nations, they were required either to submit it to the arbitration proceedings, to judicial review or to the analysis by the Council. Following the provision of article 14, the Permanent Court of Justice was established, which could resolve any dispute submitted by any state. At the same time, the Court was granted with the right to give advisory opinions on any dispute the League of Nations Assembly or the Council would submit it.

13 Ionel Cloșcă, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

14 George Elian, *Curtea Internațională de Justiție*, Editura Științifică, București, 1970, p.30

15 L. le Fur and G. Chklaver, *Recueil de textes de droit international public*, Paris, 1928, p.259.

16 Regarding the development of the Pact, the main role belonged to the great powers of that time: England, France, Italy, Japan and the United States. As the composition the League of Nations included, besides the original members, signatories of the peace treaties (32 in number) and any other state, subject to obtaining a 2/3 of the votes of the General Assembly and by actually proving their willingness to accept the obligations stipulated in the Pact.

17 See the Japanese-Chinese conflict in 1931 and 1937, as well as the violation of the Peace Treaty of Versailles by Germany and Italy.

18 The founders of the United Nations, still marked by the Second World War, have decided to create through the United Nations an instrument to “save future generations from the disaster of war”, the Preamble of the United Nations Charter. Thus, maintaining international peace and security became the primary mission of the United Nations.

19 The United Nations Charter, article 1.

20 The United Nations Charter, article 2. These are sovereign equality of Member States, fulfil in good faith all the obligations of the Charter, peaceful settlement of international disputes; not to use force against the territorial integrity



REGIONAL STABILITY AND SECURITY

and political independence of members, collective security; non complicity with non-members and non-interference in members' jurisdiction.

21 Peacekeeping has become a term used very often. A wide range of civil and military operations are called peacekeeping operations.

22 Such measures of force may include from non-military sanctions - for example, armed economic embargo - to military interventions with land, air and naval forces.

23 The United Nations go largely on sharing responsibility for their accuracy and for the importance of respecting the terminology.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE BORDER CONCEPT IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY

***Cristina BOGZEANU,
Scientific Research Assistant, Centre for Defence and Security Strategic
Studies, National Defence University "Carol I"***

The present paper sets itself to shape an overall image of the relevance of the concept of border for the modality in which security is approached at the European Union's level. Thus, we take into account the fact that the term under discussion doubles its semantics if treated from European perspective, "border" being a term to nominate either the limit between the EU's member states or the line between EU, as a political entity, and the non-member states of the organization. These characteristics of the European borders have a major impact on the way the European security ideas and policies are developed and implemented. Analyzing the documents which compose the juridical basis of EU's organization and functioning, their practical implications and EU's status as regarded from the perspective of international relations theory, we shall try to design the terms in which the relation between border and security is defined at European level.

1. European features of the notion of border

In a world which is subjected to globalization, which has been thought to be borderless, the term of "border"/"frontier" constitutes a subject for many studies and debates, because the recent conditions of the international environment entail a redefinition of these concepts. The notion of "border"/"frontier" has been defined, from juridical perspective, as the limit which dissociates two political entities, because

these concepts evolved in close connection with the idea of *state* and *sovereignty*. As a matter of fact, the idea of state reunites the concepts of border, sovereign authority and the government of the population. The first official certification in the international legislation of the sovereign right on the territorial states dates from 1648, being mentioned in the Treaty of Peace which put an end to the War of 30 years between Lutherans, Calvinists and Catholics. The document signed at Westphalia recognized the existence of irreconcilable differences between these branches of Christianity and invested their leaders with the right to freely decide in religious matters on the territory of their states. In time, this sovereign right to decide within the borders evolved and modified in the rhythm of the development of the idea of state.

Nowadays, border, as limit, as separation between political entities, is being relativized under the conditions of globalization and of the development of the European Union, as a hybrid of intergovernmental and supranational organization. EU is a *sui generis* construction, as it cannot be situated within a category of political entities established before its apparition. Its uniqueness comes from the fact that this organization functions, at the same time, on the principle of intergovernmental cooperation and on the one of the centralization of the administration in a single supranational organism. Therefore, EU implies two apparently contradictory features – sovereignty maintaining and sovereignty conceding. The relation between territory, population and borders becomes problematic under these conditions. The functions of the limits between states are subjected to modifications, as some borders are fortified (especially through the control on the accession of the immigrants), and others are weakened (through the right of free circulation of persons, goods, funds, services, through the monetary union and the European single market).

Under these circumstances, we reckon that there is necessary a reconsideration of the meaning of the “border” concept, when treated from European perspective. Although in the 21st century, there is a tendency to consider that the terms of “border” and “frontier” are commutable, at the level of the European community, there should be made a clear difference between them. In EU, we speak about internal borders



(the limit between the member states) and external borders (the limit between EU and third states). There is, generally speaking, a tendency to associate the term “border” to the external limits circumscribing the perimeter of a state, which represents the space of the manifestation of a certain collective identity, stability and security. The frontier, instead, denotes, for the most part, an intermediary zone, a contact area between two or various cultures or different political systems. Applying these definitions to the European context, as a space where sovereignty is maintained within bounds, *we can associate the concept of “border” to the external limits of EU, to the limits between European and non-european states, and the concept of “frontier” to the limits between EU member states.*

As European states are modern, high developed countries, the possibility for a conflict with territorial implications to emerge is almost void. Europe is, nowadays, characterized, first of all, by the fact that states deal with their issues and frictions through cooperation, and second, by the European citizens’ freedom to circulate. A continental confrontation with a departure point in the wish to redraw the national borders is not plausible anymore. However, these frontiers are now characterized by a high degree of permeability, due to the fact that states are an integral part of a construction with an important supranational component. Thus, frontiers have a double role in EU – firstly, they chart the limits of the member states’ sovereignty, without hindering the European coordination of some national issues, and, secondly, frontiers are endowed, within the Union, with the function to connect states, representing, as a matter of fact, entrances from a state to another. Hence, the institution of a common European space in what concerns foreign and security policy, justice, free circulation, agrarian policy, internal economic market, monetary union, etc., may be possible.

On the other hand, the Reform Treaty stipulates, at article 3a, paragraph 1, that “The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the

BORDER	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Internal border which separates member states;- Fragmentation within EU;- Keeping the sovereignty;- Collaboration between member states;- Renouncement to custom control;- Permanent.
FRONTIER	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- External border which separates EU member states from non-member states;- Cohesion inside EU;- Conceding sovereignty;- Centralised administration at EU level;- Securization;- Modifiable.

*Figure 1 – Characteristics of frontier and border concepts
at European Union's level*

State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State”. In conclusion, frontiers continue to function in their basic sense when it comes about aspects which do not enter into EU's competencies and they lose their classic connotations when treating areas which have already entered into EU's competencies. Although, one cannot ignore frontiers because member states tend to follow individually their national interests, they are inclined to be progressively shaded away at European community's level, especially through the free circulation of persons, capitals, good and services.

European borders, on the other hand, are not stable, having the possibility to be enlarged through the acceptance of new members into the Union, or to be shrunken. Lisbon Treaty (article 49A) clearly mentions that “any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements”. Therefore, although borders have the role to establish the external limits of the European construction and to chart a common space of identity, stability



and security, they are put under the sign of change. On this line, the Union crossed a long way from the six states that created the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) and the European Economic Community (1957) until the actual form made up of 27 member states. After the two core-communities have been constructed, the Union went through six enlargements which meant six border modifications. Future border changes are, theoretically, expected and possible.

Both European features of these limits correspond to a range of activities of the Union which do not seem less paradoxical – the frontier idea is connected to the cooperation and collaboration between member states, and the border concept to the increase of security measures taken for the access points in the EU, oriented against international terrorism, illegal immigration, organized crime, etc.

II. Frontiers and the European Union's security system

As regards the security issues, the problem of borders/ frontiers is even more delicate. Security assurance is traditionally connected to the prerogatives of the nation-state. Beyond the fact that a nation-state implies common language, culture and identity, it presumes, first of all, a territory that must be defended. State assumes the responsibility of defending this territory by dint of the principle of sovereignty, which, at national level, infers state's predominance over its citizens and, at international level, this principles determines the pursuing of the national interest. Frontiers were traditionally looked upon in military terms. The very etymology of the notion of frontier has military references; the word under discussion comes from "front" (French), which initially denoted the first line of fight. Plus, most of the conflicts between states had a starting point in territorial problems, aiming either to defend or to conquer it. Frontiers have been approached, along history, as lines which had to be militarily defended or conquered. This vision upon the frontier and upon its function of charting the territory upon which is manifested a certain sovereign power are prone to change under the conditions of the development of the European construction, founded on the principle of cooperation between member states in order to achieve



a closer communion between them. The contemporary international environment and the European tradition regarding the frontier are combined in the unique modality in which the Union approaches security, applying various principles of action – cooperation and integration.

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), along with European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) represent the main instruments of the EU to manage the issues of security. They imply the conceding of national sovereignty, at a larger or smaller extent, to the European Union, which is a fact achieved with great difficulties, due to the importance that European states attach to this principle. The treaties governing EU's activity and, especially, its activity in the area of security represent a compromise between sovereignty keeping and sovereignty conceding, between the activity based on the principle of intergovernmental cooperation and the one based on the principle of integration, of concentrating the administrative power in the hands of a supranational organism. Although the organization sets itself to frame progressively "a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence should the European Council so decide". (Treaty of Nice, article 17), EU engage itself, as we have previously demonstrated, to respect the traditional functions of statehood in what concerns security. Therefore, although limits between member states tend to be blurred from certain points of view (European citizens' freedom of circulation), frontiers are still functioning under their classic sense when it comes about security. The juridical definition is the one that influences security issues.

Decision-making in ESDP has an *intergovernmental* nature. The European Council (composed of the heads of state and government of the EU member states) defines the guidelines for the resolutions adopted in the area of security at European level. The most important decision-making factors usually belong to the member states. Their representatives get together in the EU Council reunited as the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), the Permanent Representatives Committee, the Political and Security Council (PSC), the Military Committee (EUMC), consisted in chiefs of defence, represented by military representatives, the Military Staff (EUMS), composed of seconded experts from the member states.

Relevant for the security and defence policy is that “The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded” (Title V, Chapter 1, Article 54/ Treaty of Lisbon). Decisions in ESDP are made by an institution which doesn’t have the right to adopt laws. Within ESDP, there are adopted only strategies, actions and common positions and decisions. The concept of common strategy appears for the first time in the Treaty of Amsterdam and refers to the areas in which member states have important common interests, in which they establish objectives and instruments that will be implemented in EU, as well as in the member states. Thus, it comes into focus that the attribution which are conceded to the EU in security through CFSP and ESDP are, especially, instruments put at member states’ disposal for pursuing some common interests, meaning that they keep their national competencies as far as security is concerned.

Moreover, there is a procedure which points out even more the fact that the definition of security is still made in terms of national frontiers – the constructive abstention. In this way, a Member State can abstain from supporting a decision requiring unanimity—including in respect of decisions having military or defence implications—while accepting that “the decision commits the Union” (Article 23(1) TEU). “If a Council member declares that, from vital reasons regarding its national policy, intends to oppose to a certain decision to be taken with qualified majority of votes, he shall not vote. The Council may request, by qualified majority, to the European Council to adopt the decision in unanimity”.

Even more, states’ autonomy in what concerns security is even greater, as the Treaty of Lisbon introduces the possibility of a *permanent structured cooperation*, which aims at developing member states’ military capabilities. Permanent structured cooperation shouldn’t be mistaken for the procedure of enhanced cooperation, which excludes problems with military or defence implications. Permanent structured cooperation is subscribed into the manifestations of the concept of “Multi-speed’ Europe”, permitting to a number of states to achieve an increased degree of integration, supposing that the others will catch up with them later, as they would develop the necessary capabilities. But, beyond the implications for the states’ liberty to decide in security



matters, this provision also aims at enhancing EU's capabilities to assume responsibilities in international community, inclusively responding to the requests of the United Nations, requests that have become more and more frequent.

Equally, one shouldn't omit that the European Union sets itself to evolve towards a "*common defence*" system (Treaty of Nice, article 17), inferring the developing of an armed force whose command should be entrusted to a supranational organism. The difficulties to concede national sovereignty restrained EU to create a European army, but member states, which are, in their majority, NATO members too, have put at EU's disposal a set of national armed forces to participate in ESDP operations.

The conservation of the classic functions of borders between EU member states is also favoured by the fact that most of the EU member states are also NATO member states, and the North Atlantic Organization is still looked upon as the main security provider in Europe. From the point of view of international relations theories, NATO may be subscribed to the category of the collective defence systems, implying the existence of an important national dimension. Its member states are supposed to have unfolded an objective evaluation of their national goals and of the difficulties they have encountered in their efforts to reach them and, subsequently, they decided that they need to be an integral part of this organization in order to create the conditions to better pursue and promote their national interests. EU, on the other hand, sets itself to evolve toward a common defence system, which would imply the creation of a structure endowed with all the necessary means to ensure security and defence and the command of this structure should be totally given to the supranational organization which would have created it. Thus, EU's goal is to create a defence system mindless of the frontiers between member states, but, as long as NATO remains the main security provider in the area and member states will manifest reticence in permitting a supranational organization to involve in the security issues, progresses will be made with difficulty in this area. CFSP/ ESDP will remain tools for EU's assertion on the international scene and for pursuing member states' common strategic



interests, without constituting a defence system defined within EU's borders and regardless of the member states' frontiers, although there have been made some progresses in this sense.

Besides, using the constructivism ideas on the security institutions, we could subscribe the European construction in the category of *security communities*. Notwithstanding that the concept of security communities doesn't refer to individuals, but to political entities, the analogy with the features of the human communities turns out useful in order to understand the states' behaviour within security communities. Thereby, Gilles Férreol asserts that the notion of community "covers, beyond necessity and compulsion, beyond material interest and personal affinities, all the types of relations, characterized by close, deep and lasting affective connections, by a moral engagement and by an adhesion and appurtenance to a community which is based not only on feelings and ideas, but also on a similar reciprocity between rights and obligations" [Gilles Férreol, Guy Jucquois, *Dictionary of Alterity and Intercultural Relations*, Polirom, Iași, 2005, p. 150]. The definition points out the idea of personal volition, of voluntary action taken on the fundament of some affinities. On the international scene, in the area of security, the term refers to a group of actors which conceive a "real conviction that the community members will not physically fight each other and that they will manage their frictions in other means" [Karl W. Deutsch et. al., *Political Community and the North Area. International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 5]. The peculiarity of this institution consists in the very importance given to sovereignty, as the political entities composing it keep their sovereignty, but exclude the possibility of managing their quarrels in military ways.

As long as intern borders/ frontiers are concerned, we should have in view a real *fragmentation* of Europe, at least in what concerns the security aspects. European states have developed, in time, a tradition of sovereignty, of self-determination, of the national authorities' right to decide within the state's borders. Even more, in a Europe of nationalisms, of conflicts for territories, of the struggle for power, sovereignty was considered to be indispensable for the assurance of

the primordial national interest – survival. We may therefore consider the difficulties in conceding sovereignty as justifiable. Additionally, we shall take into account that the European dimension of external policy, security and defence is not an accomplished fact. EU is subjected, in this sense, to a process of continuous evolution, of developing the necessary institutions and institutional capabilities for the efficient management of this sector. From this point of view, the Union has been defined as an “emergent security actor” [Constantin-Gheorghe Balaban, Security and international law. Challenges at the beginning of the 21st century, C.H. Beck, Bucharest, 2006, p. 76], meaning that Europe’s security system is under development. Thus, we can speak about a borderless Europe only in the field of the single internal market and the implications of Schengen Agreements referring to the free circulation of persons.

III. Borders and European Union’s security

a) Delineating a common security and defence system between external borders

EU’s borders, the limit which separates EU member states from non-member states, are characterized, first of all, by changeability. The European Union reached its current dimensions as a result of a range of successive enlargements. Enlargement is considered to be one of the main instruments that the organization has at its disposal in order to achieve its objectives in what concerns stability, security and conflict prevention. Any country that respects the basic principles of democracy, liberty, of the rule of law and proves to have a good respect for fundamental human rights and liberties may stand for the status of EU member state. But, in addition, the state must comply with a set of fundamental criteria, known as Copenhagen Criteria (established at the European Council meeting from Copenhagen in 1993). These criteria require the prospective member state to fulfil three basic conditions:

a) To have stable institutions to guarantee a mature democratic system, the rule of law, the respect for the human rights and the minorities’ protection;

b) To have a stable market economy able to cope with the pressure and competition from the internal EU market;



c) To be able to assume the obligations emerging from the statute of EU member state, especially the ones referring to the embracement of the political, economical and monetary union objectives.

The enlargement process is complicated because the adhesion of a new state to the EU is preceded by a range of phases which are meant to prepare the state to assume their role as EU member. Under these circumstances, there is a problem raising, namely, the one referring to the evolution that a state must have been known in order to become member of the organization. The transformations experienced before adhesion are meant to draw the national legislation closer to the *acquis communautaire*. Applying the adhesion procedure, EU has actually assured stability in its close vicinity, contributing to the development of some stable, modern, well-governed democratic systems, of some functional market economies. Candidate countries or potential candidate countries sign and implement Association Agreements, Partnerships, benefit from financial and technical assistance, of progresses' monitoring and have political dialogues, actions taken for maintaining the members of the organization as close as possible. In the main, all these phases are known as integration, which is defined as a process which develops in parallel to the enlargement or even as a necessary phase preceding the enlargement. In spite of that, the fact that the Union developed in just 50 years from a six member community to a twenty-seven member community has visible repercussions upon the cohesion within the EU. Thus, inner fragmentation became clear. Nevertheless, EU continues its policy of gradually integrating new regions of the continent, namely the West Balkans, the notorious "powder keg" of Europe, and Turkey. In both cases, the pre-adhesion procedures have been activated and they are in different stages of evolution.

The mutable, unstable character of borders is meant, in fact, to create an environment of stability and security at European level. Successive enlargements, the integration of as many as possible countries within the cooperation framework represented by EU constituted the conditions under which this environment of stability was born. The European construction assured, from its beginning, an unprecedented period of peace and stability between its peoples. Thus, if EU, as a form of security

community, underlines the conservation of the importance of frontiers/internal borders, the same form of security institution represents an assurance that its member states have renounced at the idea of using violence as a way of dealing with their conflicts. From this point of view, EU is *pluralist security community* because it can be defined as a “transnational region composed of sovereign states, whose peoples maintain well-founded expectations on peaceful changes” [Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, „*Security Communities*”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 30]. This implies the existence of an internal cohesion, of direct relations between peoples composing the above-mentioned community, a mutual acquaintance constructed on the basis of interaction, which, on a long term, could lead to the emergence of common interests, obligations and mutual responsibilities.

Moreover, in security matters, a progressive integration of these states becomes possible due to the changes manifested in the international security environment. The fact that the emergence of a military confrontation between the European states has become almost impossible doesn't mean that threats and risks have disappeared at EU's level; it just means that their nature has changed. If until and during the Cold War, the idea of security was connected to the danger of a possible territorial invasion, afterwards, threats became global, irrespective of borders, requiring an approach in consequence. Non-state actors whose action is inconsiderate of national borders represent a real threat for the rule of law. It's generally about the international terrorism phenomenon, about the organized crime, about the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction and about the possibility for them to be acquired by the first mentioned factors. The cross-border character of the threats to the EU member states requires a closer cooperation between them as far as security is concerned.

The treaties governing the activity and organization of the EU lay the basis of this cooperation and of its evolution towards a common defence system. The Treaty of Lisbon, for instance, introduces the possibility of permanent structured cooperation which is meant to develop the military capabilities of the member states and is different from the enhanced cooperation which excludes military and defence aspects. Although



this clause may be used to demonstrate the high degree of autonomy conferred to the member states when it comes about making decisions in the security area, this provision also aims at developing and enhancing EU's capacities to assume responsibilities in international community.

Also, the same treaty introduces the *solidarity clause*, which stipulates that member states shall provide mutual assistance, at the request of national authorities, if a member state was victim of a terrorist attack or of a natural or man-made disaster; the present clause constitutes a proof of the progressive integration in the security field. It also bears implications on security and defence, but at internal level, when accentuating civil protection issues. Security may be, nevertheless, approached at a level that overruns the limits imposed by the historical national frontiers, but with the reserve that the decision to ask support in managing a crisis situation still belongs to states' authorities – evidence of the conservation of the principle of sovereignty. Moreover, there have been also made progresses in this sense through the article 42(7) from the Treaty of Lisbon which provides that “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation”. The present provisions do not determine the birth of a common defence system but they lay the basis for a closer cooperation between European states as far as these issues are regarded and they contribute politically and symbolically to the solidarity development within the Union.

A notable progress towards the creation of a common defence system was registered at the very beginning of 2009, when the European Parliament voted for the institution of SAFE (*Synchronized Armed Forces Europe*). SAFE actually represents the first step taken towards building a European army. This act proposes the creation of a Council

of Ministers for enhancing the coherence between the various national policies. This effort evidently refers to the issue of the relation between sovereignty and security at European level and underlines again the difficulty encountered along the efforts to transfer sovereignty from national to supranational authorities. The same document also initials the creation of an autonomous and permanent European Operational Centre “with the capacity to undertake strategic planning and to conduct ESDP operations and missions” (point 53/ Report on the European Security Strategy and ESDP). As far as security is concerned, the Union clearly evolves towards the creation of a common defence system, but, continuing to maintain the assurance of the member states’ security between the national frontiers. Nonetheless, EU’s propositions, outlined the German member of European Parliament, Karl von Wogau, aim at a “dynamic to further development of co-operation between national armed forces so that they become increasingly synchronised” [*The Telegraph*, Blueprint for EU army to be agreed, 18th February 2009]. SAFE implies the creation of a permanently available European military force.

EU’s documents referring to security (particularly, *European Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World*) disclose the relocation of the first line of defence beyond the geographical lines of the EU. The defence line doesn’t coincide with the physical demarcation between EU member states and non-member states. This phenomenon is caused mostly because of the cross-border nature of the new threats to the European security. Thus, the European Security Strategy mentions that “In an era of globalization, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand... The first line of defence will be often abroad. The new threats are dynamic... Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early” [*A Secure Europe in a Better World, Addressing the Threats*, p. 6]. As long as security is concerned, there is an evident tendency, at the European level, to not see border as limits separating nation-states, but as an area of potentially unstable countries. The same strategy mentions “Even in an era of globalization, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed”. Thus, EU’s stability and security depend at



a great extend on preventing the isolation of poor, politically unstable states situated at the margins of an enlarged Union.

b) The relativization of the external borders and the European Neighbourhood Policy

The main instrument that the Union elaborated for guaranteeing stable vicinity is the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which is used to offer advantages and privileged relations in various domains to the nearby countries. These advantages consist in backing up progress, especially in the economic area, democratization, constructing and maintaining the respect for human rights, but also, in political-military cooperation, in order to create a favourable context for laying a basis for common actions on conflict prevention, terrorism combating and on some common mechanisms for the management of emergency situations. These policies permit non-member states to line up to the Union, but without becoming proper members.

EU has created a “ring of friends” with which has a close cooperation relation. Although there is a policy referring to the customs controls (at the external borders), third countries’ citizens being bound to have a visa in order to enter Union’s territory, there is a certain degree of cooperation, which makes from the limitary to EU states a sort of a buffer-zone, an area, which, from a juridical point of view, doesn’t belong to the EU territory, but which is backed up by the organization in order to create a stable environment at its borders. Therefore, the Union makes out of the construction of a secure neighbourhood one of the three major objectives mentioned in the European Security Strategy, and according to the Treaty of Lisbon (article 7a) “the Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterized by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation”. This method to approach the border regions turns out to be very useful if we take into consideration the fact that bad-governed states could produce massive immigration waves towards the Union, could favour the development of cross-border networks of organized crime etc. If we analyzed a map of the states which benefit from ENP, we would



observe that EU realized, through this policy, an area of transition from the European world to the non-European one. These states (Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Palestine) may represent a protection ring around the European construction, obviously contributing to the Union's security state.

EU is, therefore, surrounded either by well-developed, modern states, with a predictable behaviour on security issues, or by states which have already begun their accession procedures, or by the ENP states which is meant to assure, on one hand, the economical, political and social development of these states which passed through periods of instability, and, on the other hand, determines the emergence of a predictable behaviour in international environment of these countries in order to eliminate the possibility to become a potential factor of instability in the area.

At the same time, ENP also implies collaboration in customs management. In this sense, the states under discussion benefit from certain advantages referring to the cross-border traffic facilitation (elimination or decrease of visa taxes, the run-down of the number of the requested documents for obtaining a visa) which constitute economical advantages and ease the cultural exchanges, but there are also established agreements on the readmission procedure in the natal country of the persons who immigrated illegally. Readmission agreements were established, for instance, with Ukraine and Morocco. Thus, we deal with the issue of weakening the traditional functions of borders and of their reconfirmation, at the same time. A Commission communication on the development of a new instrument of Neighbourhood Policy (emitted in 2003) mentions that efficient border management is essential for the security and prosperity of both parts. Facilitating trade and persons' circulation, along with the securization of EU border against smuggling, illegal traffic and organized crime (inclusively terrorist threats) and illegal immigration shall have a major importance". By this approach, the Union reserved the right to elevate a good "fence" to separate it by neighbours and to permit it, at the same time, to have good relations with them.



It's pointed out the fact that the permeability of external borders is just relative, but they do not disappear and do not become irrelevant. ENP was created to protect the EU and the close neighbours from common threats (terrorism, illegal immigration, drug, weapons and human trafficking), but, the fact that the relations between EU and neighbours conserve many of the initial essential functions also denotes an effort to enhance the European security; actually, for these phenomena to happen inside the European community, they have to pass through two filters – one represented by the non-European border of the neighbour countries and one represented by their European border.

These states are not members of the European construction, but they benefit of a range of advantages resulting from the establishment of collaboration agreements. The permeability of these borders is not only relative, but also variable. Romano Prodi asserted in 2002 that “We cannot water down the European political project and turn the European Union into just a free trade area on a continental scale (...) Neighbours will share everything with the Union except institutions”. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Commissioner for External Relations, sustained Prodi's words in 2005: “Let's be clear about what ENP is, and what it is not. It is not an Enlargement policy. What it is is an offer. The offer of deeper cooperation and progressive integration into certain EU policies and programmes, depending on the fulfilment of commitments”. This way, she underlines the fact that the beneficiary states of this policy don't have the perspective to become EU member states in the close or middle future, but they enjoy a special statute. At a certain extend, they even function as borders, as frontier, as transition space from the European political area to the non-European one, as an area where European values are exported, where opposites meet, where the “other” cannot be clearly differentiated from “us”.

By assuring an environment of political and economical stability in the immediate vicinity, EU increases its own state of security. EU-led missions, under ESDP, with or without appealing to NATO's resources, developed in the immediate closeness of the EU border or in aloof regions, confirm, on one hand, the movement of the first line of defence beyond EU's physical limit and, on the other hand, the efforts made by

the organization to ensure a stable vicinity. The stability of the area from the borders of the EU is also assured through the dynamic of integration that the EU generates around its borders.

Nonetheless, although Union's border may seem to fluctuate from certain points of view, this phenomenon doesn't mean that there is a smaller importance attributed to the geographical limits between member and non-member states. Also, one shouldn't omit that the demarcation line between EU member states and non-European states coincide with the demarcation between two sovereign state entities. This border will be even more secured and protected as the agreements within the EU permit the free circulation of persons, goods and services. The securization of EU's external borders, which coincide with the frontier between a member and a non-member EU country, falls both under the EU's competency and under the competency of the respective state. For instance, in the case of Romania whose Eastern and Northern frontier coincide with the external EU's border, the border's securization is ensured by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex), but also by national resources assisted by the Union. Regarding the customs control, Romania benefited from EU's support and assistance through PHARE program. After Romania became an EU member state, the European financial assistance for the enhancement of the customs control and for border securization was supplemented [White Paper, Chapter 4, The component of external policy and of national security system, p.56]. The securization of the external frontiers of member states has in view, especially, the prevention of the illegal immigration and of other forms of cross-border crimes.

c) Romania's borders in the context of European security

Romania's geopolitical position has direct implications on the relations between borders and security in European Union context. Romania's position at the interference of South-Eastern, Central-European, Eastern areas, Black Sea basin and Central Asia represents "an advantage in promoting certain stabilization policies and in the engagement of these spaces, through the development of interregional



and intraregional cooperation, in countering the risks on continental and global security, in conformity with the international organizations' approach (especially, NATO, EU, OSCE)" [White Paper, Chapter 1, Romania's Security Policy, p. 3]. But, beyond these advantages conferred by the proximity to all these spaces, Romania's position also implies increased responsibilities in guaranteeing security, not only for the national citizens but also for the European ones. The area of the Community of Independent States which transits a period marked by the effort to clarify their identity, to redefine the territorial, ethnical, religious, economic issues may represent a possible source of instability and a possible risk to the national and European security. The South-Eastern European space may also represent a potential risk area for the security under the social-political conditions of the states which composed former Yugoslavia and the increase of some unconventional risks in this area. Romania's situation in the proximity of these spaces which may represent a potential risk source for the European security, the fact that the majority of illegal immigrants enter EU through its East side and the same side also represents the main EU entrance point for drug and human trafficking lead to the increase of the responsibility to secure the national frontiers. For our country, this chapter of the pre-adhesion treaty turned out to be even more difficult because of the relations with the Republic of Moldova. "On the grounds of the special relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova and in conformity with the natural responsibilities coming from the historical, linguistic and cultural community, with the principle "one nation – two states" and with the spirit of the European Neighbourhood Policy, we shall give a special attention to the cooperation with the Republic of Moldavia. Romania has the political and moral duty to support this state during its modernization, democratization and European integration process, to make its best to back up – from a political, economical and diplomatic point of view – the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity". [National Security Strategy of Romania, Romania – a dynamic vector of the security and prosperity in the Black Sea region, p. 36].

As a EU member state, Romania has the responsibility to secure the Eastern external EU borders. Thus, as the Schengen Agreement

represents the main instrument of managing the issues related to the EU borders and as it permits the removal of the customs control at intern borders, the control at the external borders of Romania shall ensure not only “the verification of travel documents and the other conditions governing entry, residence, work and exit but also checks to detect and prevent threats to the national security and public policy of the Contracting Parties” [article 6, a from the *Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders*].

Thus, Romania must get, at first, through a reform and modernization of the ways of ensuring the controls on the external border, and, only then, will benefit from the advantages entailed by the status of EU member state and of Schengen Convention. Our state has to improve the securization of the external ground, air and maritime borders, to develop the cooperation between the police forces, to implement the Schengen Information System and the regulations referring to the system of visas and data protection.

Romania’s situation, under the given circumstances, covers the both visions on the concept of border. Our state has the experience of the uniting borders, when they are thought in terms of frontier, transition space, common space for distinct political entities (economic exchanges, contact between individuals), but it also has the experience of borders which separate two or various political entities. This phenomenon is caused, mainly, by Romania’s status as EU border state.

Conclusions

Although from a juridical point of view, borders maintain, at EU’s level, their traditional significance, the unique character of the organization determines, at the political, economic, social level, modifications of the implications of this concept. Border doubles its significance, defining different realities (internal border/ frontier, designating the limits between EU member states, or external border/



border designating the limit between EU, as distinct political entity, and other states).

Regarded in relation to the idea of state and security, inner border corresponds to some fragmentation tendencies of the organization, as member states have at their disposal a series of tools permitting them an individual pursue of their national interests, using often EU just as an favourable environment to reach their common interests. Nonetheless, these borders tend to be blurred if we take into account the fact that the Union sets its goal to develop a common defence system and makes visible progresses on this line, through the proposition to create the Synchronised Armed Forces Europe. But we cannot speak about a “communitarization” of the security sector, at this moment, about its management according to the principles which govern the issues included in the first pillar, but about its “europenization”, about elaborating a unique political expression and a unique modality to implement it, which shall permit, as much as possible, the elimination of the manifestation of divergent political interests and the delineation of a real defence community and an increase of the supranational management of the area of security.

The external border, on the other hand, seems to unite EU’s member and to separate EU, as a whole, from non-member states, through the integration of the member states in a common institutional system and through the removal of the customs control at intern borders. However, these borders are also subjected to a relative and variable permeabilization through the European Neighbourhood Policy, which allows the states from the immediate vicinity to enjoy certain privileged economical and cultural relations with the EU, becoming, at the same time, a sort of outpost of European security and defence. Moreover, the Union refers to borders less in terms of separation between nation-states and more as zones of potentially unstable states.

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SOCIAL SECURITY – DIMENSION OF NATIONAL AND COLECTIVE DEFENCE

*Mirela ATANASIU,
Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies,
National Defence University “Carol I”*

Nations state depends by peoples' attitudes in regard with the problems shaping at macro-social level, pressures for globalization and regionalization amplifying and diversifying pressures against the identitarians. By collective security is assured the protection of an organization's members against the threats and aggressions generated by aggressors outside that organization and therefore is needed the permanent cooperation between the participants to that system to counteract threats as: terrorism, organized crime, illegal immigration, WMD and drugs proliferation, pollution, and natural disasters or human provoked.

1. Identitarian Security – Dimension of societal security

Specialists of post-Cold War security studies (Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde) name by the term of “societal security” the sustainability of the traditional patterns of language, culture, religion, national identity and habits which, nowadays, knows a gradual process of partial substitution by the alternative term seemingly more adequate “spiritual security”.

Starting from security object, at societal level, they must be preserved cultural, ideological and civilizational identity. There are relevant, for the upside idea, the concept of “societal security” used by Barry Buzan referring to “the threats and vulnerabilities affecting

the patterns of communitarian identity and culture”. When the clash among these cultural patterns becomes inevitable taking violent forms inside or outside borders, the “social security” problems become global security issues and the role of international community in the prevention of conflict’s escalation appears more pregnant (as in the ex-Yugoslavia situation, a.n.). As regards the prevention of conflict’s burst by the action over the causes producing it and by preservation societal security, essential becomes the analysis of the nationalism characteristics and its aggressive forms.

Facts’ judicial gravity is considered lower when an individual is bad-treated, on the basis of his appurtenance to an ethnic, religious, national community but, when the same treatments are over a group, the implications are more obvious and with more complex traces¹.

In our demarche to define group’s security, we must mention that, at this level, there’re many similarities with the individual security level. As a person has expectations for his security to be assured, similarly, there are also expectations at group’s level. As concern the group, still, we consider as major to assure a security state to feel sheltered from any discrimination as consequence of certain groups’ common values sharing. Consequently to the individual security, the legislation can help to group’s security assurance although the laws can, also, be discriminatory, this being a major and unavoidable source of conflict.

There are special legislative prescriptions to protect against the discriminations of groups organized on different criteria: ethnical, religious, sexual, unfavoured as well as persons with disabilities or minorities of any kind². At national level, there exist a legislative set comprising the framework to assure their security. A special category is represented by the legal framework to assure the security for the national minorities: ethnical, religious, linguistic or sexual³.

Rights conferred to the ethnical minorities represent a sensitive subject for all the former communist states, also Romania, especially after the tensions from the auto-proclaimed Kosovo state and the recognition by the Russian Federation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. In our opinion, this could be the main source of national tensions if a similar emerged situation isn’t correctly managed

by the political decision-makers, here we think about the Romania's national minorities' structure.

There are also prescriptions regarding the main liberties of individuals to associate, to freely express, to organize to preserve their security. Therefore, in the Romanian Constitution there are references about syndicates, patronages or professional associations, as forms of social-group organization above the political parties – “the pluralism is considered a condition to guarantee the constitutional democracy”⁴. The right to identity⁵, the right to education⁶, the right to culture⁷, the right to representation into the political life⁸ or the local public administration⁹, the right to use the maternal language or the translator in justice¹⁰ there are manifestations allowed to the minorities as organized social groups.

2. National security – “nation's security”

For a long period of time, one nation's security was confounded with its military power, the armed force representing the more used mean to resolve conflicts or to determine some subjects to accept the stronger one views. Also, the decisive relation between demography, finances, economy and nations' capacity to impose their will in the relations with other states was recognized since the history beginnings, hardly, and in the Napoleon's war époque was made a clear distinction among a state and its military power as part from the first¹¹.

The complexity of nation's building phenomenon, in part political, in part cultural, permits many interpretations and definitions. A nation can't fully be qualified neither by religion, common interests or geography. Ernest Renan extraordinarily expressed the fact that “nation is a soul, a mental principal. This principle is constituted from two things, that there are mainly one and another. The first is the memory and the latter is the valid accord to live together...”¹².

Even today, the nation concept standing to the basis of the contemporary state is a French contractual inspiration one¹³. As abbot Gregoire said the ensemble of citizens formed a unique and indivisible nation¹⁴. At his turn, Sieyes defines the nation as “a body of

associations living under a common law and represented by the same legislature”, expressing by it “the quintessence of the nation-state: a voluntary association, because its contractual, fusion by integration, in the thematic sense of the term, by individualities, into a homogenous nation and manifesting its will representatively. So, Sieyes creates from the nation a sovereign juridical person gathering in the same place all state’s citizens without any ethnical distinction. This conception will be, otherwise, consecrated also in article 3 from the Declaration of Human and Citizen from 26th of August 1789 stating “The Principle of each sovereignty essentially resides in Nation”¹⁵.

Afterwards, the contractual conception about nation will be deepened and crystallized by Ernest Renan in his well-known conference about “What is a nation?” from 11th of May 1882. “A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two different things which in fact consists a single one, the soul is the spiritual principle. One comes from the past, the other from present. The first is the common possession of a wealthy legacy of memories; the other is the engagement, the will to leave together”¹⁶. Practically, in this conception, the nation has a certain collective identity, qualified moreover by the will to live as being the “citizens’ community”, as “association of free and reasonable peoples”¹⁷, determined by a series of solidarity ratios and interests. This conception stands to the majority of modern constitutions; the nation isn’t the result of a juxtaposing of ethnical groups or a phenomenon solely ethnical or biological¹⁸. Starting from this conception, Article 1 from the Romanian Constitution defines the Romanian state as “national state” and Article 2 devotes the “national sovereignty”.

Regarding the theoretical basis of the nation-state conception, appears clearly the lack of a real necessity of some political circles proposals to replace the expression of national state from the Romanian Constitution with other expressions as “citizen’s state” or “multinational state”, proposals deriving from an ethnical perception wrongly attributed to the nation concept used in the Constitution from 1991.

The creation of the nation-states in the Middle Age had, undoubtedly, to the basis a concept of the “medieval nation” regarding as ethnical community. In first, the ethnical groups or medieval nationalities were



regional or provincial nationalities shaped, then, by certain events and powerful sovereigns and gradually melted into wider units”¹⁹, characterized by a certain mainly ethnical solidarity or cohesion.

Foreword, the idea of nation evolved in time, from the vision of the 17th century as political organization formed from aristocracy and clergy. The nations’ formation as subjective communities coincided with the creation of the state as objective communities, toward the end of the Middle Age, and to the end of the 18th century, the political building of the nation state will include all the nation’s member and not only the elites. After the revolutions held in 1688 in England and 1789 in France, the signification balance started to bow to the sense of nation for the people in the detriment of the aristocratic nation and the confrontation from the World War I led to the definitive formation of state’s national substance and therefore starts the era of the total national state (1914-1945). The auto-determination principle allowed the formation of sovereign nation-states, principle crossed over to the Yalta Conference and replaced by a bipolar policy sharing world into two influence spheres.

After the bipolar system collapse, the post-Cold War international relations witnessed a process of “resurrection of some local cultural and political, which were still and are reinvented now”²⁰. We assist to a phenomenon of “identitary refold” threatening the territorial nation-state by a veritable “return of nationalism”, a nationalist resurrection on the basis of ethnical exacerbation being the result of a “past reinvention” or “a process being refrigerated by the Cold War”²¹.

The disintegration of the federal states from the Europe’s Center, South-Eastern and Eastern and the region’s new emerging states was done after ethnical criteria. After put into discussion and took out from the political sea sight the old federations, the created or recreated nations being, for the moment, convinced that into their national ethnic state is better than into the structures where often were closed without their will, the fragmentation process isn’t stopped. The recurrent temptation to make the state territory to coincide with the ethnical group, gets extreme forms, even systematic ethnical cleansing, as state policy as were the cases for Rwanda, Bosnia or Kosovo. When the frontiers reshape isn’t possible or wanted, the ethnical national concept promotion

at “concurrency” with the one of contractual source strongly discusses the stability of the actual international system.

Although corresponds to an historical realities, if the idea of ethnical nation could be legitimized until the moment of states’ creation that form today the international society, its stimulation in the 21st century represents a forbidden touch against the sovereignty, as basis of the international law.

The identitary claims’ proliferation as ethnical-national fundament leads world to a “neo-tribalism” stimulating the individuals association by the cultural, religious or ethnical affinities. The exacerbate identitarianism was, undoubtedly, a belligerent factor. Re-discussing the political association threaded by the citizenship tides in the name of certain so-called natural communities, it leads to the territorial, political and conventional principle undermining for its replacing by its anchoring into an “originary” space by a carrier-state of a strong national project. Today, this type of demarche benefits by sustenance theoretically and doctrinary. An concrete and very acute perceived example is the adoption of the normative acts as “The law regarding the Hungarians statute from Hungary neighbour states” (adopted at 19th of June 2001), having as main objective, written in its preamble, the promotion of the “Hungarian nation as a whole” concept, formed by the totality of Hungarians (living not only in Hungary, as its citizens, but also in the neighbour countries). The promotion of the ethnical concept (ethnic-cultural) of the Hungarian nation “as whole” (the wide Hungarian nation) has a reparatory goal, declared many times by the Hungarian authorities, also into the debates regarding the law adoption in the Parliament from Budapest: the law refers to the Magyar ethnics “who lost the Hungarian citizenship in other ways but by their own will (Article 1 from the Law). This normative act was presented as “reparatory” for the injustices provoked by the Trianon Treaty with the region’s frontier tracing. “World’s ethnicization is charged by violence and chain destabilization”²². The tensions caused by this type of concept faint the nation-state damaging its sovereignty, especially the “exclusivity” feature by the projection of perception of virtual condominium on ethnical bases pushing the sovereignty exercise toward certain “deteritorialization” weakening its legitimate capacity to

react and control. The production of this virtual “deteritorialization” can be a first step of a dangerous slipping to and fro the political reality.

Benefiting from the general debate about the erosion of “the nation-state (which there’s a real phenomenon, even, in fact, would be more correct to be speaking about a *state and its functions’ re-adaptation* to the new international circumstances). There are authors trying to theoretically “place” this conception on the terrain of nation-state “obsolation” and its substitution with the multinational state. Is made an obvious and real confusion between one of the mondialization consequences – “nationalisms archaicization”²³ (the phenomenon regards, really, the ethnical nationalism) and “the erosion” of the nation-state, based on citizen-contractual nationalism. Therefore, “attacking” the idea of nation standing to nowadays nation-state basis, this will be substituted with an ethnical form of wide nationalism, a pan-nationalism. Is accredited that on the basis of the linguistically and ethnical factor will appears into the nation-states framework the so-called “sub-states” tending to gain, in different ratios, *para-state competences and attributions*. The drawn conclusion, we assist to nation-state “ethnicization” under the form of “national minorities states” based on the correlative legitimation of pluri-state nation juridical status, shared nation or, in fact, aiming to legitimate protection by “mother-state”/”mother-nation” of own national fragments living in neighbor political societies²⁴.

Following the initiatives trying to enforce nation as subject of the international relations but where state, political identities generator of influence spheres after the Cold War appeared the idea of a new concept “common security”. The core of this concept is created on the idea of everybody surviving, not on the previous spread the idea of threat with mutual destruction.

His Sanctity, John Paul II Pope stated into a discourse “*The right of a nation to existence is surely previous to all the rights: nobody, no state or nation, international organization isn’t based to consider a certain nation isn’t worth to exist. This fundamental right to existence don’t necessarily suppose a state sovereignty because diverse forms of juridical connections between the nations are possible as the case of the federal states, for example ...*”²⁵.

Moreover, is tried the “de-territorialization” justification by the invocation of the worldwide integration in its European dimension which “disconnects” the economic flows organization by a certain national territory that the national sovereignty “relies”²⁶. The European integration would effect a “nation’s disetatzation” consequently with a “state’s dis-nationalization”²⁷. Is tried the identification of a European identity corresponding to the European citizenship advanced by the Maastricht Treaty. Otherwise, a “post-national”²⁸ identity will be formed, equivalent to the consolidation of “the post-national European political framework”: classical nation-state can’t be the ideal framework to express the political will of citizens because of “identities plurality”²⁹.

Being uncertain the apparition of this “supra-nationalities” is tried the promotion of an intermediary idea: nation’s “disetatzation” and state’s “disnationalization” would consequence the creation of a “European federation of ethnies” and the transformation of every state entity in *multinational state* consequently with the “multination” apparition³⁰. Or, the juridical institution itself of European citizenship is built and based necessarily on the member-states citizenships.

From another perspective, reported to the state’s functions (and not to its national fundament), today is spoken by a state “erosion” by the “weakening of the political will of the European state” as about a phenomenon in evolution in all the Cold War period, accelerated after 1990, the state’s authority recognizes redirections to the superior levels (international, regional, supra-national and integration organizations), but also to inferior levels (infrastate communities or entities able, at their turn, to rely to inter-regional, inclusively trans-frontier, cooperation forms).

So, the European states renounced to develop own national policy in the field of defence, expression par excellence of sovereignty. Through the political-military alliance treaties (from Washington and Warsaw, the European states security was, in reality, trusted to the two super-powers practicing a concept of limited sovereignty corresponding to the concrete stadium of the bipolar world. This reality survived partially to the bipolar system collapse: the candidate states to NATO adhesion acts as are de facto members of the Alliance.

As regards the foreign policy registered a similarly phenomenon from similar reasons. After the decolonization, the most part of the ex-colonial European states renounced to make an extra-European foreign policy, excepting France and the United Kingdom (its foreign actions will renounce step-by-step to the decisional autonomy in regard with the United States).

Conclusions

In our opinion, for now, still, the citizens from Europe are keener to the nation-state than the idea of “European state” because its space represents, the place, the root where the national identity is fed and protected. This is justified by the reality of our living, where the individual and the communitarian security depend in first by the national security, and afterwards by the regional security, that represent an abstract level of security to create loyalties unbased on national plan. Still, the idea of European citizen and the loyalty to this newly earned statute become more present realities in nowadays. The simple fact, everybody tries to understand how it works this European gearing and the opportunities conscience to result from this quality helps us to perceive the Europeanity closer

We see that the auto-determination individualizing the “nation” subject as way-factor of existence for the social, became the force-line and guideline defended against the pressures and aggressions generated by the ideologists. Otherwise, the actual international system continues to have state as basic unit, as constitutive element of the international relations³¹.

The participation to the regional security promotion is the attribute of the Romanian defence policy being projected in regard to promote national political-military and strategic interests and objectives. Therefore, the Romanian foreign policy goals to protect the social and economic interests of Romanian citizens, as well as the promoting and protecting of economic, political and military interests of Romania in its relation with the international actors. It is applied in concordance with the geostrategic position and Romania’s profile as active and responsible

member of the international community.

The participation near the North-Atlantic Alliance member-states to the campaign against the terrorism and all its annexes, demonstrates fully the operational capacity of the Army and Romania's political stability regarding the resolution of the major problems of international security.

Presently, NATO assures its members a solid security, a human protection, implicitly societal, real and credible against the aggressions and threats outside it, by the respect of the main principle of the collective security, the one to maintain peace and stability into the common space, as is stipulated in the Constitution Treaty of the Alliance, itself³².

As regards the aspects related by state's homeland security and its capacity to assure it, is appreciated that even in this sector can be seen a weakening of the political will: different problems to affect this field (demographical outburst, environment problems, drugs' traffic c, intern or international terrorism, the proliferation of the WMD which rediscuss the principle of state's sovereignty as security instrument.

NOTES:

1 Into the International Court Statute there are considered to be very serious offences the ones touching the international community ensemble. Genocide crimes are considered "any acts committed with the intention to destroy completely or partially, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group by the members' group killing, the serious touch of physical and psychical integrity of group's members, the intentioned obedience of group to the existence conditions to lead to its total or partial physical destruction, measures regarding birth hindering into the group, the forced transfer of children from a group to another".

2 A representative example is the Convention for national minorities protection, European Council, Strasbourg, 1995.

3 Among the minorities rights there are: the recognition, citizenship, protection against discrimination, representation participation to the public life etc.

4 Constituția României, modificată și completată prin Legea de revizuire a Constituției României nr. 429/2003, Art. 8, 9.

5 Idem, Art. 6.

6 Idem, Art. 32.



- 7 Idem, Art. 33.
- 8 Idem, Art. 62.
- 9 Idem, Art. 120.
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CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRATEGIC STUDIES
RARE ȘI SECURITATE
68-72, Panduri Street, Bucharest
Tel.: (021) 319.56.49
Fax: (021) 319.55.93